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ARI Research Note 87-01

DECREASING DAMAGING EFFECTS OF STRESS-BOUND SITUATIONS;

TOWARDS A NEW MODEL OF LEADERSHIP UNDER STRESS

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Orlindo Fetelra and Jorge Jesuino

Universade Novn de Lisboa

for

Contracting Officer's Representative

Michael Kaplan

BASIC RESEARCH LABORATORY

Milton R. Katz, Director

DTIC

Kl-ECTE

MAR3 11987

c.

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U. S. Army

Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

January 1987

Approved for public rtlMM; dittribution unlimtttd.

87 3 «0 O95
U. S. ARMY RESEARCH INSTITUTE

FOR THE BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

A Field Operating Agency under ihe Jurisdiction of the

Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel

EDGAR M. JOHNSON

Technical Director

WM. DARRYL HENDERSON

COL, IN

Commanding

Research accomplished under contract

for the Department of the Army

Unlversade Nova de Lisboa

Technical review by

Steve Kronhelm

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should not ba eonttruaJ a« an official DepaMmani of tha iktmy poiition. policy, or dacition. unlau 10 dttignated

by othar official documantation.
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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE READ INSTRUCTIONS

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ART Research l^te 87-01

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* TITLE fand Sub(tll«>

Decreasing Damaging Effects of Stress-Bound

Situations: Towards a New Model

of Leadership Under Stress

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Interim Report

Novemher 85 - October 86

C. PERFORMING ORC. REPORT NUMBER

7. AUTHORS

OrUndo Perelra and Jorge Jesulno

» CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER^*;

DAJA 45-85-C-0036

t. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS

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January 1987

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IS. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

Michael Kaplan, Contracting Officer's Representative

£-

'» KEY WORDS fConlinu» on r»v»r«» »14a II nMaaaary and Idmntlly by block numhmr)

StressC^^^'*'«^^)) ^ Strain

Leadership Styl« Stressor

Organizational Behavior^ ^ - •"

20. ABSTRACT fCmmOmum am rower— at* II naaaaaaty mtä Idotullr by block number) •+

^In jobs or tasks where no possibility exists to avoid stressi(e.g. combat

action) repeated exposure is likely to produce relatively permanent damage in

groups or individuals. Previous research by Perelra (1964-1981) demonstrated

this fact in the case of marines Involved in counter-guerrilla activity.

Perelra and Jesulno (1982), using Fiedler's model as a framework, have shown

that appropriate leadership can buffer the consequences of stress. To understand how such an effect comes about, the authors developed and began testing on L Cnvprt ^

EX) I JSTV» 1473 EOITXOM Or I MOV «S IS OBSOLETE

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UNCLASSIFIED

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tCCUNITY CLA««iriCAHOM Of THIS P<

ART RESEARCH NOTE 87-01

y

20. Abstract (continued) J

a model of leadership-group transactions. The results of this field studv show

that leadership has a significant bearing on the stressors^strain interface.

Bureaucratic expertise is a prerequisite for leader and subordinates' acceptance of one another. Continuation of the research, and some practical applications of the finding are discussed, /c u*.VM o r *l i I

';

htris G^kl

1 juSuno»^en-

lA^ail end/or

Spec'-al

ü «CUWITY CL*»«« rT^TiON o» TH.S »-^ccf-».^ DM« "<•'•*
TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION 7

Counter-guerrilla stress 8

Effects of stress 12

Outline of the present field study 14

XETHOD

SUBJECTS 17

INSTRUMENTS 18

RESULTS 22

RESULTS OF T.'E OBSERVATIONS

AND OF THE INTERVIEWS 23

STRESS LEVELS 25

CRITICAL INCIDENTS 28

INTERPERSONAL BEHAVIORS 30

RESULTS OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE 33

DISCUSSION OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS 51

GENERAL DISCUSSIOI AND PROSPECTS 56

ill
^ "^

LIST OF APPE1DIXES, ILLUSTRATIOIS AID TABLES

Apptndix A - Factoriil ftructurt of the questionnaire sub-scales 66

Fig, 1 - Graphic representation of job detcntive index results

by units and by ranks

Fig, 2 - Graphic representation of job descriptive index results

by units and by ranks

Fig, 3 - Causal structure of stress aeasures iitiii

.,,38

,.,«0

,.,48

Table )

Table 2

Table 3

Table 4

Table 5

Table 6

Table 7

Table 8

Table 9

Table 10

Table 1)

Table 12

Table 13

General characteristics of the sample

Adaptation scale

Ideal Mrne

SuMtrized data fro« individual interviews

Measures of task characteristics, leader behavior, job

satisfaction, intention to leave, system of rewards and

self-described stress 34

Differences between units on LBD variables

Differences between ranks on LBD variables using Scheff* tests

Differences between units on stress variables using

Differences between ranks on stress variables using

Results on COHES stale • < • i i i i i i i i • * • < • i i i

Contributions of group, hierarchical rank and predictor variables

for actual and estimated future strain

Moderate regression analysis of dependent variables on sets of

predictor iiii*fit*>* i i • i * i i i t i i i > i > i

Hierarchical R

2

analysis by sets for aoderated effects of leaderbehavior-discretionary and non-discretionary on strain, intention

to leave and satisfaction

Table 14 - Results of hierarchical HRC analysis

,.24

,.2S

.,26

..29

- 35

...36

,,.37

,.,41

..42

..43

..44

..46

..49

,.52

iv
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INTRODUCTION

The concept of stress, fourty years after Selye borrowed it from

Physics into Medicine, and after more than 200.000 books and papers have been

published, became to be used in diferent ways. S. Kasl (1) points out four basic

meanings. It may refer to an environmental condition, e.g. a stressful situation,

the appraisal of such a situation, the response to It, or even the relationship

between the environment demands and the ability to meet them. The original

definition was clearly refered to only one the above instances. As re-stated

recently by Selye, (2) stress is a nonspecific response of the body to any

demand (his italics).

As a general adaptation syndrome it may leave no trace in the

organism but it may also end with its death. In between these extremes a series

of anatomical, physiological and psychological disturbances may occur, and

repetion and comulation of effects may induce acute chronxc diseases.

In Jobs or tasks where there is no possibility to avoid Intense and

repeated demand on the organism, specialy "when there Is threat or anticipation

of future harm" (3), e.g. combat action, fire fighting, etc. there is empirical

evidence that such repetition of stress reactions Is likely to produce more or

less permanent damage In Individuals and In groups.

In such working situation the need to establish appropriate programs

of prevention, led to the study of the individual and group coping with stress,

and some investigations came to emphasize the role of leaders in facilitating

such coping (4). A review of the literature (5) does not provide a conclusive

answer if leadership styles, or leader follower transactions may buffer the

effects of stress.

The present study constitutes a new attempt to assess the leadership

effects on stress factors. Before turning to the details it seems appropriate to

review some of its antecedents.
Coiinter-guerrilla stress

Twelve years after the termination of portuguese counter-

-guerrllla effort in Guinea-Bissau, Angola and Mozambique, (1961-1974) we

are In a position to evaluate the long tern psychological disabilities

induced by the participation in the war activities. Statistical data as

well as the data directly collected at the military hospitals psychiatric

clinics show that after 1981 the number of new claims directly related to

the participation in the war became meaningless.

If we concentrate our attention on the lavy, we find out that it

were the marines that by far suffered the most with the war effort

provided they have served more than one normal period (16 to 24 months) of

overseas commission. Some marines were "coerced" to serve up to five such

periods. The Portuguese Government claimed, at the time, that career

personnel were voluntary for repeated duty periods. In fact, many

conscripts were not allowed to retire or resign from the Armed Forces,

except for severe health reasons, their "choice" was to become career

personnel and "volunteer" to another overseas commission in orler to get a

much higher salary.

In general the marines who served for more than one normal period

of overseas duties, under a coercive basis, report some combination of the

follwing symptoms: more or less permanent nervousness and irritability,

increased difficulty in interpersonnel relations with frequent and,

apparently unmotivated, explosions of agreesiveness, memory lapses and
sleep troubles. Systenati; psychological examinations disclose a

progressive difficulty in the perfomance of complex tasks, in some cases

close to the ones described in the "supraliminal" brain damage syndrome.

The Stroop test time index is, on the average, 25% higher then in a normal

group of marines (but lower than in brain damage or schizophrenic

patients). (7).

The syndrome described is difficult to manage; drug therapy

provide limited improvement. The former marines show considerable

difficulty in learning new work skills and, significantly, prefer Jobs in

private security agencies.

Field studies conducted by O.G. Pereira, in Guinea, from 1Q64 to

1966, with follow-up to 1981 (6), (led) to clarify some of the underlying

stress-bound mechanisms of the syndrome above described. A sample of lb3

marines, was interviewed and subjected to psychological tests every six

months. Two control groups, one consisting of 53 men in Lisbon and other

consisting of 78 navy men with clerical Jobs in Bissau (Guinea) were

subjected to the same longitudinal and across-subjects design. The 153

marines were in two different situations of combat involvement: 26 naval-

-marines had a low probability of engaging In combat but were continuously

involved in security and boat-patrol duties, the remainder 127 special-

-marines were involved with very intensive combat interventions lasting

only abort 24 hours, separated by rest periods of five to seven days. The

probability of actual fight was high.
^^^"

10

1

The results show that at the end of the 16 months period;

a) the overseas duty situation (navy men with clerical Jobs in

Bissau), per se. developed hypocondriac and depressive

reactions;

b> the interfluent high probability of combat situation (special

marines) induced alterations of the interpersonal relations,

with detachment of reality and, eventually, anti-social

behavior;

c) the continuous low probability of combat situation (naval

marines) induced intermediary reactions with prevalence of

astbenic reactions (6).

