Air University

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The Wright Flyer Papers

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inside cover.indd 1 2/19/08 7:17:26 
AIR UNIVERSITY

AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

Hearts and Minds

Historical Counterinsurgency

Lessons to Guide the War of Ideas

in the Global War on Terrorism

Joseph C. McAlexander IV

Lieutenant Commander, USN

Air Command and Staff College

Wright Flyer Paper No. 29

Air University Press

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

December 2007

frontmatter.indd 1 2/19/08 7:17:59 
ii

Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely 

those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the 

United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. 

Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited.

This Wright Flyer Paper and others in the series are 

available electronically at the Air University Research 

Web site http://research.maxwell.af.mil and the AU 

Press Web site http://aupress.maxwell.af.mil.

frontmatter.indd 2 2/19/08 7:17:59 
iii

Foreword

It is my great pleasure to present another of the Wright Flyer 

Papers series. In this series, the Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) recognizes and publishes our best student research 

projects from the prior academic year. The ACSC research program encourages our students to move beyond the school’s 

core curriculum in their own professional development and in 

“advancing air and space power.” The series title reflects our 

desire to perpetuate the pioneering spirit embodied in earlier 

generations of Airmen. Projects selected for publication combine solid research, innovative thought, and lucid presentation 

in exploring war at the operational level. With this broad perspective, the Wright Flyer Papers engage an eclectic range of 

doctrinal, technological, organizational, and operational questions. Some of these studies provide new solutions to familiar 

problems. Others encourage us to leave the familiar behind in 

pursuing new possibilities. By making these research studies 

available in the Wright Flyer Papers, ACSC hopes to encourage 

critical examination of the findings and to stimulate further research in these areas.

JAY H. LINDELL

Brigadier General, USAF

Commandant

frontmatter.indd 3 2/19/08 7:18:00 
frontmatter.indd 4 2/19/08 7:18:00 
Abstract

To address the potential terrorist threats to America, the National Security Strategy of the United States of America and the 

National Strategy for Combating Terrorism state that the United 

States will wage a “war of ideas.” The war of ideas seeks to change 

the minds of varying ideological populations. A war fought in 

the minds and among people—human terrain—requires human 

players to engage and communicate with indigenous populations in the context of the local culture.

As the United States and its coalition partners in the global 

war on terror (GWOT) clear al-Qaeda from one location, terrorists will seek other locations. They target people to turn 

them against the United States and the coalition of the willing. 

A foreign or local government can win the war of ideas and 

defeat global terrorists only if it wins the hearts and minds of 

the people, which requires influencing their behavior by offering them a better solution than the solution al-Qaeda offers. A 

war of ideas is not new to the twenty-first century fight.

While history cannot provide a panacea for global terrorism, 

today’s military can learn lessons from historical small wars 

and low intensity conflicts to train and employ forces effectively 

to wage and win a war of ideas to counter global insurgents 

and their ability to win popular support. This paper employs 

a review of two case studies, Malaya (1945–60) and Vietnam 

(1964–72), to illuminate my thesis.



frontmatter.indd 5 2/19/08 7:18:00 
frontmatter.indd 6 2/19/08 7:18:01 
Preface

For a long time, I have had a strong interest in various 

cultures of the world. This interest developed from living for 

three years in Southeast Asia as a child. My interest continued 

to grow through the various ports of call I experienced in 

Central and South America, Europe, the Middle East, and 

during a permanent change of station to Sicily. In many of 

the courses I have taken at the Air Command and Staff College, in particular National Security Studies, the instructor 

frequently referenced war of ideas and winning “hearts and 

minds” in the global war on terror (GWOT). However, I believe the United States (US) military was not fully educated 

in regards to how it could implement these concepts. As 

conventional forces increasingly interact with foreign peoples while fighting the GWOT, the US military cannot rely 

solely on information operations experts and special operations forces to win the war of ideas. Success requires a cultural awareness and appreciation at all levels within the US 

military. This research journey set out to glean lessons the 

past offers for winning the hearts and minds of the foreign 

populaces the US presence will affect.

This research was made possible through the assistance of 

several individuals. First, I would like to express my appreciation to my research seminar advisor, Maj Julie Verdura, for 

supporting this topic and assisting me to narrow the focus of 

a large subject. Second, Majors Lourdes Duvall and Mike Ivanovsky, co-instructors in my research seminar, willingly spent 

many hours helping me to sort through various thoughts as 

my topic evolved. Third, Dr. William Dean provided many vectors for the case studies that I explored in this paper. Fourth, 

Col Robert Potter mentored me through the “craft of research.” 

I am grateful for the time he made available and the editorial 

comments he provided me. Fifth, and most important, I want 

to express my deepest love and appreciation to my wife and 

daughter for their unfailing love, support, and understanding 

as I spent many long weekends in the library working on this 

research paper. Furthermore, my wife selflessly followed me 

three years ago to our overseas assignment in Italy, where we 

appreciated and immersed ourselves in the various cultures 

the world offered.

vii

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frontmatter.indd 8 2/19/08 7:18:01 


Introduction

The tragic events of 11 September 2001 violently awakened Americans to the realities transnational terrorist 

threats pose to the United States. Overnight, al-Qaeda 

was thrust into the American lexicon and imprinted on the 

national psyche. Such global terrorists as al-Qaeda seek 

popular support to increase the number of recruits, safe 

havens, and line of communications (LOC). They exploit 

the grievances of those with similar ideologies to push their 

own political objectives. According to Pres. George W. Bush, 

“In addition to finding sanctuary within the boundaries of 

a state sponsor, terrorists often seek out states where they 

can operate with impunity because the central government 

is unable to stop them.”1 In many of these weak and failing states, global terrorists also seek to exploit the government’s lack of legitimacy in the eyes of their population.

To address the potential terrorist threats to America, the 

National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States of America 

and the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism state that 

the US military will wage a war of ideas.2 It can reasonably 

expect that the president of the United States will employ the 

military instrument of power (IOP) in weak and failing states to 

enable, persuade, or compel them to refrain from supporting 

global terrorists when the other IOPs fail. Some of these states 

will be fueled by global terrorist-ignited insurgencies, as they 

know they cannot beat the United States conventionally. As 

the United States and its coalition partners in the GWOT clear 

al-Qaeda from one location, the terrorists will seek another. 

They target people to turn them against the United States and 

the coalition of the willing. The GWOT is not a conventional 

war; it is being fought as small wars and low intensity conflicts (SW/LIC).

Small wars and low intensity conflicts are not unique to 

the twenty-first century. Since the beginning of the seventeenth century, the world has witnessed 270 SW/LICs.3 According to the US Marine Corps’ Small Wars Web site, 75 

SW/LICs currently engulf the world.4 Although support from 

the local populace will not guarantee success, victory cannot 

be achieved in insurgencies without it. Nevertheless, the US 

military tends to focus its training on fighting conventional 

wars, which leads to a lack of training for conventional forces 

article.indd 1 2/19/08 7:19:07 
in SW/LICs and to a focus on technological transformation 

vice the human mind and cultural intelligence at all levels. 

