Filed 3/5/14 P. v. McCunney CA2/6 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DIVISION SIX 

THE PEOPLE, 

 Plaintiff and Respondent, 

v. 

BRUCE ALAN McCUNNEY II, 

 Defendant and Appellant. 

2d Crim. No. B246996 

(Super. Ct. No. 1356020) 

(Santa Barbara County) 

 Bruce Alan McCunney II appeals an order of probation following 

conviction of driving under the influence of alcohol, and driving with an 0.08 percent 

blood alcohol level, with findings that he violated Vehicle Code provisions while driving, 

and that more than one victim sustained bodily injury. (Veh. Code, §§ 23153, subds. (a) 

& (b), 22107, 22349, 27315, subd. (d)(1), 23558.)1

 We affirm. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

 Shortly after midnight on April 20, 2011, California Highway Patrol 

Officer Scott Williams responded to the report of a traffic accident on the highway south 

of Buellton. Williams found McCunney and Travis Hawley standing on the shoulder of 

the southbound highway lane. McCunney informed Williams that he had been driving 

his vehicle at approximately 65 to 70 miles per hour when he lost control ("cut off by a 

 

1

 All further statutory references are to the Vehicle Code. 
2 

white SUV") and drove down an embankment into a ravine. McCunney stated that his 

passengers were still inside the vehicle. 

 Williams noticed that McCunney's eyes were red, his speech was slurred, 

and he had an alcohol odor. Believing that McCunney was under the influence of 

alcohol, Williams administered field sobriety tests. McCunney performed poorly on the 

tests and had difficulty following the test instructions. Williams then arrested McCunney 

for being under the influence of alcohol. McCunney later admitted that he had consumed 

two containers of beer earlier that evening. 

 The five passengers in McCunney's vehicle sustained individual injuries, 

including a fractured pelvis, a broken tooth, lacerations, and poison oak rash (the ravine 

contained poison oak). McCunney suffered a bloody nose and a lacerated lip. 

 At trial, several of McCunney's passengers testified that he was driving 

between 75 and 85 miles per hour and swerving or "goof[ing] off" before "fishtail[ing]" 

off the road. 

 A blood alcohol test revealed that McCunney had a blood alcohol level of 

0.15 several hours following the accident. An alcohol breath test administered later 

revealed a 0.11 blood-alcohol concentration. 

 Nicholas Coronado, a criminalist whose expertise includes forensic alcohol 

analysis, opined that a person whose blood alcohol level is 0.15 within an hour and onehalf of an accident, and 0.11 within two and one-half hours of an accident, is sufficiently 

impaired to preclude safe operation of a motor vehicle. 

 The jury convicted McCunney of driving under the influence of alcohol 

(count 1), and driving with an 0.08 percent blood alcohol level (count 2). (§ 23153, 

subds. (a) & (b).) It also found that he violated three Vehicle Code provisions while 

driving, and that more than one victim sustained bodily injury. (§§ 22107 [unsafe lane 

change without signaling], 22349 [exceeding maximum speed limit], 27315, subd. (d)(1) 

[passengers not wearing seatbelts], 23558 [bodily injury enhancement].) The trial court 

suspended imposition of sentence and granted McCunney five years of formal probation 

with terms and conditions, including service of 180 days confinement in county jail. The 
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court imposed various fines and fees, ordered victim restitution, and awarded McCunney 

three days of presentence custody credit. 

 McCunney appeals and contends that the trial court erred by sustaining 

prosecution objections to the defense summation regarding: 1) the reasonable doubt 

standard; 2) reasonable inferences to be drawn from Coronado's testimony that "most 

people" with an 0.08 blood alcohol level are impaired drivers; and 3) "head trauma." 

McCunney asserts that the errors are cumulatively prejudicial. 

DISCUSSION 

I. 

 McCunney argues that the trial court erred by sustaining the prosecutor's 

objection to the defense comparison of the reasonable doubt standard to the standard used 

in other important life decisions: "Think about the kinds of things where you might -- 

might be making something that you view as an abiding conviction: The choice of a 

spouse, the choice of a husband; maybe where your son or daughter is going to school; 

maybe when you buy that first house and you invest your life savings." McCunney 

contends that the court clouded the meaning of reasonable doubt by sustaining the 

objection, thereby creating reversible error. He asserts that evidence and reasonable 

inferences therefrom suggest that he was injured that evening, another vehicle swerved in 

front of his vehicle causing the accident, and the blood alcohol level results are 

unreliable. 