It was also observed that the youngest subjects, in their first

overseas mission, showed, with time, a general improvement in terms of

assert!veness and feeling of personal security ("The boys became men"),

witnessing the build up of adaptation mechanisms. Such mechanisms seem to

break down if and when a new period of war duty followed with a small

interval in between, i.e. the general case during the colonial war.

In one respect nobody, and partlculary the special marines, would

show progressive adaptation. Vhen the "news" that a military operation was

to come by in the next two or three days the "general activity" of the

group Involved increased in a crescendo up to the moment of combat (or the

decision of coming back without combat). Unobtrusive observations during

those periods showed that base line indices of consumption of alchoolic
11

beverages, tobacco, water, of sexual activities and of letter writing to

Portugal, increased systeaatically. It was also determined that such

increase wae strongly correlated with group's subjective expectation of

danger of the particular operations to coae. (6).

The above facts strongly favor the interpretation that it is a a

cognitive factor related to the expectancy of danger that enhances the

arousal mechanisms of the alarm phase of the general adaptation syndrome,

translated by the behaviors described and it may be suspected that the

interaltent repetition of that arousal has a cumulative and progressively

damaging effect that ends up in the persistent syndrome observed after more

than one normal period of overseas coerced duty.

On the whole, data colected at the lavy Hospital psychiatric

clinic, up to 1981, for marines who served not only in Guinea but also in

Angola and Mozambique, show that the best predictor of the intensity of

disability syndrome is total time spent In the overseas duties.(6)

The field studies conducted in Guinea provided also an important

clue. It was found that in units which maintained a high morale all allong

the duty assignment less negative effects were detected, either at the end

of the period, or during the follow-up (7). It was however difficult to

decide, on the only basis of clinical evidence, if this was due to a

leadership factor, or to a more global psychossocial group factor, or both,

subsequent studies conducted by Pereira and Jesuino (7) tried to clarify

the above question
12

Effects of stress

The question of deternlning if the stress effects can be

aoderated by organizational behavior has received scant attention. Traditionally research on occupational stress has been Halted to the investigation of direct relationships between role stress and role strain.

" Stress is a non-specific response of the body to any demand

"(2), strain, on Its turn, is the specific consequences of a single (or

usually, repeated) non-specific response in a specific aniaal organism. The

specific consequences nay be laedlate or long tern and they nay range fron

transitory anatoao-pbyslological disturbances up to death of the organism.

Any situation that induces a demand on the organism is called a Stressor.

An exception to the general trend are the studies of French and Caplan

(1972), Frencn, Rogers and Cobb (1974), Cobb (1976)(5) according to which

social support can reduce the effects of Job stress and strain (main

effects) as well as buffer the individual reaction from the Stressors

(interaction effect).

A similar research (Beehr, 1970X5) produced mixed results. He

found that both group cohesiveness and supervisor support did not significantly reduced the strength of the relationship between role ambiguity and

role strain, but autonomy tended to moderate this relationship in the expected direction.

La Rocco and Jones (1978)(5) in a sample of 3725 U.S. lavy

enlisted men, using both sub-grouping and moderating regression techniques

tried to obtain a more rigorous test of the buffering hypothesis. The
results suggest that the effects of support are positive and additive

rather than interactive or buffering:

(a) higher levels of support and reduced level of stress

were each related to the achievement of various organizational outcomes, and(b) support, whether from one's leader or

peers, did not appear to be an effective i^ans of removing

the negative influences of stress produced by comf1ict and

ambiguity (p. 633>.

In a more recent study conducted by the authors <7) with a stratified sample of 158 men from the Portuguese lavy Marine Corps, submitted

to two contrasting stressful situations, (one simulating combat conditions

and the other consisting of defense and security routines), and using

Fiedler's contingency theory of leadership effectiveness, It was found that

leadership style could buffer the effects of stress, on strain. The variables considered were three sources of stress (Stressors), actual strain and

estimated future strain , Fiedler's LPC score, Rice and Cheaters leader

behavior descriptive index, Fiedler's group atvosphere scale and task

structure scale, as well as, unobstructive measures on the general

population submitted to the two stress-conditions considered. However,

variables pertaining to organizational outcomes, like satisfaction, productivity or turnover were not examined. Ho matter such limitations, the

results has shown that, on the one band, person oriented leaders under

moderate stressful conditions reduce the strain of subordina' -.. while

under lower stressful conditions increase it, and, on the other hand, task-
oriented leaders under noderate stressful conditions increase the perceived

stress of followers, while under lower stressful conditions reduce it.

The present study seeks to investigate further the results previously obtained whithin a broader fraaework encompassing a greater range

of military situations and also of psychosocial variables. On the other

hand, we are interested in expanding the methods of research, because it

may be considered that the questionnaire and rating scales techniques, used

in isolation, are not the most appropriated method to pinpoint an elusive

phenomenon like the buffering of a stress affect.

ftitliae nf the praaent flaid study

As a first step we decided to run a field study using representative samples of the different service conditions faced by Portuguese

marines, adopting a more comprehensive theoretical fraaework and using in

addition to the questionnaire techniques, other clinical methods like

systematic observations and interviews.

Pereira and Jesuino (7) studied only two marine battalions: an

operational battalion and a security and defense battalion. As it was

expected and found, men experienced significantly different levels of

stress. In the present research we are including a special operations unit,

whose mission is much more complex and dangerous, the naval police

battalion and some support units, which were expected to experience lower

levels of stress in each situation than the operational battalion. In order

to avoid bias on the expectation of the aen studied, it was decided to

constitute samples of all the unite of the portugueee marine corps, which,

in one way or another, are involved in the field exercises that siaulate

war activity.
T

The new theoretical framework adopted In the present study is

more focussed than previously on the dynanics of leader-follower transactions and, at least in terns of questionnaire construction, borrowed from

the multiple influence approach of Hunt and Osborn (8). Such approach is an

attempt to broaden the contingency model through the introduction of the

new concept of discretionary leadership. It "refers to those leader

behaviors, under the control of the leader, which may vary from individual

to individual" [Hunt and Osborn,(9)1. Discretionary leadership implies,

therefore, the use of power beyond what is required by position. Also, as

it is claimed by the theory and supported by empirical evidence, subordinates are more sensitive to discretionary behaviors rather than to formal

behaviors required by the organizational rules and procedures.

On that line, one of the aims of the present study is to verify

the effects of formal as well as discretionary leadership behaviors on

stress and strain and other outcome indicators like satisfaction with the

Job and the intention to leave.

In order to take into account the variables referred, we translated and adapted the Martin, Benandi, Osborn and Hunt's (10) multiple

influence model of leadership questionnaire and completed it with the five

stress measures used in Pereira and Jesuino (7>.

lotwithstanding, the fact that the resulting instrument

encompassed much more situational and leadership variables, the limitations

of questionnaire research should be kept in mind, specially, if one intends

to do an exploratory investigation. Clinical methods are the only ones,

that, according to the experience of Pereira, in Guinea, may be used during

extreme situations like the field exercices simulating combat action. Systematic observations and both individual and collective interviews are
appropriate for capturing ongoing activities. Clinical nethods, allowing

for line exploration of the subjects experience, are expected to conpensate

the static characteristic of the questionnaire and, eventually, to call

attention to new variables not considered in a strict research design.

A clear cut classification of variables into Independent and

dependent, or predictors and criteria, is not proposed a priori. As it is

clear, at thlc> point, a systemic Interrelational dynamics is more close to

the reality of the stress phenomena than the postulatlon of simple linear

causal links. The basic ideia, for the analysis of the questionnaire data,

is to use composites for measuring the following occupational facets:

(1) task characteristics, such as, standardization, specialization, degree of difficulty and variety;

(2) leader behavior, both formal and discretionary, am

perceived by subordinates;

<3) attitudes towards the work itself, the chief, the

colleagues, the salary and the career outlook;

(4> stress and strain indicators;

(5) general satisfaction and intention to leave.

Both sub-grouping and regression techniques are to be used. Subgrouping, at first, will be based on the natural groups, that constitute

the organization under analysis. It will be recalled that it was at this

macro level that buffer effects were found by Pereira and Jesuino (7).
METHOD

smucis

A stratified random sample of 213 Portuguese marines was drawn

from the Portuguese Marine Corps population in the same way as in

Perelra Jesuino's (7).

The goal was to sample 10% of the population (about 2.500 men),

taking into consideration the organizational structure of the Marine

Corps. The sample includes the "operational battalion", the "security

and defense battalion", the "naval police unit", the "transportation

units" (cars, boats and amphibious vehicles) the "gunnery support unit",

and the "special operations unit".

The present expansion of sample, at variance to Perelra and

Jesuino (7), is Intended to provide a contluous range of stress levels

and not only the previous two levels attributed to the "operational

battalion" and to the "security and defense" battalion.

The basic unit of analysis is the squad and its line of command.

For each battalion it is as follows:

Unit Total per unit lumber of units Total

1 squad per company

1 platoon commander

1 company commander

1 company second coma.

1 battalion commander

1 battalion second comm.

1 company staff unit

1 battalion staff unit

3

3

3

27

3

3

3

1

1

3

5
Tö^

In the other sacpled military units sone adaptations were done

in accordance with its own structures.

