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FOREIGN MILITARY SALES: PROCESS AND POLICY

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, 

NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JUNE 15, 2017

Serial No. 115–35

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

BRIAN J. MAST, Florida 

FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida 

BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

THOMAS A. GARRETT, JR., Virginia 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

AMI BERA, California 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

NORMA J. TORRES, California 

BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York 

ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York 

TED LIEU, California

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

TED POE, Texas, Chairman 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

PAUL COOK, California 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

BRIAN J. MAST, Florida 

THOMAS A. GARRETT, JR., Virginia 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

NORMA J. TORRES, California 

BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Tina S. Kaidanow, Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau of 

Political-Military Affairs, U.S. Department of State ......................................... 7

Vice Admiral Joseph Rixey, Director, U.S. Defense Security Cooperation 

Agency ................................................................................................................... 21

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Ted Poe, a Representative in Congress from the State of 

Texas, and chairman, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and 

Trade: Prepared statement .................................................................................. 2

The Honorable William Keating, a Representative in Congress from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts: Prepared statement ........................................... 5

The Honorable Tina S. Kaidanow: Prepared statement ....................................... 10

Vice Admiral Joseph Rixey: Prepared statement .................................................. 23

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 52

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 53

(1)

FOREIGN MILITARY SALES: PROCESS AND 

POLICY 

THURSDAY, JUNE 15, 2017

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:22 a.m., in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ted Poe (chairman of 

the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. POE. The subcommittee will come to order. Without objection, all members may have 5 days to submit statements, questions, extraneous materials, for the record, subject to the length 

limitation in the rules. 

I have an opening statement. It is an excellent statement, but I 

am not going to give a statement at this time. I am going to file 

it in the record due to the time constraints that our two witnesses 

have today. 

And so I will yield to the ranking member, Mr. Keating, from 

Massachusetts, for his opening statement if he wishes to give one. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Poe follows:]

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Mr. KEATING. All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will just follow your lead. I know that our witnesses both have scheduling 

issues on the back end of this. 

And I just want to share, the chairman, in my view, at the opening—frankly, not to keep mentioning this, but we can’t keep it out 

of our minds, at the same time, that our prayers are with the victims of the shooting and the families that occurred yesterday, and 

all those that we serve with that suffered trauma from this. And 

a reminder across the whole country that every day, people are suffering from this kind of violence, and they are in our prayers as 

well. 

So I will yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Keating follows:]

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Mr. POE. I thank the gentleman from Massachusetts for his comments. And to add a comment to what he has said, we do a lot of 

good things, I think, this subcommittee and other Foreign Affairs 

subcommittees. And those good things almost always are bipartisan. I mean, you can’t get more bipartisan than Mr. Keating from 

Massachusetts kind of being somewhat left of center, and a Republican from Texas being a little right of center. We don’t even speak 

the same language. But yet we are very bipartisan in here all the 

way through on both sides. And I want to make that statement because you don’t hear that much here in Congress. 

So, without objection, all witnesses’ prepared statements will be 

made part of the record. I will ask that each witness please keep 

your presentation to no more than 5 minutes so the members here 

can ask you questions. I will introduce each witness and then give 

them time for their comments. 

Ambassador Tina—tell me how to pronounce your name. 

Ambassador KAIDANOW. Kaidanow. 

Mr. POE. Ambassador Kaidanow is the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. In this 

position, the Ambassador manages the provision of more than $5 

billion in international security assistance, bilateral transfers on 

commercial sales of U.S.-origin defense equipment, international 

security agreements, and implementation of the President’s Export 

Control Reform Initiative. 

Vice Admiral Joseph Rixey is the Director of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. He previously served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for International Programs and Director for the Navy International Programs Office. 

I also understand, Admiral Rixey, that you are going to retire. 

We object to that. And we still need you. But thank you for your 

long service in the United States Navy and serving the country. 

Ambassador, we will start with you. You have 5 minutes for your 

comments. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE TINA S. KAIDANOW, ACTING 

ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF POLITICAL-MILITARY 

AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Ambassador KAIDANOW. Thank you, sir. 

And let me also express at the top, on behalf of the entire State 

Department and my colleagues—I am sure Admiral Rixey will also 

express the same—but our deep sympathy and condolences for 

those who were impacted by yesterday’s shooting. I think that was 

really startling for all of us. And those of us who are so interactive 

at the State Department with our colleagues here on the Hill, we 

feel it very, very deeply. So, again, on behalf of the entire State Department, we wish them well, and we hope that they all will have 

a speedy recovery. So thank you. 

Chairman Poe, Ranking Member Keating, committee members, I 

do want to begin today, first of all, by thanking the committee for 

holding this hearing and for joining us all here today. 

It is right and it is proper that the Foreign Affairs Committee, 

and this subcommittee in particular, conduct oversight of U.S. 

arms transfer policy and procedures, because each of these, in our 

view, is fundamentally an act of foreign policy. In my testimony 

8

today, I will outline why this is the case, and I will walk through 

the process and the policy considerations by which the United 

States reaches a decision on when to and when not to offer or authorize the transfer of defense articles and services to a partner nation. 

I am joined today, obviously, by Vice Admiral Joseph Rixey, director of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, DSCA. And the 

partnership between the Departments of State and Defense, and 

particularly between my Bureau of Political-Military Affairs and 

DSCA, are stronger now than they ever have been, which is really 

key to our effective decision-making and policy implementation. 

Admiral Rixey, as you said, will be retiring soon. And I want to 

take this opportunity to thank him most sincerely—and beg him, 

also, to stay—for the outstanding partnership that he and his team 

have provided to us. 

In my written testimony for this committee, I provide an outline 

of how the arms transfer processes work in greater detail. But before you today, I would like to highlight three main points. 

First, as I indicated at the outset, arms transfers constitute an 

element of foreign policy. We, therefore, take into account foreign 

policy considerations as we contemplate each arms transfer or sale, 

including, specifically, the appropriateness of the transfer in responding to U.S. and recipient security needs, the degree to which 

the transfer supports U.S. strategic foreign policy and defense interests through increased access and influence, allied burden sharing and interoperability, consistency with U.S. interests regarding 

regional stability, the degree of protection afforded by the recipient 

company to our sensitive technology, the risk that significant 

change in the political or security situation of the recipient country 

could lead to inappropriate end use or transfer, and the likelihood 

that the recipient would use the arms to commit human rights 

abuses or serious violations of international humanitarian law or 

retransfer the arms to those who would commit such abuses. 

As a second key point, arms transfers support the U.S. defense 

industrial base and they reduce the cost of procurement for our 

own U.S. military. Purchases made through the foreign military 

sales, known as the FMS system, often can be combined with our 

Defense Department orders to reduce unit costs. Beyond this, the 

U.S. defense industry directly employs over 1.7 million people 

across our Nation. These individuals and the companies they work 

for represent a key part of American entrepreneurship and innovation, maintaining the United States as the world leader in the defense and aerospace sectors, and helping to ensure that our Armed 

Forces sustain their military edge. 

