PROPOSED PANAMA CANAL TREATIES

4r

HEARINGS

BEiORE THE

COMMITTEE ON

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

NINETY-FIFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

EPTEMBER 8, 14, 15, 20, 26, 28, AND OCTOBER 11 AND 20, 1977

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

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PROPOSED PANAMA CANAL TREATIES

HEARINGS

BEFORE TIE

COMMITTEE ON

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

~NINET IY-FIFTH ('(h(1'

FIRST SESSION

SEPTEMBER S. 14, 15, 20, 2S, AND OCTOBEIt 11 AN D 20, 1977

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

0

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

98-'il WASHINGTON : 1978

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Offi

Washington, D.C. 20402
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI, Wisconsin, Chairman

L. H. FOUNTAIN, North Carolina WILLIAM S. BROOMFIELD, Michigan

DANTE B. FASCELL, Florida EDWARD J. DERWINSKI, Illinois

CHARLES C. DIGGS, JR., Michigan PAUL FINDLEY, Illinois

ROBERT N. C. NIX, Pennsylvania JOHN H. BUCHANAN, JR., Alabama

DONALD M. FRASER, Minnesota J. HERBERT BURKE, Florida

BENJAMIN S. ROSENTHAL, New York CHARLES W. WHALEN, JR., Ohio

LEE H. HAMILTON, Indiana LARRY WINN, JR., Kansas

LESTER L. WOLFF, New York BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York

JONATHAN B. BINGHAM, New York TENNYSON GUYER, Ohio

GUS YATRON, Pennsylvania ROBERT J. LAGOMARSINO, California

MICHAEL HARRINGTON, Massachusetts WILLIAM F. GOODLING. Pennsylvania

LEO J. RYAN, California SHIRLEY N. PETTIS, California

CARDISS COLLINS, Illinois

STEPHEN J. SOLARZ, New York

HELEN S. MEYNER, New Jersey

DON BONKER, Washington

GERRY E. STUDDS, Massachusetts

ANDY IRELAND, Florida

DONALD J. PEASE, Ohio

ANTHONY C. BEILENSON, California

WYCHE FOWLER, JR., Georgia

E (KIKA) DE LA GARZA, Texas

GEORGE E. DANIELSON, California

JOHN J. CAVANAUGH, Nebraska

JOHN J. BRADY, Jr., Chief of Staff

ROBERT K. BOYER, Staff Consultant

GEORGE M. INGRAM, Staff Consultant

J. EDWARD FOX, Minority Staff Consultant

ROXANNE PERUGINO, Staff Assistant

(311)
CONTENTS

WITNESSES

Thursday, September S, 1977: Page

Hon. Ellsworth Bunker, conegotiator for the Panama Canal Tre es_ 3

Hon. Sol M. Linowitz, conegotiator for the Panama Canal Treaties--- 6

Herbert J. Hansell, legal adviser, Department of State_-__--_--_ 9

Lt. Gen. Welburn Dolvin, member, U.S. Negotiating Team for the

Panama Canal Treaties_------_-_--_________--_-____-________-__-14

Wednesday, September 14, 1977:

Hon. Dean Rusk, former Secretary of State ------------------------ -123

Hon. Henry A. Kissinger, former Secretary of State--_-_------- 127

Thursday, September 15, 1977:

Dr. John Wasylik, national commander in chief, Veterans of Foreign

Wars of the United States ------------------------------------ 155

William J. Rogers, immediate past national coimmander, the American Legion-----------_--_-_-_-___-__--- _-_-_--163

Frank D. Ruggiero, national commander, AMVETS-___-___________ 171

Dr. Robert P. Foster, chairman, National Foreign Relations Commission, the American Legion------------------------------------ 175

Col. Phelps Jones, director, National Security and Foreign Affairs, Veterans of Foreign Wars_ -------------------------------------- 177

Tuesday, September 20, 1977:

Hon. Samuel S. Stratton, a Representative in Congress from the

State of New York------------------------------------------ isi

Hon. Larry P. McDonald, a Representative in Congress from the

State of Georgia---------------------------------------------- -19S

Hon. Philip M. Crane, a Representative in Congress from the State

of Illinois_--__--------_---------------_--_--_-------_------_---205

Alfred Graham, president, Central Labor Union/Metal Trades Council, Canal Zone- ---- _ _---_-_--_----_-_--__-__--224

William Drummond, legislative chairman, Central Labor Union/

Metal Trades Council, Canal Zone ----------------------------- 231

Monday, September 26, 1977:

Hon. Harold Brown, Secretary of Defense ------------------------ 237

Gen. George S. Brown, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff -----------_240

Lt. Gen. Welburn Dolvin, member, U.S. Negotiating Team for the

Panama Canal Treaty________- ___-_--__-__-_----_-------_-_-266

Wednesday, September 28, 1977:

Adm. Thomas IH. Moorer, former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff._ 277

Tuesday, October 11, 1977:

William P. Stedman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for InterAmerican Affairs -------------------------------------------- 304

Rose Marie Aragon, Panamanian Committee for Human Rights_--__ 320

David Carliner, attorney for Rose Marie Aragon-_----_---_-_----. 326

Curtis Cutter, Legislative Officer, Congressional Relations, Department of State.--_ ____ ____- __- ___-_- _____-_--- ___-- ____--- 328

Winston Robles, assistant professor of political science, Florida International University, and director of the Panamanian Committee for

Human Rights_____-_--- _--_----_--__------------ 338

Rev. Leo T. Mahon, St. Victor's Parish, Calumet, Ill., former priest in

Panama--_-_-------_-------_--_--------------------- 344

Thursday, October 20, 1977:

Hon. Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State ------------------------- 364

Hon. Ellsworth Bunker, conegotiator for the Panama Canal Treaties. 381

lion. Sol M. Linowitz, conegotiator for the Panama Canal Treaties-- 382

(III)
IV

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Page

"Declaration of Washington" -- _--- ___--------------- 15

Letter, arguments, and counterarguments on Panama Canal Treaty----- 22

Statement of Herbert J. 1lansell, legal adviser, Department of State, before the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, August 17, 1977------------------------------------------------- 26

Legal opinion of the Attorney General on the Panama Canal Treaties.__ 28

1977 January-February issue of Freedom House .-------------------------- 48

Exchange of notes, loan guarantees, credit papers, and related documents

concerning various U.S. Government activities located in the Canal

Zone ----------------------------------------------------------- 62

Total amount of canal construction costs and total payments to Panama

by the United States --------------------------------------------- 116

Book value of the Panama Canal enterprise --------------------------- 119

Resolution No. 402, U.S. Sovereignty Over the U.S. Canal Located on the

Isthmus of Panama, submitted by Dr. John Wasylik, commander in

chief, VFW_----------------------------------------------------- 156

U.S. Government use of Panama Canal before, during, and after Vietnam. 217

List of U.S. facilities in Canal Zone to be relinquished and kept under the

treaty provisions-------------------------------------------------- 252

Estimate of co4t of the canal to the United States during the Vietnam war- 270

Statement of Hon. William L. "Bill" Dickinson, a Representative in

Congress from the State of Alabama_-__________---- _________--__-272

Statement of lion. John M. Murphy, chairman, House Committee on

Merchant Marine and Fi herie--297

Data in support of the contention of the contnuing importance of the

Panaima Canal and Canal Zone____-_-- __-----_--------_-----__-_--__ 303

Freedom Hiou-se human rights rating on Panama-__ _- __---___ -__-- '307

Freedom House's formula for determining its human rights ratings ------ 310

Pre- release from Freedom Houze "Urges Approval of Canal Treaties

1)e:pite Panama's 'Deplorable' Human Rights Record," dated November 17, 1977----------__-----_-----_ _ -- _-312

Relationhip between Torrijos and Qadhafi of Libya ------------------- 316

Clarification of Cabinet Decree No. 343-Self-censorship of the Panamnanian media--------------------------------------------------- 317

Visa case of Leopoldo Aragon Escalona submitted by the Department of

State----------------------------------------------------------- 328

Canal Zone police involvement in the capture and beating of Leopoldo

Aragon--------------------------------------------------------- 329

Documentation on the case of David Mendelson330

Excerpts from the testimony of Jerome J. Shestack, president of the

International League for Human Rights, before the Subcommittee on

Foreign Operations and Related Agencies, House Committee on Appropriations, A pril 5, 1977 -- -- ___-_-_- ___ __-- _-_- __---- __-_--_ ---- 351

Letter to Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, OAS, from

International League of Human Rights, concerning human rights violations in Panama ------------------------------------------------- 351

Press release of the Office of the White House Press Secretary on "Statement of Understanding," dated October 14, 1977--------------------- 368

Telegram from U.S. Embassy to Secretary of State, dated September

29, 1977 -------------------------------------------------------- 368

"Panama: Escobar Tells Press of Carter-Torrijos Meeting," telegram to

Department of State dated October 1, 1977 ------------------------- 369

"Panama: Escobar Betancourt Holds Press Conference," telegram to

Department of State dated October 1, 1977 ------------------------- 372

Letter sent to Chairman Zablocki from J. R. Williams, president of the

Panama Canal Pilots Association ---------------------------------- 380

Letter to President Gerald Ford concerning ongoing SALT negotiations-_ 385

Questions submitted for the record by Congressman Larry Winn, Jr. and

responses by the Department of State-- _8--- -_ 38

APPENDIX

1. Staff summary of the issues, pro and con on the Panama Canal

Treaties_----------------------------------------------------- 403

2. Texts of treaties relating to the Panama Canal- ------- 427
v

:3. Agreemumt in imiphlanviantion of Wricke H! 1Q ih l ;niNti ( mial r

Trat- - - I

4. Agrecinwnt in linpdmein k timi of artio I\' Wf 1|p 'Am: na ( nk I

Treaty . .I

5. Statement of lB iPIot lB in & w we( n tlm 1 uitkvl S1:W n.! 11awa

regar(ling the Neut12lity Treaty. -,W

6. Remarks of Dr. MOIu& 8ethanvourt Ib I 10 ih-i m'2n1insuin N21tionl

Assembily, fiom M Ii Anwriei Unvwvat ii-( 'nkm Kiv, And

September 7, 1977_-_--_-_--_-_-_-_. -- Ii

PROPOSED PANAMA CANAL TREATIES

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 8, 1977

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

CO-MMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,

Washington, D.C.

The committee met at 10:25 a.m. in room 2172, Rayburn House

Office Building, Clement J. Zablocki, chairman, presiding.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. The committee will please come to order.

The committee is beginning today the consideration of one of the

most important-and controversial-matters before our Nation. The

issue is whether the Congress should approve the proposed Panama

Canal treaties and the legislation to implement them.

The President has made his decision and commitment. At a historic gathering last night, attended by many Members of Congress and

an unprecedented number of Government leaders from Latin American

countries, the President signed the treaties as Chief Executive of the

United States. The President of Panama signed for his nation.

Now it is up to the Congress to decide whether the United States

should ratify the treaties and enact the necessary implementing

legislation.

Under our Constitution, only Senate action is required for congressional approval of treaties. However, where further U.S. legislation is

needed to carry out any of the treaty terms, as in this case, the House

must act on such legislation as well as the Senate.

The Hou se International Relations Committee will be receiving

part of the legislation required to implement the treaties. To understand fully what is involved, we will be looking simultaneously at both

the treaties and the need for enabling legislation.

The Chair is hopeful that this series of hearings will be productive

for the Congress, and for interested Americans everywhere, in bringing

out the facts on this important matter.

We have scheduled distinguished witnesses who will testify before

us over the next several weeks. We will hear from the present Secretary of State and two of his predecessors, from the Secretary of

Defense and from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, from

labor, business, and representatives of veterans' organizations and

other leaders.

We will hear from both proponents and opponents of the treaties.

Let me emphasize at the outset of these hearings that we are determined to be fair and thorough in our deliberations on this issue and

to allow both sides to present their respective arguments.

I can announce this morning that an additional witness, not

previously listed, will be Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, former Chairman

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and former Chief of Naval Operations.

Admiral Moorer will testify on September 28.

(1)
2

We will do our utmost to be thorough in bringing out the issues

'I the facts surrounding the treaties-and we will be guided by

what is in the best interests of the United States.

At this time I would like to briefly outline some of the questions

on which we need answers, and I think the people of the United

St rates will require answers to better understand what our country's

aureemetits and negotiations contain. For example, what is the

extent of our military and economic interest in the canal?

How will our defense and national security best be served?

How can we best assure continued access to the canal by American

ships, those of our allies, and by ships of all nations and the world

grenera lly?

What measures may be needed to secure the canal against sabotage

or external attack?

What is the economic value of the canal to our commerce?

What is the cost to us of operating the canal under the present

arrangement?

What will happen to canal transit costs under the new treaties?

Can the Panamanians successfully take over operation of the canal

by the year 2000?

What impact might the domestic political situation in Panama

have on the canal operation under the present arrangement, and

under the new treaties?

What steps need to be taken to assure fair treatment of present

can al employees?

What are the possibilities for building a sea-level canal at some

future time?

What role should Congress as a whole have constitutionally in

regard to the new treaties and implementing legislation?

And from the standpoint of our relations with our Latin American

neighbors and other nations around the world, what will be the results

for the United States if we do-or do not-ratify the proposed

treaties?

Before each member is a copy of the negotiated treaties, and related

materials. May I also remind the members that their microphones

are now controlled by the switches in front of them.

You push the switch forward to turn them on, to activate themso the sign in front of my switch says.

To begin those hearings, we are pleased to have before us the two

principal negotiators of the treaties-Ambassadors Ellsworth Bunker

and Sol M. Linowitz. They are accompanied at the witness table by

Lt. Gen. Welburn Dolvin, a member of the negotiating team, and the

Honorable Herbert Hansell, Legal Adviser of the Department of

State.

Gentlemen, we welcome you to the committee. I want personally to

take this opportunity to congratulate you for the efforts you have

made and the success you have had in the treaties that have been

negotiated. You may proceed with your statements, gentlemen, after

which we will have questions, I am sure.

Ambassador Bunker.
3

STATEMENT OF HON. ELLSWORTH BUNKER, CONEGOTIATOR FOR

THE PANAMA CANAL TREATIES

Mrfi. BUNKEP. Thank vou, MIr. Chailm.

MNtr. Chaiian and gentl(mnic, Ambriia:sador ILimovitz aind I ,rea1tIv

appreciate the colmlimlit tee's iin-vitation to (I I the tS now Pa\na Canal Tiaties. Tli is our first appearance b(for* a

committee since cOmpletion Of tl fi" w ri' s, wVlhVi Werue

yester-day bY Pre ,1idfent Car1tr I.ndI Pz 1m11n a' Gcea 1 To1, r r Ijo InI

which viII shortly g2o to th Senate for .dviee aUi coireiit to

ratification.

The new agreemnents iiiclude the fellowing2' 1(I) iet>:

Thll PlaIana Ca(ial TIecatyV , wvitlh two implementing greement>

ConcernIng:

Canal operatI 0-1AgreemIlen) t ill 1)1plem11enltaioni of article Ill of 11he

Panama Canal Treat v.

Defense-Agreement in Implementat ion of a rti cle IV of the PanamlIa

Canal Treatv.

Treatv concerning the pem nen t neulralIty' alld operation of the

Panama Canal.

Exchanges of notes concerning various U.S. Government activities

currently located in the (anal Zone.

A note concerning loans, loan guarantIes and crdt its to be proved (d

to Panama to assist its economic develop ent an1i to enhance its

capability to contribute to canal defense.

In our opening statements Aibassador Linowiltz anid I will review

a few of the most important features of tliese ldocilneni s . I will outline the prOviions goverlilnr Cm al opelatioii and defense tilrouiii

December I 1999. Ambassador Linowi tz will descri he thL nenitira Iii v

ttreatv and the econonmC arTangemnients. Before t ii Uai rip ca'lal opurations and defense, I want to make a few prneliimn1i ial'Y tinlaiks.

Among the committees of the f louse. your> is the one most coIAernied

with this Nat ions interests abrol(1. Not hi tg cold beter erve .te

underscore of the new canal agreement to our 1) porin l iterc.ed

than the pJre-ence in Washington for 1est-eia n)in (UreHl of

Presidents or iPrime \linisters from 20 count ries of thuv hemi-pheire

and of high-level rpreseitativeo from S other Latill American nat lo.

For many of these countries, the canal is n iiort ant trade artery.

For all of them, the extended negotiations for a new (annIl aiP 1 reemwlet

have been viewed as a test of our wiltlmiess 1 deal equitably with

our Latin American neighbors. Two U.S. foreign policy interests are

involved in the new canal treaties. The first is our inteiest-for reasionis

of both trade and defense-in assured use of an efficiently operated and

secure Panama Canal.

The second is our interest in cooperative and productive relations

with Latin America. The nations to the south of us are important not

only as neighbors sharing the same hemisphere but also as partners in

trade and investment, sources of important raw materials, and as

collaborators in building a secure, peaceful and prosperous world

community.
4

Four presidents of both political parties have recognized that the

protection of our nation's interest-with regard both to the Panama

Canal and to the hemisphere-required reform of the treaty arrangements governing the canal. We believe that the terms that have been

negotiated fully meet the needs of the United States:

They assure the efficient operation of the canal.

They enable the United States to protect the canal.

They guarantee the canal's neutrality permanently.

They provide an economic settlement that is fair and reasonable.

And they provide a firm foundation for long-term cooperation

between the United States and Panama.

Let me now describe how canal operation and defense will be carried

out under the terms of the Panama Canal Treaty which will remain in

force until December 31, 1999. The basic principle is that for the duration of the treaty--that is, for the rest of this century-the United

States will retain control of operation and defense with Panama taking

part in both activities. This arrangement will assure that the United

States can guarantee the uninterrupted, efficient operation and security of the canal after the new treaty goes into effect.

It will also provide the necessary preparatory period for Panama to

develop the capability to assume responsibility for canal operation and

defense beginning in the year 2000. The key provisions are articles III

and IV of the Panama Canal Treaty.

In article III Panama grants to the United States "the rights to

manage, operate and maintain the Panama Canal, its complementary

works, installations and equipment and to provide for the orderly

transit of vessels through the Panama Canal." Article III further lists

a number of specific powers which the United States will have in order

to exercise its responsibility for canal operation.

These include the authority to "make and enforce all rules pertaining to the passage of vessels through the canal," and "to establish,

modify, collect and retain tolls."

In similar fashion, article IV which deals with defense matters,

provides that for the duration of the treaty, the United States "shall

have the primary responsibility to protect and defend the canal."

The agreement in implementation of article IV sets forth the specific

rights which the United States will have in order to carry out its

defense responsibilities. These include rights to "station, train, and

move military forces within Panama."

Of special importance to canal operation and defense are the

arrangements for use of lands and waters in the present Canal Zone.

Under the new treaty the Canal Zone will cease to exist, and the

territory included in the zone will come under the general territorial

jurisdiction of Panama. However, the United States will have access

to and the rights to use all lands and waters needed for operation, maintenance, and defense of the canal through December 31, 1999.

The specific areas reserved for these purposes and the rights for

their use are set forth in detail in the two implementing agreements.

The designated areas include the canal itself and related facilities,

together with military bases for the use of our forces. To administer

the canal, the United States will establish, under legislation to be

sought from Congress, a U.S. Government agency, which will be called

the Panama Canal Commission and which will replace the present

Panama Canal Company.
5

Article III of the Panama Canal Treaty provides that tile ('mmission will be supervised by a Board composed of five Ameriaans ad

four Panamanians. The executive officers w ill be an Aniistnrator

and a Deputy Administrator. Until 1990, the Administrator will he

an American and the Deputy a Panamanian. Thereafter, the Adhillistrator will be a Panamanian and the Deputy an Amercan. Tlie

Administrator, the Deputy Administrator, ald all Board nemlberboth American and Panamanian-will be appointed by the United

States.

Also affecting canal operation are the treaty provisions dealing with,

personnel of the canal enterprise. The basic guidelines on personnel are

set forth in article X of the Panama Canal Treaty. In general, these

are designed to allow present employees, both American and Panamanian, whose services will be required by the new Panama Canal

Commission, to continue working under conditions generally no less

favorable than those which they currently enjoy.

For those who are displaced from their jobs, various procedures are

provided to facilitate placement in other U.S. Government positions,

to the extent these are available, and to assist in finding other jobs

when necessary. In addition, the United States will provide a special

optional early retirement program to all persons employed by the

Panama Canal Company and the Canal Zone Government immediately prior to entry into force of the new treaty.

The treaty also established guidelines for increasing employmeiit

of Panamanians at all levels in the canal enterprise in preparation

for Panama's assumption of responsibility for canal operation at the

treaty's end. The right to collective bargaining for canal employees

is guaranteed. We believe these provisions will make it possible for

the Panama Canal Commission to retain a qualified work force and

will provide fair treatment for existing employees.

In this connection, I think it worth noting that the AF,-( 'TO,

which represents most of the United States and Panamanian canal

employees, has endorsed the new canal treaties.

The treaty makes special provision to insure that environmental

considerations are not overlooked. In article VI, both :overnmetits

commit themselves to implement the treaty in a manner con-istent

with the protection of the natural environment of Panama.

The article also calls for the creation of the Joint Coi ison on

the Environment which will review the treaty's implementiiou and

will recommend ways to avoid or to mitigate any adverse environmental impacts which might arise from actions taken pursuant to the

treaty. A separate exchange of notes will provide for conitinned

operation of the Smithsonian Institution's Tropical Researeli Center

which makes such a valuable contribution to our understaidinmr of

the natural environment of the canal area. The wildlife preserve on

Barro-Colorado Island will also be maintained.

Taken as a whole, the treaty provisions concerning operation and

defense provide a comprehensive approach toward mec I U.

interests in the near and long term. They build on the effective administration and experienced personnel developed in 60 years of U.S.

operation and provide a means to utilize these important assets under

the new treaty.

The new agreements also establish an organized framework for

development of an effective Panamanian management that can carry
6

out canal operations after the year 2000. And they open the way for

modernization of the canal should that become necessary in the

future.

That, Mr. Chairman, completes my statement. Ambassador

Linowitz will follow.

Chairman ZATLOCKI. Thank you, Ambassador Bunker.

Ambassador Linowitz.

STATEMENT OF HON. SOL M. LINOWITZ, CONEGOTIATOR FOR THE

PANAMA CANAL TREATIES

Mr. LIo~xo1z. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, first

let me express my appreciation to you for scheduling these hearings

and focusing attention on an issue which is one of the most important

certainly confronting the American people today.

A- Amba-sador Bunker has indicated, for more than 13 years, under four presidents. the United States has been seeking to find

the basis for a new treaty with Panama to replace the outmoded

treaty of 1903. It has been a long and arduous road beset with many

obstacles and frustrations. Last evening we came to the end of the

road. The President of the United States, on behalf of this country, signed two new treaties with Panama to replace the 1903 treaty.

These new treaties, we believe, represent a fair and equitable

basis for dealing with the issues which have been the cause of so much

dissension and hostility over the years. And they do so in a manner

which fully protects our interests, properly recognized Panamanian

aspiration,, and does us credit as a great democratic country. As you know, President Ford has joined President Carter in

announcing his full support for these two treaties, and they have been

joined by a number of other leaders of both parties. They recognize

that in these new treaties the United States has finally realized the

result of such great effort by Demacratic and Republican administrations alike to achieve a fair and reasonable new treaty arrangement

which permits us to act the way a great nation should act.

Ambassador Bunker has outlined a number of the major features

of these new treaties to you, and I would like to follow by describing

severe others. As you know, the new Panama Canal Treaty provides

the basis for assuring to the United States continued access to a canal

which is open and secure. Under the new treaty, U.S. Forces will have

the primary responsibility for maintaining canal defense until the

year 2000. But the United States will have very important rights

extending beyond that date.

The separate treaty on the permanent neutrality and operation of

the Panama Canal, which will take effect simultaneously with the

new canal treaty, commits the United States and Panama to maintain

a regime of neutrality of the canal. Under the rules of neutrality set

forth in the treaty, the canal is to be open without discrimination as

to conditions or charges of transit. A special provision authorizes

United States and Panamanian warships to transit the canal expeditiously in both peace and war without being subject to any restrictions

as regards means of propulsion, armament, or cargo.

The treaty gives the United States the right to assure that the

canal's permanent neutrality is maint ained and places no limitation

on our ability to take such action as may be necessary in the event
7

the canal's neutrality is threatene(l oF viola ted. It a iso p'ohiits a ov

foreign country from operatmg the canal 1or stat iollinio troop ., Panama after the year 2000.

It is most important to stress t hat unlike lie t rea ty govern1:ing

canal operation, the Nelutnl ity Irca tY is of inidefinIite d(iiira tion alid

calls for the maintenance of the caial's peimanien t, net ' r lit v. TIe

Neutrality Treat y will also a pply to any other in terna ion I 7ate w(vrwa 'y that may be built in Panama in the ftIe. in short,, t he Neutrality

Treaty provides a firm foundation for asstirin tninhat oiii' long-Iten'm interest in the maintenance of an lopeni, icce,,,,tible, seCICre, efficient t

canal is preserved-now antd in the fitnrc.

In order to emphasize the im portaice of th' regime of iielit rlit v t o

world shipping, there is a protocol to the Nei rnlity Treat v ubi('h

will be open to accession by all countries of the vorild The sI>unat orlie

to this protocol will, in effect, emndorse the Neutrality Treat v by

specifically associating themselves with its object ives allI by areeIng

to respect the regime of permanent neutnility of tihe canal bot h in

time of war and in time of peace. The inst 'unient s of a('cession will be

deposited with the Secretary General of the Org nizatiol ofAmericn

States.

Now, a few other comments about the Pamuna Canal Treaty itself

and those aspects \which Ambassador Bunker did not a luIe to.

Now as to the economic terms of the new canal agreement: At t he

start of these negotiations, both countries agrced-in the 1974 kissinger-Tack statement of principles-that Panama should Ireceive a

"just and equitable share of the benefits derived from the operation of

the canal in its territory." Consistent witi this principle, the United

States maintained during the negotiations that payments to Panamai

should be drawn entirely from the canal revenues-that is that the

payments should reflect the canal's economic value as lea>ureld by

its revenue-generating capacity.

The agreement which has now been worked out has two cornpi)onents.

First, payments to Panama, to be Iinanced entirely from canal revenues, will be provided for in the new treaty. And I a package of

loans, loan guarantees, and credits outside of tile t r'eaty aId subject

to existing statutory proceduiries is also planned. Palylent to Panama

from canal revenues to be provided( for in tie new treatY uAxxil 'oni't

of:

A fixed share of tolls amounting to 30 ceit-s per Panama Ca nalI ton.

We estimate that this will yield about $40 inllion per year.

A fixed payment of $10 million per yeer, also to be draxw lfroi

canal revenues.

And third, and only if additional reveries permit, an azilitional

sum of up to $10 million per year.

The economic development program oit4Ide of the treaty conli>1t>

of loans, loan guarantees, and credits ext e'd. fing over a, period of 5

years which will include the foliowiig co Iponelnt--all designed to

support Panama's economic development.

Up to $200 million in Export-Import Bank credit.

Up to $75 million in AID housing guarantees.

A $20 million Overseas Private Investmeit Corporaltio (OPIC)

loan guarantee to (ofina, the PanaIManian national development

corporation.
8

Let me be very clear about this. None of these loans, guarantees,

and credits will require appropriations from the Congress. I want to

stress, however, that the disbursement of funds under these programs

will be subject to all the procedures and criteria which normally apply

to each of the programs involved.

In addition, the United States is undertaking to provide to Panama

up to $50 million in foreign military sales credits over 10 years to

assist it in developing the capability needed to exercise its responsibilities for canal defense under the new agreement. We believe that

the economic settlement is fair, reasonable, and appropriate. We are

convinced that it is a good investment toward establishing a new

relationship with Panama that will protect our long-term interest in

the canal. And it will not involve any additional burden for the

American taxpayer, since it can be financed from canal revenues.

The canal treaty also grants to the United States certain rights in

connection with adding a third lane of locks to the canal, or possibly

construction of a sea-level canal in Panama. Under the treaty, we

have the right to construct a third lane of locks if we should choose

to do so at any time during the treaty.

With respect to a sea-level canal, the United States and Panama

commit themselves jointly to study the feasibility of such a canal,

and if they agree that such a canal is necessary, to negotiate mutually

agreeable terms for its construction. Panama agrees that it will not

negotiate with any other country for the construction of such a sealevel canal and the United States undertakes not to negotiate with

another nation for a sea-level canal in any other country in the

hemisphere.

As was clear last evening during the treaty signing ceremonies,

these new treaties will have profound significance throughout the

hemisphere and they have the full approval of all the countries of

Latin America. It has been apparent for years that the countries of

Latin America have regarded the Panama Canal issue not as a bilateral

matter but as a problem involving the United States on the one hand

and all Latin America on the other.

At the beginning of this year the heads of state of eight countries

wrote to President Carter urging him to give highest priority to the

resolution of this important issue which so strongly affects our relations with our neighbors to the south. So, in going forward with

these new treaties and their ultimate ratification, the United States

will be opening up a new era in its relationship in this hemisphere.

BeyondI that, we believe that these new agreements present us with a

rare opportunity to demonstrate to the world how a large nation and

a small nation can settle their differences amicably and with mutual

respect and enter into a lasting partnership of which future generations

will be proud. Such a treaty will bear witness to our intention to build

a balanced, constructive and lasting relationship among the countries

of the hemisphere and around the world.

As a last word, it is fitting to go back to Teddy Roosevelt, with

whom all this started I think he put it very well.

We have no choice as to whether or not we shall play a great part in the world.

That has been determined for us by fate. The only question is whether we will play

that part well or badly.

Than vo, -Mr. Chairman.
9

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Thank you, Ambassador Linowitz. On behalf

of the members I thank both of the Ambassadors for their excellent

statements.

At the very outset let me say I would agree with you that the treaty

signing ceremonies obviously indicated the profound significance

throughout the hemisphere that the treaties have full approval of the

Latin Americans. However, I can't say that has similar approval in

this country, in many segments of the country, so we will pose many

questions. Let me at the very outset further state that my first question

will be primarily on procedural matters.

NEED FOR IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION

For example, what parts of the treaties are not self-executing and

will, therefore, require implementing legislation and, further, we would

like to know when will the executive branch send up its proposed implementing legislation?

Mr. LINOWITZ. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Herbert Hansell, who is the legal

adviser to the State Department, is here with us and I wonder whether

he could first address himself to that?

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Yes, sir.

STATEMENT OF HERBERT J. HANSELL, LEGAL ADVISER,

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. HANSELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

There are a number of major subject matters under the treaties on

which legislation will be required for implementation of the treaties

and the various related agreements. The most important areas would

include, first, provisions relating to the new relationships with Panama

and the diplomatic aspects of the treaty.

Second, the organization and activities of the new Panama Canal

Commission, including the regime for collection of the tolls and payment of the various stipulated amounts to be paid to Panama. The

objective here is to establish a self-sustaining entity that will generate

revenues sufficient to meet expenditures and rather extensive legislative provisions will be needed with respect to this subject matter.

Third, all of the provisions that will be needed relating to terms of

employment, and employment practices, for the new Commission and

the special provisions for current employees that are provided for in

article X of the Panama Canal Treaty.

Fourth, adjustments of the jurisdictional provisions applicable to

judicial and law enforcement functions during the transitional period

following the entry into force of the Panama Canal Treaty.

And, fifth, there are a number of other amendments to existing legislation that will be needed by the transfer of jurisdiction to

Panama.

Those are five principal areas, Mr. Chairman, that will be dealt

with in the proposed implementing legislation.

IMPLEMENTATION OF MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE PACKAGE

Chairman ZABLOCKI. At this point, Ambassador Linowitz has stated

that the $50 million in foreign military sales credits will not require
10

appropriations from the Congress. Do you agree with that understanding? Shouldn't that be included as part of the implementing

legislation that will have to come to Congress?

Further, there is a possibility that OPIC may be discontinued. A

continuation of OPIC is necessary in order to have the agreement as

far as OPIC's guaranteeing loans that the treaty includes. Would

you agree with that?

Mr. HANSELL. We had been distinguishing, of course, in drafting

legislation to implement the treaties, between the provisions I have

described and those actions that would be needed with respect to the

economic package. The hope is with respect to the economic package

that no congressional appropriations would be needed. There will

presumably be some legislative activity that might be required and

I don't think we have focused on that precisely as yet.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Is it not necessary, however, that you do

focus on that?

Mr. HANSELL. Yes, indeed.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Furthermore, the executive branch has not

anticipated that Congress will act prior to the ratification of the

treaty?

Mr. HANSELL. I believe that is right, Mr. Chairman. We do hope

to be able to submit the proposed implementing legislation within a

period of weeks because it will be a comprehensive package of legislation and clearly will take a great deal of time of the appropriate

congressional committees, but we would not anticipate that the legislation could be enacted or even acted on definitively prior to the

ratification by the Senate.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. I have just one further related question. In

the statements made by both of the Ambassadors, the United States

pledged its efforts outside the treaty to arrange for an economic program of loans, guarantees and credits for Panama amounting to

approximately $375 million. Is this program in any way tied to the

implementation of the treaty?