As US Marine Corps general Anthony Zinni stated, “Military 

conflict has changed and we have been reluctant to recognize it. Defeating nation-state forces in conventional battle 

is not the task for the 21st century. Odd missions to defeat 

transnational threats or rebuild nations are the order of the 

day, but we haven’t yet adapted.”5

While history cannot provide a panacea, today’s military 

can learn lessons from historical SW/LICs to train and employ forces to wage and win a war of ideas to counter global 

insurgents and their ability to win popular support. Furthermore, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

platforms, people, and tactics are key enablers, but alone 

they will not suffice. The war of ideas seeks to change the 

minds of varying ideological populations. A war fought in 

the minds and among people—human terrain—requires 

human players to engage and communicate with indigenous populations in the context of the local culture. The 

intelligence community (IC) must also receive timely and 

appropriate feedback and knowledge from those engaged 

on the front lines. The war of ideas in a counterinsurgency 

(COIN) requires effects-based operations conducted on all 

fronts—political, social, military, informational, religious, 

and cultural—by all levels and departments in the military, 

government, and nongovernmental agencies. 

A foreign or local government can only win the war of ideas 

and defeat global terrorists if it wins the hearts and minds 

of the people. Winning the hearts and minds of a populace 

requires influencing their behavior by offering them a better 

solution than the solution al-Qaeda offers. This strategy will 

entail a cultural awareness, provided through cultural intelligence, by all service members. Furthermore, a successful 

strategy will require human-to-human interaction using small 

flexible forces and a robust human intelligence (HUMINT) network at levels ranging from the privates to their commanders 

who daily interact with the foreign populaces.

Background

In “The Evolution of a Revolt,” T. E. Lawrence argues that 

insurgents “must have a friendly population, not actively 

article.indd 2 2/19/08 7:19:07 
friendly, but sympathetic to the point of not betraying rebel 

movements to the enemy.”6 Furthermore, he noted that an 

insurgency could be successful with only 2 percent active 

participation from the populace, as long as the remaining 

populace is sympathetic.7 Additionally, in On Guerilla Warfare, Mao Tse-tung observes that the only way for guerilla 

warfare to exist or thrive is for the insurgents to ensure 

they do not estrange themselves from the sympathies and 

the support of the people.8 Moreover, Mao pointedly states 

that “the moment that [a] war of resistance dissociates itself 

from the masses of the people is the precise moment it dissociates itself from hope of ultimate victory.”9

Popular Support Is Critical

Global terrorists also realize the criticality of popular support. Much like nation-state insurgencies, al-Qaeda attempts 

to draw upon popular support, primarily from Islamic populations. Populations sympathetic to global terrorists provide recruits, resources, and sanctuary. Al-Qaeda also seeks popular political support to gain credibility and legitimacy in hopes 

of recreating sovereign states to support them as they once 

achieved in Afghanistan. The best actionable intelligence used 

to assist in eliminating terrorists, their bases, and their LOCs 

comes from the indigenous populaces that global terrorists 

attempt to woo. This lesson is one the United States and its 

allies have relearned for many years. History can provide insight into winning hearts and minds.

Historical Case Study Approach

A study of historical insurgencies provides a framework that 

can be adapted to today’s issues without having to relearn past 

lessons for each insurgency the United States will face. As Dr. 

John Lynn, professor of History at the University of Illinois, 

stated, “The past does not supply us with rules, but it does 

alert us to important issues and dynamics. The past can never 

be a substitute for knowledge of the current challenge, but it 

can help us understand that challenge.”10 This paper employs 

a review of two case studies, Malaya (1945–60) and Vietnam 

(1964–72), to illuminate my thesis. The focus centers on the 

relative success and/or failure a particular third party had in 

influencing indigenous populations to achieve predetermined 

article.indd 3 2/19/08 7:19:07 
objectives regarding popular support for an initiative. The British counterinsurgency in Malaya, also known as “The Emergency,” is a good case study because it involved five different 

and major cultural entities—entities that needed to coalesce 

into a cohesive, functional society to be successful. An analysis 

of the US military involvement in the Vietnam conflict provides 

a stimulating case study because the conflict encompassed 

both conventional warfare and insurgent warfare—somewhat 

akin to what we see in 2007 in Iraq. Although this paper does 

not intend to draw comparisons between the two, it does provide a dichotomy. Much was written about Vietnam, and the 

US military experience there precipitated an American distaste 

for protracted SW/LICs. However, along with what went wrong 

in the engagement in Vietnam, the United States should be 

cognizant of some successes, specifically the successes Gen 

Creighton Abrams had in winning a measure of indigenous 

popular support for the US forces’ mission in Vietnam.

Malaya (The Emergency, 1945–60)

In 1945 Malaya was a culturally diverse British colony 

region containing five distinct and major cultural groups. 

Richard Stubbs claims “the population [was] just under five 

million people of whom 44 percent were Malay, 38.5 percent Chinese, 10.5 percent Indian, 5.5 percent Aborigines, 

and 1.5 percent ‘other’ (including the returning Europeans 

[after the Japanese Occupation]).”11 During the World War II 

years of 1942–45, the Japanese occupied Malaya. To avoid 

persecution, a significant number of Malays supported the 

Japanese during the occupation. The Chinese population 

was less fortunate and received extremely harsh treatment 

from the Japanese. This was due, in large part, to the historical enmity between the Chinese and Japanese cultures. 

To counter the Japanese persecution, the Malayan Communist Party (MCP), through their military arm, the Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA), carried out 

insurgent attacks against Japanese forces and the Malays 

who collaborated with the Japanese. These attacks on Malay collaborators continued well after the departure of the 

Japanese occupiers. The Japanese occupation of Malaya 

devastated the country’s economy and its internal security, 

prompting greater nationalism and political engagement, 

article.indd 4 2/19/08 7:19:08 
and it further contrasted the endemic cultural differences. 

After the Japanese surrender in 1945, several months passed 

before the British returned to the colony from which they 

had hastily exited.

Landing in Singapore on 5 September 1945, the British returned to Malaya with assumptions of a triumphant return. 

The British believed they would be a welcome sight. The people 

of Malaya assumed the British would bring back the prosperity 

formerly known during colonial rule. Yet, these assumptions 

did not reflect reality. The British did not retake Malaya in battle, which did not help to overturn perceptions generated by 

their exit. The economic costs of the war greatly affected Britain’s treasury and thus its ability to dedicate monies to its colonies. Furthermore, Britain’s focus remained in Europe, which 

greatly limited the labor available to dedicate to Malaya. In spite 

of Britain’s involvement in Malaya for over a century, many of 

Britain’s military forces and civil officers lacked the long-term 

adeptness in Malayan culture and languages, especially Chinese, which facilitated a greater divide among the populations. 

Moreover, the British Military Administration (BMA), the initial 

government established, was ineffective. The organization was 

primarily military, with very few civilian advisors. Poor policies 

and administration further alienated the population. In addition, the police force was neither trained for, nor capable of, 

restoring law and order. Finally, the BMA’s indifference to the 

various cultures led it to ignore numerous grievances among 

the various ethnic groups and subsequently provided the fuel 

that ignited a sustained insurgency.

The population’s primary concerns were with the extreme 

poverty that existed and a complete lack of security necessary to conduct normal human affairs. The devaluation of 

the Japanese currency, low wages for the few jobs available, the high cost of living, and the lack of rice—a staple 

of the Malayan diet—exacerbated the poverty plaguing the 

country. Malayans frequently were victims of gangster activity, kidnapping, piracy, and extortion by communist terrorists (CT). They were forced to acquiesce to the CT’s coercive demands for “protection” to maintain some semblance 

of security; then, they were punished by the government 

that perceived their acquiescence as a signal that they supported the communists. Therefore, a majority of the population saw the government, which was also plagued with 

article.indd 5 2/19/08 7:19:08 
corruption, as incapable of providing for their basic survival 

and security. Racial clashes between elements of the Malay population and the indigenous Chinese population continued to escalate, creating further grievances. The Malays 

were frustrated with the British and the MCP that supported 

the MPAJA during the Japanese occupation. Furthermore, 

the MPAJA continued to terrorize the Malay populace. The 

Chinese wanted punishment for the Malays who supported 

the Japanese during the occupation. Both the Malay and 

the indigenous Chinese populations came to view the British as putting their special interests ahead of the country’s 

interest. These circumstances created opportunities for the 

MCP to exploit during their insurgency.

