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THE SECURITY OF U.S. VISA PROGRAMS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

MARCH 15, 2016 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/ 

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

( 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin Chairman 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

ROB PORTMAN, Ohio 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma 

MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming 

KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire 

JONI ERNST, Iowa 

BEN SASSE, Nebraska 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

JON TESTER, Montana 

TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin 

HEIDI HEITKAMP, North Dakota 

CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey 

GARY C. PETERS, Michigan 

CHRISTOPHER R. HIXON, Staff Director 

DANIEL P. LIPS, Policy Director 

BROOKE N. ERICSON, Deputy Chief Counsel for Homeland Security 

JOSE ́ J. BAUTISTA, Professional Staff Member 

GABRIELLE A. BATKIN, Minority Staff Director 

JOHN P. KILVINGTON, Minority Deputy Staff Director 

HOLLY A. IDELSON, Minority Senior Counsel 

STEPHEN R. VIN ̃ A, Minority Chief Counsel for Homeland Security 

HARLAN C. GEER, Minority Senior Professional Staff Member 

LAURA W. KILBRIDE, Chief Clerk 

BENJAMIN C. GRAZDA, Hearing Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Opening statements: Page 

Senator Johnson ............................................................................................... 1 

Senator Carper ................................................................................................. 2 

Senator Tester .................................................................................................. 3 

Senator Sasse .................................................................................................... 17 

Senator Booker ................................................................................................. 22 

Senator Ernst .................................................................................................... 26 

Prepared statements: 

Senator Johnson ............................................................................................... 35 

Senator Carper ................................................................................................. 37 

WITNESS 

TUESDAY, MARCH 15, 2016 

David Donahue, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Consular Affairs, 

U.S. Department of State .................................................................................... 4 

Hon. Leon Rodriguez, Director, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security ............................................................. 6 

Hon. Sarah R. Saldan ̃ a, Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Department of Homeland Security .................................................. 8 

Hon. John Roth, Inspector General, U.S. Department of Homeland Security ... 10 

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Donahue, David: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 4 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 39 

Rodriguez, Hon. Leon: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 6 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 49 

Roth, Hon. John: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 10 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 65 

Saldan ̃ a, Hon. Sarah R.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 8 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 54 

APPENDIX 

American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) statement submitted for the Record ... 80 

Response to post-hearing questions for the Record: 

Mr. Donahue ..................................................................................................... 86 

Mr. Rodriguez ................................................................................................... 122 

Ms. Saldan ̃ a ...................................................................................................... 169 

Mr. Roth ............................................................................................................ 192 

(1) 

THE SECURITY OF U.S. VISA PROGRAMS 

TUESDAY, MARCH 15, 2016 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:06 a.m., in room 

SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Ron Johnson, Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Johnson, Lankford, Ayotte, Ernst, Sasse, Carper, Tester, Booker, and Peters. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN JOHNSON 

Chairman JOHNSON. Good morning. This hearing will come to 

order. 

I want to, first of all, thank the witnesses for your time and your 

testimony and for appearing here before us today. We do have representatives from the State Department (DOS), the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), and the U.S. Immigration 

and Customs Enforcement (ICE). You will be hearing those acronyms. There are a lot of acronyms in this business. And then, we 

also have Mr. John Roth, the Inspector General (IG) for the U.S. 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS). 

This hearing is about the security of our U.S. visa systems and 

programs. I think the potential vulnerabilities came to light, certainly, in the public’s awareness, with the attack on September 11, 

2001 (9/11), and the fact that so many of the terrorists that killed 

so many Americans were here on student visas. And then, we also 

understood—or became aware of—the reality of visa overstays. So, 

we started understanding the vulnerabilities there. 

Back then, we, obviously, had the State Department involved in 

the acceptance and granting of visas, but we also had Immigration 

and Naturalization Service (INS). You basically had one agency. 

After 9/11, then we kind of took that apart and set up the Department of Homeland Security. Now, we have different agencies. 

And, I think it is legitimate to ask: Are these agencies working together? Do we have a shared purpose, a shared goal, and a shared 

mission to, literally, keep this Nation safe? Allow for travel and 

allow for commerce, but—at the heart of it—are we making sure 

we can do everything, in an imperfect world, to keep our Nation 

safe and secure? 

So, that is really my primary question and the main purpose of 

this hearing. Are we doing all that we can to screen and vet visa 

applicants before they enter the country? And, second, how effec-
2 

1The prepared statement of Senator Johnson appears in the Appendix on page 35. 

tively are Federal agencies managing their responsibilities and 

working together—including sharing information—through each 

step of the visa and immigration process to ensure our security? 

I would ask that my written opening remarks be entered into the 

record with consent.1 And, it has been very kindly granted. 

With that, I will turn it over to Senator Carper. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARPER: 

Senator CARPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to welcome 

everybody. Thank you for holding the hearing. Thank you all for 

joining us. Three of the folks sitting in front of us are folks who 

came before us a year or two ago to be confirmed for confirmation 

hearings. And, we very much appreciate your service. And, that is 

not taking anything away from you, Mr. Donahue, but we do not 

have jurisdiction over the Department of State. We are working on 

it, but—— [Laughter.] 

We are not quite there yet. 

But, this hearing is the third in a series we have held to explore 

whether we are doing enough to address concerns that terrorists 

might try to exploit international travel to infiltrate our country. 

In the aftermath of the Paris terrorist attacks, this Committee 

first scrutinized the process in place to screen and vet Syrian refugees escaping from the carnage in the Middle East. And, we 

learned that the U.S. refugee resettlement process involves extensive security screening. Syrian refugees, we were told, undergo 

multiple rounds of screening over an average period of 18 to 24 

months—including in-person interviews by immigration analysts 

and counterterrorism officials trained in spotting fraud and trained 

in spotting deception. 

The Committee next looked at our Visa Waiver Program (VWP), 

which allows citizens of certain nations to travel to the United 

States for a visit without a visa. And, once it became clear that the 

Paris terrorists held passports from European countries whose citizens enjoy visa waiver privileges, fears, understandably, arose that 

this program could pose a security threat. 

We learned that visa waiver travelers seeking to come to the 

United States endure nearly the same level of scrutiny and vetting 

as all other travelers. We also learned that, when it comes to security, nothing is being ‘‘waived,’’ as the name of the program incorrectly suggests. And, we learned that, in return for their entry into 

the Visa Waiver Program, countries—and there are about 38 of 

them—must share intelligence with the United States, they must 

open up their counterterrorism and aviation security systems to 

our inspectors, and they must abide by our standards for aviation 

and passport security. 

As a result, the Visa Waiver Program has now become a key 

counterterrorism tool. And, what started off as a travel facilitation 

program has ended up having enormous advantages to us, in terms 

of protecting our security. 

Today, we are going to continue to look at our screening systems 

for foreigners entering our country. We will examine the depth of 

security for all forms of visas—whether they happen to be for stu-
3 

dents, for tourists, for people here on business, or for those seeking 

to make America their permanent home. 

It is a daunting undertaking, given the volume of international 

travel to the United States. It also involves the coordination of 

multiple government entities, including the State Department, the 

Department of Homeland Security, and others that are not represented here today. 

Since the 9/11 attacks against our country, there have been notable changes to strengthen our visa security—including recent adjustments made following the attacks in Paris and, more recently, 

in San Bernardino. For example, amid the Islamic State of Iraq 

and Syria’s (ISIS’s) growing online presence, the Department of 

Homeland Security is exploring ways to expand its use of social 

media to screen travelers seeking to enter the United States. 

I look forward to hearing more about these efforts and also about 

the contribution of ICE’s Visa Security Program (VSP) that may 

help to identify threats posed by potential travelers early on. We 

need to know if this program is adding real security and, if so, how 

to expand its reach. 

As with all of our recent hearings, I expect that we will find elements of our visa security that we can improve upon today—understanding that we can never eliminate all risks and should not turn 

our back on the many benefits of trade, travel, and immigration. 

Yet, as we continuously improve the security of our immigration 

system, we must also keep our eye on, perhaps, the even more 

pressing threat of homegrown terrorism. 

For all that we do to strengthen our borders and our immigration 

security, groups, like ISIS, know all too well that they may bypass 

our multiple layers of homeland security by using online propaganda to recruit people already inside of our borders—maybe born 

here—to carry out attacks against the United States. And, in this 

respect, preventing ISIS’s twisted propaganda from mobilizing our 

young people to carry out terrorist violence may help to combat the 

long-term terrorist threats to the homeland in ways that aviation 

screening and watchlist checks can never do. 

We look forward to our continued work on this Committee, both 

on combating homegrown terrorism and on strengthening the security of our immigration systems. And, I hope we can use today’s 

hearing to identify some common-sense improvements to the security of visas. 

Thank you all for being here. We look forward to this conversation. Thank you. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Senator Carper. 

Senator Tester can only be with us for a short period. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR TESTER 

Senator TESTER. I will make this very short. And, thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. I very much appreciate the flexibility. 

The Visa Waiver Program, as the Chairman and the Ranking 

Member have pointed out—they are important programs—important for our economy—but, they are also of concern. In your opening statements, if you could address: the security of the programs 

you have, first; whether you need additional tools that you do not 

have that would require this Committee—or another committee— 
4 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Donahue appears in the Appendix on page 39. 

to take action, second; and the third thing is manpower. Do you 

have the manpower to carry out the job to make sure that our 

country is not threatened by the visa program we have now? If you 

can do that, you will have answered all of my questions. 

Thank you. 

Chairman JOHNSON. That was under a minute. 

It is the tradition of our Committee to swear in witnesses, so if 

you will all rise and raise your right hand. Do you swear that the 

testimony you will give before this Committee will be the truth, the 

whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you, God? 

Mr. DONAHUE. I do. 

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. I do. 

Ms. SALDAN ̃ A. I do. 

Mr. ROTH. I do. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Please be seated. 

Our first witness is David Donahue. He is the Principal Deputy 

Assistant Secretary for Consular Affairs at the U.S. Department of 

State. Mr. Donahue has also served as Deputy Assistant Secretary 

of State for Visa Services in the Bureau of Consular Affairs and as 

Coordinator for Interagency Provincial Affairs at the U.S. Embassy 

in Kabul, Afghanistan. Secretary Donahue. 

TESTIMONY OF DAVID DONAHUE,1 PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR CONSULAR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. DONAHUE. Good morning, Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member Carper, and distinguished Members of the Committee. Thank 

you for the opportunity to testify, today, on the topic of U.S. visa 

program security. 

The Department of State and our partner agencies throughout 

the Federal Government take our commitment to protect American 

borders and citizens seriously. And, we constantly analyze and update our clearance procedures. My written statement, which I request be put into the record, describes the rigorous screening regimen that applies to all visa categories. 

Let me begin by saying that the visa program is a layered, interagency program focused on national security, beginning with the 

petition to USCIS, my colleagues here, or a visa application submitted directly to a consular section abroad. During the interview, 

prior to travel, upon arrival in the United States, and while the 

traveler is in the United States, our national law enforcement and 

intelligence communities work together to protect our borders. The 

vast majority of visa applicants—and all immigrants and fiance ́

visa applicants—are interviewed by a consular officer. Each consular officer completes extensive training, which has a strong emphasis on border security, fraud prevention, interagency coordination, and interviewing techniques. 

One hundred and twenty-two diplomatic security assistant regional security officer investigators at 107 posts worldwide bring 

additional law enforcement and anti-terrorism expertise to the visa 

process. All of this applicant data is vetted against databases—including terrorist identity databases that contain millions of records 
5 

of individuals found ineligible for visas or regarding whom potentially derogatory information exists. 

We collect 10 fingerprint scans from nearly all visa applicants 

and screen them against DHS and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) databases of known and suspected terrorists, wanted 

persons, immigration violators, and criminals. All visa applicants 

are screened against photos of known and suspected terrorists or 

prior visa applicants. 

When an interview raises concerns that an applicant may be a 

threat to national security or when the interagency screening process shows potentially disqualifying derogatory information, the consular officer suspends processing and submits a request for a 

Washington-based interagency security advisory opinion review 

conducted by Federal law enforcement, intelligence agencies, and 

the Department of State. 

The Department of Homeland Security’s Pre-Adjudicated Threat 

Recognition and Intelligence Operations Team (PATRIOT) program 

and Visa Security Program, managed by our USCIS colleagues or 

ICE colleagues, provide additional protections in certain overseas 

posts. DHS Immigration and Customs Enforcement special agents, 

who are assigned to more than 20 embassies and consulates in 

high-threat locations, provide on-site vetting of visa applications as 

well as other law enforcement support and training for our officers. 

Security reviews do not stop when the visa is issued. The Department and the partner agency continuously match new threat information with our record of existing visas and will use our authority 

to revoke visas. 

We refuse more than a million applications a year for visas. 

Since 2001, the Department has revoked more than 122,000 visas 

based on information that surfaced after issuance of the visas. This 

includes nearly 10,000 revoked for suspected links to terrorism, 

again, based on information that surfaced after issuance. Notice of 

these revocations is shared across the interagency in near real 

time. 

I noticed that you also wanted to talk about our view of the security of the VWP. While that is managed by the Department of 

Homeland Security, we believe that it does really enhance our national security. It allows us to focus on those places—to have the 

staffing and the resources in places where we really do need to look 

deeply into the threat from travelers. It also provides, as was mentioned by Senator Carper, these cooperative agreements with the 

nations that are sending these travelers to the United States. 

Therefore, we have better access and a better understanding of the 

threats they are seeing. They are sharing with us and we are sharing with them. An advanced stage of that, while it is not part of 

the Visa Waiver Program, is in Canada, where we have a very 

close relationship in sharing derogatory information back and forth 

across the border to make sure we have a strong outer border for 

the United States. 

Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of the Committee, the 

Department of State has no higher priority than the safety of our 

fellow citizens at home and overseas as well as the security of the 

traveling public. Every visa decision is a national security decision. 

We appreciate the support that Congress has given us as we con-
6 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Rodriguez appears in the Appendix on page 49. 

stantly work to strengthen our defenses. I encourage you, when you 

are traveling overseas, to visit our consular sections to see, firsthand, the good work that our officers are doing around the world. 

I look forward to your questions. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Secretary Donahue. 

Our next witness is Leon Rodriguez. Mr. Rodriguez is the Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Prior to this position, Mr. 

Rodriguez served as the Director of the Office for Civil Rights 

(OCR) at the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) 

and as the Deputy Assistant Attorney General (AAG) for Civil 

Rights at the Department of Justice (DOJ). Director Rodriguez. 

TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE LEON RODRIGUEZ,1 DIRECTOR, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES, U.S. 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Good morning, Chairman, good morning, Ranking Member, and good morning, Members of the Committee. This 

is my second time before this Committee to talk about this subject 

matter and the seventh time that I have testified before some Congressional committee in this fiscal year (FY) on this subject matter. 

I should hasten to say that this Committee has become one of my 

favorites, particularly because the level of discourse has always 

been a civil and intelligent one—not that the questions are easy. 

I think the questions we are asked are hard questions that we need 

to be able to answer for the benefit of the American people—but 

I really do appreciate the tone that you both have set here. Thank 

you for that. 

I believe, as an article of faith, that a healthy and robust immigration and travel system is critical to our economy, critical to the 

stability of our families, and critical, actually, to the successful conduct of our foreign policy and national security. 

I also believe that the most fundamental responsibility of government is to protect the public safety. I have spent a fair part of my 

career working at the local level and have learned that every time 

that we issue a driver’s license, we need to make sure that we are 

not issuing that license to someone who may become a drunk driver. Every time we issue a building permit, we need to ensure that 

that is not a building that will collapse. And, every time we issue 

some sort of immigration benefit, we need to do everything we can 

to ensure the security of our country and to ensure that those who 

mean us harm or who will become threats to our public safety do 

not exploit the immigration system. 

In particular, USCIS, my agency, bears responsibility for screening refugees who are seeking admission to the United States. Since 

9/11, we have admitted nearly 790,000 refugees—and I would hasten to add that about 120,000 of those have come from Iraq. In that 

time, not a single admitted refugee has actually engaged in an act 

of terrorist violence against the United States. There have been a 

number—a relatively small number—of terrorist plots or attempts 

to affiliate with terrorist organizations that have been successfully 

disrupted by United States law enforcement. 
7 

The reason why we have been successful is the robust screening 

process that already exists to screen those who are coming to the 

United States. It is a multi-layered process involving a multitude 

of Cabinet agencies, law enforcement agencies, and intelligence 

agencies. It involves intensive interviews conducted by several 

agencies, in particular by my officers, who are intensively trained 

and briefed to do the work that they do. 

Nonetheless, recognizing evolving threats—particularly those 

posed by lone wolves inspired by terrorist organizations—we continue to look for opportunities to intensify and strengthen the quality of the work that we do. 

An area of particular recent focus has been our review of social 

media—particularly of those seeking admission as refugees—in 

order to determine whether there is any derogatory information 

contained therein. We have undertaken, simultaneously, several pilots to identify automated tools and processes which will further 

enable us to do this work. But, we have not waited for the conclusion of those pilots to, in fact, begin actively using that as part of 

our work. And, in those cases where individuals have been flagged 

as of concern, being particularly among certain refugee streams, we 

have already been analyzing social media to determine whether 

any such information exists. We will continue to add capacity in 

this area. We will continue to strengthen our ability to do that. 

And, we will add more volume based on our assessment and our 

intelligence community (IC) partners’ assessment of where the 

highest levels of risk are. 

Now, to respond in particular to your question, Senator Tester, 

we are working to get to the point where we actually can answer 

your question—where we can identify the resources and personnel 

that we need. Needless to say, our agency is a fee-funded agency, 

so the majority of this work is actually funded by our fee-paying 

customers. But, a lot of that work is also done in concert with various tax-based partners in the law enforcement and intelligence 

communities—and we will be looking forward to a further conversation should we identify needs as we develop these processes. 

Finally, I look forward to addressing the concerns raised in the 

IG’s report. I would like to note a couple of particular findings. 

First, 93 percent of our customers in the early going of our I–90— 

that is, our replacement green card—launch reported that they 

were quite satisfied with the service that we provided. I would also 

like to note that the IG recognizes that, after July 2015, the conclusion of the audit window, we undertook a number of improvements. 

And, what I would ask is both for the IG to come back, but also 

to be able to engage with this Committee about those improvements, so that we can give you the confidence that, in fact, our automation process is successful and is poised for even greater success in the future. 

Thank you again for having me here today. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Director Rodriguez. 

Our next witness is Director Sarah Saldan ̃ a. Director Saldan ̃ a is 

the Director of the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement at 

the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Director Saldan ̃ a previously served as United States Attorney for the Northern District 

of Texas. Director Saldan ̃ a. 
8 

1The prepared statement of Ms. Saldan ̃ a appears in the Appendix on page 54. 

TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE SARAH R. SALDAN ̃ A,1 DIRECTOR, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, U.S. 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Ms. SALDAN ̃ A. Thank you. Good morning, Chairman Johnson, 

Ranking Member Carper, and other Members of this Committee. 

Senator Tester, I am still having nightmares from seeing that—was 

it a buffalo or a bison?—the head in your office. [Laughter.] 

I am sure I will get over it. 

I will say, in all seriousness, that I appreciate the opportunity to 

talk, today, about this very important subject. I absolutely agree 

with my colleagues here, with respect to the importance of this 

issue and these issues. I appreciate what we will hear from the Inspector General, with respect to our programs and the improvements that are recommended—and, obviously, to your questions 

and suggestions, with respect to how we can do our jobs better. 

As you know, Congress authorized our role in this process back 

in 2002, where we were told, first, to assign agents in diplomatic 

posts to review visa security activities and, second, to provide 

training and other assistance to our State Department colleagues. 

This effort is led by the investigative side of Immigration and Customs Enforcement: Homeland Security Investigations (HSI), with 

the involvement of our Enforcement and Removal Operations 

(ERO) folks, and it is accomplished through the program that has 

been referred to as the Visa Security Program. 

Under this program, we have analysts and agents working at 26 

visa-issuing posts in 20 countries to identify terrorists, criminals, 

and other individuals who are ineligible for visas prior to their 

travel or application for admission to the United States. This fits 

right in with ICE’s larger responsibility to detect, disrupt, and dismantle transnational criminal organizations. But, in the visa security context, obviously, we are trying to stop threats—deter 

threats—before they reach our nation’s borders. 

As a result of the additional Ccongressional funding in FY 2015, 

for which we are very thankful, ICE was able to expand VSP operations to six new issuing posts—the largest expansion in the program’s history. We are looking forward to adding four more posts 

before the end of this fiscal year. 

As my colleagues have said, the process begins and ends, obviously, with the Department of State, along with the significant involvement of USCIS. But, this process also presents the first opportunity to assess whether a potential visitor or immigrant poses a 

threat to our country—and that is where ICE comes in—our law 

enforcement folks. ICE’s actions complement the consular officers’ 

screenings, applicant interviews, and reviews of applications and 

supporting documentation. 

PATRIOT, which the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary just 

mentioned, begins our visa screening mission by conducting a first 

take—an automated screening of visa application information 

against our vast DHS holdings—all of the information we have, not 

only from DHS agencies, but from the intelligence community as 

well. This step occurs before the applicant is even interviewed for 

the first time. PATRIOT takes a risk-based approach and uses 
9 

interagency resources from ICE, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and the State Department to identify potential national 

security and public safety threats. 

Where VSP differs from most other government screening efforts 

is that it leverages the fact that we have agents posted at those 

visa-screening sites—at the visa sites that the State Department 

has—and those agents are able to investigate the information that 

comes up in the applications—to actually supplement the Department of State’s interviews of those applicants and to identify previously unknown threats. So, we are very pleased to have those 

people actually onsite in those 20 different countries. 

In FY 2015, VSP—our agents—reviewed over 2 million visa applications—over 2 million—and we determined they identified 

64,000 of them for further review. This is a flag that goes up that, 

perhaps, something there is indicating something to the agent, who 

is very well trained and versed in intelligence and criminal activity 

as well as other derogatory information. 

After in-depth vetting, the next step, we determined the existence of a little over 7,000 of 23,000 cases in which we saw derogatory information to have some nexus to terrorism, resulting in our 

recommendation to the Department of State to refuse visas to approximately 8,600 individuals last year. Approximately 850 terrorist database records were created or enhanced. That is the other 

complement to this mission—and that is, the intelligence gathering 

that we are able to do through our in-depth vetting and screening. 

While I am extremely proud of what our ICE personnel do to 

screen the visa applicants on the front side, we also actively work 

to identify and initiate action against overstay violators, which 

Senator Johnson mentioned earlier. This vetting helps to determine 

if an individual has overstayed or departed the U.S. In the last 2 

years, ICE has dedicated approximately 650,000 special agent 

hours a year to overstay enforcement. 

ICE prioritizes immigrant overstay cases using risk-based analysis through our Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation Unit 

(CTCEU). The CTCEU reviews many leads and further investigates them, referring them to others on the ERO side if we are 

unable to do anything with them on the investigative side. 

We are very proud to include both sides of our house in this effort. I believe we have actually, as a side note, increased the investigative responsibilities of our ERO folks. I look forward to working 

with this Committee and with our Appropriations Committee to 

discuss some pay reform with respect to our entire ICE workforce. 

And, I stand ready to answer any questions you may have. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Director Saldan ̃ a. 

Our final witness is Inspector General John Roth, who is the Inspector General for the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. 

Mr. Roth most recently served as the Director of the Office of 

Criminal Investigations (OCI) at the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Prior to this, he had a 25-year career as a Federal prosecutor and senior leader at the Department of Justice. Inspector 

General Roth. 
10 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Roth appears in the Appendix on page 65. 

TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE JOHN ROTH,1 INSPECTOR 

GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. ROTH. Thank you. Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member Carper, and Members of this Committee, thank you for inviting me 

here, today, to discuss my office’s oversight of DHS visa programs. 

Our recent work has involved a number of audits and investigations, and I will discuss some of our audit results this morning. 

Deciding and administering immigration benefits, including 

visas, is a massive enterprise. USCIS employs about 19,000 people 

to process millions of applications for immigration benefits. They 

are required to enforce what are, sometimes, highly complex laws, 

regulations, and internal policies that can be subject to differing interpretations. They are rightly expected to process decisions within 

a reasonable timeframe. USCIS and the rest of DHS accomplish 

their mission while working with an antiquated system of paperbased files more suited to an office environment from 1950 than 

2016. This system creates inefficiencies and risks to the program. 

To give you an idea of the scope of the problem, USCIS spends 

more than $300 million per year shipping, storing, and handling 

over 20 million immigrant files. 

This week, we published our sixth report on USCIS’ efforts to 

transform its paper-based processes into an integrated and automated system. 

We undertook this audit to answer a relatively simple question: 

After 11 years and considerable expense, what has been the outcome of USCIS’ efforts to automate benefits processing? We focused 

on the progress that was made and the performance outcomes. We 

interviewed dozens of individuals, including by traveling to the 

local field locations and talking to over 60 end users who are using 

Electronic Immigration System (ELIS). And, we literally stood next 

to them and watched as they struggled with the system. 

We found that USCIS has made little progress in transforming 

its paper-based process into an automated system. Previous efforts, 

which have cost approximately $500 million to implement, had to 

be abandoned, recently, in favor of a new system. USCIS now estimates that it will take more than 3 years and an additional $1 billion to automate benefit processing. This delay will prevent USCIS 

from achieving its workload processing, national security, and customer service goals. Currently, only 2 of about 90 different types 

of application forms are online for filing. 

We found, for example, that the time to process immigration benefits was twice that of the metrics that USCIS had established. 

Our earlier report on USCIS information technology (IT) systems, 

published in July 2014, reported that using the electronic files in 

use at the time actually took twice as long as using paper files. 

That report reflected user dissatisfaction with a system that often 

took between 100 and 150 mouse clicks to move among sub-levels 

to complete a specific process. 

As Director Rodriguez said, we acknowledge that DHS has recently taken significant steps to improve the process by which new 

information technology—including moving from a traditional development methodology to a new incremental approach, called Agile, 
11 

will assist. Implementation of automation is very much a moving 

target, and USCIS may have subsequently made progress on the 

problem since the time our field work ended in July 2015. We will 

obviously continue to monitor the situation and report back to the 

Committee as necessary. 

Separately, in a second, earlier audit, we compared databases belonging to ICE and to USCIS and found that known human traffickers were using work, fiance ́, and other family reunification 

visas to bring their victims into the country. An important finding 

we made is that the data systems that USCIS uses do not electronically capture important information which would be valuable 

in investigating human trafficking. Again, this poses risks to the 

system. We made three recommendations to improve these programs. ICE and USCIS are taking actions to resolve these recommendations and we are satisfied with their progress thus far. 

Finally, corrupt and criminal activity on the part of DHS personnel can present a risk to the integrity of the visa process. My 

written testimony illustrates several examples in which employees 

or contractors, who are in a position of trust, were able to compromise the system to provide immigration benefits to those who 

are not entitled to them. This type of insider threat presents significant risks that can only be countered through continual vigilance. 

In summary, the size and complexity of the mission, coupled with 

an archaic method of processing applications, brings significant 

risk. There is risk to operations in that it makes it more difficult 

for USCIS to accomplish its mission. There is also risk to our national security in that we may be admitting individuals who do not 

meet the requirements for a visa. Basic information on visa applicants is not captured in an electronic format and, thus, cannot be 

used to perform basic investigative steps. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I am 

happy to answer any questions that you or other Members of the 

Committee may have. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Roth. 

In my opening comments, I was talking a little bit about missions—the goals of the different agencies. In this Committee we 

have a pretty simple one: to enhance the economic and national security of America. Pretty all-encompassing. I think a problem we 

have, in terms of our visa programs, is that you, literally, have the 

tension of conflicting goals. We want to facilitate travel, commerce, 

and customer service, as Director Rodriguez was talking about. On 

the other hand, we want to ensure the security of our homeland 

and keep Americans safe. There is tension there. 

So, I want to first go to Director Rodriguez. Does your agency 

have a pretty simple mission statement like this Committee does? 

And, can you tell us what it is? 

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. We have a number of different ways, but, certainly, I have been very clear with our staff—in communications to 

the entire staff that, in fact, to articulate a set of simple principles—and that is, where an individual qualifies for an immigration benefit, they should get that benefit in an efficient and appropriate manner, subject to, first and foremost, national security and 

fraud prevention. That is a key element of our draft strategic 
12 

plan—subject, again, to the legal requirements that I mentioned 

before and subject to operational feasibility of whatever initiatives 

we are taking. 

Chairman JOHNSON. But, just the way you describe that, the first 

thing you talked about was providing benefits to your customer. So, 

I guess, the way I would interpret that is that that is really the 

first part of your mission—customer service, providing benefits to 

immigrants to this country, again, subject to security. 

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Right. And, subject to, and in no small way, to 

be given to national security and public safety. In other words, our 

staff clearly understands this, which is evidenced by the fact that 

roughly 900 of our staff members are, specifically, dedicated to the 

Fraud Detection and National Security Directorate (FDNS)—that if 

an individual poses a threat, they are denied the benefit—to be 

very clear about that. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Director Saldan ̃ a, do you have a relatively 

simple mission statement for your Agency? 

Ms. SALDAN ̃ A. It is comparable to this Committee’s, and that is: 

to ensure the national security and public safety of our country 

through the enforcement of immigration and customs laws. Huge. 

Over 400 statutes are implicated by that, but we are game. 

Chairman JOHNSON. It is a big mission. It is a serious undertaking. The results of 9/11 and the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States 9/11 Commission, and what 

they were talking about—the stovepipes—that continues to be a 

concern of mine. So, you have these cross-purposes. You have two 

different agencies now split—and I think you were always somewhat split under INS as well. But, I am concerned about that. 

Director Rodriguez, are you aware of what happened at the 

USCIS office in San Bernardino on December 3 following the San 

Bernardino attack? Are you aware of the events that occurred 

there? 

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. At the USCIS office in San Bernardino. 

Chairman JOHNSON. In San Bernardino. 

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. I am not, honestly. No, I am not aware that anything occurred at our office. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Director Saldan ̃ a, are you aware of it? 

Ms. SALDAN ̃ A. I think you are referring to our HSI office, Senator 

Johnson. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Correct. 

Ms. SALDAN ̃ A. The subject of a letter that you have sent, I believe, to the Secretary of Homeland Security, which has been sent 

to me for response. I am aware of it. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Can you describe what happened from the 

standpoint—because HSI is under your jurisdiction. Can you just 

describe, from your standpoint, what you are aware of with respect 

to that incident? 

Ms. SALDAN ̃ A. Well, with respect to the whole San Bernardino incident—— 

Chairman JOHNSON. No. I am just talking about your HSI agents 

showing up at the office of USCIS because they were made aware 

of the fact that Enrique Marquez was, potentially, there for an 

interview the day after the San Bernardino attack. You are not 

aware of that? 
13 

Ms. SALDAN ̃ A. That I am not aware of. He showed up at USCIS? 

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Yes, Senator, now I am remembering the incident. I believe, if I understand correctly, there was a concern about 

the manner in which we were providing information about the individuals involved in the attack to HSI. In fact, the intent all along 

among our staff was to provide that information. It was just a matter of completing a very short process. 

Chairman JOHNSON. So, let me just describe—this is from an internal memo written by somebody who contacted our Committee. 

‘‘At approximately 12:00 p.m. on December 3, the FBI informed 

HSI and the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) that FBI field 

interview agents learned that Marquez and his wife, Maria 

Chernykh, were scheduled for a meeting at the U.S. Citizenship 

and Immigration Services office in San Bernardino for noon on December 3. HSI contacted the HSI special agent division requesting 

a team of armed agents to respond to the San Bernardino USCIS 

office in order to detain Marquez until an FBI interview team could 

be dispatched. The special agent division informed the HSI team 

that the officer in charge of USCIS would not let HSI agents in the 

building.’’ 

So, HSI had a special team show up trying to, potentially, apprehend somebody who, at that point in time, they thought might 

have been a part of a terrorist plot, and the officer in charge of the 

USCIS office would not allow those agents in the building. 

‘‘The special agent division learned that Marquez and Chernykh 

did not show up for the meeting. The special agent division requested copies of the Alien Registration File (A File), which USCIS 

refused. The special agent division was allowed to take a photo of 

Chernykh’s photo, which was contained in that A file.’’ 

So, what happened on December 3—and this is kind of getting 

me to the cross-purposes. So, we had a team, armed up and, potentially, dealing with a terrorist. They had a tip from the FBI that 

Mr. Marquez might be at the USCIS office and the officer in charge 

of USCIS—the officers would not allow HSI into the building and 

would not give them the A file. That is not indicating a great deal 

of cooperation between two different agencies under DHS, whose 

supposedly top concern is the security of this Nation. Director 

Rodriguez, can you explain that? 

By the way, we have been told during the gathering of information process that the decision not to let HSI in came from higher 

up. 

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. That much is not correct, in the sense that, once 

field leadership had consulted with higher-ups, the instruction was, 

in fact, to facilitate the actions that HSI wanted to take. Unfortunately, this was all—as these situations do—evolving very quickly. 

Ordinarily, we do not have situations where law enforcement comes 

into a USCIS office to effect an arrest. 

Chairman JOHNSON. But, how can you explain that the officer in 

charge of USCIS would not allow HSI agents in there when they 

are saying, ‘‘Listen, you could have a potential terrorist here— 

somebody who was involved in what just happened yesterday, in 

the slaughter of 14 Americans.’’ And, they do not even allow them 

in the office? How could that possibly happen? 
14 

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Again, Chairman, I think the point here is that 

we operate according to certain protocols. That individual was 

seeking guidance from higher-ups. The guidance was to facilitate 

what HSI was trying to accomplish. Unfortunately, it all happened 

so quickly that it was, incorrectly, perceived as our folks trying to, 

in some way, obstruct what ICE was trying to do. 

Do we need to look at our protocols to make sure that those misunderstandings do not occur? That may well be something that we 

need to do. But, there was never an actual intent to prevent them 

from doing what they needed to do. 

Chairman JOHNSON. It sounds like they were prevented. 

Director Saldan ̃a, can you explain this? And, what do you now 

know about it with, maybe, your memory refreshed? 

Ms. SALDAN ̃ A. I will say, in all honesty, Senator, that I had a 

similar reaction when I first heard about the incident. But, we do 

forget the number of law enforcement and other people involved in 

this incident and the confusion and the chaos that was going on in 

San Bernardino. We had immediate conversations when it came to 

my attention—and I am having a hard time, right now, remembering exactly. I believe it was the same day, and it was taken care 

of and clarified immediately. And, we did get the information we 

needed. 

But, I am with the Director. We can always do things better. 

And, if we do not, as I tell my son, learn lessons from the mistakes 

we make, then shame on us. But, I believe—he and I meet very 

often. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Coming from the private sector—I am just 

putting myself in the position of individuals at USCIS. The day 

after a terrorist attack, if I had a team, armed, coming into my office and saying, ‘‘We believe somebody who was involved in that 

terrorist incident is in your building, we want to come in,’’ I would 

say, ‘‘Come on in.’’ There would not have been a question in my 

mind. And, yet that is not what happened. It is quite puzzling. Senator Carper. 

Senator CARPER. My first question is for you, Ms. Saldan ̃ a. Over 

your right shoulder is a gentleman sitting in the crowd right behind you—in the row right behind you. He looks very familiar— 

right over your right shoulder in the front row. It looks like his 

first name might be Jason, and I think he used to work here. He 

used to sit right behind us here on this dais. 

Ms. SALDAN ̃ A. We have spent a lot of time together. 

Senator CARPER. It is nice to see you, Jason. Welcome back. 

Thank you for your service. 

A couple of you alluded to one of my favorite aphorisms, that, if 

it is not perfect, make it better. And, one of those is how we move 

from a paper process to an electronic process. And, I think the Inspector General and, I think, Mr. Rodriguez both have touched on 

this—and the IG talked about a project that was abandoned, 

maybe, within the last year—I think after an investment of, I think 

you said, $500 million—and you thought that there had been some 

progress since the July 2015 audit. And, I heard the word ‘‘Agile’’ 

mentioned, a term describing something. Just help and make some 

sense of it for me. I think we know that, to the extent that we can 

take a paperwork process—paper processes and make them elec-
15 

tronic, oftentimes that provides better service and better security. 

How would this have done that? Where did we go wrong? And, how 

are we fixing it now? Mr. Rodriguez, lead us off. 

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Yes. So, the question is first to me. Is that correct, Senator? 

Senator CARPER. Please. 

