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FI!...ED WITH THE 

COURT SE URITY OFFICER 

eso: tlSL 

DATE: ........-{;fH-"f4>'!!/-­ l!IJ!1CIt'l!lT 

UNITED STATBS DISTRICT COURT 

POR THB DISTRICT OP COLUMBIA 

PARRI SAEED BIN MOHAMMED, 

et. al., 

Petitioners, 

v.	 Civil Action No. OS-~347 (GK) 

BARACK	 H. OBAMA, et. al., 

Respondents. 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Petitioner Farhi Saeed Bin Mohammed ( "Mohammed" or 

"Petitioner") has been detained since 2002 at the United States 

Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Respondents ("the Government") 

argue that his detention is justified under the Authorization for 

the Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40 § 2(a), 115 Stat. 

224, 224 (2001) ("AUMF"), which grants the Executive the power to 

detain individuals engaged in certain terrorist activities. 

Petitioner disagrees, and has filed a petition for a writ of habeas 

corpus [Dkt. No.1). 

The matter is before the Court on Cross-Motions for Judgment 

on the Record [Dkt. Nos. 215-17]. Upon consideration of the 

Motions, the Oppositions, extensive oral argument and accompanying 

eXhibits, and the entire record herein, Mohammed's habeas corpus 

petition and Motion are hereby granted. 

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Because of the length of this Opinion, the Court includes the 

following Table of Contents: 

I.	 Procedural History
 3 

II.	 Standard of Review
 7 

III.	 Analysis 10
 

A. Evidentiary Presumptions	 10
 

B. Mosaic Theory	 13
 

C. Government Allegations	 16
 

1.	 Use of False Names and Documents 17
 

2.	 Attendance at London Mosques 20
 

3.	 Recruitment and Travel to Afghanistan 23
 

4.	 Guesthouse Stay 28
 

5 .	 Training 40
 

a.	 The Government's Evidence 42
 

b.	 Petitioner's Attacks on the
 

Government's Evidence 47
 

i.	 Torture Allegations 48
 

ii.	 Legal Analysis 57
 

iii.	 Reliability of Evidence
 

Procured Subsequent to Torture .... 61
 

d.	 Remaining Allegations Regarding
 

Training. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
 

6.	 participation in Battle
 72 

IV.	 Conclusion
 75 

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I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

Petitioner filed his habeas corpus petition on July 6, 2005. 

After filing, there was extensive preliminary litigation regarding 

the Court's jurisdiction to entertain detainees' petitions, the 

applicability of various statutes, and the appropriate procedures 

to be used. 

After more than six years of litigation, the most important 

legal issue was resolved by the Supreme Court in Boumediene v. 

Bush, 553 U.S. , 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008). The Court ruled that 

detainees at Guantanamo Bay, none of whom are citizens of the 

United States, are entitled to bring habeas petitions under Article 

I of the Constitution, and that the federal district courts have 

jurisdiction to hear such petitions. 

The Court did not define what conduct the Government would 

have to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, in order to 

justifiably detain individuals--that question was left to the 

District Courts. Id. at 2240 ("We do not address whether the 

President has the authority to detain these petitioners nor do we 

hold that the writ must issue. These and other questions regarding 

the legality of the detention are to be resolved in the first 

instance by the District Court."). Nor did the Supreme Court set 

forth specific procedures for the District Courts to follow in 

these cases. 

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Boumediene was, however, definitive on at least two points: 

first, that the detainees are entitled to a prompt hearing, id. at 

2275 ("The detainees in these cases are entitled to a prompt habeas 

corpus hearing."), and, second, that the District Courts are to 

shape the contours of those hearings, id. at 2276 (finding that 

balancing protection of the writ and the Government's interest in 

military operations, "and the other remaining questions [,] are 

within the expertise and competence of the District Court to 

address in the first instance."). 

In an effort to provide the prompt hearings mandated by the 

Supreme Court, many of the judges in this District agreed to 

consolidate their cases before former Chief Judge Thomas Hogan, for 

purposes of streamlining procedures for, and management of, the 

several hundred petitions filed by detainees. See Order (July 1, 

2008) [Civ. No. 08-442, Dkt. No.1]. On November 6, 2008, after 

extensive briefing from Petitioners' counsel and the Government, 

Judge Hogan issued a Case Management Order ("CMO") to govern the 

proceedings. This Court adopted, in large part, the provisions of 

that Order, while modifying it somewhat, as noted in Appendix A to 

Dkt. No. 147. 

Much pre-hearing activity has taken place under this Court's 

CMO. The Government has filed the exculpatory evidence, automatic 

discovery, and additional discovery required under the CMO. The 

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Government filed its Factual Return for Mohammed on November 15, 

2005 [Dkt. No. 10] and October 26, 2006, and amended it on November 

26, 2008. The Petitioner responded by filing his Traverse on March 

17, 2009 [Dkt. No. 232]. After a period of extensive discovery, 

both parties filed substantial briefs accompanied by voluminous 

eXhibits. 

On July 14, 2009, the court set September 3, 2009, as the date 

for the Merits Hearing on the Cross-Motions for Judgment on the 

Record for Petitioner. Mohammed elected not to listen in via 

telephone to the unclassified opening arguments, and also chose not 

to testify via video-conference from Guantanamo Bay [Dkt. No. 230]. 

Parties presented their arguments during a two-day, mostly 

classified session. At the close of the Hearing, the Court ordered 

additional briefing on the issue of the admissibility of evidence 

procured by torture, or procured from an individual who had been 

tortured prior to providing the evidence upon which parties rely. 

Minute Order (Sept. 4, 2009). On September 28, 2009, parties 

submitted briefs setting forth their positions on this issue [Dkt. 

Nos. 247-48]. 

Between the filing of Mohammed's habeas corpus petition and 

the Merits Hearing, the Government has made at least two 

determinations regarding his detention status. Petitioner was 

cleared for release by the Administrative Review Board ("ARB") in 

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2008 Order [Dkt. No. 56]. 

No. 

212] ; [Dkt. No. 

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September of 2007. See Pet.'s Mot. To Lift the Stay of
 

Proceedings, Order the Government to Provide Factual Return and Set
 

a Scheduling Conference at 2 n.1 [Dkt. No. 33]. 

See Sealed Notice of Status 

[Dkt. No. 189]. In advance of that decision, parties filed a Joint 

Motion to Stay Proceedings [Dkt. No. 175], which the Court granted 

on May 13, 2009. Another stay was entered at the request of the 

Government on June 11, 2009. See Order [Dkt. No. 193]. 

all stays in the case were lifted on July 14, 2009, 

over the Government's objection, thereby allowing the Merits 

Hearing to proceed. See Order (July 14, 2009) (setting dates for 

Merits Hearing) [Dkt. No. 205]. 

There is one other procedural event that bears mention. .. 

Notice Pursuant to the Court's July 10, 

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by the Court of Appeals in Kiyemba v. 

ID.ls.h, 561 F.3d 509 (D.C. Cir. 2009), reh'g and reh'g en bane 

denied, No. 05-5487 (July 27, 2009). See Order (Sept. 29, 2008) 

[Dkt. No. 80]. 

_ [Dkt. No. 202; civ. No. 08-442, Dkt. No. 1824]. That 

motion is pending. 

II.	 STANDARD OF REVIEW 

The Government bears the burden of establishing that detention 

is justified. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2270; Hamdi, 542 U.S. 

507, 533-34 (2004). It must do so by a preponderance of the 

evidence. Order, Appendix A at § II.A (Feb. 12, 2009) [Dkt. No. 

~47-2]; see also Basardb v. Obama, 6~2 F. Supp. 2d 30, 35 n.~2

(D.D.C. 2009). 

Initially, the Government took the position that both Article 

II of the Constitution and the AUMF granted the President the 

authority to detain individuals. See Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F. 

Supp. 2d 43, 53 n.4 (D.D.C. 2009). In December of 2008, the 

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Government asserted, "[a]t a minimum, . the ability to detain 

as enemy combatants those individuals who were part of, or 

supporting, forces engaged in hostilities against the United States 

or its coalition partners and allies." Resp' t' s Statement of Legal 

Justification For Detention at 2 [Dkt. No. 105]. 

Since the change in Administrations, the Government has 

abandoned Article II as a source of detention authority, and relies 

solely on the AUMF. Gherebi, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 53 n.4. Further, 

it no longer uses the term "enemy combatant." Its refined position 

is: 

[t]he President has the authority to detain persons that
 

the President determines planned, authorized, committed,
 

or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September
 

11, 2001, and persons who harbored those responsible for
 

those attacks. The President also has the authority to
 

detain persons who were part of, or substantially
 

supported, Taliban or al-Qaida forces or associated
 

forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United
 

States or its coalition partners, including any person
 

who has committed a belligerent act, or has directly
 

supported hostilities, in aid of such enemy armed forces.
 

Resp' t' s Revised Mem. Regarding the Gov's Detention Authority
 

Relative to Detainees Held at Guantanamo Bay at 3 [Dkt. No. 153].
 

In Gherebi, Judge Reggie B. Walton of this District Court 

ruled that the Government has the authority to detain individuals 

who were part of, or substantially supported, al-Qaida and/or the 

Taliban, provided that those terms "are interpreted to encompass 

only individuals who were members of the enemy organization's armed 

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forces, as that term is intended under the laws of war, at the time 

of their capture." Gherebi, 609 F. SUpp. 2d at 70-71. The opinion 

discussed the criteria relevant to determining whether detention in 

a specific case complies with the laws of war. Id. at 68-70; see 

also infra at Section IV. 

In Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63 (D.D.C. 2009), JUdge 

John Bates of this District Court concluded that, under the laws of 

war, the Government has the authority to detain individuals who 

were "part of . Taliban or al[-]Qaida forces," or associated 

forces. rd. at 74. The court went on to rule that the Government 

does not have the authority to detain those who are merely 

"substantial supporters" of those groups. Id. at 76. While the 

Court has great regard for the scholarship and analysis contained 

in both decisions, the Court concludes that Judge Walton's opinion 

presented a clearer approach, and therefore will adopt his 

reasoning and conclusion. 1 

1 The Court agrees with Judge Bates' comment that the 

determination under Judge Walton's approach of who was a "part of" 

al-Qaida and/or the Taliban, rests on a highly individualized and 

case-specific inquiry; as a result, the "concept [of substantial 

support] may play a role under the functional test used to 

determine who is 'part of' a covered organization," and the 

difference in the two approaches "should not be great." Hamlily, 

616 F. Supp. 2d at 76. 

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III. ANALYSIS 

A. Evidentiary Presumptions 

As a preliminary matter, some attention must be given to the 

nature of the evidence that has been presented in this case, and 

how the Court, as fact-finder, will go about evaluating that 

evidence. In attempting to meet its burden, the Government has 

provided evidence in the form of classified intelligence and 

interview reports that it believes justify the Petitioner's 

detention. The reports contain the statements of Petitioner, as 

well as statements made by other detainees, that the Government 

argues demonstrate the Petitioner's status as a member or 

substantial supporter of al-Qaida and/or the Taliban. 

The Government requested that a rebuttable presumption of 

authenticity be granted to all the exhibits it intends to 

introduce. 2 Gov's Mem. Regarding Presumptions, Hearsay and 

Reliability of Intelligence Information at 2 ("Gov Presumptions 

Mem.") [Dkt. No. 171]. Given the Government's representations that 

the specific documents included in its case against Petitioner, as 

well as the documents provided to Petitioner's counsel in 

2 Ordinarily, "the requirement of authentication requires 

that the proponent, who is offering a writing into evidence as an 

exhibit, produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the 

writing 

McCormick 

is 

on 

what 

Evid

the 

ence 

proponent claims 

§ 221 (6th ed.). 

it to be." 2 K. Broun, 

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discovery, have all been maintained in the ordinary course of 

business, id. at 4-5, the Court will presume, pursuant to Fed. R. 

Evid. 803(6), that its documents are authentic. As provided for in 

the Case Management Order, the Government's exhibits will be 

granted a rebuttable presumption of authenticity and will be deemed 

authentic in the absence of any rebuttal evidence to the contrary. 

The Government has also requested that a rebuttable 

presumption of accuracy be granted to all the exhibits it intends 

to introduce. Id. at 2. Petitioner takes issue with the 

reliability of the evidence offered by the Government. Pet. Farhi 

Saeed Bin Mohammed's Mot. For J. On the Record at 11-21 (~Pet.'s

Mot.") [Dkt. No. 217J. The Government's request is denied for 

several reasons. 