In authorizing the transfer of defense articles or services, we 

take these considerations into account as well. For each export, we 

examine the effect of the proposed transfer on U.S. industry and 

defense industrial base, the risk of revealing system vulnerabilities 

and adversely affecting U.S. operational capabilities, and the availability of comparable systems from foreign suppliers. 

A third key point: The arms transfer process works. The process 

is designed to review proposed sensitive transfers while balancing 

a very complex range of policy, industrial, and technological considerations. Even with all of that, the vast majority of sales move 

9

through the process quickly and efficiently. In some cases, certain 

considerations, for example relating to technology security, human 

rights, or regional balances of power, may slow or preclude the approval of a transfer. Such cases comprise a very, very small percentage of the overall caseload that we and our partners in DOD 

manage every day, but they tend to include some of the most highprofile cases. 

I am often asked how we can ‘‘get to yes faster.’’ As Admiral 

Rixey will describe, the most significant delays in the FMS system 

lie in the contracting and the production processes. But on those 

very rare occasions when a holdup involves the foreign policy part 

of this review, I will say this: Better a lengthy decision process that 

moves forward at the right time than a hasty process that puts 

sensitive technology in the wrong hands, ultimately undermining 

not only our security and foreign policy, but perhaps even our own 

industrial technological advantage. 

Of course, there are always areas in which we can improve. We 

are working to complete the process of export control reform so that 

we shift jurisdiction over those defense articles and services that 

do not provide America with the specific technological advantage 

from the State Department to the Department of Commerce, where 

the process is a lot easier and faster. This will free up a significant 

portion of industry from unnecessary red tape and encourage innovation in our defense sector. 

We are also working with Admiral Rixey to improve the FMS 

process, including through better educating and coordinating the 

entire defense security cooperation workforce across both the State 

Department and the Defense Department. 

I will be happy to speak about these and any other initiatives before you today and to answer any questions that you may have 

about the arms transfer process. But just to conclude these brief remarks and to emphasize one more time, I am glad that this testimony is taking place, and specifically here in this context, because 

the fact that the House Foreign Affairs Committee has oversight of 

arms transfers speaks to the essential role that such transfers play 

in the construct of our foreign policy and the pursuit of our national security interests. 

Your committee’s continued interest and concern is a measure of 

the policy importance of these issues, and it tells both the American people and the rest of the world, frankly, that such transfers 

are not something the United States Government takes lightly. I 

look forward to taking your questions and also listening to any of 

your thoughts. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Kaidanow follows:]

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Mr. POE. Thank you, Ambassador. 

Admiral Rixey, you have 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF VICE ADMIRAL JOSEPH RIXEY, DIRECTOR, 

U.S. DEFENSE SECURITY COOPERATION AGENCY 

Admiral RIXEY. Thank you, Chairman Poe, Ranking Member 

Keating, and members of the committee. And before I get started, 

in light of yesterday’s events, I simply want to state thank you for 

serving. 

I am pleased to be here today in my capacity as the director of 

the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, DSCA, to discuss the 

overall health of the foreign military sales, known as FMS. I am 

summarizing my written statement and ask that it be submitted 

for the record. 

Mr. POE. Without objection. 

Admiral RIXEY. Under the offices of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, DSCA leads the execution of the Security Cooperation programs, a wide range of activities enabling a full spectrum 

of capability the department seeks to provide its foreign partners. 

FMS is the government-to-government process through which the 

U.S. Government purchases defense articles, training, and services 

on behalf of foreign governments authorized in the Arms Export 

Control Act. FMS’s longstanding Security Cooperation program 

that supports partner and regional security enhances military-tomilitary cooperation, enables interoperability, and develops and 

maintains international relationships. Through the FMS process, 

the U.S. Government determines whether or not the sale is of mutual benefit to us and the partner, whether the technology can and 

will be protected, and whether the transfer is consistent with U.S. 

conventional arms transfer policy. 

The FMS system is actually a set of systems in which the Department of State, Department of Defense, and Congress play critical roles. The Department of Defense, in particular, executes a 

number of different processes, including the management of the 

FMS case life cycle, which is overseen by DSCA; technology transfer reviews overseen by the Defense Technology Security Administration; and the management of a defense acquisition and logistics 

systems overseen by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 

for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, and the military departments. 

This process, or a version of it, also serves as well in the DOD 

Title 10 Building Partnership Capacity arena where the process of 

building a case, validating a requirement, and exercising our U.S.-

acquisition system to deliver capability is modeled on the FMS system. 

I want to say clearly that, overall, the system is performing very 

well. The United States continues to remain the provider of choice 

for our international partners with 1,700 new cases implemented 

in Fiscal Year 2016 alone. These new cases, combined with adjustments to existing programs, equated to more than $33 billion in 

sales last year. This included over $25 billion in cases funded by 

our partner nations’ own funds and approximately $8 billion in 

cases funded by DOD’s Title 10 program or Department of State’s 

appropriations. Most FMS cases move through the process relVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:08 Jun 29, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_TNT\061517\25841 SHIRL
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atively quickly, but some may move more slowly as we engage in 

deliberate review to ensure that the necessary arms transfer criteria are met. 

It should be noted that the validations required by the Arms Export Control Act, such as foreign policy or technology transfer reviews, occur regardless whether sales conducted via FMS or direct 

commercial sales. When foreign partners choose FMS, however, 

they are assured that their procurements are executed with the 

same level of confidence as ours, and they will be receiving a total 

package approach that includes associated capabilities such as 

training, logistics, and maintenance. 

Though the system overall is performing well, DSCA is working 

with DOD and interagency partners to continually analyze the 

FMS process and target areas of improvement to keep the FMS 

system responsive to partner needs and agile to support foreign 

policy and national security objectives. Together with our stakeholders, we have developed and are implementing a robust set of 

initiatives captured in our 6-year plan, Vision 2020. 

In addition, we are advancing key reforms directed by the Fiscal 

Year 2017 National Defense Authorization Act. Our focus is to improve the quality of the workforce through professionalism, to ensure the right quantity of the workforce is accomplishing our mission, and to build a more effective requirements prioritization system to be responsive to the global combatant commands while 

managing limited resources. 

We have a continuous improvement culture and have identified 

these priorities to address the mandates of the NDAA to better enable the United States to remain the provider of choice to our foreign partners, providing them with the full spectrum of required 

capabilities to train for, maintain, and sustain the products they 

receive through the FMS program. We are also developing options 

to provide more transparency in the process as it occurs to our 

FMS customers. The transparency initiative was started to facilitate the improvement of the timelines and the quality in the execution of FMS, through greater transparency and communication, 

with regard to each step of the process. 

As I have noted, DSCA plays a key role, but we are only one element of the broader U.S. Government system for FMS. My intent 

today is to comment specifically on DSCA’s contribution to this 

mission both in terms of the programs we execute and the initiatives we are championing, and at the same time demonstrate the 

linkages and close coordination between us and the larger FMS enterprise. 

Distinguished committee members, I want to thank you again for 

the opportunity to sit before you today, and I look forward to your 

questions. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Rixey follows:]

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Mr. POE. Thank you, Admiral. 

The Chair is going to recognize members in the order that they 

appeared. And I will reserve my questions till last. 