Enjoying many advantages, the MCP galvanized popular support. First, the MCP faced no recruiting competition 

within the Chinese communities. These communities viewed 

the MCP and the ex-MPAJA—now formed as the Malayan 

People’s Anti-British Army (MPABA), which were the only organized groups in the country—as the heroes of the occupation.12 Chinese culture, kinship, and friendship bolstered the 

membership levels of the MPABA. Second, “the MCP was able 

to tap the nationalistic, xenophobic, and revolutionary sentiments which had become an integral part of the Malayan 

Chinese education curriculum.”13 Furthermore, a lack of jobs 

and schools created a large pool of unemployed teens. With 

the support of the population behind them, the MCP escalated the violence. Guided by the doctrine of Mao Tse-tung, 

the MCP called for independence through a people’s war and 

an uncompromising struggle without regard to legality. The 

British high commissioner for Malaya, Sir Edward Gent, declared a state of emergency on 18 June 1948.

Greatly underestimating the causes and type of conflict 

and its causes, the British initially viewed the “emergency” 

not as an insurgency but a police action to restore law and 

order. This ignorance created many problems that led the 

British Colonial Office to remove Sir Gent and appoint Sir 

Henry Gurney to the Office of High Commissioner. Sir Gurney’s strategy called for coercion and enforcement to stop 

or discourage MCP support through searches and punishment. The plan was executed using large-scale sweeps that 

were reminiscent of the last war, which was a conventional 

war. The coercion and enforcement plan led to the detenarticle.indd 6 2/19/08 7:19:08 
tion of many innocent people. In addition, the government 

was unable to protect the masses who were unable to bear 

arms. Consequently, they were forced to continue to pay 

protection fees to the MCP. The ineffective coercion and enforcement plan further fueled the grievances of the population, making actionable intelligence harder to gain.

The IC in Malaya, composed of both military intelligence 

and the police Special Branch, had other problems of its 

own. First, there was little unity of effort achieved with each 

organization separately using different methods of collecting and disseminating information.14 Second, the IC was 

plagued with a lack of personnel, and what staff there was 

possessed narrow views of the conflict. Third, they failed to 

estimate the MCP’s hold and political standing. Fourth, they 

neglected to include the CT in battle.15 The IC focused on the 

criminal activities and ignored the political, social, and economic conditions that fed the national unrest. Fifth, they did 

not attempt to take into consideration the ideals and feelings 

of the law-abiding citizens. The problems within the IC further exacerbated the capabilities of the administration.

The BMA had minimal people-to-people contact at the 

lower levels of government and rural population centers. A 

major failing was its lack of relationship with the Chinese 

population and the lack of supervision and support in the 

schools. The government preferred to use technology to run 

its propaganda campaign, which allowed rumors among the 

people to proliferate greatly. The population saw the BMA’s 

campaign as insincere rhetoric.16 Furthermore, the BMA cut 

back its funding for crucial civil services, and it did not mitigate police force and the army destruction brought upon the 

population by the coercion and enforcement plan. “The unreasonableness of the government’s demands for support, 

the distrust of the government which had become ingrained 

during the post-occupation period, and a sense of the need 

to help those who had suffered at the hands of the security forces, all combined to unite the Chinese community 

in defense of those whom they considered most worthy of 

sympathy than receiving the full weight of the law,”17 notes 

Richard Stubbs. By 1950 the failings of the BMA and the 

IC effectively cut them off from intelligence and information 

gathering, thereby providing them with little influence over 

the population and causing them to develop a new plan.

article.indd 7 2/19/08 7:19:08 
Dissatisfied with the weakening position of the initial 

government in Malaya, the British prime minister appointed 

Lt Gen Sir Harold Briggs as director of operations to oversee 

and coordinate both military and police activities.18 In April 

1950, General Briggs spent the month touring “Malaya, 

soliciting advice from the different communities, business 

groups, governments departments, and senior members 

of the armed forces and police.”19 From the inputs derived 

during his tour, he developed the Briggs Plan. The overall 

strategy of the plan was to start in the south and move 

north to eradicate the MCP infrastructure, build security 

in populated areas, force the CTs to conduct attacks on 

the terms and grounds of the police and the army, and expand civil administration. The plan called for (1) state-run 

governance supported by the federal government; (2) regular meetings between the civil administration, police, and 

military forces, to include the IC; and (3) the creation of 

new villages. The purpose of creating new villages was to 

move people away from areas controlled by the MCP and 

to provide security and a better way of life than the CTs 

could provide. General Briggs created the Federal Joint 

Intelligence Advisory Committee to provide unity of effort 

through coordinated “collection, analysis, and distribution 

of intelligence on insurgent locations, activities, and plans 

from whatever source—civil, police, or military.”20 Shortly 

after the implementation of the Briggs Plan, the Korean War 

began, creating jobs and sources of income for the Malaya 

government and the population due to the demand for local raw materials of rubber and tin. The economic boom 

created by the Korean War coupled with the unity of effort achieved through the Briggs Plan helped to reverse the 

downward spiral of the government but only to a stalemate 

status. New leadership and plan refinement were needed.

The stage was set in October 1951, when the MCP killed 

Sir Gurney in an ambush. This action prompted the British secretary of the state for colonies, Sir Oliver Lyttleton, to 

visit Malaya to assess the situation. After visiting with many 

key leaders in the government, military, business, as well as 

the indigenous communities, he developed a six-point plan. 

First, he called for a revision of the information operations 

(IO) campaign, basing it on cultural awareness. Second, he 

set the requirements to reorganize, train, and better equip 

article.indd 8 2/19/08 7:19:09 
the police force. He recognized that the police who lived in 

the villages could relate with and knew the villagers the best. 

Third, Sir Lyttleton called for increased measures of protection for the new villages. Fourth, he placed a greater emphasis on the Home Guard by focusing on training, reorganizing, 

and recruiting, specifically within the Chinese community. 

Fifth, he instated mandatory primary education to capitalize 

on the belief that the school-age children were the best way 

to influence their parents. Sixth, and most importantly, Sir 

Lyttleton determined the most effective measure in countering the insurgency in Malaya was to provide unity of command 

and effort under one person who would provide overall direction of civil and military efforts. 