First, there is absolutely no reason for this Court to presume 

that the facts contained in the Government's exhibits are accurate. 

Given the extensive briefing and oral argument presented by counsel 

during the discovery phase of this case, as well as the exhibits 

submitted at the Merits Hearing, it is clear that the accuracy of 

much of the factual material contained in those exhibits is hotly 

contested for a host of different reasons ranging from the fact 

that it contains second-level hearsay to allegations that it was 

obtained by torture to the fact that no statement purports to be a 

verbatim account of what was said. 

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Second, given the fact that this is a bench trial, the Court 

must, in any event, make the final jUdgment as to the reliability 

of these documents, the weight to be given to them, and their 

accuracy. Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834, 848 (D.C. Cir. 2008) 

(" [The Court] must be able to assess the reliability of the 

evidence [for itself] ."}.3 Those final judgments will be based on 

a long, non-exclusive list of factors that any neutral fact-finder 

must consider, such as: consistency or inconsistency with other 

evidence, conditions under which the exhibit and statements 

contained in it were obtained, accuracy of translation and 

transcription, personal knowledge of declarant about the matters 

testified to, levels of hearsay, recantations, etc. 4 See Hamlily 

v. Obama, Civ. No. 05-763 at 4-7 (D.D.C. Aug. 21, 2009) (order 

discussing evidentiary burdens); but see Bostan v. Obama, civ. No. 

05-883, 2009 WL 2516296, at *2 (D.D.C. Aug. 19, 2009). 

Denial of the Government's request for a rebuttable 

That Parhat came before the Court of Appeals in a 

different procedural posture does not undermine the principles it 

set forth regarding the need for the courts to assess the 

reliability of the Government's evidence. See Khan v. Obama, Civ. 

No. 08-1101, 2009 WL 2524587, at *2 n.2 (D.D.C. Aug. 18, 2009). 

4 While the Supreme court did suggest in Hamdi that a 

rebuttable presumption "in favor of the Government's evidence" 

might be permissible, 542 U.S. at 534, it did not mandate it. In 

Boumediene, the court clearly left it to the District Courts to 

craft appropriate procedures. Boumediene, 128 S. ct. at 2272. 

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presumption of accuracy does not mean, however, that the Government 

must present direct testimony from every source, or that it must 

offer a preliminary document-by-document foundation for 

admissibility of each exhibit. As the Supreme court noted in 

Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533-34, hearsay may be appropriately admitted in 

these cases because of the exigencies of the circumstances. 

Finally, while parties always retain the right to challenge 

the admissibility of evidence, the Court will be guided by the 

Federal Rules of Evidence, in particular Rule 402, providing that 

u [a] 11 relevant evidence is admissible." Once all evidence is 

admitted into the record, the Court will then, in its role as factfinder, evaluate it for credibility, reliability, and accuracy in 

the manner described above. 

B. Mosaic Theory 

The Government advances several categories of allegations 

which, in its view, demonstrate that the Petitioner was detained 

lawfully. Above all, its theory is that each of these allegations­

-and even the individual pieces of evidence supporting these 

allegations--should not be examined in isolation. Rather, u[t]he 

probity of any single piece of evidence should be evaluated based 

on the evidence as a whole" to determine whether, when considered 

"as a whole," the evidence supporting these allegations comes 

together to support a conclusion that shows the Petitioner to be 

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justifiably detained. Gov's Mot. For J. Upon the Administrative R. 

and Mem. in Supp. at 6 (internal citation omit~ed) ("Gov's Mot.") 

[Dkt. No. 215]. While the Government avoids an explicit adoption 

of the mosaic theory, it is, as a practical matter, arguing for its 

application to the evidence in this case. Cf. Ali Ahmed v. Obama, 

613 F. Supp. 2d 51, 55-56 (D.D.C. 2009). 

The court understands from the Government's declarations, and 

from case law,s that use of this approach is a common and wellestablished mode of analysis in the intelligence community. This 

may well be true. Nonetheless, at this point in this long, drawnout litigation the Court's obligation is to make findings of fact 

and conclusions of law which satisfy appropriate and relevant legal 

standards as to whether the Government has proven by a 

preponderance of the evidence that the Petitioner is justifiably 

detained. The kind and amount of evidence which satisfies the 

intelligence community in reaching final conclusions about the 

value of information it obtains may be very different from, and 

certainly cannot determine, this Court's ruling. 

Even using the Government's theoretical model of a mosaic, it 

S See, e.g., McGehee v. Casey, 718 F.2d 1137, 1149 (D.C. 

Cir. 1983) (recognizing that the "mosaic-like nature of 

intelligence gathering" requires taking a "broad view" in order to 

contextualize information) (internal citations and quotations 

omitted) . 

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must be acknowledged that the mosaic theory is only as persuasive 

as the tiles which compose it and the glue which binds them 

together--just as a brick wall is only as strong as the individual 

bricks which support it and the cement that keeps the bricks in 

place. Therefore, if the individual pieces of a mosaic are 

inherently flawed or do not fit together, then the mosaic will 

split apart, just as the brick wall will collapse. 6 

A final point must be kept in mind. One consequence of using 

intelligence reports and summaries in lieu of direct evidence is 

that certain questions simply cannot be answered, i.e., there are 

no witnesses to cross-examine or deposition transcripts to consult. 

Sizeable gaps may appear in the record and may well remain 

unfilled; each party will attempt to account for these deficiencies 

by positing what they think are the most compelling logical 

inferences to be drawn from the existing evidence. Accordingly, 

that evidence which does exist must be weighed and evaluated as to 

its strength, its reliability, and the degree to which it is 

corroborated. In any event I the Government always bears the

ultimate burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that 

6 Lest there be any confusion on this point, the Court 

wishes to make clear that it does examine "the evidence as a whole" 

and does try to contextualize it, given the limited perspective 

that the facts of any individual case offer. Having said that, the 

individual tiles must still be strong enough to keep the entire 

mosaic from falling apart. 

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Petitioner's detention is lawful. Just as a criminal defendant 

need not prove his innocence, a detainee need not prove that he was 

acting innocently. In sum, the fact that the Petitioner may not be 

able to offer air-tight answers to every factual question posed by 

the Government does not relieve the Government of its obligation to 

satisfy its burden of proof. 

c. Government Allegations 

Before trial, the substantive factual areas in dispute were 

narrowed down to (1) Petitioner's use of an alias or false name 

prior to and after his detention at Guantanamo Bay, (2) 

Petitioner's use of a false passport, (3) Petitioner's attendance 

at two mosques in London, (4) the role of terrorist networks in 

recruiting Petitioner and facilitating his travel to Pakistan and 

Afghanistan; (5) Petitioner's stay at an Algerian guesthouse in 

Pakistan, (6) whether or not Petitioner trained at a terrorist 

camp, and (7) whether or not Petitioner participated in battle. 

According to the Government, the record demonstrates that 

Petitioner traveled, trained, and fought on behalf of al-Qaida 

and/or the Taliban, and his cover story to the contrary must be 

rejected as too incredible to be true. 

Petitioner denies having any connection to terrorist groups. 

He insists that he fled Algeria due to family problems and in 

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search of economic opportunities in Europe. See JE 177 at 1 

(reporting Petitioner's explanation of his background). He lived 

in France and Italy as an undocumented alien for several years 

before traveling to the United Kingdom in 2001. Id.; Pet.' s 

Traverse in Support of Pet. for Habeas Corpus at 37 ("Traverse"). 

While in Europe, Petitioner claims he attended mosques and met 

people who suggested that he go to Afghanistan to find a particular 

Swedish woman known to Rahim (a recruiter) who would be willing to 

marry him so that he could obtain citizenship to stay in Europe. 

JE 15 at 4; JE 17 at 2-3. The Court will now examine the evidence 

relating to each of the factual areas in dispute. 

1. Use of False Names and Documents 

The Government claims that Mohammed had a history of using 

false names and a false passport. It points to instances in the 

record where Petitioner, both during his time in Europe before 

arriving in the United Kingdom and during his time in United States 

custody in Pakistan and at Guantanamo Bay, reported that his name 

was "Abdullah" or misrepresented where he was from. JE 15 at 5 

(telling American interviewers that he was French); JE 53 at 10 

(same); JE 16 at 1 (reporting that Petitioner told Pakistani 

Parties submitted a volume of Joint EXhibits, which 

comprises the vast majority of evidence presented during trial. 

Unless otherwise indicated, citations to "JE" refer to the universe 

of Joint Exhibits. 

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authorities that he went by "Abdullah"). Additionally, Petitioner 

purchased a stolen passport while living in Italy. JE 15 at 2. 

The name on the passport was Oliver Jean Christian Marie Joseph 

Bayart. Mohammed used the name Bayart, in addition to 

Abdullah, when being interviewed by American and Pakistani 

authorities. JE 53 at 10; JE 16 at 1. The record establishes that 

Mohammed used this false name and passport when entering the United 

Kingdom. JE 15 at 3. He also relied on this information when he 

traveled from London to Pakistan in 2001. at 4. 

Petitioner has little to say in refutation of these facts. 

The dispute lies in the inferences that parties ask the court to 

draw from the facts. Traverse at 35-36; 53-54. Petitioner 

insists that "Abdullah" is a kunya, an honorific name commonly used 

among people in Middle Eastern cultures. Id. at 35-36. He also 

argues that the use of false names and documents was essential for 

him to survive as an undocumented alien trying to find work and a 

home in Europe. See id. at 37; see also Pet.'s Mot. at 18-19 

(explaining Mohammed's intentions to elude immigration authorities 

and find work in Europe). When considered in this light, 

Petitioner argues that his use of "Abdullah" and the Bayart 

passport were not related to any alleged terrorist activity. 

The Government maintains that the false names and passports 

demonstrate that Petitioner is a deceitful person who was 

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accustomed to misrepresenting himself to authorities. In addition, 

while there is nothing inherently incriminating about using a 

kunya, the Government argues that these names are common among 

terrorists, who use them to hide their true identities. JE 11. 

Further, Petitioner's admission of adopting ~Abdullah" as a kunya 

corroborates other witnesses' identification of Petitioner by that 

name. Gov's Mot. at 28-29. 

Given that in the years before the attacks of September 11, 

Petitioner had regularly used false names and passports in order to 

avoid detection while he attempted to live and work in Europe 

without legal status, it is doubtful that the fact that he engaged 

in such conduct after September 11 proves anything regarding his 

, support of al-Qaida. See. e.g., JE 15 at 1-2 (explaining how 

Petitioner went from Algeria to France to Italy while evading 

authorities and working odd jobs). For this reason, Petitioner's 

conduct with respect to false names and documents is not alone 

sufficient to justify his detention. However, this conduct 

certainly demonstrates his willingness and ability to lie to the 

authorities and evade compliance with the law when it suited his 

purposes. For this reason, the Court will consider this evidence's 

significance in light of other allegations as the remaining points 

in the Government's case are analyzed. 

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2. Attendance at London Mosques 

Like the evidence that Petitioner used a kunya at times and 

that he submitted false names and passports to authorities, there 

is little dispute about the fact that he attended certain mosques 

in London after arriving there in 2001. The record shows that 

Mohammed frequented the Baker Street Mosque, and also made visits 

to the Finsbury Park Mosque, during the several months that he 

lived in the United Kingdom. See JE 15 at 2-3 (reporting 

Petitioner's admission that he attended Finsbury Park six to seven 

times, and Baker Street frequently); see also JE 17 at 2 (same). 

The significance of this attendance, from the Government's 

perspective, is that these particular mosques served as critical 

posts within an al-Qaida recruiting network. The Government argues 

that the Baker Street and Finsbury Park Mosques were important 

recruiting centers for young Muslims in the United Kingdom. JE 10 

at 1; JE 48 at 6; JE 52 at 7 (New York State Office of Homeland 

Security report referring to Finsbury Park Mosque as ~a key jihadi 

breeding ground"); JE 23 at 3 (describing third-party detainee's 

comments that Finsbury Park was recruiting center for jihadists). 

In 2003, according to a Defense Intelligence Agency 

declaration about the Finsbury Park Mosque, British security 

services raided the site and then shut it down after finding links 

to terrorist activity. JE 10 at 1; JE 48 at 6. The declaration 

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also states that several well-known terrorists with al-Qaida links 

attended Finsbury Park Mosque, including attempted shoe-bomber 

Richard Reid, convicted September 11 planner Zacarias Mossaoui, and 

participants in the July 2005 bombings in London. JE 10 at 1-2. A 

radical cleric at the Finsbury Park Mosque, Abu Hamza aI-Masri (aka 

Mustafa Kernel) ("Hamza"), served as its imam. British authorities 

detained Hamza in 2004. JE 10 at 1; JE 48 at 6. 