So I will recognize the—without objection, I will recognize the 

gentleman from Florida, Mr. Mast, for 5 minutes of questions. 

Mr. MAST. Thank you, Chairman. 

Thank you, Ambassador and Admiral, for your time and your testimony. I want to get into a couple of quick questions on the process for FMS, as I am sure you are well aware that is what a lot 

of people want to talk about. 

Can you outline for me a little bit just how the process can be 

made a little bit more streamlined when we are talking about just 

one U.S. competitor that is, you know, in there? Is there a place 

that that can be streamlined when there is just one U.S. contractor 

competing? 

Admiral RIXEY. Well, first of all, in my submitted statement, I 

have two slides. The one is a Gantt chart. It really is a graphical 

depiction of the Arms Export Control Act. 

Mr. POE. Is your microphone on, Admiral? 

Admiral RIXEY. What is that? 

Mr. POE. Microphone. 

Admiral RIXEY. I am sorry. I submitted two slides with my statement. The first is a graphical representation of the Arms Export 

Control Act. It is really nothing more than a Gantt chart, critical 

path. There is a grid on it so that if we ever discuss FMS systems 

or FMS programs, we can be very specific as to where this program 

resides and how a case is particularly managing and going through 

a system. 

The second slide that I provided you is the full-spectrum capability slide. At times throughout this testimony, I will be referring 

back to those slides to explain the process in a little better way. 

As far as if a country requests a FMS case that goes sole sourced, 

we will honor that request. And so we will process that through the 

service acquisition community that will execute that case. I think 

that is your question. If it is requested by a partner, we will honor 

that sole-source commitment. 

Mr. MAST. So you don’t see a place where we are getting in the 

way there? 

Admiral RIXEY. No, not at all. 

Mr. MAST. Can you outline for me a little bit, you know, what 

would be the biggest concerns when you are looking to determine 

whether something is an inappropriate sale? What would be some 

of the examples? Or can you give me some specific examples of 

when you have identified that—you know, you are denying a sale 

because you thought it was inappropriate? Help me understand 

that process. 

Admiral RIXEY. So, again, on that Gantt chart, you will see that 

it is a graphical representation of the Arms Export Control Act. 

There are three deliberate conversations that we have to have. It 

is based on the Arms Export Control Act and, actually, PPD-27. 

PPD-27—Presidential Policy Decision—has 13 considerations that 

we must make before we make a sale. I have thinned that down 

to three. 

34

The first is, is it of mutual benefit? The first conversation we 

have is is it of mutual benefit. So we usually ask that question of 

our combatant commanders and the country team themselves. 

The second deliberate conversation that we have is the technology. Will the technology be protected? Will they preserve it or 

will they have the agreements in place so that they will protect it? 

And, third, the third deliberate conversation is foreign policy. For 

example, human rights or adherence to international norms. 

So those are the three conversations we have. COCOM on mutual benefit in our industry—I am sorry—our country team in the 

Embassy, the DTSA under Beth McCormick, who leads that particular tech transfer and tech security foreign disclosure review, 

and then, of course, we work with State in terms of a foreign policy 

review. 

Mr. MAST. And maybe this follow-on will go more to State. 

Maybe it will stick with you, Admiral, but——

Admiral RIXEY. Sure. 

Mr. MAST [continuing]. How much are you consulting with other 

intelligence agencies when you are making these determinations as 

a part of that decision-making process? 

Admiral RIXEY. The whole interagency process is engaged when 

we go through that deliberate conversation. 

Mr. MAST. Okay. You have answered all my questions. I appreciate it. It gave me a much better picture of what you are doing 

there. Thank you. 

I yield back. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentleman from Florida. 

I recognize the ranking member of the committee, Mr. Keating, 

from Massachusetts. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you for your testimony. I couldn’t agree more with both 

of the witnesses in their opening statements that this is indeed a 

major foreign policy decision. Compared to some of the other policy 

decisions we make as a country, this can indeed have longer lasting 

consequences in many instances and have just as many intended 

and unintended results. So I agree wholeheartedly that these decisions can’t be made in a vacuum. And you really did a great job 

laying out the procedure. So I am going to just put out two questions. And I know it will take up more of the time. But I like to 

give witnesses the ability, between both of you, to answer it. 

And the first one is more specific, the Saudi commitments that 

were made. Now, if you can just articulate what some of the new 

commitments are and how they are different from the prior promises that were, frankly, reneged upon by the king to our country 

and, indeed, how they might entail changes in how they deal with 

civilian casualties, and maybe giving more assurances to coalition 

partners, follow those same policies and commitments as their coalition partners. 

And then the second one, if you could, is the fact that—I said it 

is not done in a vacuum. What about our competitors, the other 

countries that are, you know, selling weapons to countries? You 

know, we know Russia, China, France, and I think interoperability. 

You laid all the reasons out why we should be where we are. But 

35

if you want to comment on the concerns you might have about how 

they do this business. 

So those are the two issues, the Saudi commitments and just 

your own personal comments on how the other countries pursue 

this, and some of the concerns you have about the way they go 

about this as well. 

Ambassador KAIDANOW. Thank you, Congressman. I think we 

had an opportunity, happily, earlier this week to brief some of you 

on this set of issues related to Saudi Arabia. So I got into a little 

bit more detail there than perhaps I can even here. But I will say 

this. We clearly believe that there is an interest in providing Saudi 

Arabia, but also some of the other countries in the Gulf, with what 

they need in order to carry out what we believe is both in our interests and theirs, and that is to counter some very serious threats 

posed by Iran and some other salient threats that we see in the 

Gulf region. 

The President went not that long ago, obviously. We concluded 

with the Saudis—and the admiral can speak to this in greater detail even than I can—a large package of arms sales. The rationale 

behind that, in most instances is, in fact, to bolster the Saudi capabilities to do the kinds of things we have asked them to do. The 

buckets, if you will, or the elements of that package, are largely in 

maritime security, for example, border security, the kinds of things 

that, arguably, they really do need, and they need to improve by 

way of capability in order to push back on the threats that they 

have. 

It is a large package, obviously. It will have other impacts that 

we can speak about. But, you know, the concerns that people feel 

about Saudi and the Saudi-led coalition’s performance in Yemen 

are real. We share some of those concerns. We have shared that 

with the Saudi Government over time, and they have given us commitments that now, actually, I think have been in the public domain, but a number of commitments that we consider to be serious 

and credible, all of which are important. For example, adherence 

to the laws of armed conflict, vetting of targets. I mean——

Mr. KEATING. Yeah. We were also assured in personal meetings 

from the foreign minister of those changes as well. So I hate to interrupt. We are running out of time. 

Ambassador KAIDANOW. No, please. 

Mr. KEATING. But if either of you want to comment on the second 

question. You know, what are your concerns about the way some 

of these other countries do their business, you know, in terms of 

our own security here and the way they do it? I suspect they don’t 

do it in as thoughtful a way as our process. But if you could take 

a little time—Mr. Chairman—to just do that, to enlighten us on 

what the other countries are doing. 

Ambassador KAIDANOW. We obviously have those concerns, sir. 

And I think we try very hard to both monitor and also, then, to 

hold accountable the countries that violate those understandings. 