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. I think it is well known to just about everybody 

here, including this Committee, that, in fact, there were a number 

of quite serious and quite protracted false starts with respect to our 

automation process. We were using what was sort of an antiquated 

development process, the Waterfall development process, which 

was directed by an outside entity. We have since migrated to this 

Agile process, which, essentially, involves multiple contractors competing against each other and also shrinks the development steps 

in such a way that we can develop a particular item, test it, try 

it out in the field, make corrections as we need to, and then move 

on to the next item—instead of trying to do everything all at once. 

To understand the timelines here, the first generation was the 

Waterfall generation. There was a second generation called ELIS. 

We began, really, the third generation, live, in March of last year, 

which, in other words, was about a month before the Inspector 

General’s audit began. We launched the I–90, which is our replacement Green Card. That, already, incorporates a number of critical 

functionalities, which are then going to be used for other applications in the future. We have now processed approximately 300,000 

I–90 applications through there and we have also added the Immigrant Visa (IV) payment since that time. 

So, we now have, approximately, 16 percent of our overall business on ELIS. What we have done so far, certainly, from a customer perspective, is working quite well. A number of the concerns 

that our internal employees had either reflected the older generation of ELIS or are things that reflected that early time when we 

first launched the I–90 application. Many of those issues have since 

been, not only resolved, but resolved well. Again, that is why I 

would like to invite the IG to come back and to invite the Committee to scrutinize further what we are doing. 

By the end of this year, we will have 30 percent of the business 

on ELIS, including some of our most complex forms. And, this is 

where—— 

Senator CARPER. I am going to ask you to hold it right there because I have some other questions. But, thank you for that explanation. 

Inspector General Roth, a quick reaction to what you are hearing 

from Leon Redbone—excuse me, Leon Rodriguez. [Laughter.] 

That is my favorite nickname for him. 

Mr. ROTH. I mean, certainly, what we simply did was we went 

out to where the work is being done and we talked to the USCIS 

employees who were actually confronted with the system that they 

had. And, the level of frustration, which is reflected by the glitches 

and the hiccups in the rollout of the ELIS report, were significant. 

And, we were able to isolate that and to uncover a few root causes, 

including that there was a lack of user engagement—that is, the 

folks in the field did not particularly feel that they were being engaged and listened to in the development of the software. Second, 
16 

that the testing was not done on an end-to-end basis—in other 

words, that the testing of certain elements of the software was 

done sporadically—but it was not done in a complete way. And, 

third, that the technical support was lacking. 

Now, the Agile development process means that you put out a 

minimum viable product and then you improve that product as you 

go. You basically fix the car while it is running, to use an analogy. 

Here, we thought that the testing, though, was insufficient, that 

the rollout was too soon, and that the user experience—the folks 

who were actually using it were highly frustrated with the system. 

Those issues—that is, user engagement, testing, and technical 

support—were the same things that we had seen in the previous 

version of ELIS—the $500 million one that ultimately had to be 

scrapped. 

Senator CARPER. Alright. Mr. Rodriguez has extended an invitation for your folks to come back and revisit them. I would urge you 

to do that and to do it soon. 

Mr. ROTH. That is part of our audit process. We will, obviously, 

continue to sort of monitor this situation. We have made specific 

recommendations—some of which they have agreed with and some 

of which they have not—and we will continue to monitor and report as appropriate. 

Senator CARPER. OK. Good. We will continue to monitor this. 

Thank you for the update. 

Director Saldan ̃ a and Mr. Donahue, how do your agencies use social media when you vet and screen visa applicants? And, what 

challenges have you encountered in doing so? 

Ms. SALDAN ̃ A. I will begin with our portion of the responsibility 

here with respect to the vetting and screening. We are, first and 

foremost, a law enforcement agency—and HSI is an investigative 

agency. In all of our investigations and reviews, we use social 

media to the extent that the evidence leads us there. 

So, in the visa screening process, in particular, there is no bar 

to our use of it. There are occasions where we do. As I mentioned, 

we go through PATRIOT first. There is a preliminary assessment 

as to whether there are some indicators for further review. Where 

there is further review, we might actually use social media—review 

a person’s social media in order to determine whether we should 

have a further study or whether we should recommend a negative 

result to the Department of State. 

So, we have that under our current authorities—and we have no 

problem using it when the case indicates we need to. 

Senator CARPER. Alright. Mr. Donahue—same question. How do 

your folks use social media when you vet and screen visa applicants? And, what challenges have you encountered as you do that? 

Mr. DONAHUE. Sure. In Consular Affairs, we have used social 

media for a while. We have it in our regulations. In fact, we just 

updated our social media regulations. We use it when we see that 

there is a reason to look further into the case. We are now doing 

a pilot program in countries of concern to find out how effective it 

can be. It is a studied program where we are using social media 

on our IR1—our immigrant visa for spouses—and our K cases to 

see what kind of especially terrorist-related information we can 
17 

find in the process. We do not have the results yet, but we have 

used it for a long time on the fraud side of the house. 

Senator CARPER. OK. Thank you everyone. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Senator Sasse. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR SASSE 

Senator SASSE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Director Saldan ̃ a, in January, 21-year-old Sarah Root was killed 

in Omaha by an illegal alien named Eswin Mejia. He was street 

driving while drunk. This is not the first time that local police had 

arrested Mr. Mejia for driving drunk. And, after he was arrested 

for the incident, he posted bail. Prior to being released from jail, 

however, local police contacted ICE and requested that he be detained because of his immigration status. ICE, however, refused 

and said that that would not be consistent with the President’s Executive Actions on immigration. Mejia was released and disappeared. 

Do you think someone who street races while driving drunk and 

kills another person is a threat to public safety? 

Ms. SALDAN ̃ A. Yes. 

Senator SASSE. If an illegal alien kills an American citizen, 

should ICE let that person go free? 

Ms. SALDAN ̃ A. Go free? Well, there will be—— 

Senator SASSE. Which is what happened here. 

Ms. SALDAN ̃ A. There will be criminal consequences. 

Senator SASSE. We do not know where the man is. 

Ms. SALDAN ̃ A. Right. And, sir, I do not understand where you got 

the information, with respect to our refusing to deal with this individual. That is not my understanding of the facts. 

Senator SASSE. This is ICE’s public comment. ICE has said this 

in response to Omaha law enforcement, who said they requested 

that ICE detain him. 

Ms. SALDAN ̃ A. I am ICE and I do not recall making that statement. I would not have said that. What we did do was—we look 

at every individual case, like we did here with Mr. Mejia, and we 

determine whether a detainer to recommend to local law enforcement is appropriate. As you know, that has been a subject of much 

conversation. We are working very hard to get all local law enforcement offices to work with us on it—and we have made some great 

strides. But, in this case—there is not a single injury or death that 

occurs at the hands of an illegal immigrant that does not weigh 

heavily on me, Senator. 

Senator SASSE. I believe that. I am going to interrupt because I 

am quoting your agency here. This is my letter to you, dated February 29. I am quoting your Agency’s public statement. This is footnote 4 in my letter. Do you have the letter from February 29? Your 

agency said in response, ‘‘At the time of his January 2016 arrest 

in Omaha—and local criminal charges, Eswin Mejia, 19, of Honduras, did not meet ICE’s enforcement priorities, as stated by the 

November 20, 2014 civil enforcement memo issued by Secretary 

Johnson.’’ 

Ms. SALDAN ̃ A. Oh, I understood you to be saying that we told 

local law enforcement we were not going to do anything about him 

because he did not meet our priorities. That is a statement of fact 
18 

in one person’s interpretation. Quite frankly, sir, it is very easy to 

look back and say that that person’s judgment was incorrect—and 

I have some concerns about that. 

As I said earlier, for every situation we have that results in 

something as horrific as this, we always try to learn from it. And, 

I will be following up to look at the specific individuals involved, 

how the judgment was formed, and why that was done. But, I misunderstood your question. I understood your question to mean that 

we told law enforcement that we are not going to do that. 

Senator SASSE. Well, the rest of your statement says—your Agency’s statement, not you personally—that Mejia is scheduled to go 

before an immigration judge on March 23, 2017—but he was released by the police once he posted bail. They contacted your agency and asked you to detain him. ICE did not act. How do you explain that to the family? 

Ms. SALDAN ̃ A. We tried to act, sir, but I believe it was a matter 

of hours between the time that we were contacted and the actual 

release. It is very hard for us to get to every inquiry that is made 

by law enforcement, and, unfortunately, it had a horrible consequence here. But, we try very hard to respond as quickly as possible. We just cannot get to every site within a matter of hours. I 

think it was 4 hours, if I am not—— 

Senator SASSE. I do not know that fact. 

Ms. SALDAN ̃ A. If I am remembering correctly. But, that is a 

fact—that we try very hard to get to and to respond to local law 

enforcement. It does not do us any good to tell them to cooperate 

with us if we are not going to respond. 

Senator SASSE. My letter to you is from 16 days ago. Can you tell 

me when I will receive a reply? Because it has details on all of 

these questions. 

Ms. SALDAN ̃ A. Yes, I think we will get you a reply within a couple of weeks—if that is satisfactory. And, if you need it sooner, I 

will certainly work to try to get that. 

Senator SASSE. Could we have that by the end of next week? 

Ms. SALDAN ̃ A. Yes, you can. 

Senator SASSE. Thank you, ma’am. 

General Roth, in November 2014, Secretary Johnson issued a 

number of memos changing DHS’s policies on immigration known 

collectively as ‘‘the President’s immigration Executive Aactions.’’ 

One of these memos addressed changes to ICE’s detention policy 

for illegal aliens. DHS said in that memo that it was designed to 

identify threats to public safety. Specifically, it says that, unless an 

illegal alien has been charged with a serious crime, ICE will not 

likely detain that person. Does this policy mean that ICE does not 

consider someone a threat to public safety unless they have already 

been convicted? 

Mr. ROTH. Frankly, I was not involved in writing that memo or 

in developing that policy, so it is difficult for me to respond to that. 

Senator SASSE. To your knowledge, though, are ICE officials required to strictly follow the new policy, or is it used as guidance 

and then there is discretion on a case-by-case basis? 

Mr. ROTH. Again, we have not looked at that in any kind of audit 

or investigation, so I think that question is best directed to members of the administration or to ICE. 
19 

Senator SASSE. Does the IG’s office have any plans or any current studies of the President’s Executive Actions on immigration? 

Mr. ROTH. We do not. 

Senator SASSE. Director Saldan ̃a, how should ICE officials implement the new detention policies that were put in place in November 2014 with regard to cases like this? You mentioned the timing. 

Can you give us a broad sense of how you exercise your discretion? 

Ms. SALDAN ̃ A. Well, generally speaking—and let me just respond 

to the tail end of that question that you had, and that is the requirement of conviction. I am happy to share with you this card 

that we have, which we provide to our ICE officers who are involved in this activity. But, there are many categories here where 

a conviction is not necessary. If this is a person with a gang affiliation, no conviction is necessary. If there is a person with terrorist 

ties, no conviction is necessary. There are several that do involve 

a conviction, but let me point out to you, sir—and I have met with 

all of our field office directors to specify, clearly, to them that there 

is always this category—which is kind of an umbrella category— 

that says that if this does not fit a specific case, but you, as an informed and well-trained officer of Immigration and Customs Enforcement believe that that person presents a public safety threat, 

you are free to exercise your judgment in the manner consistent 

with that judgment. 

Senator SASSE. But, in this case, Sarah Root is dead. So, what 

if someone kills a U.S. citizen? That does not meet the threshold? 

Ms. SALDAN ̃ A. That was after the fact, sir. What you are saying, 

as I understand it, is that that person was injured and had 

not—when that 4-hour period of time—seriously injured, but had 

not passed away until later. Again, sir, it is easy to look back and 

say that that judgment was poorly exercised. And, as I said earlier, 

I intend to learn from this particular incident. I feel terrible for the 

Root family and—but I can say, I wish I had a 100-percent foolproof method to ensure and—to look in the future and ensure 

whether somebody is going to commit a crime or not. And, it is very 

difficult to do that. I hope you take my word that we do the best 

we can. 

Senator SASSE. I hear you. But, it is not the case that he was 

released and then went and had another drunk-driving, street-racing case. This was drunk-driving, street-racing that killed someone. 

Then, he posted bond. Then, the Omaha police asked that he be detained. ICE did not detain him and now he has fled. 

Ms. SALDAN ̃ A. And, I intend to use this—again, I am going to 

look further into this and use it for lessons learned if I find that 

there were serious errors of judgment here. But, many times prosecutorial discretion is just that. It is a judgment that is being exercised by the person based on what they see at the time. 

Senator SASSE. Thank you. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Senator Peters. 

Senator PETERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, I also want to 

join to thank our witnesses today for your work. There is no question that the most important duty that we have as members of the 

Federal Government is to ensure the security of our borders and 

to ensure the security of the citizens of this country. So, I appre-
20 

ciate all of your efforts in doing that each and every day. And, I 

know that it is a difficult job that you all have. 

I am very proud to represent, as all of you know, a very large 

and vibrant Arab-American and Muslim community in the State of 

Michigan. And, I heard, from a number of my constituents, some 

concerns about the impact that the dual national provisions could 

have on their families as they are traveling to other Visa Waiver 

Program countries around the world. 

We know that Syria and Iran deem individuals to be nationals 

of those countries, regardless of where someone was born or whether they have even set foot in that country, simply because their fathers were citizens of those countries. Because the Visa Waiver 

Program is based on reciprocity, it is possible that a Visa Waiver 

Program country could impose the same requirements on dual national Syrian and Iranian Americans. So, I would like a response. 

Is the Administration—it can be from anyone on the panel. Is the 

Administration concerned that other Visa Waiver Program countries could impose restrictions on American citizens limiting their 

ability to travel to participating VWP countries without a visa? 

Mr. DONAHUE. Thank you for your question, Senator. It certainly 

is a concern, I think, for the State Department and the Department 

of Homeland Security. Our Secretaries have been working together 

on the new legislation regarding dual nationals. We are certainly 

concerned that citizens who have non-meaningful citizenship that 

they cannot remove—about the effects that that has on their life. 

They certainly can apply for a visa and travel to the United States. 

We are still reviewing that—and, certainly, we are concerned that 

there could be reciprocity from other countries. 

Senator PETERS. Would anybody else like to comment? No? 

[No response.] 

Also, for the panel, I would like to know—I would like to just get 

a better sense of how the United States makes dual national determinations. So, for example, would a German citizen who was born 

and raised in Germany and has never traveled outside of the country, but whose father was Iranian, would he be considered a dual 

German-Iranian national by the United States? 

Mr. DONAHUE. Again, I think we are looking at that. We have 

not made a final decision on how we are going to manage the dual 

citizenship. 

Senator PETERS. OK. I would love to work with you on that as 

we go forward. Obviously, we have a situation where a number of 

folks are going to be in that category and they are just concerned 

about how the process will work. And, we need to know how the 

process will work. 

Also, Mr. Donahue, given some of your concerns, are there waivers that the State Department would recommend for classes such 

as journalists, non-governmental organization (NGO) employees, 

and, perhaps, certain dual nationals that you could offer? 

Mr. DONAHUE. Yes, the Secretary of State recommended to Secretary Johnson that there—and Secretary Johnson agreed that that 

was a reasonable interpretation of the law and that there be waivers for those who are helping us in the work that we are doing. I 

think, particularly, we think about aid workers who are providing 
21 

food and sustenance to the millions of people who are in camps in 

countries of concern—Syria, for example—going forward. 

Again, while these travelers can travel with a visa—it does not 

affect their travel—it could deter people who want to help us in our 

work. For example, people who are working for the International 

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) going to Iran to ensure implementation or people who are in business in Northern Iraq and are helping that country develop. 

So, we are very concerned about that. We are working together. 

We are looking at those cases. DHS has been building questions as 

part of the Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA) program that screens visa waiver travelers, and no decisions have 

been made—or no waivers have been granted thus far—but, we do 

believe that the law was written to allow for waivers. 

Senator PETERS. Great. Thank you. 

The other area that I think we need to focus on—as a country, 

we are, but I was just hoping to get some response from the panel 

as to how your agencies work on an interagency basis with other 

parts of the Federal Government. A key area is trying to stem the 

financing of terror networks and focus on stopping the flow of 

money back and forth. And, I am just curious as to how the interagency visa vetting process works—how it incorporates information 

about financial crimes that may have been conducted by individuals who may be part of a terror financing network. The Department of Treasury is very active with this issue. I am just curious 

as to how you work with the Department of Treasury to identify 

those individuals who may be engaged in activities that are seeking 

to move around the world to continue to further those activities. 

Ms. SALDAN ̃ A. Well, I will say that our agency, Homeland Security Investigations—that is exactly up our wheelhouse. We are concerned about illicit trafficking—illicit financial transactions across 

transnational boundaries. 

So, what we do is we build databases to share information with 

the Department of State and USCIS, specifically, to communicate 

information that we may have regarding a target in an investigation or someone who has actually been convicted of a crime, which 

is available to them. We communicate through—obviously, the PATRIOT system is that first line of defense with respect to the visa 

screening process, but what I am talking about is, not only the visa 

screening process, but criminal investigations, in general, worldwide. That is exactly what Homeland Security Investigations does. 

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. The one thing that I would add is that we have 

strong relationships running in both directions with our law enforcement and intelligence community partners. Beginning with 

our law enforcement partners within DHS, like ICE and CBP, it is 

critical that we receive information from them when we adjudicate 

immigration benefits. We get that information as we need it. At the 

same time, we, occasionally, in the course of our work, identify information that is either of law enforcement or intelligence value, 

and we have well-developed pathways to make sure that that information is shared. 

One example is, during the course of refugee screening, if we 

learn information that is potentially of intelligence value, that information is, in fact, shared with the intelligence community. 
22 

Senator PETERS. Thank you. 

Mr. DONAHUE. And, we work very closely with the Department 

of Treasury. When they make a designation, as part of the announcement of that designation, anyone who is designated—and 

quite often their family members or anyone who benefits from 

these actions—they pass those to us and we immediately enter 

them into our Lookout system, review any visas, and we can do 

prudential revocations of the visas of anyone who is found by the 

Department of Treasury to be in that class. 

Senator PETERS. Great. Thank you. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Senator Booker. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BOOKER 

Senator BOOKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I just want to say, first and foremost, how grateful I am for the 

dedication, the work, and the service that the four of you render 

to our Nation. We have an incredible country, the oldest constitutional democracy. We were founded in a different way than any 

other nation in the history of the Earth at that time. We were 

founded not because we all prayed the same, not because we all 

looked the same, and not because we all heralded from the same 

genealogy, but rather because we were a nation of ideals. And, 

every generation in this country has aspired to make more real 

those ideals. 

One of the things that has sourced the richness and the greatness of this country has been the fact that we are a Nation that 

has people from all over the planet Earth who have brought such 

strength to our economy—growth. Our diversity has yielded diversity of thought, diversity of innovation, diversity of accomplishment, and, I think, that is one of the things that makes America 

great. And, you all, every day grapple in an incredibly difficult 

space where you are balancing our values and our ideals with the 

urgencies of our time. First and foremost amongst them is to keep 

us safe. 

So, I know how difficult your work is and I just want to say 

thank you. I know these hearings, as, I think, the Honorable Mr. 

Rodriguez was hinting at, can often be difficult, but please know 

I am one of those Senators that just appreciates your work. 

I want to just dive in where Senator Peters left off. I have a lot 

of concerns about the issues that face what was brought forth in 

the omnibus last year, when Congress passed a provision that 

would bar dual nationals from Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Sudan from 

using the Visa Waiver Program. I am very happy that, in a bipartisan way, Senators Flake, Durbin, and I introduced bipartisan legislation, the Equal Protection and Travel Act, repealing—seeking to 

repeal the restrictions on dual nationals while, obviously, leaving 

the other changes to the Visa Waiver Program intact. 

I just find it very disturbing that the prohibition on dual nationals applies to individuals who were born in Visa Waiver Program 

countries, but who have never even traveled to Iraq, Iran, Sudan, 

or Syria. But, they are nationals of those countries solely because 

of their ancestry. It seems to violate, in my opinion, really the values of this country that we have seen throughout our history. 
23 

And so, my colleagues and I support the tightening of the Visa 

Waiver Program, but singling out people based solely on their ancestry or national origin does not, I believe, make us safer. And, 

it is inconsistent with what I love about our country and our interests—and it invites, in my opinion, retaliation or discrimination 

against American citizens who are also dual nationals. 

So my question—and maybe I will start with you, Mr. Donahue— 

is just very plain: do you believe that the dual national restrictions 

that I just described enhance our national security? 

Mr. DONAHUE. We certainly are always reviewing where we need 

to put more emphasis and we want to be sure that every visa interview is used effectively to protect our borders. But, we also realize 

that the Visa Waiver Program, by its very nature, has allowed us 

to move resources to those places where we need to look more 

closely. 

Senator BOOKER. So, does it make us safer that somebody from 

Britain or France who has Iranian, Syrian, or Sudanese ancestry— 

does barring them from the Visa Waiver Program make us safer, 

in your opinion? 

Mr. DONAHUE. I think, all things being equal, not knowing the 

individual—not knowing—you always try to do these on a case-bycase basis. But, I agree with you that that is not, in and of itself, 

an indicator—— 

Senator BOOKER. I appreciate that. 

Mr. DONAHUE [continuing]. That this person is a higher threat. 

Senator BOOKER. In the Senate, whenever I hear those words ‘‘I 

agree with you,’’ I get very happy—and I appreciate that. 

And so, Mr. Rodriguez or the Honorable Ms. Saldan ̃ a, do you 

think we gain any additional security benefits by barring individuals based on their national origin or heritage? 

Ms. SALDAN ̃ A. Well, as a general proposition, no. 

Senator BOOKER. OK. Thank you, Mr. Rodriguez. 

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Let me be very clear. No, we do not. And no, we 

do not do that. We scrutinize people, perhaps, differently in situations where they come from conflict zones, particularly, conflict 

zones where there are organizations that are actively promoting violence against the United States. 

Senator BOOKER. Clearly. 

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. But no, we do not—and I would never operate 

an Agency that operated that way. 

Senator BOOKER. But, the omnibus that passed last year called 

for us to do those things. And, I am very happy that, again, a bipartisan group of Senators is saying that we should not do those 

things. And, you are saying to me that we do not do them now, 

or—does it add to our national—— 

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Certainly not in the manner in which my agency 

does any of its work. I do not operate the Visa Waiver Program. 

My agency does not operate that. We do other things where we 

make decisions based on—— 

Senator BOOKER. Right, but you do not think that what I described and what was in that omnibus enhances national security? 

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Again, not my lane, so I would not be opining 

on the Visa Waiver Program. 
24 

Senator BOOKER. You are a smart man to stay in your lane. 

[Laughter.] 

But, a rule, I think, is very important. But, the Honorable Ms. 

Saldan ̃ a, you do not think it makes us any safer? 

Ms. SALDAN ̃ A. As I said, as a general proposition—again, in our 

role as investigators, we look at every aspect of the facts and circumstances pertaining to an individual’s application—and there 

may be some reason to explore further. But, as a general proposition, of course not—not just solely based on a remote relationship 

with someone from a particular country. 

Senator BOOKER. I am grateful for that response. 

Let me shift into your lane, sir. It was very clear to me, after the 

horrific attacks in France, that many of the people who participated in that could have used the Visa Waiver Program to come 

to our country and, by the way, walk into a gun show, buy a trunk 

full of weapons, and commit those crimes here just as easily. And 

so, one of the aspects of the Visa Waiver Program that is important 

to me is our coordination and cooperation with our European allies, 

specifically, in sharing information and working against terrorism. 

So, my final question in my remaining few seconds is: I worry that 

our European allies and others might not be doing enough to help 

strengthen our security—to share information and to up their procedures and policies to the point where we could effectively rely on 

them. And so, what are we doing to help Europe strengthen its border security entry procedures, so that they are effectively documenting the refugees coming into their countries? 

And, if that is a new signal for my time almost being up, it is 

very effective. [Laughter.] 

Go ahead. 

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Yes, what I do know is that we work on those 

issues, primarily, through our U.S. intelligence community and law 

enforcement partners. I do know that they are actively engaged 

with their counterparts in Europe and throughout the Englishspeaking world. Just 2 or 3 weeks ago, I spent a lot of time with 

our partners from Australia, England, and Canada exchanging information and talking about our common goals in this area. We are 

going to continue doing that on a multilateral basis to make sure 

that we are supporting one another in what is really a very critical 

mission. 

Senator BOOKER. Mr. Roth, are you satisfied that we are doing 

enough in partnership with our European allies to strengthen their 

policies and procedures to make our country safer? 

Mr. ROTH. We have not looked at that specific issue of information sharing with our foreign partners. I would say, though, that 

anytime that you have a risk-based system, particularly in the current terrorist environment, in which you have functionally pop-up 

terrorists—people who are not on anybody’s list and who are unknown—that the kind of individual scrutiny that is required with 

the Visa Waiver Program really is sort of the stop-gap for that. 

Senator BOOKER. Mr. Chairman, thank you. And, thank you for 

holding such an important hearing. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Senator Booker. 

I want to talk a little bit about the problem of overstays. I do 

not quite understand it. I mean, I do but I do not. We are often 
25 

cited the statistic about how 40 percent of the people in this country illegally are here on overstays. Of the best estimate—11 to 12 

million people in this country illegally—that puts the number 

somewhere between 4.4 and 4.8 million people here that are overstaying a visa. 

Let me start by asking, does anybody know which visas are primarily abused? I will start with Director Saldan ̃ a. 

Ms. SALDAN ̃ A. I would defer that to the State Department, with 

respect to the overall picture. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Secretary Donahue, you got the football 

thrown to you. 

Mr. DONAHUE. I am not sure I have seen a figure on any particular area. I really do not know. 

Chairman JOHNSON. I mean, why would we not know that? The 

article I am looking at says there are still, today, about—what does 

it say?—523,000 visa overstays per year. Why would we not be 

tracking that? 

Mr. DONAHUE. We do track at all of our posts and we do this 

through a validation study. We will check to see, for instance, if 

people from a certain country are coming to the United States and 

staying on a certain type of visa. And, different kinds of visas are 

harder to track. For instance, a visitor, admitted for a certain 

amount of time, 6 months usually—or 3 months if they are eligible 

for a visa waiver. A student—that is a long-term admission and it 

is hard to determine at what point they become—— 

Chairman JOHNSON. But, are we not working with the schools, 

and are there not requirements of the schools to keep us up to date 

if somebody drops out, is not paying tuition, or something like 

that—that we can report that and then are aware of it, so that ICE 

can potentially enforce? 

Ms. SALDAN ̃ A. Yes. And, of course, with respect to a category, this 

is an educated, I think, guess and that is, the most visas we have 

are B1s or B2s—travelers for business or pleasure. So, I would 

think there would be some correlation between that and the number of overstays. 

But, absolutely, we are responsible for the Student Exchange 

Visitor Program (SEVP) and we have the database of information 

in the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS) 

database that relates to all 8,000 universities that have students 

placed there. And, we do have leads that are provided to the 

CTCEU, which I mentioned earlier, with respect to overstays. Once 

again, so much of what we do is risk-based, so we are looking at 

the large universe of overstays and trying to determine which of 

these folks could potentially pose a danger or a public safety 

threat. And, the information we have—at least I can give you this, 

sir: we have about half a million—489,579—leads that were provided to CTCEU, where there is a flag with respect to business and 

pleasure travelers—the B1 and B2 visas. That is the largest category of individuals that we are running down, so I think that correlation is supported by that number. 

Chairman JOHNSON. I realize there are millions—tens of millions—of people that come and go out of the United States. In today’s information technology age, I do not understand what is so 
26 

hard about keeping track of this. Everybody that comes here, legally, has a passport that has a number attached, correct? 

Ms. SALDAN ̃ A. Yes. 

Chairman JOHNSON. That goes into a database. What is so hard 

to then have that passport attached to a particular visa? Should we 

not just have the information on this thing? Again, I am an accountant, so I am kind of into numbers and I am kind of into information. But, when we take a look at what we can do in other areas 

of our economy, whether it is tracking numbers with shipments— 

that type of thing—what has been so hard about us developing that 

database, so we know exactly who has come in, who has not gone, 

and can tie it to a visa—and just know, with a great deal of certainty, by pretty much a push of a button on a computer all of that 

information? Why is that? 

Ms. SALDAN ̃ A. Well, we do know, with some degree of certainty, 

what the Principal Deputy was mentioning earlier—— 

Chairman JOHNSON. You were not able to tell me how many— 

under what visa program—again, I understand the vast majority 

of visas are in certain categories, so you assume. But, it is not like 

you have ready information, in terms of, ‘‘No, this is exactly how 

many people were granted a visa and have not checked out on 

time—there is an overstay that should be, potentially, subject to 

enforcement.’’ 

Inspector General Roth, can you speak to this? 

Mr. ROTH. What you are referring to really is a biometric system 

for exits, so you can understand who it is that has left the country, 

so you are able to compare those two sets of data. 

Chairman JOHNSON. First of all, let me—it is just numbers. It is 

actually easier than that. Again, unless I am missing something, 

in terms of people coming in with a passport and a visa—that is 

numerical information and can be easily loaded into a database 

with a set time that a visa expires. We do not have a record of this 

person leaving. To me, that is an incredibly simple database to 

manage. Why do we not do it? 

Mr. ROTH. Well, as my most recent report shows, the challenges, 

in the Federal Government, for building these kinds of information 

systems is very difficult. I think there has been some effort to try 

to get an exit system that has not been successful. So, I think, as 

a Federal Government, we are aware of the problem, but we have 

not been able to implement a solution. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Would you agree with me that, in the private sector, this would almost be like falling off of a log—— 

Mr. ROTH. Yes. 

Chairman JOHNSON [continuing]. In terms of developing a database like this? 

Mr. ROTH. Yes. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Which begs the question: why can we not do 

this after 10 years in the Federal Government? Unbelievable. 

I will go to Senator Ernst. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ERNST 

Senator ERNST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, for the ICE Director, please, a number of my colleagues have already spoken on 

this—Senator Grassley, in a floor speech and last night, and also 
27 

Senator Sasse here, in this forum, this morning asked a question 

and raised the case of the tragic death of Iowan Sarah Root, who 

was killed by a drunk driver who was, reportedly, in the country 

illegally and has since posted bail and absconded. If it is the case 

that ICE refrained from lodging a detainer on Mejia because his arrest for felony vehicular homicide ‘‘did not meet ICE’s enforcement 

priorities,’’ would you agree with me that ICE needs to take another look at its so-called enforcement policies? 

Ms. SALDAN ̃ A. Well, we do that every day. We train and we respond to evolving situations on the basis of things we have experienced and seen. So, that prosecutorial discretion, as I said a little 

earlier, is just that. It is a person’s judgment in looking at all of 

the information in front of them as to whether or not they lodge 

a detainer or not. We do it on a case-by-case basis. And, as I said 

earlier, Senator, this is a terrible instance where we will look at 

it and learn from that situation. But, prosecutorial discretion could 

have been exercised a different way here. That is us looking back. 

I want to look forward, so that we do not have that situation arise 

again. 

Senator ERNST. Well, except that the way we look forward, 

though, Director, is also by learning from mistakes of the past— 

and this is not an isolated incident by any means. And, the priority 

should be to ensure that people who enter our country illegally and 

kill American citizens are deported and never allowed to return. 

And, unfortunately, in this situation, we have a gentleman who has 

done exactly that—and I am guessing he is still here in the United 

States somewhere. 

Ms. SALDAN ̃ A. And, we will be looking for him, Senator. This does 

not end there. 

Senator ERNST. I certainly hope so. There is a family that demands answers—as do we. And, just to be clear, if he is apprehended, today, would Mr. Mejia fit the President’s enforcement priorities? 

Ms. SALDAN ̃ A. Absolutely. 

Senator ERNST. OK. I look forward to continuing the discussion 

on this. This is important. But, again, it is not an isolated incident 

and we have to make sure that all of our agencies—local and Federal—are working together on these issues. And, I think we all can 

learn from this incident. 

Ms. SALDAN ̃ A. I agree. 

Senator ERNST. Thank you for your time. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Senator Carper. 

Senator CARPER. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to go back to visa overstays. Every State has its own Medicaid program. We are told that one of the cost drivers for Medicaid 

is that people have an appointment, but sometimes do not show 

up—oftentimes these are moms, dads, and young children—and so, 

they do a lot of things to try to make sure people show up. 

One of the things that we do in Delaware—and in some other 

States as well—and I think we got this idea from Johnson & Johnson (J&J)—the other Johnson. 

Chairman JOHNSON. A good name. 
28 

Senator CARPER. And, it is called ‘‘Text for Baby.’’ And, text messages are sent to parents, who need to make sure that their child 

has an appointment and actually shows up. And, they do this 

maybe a week before or they do it like a day before. They may even 

do it the day of, I think. And, it seems to me that that is an idea 

that—and it has actually helped. It makes it more certain that people actually show up for their appointments. It saves some money 

for Medicaid and makes sure people get the health care they need. 

I am just wondering if a similar approach might be helpful for 

folks that come to this country—most of the people that come to 

this country come here legally—overwhelmingly so—but a bunch of 

them overstay their visas, as you know. And, I think it might be 

helpful if they were just getting pinged with the countdown to the 

date that their visa expires, saying, ‘‘You have 2 weeks to go,’’ ‘‘You 

have 1 week to go,’’ ‘‘You have 2 days to go,’’ or ‘‘You have 12 hours 

to go.’’ It is the kind of thing that is easily automated and most 

people who come to this country have cell phones. And, I think I 

always like to look to the private sector for a solution that might 

work for a public purpose. Actually, the other is sort of a public 

purpose as well. Just react to that, please. 

Ms. SALDAN ̃ A. It is a very interesting idea, Senator. Obviously, 

everything that we hear here we take back and talk to our folks 

about. 

We have a massive number of students in the system and, as the 

Principal Deputy said earlier, they are on different programs. I understand what you are saying—to do the ping at the end of the 

term of the visa, whether or not they are finished with their program. So, right now, as I said earlier, we are using a risk-based 

analysis with respect to these overstays—who presents a risk in 

those overstays. It is a matter of resources and trying to direct 

them to the area where the greatest risk is. But, that is certainly 

an interesting idea. I think it would require a tremendous number 

of additional resources than we have now to ping millions of people. 

But, that is certainly something I can study further. 

Senator CARPER. I was sitting here listening to Senator Johnson. 

He is shaking his head and he said, ‘‘No, it would not.’’ 

Ms. SALDAN ̃ A. No, it would not require additional resources? Is 

that what you are saying, sir? 

Chairman JOHNSON. Not a tremendous amount. 

Senator CARPER. Just think about it, OK? And, I am going to ask 

you to do more than just think about it. 

Ms. SALDAN ̃ A. Absolutely. 

Senator CARPER. We will put you in touch with the ‘‘Text for 

Baby’’ people and your folks can figure out how they do it. 

Ms. SALDAN ̃ A. Are you saying ‘‘baby’’? 

Senator CARPER. B–A–B–Y. 

Ms. SALDAN ̃ A. B–A–B–Y, OK. 

Senator CARPER. ‘‘Bring back my baby to me.’’ 

All right. This is a question for Director Saldan ̃a and Mr. 

Donahue. You are a good couple here. As I understand it, ICE uses 

an automated system—we talked about it here a little bit earlier 

today—called PATRIOT to conduct the screening of visa applicants 

for all visas that are processed at overseas posts where ICE’s visa 

security teams are present. 
29 

What is holding ICE and the State Department back from requiring this automated system to be used for all incoming visas? Is it 

simply a matter of resources? 

Ms. SALDAN ̃ A. I would not say ‘‘simply,’’ but that is certainly a 

factor. And, actually, Senator, we are undergoing a pilot right now 

under PATRIOT—a PATRIOT expansion pilot—that is looking at 

three additional countries to try to do all—that are not necessarily 

among these 20 or 26 posts where we have visa screening—but 

looking at expanding that and what it would take and how much 

time would be consumed. So, we are actually undertaking an evaluation and study of that because, if it is possible, it is certainly 

something we would like to do. But, right now, I am not in a position to tell you, ‘‘Absolutely, that can happen.’’ I think our study 

wraps up in May, so I will be able to report back to you my 

thoughts and ideas based on what we have learned from that expanded PATRIOT project. 

Senator CARPER. Would you do that? 

Ms. SALDAN ̃ A. Absolutely. 

Senator CARPER. Thank you. 

Mr. Donahue, any thoughts on this one? 

Mr. DONAHUE. I think we are also working with ICE in countries 

where the physical presence would be good, but is not possible because of resources or other reasons, to have some of the PATRIOT 

functions—the computerized functions—done domestically and then 

advising posts of the response to the PATRIOT checks. So, that will 

also expand their ability to expand it to more countries. 