According to the Government, Mohammed's involvement in this 

world, in combination with his illegal entry into the United 

Kingdom and later activity in Afghanistan, is probative of his 

being part of or substantially supporting al-Qaida and/or the 

Taliban. Gov's Mot. at 10-11. 

The Government points to evidence that Mohammed frequented the 

mosques. See JE 15 at 2-3; see also JE 17 at 2; JE 46 at 5. 

Petitioner, according to an intelligence report summarizing his 

statements, had become a more devout follower of Islam during his 

years in Italy before 2001. JE 15 at 2. Although Mohammed denies 

having any relationship with Hamza, the record does show that 

Petitioner was familiar with the cleric and heard him speak on at 

least one occasion. JE 15 at 3 (reporting that Petitioner told 

interviewers, "Hamza talked about how he lost his arms fighting 

[j] ihad") i see also JE 44 at 3; JE 33 at 3 (indicating that 

Mohammed claimed that he saw Hamza only once); JE 17 at 2 (same). 

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Perhaps most importantly, the Government argues, Petitioner's 

attendance at these mosques provided entry to the terrorist network 

that eventually helped him fly to Pakistan and enter Afghanistan. 

Gov's Mot. at 10-11. Through his affiliation with Finsbury Park 

Mosque shortly after his arrival in London, Mohammed met and was 

befriended by Abdul Rahim. JE 15 at 4; JE 17 at 2. As discussed 

below, Rahim allegedly was a recruiter for al-Qaida, Gov's Mot. at 

13, and was unquestionably instrumental in arranging Mohammed's 

travel to Pakistan and Afghanistan. JE 17 at 3; see also Pet.'s 

Opp'n at 18 (suggesting Rahim gave Mohammed a "glimmer of hope" in 

suggesting that he travel to Afghanistan) . 

Petitioner offers a different interpretation of these facts. 

The mosques, according to his account, were simply centers of 

worship and community for him. Traverse at 37-39. He attended 

Finsbury Park Mosque "about six to seven times total while he was 

in London," JE 17 at 2, and then became a "frequent[]" visitor to 

the Baker Street Mosque for the remaining few months he spent in 

London, JE 15 at 3. Petitioner explained to interrogators that 

Baker Street Mosque served cheap food to attendees, which was 

important for a man of Mohammed's limited economic means. JE 47 at 

3 (reporting that Mohammed testified before the ARB that he "would 

eat at [the Baker Street Mosque] because the food was cheap"). He 

maintains that he did not seek out the mosques because they 

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supported radical political positions; rather, as a new arrival in 

the country, he was directed to the Finsbury Park area, where he 

found living accommodations and a mosque. Id. at 3; JE 37 at 2. 

According to Government intelligence reports, he told interviewers 

that he had no interest in the mosques' militant teachings, did not 

watch extremist lectures and videos about jihad, and was generally 

ignorant of the mosques' status in any terrorist network. JE 44 at 

4; see also JE 46 at 2 (quoting Petitioner as telling the ARB, 

" [t]here was no sign on the mosque that said extremist mosque"). 

As with the evidence regarding false names and documents, 

details about Mohammed's mosque attendance are not alone sufficient 

to justify detention in this case. However, the evidence on this 

point may indeed be probative of his ties to terrorist groups when 

considered in conjunction with the more serious charges, as 

discussed below, which represent the bulk of the Government's case 

against Petitioner. Only after analyzing the entire record can the 

Court determine whether the inferences that the Government draws 

from these facts are well-founded and make it more likely than not 

that Petitioner was a member and/or substantial supporter of alQaida and/or the Taliban. 

3. Recruitment and Travel to Afghanistan 

Based on the record, it is clear that Rahim--the friend whom 

Mohammed met through the Finsbury Park Mosque--conceived, planned, 

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and funded Petitioner's trip to Afghanistan. JE IS at 4 (stating 

that Petitioner said Rahim directed him to meet a man named 

Mohammed when he arrived in Pakistan); JE 17 at 2-3. The route 

laid out for Mohammed took him first to Pakistan in June of 2001, 

and ultimately across the border into Afghanistan to the city of 

Jalalabad. Petitioner does not take issue with these facts; 

instead, he insists that he undertook this travel in the hopes of 

tracking down the Swedish woman who was willing to marry him so 

that he could obtain citizenship and remain in Europe. Pet. ' s 

Opp'n at 18-19. Rahim had told him about the woman, about whom no 

name or other details are ever provided in the record. Mohammed 

had never met the woman and did not know her name. rd. The 

Government argues that this explanation is implausible, and is 

designed to cast Petitioner's prior activity in a better light as 

well as hide his actual terrorist ties that took him from London to 

training camps in Afghanistan. Gov's Mot. at 13; 30-34. 

Rahim, as the Government points out, exercised a high degree 

of control over Petitioner's trip. Rahim initiated the idea of 

Petitioner traveling to Afghanistan, then helped him acquire a visa 

to enter Pakistan, and paid for his one-way ticket. JE IS at 4. 

Petitioner used his fake Bayart passport to enter Pakistan, and 

carried with him 250 British pounds. rd. 

Rahim told Petitioner to seek out a Moroccan man named 

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Mohammed once he arrived in Islamabad, which he then did. Id.; JE 

17 at 3. While Petitioner later provided a physical description of 

Mohammed to interrogators, he knew nothing more about his contact's 

background. JE 17 at 3. Petitioner stayed in Islamabad for one 

week before Mohammed paid for Petitioner to take a taxi to 

Peshawar, a city closer to the eastern border of Afghanistan. Id.; 

JE 15 at 4. Petitioner paid Mohammed sixty British pounds for his 

services. The two then went to the house of a man named Abdul 

Rahman. Petitioner and Rahman drove Mohammad back to Islamabad, 

and then set off for a village near the Afghanistan border. Id. 

At that village, Petitioner and Rahman stayed with a friend of 

Rahman's for a few days, and then Rahman arranged for their travel 

into Afghanistan. 

Accounts vary in minor details, but it is clear from 

intelligence reports that Rahman purchased a 4x4 Mazda truck 

capable of negotiating mountainous terrain, and drove toward the 

Afghanistan border. JE 15 at 4; JE 17 at 3 (indicating the Rahman, 

Petitioner, and Rahman's driver headed into the mountains). Once 

the road become unnavigable by truck, Rahman and Petitioner 

proceeded on foot. The two crossed the border into Afghanistan 

without showing passports or visas to anyone. Id. Once inside 

Afghanistan, Petitioner and Rahman took a taxi to Ja1alabad. 

Petitioner told interrogators that "[Petitioner] could not explain 

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why Rahman was willing to do this." JE 17 at 3. In Jalalabad, the 

two travelers headed to the Arab quarter of the city, where they 

ended their journey at the Algerian guesthouse, run by a man named 

Abdul Hafiz. Ml..:..: JE 15 at 4. Petitioner paid Rahman fifty 

British pounds, and Rahman returned to Pakistan. JE 15 at 4. 

Petitioner's self-proclaimed ignorance of who was helping him, 

and why they were, at each stage of his travel, in combination with 

his handlers' obvious familiarity with shepherding individuals from 

Pakistan to Afghanistan, establishes that Petitioner's travel was 

indeed facilitated at each turn by someone with access to a network 

of contacts in the region. 

The Government attempts to demonstrate that this was a 

terrorist network, and does so in part by presenting evidence that 

the route Mohammed took to the Jalalabad guesthouse was one welltrodden by other al-Qaida recruits from London. Gov's Mot. at 

14-17 (describing details of other detainees' recruitment· and 

travel).8 Based on this evidence, the Government argues that the 

For instance, Abdenour Sameur (ISN 659), who at one point 

admitted to training at Al Farouq, followed a very similar path to 

Afghanistan. JE 23 at 2 (detailing layout and personnel at camp); 

but see JE 24 at 3 (denying that he was ever at Al Farouq). 

Sameur, like Petitioner, is an Algerian who moved from Italy to 

London. Once there, he too attended Finsbury Park Mosque. A man 

whom he also met through that mosque, Towfiq, recruited him to 

travel to Afghanistan. Towfiq sent Sameur to Islamabad first, 

where he was instructed to meet with a man named Mohammed. 

Mohammed also took Sameur to the Algerian guesthouse in Jalalabad, 

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most sensible inference to draw is that Petitioner was being moved 

along a terrorist pipeline that led naturally from his recruitment 

at radical London mosques to his participation in training and 

battle. It is simply unbelievable, in the Government's view, that 

he was being shepherded from person to person and country to 

country in search of an unnamed and unknown Swedish bride whose 

name he did not even know. Nor is there any evidence in the record 

that Petitioner had ever been to Sweden or knew a word of Swedish. 

Mohammed admitted to interrogators that Rahman knew nothing about 

the woman, JE 15 at 4, suggesting that his handlers were not simply 

friendly locals who were eager to help Mohammed in pursuing a wife. 

Petitioner, again, does not deny either the particular route 

that the Government describes, or that Rahim facilitated his travel 

from London to Pakistan and then to Afghanistan. Rather, he 

explains his travel to Afghanistan as part of his desperate attempt 

to meet this unnamed Swedish woman and arrange a marriage that 

would allow him to claim European citizenship. Mohammed explains 

that ever since leaving Algeria, he had to struggle to find work 

which was run by Abu Jaffar. From there, Sameur went on to Al 

Farouq. JE 23 at 2;see also JE 38 (travel of Ahmed Bin Saleh (ISN 

290)); Gov's Mot. at 14, 16 (detailing similar stories of Binyam 

Ahmed Mohammed (ISN 1458) and Sulimane Hadj Abderrahmane (IBN 

323)). According to records of the statements that sayab Mutij 

Badiz Ahman (IBN 288) ("Bayab") made to interrogators, Abu Jaffar 

was in charge of this Algerian guesthouse, and Hafiz was his second 

in command. JE 31 at 2. 

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and avoid immigration authorities in Europe. He traveled to the 

united Kingdom looking for employment, and met a man who gave him 

hope--however distant--that there was a way for him to remain in 

Europe and avoid being forced back into a "dire" personal and 

economic situation in Algeria. Pet.'s Opp'n at 17-19. 

The Court cannot, and does not, credit the Petitioner's 

reasons for wanting to go to Afghanistan. They are patently 

fantastic. While it is not his burden to demonstrate why he 

traveled to Afghanistan, when he does offer an explanation that is 

so unbelievable, and the Government provides credible support for 

its interpretation of Petitioner's motivation, the Court must 

choose between the two. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 534 ("[O]nce the 

Government puts forth credible evidence that the habeas petitioner 

meets the ... criteria [for detention], the onus ... shift[s] 

to the petitioner to rebut that evidence with more persuasive 

evidence that he falls outside the criteria."). In this instance, 

the Court fully credits the Government's argument that Petitioner 

was recruited and traveled via a terrorist pipeline. 

4. Guesthouse Stay 

Petitioner admits that after being led into Afghanistan by 

Rahman, he stayed at Hafiz' guesthouse in Jalalabad. 9 See, e.g., 

Source documents provide different spellings of Hafiz' 

name. However, based on context and the overwhelming phonetic 

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JE 68 at 1. The Government argues that this guesthouse was 

associated with al-Qaida, and was run by Hafiz in conjunction with 

Abu Jaffar al-Jazeeri ("Jaffar") to facilitate the transfer of 

recruits to training camps in the region. Gov's Mot. at 17-19. 

Petitioner counters that the record does not clearly demonstrate 

that he stayed at any guesthouse associated with al-Qaida, and that 

there is no reliable evidence that he used the guesthouse as a way 

station for a trip to al-Qaida and/or Taliban training camps. 

Traverse at 43-44. 

The record establishes that Rahman guided Mohammed to Hafiz' 

guesthouse in Jalalabad. JE 17 at 3; JE 15 at 4; see also JE 21 

at 1 (interrogation report of Mourad Benchelalli (ISN 161) stating 

that he saw Petitioner at guesthouse in August of 2001 before going 

off to train and then returning to house). According to statements 

that Petitioner himself gave the Government, Hafiz ran the 

"Algerian guesthouse" in that city. JE 15 at 4. Mohammed did not 

pay for food during his stay at the guesthouse, but did pay Hafiz 

twenty British pounds upon departing. JE 17 at 3. Mohammed stayed 

at the house twice, initially for two weeks and then for another 

three weeks after traveling within Afghanistan for about one month. 

similarity of each version of the name, the court finds that the 

documents are all referring to a man who operated a house where 

Petitioner stayed while in Jalalabad. 