Selected to bring unity of command and effort was Gen Sir 

Gerald Templer, who assumed the job of high commissioner 

and director of operations in February 1952. General Templer 

immediately toured Malaya to lay out his philosophy to those 

involved in the conflict. He told the politicians, military, and police that the emergency was not just a military problem and all 

departments must cooperatively engage. He emphasized that 

peacetime activities must continue to rebuild Malaya. Furthermore, General Templer stated that insurgency must be fought 

on all fronts to include political, social, economic, and religious 

aspects. He reminded everyone that Malaya should not be 

a mirror image of Britain. Much more, all people were to be 

treated well, and their grievances must be heard and addressed 

when possible. He emphasized to the local populace and their 

leaders that Britain had no plans to stay in Malaya; instead, 

the country should be based on the collective populace’s way 

of life, and the people had a stake in determining what this 

way of life would be. From his philosophy, General Templer 

built an overall two-part strategy. The first part included the 

threat of swift punishment to those who aided the MCP and 

placement of strict controls on the communities where the 

MCP lived. The idea was to convince the population that “strict 

constraints would remain in effect until their support of the insurgency ceased.”21 The second component of his strategy was 

to increase government legitimacy by providing a better social, 

economic, political, and secure environment for the population 

than the MCP could offer. As General Templer stated, “The answer lies not in pouring more troops into the jungle, but rests 

article.indd 9 2/19/08 7:19:09 
10

in the hearts and minds of the . . . people. Winning ‘hearts and 

minds’ requires understanding the local culture.”22

In short, General Templer combined and improved upon 

aspects of the Briggs Plan and Sir Lyttleton’s six-point program to win the hearts and minds of the population. The revitalization of the new villages under General Templer provided 

not only freedom from fear for the villagers, but also created 

better access to basic services. Civil administration was more 

effective by first focusing awareness of governance at the local 

and district levels and then holding elections at the federal 

level after stabilizing the lower levels of government. 

The renewed emphasis on the Home Guard within the villages 

provided two primary benefits. First, the ownership of security 

was placed in the hands of the population, and the training and 

arms they received from the government enabled the population to trust the government. Second, since the Home Guard 

provided security, the military was free to provide protection 

to the police force and conduct COIN operations to destroy the 

MCP infrastructure. General Briggs, Sir Lyttleton, and thenGeneral Templer set the stage for effective propaganda campaigns by showing personal contact and tangible actions that 

provided benefits to the Malayan people. Their approach was 

more effective than campaigns built solely upon technology. 

In addition, General Templer stressed to the police force that 

they were servants of the people. Furthermore, realizing the 

critical requirement for obtaining actionable intelligence from 

the people and the closeness of the police with the population, 

he created the Intelligence Special Branch to include the requisite schools and the position of director of intelligence. The 

Intelligence Special Branch was responsible for collecting the 

intelligence, and the director of intelligence, recognized as an 

equal member on the Director of Operations Committee, would 

distribute the intelligence. Furthermore, the director of intelligence “was responsible for intelligence, but was not in charge 

of the intelligence collecting machine. . . . Thus [the] Special 

Branch often was protected from problems which would have 

diverted it from its main tasks of collecting and collating intelligence.”23 General Templer refocused the IC to include in the 

order of battle (OOB) the MCP’s strengths, weaknesses, strategies, and the attitudes of the population. Finally, as villages 

began to turn their support against the CTs and as the MCP 

infrastructure weakened in areas, the government declared the 

article.indd 10 2/19/08 7:19:09 
11

villages as white areas. When the administration declared a village a white area, it lifted the restrictions and controls placed 

on the village and allowed greater freedom of movement and 

support for the villages.

Between 1952 and 1955, a decided shift occurred as the 

government of Malaya seized the initiative and the offense. The 

MCP was losing ground. On 31 August 1957, after successful 

elections, the newly formed Malayan government raised the 

flag of the Federation of Malaya. This event symbolized the 

transfer of sovereignty, and the MCP could no longer claim a 

national resistance movement. The insurgency continued until 1960, but the MCP had to focus, instead, on gaining ground 

at the polls. The MCP was unsuccessful in this regard.

Vietnam (1964–72)

Much like the emergency in Malaya from 1964 to 1968, 

the United States did not appreciate the nature of the Vietnam War. It fought the war and used a search-and-destroy 

strategy, which did not work. This strategy continued to reflect the American way of war by means of attrition and big 

battalions, using overwhelming force. William Colby, US ambassador to Vietnam and head of Civil Operations and Rural 

Development and Support, stated, “We hadn’t read about the 

works of Ho Chi Minh, Vo Nguyen Giap and some of the other 

leaders as to what kind of war they wanted to fight. They 

wanted to fight a people’s war and not a Korean War.”24 The 

conventional search-and-destroy strategy allowed the North 

Vietnamese Army (NVA) and Vietcong to choose when they 

wanted to fight and build an insurgent shadow government 

infrastructure within the population. Furthermore, the 

American strategy neglected several critical areas of action 

and consideration. First, the United States disregarded its 

advisory roles to improve and empower the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN). Many of the advisors focused on 

shaping the ARVN in the image of the US military.25 Of the 

advisors sent into the countryside and placed within the 

South Vietnamese Government (GVN), many possessed no 

knowledge of the Vietnamese language, and more importantly, its culture. “Training for intelligence officers serving 

as advisers . . . was not provided until 1970,” observed Patrick Finnegan and Romana Danysh.26 Second, the US Army 

article.indd 11 2/19/08 7:19:09 
12

leadership largely ignored the pacification program and provision of security for the South Vietnamese population. Gen 

William C. Westmoreland directed his intelligence officers 

not to collect information on nor report on Vietcong forces in 

the daily OOB. Furthermore, no efforts were galvanized to 

attack the Vietcong infrastructure embedded in the South 

Vietnamese population. These neglected aspects in the war 

pushed the GVN and its military from a leading role, thus 

severely affecting their ability to influence the population 

and project legitimacy. Third, many believed the Vietnam 

War could be won militarily but failed to recognize the political aspects of the war. Ultimately, the strategy the United 

States employed led to a disenfranchisement in public support and contributed to an ARVN that was untrained and 

unprepared for an insurgency coupled with conventional 

warfare. More importantly, the ARVN was overdependent on 

the US military.27 Since the US military’s culture, doctrine, 

and training were deeply embedded with a conventional war 

mentality, only a change in leadership could reverse the direction of this strategy.

In May 1967, Gen Creighton Abrams arrived in Vietnam as 

the deputy and later succeed General Westmoreland. Lewis 

Sorely writes that “convinced that the key to winning the 

war lay not in the remote jungles, but rather in the hamlets 

and villages of South Vietnam, [General Abrams] set about 

trying to reorient the American effort.”28 During General 

Abrams’s year as deputy, he spent much time touring South 

Vietnam to formulate a new strategy through meetings with 

the politicians, people, and military forces at all levels. What 

he saw was an “elaborate and wasteful base camp system, 

exposed strings of static border camps,” a strong embedded 

Vietcong infrastructure, and a lack of popular support for 

the GVN.29 Vietcong shadow governments had “succeeded in 

obtaining the approval and cooperation of most villagers in 

many South Vietnamese hamlets. . . . The Viet Cong political 

cadres helped win the favor of numerous villagers by offering them land and other material benefits, and by promising 

to eliminate landlords and government officials, who treated 

the villagers much worse than the VC normally did. Displays 

of VC strength and the outstanding leadership and propaganda skills of the cadres helped convince many villagers to 

follow the Communists.”30 General Abrams inherited a comarticle.indd 12 2/19/08 7:19:10 
13

mand plagued by a chain of command lacking in operational 

control, unity of command, and unity of effort between the 

ARVN and its allied forces. Furthermore, he was constrained 

by “severe geographical and procedural restrictions on conduct of the war.”31 In June 1968, he took command of US 

forces and immediately set out to change the tactics and focus for the war.

General Abrams impressed upon his commanders and staff 

that this was a war to be fought on several levels—political, 

economic, cultural, and religious—and the enemy must be 

confronted on every one.32 He pushed everyone to focus on 

the “object beyond the war,” not solely on the current military 

situation with the NVA. This object focused on the people 

and their ability for self-defense and governance. An effective 

strategy would require focusing on winning the hearts and 

minds of the populace under a legitimate government vice attrition of the enemy.