Senator CARPER. OK. This is a question for everybody—and then 

I am done. Since 9/11, one of the key themes of our homeland security efforts has been information sharing. The testimony today references a lot of different programs and different databases used to 

screen applicants before they come to the United States. 

Can each of you just take a moment to reflect on how well integrated these resources are and what barriers remain? And, how 

much of this sharing is automated and how much requires time 

and initiative by an individual officer? 

Mr. DONAHUE. I can begin from our side. 

Senator CARPER. Please. 

Mr. DONAHUE. I have seen a revolution in the realm of information sharing since 9/11—and, especially, in my 32 years of doing 

this kind of work. I think one of the most remarkable things is 

that, today, someone can be interviewing an applicant for a visa in 

Mali. That person’s visa will be checked by my colleagues and the 

interagency—law enforcement and the intelligence community—response will come back to that officer—whether there is anything to 

be concerned about—in addition to whatever he or she has been 

able to find out in the interview. 

Then that person is issued a visa. A person can get on a plane 

today, arrive in Atlanta, and, at the port of entry, the officer there 

will have all of the information that was used in making that decision back in Mali—just in less time than the flight. So, that kind 

of information sharing, where we can look into—for instance, our 

database—our major database—there are more DHS users than 

there are State Department users, so that people know why we 
30 

issued a passport or why we issued a visa. And, I think that has 

made us all much more effective. 

Senator CARPER. OK. Anyone else? Just very briefly, Mr. 

Rodriguez. 

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Sure. I think, as this Committee knows, I spent 

most of my career in law enforcement and, very early on, I was an 

organized crime prosecutor. I remember, back in the late 1980s and 

early 1990s, where what was considered our organized crime database was actually rows and rows of filing cabinets that would fill 

this room. 

We have certainly come a long way from that time. We now 

have, at USCIS, a very well automated process to ping law enforcement and intelligence community databases to determine whether 

an individual seeking an immigration benefit presents a threat to 

the United States. That will never, in my view, be a substitute for 

the human judgment that is required on both ends—to make an intelligence community judgment and then for us to make an immigration judgment with that information. So, that will always continue to be part of it. 

But, in terms of the information moving, we really have reached 

a pretty good point these days. 

Senator CARPER. Good. Thank you. 

Ms. Saldan ̃ a, the same question, just briefly. 

Ms. SALDAN ̃ A. And, I agree, we can always improve and we can 

always do better—we have heard of one or two instances where the 

information—the sharing broke down a little bit. But, the Visa Security Program, itself, is an extraordinary example of that information sharing. We have our DHS holdings that we bounce the PATRIOT inquiry against and it has so many different contributors— 

FBI, obviously the State Department, and other law enforcement— 

and that is an example of the progress that we have made. 

We are always working on this to make it better—and internationally with our allies and the countries out there that we are 

in. 

Senator CARPER. OK. Thank you. 

General Roth, the last word. 

Mr. ROTH. Well, thank you, and my apologies for being the 

contrarian or the skeptic in the room. I will have to say that—— 

Senator CARPER. No, no. Be yourself. Be yourself. [Laughter.] 

Mr. ROTH. It is an occupational hazard, Senator. Several of our 

audits note sort of the difficulty with the paper-based system. So, 

for example, when we compared ICE data with USCIS data, in regard to human-trafficking victims, what we found was that the perpetrators of human trafficking, who people at ICE had investigated, were, in fact, using the visa system to bring their victims 

into the country. And, one of the reasons that has occurred is because USCIS still has a paper-based system—and I am sympathetic to Director Rodriguez’s challenges in this area. But, for example, an individual who applies for a T visa—which is the individual who is a victim of human trafficking—submits a statement 

as to what occurred to that person that allows them to receive a 

T visa. That is not digitized in any way, so there can be names and 

identifiers of perpetrators of human trafficking that simply get lost 

in the system. 
31 

So, while I agree that, in many ways, there are systems in place 

that allow for this kind of information sharing, there is much that 

can be done to improve that. 

Senator CARPER. All right. Thank you. Thank you for being the 

contrarian in the room. And, thank you to each of you for your testimony, your efforts, and your leadership. Thank you. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Senator Carper. I think we 

should work together on some piece of legislation to facilitate using 

the private sector skills that are out there—and technologies. Go 

to any business involved in logistics, whether it is FedEx, UPS, or 

any trucking company. These programs exist for tracking. It is a 

similar type of process—almost off of the shelf. I would suggest, 

maybe, getting some of their IT experts in your agencies and let 

us get this program done. It should not take years and years or billions and billions of dollars. We have done it in the private sector. 

It is unbelievable what they can really track. And, the information, 

just from a desktop, that a customer can obtain, in terms of a package being transferred from this truck to another truck—we ought 

to be able to do the same thing, in terms of tracking visa overstays. 

I do want to ask a couple more questions about resource capabilities. This is kind of going to what Senator Tester was talking 

about. I will go to you, Mr. Donahue. Again, I am an accountant, 

so I like numbers. As best I can determine, somewhere between 20 

million and 32 to 33 million people go to consulates, go to embassies, and have to do an interview to get a visa to come to the 

United States on an annual basis. Is that kind of roughly about the 

right number? Does that sound about right to you? 

Mr. DONAHUE. It is closer to about 13 million that come in and 

13.5 million that come in for a visa. The Visa Waiver Program is 

additional to that. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Something different, OK. You have about 

1,800 foreign service officers that do those interviews, so, based on 

the 13 million number, it is going to be less. But, if you talk about 

13 million people divided by 1,800, we are talking about just a few 

minutes—probably less than 15 minutes per interview. That is not 

a whole lot of time, is it? 

Mr. DONAHUE. Well, I think if you take into account the entire 

package, that the person has already gone through biometric and 

biographic database checks and that they have completed a very 

long visa application form that asks a lot of information that we 

check against—we do have fraud units and we do have our ICE 

Visa Security Units (VSUs). And, like any other business—you are 

a businessman—you expedite the easy and you spend time on what 

needs to have time spent on it. So, when a person walks in and 

everything is clear, you do a quick interview. You believe the person because of your training and knowledge that this person—just 

as you see at the ports of entry—that this person is doing what 

they say they are doing. If the next person comes in and you have 

concerns, you can stop the interview and send it to your fraud unit 

or go to one of our colleagues in DHS. You can continue the interview as long as you need to. So, while one may take one minute, 

another may not be cleared for weeks. 

Chairman JOHNSON. So, it is your sense from around the world, 

really, that the foreign service officers who are in charge of this do 
32 

not feel pressure. You feel that they feel they are adequately 

resourced for the task at hand? 

Mr. DONAHUE. Certainly people would always like to have a few 

more officers, but I think we have used business practices to make 

this as organized as possible and to make sure that the time they 

spend at the window is the most effective. We would certainly like 

to keep all of our fees—because we are a fee-based organization— 

so that we could plow all of that into making our business work 

more efficiently for our customers and make sure that we have all 

of the security checks there. But, I think most officers are using 

good business practices and their training. They are putting the 

work in with those few people who come to the United States to 

do us harm. Really focusing on that has proved effective. 

Chairman JOHNSON. By the way, you talked about a fee-based 

service. It is, again, that tension between security and customer 

service. I come from a business background. 

Mr. DONAHUE. Right. 

Chairman JOHNSON. You are generating revenue for your organization. You have an incentive for generating more revenue, which 

is somewhat at cross-purpose—trying to run more people through 

to generate the revenue versus ensuring the security. So, it does 

concern me. 

Director Rodriguez, I know President Obama announced the 

granting of—or allowing about 10,000 additional Syrians into the 

country. That is about a 20-percent increase in the number of refugees. Again, I am concerned a little bit about taking any shortcuts 

in the process. It normally takes 18 to 24 months to review those 

files. Do you believe you are adequately resourced to have a 20-percent increase in the number of refugees you fully vet? 

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. I would point out that that is still—even that increase is a relatively small part of our overall business. We have 

8 million cases that we handle in any given year across our 19,000 

employees. 

Let me also be very clear that we will do our job with respect 

to the refugees that we screen. No corners will be cut. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Good. 

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. We will do what we need to do. 

Chairman JOHNSON. That is really what I view our responsibility 

as a Committee to be: to make sure that we do not take any shortcuts. So, I appreciate your comments there. 

Let me just wrap up. There are a number of points we did want 

to make—and I want to be respectful of people’s time. I mentioned 

that December 3 incident at the office of USCIS in San Bernardino. 

Inspector General Roth, I would appreciate it if you would investigate exactly what happened there. That does show the potential 

breakdown of inter-agency cooperation. Again, I find it pretty disconcerting, to say the least. 

The K1 visa—ICE is really responsible for verifying those marriages. If you come in on a K1 visa, you are supposed to be married 

within 90 days. Again, I do not think we have a system—I do not 

think we are really verifying those things, which is a potential vulnerability. 

Inspector General Roth, you talked about the poor data collection 

and information sharing that resulted in human trafficking coming 
33 

across our borders. I would appreciate you keeping an eye on that 

and everybody being aware of that. 

I have not yet received an answer for a letter I have written. We 

had ICE Agent Taylor Johnson in for one of our hearings involving 

government whistleblowers and the retaliation against them, which 

is really prevalent in the Federal Government. It is really jawdropping. So, Director Saldan ̃ a, I would really appreciate it if you 

would respond to that, because now, apparently, Agent Johnson 

has been terminated—and the process has not really gone through 

the Office of Special Counsel (OSC) or the Inspector General. I am 

really concerned about that particular case. 

Ms. SALDAN ̃ A. And, we have that letter. We are preparing a response, sir. 

Chairman JOHNSON. OK. Again, the oversight of student visas— 

the overstays is a significant issue. I really will work with Ranking 

Member Carper in trying—if we have to produce some legislation 

to facilitate the computer systems, the IT systems, to do this— 

again, coming from the private sector and knowing what is available out there, this should not be that hard. And, I think it is a 

critical step we have to take. 

So, again, I do want to thank all of you for your service to this 

Nation. I realize this is tough. There is no perfect system. You have 

a serious responsibility. I know you take those responsibilities seriously. So, thank you for your service to this Nation, for providing 

thoughtful testimonies, and for taking the time to answer our questions. 

With that, the hearing record will remain open for 15 days, until 

March 30 at 5 p.m. for the submission of statements and questions 

for the record. This hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:48 a.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

(35) 

A P P E N D I X 
36 

Second, how effectively are federal agencies managing their responsibilities and working 

together- including sharing information- through each step of the visa and immigration 

process to ensure our security? 

I am particularly interested to understand how the DHS components represented here today are 

working together including overseeing key visa programs, sharing information, and 

preventing fraud and national security threats. 

The American people are counting on us to keep them safe. That depends on the security and 

integrity of our immigration system. It requires the State Department and the Department of 

Homeland Security, as well as their components, to work etTectively together as one team to 

protect us. 

I am pleased that we have representatives from the State Department and the Department of 

Homeland Security with us today to address these serious questions. 

You each have important jobs and responsibilities. I look forward to your testimony. 
37 

As prepared for delivery: 

Statement of Ranking Member Tom Carper 

"The Security of U.S. Visa Programs" 

Tuesday, March 15,2016 

This hearing is the third in a series we have held to explore whether we are doing enough to 

address concerns that terrorists might try to exploit international travel to infiltrate our country. 

In the aftermath of the Paris terrorist attacks, this Committee first scrutinized the process in place 

to screen and vet Syrian refugees escaping the carnage in the Middle East. We learned that the 

U.S. refugee resettlement process involves extensive security screening. Syrian refugees, we 

were told, undergo multiple rounds of screening over an average of 18 to 24 months, including 

in-person interviews by immigration analysts and counterterrorism officials trained in spotting 

lraud and deception. 

The Committee next looked at our Visa Waiver program, which allows citizens of certain nations 

to travel to the United States for short visits without a visa. Once it became clear that the Paris 

terrorists held passports from European countries whose citizens enjoy visa waiver privileges, 

fears arose that this program could pose a security threat. 

We learned that Visa Waiver travelers seeking to come to the United States endure nearly the 

same level of scrutiny and vetting as all other travelers. We also learned that when it comes to 

security, nothing is being 'waived', as the name of the program incorrectly suggests. And we 

learned that, in return for their entry into the Visa Waiver program, countries must share 

intelligence with the United States, they must open up their counter terrorism and aviation 

security systems to our inspectors, and they must abide by our standards for aviation and 

passport security. 

As a result, the Visa Waiver program has now become a key counter terrorism tool. 

Today we will continue this look at our screening systems for foreigners entering our country. 

We will examine the depth of security for all forms of visas, whether they are for students, 

tourists, people here on business, or those seeking to make America their permanent home. 

It is a daunting undertaking, given the volume of international travel to the United States. It also 

involves the coordination of multiple government entities, particularly the State Department and 

DHS, both of which are represented here today. 

Since the 9/ll attacks against our country, there have been notable changes to strengthen our 

visa security, including recent adjustments made following the attacks in Paris and San 

Bernardino. For example, amid ISIS's growing online presence, the Department of Homeland 

Security is exploring ways to expand its use of social media to screen travelers seeking to enter 

the United States. 
38 

!look forward to hearing more about these etTorts, and also about the contribution ofiCE's visa 

security program that may help identify threats posed by potential travelers early on. We need to 

know if this program is adding real security and, if so, how to expand its reach. 

As with all of our recent hearings, I expect that we will find elements of our visa security that we 

can improve upon understanding that we can never eliminate all risk and should not tum our 

back on the many benefits of trade, travel and immigration. Yet as we continuously improve the 

security of our immigration system, we must also keep our eye on perhaps the even more 

pressing threat of homegrown terrorism. 

For all that we do to strengthen our borders and our immigration security, groups like ISIS know 

all too well that they may bypass our multiple layers of homeland security by using online 

propaganda to recruit people already inside our borders to carry out attacks against the United 

States. In this respect, preventing ISIS's twisted propaganda from mobilizing our young people 

to carry out terrorist violence may help combat the long-term terrorist threats to the homeland in 

ways that aviation screening and watchlist checks can never do. 

!look forward to our continued work on this committee on both combatting homegrown 

terrorism and strengthening the security of our immigration systems. And I hope we can use 

today's hearing to identify some common sense improvements to the security of visas. Thank 

you to the witnesses for your testimony and for your service to our country. 
39 

DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

WRITTEN STATEMENT 

OF 

DA VJD T. DONAHUE 

PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR CONSULAR 

AFFAIRS 

DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

BEFORE THE 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL 

AFFAIRS 

HEARING 

ON 

THE SECURITY OF U.S. VISA PROGRAMS 

MARCH 15,2016 
40 

Good morning Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member Carper, and 

distinguished Members of the Committee. The Department of State is dedicated to 

the protection of our borders. We have no higher priority than the safety of our 

fellow citizens at home and overseas. We and our partner agencies throughout the 

federal government have built a layered visa and border security screening system, 

and continue to refine and strengthen the five pillars of visa security: technological 

advances, biometric innovations, personal interviews, data sharing, and training. 

This layered approach enables the Department of State to track and review 

the visa eligibility and status of foreign visitors from their visa applications to their 

entry into the United States. Lessons learned through the years have led to 

significant improvements in procedures and capabilities. At the same time, the 

tragic events in Paris and San Bernardino demonstrated the changing nature of 

threats and our obligation to constantly analyze, test, and update our clearance 

procedures. We will never stop doing so. 

A Layered Approach to Visa Security 

In coordination with interagency partners, the Department has developed, 

implemented, and refined an intensive visa application and screening process. We 

require personal interviews in most cases, including all immigrant and fiance( e) 

cases, employ analytic interviewing techniques, and incorporate multiple 

biographic and biometric checks in the visa process. Underpinning the process is a 

sophisticated global information technology network that shares data among the 

Department and federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Security is our 

primary mission. Every visa decision is a national security decision. The rigorous 

security screening regimen I describe below applies to all visa categories. 

All visa applicants submit online applications the online DS-160 

nonimmigrant visa application form, or the online DS-260 immigrant visa 

application form. Online forms enable consular and fraud prevention officers, and 

our intelligence and law enforcement partners, to analyze data in advance of the 

visa interview, including the detection of potential non-biographic links to 

derogatory information. The online forms offer foreign language support, but 

applicants must respond in English, to facilitate information sharing among the 

Department and other government agencies. 
41 

Consular officers use a multitude of tools to screen visa applications. No 

visa can be issued unless all relevant concerns are fully resolved. The vast 

majority of visa applicants are interviewed by a consular officer. During the 

interview, consular officers pursue case-relevant issues pertaining to the 

applicant's identity, qualifications for the particular visa category in question, and 

any information pertaining to possible ineligibilities related to criminal history, 

prior visa applications or travel to the United States, and/or links to terrorism or 

security threats. 

As a matter of standard procedure, all visa applicant data is reviewed 

through the Department's Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS), an 

online database containing approximately 36 million records of persons, including 

those found ineligible for visas and persons who are the subjects of potentially 

derogatory information, drawn from records and sources throughout the U.S. 

government. CLASS employs sophisticated name-searching algorithms to identifY 

accurate matches between visa applicants and any derogatory information 

contained in CLASS. We also run all visa applicants' names against the Consular 

Consolidated Database (CCD, our automated visa application record system) to 

detect and respond to any derogatory information regarding visa applicants and 

visa holders, and to check for prior visa applications, refusals, or issuances. The 

CCD contains more than 181 million immigrant and nonimmigrant visa records 

dating back to 1998. This robust searching capability, which takes into account 

variations in spelling and naming conventions, is central to our procedures. 

We collect 1 0-print fingerprint scans from nearly all visa applicants, except 

certain foreign government officials, diplomats, international organization 

employees, and visa applicants over the age of79 or under the age of 14. Those 

fingerprints are screened against two key databases: first, the Department of 

Homeland Security's (DHS) IDENT database, which contains a biometric 

repository of available fingerprints of known and suspected terrorists, wanted 

persons, and those who have committed immigration violations; and second, the 

Federal Bureau oflnvestigation's (FBI) Next Generation Identification (NGI) 

system, which contains more than 75.5 million criminal history records. 
42 

All visa photos are screened against a gallery of photos of known or 

suspected terrorists obtained from the FBI's Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), and 

against visa applicant photos contained in the Department's CCD. 

In 2013, in coordination with multiple interagency partners, the Department 

launched the "Kingfisher Expansion" (KFE) counterterrorism visa vetting system 

through the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). While the precise details 

ofKFE vetting cannot be detailed in this open setting, KFE supports a 

sophisticated comparison of multiple fields of information drawn from visa 

applications against intelligence community and law enforcement agency 

databases in order to identify terrorism concerns. If a "red-light" hit is 

communicated to the relevant consular post, the consular officer denies the visa 

application and submits it for a Washington-based interagency Security Advisory 

Opinion (SAO) review by federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies. In 

addition to this KFE "red-light" scenario, consular officers are required to submit 

SAO requests in any case with applicable CLASS name check results, and for a 

variety of interagency-approved policies developed to vet travelers that raise 

security concerns, including certain categories of travelers with a particular 

nationality or place of birth. In any case in which reasonable grounds exist to 

question visa eligibility on security related grounds, regardless of name check 

results, a consular officer suspends visa adjudication and requests an SAO. 

Consular officers receive extensive training on the SAO process, which under the 

aforementioned circumstances, requires them to deny the visa per INA section 

22l(g) and submit the case for interagency review via an SAO for any possible 

security-related ineligibilities. The applicant is informed of the denial and that the 

case is in administrative processing. An applicant subject to this review may be 

found eligible for a visa only if the SAO process resolves all concerns. 

DHS's Pre-adjudicated Threat Recognition and Intelligence Operations 

Team (PATRIOT) and Visa Security Program (VSP) provide additional law 

enforcement review of visa applications at designated overseas posts. PATRIOT is 

a pre-adjudication visa screening and vetting initiative that employs resources from 

DHS/Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Customs and Border 

Protection (CBP), and the Department of State. It was established to identify 

national security, public safety, and other eligibility concerns prior to visa 
43 

issuance. A team of agents, officers, and analysts from ICE and CBP perform 

manual vetting of possible derogatory matches. 

PATRIOT works in concert with the Visa Security Units (VSU) located in 

more than 20 high-threat posts and we are working with ICE to deploy VSUs to 

more visa issuing posts as rapidly as available resources will support. ICE special 

agents assigned to VSUs provide on-site vetting of visa applications and other law 

enforcement support to consular officers. When warranted, DHS officers assigned 

to VSUs conduct targeted, in-depth reviews of individual visa applications and 

applicants prior to issuance, and recommend refusal or revocation of applications 

to consular officers. The Department of State works closely with DHS to ensure 

that no known or suspected terrorist inadvertently receives a visa or is admitted 

into our country. The Department of State has not and will not issue a visa for 

which the VSU recommends refusal. 

Training 

Consular officers are trained to take all prescribed steps to protect the United 

States and its citizens when making visa adjudication decisions. Each consular 

officer completes an intensive, six-week Basic Consular Course. This course 

features a strong emphasis on border security and fraud prevention, with more than 

40 classroom hours devoted to security, counterterrorism, fraud detection, and visa 

accountability programs. Adjudicators receive extensive classroom instruction on 

immigration law, Department policy and guidance, and consular systems, 

including review of background data checks and biometric clearances. 

Students learn about the interagency vetting process through briefings from 

the Bureau oflnternational Security and Nonproliferation; Consular Affairs' (CA) 

Office of Screening, Analysis and Coordination; CA's Counterfeit Deterrence 

Laboratory; Diplomatic Security; and the DHS/ICE Forensic Document 

Laboratory. 

In addition, officers receive in-depth interviewing and name check technique 

training, spending more than 30 classroom hours critiquing real consular 

interviews, debriefing role plays, and other in-class activities. Basic interviewing 

training includes instruction in techniques for questioning an applicant to elicit 

information relevant to assessing visa eligibility. Officers use verbal and non-
44 

verbal cues to judge an applicant's credibility and the veracity of the applicant's 

story. They examine and assess documentation, including electronic application 

forms, internal background check information, passports, and required supporting 

documents during the interview. 

Officers receive continuing education in all of these disciplines throughout 

their careers. All consular officers have top secret clearances, and most speak the 

language of the country to which they are assigned and receive training in the 

culture of the host country. 

Visas Viper Program 

U.S. missions overseas report information about foreign nationals with 

possible terrorist connections through the Visas Viper reporting program. 

Following the December 25, 2009, attempted terrorist attack on Northwest Flight 

253, we strengthened the procedures and content requirements for Visas Viper 

reporting. Chiefs of Mission are responsible for ensuring that all appropriate 

agencies and offices at post contribute relevant information for Viper nominations. 

Visas Viper cables must include complete information about all previous and 

current U.S. visas. On December 31, 2009, we updated instructions regarding 

procedures and criteria used to revoke visas. We added specific reference to cases 

that raise security and other concerns to the guidance regarding consular officers' 

use of the authority to deny visa applications under section 214(b) of the 

Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), if the applicant does not establish visa 

eligibility to the satisfaction of the consular officer. Instruction in appropriate use 

of this authority has been a fundamental part of officer training for several years. 

Continuous Vetting and Visa Revocation 

Federal agencies have been matching new threat information against existing 

visa records since 2002. We have long recognized this function as critical to 

managing our records and processes. This system of continual vetting evolved as 

post-9/11 reforms were instituted, and is now performed in cooperation with the 

TSC, NCTC, FBI, DHS/ICE, and CBP's National Targeting Center (NTC). All 

records added to the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB) and Terrorist Identities 

Datamart Environment (TIDE) are checked against the CCD to determine if there 

are matching visa records. Through the KFE process, we also have additional 
45 

information checked against classified holdings. While this obviously includes 

biographic data taken during the visa process, biometric data taken during the visa 

process is likewise available to interagency partners in their counterterrorism and 

law enforcement efforts. Vetting partners send these matches electronically to the 

Department of State, where analysts review the hits and flag cases for possible visa 

revocation. We have visa information sharing agreements under which we widely 

disseminate our data to other agencies that may need to learn whether a subject of 

interest has, or has ever applied for, a U.S. visa. 

The Department of State has broad authority to revoke visas, and we use that 

authority widely to protect our borders. Cases for revocation consideration are 

forwarded to the Department of State's Visa Office by embassies and consulates 

overseas, NTC, NCTC, and other entities. As soon as information is established to 

support a revocation (i.e., information that surfaced after visa issuance that could 

lead to an ineligibility determination, or otherwise indicates the visa holder poses a 

potential threat), a "VRVK" entry code showing the visa revocation, and lookout 

codes indicating specific potential visa ineligibilities, are added to CLASS, as well 

as to biometric identity systems, and then shared in near-real time (within 

approximately 15 minutes) with the DHS lookout systems used for border 

screening. As part of its enhanced "Pre-Departure" initiative, CBP uses VRVK 

records, among other lookout codes, to recommend that airlines not board certain 

passengers on flights bound for the United States. Every day, we receive requests 

to review and, if warranted, revoke visas for aliens for whom new derogatory 

information has been discovered since the visa was issued. The Department of 

State's Operations Center is staffed 24 hours a day, seven days a week, to address 

urgent requests, such as when a potentially dangerous person is about to board a 

plane. In those circumstances, the Department of State can and does use its 

authority to revoke the visa immediately. We continue to work with our 

interagency partners to refine the visa revocation and associated notification 

processes. 

Revocations are typically based on new information that has come to light 

after visa issuance. Because individuals' circumstances change over time, and 

people who once posed no threat to the United States can become threats, 

continuous vetting and revocation are important tools. We use our authority to 

revoke a visa immediately in circumstances where we believe there is an 
46 

immediate threat, regardless of the individual's location, after which we will notify 

the issuing post and interagency partners as appropriate. We are mindful, however, 

not to act unilaterally, but to coordinate expeditiously with our national security 

partners in order to avoid possible disruption of important investigations. In 

addition to the hundreds of thousands of visa applications we refuse each year, 

since 2001, the Department has revoked approximately 122,000 visas, based on 

information that surfaced following visa issuance, for a variety of reasons. This 

includes approximately I 0,000 visas revoked for suspected links to terrorism. 

Terrorism-related visa revocations account for only .009 percent of the 

approximately l 08 million visas we have issued since January 2001. 

Going Forward 

We face dangerous and adaptable foes. We are dedicated to maintaining our 

vigilance and strengthening the measures we take to protect the American public 

and the lives of those traveling to the United States. We will continue to apply 

state-of-the-art technology to vet visa applicants. While increasing our knowledge 

of threats, and our ability to identify and interdict those threats, the interagency 

acts in accordance with the rules and regulations agreed upon in key governance 

documents. These documents ensure a coordinated approach to our security and 

facilitate mechanisms for redress and privacy protection. 

We are taking several measures to confront developing threats and respond 

to the despicable terrorist attacks in Paris and San Bernardino. 

With our interagency partners, particularly DHS, we conducted a thorough 

review of our K-visa process. As we constantly do, we analyzed our current Kvisa processes, including security vetting, to identify areas where we could 

improve. We are further exploring and implementing several adjustments and 

recommendations, especially in regard to our adjudication of cases with applicants 

from countries of concern. These adjustments and recommendations include, but 

are not limited to, working with the Department of State's Diplomatic Security 

Service to explore assigning additional Regional Security Officers in direct support 

of consular sections and visa adjudications; working with DHS to explore 

expanding the use ofiCE's PATRIOT screening in certain countries of concern 

where it is not already present; and taking another opportunity to review prior K-
47 

visa adjudications and our internal standard operating procedures to determine 

what we can learn and use to inform our processes and training. 

Additionally, we are working closely with DHS and the interagency to 

explore and analyze the use of social media screening of visa applicants. In 

addition to learning from our DHS colleagues, we began a pilot exploration of 

social media screening at 17 posts that adjudicate K-visa applications and 

immigrant visa applications for individuals from countries of concern. We expect 

to learn a great deal from this pilot and are confident we will have a much better 

understanding of the implications of using social media vetting for national 

security and immigration benefits. At the same time, we continue to explore 

methods and tools that potentially could assist in this type of screening and 

potentially provide new methods to assess the credibility of certain information 

from applicants. We believe these endeavors will provide us insights to continue 

to ensure the visa process is as secure, effective, and efficient as possible. 

Information sharing with trusted foreign partners is an area that has seen 

significant development in recent years. For example, "to address threats before 

they reach our shores," as called for by President Obama and the Prime Minister of 

Canada in their February 4, 2011, joint declaration, Beyond the Border: A Shared 

Vision for Perimeter Security and Economic Competitiveness, the Departments of 

State and Homeland Security have implemented arrangements for systematic 

information sharing with Canada. The established processes provide for nearly 

real-time access to visa and immigration data through matching of fingerprints, as 

well as through biographic name checks for information that an applicant 

previously violated immigration laws, was denied a visa, or is a known or 

suspected terrorist. Canadian officers currently access the U.S. records of Syrian 

nationals seeking refugee resettlement in Canada, among other populations of visa 

and immigration applicants. 

As part of our long-term strategic planning to improve efficiency and 

accuracy in visa adjudications, while ensuring we can meet surging visitor visa 

demand, we are investigating the applicability of advanced technology in data 

analysis, risk screening, and credibility assessment. Keeping abreast of high-tech 

solutions will help us reduce threats from overseas while keeping the United States 

open for business. 
48 

I assure you that the Department of State continues to refine its intensive 

visa application and screening process, including personal interviews, employing 

analytic interview techniques, incorporating multiple biographic and biometric 

checks, and interagency coordination, all supported by a sophisticated global 

information technology network. We look forward to working with the committee 

staff on issues addressing our national security in a cooperative and productive 

manner. 
49 

WRITTEN TESTIMONY 

OF 

U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMEI"ANO SECIJIUTY 

FOR A HEARING ON 

BEFORE 

THE U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

MARCH 15, 2016 

Hl:OOA.M. 

340 DIRKSEN SENATE OFFICE BUILDING 

WASHINGTON, DC 
50 

Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member Carper, and distinguished members of the Committee, 

thank you for the opportunity to testify at today's hearing. While my colleagues from the 

Department of State (DOS) and the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Immigration and 

Customs Enforcement (ICE) will discuss security screening in the visa process, my testimony 

will focus specifically on U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services' (USCIS) role in the 

security process for visa petitions and other USC IS adjudications. As the Director of USC IS, I 

work with the talented and dedicated professionals at my agency and throughout the federal 

government to secure America's promise as a nation of immigrants by providing accurate and 

useful information to our customers, granting immigration and citizenship benefits. and ensuring 

the integrity of our immigration system. From the visa petition stage to post-entry applications 

for immigration benefits, USC IS works closely with DOS, the DHS partners represented on this 

panel, and others to ensure that those wishing to enter the United States are screened thoroughly 

and repeatedly in every instance and without exception. Security and integrity are central to 

USCIS's mission, and USCIS personnel work with steadfast resolve and vigilance to identify and 

deny benefits to immigration applicants who pose a threat to national security or public safety, or 

who attempt to gain benefits through fraud. 

Visa Adjudication Overview 

DHS and DOS both have roles to play in determining whether a foreign national will be issued a 

visa and admitted to the United States. Generally, a foreign national who seeks to enter the 

United States must first obtain a U.S. visa from DOS. In many instances these individuals must 

first have a petition filed and approved on their behalf with USC IS. However. certain 

international travelers may be eligible to travel to the United States without a visa if they meet 

the requirements for visa-free travel such as under the Visa Waiver Program (VWP). A foreign 

national who is issued a U.S. visa or is eligible for admission without a visa may travel to a U.S. 

air, sea. or land port of entry and apply for admission into the United States. 

There are two broad classes of foreign nationals who are issued U.S. visas: nonimmigrants and 

immigrants. Nonimmigrant visas allow foreign nationals to travel to the United States on a 

temporary basis (for example, a vacation, temporary employment, or study and exchange). 

Immigrant visas allow foreign nationals, who have met the numerous eligibility requirements for 

lawful permanent residence, to travel to the United States for the purpose of residing in the 

country as lawful permanent residents (LPR). Individuals who have applied for humanitarian 

relief under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) are outside the scope of this testimony. 

Most visits to the United States arc made with a "B I /B2" nonimmigrant visa issued by DOS, or 

under the VWP or equivalent authority, for temporary stays for business or pleasure. The VWP 

is managed by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and other DHS entities in consultation 

with DOS. 

In those instances where USC IS is required under our law to adjudicate immigrant or 

nonimmigrant petitions, USClS will carefully review the claimed basis for the petition (e.g., 

family or employment relationship). When USC IS approves such a petition for a beneficiary 

abroad, that information is communicated to DOS. The approval of such a petition does not give 

a foreign national any immigration status. It does not guarantee that DOS will issue a visa, and it 

is not a guarantee that Cl3P will admit the individual to the United States. 
51 

After USC IS has approved the petition under the appropriate visa classification, the beneficiary 

of the petition may then begin the visa application process with DOS. DOS is responsible for the 

adjudication of visa applications. As part of its adjudication process, DOS ensures that the 

applicant is eligible for a visa as an immigrant or nonimmigrant under the requested 

classification, and that the applicant is admissible to the United States. Once granted a visa, the 

foreign national may travel to the United States. On arrival at a U.S. port of entry, such as an 

airport, CBP inspects the individual and determines whether to admit the individual to the United 

States. 

Visa Screening Responsibilities 

DOS and DHS each have screening responsibilities as part of our respective roles in the visa 

process. USC!S screening during petition adjudication involves screening of both the petitioner 

and the foreign national beneficiary against law enforcement and national security lookouts and 

records. USC IS reviews each petition to determine if the petitioner and beneficiary meet the 

statutory requirements of the petition. Generally, this review is done to determine if the petitioner 

and beneficiary have the relationship claimed in the petition either a family-based relationship, 

or employment-based. USC IS does not review petitions for admissibility to the United States. 

This is done initially by DOS prior to visa issuance and by CBP at time of entry. As such, any 

information uncovered is reviewed by IJSCIS and, if the petition is otherwise approvable, 

provided to our partners at DOS. Also, if there is an indication that a petitioner may have a 

conviction for a specified offense against a minor, as defined in the Adam Walsh Act, USC IS 

conducts a Federal Bureau of Investigation Fingerprint check of the petitioner. 

My colleague from DOS will provide more detail on visa adjudication. However, DOS generally 

conducts an interview with the visa applicant and conducts additional biographic and biometric 

screening; including a battery of additional background security checks. If DOS issues the visa. 

the foreign national beneficiary must travel to the United States and apply for admission within 

the visa validity period, which varies depending upon the visa classification. At the port of 

entry, CBP conducts additional biographic and biometric screening and background security 

checks on these individuals, to determine their admissibility to the United States. 

Applications for Immigration Benefits by Foreign Nationals Already in the United States 

In some circumstances individuals admitted to the United States on nonimmigrant visas may be 

able to seek certain immigration benefits while in the United States. For example, a foreign 

national who was previously admitted to the United States as a nonimmigrant may seek to extend 

his or her stay or change his or her nonimmigrant status with USC IS if the individual meets the 

requirements for doing so. As a part of their request, these individuals are screened against law 

enforcement and national security lookouts and records. Any information uncovered is reviewed 

according to current agency policies. If the information uncovered indicates that the subject may 

have national security, criminal, or public safety concerns which make them removable from the 

United States, USC IS works closely with ICE and other law enforcement offices to ensure that 

appropriate actions are taken. Depending on the immigration classification sought, additional 

biographic checks may be conducted. 

2 
52 

Moreover. certain foreign nationals in the United States. including some who were initially 

admitted on nonimmigrant visas, may be eligible under our immigration laws to adjust to lawful 

permanent resident status. Those eligible individuals must file a Form I-485 Application to 

Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status with USCIS. The 1-485 applicant must provide 

evidence of a USCIS-approved petition as the basis for immigration status, or concurrently file 

the immigrant petition with the I-485 application to establish the claimed family or employment 

relationship and/or classification specified under the INA, and meet all requirements for 

adjustment of status. 

For each adjustment application, USC IS initiates a number ofbiographic and biometric security 

checks to establish eligibility for the benefit and admissibility to the United States. USCIS 

screens applicants against law enforcement and national security lookouts as well as FBI 

biographic and biometric holdings. Additionally, USC IS may interview the applicant to elicit 

information regarding identity, derogatory and conflicting information. involvement in terrorist 

or criminal activity, or other disqualifying factors. 