I am thinking of the Sinai accords we had agreed to and then we

were told later as to some of the economic and military assistance

programs that were apparently tied in with this. Could a similar

situation be interpreted as existing in this case?

Mr. HANSELL. These are not commitments in a contractual sense.

The documents themselves will be submitted to the committee as

soon as the copies have been made, but these are to be efforts independent of the program with respect to the treaties.

Chairman ZABLOCK1. And in no way tied to the implementation of

the treaty?

Mr. HANSELL. No, sir.

Mr. LiNOWITZ. Mr. Chairman, there is no direct connection but as

part of these negotiations, we have, of course, been aware of the

discussions which have been going on between the representatives of

Panama and other agencies of our Government, and there already has

been transmitted a letter from the Secretary of State to the proper

Panamanian officials indicating our intention to use our best efforts

to bring into being all of these economic development programs we

have (isutisse(I.

Chairman ZAiantoc. Thank you. My time has expired and I note

there is a rollcall vote. We wi6i continue until the second bell. If some
11

of the members want to leave now and come back it is the hope of

the Chair we continue our hearings. [ ui)derstadi(l both Ambassa(lors

have to leave by 12 or shortly thereafter.

Mr. LINOWITZ. It we could, Mr. (hairima H, for a meeting with the

Chiefs of State.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Mr. Fountain.

U.S. GAINS FROML THE TREATIES

Mr. FOUNTAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Ambassador, I

have just a couple of questions. What does America get in return for

this enormous financial consideration we are giving to Panama?

Mr. LINOWITZ. The most important thing we get, sir, is the enhanced assurance of a continued open, accessible, secure, and iiutntl

canal.

Mr. FOUNTAIN. That is the main thing?

Mr. LINOWITZ. Yes, sir. The reason we went into the Panaiiia

Canal at all was to have an accessible, open canal to meet our needs.

It is the judgment of our highest defense officials and Joint Chiefs of

Staff, those most concerned with our security, that our security will

be enhanced, not only preserved, by insuring that the canal remains

open, accessible, secure, an(d neutral under the provisions which have

been worked out in these treaties.

Mr. FOUNTAIN. That accessibility is guaranteed to be kept open

mutually between the two countries fori how long a perio(l of time?

Mr. LINOWITZ. Permanently, sir.

U.S. MILITARY STATUS UNDER TREATIES

Mr. FOUNTAIN. What about our military situation there? How long

will we have military bases?

Mr. LINOWITZ. Until the year 2000.

Mr. FOUNTAIN. And then we give up those bases?

Mr. LINOWITZ. At that point no other country will have trooI)s or

bases in Panama.

Mr. FOUNTAIN. But we give up our bases?

Mr. LINOWITZ. Yes.

Mr. FOUNTAIN. We move all of our troops out?

Mr. LINOWITZ. That is right; there wit be no troops there.

Chairman ZABLOCKI: M. Winn.

Mr. WINN. I would like to reserve my timhe, \li. Chairman.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. The Chair would suggest that we now recess

and come back in 5 minutes.

[Whereupon, a brief recess was taken.]

Chairman ZABLOCKI. The committee ill be in order. Mlr. Der\\ iski.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would hope, because

of the limited time our distinguished diplomats have, thet perhaps at

some later time in the year they might ret urn. I am sure there w ill be

more exhaustive questioning.

Chairman ZA 13LOCKI. There is no question we will have the Aibassadors as well as executive branch witnesses whenever nece'>ary

Mr. DERwINSKI. vl first question is, AflmbaS5adVor Bluker: Ihave

or will all agreements related to the c(nail been made public in the

process of congressional deliberationss?

98-991-77 2
12

Mr. BUNKER. Yes; they will be made public. As a matter of fact,

they may not have been made public as of today but they will be

made public.

PROCEDURE TO ESTABLISHING PANAMA CANAL COMMISSION

Mr. DERWINSKI. I direct myself specifically to some of the points

in your statement. Ambassador Bunker, on page 7, you pointed out

that the board members of the new entity to administer the canal,

both American and Panamanian, will be appointed by the United

States. Do I assume that means the Panamanians will supply a list

of names from which their members will be drawn?

Mr. BUNKER. Yes; that is correct, they will supply the names.

EMPLOYEE RIGHT TO STRIKE

Mr. DERWINSKi. Then I noted further in your statement that the

right of collective bargaining for canal employees is guaranteed. What

about the question of the right to strike, the question of canal employees' right to strike? Is that in any way involved?

FINANCIAL REQUIREMENTS OF THE TREATY

Then, Ambassador Linowitz, you made reference, sir, to the factand I quote you-"It will not involve any additional burdenfor the

American taxpayer since it can be financed from canal revenues." You

are referring to the economic settlement. Yet in an earlier statement

you made reference to the fact that Panama would receive an

additional sum up to $10 million if canal revenues permit.

Now, if revenues do not permit this $10 million, at that point would

appropriations from the United States be called for?

Mr. LINOWITZ. No, sir; that additional $10 million is not a comitment; it is there if the canal earns the money. If it does not, then

there is no obligation to Panama; and the only limitation on that is:

If there are surpluses in future years, then that surplus may be used

to make up the deficit. Other than that there is no obligation to do

anything about making that payment to Panama.

SEA LEVEL CANAL

Mr. DERWINSKI. Now may I move on to the issue of negotiations

for the construction of a possible sea level canal. You state, Ambassador Linowitz, that Panama agrees it will not negotiate with any

other country for the construction of such a canal and that the

United States undertakes not to negotiate with any other nation.

Doesn't that put us in a situation where the Panamanians have the

veto power if we reach some decision at some point we may for

practical purposes build a canal elsewhere? We have agreed under

this treaty not to negotiate with another country.

Mr. LINOWITZ. To the same extent we have a veto power against

their undertaking to negotiate with any other country. In other

words, the correlativity of responsibility is to deal only with one

another in the construction of a sea level canal in the Western

Hemisphere.
13

And in that regard may I just say, sir, that when the study was

made in 1970 regarding the feasibility of a sea level canal, the recoinmendation was: If it were to be built at all, it be built in Panama.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Dr. Romulo Bethancourt is the head of the

Panama negotiating team that concluded this agreement with you.

Mr. LINowITz. Yes, sir.

PANAMANIAN NEGOTIATOR DISPUTES U.S. RIGHT TO INTERVENE

Mr. DERWINSKI. I have a copy of his statement he made to the

Panamanian Assembly a few weeks ago, and I am quoting from that

statement: "We are not giving the United States the right of intervention." And he goes on to say that, "What we are giving is assurance that the canal will be permanently neutral."

Now, how does this square with the argument that we will have the

assurances that the canal will be maintained, will be free for our use

and will be protectable?

Mr. LINOwITz. The neutrality treaty specifically says that the

United States and Panama agree to maintain the regime of neutrality

established in this treaty which shall be maintained in order that the

canal shall remain permanently neutral notwithstanding the termination of any other treaties entered into by the two contracting parties.

Interpretation of that language, which the Panamanians know and

which they understand, is that we will be in a position to take such

action as we may deem necessary in the event of any threat or attack

upon the neutrality of the canal.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. T he Chair would like to state that, as is

the custom when there is a matter of such vital interest to a particular

subcommittee, as a courtesy to the subcommittee chairman, lie will

be recognized out of order. Mr. Yatron.

Mr. YATRON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Ambassador

Linowitz or Ambassador Bunker, our Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the International Relations Committee just completed

a 14-day study mission to South America. We visited six countries;

we met with five Presidents out of the six countries as well as other

leaders from each of those countries.

LATIN AMERICAN SUPPORT FOR TREATIES QUESTIONED

We were told by the State Department prior to going on our trip

that all of these nations were very strongly in favor of the treaty; and

it is at least my impression, although I believe others share this

feeling, that at the completion of our mission, of all the leaders we

spoke to, including the Presidents, not one of them spoke very strongly

in support of the treaty. Would you care to comment as to why you

feel that they took this attitude?

Mr. LINOwITZ. It simply doesn't jibe with our impression with our

information and with the results of our own discussions. IV know

that there are some leaders of Latin American countries who would be

disturbed if today we were to undertake to trarisfer control of the

canal to Panama. They don't feel the Panamanians arc eaidy to

undertake operation and they have some questions as to whether this

would be the right course at the moment.
14

We have not talked to any leader of any Latin American country

who questions the need for our recognition of the sovereignty of

Panama or the desirability of reaching an agreement, as we have, for

turning over the operation and control of that canal to Panama.

TOLL INCREASE

Mr. YATRON. As I said, not one of them said they were opposed but

no one spoke very strongly in favor. As a matter of fact, in one country

I believe they were concerned about the increase in tolls, and in each

instance our delegation had to bring up the subject of the Panama

Canal.

Mr. LINOWITz. Let me say, on the tolls issue-because that may be

one of the things you are alluding to-there are some countries in

Latin America who have expressed their opinions at the OAS as being

concerned about the effect of a toll increase, surmising correctly that

some toll increase will be put into effect under the new treaty. But

when they understand that the United States is going to be responsible

for setting tolls as part of its operation, management and control of

the canal under this treaty, then they recognize that their concern

has been dealt with.

I don't know whether your trip, sir, was contemporaneous with or

preceded the agreements we reached.

Mr. YATRON. It was before, or just about the same time.

Mr. LINOWITZ. We do know that the reaction we have had has

been uniformly approving of the treaties as we have finally reached

them.

PANAMA CANAL COMMISSION TO BE SUPPORTED BY CANAL REVENUES

Mr. YATRON. The Panama Canal Treaty provides for the creation

of several bodies entrusted with the implementation of the treaty, namely, the Panama Canal Commission, the Panama Canal Consultative Committee, a combined board or joint commission on environment and training employees, Panama employees, and will these be

agencies supported by U.S. tax dollars?

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. WELBURN DOLVIN, MEMBER, U.S.

NEGOTIATING TEAM FOR THE PANAMA CANAL TREATIES

General DOLVIN. No, sir, those are organic parts of the new entity.

The Canal Commission will then be supported out of toll revenues as

an expense of doing business. It is possible that you might have some

Government official who might at some time sit in one of those, but in

general the answer to your question is no.

Mr. YATRON. I have one further question, then I am sure my other

colleagues have other questions.

U.S. DEFENSE RIGHTS UNDER NEUTRALITY TREATY

Article IV of the pr o posed neutrality treaty states that the United

States and Panama agree to maintain the regime of neutrality estab-
10

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16

SIGNERS OF THE DECLARATION OF WASHINGTON

Argentina-President Videla.

The Bahamas-Prime Minister Pindling.

Bolivia-President Banzer.

Brazil-Vice President Dos Santos.

Canada-Prime Minister Trudeau.

Colombia-President Lopez Michelson.

Costa Rica-President Oduber.

Chile-President Pinochet.

The Dominican Republic-President Balaguer.

Ecuador-President Poveda.

El Salvador-President Romero.

Grenada-Prime Minister Gairy.

Guatemala-President Laugerud.

Guyana-Deputy Prime Minister Reid.

Haiti-Foreign Minister Brutus.

Honduras-Chief of State Melgar.

Jamaica-Foreign Minister Patterson.

Mexico-Foreign Minister Roel.

Nicaragua-President of National Congress Hueck.

Paraguay-President Stroessner.

Peru-President Morales Bermudez.

Surinam-Ambassador Karamat.

Trinidad and Tobago-Ambassador McIntyre.

Uruguay-President Mendez.

Venezuela-President Perez.

Mr. FRASER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Torrijos in his statement last night indicated that one of

the concerns of Panama was that the United States might be able to

intervene. This would seem to be consistent with the statement that

you are making today. To the extent that such a right to intervene

exists, and I suppose it exists only to defend the neutrality of the

canal, and for no other purpose, that authority is to be found in

article IV of the Treaty on Neutrality.

Am I right about that?

Mr. LINOWITZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. FRASER. There is no other language about that in that treaty?

Mr. LINOWITZ. It is that article read in the construction of the

neutrality agreement. You see, there is a reference to the regime of

neutrality and the regime of neutrality is spelled out as open and

secure and later on in terms of efficiency and accessibility.

U.S. DEFENSE RIGHTS UNTIL THE YEAR 2000

Mr. FRASER. The impression that I have is that between now and

the year 2000 there isn't really much to be concerned about with

respect to the arrangements. That is, the United States maintains

control of the canal and can maintain defense forces until the year

2000. Generally, it seems to me that those concerned about the fate

of this canal have no cause for concern in that period.

It is the status of the canal after the year 2000 which I assume opponents of the treaty will argue represents a surrender of our claims,

our sovereignty, or whatever they think we have over the canal,

when we in effect turn it over to the Panamanians.

Is this your own sense of the political situation, that it is from the

year 2000 on where the argument will center?

Mr. LiNowITZ. One of our biggest problems has been to be sure

that the people understand what is in the treaty and you are absolutely
17

right, when they understand for the next 23 years we will continue

to have the responsibility for operation, maintenance, and defense of

the canal, then their only focus is what happens after the year 2000,

and that is where the terms of the Neutrality Treaty are indeed of

importance.

In that connection, may I just say that I have here the language or

I believe it is an accurate translation of the language used by General

Torrijos last night in the course of his remarks after the signing, and

he said:

We have agreed upon a Neutrality Treaty that places us under the Pentagon's

defense umbrella, a treaty which if not administered judiciously by the future

generations could become an instrument of permanent intervention.

Mr. FRASER. By the United States, presumably.

Mr. LINOWITZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. FRASER. I read that a journalist immolated himself in front of

the American Embassy in Stockholm. I gather that his main concern

was that the Panamanians didn't get enough out of the treaty, as I

read the news accounts.

Mr. LINOwITz. Yes, sir, Mr. Fraser, that opinion I must tell you

is shared widely in some corners in Panama and in some other places.

We have already received a number of indications that we may have

been too tough on some of these provisions. We don't think so. We

think we were fair, but that opinion has been asserted.

HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN PANAMA

Mr. FRASER. It is clear that General Torrijos runs a pretty tight

country; there are no political opposition parties permitted. I think in

the past he has exiled some of his opponents. Reports of torture are

not prevalent in recent years and some of the more violent abuses we

find in some countries have not been present in Panama in recent

years, as far as I understand it.

Mr. LINOWITZ. That is correct.

Mr. FRASER. On the question of the political nature of the regime,

General Torrijos is not likely to continue to govern for 23 years.

Nobody knows what kind of regime may come into power. I hope

that under the President's declared determination, we will give support to any democratic tendencies that may appear in that country.

Although I am a strong human rights advocate, I am not clear

about the argument being made that deprivation of human rights

should cause us not to negotiate. Is that an argument we should

be listening to?

Mr. LINOWITZ. The facts on that are very clear.

Mr. BUNKER. Well, I think there have been some violation- of

human rights in the past. Most of these took place I think before 1970

when Torrijos was consolidating his power. Amnesty Internation al, for

example, stated this in its report in 1973, but in 1975 it did not

mention Panama at all, and the report which the administration took

to the Congress on human rights, in May, I believe, of this year

indicated that there was no evidence of any systematic violation of

human rights in Panama.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Mr. Winn.

Mr. WINN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
18

ROLE OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES IN PROPERTY TRANSFER

ISSUES

I wouhl like to get some clarification if I may on the jurisdiction, and I think that you are aware of some of the problems that face

Congress. Under article IV of the Constitution, section 3 clause (2),

reads as follows, and I quote:

Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations p [r('ting the territory property belonging to the United States.

The question is, how does the administration view the power and

the right of the House of Representatives and its constitutional prerogative on property transfer as it relates to the Canal Zone and the

present treaties?

Xr. IANSELL. If I may respon(1 to that.

The provision that you have quoted from article IV, of course,

exists in the Constitution contemporaneously with the treaty power

of article II. and under the treaty power disposition of property belonging to the United States may be by treaty signed by the President

anid ratified by the Senate. There are concurrent means under the

Constitution for transfer of properties-the treaty power and the

legislative authority.

In connection with the Panama Canal transaction which is, of

course, a treaty transaction, all of the arrangements, and the basic

terms of these arrangements, are spelled out in the treaties and it has,

therefore, been deemed most appropriate that the full terms of the

tranlsactlon be accom)lished by treaty.

X1r. WINN. So it is the intention of the administration and those of

you involved in this treaty to go the treaty direction and ignore the

power to dispose of and to make the rules and regulations by the

Coiugre.s?

Mr. HIANsEL'L. I can't accept the term "ignore." The judgment has

been that this is appropriately a transaction to be completed by

treaty in all of its major aspects and that, of course, very much inc1lU(es the property aspects of the transaction.

Mlr. WJNN. But the fact that the announcement was made after

Congress was out of session and, in fact, you brought all of these Pan

American countries in here for the signing before you ever came to

1orgress for any authorization, whether it be funding or whether it

be the disposal of the Panama Canal property, to me means that you

,re ignoring the constitutional rights of the Congress.

Mr. IIANSELL. Well, it certaintly was not intended to be a matter of

ignoring. This has been a matter of tradition, practice, for many

decades. Property has been transferred by this Government under the

treaty' power as well as by legislation. The negotiations, which the

Ambassadors can speak to better than I, have been going on for many,

many yea rs.

Mr. WINN. I realize that.

Mr. IANSELL. And this issue has been discussed in hearings over

the years. I have testified both on the Senate and the House side on

this very question several times over the last several months.

LEGISLATION REQUIRED TO IMPLEMENT TREATIES

Mr. WINN. Let me switch subjects, then. In addition to the funds

that Panama will receive exclusively from the canal revenues, what
19

part of the p1)oposed (conoi1ie p11rn1d 10 1ll n,

aild credit will 1 qitre (Uong CiOt1 lI. h ify'

What I am trVing to figm21!e wit w! V0' o rj ,ou 1v ph I w(

are not gomgo to 1,e involved.

M r 1. 11A sE .171,1 n' th I u o 10 110sh -,n ten , ImbI I

caln dealwith (hats I( (F-o'i, (4 mom2 nV di. Thf I 2 a fre

m an11y as)ects of fthi imp lemen( tin f [1( U'-. th- 1red! Hy 11

legislation. Ini responSre to the (hai 's

Mr. WVINN. I heard that.

Mr. HANsELL. All of which i NVi Ill Ppropriateloy 2(' be th e 1 bjct of

legislation.

Then in this connection I simply want to be <-iue t hat w% und(ernand

that the economic development programi i-s se),rate from tIhe treati('s

and separate from the negotiations of the tieat ie4, al( as Aml):SSador

Linowitz indicated, was the subject of pa1r alleldsionL. Th1)o- 4e it em -n

would follow the normal procedures that would aly in oietion

with Export-Import Bank credits, AID housing gant e, OPIC

loan guarantees.

The items that make up that package woUild be developed' in a ecoridance with the usual procedures apphcable to thlo -e tanaions. Thio-e

are separate from the treaty implementatioi program.

Mr. INN. Well, then, the e proo0e loans and '1irAne anmdds 

credits do conform with CongressIonally mnanldate( :tvdir?

Mr. HANSELL. Absolutely.

IMPACT OF CONGRESsIONAL DIsAPPROVAL OF TREATIES

Mr. WINN. For economic and milit arv ass')ite"'?

Mr. HANSELL. Yes. Thfee would be no cli aznvie in fhe Colvenltlonal

procedires applicable to those programs.

Mr. WXINN. All right. Since it is a Separate is'ue, what if we .don't lo

it, what if we don't approve?

Mr. HANSELL. As Ambassindoir Linowitz in(Iicated (rlier, ei the

undertaking was to use our best effort s to endeavor to )iovide tliese

guarantees and credits. If in its wvisdom the C'ongre were lot to onact

whatever would be needed with respect to that hey would iot be

effectuated.

Mr. WINN. You col(d start out on two skis anid end tl) on one.

Mr. HANSELL. Those are not ain integral part of tie t reatv pIackage.

Mr. WINN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. The Chair would like to announce that lithe

Ambassadors are due at 12 o'clock at a I luncheon meetiin. Iey Iave

agreed to come back at 2 o'clock. The committee wilt, therefore,

reconvene at 2 p.m.

[Whereupon, at 11:45 a.m. the committee recessed, to rerolnvene at

2 p.m. the same day.] AFTERNOON SESSION

[The committee reconvened at 2 p.m., lion. Clement J. Zablocki,

chairman of the committee, presiding.]

Chairman Zablocki. The committee will please come to order.

The Chair will now recognize Mr. Hamilton.

Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ambassador, I first of all want to conimend you for what I

think has been an excellent negotiating jot). We are very leakedd

that you are here this afternoon.
20

IMPACT OF FAILURE TO RATIFY TREATIES

First, I would like to ask you what you think would happen if

you don't (et this treaty ratified?

\tr. LINOVITZ. There would be profound disappointment all

through Latin America. Their expectations having been raised and

agreement having been reached on a mutually fair treaty it is hard to

predict what form that disappointment might take. It would be serious

and could lead to some outbursts that would be very damaging in

the years ahead.

Mr. IAMILTON. What do you mean by outbursts? Do you think

there may be violence in the Canal Zone and in Panama?

X1[r. LINowITZ. We certainly can't dismiss that possibility.

Mr. HAMILTON. In any event, there is much less likelihood of those

kinds of things happening if you have the treaty than if you don't

have it?

Mr. LINOwITZ. There is no question at all about that.

FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF TREATY NEGOTIATIONS

Mr. HAMILTON. I had some questions about the financial aspects

about it that are not clear to me. You stated in your statement,

Ambassador Linowitz, that none of the loans, guarantees, and credits

will require appropriations from the Congress. I can understand that

with regard to the Export-Import Bank's credits and housing guarantees and the OPIC, but you also state in your statement that we

undertake to provide Panama up to $50 million in foreign military

sales credits over 10 years.

It is my- understanding that that would require an appropriation, and, therefore, I don't understand your statement with regard to

not requiring any appropriation.

Mr. LINOwITZ. I understand your not understanding the statement

because as it now reads it is not accurate and I wanted to tell you and

the chairman in response to your earlier inquiry that is true. What

happened was that, first of all, as you may know, in the last few

days we have been a bit occupied if I may say so. The two paragraphs

have been transposed on page 5. The paragraph starting with the

words "None of these loans" should come ahead of the paragraph

which now precedes it starting with the words "In addition".

In other words, the $200 million and $75 million and the $20 million

OPIC and the $50 million foreign military assistance fit within current

statutory programs.

APPROPRIATIONS REQUIREMENT

Mr. IIAMILTON. Do I understand that under the present treaty the

only appropriation we now make is the $2.3 million for Panama?

Mr. LINOwIrz. Yes, sir.

Mr. IJNIrILTON. And under the new treaties, if ratified, the only

appropriation would be for the foreign military sales credit item?

Mr. LINOWITZ. In all cases, they are current programs.

Mr. IAMILON. Is it your anticipation that the executive branch

will ask the Congress to provide that authority in the fiscal 1979

security assistance request?
21

Mr. LINoWI'rz. I don't know, but I think so, sir. Tlhat hasn't beeni

yet worked out, but my guess is it would be.

Mr. HAMILTON. Now, with regard to the payments to Panama, it

seems to me to be a kind of unusual arrangement. You have got a

fixed share of the tolls, which amounts to 80 cents per Panaaa (,'anal

ton. You think that would yield $40 million a year. On to) of that

you have another fixed payimelit of $10 million per year. On tO) of that

you have got another $10 million if the canal revenues permit.

M first question is why that unusual kind of a struct ure for your

tolls? The second question is, the Panama Canal has been losing n money

in the last few years. How are you going to (ret this $40 million or

$50 million out of that?

Mr. LiNowrrz. Well, let me take it a step at a time. There are three

different stIges, three different elements. Thc first one is wholly

uncertain. The 30 cents per ton we can't be sure of exactly how much

that will net and so that we now estimate maybe $40 million a year;

it may be less, may be more. The one certain figure is the $10 million,

which is a fixed expense.

Mr. HAMILTON. But that will certainly come out of canal revenues,

there is no chance that will come out of appropriations.

Mr. LINOWITZ. It says in the agreement it comes out of canal

operations, and the third would permit Panama to earn more if the

canal earns more.

Now, that means, as I testified earlier, in a given year there might

be no funds at all available for that purpose, but there may be in

subsequent years a surplus which could be used to make that up, but

there is no obligation as to the second $10 million.

INTEREST ON U.S. INVESTMENT

Now, if the canal, as you say, lost money, how are you going to be

able to make these payments? First of all, I want to call your attention to the fact that from the beginning we have been including as an

expense for it in connection with the operation of the canal an amount

which we labeled as interest on our original investment. Thus far, we

have received interest, so-called, on the original investment. That

is being paid now at the rate of about $16 to $20 million per year as an

annual payment to the United States labeled interest.

Mr. HAMILTON. That goes into the General Treasury the general

revenues of the Government?

Mr. LINOwITZ. Yes, they do. So that is a resource for some of these

payments immediately as a possible source of payment.

NEED FOR INCREASE IN TOLLS

Second, we do contemplate a toll increase will be necessary, an(

that toll increase we haven't yet decided on. It hasn't been decided

what the exact figure will be, because it depends on such things as the

availability of Alaskan oil and so forth, but it will probably be around

25 or 30 percent.

Mr. HAMILTON. Is it your anticipation that there will be any authorizations necessary in the Congress other than for the foreign military

sales credits as a result of this treaty?

Mr. LiNOwITz. No, sir.
22

r. I~oIl:rox. Now, iNIr. Amhbasador, I happened to hear your

im I -taat (1 i at tle Whiito louse the other day when you were

brietiIl the Vest Virginia and Arkun-as groups. During the course of

that tatelmient you set out your re;ponses to several common arguimen : that are malde against the treaty.

All I would like to ak you to (1o for the recordl-you lon't need to do

it now-simpV state thie-e arguments and the counter arguments in

writillg to the committee so that we have them as part of the record.

Those ar(ruments were, first of all giving up sovereignty, the ownership argument ; second, our security is endangered1 by this treaty; and third,

we are put at an economic disadvantage, I think is one argument used

against the treaty; and finally, that we are dealing with a dictator

in Panama. I think your responses to these arguments would be helpful

for us to have in the committee record.

Mr. LINOWLTZ. Thank you, sir. I will submit them.

[The information follows:]

LETTER, ARGUMENTS, AND COUNTERARGUMENTS ON PANAMA CANAL TREATY

Washington, D.C. September 9, 1977.

Hon. CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI,

Chairman, House International Relations Committee.

D: a AI. Cii xmiaL ,N: During the Committee's hearings yesterday,. Congressnman Hamilton asked me to supply for the record a statement of the four frequent

concerns about the new Panama Canal Treaty arrangements which I had

mentioned in recent briefings and my coinmentz about those concerns.

I am pleased to enclose the statement which Congressman Hamilton requ-('ted,

and I hope that it will l)e useful to you and to the members of the Committee.

With bet wishes,

Sincerely,

SOL \. LiNOWITZ.

CONCERNS FREQUENTLY EXPRESSED ABOUT THE PANAMA CANAL TRE \TY

ARtRANGEMENTS

1. Won't a new treatil mea i surrender of U.S. sorereigntqy orer the Panama Canal?

The simple answer is that the United States has never had sovereignty. The 1903

Treaty specifically gave the United States certain rights and authority which it

would have "if it were the sovereign." Obviously, these words would not have

been necessary if the United States were in fact intended to be sovereign.

Before the ink was dry on the 1903 Treaty Secretary of War William Taft

wrote to Preiident Theodore Roo-evelt asserting that the treaty "seems to preserve the titular sovereignty over the Canal Zone in the Republic of Panama."

A treaty of friendship entered into between the United States and Panama in

March 1936 referred to the Canal Zone as "territory of the Republic of Panama

under the jurisdiction of the United States.," In 1946 John Foter Dulles, as U.S.

Representative to the United Nations, acknowledged before the General Asseibly that Panama had never ceased to be sovereign over the Canal Zone.

The Supreme Court has dealt with the issue several times, but always for a

limited, specific purpose. Thus, in the earliest case of Wilson v. Shaw in 1907,

the Supreme Court held that for the purposes of the validity of U.S. expenditure

of funds to construct the canal, the zone was U.S. territory. But in 194S the Suprenme Court described the Canal Zone as "admittedly territory over which we do

not have sovereignty."

It is important to recognize the difference l)etween the rights acquired with

reference to Panama and the territory acquired in the purchase of Louisiana or

Alaska. In the Louisiana Purchase, the United St rates was explicitly granted

full sovereignty over the "territory with all its rights and appurtenances." In the

case of the purchase of Alaska from Russia, the 1 nited States was simnilarly ceded

all territory. In both cases it was a transfer of land; in neither transaction was

provision made for a continuing annual payment or for a continuing relationship

on the matters covered by the agreements, as is true in the Panama Canal Treaty.
23

It is worth noting that .S. citizenship ks ]I) granted it) chil(IIrell b)rn of nonU.S. parents in the zone. The zone porIs are considered forei gil pr(- for the plrpose of transporting the U.S. mail. Imports from the ( C:nal Z(1 (e intao the i.Ililed

States are treated exactly the same as imllport from forign cgi 1ries.

The simple fact is, therefore, that While we havae exei(lised vi01alI complete

jurisdiction over that part of the Panamanian territory whicli comprises the (Canal

Zone, we have never had actual sovereignty and do aot 111v it todaY.

2. Will a new Panama Canal treats prejudice our iatioaul sccurity?-The truth

of the matter is that the greatest danger to our secanrity interest in the canal

would be an effort to maintain and coitinlue the present status. WNh ile the canal

remains an important defense asset according to our l)epairtmnit of Defense,

it is no longer vital, clearly no longer as useful as it once was for the shifting of

combat forces. Larger warships and merchant tankers are unable to pass through

the canal. Alternative means of transportation have been developed which compete

by lowering costs to make land or air transportation economically viable.

But an open, secure, and efficient canal is still of importance to the United

States and the world. And in our negotiations we have worked closely with the

Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Stall to assure that our national

security interests wilt not in any respect he prejudiced under the new treaty

arrangements. They have assured us that the kind of treaty we have agreed upon

will not only preserve our security interests, but indeed enhance themn.

3. Will the new treaty seriously afflc (.8. commercials intcrcsts?-Vhile the

use of the canal commercially is still significant, ob viously its ilapolrt aiee has

diminished considerably as world cojiunerce patt ems :nd techm lagics of shipping have changed. Today larger vssels canot use th c : . In percent age

terms, the canal is much more imponllrnut to varians cemnltr. ( 4 Latin ineri

than it is to us. Today approxim1atlY s l)'cont of total S* (. Oo11 ttd ti-port

by value pass through thoe a each year. AoN()t 7 p (lint of tha l'S. sezborne

trade traverses the canal. To a subst mtitt al ext at, thnrefor, t(he cial1, though

still important, is obsolescent.

4. Is the i>resent Gwcru tuein of I aioua Mte olC wilth Oiow we 'Ooaoi be l xcyotial ig?-The fact is that for 1e-0rs nW th, Panmlina a am p b'eneava 

pressing for a new treaty. For over 12 yc:irs we have been engaged in negotiations. The present head of government, General (mar Torrijos, is conmnited

to try to work out a new treaty with the United States. And inI doing so he is

fully supported by the people in his country and following in the footsteps of

every Panamanian head of state since 1903, irrespective of any ideological

differences.

Chairman ZABLOCK1. Your time has expired.

I want to associate myself with the observations of the gentleman

from Indiana, being present at the same briefing. I think it would be

very helpful if you have a transcript of what you said at the White

House.

Mr. LINOwITZ. I will get it, sir.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Mr. Solarz.

Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me say, first of all, I think both of you gentlemen have performeld

a profound and historic service to the Nation. I think you can take

real pride in having played such an important role in making this

agreement possible.

Having paid my tribute to your good works, I hope you will forgive

me if I now ask you a couple of questions which I think are going

to come up (tring the course of what will undoubtedly be a very

heated debate in the Congress and in the country.

ROLE OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

As I idn(erstand your constitutional interpretation of Iha' athority

of the House in this matter, ouide of the $50 million r ihe foreign

military sales to Panama, the House itself will have no othl r specific
24

opportunity to get into the act. I believe that you contend that the

treatymaking power of the Senate is sufficient to transfer title to the

property and the other matters like the OPIC guarantees don't

require specific legislation by Congress.

Mr. LINOwITz. No, sir, that is not an accurate summary. I think

as Mr. Hansell was saying the treaty provides for transfer of the

property in a self-executing manner which does not require separate

legislation but separate legislation will be required for a variety of

purposes in connection with the implementation of the treaty.

Mr. SOLARZ. Such as?

Mr. LINOwITz. Setting up the Canal Commission which is going to

run the canal, policy with respect to tolls, policy with respect to

employee relations and so forth. So there will be a very significant

opportunity for the House of Representatives to become involved in

legislation designed to implement what the treaty calls for.

IMPACT ON TREATIES OF CONGRESSIONAL REJECTION OF IMPLEMENTING

LEGISLATION

Mr. SOLARZ. Supposing the treaty were approved by the Senate, but all of these ancillary pieces of legislation to which you referredand I think for the record it would be useful if you could give us at

this point a complete list of what action will be required by both

Houses-were unable to obtain the approval of the Congress? Would

Panama at that point be justified in saying that we haven't lived up

to our part of the bargain and the treaty was no longer valid, or

would the treaty remain in effect?

