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CONSTRUCTION COSTS AND DELAYS IN THE U.S. 

EMBASSY IN KABUL 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT 

AND GOVERNMENT REFORM 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

JULY 9, 2015 

Serial No. 114–144 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov 

http://www.house.gov/reform 


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COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM 

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah, Chairman 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee 

JIM JORDAN, Ohio 

TIM WALBERG, Michigan 

JUSTIN AMASH, Michigan 

PAUL A. GOSAR, Arizona 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

TREY GOWDY, South Carolina 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

CYNTHIA M. LUMMIS, Wyoming 

THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MICK MULVANEY, South Carolina 

KEN BUCK, Colorado 

MARK WALKER, North Carolina 

ROD BLUM, Iowa 

JODY B. HICE, Georgia 

STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma 

EARL L. ‘‘BUDDY’’ CARTER, Georgia 

GLENN GROTHMAN, Wisconsin 

WILL HURD, Texas 

GARY J. PALMER, Alabama 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland, Ranking 

Minority Member 

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri 

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

MATT CARTWRIGHT, Pennsylvania 

TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDA L. LAWRENCE, Michigan 

TED LIEU, California 

BONNIE WATSON COLEMAN, New Jersey 

STACEY E. PLASKETT, Virgin Islands 

MARK DESAULNIER, California 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

PETER WELCH, Vermont 

MICHELLE LUJAN GRISHAM, New Mexico 

SEAN MCLAUGHLIN, Majority Staff Director 

ART ARTHUR, Subcommittee on National Security Staff Director 

CORDELL HULL, Counsel 

SARAH VANCE, Clerk 

DAVID RAPALLO, Minority Staff Director 


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C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on July 9, 2015 ................................................................................. 1 

WITNESSES 

Mr. Michael J. Courts, Director, International Affairs and Trade, U.S. Government Accountability Office 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 6 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 7 

Ms. Lydia Muniz, Director, Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, U.S. 

Department of State 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 7 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 9 

The Hon. Gregory B. Starr, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, U.S. Department of State 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 9 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 10 

Mr. Jarrett Blanc, Principal Deputy Special Representative for Afghanistan 

and Pakistan, U.S. Department of State 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 10 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 12 

The Hon. Donald S. Hays, Senior Inspector, Office of The Inspector General, 

U.S. Department of State 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 13 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 14 

Mr. Michael L. Gulino, President and Chief Executive Officer, AEGIS LLC. 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 15 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 16 

APPENDIX 

Opening Statement of Chairman Jason Chaffetz ................................................. 70 

Questions for the Record to Assistant Secretary Gregory Starr, submitted 

by Chairman Chaffetz and Ranking Member Cummings ................................ 74 

Questions for the Record to Director Lydia Muniz, submitted by Chairman 

Chaffetz ................................................................................................................. 79 

Letter to the Hon. John Kerry from Chairman Mica ........................................... 83 


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CONSTRUCTION COSTS AND DELAYS IN THE 

U.S. EMBASSY IN KABUL 

Thursday, July 9, 2015 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM, Washington, D.C. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 9:03 a.m., in Room 2154, 

Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jason Chaffetz [chairman of 

the committee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Chaffetz, Mica, Duncan, Jordan, 

Walberg, Amash, Gosar, DesJarlais, Gowdy, Farenthold, Meadows, 

DeSantis, Buck, Walker, Blum, Russell, Carter, Grothman, Palmer, 

Cummings, Maloney, Lynch, Connolly, Duckworth, Kelly, Lawrence, Watson Coleman, Plaskett, Welch, and Lujan Grisham. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Committee on Oversight and Government 

Reform will come to order. I appreciate you being here as we have 

a hearing today regarding the construction costs and delays at the 

United States Embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan. 

Without objection, the chair is authorized to declare a recess at 

any time. 

Appreciate being here. This is an important topic. We have so 

many Americans who have given their lives in Afghanistan, who 

have sacrificed away from their families to serve the United States 

of America and our interests there. We have a duty and an obligation to make sure that they are well housed, that they are safe, 

that they are secure, that they are able to do their jobs and their 

duty, and yet after more than a decade of fighting and great work 

by our United States military, we are deeply concerned about what 

the State Department is doing or hasn’t done in Kabul to make 

sure that our Embassy facility there is in proper order. 

The State Department has invested or plans to invest more than $2.17 billion in facilities. It probably makes it the single most expensive facility that we have around the globe; and if not the most 

expensive, certainly one of the most expensive. 

Is there a threat? Yes, there is a threat there. It is a very dangerous place. Is it safe? No, it is not safe there. Did we hire the 

right contractors to put in place to make this happen? Evidently 

not. We’ve had to readjust contracts, we’ve had to dismiss some 

people along the way. The budget that was projected has now gone 

up more than 27 percent. Is this project and this buildout in Kabul 

on time? No, it’s not. It was supposed to be open last year. Now 

it looks like it might be 2017, some 3 years behind schedule. Is 

there a strategic plan? No. According to the GAO, there is not. Are 

there standards in place? No, there are not, according to the GAO. 


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Is there a security plan for temporary facilities in place? No, there 

is not. 

And so after more than a decade, this seems to be a fiasco. It is 

a mess. And one of the core questions is did we learn what we were 

supposed to learn when we were in Iraq? Evidently not. 

Keeping Americans safe who work in the Foreign Service in 

Kabul, Afghanistan, is a constant challenge. Just last week, 

Taliban militants attacked a NATO convoy just 500 yards from the 

United States Embassy in Kabul. There is an article in the Washington Post dated July 7 saying a suicide bomber rammed a car 

and an armored vehicle that was part of a NATO convoy here in 

the Afghan capital on Tuesday, the second such attack against coalition troops in a week. The attacks come a week after militants 

targeted a coalition convoy near the United States Embassy, killing 

2 Afghan civilians and wounding nearly 30. The week before, militants stormed the Afghan parliament in Kabul in broad daylight in 

what appears to be a coordinated attack. 

These incidents make clear we have to ensure our brave men and 

women serving in these hostile environments are safe, and one of 

the best ways to ensure their safety is to provide secure facilities 

for them to perform their diplomatic missions, but after an investigation by the GAO, are they safe? No, they’re not, and that’s not 

acceptable. 

Due to the mismanagement by the State Department, however, 

it’s not happening in Kabul, and as a result, American diplomatic 

staff in Afghanistan are being exposed to unnecessary danger. 

Last July, the Government Accountability Office reviewed the 

construction of the Kabul Embassy facility and found the State Department failed to properly acknowledge known risks. These risks 

include the award of a contract for work before the contract site 

was even acquired, an unrealistic schedule for work to be completed under, changes in the number of staff at the complex, and 

changes in the design of the building and security requirements. 

Again, temporary facilities don’t even have a security plan at this 

point. And as a result of these failures, construction would take 

more time, cost more money, leaving Embassy staff less secure in 

temporary facilities. We would lay these out in even greater specificity, but we would not want to give the enemy an attack plan, but 

there are vulnerabilities, and we have to address those. 

In May, the GAO once again reviewed the construction of the 

new Embassy complex in Kabul, and once again, the review identified a number of significant but preventable problems. The lack of 

planning by the State Department resulted in cost overruns and 

delays. Construction is now projected to come in at least 27 percent 

over budget and more than 3 years behind schedule. Part of the 

project was originally expected to cost $625 million. It is now estimated to cost at least $792 million. Because the State Department 

failed to properly plan for the project, it’s continuing to negotiate 

with its contractor, so the current cost overruns could become even 

larger. 

One of the factors causing these delays and cost overruns is the 

Department’s failure to follow its own directive to have a strategic 

facilities plan. As its name implies, a strategic facilities plan outlines how a particular facility will be developed and used. The need 


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for a strategic facilities plan is especially critical for facilities like 

Kabul, where there is a high turnover in personnel. 

One the things highlighted in the GAO report is that there are 

constantly turnovers in personnel. And if you don’t have a plan, a 

new person coming in has a large and long learning curve. 

The State Department recently rescinded the requirements for 

the development of a strategic plan for any facility, which was a 

requirement that had been in place since 1990. So because the 

State Department’s poor planning and the use of temporary facilities where Americans must live and work, they will continue indefinitely in Kabul. In fact, amazingly, the State Department recently requested an additional $124 million for temporary facilities. 

It is unclear why State didn’t do a better job planning for permanent and secure buildings, which resulted in the wasting of taxpayer dollars on temporary facilities. It appears, at least to me, 

that the effort to move towards temporary facilities is a way to get 

around some of the requirements that need to go into good and better planning. 

Not only does State not properly plan for permanent facilities, it 

also has no standards for temporary facilities. The State Department’s own actions in Kabul make it clear how critical such standards are. In its fiscal year 2008 budget request, State expressed to 

Congress concerns about the threat to the Kabul facility posed by 

incoming weapons fire. However, as the GAO pointed out, quote, 

‘‘The only secure protection measures specified in the 2009 contract 

for temporary housing was shatter-resistant window film,’’ end 

quote. That’s it, a little film on the windows. I’m no expert, but I 

don’t think shatter-resistant windows can stop a bullet, grenade, 

an RPG and whatnot, and yet we ask our Americans to live there 

in this high-threat environment. 

In contrast, State contracted for the temporary offices to have a 

higher standard level of security and ballistic protection on the 

temporary housing that it built. This means that employees were 

safer working 24 hours a day rather than returning to their housing, where they should be able to rest, relax, and be safe. 

The lesson here is clear. When there are no standards or guidance, the results are inconsistent and Americans are unsafe. We 

have to do a better job of getting our folks into safer, new facilities 

as soon as possible without incurring additional costs: $2 billion, 

and you’re still requesting temporary facilities with no standards, 

no protection. We did not learn the lessons in Iraq, and that is a 

crying shame. 

We look forward to having this hearing and hearing the answers 

and responses to that, but now I’d like to recognize the ranking 

member, Mr. Cummings, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

As I listened to your statement, I just sat here and said to myself: We’re better than that. We’re better than this. 

And listening to your answers to the questions that you presented, I think there’s a lot to be discussed here this morning, so 

I’m glad that you’re holding this very important hearing on the 

U.S. Embassy in Afghanistan. 

I’d like to make three main points that I think we all can agree 

on. First and foremost, the safety of United States personnel servVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:23 Jul 13, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\25880.TXT APRIL

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ing overseas is a top national security priority, and it’s critical to 

our country’s interests throughout the entire world. 

Second, we recognize that the urgency of rapidly securing U.S. 

facilities abroad may cost more for faster results. However, cutting 

corners may have the opposite effect, and careful, very careful 

stewardship of taxpayer funds is critical to maximizing the protection of U.S. personnel because any dollar wasted is a dollar that 

cannot be used to protect our personnel abroad. 

Kabul is one of the most dangerous places on the face of the 

Earth. The State Department ranks it as one of the most highthreat, high-risk locations for United States personnel. The men 

and women who serve our country in Afghanistan recognize these 

risks, and it is our job to honor their service by taking all appropriate steps to provide secure facilities for their work. 

In 2008 and 2009, the United States rapidly increased the number of personnel in Afghanistan to meet our Nation’s military and 

foreign policy goals, first under the Bush administration and then 

under the Obama administration. This, and I quote, ‘‘surge,’’ end 

of the quote, as it was called, required facilities for United States 

troops and civilian personnel, including those working side by side 

in provincial reconstruction, the government—governance and stability efforts. 

Both Republicans and Democrats supported the surge. For example, Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman John McCain argued that a surge was, and I quote, ‘‘vitally needed,’’ end of quote, 

in Afghanistan and that delays would put American lives at risk. 

This dramatic increase in personnel created a difficult challenge 

for State Department officials planning for facility and security requirements. On one hand, they had to increase the United States 

footprint on the ground in a safe and secure way. On the other 

hand, they did not want to repeat the same mistakes that were 

made in Iraq, where the United States compound became a massive, expensive fortress, even as U.S. presence subsided. 

According to the Government Accountability Office, which has an 

official testifying here today, and I quote, ‘‘The dynamic and unpredictable operating environment of Afghanistan has produced changing facility needs that have continually outpaced existing capabilities at the post,’’ end of quote. GAO also cited a senior State Department management official who explained the effects of this 

rush to accommodate the surge. State did not fully follow its cost 

and risk policies in part of the urgency of the Embassy’s facility 

needs, the security environment, and challenges supporting the 

surge and Embassy staffing that was occurring. Despite this urgency, however, GAO also found that the State Department could 

have and should have planned better. Could have and should have, 

but didn’t. 

According to GAO, the State Department contributed to construction delays and cost increases by failing to follow its own risk assessment and planning policies. There’s something awfully wrong 

with that picture. 

The GAO also found that the Department’s original contracts did 

not include adequate security measures for temporary facilities. 

This led to inconsistent security measures, more contract modifications, increased costs, and further delays, according to GAO. 


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Finally, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for agreeing to my 

request to invite Aegis here today. The people we hire and train 

to protect our facilities are just as important to our security as the 

walls we build. This company provides security at our facilities in 

Afghanistan under a contract that is scheduled to run through 

2017 at a projected cost of $723 million. 

In October 2014, the State Department’s Office of Inspector General issued a report with some very troubling findings. The IG 

found that Aegis lacked required documentation showing that its 

personnel underwent mandated security investigations and training. That’s the same company getting $723 million. The IG also 

found that Aegis billed the government for more than $8 million in 

questionable costs, including through the use of prohibited invoices. 

I am curious to learn what has Aegis learned about billing and 

what personnel they have in place, considering they’re getting $723 

million of hard-earned taxpayer dollars. 

The IG also found that Aegis held the passports—and this is particularly troubling—of third-country nationals longer than necessary, raising concerns about the company’s compliance with regulations about trafficking in persons. That is of great concern to me. 

In the past, our committee has investigated the actions of private 

security contractors in Iraq, where we witnessed shocking fraud 

and abuse. The current IG report does not include findings of nearly the same magnitude, but these are important areas that we 

would like Aegis to explain and explain thoroughly. We understand 

that some of these issues may have been addressed, and we thank 

Mr. Gulino for being here today. 

Our goal is to make sure we carry forward our past oversight to 

ensure that those lessons have in fact been learned and anything 

that needed to be corrected was corrected or is being corrected. 

And, with that, Mr. Chairman, I thank you again for this hearing, and I yield back. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I thank the gentleman. 

I’ll hold the record open for 5 legislative days for any member 

who would like to submit a written statement. 

We’ll now recognize our panel of witnesses. We’re pleased to welcome Mr. Michael Courts, Director of International Affairs and 

Trade at the United States Government Accountability Office. Appreciate the work that you and your staff do and appreciate your 

participation here. 

We’re also pleased to have Ms. Lydia Muniz, is the Director of 

Bureau of Overseas Building Operation at the United States Department of State. We appreciate you coming before our committee 

again. 

The Honorable Gregory Starr, Assistant Secretary of the Bureau 

of Diplomatic Security at the United States Department of State, 

a long-time servant at the State Department, and we appreciate 

your participation here today. 

Mr. Jarrett Blanc, Principal Deputy Special Representative for 

Afghan and Pakistan at the United States Department of State. 

The Honorable Donald Hays, senior inspector at the Office of the 

Inspector General at the United States Department of State. 

And Mr. Michael Gulino, president and chief executive officer of 

Aegis, LLC. Again, welcome all. 


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Pursuant to committee rules, witnesses are to be sworn before 

they testify, so if you will please rise and raise your right hands. 

Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you are 

about to give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but 

the truth? 

Thank you. Please be seated. 

And let the record reflect that all witnesses answered in the affirmative. 

In order to allow time for discussion, we would appreciate it if 

you would limit your testimony to 5 minutes. Your entire written 

record will be made part of the record. 

With that, we would like to begin with Mr. Courts. 

You’re now recognized for 5 minutes. 

WITNESS STATEMENTS 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL J. COURTS 

Mr. COURTS. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

Cummings, and members of the committee. I’m pleased to be here 

this morning to discuss a number of challenges related to the State 

Department’s construction efforts at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, 

Afghanistan. This testimony is based on a GAO report dealing with 

the subject that we issued in May of this year. This work is part 

of a series of GAO engagements to review State’s efforts to manage 

construction and the efficiency and effectiveness of other aspects of 

its operations overseas. 

GAO was asked to testify this morning on the extent to which 

construction costs and schedules have changed, State’s use of temporary facilities on the Kabul Embassy compound, and State’s 

planning for projected embassy facility needs in the future. 

The primary message of my testimony this morning is that costs 

have risen and schedules have been extended significantly for two 

construction contracts that State awarded in 2009 and 2010, and 

further cost increases are likely. State has also built numerous 

temporary facilities in Kabul and will continue to use them for the 

foreseeable future, but it lacks specific security standards for them. 

Further, State’s lack of strategic facilities planning has led to coordination challenges and could lead to further problems as State 

makes additional investments to meet its future facility needs in 

Kabul. 

My first point is that costs for the two construction contracts 

have increased by about 27 percent from about $625 million to almost $793 million. The projected completion of these projects has 

been delayed by over 3 years and is now slated for the fall of 2017. 

State didn’t follow its own cost containment and risk assessment 

policies for those contracts, resulting in lost opportunities to mitigate risks. When these risks, such as delays in the sequencing of 

the two contracts, eventually materialized, they led to increased 

costs and extended schedules. As of March 2015, State and one of 

its contractors were still negotiating the value of several potential 

contract changes that will likely result in further increased costs. 

My second point is that State has billed over $100 million in 

temporary buildings to meet space needs in the Kabul Embassy 

compound, but it has no security standards that are specifically taiVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:23 Jul 13, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\25880.TXT APRIL

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lored to these types of facilities. Lacking specific standards or other 

guidance to guide such construction, State inconsistently applied 

alternative security measures that resulted in insufficient and differing levels of security for temporary offices and housing. State 

subsequently took corrective action that increased cost and extended schedules. State likely paid more than it would have had 

the security requirements been included in the original contract. 

My final point is that State plans additional capital construction 

investments to address interim and future facility needs in Kabul, 

and it needs to improve its planning for these efforts. The post’s 

current facility needs stem primarily from changing circumstances 

inherent to the operating environment in Kabul, including changes 

in the security situation and new capabilities that will be required 

as a result of the drawdown of the U.S. military there. 

While stakeholders within State are working to identify, 

prioritize, and address the post facility needs, their efforts lack a 

strategic facilities planning approach. This has inhibited coordination and undermined the continuity necessary to address the Embassy’s emergent needs. 

In summary, pursuing multiyear construction on an operational 

embassy compound in a dynamic and dangerous environment such 

as Afghanistan presents distinct challenges and considerable risk. 

With construction investments in Kabul currently projected to exceed $2 billion and likely to increase further, addressing the challenges GAO has identified should be a high priority. 

Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Cummings, this concludes 

my prepared remarks. I’d be happy to address any questions that 

you may have. 

[Prepared statement of Mr. Courts follows:] 

For complete submitted testimony, please see the following 

website: https://oversight.house.gov/hearing/construction-costsand-delays-at-the-u-s-embassy-in-kabul/ 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank you, Mr. Courts. 

Ms. Muniz, you’re now recognized for—am I pronouncing your 

name right? 

Ms. MUNIZ. Yes. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Close enough? 

Ms. MUNIZ. Yes. Close enough. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. You’re now recognized for 5 minutes. Tell 

me exactly how I should say it. 

Ms. MUNIZ. Muniz. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Muniz. I will improve. Thank you. You’re 

now recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF LYDIA MUNIZ 

Ms. MUNIZ. Chairman Chaffetz, Ranking Member Cummings, 

and members of the committee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the U.S. Department of State’s 

construction projects in Kabul, Afghanistan. 

From the beginning, the goal has been and continues to be to deliver permanent, safe, and secure facilities to support those serving 

in Afghanistan. The United States reopened its Embassy in Afghanistan in December of 2001 using the existing 1971 chancery 

building. 


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In 2005, OBO completed a new office building, three new residential buildings, and support facilities to sustain the growing 

needs of the Embassy. 

In fiscal year 2009 and 2010, OBO awarded two contracts to provide additional capacity. The projects included additional classified 

and unclassified office buildings; residential and support facilities; 

as well as security and infrastructure upgrades. They also provided 

nonpermanent facilities to meet mission needs during construction 

and to provide capacity for surge requirements. The total project 

budget was $881 million. 

In spite of fluid conditions and the logistical challenges of managing an ongoing construction project on an occupied compound 

and in a war zone, I am pleased to report that the unclassified 

annex with a capacity of 917 desks will be completed this month. 

This November, the first residential facility will be delivered with 

226 residential units. In October 2016, the classified annex, with 

a capacity of 320 desks, will be completed, and the following October will see the delivery of the final two residential facilities, with 

432 units. 

When completed, the Embassy compound will have the capacity 

for nearly 1,500 desks and over 800 residential units and additional capacity if compressed. 

These accomplishments have been and will continue to be 

achieved in the face of significant challenges and modifications. 

These include the termination of the fiscal year 2009 contract and 

modifications to the scope of the fiscal year 2010 contract; an increase in scope from 545 permanent desks to 1,237; additional security requirements as the security situation in Afghanistan deteriorated; a delay in vacating space needed by the contractor to 

build the unclassified annex; modifications to the old chancery 

building to make it more functional for post in the short term; the 

elimination of scope planned for property adjacent to the Embassy 

compound occupied by the Afghanistan Ministry of Public Health; 

and the closure of the Pakistani border from November 2011 to 

July 2012, temporarily eliminating the project’s most direct ground 

shipping route. 

The cumulative impact of these changes is the addition of over 

2 years to the project’s schedule and over $250 million. 

The GAO report on Afghanistan suggested that the costs and 

schedule to project increased due to incomplete cost and risk assessments. And while these are important tools, I reject the notion 

that more thorough assessments would have had a material impact 

on the Kabul Embassy project. Instead, I would argue that they 

would have risked further delaying delivery of permanent facilities. 

The material changes and challenges to the projects were not 

known and could not have been anticipated at the time of development and award of the projects. Cost increases and delays were unavoidable. 

The GAO report also suggests that the Kabul project was not appropriately planned for the mission’s needs. I also reject this notion. The Kabul project was planned, designed, and awarded to provide the full complement of office and residential facilities as well 

as all necessary support and infrastructure required at that time. 


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Afghanistan is a fluid environment and differs markedly from 

normal operations. It is unrealistic to expect the development of a 

static master plan capturing all requirements at the beginning of 

an 8-year project, as GAO advised. Periodic reviews during and 

after the project are essential to ensure that the mission’s evolving 

needs are addressed. 

Afghanistan construction is critical to the State Department’s 

mission. With every day and with every decision, we do our best 

to deliver a platform that enables staff to perform their duties safely and securely, and we will continue this effort in cooperation with 

the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, post, other stakeholders, and 

Congress, until our work in Kabul is complete. 

I look forward to answering your questions. 

[Prepared statement of Ms. Muniz follows:] 

For complete submitted testimony, please see the following 

website: https://oversight.house.gov/hearing/construction-costsand-delays-at-the-u-s-embassy-in-kabul/ 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Mr. Starr, you’re now recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE GREGORY B. STARR 

Mr. STARR. Chairman Chaffetz, Ranking Member Cummings, 

and distinguished committee members, good morning. Thank you 

for your invitation to appear today to discuss security and construction developments at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan. 