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JE 15 at 5. 10 

The Government argues that the Hafiz house at which Petitioner 

admittedly stayed is in fact the same guesthouse that Jaffar ran to 

support al-Qaida recruitment efforts, and it supports its case by 

pointing to the statements of other detainees familiar with the 

Jalalabad facility. 

For instance, Sameur reported to interrogators that he stayed 

at a guesthouse for Algerians in Jalalabad. JE 23 at 2. He 

claimed that "Abu Jafair" was in charge there, and that Hafiz "was 

responsible for holding everyone's personal items." Id.; see also 

JE 41 at 5 (reporting that during interrogation of ISN 371, 

detainee stated that Hafiz and Jaffar were at guesthouse during 

time of his training). Sayab, an Algerian, also told interrogators 

that he stayed at the Algerian guesthouse in Jalalabad. JE 13 at 

3; JE 31 at 2. He identified Hafiz as "second in command when 

[Jaffar] was gone." JE 31 at 2; see also JE 13 at 3 ("Second in 

command of the safehouse was Abdul Hafiz."). In Sayab's 2005 

account, there were "7 sometimes eight people in the Algerian 

guesthouse in Jalalabad" when he was there. JE 31 at 2. The 

accounts are detailed, and were recorded as part of Government 

10 See also JE 17 at 3-4 (stating that Petitioner stayed at 

guesthouse twice, but not specifying length of stays); but see JE 

68 at 1 (declaration from Petitioner claiming he was at Hafiz' 

house for "about a month," but making no mention of second visit). 

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intelligence reports that were created in the regular course of 

business. The Court credits them as reliable. 

Having pointed to evidence that demonstrates Hafiz' house was 

the same facility as the guesthouse that Jaffar operated, the 

Government argues that Jaffar's house "provided lodging to j ihadist 

recruits who were headed to various al-Qaida associated training 

camps ."11 Gov's Mot. at 17. 

The Government points out, first, that Suliman Abdul Rahman 

(ISN 323) ("Suliman") told interrogators that Jaffar acted as "the 

primary point of contact for all Algerians sent to [Afghanistan]" 

as part of an al-Qaida and/or Taliban network. 12 JE 35 at 2. 

Second, Suliman provided detailed descriptions of Jaffar, and 

discussed Jaffar's participation in an al-Qaida pipeline that ran 

from London mosques to training camps in Afghanistan. Id. "Field 

comments" in Suliman's intelligence report state that Jaffar "was 

able to have Algerians and other non-Afghanis transported by the 

Taliban to his safehouses, and trained at al Qaida camps." rd. 

Suliman told interrogators that Jaffar arranged for him to be 

admitted to 

11 As discussed below, the Government also links Jaffar to 

fighting in the Tora Bora region. 

12 Neither party argues that this detainee is the same 

Rahman who led Petitioner across the border into Afghanistan. 

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also JE 7 at 2 (reporting significance of Al Farouq). Third, 

Sameur, a detainee who attended Finsbury Park Mosque and traveled 

to the guesthouse, said that funds raised at the mosque went to 

Jaffar to run the guesthouse. JE 40 at 7-8. He also told 

interrogators that occupants of the guesthouse were "encouraged to 

attend training in one of the camps," but not "pressured" to do so. 

Id. at 8. 

In yet another account, a detainee whom the Government report 

identifies only as ISN 558 stated that he knew Jaffar as the "emir 

of the Algerians in Afghanistan," a man who was "responsible for 

getting trainees to the Khalden Training Camp." JE 42 at 3. 

Although the Government admits that Khalden was "operationally and 

organizationally independent of al-Qaida," Gov's Mot. at 18 n.18, 

Id. (citing Defense Intelligence Agency Background Declaration ­

Terrorist Training Camps (JE 7 at 8». 

There is additional evidence that men who stayed at the 

Algerian Guesthouse went on to train. See JE 21 at 1; PE 2 at 2-3. 

In the case of Nizar Sassi (ISN 325), he left the Algerian house in 

Jalalabad for the Algerian house in Kabul. There he met a man 

named "Abou ((Djafar»" who informed the group that training in one 

camp had finished and that they would have to await the opening of 

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a new camp or go to another training location. Djafar coordinated 

Nizar's trip to Al Farouq. PE 2 at 2-3. 

Finally, Binyam Mohamed is reported to have given 

interrogators information that suggests the Algerian guesthouse was 

involved in terrorist activities. While detained at Guantanamo 

Bay, he stated that Jaffar informed guesthouse occupants that Bin 

Laden had called for the closing of all but two of the training 

camps. As a result, Binyam Mohamed and other recruits dismantled 

the camp at which they were training, loaded weapons into a 

vehicle, and drove them to "the Algerian guesthouse in Jalalabad 

where they were stored in a concrete safe located in the back of 

the guesthouse compound." JE 36 at 6;3 Another detainee, Sameur, 

also linked the house to weapons, claiming that he was "assigned a 

Kalishnikov [sic) while there." JE 24 at 3; but see JE 13 at 3 

(reporting that Sayab told interrogators "there were no weapons at 

the safehouse") . 

Petitioner challenges the Government's claim that Hafiz and 

Jaffar operated the same facility in Jalalabad, and also challenges 

the related suggestion that his stay with Hafiz suggests terrorist 

activity on his part. He also takes issue with the use of any 

statements made by Binyam Mohamed. 

13 See infra at note 15. 

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Petitioner claims that only he and Hafiz stayed in the 

Jalalabad house. JE 68 at 1. There is no mention in his 2009 

declaration of other guests at the house; in fact, for much of the 

month that he stayed there, according to Mohammed, he was there 

alone because "Hafi [z] was often away." In Petitioner's other 

accounts of his time at the guesthouse, Jaffar is never mentioned. 

See JE 15 at 5; JE 17 at 2-3. He argues that other detainees' 

accounts of the guesthouse do not mention Petitioner's presence 

there, except for Benchalalli. See JE 21 at 1. That account, 

Mohammed contends, simply cannot be credited because Benchelalli 

was there in August of 2001, at a time when petitioner was 

allegedly off at training. Further, Mohammed points to evidence in 

the record that suggests that it was not uncommon for guests at 

Hafiz' house to encounter few, if any, other people there. PE 2 at 

2. This intelligence report describes the guesthouse as a "villa," 

suggesting that it is at least theoretically possible that the 

facility was made up of several different buildings and therefore 

it was possible for one guest to not have any interaction with 

other guests. Id.; see also JE 21 at 1 (describing "safehouse" as 

"large structure that was very divided") . 

Petitioner's account of his stay at the guesthouse and his 

argument that he had no interaction with others in the guesthouse 

suffer from a number of weaknesses. First, his declaration claims 

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that he stayed alone with Hafiz for a month, was joined there by a 

man named "Muthaina," went to Kabul with him, and then returned to 

Jalalabad for one month after the events of September 11. JE 68 at 

1-2. He makes no mention of the guesthouse during his second stay 

in Jalalabad. However, in earlier statements made to 

interrogators, Mohammed admitted to staying at the guesthouse 

twice, both before and after his trips to Kabul. JE 15 at 4-5 

(returning to Algerian guesthouse after little over month in 

Kabul); JE 17 at 3-4 (same). The declaration does not explain 

whether he returned to the guesthouse, as he claimed he did 

earlier. In sum, Petitioner has given inconsistent statements. 

Second, in his earlier account of his travels, Petitioner 

admitted that he saw others at Hafiz' house. He reportedly told 

interrogators that "NOuradin . ., an Algerian" was "one of the 

occupants of the Algerian guesthouse." JE 15 at 5. According to 

an interrogation in October of 2002, Nouradin arrived at the house 

during Mohammed's second stay there. JE 17 at 4. Mohammed must 

have been there with at least one additional person as well, 

because he stated that he also lived with Muthaina, another 

Algerian man. JE 15 at 5; JE 17 at 3 ("Farhi met and lived with 

Mothana . at Abdel Hafeez' house.,,);14 JE 68 at 2 (declaring 

Based on context and the overwhelming phonetic similarity 

of each version of Muthaina, the Court finds that the same person 

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that Muthaina came to Hafiz' house). These admissions are 

inconsistent with his claim that he lived alone at Hafiz' house, 

and therefore bolster the Government's evidence that he was part of 

the general population of men staying at the Algerian guesthouse. 

Despite Petitioner's speculation about the existence of more 

than one Algerian guesthouse in Jalalabad, the evidence in the 

record shows that he stayed at the same facility that at various 

points accommodated groups of men who then went on to train. 

Critically, there is evidence that Petitioner's claim that he 

stayed there alone is not accurate--others identified him as one of 

the group there, and Mohammed admitted to meeting others while 

staying there. 

In sum, the court finds that the Government has provided 

credible evidence that Mohammed arrived at the Jalalabad guesthouse 

as part of a recruiting network, and stayed with other individuals 

who went on to train with al-Qaida. 15 Petitioner attempts to 

discredit the Government's argument by claiming that all of his 

travel was undertaken to meet the unnamed, unknown Swedish woman 

is being referred to. 

15 The Government has provided sufficient evidence on this 

point even without the contested statements made by Binyam Mohamed. 

Because his testimony is not necessary to prove the factual 

allegations regarding guesthouses, the Court will not address 

Petitioner's objections to his testimony in this section. 

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whom he would marry in order to obtain citizenship. Pet.'s Opp'n 

at 18-19. Mohammed insists that this motivation was behind each 

step of his journey, from his conversations with Rahim in London to 

his willingness to follow strangers into Afghanistan when he 

arrived in Islamabad. JE at 17. The Court has already rejected 

this explanation in toto. 

He maintains that his first transporter in Pakistan knew about 

this Swedish woman, but reports that his second (Rahman) did not. 

Further, he admit s that when he got to Hafi z ' house, he was 

"embarrassed" to tell his host about the Swedish bride, and so 

waited two weeks to do so. JE 15 at 4-5. When he did, Hafiz 

allegedly told Mohammed that "she had just left Jalalabad," id.; 

according to what Hafiz reportedly told Petitioner, the woman 

"travels a lot." JE 17 at 3. AS the Government persuasively 

argues, this portion of "the Swedish woman" story is as incredible 

as the portion discussed earlier. 

Mohammed further explains that he followed the advice of a man 

he had just met (Rahim) to fly from London--where he wanted to 

ultimately settle--to Pakistan in pursuit of an unnamed Swedish 

woman who mayor may not have then agreed to marry him so that he 

could obtain citizenship. He accepted the new friend's money in 

order to do so. Along the way, he forged his passport, relied on 

strangers' assistance, crossed illegally into Afghanistan, and 

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found himself in a city where he allegedly knew only one other 

person (Hafiz). He would then have us believe that he hesitated 

for two weeks in telling that one person the reason that he was in 

the city, even though the Swedish woman had been held out to 

interrogators and the Court as "the sole reason for his trip" and 

the reason for his "glimmer of hope that he could finally obtain 

those priceless residency papers." 16 JE 17 at 3; Pet.'s Opp'n at 

18; see also JE 47 at 4. 

Mohammed's stated reason for going to Afghanistan is entirely 

implausible. Further, he provides inconsistent accounts of his 

stay at the Jalalabad guesthouse. These findings undermine his 

attempts to defeat credible evidence put forth by the Government 

that Mohammed lived among al-Qaida supporters while there. The 

Government has established that it is more likely than not that he 

traveled there as part of a recruiting pipeline. Therefore, the 

Court credits the Government's evidence regarding Petitioner's 

16 Though this argument is not fully articulated by 

Petitioner, the Court does not credit the position that Mohammed 

was simply being strung along by sophisticated recruiters who 

preyed on his naive wish to meet a bride. First, Mohammed never 

alleges that Rahim and his network were doing such a thing; instead 

he sticks to the story that he was waiting for the Swedish woman, 

even after being detained for allegedly supporting al-Qaida and/or 

the Taliban. See, e,g., JE 17 at 3 (deciding to wait in Jalalabad 

for Swedish woman to return from travels). Second, Rahman, his 

second transporter, did not know about the Swedish bride. JE IS at 

4. This suggests that it was not a concerted effort by recruiters 

to hide the truth from Petitioner. 

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earlier conduct, specifically mosque attendance and travel to 

Afghanistan with Rahim's assistance. 