Most individuals who become LPRs are allowed to apply for U.S. citizenship through the 

naturalization process after a given period of time. There is, however, a category of LPRs that 

must petition USC IS in order to retain their LPR status. Those who became LPRs on the basis of 

an Alien Entrepreneur Visa Petition and those who became LPRs on the basis of a marriage that 

occurred less than two years prior to the date they attained LPR status are considered conditional 

permanent residents. A conditional permanent resident must petition USCIS to remove the 

conditions on the residence within 90 days of the end of his or her second year as a conditional 

LPR. These individuals again undergo biographic and biometric security checks, and are 

screened against law enforcement and national security lookouts, records, and FBI biometric 

holdings. In addition, USC IS may also conduct interviews in the process of determining whether 

to lift conditions on permanent residence. Conditional permanent residence can be terminated 

due to information obtained during the interview and USC IS can share the information with ICE. 

USC IS receives approximately 750,000 applications for naturalization each year. Many of these 

applicants were admitted into the United States as either immigrant or nonimmigrant visa 

holders. For each naturalization applicant, USC IS initiates a number ofbiographic and biometric 

security checks. USC IS screens applicants against law enforcement and national security 

lookouts and records as well as FBI biographic and biometric holdings. Additionally, all 

applicants for naturalization must be interviewed to establish their eligibility; this requirement 

may not be waived. During the interview, the officer confirms the basic biographic data and 

identity of the applicant, conducts an examination of the applicant's knowledge of the English 

language and of U.S. history and civics, with minor exceptions, and confirms that the applicant 

has no factors or activities that may make him or her ineligible for naturalization-such as 

certain types of criminal history. national security concerns, or prior false claims to U.S. 

citizenship. Information found in the interview can be used to deny the naturalization and can be 

shared with ICE for further investigation. 

During the process of adjudicating any application, petition, or request filed with USC IS, if any 

national security concerns are raised, either based on security and background checks, personal 

interviews, testimony, or other sources, USC IS conducts an additional review through the 

internal Controlled Application Review and Resolution Program (CARRP). CARRP includes a 

3 
53 

complete review of the case file and, in most cases, additional screening to ensure that eligibility 

is met. CARRP procedure includes regular supervisory review and headquarters coordination. 

As part of the CARRP review process, USC IS also collaborates closely with its partners in the 

law enforcement and intelligence communities, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation, in 

order to review available information from these other U.S. Government entities and determine if 

it is relevant to eligibility and/or admissibility. This engagement is not one-sided, as USC IS also 

uses CARRP to alert relevant agencies that may wish to take action on the subject of the national 

security concern. It is USC IS policy to take any ongoing law enforcement activities into 

consideration prior to making a decision or taking action on any case with national security 

concerns. 

Additional Coordination with Federal Partners 

USC IS remains committed to ensuring that immigration benefits are not granted to individuals 

who pose a threat to national security or public safety, or who seek to defraud the U.S. 

immigration system. At its core, this system ensures that every application or petition for an 

immigration benefit is screened before it is adjudicated. As noted above, in support of these 

screening efforts, USCIS works closely with DOS, CBP, ICE, and other law enforcement 

partners. USC IS engages with law enforcement and Intelligence Community members for 

assistance with identity verification, acquisition of additional information, or decont1iction to 

ensure USC IS activities will not adversely affect an ongoing law enforcement investigation. 

USCJS also shares lead information, such as coordinating with ICE on potential human 

trafficking concerns associated with T and U nonimmigrant visas. USC IS continues to work 

with DHS's I&A, and other Intelligence Community elements, to enhance screening. 

Conclusion 

I appreciate the support and interest of this Committee in our efforts on these and other matters 

critical to the transparency, integrity, consistency. and ef!iciency of our immigration system and 

the work of USC IS. 

I will be happy to answer your questions. 

4 
54 

WRITTEN TESTIMONY 

OF 

U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

REGARDING A HEARING ON 

BEFORE THE 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

March 2016 

342 Dirksen Senate Office 
55 

Introduction 

Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member Carper, and distinguished members of the 

Committee: 

Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the role of U.S. Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement (ICE) in the visa screening and vetting process. At ICE, we strive to uphold our 

homeland security mission by confronting dangerous challenges on a global stage, including 

threats emanating from beyond America's physical borders. I am proud and honored to serve 

alongside the dedicated men and women of ICE who work tirelessly to enforce our immigration 

and customs laws and keep this nation safe. Today, I welcome the opportunity to provide an 

overview of our international operations and highlight ICE"s security programs that guard the 

nation against diverse and global threats. 

One of ICE"s three operational components Homeland Security Investigations (HSI)-

is responsible for the agency's work in vetting visa applications and working with our partners at 

the U.S. Department of State (DOS) and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). 

HSI's three operational priorities are border security, public safety, and 

counterterrorism/homeland security. HSI has extremely broad authorities and jurisdiction over 

the investigation of crimes with a nexus to U.S. borders and ports of entry. It investigates 

transnational crime by conducting a wide range of domestic and international criminal 

investigations, often in coordination with other local, state, federal, and international partners, 

targeting the illegal movement of people and merchandise into. within, and out of the United 

States. HSI investigates offenses that stem from our traditional customs and immigration 

authorities, including smuggling of illicit goods and people, and illicit finance associated with 

2 
56 

global criminal organizations. These efforts provide a crucial layer of security vetting of 

individuals hoping to come to the United States. 

The Visa Security Program and Pre-Adjudicated Threat Recognition Intelligence 

Operations Team 

ICE strives to protect our nation's homeland security wherever threats confront us. One 

of our most important priorities is to detect and deter threats before they reach our nation's 

borders. To achieve this goal, ICE currently deploys approximately 250 Special Agents, 17 

Deportation Officers, and 176 support staff to 62 offices in 46 countries. ICE's international 

staff works in conjunction with international law enforcement counterparts to detect, disrupt, and 

dismantle transnational criminal groups and individuals who seek to cause harm to the security 

of the United States. 

The Homeland Security Act of 2002 authorizes the deployment of DHS officers to 

diplomatic posts to perform visa security activities and provide advice and training to DOS 

consular officers. This critical mission is accomplished by the Visa Security Program (VSP). 

VSP's primary purpose is to identify terrorists, criminals, and other individuals who are 

ineligible for visas prior to their travel or application for admission to the United States. 

YSP is our first line of defense in the visa process against terrorists and criminal 

organizations by preventing foreign nationals who pose a threat to national security from 

entering the United States. The visa adjudication process is often the first opportunity to assess 

whether a potential visitor or immigrant poses a threat. Furthermore, the visa adjudication 

process is an ongoing and continuous vetting process that searches for derogatory information on 

applicants. No visa recipient is granted admittance based on a single review point. 

3 
57 

Visa security is an important and collaborative function, shared by both DOS and DHS, 

including the component offices of ICE, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and 

USC IS. Our components constantly seek to enhance our systems and processes to improve visa 

security efforts. Through the Pre-Adjudicated Threat Recognition Intelligence Operations Team 

(PATRIOT) initiative, we conduct automated screening of visa application information against 

DHS holdings, as well as holdings of other U.S. agencies, prior to the applicant's interview and 

visa adjudication. The process includes in-depth vetting of applicants identified as potentially 

having derogatory information who may be of investigative interest, or ineligible to receive U.S. 

visas. PATRIOT takes a risk-based approach and uses interagency resources from ICE. CBP. 

DOS, and the Intelligence Community to identify national security and public safety threats. 

VSP differs from most other U.S. Government screening efforts in that it leverages its 

capabilities, such as in-person interviews, and works collaboratively with U.S. agencies at post to 

investigate suspect travelers, enhance existing information, and identify previously unknown 

threats instead of simply denying visas and any potential travel. In Fiscal Year (FY) 2015. VSP 

reviewed over two million visa applications, contributing input to approximately 8,600 cases in 

which visas were refused. Of these refusals, over 2,200 applicants had some known or suspected 

connection to terrorism or terrorist organizations. 

In addition, VSP enhances visa vetting by increasing automated data exchange between 

DOS and the CBP National Targeting Center (NTC), which provides tactical targeting and 

analytical research to prevent terrorists from entering the United States. The flow of online visa 

information to D!IS systems is now automated and information is sent back to DOS using an 

automated interface. 

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58 

ICE also deploys personnel to the NTC to augment and expand current operations, and 

the co-location of personnel helps increase both communication and information sharing. The 

NTC conducts pre-departure vetting of all travelers on flights bound for the United States. This 

vetting identities high-risk passengers who should be the subject of no-board recommendations 

to carriers, including those whose visas are later revoked. 

Within VSP's international footprint, we deploy specially trained agents overseas to 

screen and vet visa applications at 26 high-risk locations in 20 countries, augmenting vetting 

mechanisms in place worldwide in order to enhance efforts at these critical posts to identify 

potential terrorist and criminal threats before they enter the United States. ICE accomplishes this 

crucial function by conducting targeted. in-depth reviews of individual visa applications and 

applicants prior to visa issuance. and making recommendations to consular officers to refuse or 

revoke visas when warranted. ICE actions complement the consular officers· screening. 

applicant interviews, and reviews of applications and supporting documentation. As a result of 

additional congressional funding in FY 2015, HSI expanded VSP operations to six new visa 

issuing posts. 

Coordination with the U.S. Department of State 

Effective border security requires broad information sharing and cooperation among U.S. 

government agencies. In October 2006. ICE entered into a memorandum of understanding 

(MOU) with the DOS Bureau of Consular Affairs in order to exchange visa and immigration 

data. The agreement allows ICE and DOS to exchange information contained in each agency's 

respective electronic databases pertaining to foreign persons seeking entry into the United States. 

This exchange of information allows DOS Consular Affairs personnel to query and access ICE 
59 

and CBP records. Consular Affairs personnel can then consider prior violations when 

adjudicating visa applications for persons who have applied to enter the United States. 

Similarly. the exchange of information allows ICE personnel to query the DOS Consular 

Consolidated Database and to access passport and visa application information of persons under 

investigation by ICE. This information sharing also allows ICE to alert Consular Affairs 

personnel of ongoing criminal investigations for the purpose of visa adjudication. 

In January 2011, ICE signed an MOU outlining roles, responsibilities, and collaboration 

between ICE, DOS Consular Affairs, and DOS's Diplomatic Security Service. To facilitate 

information sharing and reduce duplication of efforts. ICE and DOS conduct collaborative 

training and orientation prior to overseas deployments. At overseas posts, ICE and DOS 

personnel work closely together in working groups, meetings, trainings and briefings, and 

engage in regular and timely information sharing. Additionally. ICE and DOS personnel work 

side by side to identify embassies for potential future expansion of the VSP and routinely travel 

together and provide briefings to U.S. embassy personnel prior to commencement of operations. 

Additional ICE Responsibilities in the Visa Process 

ICE's role in the visa screening process does not end at the visa screening units. Rather. 

government screening efforts continue to examine visa holders before and during their 

authorized travel to the United States. For example. should a visa traveler match derogatory 

information within government holdings, DHS and DOS work collaborativcly to determine if the 

information warrants DOS revocation of his/her visa regardless of whether the individual is 

outside or inside the United States, thereby, denying him/her any further travel access to our 

country. DHS also strives to ensure that only authorized visitors are entering the country. and 

6 
60 

DHS components actively share with each other information gathered about admissibility 

indicators, intelligence records and additional information retrieved from travelers interviewed at 

secondary inspections stations at the ports of entry. 

Overstay Enforcement in the United States 

ICE actively identifies and initiates action against overstay violators who are enforcement 

priorities. ICE's primary objective is to vet system-generated leads in order to identify true 

overstay violators. match any criminal conviction history or other priority basis. and take 

appropriate enforcement actions. Within ICE. there are dedicated units, special agents, analysts, 

and systems in place to address nonimmigrant overstays. Through investigative efforts, ICE 

analyzes and determines which overstay leads may be suitable for further national security 

investigation. 

from a DHS processing standpoint, ICE analyzes system-generated leads initially created 

by, or matched against, the data feed for biographical entry and exit records stored in CBP's 

Arrival and Departure Information System (ADIS). ADlS supports DHS's ability to identify 

non immigrants who have remained in the United States beyond their authorized periods of 

admission or have violated the terms and conditions of their visas. Once the leads are received. 

ICE conducts both batch and manual vetting against government databases. social media, and 

public indices. This vetting helps determine if an individual who overstayed has departed the 

United States, adjusted to a lawful status. or would be appropriate for an enforcement action. 

As part of a tiered review. ICE prioritizes nonimmigrant overstay cases through riskbased analysis. HSI's Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation Unit (CTCEU) oversees the 

national program dedicated to the investigation of nonimmigrant visa violators who may pose a 

7 
61 

national security risk and/or public safety concern. Each year, CTCEU analyzes records of 

hundreds of thousands of potential status violators after preliminary analysis of data from the 

various systems, including Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS) and 

A DIS, along with other information. After this analysis, CTCEU establishes compliance or 

departure dates from the United States and/or determines potential violations that warrant field 

investigations. 

CTCEU proactively develops cases for investigation in furtherance of the overstay 

mission, monitors the latest threat reports, and proactively addresses emergent issues. This 

practice, which is designed to detect and identify individuals exhibiting specific risk factors 

based on intelligence reporting, travel patterns, and in-depth criminal research and analysis, has 

contributed to DHS's counterterrorism mission by initiating and supporting high-priority national 

security initiatives based on specific intelligence. 

In order to ensure that those who may pose the greatest threats to national security are 

given top priority, ICE uses intelligence-based criteria developed in close consultation with the 

intelligence and law enforcement communities. ICE chairs the Compliance Enforcement 

Advisory Panel (CEAP), which is comprised of subject matter experts from other law 

enforcement agencies and members of the Intelligence Community who assist the CTCEU in 

maintaining targeting methods in line with the most current threat information. The CEAP is 

convened on a quarterly basis to discuss recent intelligence developments and update the 

CTCEU's targeting framework in order to ensure that the nonimmigrant overstays and status 

violators who pose the greatest threats to national security are targeted. 

Another source for overstay and status violation referrals is CfCEU's Visa Waiver 

Enforcement Program (VWEP). Visa-free travel to the United States builds upon our close 

8 
62 

bilateral relationships and fosters commercial and individual ties among tourist and business 

travelers in the United States and abroad. The Visa Waiver Program (VWP) currently allows 

eligible nationals of 38 countries to travel to the United States without a visa and, if admitted, to 

remain in the country for a maximum of 90 days for tourism or business purposes. The VWEP, 

implemented in 2008, addresses overstays within the VWP population. 

Today, CTCEU regularly scrutinizes a refined list of individuals who have been 

identified as potential overstays who entered the United States under the VWP. A primary goal 

ofVWEP is to identify those subjects who attempt to circumvent the U.S. immigration system 

by seeking to exploit VWP travel. 

Enforcement Priorities 

Each year, the CTCEU receives approximately one million leads on non immigrants that 

have potentially violated the terms of their admission. Over half of these leads are closed due to 

the vetting conducted by analysts, which eliminates false matches and accounts for departures 

and pending immigration benefits. To better manage investigative resources, CTCEU relies on a 

prioritization framework established in consultation with interagency partners within the national 

intelligence and federal law enforcement communities through CEAP. On November 20,2014, 

the Secretary of Homeland Security established priorities to focus enforcement and removal 

policies on individuals convicted of serious criminal offenses or who otherwise pose a threat to 

national security, border security, or public safety. To better manage its investigative resources, 

CTCEU has aligned its policy on sending leads to the field with the Secretary's priorities. 

ICE's prioritization framework begins with a review and analysis to determine which 

immigration violators pose the greatest risks to our national security. CTCEU conducts an initial 

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63 

review, dividing leads into I 0 CTCEU priority levels. Priority Level I, which focuses on the 

greatest risks, is based on special projects and initiatives to address national security concerns, 

public safety, and applying certain targeting rules. These projects and initiatives include: the 

Recurrent Student Vetting Program; DHS's Overstay Projects; Absent Without Leave (AWOL) 

Program; INTERPOL Leads; and individuals who have been watchlisted. 

In FY 2015, CTCEU reviewed 971 ,305 leads regarding potential overstays. Numerous 

leads were able to be closed through an automated vetting process. The most common reasons 

for closure were subsequent departure from the United States or pending immigration benefits. 

A total of9,968 leads were sent to HSI field offices for investigation -an average of 40 leads per 

working day. Of the 9,9681eads sent to the field, 3,083 arc currently under investigation, 4,148 

were closed as being in compliance (pending immigration benefit, granted asylum, approved 

adjustment of status application, or have departed the United States) and the remaining leads 

were returned to CTCEU for continuous monitoring and further investigation. In FY 2015 alone, 

HSI made 1,910 arrests, including 133 criminal arrests that resulted in86 indictments and80 

convictions. 

The remaining leads that cannot be closed by the automated vetting process and are not 

sent to HSI field offices for investigation are shared with one of ICE's other operational 

components Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO). When ERO receives this 

information, it forwards it to one of its three targeting centers, where the cases are once again 

vetted against criminal and national security databases, and additional leads may be generated. 

Those leads are then provided to ERO field offices for civil immigration enforcement action 

consistent with the priorities identified by the Secretary on November 20, 2014. 

10 
64 

Conclusion 

VSP is crucial to ICE's mission to protect the homeland. ICE is proud to work 

collaboratively with our DHS partners and our colleagues at DOS. Furthermore, ICE is 

committed to working with its U.S. Government and international partners and, especially. with 

the members of this Committee to forge a strong and productive relationship to help prevent and 

combat threats to our nation. 

Finally, as ICE's operations continue to expand and evolve, we are constantly evaluating 

how best to accomplish our mission. Since ICE's establishment in 2003, ERO has experienced 

substantial growth and evolution in its mission. In addition, the ERO enforcement strategy has 

shifted heavily towards the investigation. identification, location, arrest, prosecution, and 

removal of individuals who present a danger to national security or threaten public safety. which 

may include some visa or Visa Waiver Program overstays. 

Given these augmenting responsibilities, Secretary Johnson has directed ICE to work 

with the Department's Chief Human Capital Officer to review and determine whether changes 

need to be made to the agency's overtime compensation system for ICE officers. I am 

committed to working with the Department, the Office of Management and Budget, our 

employees, and Congress on any necessary next steps. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify about these important issues. I would be pleased 

to answer any questions you may have. 

II 
65 

Testimony of Inspector General 

ohn. Roth 

Before the Committee on 

Homeland Sec-q.l'ity and 

Governmental Affairs 

United States Senate 

''The Security of U.S .. Visa 

Programs'' 

March 15, 2016 

10:00 AM 
66 

DHS OIG HIGHLIGHTS 

March 

Why We Did 

This 

The audits and inspections 

discussed in this 

approval process, often 

a corrupt users 

What We 

Recommend 

We made numerous 

recommendations to DHS 

and its coJ:npon,ent:sprimruily 

in these 

aimed at 

programs. 

For Further Information: 

www.oig.dhs.gov 

U.S. Visa 

What We Found 

This a number of our recent 

reviews to U.S. visa programs. Our 

HUUUlC,>:> include: 

• After 11 years, USCIS has made little 

its 

uc•u"""'·"" immigration 

bene:llts prooes:slrtg environment. users now 

estimates that it take three more years and 

an additional $1 billion to automate benefit 

vL•c"'"":!'.· This delay will prevent USCIS from 

workload national 

• Known human traffickers used work and 

fiance visas to bring victims to the U.S. using 

means. USCIS and ICE can improve data 

and coordination regarding suspected 

human traffickers to better potential 

trafficking cases. 

• ICE did not have sufficient data to 

determine the effectiveness of its Visa Security 

Program, which requires the screening and 

vetting of overseas visa applicru1ts. 

• The laws and regulations governing the 

EB-5 immigrant investor program do not give 

USCIS the authority to or terminate a 

regional center's in the program 

due to fraud or national security concerns. 

Response 

With few exceptions, DHS and its components 

concurred with recommendations in these 

reports. 
67 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member Carper, and Members of the Committee, 

thank you for inviting me to discuss my office's oversight of the Department of 

Homeland and components responsible for 

administering Our recent work has involved a number of 

audits and investigations. l will discuss each of the audits, as well as a 

representative sample of some of our investigations. 

Information Technology Transformation 

This week, we our sixth report since 2005 on U.S. Citizenship and 

Immigration Services' (USCIS) efforts to transform its paper-based processes 

into an integrated and automated immigration benefits processing 

environment. 1 This is a massive undertaking to modernize processing 

of approximately benefits types. The main component of the 

Transformation Program the USCIS Electronic Immigration System (ELlS), 

intended to provide integrated online case management to support end-to-end 

automated adjudication of benefits. Once ""+'"""'·"'"·""''"' 

individuals seeking an benefit should be able to establish online 

ELIS accounts to file and track their applications, petitions, or requests as they 

move through the immigration process. 

We undertook this audit to answer a relatively simple question: after 11 years 

and considerable expense, what has been the outcome of USCIS' efforts to 

automate benefits processing? We focused on benefits processing automation 

progress and outcomes. We interviewed dozens of individuals, 

including over 60 end-users in the field who are ELIS, and reviewed 

voluminous source documents. 

is that at the time of our field work, which ended in 

been made. we found that: 

• Although USCIS deployed ELlS in May 2012, to date only two of 

approximately 90 types of benefits are available for online 

customer filing, accounting for than 10 percent of the agency's total 

workload. These are the USCIS Fee, which allows customers 

to submit electronic payment of the fee for an 

visa packet, and the to Replace Permanent Resident 

(Form l-90). 

1 USCIS Automation of Immigration Benefits Processing Remains Inejfective, (O!G 16-48, March 

2016). 
68 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

the limited number of users employees ELIS, 

rP"nnrtF•rl that the system was not user friendly, was missing critical 

functionality, and had significant performance 

benefits cases. Some of those issues are set forth in this 

infonnation. 

Difficulty navi~:at1ing among 

web 

to move browser windows 

to view case data. 

stuck tht'on"h<mt 

and 

next step without 

intervention. 

Inability to undo a function or 

correct a data: en tty error. 

enter comments oh 

after a case has 

OruuJJ~!JUU,!lUappfu:arttS. 

displayi.ng customer date 

ofbirtb.* 

complete. 

• The limited ELIS deployment and current 

may be attributed to some of the same we regarding 

previous USeiS IT transformation attempts. To date, the USeiS has not 

ensured sufficient stakeholder involvement in ELIS implementation 

activities and decisions for meeting field operational needs. Testing has 

not been conducted adequately to ensure end-to-end functionality prior 

to each ELIS release. Further, USeiS still has not provided 

technical for end-users, an issue 

ongoing since the first ELIS in 2012. 

• As it struggles to address these system issues, users now estimates that 

it will take three more years-over four longer than estimated-and 

an additional $1 billion to automate all types as expected. Until 

users implements ELIS with all the needed improvements, the 

agency remain unable to achieve its workload processing, customer 

service, and national security goals. Specifically, in 2011, USeiS 

2 USC!S has indicated that the issues marked with an asterisk were addressed during the time 

of our audit. Because of the nature of the audit process, we are unable to validate tlmt this has 

occurred. 

3 
69 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

established a plan to implement ELIS agency-wide by 2014. However, 

USC!S was not able to carry out this plan and the schedule was delayed 

by four years, causing a program breach. An updated baseline schedule 

for the Transformation was in April 2015; however, 

USCIS also shifted and these dates. 

• Certain program goals have also not been met. According to 

performance metrics, benefits processing in ELlS was to take 

65 days. However, we found that as of May 2015, was taking 

an average of 112 almost twice that amount of time. Previous 

results for metric also were 104 days in November 

2014, 95 in February 2015, and 112 in May 2015. By slowing 

down the work of adjudicators, ELIS was resulting in less efficiency m1d 

in processing benefits. 

in 2014, we reported that had been 

implemented, the anticipated efficiencies achieved. In fact, 

we reported in 2014 that benefits on was faster than 

adjudicating them in ELlS. This to date. progress 

in operational the fact that USCIS 

ctu•c:ul-<cux; methodology impact on time and accuracy in 

uc;ucJJLo:> processing. Beyond obtaining feedback from personnel and customers 

using the system, the Transformation Program Office could not effectively 

gauge whether cases were adjudicated more efficiently or accurately in 

ELlS. 

We acknowledge that DHS has taken ""~'>"a"'"'""' 

by which it introduces new information technology, moving a 

traditional waterfall to a new, incremental methodology, called 

Agile. We also of automation is very much a 

moving target, and that may since made progress on the problem 

in the time since the fieldwork of our audit ended in ,July 2015. 

Human Trafficking and the Visa Process 

of this year, we issued a 

Our audit were to 

convicted of human used legal means to bring victims to 

States, and to data quality and exchange issues that may hinder efforts 

to combat human We conducted this audit as part of our "Big Data" 

4 
70 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

initiative, in which we compare datasets from different DHS components (or 

other databases outside of DHS) to attempt to gain insights into 

jJlJl<OllUi"1 issues in DHS programs and nnPT'!,t1nn 

In this audit, we compared databases from two components-Immigration and 

Customs Enforcement (ICE) and USCIS. ICE's Case System, 

which is housed in the Customs and Border TECS 

trafficking conducted 

lrnrestlgatJons. USCIS uses two databases: the 

Humanitarian Adjudication for Victims Nationwide (HAVEN) system 

to maintain information on visas granted to of human trafficking (U 

visas and T visas ), and (2) the Computer Linked Application Information 

Management to process immigrant and nonimmigrant 

applications as work and family reunification visa 

requests. 

As a result of comparing the data in these databases, our auditors came to the 

following conclusions: 

• Work and fiance visas were the means that human 

traffickers used to bring victims the United States We made 

this determination based on matching ICE's human data 

17 of 32 known 

work visas and visas; the 

States illegally or overstayed their visitor In one example, fiance 

visas were used to lure human victims to the United States as 

part of marriage fraud schemes. The confiscated the victims' 

passports and subjected them to involuntary servitude, forced labor, 

and/or forced sex. 

• Family reunification visas also were possibly used to bring victims into 

the country. From 2005 through 2014, 274 of over 10,500 (3 percent) of 

the subjects of ICE human traJ!H~k1ng 

petitioned USCIS to bring 

States. Because ICE data investigations that were still ongoing 

and did not reflect whether the final conviction resulted in a human 

"'"'"'""IS or lesser ICE could not tell us exactly how many of the 

274 individual visa petitioners were human traffickers. However, ICE 

data showed that 18 of the 274 had been arrested for human tr~lttJ.rlcmc'­

related crimes. 

5 
71 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

• ICE and USCIS could data quality to facilitate data matching 

and identification of instances of human trafficking. For 

ICE had to extensively manipulate its to 

reliable data for our data matching 

not always collect names and other identifiers of human traffickers that 

victims had provided in their T visa Due to incomplete data, 

we were limited in our ability to analyze, and draw conclusions 

from the databases. 

• We found that ICE and USCIS on a limited basis to exchange 

'""'""'u'·l'> data, but that existed for 

between ICE and 

We made three recommendations to improve the effectiveness of the programs 

to identify human trafikkers and their victims. ICE and USCIS have concurred 

with the recommendations. The three recommendations are still open, and 

both ICE and USCJS are taking actions to resolve them. We are satisfied with 

the progress thus far. 

DHS Visa Security Program 

In September of 2014, we published a report about the DHS Visa Security 

Program. 4 The which was established by Congress, requires DHS 

personnel overseas, specifically ICE Special to nc,rtorm 

security activities in order to prevent terrorists, 

applicants from receiving U.S. visas. 0uce-JLH'-''"H 

and vet visa to determine 

largely done a screening data 

held by the Department of State TECS 

to determine whether there are any matches. In Fiscal Year (FY) 2012, ICE 

agents screened over 1.3 million visa Those applicants with a 

match are then vetted, which involves researching and investigating the visa 

applicant, documents submitted with the visa "'l-'1-'"''""'uc,,, 

and consulting with consular, enforcement, or 

vw'"'"u". ICE special agents vetted more than 171,000 visa applicants in 

ICE agents are 

officers about security threats 

to provide advice and to consular 

to adjudicating visa applications. 

As a result of our we found: 

4 The DHS Visa Securil11 Program, (O!G-14-!37, September 2014). 

6 
72 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

• The effectiveness of the Visa Security Program cannot be determined. 

Notwithstanding that ICE was to develop measures to assess 

performance, it has not taken actions to ensure that data 

needed to assess is collected and rc••nnrtP·rl 

annronn<1te advice is to consular and (3) 

amount of time needed for visa related activities at each post 

is tracked and used in determining and needs. As a 

result, ICE is unable to ensure that the Visa Security Program is 

operating as intended. 

At the time of our ICE senior management officials Pxnn''"'"'rl 

a lack of confidence in the value of the current performance measures. 

As a result, these performance measures were not included in the DHS 

and ICE annual reporting of performance. 

• ICE has not consistently or effectively provided or expert advice 

to consular officers as required. In interviewing officers we 

learned that much of the training did not cover critical subjects 

needed to enhance their skills. during our site visits we 

found a number of embassies where the consular officers have not been 

provided with any training, or training on a sporadic basis. 

It is unknown how much time ICE agents """"'"·wcu 

actually spend on visa issues. Agents not amount 

of time they spend on this notwithstanding that ICE had 

received special funding to institute the program. Anecdotally, we found 

some agents spent little time on visa security activities, while agents 

in other posts spent a percentage of their time on it. 

PnnmrRrn c.ii.]J<"-m»vll has been slow. At the time of our 

posts had visa security units. 

""'""r"" Program expansion has 

by budget limitations, obtaining visas for 

certain countries, State's mandate to reduce personnel overseas, and 

objections from State Department officials at some posts due to security 

concerns or space limitations. 

We made 10 recommendations to improve the effectiveness of the program. ICE 

concurred with each of them. ICE has five of those 

recommendations, and is 

7 
73 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

progress has been slow, we are currently satisfied with ICE's activities in this 

regard. 

Investor Visa Program 

In December of 2013, we an audit report on challenges facing the 

EB-5 program, which visas for immigrant investors. 5 Through the 

EB-5 Program, foreign investors have the to obtain lawful, 

permanent residency in the U.S. for their spouses, and their minor 

unmarried children by making a certain level of capital investment and 

associated job creation or preservation. The EB-5 requires that the 

foreign investor make a capital investment of either or $1 million, 

depending on whether or not the investment is in a area. 

The foreign investors must invest the amount 

called a new commercial enterprise, will create or preserve at least 10 

full-time jobs, for U.S. workers, within 2 years of 

conditional permanent residency. 

of our audit was to determine whether USCIS administered and 

1w~""IS'"u the EB-5 Regional Center Program (regional center program) ,,ffc•r->!iu.,lu We found: 

• The laws and regulations the program do not give USCIS the 

authority to deny or a center's participation in the EB5 based on fraud or national concerns. At the time of 

users had not developed regulations that apply to the 

centers in to in the when 

center are that may 

harm national security. 

• Additionally, USCIS has ensuring the integrity of the EB-5 

regional center program. users does not always ensure that 

regional centers meet all requirements, and USClS 

officials interpret and Code of Federal Regulations and 

policies differently. not always document decisions 

responses to external parties who inquired about progran1 activities 

""''ct"'a~ the EB-5 regional center to appear vulnerable to 

of internal and external 

8 
74 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

• users is unable to demonstrate the benefits of foreign investment into 

the U.S. economy. Although users requires documcntatio.n that the 

foreign funds were invested in the investment pool the foreign 

investor, the does not USelS the 

authority to 

creating U.S. Additionally, the regulation allows foreign to 

take credit for jobs created by U.S. investors. 

As a result, USeiS has limited of regional centers' business 

structures and financial activities. For example, we identified 12 of 15 

center files in which users allowed the creation of new commercial 

that collected EB-5 to make loans to other job-creating entities. USCIS 

adjudicators that because the eFR does not them the authority 

to oversee these additional job entities, they are unable to or 

obtain detail that would foreign are invested in the U.S. economy 

via a job-creating entity. 

Additionally, one regulation allows investors to take credit for jobs 

created with U.S. funds, making it for users to determine whether 

the foreign funds actually created U.S. jobs. the 

investors are able to gain eligibility for permanent resident status proof 

of U.S. job creation. In one case we reviewed, an EB-5 project received 82 

percent of its funding from U.S. investors through a center. The 

regional center was able to claim 100 of the growth from 

the project to apply toward its foreign even foreign 

investment was limited to 18 percent of the total investment in the project. 

We made four recommendations to the effectiveness of the program. 

Two of those recommendations have closed. The other two are pending: 

one is for a study to be done to assess the effectiveness of the EB-5 "''""'"r"'cn 

which is by the of the Commerce and 

scheduled to completed shortly; second is update regulations to provide 

greater clarity regarding USeiS' authority to or terminate EB-5 regional 

center participants at any of the of national security 

and/or fraud risks. They would also it explicit that fraud and national 

security concerns can constitute cause for revocation of center status; 

USCIS authority to that foreign funds were invested in comjJaJme~s 

U.S. and ensure for the EB-5 center 

program are applied consistently to all participants. 1his recommendation is 

overdue, and we are in discussions with users as to when this action will be 

completed. 

9 
75 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Our 2013 findings were reinforced and confirmed by an audit released by the 

Government Accountability Office (GAO) in August of last In that audit, 

GAO found that the EB-5 program has both fraud and security risks 

that USCIS needs to correct. For example, GAO found: 

Limitations in electronic data USCIS collects on centers and 

immigrant investors limits their usefulness in conducting fraudmitigating activities. Certain basic information, such as name, date of 

birth and address are either not entered into electronic databases or are 

not standardized, so basic fraud-related searches cannot be conducted. 

users anti-fraud personnel conduct only limited site visits, and GAO 

recommends increasing the number of site visits to regional centers and 

program sites to look for indicia of fraud. 

USCIS does not conduct interviews of immigrant investors to who they 

award permanent which the GAO believes would assist in 

establishing whether the investor is a victim of or complicit in fraud. 

users has limitations on being able to verify the source of 

the money invested and, other than by self-certification, does not have a 

reliable basis to determine whether the money is from an 

source. 

The GAO also found (as had the previous OIG audit) that USCIS' practice of 

allowing immigrant investors to claim by investments from other 

sources overstates the economic .EB-5 program. The GAO found 

that, in the one project they looked at, many immigrant investors would not 

have for lawful without the of allowing 

them to claim jobs by all investments in the commercial enterprise, 

regardless if they were .EB-5 investors. 

Other Audits Involving the Visa Process 

We have published a number of different audits. Some of those audits may be 

less relevant either because of the passage of time or a change in 

circumstances. However, we will briefly describe them here. 

10 
76 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

In August of 2013, we [Ju.uu,;:w.n" an audit report '"'"'."''"'lin 

the L-1 visa The L-1 visa program facilitates the tf'tnr>nr·,.rv 

of with management, and 

States. We found that USCIS 

fJ"''"uvu" because of inadequate f'.Ulucu"·"' 

as it relates to the ,.,,~,;,.,,.,,,,1 

knowledge." Additionally, we one ,L15 u.,acnn 

company to receive an L-1 visa for an 

United States. We found that this nr<wJ<::wn 

abuse." 

In June of 2013, we published an audit of 

vvtcJ.luculy fraudulent applications for benefits. 8 U.S. 

law grants permanent resident status to aliens who legally a 

or lawful permanent resident and to certain aliens who are 

members of U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents. We an audit 

to determine whether users recorded information about familybased petitions and of according to 

agency policy requirements and in a manner that immigration fraud. 

We found that USCIS has procedures to track and monitor documentation 

related to petitions and for immigration benefits 

suspected of 

petitions and were investigated and 

data were not always recorded and updated in ,n,nrnn.ri<>te> 

to ensure their accuracy, completeness, and >cJ.twuuuy 

personnel did not record in appropriate electronic databases all petitions and 

avvu.'"auvu<> denied, revoked, or rescinded because of fraud. Supervisors also 

not review the data entered into the databases to monitor case resolution. 

Without accurate data and adequate 

limited its ability to track, monitor, 

detect and deter immigration benefit fraud. 

Finally, in November 2012, we a report about the visa waiver 

program, which allows from countries to enter the United 

States and for up to 90 days without a visa from a U.S. embassy 

of our review was to determine the adequacy of 

(l) a country's initial designation as a Visa Waiver 

11 
77 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Program participant, and the continuing of current Visa Waiver 

Program countries; and (2) how effectively the Visa Waiver Program Office 

collaborates with key stakeholders. We determined that the Visa Waiver 

Program Office had established standard procedures and review 

criteria that satisfy the goals for conducting reviews. Although Visa 

Waiver Program officials maintained effective with stakeholders 

during the review additional efforts arc needed to communicate with 

appropriate the standards needed to achieve compliance with Visa 

Waiver Program requirements and the criteria used to assess In 

addition, challenges that may reduce the effectiveness of the Visa Waiver review 

process include untimely reporting of results, current staffing levels within the 

Visa Waiver Program Office, and its location in the DHS organizational 

structure. 