Mr. LINOwITL. I don't know because so many of these matters

involve agreements reached with respect to how the treaty will be

carried out and implemented.

For example, the setting up of a commission, to use the case in point,

we have solemnly agreed there will be a commission of nine members,

five Americans, four Panamanians, all to be appointed by the United

States. If the Congress in legislation were to abandon that approach

and suggest, let's say, all Americans, I should think that would have

a very significant impact on whether the treaty itself were acceptable.

So I think that the composite of all these issues which the House will

deal with will be central to the implementation of the treaty.

FORMAT OF IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION

Mr. SOLARZ. How many different items of legislation will be required

to secure the approval of the Congress once the treaty itself has been

ratified?

Mr. LINOwITZ. I don't know whether that has been worked out, has

it?

Mr. HANSELL. We would contemplate one legislative package being

submitted to the Congress that would encompass all of the various

submatters that might be dealt with and I think perhaps you may

not have been here earlier in the hearing this morning when we went

through the list of some of the areas that wculd be required which

we would hope one comprehensive legislative enactment would cover

all of the various submatters.

Mr. SOLARZ. An omnibus bill?

Mr. LINOWITZ. Yes, sir.
25

AUTHORITY TO TRANSFER U.S. PROPERTY

Mr. SOLARZ. You have a legal opinion, I gather, whieb j!'tifies

your conclusion that the House does not have in this insfalmce '( hority

over the transfer of American property in the Canal Zone7

Mr. LINOwITZ. No, it is not that the House does not, have aithoiit y,

we do have both legal opinion on behalf of the Depar nient of St ae

and also an opinion from the Attorney General, both of wLich we

would propose to submit for the record, that the trains er can costitutionally and legally be effected via the treaty power, that it is a

concurrent authority with the power cf Congress.

Mr. SOLARZ. I am sure as you know there are goinr to bc soie

powerful voices here in the House contending that the Constitltlon

requires the approval of the Congress as a whole for the tr ans!fer Of

property. How do you intend to respond to that concern?

Mr. LINOwITZ. Well, I think in the manner in which wo have delt

with it thus far, that is, while we respect those who hold that viewv,

we can only conclude that they are wrong; that is, the treaty power

does fully authorize transfer of property. The decisions of the Supreme

Court we think are quite clear, and the Attorney General concurs in

that judgment, that the transfer of property by the United States can

be effected by the treaty power as it has been historically in various

instances.

So we would propose to submit the treaty for ratification including

the proper tranfer provisions.

Mr. SOLARZ. Since the House will have the opportunity by refusing

to give its assent to the other parts of the package to which von

referred, thereby retaining the potential for disrupting the arranrement, it seems to me it might make sense for you to reconsider your

position on the transfer of property. One can easily envision a sii nation

whereby a measure of ill will is generated by those who perceive this

to be an unseeming effort on the part of the administration t> deny the

Congress its constitutional role in the transfer of property. I think it

would be unfortunate if the response of the House to the package as a

whole were jeopardized by virtue of ill will that was generated on the

particular point.

Mr. LINOwITZ. Mr. Solarz, let me see if I can briefly and clearly

answer that whole point.

The issue is whether or not there is authority. Clearly the Attorney

General and the legal authorities have decided that there is appropriate

authority within the treatymaking powers to transfer this property.

The question was then raised as to which legal device is the b est

course of procedure to be followed in connection with this treaty

arrangement. The decision has been taken after careful examination

that the best course is the self-executing power and to transfer property

on that basis. I think our position is that we are clear enough on our

ground we are perfectly willing to stand on it, and believe it is in the

best interests to proceed on that basis.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Your time has expired.

Mr. Buchanan.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

If I may pursue that point just a little further. Is it the interpretation of the Attorney General and of the State Department that
rtiCle IN', ection 3, clause 2, which contains the language, "Congress

shall have power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory and other property belonging to the

United States," that the Senate in ratifying the treaties satisfies the

definition of Congress, or is it your contention that while this is a power

of the Congress it is also a power of the Executive and aside from that

stated power in article IV, section 3, clause 2, in addition thereto you

can act as you are acting in this instance?

Mr. HANSELL. It is the latter, Mr. Buchanan. The treaty power, which exists under article II of the Constitution, is a separate grant

of power to the President, with the concurrence of two-thirds of the

Senate, to transfer property.

So there are concurrent ways property can be transferred. Of

course, transfer can occur pursuant to legislation under article IV.

Property also can be transferred pursuant to the treaty power. Mr.

Chairman, I wonder if it would be helpful if we were to submit for

the record both the opinion of the Attorney General and a copy of

my statement delivered before the House Committee on Merchant

marine and Fisheries on August 17 which sets forth the legal opinion

of the Department of State?

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Without objection.

[Mr. Hansell's statement and Attorney General Bell's opinion

follow :

STATEMELNFfr fLRBERT J. HJANSEE. LEGAL IPtA.NTME\T KAISER, OF STATE

B!Iro 1E 1OUSE COMMITTEE ON M1ER( HANT MARINE AND FISHERIES, AUG4ST 17. 1977

I wish to address this morning a legal question that has arisen in the course of

the Panama Canal negotiations. I refer to the question of whether property of the

United Statrs in the Canal Zone may he disposedi of by treaty, or whether legislation is required for such a disposition. Because this Committee has oversight

responsibility for the administration of the Panama Canal, the Canal Zone and

its waters, I appreciate that the Committee has a particular interest in this legal

question and I wish to discus it fully with you.

Ambassadors Bunker and Linowitz have described the general scope of the

proposed treaties. I would simply wish to reiterate that under the proposed

treaties, the Congress would have continuing legislative responsibility over such

matters as U.S. defense activities in Panama, organization and functioning of

the Canal operation, financial management of the Canal, employee relations and

navigation. In addition, specific legislation will be required to implement many

aspeets of the new relationship, including the establishment of a new Canal

operating agency, and a new employment system, and measures concerning the

financial management of the Canal.

While it is clear that exten-ive implementing legislation will be required, we

ae not able yet to make specific proposal concerning the contemplated legislation ince the texts of the treaties are still under negoitiTion. However, I would

emphasize, Mr. Chairman, that the Ihouse of Representatives will in any event

have a major role in the creation and impleentation of any new relationship

1)etween the Unitedl states and Panama.

I would now like to turn to the legal question concerning the power to transfer

The property. nub of the problem is the interrelation of the treaty power clause

of the Constitution (Art. 2, 2. cl. 2) and the property clause of the Constitution

(Art. 4, 3, cI. 2).

Arti-e 2, 2, el. 2, dealing with the powers of the Predent, state:

ie -hhall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to

nmke TI atiY, roviVled two thirds of the Senators present concur.''

Art ide 4, 3, (". 2 provides:

'The (ongre 1hall have power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and

Regulations re-preting the Territory or other property belonging to the UnitedA

State; and nothing in thi Con-titution shall be so nntrued as to Prejudice

any Claims of the ULnitel St at, or of any particular State.''
27

I first note that nothing in the language of the two clauses limits the treai v

power with respect to dispositions of property. Nor is Article 4 with respect to

disposition of property exclusive. As -l r. Justice Field stated in 6eofroy v. 11*9

"the treaty power, as expresed in the Constitution, is in terms imiliniti <1 excfppt

by those restraints which are found in that inrtruent. . . .'' But there is no

restraint expressed in the Constitution with respect to dispositions of property.

The property clause in Article 4, like most of the clauses granting legislative

powers contained in Article 1, provides that "Congress shall have power," without

any qualification indicating exclusiveness against the treaty power.

Today the rule is firmly settled that the treaty power extends to all areas

within the legislative authority of Congres, that are not expreflv ri -ervcd bv the

Constitution to the exclusive jurisdiction of Congress. Under Article , c,. 2 of the

Constitution, all treaties made under the authority of the United States which

are self-executing take effect as the law of the land.

The Constitution, of course, contains some provisions which linit the treaty

power with respect to specific subjects. Principal instances are Art. 1, 7, ci. I

and Ait. 1, 9, cl. 7. The former clause provides that "all bills for raising revenue

shall originate in the House of Representatives."' The second clause cited ordains

that "no money shall be drawn from the Treazurv, but in consequence of appropriations made by law." Hence it is recognized that treaties may neither impose

taxes nor directly appropriate funds.

The property clause in Article 4, however, contains no language that would

exclude concurrent application of the treaty power. In fact the placement of the

property clause in Article 4 of the Constitution (which deal. with federal-state

relations), rather than in Article 1 (which deals with the pc wers of Congress), provides further evidence that the property clause does not restrict the treaty

power. As the debates in the Constitutional Convention of 1787 show, the property

clause originated in conjunction with the grant to Congress, in the preceding

clause of section 3, of the power to create new states in the territories ceded to the

United States. The powers of Congress enumerated in el. 2 of that section were

added to establish federal authority over these territories and other property

belonging to the United States, while preserving the claims of the states and the

United States in disputed matters. The drafting history of that clause shows no

indication of any intent to restrict the scope of the treaty power.

It is also significant that the property clause in Article 4 links "the power to

dispose of" property closely to "the power to make all needful Rules and Regulations" respecting the Territory and other property belonging to the United

States. These two categories of Congressional power are closely related. The

applicability of the treaty power for one of these categories should be the same

for the other. It is well settled that the treaty power can be used to make rules

and regulations governing in the territory belonging to the United States, even

in the District of Columbia. 2

The power to dispose of public land anti other property belonging to the United

States by treaty is also supported by judicial decisions I and long standing practice.

The most familiar judicial statement of the power to transfer rights in land by

treaty was made by Mr. Justice Clifford in Holden v. Joy: I

" .* . it is insisted that the President and the Senate, in concluding such a

treaty, could not lawfully convenant that a patent should be issued to convey

lands which belonged to the United States without the consent of Congress,

which cannot be admitted. On the contrary, there are many authorities where it

is held that a treaty may convey to a grantee a good title to such lands without

an act of Congress conferring it, and that Congress has no constitutional power

to settle or interfere with rights under treaties, except in cases purely political."

Similarly in Jones v. Meehan,5 Mr. Justice Gray stated:

"It is well settled that a good title to parts of the lands of an Indian tribe may

be granted to individuals by a treaty between the United States and the tribe,

without any act of Congress, or any patent from the Executive authority of the

United States." 6

1133 U.S. 258 at 267 (1890). A Goefroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258 (1890). 2 Holden v. Joy, 17 Wall. (84 U.S.) 211, 242, 243 (1872) ; Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S.

258, 267 (1890) ; Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920) ; Asakura v. Seattle, 265

U.S. 332, 341 (1924) ; Santovincenzo v. Egan, 284 U.S. 30, 40 (1931) ; Reid v. Covert,

354 U.S. 1, 16 (1957). 4 Holden v. Joy, 17 Wall. (84 U.S.) 211 at 247 (1872).

9 175 U.S., 1 at 10 (1899).

6 175 U.S. 1 at 32 (1899).

911 991 _ r _ 0
28

Although the treaties in these cases were concluded with Indian tribes, the

decisions are authoritative precedents for treaties with foreign nations. As the

Supreme Court has stated, 7 the former power of the United States to make

treaties with the Indian tribes was-

"* . . coextensive with that to make treaties with foreign nations. In regard

to the latter , it is, beyond doubt, ample to cover all usual subjects of diplomacy."

Let me now turn to the treaty practice of the United States. There the precedents look two ways. The record shows instances where transfers of territory and

other pro(wrty have been made by or pursuant to treaties alone and instances

where treaties or executive agreements disposing of property belonging to the

United States have been concluded pursuant to or contingent upon Congressional

authorization.

Precedents supporting the power to dispose of property by treaty alone can

be found in the boundary treaties with neighboring powers, especially in the treaties between the United States and Great Britain of 1842 and 1846 for the location

of our northeast and northwest boundaries, and in the treaty with Spain of 1819

which effectuated the cession of Florida and determined the boundary west of the

Mississippi, ceding lands claimed by the United States on the Spanish side of the

boundary.

I would like to call your special attention to the treaty with Mexico of 1933

and the treaty with Mexico of 1970. Both of these treaties provided for the rectification of the river channel and the cession of lands which would have been

left on the other side of the channel.

Other recent examples of treaties transferring or providing for the transfer of

real and )personal property are the treaties between the United States and Honduras of 1971 recognizing the sovereignty of Honduras over the Swan Islands

and the treaty between the United States and Japan of 1971 for the return to

Japan of the Ryukyu and Daito Islands. Both treaties included provisions

for the transfer of real and personal property belonging to the United States

or its agencies. The terms of the treaties either transferred the property directly

or agreed upon the transfer of property. The transfers were made without implementing legislation apparently in reliance on the treaty or general statutory

authority to dispose of foreign excess property.

In the history of transfers of property to Panama we have had a mixed practice.

Property has been transferred by executive agreement implemented by a Joint

Resolution, by treaty providing specifically for legislation; and in at least one

instance by treaty alone. However in the legislation implementing the 1955

Treaty, Congress recognized the validity of conveyances made by operation of

the Treaty.

Thus, Mr. Chairman, for all of these reasons, we conclude that the Constitution permits the transfer of property belonging to the United States under the

treaty power.

Mr. Chairman, I am authorized by the Attorney General to state that he

concurs in the conclusions I have expressed here today. The Attorney General

has provided a formal written opinion setting out his views. With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I submit a copy of that opinion for the record.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my presentation. I will be pleased to try to

answer any questions. Thank you very much for this opportunity to appear.

LEGAL OPINION OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ON THE PANAMA CANAL TREATIES

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Washington, D.C., August 11, 1977.

The Honorable the SECRETARY OF STATE.

MI DEAR MR. S:CRETARY: Your letter of July 23, 1977, requests my opinion,

in connection with the negotiation of a new Panama Canal treaty, on a question

involving the treaty-making power of the President and its relation to the power

of Congress to dispose of territory or property belonging to the United States.

The question is whether a tr.-ty may dispose of territory or propeity belonging

to the United States absent statutory authorization.

Tlhe Constitution I)rovides I hat the President shall have power to make treaties

w, h the advice and consent of the Senate, if two-thirds of the Senators present

~ 7.S. v. 43 Gallons of Whiskey, 93 U.S. 188 at 197 (1876).
29

concur (Article II, section 2, clause 2); and it provides further that treati, munder the authority of the United States shall be the "supreme law of the !ai"

Article VI, clause 2.

At the same time, the Constitution give, Congress a number of specilie powers

that bear upon matters commonly subjected to the treaty power. I need mention

but a few: pursuant to Article I, section 8, Congres< has power to regulate foreign trade, to provide for the protection of rights in useful inventions, to iiake rule

governing captures on land and water, to establish a umiform rule fr at uralization, and to punish offenses against t he law of iatio I d adf o ur-e, pur- ant

v pyiiArticle IV, section 1, Congress has power t, dis t ri r 

belonging to the United States. Moreover, i hre iV atilhi vi I'v II I(

that Congress has general power, uite apart from tllc-e "jPerihic p I t, t

legislation relating to foreign affair'. ( cId States v. Cur:tujs- riyt pau I p

299 U.S. 304 (1P9r6) Pere- v. ul, :.P; T.S. 1r"w 44 197).

A question that arose very early il mur coni-Ztitut1o1, nal hi.t wIaY whether Il 'h

existence of these congressional power> tIinits the power f the Pre ident anu !lie

Senate to make law by treaty If a treaty u uch's a 1imater taat Congre:, ha

power to regulate, can the treaty be given the force and efflet of law, in alli )f

itself, if Congress has not enacted 1'gilation putting it effect? ito The ue1 In

you raise is one aspect of that g end question.

II.

I shall make two observations with respect to tiemien'aI i':V. Ii I . V t he

earliest days of the Republic the decisions of the . upreaie (''()urt \ e 1'id d

convincing support for the proposition that a treaty, unaided lby a act o

has the force and effect of law even if it touches a matter that V wit hin T he . eI 

tive jurisdiction of Congress. Indeed, the Court has held that a treaty, of it- wn

force, may supplant prior act-, of Congress to the extent that its enforcement inav

require that result. Cook v. I >itcd State,. 2S U.S. 102 19;3).

The seminal case, Un ite(I States v. Tic Schwuex P is 1 Cranch IW) 1U ) i

was decided in an opinion by Chief Justice -Marshall. during the undeclared naval

war with France, Congre-s enacted a statute that tomh rized the Presidu 

grant commissions to public vessel, with instructions that they should -eize

armed French vessels on the high seas, bring them to our ports, no subject theii

to condemnation in the courts of the United States. Act of July 9. 179>, c.LXV111,

1 Stat. 578. In 1800 the American ship Trumbull, sailing i:nder a coinis>-ion

issued pursuant to the statute, seized an armed French ve-l, the schooner Peyol,

and brought her to port. A proceeding was then instituted against the Pegel: -nd

after a sentence of condemnation wa, entered in the court belhw. a ippell was

taken to the Supreme Court.

During the pendency of the appeal President Jefferson, with the advice and

consent of the Senate, concluded a treaty with France. The treaty provided,

among other things, that vessels that had been seized by either nation ,liould be

"mutually restored" if they were not yet "definitively condemned.'

Thus, when the case of the Peg! came before the (Curt, the utietan WAS

whether the treaty controlled the disposition of the prize. If it did, the eho e

was to be restored to France. If it did not, the schooner wa, to be condemuni.d,

under the statute; and the proceeds were to be distributed equally between the

United States and the officers and men of the Trw , U 

The Court held that the treaty controlled. It wa a law of the United State>,

not by virtue of any act of Congress. but by virtue of the command of e "'onstitution itself; and it had intervened during the appeal to change the -tatutory

rule that had governed the decision below. Because the sentene Of cOidemnata 

was not yet final, the schooner was not vet "Cefinitively condemned," and it was

therefore subject to the treaty. The schooner was to be re.t ord to Fraice. I

Cranch at 109-10.

1 Indeed, the question arose in connection with t d#Iate !e over the very fir, r

made under the Constitution. the Jay Treaty with Crell Britain. The trex:1 pr ed

the creation of certain commissions and therefore r uird an a0pra Iof

President Washington, together with other Fedcralisu inchding Hailton Hi C

Justice Ellsworth, took the view that the treaty. of its own force. cread an idi

obligation as a matter of domestic law, and that Conress w re ri1

the necessary funds. Jefferson, Madison. and other lRepublicans took the Tew h r

the Jay Treaty nor any other treaty could regulate matters that were x t n 

lative jurisdiction of Congress. See 1 C. ter. "The Tr" VI 

States." 422 et seq. (1902) ; S. Crandall. "Treaties The

165 et seq. (2d ed. 1916) ; 1 W. Will ghby. "The Cia

States," 549 (2d ed. 1929). Jefforsn reitrated the epu ican V i

Parliamentary Practice." See L. Ienkin, "Foreign fftairs and the CCittion

et seq. 1972) [hereinafter cited as . hL].
30

Implicit in the decision was the elementary proposition that the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, had power to make a self-executing

t reaty affecting the disposition of a vessel captured at sea even though Congress

had power to make rules (and had in fact made a conflicting rule) governing the

same subject matter. The Court expressed no doubt whatever about the constitutionality of the treaty.

In the years that followed this decision the Supreme Court gave "self-executing" efTeet to numerous treaties that disposed of matters that Congress had power

to regulate. See, e.g., Hijo v. United States, 194 U.S. 315, 323-24 (1904) (claims

against the United States); Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 118-19 (1933)

(customs inspections); Bacardi v. Domenech, 311 U.S. 150, 161 (1940) (trademarks); see generally Henkin, supra, note 1, at 149. Today, as a result of these

and other decisions, it could not be successfully maintained, as a general proposition, that the treaty power stops where the power of Congress begins. On the contrary, the Court has said that the treaty power, operating of itself and without

the aid of congressional legislation, extends to all proper subjects for negotiation

between our Nation and others. Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332 (1924).

The lesson of history is that these "proper subjects" include many that are within

the legislative jurisdiction of Congress.

My second observation is related to the first. I have suggested that the two

powers-the power of Congress to legislate and the power of the President and

the Senate to make "self-executing" treaties-may overlap. I do not mean to

suggest that they are coextensive. They are both created by the Constitution and

they are both subject to the fundamental limitations that are imposed thereunder; 2 but the limitations that apply to the one do not necessarily apply to the

other. The treaty power may extend to subjects that are beyond the legislative jurisdiction of Congress. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920). Similarly, the

President and the Senate may be powerless to accomplish by treaty what the

Congress can accomplish by statute.

I shall elaborate briefly upon the latter point. Some lower courts 3 and many

serious students of the law 4 have expressed the view that certain matters are

subject to regulation by Congress only; and that a treaty, if it purports to deal

with such a matter, can be given effect only to the extent that it may be authorized

or implemented by statute. The two matters that are frequently mentioned in

this regard are the raising of revenue and the appropriation of funds. The Constitution provides that "all" hills for raising revenue "shall" originate in the House

(Article I, section 7, clause 1), and, further, that "no" money shall be drawn

from the Treasury except in consequence of "appropriations" made by law

(Art icle I, section 9, clause 7). In the face of these provisions the opinion expressed

by some is that a treaty purporting to require the establishment or alteration of

a revenue measure, or a treaty purporting to require an appropriation of funds, could not be effective, as a matter of domestic law, in the absence of statutory

authorization or implementation. I find it unnecessary to deal with that issue in

order to answer the question you have put to me.

I now turn to the question at hand.

III.

The point of departure is the broad principle that was laid down in Geofroy v.

Riggs, 133 U.S. 258 (1890), and was repeated in Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265

U.S. 332 (1924), to which I have alluded above: the treaty power extends to all

proper subjects for negotiation between our Nation and others; and when a

treaty purports to do so, it acts ex proprio vigore, without the aid of legislation,

and is effective for all purposes, provided it does nothing that is forbidden by the

Constitution.

2 In Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957), Mr. Justice Black stated the applicable rule:

"The prohibitions of the Constitution were designed to apply to all branches of the

National Government," including the Congress, the Executive, and the Executive and

Senate combined. Id. at 17-18.

3 See, e.g., Turner v. American Baptist MissionarV Union, 24 F. Cas. 344 (No. 14251) (C.C. Mich. 1852).

4 John C Calhoun was of opinion that a treaty could not authorize a withdrawal of funds

from the Treasury. 29 Annals of Congress, 531-32 (1816). In 1949 the Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, expressed the view a treaty could not put the United States into war.

Only Congress could declare war. "Hearings on the North Atlantic Treaty Before the

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations," 81st Cong., 1st sess., pt. 1, at 11 (1949). See

generally Henkin, supra, note 1, at 159.
31

Does the Constitution forbid the President and the Senate to make zelfexecuting treaties disposing of territory or property belonging to the United

States? I have taken note of the opinion, held by some, that the Constitution

entrusts certain matters to Congress alone. In my oDinion, however, the disposition of territory or property belonging to the United States is not such a matter. In

my view, territory or property belonging to the United States may be disposed of by action of the President and the Senate under the treaty claule.

There are at least four considerations that support this conclusion, and I

shall discuss them briefly below.

First, the fact that the Constitution gives Congress power to dispose of territory or property belonging to the United States (loes not suggest that the President

and the Senate have no power to do so under the treaty clause. This was the

implicit teaching of Marshall's decision in the Peggy and of the cases that followed.

The existence of power in Congress does not impl y an absence of power under the

treaty clause. On the contrary, the one proposition of which we can be certain

is that many of the powers that are given to Congress are shared by the Presiden

and the Senate when they act, under the treaty clause, to conclude and effectuate

bona fide international agreements.

I think it follows that if one were to hold that the power to dispose of territory

or property belonging to the United States resides in Congress alone and is

distinguishable in that respect from the numerous powers that are shared, one

would be obliged to find some basis for the distinction either in the text of the

Constitution or in the history of the relevant provisions. I find none.

The language of Article IV, insofar as it confers upon Congress the power of

disposition, is identical to the language of Article I, which confers upon Congress

numerous powers that may be exercised by the President and the Senate through the

self-executing treaties. Article IV says that Congress "shall have power" to dispose

of territory or property belonging to the United States, just as Article I says that

Congress "shall have power" to regulate foreign commerce, to make rules governing captures on land and water, and so forth. Article IV goes on to say that (ongress shall have power to make "all" needful rules and regulations respecting

territory or property. As in the case of Article I, however, Article IV does not say

that the powers it confers-the power to dispose of territory or property, and the

power to make rules and regulations respecting it-shall reside in Congress alone.

The record of the proceedings during the Constitutional Convention supports

the interpretation that is suggested by the language of the Constitution itself. The

territory and property clause of Article IV was adopted (luring a general discussion

of the role that the central government should play in connection with the territorial claims that had been asserted by the several States with respect to the

western lands. In the course of the discussion there was no suggestion whatever

that the purpose or effect of the clause was to give Congres exclusive power to

authorize or implement international agreements disposing of territory or property.

See 2 M. Farrand, "The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787" 457-59,

461-66 (rev'd ed. 1937) [hereinafter cited as Farrand].

The history of the treaty clause is even more conclusive. During the course of

the convention several proposals were put forth. One would have required every

treaty to be approved by both Houses of Congress. 2 Farrand, supra, at 532, 538.

That proposal was rejected. Another would have required the Senate to concur in

treaties, but would have exempted peace treaties from that requirement, except

for peace treaties depriving the United States of territory or territorial rights. 2

Farrand, supra, at 533-34, 543. That proposal was rejected as well. In its place,

the convention adopted a proposal that required the Senate to concur in all

treaties.

It may be possible to interpret these actions in a different way, but the simplest

and, for me, the most persuasive interpretation is this: the delegates to the convention assumed (1) that the treaty power could and would extend to questions

of territory, and (2) that treaties, including treaties affecting right, in territory,

could be effective in the absence of action by both Hiouses.5

~ I should note that this very point was considered in the State conventions that were

called to ratify the new Constitution. The objection was made that the treaty clause gave

the President and the Senate power to alienate territory. The Virginia and Norh Carolina

conventions proposed a remedial amendment that would have required every treaty ceding

or compromising rights or claims of the United States in territory to be approved by

three-fourths of the Members of both Houses of Congress. 2 "Documentary History of the

Constitution." 271. 382 (in. U.S. Cong. Doe. Ser., No. 415) : see generally S. Crandell.

"Treaties Their Making and Enforcement." 220-21 o2d ed. 1916 

98-991 0 - 78 - 4
32

This brings me to the third consideration that sunorts my basic conclusion.

To the extent that the Sunreme Court has spoken to the question, the Court has

said that the President, with the concurrence of the Senate, may conclude a treaty

disposing of territory or property belonging to the United States, and that such

a treaty may convey good title to the territory or property in question. No act of

Congress is required. United States v. Brooks, 10 How. 442 (1850); Doe v. Wilson,

23 How. 457 (1859); Holden v. Joy, 17 Wall. 211 (1972): Best v. Polk, 18 Wall.

112 (1873); Francis v. Francis, 203 U.S. 233 (1906). The dictum in Holden v. Joy

is one of the clearest statements of this principle:

"[Tlt is insisted that the President and Senate, in concluding such a treaty, could not lawfully covenant that a patent should be issued to convey lands

which belonged to the United States without the consent of Congress, which

cannot be admitted. On the contrary, there are many authorities where it is held

that a treaty may convey a good title to such lands without an act of Congress

conferring it. . . ." [ 17 Wall. at 247].

I do not hold that these cases provide a sufficient answer to the question you

have raised. They all involved Indian treaties and questions of "title" to real

property. I do think, however, that the principle for which they stand is one

of general application; that it bears upon your question; and that it supports the

conclusion I have reached. These cases, when viewed in light of the textual and

historical considerations I have already mentioned, provide substantial support for

the proposition that a treaty disposing of territory or property belonging to the

United States may be self-executing. I find no cases to the contrary.

Finally, my conclusion is supported by historical practice. While I do not suggest

that the commands of the Constitution may be attenuated by persistent practices

not in conformity with them, I must observe that as a matter of historical fact the

President and the Senate have made self-executing treaties disposing of territory

or property belonging to or claimed by the United States.

I shall mention one rather clear example of the practice. Under the Florida

Treaty with Spain (1819) the United States ceded all its territory beyond the

Sabine River in Texas to Spain in return for the cession of the Spanish territories

of East and West Florida. 8 Stat. 252, T.S. No. 327. While there had been some

dispute over some of the relevant boundaries, the congressional debates, as well as

President Monroe's annual message to Congress, make it clear that many considered

the action to be an outright *cession of American territory in exchange for Spanish

territory. 36 "Annals of Congress" 1719-38, 1743-81; 2 J. Richardson, "Messages

and Papers of the Presidents" 55 (1896). No statute authorizing the American

cession was ever enacted. 6

There have been a number of other treaties that have been self-executing insofar as they have disposed of territory or property belonging to the United States

or have compromised a claim of the United States to property or territory claimed

by a foreign power.7 I do not believe that the validity of these treaties could be

questioned today.

IV.

In stating my opinion with respect to the question you have raised, I have taken

note of general principles that bear upon the relation between congressional power

and the power of the President and the Senate under the treaty clause; but I

have no occasion to express an opinion with respect to any other questions that

may arise in that context, and I express none.

Sincerely,

GRIFFIN B. BELL, Attorney General.

Mr. LINOWITZ. May I add a word?

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Yes.

Mr. LINOWITZ. Because I think the situation is quite clear, as I

understand it. Both the Attorney General and the legal adviser of the

* The self-executing effect of the Spanish cession was the subject of two decisions by

the Supreme Court. Foster v. Neilson, 2 Pet. 253 (1829) ; United States v. Arredondo

6 Pet. 691 (1832). Congress did enact legislation authorizing the President to take possession of the Spanish cessions and to provide rules for their government. Act of March 3.

1819, c. XCIII, 3 Stat. 523, Act of March 3, 1821, c. XXXIX. 3 Stat. 637.

7 See, e.g., United States-Great Britain Treaty of 1842 (Webster-Ashburton), 8 Stat.

572, T.S. No. 119: United States-Great Britain Treaty in Regard to Limits Westward of

the Rocky Mountains of 1846 (Oregon Treaty), 9 Stat. 869. T.S. No. 120.
33

State Department have pointed out that there are certain powers

which are exclusively within the provision of the Congress and there

are certain powers which may be exercised by treaty or by legislation.

Thus, for example, the appropriation power or the raising of funds

for revenue purposes must be by legislation. But in this case both

article II and article IV, in our view, and in the view of the legal

authorities who are responsible for these determinations have decided

that either is legally feasible and that in this particular instance the

better course would be to proceed with the self-executing authority.

Mr. BUCHANAN. As your decision may imply, while you have been

through an arduous process of negotiating and you have represented

our country ably, I think you know that perhaps your most difficult

task lies ahead in helping the President convince the Congress and the

American people of the merit of the fruits of your labor.

Let me ask one more question.

I hate to keep plowing the same ground. I want to be sure I understand, sharing your view very strongly of the importance of the

permanent guarantee of the neutrality of the canal, and since you have

made some very strong statements concerning our unilateral right to

provide such a guarantee should neutrality be violated or threatened,

in the treaty concerning the permanent neutrality article IV, of

course, commits us along with the Panamanians to such permanent

neutrality, but article V says that after the termination of the Panama

Canal Treaty only the Republic of Panama shall operate the canal and

maintain military forces, defense sites and military installations within

its national territory.

In discussing that before the National Assembly of Panama, Dr.

Bethancourt who headed their negotiating team said on August 19,

1977, that they had first wanted to make plain that American forces

couldn't be there after December 31, 12 noon, 1999, but your objection

on the ground that might imply there could be Cuban forces or Russian

forces led to the end result of the present language providing only for

Panamanian forces after that time.

U.S. ABILITY TO DEFEND THE CANAL UNDER TERMS OF NEUTRALITY

TREATY

Now, my question is, If we have no military presence there and the

Panamanians only will maintain military forces, defense sites, and

military installations, how then do we fulfill our role should it become

necessary?

Mr. LINOwITZ. General Dolvin may want to amplify this. I can

say to you this provision has the full approval of the Department of

Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

General DOLVIN. Mr. Buchanan, if I could, we interpret that to

mean no other nation other than Panama could garrison forces there

and the Joint Chiefs feel that they can carry out that responsibility

from the forces located elsewhere, external forces, we can bring them in.

But when it says no other forces would station themselves there it is in

the sense of garrisons we now have there, but we would exercise

whatever forces are needed, we will bring them from Fort Bragg or

Fort Campbell or marines at sea or wherever needed.
Mr. BUCHANAN. Is our present presence there such that you don't

feel this would be a significant difference, the difference between the

present situation and the situation you have described in terms of

our ability to defend neutrality?

General DOLVIN. Well, at present, sir, we have what I would call a

modest garrison in Panama. It is essentially as you probably know an

infantry brigade, which is enough for normal circumstances. Even

under the present circumstances, if required, we would bring in extra

forces. However, it is a little different military operation when you

have bases that you reinforce as compared to a situation when you

don't have a base. But either one of them are workable military

solutions.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Politically do you think it is clear enough to the

Panamanians as well as to us that in the unhappy event that that

time should come this would not be treated, for example, like the

Turkish action on Cyprus or the American action in Vietnam, even

though we were invited by the then Government of South Vietnam?

I mean do you think it is clear enough that such action would not be

construed as an invasion by outside force since we would have no

military presence?