We belong to a number of different nonproliferation regimes. Missile Control Technology Regime, for example, is one of those. The 

idea is, again, to try and hold them to certain standards, and when 

they are not holding to those standards, hold them accountable. 

36

I will say that, again, the American weapons systems remain the 

weapons systems of choice all over the world. We want to keep it 

that way. That is why we are trying to balance the technology security aspect of what we do against the ability of our defense industry, and the companies to do their business overseas, and to be 

as effective as they can be in as wide an array of countries——

Mr. KEATING. Yeah. And I think the interoperability issue is 

clearly an issue too because——

Ambassador KAIDANOW. Yeah. 

Mr. KEATING [continuing]. Once they get these sales, and we 

don’t, the tendency will be other sales will follow that, and these 

countries will have undue influences——

Ambassador KAIDANOW. That is right. 

Mr. KEATING [continuing]. On areas we don’t want them to have. 

Ambassador KAIDANOW. Precisely. 

Mr. KEATING. All right. Well, thank you. 

I yield back, Mr. Chair. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentleman from Massachusetts. 

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. Rohrabacher, for his questions. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me ask some specific questions about maybe some specific 

deals or policies. Egypt had a policy in terms of our sales of weapons to Egypt. It used to be where they would spend—they would 

put 20 percent down on a piece of military equipment, and then 

every year after that they would pay 20 percent. So after 5 years, 

they would pay for it, but they would be able to use that weapon 

system in the meantime. Egypt, as most of us know, on the front 

lines of the battle against radical Islamic terrorism, they are, themselves, targets. And I would say that if Egypt falls to a radical regime, the entire Middle East will fall. 

Now, have we resumed the policy that we had before, instead 

of—I understand somewhere along the line, a few years ago, it became cash on the barrelhead. You have got to pay for that weapons 

system, all of it, on delivery. Which, of course, here we have someone on the front lines, the actual point of the spear of helping us 

fight radical Islam, and we are changing our policies to make it 

more difficult for them to have a weapons system. Has that been 

reversed yet or is that policy still in place? 

Admiral RIXEY. Well, I think what you are referring to is cash 

flow finance. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes. 

Admiral RIXEY. But that is an appropriated account under foreign military finance. So it is not national funds from Egypt. So it 

is the State fund that we would provide to Egypt. We used to allow 

them cash flow finance, which means if we had $1.3 billion coming 

in a particular year, they could initiate a procurement of significant 

size because we knew the 1.3 was going to come next year and the 

following year. So they would have 3 to 4, 5 years of buying power. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right. 

Admiral RIXEY. That was removed. So now that we are just—we 

will just take—we will not execute a case until the cash is there 

as financed, or cash on the barrelhead, as you said. That policy is 

still in place. 

37

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So we changed the policy to make it more difficult for Egypt to obtain a weapons system. 

Admiral RIXEY. We changed the policy. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. Let me just note that, Mr. Chairman, 

I hope we all are taking note that at a time when radical Islamists 

are murdering people all over the world, bombs are going off all 

over Egypt, I might say, which is on the front lines, we change the 

policy to make it more difficult for Egypt to have the weapons it 

needed in this struggle. 

Let me ask you about Pakistan. I remember that a few years 

ago, when our brave military went in and took out Osama bin 

Laden, that there was a—that they had to go through all kinds of 

machinations on what type of equipment, where to go. They took 

a route to go get Osama bin Laden that was much more dangerous, 

because they were afraid that they might be shot down by the Pakistani Air Force for going into the airspace of Pakistan. 

What kind of planes would they have been shot down by? Would 

they have been shot down by American airplanes? 

Ambassador KAIDANOW. Sir, I mean, it is a little difficult for me 

to answer what is largely a hypothetical question. 

I think what you are asking, though, is, you know, what kind of 

a discussion and what kind of relationship we have with Pakistan 

and ongoing. Is that what you are——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I am alluding to the fact that we have our 

own military understanding that we can’t trust them not to shoot 

down our own people, and we have ended up giving them modern 

weapon systems, and we continue to do so. Now, that is not your 

fault. You are running a system and being directed by political decisions. 

But I would suggest, Mr. Chairman, that we need to go on the 

record here, on this part of our Government, to say that we are not 

going to be providing weapons to countries like Pakistan that we 

are afraid will shoot down our own people. And we know they are 

engaged in terrorism. We know what they have done now. They 

still hold Dr. Afridi, the man who helped us finger Osama bin 

Laden, the man who was responsible for slaughtering 3,000 Americans. They still hold him in a dungeon. 

Mr. Chairman, we should be facilitating our support and our 

weapons systems to countries like Egypt that are fighting this 

threat to Western civilization, to all of civilization. And we should 

make it more difficult, not less difficult, for countries like Pakistan 

to get their hands on American weapons. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentleman from California. 

The Chair recognizes another member from California, the 

gentlelady, Mrs. Torres, for her questions. 

Mrs. TORRES. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. Just 2 hours 

north of my colleague on the other side. 

So thank you, both of you, for being here. 

Ambassador Kaidanow, I want to go back to the question that 

you were answering earlier as it relates to Saudi Arabia. 

So President Trump recently announced that we had reached a $110 billion arm deal with Saudi Arabia. Now, I know that there 

is some questions about, you know, is that really $110 billion? So 

38

we are not going to go through that today. But what are the conditions that you mention? What are those conditions that were placed 

on those weapons? You said that they—it was on Open Source. I 

have not seen it, so I would like some information. 

Ambassador KAIDANOW. I think some of it has been reported in 

the press. In fact, I think this morning there was a piece on the 

issue. 

I would not call them conditions, just to be clear. I want to sort 

of, again, give the understanding of—this is a dialogue that we 

have been having with the Saudi Government, and it is an important dialogue. I think they, themselves, recognize that some of the 

elements of their performance in Yemen have been problematic. 

They would like to improve those. We need to help them improve 

that performance. 

The way, again, that we would hope to do that, one of the things that we recently notified to Congress is a $750 million training 

package for their air force. The idea behind that is very much to 

provide training on the law of armed conflict, to give them experience with targeting and vetting of targets, the kinds of things that, 

again, arguably, any military, but certainly in a combat situation, 

you would want to have them be more proficient at. 

Mrs. TORRES. More proficient at targeting so they don’t have so 

many civilian casualties? 

Ambassador KAIDANOW. That’s correct. Specifically to try and 

avoid civilian casualties. And that is important, you know, from our 

standpoint, from the U.S. Government standpoint, from theirs, I 

think, as well. And, increasingly, they acknowledge that. 

So, again, I don’t want to call it conditions. What I want to say 

is they have made commitments. I think those commitments are 

important. And the idea here is, again, to help them do some of 

that, because, in our view, it is better to engage and then to give 

them that assistance than it is to simply stand back and—because, 

you know, the situation in Yemen is very, very challenging. The 

Saudis face a number of threats on their border with Yemen. They 

also face a number of threats that emanate from the Houthis who, 

you know, clearly are being empowered by——

Mrs. TORRES. You also talked about monitoring and holding them 

accountable. So I want to ask you about the end-use monitoring. 