Our efforts in Afghanistan and our determination to support the 

Afghan Government are among our highest—are the highest importance to the Department and to the administration. I, along 

with my colleagues in the Department of State, look forward to 

working with you to examine the issues and illustrate how we are 

collectively supporting the courageous men and women who serve 

at this mission with safer and more secure facilities. 

Our national interests sometimes require us to operate in very 

dangerous places. We identify the risks. We take deliberate and 

prudent steps to mitigate them. The Department has made important strides in that regard. I personally discuss, plan, and 

strategize with my counterpart, Director Lydia Muniz, in the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations on at least a weekly basis, 

usually more than that. We plan with a wide array of Department 

interlocutors, interagency partners, and directly with the people 

managing security and the construction projects at the mission in 

Kabul. However, we can never foresee or mitigate all the potential 

pitfalls in an unpredictable environment like Afghanistan. 

In Kabul’s high-threat environment, hostile actors routinely target the U.S. and other foreign nationals. Insurgents have employed 

a wide variety and range of attacks, including suicide operations, 

small arms fires, improvised explosive devices, assassination attempts, mortars, insider threats, kidnappings, and complex attacks. 

Just last week, as you mentioned, sir, there was an attack near our 

compound, and like past attacks, our facilities and security measures performed as they should, and continue to protect our people. 

In addition to operating in a challenging security environment 

and geographic location, we have had our primary shipping and resupply route impeded and closed for extended period of times withVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:23 Jul 13, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\25880.TXT APRIL

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out notice. The closure invariably slowed our ability to get materials to the site, but we ultimately found alternate routes, and our 

mission never ceased. 

Embassy Kabul is not just a construction site. It’s one of the 

largest functioning embassies in the world with a large number of 

direct hire and contractor personnel, which requires significant 

support, including housing, office space, and vehicles. Although 

we’ve experienced periods of elevated and targeted violence, which 

has halted all movements by the Embassy personnel at times, we 

have resumed movements and we continue to build. 

When my colleague—when my colleague at the Office of the Inspector General has brought issues and deficiencies to our attention, we’ve made changes in short order to ensure mistakes are not 

prolonged or duplicated. We have learned lessons and greatly improved operational efficiencies due to the thorough inspection of the 

GAO and the OIG reports, and we thank them for their contributions in helping us improve our operations in Kabul and many 

places around the world. 

Our facilities have proven time and time again that they can 

withstand the most complex of attacks. Simply put, our physical security countermeasures work. Building facilities in this environment is not easy and it is certainly not without risks, delays and 

unforeseen circumstances and costs. Due to a fluid and evolving security environment, we must evolve and adapt to the conditions 

and circumstances that are presented to us. We work constantly to 

improve our practices and protect our people. We continue to reevaluate. And at times, despite the inherent setbacks it may cause, 

we must chart new courses in order to advance the bigger picture 

of completing the mission to secure our people. 

As I close, I will say, and I am both confident and pleased that, 

despite the many unforeseen challenges and setbacks, Department 

personnel in Kabul are better protected, prepared, and secured 

today. We look forward to working with Congress to ensure that 

our people serving abroad, particularly in these high-threat environments, have a safe platform for carrying out the conduct of diplomacy. 

I want to thank Congress for the resources that you have provided over the years to strengthen and reinforce this vitally important diplomatic platform. As the Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic 

Security, I work every day with my colleagues in the Department 

of State to ensure a safe environment for our people, and with your 

continuous support, we are doing that. 

Thank you. And I will be glad to answer any questions that you 

may have. 

[Prepared statement of Mr. Starr follows:] 

For complete submitted testimony, please see the following 

website: https://oversight.house.gov/hearing/construction-costsand-delays-at-the-u-s-embassy-in-kabul/ 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank you. 

Mr. Blanc, you’re now recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF JARRETT BLANC 

Mr. BLANC. Thank you. Chairman Chaffetz, Ranking Member 

Cummings, members of the committee, thank you for the opporVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:23 Jul 13, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\25880.TXT APRIL

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tunity to appear before you today to discuss the future of mission 

Afghanistan with my colleagues, Lydia Muniz from the Office of 

Building—Overseas Building Operations, and Greg Starr from Diplomatic Security. 

Please allow me to begin once again by thanking the members 

of the committee for your continued support for our mission. The 

American people have been generous, steadfast, and brave in supporting Afghanistan. I would particularly like to honor again the 

dedication of thousands of American military personnel, diplomats, 

and assistance professionals who have served and continue to serve 

in Afghanistan. 

We began our mission in Afghanistan in late 2001 to ensure that 

the country would never again be used by Al Qaeda and other extremists as a haven from which to launch attacks against U.S. territory, citizens, or interests overseas. History has taught us the terrible consequences of inattention and disregard, and we must not 

repeat our past mistakes. 

Since 2001, our goal has been to foster the development of an Afghanistan that is sovereign, unified, democratic, and increasingly 

self-sufficient, both economically and militarily; in short, the development of Afghanistan as a partner in efforts to combat Al Qaeda 

and other extremists who threat then the United States and our 

allies. We cannot achieve this without smart diplomacy and, by necessity, the presence in Afghanistan of U.S. diplomats and development personnel. 

Afghanistan is undeniably a dangerous place for U.S. diplomats, 

and we understand the risks associated with our working there. 

When we ask our people, our friends and colleagues, to go into 

harm’s way, we do so because their work is vital to our national 

security, and we are all of us obligated to provide them with the 

resources they need to do their jobs safely and well. 

Understanding this, the Department of State with support from 

Congress has made significant investments to make Embassy 

Kabul the safest, most effective platform possible to carry out our 

roles, and we will continue to make improvements to adapt to a 

variable political, security, and planning environment. 

Ongoing construction and security upgrades based on our best estimate of longer term political and security challenges will create 

an embassy compound that is designed to minimize threats and 

sustain U.S. diplomacy. Before the end of 2017, we expect to complete construction on several projects that will provide new hardened office space and living quarters to accommodate permanent 

staff. 

In keeping with President Obama’s plan for a phased drawdown 

of U.S. Military Forces and a normalization of the U.S. diplomatic 

footprint to an embassy-based presence, we are executing an options-based contract for life support services that will reduce our 

dependence on the Department of Defense support and increase our 

flexibility and self-sufficiency. We are building satellite locations 

that house and support the Kabul Embassy security force closer to 

the main compound, installing advanced early-warning technologies, and enlarging our facilities for threat prevention and response teams. We continue to work with our Afghan partners to assess emerging threats and develop effective prevention strategies. 


KING-6430 with DISTILLER
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Of course, none of these measures is perfect. While we constantly 

examine our security methods to adapt to an evolving threat environment, I want to be clear that no amount of setback, no amount 

of security program will ever entirely eliminate the risk our personnel face while serving in Afghanistan. 

We will continue to scrutinize the environment in Afghanistan 

and our security footing to seize opportunities to improve security 

where possible. We have demonstrated an ability to be flexible as 

diplomats, surging our civilian staff to support the military footprint, and now drawing down to a smaller and more sustainable 

level, including by closing our presences outside of Kabul. 

To be effective, the business of diplomacy must be conducted in 

person. The men and women of Mission Afghanistan engage closely 

and continuously with Afghan institutions and actors at all levels. 

The reporting they provide is vital to informing an extensive interagency process that determines long-term U.S. strategy. They build 

relationship with Afghanistan with current and future leaders, 

making certain that U.S. policymakers remain well informed and 

our positions are heard. They oversee one of the United States’ 

largest assistance relationships, safeguarding billions of taxpayer 

dollars. This work is critical to our efforts to fight Al Qaeda, assist 

the Afghan Government against their insurgency, and bolster legitimacy and durability of the Afghan State. 

Since September 11, 2001, we have made significant progress in 

degrading Al Qaeda’s operational capacity in Afghanistan and 

Pakistan. U.S. diplomacy has helped the Afghan Government build 

a national army, a police force, and professional institutions to provide improved security, education, and opportunity for millions of 

Afghans. We have seen the country make great strides in expanding its democratic institutions, culminating recently in the first 

democratic transition in power in Afghan’s history. But many challenges remain. 

Institutions must be further strengthened to give the fledgling 

government further legitimacy. A once booming economy has 

slowed and must be reinvigorated through innovation and investment. And Afghanistan’s ability to provide a self-sufficient security 

apparatus must be bolstered in the face of persistent threats in 

order to remain a capable partner at counterterrorism operations 

and a responsible regional actor. 

Fostering Afghanistan’s development is the only way, sustainable 

way, to address U.S. security concerns in the region. And addressing these remaining challenges will require continuing assistance 

and intensive day-to-day diplomatic engagement. At the same time, 

we will continue to find ways to address the real risks our team 

in Afghanistan faces. 

Thank you very much, and I’m happy to answer questions. 

[Prepared statement of Blanc follows:] 

For complete submitted testimony, please see the following 

website: https://oversight.house.gov/hearing/construction-costsand-delays-at-the-u-s-embassy-in-kabul/ 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank you. 

Mr. Hays, you’re now recognized for 5 minutes. 


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STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DONALD S. HAYS 

Mr. HAYS. Chairman Chaffetz, Ranking Member Cummings, 

members of the committee, thank you for inviting me to testify on 

behalf of the Office of the Inspector General for the Department of 

State. My testimony will focus on the construction projects and related security issues of the Embassy in Kabul. 

The Embassy is a fortified compound composed of two adjacent 

campuses located near the center of the city. These two campuses 

total 36 acres and are a mix of completed structures, temporary offices, temporary office housing facilities, and a construction site. 

The Department leases several residences outside the Embassy 

walls to provide adequate setback for enhanced security of those 

sections of the wall. 

At the time of our inspection, over 1,000 U.S. Government employees were stationed in Afghanistan, and approximately 4,500 

contractors were working in support of the Embassy throughout 

the country. Due to the massive construction underway at the Embassy compound, employees were forced to weave their way between temporary housing offices, various constructions sites to get 

to work. A number of agencies were still in temporary facilities 

awaiting completion of their new offices. 

The inspection took place between February 2 and March 11 of 

2014. We had 21 inspectors conducting over 600 interviews and reviewing hundreds of documents and 70 oversight reviews. 

When we arrived, the security situation was deteriorating in and 

around Kabul, necessitating additional security projects in Kabul 

and throughout the country. The team found the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operation and the Bureau of Diplomatic Security 

were engaged in constructing a number of building projects both in 

and off Embassy compound. During our inspection, we reported that it spent $1.35 billion between fiscal years 2002 and 2013, some of which had contributed 

by other bureaus for the Embassy-related construction and physical 

security projects. These projects include the expansion of warehouse Marine security guard quarters, building of two hardened office buildings, construction of new housing facilities, and other 

projects in Kabul outside the Embassy, including the completion of 

contract guards sleeping quarters and facilities for Embassy fire 

department and motor maintenance facilities, and other warehouse 

facilities. 

The need for security enhancement to the exterior wall was first 

identified and funded by DS in 2009. DS considered these enhancements urgent, given the Embassy’s location in the middle of Kabul, 

large buildings adjacent to the compound, a growing security 

threat. The team made classified recommendations in our classified 

annex with regard to security enhancements. Necessary security 

enhancements, temporary housing were similarly characterized as 

urgent and funded by DS in 2011. 

Approximately 70 percent of the 800 U.S. Government employees 

and contract workers living on the U.S. compound were housed in 

temporary containerized housing units, called CHUs, at the time of 

the inspection. Most of these lacked adequate overhead and side 

cover protection. This issue was also the subject of recommendations in the classified annex of our report. 


KING-6430 with DISTILLER
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During the course of the onsite inspection, both Embassy senior 

management team and the OIG team expressed concern about 

OBO’s lack of progress on security improvements to the exterior 

wall and temporary housing. Although DS designated funding for 

these enhancements, they were not initiated, despite serious implications of not completing them. 

Based on interviews conducted by the OIG team, this issue 

caused considerable friction between DS and OBO at the time, specifically DS wishing that they expeditiously complete these 

projects, while OBO stated that it wanted to proceed with the 

projects only after design met international construction and safety 

standards. 

During the inspection process, the team raised its concerns with 

OBO about the need for enhancements. In response, OBO’s project 

manager explained that there was a lack of progress due to a number of factors, including the number of projects underway, the limited space available for construction material and equipment on the 

compound. As a result, the contractor stated that it was required 

to phase in projects in order to work efficiently and safely. The 

project manager stated that despite the desire to enhance security 

involving the compound wall and temporary housing, there was no 

way to carry out these enhancements until current construction 

projects were completed. 

Upon our return to Washington, the inspection team raised its 

concerns about the apparent inability of DS and OBO to work together to find immediate solutions to these and other security 

issues in Kabul. The team met with the Director of OBO and the 

Assistant Secretary for DS on several occasions. They stated they 

would increase coordination, work together to address these situations. Subsequently, OBO Director established a senior OBO working group to work with DS to address urgent security-related 

projects. In a follow-on meeting between the OIG and the Undersecretary for Management, the Undersecretary assured the team 

that high level meetings would be conducted to eliminate outstanding issues and to proceed with the team’s recommendations 

on security enhancements. 

In our classified report under the section ‘‘Construction Projects 

Management’’, we recommend OBO coordinate with DS and Embassy to develop and execute a master plan of all ongoing and 

planned projects, including those funded by DS. To date, that recommendation remains open and serious. 

Thank you. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank you. Could you repeat that last? I 

just didn’t hear the last two sentences there that you said. 

Mr. HAYS. In our classified report under the section entitled, 

‘‘Construction Project Management,’’ we recommended that OBO 

coordinate with DS and the Embassy to develop and execute a master plan for all ongoing and planned projects, including those funded by DS, and to date, that recommendation remains open and is 

a serious concern. 

[Prepared statement of Mr. Hays follows:] 

For complete submitted testimony, please see the following 

website: https://oversight.house.gov/hearing/construction-costsand-delays-at-the-u-s-embassy-in-kabul/ 


KING-6430 with DISTILLER
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Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank you. Okay. I didn’t hear that last 

part, and I appreciate your repeating it. 

Mr. Gulino, you’re now recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL L. GULINO 

Mr. GULINO. Chairman Chaffetz, Ranking Member Cummings, 

and members of the committee, thank you for the invitation and 

opportunity to present testimony before this committee today. I am 

pleased to represent Aegis and all of our employees worldwide on 

this matter. 

As a brief introduction, Aegis Defense Services is a U.S. company 

based in McLean, Virginia. We provide security and risk management, whose focus is to provide the support necessary for our clients so they can undertake their missions in complex and highthreat operational environments. We handle everything from protective security to the facilities that house, feed, and train our employees and canines. We employ some 1,400 people as well as 73 

canines, most of whom are performing critical missions in Afghanistan. 

Our team of dedicated professionals include employees from 47 

of the 50 United States as well as foreign national employees from 

Nepal and Afghanistan. 

Beginning in 2012, under Task Order 10 to our Worldwide Protective Services program, which I will refer to as WPS, Aegis 

worked in close concert with the Department of State to meet all 

operational and contractual requirements and to ensure the success 

of the WPS security program in Kabul. 

As the committee well knows, the Department of State Office of 

Inspector General initiated an audit of the WPS program in 2012 

and issued that report in October of 2014, and the audit covered 

the startup period of the contract. 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Cummings, we fully acknowledge that were there some administrative and logistics issues in 

the early part of that contract. Since that time and well before the 

issuance of the OIG report, Aegis has worked in concert with the 

Department of State to address and correct these administrative 

and logistical issues. This includes ensuring complete and reliable 

processes, thorough documentation for record-keeping, stringent 

employee vetting, as well as accurate timecard and billing administration. 

The OIG report also raised concerns that Aegis retained thirdcountry national passports during visa processing and did not post 

Trafficking in Persons, which we call TIPs, notices in native languages. I want to assure the committee that Aegis maintains vigilant human rights and TIPs compliance programs. We’ve refined 

our systems, and we publish a status of all passports being processed for visas to ensure that employees are aware at all times as 

to where their a passport is and the status of it. And Aegis has also 

ensured that TIPs posters are displayed in English and Nepali at 

prominent locations throughout the Embassy site where they work. 

Also, over the past 5 years, Aegis has worked closely with the 

Department of State and the DOD and the international private security community to establish PSC.1, private security contractor 

standard. This is what I call a supercharged quality management 


KING-6430 with DISTILLER
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ISO 9000-like system that will ensure compliance and professional 

management of security contractors, with an emphasis on vigilant 

protection of human rights. I’m proud to report that Aegis was the 

first U.S. security company to earn its PSC.1 certification. This is 

obtained through a vigorous external and completely independent 

audit of our system both in McLean as well as on the ground in 

Afghanistan. 

Our employees and representatives abide by the Aegis code of 

conduct, which is based upon our cornerstone core value of integrity, further ensures our workforce culture and commitment to respect, responsibility, diversity, and inclusion. 

We also maintain stringent anticorruption and whistleblowing 

policies as well as a policy of zero tolerance for retaliation. 

In conclusion, I’d like to thank the committee for the opportunity 

to participate in the discussion and to thank the Department of 

State for the opportunity to support its critical operations in Afghanistan. 

Mr. Chairman, I am proud of all the Aegis men and women for 

their continued bravery, professionalism, high standards, and exceptional work ethic. 

I’d be pleased to answer any questions you may have. 

[Prepared statement of Mr. Gulino follows:] 

For complete submitted testimony, please see the following 

website: https://oversight.house.gov/hearing/construction-costsand-delays-at-the-u-s-embassy-in-kabul/ 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank you. 

I’ll now recognize myself for 5 minutes. 

Ms. Muniz, you joined OBO in 2009, correct? 

Ms. MUNIZ. Yes, that’s right. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. And then you became the Director in 2011? 

Ms. MUNIZ. I believe that’s right. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. My understanding is you went to the ribbon cutting there in Kabul in 2010. 

Ms. MUNIZ. I believe it was a groundbreaking—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Groundbreaking. 

Ms. MUNIZ. —in 2011. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Since you’ve been the Director, have you 

been back to Afghanistan? 

Ms. MUNIZ. No, not since I’ve been Director. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. This is our biggest project in the world, correct? 

Ms. MUNIZ. One of our biggest. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. What’s bigger than this costwise? 

Ms. MUNIZ. I would say there are several that are on the scale, 

including Islamabad. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Have you been to Islamabad? 

Ms. MUNIZ. Yes. I was there with Assistant Secretary Starr in 

November. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. And you think that’s going to be in excess 

of $2 billion? 

Ms. MUNIZ. No, that won’t be in excess of $2 billion. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. So is there any embassy complex that’s 

going to be bigger than this? This is $2.17 billion. 


KING-6430 with DISTILLER
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Ms. MUNIZ. I guess I would look at it this way: We have a number of high-level and critical projects in the Department. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. All right. I—— 

Ms. MUNIZ. Kabul, Baghdad, Islamabad, the security improvements that we’re making at our consulates in Peshawar, Lahore, 

Karachi. We cover the world. I have been to all of those places. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. And we’re going to have you come back and 

talk about Mexico at some point because I would like you to spend 

some more time. I know you were recently in Mexico City, but 

some of those consulates in northern—in Tamaulipas, but we’ll 

come back to that. 

Is there a strategic facilities plan for the Kabul Embassy construction? 

Ms. MUNIZ. So I’m very glad you asked about the strategic facilities plan. I think it’s important to note that the policy that the 

GAO referred to, which had been suspended, applies not at all to 

the type of project that is Kabul effectively. And I’d like to quote 

from the policy that was revoked. I’d also like to highlight the fact 

that you mentioned that this was adopted in the 1990s and was 

just recently suspended. It was repealed because the process had 

been superceded by an improved process, but in the time in which 

it was in place, only 16 of these facilities master plans had been 

done. So let me go first to quote what they do and explain why 

Kabul was not an appropriate place in which to do this sort of a 

facilities plan, and then I can talk to you about the type of planning we did do: The long-range facilities program will be directed 

at those posts not covered in OBO’s regular capital or security capital programs. The long-range facility program is intended to provide a clear definition to post requirements, such that stakeholders 

and decisionmakers have the relevant data prior to making decisions to fund and execute projects. 

The decision based on the growth in staff and the growing needs 

of our platform in Kabul had already—we had already made the 

decision that we were going to invest in growth in Kabul. The longrange facilities plan was a tool that was developed to address those 

posts with nagging infrastructure and deferred maintenance needs 

that were never making it onto our program lists. 

Now, back to the question of whether planning was conducted, 

which I think is a very valid question. At the time that we developed the scope for the Embassy Kabul compound, a comprehensive 

plan was done for that compound as a standalone facility, assuming a continued DOD presence until modifications or drawdowns 

were made to that presence. So it was master planned. That plan 

was designed and is currently being executed. 

That said, things do get messy when you’re working on an occupied compound around hundreds of temporary facilities where 

you’re squeezing the construction project in amongst those. 

But, yes, a master plan was conducted. It was developed. It was 

designed. It’s being built. There are ongoing reviews of what needs 

to be done in that environment because in the 6 years since the 

award of that project, we have had to do continuous re-looks with 

post, with the Bureau, with DS about what are new needs, what 

are evolving needs in a situation that is continually evolving, but 

we started with a master plan and will continue to make modificaVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:23 Jul 13, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\25880.TXT APRIL

KING-6430 with DISTILLER
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tions to that plan until we have the right combination of facilities 

and security features in place in Kabul. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I appreciate that long answer. And I beg 

some indulgence here from my colleagues here as we now start to 

ask some questions. 

Is that master plan something you can provide to this committee? 

Ms. MUNIZ. Yes. I think—the reason I pause is that this master 

plan is really made up of many documents, which sort of look at 

all of the—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. No doubt—no doubt there are many documents. All I’m asking for is I’d like the original plan, and I’d like 

to see the updated plan because to hear you say it, there’s no problems, but to hear Mr. Courts and Mr. Hays, you’re spending hundreds of millions of dollars in addition to what was originally 

planned. You’re 3 years behind schedule. We have people living in 

temporary facilities that aren’t secure. 

Let me read part of this page 16 of this GAO report: Between 

2009 and 2010 contracts, State should have conducted four costcontainment studies and six risk assessments. However, for the 

2009 contract, State confirmed it did not conduct either type of assessment. 

You in your written statement wrote: I reject the notion that 

more thorough cost or risk assessments would have had a material 

impact on the cost or schedule of the Kabul Embassy project. Instead, I would argue that additional assessments would have 

risked further delaying the delivery of permanent facilities. 

You went to say: The cost increases and project delays were not 

avoidable. 

You also said: The GAO also suggested the Kabul project was not 

an appropriate plan to take into account the mission’s needs in the 

maximum extent possible. 

We’re left begging, who should we believe? We have a very independent—they don’t seem to have an agenda, GAO. You have an 

inspector general. They both come in and look at this and cite a 

host of problems. I mean, look at the way Mr. Hays concluded his 

assessment. We can’t even get the DS people in the same room 

having the same conversation with the OBO folks. I’ll go to page 

17. 