PROTOCOL TO NEUTRALITY TREATY

Mr. LINOwITz. Yes, sir. Moreover, let me point out something.

I refer to in my opening statement to the protocol which will be appended

to the neutrality treaty. This protocol, as I said, will be offered for

signature to all the countries in the world. We have every reason to

believe that, well, it is certainly overwhelming perhaps all others in

the hemisphere and I should think a number of others will want to

subscribe to this protocol.

This protocol says:

The regime of neutrality which the United States of America and the Republic

of Panama has agreed to maintain will insure permanent access to the canal by

vessels of all nations, et cetera, and whereas the said regime of effective neutrality

shall constitute the best protection for the canal and shall ensure the absence of

any hostile act against it, the contracting parties hereby acknowledge the regime

of permanent neutrality and associate themselves with its objectives.

And the signatories further on agree to observe and respect the

permanent neutrality. If, therefore, a circumstance should arrive in

which we found it necessary to take some form of military action

with respect to an attack on the neutrality of the canal, we would be

doing so not only pursuant to the specific permanent neutrality treaty

but with the knowledge and the endorsement of the other countries

in the world who are looking to us to preserve that neutrality.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Thank you.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Mr. Wolff.

Mr. WOLFF. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have listened in the short time I have been here with great interest

to some of the questions that have been proposed regarding the treaty.

One area of concern that I have, and I take it that this has been

questioned before, but I would like to raise the point again, Ambassador Bunker and Ambassador Linowitz, are there any other codicils

to this agreement other than this protocol that we have seen, the
35

papers that we have before us? Are these the only two papers that

there are?

Mr. LfNOWrTZ. No, sir; there are two treaties. Appended to the

neutrality treaty is the protocol. There is also an instrument which

contains two agreements in implementation of two provisions of the

treaty and then there will be annexes and maps. The treaties and the

implementation agreements are now available and have been publicly

made available. The annexes, I guess, are now being printed in final

form and maps have been prepared in final form and that is everyVthing.

Mr. WOLFF. There are no other? We have had some difficulties

with Vietnam, as you know.

Mr. LINOWITZ. I know.

EXISTENCE OF OTHER AGREEMENTS

Mr. WOLFF. And there are no other memorandums of agreement?

Mr. LINOwITz. There are no other agreements, written, unwritten,

understandings, which affect this treaty that are not covered in any

one of these, in one of the (ocuIments I referred to.

Mr. WOLFF. There are no others not affecting this treaty, but there

are no other memorandums of agreement nor have there been any

other conversations held with the Government of Panama that would

in any way bind our Government to any other activity other than

that which has been spelled out. Am I correct in that?

Mr. LiNOWJTZ. Yes, sir. But let me be .sure that I say it clearly.

There are no other agreements or understandins which are not already

public or which will not be made public affecting these treaties. There

are some documents which have been exchanged on some minor

things such as on post office and Gorgas Memorial Institute and so

forth, letters between the two governments. There aire eight of them,

I guess, or nine of them dealing with-I can read the listing of these.

These are the notes which have been exchange(d on commissary, post

office and Gorgas Memorial Institute on what is called joint agreement

on certain activities on the FAA, on the protective status of BarroColorado Island, Smithsonian Institution and implementation of the

Barro-Colorado agreement, and I think that is it. Those are the only

letters which are ancillary to the document,.

Mr. WOLFF. Have there been any other unilateral declarations that

have been made by either side? What I am trviny to (et at is, is there

any other discreet documents we don't know about r1'iht now that are

liable to be surfaced in the future?

It took us some 4 years to find another document that unfortunately

causes us great embarrassment today.

Mr. LINOWITZ. Mr. Wolff, in answer to your question, there are

none. You want to know if there is anything of substance, anything

of significance that is not contained in the docIments that have been

made public or will be made public. The answer is no.

Mr. WOLFF. Are there any promises or recommendations tat have

been made with the Government of Panama that have not s urfaced?

Mr. LINOwITZ. There is a letter from the Secretariy of State to the

officials of Panama which undertakes to use our best efforts to make

available the economic arrangements which I diussed in my opening

statement.
36

Mr. WOLFF. Thank you very much. It is very reassuring to know

that we won't be met in the future with some additional documentation that might influence us one way or the other as to how we should

proceed at this point.

Mr. LINOWITZ. May I also say we were cognizant of the past

hi storv.

Mr.XXOLFF. Thank you.

Chairman ZABLOCKi. The Chair would like to announce there is a

qiuorum call in progress if the Members intend to return. If the

Members want to stay on, the Chair is willing to continue.

Well, the Chair will forego going for a quorum.

Mr. Pease.

Mr. PEASE. Xes.

Mr. Chairman, I thought the Chair was going to recess and I

wouldn't have a chance. I appreciate this opportunity, just a couple

of questions.

Before I begin the questions, let me just say that I think that our

representatives in this negotiating session have done an excellent job

and are to be highly commended for the work that they have done.

Obviously, the Congress needs to look at your work and it may be

open to some question at some point, but I think overall you have

done a fine job. I commend you for it.

APPROVAL OF DISPOSITION OF U.S. PROPERTY

I am just sort of curious. There has been a lot of discussion about

the route taken to approve the disposition of U.S. property, the

transfer of U.S. property, whether it should be through the Congress

or through the treaty process. When you are thinking in those terms,

thinking of land transfer, is it your position that you are transferring

only improvements to the land, and does the question of sovereignty

and ownership of the land come into play there?

Mr. HANSELL. Well, if we can distinguish between sovereignty and

ownership. There is no doubt that we are dealing with ownership of

land. That is, there are lands and waters involved in the transfer.

Questions of title are somewhat uncertain as to some parcels of property, but there is no question that we are dealing with lands and

waters as well as improvements.

Mr. PEASE. OK.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PACKAGE

The economic development program that is outside of the treaty

contains several elements. Are those figures already agreed to or will

they be provided to Panama through action of the executive branch;

have the decisions been made, in other words?

Mr. LINOWITZ. Best efforts will be provided to provide up to those

amounts.

Mr. PEASE. Best efforts will be made to provide those?

Mr. LINOwITz. Yes, sir.

Mr. PEASE. Particularly FMS credit, that could require an action

of Congress to do that.
37

What effect, if any, will there be on the treaty if those efforts were

not successful and none of those economic development program

elements were included?

Mr. LiNowrTz. Let me reemphasize as I think we have indicated

before, Mr. Pease, the economic development ;ackaLe is not part of

the treaty, it has been negotiated separately, and it calls for an undertaking on the part of the United States to u-e it- best efforts to provide

these economic elements.

Therefore, the treaty would stand even if the economic development

package does not go forward. Obviously we would iole it does go

forward; we think it is in our highest interests to help Panama with

its economic development, but it is not integial as part of the treaty

itself.

IMFACT OF FAILURE TO RATIFY TREATY

Mr. PEASE. My final question. Mr. Chairman, what do you see

as the effect of nonratification of this treaty if it were not to be ratified

by the U.S. Senate?

Mr. LiNowIz. -fr. Hamilton asked that question earlier and the

response was that there would be a deep sense of di-appointment

throughout Latin America, that there would be a reaction, we don't

know what form it might take, but after all these years of expectation

we shouldn't be surprised at outbursts that could cause real problems.

Mr. PEASE. In terms of the operation of the canal, things will

proceed as they have been going for the last 60 years, we would proceed

under the existing treaty.

Mr. LINOwITz. There would be a new structure, the United States

would work through a new Government agency which, as Ambassador

Bunker said in his opening statement woli be supervised by five

American and four Panamanian appointees.

Mr. PEASE. Excuse me, I am thinking if the treaty were not ratified.

the operating arrangements would continue?

Mr. Li-owITz. Under the present system yes, sir.

Mr. PEASE. Thank -ou, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Perhaps the Chair should recess and still try

to make this quorum, if you gentlemen don't mind.

Thank you very much.

[Whereupon, a'short recess was taken.]

Chairman ZABLOCKi. The committee will resume the hearing.

Mr. Goodling.

Mr. GOODLING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have a couple of questions that I wol like to ask. As both of

you know, we have met on a couple of c casions, several members

of the committee, and on both occasions we talked about four particular areas that I had great concern about, and I would like to mention

those.

U.S. RIGHTS UNDER THE NEUTRALITY TREATY

First, that the United States ha, the right to guiarantee the netrality of the canal without any termination date.

One question I have in relationship to that. I we perceive ,d that

the problem would come internally, that if we in fact n to guarantee
38

the neutrality it just might be that the problem is with the Panamanians themselves or with problems within Panama. I am assuming when you say we have the right to guarantee neutrality that includes

any Panamanian problems that may cause a problem as far as neutrality is concerned?

Mr. LINOWITZ. Mr. Goodling, there is no limitation on our authority

to do what has to be done to assure the preservation of the neutrality.

Mr. GOODLING. I have another problem with that which I will

bring up a little later.

EXPEDITIOUS PASSAGE OF U.S. WARSHIPS

Second, our concern was that our warships would not be impaired

as they go to and from, and if I read the treaty properly, I assume

that that is true, that we do have access, rapidly, to warships going

back and forth?

Mr. LINOw1Tz. Yes, sir, expeditious passage in time of peace and

war.

LOSS OF U.S. INTEREST PAYMENTS

Mr. GOODLING. And the third concern that we have had when we

talk about no American tax dollars, I assume everything comes out

of tolls. I do have a little concern with the loss of $20 million in interest.

I would have to assume that we have lost $20 million, at any rate, of income that we normally would have had. Is that not right?

Mr. LINOwITZ. Probably, unless there are unanticipated earnings,

but I think for all practical purposes we probably are not going to

have that.

Mr. GOODLING. But again, I am correct in saying that there is no

request for tax dollars involved in the treaty?

Mr. LINOWITZ. Yes, sir.

U.S. EMPLOYEES IN CANAL ZONE

Mr. GOODLING. And, fourth, our concern was Americans working

in the Canal Zone. I am a little concerned with the way it was written

in, I think it was Ambassador Bunker's statement, "in general, these

are designed to allow present employees, both American and Panamanians, whose services will be required by the new Panama Canal

Commission to continue working under conditions generally no less

favorable." There are a lot of generalities.

I am assuming there is some provision for those people who are

5 years from retirement, 8 years from retirement, no place to go,

there is some specific area that they can go to in Government work

if they are not needed in the canal?

Mr. BUNKER. Early retirement provisions are provided for, Mr.

Congressman.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS PACKAGE SEPARATE FROM TREATY

Mr. GOODLING. And then one question that goes back to the question

that was posed about the neutrality, I think that it was by Mr.

Hamilton. I wasn't quite sure in your response to Mr. Hamilton. I

had i feeling that what he was tying into this package, it goes back
39

to my question about the tax dollars. I thought he was tving into this

whole thing the area they talked about, economic assistance, miilitarV

assistance and so on, and I am un der the impression that that in no

way has anything to do with the treaty, yet nobody -omiled to ,eparat e

that during your give and take on that particular area.

Mr. LINOWITZ. In my opening statement, sir, I did point out that

the economic package, so-called, economic development package is

separate and apart from the treaty.

Mr. GOODLING. I am very sensitive to that because I don't want

some "Vietnamese letter" coming forth 5 years down the pike and

saying oh, when you agreed to that treaty von agreed that You were

going to send-I have a pretty good record against military sales and

I don't want to get caught in that bind down the pike. I want to be

assured that in no way does my own record being for the treaty have

anything to do with any economic packages or military packages

down the pike 5 years, 10 years or whenever it may be, that they are

not just tied together. Can I be assured of

Mr. LINOwITZ. We understand vour concern and can assure You

nothing has been agreed to that has not been disclosed in 'our

testimony.

Mr. GOODLING. I have a feeling as .we go down the pike and if in

fact guaranteeing the neutrality is a problem with the Panamanians,

and I am voting to send military equipment sales and so forth into

Panama the Panamanians can in fact defend the canal, or whatever

it is, then they are shooting my GI's as we come in to defend the

neutrality of the canal. So you are assuring me that there is no connection between the treaty and the idea of some kind of assistance,

be it military, economic or whatever, in the future?

Mr. LINOwITz. No; this is as I think we have testified previously,

the economic development package and the military assistance

package is outside of the treaty entirely.

Mr. GOODLING. But it isn't bait?

Mr. LINOwITZ. It isn't bait?

Mr. GOODLING. Wasn't used as bait?

Mr. LINOwITz. No; it is of significance to Panama and I think it is

very important to make this clear. Panama has felt that it needs help

with its economic development program, particularly under the new

regime as it will be developing. It, therefore, has sought to obtain the

assurances from our appropriate governmental agencies and departments that it could have help along the lines we have testified to.

Mr. GOODLING. But they understand that is a long process through

this committee and many other committees in the Congress and so on?

Mr. LINOwITz. I think the answer, sir, as I clearly testified, is that

they understand that there is nothing in the treaty which assures them

of treatment otherwise than that to which they would be entitled if

there were not a treaty.

OPPOSITION TO PANAMANIAN GOVERNMENT

Mr. GOODLING. Could I have one other reaction from either or both.

I think again it was my colleague, Mr. Hamilton, who mentioned

what would happen if the Senate did not ratify the treaty, and you

responded, I think, Ambassador Linowitz, to that. I get a lot of feed-
back along the line that if the treaty is signed, the antidictator forces,

et cetera, are the most likely people to get involved in the act of trying

to bring about disruption, and so on.

How would you react to that?

Mr. LIxowiTz. The antidictator people? Our assumption is that

the people who would most like to see the treaty not ratified would

be the Communists and those who are trying to foment unrest in

Latin America. As a matter of fact, the Communists in Panama have

come out very strongly against the ratification and the support of

these treaties.

Mr. GOODLING. How about the antidictator forces within Panama,

for instance?

Mr. LiNOWITZ. You can't lump them that easily. There are some

that are antidictator and some prodictator, but the fact is the

basic thing to insure, sir, is that everything that General Torrijos

has been trying to achieve, Presidents and Chief of State of Panama

h ave been trying to achieve for decades, is nothing new in what is

being sought, recognition of sovereignty, proper payment for what

they r'Ugardl as their own territory. When you take into account that

whatever is here approved will have to have the plebiscite endorsement it is very difficult to say that an antidictatorship group would be

in opposition to these treaties, it is the people who have an opportunity

to express their opinion.

Mr. GOODLING. I would like to conclude then by saying that in

spite of the fact that the loud voices in my district are tremendously

opposed and they seem to think I must have lost my marbles somewhere along the line, from what I see of the treaty, I am very much

in support of the treaty, and I can look way beyond the 10 square

miles of water and land, as to what it means to us I think in the future.

Mr. LINOwITZ. Thank you.

Mr. GOODLING. I congratulate you.

Mr. LINOVITZ. Thank you.

chairman n ZABLOCKI. Mr. Bingham.

Mr. BINGHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am sorry that I have missed most of the hearing today. I am very

much in support of the treaty and I would like to join in extending

my con gratulations and appreciation to the principal negotiators,

Ambassador Bunker and Ambassador Linowitz.

DISPOSITION OF U.S. MILITARY EQUIPMENT

I just would like to ask a couple of questions with regard to the

disposition of U.S. military equipment.

Under the terms of article 13, relating to property transfer, what

will be the disposition of the U.S. military equipment as U.S. bases

are turned over to Panama?

General DoLvIN. I don't believe, Mr. Bingham that applies to

military equipment, but if it does, it states that all movable equipment can be brought back to this country.

Now, if it is fixed property, it would remain in Panama. But there

is no prohibition, we don't have to leave our military equipment in

Panama if that is the basis of your question.
41

Mr. BINGHAM. Well

General DOLVIN. Unless we made some sort of arrangement and

wanted to do it.

Mr. BINGHAM. In other words, that is something that is not determined under the terms of the agreements?

General DOLvIN. Well

Mr. BINGHAM. What will happen to the mobile equipment, is not

covered, is that right?

General DOLVIN. Clearly whatever we want to do with it, bring it

back home or dispose of it any other way, because it is movable

equipment

Mr. BINGHAM. At the present time, does the executive branch intend

to ask for authority to turn over that equipment to Panama?

General DOLVIN. To my knowledge, sir, that has never been raised

and that is 23 years down-it would be down the pike that long and

has never been raised.

Mr. BINGHAM. Thank you.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Mr. Burke.

Mr. BURKE. Thank you.

FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF THE TREATIES

Gentlemen, since 1903, if I understand the figures correctly, the

United States has from time to time subsidized the Panama Canal by

act of Congress. Since that period of time, we have an unrecovered

indebtedness, including accrued interest of about $700 million. Now

we propose to pay $40 million out of revenues to the Panama Canal

and in addition we have pledged an additional $10 million. If we take

the accurate and true investment figures how then are you going to

manage to do what you say without taking money from the taxpayers

to guarantee the operation of the Panama Canal?

Mr. LINOwITZ. We have already testified about that, Mr. Burke, I

think when you were not here.

Mr. BURKE. Perhaps I wasn't since I was attending another committee hearing.

Mr. LINOWITZ. Let me repeat it then, sir.

In the first place, there is $20 million a year roughly which we have

been paying to the United States as interest, so-called, on our original

investment. We have now received $642.5 million as interest on that

original investment. The original investment by the way is $387

million, which has since

Mr. BURKE. But I am talking about the total -investment, not the

original $387 million investment. If you take the original investment

in our present dollars you will find it to be a great deal more.

Mr. LINOWITZ. I agree. What I am trying to say, we have been

paying about $20 million a year as interest to the U.S. Treasury. That

sum has been considered an operating expense and would be available

for payments as may be required under this new treaty arrangement.

Second, we are going to increase tolls and we know that with the

toll increase it will be possible, according to our best estimates, to

meet the financial commitments we are hereunder taking without

going to Congress for appropriations.
42

Mr. BURKE. Without going to Congress is one thing, but if you use

a bookkeeping system like the Government very often does, you can

go to the taxpayers sometimes without going to the Congress, because budget items can be moved from one thing into another, thus I

am talking about sound business bookkeeping and honest banking practices, rather than Government accounting practices.

NEED FOR APPROPRIATIONS

Can you guarantee the American people that this arrangement that

you have made will not cost the taxpayers one cent?

Mr. LINOwITz. No, sir.

Mr. BURKE. You can't guarantee it?

Mr. LINOwITZ. It is impossible to guarantee. All we can say is

according to the best estimates we can today make.

Mr. BURKE. For the moment, you mean, Mr. Linowitz, estimates

you make today but tomorrow might create a different picture?

Mr. LINOwITz. As of today, according to our best estimates, which

have been made available to us by people most apt to know, we see

no need to consider going to Congress for appropriations.

Mr. BURKE. If I was a betting man, and being a conservative I

would like to bet that it won't happen your way.

LIMITATIONS ON NEGOTIATIONS TO BUILD SEA LEVEL CANAL

Now why do you, in this agreement, preclude our rights as Americans to negotiate with any other nation in connection with the rebuilding if needed, of another new sea level canal?

Mr. LINOWITZ. Because we had asked the Panamanians to forego

their rights to negotiate with anybody else for a sea level canal in

Panama.

Mr. BURKE. I know, but now suppose the Panama Government

says no and we need it, are we then bound by our own agreement to

say the heck with the American people, or our own security, we cannot

do it because we pledged to Panama who would no longer be friendly

to us?

Mr. LINOwITz. Well, I think it would be unthinkable for us to

say we have made up our minds and we want to build a sea level

canal in Panama and to try to do so over the objection of Panama.

Mr. BURKE. Well, I didn't say within Panama, there are other

areas.

Mr. LINOwITz. Well

Mr. BURKE. We are precluding ourselves under this agreement

from even going to any other nations?

Mr. LINOWITZ. Yes, sir, we have, sir.

Mr. BURKE. Why?

Mr. LINOWITZ. Because we wanted to be sure that Panama did

not negotiate with anybody else for a sea level canal in Panama.

Mr. BURKE. What difference would it make if they did, if we

negotiate next to them, they haven't got the money to build it, and

right now we are committed, if I understand this agreement, right

now we are committed to defend the canal, but are we going to defend

it if the Panamanains say get out? Isn't that exactly the reasoning

for giving into the treaty.
43

Mr. LINOWITZ. Are you talking about a sea level canal or the present

one?

Mr. BURKE. I'm talking about the present one. We have committed

ourselves to Panama on the basis we can take the present leader's of

Panama's word for something. We did this with the Jflpanese, ai I

recall, when Pearl Harbor was bombed. We have also taken the word;

of Communist-orientated governments and been fooled. Why, then, do

you think the government leaders, such as we have in Panama, with a

known record of violations of human rights, a dictatorship, why 61

you think that all of a sudden they are going to sit down and say we

like you-you are no longer imperialists. This has been their argument all the time in the past. In fact, it has been the argument of all

of the pro-Soviet nations.

Frankly, I can't understand why we have not negotiated on the

basis that we have (lone something right with this canal. We built it

and it cost the American people a great deal of money and we also

defended and made this hemisphere safe from invasion by other

nations during World War I and II. I can't understand why we

would exclude ourselves by this type of agreement to even looking

forward to building another one if it is needed, particularly since the

Panama Canal presently isn't capable of handling aircraft carriers or

super oil tankers and, second, we have the question, even though we

have the right under the treaty to have our warships come through

there, but it couldn't be sabotaged, no matter who has control of it,

and since Panama could remain neutral, our enemys' ships could

pass through.

Mr. LINOwITZ. I will take that in pieces.

PANAMA'S RECORD ON TREATIES TERMED EXCELLENT

In the first place, the record of Panama has been excellent in connection with the observance of treaties. If you look back over the

years, even this highly distasteful treaty to them has been one to

which they have adhered over the years. So I think, in fairness, we

ought to recognize that.

Second, what we have tried to indicate is that we are going to

make a new treaty arrangement which we believe will merit the strict

commitment of the Panamanians and which as signed by Torrijos

will be endorsed by a plebiscite among the Panamaniian people. In

other words, you are here talking about a treaty which represents the

will of the Panamanian people.

SEA LEVEL CANAL

In your other issue on the sea level canal, in 1970 we m ide i st1y

of where a sea level canal should be put if it were to be placed somewhere in the hemisphere, and the recommendation was, it oucrht to he

placed in Panama. Therefore, it becomes of the greatest importance

to us to be assured of having the right to a sea level canal in Pan ima

and that no other country be able to work with Panama in putting

through such a canal. That is what we got in this agreement and in

return we agreed we won't go to any other country for such a sea

level canal.
44

Mr. BURKE. I know we must trust some people in diplomatic circles

but I still can't understand why we are precluding ourselves and

didn't give ourselves a way out, particularly since nations change and

a government's leadership can change. We have now right in our own

hemisphere Castro who would love, and some of the other nations

there who are anti-American, pro-Communist, and certainly in my opinion very capable of causing additional trouble in this hemisphere.

Why then have we precluded ourselves from dealing with some of our

friendly nations, particularly since we dealt with Panama who has a

horrible record with regard to human rights, and we criticized some

other nations in that same area because we don't want to deal with

them.

Now, let me--

HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE

Mr. LINOWITZ. Maybe Ambassador Bunker may want to say a word

on the human rights aspect.

Mr. BUNKER. Yes. Mr. Congressman, it is true that there have

been some violations of human rights in Panama and when there

have been we have stressed our concern about them. Most of those

violations occurred prior to 1970 when Torrijos consolidated his

position and his power. Amnesty International made a report in 1973

referring to some violations by saying then that most of these had

occurred prior to 1970. In 1975, Amnesty International did not include

Panama in its criticisms of violations of human rights. In the spring

of this year, the administration made a report to this Congress saying

that there was no evidence of systematic violations of human rights

in Panama.

So that the record I think while not perfect certainly cannot be

said to be horrible.

Mr. BURKE. Well, did you read the report of Freedom House on

their analysis of various countries in the world and their record on

human rights?

Mr. LINOWITZ. When was that, sir?

Mr. BURKE. January of this year the report was completed.

It seems to me if we are going to look at violations, we should look

at all the reports and not just one that makes it convenient to say so.

In any event, analysis is certainly strongly in disagreement with you.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. The Chair would like to advise the gentleman's

time has expired. The Chair will recognize the gentleman for another

question.

PANAMANIAN EMPLOYEES OF THE PANAMA CANAL COMMISSION

Mr. BURKE. Thank you. With regard to the employees, and you

may have answered this, but with regard to the amount of the employees that are presently employed by the canal commission, what

will happen particularly to the Panamanians themselves who are now

being paid by the present commission. Will they be paid by the

United States or will there be any guarantee of their jobs by the

United States which is the U.S. taxpayers?

Mr. BUNKER. Well, the present employees of the Panama Canal

will continue in employment under the new canal commission.
45

Mr. BURKE. We are committed lin(ler this a .reement the same aii

we were under the old one. that i<. to make sure of their employment

status and to make sure they get paid and unemployment and whatever else it may be?

Mr. BUNKER. Yes, sir.

Mr. BURKE. So the American Government could be '1tick with that.

too.

Mr. BUNKER. It will be paid by the new Panama Cainal Commi-sion,

Mr. BURKE. Thank you very much.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Mr. Whalen.

Mr. WHALEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, I woul(l like to add to the accolades you have already

received on the very excellent work which you have done on behalf of

our country.

I was at the treaty ceremony la-t evening mnd I wa-s rather struck

by the fact that the signing on behalf of the Republic of Panama was

(lone by a Panamanian citizen this time instead of a French citizen

who signed in 1903.

PLEBISCITE IN PANAMA TO RATIFY Ti{TEATIES

Instead of looking at the U.S. Senate let iu look at the Republic of

Panama. Are there any further ratification proce(1urev which mu-t

take place in that country and, if so. what are they and when might

they be concluded?

Mr. LiNowITz. There is a plebiscite and it will probably take place

before the end of the year.

Mr. WHALEN. A vote among the citizens of Panaia, i' that correct?

Mr. LiNOwITz. Yes. sir.

Mr. WHALEN. The treaty, of course, provides for a reversion of the

canal and its property to the Republi ' of Panama by the year 2000.

Maybe this is a little bit of a followup on Congressman Buirke's

question.

DOLLAR VALUE OF CANAL ZONE

Has there been any dollar value attached to these assets?

Mr. LINowITZ. I think we made some >tatement-. Part of the

problem is that you try to calculate the value as of the year 2000 and

that is conjecture. We don't know what the Panama ('anal will be

in the year 2000. It may at this point be more valuable a.s it i- or aseems more likely considerably les; valuable. It may be an architecture monument, so it is very hard to sav what is value will be at

that time. We have made some estimate;. I believe, of the value of

the property which will presently be tran,4erre I. Those wx cn 1bmit

for the record.

INTERE-T PAYMENTS RECEIVED BY TREA>U RY DEPARiTMENT

Mr. WHALEN. You have indicated that the $20 million received

annually in interest amounts to somiethinL over S00 million. I

presume that originally thi- was tn arbitrary tirure and undotibtedly

has more than recompensated the United States for it- orI14in.

investment.
46

Now has that money gone to the Panama Canal Company or has

it gone to the Treasury?

Mr. LTNOWITZ. Goes to the U.S. Treasury.

Mr. WHALEN. So in effect we at least have more than recouped our

original investment?

Mr. LINOwITz. Yes, sir; the original investment, of course, a great

deal had been added since that original

Mr. WHALEN. As improvements have been added how has that cost

been covered, through the revenue of the canal or through direct investment appropriations by the Federal Government?

Mr. LINOwITz. Both.

SEA LEVEL CANAL NOT UNDER TREATY TERMS

Mr. WHALEN. You have indicated that the treaty provides for the

possibilities for negotiating either for a third lane or a new canal. If

such a treaty or agreement were concluded, would the year 2000 conversion clause also apply to this facility?

Mr. LINowITZ. We have provided terms and conditions would be

worked out. In other words, if we decide that we want to put in a sea

level canal, then we would work out terminal dates, what rights

Mr. WHALEN. I see. So if there were a new facility created as a result

of any further agreement, it would not be bound by the language in

the treaty that is now before us?

Mr. LINOWITZ. That is right, it would be subject to mutual agreement.

IMPACT OF TREATY ON PANAMANIAN JURISDICTION OVER CANAL ZONE

Mr. WHALEN. Ambassador Bunker, on page 6 of your statement I

think you have outlined what I suspect the Panamanians see as the

most important provision of the treaty. You say the Canal Zone under

the one treaty will cease to exist and the canal territory will be under

the general territorial jurisdiction of the Republic of Panama. This

deals, I think, with the sovereignty question which has been a very

significant issue. I wonder if you could outline specifically some of the

changes that will take place if this is implemented?

Will the Panamanian Government police the area and so forth?

Mr. BUNKER. There will be a transition period of 3 years during

which period our police will still function. At the end of the 3-year

period general jurisdiction will be turned over to Panama.

Mr. WHALEN. I realize that. I just wondered if you could be perhaps

a little more specific in terms of arrests, trials, and so forth. Apparently

the American citizens now are not subjected to--

Mr. BUNKER. There will be a procedural guarantee of trials for

American citizens which will be spelled out in the annexes which will

be submitted to you.

Mr. WHALEN. Would the Republic of Panama police then actually

have responsibility for policing all of the area in the canal, for apprehending those alleged to have violated Panamanian law, be they

American citizens or Panamanian citizens?

Mr. BUNKER. Yes; that is correct.

Mr. WHALEN. They don't have this responsibility or jurisdiction

now, as I understand it?
47

Mr. LINOwITZ. That is correct.

Mr. BUNKER. That is correct.

U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE IN CANAL ZONE

Mr. WHALEN. One final question. How many noncanal U.S. military facilities now are in operation in the Republic of Panama that

we eventually would either turn over or abandon?

Also, while you are looking for your figures, gentlemen, you might

indicate how many personnel are involved--I am referring to facilities

outside of the Panama Canal Zone itself.

General DOLVIN. That is a very difficult question to be precise

about, Mr. Whalen. The Federal Register shows three bases in Panama. The fact sheet that was passed out shows seven. The facts are

the entire Canal Zone is about twice the size of say Fort Knox, Ky.

These are relatively small bases. But I think seven is probably a fair

way of grouping them because there are some small installations,

such as antenna farms and things like that. The whole Canal Zone as

you know was put together as one entity.

Mr. WHALEN. They are outside of the zone?

General DOLVIN. They are outside of what will be the canal operating area under the new treaty.

Mr. WHALEN. But would be within the zonal territory?

General DOLVIN. They are all within.

Mr. WHALEN. There is no military facility of the United States in

the Republic of Panama outside of the zone boundaries, is that

correct?

General DOLVIN. That is correct. We have not had any since 1956.

Mr. WHALEN. France Field I understandA was outside the zone?

General DOLVIN. That was in the Canal Zone, old France Field. I

will say on treaty day that very little of what are now military bases

will go back to Panama. We do anticipate over the life of the treaty,

as we possibly draw down our forces, that some of these will return

to Panama but the option on when it takes place rests with the United

States.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Mr. Lagomarsino.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if we might have permission to submit questions in writing. It is obvious we are not going

to have time to go into all of the things we should here.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Without objection, questions not asked now

will be submitted to the witnesses and I am sure they are willing to

respond for the record.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. I wonder also if we might have permission to

submit for the record the 1977 January-February issue of Freedom

House, which refers to human rights in Panama and other countries

in the world.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Without objection, so ordJered.