What is the process for making sure that arms don’t end up in the 

wrong hands? Do you have the necessary resources, database, and 

the personnel to carry out effective end-use monitoring? 

Ambassador KAIDANOW. Thank you for the question. The State 

Department has a program that it utilizes for end-use monitoring, 

but that is also amplified or supplemented by other programs at 

DOD and so forth. So it is not simply a function of what the State 

Department does. 

We have a Blue Lantern program, it is called, that we utilize to 

ensure that there are ample checks, especially on the most sensitive weapon systems that we provide to some of our partners. We 

utilize some of our folks overseas in our Embassies to do some of 

those checking. Sometimes it is via the defense——

Mrs. TORRES. We have very limited time. Maybe we can follow 

up if there is some database——

Ambassador KAIDANOW. Absolutely. 

39

Mrs. TORRES [continuing]. Somewhere were you have—you know, 

where those weapons have fallen into the wrong hands, what have 

you done to either get them back or destroy them. 

Let’s talk about Mexico. I have been very concerned about the illegal trafficking of the arms into Mexico. A lot of these arms are 

ending up in the wrong hands, gun traffickers and violent criminals, narcotraffickers. Given the widespread problems with corruption in Mexico, should we also be concerned about what is happening with guns that we sell into Mexico? How do we know we 

are selling to the right people? 

Ambassador KAIDANOW. Well, again, and without getting into it 

too much here and offering up a specific briefing if you would like 

it on some of those issues. I think we do—we look very carefully 

at the end users who receive some of the weapons that we approve 

for sale. 

Mrs. TORRES. Specifically, the corrupt police and military units. 

Ambassador KAIDANOW. We look at the end-use recipients in any 

arms sale that we do, especially if it comes through the State Department. And, you know, there are some sales, obviously, that will 

eventually move again outside of our realm. But to the extent that 

it comes through because it is of a quality or a quantity that moves 

through the State Department for approval, we absolutely look 

to——

Mrs. TORRES. What happens when we find out, as in the state 

of Guerrero, that these weapons are ending up in the hands of 

narcotraffickers? What happens? 

Ambassador KAIDANOW. Congresswoman, I would defer you probably to a more detailed briefing on all of the particularities of what 

we do with regard to Mexico, if that’s all right, because I think 

there is a lot to talk about that. 

Mrs. TORRES. I ran out of time, so thank you. 

Ambassador KAIDANOW. Sure. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentlelady from California and for her line 

of questioning. 

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. 

Perry. 

Mr. PERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ambassador, Admiral, great to see you. 

Ambassador, I want to continue the conversation that we had, I 

think it was last week, regarding the Saudi Arabian arms deal and 

the other side of the ledger, so to speak. So it might be a little bit 

off topic, but I think it is instructional. 

So the context is that I am concerned about how much the export 

of Wahhabism was part of the deal, as you will recall. And so just 

to set the context, by 2013, 75 percent of North American Islamic 

centers relied on Wahhabi preachers who promote anti-Western 

ideas in person and online through sermons and through Saudiproduced literature. We think, since 1979, Saudi Arabia has engaged in a fairly persistent campaign of exporting that ideology 

throughout the world, spending about $4 billion annually on 

mosque, madrassas, preachers, students, and textbooks. I am interested in their sincerity, I guess, and how we monitor—what our 

metrics are in monitoring their efficacy adhering to their commitments. And so to further set the context, despite assurances that 

40

it would reform its educational curriculum by 2008—so this goes 

back nearly a decade. Let me just read some excerpts of current 

textbooks. 

A 12th grade textbook professes that treachery, betrayal, and the 

denunciation of covenants are among the attributes of Jews. An 

11th grade textbook teaches that cosmopolitan universities in the 

Middle East, such as the American universities in Beirut and 

Cairo, are examples of a modern-day crusade by Christians against 

Islam. And a 10th grade textbook on jurisprudence suggests that 

the most important debate about homosexuals is how best to execute them, whereas ISIS itself has used these textbooks issued by 

Saudi Arabia, their ministry of education, in its schools that it controls in Iraq and Syria. 

To the best of your ability, in this setting, can you tell me who 

in the department—is there one person or is there a portion of the 

department, is there a crew that is going to monitor the efficacy 

of their pledge, so to speak? I understand, in talking to the Secretary yesterday, that they have pledged to change the textbooks 

and supply their organizations with those textbooks and also pull 

back current textbooks. That is what I understand, right, in this 

new global center for combating extremist ideology. 

But I want to know, because we have been promised before, and 

we are tired of helping this sometimes ally when they don’t seem 

to be really doing things in what is the United States’s best interest, and if we are going to sell them things that they want and that 

we want them to have, they don’t want to uphold their end of the 

deal. But, unfortunately, while I love the Reagan doctrine of trust 

but verify, in this instance, I prefer verify and then trust. 

So what can you tell me about who is going to be monitoring that 

and how we are going to gauge their efficacy and what the penalties are for failure? 

Ambassador KAIDANOW. Sir, thanks for the question. I will say 

that, in the first instance—and, of course, these issues that you 

have mentioned I think are of concern to us just like they are of 

concern to you. But I will tell you that, you know, in almost every 

instance, the people on the ground that we have there are the ones 

that are the closest to this, and they are the ones that monitor it. 

So our folks in our Embassy there are the ones that are responsible 

for looking at, you know, whether the Saudis live up to the commitments, again, the promises that they have made. 

With regard to, you know, the State Department at large, we 

have a Bureau of Eurasian Affairs that, you know, again, concerns 

itself with these issues specifically. We also have public affairs people who look at this and the whole question of the promulgation 

of extremism through social media, through other means. These 

are the kinds of things that we preoccupy ourselves. 

Mr. PERRY. Do we literally have someone in Saudi Arabia that 

is going to be at the receiving dock checking in X amount or tons 

or skids, pallets, what have you, of old textbooks to prove that they 

either came back, or do we have someone in the United States that 

is working with the Department of State to visit these places where 

the textbooks were issued to see the new ones come and the old 

ones go? Are we taking the Saudis’ word for it? Because, apparently, we did since 2008. And you can see what we have gotten, 

41

which is very little. As a matter of fact, it has gone the other direction, in my opinion. 

How are we verifying it specifically? And if you don’t know and 

you got to get back to me later, I accept that. But I want to know 

the answer to that question. 

Ambassador KAIDANOW. Understood, sir. And, no, I could not tell 

you sitting here, you know, whether we have an individual who is 

doing something like that. But I am happy to get back to you with 

an answer. 

Mr. PERRY. All right. I think that we are all interested in that 

answer, and I think it is important to our national security in moving forward with this deal, as well within the answer, with the 

chairman’s indulgence, the consequences to the adherence of this 

agreement for failure to live up to their commitment. Thank you. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentleman from Pennsylvania for his line 

of questioning. 

Without objection, we have with us also Mr. Lieu from California, not a member of the subcommittee but a member of Foreign 

Affairs. The Chair will recognize him for 5 minutes. 

Mr. LIEU. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, ranking member, for letting me participate in this hearing. And thank you, Ambassador 

Kaidanow and Admiral Rixey, for your public service. 