Criminal Investigations 

results of our investigations: 

investigate fraud within the benefits 

USCIS employee. We investigate a 

are recent examples of the 

• Martin Trejo, a DHS contractor, was convicted for theft of government 

among other crimes, after a DHS OIG investigation determined 

stole approximately 1,000 blank, USCIS I-797 Notice of 

Action forms over a five-year for he was paid ar:,oruximLatelv 

Trejo delivered the forms to a civilian who then them to 

a fraudulent document broker. 

• Efron DeLeon, a USCIS Immigration Services Assistant in Orlando, 

Florida, was convicted of obstruction and false statements after 

a DHS OIG investigation found he assisted immigration 

pE:tlt.iOJ:leJrs and beneficiaries at the USCIS Field Office. DeLeon 

rlP«h"m;•prl records in alien files and provided information on how to 

circumvent questions in a USC!S fraud interview. He also 

improperly accessed and viewed records the Central Index System, a 

DHS database, and made false statements to DHS OIG investigators. 

• Cassandra Gonzalez, non-Dl-IS employee, was sentenced for her role in 

an immigration fraud scheme. Gonzalez and her conspirators, one of 

which was a former users employee, facilitated false marriages, 

with fake documentation, to illegally obtain immigration 

12 
78 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

" Fernando Jacobs, a Supervisory Immigration Services Officer, and his co811 Immigration Services Officer, were convicted of 

and other related crimes after a DHS OIG 

he bribes to issue Lawful Permanent 

Resident cards to illegal aliens and accessed government databases to 

obtain information USCIS status. 

Richard Quidilla, a USCIS contractor, was convicted of unlawful 

procurement of and other related crimes after an OIG 

investigation determined he accessed USC!S databases in 

excess of authority and deleted names biographical information of 

28 bona fide naturalized US citizens, and inserted names and 

information of individuals who either violated terms of their 

visas and/ or were undocumented aliens. Once altered, the 

USC IS database falsely depicted the identities of the individuals inserted 

by the contractor as actual United States citizens. 

Other matters 

as we have in the we receive information from DHS 

employees, which may uncover in programs and in the 

visa program, or constitute a violation of law, and policy. The 

specifics of some of those are from disclosure the 

Inspector General Act and the Protection Act, during 

the pendency of our investigation of those claims. However, l want the 

Committee to know that we take each of these claims and will 

investigate them to the fullest extent possible. We will also steps to protect 

whistleblowers from retaliation wherever we find it. 

Conclusion 

Deciding and administering immigration bcneilts, including visas, is a massive 

USC!S alone uses about 19,000 people to millions of 

"~-'~-'"·'--'"uvu;, for immigration benefits. They are to enforce what are 

complex laws, regulations, and internal policies. They are 

rightly to process decisions within a reasonable time frame. users 

and the rest of DHS their mission while with an antiquated 

system of paper-based files more suited to an office environment from 1950 

rather than 2016. This system creates inefficiencies and risks to the 

program. To give you an idea of the scope of the USC IS spends more 

13 
79 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

that $300 million per year 

immigrant files. 

The size and of the mission, with an archaic method of 

proces:sirtg applications, brings with it risk. There is risk to 

operations - in that it makes it more difficult for USCIS accomplish their 

mission. We found, for example, that the time to benefits 

was twice that of the metrics that USC IS e::>ta!Jn:sueu. 

USC IS IT systems, in July of 2014, that using the electronic 

files in usc at the time took twice as as using paper files. 

Additionally, the present system presents risks to our national security in 

that we may be individuals who wish to do us harm, or who do not 

meet the requirements a visa. Basic information on visa was not 

captured in electronic format and thus cannot be used to basic 

steps. Also, because of the poor quality of the electronic data kept 

by USCIS and ICE, it was difficult to in data matching, which we 

believe is an effective tool in rooting out and national security risks. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I an1 to answer 

any questions you or other Members of the Committee may have. 

14 
80 

Wil'>ll\N(,I'ON 

OF!'JCV. 

AMER!Ci\N CIVIL 

LIBERTIES UNION 

WASH!N(;TtlN 

!.EGI$UTlVEOFFlCl\ 

915 15th STRrET. NW, FL 

'WAqi!N(,l(JN, 20005 

IOJL\N\ON 

N 1\Ti(lN,\L OFFl\f. 

HR1li\D STRUT, 1H'" FL 

NFW YORE, N\' Jfl0iH·2100 

2>00 

OFFICERS 1\NO DIRECTORS 

0>\l\i\N N !JERI;lf\N 

ANTIIONY 0. ROMERO 

1.-Xf;CiJT!Vh' Df/1/:"(.TOR 

ROHEHT HEMi\R 

TN/:,1.\ii/IHN 

March 15,2016 

The Honorable Ron Johnson 

Chairman 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

U.S. Senate 

Washington, D.C. 20510 

The Honorable Thomas Carper 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

U.S. Senate 

Washington, D.C. 20510 

Re: Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

Hearing on "The Security of U.S. Visa Programs" 

Dear Chairman Johnson and Ranking Member Carper: 

On behalf of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), we submit this letter to 

the U.S. Senate's Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

Hearing on "The Security of U.S. Visa Programs." Congress must fix recent 

changes to the Visa Waiver Program ("VWP") that enshrine discrimination based 

on national origin, ancestry, and parentage, and fan the flames of discriminatory 

exclusion, both here and abroad. The ACLU urges Congress to repeal the 

discriminatory travel restriction by swiftly passing S. 2449, the "Equal Protection 

in Travel Act of2016." 

I. The Visa Waiver Program Improvement and Terrorist Travel 

Prevention Act of 2015 arbitrarily discriminates against dual 

nationals of Iran, Iraq, Sudan, or Syria who are citizens of visa 

waiver program ("VWP") countries- based on their national, 

origin, ancestrv, and parentage. 

On December 18, 2015, Congress passed the fiscal year 2016 Consolidated 

Appropriations Act, which included H.R. 158, the "Visa Waiver Program 

Improvement and Terrorist Travel Prevention Act of2015,'' a bill that never 

received a hearing or markup by the Senate Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs Committee ("Committee"). 

Hastily negotiated and cobbled together on December 3, 2015, the Visa Waiver 

Program Improvement and Terrorist Travel Prevention Act was intended to be 

Congress's response to the November 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris. What 

emerged, however, from the negotiations was a bill that singled out dual nationals 
81 

of Iran, Iraq, Sudan, or Syria to the exclusion of all other citizens ofVWP countries. There 

was no justification to strip visa-free travel privileges from these dual nationals, and the ACLU 

criticized and continues to oppose this provision as discriminatory and un-American. 

Significantly, 4 senators wrote to congressional leadership urging them, to no avail, not to 

include the discriminatory provision targeting dual nationals in the fiscal year 2016 

Consolidated Appropriations Act. 1 

Now the law of the land and in operation, the 2015 Visa Waiver Program Improvement and 

Terrorist Travel Prevention Act has categorically tenninated visa-free travel privileges for all 

citizens of VWP countries who are dual nationals2 of Iran, Iraq, Sudan, or Syria. This 

revocation of VWP privileges applies to all dual nationals of Iran, Iraq, Sudan, or Syria, even if 

they have never resided in or traveled to these four countries3 By singling out these four 

nationalities to the exclusion of other dual nationals in VWP countries, this law amounts to 

blanket discrimination based on nationality, ancestry, and parentage. 

Not only is this law discriminatory, it is arbitrary. Unlike the U.S. which grants citizenship to 

all children born on U.S. soil, birth within Syria.4 Iran,5 or Sudan6 does not automatically 

confer citizenship. Rather citizenship is conferred by naturalization, marriage, or descent. 

With respect to descent, a child born to an Iranian father is an Iranian citizen, regardless of the 

child's country of birth. The same citizenship by descent law applies to a child born to a Syrian 

father, regardless of the child's country of birth. A similar citizenship by descent law applies 

to a child born to native-born Sudanese father, regardless of the child's country of birth. The 

2015 Visa Waiver Program Improvement and Terrorist Travel Prevention Act has now folded 

such gender-based distinctions into U.S. law. 

The 2015 Visa Waiver law has caused immediate and direct harm to otherwise qualified 

visitors seeking to travel to the U.S. In January 2016 alone the following individuals were 

denied boarding on U.S.-bound t1ights, solely on the basis of their dual nationality: 

l Letter from Senators Jeff Flake, Dick Durbin, Dean Heller. and Patrick Lcahv to Senate 

and House Paul (Dec. 13, 2015). available lmJic_:,v~sU!'lD!'.,:·'£!l!l><,J!.Q;.:J'lUlliwillfll\8'lY..''-"l'S:1.'1'!Ebb:cV!2: 

2029 amends. specifically names the countries of Iraq and 

Syria (Subsection covers Iran and Sudan hy incorporating reference to existing government lists that name Iran and 

Sudan (Subsection II). 4 See OPM. supra note 2 at 192: and UK l!OME OFF., SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC-COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION (COl) 

REPORT (2013), 164-165. available at 

Iranian Civil Code states that .. ltlhost.:: whose fathers arc Iranians. regardless of\',hether they have been born in Iran or 

outside of Iran" arc ''considered to be Iranian subjects'· (The Civil Code oft he Islamic Republic of Iran. Book 2. Article 976 

(2006 ). available 6 See OPM. supra note at states 

does not automatically confer citizenship."" 

2 
82 

• Rana Rahimpour, a British-Iranian BBC journalist, and her young British citizen child 

were denied boarding on a flight from London Heathrow airport to Newark airport. 

They had planned to attend a surprise party for a relative in the U.S7 

• Marjan Vahdat, a European citizen and Iranian dual national, was scheduled to 

perform on January 30, 2016, in San Jose, California. A world-renowned vocalist 

trained in classical Persian music, Ms. Vahdat was denied boarding on her Frankfurt to 

U.S. flight. Central Stage and Hamyar Art Foundation made multiple calls to the U.S. 

embassy, Department of Homeland Security, and airlines with no success. The concert 

organizers ended up posting a notice on their website to all ticket purchasers explaining 

the circumstances surrounding Ms. Vahdat's absence8 

• Newsha Tavakolian, a European citizen and Iranian dual national, is a photographer 

whose work has been published in Time Magazine, The New York Times, and National 

Geographic. She can no longer travel to the U.S. on the VWP because of the new 

discriminatory travel restriction targeting dual nationals 9 

II. Bv singling out dual nationals of Iran, Iraq, Sudan, or Syria, the Visa 

Waiver Program Improvement and Terrorist Travel Prevention Act of2015 

creates a wedge of distrust between those minority American communities 

and U.S. law enforcement. 

There is no sullicient security reason to justify the di!Terential treatment ofVWP citizens who 

are dual nationals oflran, Iraq, Sudan, or Syria. By singling out these dual nationals, the new 

visa waiver law stigmatizes them as inherently suspect and sends a message of prejudice and 

intolerance against Iranian, Iraqi, Sudanese, or Syrian communities in the U.S. The 

discriminatory treatment of dual nationals creates a wedge of distrust between those minority 

American communities and domestic U.S. law enforcement. 

Already, many prominent Americans have spoken out against the discriminatory dual 

nationality provision, expressing how it stigmatizes them and makes them feel like secondclass American citizens: 

• Kourosh Kolahi, an Iranian-American orthopedic surgeon in California: "Because of 

the little-noticed visa reform language included in the federal omnibus spending bill, I 

am now treated differently than my wife, daughter and other fellow Americans. I was 

born in this country and have spent my entire life here .... Yet, based on our ancestry, this 

law discriminates against me and other Americans." 10 

from Central Stage and Hamyar Art Foundation to customers, who had purchased tickets to Mahsa & Ma~jan 

Vahdat concert (Jan. 29. 2016). available 

30-at-S.:iX. tJ-,'\ \J.png: and Events, A4arjan in 

hun:· n~.:nh.kodoom rnm <..'n ;;an+bl'-L',t 'm<~ri<uhmd-rn;lh:-.a-\ ahdm-in-ct>llCL'rtt7(h50 ·c· (stating that ''UPDATE, Jan. 29, 

20!6: Marjan Vahdat not [a]ble to[ a] !tend due to visa issues."). 9 l-ladas Gold and Nahal Toosi, .New York Ttmes Iran reporter on new visa reauirc•me.nts.· 

lasted, ' POLITICO (Jan. 26, 20 !6). U.!JJL.=;;:,r=ll\:l!'&!l!fr.!'l'U.c:-'.0!1~UL"lE.;:".I~)_l!.L.m;,.':::Ull.!\::!JJ.lli:,:i:l!cUl::!£12Q.!l<:£:.\cJSh: 

"I X21ll. 

TO Kourosh KolahL f'isa 1vaiver law dt!prives me. an Iranian Amencan 

3 
83 

• Marjan Ehsassi, an Iranian-American woman who previously worked at the National 

Democratic Institute in Washington, D.C.: "What this proposed language would do is 

create two tiers of citizens ... .! don't know this country. I feel like I don't belong." 11 

• Roozbeh Shirazi, an Iranian-American assistant professor at the University of 

Minnesota: "Our sense of belonging as Americans, a topic that I have devoted much of 

my research toward, is at stake. Three generations of my family's lives, memories and 

relationships arc inextricably tied to this land. For many Iraqi- and Syrian-Americans, 

this history is much longer. ... How are we expected to feel a connection to a country that 

formalizes a lower tier of citizenship for us? How are my wife and I supposed to raise 

our 2-year-old son to exercise his rights as a citizen of this country when those rights are 

marked with an asterisk?" 12 

• Farshad Farahat, an Iranian-American actor: "Unfortunately, instead of combating the 

roots of terrorism, this bill scapegoats Iranian Americans, millions of US professionals 

who have helped build America. Professionals that strive in education and economy in 

the US and in the Mid-East, the real weapons that can end terrorism." 13 

• Maziar Nourian, an Iranian-American student at the University of Utah: "The more 

important thing here is it's not really talking about travel privileges, you're creating two 

classes of citizens, one being every other American, including yourself, and me, who 

was born and raised in Salt Lake City but who happens to be of dual national 

citizenship." 14 

• Mitra .Jouhari, an Iranian-American comedian in Brooklyn, New York: '·IranianAmericans arc being targeted in a way that is alarming .... It's all knee jerk, it's reactive, 

and it's racist." 15 

III. The Visa Waiver Program Improvement and Terrorist Travel Prevention 

Act of 2015 could result in the loss of visa-free travel privileges for U.S. 

citizens who are dual nationals of Iran, Iraq, Sudan, Syria. 

Under the VWP, Americans of all nationalities have long been accustomed to traveling to 

many parts of Europe and Asia without visitor visas. This allows for speedy, flexible, and 

convenient international travel, which in turn promotes tourism, trade, study abroad, and 

business, both in the U.S. and abroad. 

However, because the VWP operates on the basis of reciprocity, the new visa waiver travel 

restrictions could result in the 38 VWP countries applying the same travel restrictions to U.S. 

citizens who are dual nationals of Iran, Iraq, Sudan, or Syria. If any of the VWP countries 

4 
84 

chooses to apply the same discriminatory rule, that reciprocal action will result in the loss of 

visa-free travel privileges for U.S. citizens who are dual nationals of Iran, Iraq, Sudan, or Syria. 

According to a letter from 34 executives and entrepreneurs from the high-tech industry, 

including Mark Cuban and Twitter CEO Jack Dorsey, such reciprocal measures would have 

the effect of "potentially weakening the power of the U.S. passport for millions of U.S. 

citizens" and would "also harm U.S. business interests." 16 

• Ali Partovi, an Iranian-American entrepreneur and investor: "the idea that some of us 

would lose this privilege because of our Middle Eastern or African heritage 

compromises the very essence of America: that 'all men are created equal."' 17 

• Sam ira Damavandi, an Iranian-American student currently pursuing a master degree at 

the University of Oxford: "I have temporarily left my home state to attend graduate 

school abroad. I thought to myself, "While I'm here, I can't wait to travel throughout 

Europe to see my cousins during my term breaks" and began planning the trips to 

Switzerland and Germany to see them. But because my Iranian-born parents 

automatically passed down their nationality on to me through jus sanguinis laws and I 

am an Iranian-American dual national, now I'm uncertain if freely traveling to see my 

family will be a possibility due to the recent passage of a discriminatory House bill 

sponsored by Rep. Candice Miller (R-MI-1 0)." 18 

• Azita Ranjbar, an Iranian-American Ph.D. candidate at Pennsylvania State University: 

"If Visa Waiver countries retaliate, Iranian Americans and other dual nationals will 

become 'less than' American citizens. We will be forced to go through long, expensive, 

and invasive security processes to secure visas for international travel ... This differential 

treatment of Americans solely based on national origin is unacceptable and a grave 

violation of the basic rights of U.S. citizens." 19 

IV. Congress must swiftly pass the Equal Protection in Travel Act (S. 2449), to 

remove the discriminatory travel provision and ensure that American 

citizens are not further harmed by the new visa waiver law. 

Introduced shortly after the new year, S. 2449 is bipartisan legislation that would correct the 

shameful discriminatory travel provision now enshrined into U.S. law. [A companion bill, H.R. 

4380, has been introduced in the House with bipartisan support.l S. 2449 would revoke the 

provision included in the Visa Waiver Program Improvement and Terrorist Travel Prevention 

Act of 2015 that strips visa-free travel privileges from dual nationals of! ran, Iraq, Sudan, or 

Syria. Under S. 2449, dual nationals of these four countries would be restored to the VWP and 

enjoy the travel privileges they had long enjoyed prior to December 18, 2015. To ensure that 

no U.S. citizens who are dual nationals are harmed by the discriminatory provision, Congress 

should move swiftly to pass S. 2449. 

5 
85 

V. Conclusion 

The ACLU urges Congress to fix the discriminatory dual nationality provision in the Visa 

Waiver Program Improvement and Terrorist Travel Prevention Act of2015 that scapegoats 

four groups based on national origin, ancestry, and parentage. We urge Congress to swiftly 

pass S. 2449, the Equal Protection in Travel Act, which will remove the provision that 

enshrines discrimination against dual nationals oflran, Iraq, Sudan, and Syria. 

For more information, please contact ACLU Legislative Counsel Joanne Lin (202-675-2317; 

jlin(c/laclu.org). 

Sincerely, 

Karin Johanson 

Director 

Washington Legislative Office 

Joanne Lin 

Legislative Counsel 

6 
86 

Questions for the Record Submitted to 

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary David T. Donahue by 

Senator Ron Johnson (#lA-C) 

Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

March 15,2016 

Please describe any reports that you are aware of relating to the issuance, 

sale, or theft of Syrian passports, including potentially fi·audulent passports. 

Question I A: 

Are there reports of fraudulent passports being issued by Syria? If so, please 

describe the scale of the problem. Are there reports of more than 10, 100, 

1000, or 10,000 sold, stolen, or fraudulent passports. 

Answer: 

We are aware of3,800 Syrian passports reported lost or stolen by the 

Govemment of Syria. 

Question 1 B: 

Please describe any actions the State Department has taken to address the 

problem of stolen or fraudulent passports. 

Answer: 

Upon notification, the Department of State (Department) followed its 

standard operating procedures and entered timely Lost/Stolen Passport 

lookouts into the Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS) and ran 
87 

the records against Interpol's Lost/Stolen Passport Database (SLTD) to 

confirm their inclusion therein. 

The Department continues to work with embassies and consulates to 

ensure proper vetting and adjudication of potential visa ineligibilities should 

they encounter any of these documents. Additionally, the Department has 

implemented measures in our consular sections worldwide to enhance our 

ability to detect falsified or fraudulent Syrian and Iraqi passports. Consular 

officers have refused some visa applications associated with lost or stolen 

Syrian passports. The Department is in contact with its interagency partners 

regarding data entry and watch listing should more reports of lost, stolen, or 

fraudulent Syrian passports surface. 

Question 1-C: 

Please provide the Committee with any State Department intelligence 

assessments related to the issuance of fraudulent or stolen Syrian passports. 

Answer: 

According to the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, the Department 

has not produced any independent intelligence assessments focusing on the 

issuance of fraudulent or stolen Syrian passports. 
88 

Questions for the Record Submitted to 

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary David T. Donahue by 

Senator Ron Johnson (#2A-F) 

Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

March 15,2016 

Please provide the following information and answer the following questions 

related to visas awarded for attendees of the U.N. General Assembly. 

Question 2-A: 

The number of visas awarded overall and by country in FY20 15. 

Answer: 

In FY 2015, the Department of State issued 16,313 G-2 visas to 

representatives of a government that is a member of a designated international 

organization, and to members of their immediate families, who were traveling to 

the United States temporarily to attend meetings of a designated international 

organization. The Department issued an additional 393 G-3 visas to 

representatives of non-recognized or non-member governments and to their 

immediate families. Travel to the U.N. General Assembly is included in these 

numbers. Additional individuals who attended U.N. meetings also may have 

potentially entered the United States using an A, B, C-2, G-2, or G-4 visa. 

Question 2-B: 

The number of waivers given in order to permit foreign diplomats to attend that 

would otherwise be ineligible for a US visa if they were not coming to the US 

specifically for UNGA in FY2014 and FY2015? 
89 

Answer: 

In FY 2015, the Department of State waived and overcame 1,964 

ineligibilities for G-2 visa applicants who were traveling as representatives of a 

recognized government, and to members of their immediate families, who were 

traveling to the United States temporarily to attend meetings of a designated 

international organization. The Department waived and overcame an additional 85 

ineligibilities for G-3 visa applicants who were traveling for such purposes as 

representatives of non-recognized or non-member governments and to their 

immediate families. In FY 2014, the Department of State waived and overcame 

1,570 ineligibilities for G-2 visa applicants and 59 ineligibilities for G-3 visa 

applicants. Travel to the U.N. General Assembly is included in these numbers. 

Additional individuals who attended U.N. meetings also may have potentially 

entered the United States using an A, B, C-2, G-1, or G-4 visa, depending on their 

purpose of travel, and these individuals may or may not have needed or received 

waivers applicable to the visa class. 

Question 2-C: 

Please describe the process by which visa applications for attendance at the U.N. 

General Assembly are reviewed and processed. How does this process compare to 

other visas? For example, is each attendee interviewed by a consular officer? 

Answer: 

Most travelers attending the U.N. General Assembly on behalf of a foreign 

government apply for and are admitted to the United States on a G-2 visa. 

Attendees who have not traveled to attend short-term U.N. meetings on behalf of a 

member state may have entered the United States on an A, C-2, G-1, G-3, G-4, or 

B visa, depending on the purpose of travel for which they sought to enter the 

United States. A, C-2, and G visa applicants are subject to limited ineligibilities, 

are exempt from fingerprinting requirements, and may have the personal 

appearance (interview) waived. However, as with all other visa applications, all 

names and associated biodata are run through the CLASS lookout system, 

interagency counterterrorism checks, and facial recognition software. Derogatory 

information that requires a Security Advisory Opinion is referred to Consular 

Affairs in Washington, DC, for appropriate checks with the interagency 
90 

community before the visa is authorized to be issued. While a consular officer 

interview is not required, an interview may be requested in order to determine the 

applicant's qualification for the visa class requested. 

Question 2-D: 

How many visa applications for attendance at the General Assembly were denied 

in FY2015? 

Answer: 

The Department does not collect information with regard to refusals of visa 

applications submitted by individuals who specifically seek to attend UNGA 

meetings; however, the United States has issued visas in a manner consistent with 

its obligations under United Nations Headquarters Agreement. 

Question 2-E: 

Is section 306 of the enhanced border security and visa reform act of 2002 applied 

to UN diplomats? 

Answer: 

Yes, all nonimmigrant visa applicants from state sponsors of terrorism are 

covered by section 306 and may be denied a visa if the Secretary detennines that 

the applicant poses a threat to the safety and security of the United States. 

Question 2-F: 

Since the public repmis in the 2000s of Iranian diplomats videotaping U.S. 

landmarks and critical infrastructure, have there been security concerns related to 

the Iranian delegations since that time? 
91 

Answer: 

All visa applicants attending the U.N. General Assembly, including Iranian 

diplomats traveling on behalf of the foreign government, arc subject to security 

screening and vetting. Most travelers who attend the U.N. General Assembly, 

including Iranian diplomats, apply for and are admitted to the United States on a 

G-2 visa. A-I, A-2, C-2, C-3, and G-1 through G-4 visa applicants are subject to 

limited ineligibilities, are exempt from fingerprinting requirements, and may have 

the personal appearance (interview) waived. However, as with all other visa 

applications, all names and associated biodata are run through the CLASS lookout 

system, interagency counterterrorism checks, and facial recognition software. 

Should the Department receive information about possible national security 

threats, we would act accordingly through our security vetting processes. 

Derogatory information that requires a Security Advisory Opinion is referred to 

Consular Affairs in Washington, DC, for appropriate checks with the interagency 

community before the visa is authorized to be issued. While a consular officer 

interview is not required, an interview may be requested in order to determine the 

applicant's qualification for the visa class requested. 
92 

Questions for the Record Submitted to 

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary David T. Donahue by 

Senator Ron Johnson (#3A-E) 

Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

March 15,2016 

Provide the following information to clarity the workload of consular officers to 

process visa applications abroad. 

Question 3-A: 

The number of consular officers that have responsibilities for screening and 

adjudicating visas in FY2015. 

Answer: 

At the end ofFY 2015, CA had 1,925 commissioned consular staff overseas 

with screening and adjudicating responsibilities. This figure includes managers 

who are responsible for training, oversight, and accountability reviews, in addition 

to handling special cases and supervising the entry-level stafimembers who have 

visa adjudication included among their core responsibilities. 

Question 3-B: 

The number ofvisa applications received in FY2015. 

Answer: 

13,250,059 
93 

Question 3-C: 

The number of visas awarded in FY20 15. 

Answer: 

10,891,529 

Question 3-D: 

An estimate for the average number of visa interviews conducted by an average 

consular officer, including an estimate for an officer stationed to a post with a high 

volume of applications and one stationed at a post with a low volume of 

applications. 

Answer: 

An officer at a low-volume post adjudicates on average 60 nonimmigrant 

visa applications per day. The average number of adjudications at the majority of 

our posts is 80 per day, and 100 per day at our large-volume operations. At most 

posts, some portion of these applicants qualify for Interview Waiver, generally 

submitted by courier; thus, the number of interviews actually conducted per officer 

is often lower than the number of adjudications. In addition, some visa interviews 

consist of families (parents with minor children), and so a single interview can 

include the adjudication of multiple applications. For immigrant visas, the average 

numbers of adjudications per day are 21, 28, and 35 for small, average, and large 

posts respectively. 

Question 3-E: 

A description of the other official responsibilities of consular officers beyond 

interviewing and screening visa applicants. 
94 

Answer: 

Consular sections at our embassies and consulates receive more applications 

for nonimmigrant visas than for any other type of service. A substantial majority 

of adjudicator time therefore is occupied by interviewing and screening visa 

applicants. In addition, consular officers: 1) provide services to U.S. citizens, 

including passport services, notarial services, welfare and whereabouts checks, 

federal benefits services, making visits to incarcerated U.S. citizens, and 

responding to crises; 2) conduct outreach to U.S. citizens and potential visa 

applicants such as students and tour operators; 3) review and respond to inquiries 

from the public as well as Congress; 4) provide and receive training on new or 

revised requirements and procedures; and 5) prepare reports, both mandatory and 

ad hoc, for the Department on various matters of interest. 
95 

Questions for the Record Submitted to 

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary David T. Donahue by 

Senator Ron Johnson (#4A-B) 

Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

March 15, 2016 

Press reports have indicated that some countries, such as several countries in the 

Caribbean including St. Kitts, Nevis and Dominica, have programs to provide 

citizenship and passports to foreign nationals who make investments in the 

country. Please describe the State Department's view about these programs, and if 

there are any security concerns associated with them. 

Question 4-A: 

What unique challenges are presented in vetting visa applicants who hold multiple 

passports for national security and fraud risks? Flow does the State Department 

identify whether a petitioner holds passports in nations other than the passport 

being presented to the State Department? 

Answer: 

We ask visa applicants to report any nationalities they hold, apmi from that 

represented in their passports, on the State Department's electronic visa 

application. In the case of "economic" citizenship, even if an applicant fails to 

disclose his/her birth nationality, his/her adopted passport must have a place of 

birth listed to be accepted as valid. Therefore, economic citizenship is not an 

effective way to evade fraud prevention screening in the visa process. The State 

Department will not place a visa in a passport that does not list the applicant's 

place of birth or does not accurately reflect the nationality of the applicant. 

Question 4-B: 
96 

For example, would a foreign national from a conflict area like Iraq or Syria face 

the same screening if they presented a passport from a Caribbean country than if 

they had presented a passport from their home countries? 

Answer: 

Applicant screening is based on many factors, including but not limited to 

which country issued a passport. If an application required additional or special 

processing, it would undergo that processing no matter what passport the applicant 

held. 
97 

Questions for the Record Submitted to 

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary David T. Donahue by 

Senator Ron Johnson (#SA-B) 

Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

March 15, 2016 

No nonimmigrant visa under Section I Ol(a)(15) of the Immigration and 

Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 110l(a)(15)) shall be issued to any alien from a country 

that is a state sponsor of international terrorism unless the Secretary of State 

determines, in consultation with the Attorney General and the heads of other 

appropriate United States agencies, that such alien does not pose a threat to the 

safety or national security of the United States. 

Question 5-A: 

Is there any reason why this law should not be amended to apply to immigrant 

visas as well? 

Answer: 

We would consider the impact of any such legislation when it was 

introduced in coordination with other relevant agencies. Since we apply section 

306 of the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of2002 in the 

context of a specific purpose of travel, it may be difficult to administer for 

immigrant visa applicants, or for applicants with both nonimmigrant and 

immigrant visa applications. 
98 

Question 5-B: 

In the case of an individual who was denied under these circumstances, who later 

applies for an immigrant visa, what is the process for adjudicating that visa, 

assuming that the only change in circumstance is the visa classification? 

Answer: 

While section 306 of the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform 

Act of 2002 does not apply to the issuance of an immigrant visa, all visa 

applications are adjudicated in accordance with U.S. Jaws. If an individual whose 

nonimmigrant visa application is refused under section 306 later applies for an 

immigrant visa, the consular officer considers all facts and adjudicates that 

immigrant visa application in accordance with all pertinent U.S. laws. 
99 

Questions for the Record Submitted to 

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary David T. Donahue by 

Senator Ron Johnson (#6) 

Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

March 15,2016 

Question: 

Fiancee visas are adjudicated as nonimmigrants (K-1 ). After San Bernardino, we 

understand that the U.S. is reexamining that process. Should diversity lottery 

winners (DV) also be adjudicated as nonimmigrants? If not, why? 

Answer: 

K visas are issued as nonimmigrant visas because at the time of the 

recipient's entry to the United States he or she is not yet married to a U.S. citizen, 

which is the legal basis for a family-based immigrant visa. Once married, the K 

visa recipient can then adjust status to become a lawful permanent resident (LPR), 

just as the spouse of a U.S. citizen or LPR who is issued an immigrant visa would 

obtain LPR status upon entry to the United States. Because a K visa permits the 

holder to marry a U.S. citizen and adjust to permanent resident status shortly after 

his or her arrival in the United States, the K visa applicant must meet most of the 

requirements of an immigrant visa, and a K-1 visa application generally follows 

the same processing as an immigrant visa application. 

The Diversity Visa program is an immigrant visa program and the applicants 

have immigrant intent upon application, so a nonimmigrant visa would not be 

appropriate for these applicants. Additionally, there is no action to be taken once 

the applicant receives the visa and enters the United States to trigger a subsequent 

adjustment to LPR status. Whereas with the K visa, the marriage to the U.S. 

citizen is the act that then initiates the adjustment of status; there is no similar act 

or requirement for Diversity Visa recipients. Qualifying for the Diversity Visa and 
100 

meeting the requirements is sufficient to obtain LPR status upon entry to the 

United States in the same manner as other immigrant visa categories. 

Section 10 I (a)( IS) of the INA lists the classes of nonimmigrants and defines 

immigrants as all aliens except those listed in section IOI(a)(l5). Fiancee visas 

(K-1) are set out at section I 0 I (a)( 15)(K) of the INA and therefore are within the 

statutory definition of nonimmigrant visas. Diversity Visas (DV) are set out at 

section 203(c) ofthe INA, and therefore they are outside the list ofnonimmigrants 

at section I 01 (a)( 15) of the INA and by statutory definition immigrant visas. 
101 

Question: 

Post-Hearing Questions for the Record Submitted by 

Senator Rob Portman (#1) 

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary David Donahue 

Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee 

March 15, 2016 

According to your submitted testimony, the Department of State initiated a pilot 

purposed to evaluate the viability of screening visa applicants' social media 

accounts. You also indicated that you followed the lead of components in the 

Department of Homeland Security. 

a. Who inside the Department of State authorized the pilot program? 

b. When was this pilot authorized? How long will the pilot last? 

c. How long will it take to assess the results from the pilot to permanently 

implement the screening of visa applicants' social media accounts? 

Answer: 

On January 8, 2016, Assistant Secretary of State for Consular Affairs, 

Michele Thoren Bond, authorized a pilot program requiring consular officers at 

certain locations to review the social media pages of specific categories of visa 

applicants. The pilot began on January 19. After 90 business days have elapsed, 

the Bureau of Consular Affairs will evaluate the program to measure its benefits 

and determine whether these efforts yielded derogatory information that a consular 

officer would not have otherwise detected during a traditional adjudication. 

Depending on the results of the pilot, we plan to continue to work with interagency 

partners and the National Security Council to identify a whole-of-government 

solution regarding reviews of visa applicant social media pages. 
102 

Question: 

Post-Hearing Questions for the Record Submitted by 

Senator Rob Portman (#2) 

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary David Donahue 

Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee 

March 15, 2016 

Your submitted testimony states that a consular officer "suspends visa adjudication 

and requests an SAO" upon finding that "reasonable grounds exist[s] to question 

visa eligibility on security related grounds." 

a. What discretion does the consular officer have in deciding to suspend a 

visa adjudication to request a SAO? 

Answer: 

i. May he or she suspend upon finding reasonable grounds? 

ii. Must he or she suspend upon tinding reasonable grounds? 

In cases in which an interagency counterterrorism check returns a securityrelated "red light" response, and/or applicable CLASS name check results exist, 

and/or a variety of interagency-approved policies developed to vet travelers that 

raise security concerns apply, consular officers are required to submit an SAO 

request. Beyond these mandatory SAO requirements, in any case in which 

reasonable grounds exist to question visa eligibility based on security-related 

grounds- regardless of the results of the processes described above a consular 

officer must suspend visa processing and request an SAO. Consular officers 

receive extensive training on the SAO process. The process requires a consular 

officer to refuse the case under INA section 221 (g) and to submit the case for 

interagency SAO review of any possible security-related ineligibilities. 
103 

Question: 

Post-Hearing Questions for the Record Submitted by 

Senator Rob Portman (#3a) 

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary David Donahue 

Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee 

March 15,2016 

According to the DHS Inspector General's submitted testimony, consular officers 

have expressed their frustration with not learning essential information to "enhance 

their skills" from their ICE partners embedded at embassy or consular facilities. 1 

Has this information sharing and collaborative partnership improved the 

effectiveness of the Department of State's role in maintaining the security of U.S. 

Visa Programs? 

Answer: 

Yes. ICE-staffed Visa Security Units (VSUs) have been present for some 

years at a number of embassies and consulates. The Visa Security Program (VSP) 

enhances national security and public safety by adding a layer of review to 

minimize the possibility that terrorists, criminals, and other ineligible applicants 

receive U.S. visas. It also maximizes the effectiveness of information gathered in 

the visa application process in efforts to combat terrorism, criminality, and other 

threats to national security. 

At posts with a VSU, State Department consular officers and our ICE 

colleagues participate in daily exchanges of information regarding individual visa 

cases, regional and post-specific trends and analysis, and other operational 

1 The Securitv of U.S. Visa Programs Beji1re the S. Comm. on flame/and Sec. and Governmental Affairs, I 14th 

Cong. (20 16) (Submitted Testimony of Hon. John Roth, Inspector Gen. of the Dcp't. of Homeland Sec., p. 7). 
104 

coordination. ICE officers are able to use their law enforcement authorities and 

connections to further enhance the already robust information sharing that exists 

between our two agencies. When necessary, ICE agents conduct targeted, in-depth 

reviews of individual visa applications and applicants prior to issuance, and 

recommend refusal of applications to consular officers when warranted. 
105 

Question: 

Post-Hearing Questions for the Record Submitted by 

Senator Rob Portman (#3b) 

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary David Donahue 

Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee 

March 15, 2016 

What are ways that this partnership can be improved? 