The strategy took shape under the one-war concept, 

which gave equal weight to all levels of the war.33 General 

Abrams called for stronger political-military relations, improvement and development of the Republic of Vietnam 

Armed Forces, annihilation of the Vietcong infrastructure, 

disruption of enemy logistics, and an IO campaign that emphasized the truth. Furthermore, he recognized that the 

grievances of the population must be heard and addressed. 

General Abrams fully advocated that the recommendations 

listed in the Pacification and Long Term Development of 

Vietnam (PROVN) study were essential to winning the war. 

The PROVN study found “the underlying objective [must be] 

‘the restoration of stability with the minimum of destruction, so that society and lawful government may proceed in 

an atmosphere of justice and order.’ ”34

Under General Abrams’s new direction and focus, military operations took the form of a clear-and-hold strategy, 

conducted by military advisors and widely dispersed small, 

flexible forces vice big battalions. The military would clear 

Vietcong-controlled areas and train and equip the village’s 

Popular Forces (PF) and Regional Forces (RF) to provide selfdefense and hold these areas. As part of these operations, the 

Strategic Hamlet concept was developed to foster “the idea 

of developing hamlets that would develop their own defense 

and their own identity as communities, and that this would 

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14

not be the imposition of military force on them but turning to 

the people to support and an effort to defend themselves.”35

This strategy required the Vietcong infrastructure to use 

self-defense forces and US teams to get to the population. By 

living with the population, the Vietcong infrastructure found 

the people appreciated the military more because of common 

commitments, security, and risks. Furthermore, the military 

would conduct retaliation operations against the Vietcong 

when they conducted indiscriminant attacks on the population. Large forces would only be used when critical points 

of the Vietcong infrastructure were determined from actionable intelligence gained by the smaller units. However, in 

late 1968, it became evident that the Vietcong were increasing their activities to restore their control of the population 

through liberation committees.

In response to these liberation committees, William Colby 

developed the Accelerated Pacification Campaign (APC), which 

kicked off in November 1968. The Phoenix Program was the 

primary mechanism to execute the APC. The program was to 

target Vietcong-controlled areas with preemptive operations 

to eradicate the Vietcong’s grip on South Vietnam. The APC 

achieved its goal through several means. First, military and 

territorial security forces saturated the countryside, targeting 

enemy bases and logistical hubs. Second, the GVN “showed 

their flag” and took the initiative by refining self-help, selfdefense, and self-government programs in the villages. The 

program “provided increase[d] support, advisers, and funding 

to the police, [RF and PF],”36 who in turn were able to obtain 

actionable intelligence from the people. Third, Colby directed 

the IC to consolidate and coordinate its efforts, saying, “A network [of] census-grievance teams was sponsored and set up 

by the [US], ostensibly to survey the aspirations and grievances of the people in the rural areas. [They collected intelligence as a cover assignment].”37 “This [campaign] was, Colby 

made clear, a job for the Vietnamese, but one which American forces could help by screening the pacification areas from 

enemy assaults and conducting spoiling operations against 

enemy forces,” remarked Solely.38 By February 1969, the APC 

was producing satisfactory results, thus the GVN decided to 

initiate a follow-on campaign.

The objective of the follow-on campaign was to place 90 

percent of the population in secure areas. To accomplish the 

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15

objective, the APC doubled the size of the RF and PF and resettled the refugees. In addition, the GVN focused on establishing a local government in every village. The GVN provided 

training for the village and hamlet chiefs and instructed them 

to lead and turn their communities into better ones, consistent with their way of life. Based on the history and culture 

of Vietnam, this was the most important aspect of securing 

villager support.39 Furthermore, the GVN assured the chiefs 

they would be there to help when needed. By late 1969, the 

United States and the GVN met and exceeded the goals of 

both the APC and the follow-on campaign. The guerilla aspect of the Vietnam War was eliminated by 1972.40

Lessons Learned from Malaya and Vietnam

In both Malaya and Vietnam, civilian administrators and 

military forces struggled with the lack of culturally and linguistically trained personnel. After Generals Templer and Abrams 

took command in their respective areas of responsibility, they 

ensured, as much as possible, relevant training promulgated 

down to the lowest levels. However, the high turnover rates 

within the ranks created cultural knowledge gaps that required 

the training of new sets of soldiers and leadership after they 

deployed in-theater. Similar to these case studies, especially in 

today’s dynamic world, cultural and linguistic training must 

take place before arriving in-theater. This training needs to be 

part of pre-deployment preparations and military culture. 

The British and American political and military leaders in 

both studies misjudged the type of conflict in which they were 

engaging. The British saw the Malayan emergency as a police 

conflict and only focused on police actions. The United States 

ignored the insurgency waged in South Vietnam and chose to 

focus solely on the North Vietnamese conventional forces. Remember that foreign forces often view SW/LICs as limited; however, the indigenous populations and their governments viewed 

them as total. Both governments initially attempted to control 

the situation vice understanding the local culture and empowering the local government to control the situation. This neglect 

decreased the training of indigenous forces and severely undermined the influence and legitimacy of the local governments. 

Military advisors to foreign countries cannot forget that they 

must seek counsel from indigenous forces and the populace 

article.indd 15 2/19/08 7:19:10 
16

to comprehend fully the culture in which they are operating. 

Generals Templer and Abrams both realized the importance 

of convincing the local populations of the value of government 

services not through words alone, but through tangible actions 

and a promise of independence. In addition, they realized in 

the end that when outside forces redeployed, the indigenous 

government and forces would be the ones required to provide 

governance, security, and self-defense. Therefore, they must be 

in the lead and foreign forces must be the advisors. Otherwise, 

the population will see the foreign forces as occupiers, which 

could result in diminished support and further escalate the 

conflict. Finally, as proven in Malaya and Vietnam, governance 

must grow from the smallest localities up to the federal level, 

bottom-up vice top-down.

In addition to realizing the political struggle of these conflicts, Generals Templer and Abrams understood the importance of intelligence gained from the population. Both generals 

involved the local populations and required the same of their 

intelligence officers. Their primary objective was to engage and 

sympathize with the local population to determine and address grievances and to immerse themselves in and embrace 

the indigenous culture. The countryside tours, each that were 

conducted, resulted in eliminating the narrow-minded views 

of the military forces, civil administrations, and populations. 

Finally, by offering the local populations better security, civil 

services, and solutions for independence than the insurgents 

could, they were able to obtain sympathetic popular support 

and actionable intelligence.

An Assessment for Today

As evidenced in the two historical studies and the situations and missions the US military is facing in the GWOT, 

the military cannot ignore the human environment as it 

has in conventional wars. Success in the GWOT will require 

offering people a better solution to their grievances than 

global terrorists will offer. The solutions must be based on 

the people’s desires and cultures, not through mirror imaging or imposing US values on them.

Credibility is crucial to persuade people and to win their 

hearts and minds. The side the people perceive to have a better solution will win the war of ideas. Bert Decker, a leadarticle.indd 16 2/19/08 7:19:11 
17

ing communications expert, states that “the idea of selling 

can be used interchangeably with the idea of persuasion and 

reaching agreement. Once we see communication as a form of 

selling, it suddenly hits home that we had better get serious 

about communicating effectively if we want to be successful, 

to have some influence—or simply to have others hear and 

understand us.”41 Credibility built with the populations of the 

world will provide more support and actionable intelligence to 

aid in achieving victory in the GWOT.