We have had prior meetings on Saudi Arabia, so I would like to 

ask some questions for the record. As you know, the U.S. has been 

assisting Saudi Arabia in its war in Yemen. I don’t have a problem 

with helping our ally Saudi Arabia, but many Members of Congress, on a bipartisan, bicameral basis, do have a significant problem when the Saudi-led military coalition is committing war crimes 

in Yemen. 

I served in active duty in the Air Force. I am aware that, in the 

fog of war, you can make mistakes. Maybe three, four, five errant 

air strikes. I get that. But we are talking about dozens and dozens 

and dozens of reports from Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, the U.N. have documented over 70 unlawful air strikes by 

the Saudi-led coalition. And this is as of last year. Who knows 

what it has done since then. And these are air strikes nowhere 

near military targets. 

It freaked out our State Department so much that last year our 

State Department’s lawyers initiated a review to see if U.S. personnel or others would be liable for aiding and abetting war crimes. 

The State Department stopped a sale of precision-guided munitions. The State Department this year has reversed. 

So I would like to know what conditions have changed from, basically, last November to now that caused that reversal. 

Ambassador KAIDANOW. As you pointed out, Congressman, I 

think this has been an ongoing evaluation. In other words—and as 

I said at the outset of my testimony, it is always a balance between 

the national security interest that we face and our allies face as 

against other considerations, many of which you just laid out, I 

think, very coherently. 

With respect to Saudi and the coalition-led effort in Yemen, I 

think, again, the Saudis themselves have recognized that some of 

the aspects of how they have pursued that campaign are problematic. I think over time, their awareness of that has grown. I think 

42

their willingness and their ability to address some of those issues 

has grown. We have seen that both in the commitments they are 

willing to make to us as well as, again, in their willingness to accept some of the assistance that we can provide in order to help 

them do the things that, arguably, would improve their performance. 

Again, as I said, they need to fully, and they have, commit to following the laws of armed conflict. They need to improve their vetting process for targeting and doing the kinds of things that we all 

know that need to be done, especially those of us who have done 

this kind of work previously. They need to be much more careful 

with their rules of engagement. These are the kinds of things they 

have to do. 

Mr. LIEU. Have the Saudis made those commitments to the 

United States in writing? 

Ambassador KAIDANOW. They have made commitments to us that 

we—again, that we have outlined for you, and we will——

Mr. LIEU. Could you give the committee the commitments they 

have made? 

Ambassador KAIDANOW. We can definitely walk you through 

those commitments, absolutely. 

Mr. LIEU. Okay. Thank you. 

I would like to now shift to Qatar. As you know, last week, the 

President of the United States, through a series of tweets, accused 

Qatar of funding terrorism. The President essentially supported the 

blockade of Qatar led by Saudi Arabia and other Gulf nations. I am 

also reading reports that the United States just agreed to sell 

Qatar $12 billion worth of weapons, airplanes. Is that true that we are selling them $12 billion worth of fighter 

jets? 

Ambassador KAIDANOW. The fighter jet sale has been an ongoing 

deliberation and consideration for quite a while. Yes, the contract 

has just been signed for the sale. 

Mr. LIEU. And I don’t mean to be facetious with this, but does 

the President know that? 

Ambassador KAIDANOW. I believe so. 

Mr. LIEU. Okay. How do you square that sale, what the President has been saying about Qatar, since you said arm sales are an 

element of foreign policy? 

Ambassador KAIDANOW. Absolutely. Yeah. Again, this goes back 

to the consideration of the wider array of foreign policy issues as 

regards the Gulf more broadly. It is not simply a question of the 

things that we concern ourselves with with regard to the extremism and so forth. Qatar needs to do some more things. The President, Secretary has made that clear. And we have made that clear 

to the Qataris. By the same token, the Qataris and the Gulf countries, as a whole, face certain threats from Iran, from other sources, 

but primarily from Iran, that they need to address through means 

that we can assist them with. These fighter sales are designed to 

address those kinds of threats. 

So I think you can easily, you know, understand why we have 

to do multiple things at the same time. 

Mr. LIEU. So thank you. So I don’t take a position on this, because I need to find out more about it, my only point is that it is 

43

really confusing to world leaders, the Members of Congress, when 

the Trump administration does two exactly opposite things. And it 

is my hope that, as the administration grows and learns, that the 

administration stops doing that. 

And with that, I yield back. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentleman. 

The Chair recognizes another gentleman from California, Colonel 

Cook, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. COOK. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. 

Ambassador, it is good to see you again. You are spending far too 

much time here. This very, very complicated business that we are 

talking about. You know, I am a historian and, go back, you read 

about Roosevelt and Churchill and who they were supporting in 

World War II. Sometimes the lines between enemy and friend was 

very, very complicated, how you could support the Soviets, some of 

the things that they did under the Stalin regime, and yet we are 

saying how much—you can go on and on and on. And I think a lot 

of these things weigh into the equation. Who is your enemy this 

week and—very, very complicated. 

I do want to talk about the NATO arena and the dependence of 

many of our allies, Eastern European, quite frankly, on Soviet style 

equipment, both armor and air, that we have not weaned them 

off—maybe that is a bad phrase. But because of parts, because of 

systems, they still have to go back to the new Russia for those 

things that they had for years. And until they become a total member of NATO, in terms of our military equipment and everything 

else, I think it diminishes their capability as a true ally. 

And if you could address that question right now, because it 

doesn’t seem like a big priority, and yet countries there, they have 

been with us and everything else. But we expect them to come to 

the fight, when and if the Russians come across, such as the Rand 

study that was envisioned. 

Ambassador KAIDANOW. Right. Thank you, sir, for the question. 

I would, first of all, just reassert our deep commitment to our 

NATO partners, as well as to our partners that are not necessarily 

members of the NATO but who are allies of ours and friends that 

we work with extensively. And in a number of cases, we obviously 

provide either assistance to them, grant assistance sometimes in 

that form, or in other forms. 

Intraoperability, as you have indicated, is a huge, big issue for 

us. I highlighted it as one of the factors, you know, that we take 

into consideration when we make these decisions. I can’t emphasize 

enough how much work we do with a number of our European 

partners, both within NATO and outside NATO, to ensure, again, 

that what you are talking about precisely takes place, that their 

weapon systems are modernized, that they are interoperable with 

ours, and to the extent that, again, that we need to provide assistance for them to do it, that we give them that. 

Mr. COOK. Yeah. I think sometimes when we criticize our NATO 

partners for not meeting their 2 percent, I think if we are going 

to put all this pressure on them, and the fact that we are going 

to come, you know, to their aid if they are attacked, I think we 

have got to have—NATO standards applies to foreign military 

sales, at least my perspective. Other countries, obviously Saudi 

44

Arabia, some of the others, it gets dicey because of some of the political considerations. Egypt, I thought were a bit heavy-handed. I 

know that still talking about the Morsi government, and everything like that, and the change by el-Sisi. But, of course, they did 

the same thing. They went right back to buying Russian military 

equipment because of what happened. 

And I think, as you rightly pointed out, we have to take that 

variable into consideration. And we can argue all day about Saudi 

Arabia and Egypt and everything else. But NATO, we cannot criticize them. If they are having a tough time meeting the 2 percent, 

then we are not going to ensure that we do something to make sure 

that that is streamlined. 