Answer: 

The Department and DHS work collaboratively on the operation and 

expansion of the VSP. State Department officers are assigned to work with ICE on 

site selection, the establishment of VSUs overseas, and to help ICE navigate the 

interagency process to establish new positions overseas. Over the years, the 

Department has gone to extraordinary lengths to support VSP expansion, including 

sending senior consular and Diplomatic Security officers on visits to posts to help 

ICE explain the program's goals to Chiefs of Mission. 
106 

Question: 

Post-Hearing Questions for the Record Submitted by 

Senator Rob Portman (#3c) 

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary David Donahue 

Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee 

March 15, 2016 

Does Congress need to do anything to greater facilitate the effectiveness of this 

partnership and information-sharing relationship? 

Answer: 

The Department and DHS coordinate to facilitate the partnership and 

overcome some of the challenging limitations on resources and administrative 

capacity that limited VSU expansion in the past. This has increased the pace of 

VSU expansion. Effective relationships at each VSU post are formed as 

Department and ICE colleagues collaborate to carry out their mission. 
107 

Question for the Record submitted to 

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary David Donahue by 

Senator Kelly Ayotte (#1) 

Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee 

March 15, 2016 

The Visa Waiver Program allows citizens from 38 countries to travel to the 

U.S. for business or tourism purposes for up to 90 days without first 

obtaining a visa. In December, Congress passed and the President signed 

into law additional restrictions for traveling under the program. Pursuant to 

that law, a citizen of a Visa Waiver Program country who has traveled to 

Iraq, Syria, Sudan, or Iran in the last five years cannot travel visa-free to the 

United States. That law also provided the Secretary of Homeland Security 

with the authority to designate additional countries to that list. Secretary 

Johnson recently announced that Somalia, Yemen, and Libya have been 

added to this list. 

Question: 

Can you please explain your role in this program generally, and more 

specifically, your role, if any in implementing these additional restrictions. 

Answer: 

While the Secretary of Homeland Security determines which countries 

will trigger the Visa Waiver Program travel restrictions cited above, he 

makes this determination in consultation with the Secretary of State and the 

Director of National Intelligence. In this case, DHS in early February 

consulted with the State Department about its plans to designate Libya, 

Somalia, and Yemen; subsequently, State concurred with DHS' 
108 

determination. In late February, State notified the 38 VWP partner 

governments about how the VWP travel and dual nationality restrictions 

would affect their citizens who either had traveled on or after March I, 20 I I 

to Iraq, Syria, Sudan, or Iran, or are also nationals of one of these countries; 

State also advised partner governments, as appropriate, that DHS would 

shortly introduce similar VWP restrictions for individuals who had traveled 

to Libya, Somalia, or Yemen on or after March 1, 20 11. The State 

Department continues to respond to partner governments' inquiries and 

concerns about the impact on their citizens. 
109 

Question for the Record submitted to 

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary David Donahue by 

Senator Kelly Ayotte (#2) 

Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee 

March 15,2016 

The Visa Waiver Program allows citizens from 38 countries to travel to the 

U.S. for business or tourism purposes for up to 90 days without first 

obtaining a visa. In December, Congress passed and the President signed 

into law additional restrictions for traveling under the program. Pursuant to 

that law, a citizen of a Visa Waiver Program country who has traveled to 

Iraq, Syria, Sudan, or Iran in the last five years cannot travel visa-free to the 

United States. That law also provided the Secretary of Homeland Security 

with the authority to designate additional countries to that list. Secretary 

Johnson recently announced that Somalia, Yemen, and Libya have been 

added to this list. 

Question: 

What was your role, if any, in the decision to add Libya, Somalia, and 

Yemen to the list? 

Answer: 

Under the legislation, the Secretary of Homeland Security determines 

which countries will trigger the Visa Waiver Program travel restrictions 

cited above. This determination is done in consultation with the Secretary of 

State and the Director of National Intelligence. The State Department's role 

in adding Libya, Somalia and Yemen to the list ofVWP travel-restricted 

countries was consultative and focused on assessing the full range of 
110 

foreign policy and national security implications. State concurred with DHS' 

determination. 
111 

Question for the Record submitted to 

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary David Donahue by 

Senator Kelly Ayotte (#3) 

Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee 

March 15,2016 

The Visa Waiver Program allows citizens from 38 countries to travel to the 

U.S. for business or tourism purposes for up to 90 days without first 

obtaining a visa. In December, Congress passed and the President signed 

into law additional restrictions for traveling under the program. Pursuant to 

that law, a citizen of a Visa Waiver Program country who has traveled to 

Iraq, Syria, Sudan, or Iran in the last five years cannot travel visa-free to the 

United States. That law also provided the Secretary of Homeland Security 

with the authority to designate additional countries to that list. Secretary 

Johnson recently announced that Somalia, Yemen, and Libya have been 

added to this list. 

Question: 

To what extent was the Department of Defense consulted in these decisions? 

Answer: 

The State Department respectfully refers you to DHS regarding any 

consultations with the Defense Department. 
112 

Question for the Record Submitted to 

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary David Donahue by 

Senator Kelly Ayotte (#4) 

Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee 

March 15,2016 

The Visa Waiver Program allows citizens from 38 countries to travel to the 

U.S. for business or tourism purposes for up to 90 days without first 

obtaining a visa. In December, Congress passed and the President signed 

into law additional restrictions for traveling under the program. Pursuant to 

that law, a citizen of a Visa Waiver Program country who has traveled to 

Iraq, Syria, Sudan, or Iran in the last five years cannot travel visa-free to the 

United States. That law also provided the Secretary of Homeland Security 

with the authority to designate additional countries to that list. Secretary 

Johnson recently announced that Somalia, Yemen, and Libya have been 

added to this list. 

Question: 

Was AFRICOM consulted? 

Answer: 

The State Department respectfully refers you to DHS regarding any 

consultations with AFRICOM. 
113 

Question for the Record Submitted to 

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary David Donahue by 

Senator Kelly Ayotte (#5) 

Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee 

March 15, 2016 

The Visa Waiver Program allows citizens from 38 countries to travel to the 

U.S. for business or tourism purposes for up to 90 days without first 

obtaining a visa. In December, Congress passed and the President signed 

into law additional restrictions for traveling under the program. Pursuant to 

that law, a citizen of a Visa Waiver Program country who has traveled to 

Iraq, Syria, Sudan, or Iran in the last five years cannot travel visa-free to the 

United States. That law also provided the Secretary of Homeland Security 

with the authority to designate additional countries to that list. Secretary 

Johnson recently announced that Somalia, Yemen, and Libya have been 

added to this list. 

Question: 

How about CENTCOM? 

Answer: 

The State Department respectfully refers you to DHS regarding any 

consultations with CENTCOM. 
114 

Question for the Record Submitted to 

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary David Donahue by 

Senator Kelly Ayotte (#6) 

Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee 

March 15, 2016 

The Visa Waiver Program allows citizens from 38 countries to travel to the 

U.S. for business or tourism purposes for up to 90 days without first 

obtaining a visa. In December, Congress passed and the President signed 

into law additional restrictions for traveling under the program. Pursuant to 

that law, a citizen of a Visa Waiver Program country who has traveled to 

Iraq, Syria, Sudan, or Iran in the last five years cannot travel visa-free to the 

United States. That law also provided the Secretary of Homeland Security 

with the authority to designate additional countries to that list. Secretary 

Johnson recently announced that Somalia, Yemen, and Libya have been 

added to this list. 

Question: 

We know that Al Qaeda continues to operate in large parts of Algeria, Mali, 

Tunisia, and Niger. Why weren't these countries also designated as a 

"country of concern" under this law? 

Answer: 

While the State Department understands and supports the criteria 

DHS used to determine which countries should be on its VWP "country of 

concern" list, wherein travel by a VWP passport holder within the last five 

years is determined to present a risk to U.S. national security, we 
115 

respectfully refer you to DHS for the specifics of its evaluation of Algeria, 

Mali, Tunisia and Niger. 
116 

Questions for the Record Submitted to 

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary David T. Donahue from 

Senator Tammy Baldwin (#la) 

Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

March 15,2016 

Question: 

What typically happens during the "Administrative processing" phase and 

why might this process take a considerable amount of time to complete? 

Answer: 

Administrative processing broadly describes any additional review 

initiated by the consular officer to examine the facts of an individual case 

and ensure that the visa application is approved or refused appropriately 

based on U.S. laws. While administrative processing is not necessarily a 

reference to the security clearance process, all visa applicants undergo an 

interagency counterterrorism check, and in cases in which that check 

identifies a need for additional processing, the appropriate interagency 

review is conducted. In nearly all cases, administrative processing is 

resolved within 60 days of the visa interview, and in many cases, much 

sooner. 
117 

Questions for the Record Submitted to 

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary David T. Donahue from 

Senator Tammy Baldwin (#1b) 

Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

March 15, 2016 

Question: 

Why is the Department of State unable to provide me or the applicant status 

updates at this stage of the application process? 

Answer: 

Section 222(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), which 

makes visa records confidential, prohibits us from discussing individual visa 

applications except in specific circumstances as directed by the INA. An 

applicant or designated representative may inquire about his or her case 

status utilizing any of the methods listed on the "Contact Us" page at 

travel.state.gov. Additionally, the websites of individual U.S. embassies and 

consulates include information about the visa application process and wait 

times, and many of the sites provide ways for applicants to inquire about the 

status of their cases. If the case is delayed for reasons unrelated to security, 
118 

fraud, or law enforcement review, the applicant may be given a detailed 

explanation. 

When a case is undergoing administrative processing for security 

reasons, however, all details of the review are confidential, often classified, 

and may be known only to the agency conducting the review. Usually, no 

information is available to consular officers prior to completion of the 

review. At that time the applicant is informed whether the visa will be 

issued or denied. 
119 

Questions for the Record Submitted to 

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary David T. Donahue from 

Senator Tammy Baldwin (#1c) 

Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

March 15, 2016 

Question: 

Has the Department considered policy changes that can accelerate the visa 

process and increase transparency for customers while maintaining security? 

If so, please discuss. 

Answer: 

The Department constantly explores options to gain efficiencies in the 

visa adjudication process while meeting our legal and national security 

mandates. For example, refinements to our security clearance procedures 

have reduced the impact of this necessary measure on the traveling public by 

reducing processing times and the number of false matches, without 

compromising security. Under INA section 212(b ), consular officers 

generally are required to provide certain details when denying a visa, 

thereby creating an exception to the visa confidentiality rule; however, 

section 212(b) explicitly does not apply to denials based on criminal, 

security, or related grounds from that disclosure provision. Consequently, 

applicants in these situations generally are told only the relevant provision of 

immigration law. 
120 

The Department's travel information website, travel.state.gov, 

provides potential visa applicants with average appointment wait times at 

U.S. embassies and consulates, a walk-through of the entire visa application 

process, and a list of all necessary forms. 
121 

Questions for the Record Submitted to 

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary Oavid T. Donahue from 

Senator Tammy Baldwin (#ld) 

Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

Mareh 15,2016 

Question: 

Will you commit to considering policy changes to increase transparency for 

applicants when inquiring about their visa application status? 

Answer: 

The Department provides multiple methods to inquire about case status. An 

applicant may inquire about his or her case status by utilizing any of the methods 

listed on the "Contact Us" page at travel.state.gov. Additionally, the websites of 

individual U.S. embassies and consulates include information about the visa 

application process and wait times, and many of the sites provide ways for 

applicants to inquire about the status of their cases. Many embassies and 

consulates also participate in outreach efforts to ensure that up-to-date information 

about the visa application process is shared with a wide audience. However, since 

the details of visa denials may be based on classified information and, regardless, 

are confidential under section 222(f) in these cases, we generally can only cite the 

provision of law used in making a denial decision. 
122 

Post-Hearing Questions for the Record 

Submitted to the Honorable Leon Rodriguez 

From Senator Ron .Johnson 

"The Security of U.S. Visa Programs" 

March 15, 2016 

Question: Please describe your understanding of the events that offered on December 3rd 

at the San Bernardino U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) otlice, 

including by answering the following questions. 

When was USCIS made aware of the orders and intentions of the Homeland Security 

Investigations (HSI) agents that went to the USCIS office that afternoon? 

Response: USCJS was made aware of the orders and intentions of U.S. Immigration and 

Customs Enforcement/HSI shortly after the HSI agents' arrival at the USCJS San 

Bernardino field office on December 3, 2015. 

Question: What happened when they arrived at the USCIS oflice7 

Response: HSI agents were admitted to the building and met with the Field Office 

Director upon arrival. Because this request was not a regular or routine request received 

by USCIS and since the person being sought by HSI had not arrived for his appointment, 

the Field Office Director requested supervisory guidance and confirmation. 

Question: How long were I-lSI agents at the USCIS office? 

Response: Approximately one hour. 

Question: At what level was the decision to deny HSI agents entry to the building made? 

Response: I-lSI agents were at no point denied entry to the building. HSJ's request was 

accommodated in a timely manner. 

Question: Was the decision communicated to headquarters? 
123 

Response: Please see the previous responses. 
124 

Question: Are you aware of any communications that occurred between USC IS and ICE 

managers in California, at headquarters, or elsewhere to address the incident at the 

users offices0 

Response: Yes. Communication between USCIS and ICE personnel took place at all 

appropriate levels regarding this incident. 
125 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

~· --~--------L--------------------------------------------------~ 

Question: Please describe USCIS's policy for assisting ICE with counterterrorism 

investigations. 

Response: USCIS regularly assists ICE on criminal and terrorism investigations. USC IS 

proactively provides information relating to criminals and individuals who are 

determined to be a national security concern pursuant to a 2008 Memorandum of 

Agreement. USC IS also provides information in response to ICE requests for 

information relating to preliminary and ongoing investigations. USCIS Fraud Detection 

and National Security Directorate staff regularly communicate with ICE agents on fraud, 

criminal, and terrorism cases. 

US CIS has a Records Policy Manual that defines the protocols for sharing immigration 

files and providing assistance and cooperation to other Federal agencies. This policy 

states that in a national security event HSI should request files through USCIS's Fraud 

Detection and National Security Directorate (FDNS) and that USCIS will create a hard 

copy and electronic copy of the file within 2 hours of receiving a request and provide 

those copies to the requester within 30 minutes of completing the copies. 

Question: Was what occurred on December 3rd consistent with those policies? 

Response: While there is a records policy for the sharing of immigration tile information, 

US CIS and ICE did not have a policy on December 3, 2015, by which ICE would request 

to interview a United States citizen at a USCIS office. 

Question: Have policies and procedures changed since this incident':' 

Response: US CIS and ICE have further strengthened their partnership by developing and 

enacting a Memorandum of Agreement on May 31, 2016, which outlines the coordination 

of ICE visits to USC IS facilities. 
126 

Question: The Committee understands that on December 3, 2015, HSI agents requested 

copies of Mariya Chernykh's A-file from USC IS. 

Did USCIS respond to HSI's request for copies of the A-file? 

Response: Yes, HSI was provided full access to the A-file on December 3rd and USCIS 

personnel reviewed the file page-by-page with the agents. Several days later, HSI 

requested a full copy of the lilc. which was provided within one day. 

Question: If so, when did USCJS provide the requested copies of the A-file to HSJ'l 

Response: HSI agents were provided full access to the A-file on December 3, 2015. A 

copy of the A-file was provided to HSI on December 8, 2015. 

Question: Please describe USCIS's policies and procedures for providing copies of Afiles to ICE. 

Response: Normally. ICE would obtain the original A-file by making a routine request 

using the same systems and processes afforded USCIS employees. The governing policy 

for making such requests is found in Chapter ll-09 of the USCIS Records Policy Manual 

(RPM). In the event of simultaneous needs by both agencies, the hierarchy established in 

Part I of RPM Chapter Jl-25 would be used to determine which agency process is granted 

usc of the original A-file. 

If needed, the production of an A-file copy (and an associated time line) is typically 

negotiated between the involved offices. 

Question: How long does it take for USC IS to provide requested copies of an A-file to 

ICE? 

Response: There is no established time standard for providing A-file copies except in a 

declared National Security Event as provided in RPM Chapter IV -0 I. In such cases, a 

2.5-hour standard is provided. 

The production of certified A-file copies in the normal course of business can range from 

producing whole files to the more common request for parts of files, such as fingerprint 

cards. The time line for producing such copies of an A-file can depend upon the 
127 

availability and location of the file, and workload of the office to produce the copy. 

Priority requests would be processed as such, as stated immediately above; the delivery 

timeline for the infom1ation would be negotiated between the parties. 
128 

Question#: 

Question: Inspector General Roth testified about USCIS's information technology 

transformation project, including that the project's initial cost projection has increased by 

more than 400 percent, and that the project which began in 2005 is now anticipated to be 

completed by 2019. The Inspector General also reported that the cost of maintaining a 

paper-based processing system is over $300 million annually. Importantly, the IG also 

reported that the current system results in green cards to be potentially sent to the wrong 

people, creating a risk of fraud and security. Please answer the following questions 

related to his audit. 

How much has been spent on the IT transformation project since FY2005? 

Response: As reported on the DHS FY 2015 Comprehensive Acquisition Status Report 

(CASR) submitted to Congress on April14, 2016, USCIS obligated $1.2 billion on the 

Transformation investment from FY 2006 through FY 2015. The USCIS Transformation 

investment began in FY 2006. Therefore, there were no obligations in FY 2005. It 

should be noted that the increased cost estimate is partly due to comparing a 22 year 

estimate to a 33 year estimate. The additional 11 years of operations and maintenance 

contributed an estimated $725 million towards the program's total anticipated costs. 

Question: How much is projected to be spent on the IT transformation from FY2016 

through FY20 19? 

Response: USCIS estimates $587 million will be spent from FY 2016 through FY 2019. 

The cost for development activities is estimated to be $354.7 million and $232.2 million 

will be spent towards operations and support. 

Question: Since projected completion deadlines have been missed in the past, please 

describe what gives you confidence that the project will be completed by 2019. 

Response: 

• USCIS recognized the limitations of the original system architecture and launched an 

enhanced system with a new architecture in November 2014. The new system is built 

on the latest cloud-based technology that is cun·cntly used in the private sector, using 

a modern technology stack that is founded on open source software and an open 

architecture. 

• USC IS also has adopted the latest commercial industry best practices and approaches 

for system development that employ lean software development practices to 
129 

iteratively deliver capabilities to end users over compressed timeframes. These best 

practices incorporate user feedback, extensive stakeholder involvement, and robust 

end user testing of system functionality. 

• The program follows a model of continuous integration, testing, and frequent delivery 

of smaller increments of capabilities to end users to shorten the feedback loop and 

give the design and development team opportunities to adjust based on user feedback. 

• The Program can make more accurate estimations since initial onboarding of the new 

development contractors in September 2014. 

• The Program delivered capability associated with four product lines during 2015. 
130 

Question: Do you know how many green cards were sent to the wrong people in 

FY2015? lfso,howmany? 

Response: USers sends the Green Card using the Secure Mail Initiative (SM!) to the last 

address on record provided by the benefit recipient, whether it be at the time of: filing the 

benefit request; requesting a replacement/renewal card; an immigrant visa interview; 

admission to the United States by a eBP officer; or through the Alien's Change of 

Address Card (AR-11) process. The SMI process does conilrm and track the delivery of 

the package to the correct address. However, if the US Postal Service cannot deliver the 

package to the address on record, it is returned to USCIS as "undelivered." All 

undelivered packages are tracked. Once received, USCIS takes additional steps to 

determine if the beneficiary has provided an updated address through the AR-11 process, 

through the Service Request Management Tool (SRMT), or through the Electronic 

Immigration System (ELlS) (after the beneficiary has been identity-proofed). If 

available, the package is again sent to the applicant at the updated address via SMI. In 

FY 2015, more than 2 million green cards were produced and mailed to the addresses last 

provided by benetit recipients. Of the more than 2 million green cards issued, 

approximately 49,000 cards-or 2 percent-were undelivered, and 76 percent of those 

were re-mailed to the applicant upon the applicant subsequently providing an updated 

address. 

It is the applicant's responsibility to provide an accurate mailing address at the time of 

11ling. immigrant visa interview, or admission as an immigrant at a U.S. port of entry, and 

to inform US CIS of any subsequent address changes. Unless a beneficiary affirmatively 

notifies USe IS of an address change, USC IS has no way of knowing if the beneficiary 

has moved from the last known address on record. We only become aware of those 

situations when: 1) the Green Card is returned as undeliverable and the U.S. Post office 

notes a change of address submitted by the applicant, 2) the applicant contacts us 

indicating that he or she did not receive the card and we ask whether the applicant has a 

new address, or 3) if the individual that currently resides at the address where the card 

was initially mailed returns it to us. US CIS does not maintain statistics on the number of 

instances associated with these situations. 

Despite improvements under SMI. users does very occasionally field calls regarding 

undelivered documents even where proper addresses changes have been made. users is 

developing processes to address this issue. For example, US CIS is developing a pilot 

wherein an applicant can opt to have their documents held at a Post Office for pick up. 
131 

Question: Please describe what actions USCIS is taking to address the technical 

challenges with the existing information technology system described in the IG's report. 

Response: 

• The Inspector General wrote about the technical challenges experienced by users of 

the original system and the new system. We had recognized the limitations of the 

original system and architecture and have decommissioned this system. The product 

line discussed in the Inspector General's report has since been migrated to the new 

system. The migration occurred after the audit team completed their review. 

• The Inspector General's report also provided feedback from users of the new system. 

After the November 2014 deployment, the program office and those using the system 

held ongoing sessions to address issues. As user issues were identified, the Office of 

Transformation implemented solutions such as developing additional functionality to 

address usability issues; identifying improvements with interfaces that drew in data 

from other USCIS systems; and working on issues that impacted supporting systems 

such as notice and card printing. 
132 

Question: Please describe the advantages that using an electronic system for processing 

benefits will provide for enhancing USCIS's ability to identify fraud and other integrity 

problems in the immigration and naturalization system. 

Response: Full capture of data in an electronic environment allows the agency to conduct 

searches and run analytics against combinations of data that the agency previously could 

not do without a very labor- and logistically-intensive process or possibly never do since 

so much of our data is only in the paper files. The electronic system also allows for 

security checks to be automatically generated at any time throughout the process, 

ensuring updated information is always available to USCIS personnel. Finally all 

information is in one location available immediately to those who need it. 
133 

Question: Please describe the policies and procedures that USCIS follows when law 

enforcement agencies, such as Immigration and Customs Enforcement, requests 

information from USCIS files. 

Under what circumstances would USCJS deny an ICE or other federal law enforcement 

officials' requests for information for an investigation related to fraud or national security 

concerns? 

Response: USC IS would not deny a request for information from ICE or other law 

enforcement entities for an investigation related to fraud or national security concerns. 

While infonnation sharing restrictions do exist, including asylum confidentiality in 8 

C.F.R. § 208.6 and certain victim confidentiality in 8 U.S.C. § 1367. exceptions exist to 

allow sharing of information to support law enforcement investigations. 

Question: Are you aware of instances when ICE agents have requested information from 

USCIS files for national security investigations where US CIS denied the request? 

Response: USC IS is not aware of any instance where an ICE agent requested 

information from USCJS to support a national security investigation and was denied 

access to that information. ICE agents have access to USC IS files and to most USCIS 

systems. 

Question: If so, please provide a number or estimate of the number of times that this has 

occurred. 

Response: See response to previous question. 
134 

Question: Please describe the annual workload of immigration and naturalization 

petitions processing for US CIS's employees each year. 

How many employees are responsible for processing petitions0 

Response: As of February 20, 2016, US CIS has a total of 5,911 on-board adjudicative 

staff under the following positions: 

Note: This total assumes all on-board adjudicative staff contribute to the processing of 

applications and petitions. 

Question: Hmv many petitions does USCIS receive each year? 

Response: The total volume for all benefit types with the exception of the processing of 

l) claims of reasonable fear; 2) a small volume of cases received at our overseas offices; 

and 3) immigrant visa packets for issuance of a "green card" where the individual obtains 

an immigrant visa from Department of Stale and enters the United States as a lawful 

permanent resident is: 

FY14 receipts (petitions & applications) were approximately 6 million. 

FY15 receipts (petitions & applications) were approximately 7.7 million. 

FY16 receipts (petitions & applications) are projected to be 7.4 million. 
135 

Question: On average, how many 

each year? 

in an hour: 

will the USC!S 

Please note, this rate reflects the portion 

process 

or It does not include any clerical work necessary, work our fraud 

detection and national security team, records checks, or any other activity that supports 

the process. 

do USC!S employees face in nrc•~'"''~""' and how 

~,;uictwC~r~~"~ be addressed? 

USC!S petitions can 

or 

or timeframes to 

requests for evidence, or willful of material facts, any of which may 

present adjudication. our website and stakeholder 

numerous tools to inform and of the 

tor the various benefit types, and we are always for 

additional ways to enhance our public outreach. 
136 

Question: Do all USCIS employees adjudicating immigration petitions have the proper 

clearances for the levels of access needed to vet immigration petitioners and beneficiaries 

for national security concerns? 

Response: Officers are given the clearance, access, and training to support the petitions 

and applications they adjudicate. 

Question: If not, how does USCIS ensure that all immigration petitions are properly 

vetted for national security concerns') 

Response: US CIS remains committed to ensuring that immigration benefits are not 

granted to individuals who pose a threat to national security or public safety, or who seek 

to defi·aud the U.S. immigration system. In keeping with this commitment, USCIS has 

instituted a robust system of programs, procedures, and security checks, led by the Fraud 

Detection and National Security Directorate (FDNS). FDNS Immigration Officers work 

with adjudicators in every USCIS Center, District, Field, and Asylum Office to identify 

and investigate cases with potential national security concerns. Adjudicators are trained 

to identify indicators of national security concern and to refer cases to FDNS for further 

investigation. Officers investigating national security concerns have security clearances 

to allow them to access relevant derogatory information and conduct their investigation. 
137 

Question#: 12 

Topic: 

Hearing: 

Primary: 1 

Committee: I HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: Please describe the work oflJSCIS's Fraud Detection and National Security 

(FDNS) Directorate, including answering the following. 

Response: FDNS Immigration Officers (lOs) work diligently to fulfill the USCIS 

mission of enhancing both national security and the integrity of the legal immigration 

system by: (1) identifying threats to national security and public safety posed by those 

seeking immigration benefits; (2) detecting, pursuing, and deterring immigration benefit 

fraud; (3) identifying and removing systemic vulnerabilities in the process of the legal 

immigration system; and (4) acting as USCJS's primary conduit for information sharing 

and collaboration with other governmental agencies. FDNS also oversees a strategy to 

promote a balanced operation that distinguishes USCIS's administrative authority, 

responsibility, and jurisdiction from ICE's criminal investigative authority. 

Question: How many employees work at FDNS? 

Response: 907 as ofMarch 28,2016. 

Question: How many petitions arc they responsible for receiving each year, including, 

for example, in FY2015? 

Response: FDNS's work is not tracked based on individual applications and petitions. 

Rather, work is person- and entity-focused. FDNS's case management system tracks 

cases by Case Management Entities (CMEs). CMEs include referrals for fraud, public 

safety and national security concerns, verifications of documentation by overseas 

personnel, and requests for assistance from law enforcement or other government 

partners. Generally, each CME is connected to at least one application, petition, or other 

torm. During FY2015, FDNS worked on 97,123 CMEs. 

Question: Please provide the following statistics about FDNS's employees and their 

security clearance levels: 

How many FDNS employees have SECRET clearances? 

Response: 441 FDNS employees have SECRET clearances. 

Question: How many have TS//SCI clearances? 
138 

Response: 340 FDNS employees have TOP SECRET clearances and of those !57 have 

TS/SCI clearances. 
139 

Question: Please describe how petitions are screened to detect potential national security, 

fraud, or criminal issues by addressing the following. 

Specifically, describe the steps that a FDNS employee would make to screen petitions, 

including what databases would be checked and what other agencies' would be contacted 

for information to understand and investigate a petitioners' background. 

Response: USCIS screens applicants against available law enforcement and national 

security lookouts and records as well as FBI biographic and biometric holdings. Much of 

this screening is automatically triggered when USC IS receives a new application or 

petition. In support of these screening efforts, USCJS works closely with the Department 

of State, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement, and partners in the law enforcement and Intelligence Community. USCIS 

engages with law enforcement and Intelligence Community members for assistance with 

identity verification, acquisition of additional information, or deconfliction to ensure 

USCIS activities will not adversely atTect an ongoing law enforcement investigation. 

Question: Please describe how USCIS communicates issues identified in background 

checks to the State Department for immigrant and nonimmigrant visa applications that 

are awarded overseas. For example, if a petitioner's application is determined to be 

fraudulent or potentially vulnerable to criminal or national security threats, how would 

that be communicated to the State Department? 

Response: Prior to issuing a visa overseas, the State Department conducts its own 

background checks. IfUSCIS discovers fraud in an application for an overseas 

beneficiary. it does not forward the case to DOS. These cases are denied. Also, USCIS 

will document the fraud in TECS for each ease. Criminal concerns are documented in 

TECS, which are communicated to DOS via CLASS. National Security Concerns are 

communicated to DOS both via TECS to CLASS, and USCIS includes a memorandum 

outlining the national security concerns that were identified. 

Question: Please describe the manners in which a USC IS employee can identity adverse 

information in an immigration petition. Please describe the types of adverse information 

that would allow US CIS and/or FDNS employees to deny each type of immigration and 

naturalization petition based on national security or fl·aud. 
140 

Hearing: 

Primary: 

Committee: HO~ELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Response: To ensure national security and public safety threats are recognized and 

addressed, USCTS conducts a combination of automated and manual biographic and 

biometric background checks. Adjudicators are trained to review applications and 

supporting information to identify indicators offraud, national security, or public safety 

concerns. During the routine process of adjudicating any USC IS benefit, if any fraud, 

national security, or public safety concerns are raised, either based on security and 

background checks, or through personal interviews or testimony, FDNS will conduct 

additional research and coordinate with partners in the law enforcement and Intelligence 

Community through established processes. USCJS reviews all available information 

related to immigration applications and petitions, evaluates whether the information is 

relevant and, if so, determines whether the information would have an impact on the 

applicant's eligibility for the benefit, and/or otherwise affect the applicant's admissibility 

to the United States under U.S. law. USCIS considers INA 212(a)(3)(A) (espionage or 

overthrow of the U.S. government, among other things), (B)(terrorist activities), and 

(F)( association with terrorist organizations), and INA 237(a)(4)(A)(espionage or 

overthrow of the U.S. government, among other things) and (B)(terrorist activities) to be 

national security concerns and treats them appropriately. 
141 

Question: Please address the following issues regarding USC IS referrals to the 

Department of Justice. 

Describe how US CIS refers cases of immigration fraud to the Department of Justice for 

prosecution. 

Response: US CIS does not directly refer cases of immigration fraud to the Department 

of Justice. This is a result of the Delegation of Authorities 0150.1 which provided for 

concurrent authority to USCIS and ICE to investigate immigration benefit fraud in both 

the civil and criminal context. However, the Delegation of Authorities also mandated 

that USCIS and ICE work out an agreement regarding the division of such 

responsibilities. This resulted in the Memorandum of Agreement between USCIS and 

ICE which provided for the referral of immigration benefit fraud cases to ICE for 

criminal investigation and prosecution. ICE is responsible for referring the case for 

prosecution to Federal, State, local and/or tribal authorities. USCIS FDNS is responsible 

for managing procedures and policies governing USCIS's fraud detection and prevention 

efforts. FDNS performs administrative investigations designed to ensure consistent 

detection, documentation, and prevention of immigration benefit fraud. Once FDNS 

completes its administrative fraud investigation, the case is referred to U.S. Immigration 

and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) for processing 

based on existing agreements with ICE. For Dl-IS, HSI serves as the enforcement arm for 

all immigration fraud matters. HSI reviews the case and makes a final determination as 

to whether the case will be presented to the Department of Justice for prosecution. The 

prosecution of immigration benefit fraud cases continues to be a multi-agency law 

enforcement effort. Over the past several years, these collaborative relationships have 

resulted in successful prosecutions. FDNS regularly utilizes what officers have learned 

from these relationships. For example, USCIS coordinates with the Department of Justice 

and the Federal Trade Commission on initiatives such as the Unauthorized Practice of 

Immigration Law (UPIL). Many USCIS ollkes across the nation work closely with our 

local ICE and DOJ counterparts to assist in prosecution of these cases. 

USCIS, Oftice of Security and Integrity is responsible for conducting investigations of 

allegations of misconduct, corruption, fraud, and violations of the immigration Jaws 

involving any USCIS employee not subject to investigation by the DHS Office of 

Inspector GeneraL Responsibility for this mission rests with OSI's Investigations 

Division (fNV). !NV does not investigate immigration fraud conducted by applicants. 

Criminal cases investigated by !NV are routinely referred to DOJ for prosecution. 
142 

i 

_, ____ Question#: 14 

Topic: USC IS Referrals to the Department of Justice 

Hearing: The Security of U.S. Visa Programs 

Pri1 The Honorable Ron Johnson 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: How many immigration fraud cases did USCIS refer to the DOJ in FY2015? 

Response: As stated above, USCIS does not refer any applicant-related immigration 

fraud cases directly to DOJ. Once FDNS completes its administrative fraud 

investigation, the case is referred to Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) for 

processing based on existing agreements with ICE. For DHS, I-IS! serves as the 

enforcement arm for all immigration fraud matters. 

Question: How many of these referrals resulted in a declination to prosecute? 

Response: Not applicable, see response to previous question. 

Question: Please describe how USCIS refers civil enforcement actions (i.e. monetary 

fines) authorized under the Immigration and Nationality Act to the DOJ? 

Response: Pursuant to a Memorandum of Agreement between DHS/USCIS and the 

Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, the USCIS Verification Division refers to 

the DOJ Office of Special Counsel for Immigration-Related Unfair Employment 

Practices (OSC) all matters identified as potentially involving an individual act or a 

pattern or practice of employment discrimination on the basis of national origin or 

citizenship status; document abuse; or retaliation. The USCIS Verification Division also 

refers to OSC allmattcrs identified as potentially involving the misuse, abuse, or 

fraudulent use of E-Verify that can result in adverse treatment of employees. Referrals 

arc made directly between the agencies on a regular basis. 

Question: How many times did USCIS make such referrals in FY 2015? 

Response: USCIS made 596 referrals to OSC. 

Question: How many of these referrals resulted in civil enforcement actions? 

Response: We respectively refer you to the Department of Justice as we believe it 

maintains more complete information regarding OSC's initiation of enforcement actions 

related to USCIS referrals. 
143 

I 

l 

I 

Question#: 15 

Topic: Tools Available to USCIS 

Hearing: The Security of U.S. Visa Programs 

Primary: The Honorable Ron Johnson 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: Please describe the tools available to USCIS to deny petitions or to 

recommend enforcement actions against legal representatives who file petitions or 

represent petitioners that are found to pose a national security risk or be fraudulent. 

Response: USC!S 's process for combating fraud involving attorneys and preparers 

includes close collaboration with our partners at ICE and other law enforcement agencies. 

USCIS and ICE have identified attorney and preparer fraud as one of the priority case 

types that is referred to ICE for criminal investigations, and USCJS and ICE work 

together to successfully manage such cases. Fraud Detection and National Security 

(FDNS) uses several fraud detection tools for administrative investigations including 

resources such as USCJS and other U.S. government systems, commercially available 

data sources, non-advcrsarial applicant interviews and site visits, as well as any tangible 

documentation provided to US CIS in support of an application or petition. Further, 

pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality Act, USCJS has the authority to deny an 

immigration petition or application due to lack of credibility or fraud. 

Adjudicators are trained to review applications and supporting information to identify 

indicators of fraud, national security, or public safety concerns. During the process of 

adjudicating any US CIS benefit, if any fraud, national security, or public safety concerns 

are raised, either based on security and background checks, or through personal 

interviews or testimony, FDNS will conduct additional research and coordinate with 

partners in the law enforcement and Intelligence Community through established 

processes. USCIS reviews all available information related to immigration applications 

and petitions, evaluates whether the inf(Jrmation is relevant and, if so, determines whether 

the information would have an impact on the applicant's eligibility for the benefit, and/or 

would otherwise affect the applicant's admissibility to the United States under U.S. law. 

USCIS considers IN/\ 212(a)(3)(A) (espionage or overthrow ofthc U.S. government, 

among other things), (B) (terrorist activities), and (F) (association with terrorist 

organizations), and INA 237(a)(4)(A) (espionage or overthrow of the U.S. government, 

among other things) and (B) (terrorist activities) to be national security concerns and 

treats them appropriately. 
144 

Question: In January, the Inspector General released a report, ICE and USCIS Could 

Improve Data Quality and Exchange to Help Identify Potential Human Trafficking Cases 

(OIG-16-17), that indicated that work and fiancee visas were used by known trafficker to 

bring victims or potential victims into the country. The Inspector General found that 

problems with data management and information sharing hindered ICE and USCIS's 

ability to recognize. investigate, and prevent instances of human trafficking. 