[The publication referred to follows:1

98-991 0 - 78 - 5
48

[Fron Freedom at Issue, January-4February 1977, No. 391

The Comparative Survey of

Freedom-VII

Thailand is the year's greatest loss, moving from free to "not free." This

failure is somewhat offset by a major gain, as Portugal joins the free

nations. A lso joining the 'free list" is Sri Lanka and the newly independent Seychelles. Important gains were also made by, especially, Spain,

and by Egypt, Sweden, Cyprus, Nigeria, and Guyana. But the overall

world trend away from freedom continues, notably in South America: El

Salvador declines to partly free, and A rgentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay

to "not free." Also newly "not free" are Kuwait and the Malagasy

Republic, while in India and South Korea civil and political rights

continue to fade.

by Raymond D. Gastil

Director of the Survey

S since 1972 Freedom House has conducted country-by- tendency of people concerned with human rights to stress

country comparative surveys of the status of freedom in those situations where they think improvement is possible

the world as a complement to its more generalized yearly rather than those which seem hopeless. The imbalance is also

surveys, Previously, there had been a few comparative an inevitable result of the fact that we are apt to hear in

surveys of freedom, but since these were generally published confirmed detail about oppression only in countries where

in books and not reissued, they were quickly outdated by the oppression is incomplete. Thus, international opinion has

flowA of events, particularly for areas with unstable political been exposed to several years of relative silence on the

conditions. The Freedom House Comparative Survey fills suppression of liberties in China or Albania while hearing a

the need for a continually adjusted survey. Moreover, as a great deal about those in Chile or the Soviet Union. It is

result of the continual monitoring on a country-by-country hoped that in a small way the Survey can provide more

basis, the methods and judgments used in the analysis have balance. With increasing interest in relating U.S. foreign

gradually been improved.I policy, and particularly foreign aid, to human-rights

There are several reasons why a comparative survey of considerations, the Survey may contribute to the setting of

freedom is important. First, it is useful for those reporting objective standards for policy decisions.

on, evaluating, or simply concerned with denials of freedom A quite different purpose of the Survey is to give

to be able to place particular gains and losses for freedom recognition to the efforts and difficulties of all those who

against a more or less consistent standard. This is persistently struggle for freedom wherever they may be. By

particularly important in the face of the double standards of its existence, the Survey indicates that there are those in the

reporting that condemn restrictions on freedom in countries Western democracies that care about the progress of

such as Chile, while ignoring them in Tanzania or Bulgaria. freedom in every country, even if at times our foreign

This imbalance may reflect the socio-political bias of the policies do not reflect this concern.

reporter, or, paradoxically, stem from the unfortunate In order to evaluate the following Survey, the reader must

be clear about our definition of freedom. First, by freedom

1 This and other notes are at end of article, we do not mean national sovereignty. Although the Survey

Note-Copyrighted by Freedom House and reprint permission granted.
49

gives attention to the question of "freedom" from calculated from other quantities A numhercd ranking Simdomination of one people by another, in general it does not pli micates that the state in quetion seems to fall nithm a

use freedom in the sense of independence. Since groupmg of states at a certain pont ang an ,rbitraril

independence is not a critical component of our definition, in diided 'continuum from free to unfree Ratngs arc now

the Comparative Survey a former colony may be rated less based on the -orparison of ratings on a heck list ol poli':cal

free after independence than before-for example. Uganda. and cisil rights. Ideally, for each item on the ist eaih country

Given this limitation, "freedom," as used in the Survey, is gisen a rating of high, medium, low, or vers law There is

refers, first of all, to the extent to which the people of a no attempt ti mathematically c umpte the rI'ults, hut the

country are able to play an active and critical role in patterns of those states which enjoy more freed m must obchoosing their leaders, and thus ultimately in determining viously lie to the high side of those which arc less free

the laws and means of enforcement under which they will To achieve a high ranking (I or 2) in poluicaa righn a

live. Such political rights generally imply an authentic country must he the critical rights prodded by a full

electoral procedure. Secondly, freedom refers to the extent operate ectoral procedure, generally> in mg an electto which people openly express opinion without fear, and are oral confrontation of multiple pattes vth a aunt knt upprotected against arbitrary actions by an independent position sote, and those elected must receie the great

judiciary. Consideration of civil rights of this kind also preponderance of political pow er A ranked Ii 1;ate will also

includes a wide spectrum of other personal rights, such as be strong in subsidary indicators, such as a recent change of

those to freedom of religion, voluntary organization, and government trom one party to another, lack of foreign

freedom of movement and occupation. domination. decentr,,zed pohtcal powu., )r a broad inWe would argue that the freedoms the Survey compares formal tha, a.,5 dO ai'egment> .9 yiies d ifaco,ocicnenu 

are the essential human rights that political systems must pow er. A state ai (, rnst base a ratnC for most cighritical

guarantee. However, we are aware that the term "human rights, and a relat. es strong p .tion elsewhere. Vience,

rights" is now often used in a much broader sense, to apply foreign domina n, high illterac or estreme peserty are

to the full spectrum of human needs, for it is now widely enironn t of nbelieved that political systems should meet those further stead 

needs.2 This approach would add "positive rights" to the pette d

negative ones we consider; for example, the right to food, bai

education, health care, recreation, or even aesthetic ex- i

perience. This is, of course, the "freedom from" usage of the p a

"Four Freedoms.- However, no matter how desirable

positive rights of this kind may be, it is a mistake to attempt

to make the concept of freedom coser the full range of

desirable social goals for a society. The reader should be P

warned that the Comparative Srvey is not an attempt lu Regsp

compare the quality of life or the provision of happiness oomes t

among countries. but only to compare certain specific rrncn: i-nc

aspects of life-though admittedly we feel these aspects are sieness to -1 ,rLof critical importance

It is often objected that the Sursey attempts the imposs.-

ble, for it is inappropriate to compare the political systems of political , ompetu

wealthy. literate West European nations with those in poor, within partsa

illiterate countries with traditions different from Western p ones In part, this criticism is justified. But it is less cogent if In ge rc

two points are made First. by scoring countries in terms of rh 

freedom, we do not mean to imply that all peoples. or their to eXpre i

leaders, should immediately achieve the levels of freedom in reJ

a country such as Denmark We recognize the mans special rt

problems that confront less favored societies. We believe de cf

only that progress toward greater freedom is possible almost en

everywhere, and that there is sery seldom an adequate 

justification for backward steps. Secondly, Ae beliese that h ar

ruling elites, once they embark upon social and economic dominatngp

modernization, wil have little choice but to adopt a model of and organizations

government adapted from Europe including Marxist- In uw righi we .- .dr

Leninist): and that, if given the choice, there is a prima facie frLm p'i caris'rsh p pen nt

case that they will eventually prefer those systems offering nantennc' of a rule If . ed I c

more freedom over those offering less. 1b 1ts ut the courts to ecde af . e g' emec, and

r -m Ranking!, for political and ciil rights 'rom mp ii cr trr r i. .apic H 

In the Survey. states are ranked in terms o: their political also, torvin control ma :mpede righ, cpe-.a 'he 'ir1

and civil rights on separate seven-point scales from I 1, mo-t two In ajciton ta :bse tour, we cnsder .w v pes o p

free, to (7), least free. The numbers bs which the ranks arc por ng oi -ubsdiary freedoms Frst are those rm

identified do not represent vanities, not can tnes be sirmp totaliaramm economic independee " the medir
50

Ranking of Nations by Political Rights

Most Free Least Free

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Australia Botswana Cyprus Andorra China (Nat.) Algeria Afghanistan Austria Colombia El Salvador Bhutan Comoro Is. Angola Albania

Bahamas Fiji Guyana Brazil Congo Rep. Argentina Benin

Barbados Finland India Dominican Rep. Egypt Bahrain Brunei

Belgium Gambia Malaysia Guatemala Indonesia Bangladesh Bulgaria Canada Greece Mauritius Lebanon Kenya Bolivia Burundi

Costa Rica Grenada Liechtenstein Korea(S) Burma Cambodia

Denmark Israel Maldives Lesotho Cape Verde Is. Cameroon

France Italy Mexico Morocco Ecuador Central Afr. Rep Germany (W) Japan Monaco Nicaragua Equatorial Guinea Chad

Iceland Luxembourg Pakistan Paraguay Gabon Chile

Ireland Nauru South Africa Philippines Guinea-Bissau China (Com.) Jamaica Papua-New Guinea W. Samoa Qatar Haiti Cuba

Malta Portugal Sao Tome & Honduras Czechoslovakia

Netherlands San Marino Principe Hungary Ethiopia New Zealand Sri Lanka Singapore Iran Germany (E) Norway Surinam Spain Ivory Coast Ghana

Seychelles Trinidad & Tobago Tonga Jordan Guinea

Sweden Turkey United Arab Kuwait Iraq Switzerland Emirates Liberia Korea (N) United Kingdom Upper Volta Malagasy Rep. Laos

U.S.A Zambia Mauritania Libya Venezuela Nepal Malawi

Nigeria Mali

Oman Mongolia Peru Mozambique

Poland Niger

Rhodesia Panama

Saudi Arabia Rumania

Senegal Rwanda

Sierra Leone Somalia

Sudan Togo Swaziland Uganda

Syria USSR

Tanzania Vietnam

Thailand Yemen (S)

Transkei Zaire

Tunisia

Uruguay

Yemen (N)

Yugoslavia

Ranking of Nations by Civil Rights Yuaoslaria Most Free Least Free

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Australia Bahamas Botswana Andorra Argentina Afghanistan Albania

Austria Fiji Colombia Bahrain Brazil Algeria Benin

Barbados Finland Comoro Is. Bangladesh Brunei Angola Bulgaria Belgium Gambia Dominican Rep. Bhutan Cameroon Burma Cambodia

Canada Greece El Salvador Bolivia Chile Burundi Central Afr. Rep. Costa Rica Liechtenstein Guatemala Cyprus China (Nat.) Cape Verde Is. China (Com.)

Denmark Malta Guyana Ecuador Ghana Chad Equatorial Guinea

France Mauritius Honduras Egypt India Congo Rep. Germany (E) Germany (W) Monaco Israel Grenada Indonesia Cuba Guinea

Iceland Nauru Jamaica Lebanon Ivory Coast Czechoslovakia Iraq Ireland Papua-New Guinea Spain Lesotho Kenya Ethiopia Korea (N)

Italy Portugal Sri Lanka Liberia Kuwait Gabon Laos

Japan San Marino Tonga Malaysia Malagasy Rep. Guinea-Bissau Mali

Luxembourg Seychelles Turkey Maldives Morocco Haiti Mongolia Netherlands Surinam Mexico Nepal Hungary Mozambique

New Zealand Trinidad & Tobago Nigeria Nicaragua Iran Somalia

Norway Venezuela Peru Pakistan Jordan Uganda Sweden W Samoa Senegal Philippines Korea(S) Vietnam

Switzerland Swaziland Qatar Libya Yemen (S)

United Kingdom Rhodesia Malawi Zaire

U.S A Rwanda Mauritania

Sao Tome & Niger

Principe Oman

Sierra Leone Panama

Singapore Paraguay

South Africa Poland

Transkei Rumania

Tunisia Saudi Arabia

United Arab Sudan

Emirates Syria

Upper Volta Tanzania

Yemen (N) Thailand

Zambia Togo

USSR

Uruguay

Yugoslavia
01

government. and freedom of mdiidual, to mom e t'n m . w

choose among educational s.sterns and occupants bt der hxw m

private property. operate in the market free or orcanie saAc. L : w m

and join private organizations of choice These ler xru 'x'''s , r

freedoms include freedom of religion. as well as freedom to Th T e is r r ne mrin

organize and join unions Civil rights are also affected br the are hased on rhane re n a m e

presence or absence of nongovernmental, environmental in tre dri ne ihe x el 1or eXa

adequacies, such as illiteracy and debilitating pox erty In this c.use hane i our undersand g * ',g d

second category of subsidiary freedoms we also place losses siiinn m ountrx I ddn'n we some'me dedi t

to freedom occasioned by private forces such as bosses, we hae ben regrdg an 'iu r h p

landlords, or labor leaders (and, at the exreme, private cxe This ear a num e' ot ce. h's ko ii re

slaxe-holders). Questions of ilhteracy and poxerix bring us eu o rn m xucx x f , new an mr adq'

back, of course. to the positive rights xhich x e argued abhoe h K 0 .rime Cx 0'

should be outside our concern 'Yet the\ Must be ien no o \\ ib . 'exh.sm si n th

account in so>Jdr as they affect a populaons it cx x al's 'ea" sis w x', e mn e , e cr wx

press opinion or vote effectixcly (ln pan t shod be 'insidred h'x' m ih c . is, . ' , nes ht 2

noted that ex aluating the effects of such factoseds a gr eat Are xx the '. mr e. m Ix I' es'imeres I to

deal more study.) m.nx xxi ie the .uo 'ici l A 'u'ti "ri 

A country ranked (1) in civil rights must rank high on all to br Ireland, ltalx and 1rnce i xxax xeii 'hat r

critical rights, and medium or higher on near all other rexecxng the tull spectrum omI rihts we ii '0n'er had

rights. In this consideration the most important subsidiary adequate ii r this istnc tn, parlt arx smeeLusficat 

rights are those to individual movement, choice o occupa- our interest in free cLress i n p0.0 a xelexant

tion and organizational affiliations, and freedom froii pression, and not in so, a controls su.h as t .c abon

private terror (especially as related to political opinion), or porioraph 1n the *e ! Franc. hii chance w a alsx

Level (1) countries must also not have xery low' levels of made possible bx an im;r\xeent t p.hia!J xce'nt

poverty or illiteracy (although this is much less important in libeCries oxer the pas scx eral x ca's in the pm

very small countries). Rank (2) in civil rights generally im- rex aiuiion led us ir mox cIai down 'rm "' i m a

plies a high ranking on three of the four critical rights, and because o' ihe conunued mabiliy in It an sx stemn to

not more than two lows in the subsidiary rights Successixely change thc pmrtx in p'xer tas s done mn mst emc''a.est

lower patterns are then attached to succeeding rankings, un- or to incorporate a1 ma1ot groups o de.son-map. PC a

til rank (7) implies a very low score on all critical rights and done In Sx teerland 1 his s noi to iit that 'he Chr stan

low scores on most of the other check list items. DeCmoncrIs should bring he omrnmlsts imo the If- ei

Inc In conside-ring these rankings it is "ell to remember mient. for we r ace tat n the lon irn ithis in ih e 

that the foregoing patterns are highly generalized. There are crcater thvat to deimiocrA

special situations in which one or a fexw considerations t ex hee Cin tie xx ord poh ii the'is wr riised lion

override the general picture, or in which lack of information I to Ii for eneex. a, *S 1 2or P'ap. e ,x mea,

forces reliance on only a portion of the full spectrum of and I-o to 0 or \.initst Chm.,,e.se ''mp r mt

evidence that should be considered An example of both of xes itmp did not h. e the exdc to 1 n n.e . Chese

these problems is Lebanon. This formerly free country is states ii the loxer citecories In tnc .xe 0' ser . mal

no\, split into areas with wAidely varying local arid foreign Persian Gui' slates, thcal bertx xas 1,e 'C,''''i'

leadership and security conditions, and must for the time be- 1' because ci the c.nsensual tacto s Imoe C thc ter

ing be very roughly estimated for the purposes of the Surxey, sistetc of traditional torms, the eureme smx s .e ' mh

The Tables of Nations and Territories indt tribe, the openness s )I to ',r pp. tt m, itx

The heart of the Comparative Survey is found in the ac- ot Ie the ,tted Ar\ i mIates. tti r' disi n o

companying Table of Nations and Table of Territories and 'xwer m a federal system I" co"s denn, i 'rnt xc trm

Dependencies. Updated at least eich year, these tables ot ttscitsual pohtes. there shtu d pehps "e x

record the current status of freedom in e.ich country or also oi Kh Chmese xi u,, . the s' 'cx xx. h

dependent area; the changes that have occurred since the last ,ur ents 0' commumst *PmP n sem

Survey: and, for some countries and dependencies, the out- "iuetc i a mannet tt m n r m et

look for or prognostication of likely directions, given the xxntensuxl ti i the ra'k I i u .s 11 ex , e e.a

current situation and the government's apparent plans for of cni u"rcst and ihe dii . in

the future. Examination of the Tables " ill rex eal that, in ad- sidir ion htrc x is postpone tii tie ieu >. ex when

dition to the rating scales for civil and political rights dis- perhaps the sitan ,i 'i be * cl e I r m e mi c rm i' t

cussed above, the nations and dependencies of the w orld are .\ible

Fed divided into Free (F). Parily Free (P F). and Not Free I i 

For this division states ranked (1) or (2) for both civil and

political rights will be rated free, states ranked (1). (4), or (5) Durmng I,)-(, the most dramatic loss to 'in x 's the

will be rated partly free, and states ranked ko) and (7) x\ ill be destruction bs another nihtiarx oup 01 die pr ixi T

considered not free. Borderline cases are more difficult, anid expei inient mii demccr \gAiii tte proh i IS iS ui

the final category is not predictable simply from the xlngnnss o opponents inmcmleles 'si ., n.h'ci

numbers. Thus, while a (7) and (5) state-such as Chile-is democratic systems to accept the fiit that i a demor i t

bound to be not free in our ratings, one marked (5) and (6) group gets cxcr\ thing it desires Instemd of "ice' e n he
52

The Comparative Survey of Freedom

Tableof Nations

Ry R' RFl> i, I ho .e- 2 I F 0

S NI U MaIetmRcPObb 6- 5 NIF- 0

NI M , 7 6 NIF 0

A N1* ,Na h '.e 3 4 PF 0

4 4 p0 Mes 4 4 PF 0

6 6 NI U e1 7 7 NIF 0 - N ~ + Ma- I 2- F 0

F 0 ridna 6 6 NF 0

.~F Mte ~ 3 2 1 0

eo 4 4- P F 0

6 4 I 1 Mas 4 2 P F 0

4' PI . M+n0la 7 7 NIF 0

0 Motcu 5 5 PF 

01 oqoe 7- 7- NF 0

- - I C NMru 2 2 F 0

4 4 PM 1 Nepa 6 5 N F 0

t 6 4 PIF 0 Nci c lnds I I F 0

- 3 1 e N /caland I I F 0

4 5P N5a a . s. PF 0

se 6 l NI t Nr 7 6 NF 

- * 7 NI u Negcea 6 4* PF 

(-I 7 6 N1 0 N I I F 0

n NI 0 Oman 6' 6 NIF 0 - 7 N 0 Iatar 4* 5 PF I

* F N * 0 Panama 7 6 NF 0

I- 0 Pa,-Ne NGeanr 2' 2 IF 0

S a t* 6* Ni * 10 Paraguay 5 6- NF- 0

(c~ A Reg NI- Peru 6 4 PF 

7.6 NI 1 Phubppnes 5 5 PF 0 + Poland 6 6 NIF 

F7 NI 0 Portugal 2-+ 2+ F+ 0

5 PI * Qatar 5* 5 PF 0

2. en 3 F 0 Rhodesa 6 5 NF 0

PF 0 Rumania 7 6 NIPl, 0 Rkanda 7 5 NIF 0

f e I I 0 1 San Marino 2 2 F 0

N F 6 * NI + 'eoTome nd Principe 5 5 Pr- 0

I pta- - 4 PS a Studi Araba 6 6 NF 0

dac>- eina 6 NF 0 Sencgal 6 4 PF 

I f 0 SnbhClkte I + 2 F 0

Dmarn 7Rntebe. 4 * P 0 Sierra Lca 6 5 PF 0

6* 4 PF 0 Singapore 5 5 PF 0 E+ 4 P- + Somala 7 7 * NF 0

I SSoudt 1 PM Sth Africa 4 5 PF 

Equatr cri 6 NF 0 Span 5 3+ PF 

6thaepi NIF v SrLanka 2 3 F 0 F -2 I- 1 Sudan 6 6 NF 0

Iad - - 0 Surinam 2 2 F 0

IF 0 Seaiand 6 4 PF 

6 6 NI 1 Sedcn -+ 1 F 0

tet2 F 0 Senairlrand I I F 0

(-arat7 NF + Syra 6 6* NIF 0

I 0 Taniamna 6 6 NF 0

7 a NF 0 Thaland 6- 6- NFcex 2 2 I 0 Togo 7 6 NIF 0

ea 2 4 PF 0 Tonga 5 3 PF 0

(em 4 3 P1F 0 Transkei 6 5 NFP 0 ra - 7 NIF 0 Trindad & Tobago 2 2 F 

CF tU 6 6 NF 0 Tunraut 6 5 NIF 0

1es a+ 3 PF 0 Turkca 2 3 F 0

6 is NF 0 Lganda 7 7 NIF 0

H 6 3 PI- 0 SSR 7 6 NF 0

6 6 NIF 0 L itid Arab Emirates 5' 5 PF * 0

IIca 1 1 U- . Cited Kingdom I I F 0

5, PF 0 , - LraedStates I I F 0 sreac 5 Pf 0 Upper \olta 5+ 5- PF 

l 6 N 0 Uruguai 6- 6- NF7 0 NI 1 \cncrucla I * 2 F 0

* 1 \trinar 7 7 NF 0

lain0 ^ e\ksternSmoa 4 2 P1F 

0 * rn I 1 lcmr 6 5 N F 0

I- - - f NF 0 \cennS 7 7 NF 0

t03 13 ugara 6 6 NF 0 F 1 Lair 7 6+ NF 0

6 6 NI 0 Zamba 5 5 PF 0 Keraa 5 P1 13*e~a~w

rcar N N I-0- I he n e at te .e r, -7 *.a.,tF i cnp- e, taie r the hitei kteet or poltltai or acta a 6 PMi' 13 .-- a . and 7" the 5,-na A phee nr ent eou ea ratnp ndI.cate, *n * epren- 

Ketnert ~ 6- 5- NI- 13 icon'nen''raafean i .,t 1 ^aret, A maeared eah apenedisitan oelchaitltd enc e e due ao eet anoar A te .,,ttn ,tho Then doe not emtet h.,epe tn the counted

- teahe rat on e the n.e a- ,rne e 1eedo, t um Jan-Feb 1973, p 20 e a4 4 P 0 tenee ate -ate p tee ate PF.andanotfree aebt NF

1 - 4 PF 0 

t,do 6 4 Po n te aced nthe probte thecon- 1 7 6 N I 0 - -s a r ate n a aheso reiteec and the tOnpenen

1 e n eta 4 2 P1 e e-e a0 efect anoeen ne

S T am aaatot Itahre. itac heen chred to bnmn tma eelaeon otfftalt kanmpachea
53

side of order, to support an essentially moderate government Table of Territories and Dependencies

(backed by a conservative electorate), some factions of the

military apparently used disorder as an excuse for their Politcal" (Il s( u'of

violent return to power. While the short-term success of this Right, Rights Ireedom Ouilook

kind of intervention is likely, such actions poison the future. Australia

A hopeful sign, however, is that the military has maintained (hindian Ocean) 4 2 P 0

the degree of unity made possible by the monarchy, and in- Cocos(KeeingIlslands 5 5 PF U

stalled a civilian premier who talks of an eventual return to Norfolk Island 4 2 PF 0

democracy. Chile

Easter Island 7 6 NI1 0

In Latin America there were a number of declines. Most Juan Fernandez 7 6 Nl 0

important was the military takeover in Argentina. However, Denmark

in this case the democratic system was corrupt and slipping Faroe Islands 2 1 F 0

fast, the military were already a law unto themselves, and in Greenland 4 1 PE 0

the resulting state of institutionalized anarchy General FOvr asDepartments 3 3 PF 0

Videla's coming to power was widely accepted. Many F renchGuiana

Argentine military leaders no doubt sincerely see their in- Guideloupe

Martinique tervention as a short interregnum before return to democ- Reunion

racy. However, without eliminating the fanatical violence Saint Pierre& Miquelon

both in their own ranks and in those of the violent left, Oversea% Teritories

French Polynesia 4 3 Pt 0

success can only be temporary. President Bordaberry's MaIoite 2 2 l 0

removal in Uruguay destroyed the last semblance of public New Caledonia 4 3 PF 0

choice in the running of the country, even though the new Ter of the ars & Issas + 3 PF

president is a civilian. In Paraguay repression appears to Netherlands

have become even more severe, and democracy more super- Neth. Antilles 2 2 F 0

ficial. However, changes in the ratings of both Uruguay and New Zealand

Paraguay are based in part on reconsideration of reports that Cook Islands 3 2 PF 0

Niue 2 2 F 0 have come in over the last two or three years, especially in Tokelau Islands 4 2 PF 0

regard to murder and torture by the security services. In Poriugal

Mexico a leading opposition paper was suppressed, and the Azores 4 2 PF 0

presidential election failed to include an opponent from the Macao 5+ 4 PF 0

main opposition party. In El Salvador manipulation of elec- SMai

toral laws effectively shut the opposition out of a chance of Canary Islands 6 4+ PF+ 

winning either in the national or municipal elections-and Places ofSovereignty

thus precipitated their withdrawal from the process. This in Africa 6 4+ PF+ 

was accompanied during the year by violent suppression of South est Africa 6 5 NF 

student and peasant protests. (El Salvador is a good example United Kingdom of a case where freedom of the press is not enough to give a Belze I 2 F 0

high rating to civil liberties.) In Jamaica political opposition Bermuda 2 I F 0

Brit Indian Ocean Terr. 4 2 PF 0 has come to be characterized by violent confrontations and Brit. Virgin Islands 3 2 PF 0

murders, with the inevitable response of the security services. Cayman Islands 4 2 PF 0

Elsewhere, the communist or Marxist states of Laos and Channel Islands 3 1 1 0 . . Falkland Islands 2 2 F 0

Mozambique further institutionalized the totalitarian Gibraltar 2 2 F 0

aspects of their model. By again postponing an election and Gilbert Islands 2 2 F 0

pushing through authoritarian changes in the constitution, Hong Kong 3 2 F 0 9Isle of Man 2 1 F 0

Indira Gandhi moved India further away from democracy. Montserrat 2 2 F 0

The government of South Korea extended its suppression of St. Vincent 2 2 F 

the press and of the opposition party; it used its agents to in- S lnsa (Brit) + F 0

still fear throughout society, even far beyond the political TurksandCaicos 4 2 PF 0

realm. Politically, Park has reduced the distinction between Tuvalu 2 2 F 0

We'st Indies Assoc.

his regime and that of Kim 11 Sung. The ruler of Kuwait dis- States 2 3 F 0

solved parliament and overthrew the constitution, following New Hebrides

in this the lead of Bahrain the year before. By a referendum (Brit-French

(December 1975) in which the opposition was not allowed to UComniud Ss+

present its views, the government of the Malagasy Republic American Samoa 3 2 PF 0

set up a one-party socialist state in which freedoms became Canal Zone 5 3 PF 0

essentially forfeit. The constitution declares, for example, Guamro Rico 2 PF 0

that: "The state punishes with the greatest severity whoever Micronesia 4 2 PF 0

harms, by act or inaction, the objectives of the revolution, Northern Marianas 3 2 PF 0

the building of the socialist economy or the public interest." 4 ,Vin lands 3 2 PF 0

Consequently there have been typically nondemocratic elections, the closing down of newspapers, and the banning of at most of its opposition, as well as all ethnic groups. Finally, in

least some parties. There remains, however, an element of Malta, electoral violence and restrictions on press freedoms

compromise in the government's attempt to incorporate have marked the last two years.
'4

Advances in freedom Independence was achieved during the last year by the

Ses.chelles in freedom and by the Transkei. Unfortunately, In C n freedom n occur red the emergence of the latter was marred by the suppression of

the I urpean area Wih well-contested legislative and the main opposition party, including thejailing of its leaders pridcntil elections, Prro ahiesed a full' democratic and the presumption of continued heavy influence from s e, a in made poihle by the existence of a spirit of South Africa. However, Chief Matanzima is not a South

,ompronme .cross at least most of the political spectrum. African puppet and, with the exigencies of the emergence Portual admiion into the Council of Europe symbolized past, Transkei's freedom may soon advance. We do not t new sttus \Without the hamards of resolution, Portugal's accept the argument that Transkei should not be regarded as example i. heing followed in Spain Political rights have been an independent state-indeed it appears to be more indcreased in the last two years, with a shift of power toward pendent than many other satellites (e.g., East Germany or

rcliance on a wider consensus, expressed in part through the Mongolia). We agree that the homelands policy of which eIslat e \embly Civil rights have also advanced, Transkei is a product is not a just one in its present form, but

through reliton of censrship, and much broader this judgment cannot determine our assessment of the degree ptance f poiotial actity, acceptance that extends in ol Transkei's independence. In the Upper Volta persistent

ome cases esen to expresons of regional demands. Sup- strikes by the powerful unions led on the one hand to repres- prakd h the lrger Europein community, Spain should sion, but, on the other, to consultations that enhanced the

mi further progress toward an open and representative broadly consensual nature of General Lamizana's rule.

,ssiem To the east, democracy seems firmly replanted in Essentially free elections have now been proposed for next

Gircece, while with a recent senate election Turkey has reaf- year. With the cooperation of opposition political parties, firmed, if somewhat violently, its commitment to Morocco was at last report embarked on a series of elections

democracy. Cyprus is still unable to resolve its division, but that were to make possible parliamentary government by it is encouraging that both the Turkish and Greek portions of April 1977.

the island held successful democratic elections in 1976.

lsew here in Europe, Italy and Germany both had crucial Changes in territories and dependencies elections, while Sweden enhanced the prima facie fairness of

its democratic sy stem by voting for a change in its political Turning to the ever-decreasing group of territories and

leadership for the first time since the 1930s. dependencies, there have been several changes since the last

Turning to the rest of the world, Egypt managed to take an Survey. These include the disappearance of Portuguese

important step in its recent movement toward democracy by Timor into Indonesia and of the Spanish Sahara into

a legislative election in which three quasi-parties were Morocco, though resistance movements continue to exist in

allowed to compete. In Guyana the return of the opposition both. The island of Mayotte decided to stay with France

to parliament improved the functioning of the system; when the Comoro Islands became independent and, if the

however, there appears to be some danger that the rap- Comoros don't interfere, will soon be a Department.

prochement may go so far as to eliminate the concept of an Departmental status advanced freedom for St. Pierre and

opposition. In Bangladesh the military leadership in- Miquelon. Among British possessions, Tuvalu left the

augurated a period of moderation during which political par- Gilbert Islands to form a separate colony.

ties were reestablished, and newspapers critical of the regime Improvements in the status of freedom appear to have

reappeared. However, in late November national elections been achieved in the Territory of the Afars and Issas, apscheduled for 1977 were postponed and opposition leaders parently on its way to independence from France; in Porarrested. In Zaire. the return of control of their schools to tuguese Macao. as it achieved a larger degree of home rule;

the churches symbolizes a greater degree of pluralism. and presumptively in the remaining Spanish territories as a

result of the liberalization at home. In the British-French

condominium of the New Hebrides a new constitution and

Other changes and trends elective assembly raised the status of freedom. (This actually

We are especially concerned that the projected elections in occurred in 1975.) In South West Africa a continuing

Sri Lanka, which are to be held before June 1977, should be process of constitutional deliberation has allowed a widened

successful. In view of several factors-the opposition's and freer participation of groups in political discussion. Even

success in by-elections in the last few years, the ability under the internal branches of the Southwest African People's

pressure of the newspapers to retain a critical role, and the Organization (SWAPO), a revolutionary organization supformation of a new Tamil front-it appears that the ported by most outsiders interested in the country, have been

democratic system here is healthier than we had thought. We included in this discussion, although not at the conference

hope that a fair election will confirm our judgment, and that table. Our reanalysis did not make possible a change in the

talk of an illegal postponement is careless speculation. rating of this dependency, but there was progress here, and

Although our reassessment did not make it possible for us to we expect more in the future.

revise Senegal's numerical rating, the government's permis- To Portuguese territories we have added the Azores and

sion for the formation of two opposition parties during the Madeira because of their distance, recent agitation, and

past year (in a manner very similar to that in Egypt) served analogy to the Spanish Canaries. They are perhaps better

to advance freedom of political expression. We assume this placed in the territorial category than some of the British

trend will soon affect the electoral process. It should also be territories, such as the Channel Islands. However, France's

mentioned that the situation in Nigeria appears to be better Corsica, an area of recent regional agitation, would perhaps

than we judged last year; this year progress on the develop- as justifiably be placed in the territorial Table. In any event,

ment of a new and democratic constitution is certainly we certainly do not mean by our inclusion or exclusion that

promising. the Azores or Madeira have special rights to self-determina-
55

tion in comparison with other areas at a distance. pensive government ownership) by way of illustration. The

line between communist and noncommunist socialist states

Comparing two political-economic models was also difficult to draw. To qualify as a communist governUntil now% the relationship of freedom to socialism and ment, the leaders had to claim that theirs was a communist

capitalism his been an issue we have avoided, on the plea government and strive to copy in detail the party organizathat those subsidiary, antitotalitarian civil rights, in which tions and control mechanisms of communist states. The new

cithats sabesiaranki high, arial biiffrighbsinewhich states spawned by the collapse of the Portuguese empire, in

capitalist states will rank high, will be offset by the non- particular, seem to lie close to this line. However, it should be

governmental pressures that erode civil rights, and in terms recognized that some socialist, one-party states clearly

of which socialist states should rank higher. However, if we differentiate both their organization and ideology from comaccept a reasonably strict definition of socialism, it is impor- dfni(e brae oranzai) r a sde is o m- tantto otetheextet t whch he wrldis coming munism (eg. Iraq or Tanzania). Where a state is only tem- tant to note the extentaspin t ohe world is becoming porarily in one category, and has serious public aspirations polarized between those aspiring to one or another of two of moving into another, this has been indicated in the Table. models of political-economic life-a one-party socialist We have also indicated the most flagrant examples of a state model and a multi-party nonsocialist model, with the latter failing to follow its ideological line by appropriate actions. far more likely to result in a high level of freedom.