This Court has already ruled that guesthouse stay may not, in 

and of itself, provide an independent basis for detention. Ali 

Ahmed, 613 F. Supp. 2d at 64-65 (finding that stay at a guesthouse, 

even among al-Qaida members, not sufficient to justify detention) ; 

classified op. at 35-39. However, that is not the issue in this 

case. Here, the Government has demonstrated that Petitioner stayed 

at a guesthouse with links to al-Qaida. It has also shown that he 

traveled to that location with the assistance of a network of 

individuals tied to al-Qaida, and that he was brought to this 

particular guesthouse by those men. Further, while his attendance 

at the two London mosques may not, in and of itself, demonstrate 

membership in or substantial support of al-Qaida and/or the Taliban 

at the time it took place, his subsequent conduct (both using the 

recruiters and and relying on their travel guides), when viewed 

along with his attendance at the mosques, does demonstrate that it 

is more likely than not that the time he spent at those mosques was 

the beginning of his journey toward affiliation with al-Qaida. 

In sum, Petitioner's story about seeking a Swedish bride in 

Afghanistan does not meet his rebuttal burden. As the Court has 

noted earlier, "once the Government puts forth credible evidence 

that the habeas petitioner meets the criteria [for 

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detention], the onus ... shift[s] to the petitioner to rebut that 

evidence with more persuasive evidence that he falls outside the 

criteria." See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 534. Petitioner has failed to 

provide persuasive evidence regarding his stay at the Algerian 

Guesthouse and the Government has met its burden by far more than 

a preponderance of the evidence. This finding does not end the 

inquiry. 

5. Training 

The Government argues that Petitioner left the Jalalabad 

guesthouse to train at an al-Qaida camp, and then returned to 

Jalalabad before fleeing the country for Pakistan after September 

11. Gov's Mot. at 19-24. Its chief support for this argument 

consists of the statements of Binyam Mohamed, who told 

interrogators at Guantanamo Bay in October and November of 2004 

that Petitioner attended a training camp with him. JE 27 at 1; JE 

36 at 5; JE 34 at 2. 

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Petitioner contends that Binyam Mohamed's statements--the only 

other evidence placing Petitioner in a training camp--cannot be 

relied upon, because he suffered intense and sustained physical and 

psychological abuse while in American custody from 2002 to 2004. 

Petitioner argues that while Binyam Mohamed was detained at 

locations in Pakistan, Morocco, and Afghanistan, he was tortured 

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and forced to admit to a host of allegations, most of which he has 

since denied. When he arrived at Guantanamo Bay, Binyam Mohamed 

implicated Petitioner in training activities. Pet.'s Opp'n at 11­

13. However, after being released from Guantanamo Bay, he signed 

a sworn declaration claiming that he never met Petitioner until 

they were both detained at Guantanamo Bay, thereby disavowing the 

statements he made at Guantanamo Bay about training with 

Petitioner. In that sworn declaration Binyam Mohamed stated that 

he was forced to make untrue statements about many detainees, 

including Petitioner. JE 60 at " 2-6. Binyam Mohamed stated he 

made these statements because of "torture or coercion," id. at , 8, 

that he was "fed a large amount of information" while in detention, 

and that he resorted to making up some stories. rd. at , 5-6. The 

Government does not challenge Petitioner's evidence of Binyam 

Mohamed's abuse. 

a. The Government's Evidence 

The inculpatory statements that Binyam Mohamed made against 

Petitioner are contained in intelligence reports based on 

interrogations at Guantanamo Bay in October and November of 2004. 

See JE 27 (October 29, 2004, interrogation at Guantanamo Bay); JE 

36 (November 5, 2004, interrogation at Guantanamo Bay) i JE 34 

(same). The Government argues that Special Agent 

who had interviewed Binyam Mohamed as early as July 21, 2004, at 

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Bagram Air Base, developed a relationship with him that was nonabusive, and, in fact, cordial and cooperative. Gov's Opp' n at 

16-18. It suggests that over time the two built a rapport that 

allowed the detainee to voluntarily provide accurate information. 

See JE 55 at , 4 (stating that Special Agent ........ created 18 

interview reports based on many meetings with Binyam Mohamed). The 

Government stresses that it relies on these voluntary confessions 

given at Guantanamo Bay, and not any statements procured by earlier 

alleged mistreatment, in establishing its case against Petitioner. 

Gov's Opp'n at 15-16. 

In support of its claim that Binyam Mohamed's statements at 

Guantanamo Bay were not coerced, the Government offers a signed and 

sworn declaration from Special Agent ........ stating that the 

witness demonstrated a "polite and cooperative demeanor" at Bagram, 

JE 55 at , 4; see also id. at , 17 (describing Binyam Mohamed as 

"kind, polite, and relaxed"), and was "kind, polite, and relaxed 

throughout [their] meetings at Guantanamo," id. at 26. He states 

that the witness did not raise any allegation of torture during 

these meetings. Id. at , 26. 

The intelligence reports that the Government directly relies 

on to place Petitioner at a training camp are consistent with 

Special Agent characterization of the interrogations.

On October 29, 2004, Binyam Mohamed was interrogated at Guantanamo 

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Bay, just after he arrived there from being held in United States 

custody in Afghanistan. The report begins by describing various 

courtesies extended to the detainee, such as using a traditional 

Muslim greeting and offering him coffee. JE 27 at 1. 18 There was 

a brief exchange about Binyam Mohamed's health, and "[s] ubject 

detainee commented that he was doing well." The meeting 

lasted for over two hours, was conducted in English, and was 

After this prologue, the report indicates that Binyam Mohamed 

was shown a total of 27 photographs of various individuals, and 

identified 12 of them. Id. at 2-4. He identified Petitioner by 

his kunya, "Abdullah," claiming that Petitioner "trained at the 

Algerian Camp with [him] and . . eventually traveled to Kandahar 

with to [sic] [him]." rd. at 2. Special Agent _ notes at 

the end of his report that the subject was "very cooperative and 

18 The report redacts the name of the interrogator. 

However, the Court infers for the following reasons that Special 

Agent _ conducted the interview and wrote the report. First 

the interrogator's employer in the report matches Special Agent 

Agent 

's. Com re JE 27 at 1 to JE 55 at , 1. Second, Special 

testified in his declaration that he interviewed 

Binyam Mohamed on the date indicated on the report. JE 55 at , 4 

n.2. Finally, Special Agenct _ stated that he memorialized 

his interviews in intelligence reports after conducting them, JE 55 

at 1 4, and the language in the report resembles closely that 

language used in the declaration. 

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polite," and that he answered questions without betraying "signs of 

deception or resistance techniques." Further, Binyam Mohamed "at 

many times" spoke freely without being questioned or prompted, and 

the information that he provided was deemed to be consistent with 

earlier information that he provided, though it does not state 

where Binyam Mohamed provided the earlier information. Id. at 4. 

On November 5, 2004, Binyam Mohamed again claimed that he 

trained with Petitioner. There are two reports in the record from 

that date. JE 34 (Summary Interrogation Report ("SIR"»; JE 36 

(Intelligence Information Report ("IIR"». Special Agent IIIIIIII 

stated that he interviewed the witness on that date, JE 55 at , 4 

n.2, although neither report reveals the name of its author, nor of 

the interrogator. It may well be that Special Agent _ wrote 

the report contained in JE 34, because its content matches his 

declaration's description of their November 5, 2004, meeting. 19 

In JE 34, Binyam Mohamed claimed that while at training, he 

was in a group with Abdullah and two other men. JE 34 at 2. 

According to the report, Binyam Mohamed "did not believe that 

Abdullah had any purpose" in undertaking the training; he did 

19 Further, JE 34 is a SIR. The intelligence community 

creates these reports after the interrogation, and they contain all 

the details of the session. JE 1 at 7. Special Agentlllllllll's 

practice was to write reports directly after his interrogations of 

subjects. JE 55 at 4. It appears the he wrote JE 34 consistent 

with these practices. 

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comment on the motivations of the two other trainees. Id. at 4. 

During this session, Mohamed was "cooperative," but appeared 

"apprehensive" at having not seen his lawyer. Id. at 1. 

The second report based on the November 5, 2004, interview is 

contained in JE 36. Binyam Mohamed provided extensive information 

about his path to Afghanistan. He stated that "another Algerian 

from Italy, Abdullah [,] who was approximately 40-45 years old, came 

with two other Moroccans to the camp only three to four days before 

it closed." JE 36 at 5. A field comment indicates that Binyam 

Mohamed had identified Abdullah as Petitioner. Binyam Mohamed said 

that Adbullah and two others (the same men described in another 

intelligence report, JE 34 at 2) traveled back to Kandahar after 

the close of the camp, along with a man named Elyas. Id. He 

expanded on this account of the camp's closing, stating that Bin 

Laden had ordered it to be shut down. As a result, trainees tore 

down the camp, packed up its weapons, and hauled them back to the 

Algerian Guesthouse in Jalalabad, where they were stored in a 

concrete safe in the yard. The four men in Binyam Mohamed's 

training group were then instructed that they would be sent on to 

Al Farouq. Id. at 6-7. In a closing field comment, the report 

notes that "the detainee answered all questions without 

hesitation." Id. at 7. 

The Government maintains that these accounts are detailed and 

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consistent, and should be credited as accurate descriptions of 

Petitioner's training activity. The information is corroborated by 

that gathered from other Guantanamo Bay and Bagram sessions with 

Binyam Mohamed where he provided detailed and consistent accounts 

of his activity in London and Afghanistan, although Petitioner was 

not specifically discussed. See JE 25; JE 26. Further, the 

Government argues that Binyam Mohamed was treated well at Bagram 

and Guantanamo Bay, where he developed a rapport with Special Agent 

_ and provided reliable intelligence to investigators, 

including information that comprises the most serious allegations 

against Petitioner. Bolstering the Government's claims, Binyam 

Mohamed admitted after his release from detention that he did 

indeed receive training while in Afghanistan. GE 7 at 9; JE 65 at 

Daily Mail 10. This admission, according to the Government, makes 

it plausible that he could have seen other individuals, including 

Petitioner, while at the camp. 

b.	 Petitioner's Attacks on the Government's 

Evidence 

The Government's claims of reliability are undermined by the 

sworn declaration of Binyam Mohamed that he was brutalized for 

years while in United States custody overseas at foreign 

facilities. He was then transferred to Guantanamo Bay, where he 

was further detained by the United States and where Government 

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personnel quickly resumed their interrogation of him, although no 

coercive measures were used. These later interrogations yielded 

the information that the Government relies on to support several 

allegations in this case, the most significant of which is that 

Petitioner trained with al-Qaida. 

i. Torture Allegations 

Petitioner provides sworn declarations from Binyam Mohamed 

that indicate he was forced to make untrue confessions while being 

abused after United States authorities detained him overseas. JE 

65 at 1 (declaring under penalty of perjury on June 9, 2009, that 

the attached accounts of his torture "are factually accurate and 

accurately describe his treatment"); JE 60 at , 8 (declaring that 

he made false statements about himself and others because of the 

"torture or coercion [he] was undergoing"). 

In addition, Binyam Mohamed detailed his mistreatment in 

meetings with his attorney, Clive Stafford Smith, in August of 

2005. Smith recorded his client's words in a memorandum that 

presents Binyam Mohamed's story chronologically, starting with his 

detention in Pakistan, following his rendition to Morocco for 

eighteen months, his transfer to the "Dark Prison"20 in Kabul, his 

imprisonment at Bagram, and then his arrival at Guantanamo Bay. 

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See JE 65 at Mem. 1, 2, 4, 16, 19-20. The narrative is at its most 

detailed in this memorandum, but has been repeated a number of 

times, in whole or in part, by Binyam Mohamed sUbsequent to his 

release from united States custody. See JE 65 at Daily Mail; JE 61 

(collecting articles). The remainder of this section presents the 

harrowing story that Binyam Mohamed has told about his abuse, as 

recounted in either Smith's memorandum or the diary he created for 

his lawyer in 2005, and repeated since his release from Guantanamo 

Bay. 

He was initially detained while attempting to leave Karachi, 

Pakistan on April 10, 2002. He was planning to return to London, 

where he had lived recently. JE 65 at Mem. 2. According to his 

account, the Pakistani authorities held him in prison, and gave the 

FBI access to him while there. Four FBI interrogators conducted 

daily interviews between April 20 and 27, 2002. Just weeks 

after his capture, his torture began. 