Admiral, would you comment on the short time I have left? 

Admiral RIXEY. Well, we will honor any letter of request for capability. So I am seeing on my travels a desire to move away from 

Russian equipment and into NATO standard-type equipment. So 

we are prepared to execute if requested. 

Mr. COOK. Okay. I yield back. Thank you. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentleman from California, Colonel Cook. 

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Garrett, 

for his questions. 

Mr. GARRETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank the members of the panel for being here. 

Generally, Mr. Chairman, when I ask a series of questions, there 

is an answer that I am driving at; that is not case today. 

Understanding the importance of what you all do, of what FMS 

does, and what the DSCA does, our office publicly stated a policy 

that we think that this Nation should adhere to very early after 

being elected, and that is first to seek peace and stability in the 

world and, second, not to arm people who might later find themselves using those weapons against the United States or our allies. 

There are literally dozens and dozens of nations, if you cover the 

gamut from main battle tanks to small arms, to whom we supply 

arms. And I don’t necessarily object to that on its face. In fact, I 

think, in many instances, it is important to do. But I would ask you 

both—and this is a tough question—if you were forced to sort of 

predict a horrible worst-case scenario where U.S. weaponry was 

turned on U.S. forces or our allies, in what nation that we currently sell weapons to might that occur? 

Because the answer can’t be, oh, it could never happen. I will tell 

you—and I know I am burning my own time here. I grew up watching terror movements, watching government upheaval where the 

foreign fighters were armed with Soviet-Style weaponry. And it has 

galled me for the last decade as we see ISIS and AQAP and other 

elements in Humvees like the one I drove in, with rifles like the 

one I carried, firing weapon systems like the ones that our soldiers 

operate. It strikes me as a bad outcome. 

So where might we see that again? And then I will give you a 

redemption clause, and how might we avoid that? 

Ambassador KAIDANOW. I think it is a really important question, 

frankly. And I also think that it is, you know, a highly sensitive 

question. In other words, you know, how do you gauge that? You 

are asking, you know, a very difficult question to kind of get at. 

45

I would say, at least when I think about it, and given the time 

that I have been doing this job, I worry perhaps a little bit less 

about some of the existing technology and what we have already 

provided. What I think about is the cutting-edge technology. The 

things that arguably, anyway, we have to be super careful about 

when we provide to other nations. And these are really open questions. I mean, we have to sit there and really think about, do we 

provide certain kinds of technology to certain partners, given some 

of our concerns, given the question as to whether those technologies will be adequately protected? And we don’t take that lightly. I can just tell you——

Mr. GARRETT. I am going to interrupt, and I am not doing it to 

be rude. 

Ambassador KAIDANOW. No, no. 

Mr. GARRETT. It is a real hard question, given the professional 

nature of your individual responsibilities. And I don’t want to get 

anybody in trouble here. 

There are two ways this could happen, and maybe this will help 

you. It could happen because the nation state to whom we sold the 

weapons turns on us. Or it could happen, as it did in Iraq, because 

the nation state to whom we provided the weapons with the best 

of intentions abandoned those weapons and they fell into the hands 

of people who sought to do us and our allies harm. 

Ambassador KAIDANOW. Yes. 

Mr. GARRETT. Where might that be a possibility? 

Ambassador KAIDANOW. I mean, you have highlighted places 

where, you know, in theory, that is possible. And there are places 

across the globe where we have, again, provided things, and you 

cannot always predict what will happen with regard to a government’s stability or whether, you know, the next government will 

somehow find it in their interest, you know, to somehow do something against our interest. 

But, again, I worry a little bit less about that with respect to the 

things already provided. I am now looking forward at the question 

of, you know, emerging technologies, how do we control for some 

of that in a very important environment in which we want American companies to have the ability to sell, and yet we also want to 

protect those technologies and not have them turned against our 

own forces. These are salient questions. 

Mr. GARRETT. Admiral Rixey? 

Admiral RIXEY. Well, I certainly don’t want to speculate in this 

open forum. So if you will allow me, I will take that back to the 

Pentagon and get you a classified brief or something of that nature. 

Mr. GARRETT. I would be delighted. I anticipate that you will 

proactively reach out to my office. I look forward to it. Thank you. 

I would yield back. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentleman. 

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York, Mr. Zeldin. 

Mr. ZELDIN. Well, thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you to both 

of our witnesses for being here. 

Ambassador, just for way of background, how long have you been 

in your current position, just so I know? 

Ambassador KAIDANOW. I have been in the principal deputy slot 

since February of last year. So February 2016. 

46

Mr. ZELDIN. Okay. And what were you doing just before that? 

Ambassador KAIDANOW. I was the State Department coordinator 

for counterterrorism. 

Mr. ZELDIN. Okay. Were you involved in all—because I just have 

some questions about the FMS-related transaction between the 

United States and Iran. Were you involved in that? 

Ambassador KAIDANOW. No. 

Mr. ZELDIN. Would you be able to answer any questions about 

that? 

Ambassador KAIDANOW. Probably not in this setting. 

Mr. ZELDIN. Well, let me try. 

Ambassador KAIDANOW. Sure. 

Mr. ZELDIN. When was the United States’ claim against Iran—

our claims against Iran—I am sorry. 

When did the United States stop disputing our claims against 

Iran? 

Ambassador KAIDANOW. Again, sir, just because this—I think 

this addresses a broader set of issues than I am necessarily responsible for in my portfolio at the State Department. I would offer, 

again, a briefing, if you would like it, on those specific issues. 

Mr. ZELDIN. Okay. For decades, the United States was disputing 

that we owed Iran money for the sale. Do you know when we 

stopped disputing whether we owed that money? 

Ambassador KAIDANOW. Sir, I don’t have the history of all that 

in front of me right this minute. So, no, I would prefer to get back 

to you on the specifics. 

Mr. ZELDIN. Okay. Do you know why we paid in cash? 

Ambassador KAIDANOW. Again, this goes a little bit beyond my 

portfolio, so I really would prefer to give you a more detailed answer. 

Mr. ZELDIN. You would be able to answer these questions, 

though, in another setting? 

Ambassador KAIDANOW. We will, obviously, provide you any information we can. 

Mr. ZELDIN. And you would be able to bring someone to that setting who would be able to answer what you might not be able to 

answer? 

Ambassador KAIDANOW. We will do that. 

Mr. ZELDIN. Do you know why the payment was made at the 

same time as the release of the American hostages? 

Ambassador KAIDANOW. Sir, I can’t answer, I think, any differently than I already have. 

Mr. ZELDIN. All right. Just, I guess, procedurally, is there anything the way we handled this entire exchange over the course of 

decades that you think the United States can learn a lesson and 

handle it better going forward? 

Ambassador KAIDANOW. Again, given the fact that, you know, we 

are not addressing in great detail the way that the issues unfolded, 

I think it would be probably better to discuss that in a briefing. 

Mr. ZELDIN. There was a lot of concern here in Congress over, 

you know, many aspects of that exchange, historically speaking. 