The accompanying Table of Political-Economic Systems The Table of Political-Economic Systems illustrates that,

presents the picture as we see it. Looking first at economic even with all the necessary qualifications, there are two

systems, for the purposes of this Table socialism is defined as definite clusters of states ideologically. In terms of our

a system in which the government aspires to directly control definitions there is only one socialist, multi-party state, while

the preponderance of economic activity (or to compel and there are very few capitalist one-party states. Apparently,

supervise cooperative arrangements). In a strict socialist several of these anomalous states may soon shift to one of

state no one is in doubt as to the government's objectives, the larger clusters. It should also be noted that most of the

although lack of money or ability may, impede full realiza- non-party states either have governments that consider th .r

tion of the model. Private property-h olders in such states present situation to be merely an interregnum, or represent

have few rights, for their ownership is judged ultimately the last stands of traditional pre-party systems that were

'wrong." In capitalist societies the presumption is the once universal.

reverse. The government owns and operates portions of the The Table of Political-Economic Systems illustrates the

economy only when and as it has to. In mixed, often pater- fact that the freer states in the world are nonsocialist, multinalistic. systems governments play one or both of two roles. parts states, while the less free arc one-party states Since the

First, without denying the rights of private ownership, the existence of multiple parties is an important category of our

government may see itself as responsible for redistributing check list for political freedoms. this result is to some extent

income or providing a high standard of services. Tax burdens an artifact of our classifications. However, where it could be

in such "social democracies" become sery high. Second, for shown that an effective opposition could exist without parone reason or another government leaders may believe that ties, this would not be a critical category of our judgment.

many key industries should be run directly by the govern- Moreoser, given our check lst, countries without parties or

ment. Somewhat intermediate between the two roles is the with single parties can easily achieve at least a partly free

initiation of extensive land reform (although not collectiviza- status. But most do not. Reference to the Table will show

tion. which is more characteristic of the socialist model). In that capitalism by itself does not assure freedom (at least as

mixed systems, particularly those involving extensive we have defined it), but socialism bs itself seems to be

government ownership, the countervailing power of the positively detrimental. It is either that socialism as we hase

pris ate sector is much weaker than in a pure capitalist socie- defined it concentrates too much power to make possible the

ty; although the private sector remains an important factor, maintenance of freedoms, or that the association of

for private capital continues to play an acknowledged role. socialism with communism in most of the word today is so

Definitions of the forms of political mobilization by party close as to make independent, freer experiments very difstructure and extent of centralization are less complex. In a ficult.

decentralized country constituent states or provinces are not M1odern colonialism normally governed by appointees from the center, while in a

centralized system the main function of regional or provin- For this Sursey we have again included the Table of Miajor

cial government is to administer policies worked out at the Subordinate Peoples first presented in 1974 (Freedom at

center. Since no one-party state has a decentralized system Issue. Jan-Feb. 197 As we pointed out at that time, the

(except de facto. where it cannot gosern). the Table for this consideration of territories and dependencies was not a

categorN distinguishes instead between two types of one- useful way to look at the problem of colonialism in the

party governments, communist and noncommunist. While 1970s, For the issue is no longer primarily the final eliminaall modern one-party governments evidently go back to com- tion of the vestiges of nineteenth-century imperialism, but

munist models, one-party organization is utilized today as a rather the extent to which some peoples have come to

means of controlling societies from capitalist to socialist. dominate others in their own homelands. This is the point

There are, of course, manifold difficulties in placing many the Third World is making, however inelegantly and onecountries in such a simplified scheme. There is, for example, sidedly, when it condemns Zionism.

a continuum from capitalist through mixed to socialist For this reason we have presented an approach to the

economies. Since the line between multi-party capitalist and question of colonialism that reflects the major forms of submulti-party mixed is particularly hard to draw, it was ordination most analogous to colonialism. We found the

decided to simply place a few of the highest-tax social closest analogies to be subordinating unions in which a

democracies in the mixed category (along with those with ex- dominant people with a separate territorial hse has cx-
Table of Political-Economic Systems m

Forms of Political Modernization

Mulfi-Parly One- Par y () Non-Parly

CenDralized lccentralized Communist Noncommunist Centralized Decentratifed

Austria I Japan I Autrabia I Chia (Nit )17 PI Argentminal" N I

Bahamas F So Korea PF Belgium 6 bo n NF Bahrin P- Barhadok F Lesotha P i win I Ivory (oast NIF Brunei N Buo II PF L heria P1 (anda F Kenvs P ( hile NI Colombriu F L ucmbourg F W Germany F Maulas, NF Ghana NF Fornin I"n Malaysia PF Pikistan PF Senegill' PF Hiou NI

Republic PF Mlia F Papua New Jordan NI . Icuador PF Mauritius F (ulnca" F Niger NI- Or El Salvador P F Morocco Pt Swittcrand F Panama NIFiji F New /ealand 1: Lited States 1: Philippines", PF Finland F Nicaragua PF Rwanda N- France I Paraguay") NIF Swamand PE Gambi F Rhodeia NIF ThidandAl NF Greece F Sierra I cone PI Uruguayf'xt

) N-

(uatemala PF Singapore PI

lIlonduras PV South Africa PI

keand 1 Spain PF

Indonesia PF Surinam F

Ireland F Tri nidad 

It.ly F Tobago I

Bingladeth PF Peru PF Brazil'" PF ( ameroon NF Afghanistan NF Nigeria" PF C osta Ria F Portugal I India PF C entral Afr ,Bhutan( ' PU United Arab

Denmark I Sr I anka F Rep Nu Chadoi NF Emirates P1 1Egyptll PF Sweden F E, Guinea NF Ethiopia NF

Israel F Turkc v Iran0 NV Kuwait NF aacall)mei Malagasy Nepal0) NF

Netherlands F Kingdom F Rep tit NF Omani') N F Norway F \enetuela F Mali N F Saudi Arabia NF Mauritania NF Uganda NF Mexico,') PF N Yemeni" NF

Togo NF

Tunisia NF

Upper Volta. PF /atrcelx' NU

Guyana PF Albania NI Algeria NF

Bulgaria NI Angolans) NF Cambodia NI- Benm N F China (Com) NI Burma NU Cuba NI Burundi NF Ciecho- Congo ReptW PF slovakia NI Guinea N F 1- Germany NF GumeaIlungary NI Efisau"t

o NV No Korea NF Iraq(2) NI NoI#, t the I O aos Nu Libya NF

I C Iyprut li.nttn ,an rev i *ytati siu.teitnqt b-Im'lliudint nhts tai Mongolia NF Sonaliat2) NF 2 Itm nmitstlmrt trmotnmtpnhitn Mozambique NI Sudan N

4 M n to.nt e t~tttt 

.ria ii 

y 

P nntevercuitnni Poland NF Syrija(*Q) NF ti or tmtt antk liimriuii Runmania NV Tanianoa NF 5 Moing t'ittd mlit t r ty sy-tm rttattdmtt iimut.pny pte annaa

6 Mttntp ttttd ninttt - rttntmmuinimn USSR NI Lambia)m 2 PF in Aloionostamtuittrtmu st)iil Vietnam NI sia d h, S.ntetnm s Yemeni 2

" NI

Yugoslavia NF
57

Table of Major Subordinate Peoples

Population Cultural lr1i, - ArJbs iw mmed

(dep Similarity ILuii cwmeium people) to

Dependent (in dominant Political M cins I high medom

State People millions) people Equalhy Mrc liriers igh iumi S g s,) ro-i 

Afghanistan Tadzhik 5 high medium

Uzbek I medium medium huh4

Algeria Berbers Pcru Quchua 2-$ i r mium

(several groups) 5 high high' Phlippines" Micro,2 mdiir n rmd

Bolivia Aymara I medium medium Rumandi M rs 2 high mdum

Quechua i medium medium South Africa B ,ip, 14 1,w iow

Burma Karens 2-3 medium low . Xi V

Shan L5 medium low Sor, cr I

Canada Quebec French 5 high high n (atalan tp b h

-iuc) med m Chad Toubous (Arabs) 2 low low i 

China (Com.)"i Chuang 7 medium medium Sri Lanka Tami 2 -mdmd

Hui 3.5 medium low Sudan'' southernn PCOplis 4 i- meci

Korean I medium medium Switzerland I rerh I 5A i Miao-Yao 3 medium medium T k I m i i:nr

Mongol Vs medium low

Puyi I medium medium Turk ku 2 medum iu

Tibetan 4 low low SSR Armiin, 2 medum medium

Uighur 4 low low Azr id nii 4 lo NYi (Lolo) 3 low low Bhkir I medium medium

Czechoslovakia Slosaks 4.5 high high 8l' u, in 7 high high

Ethiopia Eritreans 1 7 medium medium riu' sh 2 medium medium

Galla 10 medium medium Essiiini I medium low

severall groups) Gieir in 3 mediurr medium

Gojjm (povh 4 ow Au Goaam(pros) 1.5 high medium ku 411 low

Sidamo 2 medium medium K1gh dm iw

Tigreans 3 high high I an medoi low

Francl ' Alsatians I medium high M >M n 2 im nO

Bretons I high high MIduin I medium medium

Guatemala Mayans 2 medium medium? lunar 4 i-umed irm ed

India Assamese 10 high high (se'eralgioupsi

Bengali 45 high high Tad/hik 1 - a" Bihari 20 high high Turime +w

Gujarati 25 high high 

Kanarese 25 medium high 'zek 

Kashmiri 3 medium low L nied Scois

Marathi 45 high high Kingdom iScirush-lrusht I -gh

Malayalam 20 medium high Welsh 2 bpg

Oriya 20 high high r ugoslav a Albanians I medO.:m

Panjabi 17 high high Bosnian Mushim I medm Rajasthani 15 high high Croats 4,5 high med um Santali 3 medium? medium Macedonians I high m Tamil 40 medium high Sloenes 1 5-2 hig mdm Telegu 50 medium high

Indonesia" Bali 1 5-2 med.-high medium East Timor I low-med, medium

Kalimantan 4 low-med. medium Lesser Sundas 3-4 low-me& low-med ii-

(exc. Bali) I tir l

Molucca I low-med. low di

Sulawesii 6 low-med low

Sumatraui 15 low-high med -high West Irian I low low

Iran"' Azerbaijani 5 high high i

(Turkic)

Kurds I high medium i

Iraq Kurds 2 medium low

tended its rule over neighboring peoples without ex- accompanying table is produced

tinguishing their self-consciousness as separate peoples. We In presenting this material we nake no strong imphcatlon

are not considering those many heterogeneous states in that the peoples represented here should orgaruzc indepen dwhich peoples cooperate together in government (as general- ent stLtes loseser, we do asert that the hvie rightly in Nigeria or Belgium), or in which the ruling group is dependence analogous to those of the colonial peoples of the

supranational, as in Pakistan. Nor do we consider heteroge- past generation and that if their demands for autonomy are

neity without a territorial base, as in the case of most ethnic not being met w within the present sy stem, then thi, should be

groups in the United States. Using this definition, and con- considered an important constraint on freedom TakIng this

fining our attention principally to those individual groups of attitude, in 1974 we contrasted the position of the 0:rge

subordinate peoples that number more than one million, the number of subordinate peoples within the federal,
38

democratic system of India with the much more deprived

position of peoples within the operationally centralized

USSR Obviously, with the decline since 1974 of democracy

in India, including decline in the relative autonomy of its

state governments, this distinction has become much less

valid

Conclusion

Reviewing the shifts in the status of freedom in 1976, it

appears that we have had a very mixed year. Certainly the

events this year provide some reason for encouragement.

That is an improvement over 1975, when India first left the

family of free nations, an exit accompanied by declines in its

major neighbors, and when all of Indo-China succumbed to

communism. In 1976 particular importance should be placed

on the success of freedom on the geographical margin of the

European cluster of democracies. This is seen particularly in

Portugal, Spain, Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus, and there are

encouraging changes in Egypt and Morocco. The most disappointing area in 1976 was the bloc of South American

nations from Chile to Brazil, most of whose peoples are

relatively well advanced and familiar with democratic institutions. Brazil's successful municipal elections in

November were a move toward reestablishing democracy.

We can only hope that the interrupted democratic progress

in the homelands of the bulk of the people of this area will

eventually be reflected in a return to freedom.

Discouragement over the frequent setbacks encountered

by freedom in most of the world-symbolized this year by

events in Thailand-may be offset by reflecting that the 

struggle to attain freedom in Western Europe and America

was also not easy. Looking at the rest of the world in 1977,

we are reminded of what Lord Acton said about the struggle

for freedom in the Western tradition in an address delivered

just 100 years ago:

in every age lthel progress [of freedom) has been beset by its natural

enemies. by ignorance and superstitan, by the lust of conquest and by

love of case. by the strong man's craving for power, and the poor

man's craving for food During long intervals it has been utterly arrested, when nations were being rescued from barbarism and from the grasp of strangers, and when the perpetual struggle for existence,

depriving men of all interest and understanding in politics, has made

them eager to sell their birthright for a mess of pottage. At all

times sincere friends of freedom have been rare, and its triumphs have

been due to minorities, that have prevailed by associating themselves

with auxiliaries whose objects often differed from their own; and this

association. which is always dangerous, has sometimes been disastrous

Notes

I Ir add ina ,an,,n m hi olV o gy, s-arce and concepts .,e preious (omparitnve sur ,, in Feed,'" a I,., ecrpaiiy Jan .Feb 1973. Jiy-Aug 1974. Jan Feb 1975. and Jaf Ueb a", Aniser ,,pieaiovoiihe srey b ihe aaihor may be fend in Wloriai Sepi 1974, pp 47 Si Echanpee on the topic are in Worldvie. Nov 1974, pp 39-43 and Frvedonat ir se N, De, 1974.pp 1214

2 se. (n nimve, R.,had Clade. ed. (omp-ar H-an Rphi iBalumno John Hepk'i Lnse ) P,,,, 1976)

I See R D ,aii. "Affaicng Arnan ideals m F.eizn Po,,y: Freeon a, I, No Den 19. pp 1 II

4 Are ii ,n, e rre Avche, Feb 6, 1976, p 27558

5 Lmrd Actine 74, faoe, ,fFeedumacdOheeEmaysn(Lnn Macmn~iian, i9oS~t i
59

PANAMA' S HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Without going into detail on that report because that would take a long time, I might observe Panama has the

worst record of human rights, according to Freedom House, of any of

the countries in South America and is on an exact par with the U.S.S.R.

just to give some perspective.

I was on Congressman Yatron's mission to South America; my

impression is exactly the same as his. We talked to five Presidents, to

six Foreign Ministers, to many other government officials and, with

the exception of the Foriegn Minister of one country, at the end of a

3-hour dissertation, none of them even mentioned the Panama Canal.

and this was right after the agreement had been reached and announced early in August.

SEVERAL LATIN AMERICAN LEADERS SAID TO FEAR TOLL INCREASE

Several, all of them, did say, when asked, that they supported the

canal treaty; however, several of them also said privately they had

great concern about it, they would just as soon it didn't happen; and

several expressed, in a very concerned way, their fear about raises or

increases in the tolls and, several were very surprised to learn that the

the tolls would be increased, because they-at least one of them said he

had been assured they would not.

TERMS OF NEUTRALITY TREATY QUESTIONED

I would like to ask about the term "permanent neutrality." That is

the term used, is it not?

Mr. LINOWITZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. What does "permanent" mean?

Mr. LiNOwITz. Indefinite.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Is it the same as "perpetuity," by which we

apparently mean 97 years?

Mr. LINOWITZ. It means the same, I take it, as "in perpetuity."

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. As I understand it, there is a provision in the

treaty that results in the fact that if we should be at war our enemy can

use the canal; is that correct?

Mr. LINOWITZ. As they do today, Sir.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. That would remain; we would have no control

over that; that would not be a violation of neutrality, is that correct?

Mr. LINOwITZ. Neutrality today and under the new treaty would call

for assuring that the canal remains open to vessels of all nations in

time of peace and war.

USE OF INTEREST PAYMENTS

Mr. LAGOM1ARSINO. Relating to the interest payment that has been

made to our Treasury and will now be made to the Panamanian

Government, I must say I find that to be a rather interesting theory

as to how we get money to the Panamanians-in other words, paying

them, in effect, interest on our investment; is that correct?

Mr. LINOWITZ. Paying them money that we have hitherto been

paying ourselves on an investment.
60

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. SO, in fact, it is paying them the interest that we

have been paying to ourselves?

Mr. LINOwITZ. Congressman, we called it interest. Interest on

investment is a curious bookkeeping device. What we were saying is

that we were getting back a certain amount each year; we were

considering a fixed expense on that original investment on the basis

of which the so-called interest was calculated.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. That would have continued had we not entered

into this treaty, though, presumably?

Mr. LINOWITZ. I assume so.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. So, in effect, it is going to cost the taxpayers

$20 million a year directly from the Treasury?

Mr. LINOWITz. Not the taxpayers; the canal operating company.

Let me be sure you understand that. The tolls come from shipping,

not from the American taxpayers. Most of the shipping is not American; therefore, most of the money that gets paid to Panama will not

come from America.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. There will be a shortfall from what is the case

now of $20 million to the Treasury?

POSSIBLE RANGE OF TOLL INCREASE

Mr. LINOWITz. That is a different issue; yes, sir.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. I am unclear on the amount that the tolls will

be raised. We were advised right after the agreement was reachedat least I thought I was advised-,that the tolls would go up immediately by 30 cents a ton; that that would make up the $40 million

part of this payment to Panama. Was I incorrect; or was whoever

briefed us incorrect on that?

Mr. LINOwITZ. We never thought of increasing cents per ton;

we talked about a percentage increase and we then did talk about a

30-cent-per-ton increase. We now are not sure that much of an

increase will be necessary if there is a lot of oil coming out of Alaska.

That is why we haven't arrived at an exact figure.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. A while ago I thought I heard you mention

something about a 20- or 30-percent increase.

Mr. LINOWITz. Exactly.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. I don't know how much the tolls are but it

would seem to me a 25- or 30-percent increase would be more than

30 cents a ton.

Mr. LINOWITz. Yes, sir.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. How much would that be?

Mr. LINOwITz. It is about 45 cents, 46 cents.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. About 46 cents?

Mr. LINOwITZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. I know that, as I mentioned, some of those

South American countries were quite concerned about the 30 cents,

so you may have to go back and explain how come they weren't

advised about it.

ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE PACKAGE

Now with regard to the items on page 5, the $200 million in Exportlmiiport Bank credits, $75 million in AID housing guarantees, and $20

mI lion Overseas Private Investment Corporation loan guarantees,

is it my understanding that those payments or that amount of money
61

will be made avai able to Panama without the requirement of any

action by the House of Representatives?

Mr. LINOWITz. No, sir, they will be subject to all the usual obligations and limitations and restrictions that would apply if there were

no treaty negotiated.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Perhaps I misunderstood. I thought you said

we put the paragraph that starts out "None of these loans, guarantees" and so on, ahead or right behind that, that we moved that up.

Mr. LINOWITz. "None will require." If you look over what we are

talking about, the Export Bank credits are up to a certain amount

which the Congress fixes. The guarantees don't call for further congressional action, either for the private investment guarantee or the

AID housing.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. So what you are saying is that that will not

require congressional action?

Mr. LINOWITz. These proposals may be implemented within

existing statutory programs.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. The foreign military sales credit will require

guarantees?

Mr. LINOWITZ. Yes, sir.

SHOULD HUMAN RIGHTS CRITERIA BE APPLIED TO PANAMA

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. The one thing that concerns me about that

is: If we are going to apply the same criteria that we applied to

Argentina, Brazil, Chile, El Salvador, Paraguay, Uruguay, Guatemala, how are we going to do so if indeed the analysis of the human

rights violations that I mentioned a moment ago is accurate?

Mr. LINOWITZ. Well, Mr. Congressman

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Or is the answer that this is a special case,

and we must proceed because we must enter into this treaty?

Mr. LINOWITZ. There are other elements of special character.

What we are talking about is putting Panama in a position to be able

to join with us in doing what is necessary for the defense of the canal.

There is that special character.

On the human rights element, as you know, our view of it is quite

different from the one you have asserted.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Thank you.

EXCHANGE OF NOTES ON ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE PACKAGE

Mr. GILMAN. I will try to be brief. I note that the documents to

which you refer are part of the agreements and the related documents

concerning various U.S. Government activities currently located in

the zone; you refer also to the loans and loan guarantees, and credits

to be provided to Panama to assist its economic development.

I don't believe that any of those exchanges of notes or that any

of the loan guarantees or credit papers have been submitted to the

committee. Could you tell us whether you can make those available

to our committee so that we can make them a permanent part of this

record?

Mr. LINOWITZ. Yes, Sir, we will be glad to.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, with your permission, I request it

be made part of the permanent record.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Without objection, so ordered.

[The documents referred to follow:]
62

EXCANGE Fr N(rnEs. LoAN GUARANTEES, CREDIT PAPERS, AND RELATED DOCUMENTS

CONCERNING VARIOUs U.S. GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES IN THE CANAL ZONE

The Department of State of the United States of

America has the honor to inform the Foreign Ministry

of the Republic of Panama that, upon the entry into

force of the Panama Canal Treaty, it is the intention

of the United States of America to establish the Panama

Bureau of the United States Foreign Broadcast Information

Service (FBIS) as an integral part of the Embassy of

the United States of America in the Republic of Panama.

The Bureau would form part of the diplomatic mission,

in a manner similar to that of other agencies of the

United States Government currently operating in the

Republic of Panama, under the authority of the United

States Ambassador.

The Foreign Broadcast Information Service is an

agency of the United States Government with worldwide

responsibility for monitoring and translating into English

available foreign public media, including (a) transmissions

by major press agencies, (b) public radio and television

broadcasts, and (c) selected articles from newspapers

and other publications. These translated materials

are made available in the United States of America and

abroad to interested persons in both governmental and

private sectors. FBIS executes this responsibility

from fourteen bureaus located in foreign countries,

most of which are established as integral parts of

the United States diplomatic missions to those countries.
63

The-Panama Bureau of FBIS will have responsibility

for providing this seivie ' for an area which includes

most countries of Central America and northern South

America, and a part of the African continent. The Bureau

Staff currently consists of four United States citizen

employees (a Bureau Chief, a Deputy Chief and two editors)

assigned for rotational tours of two to four years. There

are no locally-hired American employees. United States

citizen personnel of the Bureau shall have the same

privileges and immunities, .and be subject to the same

conditions, as other American personnel currently assigned

to the various agencies forming parts of the Embassy of

the United States of America in the Republic of Panama.

The Bureau also currently employs three locally-hired

third country nationals resident in Panama, and twenty--

nine Panamanian citizens. FBIS anticipates no perceptible

expansion of its American or local staff in the foreseeable

future.

At the. present time, the Panama Bureau of FBIS is

located on a single parcel of land, comprising some 320

acres and including the Bureau office and the Chiva Chiva

radio antenna field, located on the Fort Clayton Military

Reservation.

Department of State.,

Washington, September 7, 1977.

98-991 0 - 78 - 6
64

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON

September 7, 1977

Excellcy~c:

I have the honor to refer to the Panama Canal

Treaty signed this date by representatives of the

United St.tes of America and the Republic of Panama.

In that connection, my Government proposes that

negotiations relating to continued air traffic

control services conmence as soon as possible and

that a definitive arrangement on this subject be

conclude- prior to the exchange of instruments of

ratification of the Panama Canal Treaty.

If the foregoing proposal is acceptable to

the Govcinrment of Panama, I shall be grateful to

hav an i2ffirmative response from Your Excellency.

Acccpt,-Excellency, the renewed assurances of

my highest consideration.

For the Secretary of State:

Ellsworth Bunker

Ambassador at Large

His Excrll1ncy

Romulo Escobar -Bethancourt,

Chief Negotiator.
65

EMBAJADA DE PANAMA

WASHINGTON,'D.C. 20008 7 septicmbre de 1977

Excelencia:

Tengo el honor de referirrm 71. a ccn fecha

de hoy, relativa a los servicio: co> ;cdc da

control de trafico aereo, y dr : :1<cii

Gobierno conviene en inici~ar ncr ' l

mayor brevedad possible, y cn coic a g

definitivo en torno a est cue.- 

al intercambio de locs itrFUc - In

del Tratado del Canal de PanrRuegole acepte, Th ce.cnciu, 1-, u

reiteradas de mi mas alta confi2.

Jefe dc ls

Su Excelencia

Ellsworth Bunkr,

Eibajador sin. Ccir
66

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON

September 7, 1977

Dear Dr. Escobar:

This is to confirm our understanding, reached

in connection with the negotiation of the Panama

Canal Treaty, that upon entry into force of that

Treaty, Article XVIi of the United States-Panama

Air Transport Services Agreement, signed at

Panama March 31, 1949, will have no further

application.

Sincerely,

Ellsworth Bunker

Ambassador at Large

His Excellency

Dr. Romulo Escobar Bethancourt,

Chief Negotiator.
67

ARTICULO II

Los Gobiernos se comprometen a tratar de promulgar, de

conformidad con sus procesos legislativos nacionales rospectivos, la legislaci6n que fuere necesaria por parte de cada

uno de ellos para garantizar la preservacion y proteccin do

dicho Monumento Natural en la forma on que se contempla en la

Convonci6n, y a no torar ninguna accion quo puca rnenoscabar

en forma alguna su condici6n de monumento protogido, salvo

como se dispone a continuaci6n.

ARTICULO III

Los Gobiernos acuerdan colaborar en el use de este Monu-enta

NI:tural para los prop6sitos de investigacion y . tuo cientficos y ayudar a los cientificos y las institucione( ccntificas

de cada uno a realizar dichas actividades en el :Ioneto Nsatural.

Los Gobiernos acordaran peri6dicamento los arr( o quC sudan

s(:r mututoente convenientes y desoables para faKii7 tal

colaboracion.

ARTICULO IV

Los Gobiernos acuerdan quo, de conformiaCd con los propasitos del Articulo VI do la Convenci6n, ellos pondUn a la

diSposici6n de todas las repGblicas americanas por igual,

Modianto publicaciones u otros medios, los conoci2>intLos cixc--

tificos derivados de los esfuerzos cooncrativos para cstalecer y mnantener el Monumento Natural.
68

ARTICULO V

Los Gobierno, conscientes de su interns mutuo en el

funcionamiento eficaz d,.-l Canal de Panama, acuerdan que al

ejercer sus reponabili7cdes en virtud del Tratado del

Canal de PanT-.,. an en consideracion este Acuerdo.

Queda entenuido c;.7l t;o del area comprendida en el Monumento N. uraI po -ol proposito &e mantener las instalaciones

existentes relcl as con cl funcionamiento del Canal de

Panama, no s c o en menoscabo de la condici6n de

monumento pr7.cii 7oe tene el Monumnento Natural. En caso

de que cualcui loz. dos Gobiernos considere en cualquier momnen-; quz :unoionarninto eficaz del Canal de

Panama preci:- ot uo-: ctra accion que afecte cualquier

parte dcl Non> tu::l, los Gobiernos acuerdan celebrar

consultas expect nat y en convenir en las medidas necesarias para L r c)1 d2 ,- la integridad general del Monumento

Natural y el fcma o do los proozitos de este Acuerdo.

ATICUJLO VI

Los GobXcne on en transmitir conjuntamente copias

de este Acucr.o -(: Cojo EconomLco y Social de la Organizacion

de Estados Anrc -- , solicitor que la Organizaci6 7.otifique

a las Partes Cont.-, de la Convencion sobre estc erC 
69

ARTICULO VII

Este Acuerdo entrara en vigor al mismo ticmp que &l

Tratado del Canal do Panama y permanecera cn vig. C:i.>

anos y, subsiguientemente, mientras amrbas ParteE c

siendo Partes de la Convencion para la ProtiO O> 

Flora, de la Fauna y de las Bellezas Esci c 

Paises de America.
70

D at !ishington, this 7th day of September, 1977, in

duplic , ir the English and Spanish languages, both texts

bcin7 c2- . authentic.

FA 1 n 7Uashincton, a los 7 dias de septiembre de 19 E7,

en lo v ig::ls y espaiol, siendo ambos textos igualrente

aUt

17> TS -:iTi:7 OF AMVRIC: FOR THE REPUBLIC OF AA

P( f ' OS DE A:ZRlCA: POR LA REPU LCA DE PAN A:

4-7
71

WASH T

S e,-te 7, 1977

Excellency:

I have the honor to refer to the Agr

pursuant to Article VI of the Conven4en oz e

Protection and Wildlife Preservation in t ent >n

Hemisphere, and to the Panama Canal rat related

agreements signed on Septomber 7, 1977 t2tiS ssc: 

of the United States of America and the 07ir of

Panama. Article III of the Agre cnt o 

Convention on Nature Protcction pro' d : r

ments may agree from tir2 to tia on mx;t

as may be mutually convenient znd de:c- e Lilitate

their collaboration in the use of the a 2 o o

Nature Monument for the purposes of s' C S?7rC2: r 

and investigation.

I consider it desirable within 4ie - of t7

aforementioned Convention and for the ' :e of the

Agreement based thereon that our Gov( a, r that

the Smithsonian Tropical Research In-- ,, (77), a

trust instrumentality of the United : :cx f 1 X7rica,

which I shall hereinafter call the Irt7 - , ce

designated by both Governments as cu>2i of tho Barro

Colorado Nature Monument. I propose tat G_ rnrcnts

His Excellen'cy

Romulo Escobar Bethancourt,

Chief Negotiator.
72

further agree that the Institute shall, during the

period of itq custodianship, have sole responsibility

to act on behalf of our Governments in authorizing

use of the Nature Monument for the purposes of scientific

research and investigation and for its protection as

envisage d in the aforementioned Convention and our

Agreement based thereon. In the event that one of the

Parties should attempt to take any action related to the

efficient operation of the Panama Canal as provided for

in Article V of our Agreement, I propose that the Institute,

as custczJian, be advised in advance and invited to comment

on the potential impact of such action on the overall

integrity of the Nature Monument.

I consifcr it desirable and to that end I propose

to Your: Exc:llency that, during the period of its

custodia.-ship, the Institute be authorized to employ

scienLiFic and support staff, to include game wardens,

as necer7ary to enforce such laws and regulations as may

apply to the protection of the Nature Monument. Persons

violating the integrity of the Nature Monument contrary

to the provisions of such laws or regulations shall be

promptly delivered to the authorities of the Republic of

Panama by gam wardens employed by the Institute for

appropriate action under the laws of the Republic of

Panama.

I further consider it desirable ard I therefore

propose to Your Excellency that our Governments agree

to designate the Institute as custodian for the Barro

Colorado Nature Monument for an initial period of five

years, to be extended for additional 5-year periods

upon request by the Institute at least one year in
73

advance of the date of expiration of the period, or

until such time as our Governments may mutually agree

on other understandings for the administration of the

Nature Monument. If, subsequent to the termination

of the Panama Canal Treaty, the Republic of Panama

should desire to terminate the custodianship of the

Institute of the Nature Monument, I consider it

desirable and I therefore propose that our Governments

agree that the decision take effect one year after

the day on which the jZepublic of Panama shall inform

the Un.ited States of this intent.

If the foregoing understandings proposed for

custo-ianship of the Barro Colorado Nature Monument

by STU are acceptable to the Government of the

Republic of Panama, I propose that this note and

Your Excellency's affirmative response constitute

an agreement between our Governments concerning

this matter.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of

my highest consideration.

For the Secretary of State:

Ellsworth Bunker

Ambassador at Large
74

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON

September 7, 1977

Excellency:

As you are aware, the Smithsonian Tropical

Research Institute, a trust instrumentality of the

United States of America, hereinafter called "the

Institute," has, for several years, carried out

experimental and research activities of an exclusively

scientific nature in various parts of the Republic of

Panama. Those activities are described and authorized

in Contract No. 1, January 5, 1977, signed by Dr.

Abraham Saied, Minister of Health, and Dr. Ira

Rubinoff, Director of the Institute. As set forth

in the seventh clause of the contract, its duration

is indefinite, but it may be terminated if one of

the parties so desires, provided that it notify the

other one year in advance of the date selected for

termination,-

Despite the foregoing, it is obvious that the

Institute's legal situation and the development of

its activities will be affected by the entry into

force of the Panama Canal Treaty and related agreements, signed September 7, 1977 by representatives

of the Republic of Panama and the Unitdd States of

America. In anticipation of that eventuality, I

His Excellency

R6mulo Escobar Bethancourt,

Chief Negotiator.
75

thought it pertinent to propose to you, In cc:: liance

with precise instructions from my Covcr:>.>ent, that

the Republic of Panama and the United *tteu of

America agree on the Institute's contin,.tion of

its scientific activities in the Ro.ubii of Panama,

after entry into force of the Panam C 2 Treaty

and related agreements, in accordance xih t'e

provisions of the above-mentioned co: - t and in

order to achieve the objectives thorc-4i- ' Corth.

The agreement which I present to ',Dr

consideration would remain in effect I( 1 :ivo ycars

from the date of the entry into fc-ce the 1_nara

Canal Treaty and would be extendeJ &utr T2ilv for

5 year periods until either Govor>ent ce : otico

of termination, at least one year bcft he ato of

automatic extension-.

I consider it advisable to proYo o ur

Excellence that if one of the parties .hu contract

should wish to terminate it on the b&a .- t_

seventh clause thereof while the P ':ml ?reay

is in force, our Governments agree Krh.le

there is a mutual understanding to rc'< the contract, 'the contract and the agreenint osed in

this note shall remain in forca.

It could also be agreed, and - s '7Z2 tO

Your Fxcellency, that, if either p rtz <:3he to

terminate the aforementioned contract a-ier the

expiration of the Panana Canal Tr'.- :r rnments shall immediately initiate ccs i
76

concerning the future legal situation of the

Institute and its facilities, properties, and

personnel in the Republic of Panama, before the

contract expires.

With respect to facilities and land and water

areas in various parts of the Isthmus of Panama

listed and described in the annex to this note,. the

use of which has not been granted by the Republic of

Panama to the United States of America by any other

means, I propose that thcy be rade available to the

Institute for its exclu 2 eive ur:ic. It is understood

that this agreement will not -Ifect the right of

the parties to the contr&ct to enter into subsequent

agreements on the terms of th institutes utilization

of other facilities and land '2 water areas in the

Republic of Panama chic the letter may consider it

desirable to make available tn the Institute for the

uses and purposes defineO in h contract.