The final sample is divided as folows:

Unit Total

Operational battalion (B.F.2)

Security and defense battalion (B.F.3)

laval police battalion (B.F.I)

Gunnery support unit (U.A.F.)

Land transportation unit (U.A.T.T.)

Aaphibious transportation unit (U.A.M.A.)

Special operations unit (D.A.E.)

46

46

33

30

12

35

11

213

The sample Includes the total population of the Special

Operations Unit (11 »en).

All the above subjects answered the questionnaire.

A sub-saqaple of 143 individuals were interviewed both individually and collectively. As there was a tine lag between the adainistratlon of the questionnaire and the beginning of the interviews, 27 individuals of the original sample had to be substituted, on a randoa basis,

but according to the previous hierarchical positions vacated. So, at the

end, 239 sen were involved in the present study.

The following observation techniques and instruments were used:

- Direct observation of behavior in the barracks and during a

field exercise of the "operational battalion", the "special
operation unit", the "gunnery support unit", the "land transportation unit" and the "anphibious transportation unit".

- Individual interviews.

- Collective interviews with the squads.

- Questionnaire.

IndlYldual laiacdM

The individual interviews encompassed a clinical interview and a

critical incident interview.

The clinical interview was semi-structured coaprising three aain

sections: auto-biographical data, health data with special emphasis or

psychossoaatic disturbances and other symptons of stress, and military

life data.

In the critical incident interview the subject was asked, first,

to recall and to describe a particularly hard, difficult or threatening

situation in wich he was involved and that was well aanaged, and, then,

to consider another similar situation that was Inadequately aanaged. A

seal-structured series of queries was used to help the subject to

produce a aaxiaum number of data!Is of each situation, such as, where

and when it happened, who was involved, how they acted, and the attributed causes and responsabilities of the sucess or failure to manage the

situation.

At the end of the individual Interview the subjects were also

asked to:

- perfora a self-evaluation of his own adaptation to the

allitary service, in a five point scale, ranging from "very

well" to "very badly adapted".
I

perforn a self-evaluation of his own global performance in

coaparieon with hie own image of the "ideal marine", In a

seven point scale.

- to answer questions about the most desired characteristics of

a oililtary chief and of a teacher; the choice was between

human relations and task related characteristics.

- and, to refer some actual problems that were not considered

during the interview.

Collective Interview

Collective interviews were conducted with the command formations

and with the squads.

The collective interview to the squads was more focused on group

and organizational factors and tried to clarify any ambiguous data

collected in the individual interviews.

Imediatly after the interviews, the interviewers rated the

interviewees using the SYMLOG forms (11).

A multipurpose questionnaire was const-u ted, including a

shortened Portuguese version of the Martin, Bt-undi, Osborn and Hunt's

multiple influence model of leadership questionnaire (10), and five

scales of stress taken from Pereira and Jesuino (7) and some tentative

scales of description of leader-follower relationships.

A pre-test of the questionnaire was performed in a non-random

stratified sample of 18 Portuguese marines. As a consequence the wording
2.4 self-report on actual stress (based on USA DECS publication on

the Managenen of Stress). (Self-described strain, stress 4).

2.5 estinated consequences for health of actual job condition scale

(originated by Pereira and Jesuino, (6). (Estinated future strain;

stress 5).

The working conditions stress scale is related to events on the

job and has 14 items pertaining the oost lively situations the marines

had met during the previous three months of duty.

The extra-organizational stress scale is related to events oaay.

from the )ob and has also 14 items, referring to the previous three

months duty. In both cases each kind of potentially stressing event is

not considered in terms of "life change units (LCD's)" as in Holmes and

Rahe (12) but merely maintained it« order on the original scale.

The organizational stress scale is related to ongoing organizational conditions on the Job and has 10 items considering the following

aspects: morale, discipline and conflict within and inter-units.

Sample:

Ve are only told about what we do when we do it wrong

Usually Sometimes Rarely

The self report on actual stress has 15 items, concerned with

actual symptom of stress.

rtrii
Sample:

I feel depreeed/frustrated at hone/work

Often A few tines

a week

Rarely

2

The estimated consequences for health of actual job conditions

scale is a scale in which the subjects are asked to estimate the

positive, neutral or negative health effects of the actual job conditions if these were to continue unchanged for the next two years.

The subject is presented with a 11 print scale being asked to

ark a point which would translate his estinate.

Sane

as now

I

8

Severely

ill

J L

10

RESULTS

The results of the present study are separeted in two sections.

First we report the results of the systenatic observations, of the

interviews and of Instruments used in conection with both. Only after,

we report the results of the questionnaire.

This way of presenting the results is justified by two reasons.

As explained pre/lously the sub-saaple of the interviews included 27 new

en, not previously submitted to the questionnaire. Also, because of the

i
usual schedule of training of the marine battalions, the operational

battalion and the security and defense battalion changed positions Just

after the questionnaire was adainistered.

The schedule of training provided the authors with the

oportunity to acconpany a 10 day field exercice of the operational

battalion and the special operations unit with the cooperation of the

support units. That field exercise tried to simulate actual battle

conditions,

BHSDLTS QP TUB niKWPW4TIQl AID QP THE IlTMYIEWS

Deanyraphic eharactarlBticü of the sii^il«

The general characteristics of the sample studied are summarized

in table l.t

Some points deserve to be noticed. The age of the petty officeis

is considerably higher than the officers. Their education le lower than

the majority of the ratings.

Only 40% of the population are conscripts. They serve during 24

months, 6 of them being occupied by courses of Instruction on the Marine

School.

Two thirds of the population are of urban extraction (about half

of thee live In Metropolitan Lisbon).

* It was verified that the percentagas in table 1 reproduce very

closely the population parameters of the 1985 official statistics of

Marine Corps.
i i
Most of the career personel (half of the officers, all the petty

officers and half of the ratings) have been involved in the Portuguese

Arned Forces counter-insurgency activities in the forner overseas provinces, from 1962 to 1975).

B— LMM

General adaptation and Mirale

The great majority of subjects are well adaptated to their

present duties. The study of the military records showed an insignificant number of disciplinary actions (three punishments for the total

sample in the last three months period), but, it should be noticed that

there is an "informal", and more person oriented, disciplinary system

that takes care of most of the interpersonal problems, which is

considered to be more satisfactory, by both leaders and followers, than

the formal one, The elimination of the health records showed, an

excellent sanitary situation (only six significant diseases for the

total sample in the same above referred period), lo significant

psychosomatic disturbance was referred.

The above data are consonant with the data collected during the

individual and the collective interviews and with the point of view of

the command. They are also consonant with the subjects self-evaluations,

made during the individual inteviews about their level of adaptation to

the military service (Table 2)

TABLE 2

ADAPTATION SCALE Z

I 143

OFFICERS PETTY OFF.

1 - \€RY DIFIOLT

2 - DimOULT

3 - mum 17,1

4 - GOGD «.5

5 - VERY QODO «ft

27,1

«,9

RAT1W6S

3

3

29

40,1
I

Another confiraatlon of the relative high morale of thr units

observed is given by the way subjects situated themselves In relation to

the "Ideal marine" (Table 3).

TABLE 3

IDEAL MARINE X

M • 1«

LOWEST

HIGHEST

OFFICERS PETTY OFF. RATINGS

2

21,5 24 15

37 64 65

44 12 12

4,5 6

As it may be seen over 70* of petty officers and rattlngs and

over 80% of officers consider to be very close of the Ideal standards

for marines. Apparently this is not an overstatement.

Tariatinii nf Btraas lill

lo matter the good adaptation of the subjects to the service in

general, some duties are felt as more stressful than others, and stress

responses were observed during the field exercises and also in security

missions, which combine intense boredom with a tight schedule (alternation of periods of vigilance and of rest of two hours, for 24 hours,

every three days).

There is not a general agreement across-subjects upon which of

the two situations, the field exercise or the vigilance duty they prefer
to be involved with. The sane nixed answers are given when we ask the

conmanding officers the sane question. However, if we ask which situation Is more demanding, fatiguing or exhausting more than half refer the

field exercise, but there is also a clear bias to consider as more

stressful the situation in which each man is involved now or in the near

future.

In one aspect, only, everybody seems to be in agreement. The

most stressful situation is, by far, the one of the "special operations

unit" (which combines the functions of marine, comando, parachuter and

diver).

Vhen we turn to the battalions, the one in wich the reported

stressfulness is lower Is the "naval police batallion". For the other

two, the division of subjective evaluations referred above for th-n general case, is dominant, but according to our observations stress

reactions are much more evident and frequent during the field exercises

of the operational battalion.

In which respects the support units, it is difficult to decide.

For one side, they seem to be close to the naval police battalion in

terms c! felt stressfulness. For the other side, it seems that the

amphibious transportation unit reachs a high stress level during the

field exercises. The same is not true for the other two support units.

Their main problem is that they are much less informed about what is

going on in the field than all the other units involved: the special

operations unit, the batta. ion, the divers unit (not observed) and the

amphibious operational unit.

Another way of looking at stress levels respects the dichotomy

conscript-career personnel. It was expected and found that the career
personel are better adapted to the different stressful situations

experienced. The same Is, also, auch more evident with the men that were

Involved In the :ounter-guerrllla activity twelve years before, specially, the petty-officers. Although, such aen find a particular difficulty

with physically demanding tasks because of their more advanced age.