DS, Diplomatic Security, is cited in the policy as an interested 

office. This relates to the cost-containment studies. According to the 

attendee list, no one from Diplomatic Security participated in the 

meetings related to this study, and Diplomatic Security officials we 

spoke with indicated they were not aware of this study and its security recommendations. The fact that we can’t even get Diplomatic 

Security to be part of the discussion in one of the most dangerous 

places on the face of the planet makes no sense to us. 

So, in isolation, you’re saying, we don’t need to do better planning, we don’t—we have a great facilities plan, but I’ve got two 

independent groups that have looked at this over the course of 

more than a year saying you’re wrong, that there is a big problem. 

We in Congress are looking at funding this to the tune of more 

than $2 billion. You’re coming in 3 years late. We’ve got people who 


KING-6430 with DISTILLER
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live there that aren’t secure, and you still have hundreds of millions of dollars in front of you that you need to spend. 

We’ve always known that Afghanistan is dangerous. That is 

not—there is no doubt that it has been dangerous and will continue 

to be dangerous. I have been there. It is a fortress of cement. It’s 

a very difficult thing. We’ve got people that we love, that we care 

about, that are sacrificing their lives and their families and putting 

their—sacrificing for this country, and they’re living in a hooch 

that is substandard and not secure. 

So I have gone way past my time here, but I struggle to figure 

out, since you became the Director, even the Deputy Director, why 

do you think things are going better because every metric I’m looking at is worse in this particular case, every one. 

Name one thing that is going better in Afghanistan since you became the Director. 

Ms. MUNIZ. I guess what I would say is, the way you’ve constructed the sentence is complicated. 

Let me be very clear about this. Kabul and Afghanistan are incredibly complex, continually evolving environments. The security 

situation has deteriorated. The numbers of desks have gone up. 

The movement and post needs in and around an ongoing construction project have continued to evolve. 

Those projects were awarded since I have been there, and I have 

watched the team work tirelessly with their colleagues in Diplomatic Security to do the best that they can to accommodate all of 

the changes—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. But the report says that Diplomatic Security is not even in the meetings. 

Ms. MUNIZ. If you could let me finish. And to keep the project 

moving forward. 

With respect to your comments on the value engineering study, 

which I think is a valid point, Diplomatic Security was invited to 

that meeting. There were no Diplomatic Security items that were 

added to the value engineering list. Had there been, we would have 

gone back to our colleagues at Diplomatic Security—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Well, they can’t add them to the list if 

they’re not even in the meeting. That’s the point of having them 

in the meeting, is to get their perspective in a high-risk assessment. We have been there for more than a decade. 

I have blown past my time. I want to give Mr. Courts and Mr. 

Hays an opportunity to offer some perspective, and then I need to 

allow other members to ask questions. 

Mr. Courts. 

Mr. COURTS. Sure. Well, I would just first acknowledge that 

Kabul is indeed a very challenging environment. And there is no 

way to completely eliminate all risk, especially in a place like Afghanistan, and that is precisely why adequate cost containment 

and risk assessment is so important in a place like that, where the 

impact of the cost and schedule is so much greater when problems 

are encountered. 

And I think if State had followed its own policies earlier, for example, as part of the 2009 contract, it probably could have better 

managed risk. It may not have eliminated all of the risk, but it 

may have better managed some of it. And if they had done that 


KING-6430 with DISTILLER
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earlier, it would at least have given State a chance to develop mitigation strategies prior to soliciting the 2010 contract. 

I would also note that when they did do a risk assessment and 

cost containment study for the 2010 contract, they did identify a 

number of risks, some of which did indeed come to pass. One of 

them was a potential problem with the sequencing of the two contracts. Another was the potential loss of the Afghan Ministry of 

Public Health site that my colleague mentioned. 

So there were a number of things that were not unpredictable. 

State actually did predict those problems. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank you. 

Mr. Hays. 

Mr. HAYS. Well, first of all, both the findings of our report and 

the GAO pretty much mirror each other. We were concerned about 

the lack of an overall plan that projected out into the future. We 

were concerned about the security of our people and the compound. 

When we came back we raised these issues. There was tension 

in the field between DS and OBO and between the field and Washington. We addressed those both to Director Muniz and to Greg 

Starr. They had agreed at that meeting to improve coordination 

and collaboration. At a later date, in a meeting with Director 

Muniz, she even established a working group of her senior colleagues to work with senior colleagues in DS. 

We believe that the coordination is improving, certainly in Washington. We are not able to speak to the relationship in the field 

anymore since we left. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank you. 

We now recognize Mr. Cummings for an exceptionally long period 

of time. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. I just want to see if I can put all of this in context a little bit. 

Ambassador Hays, I would like to ask you some questions from 

the view of the Inspector General’s Office. I understand that the 

staffing for the U.S. Embassy at Kabul significantly increased since 

we reopened the Embassy in 2002. Is that right? 

Mr. HAYS. That’s correct. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. In 2009, there was a bipartisan support for a 

drastic increase in the troops and civilian personnel in Afghanistan, and they commonly called that the surge. IG reports cite the 

surge as directly impacting planning for the Embassy compound 

and its construction contracts. 

I would like to understand in greater detail just how these staffing fluctuations have impacted the Kabul Embassy and also how 

State plans to adapt to such changes. Last August, the Inspector 

General’s Office issued a report explaining that the total number 

of American personnel working for the State Department in Afghanistan grew, and I quote, ‘‘from 340 Americans in fiscal year 

2008 to a peak of more than 1,340 in fiscal year 2012,’’ end of 

quote. 

Is that all correct? Is that right? 

Mr. HAYS. I believe that’s correct. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Now, these numbers reflect an increase of almost 

four times in State Department personnel in Afghanistan within 4 

years. Is that right? 


KING-6430 with DISTILLER
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Mr. HAYS. That’s right. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Ambassador Hays, do you know approximately 

what percentage of those people worked in the Kabul Embassy. 

Mr. HAYS. As of the time that we visited, about 800 Americans 

were housed on the compound. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. All right. 

Mr. HAYS. I can’t talk about how many there are now, because 

they were talking about a downsizing over the next year. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Now, from what I understand, a number of nonAmericans also work at the Embassy, as do employees from other 

agencies. For example, FBI, DEA, the Department of Homeland Security have employees there who conduct important work at the 

Embassy at Kabul. 

Now, Mr. Blanc, from the Department’s perspective, the United 

States Government work in Afghanistan requires a larger interagency presence at the Embassy that also fluctuates depending on 

a variety of factors. Is that correct? 

Mr. BLANC. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. These fluctuating staff levels must have exacerbated the space challenges experienced by the Kabul Embassy. Is 

that correct? 

Mr. BLANC. Sir, that’s absolutely correct. And as we noted, the 

Department has tried to really be expeditionary and flexible to 

surge our number of both State and other agency colleagues when 

the military surge took place, and now to draw down to a more sustainable level. At each of those decision points we have been confronted with very variable political and security environments in 

Afghanistan that we have tried to find the best diplomatic ways to 

address. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Now, Director Muniz, what about your perspective from the Bureau of Overseas Building Operations. How did the 

surge impact planning for the building of the Kabul Embassy? And 

I have the same concerns, by the way, that the chairman has, and 

I’m just curious as to your answer on that. 

Ms. MUNIZ. I would say that it impacted the project pretty dramatically. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Could you put your mic up because we can’t hear 

you. 

Ms. MUNIZ. Sorry. I would say that it impacted the project pretty 

dramatically. But that said, we knew that we were operating in an 

environment where we would be trying to adjust to these changes. 

And so given the constraints, given the time that we had, we 

moved forward with awarding the project as quickly as we could 

and incorporating those changes as quickly as you could. 

In a perfect world, you know the final number of desks years before you develop a project. You develop a design and you award it 

and nothing changes. That’s simply not the reality in Kabul. And 

I think it would have been a waste of time to wish that it was and 

to not continue to react to the changes in the best way we could. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. So it’s sort of like flying a plane and building it 

at the same time? 

Ms. MUNIZ. A little bit. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. This past May, GAO issued a report concluding, 

and I quote: ‘‘Since the Embassy reopened in 2002, the dynamic 


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and unpredictable operating environment of Afghanistan has produced changing facility needs that have continually outpaced existing capabilities at the post.’’ Ms. Muniz, do you agree with that 

statement? 

Ms. MUNIZ. I do agree with that statement. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And could you provide some examples? 

Ms. MUNIZ. I mean, again, I think shifting numbers, I think the 

fact that those numbers would delay the removal of temporary facilities that are in the footprint or the path of building permanent 

facilities, all of these things can complicate the execution of those 

projects. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. But you heard what Mr. Courts said. He said 

that he still thinks that you all could have figured all of that out. 

He realized that there were things that were unpredictable—am I 

right, Mr. Courts?—but there were certain things that you could 

have done to move things along more precisely. 

Is that right, Mr. Courts? 

Mr. COURTS. That’s correct. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And do you agree with that, Ms. Muniz? 

Ms. MUNIZ. I don’t agree with that. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Why not? 

Ms. MUNIZ. I simply don’t. 

Let me give you one example. So the recommendation, the risk 

assessment and the cost evaluation that were done to the 2010 

projects that have been referred to, the cost savings generated from 

the value engineering study were a million dollars in a project well 

over a billion dollars. 

The risks that were known at that time—so in an ideal situation 

you don’t award a project to two different contractors, you award 

to one contractor and they go beginning to end. The decision was 

made that there was an opportunity to gain time and to get hardened facilities delivered or at least a portion of those delivered faster. And so we took the calculated risk and made the decision to 

move forward with that approach. 

Is it an ideal approach in sort of an ideal scenario? Absolutely 

not. And I think that point is valid. But I think that we understood 

the risks. We understood the value of doing more assessment. But 

we also weighed it against the really primary need of moving the 

construction project forward as quickly as we possibly could. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Ambassador Hays, you are from the Inspector 

General’s Office. In October, your office issued a report with some 

troubling findings about Aegis and its work in Afghanistan. I understand that you were not the individual who worked on the report. Is that right? 

Mr. HAYS. That’s right. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. But you’re familiar with it, are you not? 

Mr. HAYS. I’m not familiar with the body of work that supports 

that report. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Okay. Well, let me direct the questions to the 

other witnesses. 

Mr. Gulino, you are the CEO of Aegis. Is that right? 

Mr. GULINO. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. When the IG issued its report in October, it 

raised serious questions about how Aegis handled passports from 


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third-country nationals that you hired to come to Afghanistan. Specifically the IG found that your company held these passports for 

much longer than would have been necessary for visa purposes, 

raising the prospects of violations of the standards against trafficking in persons. That’s a very, very, very serious thing, would 

you agree, issue? 

Mr. GULINO. I agree. That’s a serious—— 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Trafficking in persons. 

Mr. GULINO. Absolutely. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Yeah. And let me read what the IG found, and 

I quote: ‘‘Aegis held third-party nationals’′′—TCNs—‘‘passports for 

periods longer than necessary, had inadequate trafficking in persons awareness training for TCNs, and lacked posters in TCN native language requiring reporting of all TIP violations, all of which 

increased the risk of inappropriate practices that could lead to potential TIP violations.’’ 

I know I heard you say that now you have got the posters up. 

You should have had the posters up from the very beginning. You 

are getting $723 million. Seems like you could put a poster up. 

Would you agree? Hello. 

Mr. GULINO. Yes. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Gulino, why did your company do that? Why 

didn’t you have the posters up? And why were you holding people’s 

passports? 

Mr. GULINO. Well, let me address them separately. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Yeah, please do. 

Mr. GULINO. The passports weren’t held longer than they were 

required to be held. It’s a difficult situation in Afghanistan submitting the passports and the documentation to the Ministry of Interior, and they don’t turn them around as quickly as we would like. 

Where we failed initially was to keep the employees up to date 

on the status of their passports. But I can assure you and the committee that we don’t hold them any longer than we need to, and 

we do keep them advised of the status. 

With regard to the posters, we didn’t have posters published in 

Nepali, and we should have done that, and there is no excuse for 

it. It has been corrected. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. We shouldn’t be hearing about these kind of 

problems in the future. Is that right? 

Mr. GULINO. Sir? 

Mr. CUMMINGS. We should not be hearing about these problems 

in the future. 

Mr. GULINO. That’s correct. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. That is, Aegis holding people’s passports longer 

than it is supposed to, a company that we are paying $723 million, 

placing people in a possible indentured servant-type situation. We 

shouldn’t be hearing about that, is that right, not in 2015? 

Mr. GULINO. That’s correct. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Now, in fact the Inspector General reported that 

many of these workers complained, and I quote, ‘‘that it took 3 to 

4 months to obtain a new passport resulting in the contractor holding passports for approximately 4 months for every 6-month visa.’’ 

Mr. GULINO. Well, that’s, again, it’s a function of the Afghan 

Ministry of Interior. We weren’t holding them longer than we needVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:23 Jul 13, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\25880.TXT APRIL

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ed to. We work with the Ministry of Interior to try and turn those 

visas, multiple entries around as quickly as we can. It has improved. But I can assure you, we don’t hold passports unnecessarily. It’s just for the period of time that we need to obtain its 

work permits and multiple entry visas. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. So now how do you—you said now you are able 

to—you are in a position where you are informing these people as 

to the status and what is happening with the passports. How does 

that work? I mean, do they come to you and say—do they have to 

come to you and say, ‘‘What’s happening with my passport?’’ Or do 

you go to them? How does that work? 

Mr. GULINO. Well, the way it works is that our program managers and all of the assistant managers work with the Nepali captains of the various groups, the Gurkha Guard forces, and they advise and they give them data, and it is published in the breakrooms 

also. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Well, it’s interesting, and I want to make sure 

you correct this, which was also found by the IG. It says the IG 

found that your company had, and I quote, ‘‘an absence of detailed 

records in the contractor’s passport control log.’’ It’s kind of hard 

to give them accurate information, give them the information, 

when you don’t even have the appropriate detailed records. What’s 

happening with that? Have you improved that? 

Mr. GULINO. Yes, we have accurate records. We know exactly 

where everyone’s passport is on the entire project. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Now, Mr. Gulino, our committee has conducted 

extensive investigations of security contractors operating in Iraq, 

including the horrendous way they treated third-country nationals 

they brought in under circumstances almost resembling, as I said 

a little bit earlier, indentured servants. I think we all agree that 

this goes against our most basic values as Americans. And a key 

part of our oversight responsibility is to ensure that lessons have 

been learned from past mistakes. In that vein, we must be diligent 

in reviewing the performance of the contractors that are hired to 

secure the Kabul Embassy. 

Ambassador Hays, let me just circle back as I close. I know you 

were not the one who worked on the IG report, but we would like 

to follow up on these findings. Can we schedule a briefing for our 

staff to get an update on the inspector general’s findings in October? 

Mr. HAYS. I’m sure that we can find the appropriate time to do 

so. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Very well. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. And, Mr. Hays, following up on Mr. 

Cummings questioning, can the State Department inspector general review the documentation that is going on with Aegis around 

the world? 

Mr. HAYS. I will bring this back to the attention of the auditors 

who conducted this and see what they can do. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. If you could confirm with us that you are 

actually going to do that, we would appreciate it. 

Mr. HAYS. Absolutely. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank you. 


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We now recognize Mr. Mica, the gentleman from Florida, for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. MICA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

My first question is to the director of the Bureau of Overseas 

Buildings Operations. I think I heard you say that we were—that 

they are going to—you spoke about opening more desks or something being available. The chairman had asked about, like, what 

had you achieved. But in your testimony you said, like, in the next 

few days we’re going to open a facility with more desks? What was 

that? 

Ms. MUNIZ. This month and in the coming weeks—— 

Mr. MICA. I can’t hear you. 

Ms. MUNIZ. This month, in the coming weeks we are opening an 

unclassified facility with 917 desks. 

Mr. MICA. Okay. Well, I was, you know, looking back at your testimony, and some of what you’ve told us today, it sounds like the 

desk report. We have gone from just hundreds of desks, you said 

you will have 900 desks? And then when complete, the project will 

have 1,237 desks. But we could actually grow to 17—well, we’ll go 

to 1,487, and then the plan is to go to 1,771. 

Ms. MUNIZ. So let me clarify. So what that does is it breaks out 

the scope provided in the current project, in the 2009 and 2010 

projects, so that’s the 1,200 and the 600. If you combine those with 

the existing facilities, when we started the project, there was a 

building that we completed in 2009—— 

Mr. MICA. Well, again, I appreciate the desk report. People don’t 

understand that, I guess, the revenue in the entire country that 

they get in is about $2.5 billion, and their entire budget is $7.2 billion. Most of the rest is given money, isn’t that correct, approximately, for Afghanistan? 

Mr. BLANC. I don’t have the exact—— 

Mr. MICA. Well, I do. Okay, that’s the exact figures. The scope 

of this project is $2.2 billion and the emphasis seems to be on 

desks. Isn’t, by the end of the year, isn’t the administration supposed to have almost all the troops out? Mr. Blanc, do you know? 

Mr. BLANC. Sir, yes, we have—— 

Mr. MICA. By the end of next year. So we will have probably one 

of the best arrays of desks that you have ever seen in any post. I 

mean, now, how many people could there be in the entire bureaucracy? I was over there, and I met with some of the Foreign Ministry folks. Are we going to be buddy, like, three to one. Does anyone know? 

Mr. BLANC. If I may, and again this refers back to the point that 

I have made that we have tried to be very flexible and responsive 

in terms of our staffing in order to—— 

Mr. MICA. I know, but again a desk would suppose that a person 

is sitting at it. 

Mr. BLANC. Yes, sir. 

Mr. MICA. Of course, vacant desks would be another matter. 

But we are building—this is a $2.2 billion project. It’s probably 

the biggest infrastructure project in the history of Afghanistan in 

a country that has revenue of about $2.5 billion coming in, and we 

are supplying—we are going to have this massive complex of desks. 


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This is going to be the Taj Mahal of desks and the Taj Mahal complex that the taxpayers are getting ripped off for. 

Mr. BLANC. If I may, sir, let me—I think there two parts to your 

question. 

Mr. MICA. I don’t have enough time. 

I want to go to, again, your company, sir, Aegis, is British based? 

Mr. GULINO. The parent is British and we have a U.S. subsidiary 

that’s—— 

Mr. MICA. Okay. One of the things that disturbed me—now, who 

is your partner in Afghanistan, your major construction partner? 

Mr. GULINO. We have a—— 

Mr. MICA. Afghani partner. 

Mr. GULINO. No, sir, we don’t have Afghani—— 

Mr. MICA. No one in Afghanistan? 

Mr. GULINO. We have a subcontractor, Contrack International, 

they are also headquartered in McLean, that’s doing work for us. 

Mr. MICA. Are half your employees from Afghanistan and half 

from, where, the U.S. or other countries? 

Mr. GULINO. Of the approximate—— 

Mr. MICA. Of the project. 

Mr. GULINO. Of the 1,400, 300 are from Afghanistan. 

Mr. MICA. The rest are brought in? 

Mr. GULINO. Yes, sir. It is a little over 600 Nepalese and about 

400 U.S. 

Mr. MICA. The thing that bothers me is I was out in Helmand 

Province with some of our troops and they were looking at a school 

building they showed me. They said this is the joke of the province. 

He says, the Americans paid three or four times what it would cost 

for this. We appreciated that, the school. But it was the joke of the 

province. 

What would you estimate the premium you are paying for building in Afghanistan to be, three, four times what it would normally 

cost? 

Mr. GULINO. Well, there’s a guide—— 

Mr. MICA. Again, I just give an anecdotal incident. But not only 

the troops, but the locals told me that we are getting—that the 

American taxpayer is getting ripped off on these projects. 

Mr. GULINO. We are not doing that kind of work for the State 

Department. 

Mr. MICA. Finally, I do have a letter, Mr. Chairman, I visited one 

of our posts recently, a major post in Western Europe. Mr. Issa and 

I had worked at the end of his tenure going on post-Benghazi visits 

to some of our complexes and trying to avoid another Benghazi. 

And one of the simple things we found—that’s a huge project, it is 

a money pit—but one of the simple things we found was the lack 

of surveillance cameras and their ability to also have high definition and get those replaced. 

When I visited within the last 2 weeks one of our major posts 

in Western Europe, I found that one of the facilities did not have 

those surveillance cameras. I said: Was the reason money? They 

said no. Was it supply or something? They said: No, it was the bureaucratic acquisition process. 


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I sent Secretary Kerry this letter. I would like this made part of 

the record. And I would like a response to why we can’t acquire 

some of the small things that make a big difference in security. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Without objection, so ordered. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I thank the gentleman. 

We now recognize the gentleman from Massachusetts. 

Mr. STARR. Congressman, I will answer that question for you in 

writing if you would like. 

Mr. MICA. I would like that. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank you. I appreciate that. We look forward to seeing that. 

We will now recognize the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. 

Lynch, who has traveled extensively to Afghanistan, spent quite a 

bit of time there. And I appreciate his efforts and sacrifice for being 

there. But he is now recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I know a lot of the members on this committee have been in and out of Kabul and Afghanistan on a bunch of occasions. 

One of the most troubling aspects of our people working there is 

not so much the security of the Embassy, which is important, but 

from my experience going in and out has been the real challenge, 

going from Bagram or Kabul International Airport and then getting to the Embassy. 

And Mr. Starr, and maybe Mr. Hays, or Mr. Courts, is there any 

plan to have a helipad or some way? We are going to have 1,500 

or 1,700 desks. We are going to have a lot of people. We are going 

to have 4,500 contractors. We are going to have 1,000 employees. 

And I’m just concerned about something going sideways there 

where the Embassy might be overrun or something like that, and 

then we have got to get our people out. 

We have had incidents from codels where, you know, going 

through Massoud Circle or there is another rotary coming in from 

the airport where my security staff had to get out of the car and 

push people away from the Suburban that I was in. They were 

upset about something. I couldn’t figure that out. 

But there’s some real danger there going in and out of our Embassy, from the airport to the Embassy. We just had a convoy, a 

NATO convoy, you know, and a vehicle-borne IED recently. I have 

given up counting how many attacks on the Kabul Airport by the 

Taliban. 

So they are focusing on that corridor. And I’m just wondering if 

we’re taking any precautions at all about getting our people in and 

out of that area. And again, do we have an evacuation plan if 

things really get bad there and we have got to get our people out? 

Mr. STARR. Congressman, thank you for the question. 

Part of our job, and we do it everywhere in the world, is to make 

sure that we have adequate evacuation plans for our personnel, 

and not a single type of evacuation plan, but multiple different 

plans. We could do short drawdowns of certain personnel. We could 

lower our presence. Or they go all the way to evacuation—— 

Mr. LYNCH. Yeah, well, let’s talk about Kabul. 

Mr. STARR. We work closely with the Department of Defense. 

Mr. LYNCH. Okay. 


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Mr. STARR. We are in the midst of upgrading because of the 

surge and the number of people that are going to be left behind 

and the military leaving in large part. We are in the midst of another revision of the evacuation plan, the NEO plan we call it. We 

will ensure that we have the ability to get our people out of that 

country. Given the size, it won’t be overnight. This is not like evacuating a 200-person embassy. But we will work very closely with 

DOD. 

Your other part of the question, sir, we are exceptionally aware 

of the danger of the route, particularly Route White that goes between the Embassy and the airport. We have been using a mixture 

of air movements and ground movements, as appropriate. The Embassy every single day reviews how they are going to move people 

back and forth and what’s the safest way to do it. 