I wish to propose thJt our Covernments agree

that, as long as the Pana a al Treaty remains in

force, the United States of Aerica may permit the

Institute to use any portion of the lands and aters,

and of the facilities located therein, situated

within the land and water areas the use of which is

granted by the Treaty to the United States of America,

for purposes of the aforemntioned contract, subject

to terms and conditions consistent with the Panama

Canal Treaty, as the Unitc2 d Stctes of America may

define them.
77

I further wish to propose to Your Excellency

that upon cessation, under the Panama Canal "'reaty,

of the right of the United States to use any aiud

and water areas and facilities located therein which

are being used by the Institute, our Governments

immediately begin talks intended to reach agreements

permitting the Institute to continue to use such

areas or facilities.

The possibility should be considered, Your

Excellency, that the Republic of Panama may establish

procedures whereby any natural or legal person could

acquire, in accordance with the laws of Panama, title

to land and water areas or properties located therein

Which were formerly a part of the territory constituting the Panama Canal Zone. I therefore propose

to you that, such being the case, our Governments

agree that the Republic of Panama, subject to the

applicable laws, shall grant the InsLitute rights,

other than real property title, with resp't to any

land and water areas or properties in use by the

Institute at' the time when such procedures are

established. These rights will be granted by the

Republic of Panama by an agreement or other means

not less favorable than the rrost favorable granted

by the Republic of Panara to any other natural or

juristic person.

Finally, Your Excellency, I should'ike to

propose that in the event that the Republic of

Panama does not establish such nrocedures for

transfer of title to land and water areas or 

properties located therein to natural or legal cerF ens

other than the Government of the Republic of Panama,
78

the two Governments agree that the Government of

the Republic of Panama shall place at the disposal

of the Institute, free of cost, the use of all areas

and facilities referred to in this letter, and any

others that may be used by the Institute for the

purposes defined in the aforementioned conr':act.

An exception will be made for cases in wh :h

the two Governments or the parties to the afore,i:antioned contract miaht reach a mutual agrec. rnt on

other terms.

If the aforementioned proposals relating' to

the operation in the Republic of Panama of th.

Smithsonian Tropical Research Institute arc ac ta 1e

to your Government, I should like to propose t t

this note and Your Excellency's affirmative reoply

constitute an agreement between our Governm:nts.

concerning this matter.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assuraca2 of

my highest consideration.

For the Secretary of State:

Ellsworth Bunker

Ambassador at Large
79

ANUEX

The following facilities and lands and waters

shall be made.available for the continued exclusive

use of the Snithsonian tropical Research Institute.

1. Smithsonian Tropical Research Institute

Headquarters, shons, administrative offices, caacs

:,nd laboratories on Gorgas Road.

2. Tivoli Site. Comprises approximately 4.3

acres at the site of the former Tivoi otel and

djocnt Civoli 71itchen structure.

3. aos Island. All facilities and areas

being used I the Smilthsonian Tropical .esearcn

Institute on the date the Panaa Canal T t

into f rcc.

4. Flamenco Island. All facilities ano areas

bcing used by the Slithsonian Tropical Research

Institute on the date the Panara Canal Treaty enters

into force.

5. Pipeline Road R.eserve. Aeproxivotrlv 27

acres o: land near Pipeline Road at coordinates PA

391116 ( heet 4243 II, Ganboa).
80

EMOAJADA DE PANAMA

WASHINGTON, 0. C, 20000 7 dc eeptierbre de 1977

Excelencia:

Tengo el honor de referirme a la nota d ;u

Excelencia, con fecha de hoy, relativa a lc

designacion del Instituto Smithsonian narr

Investi gacionrs Tropicales coimo u C

onum.nto Natu:ral de B3arro Colorado, quo r C

lo ,iguiente:

Excellcncy:

I have tro hono2 to relfr to tl -. 

ment pur-1vant to Article VI of th C>av.

on Nature Protect-.ion and Nildli' P' rv

in the Ne-stern Jeri 2 rc, and Lo t. !an-.

Canal Treaty and ro ate agreements scnc

on Scptc:mber 7, 1977 by represcntati-:. or

the Unit -d States of Aer ice and the i

of Panama. Article III of the Aaree nt

relating to the Convention on ture !rot tiOn

provider that our Governm'ents cv aor< Cr:

time to time on such arrang:me!ts as v

MutualIy Convzniunt and desirable to -lci tzt

their collaboration in the use of tha ar

Colorado Nature monumentt for the pur seso

scientific recarch and investigating.

I consider it desirahlje within n t 

of the Afurcientioncd Cr:)n ant it 'n. T

purj :--" of :.:~ c t ~ t

su Nrc Ilenc a

Elwrth Biunk(-r,

Enbij ador: sn CaE tca d 1 
81

our Govenments agree that the Smithsonian

Tropical Research Institute (STRI), a trust

instrumentality of the United States of America,

which I shall hereinafter call the Institute,

be designated by both Governments as custodian

of the Barro Colorado Nature Monument. I

propose that our Governments further agree

that the Institute shall, during the period

of its custodianship, have sole responsibility

to act on behalf of our Governments in

authorizing use of the Nature Monument for the

purposes of scientific research and investigation and for its protection as envisaged in

the aforementioned Convention and our Agreement

based thereon. -In the event that one of the

Parties should attempt to take any action related

to the efficient operation of the Panama Canal

as provided for in Article V of our Agreement,

I propose that the Institute, as custodian, be

advised in advance and invited to comment on

the potential impact of such action on the

overall integrity of the Nature Monument.

I consider it desirable and to that end I

propose to Your Excellency that, during the

period of its custodianship, the Institute be

authorized to employ scientific an'd support

staff, to include game wardens, as necessary

to enforce such laws and regulations as may

apply to the protection of the Nature Monuent.
82

Persons violating the integrity of the Nature

Monument contrary to the provisions of such

laws or regulations shall be promptly delivered

to the authorities of the Republic of Panama

by game wardens employed by the Institute for

appropriate action under the laws of the

Republic of Panama.

I further consider it desirable and I

therefore propose to Your Excellency that our

Governments agree to designate the Institute

as custodian for the Barro Colorado Nature

Monument for an initial period of five years,

to be extended for additional 5-year periods

upon request by the Institute at least one

year in advance of the date of expiration of

the period, or until such time as our Governments may mutually agree on other understandings

for the administration of the Nature Monument.

If, subsequent to the termination of the Panama

Canal Treaty, the Republic of Panama should

desire to terminate the custodianship of the

Institute of the Nature Monument, I consider it

desirable and I therefore propose that our

Governments agree that the decision take effect

one year after the day on which the Republic of

Panama shall inform the United States of this

intent.

If the foregoing understandings proposed

for custodianship of the Barro Colorado :*,ature

Monument by STRI are acceptable to the Government
83

of the republic of Panama, I propose that

this note and Your Excellency's affirmative

response constitute an agreement between our

Governments concerning this matter.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances

of my highest consideration.

Tengo el honor de confirmar que mi Gobierno

accede al entendimiento dispuesto en la nota de Su

Excclencia, y en que su nota y esta nota de

respuesta constituiran un acuerdo entre nuestros

dos Gobiernos.

Rucgole acepte, Excelencia, las seguridades

rc.i.teradas de mi mas alta consideracion.

mu o Es obar Pthancourt

Jefe de las a-iones
84

EMDAJADA DE PANAMA

WASHINGTON, 0. C. 20008 7 de septielbre de 1977

Excelencia:

Tengo el honor de referirme a la nota de Su

Excelencia con fecha de hoy, relativa a las

actividades del Instituto Smithsonian para

Investigaciones Tropicalcs en la Republica de

Panama, que dice lo siguiente:

Excellency:

As you are aware, the Smithsonian Tropical

Research Institute, a trust instrumentality of

the United States of 7America, hereinafter called

"the Institute," has, for several years, carried

out experimental and research activities of an

exclusively scientific nature in various parts

of the Republic of Panama. Those activities are

described and authorized in Contract No. 1,

January 5, 1977, signed by Dr. Abraham Saied,

Minister of Health, and Dr. Ira Rubinoff,

Director of the Institute. As set forth in the

seventh clause of the contract, its duration is

indefinite, but it may be terminated if one of

the parties so desires, provided that it notify

the other one year in advance of the date

selected for termination.

Despite the foregoing, it is obvious that

the Institute's legal situation and the devclopment of its activities will be affected by the

Su Excelencia

Ellsworth Bunker,

Emblajador sin Cartera de los
85

entry into force of the Panara Canal Treaty

and related agreements, signed September 7,

1977 by representatives of the Republic of

Panama and the United States of America.

In anticipation of that eventuality, I

thought it pertinent to propose to you, in

co:aliance with precise instructions from

my Government, that the Republic of Panama

and the United States of America agree on

the Institute's continuation of its scientific

activities in the Republic of Panaraa, after

entry into force of the Panama Canal Treaty

and related aareemants, in accordance with

the provisions of the above-rentioned contract

and in order to achieve the objectives tcrein

set forth.

The agreement which I present to you for

consideration would remain in effect for five

years from the date of the entry into force

of the Panama Canal Treaty and would be extended

automatically for 5 year periods until either

Governirent gave notice of termination, at least

one year before the date of automatic extension.

I consider it advisable to promose to Your

Excellence that if one of the parties to the

contract should wish to terminate -it on the

basis of the seventh clause thereof while the

Panama Canal Treaty is in force, our Gvernnrnts

agree that, unless there is a mutual un a-rUta1di

to replace the contract, the contract and the

agreement proposed in this note shall remain in

force.
86

It could also be agreed, and I so propose

to Your Fxcellencv, that, if either party

wishes to terminate the aforementioned contract

after the expiration of the Panama Canal Treaty,

our Governments shall immediately initiate

consultations concerning the future legal

situation of the Institute and its facilities,

properties, and personnel in .the Republic of

Panama, before the contract expires.

With respect to facilities and land and

water areas in various parts of the Isthmus

of Panama listed and described in the annex

to this note, the use of which has not been

granted by the Republic of Panama to the

United States of America by any other means,

I propose that they be made available to the

Institute for its exclusive use. It is understood that this agreement will not affect the

right of the parties to the contract to enter

into subsequent agreements on the terms of the

Institute's utilization of other facilities

and land and water areas in the Republic of

Panama which the latter nay consider it desirable to make available to the Institute for the

uses and purposes defined in the contract.

I wish to propose that our Governments

agree that, as long as the Panama Canal Treaty

remains in force, the United States of Armerica

may permit the Institute to use any portion of

the lands and waters, and of the facilities
87

located therein, situated within the lnd

and waLtr areas the use of which is rntd

by the Treaty to the United Stot-s O' aeria,

for purposes of the aforementionJd contract,

subject to terms and condition- cono<;tent

with the Panama Canal Treaty, a:s th- United

States of America vay define tha:.

I further wish to propose to Yx 7c<lency

that upon cessation, under the Pan.' r

Treaty, of the right of the United ;t Je2 to

use any land and water areas an1 fai iti s

located therein which are being us " )v t e

Institute, our Governments irnrit>

talks intended to reach aareemnt t

the Institute to continue to use s . :rean

or facilities.

The possibility should be 2Qnsi re, Your

Excellency, that the Republic of Painm_

establish procedures whereby any nato:al or

legal person could acquire, in accorCan:ce ith

the laws of Panama, title to land aniQ waner

areas or properties located therein hich were

formerly a part of the territory conc-tituting

the Panama Canal Zone. I therefore p'^opose to

you that, such being the case, our Covern nzrts

agree that the Republic of Panara,' suject to

the applicable laws, shall crant th2 Institute

rights, other than real property tiLae, with

respect to any land and water areas pr properties

in use by the Institute at the time ;<en such
88

procedures are established. These rights will

be granted by the Republic of Panama by an

agreement or other means not less favorable

than the most favorable granted by.the Republic

of Panama to any other natural or juristic

person.

Finally, Your Excellency, I should like to

propose that in the event that the Republic of

Panama does not establish such procedures for

transfer of title to land and water areas or

properties located therein to natural or legal

persons other than the Government of the Republic

of Panama, the two Governments aaree that the

Covernmcnt of the Republir of Panama shall place

at the Oisposal of the Institute, free of cost,

the use of all areas and facilities referred

to in this letter, and any others that may be

used by the Institute for the purposes defined

in the aforementioned contract.

An. exception will be made for cases in

vvhich the two Governments or the parties to

the aforementioned contract might reach a

mutual agreement on other terms.

If the aforementioned proposals relating

to the operation in the'Republic of Panama of

the Smithsonian Tropical Research Institute

are acceptable to your Government, I should

like to propose that this note and Your

Excellency's affirmative reply constitute an

agreement between our Governments concerning

this matter.
89

'Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances

of ry highest consideration.

Tengo el honor de confirmar la aceptacion por

parte de mi Gobierno de las propuestas contenidas

en la presente y su acuerdo de que su nota y esta

respuesta constituiran un acuerdo entre nuestros

dos Gobiernos.

Ruegole acepte, Excelencia, las seguridades

reiteradas de mi ras alta consideracion.

I o I :scobar Bethancourt

Jefe de las Negociaciones
90

ANNEX

The following facilities and lands and waters

shall be made available for the continued exclusive

use of the Smithsonian Tropical Research Institute.

1. Smithsonian Tropical Research Institute

Headquarters, shops, administrative offices, cages

and laboratories on Gorgas Road.

2. Tivoli Site. Comprises approximately 4.8

acres at the site of the former Tivoli Hotel and

adjacent Tivoli Kitchen structure.

3. IPaos Island. All facilities and areas

being used by the Smithsonian Tropical Research

Institute on the date the Panama Canal Treaty enters

into force.

4. Flamenco Island. All facilities and areas

being used by the Smithsonian Tropical Research

Institute on the date the Panama Canal Treaty enters

into force.

5. Pipeline Road Reserve. Approximately 37

acres of land near Pipeline Road at coordinates PA

391116 (Sheet 4243 II, Gamboa).
91

DARTHENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON

Sejpt'r-rber 7, 1977

Excellency:

I have the honor to refer to the Corgas Memorial

Institute of Tropical and Preventive Medicine,

Incorporated, and its subsidiary, the Gorogas Memorial

Laboratory. The Institute and Laboratory werc e-tablished in inmory of Dr. Williami C. Gorgmn for research

on diseases endcic to Central America and northern

South America. The Institute receives from the

Government of the United States an annual contribution

in Dr. Gorgas' memory for the cperetion nd maintenance

of the Laboratory.

The Gorgas Mc-rial Laboratory is established and

operates in Panama under provisions of Law 15 of

October 16, 1930, Law 5 of Pebruary 5, 195. and Law 84

of September 20, 1973 of the Republic of PTnme. The

Institute ha' incorred the United States of its Josire

to continue its operations in Panama pursuant to the

provisions of these laws.

I refer further to the Panama Canal Treaty ann

related agreements signed this date by renresen1sti'e

of the Governments of the United States and Paana ad,

in that connection, propose that ocr Gc::ernm:s

that, subsequent to the entry into force oC the Tee x,

the Gorgas Memorial Institute and Laboratorv shill

continue to enjoy: thn solo anc9 :c1e s e ht

His Excellency

Romulo Escobar BeLhancourt,

Chief Ncgo-t-iator.
92

charge, of the following areas of lands and waters,

and installations, being used by the Institute and

Laboratory prior to the entry into force of the

Treaty:

Juan Mina Plantation, approximately 15

acres of land, and one multi-purpose building

situated thereon, located on the east side of

the Chagres River in the Balboa East District;

and Building 265, a laboratory building

adjacent to the Gorgas Hospital, Ancon, and

adjacent land.

It is understood that this arrangement shall

continue for an initial period of five years, and

will be renewed upon request at least one year in

advance by the Gorgas Memorial Institute.

I propose further that in the event the Republic

of Panama establishes any means whereby any legal or

natural person other than the Government of the

Republic of Panama may acquire title under the laws

of the Republic of Panama to any areas of lands and

waters, or other real property located thereon, which

prior to the entry into force of the Panama Canal

Treaty formed part of the Canal Zone, our Governments

agree that the Gorgas Memorial Institute shall be

permitted by the Republic of Panama to acquire title

to the above-mentioned areas the use of'which it

enjoys. Such title shall be accorded by the Republic

of Panama pursuant to an arrangement not less favorable

than that accorded by the Republic of Panama .to any

other such legal or natural person.
93

I propose further that our Governmente agrc-e

to the ;ssu,-cc of a lice.nso to the 7orga7 M'orial

Institute in accordance, with the procudurec set

forth in Article IV of the Agreement in Imie)mencation of Article III of the Panama Can_.l Treaty to

permit the use, without charge, by the Gorcas

Memorial Laboratory of Abogado and Acjeto Ialands,

located in Gatun Lake, for the purpo::es cf the

Laboratory.

I further oronose that our Go':' nr agrco

that the United States may permit thG

Memorial Institute and Laboator: to enj cI'

privilege of raking official oocht-.fx thLaboratory's operations in the United tA

military commissaries and exchanges es lh

pursuant to the Agreement in Imlemta e f

Article IV of the Panama Canal Tr.'u., nd t-,a

the United States may provide to the nt

Laboratory for offical purposes such ethor suon is

or services of the United Statc. Forces or the

Panama Canal Coromission as may he cos-enicn'.

is understood that this agrce .ee w__1 ncsj xte

to personal purchases by individuof oft t' -r. 

staff and employees of the Corcga7 ''i L 

tory, regardless of their nationulit:.

If the foregoing proposals relating to the

status and operations of the Gorqae >'corial I:stitute and Laboratory are acceptabIe t- th. Gs -' 'e-t

of the Republic of Panama, I have t honor t

propose that this note, and Your uc ll. 

affirmative resoonee, shall cc-. itment between our Governments corning thia

matter, which will enter into force co the date

of entry into force of the Poor: :

Accept, Excellenzy, the rcnowed .- 'u o:

of my highest consideration.

For the Secrotary S- :

Ellsvorth asnkr

Piabassad(7or at Loa_
94

WA; N .s N, 0. C)3 3

Excelencia:

Tengo el honor de acusar recibo de la nota

de Su Excelencia, con fecha de hoy, que dice lo

siguiente:

Excellency:

I have the honor to refer to the Gorgas

Memorial Institute of Tropical and Preventive

Medicine, Incorporated, and its subsidiary,

the Gorgas Memorial Laboratory. The Institute

and Laboratory were established in memory of

Dr. William C. Gorgas for research on diseases

endemic to Central America and northern South

America. The Institute receives from the

Government of the United States an annual

contribution in Dr. Gorgas' memory for the

operation and maintenance of the Laboratory.

The Gorgas Memorial Laboratory is

established and operates in Panama under

provisions of Law 15 of October 16, 1930, Law

5 of February 5, 1953 and Law 84 of September

20, 1973 of the Republic of Panama. The

Institute has informed the United States of

its desire to continue its operations in Panama

pursuant to the provisions of these laws.

Su Excelencia

Ellsworth Bunker,

Embajador sin Cartera de los

Estados Unidos de America.
95

C 7, - _( ai C n

Treaty and telaitd zgr12 nts signed this

date by representatives of the Governments

of the United States and Panama, and, in

that connection, propose that our Governments agree that, subsequent to the entry

into force of the Treaty, the Gorgas

Memorial Institute and Laboratory shall

continue to enjoy the sole and exclusive

use, without charge, of the following areas

of lands and waters, and installations,

being used by the Institute and Laboratory

prior to the entry into force of the Treaty:

Juan Mina Plantation, approximately

15 acres of land, and one multi-purpose

building situated thereon, located on

the east side of the Chagres River

in the Balboa East District; and

Building 265, a laboratory building

adjacent to the Gorgas Hospital,

Ancon, and adjacent land.

It is understood that this arrangement

shall continue for an initial period of five

years, and will be renewed upon request at

least one year in advance by the Gorgas

Memorial Institute.

I propose further that in the event the

Republic of Panama establishes any means whereby

any legal or natural person other than the

Government of the Republic of Panama may acquire

title under- the laws of the Republic of Panama

98-991 0 - 78 - 8
96

lq : t~ix~rt-Hich < -. ;rior

to the ent'ri ni6~orce of the Panama Canal

Treaty formed part of the Canal Zone, oar

Governments agree that the Corgas memorial l

Institute shall be permitted by the Republic

of Panama to acquire title to the abovementioned areas the use of which it enjoys.

Such title shall be accorded by the Republic

of Panama pursuant to an arrangement not less

favorable than that accorded by the P.epublic

of Panama to any other such leg-al or natural

person.

I propose further that our Governments

agree to the issuance of a license to the

Gorgas Memorial Institute in accordance

with the procedures set forth in Article IV

of the Aareement in Implementation of Article

III of the Panama Canal Treaty to perit the,

use, without charge, by the Gorgas memorial l

Laboratory of Abogado and Aojeta Islands,

located in Gatun Lake, for the purposes of

the Laboratory.

I further propose that our Governments

agree that the United States may permit the

Gorgas Memorial Institute and Laboratory to

enjoy the privilege of making official

purchases for the Laboratory's operations

in the United States military conmissaries

and exchanges established pursuant to the
97

Agreement in Implementation of Article IV

of the Panama Canal Treaty, and that the

United States may provide to the Institute

and Lahuratory for offical purposes such

other sunplies or services of the United

States Forces or the Panama Canal Comnission

as may be convenient. It is understood

that this agreement will not extend to

personal purchases by individual members

6f the staff and employees of the Gorgas

memoriall Laboratory, regardless of their

nationality.

~ If the foregoing proposals relating

to the status and operations of the Gorgas

Memorial Institute and Laboratory are

acceptable to t:e Government of the Republic

of Panama, I have the honor to propose that

this note, and Your Excellency's affirmative

response, shall constitute an agreement

between our Governments concerning this

matter, which will enter into force on the

date of entry into force of the Panama Canal

Treaty.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances

of my highest consideration.

Tengo el honor de confirrar que mi Gobierno

accede a las propuestas que anteceden, 'y que la

nota de Su Excelencia y esta nota constituiran un

acuerdo entre nuestros dos Gohiernos, que entrara

en vicor en la fecha de entrada en vicor de Tratado

del Canal de Panama.

Ruegole acepte, Excelencia, las seguridades

reiteradas de mi mas alta consideracion

'u o Fs ar Pet'hancourt

Jefe de las Negociaciones
98

AGREE E :TPUPSUAINT TO ARTICLE VI OF TL]

CO::':: (Y: T:.TE P0T> CT7I ON AND

WILDLIFE ER\/TIOA IN THE -T'-STERN HEVT32PE1

The Covernments of the United States of America and jhe

Republic of Panama,

Recalling that both are parties to the Conveinton c. i;J e

Protection and wildlife Preservation in the Western Ler

of October 12, 1940;

Desiring to promote and advance the purpo-es of t

Ccnvjntion;

Noting that Article VT of the Convention provides t 

Parties may, when circumstances warrant, enter into agr J'n V

with one another in order to increase the effectiveness c? t

collaboration to this end;

Aware of the unique importance to the internat>-

scientific community of the biological reserve located :

Earro Colorado Island in Gatun Lake in the R-puDblic of PV:1

an'

Considering that the Panama Canal Treaty and ral ated 

mnts signed this date between them make desirable a furLhe;

agreement between them to ensure preservation of this bco>

reserve;

Have agreed upon the following:
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100

Convention and to take no action which would derogate in any

Way from its protected status, except as hereinafter provided.

ARTICLE III

The Governments agree to collaborate in use of the Nature

.t for the purposes of scientific research and investigation,

and to assist each other's scientists and scientific institutions

in carrying out such activities in the Nature Monument. The

G :oin: -. ts shall agree from time to time on such arrangements

as .--y be Lutually convenient and desirable to facilitate such

collabor aton.

ARTICLE IV

The Governments agree that, consistent with the purposes of

Article VI of the Convention, they shall make available to all

the irerican Republics equally through publication or otherwise

the scientific knowledge resulting from their cooperative efforts

to establish and maintain the Nature Monument.

ARTICLE V

The Governments, mindful of their mutual interest in the

efficient operation of the Panama Canal, agree that, in executing

their responsibilities under the Panama Canal Treaty, they shall

tLke account of this cement. It is understood that use of areas

included in the Natu monument for the purpose of maintaining

ng facili ties ting to the operation of the Panama Canal

oh 11 not be considered to derogate from the protected status of
101

the Nature Monument. In the event either Government at any

time considers that the efficient operation of the Panama Canal

necessitates any other action materially affecting any part of

the Nature Monument, the Governments agree to consult promptly

and to agree to measures necessary for the protection of the

overall integrity of the Nature Monument and furtherance of the

purpose of this Agreement.

ARTICLE VI

The Governments agree that they shall jointly transmit COie:s

of Lhis Agreement to the Inter-American Economic and Social Ceumcil

of the Organization of American States, and shall recuost that the

Organization notify the Contracting Parties to the Conc:ntion of

this Agreement.

ARTICLE VII

This Agreement shall enter into force sinultanousQy with

the entry into force of the Panama Canal TrE7aty, and shall reua

in force for ten years and, thereafter, for as long as both

Governments are parties to the Convention on Nature Protection ano

Wildlife Preservation in the-Western Hemisphre.
102

ACUERDO REFERE,:TE AL ARTICULO VI DE LA CCNVENCION

SOBRE LA PROT:CCION DE LA FLORA, DE LA FAUNA Y DE

LAS BELLEZAS ESCENICAS DE LOS PAISES DE AMERICA

Los Gobiernos de la Rep~blica de Panama y de los Estados

Unidos de America:

Recordando que ambos son Partes de la Convenci6n del'12

de octubre de 1940 sobre la Proteccion de la Flora, de la

Fauna y de las Bellezas Escenicas de los Paises de America;

Deseosos de fomentar y adelantar los propositos de dicha

cOni vcncion;

TQmando en cuenta que el Articulo VI de Ia Convencion disponc que las partes pueden, cuando lo justifican las circunstancias, celebrar acuerdos entre sl a los fines de aumentar la

eficacia 6e su colaboraci6n para este fin;

Conscientes de la singular importancia que tiene para la

comunidad cientifica internacional la reserva biol6gica situada

en la isla de Barro Colorado en el Lago de GatCn de la Rep~iblica

de Panama; y

Considerando que el Tratado del Canal de Panama y los acuerdos

relacionados -firmados entre ellas en esta fecha hacen deseable la

celebraci6n de otro acuerdo centre ellas a los fines de garantizar

la preservaci6n de esta reserva biol6gica;

han convenido er lo siguiente:
103

ARTICULO I

1. El 5rea conocida como Isla de.Barro Colorado en el

Lago do Gat~n de la Rep~blica de Panama se declara Monumento

Nacional en los -Lminos definidos on el Articulo I de la

Convenci6n, y sc ei -lamara Monumento Natural de Barro Colorado. Al tri:mi la vigencia del Tratado del Canal de Panam5,

firmado en esta ccha, este Monumento Natural incluiri tambion

las areas 2 O .onacidas como Islas Orquideas y Punta

Salud; Punt:: !:.7 , Bucna Vista, y Frijoles; y los islotes

mias poqueEo ad': cnt a estas. Las antedichas areas adyacentes so han ci'onihlos durante la vigencia del Tratado

del Canal do Pa para los fines do este Acuerdo mnediante la

expedici6n de Ji n>r<i; para el uso de tierras, como se dispone

en el Articuilo Ti del Lcucrdo para la Ejecuci6n del Articulo III

del Tratado dCl Unal do Panama. La Rcpiblica de Panama expedira

licencias aproy: s para cl uso de las tierras, o hara otros

arreglos parn p: t cl uso similar de la peninsula situada

inmediatam2nt-e Al sur do Isla Maiz, la cual, al terminar la vigencia del Traad. (-J. Canal de Panamio, tambien formar5 parte dcl

antedicho Manum:o Natural.

2. En-cl scntido en que se usa a continuacion en este

Acurdo, cl. trrino "onumento Natural" se refiere al Monumento

Natural dcfinidC en cl pirrafo 1 de este Acuerdo.
104

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASH;NGION

Exckllency:

I have the honor to refer to our recent discussions

concerning programs designed to enhance cooperation between

the Uni ted States of America and, the Republic of Panama in

the economic and military spheres. As a result of those

diLcssions, I am authorized to inforn you that my governm t s prepared to agree, within the limitations cf applicab', United States legislation and subject to compliance

with applicable legal requirements and, where necessL-ry,

to the availability of appropriate funds, that:

The United States Government will consider applications

rom the Rcpnublic of Panama for housing investment guarantees

tha view to approval of specific projects with an aggregate

value of not to exceed $75 million over a five ycar period.

Approval of specific projects shall be subject to conformance

with any applicable administrative and legislative criteria.

The Overseas Private Investment Corporation would

guarantee borrowings of not to exceed $20 million in United

StaLes private capital by the National Finanic Corporation

of Panama (COFINA) for use in financing productive projects

in the private sector in Panama, subject to terms and condition-:

His Exrellency

Gabriel Lewis Galinldo,

ba~sderof Nan.
105

as shill be agreed upon by the Overseas Privat'e Investment

Corpo- .tion and COFINA, and approved by the Overseas Private

.Investroant Crporation'! Board of Directors.

The Lx:ort-Import Bank of the United States is prepared

to o e -lt-ter of intent to provide loans, loan guarantees,

and in;i c, agg-regoting not to exceed $200 million over a

five ;c r p:riod beginning October 1, 1977 and ending

Septa 1 er i, 192, for the purpose of financing the ,U.S.

exporU ye of s-lcs to Panama. Such financing shall, at

the db scre en of the Board of Directors of the Export-Import

Bank!, i- i. orm of loans, loan guarantees, or insurance

2. products for or Drojects inJ approved by I such Board.

%c e St7sGovrnmen ,-t will issue rep ym-,ent

guar&. te : r its foreign military sales proc:rm in orcler

to fc: . ti te ext1 on of loans to the Government of

Panat . >1<g ble2 lenders for the purpose of financing the

purchl- I crnoent of Penaeia of defense articles

and cc.:rvceee. The aggregate principal amount of

loans u . c by the United States Government in accordance wj rgrph shall not exceed $50 million over

a teny.o

It i 2cstoed that the undertakings of the United

States for herein will enter into force upon an

exchn 5 to that effect between our two governments.

Acc- ellency, the renewed assurance of my highest

consJTra
106

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AMBASSADOR AT LARGE

WASHINGTON

September*7, 1977

Dear Ambassador Escobar:

As was discussed during our negotiations, I am

pleased to furnish information on the application of

the Wholesale Price Index referred to in paragraph 4(A)

of Article XIII of the new Panama Canal Treaty.

The Wholesale Price Index for Total Manufactured

Goods of the United States is understood by the United

States to refer to the seasonally adjusted figure for

Total Manufactured Goods found in Table 3, "Wholesale

Price Indexes for Selected Groupings Unadjusted and

Seasonally Adjusted," of the monthly report of the

Department of Labor "Wholesale Prices and Price Indexes."

Enclosed is a copy of the latest monthly report published

by the Department of Labor entitled "Wholesale Prices

and Price Indexes" which describes the method of calculation of the indexes. 

The new rate shall be determined by multiplying

the rate of 30 cents per Panamaa Canal ton by a fraction

the numerator of which is the average index for the

twelve months ending the biennial period and the denominator of which is the average index of the twelve months

preceding the first biennial period.

Sincerely,

Ellsworth Bunker

Enclosure:

Wholesale Prices and Price Indexes 

His Excellency

Romulo Escobar Bethancourt

Chief Treaty Negotiator for Panama
107

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WA S I NG TO N

September 7, 1977

Excollenco:

I hawo thc honor to confirm that with respect

to Prtic-l -i of the Agreemont in Implementation

of Arti. ITI of the Panama Canal Treaty, it is

unc3Qrstcc( thet ir.mercialy following the exchange

of instr,.- of ratification, the United States

Forces 9 c-u:t a thorough study of the feasibility

of acc .i the persons authorized to use commissary

and pf ch'-x facilities at installations within

s s and other areas the c which the Republic .

of Pianai -Z.-' thc United States to use in accordance

with t' ;c nt in implementation of Article IV

of thc - & C nfal T::eaty.

Fo1 : the *ntfy into force of that Treaty, the

Unit ed ts A 1 taKe all practicable steps to accommodIta ]-S Carscns a facilities within defense sites

and su& tcr rea:. If the United States Forces find

that su-I ierrns c-nnot practicably be so accommodated,

the Unii* trc:s Forces may, for the purpose of providing

commi s - an p&sL exchange services, use the installationi; 1:; d n pargraphs 1(c) (iii) (A) and 1(e) (iii) (B)

of Anncx to te Agreenent in Implementation of Article

III of t. 'anama Canal Treaty for a period of six

monti. il:Lin the entry into force of the Treaty.

His E xcc

.ux 4 m . r LthancDurt,

C hief LCgOtithOr.
108

The -Repu blic of Panama agreis tinat upon the written

request of the United States, through the Joint Committee,

that six month Deriod of use will be extended until such

time as the United States Forces determine it to be

practicable to accommodate such persons within the defense

sites and such other areas. In no event, however, will

the total period of such use exceed 30 calendar months

following the entry into force of the Treaty, unless the

two Parties otherwise mutually agree.

