Joint Special Operations University

7701 Tampa Point Boulevard

MacDill AFB, FL 33621

https://jsou.libguides.com/jsoupublications

JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS UNIVERSITY

“Amateurs talk about tactics, but professionals study logistics.” This 

quote is attributed to the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General 

Robert H. Barrow in 1980. The observation is especially relevant to the 

USSOCOM enterprise due to the command’s dual role as a combatant 

command and an organization with legislated military department-like 

authorities. One of the chief tasks under those military department-like 

authorities is the procurement and fielding of SOF-peculiar equipment. 

Certainly within the past 15 years, many in the special operations community will argue that technology that is acquired and fast-fielded can 

save lives. Therefore, Dr. Tkach’s monograph is an important read for 

SOF professionals. Dr. Tkach wrote this monograph for all professionals who study logistics and enable Special Operations Forces (SOF). As 

you review the work, consider how you can ensure SOF continues to 

receive the effective support it needs to carry out its mission.

ISBN 978-1-941715-17-8

Special Operations Contracting: 

21st Century Approaches for 

Service and Technology Acquisition

Benjamin Tkach, Ph.D.

JSOU Report 17-5

JSOU Report 17-5 Special Operations Contracting Tkach 
Joint Special Operations University

and the Center for Special Operations Studies and Research

The Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) provides its publications 

to contribute toward expanding the body of knowledge about joint special 

operations. JSOU publications advance the insights and recommendations 

of national security professionals and the Special Operations Forces (SOF) 

students and leaders for consideration by the SOF community and defense 

leadership. 

JSOU is the educational component of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. The JSOU 

mission is to educate SOF executive, senior, and intermediate leaders and 

selected other national and international security decision makers, both 

military and civilian, through teaching, outreach, and research in the 

science and art of joint special operations. JSOU provides education to the 

men and women of SOF and to those who enable the SOF mission in a joint 

and interagency environment. 

JSOU conducts research through its Center for Special Operations 

Studies and Research (CSOSR) where efforts center upon the USSOCOM 

mission: 

USSOCOM mission. USSOCOM synchronizes the planning of Special 

Operations and provides Special Operations Forces to support persistent, 

networked, and distributed Geographic Combatant Command operations 

in order to protect and advance our Nation’s interests.

Press publications are available for download from the JSOU Library 

web page located at https://jsou.libguides.com/jsoupublications.

Joint Special Operations University

Brian A. Maher, Ed.D., SES, President

Francis X. Reidy, Interim Director, Center for Special Operations Studies and Research

Robert Nalepa, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret., Editor in Chief

Lisa Sheldon, B.A., Advertising, JSOU Press Editor

Cindy Snyder, B.A., Mass Communications/Journalism, Assistant JSOU Press Editor

Resident Senior Fellows

Peter McCabe, Ph.D., Political Science, Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret.

Will Irwin, MMAS, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.

Paul Lieber, Ph.D., Mass Communication & Public Affairs

David Ellis, Ph.D., International Relations, Comparative Politics

Editorial Advisory Board

Roby C. Barrett

Ph.D., Middle Eastern & South Asian History 

Public Policy Center Middle East Institute and 

JSOU Senior Fellow

James J.F. Forest 

Ph.D., Higher Education Administration

Associate Professor, School of Criminology and 

Justice Studies, University of Massachusetts 

Lowell and JSOU Senior Fellow

Mario Forestier

Chief Warrant Officer, U.S. Army, Ret.

Director, Joint Special Operations Command 

Center for Counterterrorism Studies

Thomas H. Henriksen

Ph.D., History

Hoover Institution, Stanford University

and JSOU Senior Fellow

Bernd Horn

Colonel, Canadian Dept. of National Defence, Ret.

Ph.D., War Studies

Command Historian, CANSOFCOM Education 

and Research Centre

Russell D. Howard

Brigadier General, U.S. Army, Ret.

John D. Jogerst

Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret.

James Kiras

Ph.D., History

School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, 

Air University and JSOU Associate Fellow

William W. Mendel

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret. 

JSOU Senior Fellow

Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro

Major General, Brazilian Army, Ret.

JSOU Senior Fellow

James F. Powers, Jr.

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.

JSOU Senior Fellow 

Bryan C. Price

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army

Ph.D., Political Science

Director, Combating Terrorism Center at 

West Point

Richard H. Shultz, Jr.

Ph.D., Political Science

Director, International Security 

Studies Program, The Fletcher School, 

Tufts University and JSOU Senior Fellow

Robert G. Spulak, Jr.

Ph.D., Physics/Nuclear Engineering

Sandia National Laboratories 

and JSOU Senior Fellow 

Jessica Glicken Turnley

Ph.D., Cultural Anthropology

Galisteo Consulting Group 

and JSOU Senior Fellow 

Rich Yarger

Ph.D., History 

JSOU Senior Fellow
JSOU Report 17-5

The JSOU Press

MacDill Air Force Base, Florida

2017

Special Operations Contracting: 

21st Century Approaches 

for Service and Technology 

Acquisition

Benjamin Tkach, Ph.D.
Comments about this publication are invited and should be forwarded to the 

Director of the Center for Special Operations Studies and Research, Joint Special Operations University, 7701 Tampa Point Blvd., MacDill AFB, FL 33621.

*******

The JSOU Center for Special Operations Studies and Research (CSOSR) is currently 

accepting written works relevant to special operations for potential publication. For 

more information, please contact the CSOSR Director at jsou_research@socom.mil. 

Thank you for your interest in the JSOU Press. 

*******

This work was cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Printed in July 2017.

ISBN 978-1-941715-17-8
The views expressed in this publication are entirely those of the 

author and do not necessarily reflect the views, policy, or position 

of the United States Government, Department of Defense, United 

States Special Operations Command, or the Joint Special Operations 

University.

Authors are granted academic freedom provided their work does not 

disclose classified information, jeopardize operations security, or 

misrepresent official U.S. policy. Such academic freedom empowers 

authors to offer new and sometimes controversial perspectives in the 

interest of furthering debate on key issues.
Recent Publications of the JSOU Press

Outside the Box: A New General Theory of Special Operations, JSOU Report 17-4, 

Tom Searle, Ph.D.

Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco: Change, Instability, and Continuity in the Maghreb, 

JSOU Report 17-3, Roby Barrett, Ph.D.

A Social Marketing Analysis for Suicide Prevention Initiatives in USSOCOM: A 

Framework for Future Research and Success, JSOU Report 17-2, R. Craig Lefebvre, Ph.D.

A Unified Theory for Special Operations, JSOU Report 17-1, Richard W. Rubright, Ph.D.

IS and Cultural Genocide: Antiquities Trafficking in the Terrorist State, JSOU Report 

16-11, Russell D. Howard, Marc D. Elliott, and Jonathan R. Prohov

Cultural Intelligence for Special Forces Personnel, JSOU Report 16-10, 

Russell D. Howard, Greta Hanson, and Carly Laywell

On the cover. A U.S. Army Ranger from B Company, 2nd Battalion, 75th Ranger 

Regiment, fires a Special Operations Forces Combat Assault Rifle (SCAR) at a close 

quarter marksmanship range in Fort Hunter Liggett, California, in January 2014. 

Developed by USSOCOM, the self-loading rifle boasts a rotating bolt and a firing rate 

of 625 rounds/minute. U.S. ARMY PHOTO BY PFC. RASHENE MINCY.

Back cover. U.S. Army Rangers, assigned to 2nd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, 

prepare for extraction from their objective during Task Force Training in Fort Hunter 

Liggett, California in January 2014. Rangers constantly train to maintain their tactical 

proficiency. U.S. ARMY PHOTO BY SPC. STEVEN HITCHCOCK. 
v

Contents

Foreword .....................................................................................vii

About the Author ..........................................................................ix

Acknowledgements ......................................................................xi

Introduction .................................................................................. 1

1. Acquisition and Procurement: Overview of 

Private Sector Engagement .......................................................... 11

2. SOF-Peculiar Equipment and Technology Acquisition ............. 17

3. USSOCOM’s Acquisition Process: Current Systems and 

Possible Improvements ............................................................... 25

4. USSOCOM and Private Sector Competition ............................ 41

5. Organizational Innovation ...................................................... 53

6. The Private Sector, Better Buying Power, and 

SOF AT&L Personnel ................................................................... 59

Conclusion ................................................................................. 63

Appendix A: SOFIC Survey ......................................................... 65

Appendix B: Acronym List .......................................................... 69

Endnotes...................................................................................... 71

vii

Foreword 

“

Amateurs talk about tactics, but professionals study logistics.” This 

quote is attributed to the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Robert H. Barrow in 1980. The observation is especially relevant to the 

USSOCOM enterprise due to the command’s dual role as a combatant command and an organization with legislated military department-like authorities. One of the chief tasks under those military department-like authorities 

is the procurement and fielding of SOF-peculiar equipment. Certainly within 

the past 15 years, many in the special operations community will argue 

that technology that is acquired and fast-fielded can save lives. Therefore, 

Dr. Tkach’s monograph is an important read for Special Operations Forces 

(SOF) professionals.

In the pages that follow, Dr. Tkach examines USSOCOM’s acquisition and 

procurement processes, policies, and challenges. He analyzes processes for 

SOF-peculiar acquisition, the impact of organizational capital, and market 

competition. Through interviews with Special Operations Forces Acquisition, 

Technology, and Logistics (SOF AT&L) and industry surveys, he identifies 

four specific areas for improvement: SOF procedures for identifying needs, 

SOF procedures for writing requirements, interoperability, and procedures 

for protests. He acknowledges USSOCOM’s unique advantages and benefits 

from being an adaptive, joint organization that enables flexible acquisition 

and procurement. He recognizes leadership and a dedicated workforce that 

aggressively seeks revolutionary capabilities. He is also clear-eyed about 

challenges noting that USSOCOM is less able to benefit from market competition than the Services. The economic reality is that low-volume purchases 

of SOF-peculiar equipment combined with high technology readiness level 

requirements make USSOCOM less competitive in the marketplace. Still, 

his overall assessment is positive. 

As you read this monograph, recall that USSOCOM celebrated its 30th 

anniversary in April 2017. USSOCOM comprises a tiny fraction of the 

overall acquisition workforce—about 0.4 percent. Nevertheless, at the 2016 

Defense Acquisition Workforce Awards, 5 of 17 DOD Acquisition Individual 

Award winners were affiliated with the SOF community. SOF AT&L was 
viii

also recognized as one of DOD’s top Acquisition Workforce Development 

Programs—an honor SOF AT&L has held for the past 6 years. 

Dr. Tkach wrote this monograph for all professionals who study logistics 

and enable SOF. As you review the work, consider how you can ensure SOF 

continues to receive the effective support it needs to carry out its mission.

Francis X. Reidy

Interim Director, Center for Special Operations Studies and Research
ix

About the Author 

Benjamin Tkach is an assistant professor of security and intelligence 

at King University. His research agenda focuses on the causes and 

consequences of security privatization and non-state 

actors’ involvement in conflict. His work has appeared 

in Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy, 

and Conflict Management and Peace Science. Prior 

to his current position, he was a post-doctoral fellow 

at the Center on Conflict & Development at Texas 

A&M University. He led a research team examining 

the consequences of digital technology on conflict 

perceptions and participated in institutional assessments in Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of Congo. 

He has lectured at American University Beirut (Lebanon), American University Sharjah (United Arab Emirates), University of Exeter (United Kingdom), University of Groningen (Netherlands), and Texas A&M University 

Qatar. He has been a research fellow with the U.S. National Defense University and collaborated on projects with the Department of Energy and the 

Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. He holds a Ph.D. in political science 

from Texas A&M University. Prior to graduate school, Dr. Tkach worked in 

defense consulting for Jane’s Information Group. 

xi

Acknowledgements 

I would like to thank the numerous individuals that made this monograph 

possible. I am indebted to Dr. Edwin Price, director of the Center on 

Conflict and Development at Texas A&M University, for supporting my 

research endeavors. Dr. Shahriar Kibriya provided valued insight and assistance throughout the project. The monograph would not have been possible 

without the assistance of Christopher Harrington and Wyman W. Irwin. 

Christopher arranged and managed the schedule with SOF AT&L personnel. Will provided direction, encouragement, and research assistance. Two 

anonymous reviewers provided feedback that strengthened the monograph. 

Industry representatives candidly discussed their businesses and federal contracting practices. Several students provided critical research support. I want 

to thank Chris Janes, Ryan O’Neal, and Max Shanstrom for their assistance. 

1

Tkach: Special Operations Contracting

Introduction 

The objectives of this monograph are: (a) to assess the processes and 

policies of the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) for 

purchasing technology and services from the private sector, and (b) to evaluate possible enhancements and alternative processes and policies. Primary 

responsibility for purchasing technology and related services currently lies 

with Special Operations Forces Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (SOF 

AT&L), whose mission is to provide Special Operations Forces (SOF) with 

equipment and services that satisfy validated requirements in a timely, costeffective manner. In this role, SOF AT&L is responsible not only for the 

acquisition of advanced SOF-peculiar technologies for use in operational 

environments, but also for contracting the entire range of support services 

required for USSOCOM to operate effectively. Policymakers and strategists 

recognize that staffing and funding of SOF have not kept pace in recent years 

with the increased demand for their services.1 In a fiscally tight environment, 

USSOCOM thus faces heightened challenges in ensuring that the acquisition 

and procurement process is maximized to ensure SOF continues to receive 

the effective support it needs to carry out its mission, focus on hybrid threats, 

and win in complex environments.2

SOF AT&L’s acquisition processes pursue revolutionary SOF-peculiar 

capabilities using an evolutionary acquisition system. Revolutionary capabilities are disruptive technologies that change tactical (and potentially strategic) capabilities; evolutionary capabilities are incremental improvements 

on existing capabilities.3 Despite constraints imposed by federal acquisition 

regulations, improvements in SOF AT&L’s acquisition processes are possible. 

Editor’s note: The research for this monograph was completed in mid-2015. 

At the end of 2015, USSOCOM opened the doors of their two SOFWERX 

facilities in Tampa, Florida. According to the SOFWERX website FAQ section, “SOFWERX performs collaboration, ideation and facilitation with the 

best minds of Industry, Academia and Government. SOFWERX can also 

conduct rapid prototyping and rapid proof of concepts from ideation discovery.” For more information on SOFWERX, refer to their web site, http://

www.sofwerx.org.
2

JSOU Report 17-5

The current approach of adopting and then adapting already existing, mature 

technologies and equipment has the benefit of shortening time-to-delivery. 

At the same time, it can limit the disruptive potential of new technologies. 

To achieve revolutionary capabilities, SOF AT&L may need to better mobilize its resources to develop capabilities in particular areas. Development 

of existing technology, as opposed to aftermarket modification, will better 

fulfill some SOF-peculiar requirements. That said, acquisition of revolutionary SOF-peculiar capabilities will require improvement in the processes 

through which SOF needs are translated into written requirements and in 

SOF AT&L implementation of acquisition and procurement programs. SOF 

AT&L needs to better mobilize private investment earlier in the acquisition 

process to successfully capitalize on rapid deployment of untested disruptive 

technologies.4 Prioritization of non-traditional defense companies has yet to 

have a discernible impact on the acquisition process. 

The SOF AT&L acquisition and procurement process engages the private 

sector primarily with regard to two types of services: 1) military-specific 

services that include operational support and military-specific technology 

acquisition, and 2) general support services that include administration, 

research and development, and management services. Both types of services 

impact SOF operational capabilities. Commercial industry supplies equipment and technological development, and private military and security companies (PMSCs) offer military- and security-specific services.5

 PMSCs are 

publicly traded and individually owned firms that supply materials, support, 

and expertise to the military including logistical, technological, management, and linguistic services.6

 Non-military specific private sector support 

encompasses a range of SOF requirements including management, research 

and development (R&D), and operational support. 

In this context, acquisition and procurement involves a range of private sector actors in service, logistics, and technology areas. Recent U.S. 

operations in Iraq and Afghanistan expanded public awareness of private 

sector involvement in military operations, but private sector involvement 

and engagement in military operations dates back decades.7 The evolution 

of private sector involvement from service contracts in World War II, to 

maintenance specialists in Vietnam, to base security personnel in Afghanistan accelerated following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001. USSOCOM’s 

continued adaptation to 21st century acquisition challenges ensures SOF 
3

Tkach: Special Operations Contracting

will procure the technology and capabilities required to win today’s and 

tomorrow’s fight. 

USSOCOM’s contemporary priorities and acquisition processes have 

been shaped by its history. Special operations predate the 1987 formation of 

USSOCOM, as SOF played significant roles in U.S. operations since World 

War II. USSOCOM was created in 1987 in response to growing recognition that limited coordination between the various special operation commands decreased performance and effectiveness. The reorganized structure 

enables unified command and control of operations and, consequently, of 

acquisition processes as well. The force consists of approximately 66,000 

active duty troops and civilians, and is headquartered at MacDill Air Force 

Base, Florida.8 Demand for SOF continues to expand9, even while other 

military branches experience drawdowns and budgetary cuts.10 SOF operates 

in dozens of countries and the demand for private sector support follows 

a similar pattern. Private sector partners, specifically Boeing and Textron, 

are supporting less publicized operations such as those in the Philippines,11 

where USSOCOM is conducting extended training exercises to bolster the 

government’s counterinsurgency capacity.12 Expanded public awareness of 

special operations, attributed to successful high-profile operations (e.g., the 

Osama bin Laden raid) and depictions of SOF activities on multiple media 

platforms (movies and video games), however, does not necessarily translate 

into accurate understanding of the actual activities of SOF.13

USSOCOM has several organizational characteristics that separate it 

from the rest of the U.S. military. First, the command consists of the special 

operations service component commands from the four military branches.14

The combination of commands maximizes organizational capital through 

centralized decision-making, preserves branch associations, and utilizes 

small-unit acquisition processes. Second, USSOCOM has implemented Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) more expediently than other Department 

of Defense (DOD) services through numerous funding mechanisms. For 

example, SOF AT&L utilization of acquisition category II and III programs 

increases budget flexibility through smaller financial commitments and 

limited purchase volumes.15 Additionally, USSOCOM also directly controls 

Major Force Program 11 (MFP 11) dollars, which enables rapid funding of 

SOF-peculiar requirements. MFP 11 purchases “reflect [a] macro-level force 

mission or a support mission [that] contains the resources necessary to 

achieve a broad objective or plan ... [in] a fiscal year time-phasing of mission 
4

JSOU Report 17-5

objectives.”16 MFP 11 enables rapid procurement capabilities of unfunded 

requirements that are not covered by alternative funding sources.17 Third, 

the USSOCOM commander has a comparatively flexible acquisition authority.18 Further, the commander has conferred procurement authority to the 

acquisition executive, who in turn delegates authority to lower administrative 

levels. The delegation of procurement authority affords SOF AT&L flexibility 

and the ability to respond rapidly to emerging SOF needs and pursue flexible 

acquisition and procurement strategies. The emergence of new and shifting 

operational requirements continues to shape acquisition programs. 

Utilization of the private sector generates several acquisition challenges. 

First, private sector involvement generates tension between buyers and 

sellers. Sellers of goods and services in general seek to maximize profits, 

while traditional buyers seek to minimize expenses and maximize services. 

For USSCOCOM, however, the importance of price is diminished (but 

not eliminated) compared to the primary objective of meeting operational 

requirements. In this context, USSOCOM’s specific mission requirements 

differentiate its contracting practices from broader DOD acquisition policies 

and operations. Rapid deployments, harsh and isolated operating environments, specialized skill requirements, and high reliability requirements characterize SOF operations. Additionally, unlike the Services, USSOCOM often 

modifies existing equipment and technologies, which alters the acquisition 

process. Thus, adopting broad general lessons from DOD-wide experiences 

may not suit USSOCOM requirements. The challenge for USSOCOM, in 

the words of Gary Smith, the first acquisition executive for USSOCOM, is 

to focus on the imperative of timely and effective service delivery to such 

a degree that, “if [USSOCOM is] going to manage a program on the same 

schedule as one of the Services, we’re not doing our job.”19

Second, firms that provide goods and services may face barrier-to-entry 

challenges, which occur when either the market keeps firms out through 

high costs or technological requirements, or when the bureaucratic hurdles of 

federal contracting limit company engagement. Barriers to entry in defense 

markets have previously been examined in environments distinct from special operations.20 Four USSOCOM barriers cited by firms include specialized contract requirements, less-than-easy access to decision makers, the 

challenge of navigating FAR, and low-volume orders.21 Continued improvement in engagement with the private sector may mitigate these barriers and 

increase the presence of non-traditional defense companies. 
5

Tkach: Special Operations Contracting

Third, USSOCOM purchases are generally much smaller than those 

made by the main military branches. USSOCOM’s relatively small budget, 

despite rapid increases in its total size since 2001,22 reduces the potential benefits of economies of scale and bulk purchases compared to branch service 

purchases.23 Further, because SOF AT&L’s priority is to meet operational 

requirements, which often require rapid deployment of technologies and services, budgetary and time pressures elevate the utility of modifying branch 

equipment or commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) items to fulfill requirements. 

However, this equipment-modification approach requires purchased items 

to have high technology readiness levels (TRL). The purchase of higher-TRL 

equipment improves delivery times because technologies, equipment, and 

procedures have typically already been tested outside a laboratory environment. However, smaller budgets and higher TRLs limit the acquisition of revolutionary technologies—disruptive technologies that could fundamentally 

alter the nature of combat and give SOF a significant operational advantage. 

Monograph Outline 

The following monograph examines USSOCOM’s acquisition and procurement processes, policies, and challenges. The monograph’s first section outlines private sector support of military- and non-military-specific equipment 

and services. Next, the acquisition and procurement processes are examined 

through analysis of SOF-peculiar acquisition practices, market competition, and organizational capital. Market competition remains a fundamental 

assumption of government acquisition procedures—with competition being 

understood as a force that in general decreases prices, spurs innovation, and 

improves quality.24 Organizational capital is the capacity of an organization to adopt alternative modes, mechanisms, and structures to adjust to 

new requirements. Additional extensions from these three main concepts 

examine technology development, bureaucratic management, contractor 

dynamics, and small-business engagement. 

To draw attention to key features of the USSOCOM’s SOF-peculiar acquisition process, the author has compared this process to a stylized acquisition 

model. USSOCOM has outpaced the rest of the DOD in utilizing innovative 

and efficient methods and authorities to quickly acquire and deploy new technologies and services.25 SOF AT&L’s procurement authority is unique within 

DOD because it is vested in the commander, who delegates the authority to 
6

JSOU Report 17-5

the acquisition executive. This organizational improvement increases SOF 

AT&L’s capability to rapidly and effectively support the force. The existing 

streamlined acquisition process limits the usefulness of looking to other 

commands to identify potential areas for improvement. For this reason, the 

following monograph instead compares SOF AT&L practices with idealized 

acquisition procedures and processes. Interviews with SOF AT&L personnel 

and industry surveys identified four specific areas where improvements are 

needed. These four areas were SOF procedures for identifying needs, SOF 

procedures for writing requirements, interoperability, and procedures for 

protests. Two of these areas, the writing of requirements and interoperability, 

are not necessarily SOF AT&L responsibilities. The USSOCOM Directorate of Force Structure, Requirements, Resources and Strategic Assessments 

(J-8) establishes written requirements and conducts the validation process.26 

Interoperability requires multidimensional coordination with the branches, 

international SOF, and international partners, and interoperability may or 

may not be an explicit component of a validated requirement. Examination 

of the four aforementioned areas for improvement indicates that delivery of 

SOF capabilities can be improved through specific adjustments in each area. 

Market competition remains one of the most touted mechanisms to save 

money when purchasing services from the private sector—indeed, DOD 

Better Buying Power (BBP) terms it “the single most powerful tool available” 

to improve productivity.27 National governments identify competition as an 

important mechanism for removing waste and increasing efficiency. Initial 

research examining private sector involvement in SOF operations indicates 

that market competition between firms may improve performance.28 The 

Pentagon’s direct BBP specifically identifies strategies to improve market 

competition between PMSCs. Extending theoretical competition models, 

the analysis presented in this monograph identifies patterns in procurement 

and the significant influence of competition on acquisition procedures. For 

example, the analysis indicates that USSOCOM’s comparatively small budget 

may reduce the role of competition in certain service sectors; at the same 

time, the analysis indicates that USSOCOM generally promotes effective 

competition across service sectors among both large and small businesses. 
7

Tkach: Special Operations Contracting

Research Methods 

The following monograph adopts a multi-method approach to examine 

USSOCOM’s acquisition and procurement processes. Both quantitative 

and qualitative methods are employed. Quantitative analysis enables bigpicture examination of procurement patterns and trends. Qualitative methods supplement the quantitative analysis by illuminating key features of the 

acquisition process identified by stakeholders. Quantitative and qualitative 

methods are commonly combined when examining SOF topics because of 

the classified environment and unique SOF culture.29

Quantitative assessments examine the role of organizational capital and 

market competition. The Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS) provides 

data for over 88,000 USSOCOM transactions between 2004 and 2014—a 

detailed and publicly available record of the command’s procurement history. Trend analysis examines business practice changes during the current 

period of USSOCOM expansion. Content analysis of individual requests for 

proposals and information accessed through the Federal Business Opportunities website deepens our understanding of the role of interoperability 

in written requirements. 