We have, I think because of our efforts, not suffered the same 

types of attacks yet. I can’t guarantee that we won’t ever have 

them. But we absolutely do our best and we use a mix of air and 

ground movements. 

Mr. LYNCH. Yeah. Well, I would say given the history here, we 

should expect, You know, further attacks on the Embassy, and on 

the airport as well. We are spread out here between, you know, 

Camp Alvarado and then Camp Sullivan, Kabul Airport. We have 

got some properties there where we’re spread out. 

And I think the distance, it’s about 2.5 miles, I think, from—at 

least 2.5 miles, probably longer, from the U.S. Embassy to Kabul 

Airport. That’s a pretty long ride and those roads aren’t good. I’m 

just concerned about getting our people out of there. Just practical 

stuff. 

I’m going to—I don’t have enough time to go over the contract 

issue. I do think, Mr. Chairman, that we need to get back on the 

ground in Kabul and go over all these documents and figure out 

what the cost increase, what that delta is between what we expected to see and what we are seeing now in terms of cost. 

And I’m not at all assured by the statements that the quality of 

the work is good and we’re on schedule and we’re under budget. 

And I think that’s just bogus, you know. We heard the same thing 

from Ms. Muniz’s, one of her predecessors, General Williams, about 

the Baghdad situation, that the quality of the work was good and 

we’re under budget and we’re on scheduled. And then when he was 

gone, the budget went from $500 million to close to a billion. 

I was in Baghdad. I stayed at the Embassy last week. I mean, 

I’m happy it’s done. But in the meantime, we lost some good Americans, electrocuted because of faulty code violations and electrical 

systems that weren’t grounded, things like that. And I’m just concerned that we are having a repeat performance here. 

And we did let the contractor know that this was in Afghanistan. 

So the added costs should have been baked in. Afghanistan has 

never been a peaceful, not in my lifetime, a peaceful place, and it 

was always a difficult environment to operate in. So we shouldn’t 

be shocked that a war broke out. There has been a war going on 

there for 10 or 12 years, and beyond that with the Soviets. 

So it’s always been a tough environment. So I don’t like hearing 

that over and over again, that that’s the reason for the cost inVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:23 Jul 13, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\25880.TXT APRIL

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crease. When we get a bid, we expect that to be baked into the cost, 

that this is a construction project in a difficult environment. 

But I do appreciate you trying to help the committee with it’s 

work. 

And I’ll yield back. Thank you. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I thank the gentleman. 

We now recognize the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Walberg, 

for 5 minutes. 

Mr. WALBERG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to the 

panel. 

I have been in Afghanistan and Kabul several times, and I think 

the most recent one was late 2010 that I was there. At that time 

some of the temporary facilities used shipping containers. I remember staying in hooches, trailers, and then having meetings in shipping containers and temporary facilities. 

I assume these are still at the Embassy and in use, Ms. Muniz. 

I’m correct? 

Ms. MUNIZ. Yes, that is the case. 

Mr. WALBERG. How secure are they? Mr. Starr? 

Mr. STARR. Sir, I would tell you that they certainly don’t come 

to the same level of security as a permanently built building, but 

we have taken steps to surround them with either concrete barriers 

to limit shrapnel, we have overhead cover in forms of sandbags on 

many of them—most of them. We have predetonation shields over 

the top of them so that a mortar or rocket coming in predetonates 

them and the sandbags catch the shrapnel. We have over 100 feet 

of setback from any of our perimeter walls. We have high perimeter 

walls around them, well-guarded and well-reinforced. We have 

bunkers on the compound. 

To the extent that we have to use these temporary CHUs, we are 

very aware of the vulnerabilities that they come with and do everything we can to mitigate them until we can bring the buildings, the 

permanent buildings on line. 

Mr. WALBERG. Mr. Courts, I understand that GAO recommended 

that State establish security standards for the temporary facilities 

and that they did not accept these recommendations. Is that correct? 

Mr. COURTS. The State Department partially concurred with that 

recommendation. They didn’t fully accept it. 

Mr. WALBERG. What were the problems with fully accepting 

them? 

Mr. COURTS. Well, the State Department would argue that there 

are office of Security Policy Board standards that apply to all facilities overseas, including permanent and temporary facilities, and 

that those are the standards that they hold themselves to. But in 

actual practice, I think they would tell you that the only buildings 

that actually meet those standards are permanent structures. And 

as we noted, when State contracted for the temporary buildings, 

they contracted for buildings that had differing levels of security 

and didn’t have overhead cover. 

I would also note that in 2008 the State Department notified the 

Congress that they needed additional funds because the threat in 

Kabul required overhead cover for their temporary facilities. But in 


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2009 they contracted for temporary buildings that did not specify 

the need for overhead cover. 

Mr. WALBERG. Let me give an opportunity for Ms. Muniz or Mr. 

Starr to answer from your perspective on that question of not accepting all the standards and where you are at now. 

Mr. STARR. Sir, the recommendation to have different standards 

for temporary structures has always struck us as very strange. We 

try—— 

Mr. WALBERG. But they are different facilities. 

Mr. STARR. Well, the problem is that invariably, when I have 

seen standards for temporary structures or interim facilities, it’s a 

lowering of the standard. What I’m afraid of is that we will, by virtue of the fact that a trailer is a trailer, we will have lower levels 

of security standards for them rather than striving to meet the real 

standard. 

An example, sir, is that for many years all we had was construction trailers. Over the last several years, we have developed a 

heavily armored trailer that we can now ship into places, and we 

are using them in Adana and we are using them in Peshawar, that 

allows us to much more closely meet the actual real permanent 

standard. It is our goal to meet the permanent standards to the extent that we can and not water down the standards and have 

lower-level security standards for interim structures. 

Mr. WALBERG. Ms. Muniz, did you have—I noticed you moved toward that, and I don’t want to cut you off if the answer is there. 

Well, I would assume that in 2009, I’m told that State acknowledged that personnel should be housed in permanent, hardened facilities. We are dealing with reality, I understand the process. Our 

concerns today are the basis of the questioning of how this has 

been a cost overrun, how it continues on, the length of the process. 

But we have a large number of American personnel using temporary facilities in Kabul. I appreciate the answers that you want 

to go and strive toward the permanent level, but these are not permanent, though they seem to be existing an awful long time. I 

guess I have heard your answer that you don’t plan to develop 

standards for temporary housing. 

So knowing that my time has expired here, Mr. Chairman, I 

would contend that the biggest question is, how do we finish this 

project, complete it, complete it on time, and make sure that it 

meets the standards necessary? I yield back. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Do either of you want to respond to that? 

I mean, the overuse of temporary facilities is a deep concern. 

Mr. STARR. Mr. Chairman, at the time that the Department and 

the administration made the decision that we needed to surge people in, we had no choice but to use temporary facilities. 

At the particular start of that period in 2009 and 2010, some of 

the threats that we were facing were not the same types of threats 

that we are facing today. We had had other buildings built around 

us in the meantime that grew in height. That presented a different 

type of threat. Once we saw that, we started surrounding our 

buildings with cement walls and sandbags. 

We had not been subject to incoming fire, either mortars or rockets, and even today it’s a very, very infrequent type of attack. Infrequent or not, we have taken the countermeasures now by putVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:23 Jul 13, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\25880.TXT APRIL

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ting overhead cover on our temporary facilities, building walls 

around them, putting bunkers in, making sure that we have a 

radar system that’s a duck-and-cover warning system to give people the most amount of time. 

I think it really goes to the point that we have to serve in certain 

places and we have to take certain risks. I understand that we had 

a surge. We had to go in with trailer type of housing units and in 

some cases offices. We modified those to the absolute best we can 

to actually try to mimic our permanent standards, give them setback, give them bullet resistance, give them shrapnel resistance. 

We make sure that we do everything that we can. But at a certain 

point we have no choice but to use temporary structures while we 

are awaiting the permanent structures to be completed. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. The only problem I have with what you 

said is it is just not true, and that was borne out in these reports. 

And I can go in great specificity, but probably not in this nonclassified setting. But for you to suggest that you have done all those 

things in Afghanistan, that ain’t true. That is not true. 

Mr. STARR. Sir, we try to do that as best we possibly can. There 

are certain times that we have not—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. But you didn’t. You did not. No, I beg to 

differ, and believe me, if we can get these two, the GAO, the inspector general, myself, and you, and whoever else wants to be in 

that, that is not true. And I will show it to you. They have pictures 

in it. And that’s the concern. 

Mr. WALBERG. Mr. Chairman, may I just follow up and say I 

think this goes to a bigger policy, and that is our whole Afghan policy, that we are leaving State Department in a situation like this 

without a significant policy on how to win, keep, and secure Afghanistan. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I thank the gentleman. 

We now recognize the gentlewoman from New Jersey, Mrs. Watson Coleman, for 5 minutes. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank 

you for your indulgence in the time allotted to get through some 

of these interesting questions. 

And thank you to the panel. 

What is the condition of the wall, the wall that was the subject 

of the report that I read last night? Is it complete or is there a portion that’s left? 

Ms. MUNIZ. Let me take the first part of that question and then 

I will turn it to my colleague, Mr. Starr. 

That wall is currently in design and will be executed in the context of the larger construction contract. 

I appreciate the question because the issue of the request for 

modifications to the wall came up in the IG report, and the question about why this couldn’t be done immediately. I think the committee and folks need to understand that we have an active construction project that included construction of a wall in the context 

of the larger project. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. I understand that. I understand. 

Ms. MUNIZ. So those modifications will be made in that context. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. So the wall was considered very significant in keeping those within the walls safe and secure. So absent 


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having that wall, I’m new, I have not been there, what is keeping 

that facility and that compound safe? 

Mr. STARR. There is a wall. There is our existing walls that are 

composed of things like HESCO barriers that are 11, 12, 13 feet 

high, cement walls, steel panels. There is no area around our facility that does not have a wall. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. Of some sort. 

Mr. STARR. They were interim types of security measures that 

were put in place. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. Does that mean that they’re easily compromised? 

Mr. STARR. Not easily compromised at all, Congresswoman, but 

we believe that there are newer technologies and better types of 

technologies available today than those walls. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. Thank you. I appreciate the two of you 

speaking to me first, because I have a question to both of you. 

Ms. Muniz, what is exactly the role of the Overseas Building Operations in the Embassy construction projects? 

Ms. MUNIZ. OBO is the real property manager for the U.S. Department of State for all of our facilities overseas. So we design, 

we build, we buy, we lease, we sell. And obviously construction is 

in our realm of responsibility. 

We execute that construction based on, I would say, two important factors. One is the number of desks or beds, the number of 

people who are going to be in that facility. That is a departmental 

decision that is made outside of OBO. So we take those base requirements and turn them into buildings. And the second piece of 

it is that we work very closely with our colleagues in Diplomatic 

Security to understand the security situation and make sure that 

any building we develop meets all of the security standards that 

they require. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Starr, what is your overall, what is the overall responsibility? 

Mr. STARR. I am the assistant secretary for diplomatic security. 

I advise the Secretary of State and others in the Department on 

the levels of security that we must have and maintain. And under 

me, I have an organization that is a security organization and a 

law enforcement organization responsible for passport/visa fraud 

violations, other types of violations, and the security of our personnel domestically and abroad. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. So with regard to security issues, who 

has the final say? Who has the final say in do this because this is 

going to secure these facilities that are being built? Is it OBO or 

is it you? Who breaks that tie if there’s a disagreement? 

Mr. STARR. If there’s a disagreement, I would say I win. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. You win, okay. 

So my understanding is from the IG’s report that there has been 

this sort of tension between OBO and your entity. Where are we 

on that? I understand that there has been a senior-level study 

group or senior-level whatever, task force, put in place to address 

some of these. What does that mean? How does it work? And how 

is it working? 

Ms. MUNIZ. I think we’ll divide that question up. 


KING-6430 with DISTILLER
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The tension you describe and the IG described is a natural tension. The OBO project directors on the ground are trying to execute 

a project that has already been agreed to with all of the parties 

and which has already been confirmed by DS to meet all of the current security requirements. 

To the degree that in the execution of the billion-dollar project 

changes are recommended throughout, the teams have to work 

very closely together to understand the impact of those changes, 

the impact that those changes will have on the execution, the costs, 

and the schedule of the long-term project. 

So I would say at the working level there is tension because on 

the DS side they are thinking: This is what we need, just do it now. 

And on the OBO side we are thinking: Okay, we have a big project 

to execute, let’s figure out how we make this work in the larger 

project, and let’s make sure we have the prioritization agreed to. 

The working groups that you referred to and this sort of higherlevel percolation is that those things are really worked out and decided at the higher level. So if we see things not moving forward, 

or obviously urgent security requirements that need resolution but 

there isn’t perfect clarity about which we should do, which we 

shouldn’t do, and when, that’s when I sit down with Assistant Secretary Starr, where one of my principal deputies, Casey Jones, sits 

with his colleague, the head of physical security, Wayne Ashbery, 

and we work these things out. 

Mr. DUNCAN. [Presiding.] The time of the—— 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. So may I ask—— 

Mr. DUNCAN. The time of the gentlelady has expired. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. Pardon me, sir? 

Mr. DUNCAN. The time of the gentlelady has expired. So we will 

go now to Mr. DeSantis. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Assistant Secretary Starr, while I have you here, I’m concerned 

about the State Department’s proposal to build their own training 

facility in Fort Pickett in Blackstone, Virginia. And I want to know, 

you know, FLETC in Georgia serves 91 different agencies. Why is 

that not sufficient for the State Department’s security service? 

Mr. STARR. Sir, we studied FLETC, and we studied over 90 

places to try to do the type of training we want. FLETC in Georgia 

is an excellent facility. We train our agents there in criminal investigations. But it is a law enforcement training facility. It does not 

use the type of weapons that we use. It does not have the capacity 

for the number of people, the foreign service officers that we want 

to train. It is not —— 

Mr. DESANTIS. They have expressed their willingness to make 

those accommodations, correct? They said that they would build 

new driving courses, mock embassies, and let State Department 

have primary control over that. So there is an acknowledgment 

that that would need be done, but that could be done at half the 

cost of what you are proposing to spend to have a facility in 

Blacksburg, Virginia, isn’t that the case? 

Mr. STARR. No, sir. We don’t believe the costs that FLETC can 

build are significantly different than our costs. The GAO study—— 

Mr. DESANTIS. But what you believe and what they produce, 

though, are two different things. So I think me and people on the 


KING-6430 with DISTILLER
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committee who are concerned about the State Department being 

good stewards of the taxpayer dollars, I think we see a cost discrepancy. So you can disagree with that, but I think we see it’s there. 

So you were going to continue. 

Mr. STARR. Sir, there is a GAO report coming out that will talk 

to the numbers that we have put down and how they have been 

carefully verified and the fact that FLETC’s numbers have not 

been so quite as carefully verified. 

More importantly, sir, it is also a question that we need something in this area. We are going to be moving thousands of people 

a year to training. We believe that the Fort Pickett site, which is 

a military base which can take the type of weaponry that we are 

required to use, as was seen in our defense of the consulate in 

Haaretz and in other places, is not the types of training that 

FLETC does. 

Our training has, unfortunately, come to the point that we are 

much more closely aligned to the military in what we must do in 

many cases than law enforcement and we believe that Fort Pickett 

is certainly the better answer. Thank you. 

Mr. DESANTIS. But why, being close to Washington, why—I 

mean, of the other agencies, presumably, I mean, they would like 

to have people close, but they go to Georgia. I mean, why can’t people just train in Georgia if you had what you needed? It seems to 

me that that wouldn’t be a big deal to put people on a plane and 

have them do the training course, then come back, correct? They 

are not commuting from the State Department to Fort Pickett on 

a daily basis. They are going to be there, they are going to do the 

training, and then they will be back, right? 

Mr. STARR. Sir, the training is for foreign service officers, Diplomatic Security agents, foreign security entities that we are training. Many studies have shown that we need a coordinated, consolidated training site. This would give us this site at Fort Pickett. 

Most importantly, it allows us to train with our partners, such as 

the U.S. Marine Corps Security Battalion in Quantico, and do the 

types of training that we need jointly together. They are going to 

have a very difficult time getting down to FLETC Georgia to do the 

types of training exercises. 

And FLETC does not currently on their space, they have acknowledged this, they cannot handle the type of weapons that we 

use. They are looking at getting another military facility 30 or 60 

miles north of FLETC Georgia that we would also have to go to in 

order to use the weapons. We can train at Fort Pickett. 

Mr. DESANTIS. That would not be worth doing it, that saves a 

couple hundred million dollars for the taxpayer? 

Mr. STARR. Sir, again, going back to it, I would suggest looking 

at the GAO study that comes up. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Well, I will look at that. 

Mr. STARR. We don’t believe that it is going to—— 

Mr. DESANTIS. What is your, right now, what is the cost? Because the cost that the State Department has provided about how 

much this will cost has fluctuated a great deal. So what will be the 

costs to the taxpayer for Fort Pickett? 

Mr. STARR. Four hundred and thirteen million dollars. 


KING-6430 with DISTILLER
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Mr. DESANTIS. Okay, $413 million. I mean, it’s gone from $416 million, $907 million, $950 million. Now we are back down to there. 

How long has that been the estimate? 

Mr. STARR. Independent estimates conducted by GSA, our build- ing contractor, have brought it in at $413 million. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Okay. 

Well, we are going to be conducting oversight over this, because 

I think that there has been examples, I mean, there were several 

billion dollars at State Department not accounted for during Secretary Clinton’s tenure, and, you know, we want to make sure that 

we are getting bang for the buck for the taxpayer. 

I’m out of time and I yield back. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. [Presiding.] I thank the gentleman. 

We will now recognize the gentlewoman from the Virgin Islands, 

Ms. Plaskett, for 5 minutes. 

Ms. PLASKETT. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Good morning everyone. 

I had a question, Director Muniz, about the surge and the military civilian personnel and the need that that created for immediate office space in the time that we were having the surge. I 

know that this presented a challenge for the State Department requiring the necessary amount of space to be built quickly, safely, 

not doing the overruns and the mistake that was made in Iraq, 

where we had this huge compound that was built and we immediately downsized the number of personnel that were there. 

And in that instance we would be having a hearing about cost 

overruns. And in this instance we are having a hearing about 

something else, potentially. 

So Ms. Muniz, do you agree that the State Department needed 

to be careful not to overbuild on planning for the Kabul Embassy? 

Ms. MUNIZ. I would agree with that. But I would argue that we 

have been careful not to overbuild, and in the end we will not have 

overbuilt. 

Ms. PLASKETT. And why is that? 

Ms. MUNIZ. Because we will have built to the number of desks 

and the number of beds, the requirements that we need. 

Ms. PLASKETT. Okay. So unlike most embassies around the 

world, in Afghanistan most U.S. Government employees not only 

work at the Embassy compound, but they also live there, right? So 

all the support services that we take for granted on a daily basis 

here in the United States must be provided on that Embassy compound as well in order to support the employees that have to remain in that compound. Correct? 

Ms. MUNIZ. That’s absolutely right. Whether it’s dining, cleaning 

facilities, everything that you would do in a small city is done essentially on that same compound. 

Ms. PLASKETT. Okay. And to meet the increased requirement in 

the fastest way possible, hence, you have the temporary facilities, 

correct? 

Ms. MUNIZ. Correct. 

Ms. PLASKETT. And what benefits do those temporary facilities 

provide? Does it better—and my sense is, does it—I would think 

that it would help you to plan better for the permanent because 

you have something in which people are living in and functioning 


KING-6430 with DISTILLER
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in on a temporary basis so that you can accurately plan for the permanent structure. 

Ms. MUNIZ. I think that’s right, but I think fundamentally it provides facilities in which all of the staff can live and work until the 

permanent facilities are done. 

Ms. PLASKETT. Okay. And I would like to hear from some of the 

other witnesses if they think that that’s correct or not correct. 

Mr. Gulino? 

Mr. GULINO. Yes, I do. I do believe that is correct. 

Ms. PLASKETT. And, Mr. Starr, what are your thoughts on that? 

Mr. STARR. Yes, I think it gives us an idea of whether or not we 

can support the platform. I would say that we don’t get the efficiencies out of the temporary structures that we can get out of our 

permanently built structures, and that’s one of the things that I 

think OBO factors into their planning. 

Ms. PLASKETT. Okay. And in building the permanent structures 

to house all of the additional personnel and planning that properly, 

was using the temporary facilities a mistake? 

Ms. MUNIZ. I would argue that it wasn’t an option not to use 

those temporary facilities. If the basic assumption is that based on 

national security priorities the U.S. Government needed to be in 

Afghanistan at the levels at which the administration had agreed, 

the use of temporary—— 

Ms. PLASKETT. On the date that they’d agreed to have them. 

Ms. MUNIZ. Exactly. The use of temporary facilities was an inescapable fact. 

The second priority was continue to build the permanent facilities as quickly as possible. Those were the two things we were 

doing. 

Ms. PLASKETT. And so the expressed concern by GAO and the IG 

regarding the use of the temporary facilities, you would say what 

to that? 

Mr. STARR. I think we all have concerns about using temporary 

facilities. But as Director Muniz has said, when faced with the situation that we need to surge people, it was our choice. And I think 

we all have concerns about the length of time that we use temporary facilities. But this particular project, because we were having to build on the same site, essentially, as using them, was very 

complex. 

Ms. PLASKETT. So the challenge is to build the temporary facilities, but to move quickly into the permanent ones at the right period of time in the challenged environment in which you are in in 

Afghanistan? 

Mr. STARR. Exactly. 

Ms. PLASKETT. Okay. Thank you. I yield back the balance of my 

time. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I thank the gentlewoman. 

We’ll now recognize the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Carter, for 

5 minutes. 

Mr. CARTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank all of you for being here. 

Mr. Courts, I will start with you. In planning projects such as 

this on this scale, are value engineering studies important? 


KING-6430 with DISTILLER
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Mr. COURTS. Yes, they are. That is a very well-established practice that both the Federal Government and the private sector have 

used for decades to reduce costs while still maintaining the quality 

in the performance of a project, and especially one of this size. It 

is also required by both OMB and by OBO itself. 

Mr. CARTER. So it is required by OMB? 

Mr. COURTS. It is, yes. 

Mr. CARTER. Okay. Let me ask you, value engineering studies 

are sometimes referred to as cost-containment studies. 

Mr. COURTS. Right. 

Mr. CARTER. Because that’s what they’re intended to do, contain 

costs, and to make as sure as we can that we don’t have cost overruns, correct? 

Mr. COURTS. That’s correct. 

Mr. CARTER. Mr. Starr, let me ask you. It’s my understanding 

that the State Department’s Overseas Building Operations didn’t 

follow cost-containment policies in this project. Is that correct, Mr. 

Starr? 

Mr. STARR. I think Director Muniz would have a better answer 

to that. My understanding is that certain ones were done, certain 

may not have been—certain ones may not have been. 

Ms. MUNIZ. So I’m the director of OBO, so we are responsible for 

conducting—— 

Mr. CARTER. I understand that, and congratulations. 