Please describe what actions USCIS has taken to address the Inspector General's findings 

and recommendations, including how users will appropriately collect and share 

information about potential human traffickers to ICE. 

Response: The OIG report contained two recommendations for USCIS. 

Recommendation #1 was to develop and implement procedures to capture names and 

other identifying information on human traffickers found in victims' statements, which 

are submitted with T and U visa applications and petitions, in USCIS information 

systems. USCIS concurred with this recommendation, and the actions to implement it 

will include the necessary strict protections on information on individuals with pending 

or approved T and U visa applications or petitions, as enacted by Congress. USCIS 

onicers have examined sample T and U cases to assess what kind of trafficker 

information can be captured, which will filrther inform ongoing discussions about the 

best methods for systematically identifying the information. USCIS expects to complete 

the work related to implementing this recommendation by September 30, 2017. 

Recommendation #2 was for USCJS to collaborate with ICE to institute a mutually 

acceptable procedure for transferring USCIS data on alleged human traffickers to ICE. 

USC IS concurred with this recommendation and will work within the strict limitations on 

the ability of DIIS to share information related to these applicants or petitioners. As 

processes for the identification and management of trafficker information arc being 

developed, USC IS is working with key ICE personnel directing the Human Smuggling 

and Traflicking Center (HSTC) to draft an information sharing agreement to support the 

routine and systematic sharing of such information. Since the initial coordination 

meeting of the Joint Coordination Working Group (USCIS-ICE), USCIS continues to 

engage with ICE through the IISTC in this effort. The estimated completion date for the 

agreement is on or before September 30, 2017. 

Question: Arc you confident there is appropriate data management and information 
145 

sharing between ICE and USCIS to prevent human trafficking suspects from using visas 

to bring potential victims into the country? 

Response: USCIS continues to strengthen appropriate data management and information 

sharing between ICE and USC IS, in an effort to prevent human trafficking suspects from 

acquiring visas for themselves or trafficking victims. USCIS relies on ICE and other law 

enforcement partners to identify human traffickers and notify USCIS using information 

sharing tools, such as TECS Lookouts, with appropriate biographical information. 

users uses these information sharing tools to identify alleged or known human 

traf1ickers, when applications are processed through USCIS's vigorous security vetting. 
146 

Question#: I 7 

f ----;;:;--;-+.;~~,.---;;--:-c:-------·--·---­

Topic: Whistleblowcr Protections 

Question: Please describe what actions USCIS has taken or is taking to inform its 

employees and managers of federal employees' rights under federal law and 

whistleblowcr protections to speak with Congress, the Inspector General, and other 

watchdogs, and address the following: 

Response: The Office of Equal Opportunity and Inclusion (OEOI) in conjunction with 

the Office of Human Capital and Training (HCT), provides an online training course for 

all users employees regarding their rights and remedies under the federal 

antidiscrimination, whistleblower, and retaliation law listed in the No FEAR Act. All 

USCIS employees are required to complete the No FEAR Act training no less than every 

two years. All new employees are required to complete the training within 90 days of 

entering on duty. 

Question: Describe the number of incidents of retaliation that have been reported to you 

during the current fiscal year. 

Response: During FY16, the USCIS Investigations Division ofthe Office of Security 

and Integrity has received 4 complaints of possible retaliation. 

Question: In a statement to Fox News, a DHS spokesperson said "DHS does not tolerate 

retaliation against employees who bring possible misconduct to light and complies with 

all whistleblower protection laws." Please describe how a USCIS employee's 

communication to Congress, the Inspector General, or the Office of Special Counsel 

could violate federal whistle blower protection Jaws. 

Response: We respectfully submit that the question misconstrues the DHS statement. 

The statement said that ''DHS ... complies with all whistleblower protection laws." The 

compliance referenced is that of DHS, not of employees who communicate concerns. 
147 

Question: Inspector General Roth discussed weaknesses in the EB-5 visa program in his 

testimony, including that the laws and regulations related to the Regional Center program 

do not allow USC IS to terminate a center based on national security or fraud concerns. 

This finding dates back to a December 2013 Inspector General audit of the EB-5 

Regional Center program, which identified a number of weaknesses and included the 

recommendation that USC IS update federal regulations to provide greater authority to 

mitigate fraud and national security risks within the program. Please answer the 

following: 

Explain what actions USCIS has taken to respond to the DHS OIG's 2013 

recommendations. For example, has USCIS taken action to update the regulations of the 

EB-5 Regional Center program? 

Response: USCIS has worked diligently to address the recommendations made by the 

DHS OIG and as a result of our efforts, DHS OIG closed Recommendation #2, regarding 

collaboration with other agencies, and Recommendation #4, regarding quality assurance 

steps, in October 2015. Both Recommendation #1 to update and clarify the EB-5 

regulations and Recommendation #3 to complete a valuation study of the EB-5 program 

remain open, but we are working satisfying the recommendations. 

In response to Recommendation #1, USCIS has made significant efforts to update the 

EB-5 regulations. USC!S established an internal working group in FY 2014 to consider 

potential regulatory changes. In FY 2015, however, these potential regulatory changes 

were set aside in anticipation of reform legislation. /\s reform legislation has not been 

passed, USC IS is renewing its efforts to draft the EB-5 regulations. In response to 

Recommendation #3, USCIS has entered into an interagency agreement with the 

Department of Commerce to conduct a valuation study of the EB-5 program. The 

Department of Commerce anticipates it will complete this study by June 2016. 

Question: Is US CIS aware of any Regional Centers that are known or suspected to be 

fraud or national security risks but are still eligible for EB-5 visa applications and 

investments? 

Response: USC IS designation of a regional center authorizes the regional center to 

participate in the Immigrant Investor Program. When a regional center is no longer 

eligible to participate in the Immigrant Investor Program, USC IS terminates such 

participation. USCIS designation of a regional center does not confer EB-5 classification 
148 

Question#: 18 

on individual investors. Each investor's eligibility for EB-5 classification is evaluated 

through the adjudication of Form I-526, Immigrant Petition by Alien Entrepreneur, and 

the investor is admitted to the United States only after he or she has been evaluated with 

respect to fraud, national security, criminal history, and all other grounds of 

inadmissibility. 

When USC IS learns of derogatory information, it considers whether such information 

impacts any EB-5 eligibility requirements, and strives to ensure that all relevant 

information obtainable is considered prior to issuing a decision. USCIS also uses its 

regulatory authority to withhold adjudication in appropriate cases. See 8 C.F.R. § 

103.2(b)(18). The USCIS Fraud Detection and National Security EB-5 Division (FDNS 

EB-5) works closely with law enforcement and regulatory partners to remain aware of 

any ongoing investigations relating to regional centers, associated parties, as well as 

related petitioners or applicants. 

Question: If so, please identify the number of these regional centers. Also, please 

identify these specific regional centers. 

Response: The integrity of the program is paramount to USCIS and officers adjudicating 

applications and petitions related to the EB-5 program work closely with their colleagues 

in the Fraud Detection and National Security EB-5 Division. USCIS does not maintain 

public data on the information requested, but would be happy to provide details of these 

cases to Congressional members in a secure briefing. 

Question: Please describe how EB-5 petitioners' applications are vetted to ensure the 

source of funds for the ER-5 Regional Center program were legitimately and lawfully 

obtained and transferred to the United States. 

Response: Trained US CIS Adjudications Officers review the files of all EB-5 petitioners, 

including petitioners associated with a regional center, to ensure that there is relevant 

evidence and will consider such evidence in determining whether the petitioner has 

demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, a lawful source of funds. 

Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 204.6(j)(3), to show that the petitioner has invested, or is actively 

in the process of investing, capital obtained through lawful means, the 1-526 Immigrant 

Petition by Alien Entrepreneur must be accompanied, as applicable, by: 

(i) Foreign business registration records; 
149 

(ii) Corporate, partnership (or any other entity in any form which has filed in any 

country or subdivision thereof any return described in this subpart), and personal 

tax returns including income, franchise, property (whether real, personal, or 

intangible), or any other tax returns of any kind filed within five years, with any 

taxing jurisdiction in or outside the United States by or on behalf of the petitioner; 

(iii) Evidence identifying any other source(s) of capital; or 

(iv) Certified copies of any judgments or evidence of all pending governmental civil 

or criminal actions, governmental administrative proceedings, and any private 

civil actions (pending or otherwise) involving monetary judgments against the 

petitioner from any court in or outside the United States within the past fifteen 

years. 

As appropriate, if the source of the petitioner's investment is a gift, USCIS will request 

evidence from the petitioner as to the source of the gift (such as the earnings or assets 

belonging to the gilt-giver). If the source of the petitioner's investment is a loan, USCIS 

will, as appropriate, request evidence to determine whether the loan was obtained by 

unlawful means (such as fraud on a loan application) and whether the loan proceeds are 

themselves lawfully derived. Additionally, the presence of a restriction on the use of 

proceeds may weaken the credibility of the evidence in the record submitted to establish 

that the loan in question was the actual source for the petitioner's capital investment. 

Upon review of each case, if the evidence is insufficient to demonstrate eligibility, 

adjudicators may issue a request for more evidence, issue a notice of intent to deny, refer 

the case to USCIS's Fraud Detection and National Security EB-5 team (FDNS EB-5). 

and/or deny the petition, as appropriate. FDNS EB-5 has access to a wide array of 

government and commercial data sources to further review the case and associated 

evidence. The FDNS EB-5 staff is equipped to conduct searches in the native or official 

languages of over 90% of EB-5 petitioners. As needed, FDNS EB-5 will request an 

overseas verification be conducted by US CIS staff stationed abroad, or by Consular 

employees in locations where USCIS has no personnel. USCJS also refers cases 

involving integrity concerns, including suspected fraudulent activity related to an EB-5 

matter, to U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Homeland Security 

Investigations and other law enforcement and regulatory partners, as appropriate. 

Question: What adverse information is sufficient to deny an EB-5 petition based on 

insufficient evidence that the source of funds were lawfully obtained? 
150 

Response: Denial of an EB-5 petition based on adverse information regarding the source 

of funds depends on the facts of the individual case, and whether the petitioner has 

established by a preponderance of the evidence that the capital was obtained through 

lawful means. Sec, e.g., 8 CF.R. § 204.6(j)(3) (listing evidence to be submitted with 

Form 1-526, Immigrant Petition by Alien Entrepreneur, to show the investment capital 

was obtained through lawful means),§ 216.6(c)(2) (discussing investment funds obtained 

through other than legal means in the context of Form l-829, Petition by Entrepreneur to 

Remove Conditions on Permanent Resident Status); see also Matter olSoffici, 22 l&N 

Dec. 158, 164-65 (Assoc. Comm 'r 1998). 
151 

Post-Hearing Questions for the Record 

Submitted to the Honorable Leon Rodriguez 

From Senator Rob Portman 

"The Security of U.S. Visa Programs" 

March 15, 2016 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: Syed Farook filed an immigrant petition with USeiS for Tashfeen Malik as a 

part of her application for a K-1 fiance visa. Your submitted testimony indicates that 

USeiS screens both applicants and petition beneficiaries against law enforcement and 

national security lookouts and records. Has social media been permanently added as a 

source to screen against? 

Response: USers recognizes the potential value of using social media as an additional 

vetting tool in the background check process. users has been piloting the use of social 

media to better understand social media as a vetting resource, and this has led to users 

instituting routine social media queries for certain populations. The piloting has and will 

continue to allow users to identify any operational constraints and hone ways that the 

agency may most effectively leverage social media as a vetting resource. As 

methodologies, tools, and resources all improve, expansions of limited social media 

vetting to further risk-based populations are planned. 

Question: If yes, when was this policy instituted? 

Response: USe IS has been exploring the legal and policy implications related to the use 

of social media for vetting purposes. At the beginning of FY 20 !5, US CIS began testing 

the utility of incorporating social media vetting into the adjudication of select 

immigration classes through various pilots, and now has limited operational capability for 

certain populations. 

Question: If yes, have any immigrant petitions since been rejected based on derogatory 

information found from a search of social media accounts of both petition applicants and 

beneficiaries? 

Response: As of June 7, 2016, no immigration benefits have been denied solely or 

primarily because of information uncovered through social media vetting. In a small 
152 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

number of cases, information discovered through social media vetting had limited impact 

on the processing of those cases. In cases of benefit denial, the denial was based on 

information found outside of social media, such as through routine security and 

background checks, or uncovered during an interview. 
153 

Question: According to the DHS Inspector General's submitted testimony, the Office of 

Inspector General ''published an audit report [in July 2013] regarding USCIS' tracking of 

potentially fraudulent applications for family-based immigration benefits." What is 

US CIS doing to improve the accuracy, completeness, and reliability of its holdings of 

fraud-related data? 

Response: USCJS has established several procedures to track and monitor infonnation 

related to petitions and applications for family-based immigration benefits suspected of 

being fraudulent. The Ot1ice oflnspcctor General Report 13-97 found that, once 

petitions and applications for immigration benefits were investigated and adjudicated, 

traud-related data were not always recorded and updated in appropriate electronic 

databases to ensure their accuracy, completeness, and reliability. OJG Report 13-97 

recommended clarifying and enforcing policies and procedures to ensure that TECS 

records are created and updated for all identified cases of immigration benefit fraud. 

On June 13, 2013, USC IS issued enhanced TECS Guidance satisfying the 

recommendation. While the OJG report 13-97 focuses specifically on TECS entries as an 

important piece ofUSCIS anti-fraud program that will help disrupt fraud schemes, 

USCIS employs many additional tools to detect, deter, and prevent fraud. 
154 

Question: The FY 2017 Budget Request states that the funding of the Fraud Detection 

and National Security Directorate (FDNS) was reduced in the FY 2016 Budget by $21 

million. Has this cut in financial resources impacted USCIS' ability to accurately and 

timely screen referrals made to FDNS? 

Response: No. The overall FDNS Budget from FY2016 to FY2017 has not been 

reduced, only the contribution of funding provided from the Fraud Prevention and 

Detection Account and the Immigration Examinations Fee Account (IEFA) has changed. 

Because the overall FDNS budget has not changed, we do not believe our ability to 

accurately and timely screen referrals made to FDNS has diminished. FDNS receives 

the majority of its annual funding from the IEF A, but also receives funding from the 

Fraud Prevention and Detection Fee Account. USCIS uses both fee accounts to fund 

FDNS, and depending on the unspent balance carried forward from the previous year 

within the two fee accounts, the contribution each provides in any given year may change 

to ensure effective use of all available resources. 
155 

Hearing: 

Primary: 

; Committee: 

L___ _________ _L _______________________________________________________ ~ 

Question: Inspector General concluded his submitted testimony by identifying the 

national security consequences of USCIS using paper files. When can we expect US CIS 

to conduct all of its business electronically in order to solve this self-inflicted 

vulnerability to threats? 

Response: The current plan is to complete development of capability to support 

processing all ofUSCIS' workload electronically by mid-FY 2019. By the end ofFY 

2016. over 30 percent of users· workload coming in will be handled in the new cases 

management system. Capturing basic information on applicants for immigration benefits 

and others actions in an electronic format will enhance USCIS's and partner agencies· 

ability to perform basic investigative steps. Additionally, enhancing the quality of the 

electronic data kept by both USC IS and ICE will facilitate data matching, which we 

believe is an effective tool to root out fraud and national security risks. 
156 

Post-Hearing Questions for the Record 

Submitted to the Honorable Leon Rodriguez 

From Senator Claire McCaskill 

"The Security of U.S. Visa Programs" 

March 15,2016 

Question: There are a number of similarities and some differences between the 

information DHS receives and analyzes for foreign nationals wishing to enter the U.S. 

using the Visa Waiver Program (VWP) and those who must obtain a tourist visa. For 

example, it is my understanding that DHS reviews the same databases for VWP 

applicants and tourist visa applicants. But VWP applicants do not receive an in-person 

interview, whereas tourist visa applicants are interviewed by a trained consular of1icial. 

On the other hand, DHS receives a lot of additional intelligence infom1ation about 

potential U.S. visitors from VWP-participating countries than DHS receives from nonVWP countries. 

These ditierences necessarily result in some trade-offs, some costs and benefits, to the 

visa waiver program over requiring a tourist visa. 

What specifically are the differences in information that DHS receives and reviews 

between the VWP and tourist visas0 

What are the costs to U.S. security and the benefits to U.S. security with respect to these 

differcnccs0 

Response: All prospective VWP travelers must first obtain pre-travel authorization via 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) Electronic System for Travel Authorization 

(ESTA) prior to boarding a plane or vessel bound for the United States. The ESTA 

application collects nearly identical information as the State Department's DS-160 visa 

application form. A side-by-side comparison is provided in the table below. EST A also 

collects data needed to implement security enhancements announced by Secretary 

Johnson in August 2015 and those enhancements required by the Visa Waiver Program 

Improvement and Terrorist Travel Prevention Act of 2015, such as emergency contact 

number(s)/address(es), citizenship, traveL and passports. VWP travelers must apply for 
157 

an EST A at least every two vears 1 while certain tourist visa holders can have a validity of ' ~ up to 10 years.-

The vetting processes for an EST A authorization and a visa use essentially the same 

biographic databases, including DHS TECS3 records, the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation's Terrorist Screening Database, and the State Department's Consular 

Lookout and Support System, as well as international databases, such as INTERPOL's 

Stolen and Lost Travel Document database. All EST A applications are also vetted by the 

National Counterterrorism Center. 

One difference between an ESTA authorization and a visa is the point at which certain 

information is collected during the vetting process. Tourist visa applicants have their 

biometrics collected and are interviewed by a consular oJ!icer before being issued a visa, 

whereas the EST A applicant is subject to these additional layers of screening upon arrival 

at U.S. ports of entry. At that time, CBP oJ!icers collect and vet biometric information 

from and conduct a short interview with all VWP travelers. 

There are also important differences between VWP member countries and countries 

whose citizens are required to obtain visas for travel to the United States. VWP member 

countries are required as a condition of their designation in the program to sign and 

implement agreements to share information about known and suspected terrorists, serious 

criminals, and lost and stolen passports. This information significantly strengthens DHS's 

ability to identify and disrupt the travel of individuals who pose a threat to the United 

States. Countries that are not in the VWP generally do not share information as willingly 

or often as our VWP partners. 

Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, DHS, in consultation with the Stale 

Department, must conduct reviews of the effects of each VWP member country's 

continued designation in the program on U.S. national security, law enforcement, and 

immigration enforcement interests at least once every two years. See 8 U.S.C. § 

1187(c)(5). During these six- to nine-month-long reviews, DHS assesses each VWP 

member country's counterterrorism, law enforcement, immigration enforcement, passport 

security, and border management capabilities. Many reviews include rigorous and 

thorough DHS inspections of airports, seaports, land borders, and passport production 

1 As ofi\pnll, 2016 al! ne;.v and renewal Greek ESTA applicants will have a om:.ycar ESTA validity period based on the findmgs of 

the most recent coutmuing designation review 1 VWP travelers aho w!l! need to reapply for an E~TA when they receive a new passport even if their current ESTA is :.till valid 

' TECS 1s lln nutomatcd enfor~ement and inspections system that provides a large database of mfOnnatwn tOr law cntOrccmcnt and 

bonier inspection purpn~cs 
158 

Question#: 23 

Topic: 

Hearing: The 

Primary: 

Committee: 

and issuance facilities in VWP member countries. No other program enables the U.S. 

Government to conduct such broad and consequential assessments of foreign partners' 

security standards and operations. 

T bl e 1 C a : omEartson o fD a a o t C II ec t e d d un cr y· 1sa an d ESTAA r f ' lppnca wn 

Data Element 

Name 

Date of birth 

Othernamesoraliases 

Gender t-:-::--- ---- Travel document type 

Passport number 

1 Passport country/ citizenship 

I 

Passport issuance date 

Passport expiration date 

~tiona! ID number -

City of birth 

1 Country of birth .. 

1 Country of residence 

I [ ,ti;cdmo --

ther's name 

t-"Oth"er citiz ensh~p (yes/no) 

: (Condition 

i other citi7 

a!) if"yes" for 

.enshi p, enter 

al) if "yes" for 

country 

(Condition 

other citiz 

passport n 

enship, enter 

umber 

!fOreign st reet address 

I Foreign mailing address 

' Foreign/home telephone 

--

I 

I 

! 

! 

DS-160 visa application 

Mandatory 

Mandatory 

Mandatory 

MRncht0ry 

Mandatory 

Mandatory 

Mandatory (asks for country/ 

region of origin) later asks 

for passport country/issuing 

authority 

Mandatory 

Mandatory 

Mandatory 

Mandatory 

Mandatory . ~--·-

Mandatory (asks for home 

address but not ex p licit! y 

that is the applicant's 

-- rcs1 'd ence ) 

---~datory 

Mandatory 

Mandatory 

Mandatory 

Mandatory 

Mandatory 

if 

Mandatory (asked as primary 

! 

I 

I 

! 

I 

I 

I 

I 

ESTA 

Mandatory 

Mandatory I 

Mandatory ' i 

Mandatory 

Must be a passport 

Mandatory 

Mandatory 

Mandatory 

Mandatory 

Mandatory 

Mandatory 

Mandatory I 

Mandatory ! 

Mandatorv - I 

' 

Mandatory 

Mandatory if"yes'' to 

other citizenship 

--------1 

Optional if"yes" to 

other citizenship 

Mandatory (home 

address) 

Mandatory (home 

address) --·~ 

Home, work, mobile, 
159 

C), dio>nJJ• 23 

Topic: Visa Waiver Program Information 

I Hearing: The Security of U.S. Visa Programs 

,- ---· 

I Primary: 1 The Honorable Claire McCaskill I i 

I Commit~ee: i HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

I phone number) or ''other·· phone 

Foreig'll! home cell phone Asked as secondary phone number is mandatory 

number ("Docs not apply" 

option is available) 

Work telephone ("Does not apply" option is 

available) 

Primary il ("Does not apply" option is Primary or secondary 

available) email is mandatory 

Secondary email Not Collected -:::-· 

Emplover name Mandatory Mandatory i 

~-- Job title Mandatory Mandatory 

Employer address Mandatory Mandatory ·------

Employer telephone Mandatory Mandatory ---:::··--· 

I Purpose of visit Mandatory Not Collected (Limited 

to business or tourism) 

Airlineillight/vessel name Not Collected (asks for Not Collected 

arrival and departure t1ight (Available through 

number if specific travel APIS and PNR data) 

plans have been made) 

Port of origin I Ask for departure city Not Collected 

i ! (Available through 

i APJS and PNR data) 

Final destination port Asks for arrival city Not Collected 

i (Available through 

t:ouutc;" ~<hOc<hoo U.S uu I NOt Cullec"d 

APIS and PNR data) 

Not Collected (asks if 

1 tnp travel to U.S. occurring 

I in transit to another 

i country) 

. U.S. lodging POC name -- Not Collected One U.S. POC name is 

I mandatory 

U.S. lodging POC address I Mandatory (asks for address Address while in the I 

I where you will stay in the United States is 

U.S.) mandatory I 

U.S. POC name Mandatory Mandatory 

U.S. POC address Mandatory One U.S. POC address I 

mandatory ', 

U.S. POC phone number Mandatory One U.S. POC ph?_n~-
160 

Question#: 23 

Topic: Visa Waiver Program Information 

Hearing: 

Primary: 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

! ! number is mandatory 

! Emergency POC name Not Collected Mandatory 

!Emergency POC cell phone Not Collected One emergency POC 

i Emergency POC home phone Not Collected i phone number is 

i I mandatory l Emergency POC email Not Collected I Mandatory 

address I 

~tes of intended travel ! Mandatory Not Collected 

I (Available through I PNR data) 

Contact info for originator o~ Not Collected (asks for data Not Collected 

~eservatwn on !lerson who !laid for trip) 

*The DS-160 also asksfor other information not listed on this comparison chart, 

including job history and education, previous US travel, prior visas, questions related to 

visa ineligibilities, information on family including current andformer spouse and 

children, languages spoken, military service, security and background information, and 

more extensive information on parents as appropriate to the visa classification the 

individual is appZvingjiJr. 

**The ESTA application also has questions relating to eligibililyfor travel and 

admission to the United S'tates under the VWP. including communicable diseases of' 

public health significance; drug abuse; criminal record; terrorist activity; espionage; 

sabotage; genocide; visa/ent1yloverstay violations; travel to Iraq, Syria, Iran, or Sudan 

on or afier March l, 2011; and dual nationality. 

***First-time tourist risa applicants have their biometrics collected and are interviewed 

by a consular officer bej(m: being issued a visa, whereas the ESTA applicant is subject to 

these additional/ayers o{screening upon arrival at U.S. ports o{entry. 

I 

I 

I 

I 
161 

Question: Right now, as you know, our immigration system is mostly still paper-based. 

In this day and age, with a need so share information across agencies and to process 

applications quickly and reliably. this is unacceptable. 

ELlS, and the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service's (U.S.C.!.S.) Transformation 

Program more broadly. are supposed to solve these problems and create an interoperable 

system that tracks immigration applications and immigration benefits, and enables 

sharing of this information across agencies more quickly and easily. 

The DHS Cost Analysis Division is supposed to conduct independent cost analyses of 

major DHS acquisition programs. My understanding is that it is so short-staffed, though, 

that it ends up approving the vast majority of cost analyses given to them by the DHS 

components and conducting its own independent analysis of only 2 or 3 acquisition 

programs per year. 

Did the DHS Cost Analysis Division conduct its own independent analysis of the 

Transformation Program or did it just review and approve what US CIS gave them? 

Did US CIS conduct its own independent cost analysis or did it rely on the contractors' 

cost estimates" 

I was under the impression that no more DHS acquisition projects would move forward 

without approved basic acquisition documents like a program baseline. 

Who approved USC IS to start awarding contracts without a revised baseline cost estimate 

last year? 

Response: On May 4, 2015, the Acting Under Secretary for Management made an 

Acquisition Decision to approve there-baseline of the Transformation Program and 

remove the program from breach status, effectively authorizing the program to move 

forward. Prior to that decision on April l, 2015, the Acting Under Secretary for 

Management approved a revised Acquisition Program Baseline (APB) for the US CIS 

Transformation Program. The USCIS Office of Transformation Coordination developed a 

Life Cycle Cost Estimate (LCCE) and submitted this estimate to DHS Chief Financial 

Officer for approval. The Transformation LCCE was comprehensive of the program's 

requirement and addressed scope beyond their contractor cost estimates. The DHS Cost 

Analysis Division (CAD) of the Office of the Chief Financial Officer conducted a 
162 

Question#: 24 

Topic: Cost Analysis 

Hearing: The Security of U.S. Visa Programs 

--~ 

i 

i 

Primary: The Honorable Claire McCaskill 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

thorough review of the Transformation LCCE and the DI~JS Chief Financial Officer 

approved the cost estimate on April 1, 2015. Prior to the approval of the Transformation 

LCCE, DHS CAD conducted a review and assessment using a set of criteria derived from 

the Government Accountability Office Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide. The 

object of CAD's review is to assess if the cost estimate has met all the attributes that 

GAO examines when they review government cost estimates. Specifically the review 

determines if the LCCE is reliable, accurate, credible, and well-documented. CAD found 

that the USC IS Transformation LCCE met or partially met all criteria of our independent 

review. At this time, CAD has not independently quantified the estimated cost of the 

Transformation Program requirements. At this time, CAD conducts a limited and 

focused amount of these independent analyses for major acquisition programs at DHS, 

but has a planned effort to grow this capacity. 
163 

Question: The Office of Program Accountability and Risk Management (P ARM) is 

responsible for Dl!S's overall acquisition governance process. The Office of the Chief 

Information Otlicer (OCIO) is responsible for, among other things, ensuring that IT 

acquisitions comply with DHS IT management processes. 

Who is in charge of oversight of this project, PARM or the OCIO? 

Has anyone been held accountable for this program's delays and cost overruns'> 

Response: DHS Acquisition Oversight is a Department wide effort with complimentary 

roles and responsibilities that support the Department's Chief Acquisition Officer (CAO) 

for the management, administration, and oversight of the Department's acquisitions. The 

Ot1ice of Program Accountability and Risk Management (PARM) is responsible for 

overseeing the Department's acquisition program portfolio to monitor each investment's 

cost, schedule, and performance against established baselines. The Office of the Chief 

Information Officer (OCIO) is responsible tor developing and providing an IT 

assessment and approval of IT programs in support of the CAO roles and responsibilities. 

The USCIS Transformation Program Manager is accountable tor the program delays and 

cost overruns. The USC IS Transformation Program Manager and her staff were required 

to address the Program's Acquisition Program Baseline (APB) breach and take the 

necessary steps to produce a re-baseline tor the Program. The USCIS Transformation 

Program was rc-baselined on April 1, 2015 and authorized to proceed on May 4, 2015. 
164 

Question#: 

Topic: 

Hearing: 

-· 

Primary: 

Committee: 

26 

Post-Hearing Questions for the Record 

Submitted to the Honorable Leon Rodriguez 

From Senator Tammy Baldwin 

"The Security of U.S. Visa Programs" 

March 15, 2016 

Visa Application Process 

The Security of U.S. Visa Programs 

The Honorable Tammy Baldwin 

HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: I hear frequently from my constituents in Wisconsin who are deeply frustrated 

by the visa application process at USCJS. In particular, constituents are frustrated that 

US CIS cannot provide updates on the status of their background check even after their 

application has exceeded the expected processing times listed on the USCJS website. 

Specifically, I have heard from constituents whose background checks have taken months 

and even years. This is a significant problem, particularly for constituents with an urgent, 

time sensitive need for a visa, as in the case of a sick relative or a work obligation. 

Why might a background check for a visa applicant take months or years to complete? 

Response: USCJS is committed to adjudicating immigration benefits4 in a timely manner 

while also ensuring public safety and national security. A small percentage of 

applications and petitions have unresolved background cheek issues that temporarily 

delay adjudication. Although USCIS makes every effort to resolve such cases promptly, 

USC IS is unable to speculate when the background checks will be completed. If a 

background check reveals an issue that may impact an applicant's eligibility for the 

requested immigration benefit, further inquiry is needed. The inquiry may include an 

additional interview and/or contact with another agency for updates or more 

comprehensive information. Upon gathering and assessing all available information, 

USCIS will adjudicate the application as quickly as possible. USCIS realizes that 

applicants may be frustrated by the progress of their case. However, the agency must 

balance individual inconvenience against issues of public safety and national security. 

4 DHS does not adjudicate visa applications: The Department of State maintains sole responsibility for the 

issuance of all visas. including the K- I fiance( e) visa. DHS adjudicates all related petitions and has 

authority for visa policy under section 428 of the Homeland Security Act. 
165 

~~--Q-~estion#: 26 

Topic: 

Hearing: 

Primary: 

Committee: 

Question: Why is USCIS unable to provide me or the applicant status updates at this 

stage of the application process'7 

Response: USCIS cannot divulge specific information pertaining to individual 

background checks; in certain cases, the information may be confidential or contain 

information related to fraud or national security concerns that requires further vetting. 

However, we can say that the case is pending "the background check." 

Question: Has US CIS considered policy changes that can accelerate the visa process and 

increase transparency for customers while maintaining security? 

Response: Yes, USCIS has considered policy changes related to background checks to 

reduce processing times and increase transparency. 

Question: If so. please discuss. 

Response: US CIS is responsible for ensuring that our immigration system is not used as 

a vehicle to harm our nation or its citizens by screening out people who seck immigration 

benefits improperly or fraudulently. In order to fulfill this mission, USCIS conducts 

background checks for all cases involving a petition, application, or request for an 

immigration service or benefit. However, USCIS recognizes that sometimes background 

checks are slower for some customers than they would like. To enhance customer 

service and reduce unnecessary delays, users works closely with interagency partners 

throughout the clearance process. 

Additionally, we are moving toward electronic application filings which allow customers 

to submit and view certain benefit requests, receive electronic notification of decisions, 

and receive real-time case status updates. We continue to expand the use of electronic 

filing, which will allow USCJS to usc innovative tools to enhance national security and 

ensure the integrity of the immigration process, and also increase the agency's efficiency 

and decrease processing times. 

Furthermore. USCIS is consolidating policy guidance and presenting the information to 

our customers in a way that is easy to access and understand through the creation of the 

USCIS Policy Manual. In the USCIS Policy Manual, customers can find a centralized 

online repository of the agency's immigration policies, including information on 

background and security checks related to naturalization processing. USCIS is aware this 

subject matter is of interest to customers and will be including more information on 

background checks related to other topics in forthcoming publications. 
166 

~~ ____ Q_u_e_s_ti_o_n#_:-1-1-2_6_____ -· 

Topic: i Visa Application Process 

! I 

I Hearing: 1 The Security of U.S. Visa Programs 

:- -----=c--,----i---c-c----:-;--::;:----::-:--:--;----------------------; Primary: The Honorable Tammy Baldwin 

i 

~~C~o-m-m it~te-e.-· ~~~I(~)~M~E~LA~N~.~D~SECC"~U~R~ITY~~-(~SEN~A,-T~I-E:--)----------------~ 

It is important to note that, while USeiS remains committed to providing excellent 

customer service and exploring ways to improve the visa process, the agency will not 

grant an immigration benefit before the required security checks are completed. 

Question: Will you commit to considering policy changes to increase transparency for 

applicants when inquiring about their visa application status? 

Response: USCIS is careful to balance the need to strengthen national security and 

maintain the integrity of our immigration system with the need to ensure that our 

customers are not subject to undue delays. To this end, while USCIS must conduct 

background checks to thoroughly screen applicants, each users office has experienced 

officers dedicated to resolving background checks as expeditiously as possible. and we 

continue to assess our policies and procedures to ensure that they are not only warranted, 

but also that checks are conducted in the most efficient way possible. 

users is, and will continue to remain, committed to providing excellent customer 

service. In furtherance of our dedication to explore ways to increase transparency, we 

will also continue to hold public engagement events where we share information and seek 

input from our customers on lJSeJS programs and policies. 
167 

i Question#: 

i Topic: 

27 

Post-Hearing Questions for the Record 

Submitted to the Honorable Leon Rodriguez 

From Senator Kelly Ayotte 

"The Security of U.S. Visa Programs" 

March IS, 2016 

Visa Waiver Program Changes 

rHearing: The Security of U.S. Visa Programs 

Primary: The Honorable Kelly Ayotte 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: The Visa Waiver Program allows citizens from 38 countries to travel to the 

U.S. for business or tourism purposes for up to 90 days without first obtaining a visa. In 

December, Congress passed and the president signed into law additional restrictions for 

traveling under the program. Pursuant to that law, a citizen of a Visa Waiver Program 

country who has traveled to Iraq, Syria, Sudan, or Iran in the last five years cannot travel 

visa-free to the United States. That law also provided the Secretary of Homeland 

Security with the authority to designate additional countries to that list. Secretary 

Johnson recently announced that Somalia, Yemen, and Libya have been added to this list. 

Can you please explain your role in this program, generally, and more specifically, your 

role, if any, in implementing these additional restrictions. 

What was your role, if any, in the decision to add Libya, Somalia, and Yemen to the list'J 

To what extent was the Department of Defense consulted in these decisions'J 

Was AFRJCOM consulted? 

How about CENTCOM? 

We know that Al Qaeda continues to operate in large parts of Algeria, Mali, Tunisia, and 

Niger. 

Why weren't these countries also designated as a "country of concern'' under this law? 

Response: The Secretary considered the three criteria in the statute, specifically 

217(a)(I2)(D)(ii): 
168 

''(I) whether the presence of an alien in the country or area increases the 

likelihood that the alien is a credible threat to the national security of the United 

States; 

''(II) whether a foreign terrorist organization has a significant presence in the 

country or area; and 

'"(Ill) whether the country or area is a safe haven for terrorists." 

The statute does not preclude the Secretary considering other relevant criteria as well, so 

the Department ofllomeland Security also considered (a) available intelligence on the 

nature of the terrorist threat to the Homeland from the Islamic State oflraq and the 

Levant (ISIL), al-Qa' ida, and other terrorist groups; (b) available intelligence on the 

nature of the terrorist threat from ISIL, al-Qa'ida and other terrorist groups to our allies 

and to U.S. interests overseas; (c) the extent of counterterrorism cooperation, and 

cooperation on aviation, border and maritime security, between the United States and the 

countries under consideration, and those countries counterterrorism capabilities; and 

(d) the extent and nature of legitimate trade, travel, commerce and familial connections 

between the United States and the countries under consideration. 