Qualitative analysis highlights specific areas for improvement identified 

by SOF AT&L personnel and industry representatives. Face-to-face interviews with USSOCOM personnel and contractors were conducted at MacDill 

Air Force Base, providing perspectives on all aspects of the acquisitions 

process. These interviews combined standard structured social science and 

ethnographic techniques. Structured interview methods minimize interviewer effects and enable systematic comparisons across interviews.30 Ethnographic methods allow for directed but informal conversations to discover 

how individuals conceptualize their organization and identify meaningful concepts.31 The combination of these techniques enables comparisons 

between interviewees in the standardized sections and flexibility to focus 

on an individual’s specific role and his or her suggestions for improvements 

in the acquisition process. The majority of questions posed in these interviews focused on participants’ experience, opinions, and values. In some 

cases, individuals with many years of experience were asked follow-up questions comparing the current acquisition process and SOF AT&L culture to 

previous periods. Individual names and positions are not identified in the 

monograph to protect the anonymity of respondents.32
8

JSOU Report 17-5

Concept exploration is emphasized in the qualitative research.33 Concepts 

are the unit of analysis, not individual interviews. Thus, quotations and 

insights from each interview are applied where appropriate based on the 

subject matter. Each interview involved an initial explanation of the nature 

and purpose of the research, an informed consent process, standardized 

questions, and open-ended responses. Specific quotes were written verbatim 

during each interview because security requirements prohibited the use 

of any recording device (or any other electronic device). Quote accuracy 

was confirmed during the interview by reading back the exact quote to the 

individual participant and acquiring verbal confirmation of accuracy. Consistent with standard ethnographic practice, each interview concluded with 

discussion of the most important element of the interview as identified by 

participants. 

An online survey of Special Operations Forces Industry Conference 

(SOFIC) 2015 participants provides insight into the views of industry representatives.34 Participants from SOFIC 2015 were contacted and nearly 50 

company representatives provided feedback on a range of issues. The survey 

contained quantitative and qualitative components. Participants rated SOF 

AT&L personnel on a range of professional characteristics as well as SOF 

AT&L practices and procedures. Participants were also asked open-ended 

questions about the acquisition process to identify areas for improvement. 

Analysis of the open-ended questions utilizes the same ethnographic techniques previously discussed. Similar to the individual interviews, this 

industry survey is not assumed to be representative of industry perspectives. Moreover, because of limitations in sampling procedures,35 conclusions are not drawn solely from the survey analysis. Instead, the survey 

provides an indication of key issues facing SOF AT&L from the private sector’s perspective. 

Conclusions 

The research presented in the following pages provides an analysis of 

USSOCOM acquisition policies and practices, and trends in these policies 

and practices. The analysis examines a wide range of topics, driven partly 

by questions and inquiries provided by SOF AT&L personnel. Key points 

are summarized below: 
9

Tkach: Special Operations Contracting

• SOF AT&L’s pursuit of revolutionary capabilities may depend on adoption of a model of acquisition in which the government plays the 

role of lead integrator, coordinating the activities of multiple parties 

over extended periods of time. The Tactical Assault Light Operator 

Suit (TALOS) program illustrates how this model could work. The 

program requires unprecedented forms and levels of collaboration 

among multiple private sector actors, universities, and the government 

to overcome daunting technical challenges. Success will be measured 

by the delivery of a working suit prototype by 2018, the stated official objective.36 Program success is not limited to on-time delivery, 

however, spin-off technologies are a potential benefit for USSOCOM 

and other entities (e.g., military services, fire departments, etc.) The 

acquisition model for the TALOS program requires that companies 

cooperate with one another and with USSOCOM to higher degrees 

than in previous collaborative contracts, including potentially sharing 

proprietary technology and contributing resources without receiving 

intellectual property rights. Organizational innovations, such as rapid 

prototyping environments, should be evaluated to identify how each 

change contributes to the program. A detailed program history that 

documents business participation, decision-making processes, and 

mistakes should be implemented. If the TALOS program is successful, extensive (declassified) documentation will aid in replication and 

extension of the TALOS approach to other programs. 

• Contract requirements describe the proposed good, service, equipment, or technology to be procured from the private sector. The clarity with which these requirements are articulated remains an issue 

for the acquisition process. USSOCOM personnel and private industry described the need to improve how requirements are generated, 

written, and communicated. The responsibility for articulating and 

communicating requirements effectively extends beyond the contract 

officers and legal teams. Steps to improve understanding of requirement language for additional personnel may enhance the acquisition 

process. 

• Market competition is a bedrock principle of acquisition and procurement. Competition typically lowers prices and improves innovation. 

USSOCOM, however, is less able to benefit from competition than 

the services because SOF-peculiar technology and equipment are not 
10

JSOU Report 17-5

mass-produced. Competition levels are not consistent across industries. Low-volume purchases and high TRLs further reduce competition in some sectors. 

• USSOCOM benefits from extensive organizational capital that enables 

flexible acquisition and procurement. Branch-level purchases of major 

platforms reduce oversight and management burdens for the relatively small staff. Division between branches of the command provide 

for improved SOF-peculiar procurement. Finally, centralization of 

decision-making significantly reduces decision timelines. 

• Understanding SOF culture is important for success. Businesses recognize the importance of the SOF culture, often employing individuals with SOF experience. Yet, the importance of employees with SOF 

experience varies between companies and within company positions. 

Employment of personnel with SOF experience is not—and should 

not be—a requirement for the private sector to successfully engage 

USSOCOM. 

• The leadership qualities of individual USSOCOM officers establish 

expectations and create a unique business environment. USSOCOM’s 

overarching emphasis on SOF-informed acquisition and reduction 

of bureaucracy is actively supported by the command. Turnover of 

personnel is inevitable, yet institutionalization of standards and procedures may reduce the negative effects of such turnover. 
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1. Acquisition and Procurement: 

Overview of Private Sector Engagement 

USSOCOM acquisition and procurement processes involve a diverse 

array of firms that support command activities. Some of these firms 

furnish non-military-specific equipment and services, while others provide 

only specialized military-specific equipment and services, and still others 

provide a mix of both types. As is the case with other federal agencies, the 

private sector provides general and specific services that support the operational capacity of SOF. SOF AT&L is one player in a dynamic international 

marketplace where DOD, as a whole, is the single largest and most influential 

party. The federal government and DOD set sector-wide acquisition policies 

that influence USSOCOM’s policies and procedures. In this section, we first 

explore key features of DOD private sector involvement before delving into 

USSOCOM-specific practices. 

Private sector engagement is often synonymous with contracting services. 

The transition from government-provided services to contracted services was 

one of the most important federal management trends initiated in the 1990s. 

Nor has the trend been limited to services alone; a similar transition has been 

underway for decades with regard to the production of advanced weapons 

systems, too, with multinational corporations taking over the production 

of most big-ticket items, from 

fighter aircraft to intercontinental ballistic missiles.37 In 

general, privatization trends 

in DOD activities have mirrored privatization across the 

federal government.38 The Army Corps of Engineers initiated a formal study 

of contracting and its benefits in 1992, and follow-up research by private 

firms amplified key findings.39 Additional federal investigations in the 1990s 

gave the impression of a consensus about the benefits of contracting, particularly regarding potential monetary savings.40 During the 1990s, the use 

of private companies also shaped U.S. Army doctrine, including composing 

field manuals and assisting in training operations.41 The privatization trend 

has had critics, too, notably units within the U.S. Government Accountability 

The transition from government-provided 

services to contracted services was one 

of the most important federal management trends initiated in the 1990s. 
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JSOU Report 17-5

Office (GAO) that explicitly argued the projected savings from privatization were overstated.42 Yet these critical voices have not slowed the overall 

trend. Further, the trend of private sector engagement shows no signs of 

slowing—despite opposition from proponents of government contracting, 

and the mixed results of private sector contracting.43 Today privatization 

constitutes a significant factor in determining the success and failure of U.S. 

military operations. 

Private sector involvement has also been internationalized. The majority 

of USSOCOM transactions involve firms located in the United States: firms 

from each of the 50 states and three of the five territories are represented in 

the data.44 As shown in figure 1, however, USSOCOM also works with at least 

one firm in 47 different countries around the globe. International private 

sector transactions totaled about $916 million during the 10-year period 

studied.45 The geographic diversity of firms in the U.S. and foreign countries 

reflects USSOCOM’s global footprint. 

The following sections describe non-military and military-specific private 

sector support. The first section discusses non-military-specific support by 

describing its importance for USSOCOM, as well as the economic challenges associated with employing firms providing non-military services. 

The second section examines USSOCOM engagement with firms providing 

military-specific services. 

Figure 1: Country of primary service performance of firms contracted with 

USSOCOM (2004-2014). Source: The Federal Procurement Database System 
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Tkach: Special Operations Contracting

Non-Military-Specific Private Sector Support 

Special operations usually require non-SOF support. Private sector support 

involves numerous non-military-specific services and products. Support 

occurs throughout the entire range of SOF activities from R&D, to training, 

to actual operations. Commercial items and services may or may not be ready 

to use off-the-shelf and may require modification to meet USSOCOM specifications.46 Non-military-specific private sector support involves acquisition 

and modification of items ranging from lightweight boats to unmanned 

aerial systems. Other support includes manufacturing, public administration, logistics, and professional/scientific services.47 Non-SOF-peculiar support is provided on U.S. and international bases, as well as in operational 

environments. 

Non-military-specific contracts cover equipment and services; many 

include applications outside of a direct military and security context. For 

example, a recent solicitation for a password-recognition software program 

that identifies complexity in passwords and ensures compliance is not unique 

to a military context.48 Non-military-specific services are also sometimes 

included in larger contracts. The Special Operations Forces Support Activity Contractor Logistics Support contract is one such example. Lockheed 

Martin’s 2010 contract includes non-military specific services such as business process transformations and information technology in addition to 

military specific services such as vehicles, weaponry, and electronics equipment maintenance. 

Modification of commercial items is the alteration of equipment or technology to ensure compliance with military-quality standards and requirements. Modification of commercial items reflects a general shift in federal 

acquisition patterns. Since passage of the Federal Acquisition Streamlining 

Act of 1994, federal procurement has shifted from products developed exclusively for the government to an environment that focuses on modifying and 

optimizing commercial items to meet government requirements. The initial 

iteration of the law is premised on three concepts: maximizing use of commercial products, using contractors who have previously demonstrated superior performance, and promoting competition. Commercial item acquisition 

accounted for approximately 43,069 of the 88,407 USSOCOM transactions 

totaling over $6.4 billion from 2004 through 2014.49 The initial provider 

or an alternative firm can do SOF-peculiar modifications. Modification of 
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JSOU Report 17-5

commercial items to fulfill requirements is a priority for private sector partners and USSOCOM.50

Purchase and modification of commercial equipment, however, is often 

problematic. Commercial equipment, services, and software typically meet 

an immediate need but do not necessarily address USSOCOM’s long-term 

requirements. COTS may become obsolete before the end of a typical military life cycle.51 Obsolescence is especially problematic in sectors such as 

software, telecommunications, and information technologies where the military generally requires longer service life cycles than is the case in private 

industry.52 Finally, when a military requirement exists that no commercially 

available item can fulfill, limited funding usually restricts the option of 

developing the needed equipment in-house, within the military. 

In sum, non-military-specific private sector support is pivotal to operational success.53 Proximity to combat does not determine the impact of 

the private sector’s contribution. Commercially available equipment and 

technology play an essential role in helping USSOCOM meet time-delivery pressures.54 Contracted commercial support for routine services, as 

well as highly-sensitive services, is likely to continue in the current era of 

privatization.55

Military-Specific Services: Private Military and Security 

Companies 

PMSCs are rational, profit-motivated companies that supply a full range of 

services to USSOCOM and other employers.56 In this analysis, PMSCs are 

defined as firms that are contracted to provide security- and military-related 

services, equipment, and material to USSOCOM. This broad conceptualization of PMSCs enables a holistic evaluation of the acquisition and procurement process. 

Security and military related services are equipment and services that 

are exclusive to military and security environments. Examples of militaryspecific equipment and services include weaponry, military vehicles, and 

surveillance capabilities. Operational conditions—operating in isolation or 

in advance of forces—often require intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) support from the private sector. A case in point is operations in 

Iraq, the Philippines, and Afghanistan that utilized unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) to provide real-time updates. Operation of Boeing’s Scan Eagle 
15

Tkach: Special Operations Contracting

required private sector representatives to support operations. Boeing and its 

subsidiaries (Insitu) and Textron subsidiary AAI Test & Training have won 

several contracts worth upwards of $300 million for surveillance services.57 

These ISR contracts use an innovative “rent-a-pixel” structure.58 Firms are 

paid hourly rates for services that encompass the equipment, operation, 

and maintenance personnel in the new contractor-owned and contractoroperated approach. 

PMSCs provide critical services to the military and affect operational 

capabilities.59 PMSCs provide a range of services to the military. Peter Singer 

conceptualizes the service continuum as a spear, with non-kinetic support 

including logistics and training as the shaft and kinetic services as the tip 

of the spear. Public records indicate that USSOCOM does not hire firms to 

conduct kinetic services—distinct from other U.S. federal government agencies and units, particularly the Department of State.60 Non-kinetic services 

such as surveillance and linguistic support are critical for operational success. For example, in 2006, Shee Atika was contracted to provide linguistic 

and interrogation support in various locations across the globe.61 PMSCs 

play a crucial role in addressing operational gaps and technology deficiencies 

in both equipment and services for standard military operations.62 PMSCs 

impact on SOF operations is unknown.63

Conclusions 

Acquisition and procurement processes involve military and non-military 

equipment, services, and technology from a geographically dispersed network of companies. Support from the private sector, particularly in non-military services, will continue to follow general DOD trends. The implications 

of increased privatization in SOF’s global support network, however, are 

less clear. Key questions for the force include whether failures to provide 

support services due to unforeseen problems (e.g. company failures, contract award protests, geographic limitations, etc.) affect SOF operations and 

whether the global support network will be able to adapt to the changing 

nature of SOF operational environments. Failure to adequately ensure the 

global network’s flexibility will reduce the effectiveness of acquisition and 

procurement processes. 

Recent allegations by Congressman Duncan Hunter, R-California, that 

SOF personnel have used personal funds to equip themselves with basic 
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JSOU Report 17-5

combat gear, including ballistic helmets and tactical gear, suggest there 

may be significant problems with the procurement process.64 Representative Hunter’s inquiry raises concerns about several aspects of the procurement process—indicating that, on at 

least a handful of occasions, SOF personnel have not been provided with 

key pieces of necessary equipment in a 

timely manner. However, instances of 

SOF personnel purchasing their own 

equipment to overcome limitations in 

issued equipment remains extremely rare. (A much more common and 

widely accepted scenario involves SOF personnel spending their personal 

funds to customize their gear in idiosyncratic ways.) In general, it appears 

that the existing global procurement network has effectively adapted to the 

current environment. 

Modification of commercial and branch equipment remains a primary 

function of industry. Off-the-shelf equipment is frequently not adequate for 

USSOCOM purposes, and procurement of SOF-peculiar equipment therefore often requires additional research and development that may or may 

not receive funding. Yet it appears certain that fulfillment of SOF-peculiar 

requirements will continue to utilize modified commercial items because 

of the imperative for on-time delivery, a USSOCOM procurement priority. 

Evolution of off-the-shelf procedures now extends to renting services and 

equipment, particularly in technology-intensive areas (e.g., ISR), is a major 

advancement. As USSOCOM and DOD continue to develop rental services, 

additional analysis of the cost-effectiveness and operational impact of such 

services will be possible. Additional data and analyses will also allow us to 

ask and answer new questions such as whether, over time, SOF’s reliance on 

private sector companies for military-specific services expands the international SOF network by steadily adding new partners. 

Failure to adequately ensure 

the global network’s flexibility 

will reduce the effectiveness of 

acquisition and procurement 

processes. 
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Tkach: Special Operations Contracting

2. SOF-Peculiar Equipment and 

Technology Acquisition 

SOF AT&L’s main objective is to supply SOF-peculiar capabilities 

that fulfill validated requirements to their personnel. Two SOF-specific lessons from the existing linear acquisition process are examined: 

advanced equipment is not a guarantee of tactical supremacy and advanced 

technology rarely develops in a single geographic location. Delivery of 

SOF-peculiar capabilities takes two general acquisition approaches: evolutionary approaches emphasizing incremental improvements or revolutionary 

approaches emphasizing disruptive technology. Specific acquisition strategies are adopted depending on which general approach is required to fulfill 

the specific requirement. These two approaches influence how firms meet 

required TRLs. SOF-peculiar equipment has high TRL thresholds, which 

some companies are not able to meet.65 USSOCOM’s limited financial flexibility in the current austere fiscal environment reduces R&D funding to 

assist firms with TRL requirements. The austere environment has spurred 

an innovative approach to acquisition with the launch of the TALOS program, which represents a potential alternative approach to acquisition. The 

program uses the government as lead technology integrator, the body that 

coordinates the sub-systems supplied by multiple providers. Integrators are 

typically large defense companies. 

Lessons from the Existing Linear Model 

Operators are USSOCOM’s acquisition and procurement priority. Operators 

are directly brought into the initial identification of requirements by J-8. Yet, 

individuals in SOF AT&L acknowledge the acquisition and procurement process results in alterations from the original requests.66 Consequently, despite 

SOF AT&L innovations and acquisition flexibility, the acquisition process 

still largely follows the standard linear military model. These strategies are a 

byproduct of the federal contracting system and, when required, dependent 

on branch purchases. The linear, top-down model may or may not produce 

disruptive technologies. 
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JSOU Report 17-5

Disruptive technologies are able to change the strategic or tactical operation of military forces. The introduction of advanced technologies, in and of 

themselves, does not constitute a disruptive technology.67 Disruption requires 

technology to alter tactical environments. The introduction of night vision 

goggles is an example of disruptive technology.68 Image intensifying technology quickly altered tactics once the technology was reliable and portable. 

However, image intensifying technology and other disruptive technologies 

demonstrate two limitations of technology acquisition. 

First, technology alone is not a guarantee of tactical supremacy. Creativity is one of the distinguishing characteristics of SOF personnel and 

organization. Robert Spulak argues that rapid operational innovation may 

or may not involve technology, but that technology has often been a key 

advantage.69 Tactical advantages provided by rapid technology acquisition 

in areas such as night vision, live-feed surveillance, and telecommunications 

provide evolutionary changes to capabilities, but have not fundamentally changed 

the mission or operation of SOF. SOF gain 

tactical supremacy through elite warriorship, flexibility, and creativity.70 Technology 

is not necessarily a defining requirement of 

each of these characteristics. That said, adoption and integration of new 

technologies has been a feature of elite fighting forces throughout history. 

Second, advanced technology rarely develops in only one location. 

Increased dependence on COTS technologies and mature components, by 

definition, means that advanced weapons and other equipment are now 

generally more readily available to adversaries than was the case in the past, 

when products were developed in classified programs in industry, national 

laboratories, and academia. The sophistication of commercial UAS and 

the development of armed variants by foreign states are such examples. 

The U.S. currently maintains a substantial lead over other countries with 

regard to both the sophistication of its technology and also the size of its 

arsenal, causing some policy analysts to call for limitations on exports of 

commercial technologies.71 However, the development and spread of UAS 

technology is not limited to the United States. The extensive export controls 

and personnel training required by recipients of drones makes strategic 

sharing of technology with allies one approach to decreasing demand on 

U.S. resources. Advanced technologies like these are developed in multiple 

Creativity is one of the 

distinguishing characteristics of SOF personnel and 

organization.
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Tkach: Special Operations Contracting

locations simultaneously, which requires continued tactical innovation by 

SOF to maintain supremacy.72

Revolutionary versus Evolutionary Technology Changes 

Development of SOF-peculiar equipment must balance technological innovation and risk. Technology development can be categorized as revolutionary 

or evolutionary. Revolutionary technologies are disruptive technologies that 

alter the nature of combat and war. Evolutionary technologies are those that 

make incremental improvements over previous models.73 Each approach has 

different levels of risk, defined in this context as the negative externalities of 

failing to deliver effective equipment. The two approaches are not mutually 

exclusive, but do require a different approach to acquisition. 

The acceptance of risk demarcates the two approaches to technology 

development. Risk in this military context is defined as ensuring that the 

military force has the technology required to readily deploy and remain 

effective. Understandably, risk is a strong consideration when pursuing 

technology purchases.74 In the words of one SOF AT&L employee, “military 

commanders are geared toward risk reduction, which means eliminating 

risk.”75 Risk is generally reduced through pursuit of evolutionary changes. 

Evolutionary changes enable rapid deployment of technology advances and 

more predictable delivery timelines. Risk is further mitigated in evolutionary contexts because new equipment is more likely to be interoperable with 

legacy and SOF allied equipment. Contract requirements are often tailored 

to ensure continuity of capabilities. 

Revolutionary technologies are inherently higher risk. First, revolutionary capabilities may fail to provide the expected disruption in tactics and 

strategy. Second, revolutionary technologies must be articulated clearly in 

the requirements section of requests for information and proposals. Clear 

description and specification of hypothetical technologies is a difficult task. 

Finally, revolutionary technologies, once adopted, typically require organizational changes to fully maximize the new capability.76

The pursuit of revolutionary technologies using a system designed to 

produce evolutionary changes invariably creates friction. The FAR are, to 

a large degree, a system of checks and balances designed to produce incremental improvements. The existing system is thus biased in favor of evolutionary change and against revolutionary change. The standardization 
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JSOU Report 17-5

of the acquisition process, while critical from the perspective of efficiency 

and risk management, reduces opportunities for the development of SOFpeculiar products that provide revolutionary capabilities. Finally, limited 

financial capacity to assist companies in the development and testing of new 

equipment reduces the availability of technologies that reach the high TRL 

threshold required by SOF AT&L. 

Technology Readiness Levels 

TRLs provide a metric with which to evaluate technology (and products) during the acquisition process. TRLs are at the center of the tension 

that exists between revolutionary and evolutionary technology change. 

USSOCOM predominantly purchases technologies that have higher levels of 

readiness, unlike the military branches that provide R&D funding to develop 

new concepts. Time-sensitivity and rapidly changing field requirements often 

dictate pursuit of evolutionary, not revolutionary, technology innovation. 

Acquiring and altering existing technology to SOF-peculiar requirements 

is consistent with a focus on producing 80 percent solutions today.77 The 

following section outlines how TRLs shape the acquisition process. TRLs 

determine the availability of technology and establish private sector goals. 

However, USSOCOM’s high TRLs are a barrier to market entry, which leaves 

some promising technologies undeveloped or not fielded. 

DOD TRLs are divided into 9 levels with each involving a different level 

of proof of concept requirements. Typically, only technologies that have 

reached at least level 5—demonstration of system or subsystem effectiveness 

in a laboratory environment—are taken to the next stage of development. 

This is a demanding threshold that typically results in modifications of existing equipment and technologies. 

USSOCOM TRLs indirectly establish private sector goals. Companies 

that primarily work with USSOCOM and other federal agencies benefit 

from products they develop because they 

often gain access to additional markets. 

SOF-peculiar technology has a very limited market, despite the command’s goal 

of sharing technology with the branches. 

Developing a technology or product to 

TRL 5 is costly, particularly when small 

Companies that primarily 

work with USSOCOM and 

other federal agencies benefit 

from products they develop 

because they often gain access to additional markets. 
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Tkach: Special Operations Contracting

economies of scale exist. One company executive articulated this point as 

follows: “the more demand by the military insofar as volume, the more the 

specific requirements will get sent up the chain of importance in product 

development.”78 The current austere financial environment requires companies to self-fund technology development, an acquisition strategy that shifts 

more risk from USSOCOM to private industry. 

The private sector faces higher financial risks when pursuing contracts 

with high TRLs. High TRLs require costly extensive testing and fielding 

to ensure interoperability and compliance with military specifications. 

USSOCOM does not typically prioritize development of nascent technologies, which is consistent with their priority of providing rapid and responsive 

support to SOF. But the lack of funding increases the risk to firms that seek 

to develop revolutionary technologies.79 The development cycle often leaves 

technologies in the “valley of death”—the zone that lies between isolated 

demonstration of capabilities and thorough testing in a particular environment. The existing acquisition model shifts the financial burdens and development risk to industry, but if industry is unwilling or unable to establish 

a profitable business model, investment in the development process may 

weaken and useful technologies will not be fielded.80

TALOS Case Study 

The development of the TALOS may foreshadow the future of specialized 

military acquisition processes. TALOS was launched at the behest of Admiral 

William McRaven, former USSOCOM commander, following the loss of 

SOF personnel, particularly in instances where warriors breach doorways.81

TALOS is a mechanized exoskeleton suit designed to augment the strength 

and endurance of the operator. The current acquisition program is designed 

to deliver a prototype of the suit by 2018, which will require integration of 

revolutionary technology leaps using existing evolutionary acquisition procedures. TALOS is a unique program in which USSOCOM is the lead integrator.82 The program also uses lump-sum competition awards, integration 

of other DOD resources, and development of long-term technologies with 

lower TRLs. If the program is successful, it has the potential to revolutionize 

the military acquisition and procurement process. 

The technology requirements for the suit are daunting. The ambitious 

program seeks to integrate the following characteristics: advanced armor, 
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JSOU Report 17-5

mobility/ability, situational awareness, light and noise discipline, C4, medical, thermal management, power generation, and power management. The 

technologies for each of these capabilities, in many cases, are still under 

development. For example, clothes that staunch blood loss and treat medical wounds are still under development. The most demanding challenge is 

the generation, storage, and distribution of energy.83 The suit’s advanced 

technological requirements and the lack of existing capabilities catalyzed 

USSOCOM to develop new approaches to acquisition. 