The FBI questioned him about his activities, and, unsatisfied 

with his answers, threatened to transfer him to other countries 

where he would experience harsher treatment. Then, the FBI agents 

would leave the room and Pakistanis entered. They beat him with a 

leather strap, and staged a mock execution where a guard pointed a 

semi-automatic weapon at Binyam Mohamed's chest for several 

minutes, and stood over him motionless. The guard relented, left 

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the room, and FBI personnel re-entered the room for further 

questioning. Id. at 2-3 

Binyam Mohamed told his lawyer that on July 19, 2002, he was 

flown from Karachi to Islamabad. He was kept in a cell for the 

weekend. On July 21, he was taken to a military airport and turned 

over to United States authorities. Soldiers dressed in black and 

wearing masks stripped him, conducted a full-body search, and put 

him aboard a plane. He was shackled, blindfolded, and made to wear 

earphones. Id. at 4. The plane arrived in Morocco the next day, 

at a place that he believed to be near the city of Rabat. 

At this point in Smith's memorandum, he transcribes undated 

entries from a "very rough preliminary edition of Binyam's diary of 

his torture." Id. at 4. According to that diary, Binyam Mohamed 

was told that the United States wanted a story from him, and that 

he had been linked to important figures in al-Qaida, including 

Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Abu Zubaydah, Ibn Sheikh Al Libi, and Jose 

Padilla. Id. At the prison, which is described in great detail, 

he was confronted by several individuals, each of whom played a 

role in eliciting information from him. Id. at 5-6. He claims 

that the Americans wanted testimony from him to use in court 

proceedings. Id. at 6. 

In the first week at the prison, he was questioned repeatedly, 

warned that he would experience torture if he did not cooperate, 

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and told that the British government knew of his situation and 

sanctioned his detention. Id. at 7-8. Throughout the narrative, 

Binyam Mohamed conveys dates, physical descriptions of guards and 

interrogators, details about his surroundings, and details about 

his treatment. 

On August 6, his captors began to beat him. With hands cuffed 

behind his back, he was punched in the stomach many times, kicked 

in the thighs, and left on the floor, where he vomited and urinated 

on himself. Id. at 9. His entry for August 7 begins by stating, 

" [t]here was to be no more first[-]class treatment. No bathroom. 

No food for a while. I was taken for interrogation." 

The guards beat him, then demonstrated sympathy, and then resumed 

beatings. Id. at 10. While being beaten, he was fed information 

about himself and told to verify it. If he denied it, he was 

beaten; he would then confirm the information, and be ordered to 

provide more details about it. When he failed to provide more 

information, he was again beaten. After a week without any abuse, 

he was moved to a room in another location, and introduced to a man 

named \\Marwan." Id. 

Marwan told Binyam Mohamed to \\give [him] the whole story over 

again," and when the witness faltered in repeating information, 

watched as three "goons" stepped in to beat him while he was tied 

to a wall. Id. He was left hanging from the wall for an hour. 

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The men returned and resumed beating Binyam Mohamed; they kicked 

his feet out from under him so that his arms were wrenched upward 

behind him. They beat him throughout the night, and left him on 

the floor the next day. at 10-11. He heard the screams of 

others outside his cell, and thought that they were either being 

raped or electrocuted; he was kept awake at night by these sounds. 

Id. at 11. 

According to the diary, his Moroccan captors made it clear 

that they were working with the United States. Id. at 11 (stating 

that Moroccans sided with "pissed off" Americans, and would do 

"whatever [the United States] wants"). Binyam Mohamed was told 

that he was suspected of being a "big man" in al-Qaida. Binyam 

Mohamed stated that he was willing at this point to say Whatever 

his captors wanted him to, which pleased Marwan. Put off by his 

satisfaction, Binyam Mohamed mocked Marwan for being Moroccan and 

not having intelligence as the British do. rd. at 11-12. 

After this exchange, Marwan had Binyam Mohamed tied to a wall. 

Three men stripped him of his clothes with "some kind of doctor's 

scalpel." The witness claims he feared rape, electrocution, or 

castration. rd. at 12. His captors cut one side of his chest with 

the scalpel, and then the other. One of the men then "took [Binyam 

Mohamed's] penis in his hand and began to make cuts" with the 

scalpel as Marwan looked on. Id. at 13. They cut "allover [his] 

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private parts" while Binyam Mohamed screamed. He estimates that 

they cut him 20-30 times over two hours; "[t]here was blood all 

over." Id. He was given a cream from some doctors. This precise 

conduct continued about once per month for the 18 months that he 

was in Morocco. at 12-13; 16 (describing "routine" cuttings 

and use of liquids to burn him). He reports that a guard told him 

that the purpose of the scalpel treatment was to "degrade" him, so 

that when he left, he'd "have these scars and [he'd] never forget. 

So [he'd] always fear doing anything but what the US wants." Id. 

at 13. 

The captors coached Binyam Mohamed on what to say during 

interrogations, according to the diary. He was told that if he 

simply repeated in court the information being fed to him, then the 

torture would cease. Binyam Mohamed agreed to repeat what he was 

told. Id. at 14. He was told to say, among other things, that he 

met Bin Laden five or six times, that he advised him on places to 

attack, and that he had conferred with Bin Laden's deputies. Id.; 

but see JE 65 at Daily Mail 14 (claiming that he told interrogators 

he met Bin Laden thirty times). He was given names of people that 

he allegedly knew, and told to confess to being "an [a]l[-]Qaida 

operations man." JE 65 at Mem. 14. 

He was moved again in September or October of 2002 to a new 

location in Morocco. His new quarters are described in his diary 

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in extreme detail, including a listing of the color of his sheets, 

the type of toothpaste he was given, and the brand of soap he was 

supplied. For days on end, he remained handcuffed with 

earphones on, and loud music was blasted into his ears. This 

tactic, as well as others, interrupted his sleep for the whole time 

he was in Morocco. rd. at 14-15. This treatment, in Binyam 

Mohamed's account, was the beginning of a campaign of mental 

torture designed to break him. He claims that his captors put 

mind-altering substances in his food, forced him to listen to 

sounds from adult films, drugged him, and paraded naked and seminaked woman around his cell. rd. at 15. 

He wrote that the mental torture led to an "emotional 

breakdowns." rd. Throughout this period, he was subject to two or 

three interrogations per month. These sessions are described as 

being "more like trainings, training [him on] what to say." rd. at 

16. He was deprived of all access to the outdoors. He met only 

interrogators and guards while in the Moroccan prison. 

On January 21 or 22, 2004, Binyam Mohamed and two other 

prisoners were put on a plane with United States soldiers dressed 

similarly to those who had transferred him to Morocco from 

Pakistan. rd. at 16-17. Again they stripped him before 

transporting him. Binyam Mohamed recalls that one female soldier 

was assigned to take pictures of him. She expressed horror at the 

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scars on his penis. Id. at 17. 

The diary reports that Binyam Mohamed was taken to the "Prison 

of Darkness" in Kabul. He describes the location of his cell, its 

proximity to the shower room, and its size ("2m by 2.5m"). Before 

being locked in that cell, his head was banged against a wall a few 

times "until [he] could feel blood." Id. He was given a thin 

blanket, and a bucket to use as a toilet. Binyam Mohamed was 

chained to the floor and then locked in complete darkness. He was 

"hung up" for two days,21 deprived of sleep, and fed only once over 

that period. Id. at 17-18 (stating that his "wrists and hands had 

gone numb"). "After a while I felt pretty much dead," he wrote. 

Id. at 18. 

Guards bombarded his cell with loud music ("Slim Shady and Dr. 

Dre" for 10 days) and scary sounds. He was fed inedible food and 

weighed every other day. Guards made noises to prevent prisoners 

from sleeping. There were infrequent showers and even less 

frequent changes of clothes. Id. He told a British newspaper in 

2009 that he was shackled often, once for eight days on end in a 

position that prevented him from standing or sitting. JE 65 at 

Daily Mail 5. While undergoing this treatment, it appears that 

Binyam Mohamed attempted to be forthright with CIA interrogators 

21 This term is not explained. It may refer to the "hanging 

from the wall" described earlier. 

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and renounce the story he had been coached to adopt. This resulted 

in his "being chained to the rails for a fortnight." JE 65 at Mem. 

at 18. He stated that he tried to tell the truth because "the CIA 

interrogators looked understanding." at 18. 

He and another prisoner were interrogated regularly. Binyam 

Mohamed says the sessions drove other detainees crazy. He heard 

these detainees "knocking their heads against the walls and the 

doors, screaming their heads off." Id. Binyam Mohamed maintains 

that he was fed information about individuals in pictures. When he 

tried to be compliant and provide made-up information about the 

pictured men, his interrogator was initially happy, but then "did 

[his] homework" and threatened to torture him further if he lied 

again. They simply wanted him to repeat what they told him to 

say. This included an admission of his involvement in a dirty bomb 

plot. Id. at 19. 

At first, his cell was dark for all but one hour per day. 

Gradually, he was allowed more light, until it was dark for half of 

the day. Similarly, showers were not allowed initially, but later 

prisoners were permitted weekly bathing. Binyam Mohamed at first 

received food once every 36 hours. After some weeks, that was 

increased to twice per 36 hours, and by May of 2004, he received 

tea and bread for breakfast. Eventually, he was given five minutes 

per week to spend outside. Id. at 18-19. 

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In May, Binyam Mohamed and other prisoners boarded a 

helicopter destined for Bagram Air Base. While there, he was 

permitted to see the ICRC for the first time. Id. at 19-20. 

According to Binyarn Mohamed, the ICRC could not publish his story, 

because they had an agreement with the United States to "keep 

everything on the hush hush." Id. at 20. At Bagram, Special Agent 

_ made him write out his narrative. Part of this story 

repeated the lies that he was fed by his captors while in Morocco, 

including the story about his involvement with the alleged "dirty 

bomber," Jose Padilla. Id. 

In October of 2008, the Government dropped allegations that 

Binyarn Mohamed was involved in any bomb plot. See Peter Finn, Key 

Allegations Against Terror Suspect Withdrawn, Wash. Post, October 

15, 2008, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2008/10/14/AR2008l01403146.html?hpid=topnews. 

ii. Legal Analysis 

The United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, 

Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Article 15), Dec. 10, 

1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 ("Convention" or "CAT"), requires that 

governments which are party to it "ensure that any statement which 

is established to have been made as a result of torture shall not 

be invoked as evidence in any proceedings, except against a person 

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accused of torture as evidence that the statement was made."22 rd. 

The Government has represented that it "recognizes torture to be 

abhorrent and unlawful, and unequivocally adheres to humane 

standards for all detainees.. . Consistent with these policies 

and with the treaty obligations imposed by the Convention on the 

United States as a State Party, the [G]overnment does not and will 

not rely upon statements it concludes were procured through torture 

in the Guantanamo habeas litigation." Resp't's Br. in Resp. To the 

Ct.'s Order of Sept. 4, 2009, at 1-2 [Dkt. No. 248] .23 

The Government does not challenge or deny the accuracy of 

Binyam Mohamed's story of brutal treatment. Rather, it argues that 

the Court should not adopt any automatic per se rule requiring 

exclusion of the statements he made at Guantanamo Bay because they 

were not "tainted" by any mistreatment by Special Agent IIIIIIII, 

22 Under the Convention Against Torture, "torture" is 

defined as "any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether 

physical or emotional, is intentionally inflicted on a person for 

such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information 

or a confession . . . when such pain or suffering is inflicted by 

or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a 

public official or other person acting in an official capacity." 

CAT, art. 1 (1) . 

23 On September 4, 2009, the Court directed parties to 

submit additional briefing regarding the admissibility of evidence 

procured by torture. Specifically, parties were asked to address 

federal and international law concerning: 1) the admissibility of 

evidence procured by torture; and 2) the admissibility of evidence 

procured 

providing 

from 

the e

an 

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individual 

nce upon w

who 

hich an

had 

y p

been 

arty relies. 

tortured prior 

. 

to 

81!!!M1'f 

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or anyone else at that detention center. The Government candidly 

"acknowledges that there is a dearth of precedent directly on 

point," and suggests using existing case law in the criminal area 

as a useful, albeit not perfect, analogy. .Id.... at 3. The Court 

agrees .24 

In the criminal context, confessions or testimony procured by 

torture are excluded under the Due Process Clause because such 

admissions would run contrary to "fundamental principles of liberty 

and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political 

institutions." Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 286 (1936) .25 

Also, as a practical matter, resort to coercive tactics by an 

interrogator renders the information less likely to be true. 

Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 638 (1965). Courts must 

therefore determine if the confession or testimony was given 

voluntarily. 