The problem of adaptation to stress should always be c usldered.

CRITICAL I1CIDE1TS

Quite all the subjects that had previous war experience reported

Incidents that had to do with such experience.

For the other subjects, more than 50% of the incidents had to do

with episodes occuring during the courses of instruction and only 15%

had to do with the field exercices. (Of the remainder, 10% are related

to on duty problems and only 8% with general organizational problems).

The above general pattern does not apply to the special

operations unit; more than 50% of the incidents had to do with the field

exercices and only about 25% with the courses of instruction. (The

operational and security and defense battalions also diverge a little

from the general pattern, but not so much as the special operations

unit).

SOCIAL SPfQgT

The analysis of the critical incidents reported also reveals

that the interpersonal network present in the marine units studied

provides its elements with considerable social support. For one side,

most of the tasks need cooperation behavior within the group considered

(unit, company, platoon, squad), for the other, whenever someone gets in
trouble or into a difficult situation, it is very likely that be will be

helped by the superiors, the colleagues or the subordinates. Such help

nay assune the forn either of encourageaent, readiness to assist, direct

physical aid, or the provision of information to reduce uncertainty or

to change a deficient causal attribution. Frequently, also, huoor is

used to dedrasati*. different kinds of difficult situations. See Table 4

TABLE 4 - Sunaritcd data froa individual interviews

| OFFICERS 1 PETTY OFFICERS 1 RATING

| Critical incidtnti

Kciponaabilititt

Attributed to «elf |

30Z 17X 32X |

Attributed to other« 53S 71X 5**

Mot reported 1 171 111 lit |

Colleaquee behavior

Help 57X i

71X S9Z |

Abandomn 1

,0X 1

4X

'

,X

Not reported 111 25Z 32X |

Superiors behavior

! Help OX* 63X sax*

Uncertainty reduction 57S 88X 77X

Huaour 37X III 56X

Preference for leadership

etyle 1

Competence III 61X 42X |

Consideration 41Z 39X

581 I

Relation with colleagues

i«»y III 94X S4S |

Difficult 7Z 6X 16X \

SYNLOC aean rating

Of interviewers

By interviewers

UD 20 | 10 I ID |

"

9f Iff j if i

Fl ^ IT \ IF |

* Percentages higher than 100X

due to siaultaneoua behavior

types reported.
The results also suggest that the leader behavior on the

reported incidents is, by far, more important than the colleagues

support, both in terns of diversity and frequency.

The interpersonal network tend to polarize around the groups

mentioned above and to assume particular cultural paterns which

determine most of the informal behavior that is observed, nevertheless,

the range of such behavior is limited by the network itself. That is to

say, the need to preserve an acceptable image of any group to all the

other groups limits its peculiar cultural expression, so that all the

units observed tend to appear much more similar than different. Such

fact curtails the possibility of, for example, a new commander to

produce a marked and sustained change in any particular unit.

In addition, it is clear, that there are two positions that

stand a considerable greater amount of the interpersonal tension within

the network, i.e. the persons in such positions are expected to be much

more helpful and effective than the others (with the obvious exception

of the commander of the unit). The two positions are squad leader and

the platoon leader. The first case derives from the fact that the squads

have to act frequently on their own and its leader being a rating. The

second case derives from the fact that the platoon leaders are laval

Reserve officers with considerably less experience and age than most of

the men they command.

TrriroPKMnMAi. mmATinafi

The previous section can be summarized by saying that the

interpersonal communication is easygoing at and between all hierarchical levels. That verification Is consistent with the SYMLOG data. Subjects were rated by interviwers in the general pattern U, P, F (domi-
nant, friendly, Instrunental, I.e. democratic leadership) with the

exception of ratings which appeared more submissive. (Table 4).

Ve tried to clarify by direct observation, both In the barracks

as well as during the field exercise, and with the Interviews, how the

positive interpersonal atmosphere, above referred, comes about and is

maintained along time. The data collected favor the hypothesis that the

main contributing factor is the professional competence of the leaders,

namely, the career marines, at the different hierarchical levels. First

of all, a good number the officers, all the sergents and most of the

ratings experienced the counter-guerrilla action in the former Overseas

Provinces of Portugal, which provided them with a very rich background

and clear orientation in what is expected from a marine. Then, the high

percentage of career personal in the units provides a good framing for

the much less experienced laval Reserve officers, when in leadership

positions and also for the conscripts as subordinates. The interpersonal

processes, ongoing during the last twelve years, created the cultural

models to maintain its own continuation as a stable set of mutually

accepted behaviors.

Ve had the opportunity to observe what happened when a change of

unit command was announced, another one occured, and, also, when some

platoon and squad leaders were replaced, as well as some squad members

were also replaced. At the one hand, the new leaders and new subordinates felt, very counsciously, the group prer .jre to accomodate to its own

norms. At the other hand, the subordinates relatively to the new

leaders, and the leaders relatively to the new subordinates, become very

attentive to the others behaviors, specifically to deviations from the

general (all units) expected ways of acting. Some mutual adaptations
were detected but, more important, a very strong pressure was also very

obvious to return to a steady state.

Some of the interviewees referred spontaneously (and other confiraed the same when asked) that when there is a change of persons,

leaders or subordinates, a kind of open credit account is opened, at

once, and then such credit account grows or decreases according to the

consistent behaviors of the person under observation. It is at this

point that professional competence, instrumentality, becomes the most

prominent factor of mutual evaluation. The central aspect of competence,

in the present case, is the way the leaders manage information. That is,

how the leaders activeily search for relevant information and volunteer

part of it according to professional standards.

The next decisive steps in this "dynamic game" occur when an

exceptional, unexpected, difficult or threatening situation arises. The

leader becomes the obvious center of attentior and the way he solves or

contributes to the solution of the situation is crucial for his future

credit. Vhen one such situation requires a specific new group action or

a sustained group effort or coping with uncertainty, the capacity of the

leader to effectively lead, depends much more on the consideration he

shows towards his men than on his competence. The relevant factors are,

here, support, direct help and "dramatization", in a person-oriented

basis.

In short, at least for the present case, competence (instrumentality) and consideration (human relations orientation) do not appear to

be dicothomlc leadership factors; they are relevant at different moments

of the basic interpersonal process that sustains leadership behavior.

Competence contributes to establish and increase the credit of leader

*
and his real power beyond his formal power. Consideration, becomes, then

a requisite to allow true leadership behavior, that Is, behavior that

makes a difference in the perfomance of the group.

BBSOLTS QP THE QOHSTIQIMAIM

The first step in the analysis of the questionnaire data

consisted of the determination of the factorial structure and at the

internal reliabilities of the different sub-scales included.

Table 5 lists all the variables (with the abbreviations used in

the subsequent tables), the number of the questionnaire items

contributing to each one of the variables, and the cross-sectional

estimates of reliabity. Appendix A details the factorial structure

underlying the multi-item indeces listed in table 5.

As it can be seen, the various instruments are reliable and the

of the questionnaire hac construct validity.

The next step in the analysis consisted of the examination of

the differences of scores pertaining to the hierarchical ranks and the

marine units represented in the sample. Scheff6 tests of significance

were used for each sub-scale.

The main differences found, for each variable, are outlined

below.

(variables: STD, TSKSP, TSKV, TSKD)

The only difference detected respects variable TSKD - task

difficulty -, between the amphibious transportation unit (UAKA), with a

mean score of 3,6 and the special operations unit (DAE) with a mean

score of 2.1 (d.f.= 6/195; F= 16.7, P< .001). The global results suggest
TABLE 5 - Measures of task characteristics, leader behavior, job

satisfaction, intention to leave, system of rewards and

self-described stress

Measures Abbreviations Nuaber of Cross-sectional

used itees estiaates of the

reliability

Task characteristics

Standardisation STD 4 .50

Specialisation TSKSP 2 •

Difficulty TSKD 2 -

Variability TSKV 3 .«0

Leader Behavior nssnrlpMnn

Resources LB01

Role clarity LBD2

Credibility LBD3

Rules and produces LBD4

Work assignaents UDS

Support LBD6

Contact LBD7

Consideration LBD8

Bureaucratic Expertise LBD9

Technical Expertise LBD10

Predictability LBD11

Systea of rewards SYRND

Coheslveness COHES

Discretionary leadership

Rules and procedures DXSRP

Work assignaents DI8WA

Support DISSUP

Intention to leave ITL

Job satisfaction(JDZ)

WORK NRR

CHIEF CHIEF

COLLEAGUES COLLG

SALARY SLRY

CAREER CAREER

SATISFACTION SATI8F

.7«

.77

.S3

.70

—

.«2

.50

.S5

.C3

.S3

—

.15

.14

.11

.13

.7«

.77
Measure» Abbreviation Number of Cross-sectional

•

used items estimates of the

reliability

Discretionary leadership

Control CONTROL -

Job clarify PTHC -

Rules and procedures PTRP -

Support PTSÜP -

Contacts BCANT -

Face to face BCFACE -

Ron personal BCNPBRI -

Desirability DESIRAB .33

Stress

Stress type I

(events on the job) STR1 14 -••

Stress type II

(life events unrelated

to job) STR2 14 •

Stress type ZZI

(organisational stress) STR3 1 -

Stress type ZV

(•elf-described strain) STR4 15 -

Stress type V

(estimated future strain) STR5 1

• This sub-scale was completed only by officers and patty officers

with supervisionary functions (N«51)

** Scores are computed by summing the total ncnber of items

indicated by each respondent. As they differ from subject to

subject reliability cannot be computed.
that tasks are evaluated as fMrly standardized and specialized and

considered to have low varlablll i and difficulty no natter the rank or the

unit of the respondents.