Prime contractors typically integrate system and subsystems of technologies on major defense systems. Prime contractors are typically large, multinational defense companies that are the lead company and carry primary 

responsibility for completing a contract. 

The existing model that uses private sector firms as lead integrators has 

elicited criticism. First, prime contractors are not necessarily open and 

transparent about the nature of their competitions for sub-awards. Thus, 

the government often does not benefit from the competitive bidding process 

embedded within the contracting model.84 Second, detractors argue it is 

too expensive because primes are able to push costs to subcontractors while 

taking a percentage of the profits. The combination of defense consolidation 

and decreasing defense budgets increases prime contractors’ leverage over 

subcontracted firms.85 Third, when a firm is the lead integrator it typically 

retains intellectual property (IP) rights to the system and its subcomponents. Control of these IP rights is highly contentious between firms and the 

military. IP rights often influence firm profitability, system costs, recompete 

advantages, and market scalability.86 Former USSOCOM Command Sergeant 

Major Chris Faris, speaking at SOFIC 2013, indicated the importance of IP 

when he stated that participation in TALOS “might mean that you [private 

companies] have to lay out intellectual property on the table next to a competitor.”87 The context of the statement is clear: revolutionary change may 

require industry to overcome their reluctance to share IP. Whether industry 

will overcome this reluctance remains an open question. 

The government, as lead integrator, has spurred direct collaboration with 

a wide range of actors. The Joint Acquisition Task Force—Tactical Assault 

Light Operator Suit, directs the TALOS program, and locations across the 

country are developing pieces of the program. Multi-location development 

is not unique to TALOS, but the high level of direct interaction and cooperation—made possible by the removal of bureaucratic layers—is unique. 
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Tkach: Special Operations Contracting

In addition to private sector firms, the TALOS program has involved universities, national laboratories (e.g., Sandia and Los Alamos), and multiple 

government agencies, including the Defense Advanced Research Projects 

Agency (DARPA). This high level of collaboration has increased the logistical 

burden on program personnel,88 but it has also increased organizational flexibility.89 Unlike prior defense acquisition models, both successes and failures 

are directly reported to the program executive office (PEO) SOF Warrior. 

The increased efficiency greatly reduces the time between decisions. Integration of SOF is a foundational component of TALOS and creates conditions 

for accelerated development of technologies as well as for identification of 

potential spin-off technologies. The government stepping into the role of lead 

integrator has also provided more opportunities for direct warrior feedback 

during the development phase. SOF personnel are embedded in the TALOS 

team, which enables direct identification of technology and capabilities that 

can be used today. Once these are identified, collaboration between combat 

developers and POE can initiate acquisition of materials through USSOCOM’s acquisition process. 

The TALOS program also utilizes competitive awards and low-level TRL 

technology development. Competitive awards are procedures used to reward 

delivery of requirements. Other federal agencies, particularly DARPA, use 

competitive awards to spur innovation. The TALOS program’s use of competitive awards is the continuation of shifts in procurement policies. The 

TALOS program also issued requirements for information far lower than for 

normal TRL technologies.90 The request for lower-than-normal TRLs in the 

TALOS program is an effort to ensure that developed technology aligns with 

future requirements and that it accelerates delivery of program subsystems.91 

USSOCOM’s adoption of these two approaches seeks to create revolutionary 

leaps in technology and acquisition policies required to field TALOS. 

The government-as-lead-integrator model poses risks and challenges as 

compared to the traditional linear, top-down acquisition model. Under the 

new model there is no outside firm (or other actor) that can be held responsible for failing to deliver the capability; the government will have no one to 

blame or sue if delivery of equipment is delayed or if equipment is unsuccessful. A significant risk involved in the pursuit of revolutionary technologies 

is conditions where SOF are not adequately supplied. TALOS is insulated 

from these concerns because the program is fulfilling a requirement that 

currently has no known solution. 
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JSOU Report 17-5

An additional problem arises when the government acts as lead integrator: Who will manufacture the final product? To achieve the rates of production anticipated by the program and expectations of wider audience adoption 

(e.g., fire, police), a manufacturer or a group of manufacturers may have to 

be engaged. The process to move multiple components, each of which may 

have proprietary elements, to private industry is a daunting task. Little to no 

discussion or research has been conducted on production of products with 

the government as lead integrator. 
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Tkach: Special Operations Contracting

3. USSOCOM’s Acquisition Process: 

Current Systems and Possible 

Improvements 

Acquisition of SOF-peculiar services and equipment is the responsibility of the SOF AT&L Center. The center was established in 1991 and 

is responsible for research, development and acquisition, procurement, and 

logistics support for the Command. SOF AT&L’s centralized acquisition 

authority has improved many aspects of the acquisition process, yet the full 

process—from identification of SOF needs to final delivery of products and 

services—remains convoluted. Furthermore, SOF AT&L must conform to 

a variety of federally required steps and administrative management layers 

that reduce acquisition efficiency. Areas for improvement are identified 

based on interviews with SOF AT&L personnel and industry participants 

at SOFIC 2015. Multiple study participants identified four specific aspects of 

the acquisition process that deserve attention: identification of needs, written 

requirements, interoperability, and protests. Each area is examined in the 

context of the existing acquisition process. 

An ideal acquisition process would minimize bureaucratic layers between 

SOF operators and industry partners. The ideal acquisition model would 

expand this team to encompass expertise for the entire spectrum of acquisition steps—in particular the identification of needs and the validation of 

requirements. In this ideal process, SOF operators would identify a need 

(requirement) that would then undergo an internal validation process. Once 

approved, SOF AT&L would efficiently utilize industry to furnish the service 

or equipment. Non-SOF-peculiar acquisitions (e.g., public administration) 

would also be taken into account when conceiving of this ideal model, given 

that generic support services are also essential to optimal functioning of the 

Command. Further, the ideal acquisition model—from the standpoint of 

innovation, efficiency, and rapid delivery—would incorporate the wisdom of 

Integrated Product Teams (IPTs), which would further reduce bureaucratic 

layers. IPTs reduce these layers by combining key members of the acquisition 

process (PEO, legal, and contracting officers) into a single cohesive team. 

This would remove layers between J-8 and SOF AT&L to create a single, 
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JSOU Report 17-5

flat bureaucratic layer with expertise to handle each step in the acquisition 

process.92 A change along these lines would reduce to the absolute minimum (i.e., a single layer) the number of bureaucratic layers between SOF 

and capabilities delivery. This new structure would optimize SOF’s ability 

to experiment with rapidly delivered novel capabilities. Federal regulations, 

however, limit the implementation of the ideal acquisition model, as numerous bureaucratic layers are required to write requirements, manage acquisition and maintain oversight.93

Where and how exactly does the existing acquisition process diverge from 

the ideal model sketched in the preceding paragraph? First, steps from identification of initial requirements by J-8 to delivery are extraordinarily complex, involving numerous actors, decision makers, and bureaucratic levels. 

Identification of requirements begins with SOF operators and is formalized 

at J-8 (Force Structure, Requirements, Resources, and Strategic Assessments). 

Once requirements are identified, the Requirement Analysis Division of J-8 

shepherds the documents through the validation and approval process. PEO 

identify acquisition and technical requirements necessary to meet the validated requirements. Additional SOF AT&L bureaucratic layers include legal, 

management, and contract offices. Other elements of the existing acquisition 

model that generate inefficiencies fall into the four aforementioned areas 

identified by SOF AT&L personnel and industry partners as problem areas: 

the identification of SOF needs, written requirements, interoperability, and 

protests. These areas merit further investigation not only because they were 

mentioned by a significant percentage of SOF AT&L personnel and industry participants interviewed at SOFIC 2015, but also because they comprise 

elements that can, in fact, be addressed and improved within the existing 

federal acquisition system that dictates SOF AT&L acquisition and procurement strategies. 

In the following pages, SOF-specific characteristics of the acquisition 

process are discussed with a view to suggesting possible changes that would 

streamline the acquisition process and address a variety of inefficiencies. 

Each of the subsequent subsections identifies specific strengths and limitations in the existing acquisition model. Overall, SOF AT&L has a strong 

record of streamlining acquisition policies and practices when compared to 

the services. But comparisons between the services, and across the federal 

government in general, risk misconstruing SOF AT&L capabilities. SOF 

AT&L benefits from unique acquisition authority, organizational capital, 
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Tkach: Special Operations Contracting

acquisition categories (ACAT) level, 

and lower budget amounts that 

increase acquisition strategy flexibility and make possible tailored 

oversight and management. These 

unique characteristics limit the utility of direct comparisons with other organizations. Instead, SOF AT&L is 

contrasted here with a stylized acquisition model to identify areas for potential improvement. 

Identification of SOF Needs 

Identification of SOF needs begins with SOF operators. Both J-8 and SOF 

AT&L work to ensure that validated requirements and the acquisition and 

procurement program fulfill operator needs. Multiple individuals interviewed for this report identified that difficulties in this initial process cascade 

through the acquisition process and create inefficiencies.94 When SOF needs 

are not effectively identified, translation of requirements into a legal framework that enables construction of objective evaluation metrics generates 

further difficulties and system inefficiencies. A crucial step then, comprises 

the initial identification of needs and the timely and accurate translation of 

these needs into written requirements. 

SOF AT&L currently utilizes multiple mechanisms to ensure operators 

are involved in the acquisition process. First, SOF directly engages SOF 

AT&L personnel, particularly through placement of personnel in the PEO. 

Second, SOF personnel attend industry shows and conferences, including 

SOFIC, which affords the private sector with opportunities to demonstrate 

capabilities and discuss requirements. Despite these efforts, there are limitations in SOF involvement. Individual billets and involvement with PEOs are 

not permanent. Budget cuts have limited attendance at industry days and 

conferences.95 Finally, SOF and partners will still need to overcome limitations associated with the vagaries of interpersonal communication within 

an anonymous system.96

Identification of needs and delivery of SOF-peculiar capabilities involving 

revolutionary advances may require a new non-classified engagement forum. 

Two current mechanisms, the Technology & Industry Liaison Office (TILO) 

and the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program, developed out 

Overall, SOF AT&L has a strong 

record of streamlining acquisition 

policies and practices when compared to the services.
28

JSOU Report 17-5

of the existing acquisition cycle and, consequently, have limitations. SBIR 

funds small business research opportunities on a competitive basis, but the 

National Research Council found that total federal SBIR funds, not necessarily USSOCOM’s initiatives, are associated with higher levels of overhead 

and higher levels of uncertainty about contract completion because of the 

lack of reliability of unknown suppliers.97 TILO operates a digital proposal 

receptacle in which companies detail their capabilities in USSOCOM areas of 

interest and the TILO platform connects the company with the appropriate 

PEO or other personnel. Congress established SBIR to support small business 

research and development. Both mechanisms are external to the acquisition 

process. TILO, in particular, has a strong track record for timeliness, with 

reviews of applications usually occurring within 30 days. However, administrative hurdles, particularly TILO format requirements for proposals, have 

reduced initial company participation. Additionally, submissions are limited 

to preexisting identified SOF needs, which inhibits creative, novel solutions 

to issues USSOCOM has yet to formally identify and describe through its 

bureaucratic channels. Consequently, TILO is designed to address yesterday’s 

problems with today’s technology. 

An additional burden is answering who owns the IP rights. Firms funded 

by the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) In-Q-Tel (IQT) retain their IP, 

which enhances their potential profits. SOF AT&L has adopted a different 

approach in the TALOS program, where firms are encouraged to share IP. 

It is unclear if TALOS will be successful, and even if successful, which of 

the two models is best suited to deliver SOF-peculiar equipment and technology. To achieve revolutionary advances in SOF-peculiar equipment and 

technology, SOF AT&L should be open to alternative acquisitions models. 

USSOCOM should simultaneously pursue a non-classified portal modeled on the CIA IQT. IQT is a non-profit organization that connects industry with the intelligence community, identifies limitations in capabilities, 

and specifically invests in start-ups that can deliver product in less than 

36 months. There are numerous bureaucratic hurdles to establishing such 

a system, yet IQT boasts a very attractive $9 to $1 return on investment 

and nearly two thirds of companies using IQT are non-traditional defense 

companies.98
29

Tkach: Special Operations Contracting

Written Requirements 

Contract requirements are of the utmost importance for an effective acquisition process that delivers the capabilities needed to succeed in hybrid 

warfare. Contract requirements describe in detail the product or service 

requirements to be fulfilled by the private sector. In the ideal acquisition 

model, SOF personnel directly inform the requirements. As described above, 

SOF AT&L utilizes experienced operators in the acquisition process more 

than is the case in other DOD units. Nonetheless, the current process of 

identifying and writing requirements remains problematic. Individuals from 

each phase of the acquisition process independently identified the absence 

of well-written and specific requirements as a significant impediment standing in the way of successful acquisition.99 Three specific issues with written requirements were identified as reducing the efficiency of the existing 

acquisition process: the challenge of translating SOF-operator-identified 

needs into requirements, the bureaucratic approval process, and the reality 

that clearly specified requirements are still no guarantee of on-time delivery. 

These issues are not unique to SOF compared to other DOD acquisition and 

procurement programs; however, SOF AT&L is more affected by on-time 

delivery than the branches because of the nature of the service.100 As well, 

SOF AT&L are in principle better able to address these limitations through 

leadership initiatives, and acquisition and program procurement flexibility. 

The difficulty of translating SOF needs into written requirements is primarily a communication problem. SOF identifies their needs and often, 

understandably, requests operational capabilities that may exceed existing 

technologies and equipment. Once a desired capability is identified, written, and approved by J-8 personnel, SOF AT&L personnel must translate 

the requirements into a form that can be used to write legal contracts. Once 

requirements are approved, SOF AT&L identifies the most appropriate acquisition strategy. 

Generating written requirements involves multiple layers of bureaucracy 

in J-8 before SOF AT&L is tasked with implementing an acquisition strategy. USSOCOM ensures that SOF input is provided from the beginning 

and has streamlined the bureaucratic process in several key ways. Nonetheless, red tape can still hinder the acquisition process. SOF AT&L often 

form IPTs to reduce these layers and promote cooperation between PEOs, 

legal review, contracting officers, and additional acquisition personnel. SOF 
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JSOU Report 17-5

AT&L integrated product teams have also reduced acquisition barriers by 

limiting individual team representatives from independently slowing (and 

stopping) the acquisition process. On rare occasions when SOF AT&L uses 

a service to manage a program, additional DOD layers of bureaucracy must 

usually be dealt with. As a consequence of these bureaucratic layers, written 

requirements often end up being controlled and shaped from the top, so to 

speak, to the point that they no longer resemble the original user requests.101

One scholar articulates this point as follows: 

In general, requirements as user needs do not represent bottom-up 

innovation because the requirements validation process results in 

top-down requirements that may have little resemblance to the 

original user requests or current needs by the time the technology is 

fielded. This point is illustrated by the formal USSOCOM process—

that is, the long-range planning process at SOCOM headquarters 

provides the input to the requirements validation process, and no 

operator input is explicitly shown. As a result, development projects 

(e.g., the Mk 23 offensive handgun) can show delivery of a capability 

that met the requirements but did not meet user needs.102

Consequently, the existence of multiple bureaucratic layers often leads 

to a second issue with written requirements—final products that do not 

ultimately fulfill end users’ needs. 

The recent case of the all environment capable variant small unmanned 

aircraft (AECV) demonstrates how failure to properly validate requirements 

cascades through the acquisition process, potentially resulting in fielding 

deficient equipment. In 2015, the DOD inspector general (IG) conducted 

an audit that concluded USSOCOM effectively validated requirements for 

6 programs, but the AECV did not meet primary performance attributes 

during operational testing.103 The IG stated USSOCOM fielded 41 AECVs 

with no assurance that it is capable of fulfilling its mission because of underperformance in the launch and recovery categories as well as weight/size. The 

director of J-8 maintained that the proper test methodology was followed, 

however, J-8 will field test a different variant of the AECV in the future to 

demonstrate compliance with the primary performance attribute, an acceptable solution to the IG. SOF AT&L does not have control over the validation 

process and is not responsible for the audit’s findings. Yet, failure to follow 
31

Tkach: Special Operations Contracting

policy resulted in acquisition of equipment that may not adequately support 

the operator. 

SOF AT&L acquisition programs that prioritize customization of equipment may still not match up with the ideal acquisition model previously 

sketched. SOF AT&L has experimented with intensive SOF involvement in 

the development process of SOF-peculiar equipment. One example is the 

Special Operations Combat Assault Rifle (SCAR) family of weapons. The 

SCAR program was launched to find a replacement for the M4 carbine and 

other small arms rifles.104 The program enabled extensive testing and interaction with SOF personnel to identify key features of the rifle. The Belgium 

company FN Herstal utilized 3D printing to fabricate different model variants that received immediate feedback from SOF personnel. Design improvements included lappable bolts and the ability to accommodate different-size 

magazines (e.g., both M-16- and AK-47-style) in addition to an extended life 

of the barrel, improved stock technology, and advanced sights. The program 

more closely followed the ideal acquisition process. Yet, while the procurement process approached a hypothetical ideal process, SCAR demonstrates 

two limitations of acquisition processes focused on customization. First, 

extensive customization reduces the ability of other firms to compete. One 

company representative identified this problem, stating, “[requirements] 

help us to understand the targets but sometimes they are written so narrowly that it is clear that they only want a specific product [from a particular 

manufacturer].”105 Second, extreme customization may sacrifice affordability. If FN Herstal’s collaboration with SOF members influenced the written 

requirements, then market dynamics and potential competition benefits 

were impaired or eliminated. The announcement that the program passed 

milestone C, enabling full-rate production, confounded the procurement of 

5.56 mm Mk 16 variants, with USSOCOM announcing that it would not be 

proceeding with those orders. In the end, SOF received a rifle that fulfilled 

its requirements, but ultimately cancelled the Mk 16 because the increased 

costs were not associated with meaningful improvement over the M4. 

Written requirements drive affordability. Affordability is typically defined 

in terms of per unit and life cycle costs. SOF AT&L’s low volume purchases 

pose challenges for many private sector partners because profitability typically depends on the ability to sell to a larger customer base, but meeting 

specialized SOF-specific requirements may reduce marketability.106 The criterion of affordability is therefore often problematic. It entails addressing 
32

JSOU Report 17-5

how requirements are written and developed to balance SOF needs while 

still engaging the private sector.107 Affordability, it must be noted, is a subjective assessment for many SOF acquisition programs. The unique demands 

placed on SOF may justify increased costs to ensure operational continuity. 

In sum, effective translation of SOF needs into written requirements 

remains a challenge for J-8 and SOF AT&L. Communication problems, 

bureaucracy, and the costs of customization move the acquisition process 

away from the ideal acquisition model. Tracking the evolution of requirement language from initial requests made by SOF to request for proposal 

(RFP), section M (evaluation factors for award) & L (instructions, conditions, 

and notices to offerors or respondents) formalization, to source-selection 

debriefs (winners and losers) could yield useful insights into the process 

but is unfortunately beyond the scope of the current research. No publicly 

available database currently exists to allow this type of analysis of the evolution of requirements. Industry, for its part, is generally capable of supplying 

equipment and technology that fulfills requirements, but the requirements 

must be written in a manner that ensures market engagement and satisfaction of SOF needs. SOF AT&L can improve performance through increased 

training for SOF operators and support staff and by conducting evaluations 

of how requirements change during the contracting process. 

Interoperability 

Interoperability is most broadly defined as the ability of systems, procedures, individuals, and military forces to collaborate effectively and achieve 

a common goal.108 Consistent with SOF Truths that humans are more important than hardware, SOF interoperability emphasizes individual and leadership collaboration over compatibility of equipment and technology. However, 

equipment and service interoperability 

is growing in importance as USSOCOM 

adopts a global posture to strengthen 

and support strategic partners.109 SOF’s 

explicit need to work globally with allies, 

partners, and even resistance groups 

places an emphasis on the acquisition 

process delivering interoperable equipment that goes beyond typical military 

Consistent with SOF Truths 

that humans are more important than hardware, SOF 

interoperability emphasizes 

individual and leadership collaboration over compatibility 

of equipment and technology. 
33

Tkach: Special Operations Contracting

specification standards. Interviewed SOF AT&L personnel emphasized 

interoperability of equipment and technology as increasingly important 

in the globalized SOF network. Specifically, representatives reported that 

equipment and technology challenges arise, particularly when operations 

involve collaboration between SOF forces and international partners. This 

section examines interoperability in a SOF context focused on international 

partners, before concluding with a discussion of SOF AT&L’s options to support interoperability with non-U.S. partners. 

Interoperability between United States Special Operations Forces 

(USSOF) personnel and international SOF occurs at two operational levels. 

First, interoperability at the strategic level requires coordination of national 

policies and use of SOF. Second, tactical unit-level interoperability allows 

for coordinated actions and activities in operations. Interoperability with 

international SOF is primarily achieved through training, education, and 

equipment. USSOF acquisition decisions establish benchmarks for international SOF, despite some equipment not being available for export because 

of restrictions imposed by the International Traffic in Arms Regulations. 

As is the case for other branches and units of the DOD, provision of equipment and services for SOF can occur through international agreements, 

direct commercial sales, and foreign military sales. These mechanisms take 

on distinct characteristics in the SOF environment that distinguish USSOCOM’s efforts to support international partners. SOF AT&L is not solely 

responsible for provision of equipment to partners. Direct commercial sales 

of SOF-peculiar equipment, such as Italy’s purchase of the Ground Mobility 

Vehicle 1.0,110 enhance interoperability between allies. SOF-peculiar direct 

commercial sales are limited by international traffic in arms regulations 

restrictions because the modifications to platforms and SOF-peculiar technologies and equipment are typically classified. Pursuit of interoperability 

during the acquisition process enhances the influence and global leadership 

of USSOCOM. 

Interoperability between USSOF and international partners face distinct 

challenges in the provision of equipment and training. DOD and USSOCOM 

provide equipment, training, weapons, and services to international partners, though the quality of equipment provided and its compatibility with 

U.S. equipment varies from one partnership to the next. For example, USSOF 

has recently deployed to countries as varied as the Democratic Republic of 

Congo and the Philippines to provide training and technical assistance. Each 
34

JSOU Report 17-5

country has a different level of military capability and a unique relationship 

with the U.S. that together constrain and shape the provision of training 

and equipment. The U.S. Africa Command, via its theater special operations 

command, provides basic military training in the Congo.111 Meanwhile, in the 

Philippines, USSOF members carry out a wide range of activities that place 

forces near or on the battlefield.112 In the latter case, the provision of military 

equipment and services is designed to improve operational results, whereas 

in the former case, training operations are designed to build the relationship. The presence of SOF does not mean, however, that provided equipment 

and services are SOF-peculiar. Sale and transfers of military equipment are 

predominately managed by DOD and typically provide non-SOF-peculiar 

capabilities. For example, in the Philippines case, sale of non-specialized 

equipment from the military branches is the standard practice. International competitors also equip the Filipino military. Thus, improvements in 

the counterterrorism capabilities of the armed forces are a combination of 

USSOF involvement and traditional military sales. Public records do not 

provide information on whether SOF-peculiar equipment and services have 

been included in transfers. 

Currently, acquisition and procurement programs do not explicitly 

emphasize interoperability outside of the U.S. military. Text analysis of 

USSOCOM requests for proposal (RFP) requirements,113 when available in 

the Federal Business Opportunities records from the last year, reveals no 

instances in which interoperability was explicitly connected to the involvement international partners. RFPs included a diverse range of products and 

services including modification of commercial items (e.g., commercial vehicles) and SOF-peculiar equipment development programs (e.g., dry combat 

submersible). Interoperability with international partners and international 

SOF appears to be addressed mostly after the acquisition stage, primarily 

through training and through ad hoc testing of compatibility in equipment 

and technology for particular applications. 

There are opportunities for SOF AT&L to promote international interoperability. USSOF acquisition and procurement practices set global trends: 

USSOF is the world’s largest such force, giving it considerable market leverage and influence over the direction of technology development. As we have 

noted, SOF-peculiar equipment may require aftermarket modifications, and 

export of these modifications is both important for establishing interoperability, and potentially difficult because of export restrictions. Direct 
35

Tkach: Special Operations Contracting

commercial sales and foreign military sales of SOF-compatible equipment 

are also options. USSOCOM and other DOD entities are involved with sales 

to foreign entities. Finally, USSOCOM has pursued the option to manufacture weapons used by partners. Recent solicitations for information have 

sought to identify possible manufacturers of non-standard (non-U.S. and 

NATO) firearms and equipment. For example, a recent solicitation calls for 

the U.S. industrial base to manufacture variants of the AK-47 and Dragunov 

sniper rifles.114 The solicitation is explicitly designed to produce weapons 

used by foreign partners.115 The policy justification for the production of 

foreign-designed weapons by U.S. firms includes ease of field maintenance 

(versus current U.S. supplied weapons) and removal of foreign producers 

from the supply chain, which may increase oversight and quality control. 

However, supply of foreign-designed weapons will also reduce identification of U.S. support, which may indirectly decrease public accountability 

of supplied weapons because a given weapon’s country of origin may now 

include the U.S. 