The use of coercion or torture to procure information does not 

automatically render subsequent confessions of that information 

24 Petitioner claims that "U. S. federal law and treaties and 

norms of international law have outlawed torture and applied . . . 

a categorical rule of inadmissibility of evidence obtained directly 

or indirectly through torture." Pet.' s Mem. of Law Regarding 

Admissibility of Evidence Tainted by Torture, at 1 [Dkt. No. 247]. 

However, none of his citations support such a broad statement. 

25 As the Supreme Court eloquently stated, "[t]he rack and 

torture chamber may not be substituted for the witness stand." 

Brown, 297 U.S. at 285-86. 

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inadmissible. United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 540-41 (1947). 

The effects of the initial coercion may be found to have dissipated 

to the point where the subsequent confessions can be considered 

voluntary. M....: Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298. 311-12 (198S) 

(discussing Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596, 603 (1944)); United 

States v. Karake, 443 F. Supp. 2d 8, 86 (D.D.C. 2006). The 

Government bears the burden of showing that the confessions are 

voluntary. Karake, 443 F. Supp. 2d at 49-50. 

To determine if the effects of the earlier coercion have 

dissipated--that is, to determine the voluntariness of the 

subsequent confessions--courts apply a "totality of the 

circumstances" test. rd. at 87. The Supreme Court has ruled that 

"the time that passes between confessions, the change in place of 

interrogations, and the change in identity of the interrogators all 

bear on whether that coercion has carried over into the second 

confession." Elstad, 470 U.S. at 310. Further, courts should 

examine, inter alia, the age, education, intelligence, and mental 

health of the witness; whether he has received advice regarding his 

Constitutional rights; the length of detention; the "repeated and 

prolonged nature of the questioning"; and the "use of physical 

punishment such as the deprivation of food or sleep." Schneckloth 

v.	 Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973). 

This multi-factor inquiry aims to uncover whether there has 

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been a "break in the stream of events . sufficient to insulate 

the statement from the effect of all that went before." Clewis v. 

State of Texas, 386 U.S. 707, 710 (1967). The test has already 

been applied in the context of Guantanamo Bay litigation. See Al 

Rabiah v. United States, civ. NO. 02-828, classified op. at 51-52 

(D.D.C. September 17, 2009) (finding that Government did not meet 

burden of showing dissipation of coercion). The Supreme Court's 

framework for deciding whether subsequent confessions are voluntary 

is to "determine [] the factual circumstances surrounding the 

confession, assess[] the psychological impact on the accused," and 

then issue a legal conclusion. Schneckloth, 412 U. S. at 226. 

iii. Reliability of Evidence Procured 

Subsequent to Torture 

Under the framework contemplated by Schneckloth, id., the 

Court must assess the reliability of the facts surrounding the 

alleged mistreatment. In this case, the account in Binyam 

Mohamed's diary bears several indicia of reliability. First, it is 

extraordinarily detailed. The diary, written in the witness' own 

words, provides approximate dates at multiple points in the 

narrative, describes the physical features and conduct of guards 

and interrogators, and is consistent throughout several accounts. 

Second, the fact that Binyam Mohamed has vigorously and very 

pUblicly pursued his claims in British courts subsequent to his 

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release from Guantanamo Bay suggests that the horrific accounts of 

his torture were not simply stories created solely to exculpate 

himself. David Stringer, EX-Gitmo Detainees Sue UK to Make 

Evidence Public, The Associated Press, October 27, 2009, available 

at http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/E/EU_BRITAIN_GUANTANAMO 

?SITE=FLTAM&SECTION=HOME&TEMPLATE=DEFAULT. His persistence in 

telling his story demonstrates his willingness to test the truth of 

his version of events in both the courts of law as well as the 

court of public opinion. 

The record does not indicate whether the evidence procured 

under torture includes information related to Petitioner. Binyam 

Mohamed insists that it does not, as he did not know Petitioner 

until he arrived at Guantanamo Bay in 2004. JE 60. Indeed, the 

record of earlier interrogations of Binyam Mohamed does not include 

any mention of Petitioner. See JE 73. Significantly, the 

Government neither confirms nor denies his account of his abuse 

while in United States custody; instead, it focuses on the 

allegedly voluntary statements provided to Special Agent IIIIIIII 

in the wake of Binyam Mohamed's mistreatment. Gov's Opp'n at 15­

17. 

Special Agent _ began his questioning of Binyam Mohamed 

at Bagram in July of 2004, just over two months after he was 

transferred from the Dark Prison. Following a September transfer 

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to Guantanamo Bay, the questioning continued. When considering the 

amount of time which has elapsed between the coerced confession and 

the sUbsequent one, courts have never insisted that a specific 

amount of time must pass before the taint of earlier mistreatment 

has dissipated. See, e.g., Lyons, 322 U.S. at 603-04 (twelve 

hours); United States v. Shi, 525 F.3d 709, 727 (9th Cir. 2008) 

(one day). Indeed, as a legal matter, it has been held that the 

effects of earlier coercion could last for nearly one year. See Ai 

Rabiah, classified op. at 52 (finding that without Government 

evidence to the contrary, effects of torture could poison 

confession made nine months later). 

A totality of the circumstances inquiry, therefore, cannot be 

reduced simply to mechanical computations of time. See 

Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226 ("The significant fact about all of 

these decisions is that none of them turned on the presence or 

absence of a single controlling criterion; each reflected a careful 

scrutiny of all the surrounding circumstances."). Where one court 

has found days to be sufficient to represent a dissipation in the 

effects of torture, another may require substantially more time. 

This court concludes that the temporal break in this case was not 

long enough--given the length of the abuse, its severity, and the 

fact that it was targeted to overwhelm the Petitioner mentally as 

well as physically--to "insulate the statement from the effect of 

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all that went before." Clewis, 386 U.S. at 710. 

First, Binyam Mohamed's lengthy and brutal experience in 

detention weighs heavily with the Court. For example, this is not 

a case where a person was repeatedly questioned by a police 

officer, in his own country, by his own fellow-citizens, at a 

police station, over several days without sleep and with only 

minimal amounts of food and water. See Ashcraft v. State of Tenn., 

322 U.S. 143, 153-54 (1944); Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 440-41 

(1961) (murder suspect held incommunicado for eight days, 

questioned extensively for four, and interrogated while sick). 

While neither the Ashcraft nor Reck scenarios are to be approved, 

they can hardly compare with the facts alleged here. 

The difference, of course, is that Binyam Mohamed's trauma 

lasted for two long years. During that time, he was physically and 

psychologically tortured. His genitals were mutilated. He was 

deprived of sleep and food. He was summarily transported from one 

foreign prison to another. Captors held him in stress positions 

for days at a time. He was forced to listen to piercingly loud 

music and the screams of other prisoners while locked in a pitchblack cell. All the while, he was forced to inculpate himself and 

others in various plots to imperil Americans. The Government does 

not dispute this evidence. 

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Thus, the physical abuse in this case more closely resembles 

the conduct in Brown v. Mississippi, where suspects in a criminal 

investigation were brutally beaten, whipped, and exposed to mock 

executions in the days before making a coerced confession and being 

thrust into the courtroom for a one-day show trial. See 297 U.S. 

at 281-85. 

Second, the psychological effects of this lengthy and inhumane 

treatment also persuade the Court that Binyam Mohamed's later 

statements made at Guantanamo Bay must be excluded because they are 

tainted by his prior experiences. There is a substantial body of 

scientific literature describing the effects of physical and 

psychological torture on prisoners. 26 

Torture and "enhanced interrogation techniques" employed by 

the Government during the War on Terror have been shown to be 

"geared toward creating anxiety or fear in the detainee while at 

the same time removing any form of control from the person to 

create a state of total helplessness." Metin Ba.<;;oglu, M. D., PhD., 

26 See, e .g., Charles A. Morgan III et al., Accuracy of 

Eyewitness Memory for Persons Encountered During Exposure to Highly 

Intense Stress, 27 Int'l Journal of Law and psychology 265 (2004); 

Morgan et a1., Hormone Profiles in Humans Experiencing Military 

Survival Training, 47 Biological Psychiatry 891 (2000); Morgan et 

al., Consistency of Memory for Combat-Related Traumatic Events in 

Veterans of Operation Desert Storm, 154 Am. Journal of Psychiatry 

173 (1997). 

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et al., Torture vs Other Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading Treatment: 

Is the Distinction Real or Apparent? 64 Archives of Gen. 

Psychiatry 277, 283 (2007). Indeed, rates of Post-Traumatic Stress 

Disorder ("PTSD") in torture survivors far exceed the rate among 

the general population. Physicians for Human Rights, Leave No 

Marks: Enhanced Interrogation Techniques and the Risk of 

Criminality, 43-44; 43 n.337 (Aug. 2007), available at 

http://wwww.physiciansforhumanrights.org/library/documents/report 

s/leave-no-marks .pdf (collecting journal articles that report rates 

for torture victims higher than 3.6% rate of PTSD among general 

population) . 

According to a new study about to be published in a peerreviewed journal, "prolonged and extreme stress has a deleterious 

effect on frontal lobe function," Shane O'Mara, Torturing the 

Brain: On the Folk Psychology and Folk Neurobiology Motivating 

"Enhanced and Coercive Interrogation Techniques" Trends in 

Cognitive Sciences _ (forthcoming) (manuscript at 2), available at 

http://download.cell.com/trends/cognitive-sciences/pdf/PIIS1364 

661309001995.pdf (published Sept. 24, 2009) ,27 

27 Trends in cognitive Sciences is a peer-reviewed 

professional journal published in the United Kingdom by Elsevier. 

The article cited is written by an Associate Professor in the 

School of Psychology at Trinity college Dublin, in Ireland. 

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A common consequence of coercive interrogation techniques is 

"confabulation," or the "pathological production of false 

memories." As the author explains, "[s]tress causes 

heightened excitability or arousal in the brain and body. 

Experiencing stress causes release of stress hormones (cortisol and 

catecholamines . [which] provoke and control the 'fight or 

flight' response that, if overly prolonged, can result in 

compromised cognitive neurobiological function (and even tissue 

loss) in [the prefrontal cortex and hippocampus]." Id. at 1. 

Because of these physiological reactions, the brain areas function 

improperly, and "both memory and executive functions (intention, 

planning[,] and regulation of behavio[]r) can be impaired." rd. 

The study specifically addresses the "folk psychology that is 

demonstrably incorrect" 28 underlying adoption of enhanced 

interrogation techniques. rd. at 1. 

The author concludes that "[i]t is likely to be difficult or 

perhaps impossible to determine during interrogation whether the 

information that a suspect reveals is true: information presented 

28 The author concludes that there is no scientific evidence 

supporting the neuropsychobiological model underlying the 

Government's adoption of coercive interrogation techniques. .ML.. at 

1. Quite the contrary--the article concludes that "these 

techniques are unlikely to do anything other than the opposite of 

that intended by coercive or 'enhanced' interrogation," i.e., to 

provide reliable, truthful, and accurate information. Id. 

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!!!!ltl!ll 

by the captor to elicit responses during interrogation might 

inadvertently become part of the [subject's] memory, especially 

because [subjects] are under extreme stress and are required to 

tell and retell the same events that might have happened over a 

period of years." Id. at 2. 

In this case, even though the identity of the individual 

interrogators changed (from nameless Pakistanis, to Moroccans, to 

Americans, and to Special Agent _, there is no question 

that throughout his ordeal Binyam Mohamed was being held at the 

behest of the United States. Captors changed the sites of his 

detention, and frequently changed his location within each 

detention facility. He was shuttled from country to country, and 

interrogated and beaten without having access to counsel until 

arriving at Guantanamo Bay, after being re-interrogated by Special 

Agent _. See JE 72 (declaration of Binyam Mohamed's 

attorney, Clive Stafford Smith, stating that he did not meet with 

client until May of 2005). 

From Binyam Mohamed's perspective, there was no legitimate 

reason to think that transfer to Guantanamo Bay foretold more 

humane treatment; it was, after all, the third time that he had 

been forced onto a plane and shuttled to a foreign country where he 

would be held under United States authority. Further, throughout 

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his detention, a constant barrage of physical and psychological 

abuse was employed in order to manipulate him and program him into 

telling investigators what they wanted to hear. It is more than 

plausible 29 that, in an effort to please Special Agent _ 

(consistent with how captors taught him how to behave), he re-told 

such a story, adding details, such as Petitioner's presence at 

training, which he thought would be helpful and, above all, would 

bring an end to his nightmare. 30 

In Bagram, he wrote that he trained with three Algerians. JE 

73 at 1902. When he arrived at Guantanamo Bay and, according to 

his subsequent statements, met Petitioner for the first time, he 

then reported that one of those unnamed Algerians was in fact 

Petitioner. JE 27 at 2; JE 36 at 5. Given the factors discussed 

above, the court cannot credit this confession as voluntary. The 

earlier abuse had indeed "dominated the mind" of Binyam Mohamed to 

such a degree that his later statements to interrogators are 

unreliable. Lyons, 322 U.S. at 603; see also Leave No Marks at 117 

("The ultimate effect of [employing methods of psychological 

control] is to convince the victim that the perpetrator is 

omnipotent, that resistance is futile, and that his life depends on 

29 See O'Mara, supra at page 66.
 

30 See Al Rabiah, classified op. at 50.
 

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absolute compliance."). 