Ms. MUNIZ. Thank you. We’re the ones responsible for conducting 

the value engineering studies. And as I mentioned in my testimony, we conduct those, they’re valuable. We did not conduct it in 

the 2009 project. 

Mr. CARTER. But you agree they are valuable? 

Ms. MUNIZ. Yes, absolutely. 

Mr. CARTER. Okay, thank you. Thank you. 

Mr. Starr, can I get back to you. 

Mr. STARR. Sure. 

Mr. CARTER. Mr. Starr, my colleague from Florida earlier talked 

about the proposed new facility being built near Fort Pickett in 

Virginia instead of being built—or instead of utilizing the facilities 

that already exist at FLETC in Glynco, Georgia. Is that correct? 

Mr. STARR. Yes, sir, Congressman. I want to answer your question. 

Mr. CARTER. Okay. Yes, sir. 

Mr. STARR. But I do feel duty bound to say we were brought up 

to discuss Afghanistan. 

Mr. CARTER. I understand that. I understand that. But what 

we’re brought up to discuss is these cost overruns and the waste 

of money by the State Department. I think more importantly, that’s 

what we are interested in. 

Because as all of us know, when you’re in a hole you stop 

digging. And we’re in a hole here and we need to stop digging. And 

we don’t let—we don’t need to let happen what has already happened before. We want to learn from our experiences. 

Now, you said earlier that the cost of this new facility would be 

$413 million if it were built in Fort Pickett, is that correct? 

Mr. STARR. Yes, sir. 


KING-6430 with DISTILLER
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Mr. CARTER. Now, originally it was set at $950 million. How did 

it get down to $413 million? 

Mr. STARR. The Department of State started this project looking 

at a hard skills training site only. At some point the Department 

also asked a question: Should we, instead of just using it for hard 

skills, combine all security training, soft and hard skills? GSA was 

asked to look at that and GSA told us that in order to do both it 

would cost about $900 million or more. 

We went back after that and said: That’s not supportable, we 

don’t require the collocation of hard and soft skills. And when we 

went back to GSA and said concentrate solely on the hard skills 

security training, that’s when the costs were revised and showed 

that it is now $413 million. It does not include—— 

Mr. CARTER. Mr. Starr, it’s been said that the greatest threat to 

our national security is our national debt, and I believe that to be 

true, and I’m very concerned about that. And you say you’re not 

here to discuss this, but you’re here to discuss Kabul. Well, we’re 

here to discuss cost overruns and the waste of taxpayers’ money, 

and there is no better example than this. 

You’ve got a facility in FLETC that trains over 91 agencies, but 

yet you’re saying that you’ve got to have one of your own, that you 

can’t utilize this. And I’m having trouble understanding that when 

FLETC has already said that they could do this at almost half the 

cost. 

Mr. STARR. A, we don’t believe they can do it at half the cost. B, 

most of every one of those facilities has additional hard skills, higher skills training facilities. The Secret Service has its own higher 

skilled training facility than FLETC offers. The Air Marshals have 

higher skills training centers. The U.S. Marshals have higher skill 

training centers than what’s offered at FLETC. 

Mr. CARTER. So you believe that you can spend $416 million and 

build another facility, a stand-alone facility, yet we already have 

one that is available. Is there a report by OMB about this? 

Mr. STARR. OMB has looked at this. There is not a report that 

I am aware of. 

Mr. CARTER. Can you provide me a report with them? 

Mr. STARR. The GAO report is coming out very soon. 

Mr. CARTER. And will there be a report from OMB? 

Mr. STARR. I’m not OMB, sir. I can’t tell you that. 

Mr. CARTER. Would you work with me to request a report from 

OMB? 

Mr. STARR. Sir, I think the administration has made its decision. 

We have made a decision that it is in the best interest of all of us 

to move ahead with Fort Pickett. OMB has responded to Congress 

several times that I’m aware of. A request for OMB would—to 

them to respond to you would have to come from them, not from 

the State Department. 

Mr. CARTER. Mr. Starr, I’m not going to accept that. And I’m 

going to tell you, I’m going to continue to fight this because I think 

you’re wasting taxpayers’ money. I think you’ve got a perfectly fine 

facility that can be utilized without building another one, without 

getting us further into debt, and without wasting taxpayers’ money 

like the State Department has done time and time again. 


KING-6430 with DISTILLER
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Mr. STARR. I do not want to ever waste taxpayer money, sir. I 

think that the outcoming GAO report will show that this is not a 

waste of funding. We have to build 90 percent of the facilities that 

we would have to build in Georgia—would have to be built in Georgia as well as Fort Pickett. Georgia does not have the facilities that 

we need. 

Mr. CARTER. They have proven, and they have said and they 

have shown that they can do that at a lower cost. 

Mr. STARR. No, sir they have not. And I think the outcoming 

GAO report will show that. 

Mr. CARTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I yield the remainder of my time. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank you. And an interesting topic, and 

we will follow up on that. 

We’ll now recognize the gentlewoman from Michigan, Mrs. Lawrence, for 5 minutes. 

Mrs. LAWRENCE. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and to the committee 

that’s speaking here today. 

Ambassador Hays, according to the 2014 report, Aegis billed the 

government without required documentation and with inadequate 

invoices. What steps has the State Department taken to ensure 

that the administrative and logistic issues are addressed before the 

issuance of new contracting programs, and how long does it take 

to identify or rectify these discrepancies? 

Mr. HAYS. Ma’am, that was an audit report, and I was not on 

that team, so I can’t speak to the findings of that team, but I certainly can get back to you through our legislative assistant and 

give you the information you require. 

Mrs. LAWRENCE. So you have read the audit? 

Mr. HAYS. I have not read that audit, no. 

Mrs. LAWRENCE. Are there any other—who reads the audit, then, 

once its issued? 

Mr. HAYS. The senior staff of the OIG. Individual teams don’t 

necessarily read each other’s audits unless they’re conducting an 

inspection of that specific area. And we go from area—— 

Mrs. LAWRENCE. Ambassador, let me go to a statement that you 

have said, and hopefully you’ll be aware of this. You highlight in 

your statement the lack of coordination between the Bureaus of 

Diplomatic Security and Overseas Building Operations. And since 

this conclusion, what are the best practices you can share with me 

to best manage these multiple projects and the lack of space available to complete them? 

Mr. HAYS. Well, there were two recommendations that we made 

in our inspection report: One was in the classified, and the other 

was in the unclassified. The first one was that we needed a dynamic master plan. And we raised that in our report, and we 

raised it with Director Muniz. The second was that they put together a management oversight team between the senior staff of 

OBO and DS. To the best of my knowledge, they have done the latter. Director Muniz has said what she has done on the first issue. 

Ms. MUNIZ. If I could add on the master planning, I’d like to clarify a point that was brought up earlier by the OIG about the recommendation for a master plan and the fact that that recommendation remained open. We have a master plan for Kabul. 


KING-6430 with DISTILLER
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The recommendation is still open because we are waiting for funding approval from Congress. We notified the OIG of that fact in 

April of this year. So the plan is complete, but the execution of the 

plan will not be approved until we receive that approval from Congress. I just wanted to clarify on that issue. 

Mrs. LAWRENCE. I thank you for that. I want to go back to you, 

Director Muniz, right? 

Ms. MUNIZ. Muniz. 

Mrs. LAWRENCE. I really want a sense of assurance. There has 

been, and you must admit, some concern about the operations in 

the past. Moving forward, are you positioned and empowered to ensure that these concerns about lack of documentation, master planning—because that’s the concern. We can talk about what happened in the past, but what I’m very passionate about right now 

is in your role, and you’ve identified a couple times that you are 

the Director and you have this responsibility, where do you see us 

correcting these things of the past? And you can’t just keep doing 

the same things and expect a different result. So I really want you 

on the record saying, as the Director, how are you going to correct 

these concerns that we have? 

Ms. MUNIZ. Thank you for the question. 

I think that we have very strong master planning programs, and 

I’ve argued that we have planned, designed, and built on those 

master plans in Kabul. My argument in Kabul is simply that in 

these environments that are ever-changing, we have to have a different approach, and we do have a different approach. We can’t develop a master plan at the beginning of a project that was awarded 

in 2009 and expect that that master plan remains static. What we 

are building in Kabul on the Embassy compound is what we need, 

and we have evolving requirements that reflect later phases of a 

master plan. So I think we have in place the planning mechanisms 

and the budgeting mechanisms to let Congress know the direction 

that we’re going in in such a kinetic environment, which is unusual. 

Mrs. LAWRENCE. Thank you. 

I yield back my time. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. And before she yields back, earlier, the Director had agreed to give us the original plan and then the most 

updated plan. What’s a reasonable time that you’d provide those to 

us? 

Ms. MUNIZ. Well, let us get back to you after this. Those plans 

exist, so in theory, we could get it to our folks in the Department 

to get those to the committee, but I know that there’s a long queue 

of documents making their way to you, but we will try to get those 

to you as quickly as possible. We can also in the interim offer a 

briefing and walk you through the entire master plan. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. That would be great. What I’m trying to 

look for a specific date, just because—at what point do we say, Hey, 

you’re not fulfilling what you’re said you were going to do? We’ve 

had, unfortunately, these challenges in the past, so I’m just trying 

to get you to agree to some sort of date. You pick it, but I want 

it to be somewhat reasonable and timely. 

Ms. MUNIZ. Why don’t we get those documents to you within the 

month. 


KING-6430 with DISTILLER
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Chairman CHAFFETZ. By the end of July? Is that fair? 

Ms. MUNIZ. Within a month. It’s the 9th of July. It would mean 

the 9th of August. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Okay. By the 9th of August. 

And we will invite you as well. 

Mrs. LAWRENCE. Okay. Thank you. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank you. I appreciate that. 

I will now recognize the gentleman from Oklahoma, Mr. Russell, 

for 5 minutes. 

Mr. RUSSELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Starr, you’re a smart man with a lot of security knowledge. 

Is a footprint more secure if it’s smaller or larger? 

Mr. STARR. A footprint, sir? 

Mr. RUSSELL. Uh-huh. 

Mr. STARR. A larger one is going to require a lot more resources 

to secure; not necessarily more secure, less secure. I would tell you 

that our consulate in Haaretz, which was much smaller than the 

Embassy, we successfully defended that against a complex attack, 

and we’ve also successfully defended the Embassy against attacks. 

Mr. RUSSELL. Well, I would agree with that. And, in fact, at the 

Embassy in Kabul, even after it was vacated for a decade, it was 

a secure building. It had to be breached by the roof. When we went 

in there in the early days, I recall seeing George Bush’s picture on 

the wall with Mr. Shultz as Secretary of Defense, 1989 calendars 

on the wall, Volkswagen Golfs in the garage. 

I guess this notion that we have to have 5,500 people on a compound is just a mystery to me. How do you justify that? 

Mr. BLANC. Sir—— 

Mr. STARR. Allow me to turn to my counterpart, sir. I’m the one 

that’s given the task to secure them. 

Mr. RUSSELL. We appreciate Ms. Muniz, and she has been gracious to allow us to beat up on her in previous testimony, but she 

has also stated clearly here in this hearing that any dispute, which 

the GAO and the IG have laid out, which they’re in agreement, by 

the way, on security issues, and Ms. Muniz in her testimony today 

said that any dispute on security matters, you win; it’s a 

deferment. 

And so now what I see is this no desire to streamline infrastructure. We see a support of the support, and then the more support 

that comes in, it has to be supported, and then it has to be secured, 

and then the logistics of that, and now we’ve got 5,500 people, and 

we’re guarding them with Gurkhas, which I have great admiration 

for the Gurkhas. I’ve been in environments with them, tough, you 

know, sharp knives, a lot respect for them. However, we have created a situation where this thing is massive. And you, by your own 

admission, in talking about Haaretz and how it was defensible, 

how can you justify this enormous footprint? 

Mr. BLANC. Sir, I think that the point is that we obviously have 

a different set of requirements for professional staff in Kabul than 

we did in Haaretz. You know, in heart, I think professional staff, 

we had 10 or a dozen. In Kabul, we are now going to be running 

all of our operations in Afghanistan because we’ve pulled back from 

short locations. We, of course, have a much larger direct-hire population of people who are doing the work of diplomacy, doing the 


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work of development. That number is drawing down in terms of the 

current agencies, but it’s actually going to go up because you’re 

going to have the Security Cooperation Office come under the Embassy umbrella at a certain stage. You’ve got other agencies that 

are going to stop being self-supporting at a certain stage. 

And the truth is that in the current situation in Kabul, you’ve 

hit the nail on the head, if you’ve got several hundred people doing 

professional work, you’re going to have thousands more who are 

providing the life support services of a small city, who are securing 

that, who are providing movement security. 

Mr. RUSSELL. Look, in the early days all the way up to 2009, and 

we had an embassy there that was secured by a Marine security 

company—by the way, they do that. That’s part of their mission. 

The Marines, they secure embassies. I mean, this is no revelation 

to anyone on this panel. And yet we’re talking about this insatiable 

need for size and girth. 

I don’t know how—I guess my question, you stated in your own 

testimony, Mr. Blanc, I appreciate you piping up, that the Department of State needs to be expeditionary in nature. I believe those 

were the words that you used. So how can a four times increase 

in the operations since 2009 be expeditionary? 

Mr. BLANC. Well, sir, I think there are a few things. First of all, 

there are a number of security challenges in Afghanistan that are 

obviously not normal to—— 

Mr. RUSSELL. I’m aware of them. I even lived in a safe house in 

Kabul. I’m very familiar with the security structure and the dangers in Afghanistan. 

Mr. BLANC. And I would say further, sir, the security situation 

has evolved over time. When I first lived in Afghanistan in 2002, 

the situation was very different and the Embassy at the time was 

secured very differently. Now the number of—you know, the security requirements for movement—we talked about the road to the 

airport—the situation is very different. And so, inherently, the support requirements have also changed. 

I would, though, challenge, sir, the idea that we have an insatiable need for girth. In fact, the civilian staff surged with the military surge and is now drawing back. And to the extent that there 

is going to be girth, it’s really going to be girth from other agencies 

coming in under the State Department umbrella. So I believe that 

the support services that we have, both life support and the security support, are necessary. I don’t think that they can be replaced 

in Kabul at this time. And I think—— 

Mr. RUSSELL. But it’s self-perpetuating. 

And if I may ask for an indulgence, Mr. Chairman. 

They’re self-perpetuating, and the larger we increase the footprint, the more need to increase the footprint. I mean, at some 

point—and it’s easy to see how it’s happened. In fact, the GAO and 

the IG agree, there’s not been this strategic master plan. And then 

we hear from Ms. Muniz, you said we can’t develop such a plan. 

My reply to that is, nonsense. Develop the plan and then adjust it. 

We do that all the time at State. We do it in the military. We do 

it in Congress even. I know that’s shocking to some people that we 

actually plan. 


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Ms. MUNIZ. That’s precisely what we did. I argued that that is 

precisely what we did. I did not say that was not necessary or possible. 

Mr. RUSSELL. Well, then, you have mentioned, though, that the 

regular plans, that the standard plans were not applicable. Even 

in this testimony today, you said that the international construction and safety standards needed to be taken into account. How 

could those possibly be any better or different, or we’ve not seen 

these international construction safety standards, I believe is what 

you called them today. How would that deviate from standard embassy designs with military security in the early dangerous days 

and then you enhance it later? 

Ms. MUNIZ. I’m not sure which document you’re referring to. 

Mr. RUSSELL. I’m not. I’m picking from your testimony today—— 

Ms. MUNIZ. That’s—— 

Mr. RUSSELL. —and I quote—— 

Ms. MUNIZ. That’s not my—— 

Mr. RUSSELL. —international construction of safety standards. So 

I’m as baffled by it as you are. What would those be? 

Mr. STARR. Congressman, the security standards are based on 

the Overseas Security Policy Board standards. I actually chair the 

Overseas Security Policy Board with the heads of the other agencies that work overseas. 

I would say that in our normal buildings that we build around 

the world, and we incorporate those standards in—and every building that OBO builds meets those standards—we’re in a situation 

where we have been asked to stay in what is essentially a war 

zone, and that presents challenges even on top of the regular Overseas Security Policy Board standards. And these are some of the 

things that we’ve had to adjust to as the security situation has declined. 

Mr. RUSSELL. And I appreciate that. And I know—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. The gentleman’s—— 

Mr. RUSSELL. I—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. The gentleman’s—— 

Mr. RUSSELL. I’m sorry—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. The gentleman’s time is up. 

Mr. RUSSELL. —Mr. Chairman. If there’s time later, I’d like to 

follow up, if I may. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I thank you. 

I now recognize the gentlewoman from New York, Mrs. Maloney, 

for 5 minutes. 

Mrs. MALONEY. I thank you for holding this important hearing, 

and thank you to all the panelists. 

I just want to talk about really the security concerns that we 

have in high-threat Kabul. The Embassy has consistently remained 

one of the most, I’d say, high-threat environments for our overseas 

personnel. And in February, in 2014, a vehicle-borne explosive device killed two Department of Defense contractors, and just last 

month, a suicide bomber targeted a NATO convoy about 500 yards 

from the Embassy. 

And so I’d just like to ask Mr. Gulino, your company, Aegis, is 

a prime security contractor, and your employees are on the front 

lines everyday in a very dangerous area. Can you give us an overVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:23 Jul 13, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00047 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\25880.TXT APRIL

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view of the security services your personnel provide to the Embassy 

in this high-threat area, and can you explain how Aegis personnel 

maintains a secure environment with changing and often very challenging, to say the least, political dynamics? 

Mr. GULINO. Yes, I’d be pleased to. Let me first say that the security strategy—the strategic plan for security is developed by our 

customer, the Department of State. We hire the very best people, 

and we deploy them according to the plan, which is ever evolving, 

ever changing, based upon the conditions in Kabul at any given 

time. 

So, having said that, the services that we provide in force protection are primarily in six areas: We provide static security, which 

is kind of like going through a gate when you come into the building here, obviously. We provide mobile security, which is assisting 

in movement of people. We provide convoy protection. We have explosive detection dogs, EDDs, that are handled by trainers. And we 

provide what we call ELU, which is basically elite protection for 

codels, people like yourself, that come in. We have teams that provide protection to them. And then, lastly and importantly, we have 

emergency response teams. And those teams are positioned at strategic locations, and they’re typically in an MRAP-like vehicle, 

BearCat, they’re called, and they have a combination of EMTs, 

emergency medical technician people, as well as guards, security 

personnel. 

And, importantly, we train our people so that there’s someone on 

that team who is responsible for command and control and makes 

the decisions as to what the appropriate response should be based 

upon a call or a situation that comes in. So those are the six areas 

that we provide services. 

And I want to just say that we do have a mixture of the three 

groups that I mentioned, including the Nepalis Gurkhas, and they 

are quite good soldiers. 

And I want to—for the record, I’d like to be able to say that duty 

of care to our employees is of utmost importance. And, yes, we 

didn’t have some posters opened up in Nepali initially, but we take 

care of our Nepalis. When that earthquake hit, the first thing we 

did was pull all of our employees. We found out—we gave them 

phones. We gave them contact back to Nepal. For the ones that 

were in training in Jordan, we gave them phone cards so they 

could call. We determined that there were a few people that needed 

to go out immediately. Fortunately, there were no lives of family 

members lost, nor of employees on leave. We raised over $30,000 

to give to those employees to repair their homes. 

Mrs. MALONEY. Good. 

I’d like to ask Ambassador Hays and Mr. Courts, given what 

you’ve learned in your investigations and your oversight, I’d like to 

hear what security recommendations would you put forward? What 

ideas do you have that we could improve our security in this area? 

Ambassador? 

Mr. HAYS. The dynamic in a war zone is extremely difficult. The 

changing numbers of people going in and out, the policy dynamic 

affecting the personnel in country, all of these play into the need 

for solid planning, for worst-case-scenario planning, for very close 


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collaboration between the policy and the implementers of both construction and security. 

We believe that it is important to have long-range dynamic planning. That means that not only do you have a plan out there, but 

you also are working with others that are involved in this constantly to make sure that that plan meets all the requirements on 

the ground and that you put security first. 

Mrs. MALONEY. Okay. My time has expired. Thank you. Thank 

you for your service. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank you. 

We now recognize the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. 

Meadows, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Madam Director, I’m going to start with you to say thank you. 

The last time you were here, I think Mr. Russell talked about the 

fact that it could be contentious, would be maybe an adjective or 

a verb to describe what went on that particular day, but I also 

want to acknowledge the fact that after that hearing, you made a 

personal attempt to come and not only brief me and my personal 

staff, but to follow up, and in a time when all the headlines are 

about a lack of cooperation. So I just want to say, thank you, 

and—— 

Ms. MUNIZ. Thank you. 

Mr. MEADOWS. So, Mr. Courts, let me come to you because Mr. 

Starr is characterizing your new GAO report as going to be giving 

him an A-plus, is kind of the direction that—I mean, from his testimony just a few minutes ago. Would you characterize the new report that you’re going to be putting out is something that we want 

to publish, I guess? Let’s put it that way. 

Mr. COURTS. Congressman, we have not released that report yet 

to our original requesters, and I can’t discuss it until that report 

is actually released. 

Mr. MEADOWS. All right. But Mr. Starr knows what’s going to be 

in that report? 

Mr. COURTS. He has seen a draft report, yes. 

Mr. MEADOWS. So since you’re not going to comment on that, 

would you characterize his testimony as it being an A-plus and as 

being accurate? 

Mr. COURTS. Congressman, I can’t comment on that, as the result—the report hasn’t been released yet. 

Mr. MEADOWS. All right. When will that be released? 

Mr. COURTS. We’re still working that out with our client. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Okay. So, Mr. Starr, let me come to you. You’ve 

seen the report, or you’ve at least seen your draft. Is your characterization of it giving you a glowing report, is that accurate? 

Mr. STARR. I think the report is a fair and balanced report, sir. 

I don’t think it’s an A-plus for anybody. I think that it’s best that 

we wait until the report come out and people can judge where we’re 

going on the merits of the report. 

Mr. MEADOWS. So your reference to it was only referencing a 

short portion of that as it relates to your ability to provide a secure 

location? Was that your testimony? I guess here’s what I’m finding, 

is we’ve got all kinds of testimony that’s going back and forth. And, 

Mr. Starr, my concern is, is here, as Mr. Russell was talking about, 


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we’ve got this big footprint. As I understand it, we’re bringing people in in helicopters into the facility currently, is that correct, because it’s too dangerous? Other modes of transportation. 

Mr. STARR. Yes. 

Mr. MEADOWS. So if it is indeed that dangerous and the core mission of the State Department is diplomacy, how do you reconcile 

the two? I mean, because if it’s so dangerous that we can’t get out 

and do our diplomacy, are we not just building a military structure 

in Afghanistan? 

Mr. STARR. Congressman, that’s a very fair question. And 

Jarrett, I think, has some comments on this as well, but I will say 

one thing. The responsibility to protect our people at our Embassy—— 

Mr. MEADOWS. I don’t deny that. Let me just tell you, the Director knows that I am with her on that particular—— 

Mr. STARR. But that’s one portion of the mission, so that we don’t 

lose the platform. The second—— 

Mr. MEADOWS. That’s not the core mission, though, Mr. Starr. 