In many instances, it is the aftermarket modifications that transform 

a platform into SOF-peculiar equipment. Modifications are difficult. For 

example, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency received approval for 

sales of Blackhawk UH-60M helicopters to numerous countries including Austria, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Thailand, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, 

Mexico, Brazil, Tunisia, and Egypt. U.S. Army SOF fly MH-60M variants of 

the helicopter, but the Defense Security Cooperation Agency and the individual countries do not identify if the purchases will be modified for special 

operations. Additionally, this example illustrates the difficulty of identifying 

SOF-peculiar equipment and technology transfers. Both the U.S. government 

and international actors document arms transfers, but not always with sufficient detail to allow identification of SOF-peculiar equipment. Finally, this 

example also illustrates the divisions that exist between advanced militaries 

with whom operational collaboration is more likely, and other international 

partners. Current commercial sales and other existing avenues enable shortterm interoperability solutions tailored to specific international partners. 

Establishing interoperability through the provision of equipment and 

weapons, however, may not provide the intended results. Recent research 

indicates that countries that receive U.S. military assistance have incentives 

to support U.S. counterterrorism policies. However, the provision of military 

assistance also generates a moral hazard whereby a recipient government 
36

JSOU Report 17-5

deliberately refrains from definitively eliminating a terrorist threat because 

of fear of losing desired military assistance.116

In sum, the pursuit of international interoperability is not the responsibility of SOF AT&L, unless this criterion is explicitly stated in a requirement. 

Compared to larger DOD programs such as Joint Strike Fighter, radar systems, and aerial refueling, where there are financial and military advantages 

to cooperation, USSOCOM is less likely to benefit from co-production of 

SOF-peculiar equipment. Limited SOF-peculiar equipment markets and 

the complexity of export regulations reduce the benefits of cross-national 

industry collaboration because of heavy reliance on modification to satisfy 

SOF specifications. 

Protests 

Protests are a final potential cause of delay in the acquisition process. The 

protest system enables companies to challenge the award of a source selection if they believe the process was not conducted fairly or legally. Protests 

delay the source selection award until they are 

reviewed and resolved by the GAO, and in some 

cases adjudicated in federal courts. Protests 

occur at all federal agencies; they are a natural 

part of the contracting system. However, protests 

generate delays in service delivery and efforts are 

therefore made to avoid them.117 Delays affecting USSOCOM source selections are typically 

shorter than those for large weapon programs. 

Still, these shorter delays may have a significant 

negative impact on SOF operations because of 

the generally high level of urgency of SOF AT&L 

contracts.118 This subsection identifies different 

types of protests and emphasizes the importance of written requirements 

as a mechanism to reduce the likelihood of protests. 

Protests are typically based on either procedural complaints—certain 

policies were not followed—or disagreement about the evaluation of a proposal with regard to a particular requirement. Each type of protest presents 

SOF AT&L with opportunities to improve the acquisition process to minimize protest volume and speed resolution. 

Limited SOF-peculiar 

equipment markets 

and the complexity 

of export regulations 

reduce the benefits of 

cross-national industry 

collaboration because 

of heavy reliance on 

modification to satisfy 

SOF specifications. 
37

Tkach: Special Operations Contracting

Procedural protests occur when a company identifies what they perceive 

to be a violation of protocol. Procedural violations are typically addressed 

through administrative records at Federal Business Opportunities, firm 

records, and SOF AT&L. The GAO typically determines procedural protests 

quickly because violations are based on established policies and are specified 

in the RFPs. However, procedural protests still arise, as illustrated by the 

SOCOM Wide Mission Support (SWMS) contract. SWMS is an indefinite 

delivery, indefinite quantity contract that includes a range of knowledge 

management, administrative, and professional assistance to SOCOM HQ, 

components, and other USSOCOM entities.119 SWMS provides an example 

of the protesting procedure. Federal Acquisition Services Team, LLC (FAST) 

protested the award on the basis that USSOCOM did not consider their 

application.120 FAST’s protest centered on the claim that their proposal was 

not properly processed through the federal email system. The GAO ruled that 

USSOCOM had followed established procedures and denied the protest.121

GAO rulings are final unless plaintiffs move to federal court, which FAST 

did in January 2015.122 The initial four-month delay was further extended by 

the federal court case. SWMS is a broad-based support contract, and delays 

are therefore costly and affect USSOCOM capabilities. 

Protests relating to evaluation criteria are often more complex and time 

intensive. One example is the protest of translation and interpretation service 

contracts by Mission Essential Personnel, LLC (MEP). The 2013 protest was 

based on a disagreement with USSOCOM’s evaluation of the qualifications 

of MEP’s linguists and alleged failure to engage MEP following identification 

of deficiencies in the proposal. Each of the five companies competing for 

the contract received multiple evaluation notices and initial evaluations of 

their proposals. MEP was found to have included qualifications information 

for only 163 of the 330 required linguists; 382 candidate linguists failed to 

provide required certifications. The GAO denied the protest.123 WorldWide 

Language Resources, Inc. was ultimately awarded the $245 million contract; 

approximately six months later than would have been the case without the 

protest. This example demonstrates an important lesson for SOF AT&L. 

Written requirements that appear clear from the perspective of USSOCOM 

personnel may not be clear to industry: MEP argued vehemently that they 

had appropriately completed documentation as directed in the request for 

proposal. 
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JSOU Report 17-5

In sum, protests are a natural part of the federal contracting system and 

cannot be completely avoided. Written requirements and their evaluations 

are often at the center of the protests. For its part, SOF AT&L has a strong 

record of winning protest cases. Yet, in the SOF context, delays are particularly costly because of the time-sensitivity of SOF AT&L orders for products and services. Improvements in the quality and transparency of written 

requirements may reduce protests. 

Ideal vs. Actual Acquisition Process: Conclusions 

Arguably, SOF AT&L’s approach to acquisitions is better than any other 

organization within the DOD.124 And yet, even the SOF AT&L approach 

falls short of what might be characterized as the ideal model. In the ideal 

model, the acquisition process would always begin with SOF identification of 

needs, and it would minimize bureaucratic layers between contract officers 

and delivery of equipment and services. SOF AT&L has an excellent track 

record of prioritizing SOF needs and involving SOF personnel throughout the acquisition process. This prioritization is evident in the degree of 

interoperability achieved and the limited number of sustained protests. SOF 

AT&L’s successful streamlining of the acquisition process must also be seen 

in the context of the unique pressures of obtaining specialized services and 

equipment on very tight timelines for SOF operating in diverse and evolving 

environments. Continued improvement of the acquisition model requires 

addressing written contract requirements. 

Evaluation of the existing TILO database to track industry submissions 

through the entire acquisition and procurement process can shed light on 

USSOCOM’s ability to rapidly adopt market innovations. TILO contains 

non-classified but potentially proprietary industry innovations that stretch 

back 5 years in the inactive database. The 

existing system accepts submissions only 

for currently identified issues—an inherent limitation because of rapidly changing 

technology. Empirical evaluation of TILO 

submissions will identify if an alternative 

private sector engagement mechanism is 

required. Furthermore, analysis of the submissions will provide insight into 

market competition, small business participation, and SOF AT&L’s ability 

Continued improvement 

of the acquisition model 

requires addressing written 

contract requirements.
39

Tkach: Special Operations Contracting

to bring innovations from the marketplace to the operator. Process tracing of specific TILO filings through the acquisition and procurement process will identify how the bureaucratic process influences equipment and 

procurement. 

Written requirements can be improved to better streamline the acquisition process. Requirements are one area outside of procedural limitations 

imposed by FAR that can realistically be addressed. Some amount of friction 

between the different steps in the formalization process is natural and to be 

expected. However, improvement of written requirements through training, 

education, and research will improve delivery of SOF-peculiar capabilities 

and decrease the likelihood of protests. Additional collaboration between 

J-8 and SOF AT&L personnel and industry is required to reduce inefficiencies. Specifically, further research is needed to shed light on the evolution 

of requirements, and in particular to ascertain how exactly requirement 

language impacts SOF AT&L acquisition programs. 

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Tkach: Special Operations Contracting

4. USSOCOM and Private Sector 

Competition 

The expectation that private sector competition will reduce costs and 

accelerate innovation is a fundamental assumption of government contracting. For contracting to live up to this expectation, incentive differences 

between buyers and sellers in the market must be reconciled. Buyers seek 

to maximize services while sellers seek to maximize profits. In the classic 

theoretical contracting model, effective contracting procedures—procedures 

that overcome incentive differences—abide by four principles: contracts are 

complete, contracts receive sufficient bid solicitations, objective evaluation 

metrics are applied, and objective monitoring is enforced.125 These principles 

do not have to be fully satisfied for effective acquisition and procurement. 

Instead, the principles represent what is desirable under ideal conditions; 

in reality, they are unlikely to be fully realized. That said, the classic contracting model generates a rubric with which to evaluate the effectiveness 

of USSOCOM contracting and the likelihood of achieving BBP objectives. 

In the following pages, after a more detailed discussion of the theoretical 

contracting model, USSOCOM engagement with small and large businesses 

is examined using empirical data from FPDS. This section concludes with a 

brief discussion of the influence of private sector competition on USSOCOM 

contracting. 

The Theoretical Contracting Model and USSOCOM 

The first principle of the contracting model is that contracts should be 

complete. Complete contracts are those that include all possible specifications detailing the dynamics between the private sector and USSOCOM. 

Contracting theory provides the foundation for this principle. Incomplete 

contracts occur when information about the seller, buyer, or the environment—a critical complicating element for USSOCOM operations—are not 

known. Contracts are typically incomplete because it is too costly to research 

and draft a contract that includes all possible contingencies.126 In the DOD 

context, complete contacts are those that control initial price and total life 

cycle costs. In BBP parlance, complete contacts “[mandate] affordability as 
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JSOU Report 17-5

a requirement.”127 Despite improvements in DOD-wide acquisition, many 

programs continue to exceed cost estimates.128

USSOCOM acquisition programs typically focus on modification of 

existing high-TRL equipment. Contracts involving existing equipment tend 

to be more complete than those involving platform development or R&D 

work because there is less uncertainty regarding the capabilities of existing equipment.129 On the other hand, contracts for services in operational 

environments are regularly shaped by incomplete information between contract participants because of the general uncertainty of the environment 

and unknown costs of service delivery. Haphazard contracting procedures, 

particularly in the administration of service contracts in the field, plagued 

U.S. military operations in Iraq, reducing military effectiveness.130 In general, SOF AT&L is better positioned to issue complete contracts than other 

areas of DOD. 

The second principle of the contracting model is that sufficient bid solicitation should occur to generate market competition. BBP provides guidance 

on the entire acquisition and procurement process and emphasizes the use of 

bid solicitation and competitive pressures to align buyers’ and sellers’ disparate incentives. Assessing the sufficiency of bid solicitation involves measuring competition in terms of the number of firms able and willing to compete 

for a specific contract. Bids capture the total number of competing businesses 

willing to endure the costs of competition. The number of bids also details 

information on both the observable and unobservable business calculus of 

firms. Observable factors are composed of publicly available information 

about firms (e.g. existing contracts, number of employees, revenue, taxes, 

etc.) and characteristics of the solicitation (e.g. contract amount, contract 

structure, geographic location, etc.). Unobservable factors include firms’ 

possibly diverse business models, risk acceptance, and similar proprietary 

information. One critical unobserved factor is that firms constantly seek to 

balance their profit margin portfolios. In a period when profit margins are 

fixed or squeezed through intense competition, firms may choose not to 

pursue particular opportunities based on the expectation that, even if they 

emerge victorious, the resulting contract will not be lucrative enough to raise 

their overall profit margin. There is thus a definite risk that particular services, equipment items, and technologies will not be developed or provided 

in the future if enough firms are not able to achieve the profit margins they 

need or wish to attain across all their contracts. Because firms are profit 
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Tkach: Special Operations Contracting

maximizing, competition only occurs when multiple firms pursue a contract. 

And for now, competition exists in nearly all security and military service 

sectors because few, if any, services are provided by a single firm. 

The principle that contracts should undergo competitive bidding, while 

often realized, fails to capture the complexity of DOD and USSOCOM contracting. Various government restrictions alter the competitive landscape. 

DOD and USSOCOM utilize sole-source 

contracting mechanisms as necessary to support operational and classified requirements. 

Moreover, federal procurement policies 

establish protections for small businesses 

(e.g., veteran-, women-, or minority-owned 

businesses) that enable firms to be competitive. These necessary protections 

ensure the long-term health of the industry and promote innovation.131

The third principle of the contracting model requires objective evaluation metrics. Objective evaluation metrics are typically associated with 

performance indicators, including on-time delivery and price. However, 

even delivery and price are often difficult to quantify.132 One mechanism 

designed to eliminate the ambiguity in pricing are “lowest–price technically 

acceptable” (LPTA) numbers. A LPTA number is determined based on the 

lowest-price submitted by industry that satisfies the minimum technical 

requirement. However, even this mechanism can be problematic for DOD 

and USSOCOM.133 For example, Frank Kendall made the case that LPTA 

should be selectively utilized and should generally be reserved for situations with “well-defined requirements [in which] the risk of unsuccessful 

contract performance is minimal, price is a significant factor in the source 

selection, and there is neither value, need, nor willingness to pay for higher 

performance.”134 SOF AT&L evaluation metrics are dependent on specific, 

well-defined requirements, arguably the antithesis of the LPTA approach.135

USSOCOM’s mission requirements and truncated timetables often limit 

the utility of traditional evaluation metrics. Price is not necessarily USSOCOM’s most important metric, which is consistent with evaluation metrics 

in contingency operations.136 Instead, evaluation metrics focus on required 

capabilities, on-time delivery, and affordability. 

The final principle of the contracting model is objective monitoring in 

USSOCOM’s two primary environments. The first environment is when 

contracts are fully executed in the U.S. which is the case for the vast majority 

Because firms are profit 

maximizing, competition 

only occurs when multiple 

firms pursue a contract. 
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JSOU Report 17-5

of USSOCOM contracts. In this environment, consistent and robust monitoring of private sector partners is possible. The second environment occurs 

when contracts occur outside the U.S., particularly in operational environments. Ensuring objective monitoring in both environments through effective monitoring systems remains a key objective for the U.S. military.137 To 

ensure objective monitoring, USSOCOM is developing the Special Operations Resource Business Information System (SORBIS) for use in both contracting environments. SORBIS combines three existing systems that detail 

each of the three business cycle phases: financial execution; planning, programming, and budgeting; and acquisition management/program information reporting. Combining the different systems into a unified portal is 

expected to increase the frequency and accuracy of real-time updates during 

the acquisition process. The GAO found that the program was not well maintained or updated, and it lacked an enforcement mechanism. Consequently, 

the program was terminated in 2011.138 The failure of the SORBIS system 

demonstrates the difficulty of management in operational environments. 

Each of the four principles described in the preceding paragraphs highlights different aspects of the acquisition process. Effective engagement need 

not strictly abide by all four principles; instead SOF AT&L’s fulfillment of 

SOF needs remains the benchmark for acquisition directives. Market competition is not the panacea proponents argue it is, but competition does exert 

downward pressure on prices while also promoting technological innovation. In the next section, market competition—arguably the most lauded 

feature of the contracting model—is examined within the larger context of 

procurement trends. 

Empirical Evaluations of USSOCOM Transactions 

This section empirically evaluates USSOCOM procurement practices. The 

analysis is based on transactions data from the Federal Procurement Data 

System-Next Generation. All USSOCOM activities from 2004 through 2014 

that are publicly available and recorded are used. The Federal Procurement 

Data System-Next Generation is the U.S. federal government’s central source 

for contract data that contains detailed information on all contract actions 

greater than $3,000. FPDS systematic reporting of transactions is a more 

complete picture of procurement practices than any other publicly available 

source.139
45

Tkach: Special Operations Contracting

A second key source of information is Defense.gov, which announces 

contracts more than $6.5 million on a daily basis. Defense.gov is an excellent 

resource for tracking contracts that execute services on behalf of USSOCOM. 

For example, the 10 June 2015, extension of DynCorp International LLC’s 

Navy contract directly supports the Joint Special Operations Task ForcePhilippines. This $18.5 million extension, and the cumulative $154 million 

total contract award, will not be captured in the FPDS dataset criteria used 

in this analysis because it is overseen by the Navy. This is an example of SOF 

AT&L’s organizational capital that will be discussed in the next section. FPDS 

data is not complete. Aside from the fact that some portions of USSOCOM’s 

budget are classified and not reported at all, FDPS is only as accurate and 

reliable as the individuals who input the data.140 Despite these limitations, 

FPDS remains the best publicly available source on federal contracting.141

The dataset for this monograph is compiled from all USSOCOM transactions from 2004 through 2014.142 The data was compiled using USSOCOM 

as the highest administrative unit in the FDPS database. This criterion 

ensures inclusion of other contracting offices and units within USSOCOM’s 

umbrella, regardless of their geographic location. Each of the 88,382 recorded 

transactions details information about what was purchased, whether or not 

the contract was competitive, the name(s) of the firm(s) involved, the firm’s 

structure (small business or not), the location of services, the name of the 

administrating unit, the number of competing bids, and the contract structure. Each transaction further identifies firms by their North American 

Industry Classification System (NAICS) code. The data contains 24 major 

categories and 675 specific acquisition categories. The net total transactions 

are worth over $23 billion during the specified period.143 It is important to 

keep in mind that the data pertains to transactions, not source selections or 

individual contracts. A single contract award can contain hundreds of transactions. Evaluations of transactions are thus the primary unit of analysis for 

the following empirical sections.144 Figure 2 depicts annual financial acquisition outlays from 2004 through 2014. The values represent only those funds 

used for acquisition and do not include personnel and operational costs.145

Total spending levels are indicative of increased demand for SOF. For the 

2004 to 2014 period, SOF AT&L’s budget increased an average of 4.8 percent 

every year. The average annual increase includes periods of sequestration and 

year-to-year periods of decreased funding. The major spike in spending in 
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JSOU Report 17-5

2013 includes contracts for task orders based on existing contracts for CV-22 

Osprey and MH-60 aircraft.146

Marketplace Competition and Business Size 

DOD acquisition leadership emphasizes market competition typically in one 

of two ways: 1) in terms of holding a fair and open competition in which firms 

compete against each other or, 2) in terms of receiving more than one bid 

for each task order. SOF AT&L typically outpaces DOD guidelines for the 

percentage of contracts put out for competitive bidding. However, the second 

definition of competition is the one utilized in this analysis. The reason is 

that fair and open competitions do not necessarily lead to actual market 

competition. When market competition, as conceptualized in the contracting model, requires multiple firms to compete for a contract, the particular 

mechanisms used to arrange competition are less important than the end 

result of having more than one firm submit a bid.147 The following section 

examines market competition based on business size and service sector. 

Market competition is measured using the number of bids received for 

each transaction. Consistent with the BBP language, bids are the number of 

firms that formally submit proposals in response to RFPs.148 Submitted bids 

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

0 1 2 3

Total in U.S. Billions

Figure 2: Annual SOCOM Financial Acquisition Totals: 2004-2014. 

Source: The Federal Procurement Data System 
47

Tkach: Special Operations Contracting

capture multiple dynamics of the private security market. Each business 

sector is subject to different competitive forces. SOF AT&L’s acquisition focus 

is different than that of the four services. The effects of sector competition 

are thus distinct from those experienced by the services. SOF-peculiar equipment and services benefit from service-level competitions. SOF AT&L is also 

able to identify and implement incremental contract awards, recompetes, 

and other mechanisms to maximize competition. 

First, bids capture the number of firms that are capable of providing the 

required services and that possess a viable business case to compete. Bidding on contracts requires a financial commitment with no guarantee for 

return on investment. Costs associated with pursuing RFPs vary based on 

the services, contract complexity, and firm size. 

Second, across the defense industry, increased competition and barriers 

to entry have increased consolidation, thereby reducing the ability of small 

businesses to compete for certain types of contracts (e.g., contracts for airlift 

services).149 U.S. federal contracting requirements establish parameters that 

set benchmarks for small-business participation levels. Federal regulations 

also set benchmarks for participation of businesses with particular ownership characteristics (i.e., minority, veteran, etc.), which creates a market 

environment that is not strictly free and open. 

BBP establishes the importance of small-business participation by identifying two objectives: promoting real competition and improving tradecraft 

in service acquisition.150 Small-business involvement in DOD acquisition 

is predicated on operational factors including innovative technology, rapid 

fielding, and patent holdings as well as business-environment factors including low overhead, job creation, and sustainable economic growth. USSOCOM’s approach to engaging small businesses involves the entire acquisition 

life cycle. 

Figure 3 shows the average level of competition faced by small businesses 

and large businesses when vying for contracts in the top 10 NAICS categories. 

Competition is measured as the average number of bids for all transactions 

in each category.151 The average level of competition across all business is 

indicated for each category with a circle. Figure 4 demonstrates that, for 

most services, small businesses face more competition than large businesses. 

SOF AT&L has effectively generated competition in most service areas. 

Small firms, however, face a more competitive marketplace. On average, they 

face two additional competitors in task orders they win beyond the number 
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JSOU Report 17-5

faced by large firms. Public administration and professional, scientific, and 

technical are the only two categories where large businesses face higher competition levels than small businesses. These categories are two of the highest 

value service areas in USSOCOM, DOD, and the federal government. While 

all firms benefit from economies of scale, higher competition levels between 

large businesses in these categories are likely due to the increased profitability of providing generic government support services. Two service categories 

—manufacturing and public administration—experienced essentially the 

same level of competition between different-sized firms. This consistency 

suggests that the market for these services is not conditional on economies 

of scale.152 Economies of scale is one of the few limitations USSOCOM faces. 

USSOCOM’s low acquisition rate increases costs for private industry unless 

the product or service is marketable outside special operations. 

The continued consolidation of the U.S. defense industry is evident in 

several service categories. Large businesses faced less than three competitors 

in six service categories. These six categories also account for the majority 

of spending. Two categories (public administration, and transportation and 

warehousing) averaged less than two competitors—the minimum required 

for competition to actually occur. Defense consolidation may pose a danger to 

SOF AT&L’s ability to generate competition in the marketplace of the future.153

Figure 3: USSOCOM Competition Level: Top 10 Services/Products. 

Source: The Federal Procurement Data System

0 1 2 3 4 5

Competition Level (average bid)

Manufacturing

Primary Metal Manufacturing

Retail Trade

Transportation & Warehousing

Information

Professional, Scientific & Tech

Administrative and Support

Educational Services

Other Services (except PA)

Public Administration

Small Business

Large Business

Category Average
49

Tkach: Special Operations Contracting

USSOCOM effectively balances business size and total contract value in 

most acquisition categories. Figure 4 depicts the top 10 NAICS categories 

based on total transaction value, with a breakdown for each category by 

business size. During the specified period, only four service categories saw 

large business outpacing small businesses by more than a billion dollars. 

This represents a considerable achievement for SOF AT&L, given the size of 

its budget and DOD-wide performance.154 The top four spending categories 

were metal manufacturing; transportation and warehousing; professional, 

scientific, and technology; and administrative support. These results indicate that, overall, SOF AT&L has effectively engaged small businesses. The 

Office of Small Business Programs (OSBP) is designed to advocate for small 

businesses. OSBP achieved goals of 33 percent of prime dollars to small 

business, or approximately $906 million in FY 2015.155 OSBP also achieved 

protected category specific goals in woman-owned, service-disabled veteranowned, and small disadvantaged business goals. OSBP is an effective advocate for small business compared to DOD services and the larger federal 

government. The Office of Federal Procurement Policy awarded OSBP the 

Figure 4: USSOCOM Transaction Totals by Business Size: Top 10 Services/

Products. Source: The Federal Procurement Data System 

Professional, Scientific & Tech

Primary Metal Manufacturing

Transportation & Warehousing

Admin., Support, & Waste Manage.

0 $2 Billion $4 Billion $6 Billion $8 Billion

Small Business Non-Small Business

2.5 5.0

1.9 5.6

.04 2.3

.03 1.8

Public Administration

Educational Services

Information

Retail Trade

Other Services

Manufacturing

0 $.5 Billion $1 Billion $1.5 Billion

.84 .56

.53 .23

.33 .30

.16 .12

.94 .17

.12 .14
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JSOU Report 17-5

Chief Acquisition Officers Council award in 2015 in recognition as a top 

performer.156 Small business engagement is expected to remain high as long 

as it remains a leadership priority. 

Parity in contract value between small and large businesses is not a reasonable or, in most cases, desirable goal. Firms that are able to overcome 

inefficiencies in the market survive and are profitable. SOF AT&L acquisition is better able to approach parity in value than the services because of its 

unique acquisition focus. Low-volume production requirements may limit 

profitability for many firms that require economies of scale in production in 

order to achieve profitability. The reality is that many large firms depend on 

high rates of production to generate profitability because of their higher levels 

of overhead. Small firms, on the other hand, are less able to contribute R&D 

funding and platform development. In this context, the fact that SOF AT&L 

has achieved something close to transaction value parity—across small and 

large businesses—in multiple categories including education, information, 

retail trade, and manufacturing, demonstrates SOF AT&L’s strong commitment to small-business collaboration and investment. 

Figure 5 shows outlays on the top 10 NAICS categories based on transaction value from the FDPS data, with each category further broken down by 

spending on small and large businesses.157 As was the case for spending on 

the general service and product categories, spending in these categories flows 

predominantly to large businesses, especially in air transportation, aircraft 

Figure 5: USSOCOM Total Financial Outlay: Top NAICS Services/Products. 