(Variables: L6D1 to LBD11)

Significant differences between units are found for support

(LBD6). contact (LBD7) and technical expertise (LBD10) as shown in Table 6.

TABLE 6 - Differences between units on LBD variables

Variables Coaparison

LBD6 (Support) OATT/UAF .OS

LBD7 (Contact) OATT/OAE .01

LBD10 (Technical DATT/IFI .05

Expertise) OATT/V2 .05

On the reaalnlng LBD variables, the land transportation unit

(UATT) consistently scores lower than the other units, which suggests that

in this unit leaders are described in less favourable terns than in all the

other units.
On the other side, If we consider the differences anonr ranks, It

Is clear that higher officers (conaanders) consistently describe their

superiors In less favourable terns. The significant differences found are

sumnarlzed In Table 7.

TABLE 7 - Differences between rank* on LBD variables using

Schaffi tests

df«S,1IS

Variables ! CoBparlson I

L8D1 (Resources) ! 5-6, 4-C 1 •

01

.05 1

LBD4 (Rules end procedures! 1-5, 2-5, 3-5 •01

LBD« (Support) 5-6 •

05

LBD7 (Contact) 1-6, 5-6 .05

.01

11 (Oeneideretion) 5-6 .01

1 - Conscript / 2 - Enlisted / 3 - Corporal /

4 - Petty-Officer / 5 - Officer / 6 - Coaaander

(Veriable«: DISIP. DISVA, DISSUP^ COITROL, PTBC, PTRP, PTS0P,

BCAKT, BCFACB, BCIPERS)

The only significant difference between unit« concerns the

special operations unit (DAE), which scores higher than the gunnery support

unit (UAF) (P«14,6; P<.005).
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t«i «Mk Mala tb« t«tM «tMU »MM Ik« •«•*•! 1 teas ••••• f—tß a.i)

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ltk*(4 tattt ara tl|aalla< ky a« aatarlak aa4 ••*Uta«4 at tka kattaa af aaak

•aala.
In which concerns rank differences, higher officers score lower

In work asslgnaent (DISVA) and support (DISSUP), (a result parallel to the

one just described for LBD variables).

Job aatiBfaction <JDI?

(Variables: VRK. CHIEF, COLLG, CAREER. SLRY and SATISF)

Figure 1 pictures the summary of the results on JDI taking into

consideration the differences among units and among ranks.

As it can be seen satisfaction is highest towards superior

(CHIEF) and colleagues (COLLG), moderatly low towards the work itself

(VRK), and low both for salary (SLRY) and promotion prospects (CAREER).

Significant differences between units are found for variables

work and salary:

- The amphibious transportation unit (DANA) scores 1.1 against

0.8 of the gunnery support unit (O.A.P.) for VRK (d.f.=6/195; F=15,2;

P<.01)!

- The special oper tions unit (DAE) shows the lowest possible

score on SLRY (X=0; SD=0) against all other units;

- The operational battalion (BF2) and the land transportation

unit (UATT) (F=12.3; P<.05), for SLRY.

Significant differences between ranks are found for variables

work and career:

- The conscripts score .6 against 1.0 for (d.f. =5/176; F=12.7;

P<.05) and 1.3 for higher officers (F=63.1; P<.01), for VRK;

- The enlisted men (ratings) score .9 against 1.3 for the higher

officers (F=32.3; P<.01), for VRK;
40

5

im '—»-

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- The officers score 1.2 against .2 for the conscripts <F=27,4i

P<.01) .5 for the enlisted aen (F=16.8; P<.01) and .4 for the conscripts

<F=17.2; P<.01)(for CAREEF

(Variables STR1 to STR5)

The results are summarized in Fig. 2

Significant differences between units are sunaarlzed on Table 8.

TABLE 8 - Differences between units on stress variables using

Scheffc tests

df.6,200

Variables Comparison

Stress 1

Stress 3

Stress 5

BP3 - DAE .05

BF3 - ÜATT lb.64 .01

BF3 - ÜATT .01

BF1 - BM .05

BF1 - BP3 .05

BF1 - ÜATT 26.7 .01

DAE - OATT 12 96 .05

The operational battalion (BF3> scores conparatively high on

•tress on the Job (STR1) and organizational stress (STR3) and the naval

police battalion (BF1) and the special operations unit (DAB) score

relatively high on estimated strain (STR5).

Significant differences between ranks are suaaarizcd on table 9

55
TABLE 9 - Differences between ranks on stress variables

using Scheffc tests

df - 5,199

VARIABLES COPARISON F P

STR3

STR^

M-6

1-2

13.7

11.9

.05

.05

_1. Conscript 2. Enlisted 4. Petty-officers 6.- CcRimnlsrs

Higher officers score relatively higher on organizational stress

(STS3) and conscript« on self described strain <STR4).

There are not significant differences respecting away-froa-the-

-Job stress (STR2). This fact aeans that all the significant interaction of

the stress variables considered in the questionnaire, have to due with

stress sources and stress effects inherently bound to the »llitary life of

the subjscts.

Isteatlm tq llBTM

(Variab]e: ITL)

A difference was found between the transportation unit (UATT) and

the asphibious unit (UAMA) (F=16; P<.05) UATT shows the lowest score on

ITL.

(Variable COHES)

)
This varlabl« consists of a seaantic differencial scale of a

iteas, each one with 7 points, rated only by officers and petty officers

with supervisory responsabl1itles.

Results obtained are suanarized In Table 10.

TABI£ 10 - Results on OOKES scale

Units Mean S.D.

BF 1 48.0 3.8 11

BF 2 45.5 3.95 13

BF 3 45.5 6.8 15

DAE 42 - 1

UMT 39.7 2.1 3

UAF 48.8 3.0 4

UAMA 46.2 2.7 5
44

A significant difference was found between the land transportation (UATT) and anphlbious transportation unit (UAF> <F=16,81i P<.01).

tultinri*** AimlytHc

In order to determine the effects of sub-grouping arrangements

both in natural units and in hierarchical ranks a duaay variable

transformation was used as recomnended by Cohen and Cohen (13). Units were

coded in 7 categories, one of each unit, then transformed into 6 dummy

variables for 7 mins 1 degree of freedom in the original variable. R

squared for these 6 predictor variables, as a set, represents the percentage of variance accounted for by units. The same procedure was followed

for hierarchical ranks, which were transformed into 5 dummy variables.

lext step consisted In determining the percentage of the variance

in dependent variables that was accounted for by the set of predictors

hypothesized to be associated with it. Moderate regression analysis (XKA)

was performed for self reported strain <STR4), estimated future strain

(STR5), Job satisfaction (SATISF) and intention to leave <ITL). as

dependent variables.

Table 11 presents the results obtained combining the quantitative

(predictors) and nominal (dummy) sets of variables.

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nd «UMMA Mn« atxmln

mi 4 >

ie AR1 F O.P. if

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win • RNM

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SlGHIF. f m .0000
As it may be seen while actual strain (STR4> is exclusively

accounted for by predictors, estimated future strain (STR5) is exclusively

related to units. The effects of hierarchical ranks are more complex. Main

effects are observed both from ranks and predictors for STR4 and from ranks

for STR5.

The Interaction effect of units and ranks was also computed using

the technique recommended by Cohen and Cohen (13) which consists of adding

a multiplied factor to the scores of the variables. The resulting

increments of AR2= .10 on STR4 and AR2= .09 on STR5 are not significant. It

thus can be concluded that units and ranks produce only additive and not

multiplicative effects.

In Table 12 a summary is given of the remaining KRA using

exclusively quantitative sets of predictor variables. STR5 was not

considered due to the fact of its unique dependence on nominal variables.

In accordance with the results summarized on Table 12 it may be

concluded that sets of predictors accounted for a total of 39% of strain,

30% of global satisfaction and 33% of intention to leave.

In general terms strain is significantly related with

organizational Stressors like leadership behavior, task characteristics,

attitudes towards the Job and personnel as well as professional life

e/ents. Quite interesting is the finding of strain being a better criterion

of organizational variables than the sore tradlclonal ones like Job

satisfaction and intention to leave. As a satter of fact either

satisfaction and intention to leave are accounted for by attitudes towards

Job (JDI) only. Leadership variables do not produce significant increments

on those criteria.Particularly helpful seems therefore to be the Joint

combination of measures STR4 and STR5, the first one as a good criterion of

-
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a balanced organizational behavior and the second one as a sensitive

Indicator of global expectations about consequences of working conditions.

It also may be seen that stress measures used In the questionnaire fall In two different and Independent categories. Job events (STR1),

personal events away from the Job (STR2) and events pertaining to the

organization (STR3) are sources of stress (Stressors) and, as such, must be

Included among the predictors of strain.

In order to hypothesized a possible causal structure linking the

various stress measures a path analysis (Pedhazur, (10)> was carried out

leading to the arrangement suggested at Fig 3.