In reaching this conclusion, the Court does not doubt the 

abilities or experience of Special Agent 1IIIIIIII, nor his account 

of his humane treatment of the witness. Rather, based on the 

factors discussed above, the Court finds that Binyam Mohamed's will 

was overborne by his lengthy prior torture, and therefore his 

confessions to Special Agent 1IIIIIIII do not represent reliable 

evidence to detain Petitioner. 

d. Remaining Allegations Regarding Training 

Without Binyam Mohamed's statements implicating Petitioner in
 

training, the Government's evidence supporting this allegation is
 

severely weakened.
 

After three nights there, he 

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insists that he returned to Kabul. rd. According to Petitioner, 

and 

perhaps reflects a misunderstanding by interrogators that he 

He notes also 

that the training allegations that Binyam Mohamed made involved 

different locations than Bagram. Traverse at 45-46. 

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Based on this record, the Court cannot credit the one sentence 

upon which the Government's claim now rests. As 

described above, we do not know who reported the comments regarding 

the and therefore it is impossible to assess that 

person's reliability. Additionally, the comment is not specific, 

and refers to 

sustained on this record. 

6. Participation in Battle 

The Government asserts that Petitioner participated in battle. 

This allegation rests only on highly speculative evidence. There 

is no eye-witness account of Petitioner engaging in battle. 

The Government derives its evidence almost entirely from the 

comments contained on one page of an intelligence report from 2005. 

In that report, based on an interrogation of Petitioner, the author 

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remarks that "detainee admitted to authorities in the 

past that he fought on the front lines but is now recanting all of 

this with the American interrogators." JE 33 at 4. He also 

identified another detainee, ISN 197, by his kunya, "Abdul Haq." 

According to the report, "this is interesting because ISN 197 was 

only known by this alias while fighting" at Tora Bora. Id. The 

Government marshals additional evidence about Petitioner's travel 

pattern and his al-Qaida associations in order to buttress its 

argument. 

The Court finds that the Government has not shown that it is 

more likely than not that Petitioner fought. The reported 

statement about Petitioner's admission to authorities is

not reliable, as it represents multiple levels of hearsay: the 

Court cannot ascertain who the authorities are who

allegedly received this information from Petitioner, nor to which 

United States official the information was then sent or 

transmitted. 

As for the identification of Abdul Haq, Petitioner provides 

declarations from ISN 197 and his brother, in which the two claim 

that ISN 197 only adopted the kunya Abdul Haq after arriving at 

Guantanamo Bay. JE 66; JE 67. If true, this would contradict the 

intelligence report's assertion that ISN 197 only used that kunya 

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at Tora Bora. The Government supports this assertion by pointing 

to an intelligence report where a detainee identifies ISN 197 as 

Abdul Haq, the name by the detainee knew ISN 197 "while he was in 

Afghanistan." JE 39 at 1. Even if the Government's evidence is 

credited so as to resolve this dispute in its favor, that 

establishes that ISN 197 and his brother lied about using the kunya 

only at Guantanamo Bay. It would not establish that ISN 197never 

used the kunya at Guantanamo Bay. In short, there is no reliable 

evidence that ISN 197 used the name Abdul Haq only at Tora Bora, as 

the comments in JE 33 insist, and so Petitioner's identification of 

ISN 197 is not probative of whether or not Petitioner fought at 

Tora Bora. 

The Government's reliance on comments in one intelligence 

report cannot sustain this allegation. No witness places 

Petitioner in battle, and no other evidence corroborates that 

Petitioner made the comments attributed to Petitioner. The 

Government's evidence regarding Petitioner's travel pattern, his 

associations, and his alleged encounter of Bin Laden while passing 

by a funeral in Kabul, JE 15 at 5, does not meet its burden to show 

that it was more likely than not the Petitioner participated in 

battle. 

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IV.	 CONCLUSION 

The Government has consistently urged the Court not to examine 

in isolation individual pieces of evidence presented in the habeas 

cases emanating from Guantanamo Bay, but rather to evaluate them 

"based on the evidence as a whole" in determining whether the 

allegations, when viewed together, support a conclusion that 

Petitioner has been justifiably detained. 

After considering the evidence as a whole, the Court rejects 

the Government's conclusion. While the mosaic approach can be a 

useful tool, the evidence must also be carefully analyzed--majorissue-in-dispute by major-issue-in-dispute--since the whole cannot 

stand if its supporting components cannot survive scrutiny. 

The facts of this case demonstrate the need for this 

analytical approach. Here, the Government has clearly proven, by 

far more than a preponderance of the evidence, that Petitioner 

traveled extensively in Europe, both before and after September II, 

2001, by using false names, passports, and other official 

documents. It has also proven, by far more than a preponderance of 

the evidence, that while in London Petitioner attended mosques 

which were well known to have radical, fundamentalist clerics 

advocating jihad. At one of the mosques he met a recruiter who 

then paid for and arranged his trip to Afghanistan along routes 

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well-traveled by those wishing to fight with al-Qaida and/or the 

Taliban against the United States and its allies. Finally, the 

Government has also proved, by far more than a preponderance of the 

evidence, that once Petitioner arrived in Afghanistan he stayed at 

a guesthouse with direct ties to al-Qaida and its training camps. 

But the Government's evidence fails to prove anything more. 

The Government has failed to provide reliable evidence that 

Petitioner received any training in weaponry or fighting, or that 

he engaged in actual fighting of any kind on behalf of al-Qaida 

and/or the Taliban. 

The question then becomes whether, under Gherebi and Hamlily, 

the Government's evidence meets the standard for detention. 

Analyzing those two cases, the court concludes that 

Petitioner's conduct does not meet the legal standard for 

detention. In determining whether Petitioner was a member or 

substantial supporter of al-Qaida and/or the Taliban, or associated 

forces, the Court must consider whether he was a "member[] of the 

enemy organization's armed forces, as that term is intended under 

the laws of war." Gherebi, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 70-71. Both 

substantial supporters and members of al-Qaida and/or the Taliban 

must have occupied a role within "the military command structure of 

an enemy organization." Id. at 70. A key indicator of such a role 

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is receiving and executing orders from the enemy force's "combat 

apparatus." Id. at 69. In determining who is "part of" al-Qaida 

and/or the Taliban, "[t]he key inquiry, then, is not necessarily 

whether one self-identifies as a member of the organization . . . 

but whether the individual functions or participates within or 

under the command structure of the organization--i.e., whether he 

receives and executes orders or directions." Hamlily, 616 F. Supp. 

2d at 75. 31 

In this case, there is no evidence to show that it is more 

likely than not that Petitioner received and executed orders from 

the command structure of al-Qaida or that he was part of the enemy 

force's "combat apparatus." Petitioner had simply not yet reached 

that point in his journey to become a part of al-Qaida. The 

Government has provided credible and reliable evidence that he 

attended radical mosques in London, that he met a man named Rahim 

31 Nor is actual fighting on a battlefield required. See 

Gherebi, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 69 ("[T]he armed forces of the enemy 

consist of more than those individuals who would qualify as 

'combatants' in an international armed conflict.") (citing 

International Committee of the Red Cross ("ICRC") commentary on 

Third Geneva Convention). "Thus, an al-Qa[i]da member tasked with 

housing, feeding, or transporting al-Qa [i] da fighters could be 

detained as part of the enemy armed forces notwithstanding his lack 

of involvement in the actual fighting itself.... " rd.; see also 

id. at 68 (reasoning that "[s] ympathizers, propagandists, and 

financiers who have no involvement with th [e] 'command 

structure[] '" are not part of armed forces, and therefore can only 

be detained if they engaged directly in hostilities) . 

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who coordinated and funded his travel to Pakistan, that he was 

shepherded from Pakistan to Afghanistan by Rahim's contacts via an 

established corridor for transporting al-Qaida recruits, and that 

he stayed at a guesthouse that linked these recruits with training 

camps. 

While these facts demonstrate that Petitioner was exposed to 

radical, anti-American rhetoric at mosques in London, and that he 

traveled to Afghanistan with the assistance of an al-Qaidaaffiliated network, there is no evidence that Petitioner took 

orders from that network or from any "combat apparatus." Training 

may have been encouraged by guesthouse operators, but there is no 

evidence that it was required or ordered. JE 40 at 8. In short, 

at the point in his journey where the Government's evidence fails, 

Petitioner had not yet acquired a role within the "military command 

structure" of al-Qaida and/or the Taliban, nor acquired any 

membership in these enemy forces. One who merely follows a path, 

however well-trodden, from London to Afghanistan and ends up 

staying in an al-Qaida-affiliated guesthouse, cannot be said to 

occupy a \\ \structured' role in the \hierarchy' of the enemy force." 

Gherebi, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 68. 

Admittedly, there is a preponderance of evidence indicating 

that Petitioner was prepared to join al-Qaida and/or the Taliban, 

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and that he set out for Afghanistan with the intention of doing so. 

But Mohammed did not actually join or substantially support enemy 

forces simply by virtue of his attendance at the two mosques, 

recruitment, travel, and guesthouse stay. 

Sliti v. Bush, 592 F. Supp. 2d 46 (D.D.C. 2008), upon which 

the Government relies, is therefore distinguishable. In that case, 

the petition for habeas corpus was denied because petitioner 

"traveled to Afghanistan as an [al-Qaida] recruit and trained at 

the local military training camp proximate to the Tunisian 

guesthouse in Jalalabad." at 51 (emphasis added). The case 

does not support the proposition that mosque attendance, 

recruitment, travel, and guesthouse stay alone are sufficient bases 

for detention. 

Whether or not one believes that Petitioner was a potential 

danger to the security of this country, or whether or not one 

speculates that Petitioner would have attended a training camp and 

then fought with al-Qaida and/or the Taliban if the opportunity 

presented itself, is not relevant. The legal issue to be decided 

is whether--based on the actual evidence presented--that evidence 

satisfies the standard set forth in Gherebi and Hamlily for 

determining whether Petitioner, at the time of his capture, was a 

member or substantial supporter of the terrorist organizations 

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fighting against the United States and its allies. At the point at 

which he was detained, those requirements had not yet been met, 

even though they might well have been satisfied at some future 

time. In short, Petitioner may well have started down the path 

toward becoming a member or substantial supporter of al-Qaida 

and/or the Taliban, but on this record he had not yet achieved that 

status. 

Mindful of the limitations on the scope of the remedy in this 

situation, see Kiyemba, 555 F.3d at 1024, the Court further orders 

the Government to take all necessary and appropriate diplomatic 

steps to facilitate Petitioner's release forthwith. Further, the 

Government is directed to comply with any reporting requirements 

mandated by the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 

2010, Pub. L. No. 111-83, 123 Stat. 2142 (2009), if applicable, to 

facilitate Petitioner's release, and to report back to the Court no 

later than December 2009, as to the status of that release and 

what steps have been taken to secure that release. 

November L[, 2009 

Judge 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
 

FOR THE DISTRICT OP COLUMBIA
 

PARRI SAEED BIN MOHAMMED, 

et. a1., 

Petitioners, 

v.	 Civil Action No. 05-1347 (GK) 

BARACK	 H. OBAMA, at. al., 

Respondents. 

ORDER 

For the reasons set forth in this Court's Classified 

Memorandum Opinion of November/~, 2009, it is hereby 

ORDERED, that Petitioner Farhi Saeed Bin Mohammed's petition 

for a writ of habeas corpus is granted; and it is further 

ORDERED, that the Government take all necessary and 

appropriate diplomatic steps to facilitate Petitioner's release 

forthwith. Further, the Government is directed to comply with any 

reporting requirements mandated by the Department of Homeland 

Security Appropriations Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-83, 123 Stat. 

2142 (2009), if applicable, to facilitate Petitioner's release, and 

to report back to the Court no later than December/~, 2009, as to 

the status of that release and what steps have been taken to secure 

that release. 

November/~, 2009 

Copies to: Attorneys of Record via ECF 

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