Classification: (O) Other, (AO) All Other. Source: The Federal Procurement 

Data System 

Small Business Non-Small Business

Computer Related Services (O) 

Air Transportation (O)

Engineering Services

Radio & TV Broadcasting

Support Service (AO)

General Gov. Support (O)

Aircraft Parts (O)

Misc. Manufacturing (AO)

Administrative Management

Search, Detection, Navigation

0 $1 Billion $2 Billion $3 Billion

1.1 2.1

01 2.3

.72 1.5

.25 1.7

01 1.8

.83 .55

.21 .80

.28 .54

05 .76

15 .71
51

Tkach: Special Operations Contracting

parts, support services, and search, detection, and navigation. However, 

small businesses are better able to compete and win contracts related to 

engineering, general computer technology, and general government support. 

These are also categories in which businesses can compete outside of SOF 

AT&L, DOD, and the federal government while remaining profitable. This 

trend suggests that, while many small businesses provide military- and security-specific services, continued intentional efforts by SOF AT&L to award 

contracts to small businesses are required for the health of the industry. 

Competition Conclusion 

BBP establishes competition as the bedrock principle of effective acquisition 

and procurement programs. Two conclusions emerge from the preceding 

analysis. First, the competitive landscape remains robust. Market specialization has enabled USSOCOM to effectively generate competition in most 

service areas. SOF AT&L generates competition across most categories of 

private sector support. Two high-technology sectors—information services 

and professional, scientific, and technological services—exemplified robust 

competition during the period reviewed, namely, 2004 to 2014. Both service 

sectors averaged approximately four competitors for each task order. These 

industries are high-value sectors: the category of professional, scientific, 

and technological support alone accounted for over $5 billion during the 

period studied—the single largest acquisition category. Consistent with SOF 

AT&L’s acquisition priorities of equipment modification and rapid development, competition in these technical services strongly suggests that defense 

industries are healthy and that USSOCOM’s acquisition approach is effective. 

Two service sectors—transportation and warehousing and public administration—lagged behind the others in SOF AT&L’s portfolio. Transportation and warehousing is a category in which defense consolidation has 

reduced competition, with some firms dropping out of the market. Rotor 

and fix-wing airlift capacity and their support services (e.g., spare parts, 

maintenance) have undergone industry-wide consolidation. A reduction in 

the number of firms providing transportation support is a general defense 

industry trend. Future challenges posed by consolidation will be faced by 

the services, which have improved leverage over platform-level acquisition. 

The lack of competition in public administration services is inconsistent with 

evidence from other federal agencies.158 Future analysis specifically focusing 
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JSOU Report 17-5

on public administration is warranted to identify if there are particular idiosyncratic features of SOF AT&L requirements that diminish competition. If 

competition remains limited in this area, SOF AT&L may overpay or receive 

lower-quality services from their contracted support partners. 

Second, small businesses face more competitive pressures than large businesses. There are two explanations for this result. Small businesses are more 

plentiful than large prime contractors following years of defense industry 

consolidation. Additionally, small businesses are often in a better position 

to compete for low-volume, SOF-peculiar items and modifications. Overall, 

USSOCOM has adopted BBP models and practices that produce what is 

arguably the best record of small-business engagement in the DOD. 
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Tkach: Special Operations Contracting

5. Organizational Innovation 

Organizational capital is the capacity of an organization to adopt new 

modes and mechanisms to adjust to new challenges and changing 

environmental conditions. Organizational capital is an intrinsic characteristic of organizations that impacts their ability to achieve their objectives. 

Large bureaucracies typically have limited organizational capital because size 

and age decrease incentives to overcome collective action problems.159 The 

U.S. military is arguably the world’s largest bureaucracy. It should therefore 

come as no surprise that, overall, its acquisition and procurement policies 

and practices struggle to adapt to changes in the environment (e.g. rapid 

changes in networked technologies). And yet, within the U.S. military there 

are exceptions to this general trend, most notably USSOCOM. USSOCOM’s 

high level of organizational capital, particularly compared to that of the five 

services has enabled adoption of innovative acquisition polices to support 

SOF’s unique mission. 

USSOCOM’s organizational capital is comprised of three elements: 1) 

a commander with head-of-agency power that enables centralization and 

delegation, 2) service purchases and modifications, and 3) establishment of 

SOF culture and individual leadership quality.160 Yet, organizational capital 

is dynamic and organizational capital fluctuates. Moreover, even optimized 

agency powers do not magically overcome the distance and division between 

contractors and government employees, guarantee control over personnel, or 

resolve the challenges of working on classified systems. Constant personnel 

turnover, including leadership positions, reduces organizational continuity 

and efficiencies. The following section describes in detail the three major 

components of USSOCOM’s organizational capital and concludes with a 

brief discussion. 

Head of Agency Powers 

The commander of USSOCOM, unique among combatant commanders, 

has the authority to directly procure equipment, technology, and weapon 

systems. The USSOCOM commander has the authority of a head of agency 

and authority over USSOCOM’s own budget. This budgetary authority 

enables SOF AT&L to innovatively pursue SOF-peculiar equipment and 
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JSOU Report 17-5

services, while fully complying with all federal and DOD rules and regulations involving acquisition. The commander delegates authority to the 

acquisition executive who, in turn, delegates procurement authority down 

through the organization to individual contract officers. 

SOF AT&L consists of the support staff for the acquisition executive, eight 

PEOs, and four directorates.161 The division of labor within the command and 

the command’s high level of independent purchasing authority affords PEOs 

increased organizational flexibility. The organizational arrangements that 

have emerged mirror the major acquisition requirements for the force (e.g., 

fixed wing, services, etc.). The division improves connections with industry 

on specific equipment and technology.162

USSOCOM is comprised of various units that enable the acquisition 

process to be tailored to the specific needs of the SOF. Figure 6 depicts the 

top twelve funding agencies by total transaction values during the period 

studied for this report (2004-2014). USSOCOM’s Regional Contracting Office 

(represented by the second bar in the second panel) oversaw $16 billion in 

acquisitions during the studied period, accounting for nearly 70 percent of all 

USSOCOM financial transactions. The top three funding agencies—USSOCOMs Regional Contracting Office, the Technology Application Contracting 

Office, and SOF special activity agencies—account for nearly 90 percent of all 

acquisitions. This degree of centralization reduces transaction costs for both 

the buyer and the seller and represents a significant advantage USSOCOM 

has over other military services and DOD-wide initiatives. The centralization 

of authority is a form of organizational capital asset: establishing centralized 

decision making, financial authority, and review processes create a single 

user-interface scenario. 

Figure 6 demonstrates how organizational capital enables flexibility in 

the acquisition process. USSOCOM has the flexibility to utilize numerous 

funding agencies—more than 235 are included in the data—to ensure timely 

delivery of services and materials. The utilization of additional funding agencies does not translate into huge financial outlays, however. Indeed, the average financial obligation from the bottom 10 percent of funding agencies is just 

over $1 million—less than a rounding error in most budget environments. 

Yet, this organizational flexibility is pivotal to USSOCOM’s contracting success because firms and the command have multiple avenues through which 

to partner without needing to incorporate other military services into the 

acquisition process.163
55

Tkach: Special Operations Contracting

Control over budgets does not guarantee control over personnel. SOF 

AT&L personnel policies remain entrenched in federal requirements and 

DOD practices. Personnel stability, the degree to which individuals maintain 

positions, is an important determinant of organizational success.164 SOF 

AT&L’s personnel instability is impacted by the elimination of positions and 

the assignment of specific positions by the services, rather than total work 

force turnover.165 Elimination of positions is often determined outside of the 

command. Typically the services influence billet assignments because they 

fund the personnel positions. Additionally, specific billets, particularly in 

the legal department, may not align with the current needs of the force.166

SOF AT&L relies on contractors to support acquisition policies and their 

implementation. Contractors have supported internal acquisition policies 

up to the permitted “inherently governmental function” boundary established by federal regulations. Contractors do not provide one-to-one ratio 

capabilities as government employees but are often treated as facsimiles by 

decision makers in higher positions of authority.167 Contracting personnel are 

often credited with increasing organization flexibility and helping to manage 

Hundreds of millions USD

HQ AFSOC

HQ USSOCOM

SORDAC PMC4

MARSOC

NAVAIR

NSWDG

NSWG-4

NSWG-2

Contingency Contracting

0 2 4 6 8

Billions of USD

SpecOp Special Activity

Regional Contracting Office

USSOCOM TAKO

0 0.5 1 1.5 

Figure 6: USSOCOM Total Financial Value: Top 12 Units. 

Source: The Federal Procurement Data System 
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JSOU Report 17-5

service-demand fluctuations. However, contracting overall is negatively associated with organizational performance.168 Contracted SOF AT&L personnel 

identified differences in workplace treatment, job security, and general trust 

as negatively affecting to their job performance. These perceptions are consistent with the findings of federal surveys of contracted personnel working 

in government environments.169 Continued substitution of contract personnel for government positions may over time erode organizational capital. 

Benefits and Problems of Service Collaboration 

USSOCOM has the capacity to collaborate with military services to secure 

and modify platforms tailored to SOF. For example, USSOCOM operates 

SOF-variants of the ‘Chinook’ (MH-47) helicopter that have improved its 

range, defensive capabilities, and overall operational capacity. The Army 

purchased the helicopters and provided numerous upgrades, and USSOCOM 

supplied the final upgrades to ensure delivery of operational requirements. 

The dual acquisition approach enables SOF AT&L to add task orders to existing purchase orders. The ability to shift major acquisition and management 

responsibilities to a different military service largely insulates SOF AT&L 

management from the burdens of program management. 

Dependence on service modifications, however, generates bureaucratic 

and strategic limitations. First, bureaucratic impediments arise because of 

incompatibility between operational procedures, different accounts, computer software, and similar functional processes. For example, transferring money between USSOCOM and the services used to be a laborious 

process that could take a month or longer. SOF AT&L personnel have since 

decreased the transfer time to about three weeks.170 The compatibility—and 

lack thereof—of computer software also frequently generates bureaucratic 

impediments. The contracting software currently in use is a case in point. 

DOD-wide software, while attempting to unify the system, has generated 

one-size-fits-all procedures that may not fully support SOF-peculiar contracts. Thus, compatibility is limited not only because software is sometimes 

incompatible, but because unified software is incompatible with SOF-peculiar contracts. 

Second, dependence on the services for major acquisitions poses a potential long-term limitation for procurement of SOF-peculiar equipment. Currently, the services purchase equipment that can be modified, sometimes 
57

Tkach: Special Operations Contracting

at a very high cost to meet SOF-peculiar 

requirements. Modification, however, is 

an effective policy only if the services continue to purchase equipment that can realistically be modified, similar to what they 

have purchased in the past.171 Emphasis on 

conventional capabilities will likely continue to occupy a prominent role in service 

acquisition;172 however, service acquisitions are increasingly focusing on 

technology-intensive platforms that reduce the role of the individual soldier. 

For the services, technology-intensive equipment offers opportunities to 

remove individuals from harm’s way and improve operational alternatives. 

This approach may not always be compatible with SOF tactics, which often 

require that SOF personnel operate in close proximity to enemy targets and 

therefore seek to augment and enhance, not reduce, the individual soldier’s 

capabilities. Currently, there are no alternative plans for major platform-level 

acquisition, which may leave USSOCOM vulnerable to changes in service 

acquisition behavior.173

SOF Culture and Individual Leadership 

Individual leadership and the understanding of SOF culture influence SOF 

AT&L acquisition effectiveness. The available research indicates that, in 

some contexts, bureaucratic processes can be strongly influenced by difficult-to-quantify leadership qualities (e.g., decision-making, leadership style, 

and innovation). USSOCOM is an example of such a context. SOF-peculiar 

cultural elements (e.g., acute time-sensitivity, SOF Truths, a very strong 

mission focus and shared sense of operational importance) differentiate the 

environment from the rest of DOD. Specifically, leadership and SOF culture 

influence SOF AT&L personnel with regard to direction, personnel turnover, 

and emphasis on retaining personnel with DOD experience instead of hiring 

new employees. 

Leadership from the top of SOF AT&L establishes expectations and performance incentives. Leadership’s influence on organizational culture is 

exemplified by the ability of personnel to readily identify their organization’s 

priorities and performance measures. Interviewed SOF AT&L personnel 

often cited providing “guys down-range” with needed equipment as their 

DOD-wide software, 

while attempting to unify 

the system, has generated 

one-size-fits-all procedures 

that may not fully support 

SOF-peculiar contracts.
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JSOU Report 17-5

top professional performance measure, regardless of previous conceptualizations of professional accomplishment. Subtle shifts in organizational culture 

resulting from leadership are reflected in the acquisition executive office’s 

push for face-to-face interactions with industry. Both the private sector and 

SOF AT&L sources referenced this new emphasis on face-to-face interactions 

as a significant factor moving forward. 

Successful interactions between the private sector and SOF AT&L are 

seen by many SOF personnel as requiring a shared understanding of SOF 

culture.174 SOF culture is certainly unique. One potential downside is that 

private sector employees and SOF AT&L personnel may sometimes talk past 

each other.175 Despite efforts of SOF AT&L leadership to facilitate successful 

partnerships, the perception persists in the private sector that in-house SOF 

experience (e.g., hiring retired SOF personnel) is required to win contracts. 

Continued emphasis on FARs and clarifying contract requirements may help 

to counter this industry misperception. 

SOF AT&L operations place a heavy emphasis on the expertise of experienced personnel. The complexity of many SOF AT&L tasks (e.g., articulating 

requirements for contracts to modify existing military equipment or develop 

highly specialized new equipment) means that familiarity with SOF AT&L 

procedures and culture is especially valuable. Yet, few individuals start their 

careers at USSOCOM. Instead, it is typical for individuals to transfer into 

SOF AT&L.176 Consequently, personnel who have accumulated a number of 

years of SOF AT&L experience and expertise are seen as the backbone of 

SOF AT&L and leadership tries to retain them. As is the case in other federal agencies, however, a generational workforce gap is developing that may 

negatively impact future efficiency. 

SOFT AT&L is taking steps to mitigate potential generational gaps. First, 

USSOCOM utilizes Expedited Hiring Authorities which allow individuals to 

be hired “off the street” that would not otherwise be available. The expedited 

process is a DOD-wide initiative to appoint highly qualified individuals in 

specific shortage acquisition categories.177 Second, SOF AT&L developed an 

intern program to assuage generational gaps in the workforce. These initiates bridge generational gaps, yet it is unclear if these steps are sufficient to 

avoid staffing issues in the future. Moreover, SOF AT&L will likely eschew 

staffing issues facing DOD as a whole because of the existing practice to 

recruit from within the DOD. 
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6. The Private Sector, Better Buying 

Power, and SOF AT&L Personnel 

In the context of increasing private sector integration, and to better engage 

the private sector, DOD instituted the BBP program. BBP 1.0 was issued 

in 2010 by Ashton Carter, then Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology, Logistics (USD (AT&L)), as part of DOD’s Efficiency Initiative.178

Input from industry, the military, and Congress generated two additional 

versions of the document. The primary objective of the BBP 3.0 program is 

to “deliver warfighting capabilities needed within the constraints of a declining defense budget by achieving better buying power for the warfighters 

and taxpayer.”179 A brief review of the program identifies key aspects of the 

contracting model and how it relates to USSOCOM’s acquisition programs. 

BBP initiatives are examined within the context of SOF AT&L personnel and 

a preliminary empirical analysis of USSOCOM transactions. 

BBP and USSOCOM 

The BBP program identified initiatives to improve Pentagon acquisition 

processes. The review produced 36 different initiatives, which are condensed 

here into seven primary focus areas.180 Two of the initiatives, improving tradecraft in the acquisition of services and improving the professional quality 

of the total acquisition workforce, are examined in relation to USSOCOM 

in the following sections.181

USSOCOM acquisition programs are atypical compared to the rest of 

DOD. ACAT is the DOD’s taxonomy of acquisition program categories. The 

categories are divided by financial size (cost) and level of decision authority.182

Each acquisition program—though not necessarily all the transactions and 

contracts it generates—contains milestone decision authority that determines if and how the program moves forward. SOF AT&L typically manages ACAT III programs and milestone decision authority resides with the 

commander, who delegates acquisition authority to the acquisition executive. 

The commander, in turn, may designate the acquisition executive.183 Rapid 

modification and fielding of equipment is different from the development 

of weapons platforms or similar projects. USSOCOM experienced problems 
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JSOU Report 17-5

with both ACAT I acquisition programs (common aviation package and 

Advanced SEAL Delivery System) and ACAT II programs (CV-22 Advanced 

Vertical Lift Aircraft).184

BBP’s cost targets and goals are applicable to SOF-peculiar programs.185

Acquisitions cost limitations are predicated on the will-cost and shouldcost managerial approach. “Should-cost” is a concept introduced by then 

USD (AT&L) Carter to emphasize the life-cycle costs of acquisition and 

underscore the importance of cost estimates as a ceiling, not a cost floor.186

Conceptually, “should–cost” costs are those incurred once all inefficiencies 

and bureaucratic costs that can be removed are calculated.187 Kendall identified the importance of “should-cost” for all programs: 

Managers at all levels should be taking and requiring that these 

steps be taken and rewarding successful realization of cost savings. 

I am seeing more and more of the desired behavior as time passes, 

but I am also still seeing cases where implementation seems to be 

more token than real. We also have work to do in understanding 

and teaching our managers the craft of doing “should cost” for our 

smaller programs (e.g., Acquisition Category IIIs, Services, etc.)—

this remains a work in progress. Overall, “should cost,” as a single 

measure alone, if fully implemented, will cause fundamental change 

in how we manage our funds.188

SOF-peculiar modifications and lower ACAT levels present challenges in 

establishing “should cost” prices. 

Organizations are typically slow to adapt to new policies and programs—

a problem for many large bureaucracies. Top-down initiatives, such as BBP, 

required management personnel to support and implement policy changes 

and alterations. Management is a key characteristic in implementation of 

BBP because DOD’s acquisition budget is so large.189 Many SOF AT&L staff 

downplayed the practical application of BBP.190

SOF AT&L has largely been able to overcome organizational hurdles and 

achieve BBP objectives through effective management decision-making and 

leadership. SOF AT&L’s record of small business engagement is one example 

of implementation of BBP policies to improve tradecraft in the acquisition 

process. Promotion of small business permeates SOF AT&L acquisition 

culture because it is a leadership priority.191 USSOCOM’s OSBP routinely 

outpaces the rest of DOD and the federal government in small business 
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engagement. SOF AT&L figures from fiscal year 2013 demonstrate their success. In 2013, the small-business goal was 23 percent of all contracts, but SOF 

AT&L achieved a 25.56 level of engagement. During the same period, DODwide small-business engagement achieved 20.94 percent, falling short of the 

goal of 22.28 percent. Similar outpacing of DOD targets in other categories 

of protected small-business contracts were also achieved by SOF AT&L. 

Private Sector Views of SOF AT&L Personnel 

SOF truths that humans are more important than hardware applies to the 

individuals that purchase the hardware. BBP 3.0 identifies improvement in 

the professional quality of the total acquisition workforce as a major objective. SOF AT&L personnel, who number approximately 600, are essential 

to the development and implementation of innovative acquisition policies 

and procurement strategies. SOF AT&L 

employs civilian and active military 

personnel. Retired military personnel 

are also an important source of new 

employees. This section briefly discusses SOFIC 2015 participants’ views 

of SOF AT&L personnel. The survey 

provides a general overview of private sector actors’ views of SOF AT&L 

engagement, not a critique of existing personnel nor a comprehensive survey 

of industry attitudes regarding SOF AT&L. 

Figure 7 contains survey results from SOFIC 2015 participants. Respondents were asked to rate SOF AT&L personnel on a scale of 1 to 5, with 5 

representing “very high” and 3 representing “average.”192 The results suggest 

that SOF AT&L personnel are perceived as generally capable and well-versed 

in the acquisition process. Each category averaged about 4, a rating of “high.” 

However, SOF AT&L personnel rated lower with regard to responsiveness 

and understanding of specific businesses and business sectors. 

The survey captures differences in perspectives across traditional and 

non-traditional partner firms. Firms are considered non-traditional partners if they reported less than 25 percent of their revenue coming from 

DOD-related contracts.193 For example, no non-traditional partner rated 

SOF AT&L personnel as above average with regard to knowledge of their 

SOF AT&L personnel, who 

number approximately 600, are 

essential to the development 

and implementation of innovative acquisition policies and 

procurement strategies.
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JSOU Report 17-5

firm and responsiveness. By contrast, traditional partners were rated highly 

for responsiveness and firm-specific knowledge. One potential explanation 

for this inverse relationship is that non-traditional partners are more accustomed to rapid interactions in the private sector and are not yet familiar with 

DOD acquisition environments. Interestingly, non-traditional partners consistently gave SOF AT&L personnel higher ratings for their understanding of 

acquisition policies than did traditional partners. This result can partly be 

attributed to non-traditional partners’ lack of familiarity with the acquisition 

process. Conversely, traditional partners are better versed in the acquisition 

process and may therefore be better able to identify limitations and shortcomings in SOF AT&L-provided support. Because engagement with nontraditional partners is a priority for SOF AT&L, improved understanding 

of their individual businesses may be required to increase engagement. SOF 

AT&L’s ‘radical transparency’ practice, while an improvement over DODwide practices, may still lag behind private sector expectations. 

Figure 7: SOFIC 2015 Respondents to “How would you Rate SOF AT&L 

Personnel?” Source: author, data collected from online survey of 2015 

SOFIC company participants 

Low Average High

Responsive to your requests

Knowledge of your business

Knowledge of your business sector

Understanding of acquisition 

procedure and requirements

General capacity

0 1 2 3 4 5

3.7

3.4

3.6

4.0

4.0
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Conclusion 

The 21st century presents many challenges in the acquisition and procurement of services and technologies for the SOF community. Challenges 

arise from the internal constraints of decreased federal defense spending and 

complex federal contract requirements. Yet, despite fiscal limitations, the 

demand for special operations is on the rise. Emerging threats from state and 

non-state actors increase operational demands, straining both equipment 

and personnel. SOF AT&L provides arguably the best and most responsive 

acquisition process in the military; however, SOF-equipment cannot be mass 

produced. The fiscal, technological, and operational environment requires 

SOF AT&L to modify the acquisition model to successfully overcome the 

challenges of the contemporary environment. 

The existing acquisition model ensures continuity of services but often 

fails to provide revolutionary technology and equipment improvements. 

Revolutionary technologies disrupt 

the existing military paradigm. The 

pursuit of revolutionary technology 

requires adaptation of the existing acquisition model. SOF AT&L’s 

TALOS initiative is the most prominent example of attempts to acquire 

revolutionary capabilities. The collaborative effort involves USSOCOM, 

universities, national laboratories, and private firms. The collaborative environment, particularly the potential for firms to share proprietary information, may offer new solutions to the most daunting technology integration 

challenges. Potential improvements in the acquisition and procurement 

process ensure that TALOS’ impact is not limited to equipment and spinoff technologies. 

Public administration is one area of service acquisition that requires 

additional research. Public administration includes a wide variety of activities ranging from day-to-day business operations, time-sensitive planning, 

interagency support, to intelligence operations and program analysis.194

Public administration services accounted for over $1 billion from 2004-2014. 

Because reliance on private firms for public administration services may 

The fiscal, technological, and 

operational environment requires SOF AT&L to modify the 

acquisition model to successfully 

overcome the challenges of the 

contemporary environment.
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JSOU Report 17-5

influence USSOCOM operations, it is imperative to identify how and under 

what conditions private firms best support the command. Furthermore, in 

some areas of government, private firms are so entangled with operations, 

reversibility in privatization trends are not an option. Future research must 

explore the consequences of procuring private sector public administration 

support. 

The continued importance of collaboration with international SOF and 

international partners offers opportunities for acquisition and procurement 

programs to advance operational goals. Because requirements are written to 

support USSOF, international interoperability is often not a consideration. 

Yet, USSOCOM often establishes market trends and standards because it is 

the world’s best-funded force. 

Identification and evaluation of whether and how acquisition and procurement programs can be designed to improve international interoperability without losing sight of the primary goal of supporting USSOF may have 

lasting consequences for allies, partners, and operational success. 

Finally, AT&L personnel immortalize the SOF truth that personnel are 

more important than hardware. The existing acquisition system can be 

improved and the personnel are the individuals with the expertise, capacity, 

and motivation to revolutionize the acquisition and procurement process. 

Dedication to overhead minimization, improved organizational capacity, 

and revolutionary technology development are only a few of the areas of 

excellence. Development and implementation of new acquisition tools and 

procedures to improve delivery of SOF-peculiar services and technology are 

required if SOF are to continue to be the best equipped force on the planet. 
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Appendix A: SOFIC Survey 

The SOFIC is held annually in Tampa, Florida. It brings together U.S. and 

international industry partners, internationally-based SOF members, 

and government personnel. The conference provides a forum for industry 

to directly interact with SOF personnel and decision makers, to view demo 

products, and receive updates. For this monograph, a survey was provided to 

each company that participated in SOFIC 2015. The 2015 conference attracted 

approximately 9,000 attendees and 340 companies. 

The purpose of the survey was to identify methods and mechanisms to 

improve interactions between USSOCOM and the private sector. The need 

for the survey was identified during conversations with SOF AT&L personnel. Several individuals recommended direct contact with private sector 

actors to ensure accurate and up-to-date description of their views. 