The structure proposed seems coherent and relatively straightforward. Variables STR1 and STR2 measure life events respectively on the Job

(STRl) and away of the Job (STR2). Both contribute to determine the level

of organizational stramm (STR3), and all thee« objective measures contribute for the symptoms (strain) described by subject? (STR4). Estimated

stress in the future, should the present Job conditions maintain (STPö), is

related, although by a negligible amount with level of strain (STR4) only.

lext step in the analysis consisted of examining possible

moderated effects on the relationship between the predictors and the

criteria. The method followed was, once again, the one recommended by Cohen

and Cohen (13) which consists of adding a multiplied factor of the

variables in hierarchical regression analysis. The sets of variables

examined were the ones related to leader behaviors, non-discretionaiy and

discretionary, as well. Criteria variables were the self-reported strain

(STR4), global satisfaction (SATISF) and intention to leave (ITL). Results

are summarised in Table 13.

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F values of increaents (AR2

) were conputed using Cohen's formula

df=kb(n-kA-kB-l)

It is Interesting to note that the relationship between non-

-dlscretlonary leadership and criteria Is not, as a rule, aoderated either

by discretionary behavior or leaders, by attitudes toward Job, by task

characteristics or by Stressors. Only one significant Interaction was found

with the variable SYSKVD, but even In this case the significant Beta

coefficients are the ones related with factors LBDQ4 (rules and procedures)

and LBDQ6 (support). This aay be Interpreted as an indication of an

enhancing effects of the interaction: The less fair is felt the systea of

rewards the »ore likely the structuring and support behavior of the leaders

will affect the strain of followers.

On the other band, discritlonary leadership interacts with

attitudes toward the Job and task characteristics, which suggests that the

effects of the attributed flexibility of leaders on strain can be Moderated

by other organizational behavior variables. These aoderating effects were

detected for the strain criterion only which confiras the previous

observation aods about its value for the study of leadership behavior.

In order to Interpret the aaaning of the Interactions found we

have to look at the significant Beta coefficients in sack equation.

The first equation calculated relates discretionary leadership

and task characteristics with strain. It wao found that it is the

ultlplicatlve tera TSKDeDISSUP the only one with a significant Beta (.71

t«3.1M>. The interpretation is stralghtfoward: the aore difficult the

taaks ths aore stressful will be tha lack of support froa the leaders,

itly If such a support can be controlled by the leader.
The second equation, in Table 14, combines the effects of

discretionary leadership and job attitudes on strain.

In accordance with the findings it appears that strain is likely

to increase under inconsistent chiefs, namely when their behaviors of

"support" and "rules and procedures" centradicts the way they proceed on

"work assignments". Once again, we are talking here about discretionary

leadership behavior, that is to say, about ways of proceeding under the

control of the leaders.

This last equation combining the significant interaction effects

of discretionary leadership with task characteristics and with Job

attitudes only confiras, as expected, the precedent findings. Just above

reported.

piacnssiw OP THM QOBSTI

The analysis carried out so far shows that the different units

considered in the study are more similar than different. Such findings are

consistent with the considerations about organizational culture previously

reported about the interviews results.

In which respect« the units, only one shows a consistent pattern,

scoring below the average on leader behavior descriptions, Job satisfaction

and group coheslveness. Paradoxally, this same unit, the land transportation unit (UATT), shows the lowest scores on actual stress symptoms, or

strain (STR4) and on estimated future strain (STF5).

It is also interesting to notice that special operations unit

(DAE) has the lowest score of strain (STR4) and at the same time the

highest one on estimated strain (STR5). One possible explanation may be related to the higher familiarity of the special operations unit (DAB) marl-
ii

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nes with dangerous situation leading then to a more accurate evaluation ol

potential threats in the the future <3). As an alternative, or In addition,

the apparent lack of strain in the special operations unit (DAE) nay be

attributed to good interpersonal relations between the men and their leader

and among colleagues as well.

For the differences among hierarchical ranks the most salient

results respect the higher scores of the officers reflecting more negative

attitudes towards leadership and the organization, which nay be due to more

stringent criteria of evaluation used at higher hierarchical echelons.

Another salient result Is the higher strain \STR4) reported by

conscripts, easily attributable to the anxiety felt at the "inclusionary

boundary passage (Van Maqnen and Schein, (16)> separating the civilian

fron the nilitary life (Jesuino, (10)).

The results of the questionnaire, at the nacro-level of the unit

analysis (as fornal organizational sub-groups) suggest that organizational

behavior variables have reinforcing effects on the relationship between

role Stressors on role strain.

In fact, it was found that the only stress neasure exclusively

related to group (unit) membership is the estimated future strain (STR5).

This anticipated threat to health, should the present Job conditions be

naintained, is not likely to be reduced by leadership techniques. The

groups scoring high on this neasure, the special operations unit (DAE), the

naval police battalion (BF1), and the amphibious unit (UAXA), are fairly

well led, cohesive and notlvated. In contrast, the land transportation unit

(UATT), scoring low on Job satisfaction, produced the lowest possible score

on estlnated strain. Other units scoring comparatively low in this neasure.
the security and defense battalion (BF3), the gunnery support unit (UATT)

and the operational battalion (BF2), also score noderate to high on Job

satisfaction measures.

There is a common factor among the three units that score higher

in estimated strain <STKESS5). Due to specialization they have no

conscripts (DAE and UAMA) or a relatively lower percentage <BF1), and the

career personnel, that constitutes them, usually stays in the same unit for

a much longer period of years than in all the others. So, the questions of

anticipation of strain "should the present conditions be maintained" sounds

much more realistic. Further more, at least, for the special operations

(DAE) and the amphibious (UAKA) unit, because their men are more familiar

with dangerous situations, they may "eventually believe that their chances

of survival are weakened if they continue beyond a certain point" (15).

It should also be pointed out that the measure of anteclpated

strain (STRESS5) represents an alternative way to ask someone about his or

her actual strain, and, as it has been seen, one that may produce positive

results when the direct measures of actual strain (STRESS4) do not, the

case of the special operations unit (DAE). Some people may find It

difficult to admit that they are feeling actual strain - that should be the

case of marines - and at the same time are not "ashamed", or are even

eager, to report their antecipatlon of future harm, as in such a way they

may expected to get some organizational advantage. Besides, why are someone

asking them about future harmful consequences for health ?

The results obtained through hierarchical regression techniques

seem to favor also the central hypothesis of the present field study

concerning the relative importance of discretionary leadership. As a matter

of fact It was shown that It is the discretionary leadership rather than
T

the non-discretionary leadership thr.c interacts significantly with the

other organizational variables accounting for the resulting strain.

In sumaary, we nay concJude that leadership plays an important

role on the understanding of organizational stress. Formal leaders

represent a possible source of stress, specially, when associated with

reinforcement of rules and procedures and with lak of organizational

competence. But they also may reduce the actual strain of subordinates not

only by learning or adhering to stereotypical patterns of effective

leadership but also through a more personalized interplay with

subordinates. The leadership factors in conjunction with the group

atmosphere and cohesion are the ones that contribute mostly to a better

adaptation of men to the stressful conditions jf marine life.

The above results are mostly concordant with the literature on

the subject. La Rocco and Jonas (5), for instance, verified that social

support and leader support are significant predictors of stress, but such

effects are additive and not multiplicative, that is to say, there is no

evidence that they moderate the effects of of the stress role. The present

results favour also the conclusion that at the level of the formal groups,

i.e., the military units, there are not interaction effects. Also, no

interaction effects were found between units and ranks.

However, and that is one of the novelties of the present study,

at variance with the tradicional studies on this matter, it was found that

the stress-strain relationship can be moderated by the organizational

variables like task characteristics and Job attitudes.

Finally, it was also found that strain is another possible

criterion, and an extremely valuable one, for the study of organizational

leadership.

-
CSEUERAL EL

AMJD FROSfECXgL

In the present field study a representative sample of the

operational portuguese marine units was examined, in different service

situations, including a field exercise simulating combat conditions, in

order to explore the relationship between leadership variables and stress

variables.

The study comes in the sequence of clinical field study by

Pereira started in 1964 in Guinea, and a quasi-experimental study, by

Pereira and Jesuino (1982), conducted in the Portuguese Marine Corps. The

present study aimed more at being an exploratory rather than a strlcly

hypothesis-testing research. The main reason for that posture derives from

the results of the previous studies, that in conjunction with the

literature review (4;5), showed clearly that the relationship between

stress and leadership variables is a complex one, as it involves also other

situational, psychossocial or, even, personal variables. As a consequence,

we tried top selec from an extended set of variables the ones that seen

most relevant to establish, in further and more focussed Investigations, a

functional network with practical applications to real situations.

To stand a better chance to achieve the intended goal a

combination of several research methods was used. Each one provided

relevant results, that were, essentially, concordant or complementary on

the sain issues.

First of all, it should be stressed that we found that, for all

units studied, the general adaptation of the men to the present duties is

good, the interpersonal network provides its eleiu-.-its with considerable
social support, and that discipline and communication are easygoing at and

between all hierarchical levels. The Job satisfaction indeces are congruent

with the above summary, being highest toward superiors and colleagues,

moderate toward work itself, although very low toward salary and career

prospects.

In such a setting that has a lot to '.o with a strong organizational culture, It cones as no surprise that both the data fron the

interviews and the data fron the questionnaire Indicate that the marine

units are more similar than different and that the differences among

hierachical ranks are not very narked. Consequently, one should not expect

to found high levels of stress pertaining the connon characteristics of the

work of the marines or due to the organizational sources. Indeed it was

found, by direct observation and fron the analysis of the interviews, that

the higher levels of stress (actual strain) are conected with the training

in the Marine School, the field exercices, and with some actions of the

special operations unit and of the amphibious unit. In the first case, the

training, it is the novelty and the intensity of the situation that should

account for the stress level reached; in the remainder it is the perception

of a real danger that acounts for it.