Mr. STARR. Exactly, but the core mission is to conduct diplomacy. 

And beyond securing the Embassy, we have to have programs that 

get people out. We have to get them to these meetings. 

Mr. MEADOWS. All right. 

Mr. STARR. We have to make sure—— 

Mr. MEADOWS. But do you understand how the American people 

have a real hard time with this? We’re spending a billion dollars 

to create a facility that we’ve got to helicopter people in and out 

of, that they can’t really do diplomacy, and they’re saying, well, 

why are we doing that? I mean, why would we do that, Mr. Starr? 

Mr. STARR. I would argue that we are conducting diplomacy. 

Mr. BLANC. Sir, if I may, I mean, I think that is exactly the 

point: We are conducting diplomacy. There are some routes in 

Kabul, including route to the airport, that occasionally get and 

more and less dangerous, and our colleagues from Atlantic Security 

take very good care to make sure that we have the best available 

security in those instances, but I can assure you, and I spend quite 

a bit of time there myself, our people get out, they are hands-on 

involved with the Government of Afghanistan—— 

Mr. MEADOWS. All right. So give me the top three diplomatic success stories that you can share, then? I mean, you’re saying you’re 

creating—what are the top three—what would be the headlines of 

the Washington Post tomorrow, what are the top three that they’ve 

accomplished? 

Mr. BLANC. Sir, well, first and foremost, I would say it’s the successful transition from President Karzai to President Ghani last 

summer. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Okay. But that was not diplomatic in its nature. 

Mr. BLANC. Yes, sir, it was. That was deeply—that involved— 

that was a—— 

Mr. MEADOWS. So that had everything to do with the Embassy? 

Mr. BLANC. The United States Embassy was deeply engaged in 

that successful transition, and there were—— 

Mr. MEADOWS. All right. What are the other two? 

Mr. BLANC. So the next thing I would propose to you, sir, is that 

we have seen a substantial change in the nature of the relationship 


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between Afghanistan and Pakistan since President Ghani came 

into office. That has been largely due to President Ghani’s courageous actions and reciprocation from Pakistan. But, again, I don’t 

think either of those countries would deny that the United States 

and our Embassies in both of those countries have played critical 

facilitating roles. 

And then, finally, sir, I would say that we have had a substantial 

long-term success in terms of some of those things that I mentioned 

in my initial testimony of helping create a sustainable Afghan Government, which is able to provide core services for its people, which 

is standing up its military. That’s obviously a Department of Defense role, but also an embassy role in the political aspects of it, 

which is providing educational services, which is providing health 

services. I can keep going, sir, but I am—— 

Mr. MEADOWS. Well, we’ll follow up. My time has expired. 

I’ll yield back. But I would welcome your follow up. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I thank the gentleman. 

Now recognize the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Connolly, for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, welcome, to our panel. 

Mr. Blanc—and I’m going to ask you to pull the mic closer so we 

can hear you. Thank you. 

Obviously, it’s always a balancing act, isn’t it, security and diplomacy? We have to make our facilities secure so people aren’t 

harmed, including people who are serving in country, and certainly 

not our diplomats, but on the other hand, sometimes security can 

circumscribe our ability to carry out our mission in a country because security can become so tight. Would that be a fair characterization, from your point of view? 

Mr. BLANC. Sir, I think that’s absolutely a fair characterization. 

And we’re constantly looking for that right balance. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. When I was—and that’s going to vary from country to country, is it not? 

Mr. BLANC. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. So your challenge in San Jose, Costa Rica, is 

quite different than Kabul, Afghanistan? 

Mr. BLANC. Not only that, sir, but our challenges in Kabul, Afghanistan, is different from month to month and has changed substantially over the course of our mission. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Speaking of which, when Mr. Lynch and I traveled together to Kabul several years ago, we stayed on the compound, but I think there were, like, little wooden buildings, little 

cottages we stayed in. I forget what they called them. But they certainly weren’t reinforced. And we were on the Embassy compound. 

And at least at that time, we weren’t overly concerned about our 

personal security. There had been some lobbing of grenades or 

rocket shells into the compound, as I recall, but not while we were 

there, and we weren’t, as I said—either that or maybe the Embassy 

wasn’t overly concerned about Members of Congress being overly 

secure. I don’t know. 

Has the situation deteriorated such that we are now concerned 

about that in Kabul? 


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Mr. BLANC. Sir, I’ll start, and then I’ll ask Mr. Starr to continue. 

The security situation in Kabul has substantially changed over 

time. I mean, starting from 2002, where it was relatively permissive, through a number of years where it got a little bit worse over 

time but was still generally permissive, it is at a very much more 

difficult stage right now. The Government of Afghanistan at the 

end of last year took full responsibility for the security of their 

country. They are exercising that responsibility quite well, they are 

standing in the face of a vicious onslaught, but there is still a real, 

you know, result in terms of everybody’s personal security, Americans, Afghans, everybody else, as that transition settles in. And so, 

yes, sir, the situation has changed. And Mr. Starr—— 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, actually, the verb I used was ‘‘deteriorated.’’ 

Mr. BLANC. Deteriorated, yes, sir. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. You agree with that—— 

Mr. BLANC. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. All right. Mr. Starr. 

Mr. STARR. Taliban networks, particularly the Haqqani network, 

have shown themselves to be dedicated to trying to attack Western 

and Afghan institutions in Kabul starting a couple of years ago, 

and it has reached quite a crescendo. The numbers of attacks and 

the different types of attacks have been very difficult to handle. In 

some cases, they’ve been very successful. In many cases, they have 

been unsuccessful, either from the efforts of the Kabul Government, the Kabul security forces. Sometimes it is Western security 

forces like ours that have protected the people and made sure that 

our people were safe. But it’s undeniable that the number of attacks has grown tremendously in Kabul. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you. I think that’s something that needs 

to be underscored in terms of the environment we’re facing in 

Kabul. 

Ms. Muniz, Mr. Courts in his testimony today recounts a comment of a State Department official explaining the challenge we 

faced with the surge in Afghanistan, and, quote, ‘‘given concerns 

about security in Kabul and pressure to get permanent hard facilities built as soon as possible, State was not going to act on any recommendation that would delay getting the contracts awarded and 

the facilities built.’’ 

Is that a fair statement, from your point of view, and do you 

want to elaborate? In fact, would you elaborate. 

Ms. MUNIZ. I think that’s a fair statement. I would qualify only 

that we wouldn’t do—I think you used the word ‘‘any,’’ or the quote 

used the word ‘‘any.’’ I think there’s—— 

Mr. CONNOLLY. On any recommendation. That’s right. 

Ms. MUNIZ. I think there are some recommendations that we 

might have considered worthwhile to delay the award of a project. 

I would put security among some of the highest requirements, but 

I would say really the goal has been to continue to press forward 

with construction of the permanent facility. So that statement is 

generally true. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. And my time’s running out too. All right. The security situation has deteriorated in Kabul, and as you point out, 


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not just for us, but for everybody. That’s tragic and needs its own 

examination. 

In your view, Ms. Muniz, the decisions we made and executed, 

is the compound more secure today than it was, say, when I was 

there back in 2009 and 2010? 

Ms. MUNIZ. I believe it is significantly more secure. And as I 

mentioned earlier, the ability to move 900 people into safe office 

buildings is a huge milestone, and in November, nearly 300 into 

another residential facility. So I would say yes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you. 

My time is up, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank you. 

I now recognize the gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Duncan, for 

5 minutes. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think all the questions 

that need to be asked have been asked, but I would like to place 

a few comments on the record. 

First of all, I want to say that I strongly agree with Mr. Mica 

in talking about how ridiculous the waste of all this is, the excessiveness of all this is, and that he mentioned the Taj Mahal. And 

The Fiscal Times reported a few weeks ago, and it said: This year 

the State Department allocated $1.11 billion to cover the 2009, 

2010 contract costs as well as other expenses for constructing the 

facility. Once it is complete, the Embassy will have 1,487 desks and 

819 beds. 

And this is in a country that, according to another publication, 

says: We’re reducing our Afghan presence from 32,000 troops to 

9,800 by year’s end, with half that number remaining in 2015. Only 

a small force to protect the Kabul Embassy and manage security 

would remain after 2016. 

I mean, we’re practically all leaving and yet we’re still spending, 

as Mr. Mica pointed out, almost $2.2 billion. This is in a country 

that has a total GDP of just slightly over $20 billion, $20.3 billion, 

30 million population. The people over there have to get by on an 

average of less than $2 a day. They must just be astounded. I think 

probably they must be laughing at us on how much money we’ve 

been spending over there. And, you know, I’ve seen for years the 

easiest thing in the world to do is to spend other people’s money. 

I remember Admiral Rendell, who later became Governor of Pennsylvania and later became the National Democratic Chairman, 

when he was mayor of Philadelphia in testimony before the House 

Ways and Means Committee many years ago, he said: Government 

does not work because it was not designed to. He said there’s no 

incentive to save money, so much of it is squandered. There’s no 

incentive for people to work hard, so many do not. That was his 

quote. 

And certainly it seems to me that mega hundreds of millions 

have been squandered and are still being squandered over there. 

Last month, David Keene, who spent 27 years as head of the 

American Conservative Union and is now the opinion editor of The 

Washington Times, he wrote this about our unnecessary wars in 

the Middle East and our failed attempts at nation-building. He 

said: As a result of our wars and attempts at nation-building in the 

Middle East, there is a generation of young Americans who have 


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never known peace, a decade in which thousands of our best have 

died or been maimed with little to show for their sacrifices. Our enemies have multiplied, and our national debt has skyrocketed. 

And I think that all of the people who have any responsibility or 

role at all in going along with the construction of this massive 

project in Afghanistan should be ashamed. I think it’s very sad 

what we’ve heard here today. And I just wanted to place those comments on the record. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank the gentleman. 

We’ll now recognize the gentlewoman from Illinois for 5 minutes, 

Ms. Duckworth. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I’d like to ask about the inspector general’s report from October 

on the Aegis contract to provide security. 

Mr. Chairman, I’d like to request that the report actually be entered into the record. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Without objection, so ordered. 

[The information follows:] 

https://oig.state.gov/system/files/aud-mero-15-03.pdf 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Thank you. 

Mr. Gulino, thank you for being here today. In this report from 

October, the inspector general raised a number of problems, and I’d 

like to get your responses to some of these. The State Department’s 

contract requires Aegis to maintain documentation of each employee’s training and security clearance, but the IG found 25 of 333 

files, or 8 percent, were missing 49 required personnel training or 

investigation documents. Can you explain why the documentation 

was missing? 

Mr. GULINO. Early on, when we took that contract over, there 

were—we took an existing workforce over, and it took a little bit 

of time to get all the documentation and the records right, the entire program up to WPS standards, which we did. We worked in 

concert with the State Department. All of our records are up-todate. State Department comes in and audits our records. We keep 

dual sets of records. The same exact record that exists in Kabul exists in our Washington office. They have audited twice this year, 

and of those two audits, they found one discrepancy, a document 

that—we typically they flag if we don’t have something—that needed to be added in, and it was added in after that. So the documentation is complete now. There is nobody that goes out to Afghanistan that doesn’t have a clearance and also doesn’t have the 

appropriate training, whether they’re U.S. or whether they’re 

TCNs, third country nationals, from Nepal. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Now, were there any people there—so the report actually says seven Aegis U.S. citizen employees working in 

various positions in Kabul had no documented security clearance 

investigations. So what you’re saying is that they had them. It’s 

just—the documentation needed to be cleared up, and that that 

problem has been solved? 

Mr. GULINO. The problem has been solved. It’s either one of two 

things. Yes, it’s either that when we assumed the workforce from 

another contractor, that documentation didn’t exist, and we put it 


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together, or the clearance wasn’t appropriate. We trained everybody, and we got all the documentation up to WPS standards. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Okay. 

Mr. GULINO. We have no further problems in documentation or 

clearances. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. That’s good to hear. 

The IG also reviewed invoices that were submitted by Aegis to- taling about $217 million, and they questioned about $8 million— 

let me just quote the amount—$8,642,485 in costs, about 4 percent 

of the contract. They said that those invoices—57 invoices are possibly—of those invoices, 8 percent, 457, were possibly unallowable 

are not supported in accordance with contract requirements. Do 

you know what those invoices were for? 

Mr. GULINO. Typically they were either—well, they were either 

for labor or for reimbursable items. We have provided—we worked 

with State Department. We’ve provided all of the documentation 

required to have the appropriate backup for those invoices, and we 

worked with them since that audit was out. 

And I also mentioned earlier that independent of the IG audit, 

Aegis conducted its own audit of the first year of the contract on 

its own with its own people and presented all of the discrepancies 

and clarified all the discrepancies. We looked at over 71,000 line 

items and compared a document called a muster to a Delta accounting program to time sheets to biometrics, and we are now proceeding on auditing the second year of the contract on our own 

without any requests from the government or the IG. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Okay. Do you know how much of that $8.6 million ended up being allowed or how much was disallowed? 

Mr. GULINO. I’m not aware of any disallowances at this point. 

We’ve presented all the documentation to the State Department, 

and they’ve not come back to us with any disallowances to the best 

of my knowledge. If there were, it has to be minor. The audit that 

we conducted verified that. We—— 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. So you’re saying the gaps in the billable hours 

are from other—the issues with those invoices were partially as a 

result of you taking over a contract, and you fixed those problems? 

Mr. GULINO. Right. That’s part of it. We took—when you take a 

contract over in any—in any instance where you take an existing 

workforce over and a new contract, especially when the procurement period is quite long, that is, from the time an RP is issued 

until the contract is awarded, the scope of work changes. 

In a situation like Afghanistan, we went into it, and the State 

Department understandably said, you know, we don’t want those 

posts anymore. Take 880 people. We don’t want those posts, we 

want these. So move the people around, change the classifications. 

And it took some time to get all of that properly documented and 

up to speed and properly invoiced. 

The audit we conducted, we found that approximately 75 percent 

of any discrepancy occurred in the first 4 months of the contract. 

And we have a good process control documentation system now so 

that that does not occur again. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Thank you. 

Ambassador Hays, I’d like to know the IG’s view of the status of 

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tions costs. Would you have a schedule—a follow up with the appropriate officials in the inspector general’s office just to make sure 

that those fixes have taken place? 

Mr. HAYS. Certainly. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. And do you have any opinion on whether or not 

you think that those problems have been fixed and that the processes in place now are adequate? 

Mr. HAYS. I conducted the inspection of the facilities in February 

of 2014. I did not participate in the audit nor the compliance of 

that, but I can certainly pass on your concerns to the IG himself, 

and he will get back to you. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Great. Thank you. 

I’m out of time. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank you. 

I now recognize the gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. Grothman, 

for 5 minutes. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Thank you. 

I guess this would be for Mr. Starr. I want to follow up a little 

bit on what Congressman Russell says. First of all, how many 

buildings are going to be in this compound total, about when we’re 

done in Kabul? 

Ms. MUNIZ. So there was an existing chancery built in 1971, 

which was the starting point. Another annex building was built 

and completed in 2005 with three residential facilities. The 2009 

and 2010 projects will provide for another unclassified annex and 

another classified annex and three more residential buildings. In 

addition, security, utility and support buildings are also included in 

the scope of the project. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Okay. So at least ten plus. Whatever. Okay. 

How many people are going to be based in these facilities when 

you’re all done? 

Ms. MUNIZ. The program that drove the facilities is 1,487 desks 

and 800 beds. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Okay. So how many people—— 

Ms. MUNIZ. So, basically, the delta is between the U.S. direct 

hire staff who sleep on the compound and those who work in the 

buildings but who don’t necessarily sleep on the compound. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Okay. So we say—how many total people, say, 

are based or work in the compound by the time we’re done? 

Ms. MUNIZ. Let me turn that over to Jarrett and to Greg. OBO 

builds to the sort of hard facility requirements, but there are many 

support workers and security who don’t have desks in the facilities 

but who work around the compound. So for a comprehensive number, I would turn to them. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Sure. 

Mr. BLANC. So, you know, in broad terms, there are going to be 

about 5,000 people on the compound between direct hires and contract support staff, including security staff. There are some ambiguities in this still because there are still planning decisions being 

made about the future Security Cooperation Office and other agencies that will come under the Embassy umbrella. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. This kind of hits me as high. That’s all. 

Of those 5,000, how many are Afghans themselves? 

Mr. BLANC. I don’t have the local—— 


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Mr. GROTHMAN. I mean, guess wildly. I don’t expect you to—— 

Mr. BLANC. About 850, 900. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Okay. So about a fifth, a little under that. Could 

we get, and you don’t have it right away today, but just because 

it hits me as a high number, what do these people do? 

Mr. BLANC. Sir, we can provide that. What I can tell you is that 

it’s the smaller portion that are direct hire U.S. staff, who are 

doing what we think of as the work of diplomacy. The larger portion are people who are necessary to support that staff, given the 

very unique circumstances in Kabul, whether that’s the security 

staff that Greg oversees or the life support staff, especially as the 

military mission draws down, and we lose some of the services that 

the Department of Defense has provided, need to provide them for 

ourselves, services that just, to be blunt, you can’t—the Embassy 

can’t rely on the economy to provide, it has to provide for itself. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Okay. Of the 5,000, how many are military personnel? 

Mr. BLANC. So, right now, of the 5,000, the number is pretty 

small. That number is likely to increase over the out years because 

as the military mission changes, there will be a Security Cooperation Office that will eventually be part of the Embassy that will 

oversee our security—the assistance that we provide the Afghan 

National Security Forces. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Okay. 

Mr. BLANC. Those are decisions that are being made right now, 

and I can’t really tell you how they’ll come out. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Okay. Just to guess wildly, you told me there 

were 5,000 total, you said a relatively small amount of military 

personnel. What does that mean? 100, 200, 300? Just guess wildly. 

Mr. BLANC. Maybe 100. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Maybe 100. So we have almost 5,000 civilian 

personnel that we anticipate having in Afghanistan? Is that the 

deal? 

Mr. BLANC. So, again, you’re combining what’s the case right now 

and what will be the case over time. Over time, I expect that military number will be a larger percentage because of the Security Cooperation Office. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Okay. Okay. Then we have a question for—I 

guess I’m running out of time. Well, was a risk assessment done 

at the Kabul site, and if it wasn’t, why not? That’s the final question. 

Ms. MUNIZ. Risk assessments are always done before the award 

of a large-scale project. So our team goes out and understands with 

the contractor what are the risks that we might encounter. 

A formal risk assessment, sort of the way we lay it out as a separate assessment was not done in the 2009 project, was done in 

2010, but I would argue that in all cases, we are assessing the situation and know what the major risks are, and those here included 

the security situation, growing staff, a changing environment, but 

those were known at the time of the award of the 2009 contract. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Okay. My time is up. 

Mr. BLANC. Sir, if I may just to correct. I’m being told that the 

correct number for current military personnel is closer to 50, beVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:23 Jul 13, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00057 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\25880.TXT APRIL

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tween the liaison for the Embassy and the residence support mission and the Marine force. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. You said total number is what? 

Mr. BLANC. It’s closer to 50 than 100. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Fifty, 50? 

Mr. BLANC. Five zero. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Okay. Thank you. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. To clarify, page 16 of the GAO report says, 

between the 2009 contract and the 2010 contract, State should 

have conducted four cost-containment studies and six risk assessments. However, for the 2009 contract, State confirmed it did not 

conduct either types of assessment. Because of the value of the 

2009 contract, which was $209 million, two separate cost-containment studies would have been required. Also, no risk assessments 

were performed and no risk-mitigation plan was developed. 

So your answer’s a little shy of the reality, at least according to 

the GAO, correct? 

Ms. MUNIZ. I would argue that—the policy that the GAO is referring to and the sort of narrow interpretation of a separate risk assessment being conducted during or before award of a project, that 

is true. But risk assessment when you look at it on its face is going 

to the post; understanding what the risks are. How are you going 

to get materials in? Are there changing situations on the ground 

that are going to impact your project? Those are all things that are 

analyzed and that are known and that are included in the cost development for these projects. And that was done with the 2009 

project, but understand that the budget for the 2009 project was 

developed in advance of knowing that there was going to be a significant increase in staff, that the border with Pakistan was going 

to be closed for 7 months, and any number of other issues that I’ve 

outlined in my testimony. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Mr. Courts, is that what happened? 

Mr. COURTS. Well, I would again just point out that the risk-assessment and cost-containment study that they did in 2010 did 

point out some of the risks that eventually materialized. And by 

the way, one of those was difficulties with the land transport of 

materials, so some of these risks were known in advance. They predicted them in the 2010 study. If they had done the 2009 study, 

perhaps they would have had more time to try to develop some 

mitigation strategies. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. And part of the—— 

Ms. MUNIZ. And perhaps we would have delayed award of a contract that is getting people into safe facilities as quickly as possible. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. They’re not safe. That’s the point. They 

weren’t safe, and now they’re way over budget. We’re missing by 

hundreds of millions of dollars. The overall project is coming in 3 

years late. It was supposed to be done last year, and now it’s not 

supposed to be done until 2017. So what’s the case to be made that 

you’ve made this huge progress by bypassing all the bureaucracy, 

you put people in a better situation because you’ve got two independent people who have come in and looked at that and, I think, 

disagree with that analysis? 

And in regards to the security, on page 17 of the report, DS officials were not sufficiently involved in the cost-containment study, 


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and it goes on for a full paragraph. That’s the frustration. Just 

reading this, this is why we’re having a hearing, you would get the 

impression that you’re not even talking to the Diplomatic Security. 

And we addressed that a little bit earlier, but that should be part 

of before you do 2009. It should have been part of 2010, but that 

evidently wasn’t done according to the report. Am I wrong? 

Ms. MUNIZ. I believe you are. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Well, this is why we have this hearing. DS 

cited—this is from the report. DS is cited in the policy as an interested office. According to the attendee delist, no one from Diplomatic Security participated in the meetings related to the study. 

You have a pretty hard case to make that you were taking security at the top of your list and putting it in there when they 

weren’t even invited into the meeting. 

Ms. MUNIZ. They were invited to the meeting. We can prove—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. So they were no shows? Mr. Starr, did your 

staff not—they just said, Forget it, I’m not showing up, not worth 

our time? 

Mr. STARR. Congressman, I think our people decided that the— 

at that—that one particular meeting, that there weren’t equities 

that we were necessary to be there. 

I want to emphasize something, though, sir. And I know that 

there are individual points that can be brought out and looked at 

by both IG and GAO, and in many cases. They bring very important things to our attention, and we correct those things. But I 

don’t want to leave you with the impression that DS and OBO 

don’t work together very closely to ensure that the physical security standards in our buildings are always—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. She just said that your people don’t show 

up at her meetings. 

Mr. STARR. At one particular meeting on—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. That’s not what this says. That’s not what 

this says. I didn’t just come make this up. I didn’t just come say: 

Hey, let’s pick on State. I’m reading a GAO report that pretty 

much concurs with what the inspector general found. And the reality is it’s 27 percent over budget. You missed it by hundreds of 

millions of dollars. You’ve got facilities that aren’t secure. There’s 

no master plan. There’s no plan for temporary facilities. And it’s 

the biggest expenditure we have in an embassy compound complex 

that we’ve ever had in the history of the United States of America. 