As required in 217(a)( 12)(D)(i), the Secretary consulted with the Secretary of State and 

the Director ofNationallntelligencc in making the determination to designate Libya, 

Somalia and Yemen. The Department of Homeland Security consults continually on 

both intelligence and policy matters with the interagency and specifically with the 

intelligence and counterterrorism communities, including the Department of Defense 

(both the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Joint Sta11), as well 

as with regional commands and the Defense Intelligence Agency. These consultations 

routinely discuss the presence of terrorists in countries that may pose a credible threat to 

the national security of the United States, whether terrorist organizations have a 

significant presence in those countries, or whether those countries are considered safe 

havens for terrorists. 

Weighing all the criteria listed above and input received during interagency consultations, 

Libya, Somalia and Yemen were designated by the Secretary as Countries of Concern in 

February 2016. The Secretary will continue to review whether changes on the ground, or 

in the security practices of other nations, make it prudent to add additional countries such 

as Algeria, Mali, Tunisia, and Niger, to the list or to remove countries already designated. 

The presence of JSIL, al-Qa'ida, or other foreign terrorist organizations will be an 

important factor in making these decisions. DHS will continue to work with our 

interagency partners and monitor the threat environment to inform the Secretary's 

decisions on this matter. 
169 

Post-Hearing Questions for the Record 

Submitted to the Honorable Sarah R. Saldana 

From Senator Ron Johnson 

"The Security of U.S. Visa Programs" 

March 15, 2016 

Question: Please describe your understanding of the events that occurred on December 

3rd at the San Bernardino U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) office. In 

your response. please include answers to the following questions. 

What were the orders and intentions of the Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) 

agents that went to the users office that afternoon? 

What happened when they arrived at the USC IS office? How long were HSI agents at 

the USCJS office? 

Response: On December 3. 2015, Homeland Security Investigations Special Agents 

went to the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) San Bernardino office to 

inform US CIS of developing information regarding the San Bernardino incident. The 

Special Agents went to the USCJS San Bernardino office to investigate subjects linked to 

the San Bernardino incident. 

The Special Agents met with the USCIS Field Office Director to discuss the matter. 

During the meeting. the Special Agents explained the urgency and need to locate two 

individuals with a direct link to the San Bernardino incident who allegedly had a 

scheduled appointment with USCIS that day. USCIS looked up the subjects' 

appointment and informed the Special Agents that the subjects were a "no show" and had 

not called to reschedule. 

The Special Agents asked for pictures of the subjects so they could be disseminated for a 

"Be on the Lookout" alert. USC!S provided photographs of the subjects retrieved from 

the alien file. The Special Agents were in the USCIS office for approximately one hour. 
170 

The Security of U.S. 

The Honorable Ron 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: Are you aware of any communications that occurred between USCIS and ICE 

managers in California, at headquarters, or elsewhere to address the incident at the 

users offices? 

Please provide all documents and communications regarding the December 3rd incident 

at the San Bernardino USCIS otlice. 

Response: On the day following the San Bemardino terrorist attack, Special Agents with 

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's (ICE) Homeland Security Investigations 

(l-IS!) informed Federal Protective Service (FPS) contract guards and U.S. Citizenship 

and Immigration Services (USCIS) local field office personnel that they wanted to 

question a person of interest who had a previously scheduled appointment at the users 

field office. After receiving supervisory concurrence, the USCIS field office director 

provided the special agents access to the users office to facilitate the questioning of the 

person of interest. However, the individual did not appear for the appointment. USCIS 

then provided the Special Agents access to the information contained in the file related to 

that person of interest. 

As described in the Inspector General's report (which can be found here: 

https:l/vvww.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mga/OIG-mga-060 116.pdD, although the Special Agents 

were granted access to the USC IS field office and to the requested inlormation, there was 

a delay in doing so while supervisory concurrence was being obtained. ICE and USCIS 

have since improved their protocols for facility access and inlormation sharing in 

circumstances with potential national security or public safety implications, in order to 

avoid any such delays in the future. FPS is also clarifying with its employees, Facility 

Security Committees, and protective security officers the agency's policy of allowing law 

enforcement partners access to federal facilities during emergency situations. 

On May 31, 2016, US CIS and ICE signed a Memorandum of Agreement designed to 

memorialize the joint commitment to work together when ICE Special Agents or officers 

need to visit USCIS facilities to question, apprehend, or arrest persons of interest as well 

as to share and safeguard information when addressing emergent matters of national 

security and public safety. 
171 

Question: Please describe ICE's policy for informing US CIS of investigative actions 

that involve USCIS and your understanding ofUSCIS's policy for assisting ICE with 

investigations. Was what occurred on December 3rd consistent with those policies? 

Response: On the day following the San Bernardino terrorist attack, Special Agents with 

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's (ICE) Homeland Security Investigations 

(HSI) informed Federal Protective Service (FPS) contract guards and U.S. Citizenship 

and Immigration Services (USC IS) local field office personnel that they wanted to 

question a person of interest who had a previously scheduled appointment at the USCIS 

field office. After receiving supervisory concurrence, the USCIS field office director 

provided HSI Special Agents access to the USCIS office to facilitate the questioning of 

the person of interest. However, the individual did not appear for the appointment. 

USCIS then provided HSI access to the information contained in the tile related to that 

person of interest. 

As described in the Inspector General's report (which can be found here: 

https://w\\w.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mga/OIG-mga-060116.pdf), although the ICE special 

agents were granted access to the USCIS field office and to the requested information, 

there was a delay in doing so while supervisory concurrence was being obtained. ICE 

and USC IS have since improved their protocols for facility access and information 

sharing, in circumstances with potential national security or public safety implications, in 

order to avoid any such delays in the future. FPS is also clarifying with its employees, 

Facility Security Committees, and protective security officers FPS's own policy of 

allowing law enforcement partners access to federal facilities during emergency 

situations. 

On May 31, 2016, USC IS and ICE signed a Memorandum of Agreement designed to 

memorialize the joint commitment to work together when ICE Special Agents or officers 

need to visit USC IS facilities to question, apprehend, or arrest persons of interest, as well 

as to share and safeguard information, when addressing emergent matters of national 

security and public safety. 
172 

Question: The Committee understands that on December 3, 2015, HSI agents requested 

copies ofMariya Chernykh's A-file from USCIS. 

Did US CIS respond to HSI's request for copies ofthc A-file? If so, when did HSI receive 

the requested copies of the A-iile'J 

Please describe HSI's policies and procedures for requesting copies of A-iiles from 

USC IS. How long does it take for HSI to receive requested copies of an A-tile from 

USCIS? 

Response: On December 3, 2015, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) 

provided U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Homeland Security 

Investigations (HSI) Special Agents access to the A-iile in order for the agents to obtain 

necessary information to address immediate investigative needs. HSI Los Angeles later 

submitted a formal request to USCIS for the A-iile on December 7, 2015. HSI Los 

Angeles received the A-tile from USCIS on December 8, 2015. 

On February 5. 2014, USCIS approved a memorandum updating the Record Operations 

Handbook titled, "Immigration File Sharing and Sequestration Procedures During a 

National Security Event." This memorandum updated procedures for ICE and USCIS 

during such an event. Further guidance was provided to all domestic !lSI field oflices as 

a reminder of the standard operating procedures regarding the handling of A-files within 

ICE during a national security event. Please note that the timeline for obtaining A-iile 

copies varies depending on the urgency of the request and the location of the iilc. 
173 

Committee: llOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: Please describe what actions ICE has taken or is taking to inform its 

employees and managers of federal employees' rights under federal law and 

whistleblower protections to speak with Congress, the Inspector General, and other 

watchdogs. 

My office learned that, following the March 15th hearing. ICE supervisors were seeking 

to find individuals who provided information to the Committee. Are you aware of those 

actions') Do you believe that they are appropriate? If not, what have you done to inform 

ICE managers that it is inappropriate to seek to find or threaten retaliation against 

employees who speak with Congress or other watchdogs? 

Please describe the number of incidents of retaliation that have been reported to you 

during the current fiscal year. 

In a statement to fox News, a DHS spokesperson said "DHS docs not tolerate retaliation 

against employees who bring possible misconduct to light and complies with all 

whistleblower protection laws." Please describe how an ICE employee's communication 

to Congress, the Inspector General, or the Office of Special Counsel could violate federal 

whistleblower protection laws 

Response: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which includes U.S. 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), does not tolerate retaliation against 

employees who bring potential wrongdoing to light. I respectfully submit that your 

question indicates that you may have misconstrued the referenced DHS statement. The 

statement said that "DHS ... complies with all whistleblower protection laws." The 

compliance referenced was intended to refer to DHS, not that of employees who 

communicate concerns. 

ICE is committed to abiding by merit systems principles, providing protection from 

prohibited personnel practices, and promoting accountability in accordance with the 

Whistleblower Protection Act and the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 

2012. As public servants, our employees are held to the highest standard of professional 

and ethical conduct. Employees who believe they have been mistreated or retaliated 

against are encouraged to report such incidents to DHS's Office of the Inspector General 

or the Office of Special Counsel. Enclosed please find a copy of a DHS broadcast 

message dated February 12,2016, reminding DHS employees to complete compulsory 

''DHS No fear Act Training" and connecting them to the DHS Whistleblower Protection 

website. In addition, all DHS employees receive mandatory whistleblower protection 
174 

training every two years, and all ICE managers receive instruction on whistleblower 

protection laws within one year of initial appointment to a supervisory position. 

Recognizing our obligation to protect the rights afforded to employees in making 

protected disclosures, including disclosures to Congress, ICE is committed to ensuring 

that leadership and management adhere to all whistleblower protection laws, including 5 

U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). and to ensuring that employees do not suffer retaliation for making 

protected disclosures. I am unaware of any ICE effcni to identify the employee(s) who 

made any disclosures to the Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs Committee, and 

would not countenance any such etlort. 
175 

Question: In January, the Inspector General released a report, ICE and USCIS Could 

Improve Data Quality and Exchange to Help Identify Potential Human Trafficking Cases 

(OIG-16-17), that indicated work and fiancee visas were used by known traffickers to 

bring victims or potential victims into the country. The Inspector General found that 

problems with data management and information sharing hindered ICE and USCIS's 

ability to recognize, investigate, and prevent instances of human trafficking. For 

example. the Inspector General wrote, "ICE had to extensively manipulate its case 

management system to provide reasonably reliable data for matching purposes." 

Please describe what actions ICE has taken to address the Inspector General's findings 

and recommendations. 

Has the problem been fixed? Does appropriate data collection and information sharing 

now exist between USC IS and ICE to prevent human traffickers from exploiting the visa 

system') 

Response: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has responded to the 

Department of Homeland Security Office oflnspector General (OIG) concerning report 

OIG-l6-17, ICE and United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) Could 

Improve Data Quality and Exchange to Help Identify Potential Human Trafncking Cases. 

In the response, ICE Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) stated that as new alleged 

human traffickers are identified, ICE will check USCIS systems, particularly the 

Computer Linked Application Infonnation Management System (CLAIMS 3), to identify 

whether they filed immigration benefit applications or petitions with users and inform 

USC IS when there is a match. ICE HSI will issue a broadcast message to the field 

informing them of the users systems check and reporting requirement. 

In the response, ICE also stated that ICE and USCIS share trafficking information, 

including T nonimmigrant status applications and U nonimmigrant status petitions, at the 

local level in accordance with ICE HSI policy and consistent with confidentiality 

protections. ICE I-lSI offices regularly contact other agencies, including USCIS and local 

human trafficking task forces, to exchange leads or other information related to human 

trafficking violations. 

Finally, ICE noted that USC IS and ICE worked together to establish a Joint Coordination 

Working Group to identify and implement additional mechanisms to share information 

on traffickers and victims. 
176 

Question: Please describe ICE's process for allocating resources for domestic 

investigations, including illicit trade, illicit travel, illicit finance, and investigative 

support, and answer the following: 

How docs ICE decide to prioritize which categories of investigation receive what level of 

resources? Please describe the current strategy for allocating resources by investigative 

area. 

Within the category of investigations related to illicit travel, please describe how 

investigative resources are allocated by the different types of illicit travel investigations. 

Response: ICE prioritizes its investigative work based on threat analysis and operational 

prioritization. This analysis takes into consideration any imminent threat to national 

security and/or public safety; any imminent threat within a specific geographic area; or 

any operational priority set by the Secretary of Homeland Security and the ICE Director. 

ICE subsequently prioritizes and allocates its investigative resources strategically, in both 

domestic and foreign offices, to ensure that efforts to disrupt and dismantle the 

transnational criminal organizations posing the greatest threat to the United States arc 

appropriately resourced. 

ICE uses a stringent planning process to determine what investigative areas may need 

new focus or enhancements related to investigations in illicit trade, travel, and finance. 

The process includes the Strategic Risk Assessment (SRA) and Significant Case Review 

(SCR) process. The SRA is a risk-based decision-making tool that assists ICE with the 

process of prioritizing mission areas. The SRA compares risk levels to investigative level 

of etTort to support ICE's ability to make risk-informed resource allocation decisions. 

The SCR process enables ICE to identify and measure progress on significant 

investigations, thereby enhancing ICE's ability to prioritize and define its substantive 

investigative efforts. ICE can provide a briding on the process, if requested. 
177 

Question: Regarding K-1 visas for fiancees, in December 2015, DHS told committee 

staff that USCIS does not verify whether K-1 visa holders are married within 90 days as 

required by the terms of their visa. Does ICE investigate or verify whether K-1 visa 

holders marry within 90 days? If the information is known, what percentage ofK-1 visa 

holders marry within 90 days and what percentage does not? 

Response: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) does not investigate or 

verify whether K-1 nonimmigrant visa holders marry within 90 days of their admission to 

the United States. K-1 nonimmigrant visas are issued by the U.S. Department of State, 

and individuals issued K-1 nonimmigrant visas are admitted to the United States by U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection. K-1 nonimmigrant visa holders are required by statute 

to marry their fiance or fiancee within 90 days of their admission to the United States, or 

depart the United States. Once married, the K-1 nonimmigrant visa holder can then file 

for Lawful Permanent Resident status by filing a form 1-485, ''Application to Register 

Permanent Residence or Adjust Status," with U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 

(USCJS). K-1 nonimmigrant visa holders who do not marry within 90 days of their 

admission are in violation of the terms and conditions of their nonimmigrant status and 

subject to removal consistent with Department civil enforcement priorities. 
178 

Question#: '9 

-- Topic: Student and Exchange Visitor Program 

Hearing: The Security of U.S. Visa Programs 

--·-~-~---~- ----- ---

I 

Primary: The Honorable Ron Johnson 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: ICE has responsibility for overseeing the Student and Exchange Visitor 

Program (SEVP). Past audits by the Government Accountability Office have identified 

challenges in ICE's management of the SEVP and compliance with federal requirements 

for ensuring the integrity of this program, including insuring that all schools are 

recertified every year, that all flight schools participating in the program have appropriate 

certification by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and that students 

participating in the Optional Practical Training (OPT) are following the terms of their 

visa (including collecting information about OPT students' employers). Please answer 

the following. 

Provide a timeline of ICE's process for recertifying SEVP approved schools. !las this 

process been completed since 2003'7 What percent of current SEVP-eligible schools 

were recertified within the past two years? When do you anticipate that the certifications 

for all schools will be completed'? 

Response: Per the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of2002, 

schools are recertified every two years. In the last two years, Student and Exchange 

Visitor Program (SEVP) has recertified 7,243 schools, the majority of which were the 

schools' second recertification. Since June 2010, SEVP has adjudicated 13,580 school 

recertifications. Currently there are 8.669 SEVP-certitied schools. There are fewer than 

I 0 schools remaining that have never been recertified, all of which arc being actively 

worked. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) anticipates finalizing these 

last few cases in August 2016. As part of the ongoing recertification process, 71 schools 

have been denied recertification to date. 

Question: Are all flight schools listed as SEVP-cligiblc on ICE's "Study in the States" 

website FAA certitied'l 

Response: ICE reviews the list of SEVP approved flight schools on a monthly basis for 

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) certification. If a school has lost its FAA 

certification (or has dropped back to provisional certification), SEVP takes appropriate 

administrative action to remove the school's SEVP certification. Once that 

administrative process is complete and the school is no longer SEVP-certified, it is 

removed from the list on "Study in the States:· 

Question: How many SEVP visa participants arc currently in the United States under the 

Optional Practical Training program? Please provide the percentage of students 

I 
179 

participating in OPT who lack required information in their file (such as the name of an 

employer). lf!CE cannot provide this information, please explain why. 

Response: Students who elect to continue their education through practical training 

remain in the United States on their F-1 or M-1 visas. Under the current regulations, 

employer information is only required for students participating in Science Technology 

Engineering Math (STEM) Optional Practical Training (OPT), which means they 

graduated with a degree in a STEM field and are participating in OPT. Of the 29,070 

students currently on STEM OPT, only 31 (0.11 percent) have files with missing 

employer information. SEVP is currently working with the schools to ensure that this 

information is appropriately updated in the Student and Exchange Visitor Information 

System. 
180 

Question: Please describe what challenges does ICE face in overseeing the SEVP 

program. 

Response: As of May 2016, there arc 1.18 million F and M international students and 

200,861 J-1 exchange visitors in the United States. There are also 8,687 SEVP-certified 

U.S. schools to enroll F and M international students. The primary sets of challenges 

SEVP faces pertain to Information Technology (IT) systems development, compliance 

efforts, and emerging policy and regulatory requirements. 

The Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS) houses information on 

students, schools, and exchange visitors. SEVIS is a web-based information system that 

maintains records for numerous entities, including SEVP-certified schools, F-1 and M-1 

nonimmigrant students and their dependents, exchange visitor program sponsors, and J-1 

exchange visitors and their dependents. 

This IT system has received considerable attention over the past few years from within 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and ICE. SEVP has status reviews with DHS 

and ICE at least every quarter. After two years of planning and the development of a 

robust Analysis of Alternatives, the SEVP program plans to initiate the acquisition 

process for SEVIS modernization. The increased oversight of SEV!S since 2013 has 

resulted in dramatic improvement in all five DHS categories that indicate the overall 

program health of an IT system (i.e., Scope, Technical Performance, Schedule, Funding, 

and Risk). SEVIS' scoring has changed from red (failing) in all five categories to green 

(exceptional) in all five categories. Most recently, in 2016, the DHS Under Secretary for 

Management issued an Acquisition Decision Memorandum to SEVP identifying SEVIS 

as a DHS IT Acquisition Agile Pilot. This pilot is designed to improve the execution and 

oversight ofDHS IT acquisitions using industry best practices, including Lean and Agile 

incremental development technologies. The pilot for SEVIS modernization is being 

conducted within the spirit and intent of Acquisition Management Directive I 02-0 l, 

focusing on right-sizing the documentation and processes. While keeping with principles 

outlined in the u.S. Digital Services Playbook, additional flexibility is built into this pilot 

to execute the project successfully. The lessons learned from this pilot will be used to 

develop and update policies and procedures for executing these and future IT 

acquisitions. 

SEVP must also manage compliance and enforcement-related challenges. This includes 

investigating alleged fraud related to curricular practical training and other areas; 

implementing a risk assessment process for schools and directing SEVP compliance-
181 

Question#: I 0 

Topic: 

Hearing: 

Primary: 

l--c::c-o-m-m-:cit-:-te-e:+.H=oME-oLA_N_D_SECUR!1'Y(sE-NA-TE)--------------I 

L-------'-----------------------------------' 

related resources accordingly; and monitoring state licensing and accreditation of all 

SEVP-certified schools. Additionally, SEVP provides support to federal law 

enforcement entities that track and locate students who have overstayed their visas. 

These challenges must be coordinated not only for compliance with existing laws and 

regulations, but also with HSI Jaw enforcement assets when necessary. SEVP leverages 

SEVIS to maintain information on all F, M, and J nonimmigrant students, certified 

schools, and approved programs of study. SEVP also certifies, recertifies, and withdraws 

schools that enroll nonimmigrant students in the United States to ensure compliance with 

federal regulations: oversees the collection of information on SEVP-certitied schools and 

nonimmigrant students for national security and law enforcement agencies; supports 

criminal enforcement cases related to school fraud: and enforces federal rules and 

regulations, such as the Accreditation of English Language Training Programs Act. 

SEVP supports its mission through stakeholder engagement and by promoting program 

awareness, inclusively through the SEVP Response Center, SEVP field representatives, 

conferences and outreach efforts, and digital resources such as Study in the States and 

other online tools. 
182 

Question#: II 

Question: Please describe the policies and procedures that ICE follows when requesting 

information from immigration files tor investigations. 

Under what circumstances arc ICE agents' requests for information from USCIS denied? 

Arc you aware of instances when ICE agents have requested information from USC IS 

files tor national security investigations where the information was denied? 

If so, please provide a number or estimate of the number of times that this has occurred. 

Response: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) follows the policies and 

procedures for requesting information from immigration files (A-Files) as outlined in the 

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service's (USCIS) User Guide for the National File 

Tracking System (1'\FTS), as well as USCIS Memorandum IIQREC 160/8 P 

(Immigration File Sharing and Sequestration Procedures Used During a National Security 

Event). The NFTS User Guide outlines procedures for requesting and receiving A-Files 

through NFTS. In addition, the memorandum outlines processes for sharing A-Files 

during a National Security Event (NSE). ICE-Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) 

takes the lead in coordinating tile movement with USCIS and the USCIS-FDNS (Fraud 

Detection and National Security) Directorate when an NSE occurs. 

ICE is unaware of any circumstances in which information requested !rom US CIS was 

denied, including for the purpose of national security investigations. 
183 

Question: Please complete production to my December 28, 2015 letter and respond to 

my March 4, 2016 letter, both regarding Homeland Security Investigations Special Agent 

Taylor Johnson. 

Response: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) provided a partial 

response to your December 28, 2015 letter on March 9, 2016. ICE responded to five of 

the six questions included in that letter. A partial response was provided to question three 

with a note that ICE will provide additional documents as they are identified. ICE 

continues to search for documents responsive to question three and will provide them as 

they become available. 

ICE also continues to gather documents in response to your March 4, 2016 letter, which 

contained seven questions, some requiring an extensive search to locate documents that 

might be responsive. ICE has accorded your letters a high priority, and we endeavor to 

respond to you as soon as possible. 
184 

Question#: 13 

Topic: ICE Referrals to Department of Justice 

Hearing: The Security of U.S. Visa Programs 

-----~~~~---~--- ------- Primary: The Honorable Ron Johnson 

Lmmittee: i HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

I 

Question: Please describe how ICE refers criminal enforcement actions to the 

Department of Justice (DOJ) for prosecution. How many immigration fraud cases did 

ICE refer to the DOJ in FY20l5':' How many of these referrals resulted in a declination 

to prosecute? 

Please describe how ICE refers civil enforcement actions (i.e. monetary fines) authorized 

under the Immigration and Nationality Act to the DOJ? How many times did ICE make 

such referrals in FY20!5':' How many of these referrals resulted in civil enforcement 

actions? 

Response: In most situations, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) 

presents criminal investigations to the Department of Justice (DOJ) for prosecution 

through an open dialogue with the U.S. Attorney (or delegate). which includes presenting 

the f~lcts and discussing the investigative evidence that establishes the clements of the 

criminal violation within the judicial district in which the alleged criminal offense took 

place. During that discussion. the U.S. Attorney (or delegate) will determine whether a 

criminal investigation will be accepted for prosecution, or if additional investigation and 

evidence is necessary. 

ICE interprets immigration fraud as immigration benefit fraud, which is an investigative 

program within ICE. ICE does not categorically track the number of investigations 

presented to DOJ for prosecution and whether they are accepted or declined. However, 

in Fiscal Year (FY) 2015, ICE initiated 1,414 investigations, executed 873 criminal 

arrests, obtained 716 convictions and seized approximately $!8.5 million in illicit 

proceeds and assets relating to immigration benefit fraud. 

In regards to civil enforcement actions (i.e., monetary fines) relating to immigration 

fraud. Section 274C of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) allows for civil 

penalties against an individual or entity for the knowing creation, usc, acceptance, 

f(Jrging. altering, counterfeiting and false making of any document for the purpose of 

satisfying a requirement of~ or obtaining a benefit under, the INA. ICE allocates 

resources toward activities that yield the greatest fraud deterrence effect and weighs the 

required amount of evidence necessary to successfully fine an individual or entity under 

this provision. ICE finds it more efficient and effective to pursue criminal violations 

when immigration fraud is discovered rather than pursue civil penalties under Section 

274C of the INA. 
185 

Que•tion#o 13 

Topic: ICE Referrals to Department of Justice 

Hearing: The Security of U.S. Visa Programs 

--"-

Primary: The Honorable Ron Johnson 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

With respect to civil enforcement actions (i.e., monetary tines) in connection with 

worksite enforcement investigations, ICE serves a Notice of Intent to Fine (NIF), as 

authorized by the INA, and charging documents specifying the violations committed by 

the employer. The employer has the opportunity to either negotiate a settlement with ICE 

or request a hearing before the DOJ Office of the Chief Administrative Hearing Officer 

within 30 days of receipt of the NIF. In FY 2015, ICE worksite enforcement 

investigations resulted in the issuance of 513 final orders for a total of $18,040,977 in 

lines. 
186 

Question: Please describe enforcement actions available to ICE against legal 

representatives who file petitions or represent petitioners that are found to pose a national 

security risk or be fraudulent. 

Response: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's (ICE) Homeland Security 

Investigations investigates and refers for prosecution attorneys and representatives who 

are believed to be knowingly participating in the filing of fraudulent immigration 

applications and petitions, including those that conceal the fact that the applicant or 

beneficiary may be a national security risk. The majority of the crimes committed by 

legal representatives are prosecuted at the federal level for violations of conspiracy (18 

U.S.C. §371) as it relates to one or more of the following statutes: 18 U.S.C. § 1546 (visa 

fraud), 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (false statements), 18 U.S.C. § 1425 (naturalization fraud), and 

8 U.S.C. § 1325(c) (marriage fraud). Other federal violations include 18 U.S.C. § 1956 

(money laundering), as well as 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (mail ti·aud), and 18 U.S.C. § 1343 

(wire fraud). 

Leading the criminal enforcement of immigration fraud are ICE's 23 Document and 

Benefit Fraud Task Forces (DBFTFs). The ICE DBFTFs maximize resources, eliminate 

duplication of efforts, and promote the sharing of information between ICE and its law 

enforcement partners. 

Allegations of fraud or misconduct on the part of legal representatives may also be 

referred to ICE's Ethics Office for potential referral to a state bar, the Disciplinary 

Counsel for the Executive Office for Immigration Review, or U.S. Citizenship and 

Immigration Services, depending on the forum in which the conduct occurred. As 

provided in 8 CFR part I 003, subpart G, the Executive Ot1ice for Immigration Review 

conducts proceedings to suspend or disbar attorneys and representatives from 

representing individuals before the immigration judges, the Board of Immigration 

Appeals, and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services for violations of the disciplinary 

rules. 
187 

Post-Hearing Questions for the Record 

Submitted to the Honorable Sarah R. Saldana 

From Senator Rob Portman 

"The Security of U.S. Visa Programs" 

March 15, 2016 

Question: According to the DHS Inspector General's submitted testimony, consular 

officers have expressed their frustration with not learning essential information to 

"enhance their skills" from their ICE partners embedded at embassy or consular facilities. 

What has been done to improve the quantity and quality of the training provided to 

consular officers from their ICE partners? 

Are there any ways that this partnership can be improved? 

Response: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Homeland Security 

Investigations (HSI) currently has a strong relationship with U.S. Department of State 

(DOS) Consular Af1airs and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) at both the 

headquarters and field levels. ICE and its partners collaborate closely on all Visa 

Security Program (VSP) matters including the training of consular officers. 

ICE has recently taken several steps to provide training to our consular partners. ICE, 

DOS Consular Aflairs, and CBP continually assess the VSP and explore areas of 

potential improvement, including in the area of training. As such, ICE is currently 

coordinating with the DOS Office of Screening, Analysis, and Coordination and the 

Office of Visa Services to update basic training curriculums that meet the needs of the 

consular employee as well as the intent of the Homeland Security Act and the January 

2011 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between ICE and DOS (Consular Affairs 

and Diplomatic Security). This MOU between ICE and DOS defines the roles and 

responsibilities ofVSP operations at Post and directs ICE Special Agents at Post to 

develop formal training and briefings for DOS consular officers on identified threats 

relating to the visa process. ICE will request input from both Consular Affairs personnel 

and ICE Special Agents overseas to ensure that training needs arc being met both on 

programmatic and Post-specilic levels while also addressing emerging local threats. 
188 

In addition, ICE has recently selected an experienced law enforcement instructor to 

coordinate all VSP training. This training program manager will develop a specialized 

training module for ICE Special Agents assigned to the VSP to utilize when conducting 

standardized training sessions for DOS Consular Affairs personnel at Post. The training 

module will be disseminated to all Posts that include a Visa Security Unit. 

Question: Does Congress need to do anything to greater facilitate the effectiveness of 

this partnership and information-sharing relationship? 

Response: ICE enjoys a strong relationship with DOS Consular Affairs and CBP. ICE 

will continue to build upon this partnership both at Post and at the agencies' headquarters 

offices. Continued Congressional interest and support of current VSP operations and its 

expansion is appreciated. 
189 

Question: The General's report also 

how much time dedicated to visa issues. 

revelation, have ICE agents how much time they 

issues'> 

bow much time do ICE agents devote to visa 

to other tasks'! 

issues in 

Response: U.S. and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Homeland 

(HSI) have to track the time that on visa 

issues. The below chart shows the combined hours since Fiscal Year (FY) 2014 on visa 

issues compared to all hours from ICE HSI offices c.v'"""''"'" 

""ug<cm.c. and 

" Visa hours are defined ICE as those investigative hours worked on 

visa securily operations, the Visa Security the Student Visitor 

Program, outreach of same, as well as school that facilitates visa !t 

must be noted that ICE does not a single mission set; this percentage 

fits into a larger coordinated national and border 
190 

Question: You testified at the March 15 hearing, as well as your submitted testimony 

indicates, that ICE uses SEVIS to screen for overstays. Further, colleges and universities 

communicate with ICE through SEVIS regarding the status of students and exchange 

visitors. 

How timely is reporting from the 8,000 universities and colleges who have students and 

exchange visitors enrolled at their institutions'l 

Response: Under the regulations that govern the Student and Exchange Visitor Program 

(SEVP), there are numerous timelines for submission of information. The Student and 

Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS), the database that stores information on 

schools and students, has a number of automatic actions that occur if a school has not 

taken action in an appropriate amount of time. For example, if a school does not indicate 

that a student has enrolled within the required amount of time, SEVIS automatically 

terminates that student. 

Question: How accurate is the information provided by the universities and colleges? 

Response: SEVP has an ongoing initiative that regularly validates information in the 

system and flags information in a school or student record that does not appear to be 

accurate, such as someone underage enrolled in a doctorate program. Each inaccuracy 

discovered is examined to determine whether SEVP should simply request that the school 

update the information, or whether the inaccuracy may be part of a larger pattern of 

noncompliance warranting further investigation. SEVP combines this examination with 

risk analysis criteria to determine which schools and students require further review. 
191 

Question: Another database used to find overstays is the CTCEU's Visa Waiver 

Enforcement Program. Entrants via the United States' Visa Waiver Program may stay in 

country for only ninety days before being designated an overstay. If someone overstays 

and is subsequently found and removed, is he or she able to re-enter the U.S. under the 

Visa Waiver Program? 

Response: One of the requirements for eligible travel under the Visa Waiver Program 

(VWP) stipulates that the traveler must have complied with the conditions of any 

previous admissions. Therefore, an individual that has not complied with those conditions 

would be unable to subsequently travel under the VWP, and would have to apply for, and 

receive, a non-immigrant visa to travel to the United States on his/her next visit to the 

United States. 

Question: Will this removal be counted as derogatory when he or she applies for a 

subsequent re-entry? 

Response: The individual's removal from the United States would be reported to the 

State Department and recorded in the !DENT system. When that individual's fingerprints 

and name checks are queried as part of the visa process, this information would be 

available to the Consular oflicer who would interview that applicant. The reason for the 

individual's removal, and the reason the applicant is seeking a visa for a subsequent visit, 

are both considerations in determining their eligibility for a non-immigrant visa. 
192 

lJSCIS and ELlS 

Post-Hearing Questions for the Record 

Submitted to the Honorable John Roth 

From Senator Rob Portman 

"The Security of U.S. Visa Programs" 

March 15,2016 

I. Your submitted testimony and verbal testimony at the March 15 hearing have outlined the 

risks associated with USC IS' use of a paper-based file system. You also detailed USC IS' 

troubles with transferring to an electronic system. What has been the single greatest 

impediment to the creation, adoption, and implementation of an electronic-based system? 

Answer: The greatest impediment to the implementation of the electronic immigration (ELlS) 

system is longstanding deficiencies in USCIS Of1ice of Transformation's program management 

practices. The lack of progress and system performance problems we reported in our March 2016 

report, "USCIS Automation of Immigration Benefits Processing Remains Ineffective" are the 

same program ddiciencies we previously disclosed in five prior repotis concerning lJSCIS' 

attempts to transform its antiquated. paper-based processes. Above all, Transformation program 

management has failed to effectively plan. provide consistent program direction, include 

stakeholders in system development activities, and address technical end-user concerns. There 

has been a lot of activity over the years, but minimal productivity towards accomplishing the end 

objective of automating about 90 benefits processes-all at a sunk cost of $1.2 billion to date, 

and an anticipated total program cost of $3. I billion by 2033. USCIS' ability to execute this 

program using its own funds derived from benefits processing fees has contributed to the 

continued waste and inefficiency. 

a. ls there anything that Congress should do accelerate the creation, adoption, and 

implementation of a system? 

Answer: As discussed in our March 2016 report and the accompanying transmittal 

letter. USC IS has resisted our repeated audit oversight efTorts and findings. 

Congressional oversight could help improve management accountability and efforts 

to accomplish the automation program. Routine reporting to Congress would increase 

visibility and oversight. help identify and ensure mitigation of risks on an ongoing 

basis. and help avoid further delays and continued cost overruns in lJSCIS 

Transformation program performance. Specifically, the Congress could help spur 

USCIS action to implement our March 2016 report recommendations. 

b. Is/are the impediment(s) internal or external to USCIS? 

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193 

Answer: The impediments, as described above, are all internal to USCIS. Our four 

report recommendations outlined above were issued specifically to address these 

program management deficiencies. However, as discussed in the report, USC IS 

disagreed with the recommendations regarding the need for improved stakeholder 

communication and technical end-user support. Both of these issues have existed 

since the first ELlS release in 2012. 

Investor Visa Program 

2. Regarding the GAO and previous OTG audits, do you believe legislation clarifying the 

requirements for the EB-5 program would be helpful to USCIS in administrating the 

program? 

Answer: Clarity and stronger legal authority would help USCIS better administer the program. 

As we identified in our audit, the laws governing EB-5's regional center program arc not clear 

about US CIS' authority to deny or terminate regional centers based on fraud or national security 

concerns. Specifically, the Departments of Commerce, Justice and State, the Judiciary, and 

Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1993 only describe requirements for approving a regional 

center that submits a ''general proposal for the promotion of economic growth." Under the 

Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) USC IS can deny an immigration benefit or visa to those 

who are a national security concern, but USCIS docs not interpret the INA as applying to this 

situation because regional centers arc pooling funds from investors not seeking an 

immigration benefit or visa_ USCIS has not developed regulations to deny participation in the 

EB-5 program when regional center principals are connected with questionable activities that 

may harm national security. 

We believe USCIS could better manage the program if, as we recommended in our report, it: 

• Updated and clarified Federal regulations to allow it to deny or terminate EB-5 regional 

center participants in any phase of the process when known connections to national 

security and/or fraud risks are identified without compromising any ongoing or potential 

investigation; 

• made explicit that fraud and national security concerns can cause revocation of regional 

center status (under 8 CFR § 205.2): 

• is given the authority to verify that the foreign funds arc invested in companies that create 

U.S. jobs; and 

• applies requirements for the EB-5 regional center program consistently to all participants. 

USC IS has sought a revised rule for EB-5 regulations to clarify the requirements for establishing 

program eligibility, but two years after our recommendation the draft rule is still in development 

and does not yet include all policy decisions. According to USCIS, the draft rule will evolve as it 

goes through the Federal regulatory process. According to USC IS, it may change significantly 

Page 2 of 3 
194 

Æ 

depending on input from key players in the process. We expect the revised rule to more clearly 

define the requirements for individual EB-5 petitions versus regional center-based applications 

and petitions. 

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