On the other hand the questionnaire results revealed that the

most important contributing factors for the determination of actual strain

are the relations with the colleagues and next the nature of the task at

hand.

The questionnaire data were important to clarify the

interrelationship among the stress measures. All the three Stressors

considered contribute to the actual strain, and it is that variable only

that contributes for the estimation of future strain. Simultaneously, there
Is a causal network among the Stressors. Life events on the Job and away

from the Job, both contribute to the organizational source of stress. (See

fig. 3>. Such a pattern of Interrelationship between stress measures was

not clear in Pereira and Jesuino (1982) and was difficult, if not

impossible, to deduce from the interview data.

Both the Interviews and the questionnaire contributed to a better

understanding of the relationship between stress and leadership. Leaders

may either represent a possible source of stress or reduce the actual

strain of the subordinates.

It was found that discretionary leadership plays an Important

role on the above referred Interrelations. It was a clear result of the

interviews that a pre-requisite for an effective leadership is the

professional competence of the leader. The questionnaire data revealed that

lack of bureaucratic expertise and rigid adherence to rules and procedures,

increases the level of organizational stress, whereas a more person

oriented assignment of tasks, may significantly decrease strain.

Both sources of data, seem to indicate that both task-orientation, specially when it becomes or be recognized as professional competence, and human relations orientation, specially when it becomes oriented

for each specific person, are not dichotomic leadership factors but are

both relevant and necessary at different moments of an effective leader

subordinate cooperation process. Competence contributes to establish and

increase the leader credit and capacity to exerclce decisive power beyond

his formal power, specially in difficult, ambiguous or dangerous occasions.

The analysis of the critical incident interviews revealed the

concrete ways in which the leaders help the subordinates in difficult

moments. Such help may even assume a character of direct physical aid, but,
usually consists of encouragement, readiness to assist, reduction of

uncertainty, refraalng to change a deficient causal attribution or

dramatization through humor. The collegues may do the same, but the

results, clearly show, that the same action by the leader is much more

effective.

It was also found that the effects of the action of the leader

and of the colleagues, depend on the group atmosphere and cohesiveness, but

such a result, although, in acordance to our expectation, is still at the

macro-level of the personal and the group interactions. To decide how a

leader should behave, in a particular situation and on the setting of his

formal power, toward a particular subordinate and within the boundary of a

particular sub-group (squad, platoon, company or, even, battalion), and to

be able to plan his own training in conformity, subsequent and more

focussed researches need to be carried out. At this point we believe we

have selected the relevant variables to be dealt with and that we may try

to approach the requirements of the experimental studies in a laboratory

setting.

Such is the next step in our long-term research plan; the final

one being the set-up and evaluation of a specific leadership training.

Although, the present study was, as we repeatly stated, an

exploratory one. some hints may be offered towards ways ox coping with

stress is military environments.

Let it be recalled that the fundaiental question we are dealing

with concerns the possibility that reapeated exposure to stress may produce

permanent health consequences . It is such unwanted effect that we want to

prevent, and the problems arise because there is not any simple receipt to

Ate
do it. The different aspects of stress and their interconections with other

variables have to be considered.

Our findings shows that on-the-Job stress and away-from-the Job

life events combine to increase a third Stressor, the organizational

stress.

It is obvious that organizational sources of stress nay be

directly managed and the question becomes if the military chiefs want to

"adhere to the book" or to create a setting that may favor military

effectiveness and job satisfaction. Our present observations clearly show

that the more there is Job specialization increasing the probability of

dangerous situations to occur (the special operations, the amphibious unit

and the operational battalion) the more traditional rules, procedures and

discipline should be substituted by more flexible forms of leader subordinate cooperation. That seems to be the May to manage this interface, as

there is only a limited possibility to act on most of the on-the-Job

sources of stress, because increased specialization of the marine function

usually goes together with increased likelyhood of danger. The leader may

only act, when there is perceptual ambiguity or a deficient causal attribution. (To act on the away-from-the-Job sources of stress is, obviously,

out of question for pratical and ethical reasons).

On the other hand it was also found that the less structuring is

the leader behavior, either formal or discretionary, the sore is the actual

strain reported by men. This suggests that, at least in military situations

like the one described, where the general stress level is moderate rather

than extreme, "the one best way" for the leader is to structure the tasks

of their subordinates but on a one by one (personal) basis.
It will be appreciated that the managing of the organizational

sources of stress requires a considerable amount of specific research,

because it is here that leadership plays its major role. As a consequence,

It is also in this conectlon that training makes sense. But, it should also

be kept in mind that professional competence is a pre-requisite for

effective leadership, so that, it is the most Important aim of a leader

training must be to make him a good professional.

If we turn now to the interface organism - G.A.S.(stress, it

becomes clear that we can only decrease the intensity of the non-specific

reaction of the organism, discovered by Selye, through progressive

adaptation. It is here that marine training (and, eventually, stress I

dessensitization) may be relevant.

Our study revealed that the instruction period at the Marine ,

1

School Is recollected in the critical incidents interviews in a particular

Intense way. Such finding quite compelled us to study such training«, it

i

seems logical the training of the leader and the general training of

marines should be planned toghether.

Finally, and in accordance with the original studies of Pereira j

(6) a long period of intermitent exposure to high stress coupled with j

organizational tension, are important factors for inducing a permanent

strain. So the possible action at this level has to do, above all, with

career management.

* A longitudinal study of laval Research marine cadets is being carried out

but not yet completed.

I
62

Literature cited

(1) Kasl, S.V (1963) - Pursuing the links between stressful life

experiences and disease: a time for reappraisal, in Gary L. Cooper

(Ed. ) - Stress Research Issues for the eighties. Chichester, John Viley

ft Sons.

(2) Selye, H. (1963) - The stress concept: Past, present and future in Gary

L. Cooper (Ed.) - Stress Research Issues for the eighties. Chichester,

John Viley ft Lans.

(3) Lazarus, R.S. (1966) - Psychological Stress and the Coping Process

lew York, aacgraw Hill.

(4) Bass, B. (1961) - StogdlH's Handbook of laadershlp

lew York. The Free Press.

(5) La Rocco, J.N. and Jones, A.P. (1976) - Co-Vorker and Leadership

Support as Moderators of stress - strain Relationships in Work

Situations. Journal of Applied Psychology. 63, 629 - 634

Fiedler. F. (6) - A theory of leadarehlp effectiveness

lew York. NcGraw Hill.

French. J.R.P. Jr. and Gaplan. R.D. (1972) - Organizational stress and

Individual strain in A.I. Marrow (Ed.) - The Failure of Sucess

ew York; AIACOM
Cobb, S. (1976) - Social Support as a noderator of life stress

PsychosQaatlc Itedlclne. 38, 300 - 314

Berh, T.A. (1976) - Perceived sltuational aoderators of the relationship between subjective role aabigulty and role strain. Journal of

Applied Psychology. 61. 35 - 40.

(6) Pereira, O.G. (1974) - "Honens en guerra: I - Bstudo psiquiatrlco".

Revlsta Portuguasa da Madlclna Militär. 22., 2, 139 - 154

(1974a) - "Honens en guerra: II - Estado pslcossocial de canpo" Revlsta

Portuguesa de Medicinj Militär. 22. 2. 139 - 154

(1981) - "Psychological danage in narines after repetition of war duty

periods". A presentation to the 17th International Synposlun of Applied

Military Psychology, Slntra, Portugal.

(7) Pereira O.G. and Jesuino, J.C. (1982) - "Stress and leadership:

Moderator effects in narine units" A presentation to the 18th International Synposlun of Applied Military Psychology London, June 1982

Jesuino, J.C. (1984) - r.n«tlngAncla e Interac^io no» procassos de llderan^a Doctoral dissertation, Lisbon, UTL.

(8) Hunt, J.G. and Osborn, R.I. (1982) - Toward a nacro-oriented nodel of

leadership in J.G. Hunt, S.G. Sekaran and C. A. Schrieshein (Eds)

Leadership: Bnyond Established Views C&rüondale, Southern Illinois

Press.

(9) Osborn, R.I. and Hunt, J.G. (1975) - An adaptative - reactive theory

of leadership: The role of nacro variables in leadership research
nrganlzatloBal and Adanlstrativa Science. 0, 27 - 44, p. 26

(10) Martin, H.J., Benandl, J.A., Osborn, R.I. and Hunt, J.G. (1980)

- A guide to tha analyata and MeasuraMent of YflriablflS Included in

tha aultlpla Influanca aodel of laadershlp Department of

Adanistratlve Sciences, Southern Illinois University at Carbondale.

(11) Bales, R.F. and Cohen, S.P. (1979) - SYMLOG - A systea for the

ultlple level obsarvation of groups lew York, The Free Press.

(12) Holaes, T. and Rahe, R.H. (1967) - The social adjustaent rating

scale Journal of Psychosoaatie Research 11,213 - 216.

(13) Cohen, J. and Cohen, P. - Appliad iltipla regression, lew York,

Wiley.

(14) French, J.R.P., Jr, Caplan, R.D. and Van Harrison, S. (1962) - The

Wachanlsm of Jnb Stress and Strain Chichester, John Viley 4 Sons.

(15) Pedhazur, E.J. - Multiple regression for behavioral research, lew

York, Holt.