Each company was asked to provide a representative from the company to 

complete the survey. Individual respondent names and information were not 

collected.195 Individuals from 47 companies completed the survey, representing a response rate of roughly 13 percent. Companies were contacted through 

email or contact links on their websites.196 Some companies provided their 

name on the survey, but that was removed from the record. The survey was 

not designed to obtain definitive answers on the topics addressed, rather, it 

supplements the existing research. In this monograph, individual narrative 

responses are quoted (without named attribution) and descriptive statistics 

are utilized when appropriate. Descriptive statistics and graphics for each 

question are provided in this appendix. 

Survey respondents were representative of the industry. Companies identified their employee total, small business status, defense-specific revenue, 

and SOF experience. Representatives from manufacturing, retail trade, 

transportation, information, professional and scientific, educational services, and other branches of the industry all provided responses.197 Firms 

varied in size from 2 to over 10,000 employees. Protected small businesses 

were included in the sample. Individual representatives included owners, 

presidents, contract managers, and market managers. About 30 percent of 

the companies have SOF-experienced personnel in their leadership. One 

quarter of companies responded that SOFIC 2015 was their first conference 
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attendance. Finally, companies surveyed derive between 1 percent and 65 

percent of their revenue directly from USSOCOM-related contracts. 

The survey examines SOFIC, SOF experience, technology integration, 

military requirements, and engagement impediments. Questions were 

developed during the research, and in many cases are based on feedback 

from USSOCOM personnel. For example, based on this feedback, questions 

were included to probe possible misconceptions; such as the misconception 

repeated by multiple private sector respondents that previous SOF experience is a mandatory prerequisite for successfully winning business. Multiple 

questions were included in the survey to address this issue. 

In general, individuals with SOF experience are involved in the business 

practices of many firms. That said, many respondents stated that SOF experience is not, in fact, required for business success. One of the most insightful 

comments on the survey addressed the idea that the value of SOF experience 

for firms seeking USSOCOM contracts may evolve over time. One company 

representative stated: “At one point they were [SOF personnel] but the economic climate has forced us to be much more diversified; however, we feel 

our products offer some solutions to existing needs.”198 There appears to be 

an inconsistency between the perceptions of SOF AT&L personnel and perceptions in the private sector regarding the importance of SOF experience. 

SOFIC 2015 Survey: 

1. Is 2015 your company’s first Special Operations Forces Industry 

Conference? 

2. What are the benefits of SOFIC? 

3. How would you rate SOFIC compared to other industry conferences? 

4. In what areas can SOFIC be improved? 

5. How would you rate SOF AT&L personnel? 

a. Professionalism 

b. General capability 

c. Understanding of acquisition procedures and requirements 

d. Knowledge of your business sector 

e. Knowledge of your business 
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Tkach: Special Operations Contracting

f. Responsiveness to your requests 

6. How important are the following issues to your success when working 

with USSOCOM? 

a. Individual or business special operations experience 

b. Understanding special operations culture 

c. Industry involvement in refining requirements 

d. Direct access to special operations forces 

e. Direct access to decision-makers and acquisition personnel 

f. Special Operations Industry Conference 

7. How does the level of technology readiness required by USSOCOM 

influence your business decisions? 

8. How do military specification requirements influence your company? 

9. What factors, if any, limit technologies and capabilities that could 

benefit USSOCOM? 

10. How do you see the dynamics between commercially funded development and USSOCOM’s emphasis on open architecture/fully integrated 

systems? 

11. Are there non-traditional contracting mechanisms (e.g. renting equipment, contractor-owned government-operated, government as lead 

integrator) that would benefit your company? 

12. What are the primary impediments to engaging USSOCOM (e.g. 

federal contracting system, limited demand, R&D costs, others)? 

13. Are individuals with special operations experience critical to your 

company’s success? If yes, at what point in the business process are 

they most valuable (e.g., identifying requirements for information, 

connections, presentations, business model, etc)? 

14. Individual company demographics 

a. Does your company work with other DOD or federal agencies? If 

so, please list the agencies. 

b. How many employees does your company have? 
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c. Approximately how long have you done business with USSOCOM? 

d. Is your company considered a protected small business? 

e. Are members of your company’s leadership special operations 

veterans? 

f. What percentage of your company’s revenue comes from DODrelated business? 

g. What percentage of your company’s revenue comes from USSOCOM-related business? 

15. Please identify the primary category of services your company provides. 

16. Please identify the secondary category of services your company 

provides. 
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Appendix B: Acronym List 

ACAT acquisition categories 

AECV all environment capable variant (small unmanned 

 aircraft) 

BBP Better Buying Power 

CIA Central Intelligence Agency 

COTS commercial off-the-shelf 

DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 

DOD Department of Defense 

FAR Federal Acquisition Regulation 

FAST Federal Acquisition Services Team, LLC 

FPDS Federal Procurement Data System 

GAO Government Accountability Office 

IG inspector general 

IP intellectual property 

IQT In-Q-Tel, a privately-owned non-profit organization 

ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

J-8 (USSOCOM) Joint Staff Directorate of Force Structure, 

 Requirements, Resources and Strategic Assessments 

LPTA lowest–price technically acceptable 

MEP Mission Essential Personnel, LLC 

MFP 11 Major Force Program 11 

NAICS North American Industry Classification System 

OSBP Office of Small Business Programs 
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JSOU Report 17-5

PEO program executive office 

PMSCs private military and security companies 

R&D research and development 

RFP request for proposal 

SBIR Small Business Innovation Research 

SCAR Special Operations Combat Assault Rifle 

SOF Special Operations Forces 

SOF AT&L Special Operations Forces Acquisition, 

 Technology, and Logistics 

SOFIC Special Operations Forces Industry Conference 

SORBIS Special Operations Resource Business 

 Information System 

SWMS SOCOM Wide Mission Support 

TALOS Tactical Assault Light Operator Suit 

TILO Technology & Industry Liaison Office 

TRL technology readiness level 

UAS unmanned aircraft systems 

USD (AT&L) Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

 Technology, and Logistics 

USSOCOM U.S. Special Operations Command 

USSOF U.S. Special Operations Forces 
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Endnotes

1. Linda Robinson, The Future of U.S. Special Operations Forces (Washington, D.C.: 

Council on Foreign Relations, 2013), 3. 

2. USSOCOM J5, Directorate of Strategy, Plans, and Policy, identified the importance of understanding the acquisition process. J5 identified acquisition as a 

strategic issue by posing the following question: “Is SOCOM’s acquisition process positioned to capitalize on rapid fielding of untested, potentially disruptive 

technology?” See: Special Operations Command, “J5 Key Strategic Issues as 

of 4 September 2014,” accessed 6 February 2015 at: http://www.soc.mil/swcs/

SWEG/_pdf/GRAD/USSOCOM%20J5%20Key%20Strategic% 20Issues%20List.

pdf. 

3. Richard L. Kugler and Hans Binnendijk, “Choosing a Strategy,” in Transforming 

American’s Military, ed. Hans Binnendijk (Centre for Technology and National 

Security Policy, National Defense University, 2002), 57-87. Kugler and Binnendijk 

discuss the internal DOD debate around competing approaches to transformation. They detail the debate between “evolutionary ‘steady as you go’” strategies 

and “revolutionary ‘leap ahead’” strategies that aim to move SOF methods ahead 

in “faster, bolder, and riskier ways.” The authors advocate a blended approach 

to achieve a “purposeful and measured transformation.” This blended strategy 

“aspires to keep U.S. forces highly ready and capable in the near term, to enhance 

their flexibility and adaptability in the mid- term, and to guide their acquisition 

of new systems prudently in the long term.” 

4. USSOCOM J5, “Key Strategic Issues,” 14. 

5. For a discussion of the potential benefits and liabilities of PMSC involvement 

in special operations, see: Christopher Spearin, “Special Operations Forces & 

Private Security Companies,” Parameter, vol. 44, no. 2 (2014), 61-73. 

6. There are multiple definitions and acronyms used to describe the private security industry. Peter Singer’s is perhaps the most cited definition and includes 

all provided services (combat services, consulting, and logistical support). 

Christopher Kinsey distinguishes between “the object to be secured” and the 

“means of securing the object” which allows him to differentiate between firms 

based on whether the client is public (state government) or private (corporations, 

non-governmental organizations, private firms). Scholars disagree about the 

proper acronym for the industry: Deborah Avant uses the term “private security 

companies” (PSC), Seden Akcinaroglu and Elizabeth Radziszewski use “private 

military companies” (PMCs), Kinsey and Malcolm Hugh Patterson use “private 

contractors,” and Ulrich Petersohn uses “private military and security companies” 

(PMSCs). Defining the industry in clear terms remains difficult and the nuances 

between these terms are conceptually important. PMSCs is the most inclusive 

and perhaps for that reason increasingly used by scholars. It encapsulates the 

entire range of services, technologies, and types of support provided by the 
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private sector. See: Seden Akcinaroglu and Elizabeth Radziszewski, “Private 

Military Companies, Opportunities, and Termination of Civil Wars in Africa,” 

Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 57, no. 5 (2013), 795–797; Deborah D. Avant, 

The Market for Force: The Consequence of Privatizing Security (New York, NY: 

Cambridge University Press, 2005), 2-13, Christopher Kinsey, Corporate Soldiers 

and International Security: The Rise of Private Military Companies (New York, 

NY: Rutledge, 2006), 1-4; Christopher Kinsey and Malcolm Hugh Patterson, 

Contractors and Wars: The Transformation of US Expeditionary Operations 

(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012), 1-3; and Ulrich Petersohn, “The 

Impact of Mercenaries and Private Military and Security Companies on Civil 

War Severity between 1946 and 2002,” International Interactions, vol. 40, no. 2 

(2014),191–193. 

7. Historical identification of PMSCs’ initial contracts with the U.S. military remains 

contested. Mark Wilson argues that use of private firms by the military—and 

corruption—dates back at least to the U.S. Civil War, while William Epley details 

contracting during the Revolutionary War. Some scholars identify Vinnell Corps’ 

1975 contract to train the Saudi Arabian National Guard as the unofficial start 

of U.S. PMSCs because it involved training an outside military force and not 

just logistical support. The enduring importance of PMSC support is typified by 

the continuation of the 1951 Contract Field Team (CFT) that provided skilled 

aircraft technicians to support Air Force locations during the Korean War. 

DynCorp’s predecessor, Land-Air, Inc, won the initial contract and continues to 

maintain the contract. Avant traces the historical development of privatization 

following the demise of mercenary armies during the Napoleonic period. See 

Deborah D. Avant, “From Mercenary to Citizen Armies: Explaining Change in 

the Practice of War,” International Organization, vol. 54, no. 1 (2000), 51–72; 

William W Epley, “Civilian Support of Field Armies,” Army Logistician, vol. 22 

(1990), 30–35; David Isenberg, Shadow Force: Private Security Contractors in Iraq

(Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2009), 3-20; and Mark Wilson, 

The Business of the Civil War: Military Mobilization and the State (Baltimore, 

MD: John Hopkins University Press, 2006), 107-147. 

8. Andrew Feickert, U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for 

Congress, RS21048 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2015), 1. 

9. Matthew Johnson, “The Growing Relevance of Special Operations Forces in 

U.S. Military Strategies,” Comparative Strategy, vol. 25, no. 4 (2006), 273-275. 

See also: Iver Johanse, “Special Operations forces-a weapon of choice for future 

operations?” in International Military Operations in the 21st Century: Global 

Trends and the Future of Intervention, ed. Per M. Norheim-Martinsen and Tore 

Nyhamar (New York, NY: Routledge 2015), 97-115. 

10. In February 2015, President Obama sought formal Congressional approval 

for limited ground forces, specifically special operations, to operate in Iraq to 

combat the growing threat of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). The 

President sought approval for special operations to conduct humanitarian and 

military missions, including military strikes against ISIL leadership. See: White 
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House, “Joint Resolution,” accessed 15 April 2016 at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/

sites/default/files/docs/aumf_02112015.pdf. 

11. Richard Comer, “Operation Enduring Freedom–Philippines (OEF-P),” Defense 

Media Network, 23 August 2012. 

12. Crofton Black outlines that USSOCOM total demarcated spending in the Philippines between 2009 and 2014 was $29.7 million with approximately $26.3 million 

for UAS-ISR services performed by Boeing and Textron. See: Crofton Black, “U.S. 

Special Operations Command Contracting: Data-Mining the Public Record,” 

Oxford Research Group: Remote Control, 2014, 35. 

13. See: Ian Graham Ronald Shaw, “Playing War,” Social & Cultural Geography, vol. 

11, no. 8 (2010), 789–803; Roger Stahl, “Have You Played the War On Terror?” 

Critical Studies in Media Communication, vol. 23, no. 2 (2006), 112–130; and 

Nick Robinson, “Videogames, Persuasion and the War on Terror: Escaping or 

Embedding the Military–Entertainment Complex?” Political Studies, vol. 60, no. 

3 (2012), 504–522. 

14. The five Commands are Army Special Operations Command; Naval Special 

Warfare Command; Air Force Special Operations Command; Marine Corps 

Forces, Special Operations Command; and Joint Special Operations Command. 

15. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions: An Analysis of 

the Special Operations Command’s Management of Weapon System Programs, 

GAO-07-620 (Washington, D.C., 2007). 

16. Elvira N. Loredo, John E. Peters, Karlyn D. Stanley, Matthew B. Boyer, William Welser IV, and Thomas S. Szayna, “Authorities and Options for Funding 

USSOCOM Operations” (Washington, D.C.: Rand Corporation, 2014), 46. 

17. Numerous funding mechanisms are available to USSOCOM. Options include 

but are not limited to the following: military departments, geographic combatant commands, MFP 2, and MFP 11. For operations, the theater special 

operations command is responsible for identifying funding. Identification of 

funding, particularly between MPF 2 (General Purpose Forces) and MFP 11 

(Special Operations Forces), remains a challenge. DOD’s report to Congress on 

SOF only partially addressed MFP 11 funding allocation. DOD concluded that 

MFP is adequate but did not provide details regarding how the assessment was 

conducted or how this conclusion was reached. See: U.S. Government Accountability Office, Assessment of DOD’s Report on Special Operations Forces and U.S. 

Special Operations Command, GAO-14-820R (Washington D.C., 2015), 1. 

18. Congress provides USSOCOM with acquisition authority for SOF-peculiar 

equipment through Title 10, United States Code, Section 167. The combatant 

command is the only one with branch-level acquisition authority. William 

Lane argues that retention of this acquisition authority should continue so long 

as the demand for SOF remains high and the global war on terror (GWOT) is 

a national priority. Future alterations in the responsibilities of the command 

may necessitate shifting acquisition authority back to the separate branches. 

See: William R. Lane, “Resourcing for Special Operations Forces (SOF): Should 
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Responsibilities be Passed from USSOCOM Back to the Services?” U.S. Army 

War College (2006), 3-14. 

19. Collie J. Johnson, “Program Manager Interviews Gary Smith, SOCOM Acquisition Executive,” Program Magazine, September-October 1997, 2. 

20. Stephen Brooks argues that production of large defense equipment (airplanes, 

naval vessels, telecommunication equipment) by a single country, including the 

United States, is not financially feasible. Globalization of production ensures that 

links of the supply chain occur outside a single country. Keith Hartley examines 

defense acquisition in alliances and finds that trade between allies is beneficial but 

collaborative technology development is inefficient. See: Stephen G. Brooks, “The 

Globalization of Production and the Changing Benefits of Conquest” Journal of 

Conflict Resolution, vol. 43, no. 5 (1999), 646–670; Stephen G. Brooks, Producing 

Security: Multinational Corporations, Globalization, and the Changing Calculus 

of Conflict (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), 16-46; and Keith 

Hartley, “Defense Industrial Policy in a Military Alliance,” Journal of Peace 

Research, vol. 43, no. 4 (2006), 473–489. 

21. These are four common answers from a survey of SOFIC attendees conducted 

in 2015. The procedure and summary answers are available in Appendix A. 

22. USSOCOM’s annual budget has increased dramatically from 2001 to 2014 from 

approximately $3.1 billion to $9.8 billion in FY 2014 constant dollars. This increase 

only includes funding for special and contingency operations. These figures do 

not include service-provided support, which the GAO estimates at approximately 

$8 billion per year. See: U.S. Government Accountability Office, Special Operations Forces: Opportunities Exist to Improve Transparency of Funding and Assess 

Potential to Lessen Some Deployments, GAO-15-571 (Washington, D.C., 2015), 1. 

23. Potential risks associated with mass item purchases include outdated capabilities 

and resource misallocation. 

24. See Kateri Carmola, Private Security Contractors and New Wars: Risk, Law, 

and Ethics (New York, NY: Rutledge, 2010), 64-98; William D. Eggers and John 

O’Leary, Revolution at the Roots: Making our Government Smaller, Better, and 

Closer to Home (New York, NY: Free Press, 1995), 94-119; Stationary Office, Private 

Military Companies: Options for Regulation (London: The Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2002), 12; U.S. Department of Defense, Contractor Support in the 

Theater of Operations: Deskbook Supplement (Washington, D.C.: United States 

Government Printing Office, 2001); and Paul R. Verkuil, Outsourcing Sovereignty: 

Why Privatization of Government functions Threatens Democracy and What We 

Can Do About It (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 42-56. 

25. For example, the rapid development and fielding of the Casualty Evacuation Kit 

in a two-year window received the first ever DOD Better Buying Power Efficiency 

Award. A combined accelerated acquisition process, joint development, and 

operational testing approach saved considerable time in development and fielding of the kit. Bureaucratic procedures inhibit policy and process innovations 

because of hierarchical limitations and federal regulations. See: Beth Ritter and 
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Mike Bottoms, “USSOCOM Wins First-Ever DOD Better Buying Power Efficiency 

Award,” Legistrom, 7 November 2012, accessed on 20 February 2016 at: http://

www.legistorm.com/stormfeed/view_rss/233284/organization/31571.html. 

26. The requirements validation process is outlined by USSOCOM Directive 71-4, 

Special Operations Forces Capabilities Integration and Development System 

(SOFCIDS). J-8 establishes Special Operations Command Requirements Evaluation Board (SOCREB) to review potential requirements. Validation authority 

sits with the USSOCOM Vice Commander who endorses requirements if they 

have interest from the Joint Requirement Oversight Committee, which identifies 

SOF-peculiar needs. 

27. Department of Defense, Acquisition, Logistics and Technology, “What is Better 

Buying Power,” accessed 20 February 2016 at: http://bbp.dau.mil. 

28. Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski, Private Military Companies, 795. 

29. For an example of combined qualitative and quantitative methods, see: Linda 

Robinson, Patrick B. Johnston, and Gillan S. Oak, U.S. Special Operations Forces 

in the Philippines, 2001-2014 (Washington, D.C.: Rand Corporation, 2016). 

30. James H. Frey, “Open-ended Questions,” in The SAGE encyclopedia of qualitative 

research methods (vol. 1), ed. L. M. Given (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2008), 768. 

31. David M. Fetterman, “Ethnography”, in The SAGE encyclopedia of qualitative 

research methods, 290-291. 

32. Interviewee identifiers and positions are not included in the manuscript to protect 

the anonymity of participants. Each participant signed a USSOCOM-reviewed 

and approved consent waiver prior to beginning each interview. Anonymity is 

required to ensure individuals speak freely without fear of retribution. Positions 

and ranks of participants are also not identified because this information, by 

itself, might in some cases make possible the identification of individual speakers. Consent forms remain on file with the author. 

33. Concept exploration is one component of sensitizing concept illumination techniques. Sensitizing concept illumination is an ethnographic approach that uses 

exact quotes from different interviews to identify concepts while the interview 

unfolds. This process emphasizes varying perspectives on and meanings of the 

key concepts identified by interviewed personnel. Sensitizing concepts are central 

organizing ideas in a field of research. Clearly, the concepts identified during this 

research do not fit this definition. First, the field of research on special operations 

is expanding but has yet to coalesce in acquisition and procurement areas. (The 

field has identified sensitized concepts related to operations such as flexibility, 

innovation, and interoperability.) See: Cathy Sheehan, Helen De Cieri, Brian 

Cooper, and Robert Brooks, “Exploring the Power Dimensions of the Human 

Resource Function,” Human Resource Management Journal, vol. 24, no. 2 (2014), 

193-200; and Michael Q. Patton, Qualitative Research and Evaluation Methods, 

4th Edition (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2015), 443. 
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34. Texas A&M University Institutional Review Board reviewed and approved the 

survey instrument. A complete description of the survey can be found in the 

Appendix A. 

35. No sampling strategies could be implemented with industry representatives 

because there is no mechanism that requires participation. The entire list of 

publicly available participants at SOFIC 2015 were individually contacted with 

a request to participate in the survey. Convenience sampling was the only option 

for data collection from this population. Limitations resulting from convenience 

sampling include the inability to identify what is unknown. For example, a particular segment of industry employees may have specific suggestions for improvements in the acquisition process, but if no one from this subgroup completes the 

survey, their comments and suggestions will not be captured. 

36. Program outcomes are identified in: Stew Magnusen, “Special Ops’ ‘Iron Man 

Suit’ on Track for 2018,” National Defense Magazine, May 2016. 

37. Richard A. Bitzinger, “The Globalization of the Arms Industry: The Next Proliferation Challenge,” International Security, vol. 19, no. 2 (1994), 170–175 and 

Theodore H. Moran, “The Globalization of America’s Defense Industries: Managing the Threat of Foreign Dependence,” International Security, vol. 15, no. 1 

(1990), 57–99. 

38. Frank Camm, “How to Decide When a Contractor Source is Better to Use than 

a Government Source,” in Contractors and Wars: The Transformation of US 

Expeditionary Operations, ed. Christopher Kinsey and Malcolm Hugh Patterson 

(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012), 233-255. 

39. Jeremy Scahill, “Blackwater Down,” The Nation, 10 October 2005. 

40. See: U.S. Defense Science Board, Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force 

on Outsourcing and Privatization (Washington, D.C., United States Government 

Printing Office, 1996), 46-96; U.S. Government Accounting Office, Private and 

Public Prisons: Studies Comparing Operational Costs and/or Quality of Service, 

GAO-GGD-96-158 (Washington, D.C., 1996), 1; and U.S. Government Accounting Office, Privatization: Questions State and Local Decision-makers Used when 

Considering Privatization Options, GAO-GGD-98-87 (Washington, D.C., 1998), 

12-15. 

41. In 1994 MPRI was contracted by the State Department to provide monitors on 

the Serbian border and secured a contract to train the Croatian Army. Following 

the successful seizure of the Krajina region, MPRI secured additional contracts 

with Croatia and the United States. MPRI’s influence grew sufficiently that they 

assisted the U.S. Army Combined Arms Support Command on multiple programs, 

including the Battlefield Distribution project, the Theater Force Opening Package, 

and the CSS Rock Drill. MRPI also contributed to the Theatre Distribution and 

Theater Support Command Field Manuals. This note is based on: Bernd Horn, 

“Private Military Corporations as Members of the Global SOF Network: Worth 

Another Look?,” in The Role of Global SOF Network in a Resource Constrained 

Environment, ed. Chuck Ricks (MacDill AFB, FL: JSOU Press, 2013), 45. 
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42. See: U.S. Government Accountability Office, Outsourcing DOD Logistics: Savings 

Achievable by Defense Science Board’s Projections Are Overstated (Washington, 

D.C., 1997), 4. 

43. For a meta-analysis of the public administration literature, see: Trevor L. Brown, 

Matthew Potoski, and David M. Van Slyke, “Managing Public Service Contracts: 

Aligning Values, Institutions, and Markets,” Public Administration Review, vol. 

66, no. 3 (2006), 323–331; Graeme A. Hodge, Privatization: An International 

Review of Performance (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2000), 13-34; Kenneth 

J. Meier and Laurence J. O’Toole, “The Proverbs of New Public Management 

Lessons From an Evidence-Based Research Agenda,” American Review of Public 

Administration, vol. 39, no. 1 (2009), 4–22; and Jonas Prager, “Contracting Out 

Government Services: Lessons from the Private Sector,” Public Administration 

Review, vol. 54, no. 2 (1994), 176–184. 

44. Data from the FDPS on USSOCOM transactions from 2004-2014 are used for the 

figures. The U.S. is often listed as “place of performance country” when locations 

are classified. Companies are identified by the U.S. state and/or the country in 

which they conducted their principal performance. Firms were also located in 

the U.S. territories of Guam, Northern Mariana Island, and Puerto Rico. Additional international locations (not listed here) likely also served as locations of 

performance, but the data provide no further details. 

45. The relatively small quantities of international transactions mask the financial 

implications and importance of international private sector support. Several of 

the international transactions are in support of major operations such as previous 

actions in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as ongoing operations in the Philippines 

and Columbia. For a review of USSOCOM operations in Columbia, see: Mark 

Moyer, Hector Pagan, and Wil R. Greigo. Persistent Engagement in Colombia 

(MacDill AFB, FL: JSOU Press, 2014), 15-24. 

46. COTS items include any item “of a type customarily used by the general public, 

or by nongovernmental entities” that is acquired, leased, or licensed by the government. See: U.S. Department of Defense, Commercial Item Handbook, Office 

of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 

(Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, 2001), 1. 

47. The distinction between military-specific and non-military-specific equipment 

and service providers is somewhat artificial. However, the distinction is useful. 

Non-military-specific services are often not studied in conjunction with security 

firms but are critical to operational success. When speaking to the Operational 

Contract Support Leader’s Conference, General Martin Dempsey stated that 

“we should acknowledge that [operational contract support] is no longer a niche 

capability ... contractors are part of our total military force.” See: General Martin 

Dempsey, “Opening Remarks to Operational Contract Support Leader’s Conference,” 2012, accessed on 20 November 2015 at: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/

new_pubs/jp4_10.pdf. 

