NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

In re the Matter of:

JUSTINE ALANIZ, Petitioner/Appellee,

v.

CHRISTIAN ALANIZ, Respondent/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 21-0125 FC

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. FC2020-098234

The Honorable Harriet M. Bernick, Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Alexander R. Arpad Attorney at Law, Phoenix

By Alexander R. Arpad

Moon Law Firm PLC, Mesa

By Robert J. Moon

Co-Counsel for Petitioner/Appellee

The Hogle Firm PLC, Mesa

By Nathan J. Hogle

Counsel for Respondent/Appellant

FILED 3-3-2022
ALANIZ v. ALANIZ

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Peter B. Swann delivered the decision of the court, in which 

Judge David D. Weinzweig and Judge Paul J. McMurdie joined.

S W A N N, Judge:

¶1 Justine Alaniz (“Wife”) sought an order of protection against 

her husband Christian Alaniz (“Husband”), alleging Husband had been 

violent against her, intimidated her with a firearm, and told her employer 

she abused drugs. The Mesa Municipal Court issued the order of protection 

and a Brady Notice ordering Husband to surrender his firearms to the local 

sheriff’s department. After a contested evidentiary hearing, the Maricopa 

County Superior Court confirmed the protective order and Brady Notice. 

Husband appeals. For the following reasons, we affirm.

DISCUSSION

¶2 We review a protective order for abuse of discretion. Savord 

v. Morton, 235 Ariz. 256, 259, ¶ 10 (App. 2014). A court abuses its discretion 

when “it makes an error of law in reaching a discretionary conclusion or 

‘when the record, viewed in the light most favorable to upholding the trial 

court’s decision, is devoid of competent evidence to support the decision.’”

Michaelson v. Garr, 234 Ariz. 542, 544, ¶ 5 (App. 2014) (citation omitted). We 

view the evidence in the light most favorable to upholding the superior 

court’s findings but review questions of law de novo. See Shah v. 

Vakharwala, 244 Ariz. 201, 202, 204, ¶¶ 5, 11 (App. 2018).

I. THE GUN INCIDENT ALONE WAS AN ACT OF DOMESTIC 

VIOLENCE WARRANTING AN ORDER OF PROTECTION.

¶3 A court must grant a protective order if it determines that the 

defendant may commit an act of domestic violence or has committed an act 

of domestic violence within the past year.

1 A.R.S. § 13-3602(E)(1), (2). An 

act of domestic violence occurs when an individual commits a qualifying 

1 The court may look beyond the one-year timeframe if it finds “that 

good cause exists to consider a longer period.” A.R.S. § 13-3602(E)(2).
ALANIZ v. ALANIZ

Decision of the Court

3

crime2 against someone with whom they have a specific relationship, 

including marriage. A.R.S. § 13-3601(A). The issue of the parties’ marital 

relationship is not in dispute. However, Husband argues there was 

insufficient evidence of domestic violence to meet the requirements for an 

order of protection. We disagree.

¶4 At the evidentiary hearing, Wife testified that during an 

argument on October 6, 2020, Husband retrieved a revolver from the 

couple’s closet, attempted to force her to take the gun, and told her to use it 

against him. Husband argues that the incident was not threatening, as he 

only used the weapon to “make a dramatic point.” Wife, however, testified 

that she was afraid for her safety because at the time Husband was 

intoxicated and would not allow her to leave the room. Wife also 

introduced several text-message conversations between the parties in 

which Husband admitted he knew the incident with the gun was “scary.”

¶5 We defer to the trial court’s findings of credibility and the 

weight to give conflicting evidence. Cardoso v. Soldo, 230 Ariz. 614, 619,

¶ 17 (App. 2012). The court found Wife’s testimony more credible, and we 

will not substitute our own judgment for the superior court’s. Accepting 

Wife’s version of events, the gun incident meets the requirements for 

several crimes listed under A.R.S. § 13-3601(A).

¶6 The superior court recognized that by bringing out a weapon 

and attempting to force Wife to take it, someone could have been hurt. This

is endangerment. A.R.S. § 13-1201(A) (“A person commits endangerment 

by recklessly endangering another person with a substantial risk of 

imminent death or physical injury.”). Husband’s reckless handling of a 

firearm also constitutes disorderly conduct. A.R.S. § 13-2904(A)(6) (a 

person commits disorderly conduct when, intending or knowing he or she 

will disturb the peace or quiet of another person, he or she “[r]ecklessly 

handles, displays or discharges a deadly weapon or dangerous 

instrument”); A.R.S. § 13-105(15) (“‘Deadly weapon’ means anything 

designed for lethal use, including a firearm.”). Finally, in preventing Wife 

from leaving the room, Husband committed unlawful imprisonment.

A.R.S. § 13-1303(A) (unlawful imprisonment is committed by “knowingly 

2 Qualifying crimes include those prescribed in §§ 13-1102, 13-1103, 

13-1104, 13-1105, 13-1201, 13-1202, 13-1203, 13-1204, 13-1302, 13-1303, 13-

1304, 13-1406, 13-1425, 13-1502, 13-1503, 13-1504, 13-1602 or 13-2810, 13-

2904, subsection A, paragraph 1, 2, 3 or 6, 13-2910, subsection A, paragraph 

8 or 9, 13-2915, subsection A, paragraph 3 or 13-2916, 13-2921, 13-2921.01, 

13-2923, 13-3019, 13-3601.02 or 13-3623. A.R.S. § 13-3601(A). 
ALANIZ v. ALANIZ

Decision of the Court

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restraining another person”); see also Swetnam v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 83 Ariz. 

189, 192 (1957) (“Any restraint, however slight, upon another’s liberty to 

come and go as one pleases, constitutes an arrest.”).

II. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN AFFIRMING THE BRADY NOTICE.

¶7 Husband argues the superior court erred in affirming the 

Brady Notice because there was insufficient evidence that his actions

constituted a credible threat to Wife’s safety. However, courts may prohibit

an individual from owning firearms if they either make a finding that the

defendant is a credible threat to the plaintiff’s safety or that the order itself

contains explicit language prohibiting the use, attempted use, or threatened

use of physical force against the plaintiff. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)(C)(i), (ii). A 

person may not possess a firearm if he or she is subject to a court order that:

(A) was issued after a hearing of which such person received 

actual notice, and at which such person had an opportunity 

to participate;

(B) restrains such person from harassing, stalking, or 

threatening an intimate partner of such person or child of 

such intimate partner or person, or engaging in other conduct 

that would place an intimate partner in reasonable fear of 

bodily injury to the partner or child; and

(C) (i) includes a finding that such person represents a 

credible threat to the physical safety of such intimate partner 

or child; or (ii) by its terms explicitly prohibits the use, 

attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against 

such intimate partner or child that would reasonably be 

expected to cause bodily injury.

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8). Page one of the superior court’s order explicitly states:

Defendant shall not commit any crimes, including but not

limited to harassment, stalking, or conduct involving the use,

attempted use, or threatened use of physical force that would

reasonably be expected to cause bodily injury, against

Plaintiff or Protected Persons. 

¶8 The superior court issued the protective order following a

contested evidentiary hearing. Therefore, in view of the order language,

we need not address the sufficiency of the court’s finding that Husband

posed a credible threat to Wife’s safety.
ALANIZ v. ALANIZ

Decision of the Court

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CONCLUSION

¶9 For the aforementioned reasons, we affirm.