The first step critical to developing credible communications with indigenous populations begins with a thorough 

awareness and appreciation of their culture. In an article 

listing lessons learned by intelligence officers in Vietnam, 

Harold Ford argues that “there was no substitute for being 

immersed in the history, politics, and society of a region, in 

this case Indochina. The best analytic records were generally 

registered by those officers who had had considerable such 

exposure [sic]. . . . The ideal combination of such exposure 

was to have had experience both in the field and in Washington.”42 To be successful in COIN operations, military forces 

must learn to embrace the local culture. Cultural awareness 

can be achieved through cultural intelligence and the cultural knowledge training provided to the forces.

The military must conduct cultural training for all pay 

grades. Pre-deployment training to prepare forces for a specific region in which they will operate is necessary; however, 

to develop the cultural awareness and appreciation mind-set 

within the military, pre-deployment training is not enough 

by itself. Global cultural training should begin as early as 

possible. Furthermore, cultural training should continue 

through and be included in follow-on basic courses—the Navy’s Basic Officer Leadership Course, the Air Force’s Air and 

Space Basic Course and Squadron Officer School—as well as 

service command and staff colleges and war colleges.

Since communication is vital to connecting with the indigenous populations in areas the US military will deploy, language training is a good place to start. Ideally, one day all US 

military personnel will at least be bilingual. Due to space limitations, this paper does not attempt to develop a plan to address language training for all US military personnel; however, 

it does offer several recommendations to begin increasing the 

linguistic skills in the force. First, all services should follow the 

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18

lead of the US Marine Corps’ Center for Advanced Operational 

Culture Learning (CAOCL).43 The CAOCL Web site offers tools 

to prepare troops during pre-deployment phases and a good 

starting place for self-motivated Marines to learn another language. Concurrently, the US military should engage companies that produce language-learning software, including Rosetta Stone,44 to participate in programs similar to the Home 

Use Program (HUP) contract with Microsoft. HUP contracts 

allow employees to purchase software necessary for their jobs 

at more affordable rates. A HUP program for educational language software will allow self-motivated military personnel to 

learn another language, even if they are deployed, do not have 

the time to take college classes due to work commitments, or 

lack available resources. Second, services should target students in officer training programs for language training before commissioning them or enlisting them. Many engineering 

degree-granting programs, which are already at the limit set 

for credits required to graduate, do not require a foreign language. As the military continues to seek personnel with engineering and technical degrees, the services should consider 

language classes as part of the curriculum. This may require 

a reevaluation of syllabi. Training commands should remove 

any course material students can effectively learn on the job 

to make room for language courses. Otherwise, engineering 

students will continue to be hampered in their pursuit of a 

second language. Third, all service war and staff colleges need 

to include language courses. “A single officer fluent in the local language and aware of cultural nuances can be far more 

valuable to our military than entire squadrons of F/A-22s 

(emphasis in original).”45

While language training is beneficial, alone it is not 

enough. The US Army’s Field Manual-Interim 3-07.22 

states, “The center of gravity in counterinsurgency operations is the population. Therefore, understanding the local 

society and gaining its support is critical to success in 

[COIN operations]. For US forces to operate effectively 

among a local population and gain and maintain their support, it is important to develop a thorough understanding of 

the society and its culture, to include its history, tribal/

family/social structure, values, religions, customs, and 

needs.”46 A goal of the war of ideas is to change the minds 

of varying ideological populations. A war fought in the 

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19

minds and among people—human terrain—requires human players to engage with indigenous populations. A person with some linguistic skills and a solid understanding of 

another culture will fair better than someone who is fluent 

in that particular culture’s language but has no appreciation and awareness of the culture itself.

Navy commanders frequently tell their sailors prior to a 

port visit they are direct representatives of America. This is 

quite true, for in a foreign land perceptions of the United 

States are oftentimes based more on how US military personnel conduct themselves than how fluent they are in the 

local language. Actions by Americans significantly affect 

host cultures and go a long way in developing host-nation 

impressions of the United States. The US military needs to 

train all soldiers, Airmen, sailors, and marines to be culturally aware soldier-diplomats. 

Much like the suggestion previously offered for language 

training, cultural awareness training should begin as early 

as pre-enlistment programs and continue through all levels 

of professional military education (PME). The lower levels of 

PME should offer basic cultural awareness at the global level. 

While war and staff colleges should focus on regionally specific areas; however, this education should not be limited to 

short two- to three-hour educational blocks. For example, the 

Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) currently provides 

region-specific studies, which the international officer students present as part of their research seminar requirements. 

The four-month regional area study seminars are open only 

to international officers. This is a missed opportunity for US 

military officers. Therefore, ACSC should open these seminars 

to US students as well. Such a refinement would allow US 

military students to integrate more fully with the international 

students and learn their cultures in greater depth than the 

current curriculum provides. The criticality of cultural appreciation and knowledge cannot be overstated: “The fastest 

way to damage the credibility of US forces and the legitimacy 

of our involvement with the local national government is to 

ignore or violate the social mores or precepts of a particular 

population.”47 In its report on strategic communications, the 

Defense Science Board recognized that “to be effective, strategic communicators must understand attitudes and cultures 

article.indd 19 2/19/08 7:19:11 
20

[and] respect the importance of ideas. . . .”48 Without a strong 

cultural awareness, communication will be ineffective.

Credible communication builds trust. The GWOT has 

seen an increase in the use of words as a weapon. Each side 

of a conflict uses words to delegitimize its opponent’s standing with the people who are neutral to win popular support. 

Technological advances in communication techniques and 

capabilities, as well as one-way propaganda, will not achieve 

effective communication without human interaction. Simply 

put, people will ignore words without the accompanying supporting actions. The British learned this principle early in the 

Malayan emergency when their propaganda campaign relied 

on leaflets and “loud-speaker vans which were described by 

the Chinese as ‘loud but empty voices.’ ”49 Both the British 

in Malaya and the United States in Vietnam found that their 

respective propaganda campaigns to win the hearts and 

minds were ineffective until the indigenous population could 

put a face with the voices through human interaction. As 

evidenced in the case studies, both militaries changed their 

technology-driven IO strategies to ones that included placing 

small forces within the local populations. As a result, the 

local populations’ sympathies turned from the insurgents 

when the forces assigned to help them began to share the 

risks and goals of the communities. 

This paper does not argue against technology, as technology is increasingly an enabler; however, unmanned aircraft systems and satellites, for example, will not be key 

components to winning the war of ideas by themselves. The 

effectiveness of such technology would greatly decrease in 

such environments as dense jungles. Furthermore, a picture may be worth a thousand words, but a picture cannot alert one to the local population’s thinking and feeling. 

The US military must push past the seeming paradigm of 

technological transformation and begin to include education in effects-based strategic communication with foreign 

cultures at all levels—tactical, operational, and strategic. 

Communication is not just about putting faces on team 

members, speaking the local language, or acting on the 

words spoken. Effective communication requires listening, 

which also requires an understanding of cultures and norms 

within a community. The Defense Science Board Task Force 

also noted that “effective strategic communications will enarticle.indd 20 2/19/08 7:19:12 
21

gage in a respectful dialogue of ideas that begins with listening. . . .”50 During the initial phases of the two conflicts reviewed in this paper, one of the missing elements to winning 

indigenous popular support was a failure to listen to the 

valid grievances of the local populace. People will not want 

to lend their sympathies if they feel the parties they are supporting are not sympathetic. A local population’s grievances 

must be heard, and when possible, their grievances must be 

addressed. In sum, fighting a war of ideas on human terrain 

requires human-to-human interaction. Interaction between 

people coupled with open listening will build trust. Trust will 

help build credibility. Without effective cultural intelligence 

and communication—verbal and nonverbal speech, listening, and feedback—intelligence preparation of the battlefield 

will be ineffective.

