[DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

_______________________ No. 12

- 13844 Non

- Argument Calendar

_______________________ D.C. Docket No. 2:09

- cv - 01089

- MEF

- TFM JAMES EDWARD SPENCER, and other similarly situated individuals,
Plaintiff

- Appellant,

versus BOB RILEY, in his individual and official capacity, TROY KING, in his individual and official capacity, CYNTHIA DILLARD, in her individual and official capacity, RICHARD ALLEN, in his individual and official capacity, M. WILSON Classifications, Dept. of Corrections, Defendants

- Appellees.

_______________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama

___________________ ___ (July 25, 2013) Case: 12-13844 Date Filed: 07/25/2013 Page: 1 of 32 Before CARNES, MARTIN, and JORDAN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: James Spencer, a convicted sex offender, is currently incarcerated for 2006 and 2007 violations of the Alabama Community Notification Act, Ala.Code § 15

- 20

- 20 et seq. (repealed July 1, 2011). He filed a lawsuit against several Alabama officials pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that, for various reasons, the ACNA could not be constitutionally applied to him. The district court granted the defe ndants’ motion for summary judgment, and Mr. Spencer, proceeding pro se, now appeals. Exercising plenary review, see, e.g., Sierra Club, Inc. v. Leavitt , 488 F.3d 904, 911 (11th Cir. 2007), we affirm. We read pro se briefs liberally, see Cofield v. Alaba ma Public Service
Comm’n , 936 F.2d 512, 514 n.2 (11th Cir. 1991), but even so it is difficult to figure out what arguments Mr. Spencer is making on appeal. He does not, for example, list any specific issues. Nor does he say why he believes the district c ourt erred. In a prior appeal by Mr. Spencer, we noted the same problems. See S pencer v. King , 333 F. App’x 488, 489 (11th Cir. 2009) (“Although we construe pro se filings liberally, Spencer’s appeal gives us very little to work with.”). The one argument we think we can discern from the brief is Mr. Spencer’s contention that the ACNA

– and specifically its residency and registration requirements

– cannot be constitutionally applied to him because of ex post facto

Case: 12-13844 Date Filed: 07/25/2013 Page: 2 of 33 and equal protection conce rns. The problem for Mr. Spencer is that a challenge to a criminal conviction cannot be brought under § 1983. See Bradley v. Pryor , 305 F.3d 1287, 1289 (11th Cir. 2002) (“[H]abeas Corpus [rather than § 1983] is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner w ho challenges the fact or duration of his confinement and seeks imm ediate or speedier release.”) (c iting Preiser v. Rodriguez , 411 U.S. 475, 490 (1973)). And insofar as Mr. Spencer seeks damages for his ACNA convictions, that claim is, as the district cou rt explained, currently barred by Heck v. Humphrey 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994) (damages action under § 1983 is not cognizable if a judgment in the plaintiff’s favor “would necessarily imply the invalidity of [the] conviction or sentence,” and the conviction a nd sentence have not been reversed, vacated, or otherwise invalidated.).
AFFIRMED. Case: 12-13844 Date Filed: 07/25/2013 Page: 3 of 3