Filed 5/19/16 Brannon v. Iafornaro CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

LYNNE BRANNON,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

ANGELEA IAFORNARO,

Defendant and Respondent.

 D068663

 (Super. Ct. No. D552922)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Paula S. 

Rosenstein, Judge. Affirmed.

Lynne Brannon, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant. 

Randolph McNichol for Defendant and Respondent. 

Lynne Brannon appeals from a domestic violence restraining order (Order) that 

requires her to stay away from, and precludes certain personal conduct related to, her 

daughter, Angelea Iafornaro, and Iafornaro's six-year-old son (Brannon's grandson), B.F. 

Brannon's arguments on appeal are based on what she contends was said and done at 
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hearings that preceded and resulted in the Order. However, by not providing an adequate 

record on appeal from which we can determine the evidence that was presented or what 

was said at the hearings, Brannon has not met her burden of establishing error. 

Accordingly, we will affirm the Order.

I.

BURDENS ON APPEAL

" 'A judgment or order of the lower court is presumed correct. All intendments 

and presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to which the record is silent, 

and error must be affirmatively shown. This is not only a general principle of appellate 

practice but an ingredient of the constitutional doctrine of reversible error.' " (Denham v. 

Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) "It is well settled, of course, that a party 

challenging a judgment [or order] has the burden of showing reversible error by an 

adequate record." (Ballard v. Uribe (1986) 41 Cal.3d 564, 574.) "A necessary corollary 

to this rule is that if the record is inadequate for meaningful review, the appellant defaults 

and the decision of the trial court should be affirmed." (Mountain Lion Coalition v. Fish 

& Game Com. (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 1043, 1051, fn. 9 (Mountain Lion Coalition).) As 

particularly applicable in the present appeal, Estate of Fain (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 973 

(Fain) instructs: "Where no reporter's transcript has been provided and no error is 

apparent on the face of the existing appellate record, the judgment [or order] must be 

conclusively presumed correct as to all evidentiary matters. To put it another way, it is 

presumed that the unreported trial testimony would demonstrate the absence of error." 

(Id. at p. 992, italics added & deleted.)
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Iafornaro has not appeared in the appeal. California Rules of Court, rule 

8.220(a)(2) provides that where there is no respondent's brief, "the court may decide the 

appeal on the record, the opening brief, and any oral argument by the appellant." We do 

not consider the failure to file a respondent's brief as an admission of error; we review the 

presentation by Brannon (as appellant) — here, a clerk's transcript and a brief — and 

determine whether she has met her burden of establishing reversible error. (Gonzalez v. 

Munoz (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 413, 419, fn. 2 (Gonzalez) [domestic violence restraining 

order].)

In the trial court, at times Brannon was represented by counsel, and at times 

(including in preparation for and at the hearing at which the Order was issued) she 

represented herself. On appeal, Brannon is representing herself. In both the trial and 

appellate courts, the procedural rules apply the same to self-represented parties as to 

parties represented by counsel. (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984-985; 

Barton v. New United Motor Manufacturing, Inc. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1200, 1210 ["a 

party appearing in propria persona . . . is to be treated like any other party and is entitled 

to the same, but no greater consideration than other litigants and attorneys"].)
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II.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1

Brannon initiated the underlying matter that preceded the restraining order 

proceedings by filing a petition in January 2015, seeking custody and visitation of B. F.2

In Brannon's supplemental declaration filed in support of her petition in February 2015, 

Brannon presented evidence about the condition of the daycare center B. F. attended. 

The next items in the record are three declarations from Brannon — two filed in

late June 2015 and one filed in early July 2015. They appear to have been submitted in 

opposition to a request for a restraining order by Iafornaro.3

The record on appeal also contains the clerk's minutes from the July 14, 2015 

hearing on Iafornaro's request for a restraining order. The minutes reflect that the court 

 

1 We base our factual and procedural recitation on what Brannon presented in the 

one-volume clerk's transcript, disregarding statements in Brannon's brief that do not find 

support in the record on appeal. (Pulver v. Avco Financial Services (1986) 182 

Cal.App.3d 622, 632.)

2 At various places in her brief, Brannon references factual "details" regarding her 

January 2015 petition. In a supplemental declaration in support of the petition, Brannon 

refers to an original declaration she filed in support of the petition, in which she 

"described the situation between [Iafornaro and B. F.], and the bond that he has with me 

and why we need to resolve the child sharing problem we have among us." However, 

because Brannon did not include a copy of the original declaration in the record on 

appeal, the record does not contain any evidence of the facts which she attributes to the 

"details" in support of the petition.

3 From context in Brannon's brief — which is not evidence (In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 

Cal.4th 396, 413, fn. 11 [arguments in briefs not evidence]) — we understand that the 

first two declarations were submitted in opposition to Iafornaro's request for a temporary 

restraining order and the third declaration was submitted in opposition to Iafornaro's 

request for the final restraining order.
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received evidence, entertained argument and issued the requested restraining order. The 

court also filed a formal order on Judicial Council Form DV-130, which we previously 

identified as the Order. Among other directives, the Order contains personal conduct 

orders and stay-away orders that preclude Brannon from having any contact with 

Iafornaro or B. F. 

Brannon timely appealed from the Order. 

The record on appeal is comprised entirely of the above-described eight 

documents. We have not been provided a copy of Iafornaro's request for a restraining 

order, any of the written documentation Iafornaro may have submitted in support of her 

request, or — most significantly — any reporter's transcripts of trial court proceedings. 

III.

DISCUSSION

We review a trial court's order issuing a domestic violence restraining order for an 

abuse of discretion. (Gonzalez, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 420.) " 'The appropriate test 

for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason. When 

two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has 

no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court.' " (Ibid., quoting from 

Shamblin v. Brattain (1988) 44 Cal.3d 474, 478-479.) 

Thus, in determining whether the trial court abused its discretion in issuing the 

Order, we must consider all of the facts that were before the trial court. Here, however, 

as we explained ante, without a reporter's transcript, we "presume[] that the unreported 

trial testimony would demonstrate the absence of error." (Fain, supra, 75 Cal.App.4th at 
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p. 992, italics added.) Thus, without a complete reporter's transcript, we presume the 

court heard testimony both that supported Iafornaro's claim for a restraining order and

that defeated any defense Brannon may have presented. Stated differently, because the 

record presented by Brannon is "inadequate for meaningful review," Brannon did not 

meet her burden of establishing reversible error, "and the decision of the trial court 

should be affirmed." (Mountain Lion Coalition, supra, 214 Cal.App.3d at p. 1051, fn. 9.)

We recognize and appreciate that Brannon's underlying request for grandparent 

custody and visitation is serious and important — not only to Brannon, but also to B. F. 

However, so too is the Order (based on evidence of domestic violence) and the protection 

it affords — not only to Iafornaro, but also to B. F. As an appellate court, we have not 

seen the witnesses, heard the testimony or reviewed the exhibits (if any) that were 

presented to the trial court — i.e., the evidence upon which the Order is based. By not 

providing this information to us, Brannon has precluded meaningful appellate review of 

the Order.
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DISPOSITION

The restraining order after hearing, filed July 14, 2015, is affirmed.4 In the 

interest of justice, costs on appeal are not awarded. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 

8.278(a)(5).) 

IRION, J.

WE CONCUR:

HALLER, Acting P. J.

AARON, J.

 

4 We express no view on the merits of Brannon's January 2015 petition for custody 

and visitation of B. F.