48. USSOCOM requires Enterprise Password Policy Enforcement that discriminates 

between difficult and complex passwords, customizable e-mail reminders, and 
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password reset integration. (See solicitation F2VUJ01146AC01 for complete 

details.) This particular solicitation was chosen to demonstrate the seemingly 

pedestrian nature of private sector support. Password failures may not seem 

important enough to impact operational success, but inability to access classified 

information in a timely matter is in fact a critical operational concern. 

49. Data collected from the Federal Procurement Database System. Data was retrieved 

20 April 2016 at: https://www.fpds.gov/fpdsng_cms/index.php/en/. 

50. One company representative stated that, “military specs heavily influence our 

company as we often work with USSOCOM to find COTS solutions that address 

MILSPEC [military specifications].” Additional company representatives stated 

similar priorities. Quote taken from the survey of SOFIC 2015 participants. 

51. Cees Bil and John Mo, “Obsolescence Management of Commercial-off-theShelf (COTS) in Defense Systems,” in Concurrent Engineering Approaches for 

Sustainable Product Development in a Multi-Disciplinary Environment, ed. Josip 

Stjepandic, Georg Rock, and Cees Bil (New York, NY: Springer, 2013), 621-632. 

52. One example of software compatibility and support is Microsoft SharePoint. One 

USSOCOM employee identified how different offices have different versions of 

the software and that private actors also have different versions. Some offices use 

versions that are no longer supported, so updates and licenses are out of date. 

The lack of compatibility decreases functionality. Another example is the Navy’s 

continued use of Windows XP, a program that is no longer supported by the 

company. See Robert Hackett, “Why the Navy Still Pays Millions for Microsoft’s 

Windows XP,” Time, 25 June 2015. 

53. Operations in Iraq exemplified the importance of non-military-specific support 

for operational success. For example, difficulty in fuel delivery spurred DOD to 

initiate programs to move away from fossil fuels. Deputy Secretary of Defense 

William Lynn specifically identified targeting of ‘soft-target’ fuel trucks as a 

threat to operational success. See: Steven M. Anderson, “Save Energy, Save Our 

Troops,” New York Times, 12 January 2011; and Christopher Helman, “For U.S. 

Military, More Oil Means More Deaths,” Forbes, 12 November 2009. Soldiers’ 

daily provisions are increasingly provided by the private sector, though SOF 

forces are unlikely to fall into this category of support. 

54. Donna Miles, “SOCOM Strives to Meet Current, Future Operator Requirements,” 

American Forces Press Service, 29 May 2013. 

55. Carlos Ortiz, “The New Public Management of Security: The Contracting and 

Managerial State and the Private Military Industry,” Public Money & Management, vol. 30, no. 1 (2010), 35-41. 

56. The U.S., U.K., and other democratic states employ the majority of PMSCs 

globally. Clive Walker and Dave Whyte, “Contracting Out War?: Private Military Companies, Law and Regulation in the United Kingdom,” International 

& Comparative Legal Quarterly, vol. 54, no. 3 (2005), 651–690. The increased 

acceptance of PMSCs is reflected by the decisions of multinational companies, 

humanitarian organizations, and the United Nations to employ PMSCs, too, for 
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both armed and unarmed services. See: Ase Gilje Ostensen, UN Uses of Private 

Military and Security Companies: Practices and Polices, Technical report Geneva 

Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (2011); and Abby Stoddard, 

Adele Harmer, and Victoria DiDomenico, “Providing aid in insecure environments: 2009 update,” HPG Policy Brief, 34 (2009). 

57. See Michael Peck, “Insitu to Support SOCOM ScanEagle in $300M Deal,” Defense 

News, 17 September 2013. USSOCOM has announced an additional competition 

to be awarded in 2015 for an additional indefinite-quantity, indefinite-delivery 

(IDIQ) contract (solicitation number H92222-15-R-0001). These contracts are 

all part of the Mid-Endurance Unmanned Aircraft Systems II contract. 

58. Richard Whittle, “DOD Tries Buying Pixels, Not Planes, For Flexible ISR: It Ain’t 

Renting,” Defense News, 7 May 2012. 

59. Peter W. Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry

(Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2002), 16. 

60. U.S. Commission on Wartime Contracting, Transforming Wartime Contracting: 

Controlling Costs, Reducing Risks (Washington, D.C.: United States Government 

Printing Office, 2011), 102-105. 

61. Shee Atika received approximately $153 million for dozens of transactions related 

to linguistics and translation services starting in 2006, see: Black, “Data-mining,” 

1-13. The contract stems from a larger DOD Directive 3115.09, which specifically 

outlines interrogation support including those performed by USSOCOM. The 

contracts and directives have been made publicly available through Freedom of 

Information Act filings, accessed on 15 November 2015 at: http://www.dtic.mil/

whs/directives/corres/pdf/311509p.pdf. 

62. One motivation for additional ISR contracts for UAS was the surge in capacity 

that was required following cancelation of AAI’s contract in December 2014. See 

Paul J. McLeary, “SOCOM Seeks New Contractor for UAV Program,” C4ISR and 

Networks, 30 December 2014. Details for the cancelation are classified. USSOCOM 

was able to cite national security concerns, stated as unusual and compelling 

urgency, to quickly reissue the contract to Boeing and ensure continued operational capacity. 

63. Service and equipment procurement from the private sector may pose problems 

for SOF. In standard military operations, private sector firms’ impact on operations is dependent on management effectiveness and the operational environment. See: Jacques S. Gansler and William Lucyshyn, “Contractors Supporting 

Military Operations: Many Challenges Remain,” in Contractors and Wars: The 

Transformation of US Expeditionary Operations, ed. Christopher Kinsey and 

Malcolm Hugh Patterson (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012), 278-

296. Employment of PMSCs may decrease military effectiveness, potentially 

reducing the advantages of democratic militaries. See: Molly Dunigan, Victory 

for Hire: Private Security Companies’ Impact on Military Effectiveness (Stanford, 

CA: Stanford University Press, 2011), 4-5. For a review of democratic advantage, see: Dan Reiter and Allan C. Stam, “Democracy and Battlefield Military 
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Effectiveness,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 42, no. 3 (1998), 259; and Dan 

Reiter and Allan C. Stam, “Democracy, War Initiation, and Victory,” American 

Political Science Review, vol. 92, no. 2 (1998), 377–389. Reiter and Stam argue 

that democratic military forces benefit with regard to innovation, logistics, and 

leadership when compared to non-democratic militaries. Because PMSCs are 

increasingly viewed as extensions of the agencies they support, including SOF, 

see: Ryan Kelty and Darcy Schnack, “Attitudes on the Ground: What Soldiers 

Think about Civilian Contractors,” in Contractors and Wars: The Transformation of US Expeditionary Operations, ed. Christopher Kinsey and Malcolm Hugh 

Patterson (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012), 36-59. 

64. Meaghann Myers, “Lawmaker Questions Why Some Navy SEALS Buy Their 

Own Gear,” Navy Times, 7 March 2016. Rep. Duncan Hunter also alleges SEALs 

have not received sufficient combat rifles and critical gear. See: Richard Lardner, 

“Navy SEALs tell Congressman there is a Combat Rifle Shortage,” CNSNEWS.

com, 7 March 2016. 

65. One industry representative stated that the expectation of high TRLs “puts an 

onus on us to develop product on our own, makes predicting the need difficult 

and makes the military world a less desirable and more competitive market.” The 

uncertainty of future requirements is a financial cost that shifts from USSOCOM 

to private industry. High-TRL equipment will continue to be provided so long 

as companies are willing to fund investment. As echoed by the company representative, there is a profit margin threshold that is required to do business with 

the military. 

66. Three separate interviewees and one manuscript reviewer identified the difference between initial SOF requests and final requirements. Interview with SOF 

AT&L personnel, MacDill AFB, Florida. 

67. Air power, specifically the suite of stealth aircraft technologies and precision 

munitions, has been one key area of disruptive technology advances. Stealth 

aircraft were first deployed in the Gulf War in 1991, and their radar-evading 

capacity, first strike capability, and precision munitions had a significant impact 

on the war’s outcome. In the wake of the Gulf War, air power was extolled by 

many advocates as the tool-of-choice for future conflicts. See: Daniel Byman, 

John G McGinn, Keith Crane, Seth G Jones, Rollie Lal, and Ian O Lesser, Air 

Power as a Coercive Instrument (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1999); 

and Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca, 

NY: Cornell University Press, 2014). However, the usefulness of stealth air power 

in counterinsurgency contexts is limited because complete air superiority does 

not necessarily advance the achievement of mission objectives. In counterinsurgency combat, evasion of enemy anti-aircraft capabilities is less important than 

avoiding civilian collateral damage. See: Daniel R. Lake, “The Limits of Coercive 

Airpower: NATO’s ‘victory’ in Kosovo Revisited,” International Security, vol. 34 

(2009), 83–112. Benjamin Lambeth concludes that infusion of information over 

multiple platforms and munitions, not stealth technology, accounts for much 

of the success of Operation Enduring Freedom. See: Benjamin S. Lambeth, Air 
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Power Against Terror: America’s Conduct of Operation Enduring Freedom (Santa 

Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2005), xxix. 

68. Night vision goggles refers to the suite of technologies that enable improved 

vision in low-intensity light situations. 

69. Robert G. Spulak, Jr., A Theory of Special Operations (MacDill AFB, FL: JSOU 

Press, 2007), 1. 

70. Ibid. 

71. Sarah Kreps and Micah Zenko, “The Next Drone Wars,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 93 

(2014), 15–16. 

72. Advanced technology development also includes how technology is utilized. 

For example, the development of advanced Internet propaganda requires multilocation development. A website is not necessarily an innovative technology, 

but groups such as al-Shabaab and ISIL have demonstrated the importance of 

propaganda for recruiting personnel and for dissemination of information. To 

counter these media efforts, USSOCOM initiated a $19 million contract with 

General Dynamics to support the Magherbia website to promote news in English, 

Arabic, and local dialects. The site was eventually funded and operated by Africa 

Command before lack of funding ended the program in February 2015. See: Tom 

Vanden Brook, “Special Operations Command Leads Propaganda Fight,” USA 

Today, 6 December 2012. 

73. Richard L. Kugler and Hans Binnendijk, “Choosing a Strategy,” in Transforming 

America’s Military, ed. Hans Binnendijk (Washington, D.C.: National Defense 

University Press, 2002), 57-100. 

74. DOD conceptualization of risk broadly applies to the entire supply chain within 

acquisition. The literature on minimizing risk in acquisition is extensive. For 

a review of DOD policies see: U.S. Department of Defense, Performance of 

the Defense Acquisition System: 2014 Annual Report (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 

Government Printing Office, 2014), 5-6; and U.S. Government Accountability 

Office, Additional Guidance Needed to Improve Visibility into the Structure and 

Management of Major Weapon System Subcontracts, GAO-11-61R (Washington, 

D.C.: 2010), 4-19. 

75. Quote from interview with SOF AT&L personnel, MacDill AFB, Florida. 

76. Revolutionary technologies have been discovered during the process of evolutionary change in military technology. See: Andrew F. Krepinevich, “The MilitaryTechnical Revolution: A Preliminary Assessment” (Washington, D.C.: Center for 

Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 1992) and Rolf Hobson, “Blitzkrieg, the 

Revolution in Military Affairs and Defense Intellectuals,” The Journal of Strategic 

Studies, vol. 33, 2010, 625–643. The development of German blitzkrieg tactics is a 

specific example. The revolutionary change was not the tank (or the mechanical 

superiority of German tanks), but development and employment of combined 

arms doctrines. Technology that enabled improved command and control was also 

critical in developing the new, effective battlefield tactics. Krepinevich describes 

revolutionary changes occurring when the “application of new technologies into 
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a significant number of military systems combines with innovative operational 

concepts and organizational adoption in a way that fundamentally alters the 

character and conduct of conflict.” See: Andrew F. Krepinevich, “Cavalry to 

Computer: The Pattern of Military Revolutions,” National Interest, fall 1994, 

30–42. Revolutionary technologies produce a dramatic increase—often an order 

of magnitude or greater—in the combat potential and military effectiveness of 

armed forces. Cyril Falls states that, “It is fallacy, due to ignorance of technical 

and tactical military history, to suppose that methods of warfare have not made 

continuous and, on the whole, fairly even progress.” Quoted in Eliot A. Cohen, 

“A Revolution in Warfare,” International Security, vol. 75, 1996, 35-54. Original 

quotation is from Cyril Falls, A Hundred Years of War (New York: Collier Books, 

1953). 

77. Secretary Gates initiated the discussion of rapid fielding equipment by focusing 

on problems with platform acquisition. He argued for a transition from 99 percent 

exquisite service based platforms to the 80 percent multi-service solution. See: 

Robert Gates, “Remarks by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates at the Army War 

College,” 16 April 2009, accessed on 14 December 2015 at: http://archive.defense.

gov/transcripts/ transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4404. While Gates’ reforms primarily focused on platforms, the 80 percent solution today has become common 

acquisition parlance. 

78. Quote from a survey of company representatives that attended SOFIC 2015. 

79. One company representative stated; “technology gaps may feed directly into 

research and development, but in the absence of clear requirements, even existing 

technologies may not be evaluated.” Quote from survey of 2015 SOFIC attendees. 

The lack of technology evaluation reduces the likelihood of discovering revolutionary technology changes. 

80. USSOCOM does have a limited development support budget and ability to 

provide in-kind support (e.g. training environments for operational testing). 

81. Miles, “SOCOM Strives to Meet Current, Future Operator Requirements.” 

82. Michel Fieldson, TALOS lead for USSOCOM, identified the difference between 

traditional government procurement that utilizes a prime contractor and government as a lead. Fieldson stated; “in this case, the government will be the lead 

integrator, and we’ll look to work with traditional or nontraditional partners 

in industry and academia who are innovative.” Quotation is taken from Ellen 

V. Rubin, “Special Ops Command Seeks Prototypes for `Iron Man Suit,’” Army 

News Service, 18 October 2013. 

83. Stew Magnuson, “Power Remains Key Challenge for Building SOCOM’s Iran 

Man Suit,” National Defense Magazine, May 2015. 

84. Prime contractors are increasingly outsourcing elements of contracts with estimates ranging from 60 to 80 percent of the value of the main contract. See: U.S. 

Government Accountability Office, Additional Guidance Needed to Improve Visibility into the Structure and Management of Major Weapon System Subcontracts, 

GAO-11-61R (Washington, D.C.: 2010), 1. Prime contractors are also increasingly 
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managing the risk associated with outsourcing by using firm fixed-price (FFP) 

contracts. This trend in fact mirrors existing trends in federal government contacting. Yong Woon Kim and Trevor Brown found that the DOD uses FFP for 

most short-term purchases but modifies longer-term contracts, which reduces the 

benefits associated with market competition. See: Yong Woon Kim and Trevor 

L Brown, “The Importance of Contract Design,” Public Administration Review, 

vol. 72, 2012, 687–696. 

85. There is disagreement about whether military spending has declined because of 

consolidation (William Kovacic and Dennis Smallwood) or whether (as Nayantara 

Hensel argues) competitive markets account for post-Cold War defense industry 

consolidation. See William E. Kovacic and Dennis E Smallwood, “Competition 

Policy, Rivalries, and Defense Industry Consolidation,” Journal of Economic 

Perspectives, 1994, 91–110 and Nayantara Hensel, “Can Industry Consolidation 

Lead to Greater Efficiencies? Evidence from the U.S. Defense Industry,” Business 

Economics, vol. 45, 2008, 187–203. 

86. Ownership of the integrated system is a priority for firm profitability because of 

the life-cycle advantages. System costs are the entire range of costs associated 

with a product including research and development, prototyping, testing, manufacturing, and distribution. When firms act as lead integrators, financial benefits 

can accumulate throughout the business cycle, instead of deriving from just one 

piece of the process. As a result, firms are more flexible during the development 

phase—and willing to take risks and bear costs—if they can count on making 

a profit at another phase of the cycle. Recompete advantages occur when firms 

bid on contracts for existing systems—contracts involving maintenance and/or 

new purchases. Recompete advantages most often occur with complete weapon 

systems, such as aircraft. TALOS will be a particularly lucrative program if firms 

are able to scale it to the entire military force. Non-military applications of the 

suit further extend potential scalability. 

87. Quoted in Steven Hoarn, “SOCOM Seeks TALOS (Tactical Assault Light Operator Suit),” Defense Media Network, 18 May 2013. 

88. Interview with USSOCOM staff at MacDill AFB, Florida. 

89. One step to remove bureaucracy is the Cooperative Research and Development 

Agreement (CRADA) signed by Acquisition Executive James Geurts, which 

institutes a government-industry agreement that promotes sharing of resources 

and technical expertise. CRADA is part of the federal contracting system, but 

Geurts took the step of issuing an industry-wide agreement and allowed POE 

to sign their own CRADA. See: George Jagels, “SOCOM’s TALOS: Build it Fast, 

Build it Right,” Armor & Mobility, 22 May 2014. 

90. For complete details see: solicitation USSOCOM-TALOS-RFI-Nov, Federal Business Opportunities, accessed on 15 March 2016 at: https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=

opportunity&mode=form&id= 7688dd7f440ee5edb97e5dbb533f874b&tab=

core&_cview=1. 
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91. Scott R. Gourley, “SOCOM Extends TALOS Technology Timeline Vision,” 

Defense Media Network, 23 September 2013. 

92. Individual small acquisitions initiated using commander funds typify the ideal 

acquisition model. However, the relatively small size of commander funds limits 

their utility for SOF-wide acquisitions. Purchases beyond commander funding 

require additional oversight and management. 

93. This is a stylized description of the translation process that highlights SOFspecific elements of the federal contracting system. The FAR was codified in 

1974 and updated with the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994. FAR 

is designed to “deliver on a timely basis the best value product or service to the 

customer, while maintaining the public’s trust and fulfilling public policy objectives (FAR1.102).” Available at: http://159.142.160.6/comp/seven_steps/library/

FAR1-102.pdf. Because SOF AT&L must adhere to the FAR, as do other federal 

agencies, acquisition problems and issues that arise because of the FAR are not 

examined. 

94. Interviews with individuals at MacDill AFB, Florida, were conducted in February 

of 2015. In some instances, interviewees reported that operators have difficulty 

even articulating a specific capability gap. One example identified by interviewed 

SOF AT&L personnel involved the ability to see through walls, an evolutionary 

extension of existing technology that is difficult to conceptualize. 

95. Industry representatives rated SOFIC as an above-average defense conference. 

When compared to other defense conferences, a majority of respondents (63%) 

selected the response “better than most” or “much better than most.” Approximately 25% of participants rated SOFIC as average. A common complaint was 

the lack of SOF personnel and limited time for interaction. However, a common 

endorsement was access to SOF personnel and decision makers. Multiple other 

respondents focused complaints on alterations to the reservation system, the 

requirement to purchase advertising space, and limited conference amenities 

(limited coffee, venue duration too long, floor space insufficient, dislike TIER 

system, etc.) Many small-business owners self-identified themselves to specifically voice concern over the costs of attendance. One final suggestion offered was 

to follow a model used at other defense conferences (e.g., AFCEA) that enables 

companies to exhibit based on previous performance. 

96. Spulak argued that the lack of personal connection might inhibit exchange of 

ideas and solutions. In the future, the classified Hardedge Web system will provide a platform that connects MTRCs, USSOCOM, government, industry, and 

academia in one integrated system. The system is designed to provide evolutionary solutions to contemporary issues faced by deployed SOF. The system is not 

designed to deliver revolutionary capability changes, despite the environment 

for extensive experimentation and testing. See: Robert G. Spulak, Jr., Innovate or 

Die: Innovation and Technology for Special Operations (MacDill AFB, FL: JSOU 

Press, 2010), 45. 

97. Charles W. Wessner (ed.), An Assessment of the Small Business Innovation Research 

Program (Washington D.C.: National Academies Press, 2008). Analysis of SOF 
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AT&L and other USSOCOM entities’ use of SBIR funding are not included in 

this analysis. 

98. See the CIA’s In-Q-Tel website, available at: https://www.iqt.org. 

99. Interviews with individuals at MacDill AFB, Florida, were conducted in February 

2015. 

100. The GAO’s annual review of DOD’s major weapons acquisition programs identified several problems: failure to implement knowledge-based practices, decreased 

use of competition in bidding, and inconsistent application of ‘should-cost’ 

principles. These problems significantly increase risk and expose programs to 

undue costs and schedule delays. See: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 

Defense Acquisitions: Assessment of Selected Weapon Programs, GAO-16-329SP 

(Washington, D.C.: 2016), 6-28, at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/676281.pdf. 

101. Spulak, Innovate or Die, 22. Spulak describes the process, stating, “In general, 

requirements as user needs do not represent bottom-up innovation because the 

requirements validation process results in top-down requirements that may have 

little resemblance to the original user requests or current needs by the time the 

technology is fielded. This point is illustrated by the formal USSOCOM process—

that is, the long-range planning process at SOCOM headquarters provides the 

input to the requirements validation process, and no operator input is explicitly 

shown. As a result, development projects (e.g., the Mk 23 offensive handgun) can 

show delivery of a capability that met the requirements but did not meet user 

needs.” 

102. Ibid. 

103. Inspector General, U.S. Department of Defense, “USSOCOM Needs to Consistently Follow Guidance to Revalidate Capability Requirements,” Report No. 

DoDIG-2015-077, 15 February 2015. 

104. The development contract for SCAR was issued in November 2004 following 

drafting of the Joint Operational Requirements Document (JORD). FN Herstal 

passed Milestone C in 2010, which allowed for full-rate production of the different variants. 

105. Survey respondent from the 2015 SOFIC conference survey. 

106. One industry representative, when asked about the importance of requirements, 

stated that, “The more demand by the military insofar as volume, the more the 

specific requirements will get sent up the chain of importance in product development” (response provided by 2015 SOFIC participant). Low-rates of production 

will remain an enduring challenge for SOF AT&L. USSOCOM’s cancelation 

of FNH USA SCAR-L orders in 2010 is one specific example of how specific 

requirements may decrease marketability. FNH USA marketed the SCAR Mk 

16 variant as the rifle of the elite warrior, but faced problems with marketing 

following cancelation. See: David Crane, “SOCOM Cancels FN Mk-16 SCAR-L,” 

Defense Review, 28 June 2010. 

107. The Chairman of the Strategic Direction of the Joint Force argues that acquisition 

“must be affordable in every way possible.” See: William H. McRaven, “United 
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States Special Operations Command: Forging the Tip of the Spear,” U.S. Special 

Operations Command, 2013, 8. Affordability, however, typically generates two 

divergent economic principles: affordability usually requires either near-term 

savings (e.g., rapid acquisition of COTS) and increased life cycle costs, or increased 

near-term costs but savings over time. 

108. Interoperability’s two pertinent dimensions for this analysis include coordination and cooperation with U.S. armed forces, including the SOF component and 

international partners. The definition of interoperability is paraphrased from 

Myron Hura et al., Interoperability: A Continuing Challenge in Coalition Air 

Operations (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2000), 7. 

109. McRaven articulates a vision for a “globally networked force of Special Operations Forces, Interagency, Allies, and Partnerships able to rapidly and persistently 

address regional contingencies and threats to stability.” See: McRaven, United 

States Special Operations Command, 4. For a discussion of the importance of 

inoperability with international partners see: Richard Rubright, Kevin Morton, 

Emily Spencer, Bill Knarr, Bernd Horn, Alan Bell and Chuck Ricks, The Role 

of Global SOF Network in a Resource Constrained Environment (MacDill AFB, 

FL: JSOU Press, 2013), 19-22. For a review of the development of the global SOF 

Network see: Thomas S. Szayna and William Welser IV, Developing and Assessing 

Options for Global SOF Network, Research Report RR300 (Santa Monica, CA: 

Rand Corporation, 2013). 

110. Andrew White, “Latest Tactical Vehicles Capture Attention at SOFIC,” HIS 

Jane’s, accessed on 30 May 2016 at: http://www.janes.com/article/60811/

latest-tactical-vehicles-capture-attention-at-sofic. 

111. Nicole Dalrymple, “U.S. and DRC in Partnership to Train Model Congolese Battalion,” United States Africa Command Public Affairs, accessed on 

20 March 2016 at: http://www.africom.mil/NewsByCategory/ article/7196/

us-and-drc-in-partnership-to-train-model-congolese. 

112. See Robinson, Johnson, and Oak, Philippines, iii. 

113. Practical extraction and report language (PERL) was used to extract statements 

from files associated with each FedBizOpps solicitation entry. PERL enables text 

manipulation and organization, in this case, identification of key words in the 

text. Key words were identified for the word searches. Because of the paucity of 

entries that emphasized ‘international,’ all phrases, regardless of text length, 

were individually examined. 

114. Howard Altman, “Iconic Russian AK-47 Might Some Day be `Made in the U.S.A.’ 

for Military,” Tampa Bay Times, 9 June 2016. 

115. Thomas Gibbons-Neff, “Special Operations Command looks to U.S. Companies 

for Homemade AK-47s,” Washington Post, 10 June 2016. 

116. See: Navin A Bapat, “Transnational Terrorism, US Military Aid, and the Incentive 

to Misrepresent,” Journal of Peace Research, vol. 48, no. 3 (2011), 303–318. One 

additional difficulty when supplying interoperable weapons pertains to ensuring that international partners use the equipment responsibly. Weapons may be 
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used irresponsibly, or they may fall into the wrong hands. For example, there 

are claims that advanced weapon systems from the Free Syrian Army have been 

utilized by ISIS members following defeat of the Harakat Hazm group. See: Liz 

Sly, “Syrian Rebel Group that got U.S. Aid Dissolves,” Washington Post, 1 March 

2015. 