Intelligence is vital to winning the war of ideas. The role 

military intelligence performs in COIN operations is critical. 

Not just within the military, strategic, and operational levels 

but also at the tactical level. Joseph Celeski emphasizes 

that “intelligence preparation of the environment at the operational level and intelligence preparation of the battlefield 

at the tactical level will shift from the old model developed 

for force-on-force fights, to one more consistent with law 

enforcement and detective work . . . link diagramming and 

ethnic/cultural demographic studies.”51

To provide actionable intelligence in COIN operations, the 

military IC must determine several aspects regarding local 

populations. This paper highlights several aspects. To begin 

with, as previously mentioned, it is imperative to determine 

popular grievances and the associated underlying causes. 

Concurrently, intelligence must determine where the sympathies of the local population lie and why. Determining the 

“why” is crucial to building an effective IO campaign. The 

“why” may not be limited to a populace’s grievances. It can 

stem from—but not be limited to—cultural, family, tribal 

ties, religious, or economic reasons. Furthermore, military 

forces must understand the structure of the local government and/or society. In particular, who are the most influential people in the local population? In other words, who 

do the people listen to and follow—a chief, tribal leader, 

or religious leader? US forces in Iraq today have learned 

this lesson. Antonio Castaneda argues that “in Ramadi, it’s 

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22

the local sheiks who more often get results. And with their 

blessing, the drive to recruit an effective police force is finally gaining steam.”52

In addition, what is the populace’s understanding of selfgovernment? In Vietnam one of the worst things the United 

States imposed was the American way of democracy. The Vietnamese people could not comprehend this form of governance, 

as they historically were not accustomed to supporting a person before they knew who would win.53 A foreign nation-state’s 

self-governance design cannot be with an American face if the 

United States is to win the war of ideas. In addition, military 

intelligence must determine the magnitude of the insurgent’s 

infrastructure embedded in the local population. Moreover, 

identifying the insurgent ideologies and propaganda promulgated in the local population will assist in developing IO campaigns to address grievances. Determining the means and 

places insurgents propagate their ideologies is crucial. As seen 

in the Malayan emergency and in Taliban rule in Afghanistan, 

much of the ideological training was promulgated through the 

primary schools of children. The underlying idea was to train 

young malleable minds to achieve lifetime lasting effects and 

to use the children to sway the mind-set and beliefs of their 

parents. Finally, it is critical to determine which populations 

provide external support to the insurgents. These populations 

should be among the first targeted for winning over hearts and 

minds. Again, the importance of a strong cultural awareness in 

the military IC to better analyze the points written above cannot be disregarded. As General Abrams urged one analyst “[not 

to just] rely on the teachings of his alma mater . . . ‘but [be] a 

better Asian.’”54 Part of the problems seen in the Malayan and 

Vietnam campaigns of focusing the military IC on the right issues was a lack of doctrine on insurgent/guerilla warfare.

Sam Sarkesian believes that “there is a need to learn from 

history, analyze American involvement and the nature of lowintensity conflict, and translate these into strategy and operational doctrines.”55 Currently, COIN and counterterrorism 

doctrine are relegated to small subsections within military 

operations other than war doctrines or other publications, 

such as peacekeeping, stability operations, and civil-military 

operations. These topics should be stand-alone doctrine publications. The Army’s new Field Manual-Interim 3-07.22 and 

the United States Marine Corps’ (USMC) Small Wars Manual, 

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23

last published in 1940, are good references for each service 

to use to formulate its respective doctrines. Furthermore, as 

the Air Force is increasingly providing intelligence officers 

and security personnel and the Navy is executing the Individual Augmentation System to support joint staffs engaged 

in the GWOT, joint doctrine also should be refined. However, 

doctrine is only a guide, it is not a panacea that will change 

military culture to espouse cultural intelligence and achieve 

successful effects-based COIN operations. Education and 

training must coincide with doctrine.

The US military needs to return SW/LICs courses to its 

PME curricula. As a whole the US military excels in fighting conventional wars from the start; however, in spite of 

all the SW/LICs the United States has been involved in, it 

continues to struggle with fighting insurgencies. In spite of 

all the literature, documentation, and lessons learned from 

previous US involvement in COIN operations, the military 

continues to wait until it is engaged in SW/LICs to train 

and relearn the lessons of the past. For example, at ACSC 

only a few hours were scheduled in the current curriculum 

to cover insurgency, guerilla warfare, terrorism, and irregular warfare. Only a brief mention was given to lessons that 

could be derived from such material as the USMC Small 

Wars Manual. However, Airmen today are involved in all 

levels in COIN operations throughout the world. Sarkesian 

points out that “without some sense of historical continuity, Americans are likely to relearn the lessons of history 

each time they are faced with a low-intensity conflict.”56

This paper does recognize that total conventional war remains a potential in this uncertain world and could present 

several dangerous scenarios. Many argue that the military 

should not stovepipe its focus on the current conflicts being fought today, including insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan. They argue that the United States must focus 

on possibilities of war with nations that have conventional 

militaries; however, as a sole primary focus for training, 

the argument does not stand the test of history and the 

future in which the US military will engage in the GWOT. 

Joseph Celeski remarked, “The [GWOT] and the charter to 

promote liberty and freedom as part of our national policy 

will predictably mean confrontation with those who are opposed to our national strategy. We should expect to see our 

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24

continued involvement in insurgencies, including those of a 

transnational nature.”57 Part of the instruction provided in 

the PME should focus not just on COIN techniques, tactics, 

and procedures, but also on the strategies of the adversaries 

the military faces or may face. 

Celeski, a COIN expert, suggests in his paper, “Operationalizing COIN,” that today’s insurgents blend the best of 

different historical models to form their strategies.58 None 

of these strategies involves the theories of Clausewitz, 

Jomini, or Napoléon. Yet the US military PME, following the 

American way of war, tends to place its emphasis on these 

theorists and captains. Returning to ACSC, for example, 

the curriculum devotes less than two hours to non-Western 

theory and strategy, and the majority of that time is devoted to Sun-Tzu. To get inside the enemy’s orient, observe, 

decide, and act loop effectively, one must first know the 

strategies against which they may confront. PME should 

include studies on historical insurgents, their strategies, 

and ideologies—e.g., Mao Tse-tung, Che Guevara, Carlos 

Marighella, non-Western military strategies, and radical Islam. The US ambassador to Vietnam during the conflict, 

William Colby, has said, “A turning point which reflected, in 

my mind, the fact that we hadn’t read about the work or 

writings of Ho Chi Minh, Vo Nguyen Giap, and some of the 

other leaders as to what kind of war they wanted to fight. 

They wanted to fight a people’s war and not a Korean War.”59

Conclusion

While there will always be the possibility of another conventional war, the likelihood of fighting insurgency-style conflicts 

in the GWOT is more prevalent. Such terrorist networks as 

al-Qaeda and their affiliates know they will fight a conflict of 

attrition if they wage a conventional war against the United 

States. The United States and its coalition partners will fight 

future wars in the information battlespace for popular support. The world contains many cultures unique to their environments. Moreover, America does not have the monopoly 

on the best culture in the world: American culture works in 

the United States. American culture may succeed in other 

countries; however, it must be the choice of the people. As the 

world has seen in Palestine, impressing upon foreign cultures 

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to implement American democracy can backfire. To win the 

war of ideas and the hearts and minds of foreign populaces, 

the United States must bridge the culture gap. As the US military continues to be on the front lines of the GWOT, it must 

develop a better appreciation and awareness for other countries’ mores and customs. Neglecting to train culturally aware, 

expeditionary soldier diplomats who can communicate—to include listening—and embrace other civilizations will greatly 

undermine the efforts to win the war of ideas. 