When it happened, Iran was—they were canceling orders, and we 

ended up—the United States had parts that we were in the process 

of putting together. Iran takes over our Embassy. And everything 

47

that happens there at that point in time, you can make an argument of whether or not we would have owed them anything then. 

But then there are these disputes, over the course of the years 

ahead, to be settled out in court or out of court, both the United 

States against Iran and Iran against the United States. And we 

were disputing whether or not we had owed this money to Iran. 

Yet what appears to me as a Member of Congress, and I know for 

many of my colleagues and for much of the American public, it 

seemed a bit odd that a position that the United States had for decades, that out of nowhere, we see the United States making a payment for the full principal amount, a generous interest amount, 

and it had to be delivered on a cash pallet to the Iranians at the 

same exact time as the Iranians releasing American prisoners. And 

it was the position of the administration that that was a coincidence and that one thing had absolutely nothing to do with the 

other. And I would be really interested in getting filled in on, if 

there is another, you know, 99 percent of the story that we are not 

familiar with, I would loved to be briefed up on it. 

But without that information, I find it incredibly hard to believe 

that that was anything other than a ransom payment. And I find 

it hard to believe that I would be able to take the position that it 

was a coincidence. But also as it relates to, you know, our policies—lessons learned, our policies going forward—I don’t know 

whether or not we even had owed the money. And that was a 

whole other dispute that was consistent—I say my position was 

consistent with U.S. position for decades. 

So I certainly would appreciate that, Chairman, if we would have 

that opportunity to fill in the gaps that still exist. 

I yield back. 

Mr. POE. I appreciate the questions from the gentleman from 

New York and the gentleman from Virginia. I intend to figure out 

a way that we can have a classified briefing from you all on the 

issues raised by the gentleman from New York and Virginia and 

the gentleman from California as well. 

I recognize myself for a line of questions. 

We are all aware of the Turkish security detail that assaulted 

peaceful protesters on American soil and tried to prevent them 

from exercising constitutional rights of the right to assemble and 

to free speech. And I am still mad about that. I think other Members of Congress are as well. 

The U.S. has a plan to sell small arms to security details like the 

Turkish goons that assaulted Americans. The chairman has written a letter to Secretary Tillerson asking to stop that sale until this 

is resolved about the assault. Where are we on that, Ambassador? 

Ambassador KAIDANOW. Sir, thank you for the question. I think 

you have expressed concerns. We have some similar concerns that 

we expressed directly to our Turkish friends and colleagues. But 

this sale is one that obviously is going to have to be looked at and 

reviewed. It is still in the process of review, given the fact that now 

the law enforcement process is in play. Rather than sort of give you 

an end state, I would like to just come back to you soon and give 

you an update on where we are with it. But it is still in review. 

It has not——

48

Mr. POE. You understand, as oversight on this issue, members of 

the Foreign Affairs Committee, through the chairman, have said 

suspend those sales till this is resolved and the folks that committed these crimes against Americans on American soil is resolved. I think that is atrocious that that would ever occur. So that 

is our position. And we hope that you will suspend those sales until 

this is done. 

This whole concept of sales to foreign countries, hopefully folks 

that are friendly to us, is complicated, because the idea that if we 

don’t sell to country X, then they are going to go buy from the Russians, the Chinese, whoever they can get these weapon systems 

from. It is a political issue, but it is also a security issue for the 

U.S. to have partners that look to us rather than look to the Russians or the Chinese. I understand that. 

Let’s talk about Lebanon. We are in the process of selling weapons to Lebanon. Reports are the Lebanese Government gives those 

small arms to Hezbollah, a terrorist group. Where are we on that? 

How do we know that Lebanon—those arms don’t end up in the 

possession of Hezbollah, a terrorist group in Lebanon and now in 

other countries as well? 

Ambassador or Admiral, either one of you. How do we know that 

is not going to happen? 

Ambassador KAIDANOW. Thank you again for the question. So we 

are very resolute in supporting the Lebanese armed forces. Those 

armed forces we regard as the most important guarantor, if you 

will, of Lebanese sovereigty and the ability of Lebanon as a country 

to maintain its integrity. We consider that very important with regard to what is going on in the region now, given the threat of ISIS 

or Daesh, given the threat of Iran extending its arc of influence 

through——

Mr. POE. I get that. How do we know they don’t end up in the 

possession of Hezbollah? 

Ambassador KAIDANOW. We are watching very, very carefully. 

Extremely carefully. And we are confident, thus far, that no weapons have been transferred from the Lebanese Government or the 

Lebanese armed forces into the hands of those who should not get 

it, including Hezbollah. 

Mr. POE. Do you have a comment, Admiral? 

Admiral RIXEY. Well, sir, we would, of course, execute our Golden 

Sentry program and end-use monitoring in that country to ensure 

that that does not happen. 

Mr. POE. I want to turn to Pakistan. We have been having the 

issue with Pakistan whether they are loyal or playing us for years 

on the issue of aid to Pakistan and sales to Pakistan. As mentioned 

by the gentleman from California, Mr. Rohrabacher, when we went 

in to get Osama bin Laden, we were concerned about the Pakistanis scrambling F-16s that we made and sold to the Pakistanis 

so that they wouldn’t shoot down Americans who were doing the 

job of taking out this terrorist. 

I personally think Pakistan plays the United States, because 

they turn to China if we don’t help them. I understand all that. 

They have nuclear weapons, and we want to have a relationship 

with them so that they don’t look to China. I get all that. But are 

we doing anything different on sales to Pakistan to make sure 

49

those sales of whatever it is aren’t used against us directly or used 

against us indirectly because of the military helping the Taliban in 

Afghanistan where we have our troops, and those weapons could be 

used against the United States? Are we doing anything different to 

make sure that doesn’t happen or are we still using the same formula? 

Ambassador KAIDANOW. No. I mean, I think what we applied to 

Pakistan is what we applied to a number of our partner countries. 

But with Pakistan, we have a robust end-use monitoring program, 

extremely robust, to ensure that the items that we provide for 

them are used appropriately and within the boundaries of what we 

have asked them to accomplish. 

We, as you say, regard Pakistan as an important partner on 

counterterrorism issues. They will be essential in bringing the Afghan Taliban to the table for peace talks. There are a number of 

things where we need their cooperation and their assistance. And 

we do want to help them on the counterterrorism front. But on the 

other hand, again, we have very big concerns that we continuously 

front with them on support for Haqqani, on support for other 

things. This has been made clear to the Pakistani Government at 

the highest level. 

Mr. POE. Admiral, you don’t want to comment? 

Admiral RIXEY. I defer to State. 

Mr. POE. All right. I am out of time. 

I will mention to the subcommittee and to the witnesses, I appreciate you all being here. We will figure out a way to have a classified briefing, because we have gone about halfway on the questions 

that we are asking. Many Members of Congress want a bottom-line 

answer to the questions that they ask about the different countries 

during their questioning here in open forum. So we will work on 

that. 

I thank both of you for being here. I know you all have time constraints. I was just making sure there is not anybody else here. 

The subcommittee is adjourned. Thank you very much. I thank 

the members for being here. 

[Whereupon, at 11:32 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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