 The trial court did not err by sustaining the prosecutor's objection to the 

defense characterization of reasonable doubt. 

 It is well settled that the reasonable doubt standard is not a standard a 

person might employ in making everyday decisions. (People v. Katzenberger (2009) 178 

Cal.App.4th 1260, 1265.) "The judgment of a reasonable man in the ordinary affairs of 

life, however important, is influenced and controlled by the preponderance of evidence. 

Juries are permitted and instructed to apply the same rule to the determination of civil 

actions involving rights of property only. But in the decision of a criminal case involving 

life or liberty, something further is required. . . . There must be in the minds of the jury 
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an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the truth of the charge, derived from a 

comparison and consideration of the evidence." (People v. Brannon (1873) 47 Cal. 96, 

97.) To liken the reasonable doubt standard to that same standard a person uses in 

making important life decisions "trivializes" the standard and constitutes improper 

argument. (People v. Nguyen (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 28, 36.) 

 In any event, the trial court properly instructed regarding the reasonable 

doubt standard and also informed the jury that it must follow the court's instructions and 

not the attorneys' comments regarding the law. (CALCRIM Nos. 200 ["Duties of Judge 

and Jury"], 220 ["Reasonable Doubt"].) We presume that jurors generally understand and 

follow the court's instructions. (People v. Myles (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1181, 1212.) 

II. 

 McCunney contends that the trial court precluded him from contesting guilt 

and impermissibly shifted the burden of proof by sustaining the prosecutor's objection to 

this summation argument: "'When a person reaches an .08 blood alcohol level, does 

impairment manifest itself at that point?' Well, the answer [according to expert witness 

Coronado] . . . is that in most people it does, but there's two reasonable conclusions from 

the answer. Most people would be impaired, but some people reasonably are not 

impaired." McCunney argues that the error is not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, 

pointing to evidence that another vehicle may have caused the accident. 

 The trial court did not err by sustaining the prosecutor's objection. 

Coronado's testimony that "most people" with 0.08 blood alcohol levels are impaired 

drivers does not permit a reasonable inference that a specific person (McCunney) with an 

0.08 blood alcohol level is not an impaired driver. Moreover, evidence at trial 

established that McCunney's blood alcohol level was either 0.11 or 0.15, depending upon 

the nature of the test. 

 In any event, the trial court properly instructed regarding the elements of 

the charged criminal offenses and the definition of "under the influence." (CALCRIM 

Nos. 2100, 2101.) The court also specifically instructed: "If the People have proved 

beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's blood alcohol level was 0.08 percent or 
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more at the time of the chemical analysis, you may, but are not required to, conclude that 

the defendant was under the influence of an alcoholic beverage at the time of the alleged 

offense." We presume that the jury generally understands and follows the instructions. 

(People v. Myles, supra, 53 Cal.4th 1181, 1212.) 

III. 

 McCunney argues that the trial court erred by sustaining the prosecutor's 

objection to defense counsel's argument that head trauma explained his apparent 

intoxication: "[W]here did the bloody nose come from? Probably contact with the 

steering wheel. Head trauma. . . . [T]here is another reasonable alternative to explain [a 

failed field sobriety test]: Head trauma." 

 At closing argument, a party may discuss the evidence and comment on 

reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom. (People v. King (2010) 183 

Cal.App.4th 1281, 1306.) Nevertheless, counsel may not assume or state facts not in 

evidence or mischaracterize the evidence. (Id. at pp. 1306-1307.) 

 The trial court did not err by sustaining the prosecutor's objection because 

there is no evidence that McCunney suffered from head trauma nor was there evidence 

that head trauma can mimic symptoms of intoxication. McCunney did not offer expert 

witness testimony whether head trauma can result in failure to perform field sobriety 

tests, or in bloodshot eyes or slurred speech. Defense counsel's argument was unfounded 

and not based upon the evidence presented at trial. 

 The judgment is affirmed. 

 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED. 

 GILBERT, P.J. 

We concur: 

 YEGAN, J. 

 PERREN, J. 
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Patricia Kelly, Judge 

Superior Court County of Santa Barbara 

______________________________ 

 John Derrick, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant 

and Appellant. 

 Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant 

Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Victoria B. 

Wilson, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, David F. Glassman, Deputy Attorney 

General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.