117. Interview with SOF AT&L personnel on 15 February 2015 at MacDill AFB, 

Florida. 

118. For example, the Air Force’s acquisition of KX-TANKER was delayed by nearly 

four years because of protests. Both Boeing and EADS/Airbus and Northrop 

Grumman consortium protested the contract award. Because the time horizon for 

acquisition is 2020 to 2035, there are few, if any, immediate negative consequences 

for the Air Force and its operations. However, most SOF-peculiar acquisitions 

are somewhat or extremely time-sensitive, which means that a delay as short as 

four months may negatively impact operational capacity. 

119. SWMS is a general-support contract that requires firms to provide cost-effective 

services that fulfill all requirements in the task order. There are five major categories of support services, which include program management, management 

services, administrative and other services, professional services, and education 

and training. 

120. See U.S. Government Accountability Office, Federal Acquisition Services Team 

LLC, B-410466 (Washington, D.C.: 2014). 

121. In the ruling, the GAO determined that FAST had sent files that were too large to 

enter into the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) server and improperly used contract officer email addresses instead of the designated USSOCOM 

service. See: U.S. Government Accountability Office, Federal Acquisition Services 

Team LLC. Another example of procedural protests is the 2004 USIA Underwater 

Equipment Sales Corporation case. USIA alleged USSOCOM illegally failed their 

product during the pass/fail testing phase of proposal evaluations. USIA’s fabric 

failed to pass an abrasion test, resulting in the protest. USSOCOM relied upon 

the services of an International Organization for Standardization (IOS)-certified 

laboratory to conduct the materials test. USIA argued that the materials tests were 

improperly used as a reason to exclude their entry from further consideration. 

They supported their position by pointing to the permissive words “may” and 

“should” used in the contract solicitation (in connection with the materials tests) 

as opposed to “must” and “shall.” The protest was denied. See: U.S. Government 

Accountability Office, USIA Underwater Equipment Sales Corporation, B-292827.2 

(Washington, D.C.: 2004). 

122. Judge Victor J. Wolski’s order in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims disclosed 

several interesting aspects of this procedural protest and at the same time indicated general principles underlying how protests are handled at this level. First, 

FAST again raised claims that FedBizOpps’s web portal failed to work correctly 

and improperly denied their application. Second, Wolksi’s order highlighted the 

importance of individual contract officers. FAST alleged that a specific contract 

officer (Ms. Stevens) provided statements of “bad-faith” during the GAO hearing. 
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The Judge ruled the protest was unique and required evidence outside the ordinary 

administrative record. A limited written deposition from Ms. Stevens was ordered. 

Yet, the Judge formally recognized the time-consuming nature of this protest, 

stating, “And while the deposition of a contracting officer by oral examination 

‘is not lightly to be ordered’ because it can be time-consuming and disruptive 

of other duties, the Court finds a limited deposition of Ms. Stevens by written 

questions to be an appropriate means to fill gaps in the record and thereby enable 

effective judicial review.” Quote taken from Judge Victor J. Wolski ruling: “In 

the United States Court of Federal Claims: Federal Acquisition Services Team, 

LLC v. The United States”, No. 15-78C, 3-4. Order retrieved on 3 October 2016 

at: https://ecf.cofc.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/show_public_doc?2015cv0078-26-0. 

123. See: U.S. Government Accountability Office, Mission Essential Personnel, LLC, 

B-408788 (Washington, D.C.: 2013). 

124. DARPA is also often lauded for innovations in acquisition models. However, 

DARPA suffers from several limitations that currently do not affect SOF AT&L. 

As organizations age, their bureaucratic processes tend to ossify, slowing adoption 

of innovations. See: John Paul Parker, “At the Age of 50, It’s Time for DARPA to 

Rethink its Future,” National Defense, September 2009. Older organizations also 

have difficulty keeping pace with external developments and demands, though 

older organizations may provide incremental innovations compared to younger 

organizations that provide more impactful innovations. See: Jesper Sorenson 

and Toby E. Stuart, “Aging, Obsolescence, and Organizational Innovation,” 

Administrative Science Quarterly, vol. 45, no. 1 (2000), 81–112. 

125. Ruth H. DeHoog, “Competition, Negotiation, or Cooperation Three Models for 

Service Contracting,” Administration & Society, vol. 22 (1990), 317–340. 

126. Fredland argues that transaction costs for firms in the defense sector prohibit 

firms from providing effective combat services. Davids specifically examines 

transaction costs in conflict environments. Both find that the military logistical 

operations are similar to e-commerce approaches to acquisition. E-commerce 

approaches rely heavily on outsourcing and local contracting. See Eric J. Fredland, 

“Outsourcing Military Force: A Transactions Cost Perspective on the Role of 

Military Companies.” Defence and Peace Economics, vol. 15, no. 3 (2004), 205–219, 

Christiaan Davids, Robert Beeres, and Paul C. van Fenema, “Operational Defense 

Sourcing: Organizing Military Logistics in Afghanistan.” International Journal 

of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management, vol. 43 (2013), 116–133. 

127. Ashton Carter, “Memorandum for Acquisition Professionals,” Office of the Under 

Secretary of Defense, 2010, 2. 

128. The GAO provides extensive reviews of defense acquisition performance, see: 

U.S. Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions: Where Should 

Reform Aim Next?, GAO-14-145T (Washington, D.C.: 2014), 2. 

129. The KC-X Tanker competition typifies incomplete contracting in defense industries. See: John Birkler et al., Competition and Innovation in the US Fixed-Wing 

Military Aircraft Industry (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2003). KC-X 
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experienced numerous award problems that generated multiple objections 

from both Boeing and the EADS/Airbus and Northrop Grumman consortium. 

The lack of clarity regarding requirements eventually resulted in a simplistic 

evaluation metric where each feature (e.g., working toilets, effective fuel delivery 

booms) was given equal weight in performance evaluations. Failure to effectively 

quantify the evaluation criteria prior to competition extended the competition, 

costs, and delivery. See: Nayantara Hensel, “Can Industry Consolidation Lead 

to Greater Efficiencies? Evidence from the U.S. Defense Industry” Business Economics, vol. 45 (2008), 187–203. ACAT I systems are more prone to these types 

of complications, but all USSOCOM SOF AT&L contracts can be considered 

incomplete—to a lesser or greater extent—with regard to the general principle 

of contracts needing to be complete. 

130. John Hutton and William Solis, “Defense Acquisition: Actions Needed to Ensure 

Value for Service Contract,” GAO-09-643T, Testimony Before the Defense 

Acquisition Reform Panel, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C., 2009. 

131. SOF AT&L emphasis on small business was identified during numerous interviews. The consistent refrain from personnel is that small business engagement is 

a leadership priority. This commitment is reflected in the FY 2015 budget, where 

33.1 percent of all contracts were awarded to small businesses. See: Courtney 

Hacker, “We Wanted to Know SOCOM’s top priorities, so we asked the guys in 

charge,’ Bloomberg Government, 2 March 2016. 

132. Renee de Nevers, “Looking Beyond Iraq: Contractors in US Global Activities” 

in Contractors and Wars: The Transformation of US Expeditionary Operations, 

ed. Christopher Kinsey and Malcolm Hugh Patterson (Stanford, CA: Stanford 

University Press, 2012), 60-84. 

133. Anuj Vohra and Alan Pemberton, “Under Secretary Kendall Proposes ‘Limited’ 

Use of Lowest-Price, Technically Acceptable Procurements in Department of 

Defense,” Inside Government Contracting, 22 March 2015. 

134. Frank Kendall, “Memo: Appropriate Use of Lowest Price Technically Acceptable 

Source Selection Process and Associated Contract Type,” U.S. Department of 

Defense, 4 March 2015. 

135. One SOF AT&L contracting officer stated that the lack of system-wide, standardized tools for automated evaluation is one limitation that slows the existing acquisition process. Different PEOs have different processes for evaluation 

of requirements that use different metrics (Author’s interview with SOF AT&L 

personnel, February 2015). 

136. James W. Vizzard and Timothy A. Capron, “Exporting General Petraeus’s [sic] 

Counterinsurgency Doctrine: An Assessment of the Adequacy of Field Manual 

3-24 and the U.S. Government’s Implementation,” Public Administration Review, 

vol. 70 2010), 485–493. 

137. See: U.S. Commission on Wartime Contracting, Transforming, 9-12. 
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138. SORBIS combines the following three systems: financial information system 

(FIS), the planning, programming and budgeting, and execution system management information system (PPBES MIS), and the special operations acquisition 

and logistics (SOAL) information system (SOALIS)/integrated financial tool 

for SOAL (IFTS). The GAO identified serious limitations regarding SOALIS’s 

capacity to perform the required reporting. See: U.S. Government Accounting 

Office, Defense Acquisition, 23. 

139. The FPDS only includes information about firms that win awards; no data on 

competitors is provided. FPDS does not include subcontractor related information, nor is data on subcontractors typically available in DOD-reported contract 

activity. 

140. FPDS collects information provided by each federal agency. SOCOM’s headof-agency authority ensures data availability. Periodic updates and corrections 

are submitted. DOD has implemented the small business maximum practicable (MaxPrac) opportunity analysis model that utilizes the FDPS to identify 

opportunities to identify small businesses to participate in unclassified contract 

competitions. 

141. FPDS has been used to compare adoption of acquisition programs, defense 

spending trends, and review of overseas contracting. See: Dylan D. Pope, “Performance Based Service Acquisition: A Quantitative Evaluation of Implementation 

Goals and Performance in the United States Air Force” (Master’s thesis,Wright 

Patterson Air Force Base, 2005), David Berteau et al., Defense Contract Trends: 

U.S. Department of Defense Contact Spending and the Supporting Industrial 

Base (Washington, D.C.: 2011), and Moshe Schwartz and Wendy Ginsberg, 

Department of Defense Trends in Overseas Contracting, R41820 (Washington, 

D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2013). DOD also uses the database for the 

annual performance review of the defense acquisition system, see: Department 

of Defense, 2014 Annual Report, 4. 

142. There are three types of transactions in the data: purchase orders, definitive 

contracts, and delivery orders. The total transactions number provides a holistic 

view of USSOCOM procurement activities. 

143. Positive and negative values associated with adjustments to contracts, delivery 

orders, and purchase orders are included in the analysis. The values do not include 

all personnel, equipment, and operational costs that are born by the services or 

the contingency operations budget. See: Marcus Weisgerber, “Peeling the Onion 

Back on the Pentagon’s Special Operations Budget,” Defense One, 27 January 

2015. 

144. Source selections are an alternative unit of analysis. Source selections are the 

“process of evaluating competitive bids or proposals to enter into a Government 

procurement contract” (Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy). 

145. Estimates of USSOCOM’s total budget range from one to three percent of the 

DOD’s total budget, depending on how personnel, major platforms, and additional “enabler costs” are tabulated. See: Weisgerber, “Peeling the Onion Back.” 
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146. Miles, “SOCOM Strives to Meet Current, Future Operator Requirements.” 

 147. Under the strict definition used here, only two firms are required to generate 

competition. One SOF AT&L officer stated that at least three firms are required 

for USSOCOM to benefit from competition. 

148. New competitions do not occur for each transaction. Competition between firms 

occurs during source selections, contract awards, and non-FAR contracting 

models. Transactions are used to quantify the competition landscape throughout 

the procurement process. 

149. See: Anna Leander, “The Power to Construct International Security: On the Significance of Private Military Companies,” Millennium-Journal of International 

Studies, vol. 33 (2005), 803-825; and Greg Schneider, “Lockheed Spins off 10 

High-Tech Companies: Defense Contractor to Keep 35 Percent Share of Newly 

Formed Firm,” Baltimore Sun, 4 February 1997. 

150. Richard Ginman, “Memorandum for Commander: Use of Government-wide 

Acquisition Contracts Set Aside Exclusively for Small Business,” Office of the 

Under Secretary of Defense, 2011; and Andre J. Gudger and Richard Ginman, 

“Memorandum for Commander: Subject Increase Dynamic Small Business Role 

in the Defense,” Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, 2011. 

151. NAICS codes are missing in some instances and if ‘missing’ is treated as a single 

category it would be the 7th largest by value. It is not possible to determine if 

the missing information is systematic and characteristic of classified activity or 

if the data was not correctly entered into FDPS. 

152. These service categories are more competitive than others because the services 

are often generic and opportunities abound in the commercial market. Low 

competition levels in public administration are an odd result. It is possible 

that characteristics of SOF AT&L requirements for public administration are 

incongruent with the larger market, thus reducing the number of firms able and 

willing to compete. 

153. Officials interviewed at SOF AT&L expressed concern that defense industry 

consolidation, increased demand for intellectual property rights, and capability 

sharing may threaten the long-term health of the industry. Their concern stemmed 

from the observation that profits for contractors continue to shrink while regulation has increased. In combination, these factors may reduce the ability of firms 

to deliver services. Consolidation in aerospace, weapon systems, and missiles may 

pose challenges for the services to generate competition, which will indirectly 

impact SOF AT&L. (Author interviews with SOF AT&L personnel, February 

2015). See: Major Judy Davis, The Impact of the Defense Industry Consolidation 

on the Aerospace Industry (Wright Patterson Air Force Base, OH: Department 

of the Air Force Air University, 2006); and U.S. Government Accounting Office, 

Privatization: Questions State and Local Decision-makers Used when Considering 

Privatization Options, GAO-GGD-98-87 (Washington, D.C.: 1998), available at: 

http://www.gao.gov/special.pubs/gg98087.pdf. 
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154. The Pentagon exceeded its small-business targets for the first time in 2014. In that 

year, small-businesses won nearly 23 percent of prime contracts. See: Claudette 

Roulo, “Small-business Contracting on the Rise, Officials Says,” DOD News, 14 

October 2014. 

155. See Hacker, “We Wanted to Know SOCOM’s Top Priorities.” 

156. USSOCOM, “2015 Program Updates,” accessed on 20 March 2016 at: http://www.

specops-dhp.com/interesting-post/2015-socom-program-management-updates/. 

157. Five of the 10 categories are ‘catch-all’ categories. These are denoted with O (other) 

and AO (all other). The difference between these categories is the degree to which 

a particular sub-category is divided. ‘Other’ is a larger category than ‘All Other.’ 

158. See: George A. Boyne, “Sources of Public Service Improvement: A Critical Review 

and Research Agenda,” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 

vol.13 (2003), 367-394. 

159. Mancur Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, 

and Social Rigidities (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1982), 76-77. 

160. Michael Horowitz provides the definition of organizational capital used in this 

analysis. Horowitz analyzes the concept into three dimensions: the critical focus 

of the organization, resources for experimentation, and organizational age. The 

critical focus of the organization is the guiding principle of the organization—

the more strictly an organization defines its goal the more difficult adoption 

of innovation becomes because interests become entrenched in achieving only 

the stated goal. SOF AT&L’s strengths align well with this conceptualization of 

organizational capital: 1) SOF AT&L’s mission remains broad—to be responsive to 

the time-sensitive needs of SOF missions; 2) SOF AT&L’s has been given latitude 

to experiment with different acquisition policies, particularly TALOS; and 3) 

SOCOM’s organizational structure was created in 1987, which makes SOCOM 

a relatively youthful organization. See Michael Horowitz, The Diffusion of Military Power: Causes and Consequences for International Politics (Princeton, NY: 

Princeton University Press), 18-64. 

161. See SOF AT&L website, http://www.socom.mil/our-organization, for complete 

organizational description.

162. SOFIC 2015 Survey respondents consistently ranked access to PEOs as a top 

conference feature. 

163. Between 2001 and 2007 only two major programs suffered from delays between 

USSOCOM and another military service. See: Government Accountability Office, 

Special Operations Command’s Management, 19-22. 

164. See: Laurence O’Toole and Kenneth J. Meier, “Plus ça change: Public Management, Personnel Stability, and Organizational Performance,” Journal of Public 

Administration Research and Theory, vol. 13 (2003), 43-64. The authors identify 

five types of stability including structural stability, mission stability, production/

technology stability, procedural stability, and personnel stability. Institutional 

constraints, such as the FAR, and mission dedication ensure stability across four 

of the five stability types. 
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165. Interviews with SOF AT&L personnel in February 2015, MacDill AFB. 

166. Ibid. Each individual interviewed was asked to identify a limitation in the existing workforce. Approximately half stated that the heavy workload of the legal 

team generated backlogs and delays. 

167. Ibid. 

168. Kaifend Yang and Anthony Kassekert, “Linking Management Reform with 

Employee Job Satisfaction: Evidence from Federal Agencies,” International 

Journal of Public Opinion Research, vol. 20 (2010), 413-436. 

169. To examine federal employee views on contractor views, see: Ellen V. Rubin, “The 

Role of Procedural Justice in Public Personnel Management: Empirical Results 

from the Department of Defense,” Journal of Public Administration Research and 

Theory, vol. 19 (2009), 125-143. One oft-cited benefit of contracted personnel is 

the ability to easily move them to a different unit or location. Several individuals 

cited this area of flexibility as a key benefit of using contractors during interviews 

with SOF AT&L personnel in February 2015, MacDill AFB. 

170. Difficulties in the transfer of funds are also tied to legal requirements of the FAR, 

legal departments, and the existing process (interview with SOF AT&L personnel 

in February 2015, MacDill AFB). 

171. Duncan provides an excellent review of the difficulties experienced by SOF 

AT&L when transitions occurred from SOF-peculiar equipment to servicecommon equipment. A collective-action problem arises between SOF AT&L and 

the services when transitions of equipment do need to occur. SOF AT&L seeks 

to not purchase service-common equipment, because it is the responsibility of 

the services to provide this equipment. However, the services have no codified 

incentive to alter current processes and procedures to accommodate SOF needs. 

SOF AT&L internal audits reveal that service-common equipment continues to 

be purchased and that no solution to the issue is readily available. See: Jonathan 

M. Duncan, “The Dilemma for USSOCOM: Transitioning SOF-Peculiar to 

Service-Common,” Air War College, 15 February 2012, 2-7. 

172. For discussion on conventional weapon procurement and U.S. counterinsurgency 

strategy, see: Frank G. Hoffman, “Neo-Classical Counterinsurgency?” Parameters 

37 (2007), 71-89; and GlobalSecurity.org, “US Military Power 2012,” accessed 

15 April 2016 at: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library /report/2013/

us-military-power2012_cscpa03.htm. 

173. Interview with SOF AT&L personnel in February 2015, MacDill AFB. 

174. Ibid. 

175. SOFIC Survey 2015 respondents articulated the importance of employing SOF 

personnel. In many responses, company representatives identified specific business functions (i.e., understanding RFPs) where SOF experience is beneficial. 

However, the most common answer was that SOF experience was beneficial to 

the business process, but not mandatory for winning SOF AT&L business. 
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176. SOF AT&L civilians and contractors interviewed for this piece largely conform 

to this transfer process. Only one participant’s career started at SOF AT&L. 

As previously discussed, limitations in total interview numbers prevents trend 

analysis of SOF AT&L personnel. The anecdotal evidence only provides tentative 

support of generational gap challenges. 

177. DOD-wide expedited hiring authority (EHA) for acquisition personnel was again 

extended in 2015. Examples of the 13 career fields that qualify for EHA include 

auditing, contracting, and small business, among others. This list of career fields 

is drawn from Frank Kendall, “Memorandum for the Secretaries of the Military 

Department: Extension of Expedited Hiring Authority for Select Defense Acquisition Workforce Positions,” Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Acquisition, 

Technology, and Logistics), 2015. 

178. Ashton B. Carter, “Better Buying Power: Guidance for Obtaining Greater Efficiency 

and Productivity in Defense Spending,” Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, 

Technology, and Logistics) 14 September 2010. 

179. Department of Defense, “BBP Background,” accessed 15 March 2016 at: http://

bbp.dau.mil/ background.html. 

180. The seven primary focus areas comprise achieving affordable programs, controlling costs throughout product life-cycles, incentivizing productivity and 

innovation in industry and government, eliminating unproductive processes 

and bureaucracy, promoting effective competition, improving tradecraft in the 

acquisition of services, and improving the professionalism of the total acquisition workforce. 

181. The emphasis on professionalism, according to BBP 3.0, prioritizes the need to 

continue improving skills and professionalism, and underscores the need for 

personnel to maintain a critical perspective regarding the complex decisions 

involved in acquisition work. This inclusion of this category does not imply 

that the DOD or SOF AT&L workforce previously lacked professionalism in any 

capacity. Nor does the category imply that PMSCs employed by SOF AT&L have 

previously engaged in unprofessional acts, such as those unprofessional and illegal 

acts alleged to have been committed by Titan employees at Abu Graib. See: Joel 

Brinkley, “Private contractor use violated Army’s policy,” New York Times, 12 

June 2004; and John H. Cushman, “Contractor Settle Case in Iraq Prison Abuse.” 

New York Times, 8 January 2013. 

182. ACAT I involves procurement with eventual total expenditures of $2.19 billion 

or more and the decision authority rests with the USD (AT&L). Expenditures 

for research, development, technology, and evaluation totaling more than $365 

million are classified as ACAT I. The benchmarks for ACAT II are $660 million 

and $140 million for research with the MDA residing with the DOD component 

acquisition executive or designee. ACAT III comprises those programs that do 

not qualify for ACAT I or II. 

183. SOF AT&L manages approximately 138 programs, but only four are identified 

as ACAT II. Between 2001 and 2006, 76 of 86 acquisition programs were ACAT 
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III. ACAT III programs account for approximately 80 percent of USSOCOM 

weapon system acquisition programs for the same period. See: U.S. Government 

Accountability Office, Special Operations Command’s Management. 

184. See: U.S. Government Accounting Office, Defense Acquisitions: Advanced SEAL 

Delivery System Program Needs Increased Oversight, GAO-03-442 (Washington, 

D.C.: 2003); and U.S. Government Accounting Office, Defense Acquisitions: Readiness of the Marine Corps’ V-22 Aircraft for Full-Rate Production, GAO-01-368R, 

(Washington, D.C.: 2001). 

185. Kendall argued that, “for smaller programs that are a fraction of the considered 

capability portfolio, assigning a [cost] cap can be problematic, but it still needs 

to be done to instill discipline in the requirements process.” See: Frank Kendall, 

“Better Buying Power A Progress Assessment From the Defense Acquisition 

Executive,” Defense AT&L, July-August 2014, 1. 

186. Amber Corrin, “DOD Issues ‘should cost’ Guidance for Achieving Acquisition 

Savings,” Defense Systems, 29 April 2011. 

187. The concept of ‘should cost’ is similar to concepts introduced by Arthur Fitzgerald. See: Arthur Ernest Fitzgerald, The Pentagonists: An Insider’s View of Waste, 

Mismanagement, and Fraud in Defense Spending (Boston, BA: Houghton Mifflin 

Harcourt (HMH), 1989). Similarly, Fitzgerald advocated removal of bureaucratic 

layers and inclusion of life-cycle costs in all estimates. 

188. Kendall, “Progress Assessment,” 3. 

189. Matthew Leatherman, a fellow at the Stimson Center, quoted in Mehta (2015), 

emphasized management, stating, “One of the things that strikes me about the 

BBP sequence is, it looks like it is focused on managing the acquisition challenge, 

not on fixing it or resolving it.” 

190. One SOF AT&L official described the initiatives as “common sense” approaches 

to contracting. Another stated, “BBP documents what good contract officers 

already do.” Interview with SOF AT&L personnel, MacDill AFB. 

191. Small businesses do pose problems for USSOCOM, however. Small businesses 

typically have less experience with FAR than large businesses. The lack of expertise 

in the contracting process is emphasized by comments by Acquisition Executive 

James Geurts in 2014, wgi stated, “You guys make my life miserable ... I can’t 

think of a small business award I have done that hasn’t got at least one or two 

protests.” Quoted in Stew Magnuson, “Small Business Causes Big Headaches for 

SOCOM Acquisition”, National Defense Magazine, 1 April 2014. 

192. Additional discussion of the survey is available in the appendix. 

193. The technical definition of non-traditional partners would include firms that are 

not currently under contract and have not performed contracted services within 

the last year. For a complete definition see: https://www.dodrif.com/home/faqs?

AspxAutoDetectCookieSupport=1. It is outside the scope of this manuscript to 

examine each firm’s financial transactions. 
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194. The list of administrative support categories is from the ALMBOS contract with 

Jacobs Technology, Inc. See: Staff, “US SOCOM Raises Ceiling on ALMBOS 

Contract As Follow-on Contract Awaits GAO Protest Review,” Defense Industry 

Daily, 19 April 2010. 

195. The survey was reviewed and approved by the Texas A&M University Institutional Review Board. The IRB approval letter and original data remain in the 

possession of the author. 

196. The response rate for companies directly contacted via email is about twice that 

of companies contacted using their web-based contact form. 

197. The industry categories are taken from the FPDS. Administrative support and 

public administration (PA) are two categories that received no response. The 

lack of response from companies describing themselves as public administration 

companies is odd because PA is one of the largest monetary service categories for 

USSOCOM. It is unclear whether or not the lack of PA companies distorts the 

responses or whether companies classify their services in a different way than 

according to the official FPDS categories. 

198. Quote taken from the survey of SOFIC 2015 survey participant.