This paper presents an argument and stimulates discussion of lessons learned from history that can be adapted 

today. Due to the limitations of this paper, several areas 

should be explored and further refined. For example, the 

services should develop a plan to provide better training in 

COIN techniques, tactics, and procedures, especially interacting with local populations. PME cannot afford to continue 

to neglect COIN operations or to include such topics as an 

aside in the curriculum. To refine the schoolhouse training 

provided, a focus should be placed on cultural intelligence, 

communication skills, and embracing the local culture once 

Airmen are in the field. Moreover, SW/LICs should be better 

addressed and strengthened in service and joint doctrine. 

Training alone will not be sufficient without the doctrine to 

back it up. 

Additionally, the US military must achieve better communication and rapid dissemination of information feedback from 

troops in the field to the IC. While special operations forces 

are highly trained with the aspects presented in this paper, to 

include providing the IC with useful information, they are a 

high-demand/low-density asset that cannot be everywhere all 

the time. Thus, in the GWOT the US military is frequently using large conventional forces in COIN operations. As presented 

in the lessons learned, several times usable intelligence came 

from HUMINT gained from local populations and leaders by 

conventional forces in the field. 

This paper does not suggest that the US military must 

train every soldier, sailor, Airmen, or marine involved in 

COIN operations to be HUMINT experts; however, each one 

needs to learn how to fill HUMINT gaps. The services must 

train its military members to realize what types of information gathered from conversations and observations are useful and why it is important to provide that data to the IC. 

article.indd 25 2/19/08 7:19:13 
26

Each must know how to recognize indicators at the tactical 

level if COIN campaign objectives are succeeding or failing. 

There must be a robust feedback loop established between 

the IC and the boots on the ground: IC must support the 

war fighter and the war fighter must support the IC. Each 

service should explore implementation of the “Every Soldier 

is a Sensor” concept that the US Army is developing.60

The services must closely weigh the value and implementation of language training. Each service should research 

how to avoid two potential stovepipes. The first stovepipe 

could emerge if languages are targeted using current conflicts as a guide or only addressing a worst-case scenario to 

make language-training decisions. A second stovepipe could 

arise if the military locks personnel into one geographic location and/or career path because of the language skills 

they possess. Language training is critically relevant in the 

GWOT. Therefore, well-counseled deliberations must ensue 

to determine how best to capture the skills that will provide 

the most-effective military corps.

In sum, the military must champion cultural education and awareness to achieve the end-state of the war of 

ideas. To achieve a better state of peace and to “preserve 

the peace,”61 as written in the NSS, the US military must 

leave some lasting, positive effects with the foreign populations. While winning the hearts and minds of people will not 

guarantee victory in the GWOT, the United States cannot 

achieve victory without it. To conduct successful effectsbased operations on human terrain in the GWOT, the US 

military must focus on developing a culturally aware force 

that can interact with the various cultures of the world the 

United States wishes to influence.

Notes

(All notes appear in shortened form. For full details, see the appropriate 

entry in the bibliography.)

1. Bush, National Security Strategy, 8.

2. Bush, National Strategy, 6.

3. Small Wars Center of Excellence, “Inactive Small Wars and LICs.” 

4. “Small Wars/LIC/MOOTW.”

5. Clancy, Zinni, and Koltz, Battle Ready, 424.

6. Lawrence, “Evolution of a Revolt,” 22.

7. Ibid.

article.indd 26 2/19/08 7:19:13 
27

8. Mao Tse-tung, On Guerilla Warfare, 71.

9. Ibid., 72.

10. Lynn, “Patterns of Insurgency,” 22–27.

11. Stubbs, Hearts and Minds, 12.

12. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup, 62.

13. Stubbs, Hearts and Minds, 49.

14. Sunderland, “Antiguerrilla Intelligence in Malaya,” vi, 1–80.

15. Ibid., 6.

16. Stubbs, Hearts and Minds, 86.

17. Ibid., 77.

18. Ibid., 100.

19. Ibid.

20. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup, 71.

21. Pelli, “Insurgency, Counterinsurgency, Marines,” 8, 19.

22. McFate, “Anthropology and Counterinsurgency,” 24–38.

23. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup, 91.

24. Colby, Keynote Speech. 

25. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup, 120.

26. Finnegan and Danysh, Military Intelligence, 149.

27. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup, 120–21.

28. Sorely, A Better War, 11.

29. Ibid., 30.

30. Moyar, “Villager Attitudes.”

31. Sorely, A Better War, 30.

32. Ibid., 18.

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid., 20.

35. Colby, Keynote Speech.

36. Cassidy, “Back to the Street,” 73–83.

37. Sorely, A Better War, 145.

38. Ibid., 65.

39. Moyar, “Villager Attitudes,” 14.

40. Colby, Keynote Speech.

41. Decker, You’ve Got to Be Believed, 16.

42. Ford, “Revisiting Vietnam.”

43. See http://www.tecom.usmc.mil/caocl/, “USMC CAOCL Home Page.”

44. Stone, “Language Learning Software,” http://www2.rosettastone

.com/en/ (accessed 1 March 2006).

45. Peters, “A Grave New World.”

46. United States Army, Field Manual-Interim 3-07.22, Counterinsurgency 

Operations, 4-3.

47. Ibid.

48. Defense Science Board Task Force, Report of the Defense Science 

Board. 11.

49. Stubbs, Hearts and Minds, 86.

50. Defense Science Board Task Force, Report of the Defense Science 

Board, 2.

51. Celeski, Operationalizing COIN, 27.

52. Castaneda, “U.S. Counts on Sheiks.”

53. Sorely, A Better War, 280.

article.indd 27 2/19/08 7:19:13 
28

54. Ibid., 169.

55. Sarkesian, America’s Forgotten Wars, 245.

56. Ibid.

57. Celeski, Operationalizing COIN, 1.

58. Ibid., 20–21.

59. Colby, Keynote Speech.

60. Peck, “Army Game Strives.”

61. Bush, National Security Strategy, 1.

article.indd 28 2/19/08 7:19:13 
29

Acronyms

ACSC	 Air Command and Staff College

APC	 Accelerated Pacification Campaign

ARVN	 Army of the Republic of Vietnam

BMA	 British Military Administration

CAOCL	 Center for Advanced Operational Culture

Learning

COIN	 counterinsurgency

CT	 communist terrorists

GVN	 South Vietnamese Government

GWOT	 global war on terror

HUMINT	 human intelligence

HUP	 Home Use Program

IC	 intelligence community

IO	 information operations

IOP	 instruments of power

LOC	 lines of communications

MCP	 Malayan Communist Party

MPABA	 Malayan People’s Anti-British Army

MPAJA	 Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army

NSS National Security Strategy of the United States

of America

NVA	 North Vietnamese Army

OOB	 order of battle

PME	 professional military education

PF	 Popular Forces

PROVN	 Pacification and Long Term Development of

Vietnam (Study)

RF	 Regional Forces

ROTC	 Reserve Officer Training Corps

SW/LIC	 small wars/low intensity conflict

USMC	 United States Marine Corps

Acronyms.indd 29 2/19/08 7:50:32 
Acronyms.indd 30 2/19/08 7:50:32 
31

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