So you have a really hard case to tell me that we’re doing things 

better and everything’s good, just move on, nothing to worry about 

here. That’s a $2 billion expenditure, and it’s not yet finished. 

Mr. STARR. Mr. Chairman, I would disagree with your characterization somewhat, but in certain cases—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Which one? 

Mr. STARR. —you’re right. This one—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Which part? Tell me. 

Mr. STARR. This is certainly a very expensive project, it’s very 

large, but—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Tell me what you disagree with. 

Mr. STARR. That we are not providing safe and secure facilities. 

It is true that they are behind the original schedule, but we are 

building safe and secure facilities. During the entire time that we 


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were there in our temporary facilities, we have never lost a person 

on our compound even with the temporary facilities, and we’re 

building better ones today. 

Can our coordination be improved? Yes. The IG and the GAO 

pointed out that there were problems, and Lydia and I have 

worked to ensure that those problems don’t continue. There is always room for improvement. And I, quite frankly, would wish that 

we could have brought these projects in faster because moving the 

people out of temporary facilities faster gives them even better protection. We’ve been responsible for providing that protection during 

this entire time. And I think we’ve done a very good job, but none 

of us minimize the problems that have occurred in this environment as we try to struggle to bring these buildings in. 

But I will tell you that, you know, while we appreciate GAO and 

IG, and they do bring a lot of good things to our attention, not everything can be characterized as off base here. We are delivering, 

although you are correct, it is behind schedule, and it is over the 

budget. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I now recognize the gentleman from Oklahoma, Mr. Russell. 

Mr. RUSSELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, Ms. Muniz, I wanted to make a correction. It was Mr. Hays 

in his testimony that spoke about the international construction 

and safety standards and that this was causing some unnecessary 

delays between OBO and State. 

And so I would like to ask you, Mr. Hays, you spoke to these 

international construction and safety standards causing these 

delays. What were those? 

Mr. HAYS. Well, the international standards for construction, 

which OBO works to and has to work to because of legislation, are 

the same that you would apply to Embassy Berlin or a building in 

downtown D.C. They require a building to be built in a way that 

is safe and sound for a longer period of time. 

The DOD regulations authorize more flexibility, especially in war 

zones. And we raised the issue that OBO and DS should look into 

the Department as a whole, look to find more flexibility to move 

quicker in war zone situations more expeditiously. DOD has that 

authority. They have a workaround for a number of international 

standards for specific areas like Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Mr. RUSSELL. Thank you. 

Mr. Blanc, you spoke of land route delays, and I can certainly appreciate what a closed Pakistani border does to American anything 

or international anything in Afghanistan. What, though, if we 

should have something like this that happens again with such a 

large footprint now? Can you foresee a time where we would need 

to reduce a footprint and be streamlined to be more effective because now we have these 5,500 personnel? And if this happens 

again, which it’s not unlikely and certainly those routes get interdicted, what do we do about that? 

Mr. BLANC. Well, sir, I think if I can say two things. First of all, 

even during the interdiction of those routes, both the diplomatic 

and the military mission were able to continue, using a whole variety of creative logistics. And I think that in the unfortunate instance this happened again, obviously working very hard on our reVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:23 Jul 13, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00060 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\25880.TXT APRIL

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lationship with Pakistan to prevent it, we would again fall back on 

some creative logistics. 

I think your question in principle, are there conditions under 

which we would look to draw down diplomatic mission in Kabul, 

the answer is, of course, but we are always looking at a whole variety of questions, the immediate security situation, how effective is 

the team being, what specific needs do we need to fill either in the 

sort of professional Diplomatic Service or what we no longer need 

to contract, what might we be able to do on the economy in Afghanistan. Those are all questions that we address on a literal—— 

Mr. RUSSELL. And I don’t—I certainly don’t underestimate the 

complexities of the problems. I guess my concern is we’re seeing a 

pattern. We’re seeing a pattern where we’ve become so cumbersome 

with it. It becomes cumbersome to get things there. It becomes 

cumbersome to secure things. It becomes extraordinarily expensive. 

It wastes resources, and I just would think that a nation of 31 million souls with the types of problems that we have, that we can be 

efficient, but I’m not hearing that. Instead what I’m hearing is, and 

particularly from Mr. Starr, which—look, everyone at this table, I 

have no doubt, is dedicated to this Nation. I mean, look at your resumes: They’re not only impressive, but they’re long-serving, and 

I have the highest respect for all of you, and you’ve done it from 

administration to administration, and for that, I sincerely thank 

you. But I guess my—the pattern that we are seeing now is just 

an increasing infrastructure where it just grows and grows and 

grows, and it requires more security and more security and more 

security. 

And the last question that I have is for Mr. Gulino. I have no 

doubt of the ability of the Gurkhas to win almost any fight that 

they’re ever encountered in. Language barriers. You know, we’ve 

seen the posters. Got all of that. In a no-kidding combat situation, 

you’ve got an American compound and now you’ve got Gurkhas. 

How are you mitigating that? 

Mr. GULINO. In the first place, we have well over 400 U.S.—I 

didn’t mean to imply by any means, I don’t think I did—that we 

have a Gurkha workforce. We have 600 Gurkhas, you are quite 

right. They are selected from a wide pool of—— 

Mr. RUSSELL. No, I get that. But how are you mitigating the language barriers in a combat environment? 

Mr. GULINO. And they are vetted for language in Nepal first. And 

then when they go through training in Jordan, in Amman, Jordan, 

at KASOTC training, we don’t just train them and test their skills 

with weapons. We test their language understanding and their 

ability to speak English. 

Mr. RUSSELL. So all of these Gurkhas then are English speaking 

or have understanding? 

Mr. GULINO. Yes, sir. Yes, sir. 

Mr. RUSSELL. So why do we need posters then? 

Mr. GULINO. Why do we need what? 

Mr. RUSSELL. Why do we need Nepalese posters? If they are all 

proficient in the English language, then why was this an issue? 

Mr. GULINO. Well, let me just say this. It is a requirement, and 

not every Nepalese Gurkha on our post can read The Washington 

Post either from first page to the back page. 


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I think that as a matter of policy and procedure and human 

rights we should have the posting of passports in Nepali. I don’t 

question for a minute we should have had it from day one. We have 

it now and we will going forward. Anything that we communicate 

to the Nepalese, we do it both in English, as well as the Nepalese, 

including their contracts, their employment contracts. 

Mr. RUSSELL. I thank the chairman for additional time, and I 

yield back. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank you. 

I now recognize Mr. Cummings for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Courts, I would like to discuss GAO’s examination of two 

construction contracts at the Kabul Embassy. The first was awarded in 2009. The second was awarded in 2010 to a different contractor. Is that correct? 

Mr. COURTS. That’s correct. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Can you briefly describe the two sets of projects 

that were contracted and their originally estimated completion 

dates? 

Mr. COURTS. I believe that the 2009 contract was intended to 

construct a number of temporary offices and housing. It was also 

intended to construct an office annex, the unclassified facility that 

my State colleagues have referred to, as well as some additional 

warehouses, some compound access facilities, some perimeter security features, and other things. 

In the end that contractor ended up building mostly just the temporary offices and housing, and the rest of those requirements were 

transferred to the 2010 contractor. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Now, what about completion dates? What were 

the projected completion dates on the projects? 

Mr. COURTS. I don’t have the projected completion date for the 

2009 contract at my fingertips. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Okay. 

Director Muniz, according to GAO’s report, in 2011 the State Department partially terminated the 2009 contract, and I quote, ‘‘in 

part due to concerns about contractor performance and schedule 

delays,’’ end of quote. Can you please explain exactly the concerns 

were, what they were, and why was the contractors—why were 

they terminated and what was the performance issue and schedule 

delays? 

Ms. MUNIZ. So the contract included both temporary facilities 

and permanent facilities, and we knew that there was a follow-on 

contract that would be building on that base and adding permanent 

facilities. 

We had concerns that the first contractor was not meeting key 

milestones and would not be able to meet their original schedule, 

which was the end of 2012, in a way that didn’t interfere with the 

execution of the fiscal year 2010 contract. So the government terminated that contract for convenience. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And have you experienced challenges terminating this contract or other contracts due to contractor delays? 

Ms. MUNIZ. We do. It’s a challenging circumstance. So we want 

to require contractors to perform and we want to encourage them 

to have a track record of serious performance. It’s actually under 


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the Excellence initiative, one of the things that we’ve pushed is 

going to best-value awards as opposed to lowest cost, because we 

can hold contractors accountable based on past performance. 

It’s complicated and we always weigh a termination and the 

length of restarting with trying to push through with current contractors. In the instance of the 2009 contract, without going too 

much into it, we just had concerns that in the much longer term 

it was going to become a challenge for our 2010 contract and we 

realized that it would be most effective to terminate it with just the 

temporary facilities built and transfer the permanent facilities to 

the 2010 contract. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Now, Mr. Courts, according to GAO’s report, the 

rest of the contract was shifted to the second contractor who was 

working on the 2010 contract at that point. Is that correct? 

Mr. COURTS. That’s correct. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Your report also reveals that the estimated completion date of the expanded 2010 contract has been pushed out 

more than 3 years, until 2017. 

Mr. COURTS. That’s correct. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Courts, would it be accurate to say that part 

of this additional 3 years is due to the termination of one of the 

contractors and the subsequent transfer of the remaining contract 

elements to another? 

Mr. COURTS. I don’t think there is any doubt that that probably 

did add time, yes. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And your report also mentioned additional contract modifications. Were all of these modifications new or did some 

have to do with the prior 2009 contract? 

Mr. COURTS. I believe there was a mix of both. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Are you familiar with this, Ms. Muniz? Would 

you know that answer? 

Ms. MUNIZ. Which modification? 

Mr. CUMMINGS. I guess this would be the 2009 contract. Then 

they had some modifications to that. Would that have been the contract, Mr. Courts, the 2009 modifications, is that right? 

Mr. COURTS. Both the 2009 and the 2010 contract had modifications. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Okay. 

Ms. MUNIZ. That’s accurate. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Okay. 

Ms. MUNIZ. Both had significant modifications. Those were—— 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And how did those modifications come about? 

What happens? 

Ms. MUNIZ. I was just going to answer that. Those were due to 

the increase in desk requirements. And again, this is driven by national security priorities and the increase in staff. I would turn to 

Jarrett. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Well, I’m going to—unfortunately, I’m going to 

have to get to another meeting, but I just—I think there are a lot 

of concerns here. 

And I go back to something that Mr. Duncan said. And maybe 

you all can answer this for me, because I think he said something 

that just seems to be so accurate. He questioned, what is the incentive for saving money? Do we have any, Mr. Courts? 


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In other words, it seems like we spend and spend and spend, and 

the chairman has been very clear that we haven’t—that we probably could do better. So what is the incentive? 

And I have got to ask you this, Mr. Gulino. I’m going to take one 

out of the—the chairman and I were just talking about this. What 

do you pay these nationals, by the way? 

Mr. GULINO. Salaries for the—— 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Yeah, the nationals. You know, the ones that you 

hold the passports up for. Those, those folks, Nepal. 

Mr. GULINO. Oh, third-country nationals. They are paid in the $40,000 to $50,000 range a year. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. $40,000 to $50,000? 

Mr. GULINO. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. That’s quite a bit of money for somebody over 

there, isn’t it? 

Mr. GULINO. I think it’s competitive with the requirement for 

the—— 

Mr. CUMMINGS. No, I mean, I’m glad to hear that and I would 

like for you to get us some verification. I would like to see the documentation. Do you have contracts with these people? 

Mr. GULINO. Yes, I will send documentation. I will get back to 

you on that to confirm the rates. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And do they have benefits? 

Mr. GULINO. They have insurance benefits, yes. They get a bonus 

payment. At the end of their 1-year contract, they get a bonus payment. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And are they doing the same types of jobs as 

other folks who are not nationals? 

Mr. GULINO. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And you’re telling me that the rates would be the 

same, comparable for people who are doing the same work, whether they are nationals or not? Is that what you’re telling me? 

Mr. GULINO. The rates are different for expatriates. For U.S. performing similar types of work are slightly higher. Because it’s a 

market-driven thing. We can’t hire U.S. personnel. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. I understand that. But I’m trying to make sure— 

I’m just trying to figure out what you are paying. And I guess if 

you’re using our dollars, which you are—— 

Mr. GULINO. Right. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. —I’m trying to make sure you—I want to know 

what you’re paying. And I want to know—I want detailed information about that. 

Mr. GULINO. Sure. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Can you get me that? 

Mr. GULINO. I would be happy to have our staff provide that to 

you. 

But the premise is this: If you don’t need to hire all U.S. personnel and you can use fully qualified third-country nationals that 

operate in the same post, same kinds of jobs with weapons, you use 

those and it drives the cost down. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Yeah, I understand that, but I’m also concerned, 

I’m trying to make sure we don’t have a situation where we’ve got 

people making peanuts—— 

Mr. GULINO. We don’t. 


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Mr. CUMMINGS. Yeah. 

Mr. GULINO. No, sir, we don’t. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And let me finish. And then we’ve got contractors, stockholders, and others who are making millions. And I just 

want to make sure we—I read all of—I read your statement and 

you talked about reputation, integrity, compliance, and all this 

kind of thing, and that’s good. But I want to see some records as 

to what you’re paying these people. All right? 

Mr. GULINO. Yes, sir, we’ll provide that. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. All right, thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank you. 

I’ve got to wrap up with a few different questions and then we 

will conclude this hearing. I appreciate your patience. You have 

been here a long time. 

Mr. Hays, part of what Mr. Cummings and I have discussed and 

we will formalize is we are going to request of you that we look at 

the contracts, really around the globe. I’m not suggesting we do 

each and every market, but find a way to look at how these security contracts work for the security. It plays such a vital role and 

we have had some feedback in some countries that these people are 

not being paid very well. 

I’m not suggesting that is at all the case with Aegis. I’m not suggesting that at all. I’m just saying, we would like to look at it and 

feel more comfortable with it. And we will formalize something 

with you. 

There are two recommendations in the draft report where there 

seems to be a bit of conflict, and I’d like to clarify that, and if 

there’s still conflict, there’s still conflict. But recommendation 2 on 

page 50 says: ‘‘GAO recommends the Secretary of State consider establishing minimum security standards or other guidance for the 

construction of temporary structures, especially those used in conflict environments.’’ Second sentence of the response from State 

says: ‘‘DS’’—Diplomatic Security—‘‘does not support separate 

standards for temporary structures.’’ Why not? 

Mr. STARR. It’s still a disagreement, sir. We still maintain that 

our goal is to try to meet the permanent standards, the highestlevel standards, as best we can. And if we can’t, then we have to 

look at what risk that entails. We may have to give exceptions or 

waivers. But it is our goal to try in those situations to meet the 

highest-level security standard we can. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. And, Mr. Courts, why did you make that 

recommendation? 

Mr. COURTS. Well, let’s just point to the OSPB standards that 

Mr. Starr referred to as sort of the goal that they are trying to 

achieve. In reality, the only buildings that can actually meet those 

standards are permanent structures. 

They do have the waivers and exceptions process that Mr. Starr 

referred to. That’s supposed to be a process where mitigation strategies are proposed and considered as a condition for granting the 

waiver, and then a very conscious and explicit acceptance of the 

risk, considering all of those factors. 

In actual practice, we found that State doesn’t always follow that 

policy, and in fact we found a number of instances in Kabul with 


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temporary facilities that did not have those required waivers. So 

that process that was just described wasn’t followed there. 

So we think something is not working. And establishing some 

sort of standards—State is really uncomfortable with the word 

‘‘standards’’ or other guidance, and they propose, perhaps, some 

sort of template or some sort of lessons learned document that 

takes lessons learned from the experience that we have already 

had in Kabul and perhaps provide some information to those that 

are procuring temporary facilities in conflict environments in the 

future. And we think if they follow through on that, they could perhaps meet the intent of our recommendation. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. And I think part of the concern, at least my 

concern, is that many of these temporary facilities end up being not 

so temporary—I mean, many of these are there for close to a decade, if not longer—and that it is much more convenient, it’s a lot 

easier, a lot less paperwork to just deem it a temporary facility. 

Therefore, you don’t have to comply with all these other standards. 

And so I think this is part of the problem that we got ourselves 

in Libya. This is part of the problem that I see in some of these 

other places. And granted, they are very difficult, tightly configured 

situations. 

But to say that there ought to be some sort of minimum standard 

or guidance or—it’s just—it seems like a reasonable request. We 

are not solving that here, but it’s something that’s on our radar 

and that we do need to solve. 

On page 51, recommendation 3, develop—we may have exhausted this—but ‘‘develop a Kabul strategic facilities plan. Such 

a plan should comprehensively outline existing facilities’’—and we 

will go through this as we give the staff briefing. 

So I appreciate you doing that. I don’t have another question 

about that. 

And, Director, have you issued any official policies or directives 

related to OBO’s use of Design Excellence? 

Ms. MUNIZ. We’ve revised many, many of our P&PDs, our policies and procedures, to reflect our trying to do work in different 

ways; again, to include doing best-value awards as opposed to lowest cost when appropriate. I believe that we have revised in probably the last 2 or 3 years over 30 P&PDs. We could get you exact 

numbers on those and in which ways they have been—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I guess if you have issued directives related 

to Design Excellence, is it reasonable by the August 9 meeting that 

you would provide us that—I mean, I’m hoping this is just a 

photocopying exercise. This is not—I’m not asking you to create 

anything new. I’m just trying to get a snapshot of where are you 

at right now here today. 

Ms. MUNIZ. So I guess what I would say is because in my mind 

excellence is just a way of approaching our work and always trying 

to do our work in the best way we can, there isn’t one policy written about excellence. It sort of permeates through all of our policies. So if the request is for a copy of all of our—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I guess I’m looking at—— 

Ms. MUNIZ. —revised policies, we can get back to you on that. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. We had standard embassy design, which is 

something that was put forward by Secretary Powell. 


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Ms. MUNIZ. Yes. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Design Excellence was changed by Secretary Clinton. There was a new direction, a new approach, a 

new—it’s new, it’s different. But what we haven’t seen is what is 

that directive? What is that plan? What is that strategy? I’ve seen 

bits and parts of it, but it’s not just some nebulous: Hey, this is 

just a theory, we want to be great in everything we do. It was a 

concerted effort to change the way we were building embassies into 

a new Design Excellence plan. 

Ms. MUNIZ. Absolutely. So when you ask is there one policy that 

reflects that, I could give you general documents that highlight 

what the Excellence program is. We could go to all of the policies 

and procedures that have been changed to reflect that. We could 

go to the standards, which are basically a flexible set of standards 

that we provide all of our architects and engineers to say these are 

the base requirements that you need to meet in all of our buildings, 

and put our buildings together like a kit of parts. 

So we could give you many documents. I think you have requested many of those already, and we are in the process of giving 

those. So I’m happy, again, to have our folks work with yours and 

to prioritize the list of things that you are asking for and to make 

sure you get every single thing that you are asking for. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. And this is sort of the recurring theme 

here. I mean, we’re asking for what was the plan for Kabul, and 

there wasn’t one. And what is the plan for Design Excellence as opposed to standard embassy design, which was pretty clearly defined. I mean, I think we have four different reports that say—— 

Ms. MUNIZ. There are plans for both, and we can provide you 

documents for all of those things if we haven’t already. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. That would be great, because we have been 

asking for a long period of time and we still haven’t gotten to that 

point where you could say: All right, now, based on this, you should 

be able to understand everything we are doing with Design Excellence. That’s what we are trying to get to. That’s why we keep asking. That’s the goal. But I need your help in getting to that point. 

So I appreciate it. 

Ms. MUNIZ. Understood. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Okay. 

Mr. Starr, you’re involved in the construction of the new embassy 

compound in Jakarta, Indonesia, correct? 

Mr. STARR. Yes. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Have you conducted any physical blast 

testing for the facade or the outside of the Jakarta Embassy? 

Mr. STARR. Not on that particular one. We have done extensive 

blast testing on facades and glass facades and the way to—and 

what levels they will meet. I am confident that that building meets 

and actually exceeds our blast standards. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. But it has been the practice to do an actual 

blast test on the facade that would be there in Jakarta? 

Mr. STARR. No. In that case, it was within the design engineering 

parameters that the blast engineers felt comfortable that looking 

and reviewing the drawings, they said: Yes, this meets the parameters. 


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We did blast testing on the London design because these were 

very large and a different type of design, but the parameters on Jakarta fell within what the engineers were very comfortable with. 

Very experienced blast engineers. And they are confident, absolutely, that it exceeds our blast requirements. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. And can you provide us that documentation? 

Mr. STARR. Yes, I think we can. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. It is my understanding that we actually 

conduct actual blast testing. You are telling me the reason, the 

exact same materials, configuration, wall or facade that has been 

used other places, that has gone through the actual physical testing. In other words, is there anything different about this facade 

or wall that is—that has not been used before previously? 

Ms. MUNIZ. So let me take part of that question, and then we 

will turn it back to Greg. 

So the curtain wall in—the curtain wall used in Jakarta is not 

dissimilar to the curtain wall used in London to the degree that 

those are curtain walls that have what we call an open bite. As you 

know, there were tests performed on the London Embassy and the 

performance in those tests went very well. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. But there were several times where it did 

fail, correct? 

Ms. MUNIZ. No. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. You’re telling me they didn’t do any tests 

where they failed? 

Ms. MUNIZ. I’m telling you there was one full-scale blast test and 

it passed. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. But there were previous tests on that wall 

that failed. 

Ms. MUNIZ. There were component tests that were derived to 

provide information for the final blast test, but there was one blast 

test of the full curtain wall and it passed. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Okay. That’s not my understanding of it. I 

mean, I think we actually have video of it. And so be careful there. 

But I don’t believe that the original tests that were done on the 

blast wall in London passed. 

Ms. MUNIZ. There was one full-scale test of the curtain wall in 

London and it passed, and it passed with flying colors. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Are you using the exact same wall in Jakarta? 

Ms. MUNIZ. We are not using the exact same wall. But when you 

test, it is a similar—there are variations on the same system. And 

once DS was comfortable that the open bite system, which has been 

used for years in private industry, but not to the security standards 

that the Department uses, when they were comfortable from the 

results of the London test that this solution worked, they accepted 

the calculations. 

Many of these performance standards are met by calculation and 

by engineers who have done this for years. DS and the engineers 

who designed the curtain wall were comfortable that the curtain 

wall met all of the standards. 

Mr. STARR. Sir, we have done a tremendous amount of blast testing over the years, and one of the things we do is test to find out 


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what works and what doesn’t work. And in early stages we often 

find things that don’t work and then we correct them. And then we 

eventually get to the point where we think we have got a high level 

of confidence, and then we did the large-scale test of all of the panels, and then that passed. 

So failure at an earlier stage in blast testing gives us the information to make the corrections and do the right things so when we 

get to that engineering point we know we have a product that 

works. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. And so how would you categorize where 

we’re at with Jakarta and its blast wall? 

Mr. STARR. Sir, we wrote a certification to Congress. Any time 

we build a building we tell you that that building is going to meet 

or exceed the security standards and be safe and secure for our 

people, our national security activities, and our information. And 

we sent that certification to Congress, and that building will pass 

everything. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. For the one in Jakarta? 