(16) Van Maanen, J. and Schein, E.H. (1979) - Toward a theory of organizational socialization in B.M. Staw (Ed.) - Research In Organizational

Behavior (Vol 1) Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press

Jesuino, J.C. (1966) - The us« of SYMLOG in the study of organizational socialization in Richard B. Polley (Ed.) - The SYMLOG
Practitloner: Applications of Saall Group Research Praeger, under

press.

(17) Lazarus, S.S. (1906) - Psychological Stress and the Coping Prnrpss

New York, XcGraw Hill p. 94
I

AIPFESTDIX /L

FACTCDRIAL SXRUOTURE OF THE

QUESTIONNAIRE SUB—SCALES
A.j>PBirX>XX A.

taatOKXml «tmetuf of Ihm qummUn-nMtwm rmmuMm

i. rmm* B^aeaataeitiMi

Tabl« Al - Factorial aolutloa after Tarli rotatloo

Itta ducriptieo

Factor 1

Specialisation

(TSP)

Factor II

VarUklllty

Factor in

StaadaHitatio

(TMCV) (HP)

Factor IV. Rffraiü

(tsn»

- Ftrcoat of collaaguta

parfozaiag tbt aaaa Job

- Fcrctat of collaaguas

aakiag 4aeiaioM of tha

iaM typo

- Saaa taska froa lap to dap

- Bow fraquoatlp 4v axcaptiona

ariaa

- Row ofttn do you follow about

tha aaaa work aethoda or atopa

for doing pour taaka

- low aany writtoa rulaa aad

proeeduraa

- lew yraciaalp 4a thaaa rulaa

and procaduraa apacifp bow

pour aajor taaka arc dona

- To what axtant did you follow

atandard procaduraa

- Ptrctat of tha tiaa do you

do you hava vrittan or uawrittan

procaduraa

- In tha paat 3 aoatha bow

oftan did difficult problaaa

ariaa in your work

- About how auch tiaa did you

apaod «olviag thaaa work problaaa

.•9

.17

.75

.71

.35

.5«

.73

M

Fct of var

a

CUB pet 19.1 34.5

-TJX

41.3 59.6
S. ImmAmr t»l>«vlBr ^—artptlaa

Tabl« A2 - Vaetorlal «elutlM «tt«r Varli rotation

ItM «Merlpttoa FirtM 1 PMUt II tMte. Ill

(inn

•tit CUrlty CfoMblllly

(1102) (UN)

j - Itlpa ate «nrklag

M ^ Job aor« plMout Lss

' • IM tko taokaieal kae«f-kew

to kolp Bi oa toogk Job» .52 •

1 - lo portlmilarly good ot

«tvoloplig rolotloaoklpa wltk

otter oalta M

- Coaoo up wltk addltloaal

roooorooo Mfeao I raaly ao«4 ttoa .74

1 - lo portloolarly good at

oottlog Mtet I oaod to got

1 wj JOb «ooo |.»7 {

. . •

- Biploiao proclooly tte lovol

1 of porforaoaoo ttet lo

oxptcto« of ao I*-7* - liplolM tte quality of «ork

ttet lo ospoeto« el at .71

1 - Isploloo Mtet lo tzpoctod

of o» oa air Job

- toooo't wck oaro «tet teppoaa

f lo otter valto «ntk «kick MO

typleolly «ool

.71

.7*

- Cevora for my aiotakoo to koop

o out of treublo .. -.St

1 Olvoo at brood ooolgoa»oto,

| «ot opoclflo .SI

- Xo loto ood okert oa gottlag

tte rtooureoo 1 aood M

- Olvto ot oucloar geolo to rooek

oo qr Job .Jt

- Hralto ao to Igooro ruloo ood

1 rogulotlooo which offoct how do my Job .32

- Dotoo't kaow how to got orouod

1 buroouorotle rood block» .41

• tartly rooeto to ay ouggtotlono

lot prodlctoblo woy LJ

>ct of vor

j CUB pet

20.»

20.» M.I 3».1 j
Table KZ (Coat)

! f»ft«f IV _ Fitlar ¥ Fit tor « Fittat VII !

[ lt«a «tacrlptlOB -*'

Rulti «itf proctdurn

(LN4)

Mark tnignacnt

(UM»

talari

(LIM)

ConUtl

(1107)

- Ut> m dacldt what »pacific

1 dutiaa to parlor» .75

- Lata at davalop ay own

aithoda for doing ay job .74

- Sacldao bow I aa to do ay Job

- Puta aa la aptdflc Job«

.69

.M

- Glva» aa «pacific work

aaalpaaat«

- I» pradlctabl«

.70

.70

- lalatalaa a frltadly -ortlaf

ralaxloaablp with at .33

- Doa« tblaga to aaka ay lob

1 laaa plaaaaat

- la la fraquaat contact with

aa during a typical «ore day

.45

.78

- Doaa'at talk to aa attar

during a typical work day .7?'

1 Pet of w ••* "

j Cua pet *0.5

3.9

44.9

3.«

48.1

33 1 51.4 i
Tabl« A2 (Coat)

It«« dt»crlptiOB fttf BU Flit« II Fiftif I fiiUr 11

CeiMidtration

(UN)

luftMicratit

EnpartiM

(UM)

TnlMiMl

E^trtiM

(INI«)

frtflittibility

(UOII)

- Clmtm tb« cradlt for good

work don« hy m

- Paralt« m to igBort rulM

•ad relations wfclcb affoet

bow I do ay Job

- Traata at wltbout coMldarlng my f««Unfe

.74

.57

.44

- Raacta to cbangaa la a praj dletabla my

' Xnowa tb« buraaucratic In»

and out«

- Glvaa v«gut •xplaiatloas of

«bat la «syoctad of a«

- Setaa't know bo« to got «round

I buraaucratic roadblocks

- laraly raacta to ay owggastloaa la a prtdlctabla way

{ - Inltlat«« contact «rttb otbar

groups «hen It's necessary

.75

.45

.59

.47

-.51

.5«

Fet of w j#1

* P

6

* 54!5

2.7 2.» 2.5

57.3 5».» «2.4

. ,
3. Job D«»erlptlon InA««

Tabl« A3 - Factorial aolution after Tarlaax rotation

Itaa dtacrlptlon

Ry wrk Ry (hitt % tmtkttt *f »r«MtiMi Ply fty

IW) («Iff) IMUI) (CMOI) (Hin)

PlatMBt

Borlag

1 Good

Annoying

Satlafylag

Prustratlag' .66

Crantlva .M

! Oaaful .61

FaaclMtlig

Annoying

56

.66

Bp-to-datt .65

Tactful .62

Stubborn .59

i lapollt« .59

Ufluaatlal .54

EaaMM Job mil .54

Vncoordlnatad .53

Kenny .51

InttlllgtBt .51

lard to pltaaa

1 Rcaponalblc

.51

1 76

! lalpful .72

Fant .72

I Aetlvt .69

| Uxy .67

| Slow .67

Stlaulntlng .53

Loyal .52

InttHlgtnt

Good chanct for

.52

proaotlon I.TT

| Xtgular proaotlm .73

Vafraquant proaotloaa .61

i Opportunity aoa

1 Oadirpald

i**at llaltad .67

.W

1 Vtll paid .71

Incoa» adaquatt for aerial aaptnnaa .62

i Bad .62

Baroly ll»t on LacoM .51

Fet of »ar 12.1 7.« i.9 5.2 3,6 |

Cua pet 12.1 19.4 25.3 30.6 34.2

L
a Pl«ff»tlaamry L«*dT«klp

T«bl« A3 - Factorial aolutloa aftar Varlaa« rotatioi

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(OIIM)

f"t*' «"

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• Ttlla at kow I aa to go

about ay Job

- Clvta at iMtntctloaa oa

bow to 4a ay Job

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W9 Job

- Puta a» oa apacldc Joba

- Caratullj dafiat» «bat Joba

1 aa to do

- E^kaattaa nilaa «ad ragulatl

«hieb affact bo« 1 do ay Job

- Itlpa aakt «orklag oa agr

Job asrt pltaaaat

- Cosaldara wj ftlllags

- blatalaa a trtaaAly «orklag

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tntntt it mm* Indtr Wavitr lUi twtrtl, jtt tUfi»y. tt\t% v* HMHHTM, MPH^I.

CMUCU, IKI to Itct fiUUaahiH m4 m pnaal iMtocl.
8. irttrtiM to 1

mm mb-sc*la eomprim— Xhr— lfm, «aek OM irttfc tit* peimt«:

1. fklek of tta fellewlig «tatcwat« aoat clearly raflact« jour

fMllaga about your futura la tba aa»y «rlthla tka aaxt yaar ?

Datialtaly «ill art loova (1> fn*My «111 art laava (2)

«Mortal« (9) Probably will loava (4) Baflalialy will

laavo W>

S. If yon war« coaplttaly froa to cbooot, «ould yoa prafor to

coatlaua aorklaf la tba lavy T

9. low iaportaat lo It to you parooaally to «paad year earaar la

tka Utj tatkor tkaa wltk OOM oth*r orgulsaUao J

Calcvlatioa of oeala - I ITU 1 2 3

%, infial ttMlriMllty

m« wb-ocala cooprlala tkraa Itaao. aack ooa witk fl«o polata.

alalag to aaaaura tka «Ofro« at wklck raopoadaat« art llkaly to gl«o

ooclal daolrabl« aaowaro.

Baa to low latoraol rollaMllty tkla oaaoaraa aaa «loeardadt