Mr. STARR. Yes. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. And, Ms. Muniz, is the embassy currently 

in Jakarta currently scheduled to be delivered as it’s originally 

scheduled, or if it is not due to come in on time, when will it be 

done? 

Ms. MUNIZ. Right now our contract completion is 2017. As you 

might know, Jakarta was built on an existing Embassy compound. 

So we were working with a very tight site, had a multiphased 

project where the first phase had to—was to move most of the Embassy function off the compound to allow for the construction of the 

full Embassy. We encountered some difficulties with the contractor 

in that first phase which has delayed this later phase. We are 

working with the current contractor, who is a very strong contractor, through the project to see what time can be made up for. 

But right now there are no final adjustments to the project’s schedule. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. So it will be on time, or you think it might 

be delayed but you just don’t have a date yet? 

Ms. MUNIZ. I think it might be delayed, as I said, because of the 

performance—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. But you don’t know. 

Ms. MUNIZ. —of the first phase contractor, but we don’t have a 

date finalized. But when we do contractually, we can provide it. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. And how is it compared to the original 

budget? 

Ms. MUNIZ. To my knowledge, right now we are on budget. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Are there any anticipated requests from 

the contractor for additional money to complete the Jakarta facility? 

Ms. MUNIZ. I would say, until a project is completed we always 

anticipate that there will be requests for equitable adjustments 

from contractors for any number of issues, to include the issue with 

the first phase delays. 

So I would say that we expect them, like we do on any project, 

and we work through them. We manage to our budgets to the best 

that we can, to include beginning to cut things out of the budget 


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of the existing building. So that’s just an ongoing process of managing just to the budget. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. So are you aware of any upcoming requests 

for additional money to build and finish the Jakarta Embassy? 

Ms. MUNIZ. I believe I already answered your question but I 

could answer it again. Like with any contract, we expect through 

the life of the contract—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. No, I’m asking if you have any direct 

knowledge that they are about to ask you for a lot of additional 

money. Do you or do you not? 

Ms. MUNIZ. I don’t. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Do you, Mr. Starr? 

Mr. STARR. No, I certainly don’t. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I want to ask you just one more time. The 

contractor indicated any intention to request an equitable adjustment? 

Ms. Muniz. 

Ms. MUNIZ. I’ve answered this question a number of times. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I’m going to ask you, because I obviously 

know something about this. And I want you to be direct and complete with—you act as if it’s your money and it’s not. There is going 

to be some sort of consequence here. There is obviously a lot of information that I have at my disposal. 

And I want to know if you are going to be truthful and honest 

with us because you have yet to show or demonstrate to the United 

States Congress that you can produce a project on budget, on time, 

that is safe and secure. It hasn’t happened. We keep seeing overrun after overrun after overrun, Mexico City, Jakarta, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Port Moresby, Jakarta. The list is pretty long. 

London. 

Ms. MUNIZ. Congressman Chaffetz, I can go through every one 

of—if you want to have another hearing on the Excellence initiative—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Oh, we are going to. You are going to be 

a regular visitor up here. 

Ms. MUNIZ. I’m happy to do that. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. No doubt about it. 

Ms. MUNIZ. I’m happy to do that. I don’t have all of the information—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Then provide us the documents that we 

ask and be forthright in your comments. 

Ms. MUNIZ. We have provided you over 60,000 pages of documents—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I want to know what percentage. I’m tired 

of the State Department telling me that they have given us a certain number of documents. 

We have been asking for very basic documents. For instance, 

your testimony by a certain time, which was late. Everybody else 

is on time except yours. It’s just—it’s unbelievable how you respond 

to us. And we are not going to continue to stand for that. 

You’re right, we will continue to drag you up here. We’d rather 

not. We’d much rather have staff meetings and get this information. 


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Ms. MUNIZ. And we have been having those staff meetings and 

we have provided a great deal of information. I’m happy to continue to do so. 

All of the questions and the concerns that have been raised about 

the Excellence initiative with respect to cost and to schedule are 

valid concerns. But we have answers to all of those. 

And I’m also happy to report that of the four Excellence initiative 

projects, or five, that you had requested, which ones would we say 

are under Excellence, all are being delivered on budget, on schedule. The only one delayed is because of a new MSG activation, and 

we had to extend the contract to build a Marine security guard 

quarters after the award of the initial contract. Everything is as it 

should be. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. What are those four? 

Ms. MUNIZ. One minute. 

Vientiane, Paramaribo, Mbabane, Nouakchott, and N’Djamena. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank you. 

Two more questions. In Iraq, do you recall off the top of your 

head—granted, the focus of this hearing is about Afghanistan—the 

number of beds and desks built versus numbers of beds and desks 

occupied? Do you have that number or is that something you can 

provide this committee at some point? 

Ms. MUNIZ. I think that’s something we can provide. It’s not 

something I have off the top of my head. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Okay. I hope it is not a difficult ask. And 

we expect and would hope that you get that to us sooner rather 

than later. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Last question—set of questions here on 

cybersecurity. Are you aware of any network disruptions or cyber 

intrusions at the State Department that have affected OBO? 

Mr. STARR. Let me take this one. We have not—we have had network intrusions. They have not affected any of our databases and 

OBO was not affected by them. They affected our emails at one 

point, but they did not affect any of our databases or our systems. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Is there any indication that any systems 

containing sensitive information about our embassies’ physical security was either viewed or compromised, extracted, or hacked into 

in any way, shape, or form? 

Mr. STARR. I’m not aware of any information to that point. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Nothing regarding your Department, Ms. 

Muniz? 

Ms. MUNIZ. Not that I know of. Not that I know of. We could go 

back and look and ask the appropriate people, but I’m not sure 

what you’re referring to. 

Mr. STARR. Sir, through the years, and I’m going back quite a 

ways, there were incidents where some documents were improperly 

handled, security violations were handed out, and procedures were 

improved. I don’t think—I don’t believe there has been any cyber 

intrusions into this. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. It’s just over the last 12 months, obviously, 

we have had a number of issues and incidents and some very highprofile intrusions. We are on a regular basis going to be asking departments and agencies as they come up here if that’s been affectVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:23 Jul 13, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00071 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\25880.TXT APRIL

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ing them in any way, shape, or form. It’s just sort of a general 

question that we’re going to be asking. 

It’s been a long hearing. Thank you for your time. We do appreciate it. A lot of good men and women do a lot of good service. They 

care about their country. They are working hard. Please, we know 

and appreciate this. 

This is part of the process in the United States of America. It’s 

what makes our country great. That’s why our Founders, in their 

infinite wisdom, set this up this way. And that’s our role and responsibility under the Constitution, and we are going to fulfill it. 

And we appreciate your doing your jobs. And again, we thank 

you again for your time. 

This committee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:32 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 


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APPENDIX 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD


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Opening Statement 

Chairman Jason Chaffetz 

Kabul Embassy Hearing 

July 9, 2015 

Keeping Americans safe who work in Foreign Service in Kabul, 

Afghanistan is a constant challenge. 

Just last week, Tali ban militants attacked aNA TO convoy just 

500 yards from the U.S. Embassy in Kabul. 

The week before, militants stormed the Afghan parliament in Kabul in 

broad daylight. 

These incidents make clear we have to ensure our brave men and women 

serving in these hostile environments are safe. 

And one of the best ways to ensure their safety is to provide secure 

facilities for them to perform their diplomatic missions. 

Due to mismanagement by the State Department, however, that is not 

happening in Kabul. 

As a result, the American diplomatic staff in Afghanistan are being 

exposed to unnecessary danger. 

Last July, the Government Accountability Office reviewed the 

construction of the Kabul embassy facility and found the State 

Department failed to properly acknowledge known risks. 

These known risks included: 

• The award of a contract for work before the contract site was 

acquired; 
71 


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• An unrealistic schedule for the work to be completed under; 

• Changes in the number of staff at the complex; and 

• Changes in the design of the building and security requirements. 

As a result of these failures, construction would take more time and cost 

more money, leaving Embassy staff in less secure, temporarily facilities. 

In May, GAO once again reviewed the construction of the new Embassy 

complex in Kabul. 

And once again, the review identified a number of significant but 

preventable problems. 

This lack of planning by the State Department resulted in cost 

overruns and delays. 

Construction is now projected to come in at least 27 percent over 

budget and more than three years behind schedule. 

The project was originally expected to cost $625 million. 

It is now estimated to cost at least $792 million. 

Because the State Department failed to properly plan for the project, it is 

continuing to negotiate with its contractor. 

So the current cost overruns could become much larger. 

2 
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One of the factors causing these delays and cost overruns is the 

Department's failure to follow its own directive to have a strategic 

facilities plan. 

As its name implies, a strategic facilities plan outlines how a particular 

facility will be developed and used. 

The need for a strategic facilities plan is especially critical for facilities 

like Kabul, where there is a high turnover in personnel. 

The State Department recently rescinded the requirement to 

development a strategic plan for any facility, which was a requirement 

that had been in place since 1990. 

So because of the State Department's poor planning, the use of 

temporary facilities, where Americans must live and work, will continue 

indefinitely in Kabul. 

In fact, amazingly, the State Department recently requested an additional 

$124 million for temporary facilities. 

It is unclear why State didn't do a better job planning for permanent and 

secure buildings, which resulted in wasting taxpayer dollars on 

temporary facilities. 

Not only does State not properly plan for permanent facilities, it also 

has no standards for temporary facilities. 

The State Department's own actions in Kabul make clear how critical 

such standards are. 

In its FY 2008 budget request, State expressed to Congress concerns 

about the threat to the Kabul facility posed by incoming weapons fire. 

3 
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However, as GAO pointed out "the only security protection measure 

specified in the 2009 contract for the temporary housing was shatterresistant window film." 

I'm no expert, but I don't think "shatter-resistant" windows can stop a 

bullet, or worse, a grenade. 

In contrast, State contracted for the temporary offices to have a higher 

level of security and ballistic protection than the temporary housing it 

built. 

This means that employees were safer working 24-hours a day than 

returning to their temporary housing. 

The lesson here is clear: when there are no standards or guidance, the 

results are inconsistent and Americans are unsafe. 

We have to do a better job of getting our folks into the safer new facility 

as soon as possible without incurring additional cost overruns. 

The need to get this right is absolutely urgent. 

4 
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Questions for the Record Submitted to 

Assistant Secretary Gregory Starr by 

Representative Jason Chaffetz (1) 

House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

July 09, 2015 

Question: 

Since January 1, 2014, is the State Department aware of any network 

disruptions or cyber intrusions affecting the Bureau of Overseas Buildings 

Operations (OBO)? 

Answer: 

The Department is implementing a strategy to harden and modernize 

our infrastructure to better protect our data. During the periods of October 

2014 and March 2015, some individual workstations were taken off-line and 

replaced, which did include various OBO workstations. This was done at 

various times during the period. In addition, the Bureau of Information 

Resource Management (IRM) also severed connectivity to the internet to 

make security enhancements to the network due to malicious activity on two 

occasions, approximately November 14, 2014 through November 18, 2014, 

and again on March 13,2015, through March 16,2015. This affected the 

entire Department, including OBO. 
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Question: 

Questions for the Record Submitted to 

Assistant Secretary Gregory Starr by 

Representative Jason Chaffetz (2 ) 

House Committee on Foreign Affairs 

July 09, 2015 

What is the State Department's current estimate of the end-date for 

the use of temporary facilities at the Kabul embassy compound? 

Answer: 

We have not set an end-date for the use of temporary structures at Embassy 

Kabul. The use of these structures is dependent upon staffing levels at the 

embassy which are, in tum, dependent upon the evolving political and 

security situations on the ground, and as such have not been finally 

determined. However, we recently completed a permanent unclassified 

office building with a 917-desk capacity. In addition, a permanent 

residential building of 226 units is scheduled for completion this fall. By 

October of 2017 we will add an additional 320 desks and 432 residential 

units in permanent structures. These projects will significantly reduce our 

dependence on temporary structures. 
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Questions for Gregory B. Starr, Assistant Secretary, 

Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Department of State 

Rep. Eli.iah E. Cummings, Ranking Member 

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

Hearing on "Construction Costs and Delays at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul" 

July 20,2015 

I. Aegis guard employment contracts from 2012 and 2013 specify a standard workweek of72 

hours-12 hours a day for six days per week. 1 That information appears to match the 

standard promulgated by the State Department during its solicitation for contractors under the 

Worldwide Protective Services Program. 2 In a federal lawsuit filed in January 2013 against 

Aegis, guards alleged that they have worked much more than 72 hours per wcek. 3 According 

to the Project on Government Oversight (POGO), a lawyer for the plaintiffs, Hillary Schwab, 

reported that guards she represents were "overworked, fatigued, and exhausted, which made 

them unable to carry out their assigned duties protecting the embassy."4 

How many hours are Aegis guards authorized to work per week? How frequently are 

they exceeding that number of hours? Please provide documentation to support these 

answers. 

2. An Inspector General report issued in March 2013 found that emergency shelters were 

inadequately stocked with supplies of food, water, medical necessities, and backup 

communication equipment. 5 

An Inspector General audit issued in October 2014 reported that the State Department had 

issued a "deficiency notice" to Aegis in November 2012 requiring remedial action to address 

"issues with Aegis's candidate screening and recordkeeping."6 

1 Aegis Defense Services LLC.. International Assignment Employment Agreement (Apr. 

20 12) (online at www.pogo.org/documents/20 l3/contract-for-aegis-guards-in-kabul-april2012.html); Aegis Defense Services LLC., International Assignment Employment Agreement 

(June 20 13) (on line at www.pogo.org/documents/20 13/contract-tor-aegis-guards-in-kabul-junc2013.html). 

2 Department of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Worldvl'ide Protective Services 

Statement of Work (Apr. 20, 2010). 

3 Class Action Complaint and Jury Demand (Jan. 22, 20 13), Boatright eta!. v. Aegis 

Defimse Services LLC, E.D.Va (No. 1:13 CV 00091). 

4 Project on Government Oversight, Lawsuit: Kabul Embassy Guards Told to Lie About 

Long Hours (Jan. 23, 2013) (online at www.pogo.org/blog/2013/01120130123-kabul-embassyguards-to ld-to-lie-about-hours.htm 1). 

5 Department of State, Office of Inspector General, Evaluation of Emergency Action 

Plans for U.S. Mission Afghanistan (March 20 13) (A UD-MER0-13-20) (online at 

https://oig.state.gov /system/files/212779 .pdf) 
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What deficiencies, if any, has the State Department identified in Aegis's performance 

under its Kabul embassy security contract? Please provide copies of any show cause 

letters, cure notices, corrective action requests, or similar communications since Aegis 

was awarded the contract. 

3. POGO has reported that, although the State Department has confirmed that it has authority to 

withhold funds from contractors, the Department has not explained publicly whether it has 

used, or had a basis to use. that power with respect to Aegis in Kabul. Current and former 

Aegis employees reportedly informed POGO they were concerned that the State Department 

was not utilizing all appropriate measures to hold Aegis to the terms of its contracts. 7 

Has the State Department assessed any administrative sanctions against Aegis, 

including but not limited to deductions to its pay, fines, or other penalties, financial or 

non-financial? If so, please provide documents reflecting such actions. 

Has the State Department determined that it had grounds to assess any administrative 

sanctions against Aegis, including but not limited to deductions to its pay, fines, or other 

penalties? If so, please provide copies of documents reflecting such determinations. 

4. A report issued in August 2013 by an independent State Department panel found that the 

Department was routinely condoning exceptions to security standards: "Waivers for not 

meeting security standards have become commonplace in the Department. ... Department 

employees, particularly those in high threat areas. could be exposed to an unacceptable level 

ofrisk." 8 

Has the State Department waived any security standards for Aegis Defense Services? If 

so, please provide copies of those waivers and any mitigating efforts that were taken as 

a result. 

5. According to a POGO investigation, a petition filed by Aegis guards in 2013 accused leaders 

of incompetence and a lack of understanding ofthe operational environment.9 

6 Department of State, Office of Inspector General, Audit<!{ Bureau of Diplomatic 

Security Worldwide Protective Services Contract Task Order 10 Kabul Embassy Security Force 

(Oct. 20 14) (AUD-MER0-15-03) (online at https://oig.state.gov/system/files/aud-mero-15-

03.pdt). 

7 Questions for Under Secretary of State Patrick Kennedy (Sept. 18, 2013) (online at 

www. pogo. org/b I og/2 0 13/09 I questions-tor-under-secretary-of-state-patrick -kennedy. htm l). 

8 Department of State, Independent Panel on Best Practices (Aug. 2013) (online at 

www .state.gov/documents/organization/23034l.pdt). 

9 Project on Government Oversight, A "Mutiny" in Kabul: Guard~ Allege Security 

Problems Have Put Embassy at Risk (Jan. 17, 20 13) (online at www.pogo.org/ourwork/reports/20 13/a-mutiny-in-kabul-guards-allege-sccurity-problems.html) 

2 
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What is the length and hours per day of the Aegis training program for security 

contractors for the Kabul Embassy? 

Are there different training programs for the different security services Aegis provides? 

Do third country nationals receive different levels oftraining compared to American 

expatriates or Afghan contractors? If so, why? 

Please provide documentation for all of the above. 

6. POGO has reported that guards were rarely if ever given an opportunity to go to firing ranges 

to qualify in their usc of weapons. They also reported that they were often prevented from 

·'zeroing," or properly sighting, guns and optical scopes. One alleged that "sharpshooters on 

the embassy roof did not have zeroed weapons." 10 

What weapons arc Aegis contractors trained to usc, what are the testing requirements, 

and how often do they requalify? Please provide documentation. 

7. There are persistent concerns about a language barrier between U.S. and Nepalese security 

personnel guarding the embassy dating back to the previous contractor, ArmorGroup. 11 

What is the level of English proficiency required of Gurkhas and Afghan Aegis security 

personnel prior to deployment to the embassy? What grade reading level is that 

equivalent to'! 

How many hours do they spend in English language instruction per day, and total over 

the course of their training? 

What tests must Aegis personnel pass and do they have to requalify their English 

language skills? 

Please provide documentation and sample examinations. 

10 !d. 

11 Commission on Wartime Contracting, Special Report on Embassy Security Contracts 

(Oct. 2009) (online at www.wartimecontracting.gov/docs/CWC _ SR2-2009-I 0-0 !.pdf). 

3 
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Question: 

Questions for the Record Submitted to 

Director Lydia Muniz by 

Representative Jason Chaffetz (1) 

House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

July 09, 2015 

Please provide a breakdown of the number of desks and beds at the U.S. Embassy 

in Baghdad, Iraq, as ofJuly 15,2015. Specifically: 

a. How many desks have been constructed and how many are currently 

occupied? 

b. How many beds have been constructed and how many are currently 

occupied? 

Answer: 

Construction provided for 1,333 permanent desks; post reports that as of 

July 15,2015, 1,130 are occupied. There are also 96 temporary desks placed in 

warehouses, access control points, and cafeterias and only serve as work space tor 

short periods during the work day. 

Construction provided for 2,480 permanent beds in hardened structures on 

the Embassy grounds; post reports that as of July 15, 2015, 2,063 are occupied. It 

should be noted that given the security situation in Baghdad, the U.S. government 

provides beds for support contractors as they are not allowed to be in offcompound housing. 
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Question: 

Questions for the Record Submitted to 

Director Lydia Muniz by 

Representative Jason Chaffetz (2) 

House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

July 09, 2015 

What is the number of Afghan nationals expected to be present on the NEC upon 

completion? Please also provide a breakdown of the number of Afghan national 

personnel by each of the positions they are expected to occupy. 

Answer: 

We expect to have approximately 1000 Afghan nationals present on the 

NEC in 20 16; 20 17; and 2018, respectively. For a full breakdown of the sections 

in which these nationals will be employed, please see the attached document. 
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10/13/2015 12:20 

LE STAFF BY SECTION (FY 2016) (FY 2017) (FY 2018) 

Section/ Agency LE Staff LE Staff LE Staff 

TOTAL PROGRAM 117 149 149 

Executive Office 7 7 7 

Consular 19 19 19 

ECON 5 5 5 

"U Regional Affairs Office 20 20 

"' 0 

G\ POLITICAL 11 11 11 

"' POL-MIL 2 2 2 l> 

$ INL 31 43 43 

PUBLIC AFFAIRS 38 38 38 

OSC (Open Source Center) 2 2 2 

EXBS 1 1 1 

BEP 1 1 1 

Management: 376 365 365 

Human Resources Office 20 20 20 

Information Mgmt Office 60 69 69 

General Services Office 165 165 165 

n 

l> Facilities Mgmt 100 80 80 

"' "' Health Unit 6 6 6 

Embassy Air 2 2 2 

Financial Management Office 21 21 21 

CLO 2 2 2 

Regional Security Office: 143 143 143 

"' Executive Office 136 136 "' 136 0 

Engineering Security Ctr 7 7 7 

S' Other: 10 10 1 

=r OBO 9 9 ~ OIG- State 1 1 1 

STATE Sub-TOTALS 646 667 658 

USAID 275 275 275 

FBI (LEGAT) 4 4 4 

" DEA 9 9 9 

0 DOJ (U.S. Attorney's Office) 8 8 8 $ 

z Commerce 2 0 

" DOT/FAA 2 0 

~ Security Cooperation Office 5 40 40 (\) 

Defense Attache Office 2 2 2 

Special IG for Afg. Reconstruction 11 11 11 

USAIDOIG 5 5 5 

NON-STATE Sub-TOTALS 323 354 354 
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!Total COM Positions 969 1021 1012 
83 

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The Honorable John Kerry 

Secretary, U.S. Department of State 

240 I E Street, NW 

Washington, D.C. 20037 

Dear Secretary Kerry: 

I want to bring to your attention and request your response to an Embassy and Facilities 

security issue recently brought to my attention. During a June 22, 2015 visit to Paris, France in 

which I conducted oversight and review of current security matters, it was disclosed the new HD 

security cameras had not been installed at the Ambassador's residence. The reasons stated for the 

delay was that apparently lengthy acquisition requirements are required for the retrofit. After a 

post Benghazi review of facilities I conducted with then Chairman Darrel Issa, we urged State 

Department officials to expedite retrofitting of key facilities with new surveillance HD cameras 

as soon as possible. 

Your assistance in providing me with details regarding this procurement is requested 

along with specific regulations or laws that govern these types of acquisitions. 

Furthermore, any lack of ability or wavier to expedite this type of security equipment 

acquisition and installation should also be cited. Any funding delays or Jack of financial 

resources should be noted. Furthermore, at any high risk facilities are there similar delays? 

I am by this communication informing U.S. House authorities and appropriations and 

Oversight Committees of jurisdiction relay this matter and will provide each with your response. 

Finally is it correct that only one equipment manufacturer and product line has been 

approved for this type of camera surveillance. If installation of this type of security camera, at 

this and other locations, has been a cause of delay that would also be of interest. 

A timeline of action taken on the matter of the Paris France Ambassador's residence 

retrofit project is also part of this request. Finally, is there any current backlog in obtaining the 

approved equipment and what current orders and approvals are pending or delayed? 

Your prompt and complete response is requested.