If the foregoing proposal is acceptable to you, I

have the honor to suggest that this note and your reply

thereto indicating acceptance shall constitute an agreement between our two Governments concerning this matter,

which will enter into force on the date of the exchange

of ratifications of the Panama Canal Treaty, and shall

become effective on'the date of the entry into force of

the Panama Canal Treaty.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my

highest consideration.

For the Secretary of State

Ellsworth Dunker

Ambassador at Large
109

EMBAJADA 'DE PANAMA

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20008 7 de septiembre de 1977

Excelencia:

Tengo el honor de avisar recibo de la nota de Su

Excelencia, fechada hoy, que dice lo siguiente:

Excellency:

I have the honor to confirm that with

respect to Article XII of the Agreement in

Implementation of Article III of the Panama

Canal Treaty, it is understood that immediately

following the exchange of instruments of ratication, the United States Forces will conduct

a thorough study of the feasibility of accommodating the persons authorized to use coriissary

and post exchange facilities at installations

within the defense sites and other areas which

the Republic of Panama permits the United

States to use in accordance with the Agreement

in Implementation of Article IV of the Panama

Canal Treaty.

Following the entry into force of that

Treaty, the United States will take all practicable steps to accommodate such persons at

facilities within defense site- and such ot-rareas. If the Unitrd State, Fcrce find t s

persons cannot pr .eL cably J%' b. hv SQ 

Su Excelencia

Ellsworth Bunker

Embajador sin Cartera

de los Estados Unidos de America
110

the United States forces may, for the purpose of

providing commissary and post exchange services,

use the installations listed in paragraphs

1(c) (iii) (A) and 1(e) (iii) (B) of Annex A to

the Agreement in Implementation of Article III

of the Panama Canal Treaty for a period of six

months following the entry into force of the

Treaty.

The Republic of Panama agrees that upon the

written request of the United States, through

the Joint Committee, that six month period of use

will be extended until such time as the United

States Forces determine it to be practicable

to accommodate such persons within the defense

sites and such other areas. In no event,

however, will the total period of such use

exceed 30 calendar months following the entry

into force of the Treaty, unless the two

Parties otherwise mutually agree.

If the foregoing proposal is acceptable

to you, I have the honor to suggest that this

note and your reply thereto indicating acceptance

shall constitute an agreement between our two

Governments concerning this matter, which will

enter into force on the date of the exchange of

ratifications of the Panama Canal Treaty, and

shall become effective on the date of the

entry into force of the Panama Canal Treaty.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances

of my highest consideration.
111

Tengo asimismo el honor de confirmnar en nonbre de

mi Gobierno, los arreglos que anteceden y de convenir

I;

*en que la nota de Su Excelencia y esta nota constituiran

un acuerdo entre nuestros dos Gobiernos concerniente a

este asunto, que entrara en vigor en la fecha del canje

de los instrumentos de ratificacion del Tratado del

Canal de Panama, y que surtira efecto en la fecha de

entrada en vigor del Tratado del Canal de Panama.

Ruego a Vuestra, Excelencia acepte las seguridades

reiteradas de mi mas distinguida consideracion.

omulo EsCoba. Bethancourt

Jefe de las Negociaciones

98-991 0 --
112

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON

September 7, 1977

Excellency:

I have the honor to confirm our understanding,

reached during the negotiation of the Panama Canal

Treaty, that the postal services of the United States

Forces and of the Republic of Panama shall establish

appropriate arrangements through the Joint Committee

whereby mail being handled by both postal systems may

be delivered by the Postal Service of the Republic

of Panama through existing postal facilities in the

Canal operating areas and housing areas.

Further, it is understood, with respect to Article

X of the Agreement in Implementation of Article IV of

the Panama Canal Treaty, that the Republic of Panama

will furnish space in the Balboa Post Office (Building

724) and within the area in the Cristobal Administration

Building (Building 1105) made available to the Postal

Service System of the Republic of Panama, which the

United States Forces may use for bulk mail sorting

and as postal distribution points, under procedures

to be developed by the Joint Committee.

His Excellency

Romulo Escobar Bethancourt,

Chief Negotiator.
113

If the foregoing is acceptable to you, I have the

honor to suggest that this note and your reply thereto

indicating acceptance shall constitute an agreement between

our two Governments concerning this matter, which will

enter into force on the date of the entry into force o

the Panama Canal Treaty.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my

highest consideration.

For the Secretary of St'te:

Ellsworth Bunker

Ambassador at Largje
114

i-M AJ%, D!7 PANAMA 7 de septiembre de 1977 w I I N G , r.;, C. 20000

Tengo el honor de avisar recibo de la nota de Su

E ncia, fechvda hoy, que dice lo siguiente:

xc C Incy:

I have the honor to confirm our understanding,

rcachd Aduring the negotiation of the Panama

Cc-a1 Treaty, that the postal services of the

U--o-------- Forces and of the Republic of Panama

alTI <nthblih appropriate arrangements through

thv Ji)Int Cor.nittee whereby mail being handled by

bT. ( tal systems may be delivered by the Postal

[i:- ice cf the Republic of Panama through existing

os&al facilities in the Canal operating areas

Ind using areas.

FurthLr, it is understood, with respect to

Article X of the Agreement in Implementation of

ArLicle IV of the Panama Canal Treaty, that

thc Republic of Panama will furnish space in

th ialboa Post Office (Building 724) and within

the rea in the Cristobal Administration Building

i',;l.:orith Bunker,

Embaj Ador zin Cartera

do los Estados Unidos de Awnrica.
115

(Building 1105) made available to the Postal

Service System of the Republic of Panama, which

the United States Forces may use for bulk mail

sorting and as postal distribution points, under

procedures to be developed by the Joint Committee.

If the foregoing is acceptable to you, I

have the honor to suggest that this note and

your reply thereto indicating acceptance shall

constitute an agreement between our two Governments concerning this matter, which will enter

into force on the date of the entry into force

of the Panama Canal Treaty.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances

of my highest consideration.

Tengo asimismo el honor de confirmar en nombre de

mi Gobierno, los arreglos que anteceden y de convenir

en que la nota de Su Excelencia y esta nota, constituiran

un acuerdo entre nuestrot dos Gobiernos concerniente a

este asunto, que surtira efecto en la fecha de entrada

en vigor del Tratado del Canal de Panama.

Ruego a Vues'tra, Excelencia acepte las seguridades

reiteradas de mi mas distinguida consideracion.

o o lstobar Bethancourt

Jefe de las Negociaciones
116

U.S. PAYMENTS AND RECEIPTS INVOLVING THE CANAL

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Ambassador, can you tell us what is the total

amount incurred by the United States since the initial agreement with

Panama for canal construction? What is the total amount of dollars

we have paid to Panama over the years, including the purchase price

and annual payments?

Mr. LINOwITZ. To Panama?

Mr. GILMAN. Yes. Right from its inception. Can you give us an

approximate amount?

Mr. LINOwITZ. It is about $70 million total for all the amounts

that have been paid starting with the initial $10 million downpayment

and the $250,000 annuity under the 1903 treaty to the recent $2.3

million. Is that the figure you were looking for?

Mr. GILMAN. Also, the initial cost, which was approximately how

much?

Mr. LINOwITZ. $387 million it cost us originally in construction

cost.

Mr. GILMAN. And there have been no other payments than these

annual payments of $60 million?

Mr. LINOwITZ. Of course, the initial construction cost was a

figure we incurred, and we did pay down $10 million to Panama when

we entered into this treaty.

Mr. GILMAN. I am sorry; I am having trouble hearing you.You

say that we paid down $10 million to Panama when we entered into

this treaty in addition to the $250,000 a year, is that correct?

With your permission, Mr. Chairman, without objection, I request

that information be submitted for the record showing the total amount

of canal construction costs and total payments to Panama by our

Nation since its inception.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Without objection.

[The information follows:]

Original Cost of Building the Canal.-$387 million.

Total Payments to Panama under the 1903, 1936, and 1955 Treaties.-$70.5

million.

ESTIMATE OF FURTHER CANAL TRAFFIC

XIr. GILMAN. Thank you. Could you tell us what are the projections for commercial use of the canal for the next 23 years, the period

of time in the treaty in which we will be operating the canal? What are

those projections? Is canal usage expected to increase or decrease?

Mr. LINowITZ. A modest increase, I believe, sir, but again there

are uncertainties because we don't know what will happen to the

Alaskan oil situation. That could be a large spurt in traffic for the

canal.

Mr. GILMAN. Assuming that the Alaskan pipeline is going to bring

additional oil to the west coast and we want to move it to the east

coast, won't that considerably increase the trade that goes through

the canal, isn't that so?

Mr. LINOwITZ. Yes, sir.
117

U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE IN CANAL ZONE

Mr. GILMAN. Under the status-of-forces agreement, how many

U.S. troops and how many U.S. bases will remain in the area of the

present zone and where will they be located?

Mr. LINOWITZ. General Dolvin.

General DOLVIN. We have there now, Congressman Gilman, about

9,300 Armed Forces people located in what we would call about seven

bases. We have no obligation to, although we probably will as a

matter of fact, reduce troop levels over the life of the treaty.

Mr. GILMAN. We have the discretion?

General DOLVIN. The decision to do so rests with the United States.

We have written into the treaty a provision by which we would attempt, we will make our best efforts not to increase our troops beyond

that which we have there on the effective (late of the treaty in normal

times.

So that is a kind of political problem. We can augment forever if

anything happens there. However, the reduction of both the troops as

far as troop levels go and military bases is up to the United States.

Mr. GILMAN. Then do you contemplate reducing the troops, the

numbers of bases, over the period of tiine between now and the year

2000?

JOINT U.S.-PANAMA DEFENSE ARRANGEMENT CONTEMPLATED

General DOLvIN. It is contemplated that we will have a joint de~

fense arrangement by which Panama and the United States will

defend the canal jointly, although the command arrangements will

remain national. If that works out as we hope it will-an(d we feel

sure it will-then it is possible we might be able to reduce our forces,

but there is no commitment to do so.

Mr. GILMAN. No formula has been written into this agreement?

General DOLVIN. No.

PANAMA S ESTIMATED INCOME UNDER TREATY PROVISIONS

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you. Using last year's canal transit figures asM

an illustration, how much income would Panama have received and

would they have received the additional $10 million under this proposal

using last year's figures as a basis?

Mr. LINOWITZ. No, sir.

Mr. GILMAN. What is your realistic projection of the amount

Panama will receive in the hext few years based on the projections of

commercial usage?

Mr. LINOWITZ. A total of $50 million to $60 million a year.

Mr. GILMAN. That is just out of the revenues, and then, in addition

to that, all of the other extra amounts that you have mentioned

earlier?

Mr. LINOwITZ. None of those are payments, you understand; everything else outside of the treaty is loan or guarantee(]. There are no

payments being made to Panama outside of the treaty. There are

loans and guarantees covered in the economic package.
118

Mr. GILMAN. That sewage and water amount is a loan, or is that

a payment-the $10 million figure that you stated.

Mr. LINOWITZ. That is for costs incurred in connection with the

provision of certain services to the canal commission.

Mr. GILMAN. Those intended are to be payments, aren't they?

Mr. LiNOwITz. Yes, sir, but that is payment for services to be

rendered. In other words, the canal commission could do these things

itself as we have been doing them at a far greater cost than the $10

million indicated or Panama could provide those services and then

the canal commission would reimburse Panama.

Mr. GILMAN. Would we be saving money by doing it that way?

Mr. LINOwITZ. Based on the present figures, yes.

NOTICE NOT REQUIRED TO CARRY OUT DEFENSE ACTIVITIES UNDER

NEUTRALITY ACT

Mr. GILMAN. I have just one more question, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ambassador, could you tell us what type of notice would be

required in the event that the United States felt that the neutrality of the canal was being threatened?

Mr. LiNOwITz. To whom, sir? None is called for. The provision of

the canal treaty is general enough and permits us, we believe, to take

such action as we may think necessary to assure continued neutrality

of the canal. It does not require us to-give notice to anybody.

Mr. GILMAN. We could move the troops in if we felt the canal is

being threatened?

Mr. LINOWITZ. If, in our best judgment, the way to preserve the

neutrality of the canal requires the use of troops, we would be free

to (10 so.

Mr. GILMAN. No further questions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

CANAL HAS OPERATED AT A DEFICIT

Chairman ZABLOCKI. The Chair will recognize Mr. Burke for a

further question. But first, may I ask a question on this matter of

financing. It is my understanding the last 2 or 3 years there was

about a million dollars annual deficit on operation of the canal.

Mr. LINOwITZ. I am told the amount has varied in the last 3 years;

but remember, that is after payment of interest, I believe.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. There was a deficit?

Mr. LINOWITZ. Yes.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. How was that financed?

Mr. LINOWITZ. We used the interest that otherwise would have

been paid to the United States to make up the deficit.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. That is $20 million?

Mr. LINOWITZ. $16.6 million in fiscal year 1976.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. The United States received 13 or 14 percent

or whatever?

Mr. LINOwITz. Around $9 million, Yes sir.

CURRENT U.S. PAYMENT TO PANAMA

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Further it is my understanding that currently

the Department of State has permanent budget authority to make
119

an annual payment to the Government of Panama of $2.3 million

annually.

Mr. LTNowITZ. Yes, sir.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Will that authority be retained or will Congress be asked to repeal this authority or will this $2.3 million be in

addition to whatever the treaty provides? In other words, my quostion is: After the treaty is agreed to, should not the $2.3 million

permanent authority with the State Department be terminated?

Mr. HANSELL. It would be terminated, Mr. Chairman. If the legislation is in the form that we think it will be, we would contemplate

that the new commission would have authority to make the payments,

the annual payment, directly from the tolls to Panama, and the

State Department would not continue to have the authorization that

you mentioned.

Chairman ZABLOCK1. And you anticipate the executive branch will

request that it be terminate(?

Mr. HANSELL. Yes, sir.

Chairman ZABLOCK. Mr. Burke.

"BOOK VALUE" OF CANAL

Mr. BURKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ambassador Linowitz, I

hate to keep talking about the figures that we have; you keep using

"$387 million"; but according to the estimate I got, the book value

of the Panama Canal presently is $561/ million. Would that be

correct?

Mr. LINowITZ. Would you repeat that figure?

Mr. BURKE. I said: You talked about the construction costs of

the Panama Canal at $387 million, but presently the book value is

$561% million.

Mr. LTNOWITZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. BURKE. What does that include?

Mr. LINOwITZ. I will ask Mr. Wvrough, who ought to know the

answer to that, to talk about it for a moment.

Mr. WYROUGII. I cannot give him the exact basis for that but we

can provide

Mr. BURKE. If you would furnish those figures and also would you

furnish the amount of the value of all of the other improvements,

including the homes there, the hotel, the golf course and the many

other things that are included in our own canal area and zone?

Mr. LINOVITZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. BURKE. Plus, I understan(l under the present agreement, the

land is worth something also. So we could get some idea for the record

what we are talking about and what will be going to the Panamanians

just in case that some day if somebody says we cheated the Panamanians; like Sweden had the gall to say as it did so today, we will

at least have some basis to show what they got and what we didn't.

Could you furnish us that information?

Mr. LJNOwITZ. Yes, sir.

[The information follows:]

Book value of the Panama Canal Enterprise: Millio

Panama Canal Companv -------------------------------------- $501.8

Canal Zone Giovernment ---------------------------------------- 59. 6

Total------------------------------------------------------ 561. 4

F5timated vfllue of uiuscd Canal Zone land 112
120

Mr. BURKE. Let me ask one other question, then. I want to thank

you gentlemen by the way, for your patience; it has been a pleasure

to talk to you.

COLOMBIA'S POSITION ON THE CANAL

When we were in Colombia, the President of Colombia, the Foreign

Minister, indicated that Colombia was not affected technically by

any charges which would be made by the Panama Canal because they

go in there free. Why do they get a free ride even though it was

carved out of Colombia? Why don't they want it back? We asked

them that by the way. I would like to get your answer.

Mr. LINOwITz. Well, as you probably know, President Lopez

Michelsen, President of Colombia, was one of the closest advisers to

General Torrijos throughout these negotiations and strongly supported the Panamanian position. I think he recognizes realistically

that Panama would not accede to having Colombia now assert a

claim, and therefore the only thing he has been interested in as far as

Colombia is concerned is assurance that that toll rate right will

continue.

I think it is noteworthy that the country which would have probably

had the greatest claim on the canal by virtue of its former association

with Panama has been at the forefront urging that we enter into this

new treaty relationship, and the only condition that, I guess, has ever

been imposed by Colombia at any point has been with respect to tollfree passage and in the implementation, in the neutrality treaty, you

will also see that Panama has indicated a willingness to extend that

same privilege to Costa Rica. These happen to be two of the countries

which have worked most closely with Panama.

Mr. BURKE. I know Peru and Argentina, when we talked to the

Presidents there, were very surprised to note the rates were going to

be what they were; and, as was indicated, you may have some objection, but I might--

Mr. LINOwITZ. Were these the two countries-Peru and Argentina?

Mr. BURKE. Yes.

Mr. LiNOwITz. We do know they are aware of them now.

Mr. BURKE. Chile also was suiprised. Most of these governments

indicated that because of the actions of the Organization of the

American States they went along with them; some of them had some

questions really about what the result might be and some concern.

But I might say this rather facetiously: One of the gentlemen we

are talking about, being the President of Colombia, said: The truth

of the matter is, they didn't want it back.

Chairman ZABLOCKi. The Chair promised the witnesses we wGuld

keep them no longer than 3:30. I understand they have a prior commitment. However, we would be remiss if we would not permit

Congressman Steve Solarz to give the amen to this meeting. Mr.

Solarz.

Mr. OLARZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

U.S. RIGHTS UNDER NEUTRALITY TREATY

As I understand your interpretation of the treaty, we retain the

right to intervene militarily in order to protect the neutrality of the
121

canal and our access to it. Is that a fair interpretation of the treaty as

you understand it?

Mr. LINOwITZ. I was wincing visibly at your use of the word

"intervene." The proposition is: right to take such action we think

might be necessary.

Mr. SOLARZ. Would that apply to a situation in which Panama was

not invaded by a foreign country but in which, as a result of a domestic

insurrection or a change of regime, a future Government of Panamaor the present one if it decided to change its mind-decided to deny

us access to or use of the canal at some point in the future, the treaty

notwithstanding?

Mr. LINOWITZ. When I was asked that previously, Mr. Solarz, I

responded that there is no limitation in the neutrality treaty on our

authority to take such action as we may think necessary to assure

that the neutrality of the canal is preserved.

Mr. SOLARZ. So, from our pOint of view, as you interpret the treaty,

even if Panama were to, say, unilaterally abrogate the treaty for whatever the reasons, from our point of view the rights conferred upon us

by virtue of the treaty would remain in existence?

Mr. LINOWITZ. We not only have the right but we would, pursuant

to the protocol, have a kind of obligation to the other countries of the

world to assure that this neutrality is preserved.

SIGNIFICANCE OF NEUTRALITY TREATY DEFENSE POSITIONS

Mr. SOLARZ. Let me ask you one final question, then. If, in fact, as

many people have said, the canal is inherently indefensible and if one

person were to put a bomb in a suitcase he could put the thing out of

commission for a couple of years, what is the significance of this clause

which you have skillfully managed to get into the treaty giving us the

right to act on the basis of our own best judgment for the defense of the

canal if, in fact, the canal can't be defended?

Mr. LINOwITZ. Well, the greatest protection of a secure, accessible

open canal is the cooperation of the Panamanian people.

There is no 100-percent foolproof method that can be devised to

guarantee under absolutely no circumstances could anybody tamper

with the canal's operation. What we have tried to preserve is as much

freedom as possible for us to do what we think has to be done to assure

that continued neutrality.

Mr. SOLAz. Can you envison a situation in which the continued

operation of the (-anal is in some sense a function of our determination

to utilize the option contained in the treaty to act in defense of the

canal? In other words, can you envision a situation where we would

by virtue of our action keep the canal open where it wouldn't have

been kept open had we not decided to act in pursuance of the clause

in the treaty giving us the right?

Mr. LINOwITZ. Absolutely.

Mr. SOLARZ. Such as?

Mr. LINOwITZ. Well, third party intervention is a clear case. Action

as I have indicated which need not be pursuant to third party intervention which keeps us from having free access to the canal or any

manner impairs its neutrality. I would say any incident that, ill our

judgment, impedes the free, open accessible canal gives us an oppor-
122

tunity to do what we think might have to be done to assure that it is

kept open.

Mr. SOLARZ. One final question.

JUSTIFICATION FOR "PAYING"l PANAMA TO TAKE THE CANAL

How do you respond to the argument which I have seen emerging

that after investing hundreds of millions of dollars, maybe billions in

the canal, we are not only turning it over to the Panamanians lock, stock, and barrel, but on top of that we are also paying them for the

privilege of taking it from us? Some claim that this seems to conflict

with common sense whereby if you really built something and you

have invested so much in it and then you are going to give it to someone else, usually they pay you for what you have given them. Herewe seem to be paying them and giving them.

Mr. LINOWITZ. Well, a very brief answer to a very long question

would be that the canal was built by us on another country's territory.

We have received as I said before as an interest return a very considerable amount of money which we have designated as interest on

the original investment.

We have gained considerably more and I don't know how to estimate it in the bills in terms of what this has meant for our development, what that means for our economy over the years since the canal

was first opened.

Now, as we look forward to a decreased significance of the canal

both for security and commerce reasons, as we recognize 1977 is not

1903, and as we are at the position now of trying to find a fair figure

for the use of the Panamanian territory, which $2.3 million comes to

$6 per acre we are now paying, we ought to be able out of the canal

operations-mind you, this is not coming out of the United States, this is coming out of canal operation-agree on a mutually acceptable

figure which more justly compensates them.

That is what we think we have arrived at in the treaty and when

we turn over the canal operation in the year 2000, we are turning

over to them the responsibility for keeping that canal open on their

own territory by assuring ourselves of preserving what is important

and vital to us and under those circumstances we think we are acting

not only to preserve our interests, to recognize our aspirations, but

the way a great nation should act.

Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you.

Chairman ZABLOCKI Thank you.

Ambassador Bunker, Ambassador Linowitz, again on behalf of

myself and the committee we want not only to express our deep

appreciation for your efforts and congratulate you for the negotiations

of the treaties but to extend our appreciation for the amount of time

you have given us today in testimony before the committee this

afternoon. We also want to thank General Dolvin and Mr. Hansell,

your associates here today.

If there is a necessity as I have assured my colleagues, we will call

upon you again in the future.

Again, thank you very much. The committee stands adjourned

until further notice.

Mr. LiNowvrz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Whereupon, at 4:10 p.m., the committee adjourned.]
PROPOSED PANAMA CANAL TREATIES

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 14, 1977

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,

Wasington, I).C.

The committee met at 10:10 a.m. in room 2172, Rayburn House

Office Building, Hon. Clement J. Zablocki, chairman, presiding.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. The committee will please be in order.

The Chair understands that the members are on their way and will

be here very shortly.

We meet this morning to continue the committee's hearings on the

proposed treaties relating to the future status of the Panama Canal

and necessary associated legislation. Last Thursday, the committee

heard the principal U.S. negotiators, Ambassadors Ellsworth Bunker

and Sol Linowitz. Today, we are honored to have the opportunity to

hear the testimony of two distinguished former Secretaries of State,

the Honorable Dean Rusk and the Honorable Henry A. Kissinger.

Gentlemen, it is a difficult task to say which one of you is more

distinguished. On my behalf and on behalf of the members of the

Committee on International Relations I welcome you to the committee.

If it is agreeable with you and the.members of the committee, we

will first hear your prepared statements, then we can proceed with

questions. While it is with some trepidation that I set the protocol for two of

our most distinguished diplomats, may I suggest that Secretary Rusk,

who served with the earlier administrations, speak first.

Mr. Secretary, you may proceed.

STATEMENT OF HON. DEAN RUSK, FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE

Mr. RUSK. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It is very good to

see you again and other members of this very distinguished committee.

Although I have not yet played the role of a grandstand quarterback

since I left Washington, I felt obliged to accept your invitation to

present my views on the two Panama Canal Treaties which wilt be

before the Congress for advice and consent in the Senate and for

implementing legislation. The negotiations which eventually resulted

in these treaties were begun during the Johnson ad ministration although

previous administrations, including that of John F. Kennedy, had been

engaged by the Panamanians in discussions looking toward basic

changes in the status of the canal and of the zone.

In the mid-1960's it became apparent to us that history had overtaken the status quo in Panama and that a new relationship would have

to be found if our vital interest in the operation and safety of the canal

(123)
124

was to be assured. In these opening remarks I shall limit myself to

certain simple but basic considerations which lead me to support the

new treaties and to commend them to your favorable action, leaving to

others an article by article examination of all their terms.

My first point is that the 1903 treaty, as amended, provides a

very fragile platform on which to try to stand as we move toward the

21st century. Here I do not rest upon the murky circumstances

surrounding the secession of Panama from Colombia and the conchision of the treaty with Mr. Bunau-Varilla, a citizen of France

with uncertain credentials as a representative of Panama.

It is a fascinating story with a colorful cast of characters. But I

see little point in our now wearing sackcloth and ashes over what

our grandfathers did in another historial era, when what happened

in most of the world was determined by decisions made or not made in

a handful of Western capitals. We should not, however, be under the

illusion that those events could stand the test of modern standards of

treatymaking.

In 1964-65 it became necessary for us to think very hard about the

1903 treaty. That treaty seemed to me to take its place alongside the

so-called "unequal" treaties which certain Western Powers imposed

upon China in the 19th century and the capitulations which gave

certain powers extraterritorial rights in the Ottoman Empire. Even

if we had acquired absolute title to the Canal Zone, which we did

not, the general international policy and practice of decolonization

would have rendered the status quo in Panama untenable.

The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties has not yet received

the advice and consent of our Senate, apparently because of differences between some Senators and the executive branch as to the

handling of executive agreements within our own constitutional system. I would suppose, however, that the contents of that convention

apply to the United States and to other nations because it simply

codified established rules of customary international law.

It seems to me that the 1903 treaty with Panama would be vulnerable to the doctrine of fundamentall change of circumstances"-

rebus sic stantibus-found in article 62 of the convention. In my

view, the United Nations charter contains the overriding statement of

international law and policy-despite our occasional irritations over

the conduct of members in some organs of the U.N. organization

itself and the many failures of members of the world community in

giving effect to charter precepts.

The charter insists upon the "sovereign equality of all its members"-article 2, paragraph 1-and calls for respect for "the equal

rights * * * of nations large and small"-preamble. I have already

mentioned decolonization, well established both in principle and

practice by the charter and by the history of this postwar era.

Article 64 of the Convention on the Law of Treaties states, "if a

new peremptory norm of general international law emerges, any

existing treaty which is in conflict with that norm becomes void and

terminates." Lawyers have debated at considerable length this doctrine of 'jus cogens" and the identity of the norms which can be said

to be peremptory in character. They are probably few in number.

I would suggest to you that, in the modern wcrld, one nation cannot

maintain a presence within another nation without consent of the
125

second nation. If the situation in Eastern Europe is different, the

contrast merely emphasizes the general rule and provides no precedent

for the United States. We have withdrawn from valuable bases and

installations in Libya, Ethiopia, and Pakistan; we have seen the use

of bases in Turkey sharply restricted by that government; we withdrew our forces from France on the demand of President de Gaulle.

We know that such bases and personnel as we have in other countries

require the consent of the governments concerned, as this committee

knows, and that some of them have charged us very high prices for

that consent. The 1903 treaty with Panama is not an adequate substitute for such consent. It is not an arrangement which could be negotiated in this latter part of the 20th century.

I do not know whether President Theodore Roosevelt was accurately

quoted in a remark about Panama: "We wanted it, we took it." But

let us be under no illusion-an attempt to maintain our position in

the Panama Canal Zone on the basis of the 1903 treaty would be an

act of force-as in Eastern Europe. We can choose that course if we

are prepared to pay the heavy political, economic, and military cost

involved.

In concluding my comment on the status of the 1903 treaty, let me

adld that I dc not believe that we could afford to allow the validity of

that treaty to be tested in the International Court of Justice. I am

glad that that treaty has not, been pursued in the General Assembly of

the United Nations where I would suspect we would be almcst alone

in the voting. Some of1 our closest friends would leave us because of

considerations of general policy. When the United Nations Security

Council-here I amend my written text to make it more preCise-met

in Panama in 1973 and had before it a resolution on Panama, hostile

to the U.S. interests, it was necessary for our representative to exercise

a veto, with no member of the council voting with us. There were 13

''yes" votes, the United Kingdom abstained, and the United States

cast the only negative vote.

An alternative is to try to safeguard our interests in the Panama

Canal by agreement between ourselves and Panama in a modern

setting. There are very strong feelings among the peoples of our two

countries, feelings which make it very difficult for governments to find

agreement with which all can be satisfied. These feelings will be further

acerbated during the present debate in both countries about the new

treaties; already what is said in one country is being used to inflame

feelings further in the other country.

Opponents of these treaties object to our making such agreements

with a dictator. Having been involved with this problem before the

present regime in Panama came to po\w-er, I woldd suggest that the

more democratic the Government in Panama, the more insistent

they would have to be on a prompt and fundamental change in the

arrangements regarding the canal.

I might add an aside here. I remember talking with some of the

high Panananian officials in 1965 about this and there was a reasonably democratic government at that time. At that point they were

very insistent on putting our presence in Panama on exactly the same

footing as was our presence in Spain, short-term agreements based

wholly upon the consent of the host government, far different than the

kind of treaties we have in front of us today.
126

Our national interest lies in access to and the safety of the Panama

Canal itself, not in a continuation of our special position in the zone.

I believe that our interest in the canal-I hope our Panamanian

friends won't be offended by this-includes a residual responsibility

to the maritime nations of the world and to certain nations of our own

hemisphere for whom the canal is a lifeline. I think history leaves us

with that residual responsibility, as I call it.

But surely we should attempt to satisfy these interests by agreement

and should seek to engage the friendship and cooperation of the Panamanian Government and people in the decades ahead. We can give

ourselves a chance to repair past injuries and proceed in the future

on the basis that we and the Panamanians need each other in these

matters.

We must take into account, however, the possibility that events

will not work out as we now hope. Under the new treaties, we shall

have 23 years to test the ability of Panama and ourselves to proceed

on the basis of agreement. The responsibilities which we would have

until the year 2000 clearly make it possible for us to insure the operation and safety of the canal.

Beginning with the year 2000 questions regarding passage and safety

of the canal would be governed by the provisions of the Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama Canal.

Under article IV of this treaty, "The United States of America and

the Republic of Panama agree to maintain the regime of neutrality

established in this treaty."

The separate and joint responsibility of the United States and

Panama for that "regime of neutrality" as spelled out in the treaty

gives us, in my judgment, all that we need to maintain our essential

interests in the matter, namely, passage and the security of the canal

itself.

I do not believe that we should approach such matters in terms of

the worst case imaginable but rather through a genuine desire and

expectation to work things out on an amicable basis. In any event,

Providence has not given us the ability to pierce the fog of the future

with accuracy and the year 2000 is a long way off. Perhaps we should

not, today, try to answer every problem which might be posed to some

future President and Congress.

I must confess, however, that article IV cf the Neutrality Treaty

played a major role in my own decision to support these two treaties.

If, God forbid, it should ever become necessary for a President and a

Congress to take strong measures to keep the canal functioning and

safe, they would be in a far stronger position to do so under the treaties

of 1977 than under the anachronistic treaty of 1903.

Thus, whether we are thinking of the principles upon which we hope

to see a cooperative community of nations move into the future or are

thinking about a hardheaded approach to adverse contingencies which

may lurk in the future, it seems to me to be to our advantage to give

effect to these two new treaties. The consequences of not doing so

could be very severe. I see no point in inviting these consequences

upon ourselves now when we have a good chance to avoid them altogether.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
127

Chairman ZA BLOCKI. Thank you, Mr. Secret ary. Your well-thoughtout statement outlines very succinctly some of' the valid points as to

why the treaty should be carefully considered and are most welcome.

STATEMENT OF HON. HENRY A. KISSINGER, FORMER SECRETARY

OF STATE

Mr. KISSINGER. Mr. Chairman, I would like to express my pleasure

at being able to meet with this committee and also to be able to testify

together with my distinguished predecessor, whose pl)triotism and

dedication saw the country through great difficulties. He was a great

support to his successors after lie left office.

I feel also personally gla(d that he inaugurated the modern tradition

of Secretaries of State who speak with an accent. [Laughter.]

I am pleased to be here today to testify on an issue about which I

feel deeply. I am here before you today to express my firm conviction

that the new treaties with Panama regarding the canal significantlv

advance the national interests of the United States. I have carefully

reviewed the treaties an(I discussed them in detail with Ambassadors

Bunker and Linowitz; the Chairman of the -Joint Chiefs of' Staff,

General Brown; the Air Force Chief of' Staff, General Jones; President

Carter and former President Ford.

These treaties preserve for the remainder of this century the significant elements of the existing arrangements for mainagement and

defense of the canal, while at the same time establishing a cooperative

relationship with Panama which will actually enhance the canal's

security and efficient operation.

After the year 2000, when management of the cznal pses to

Panama, the United States will continue to have the right to guinrantce

the canal's neutrality and impartial access to it. The Nelitri'lit v 're, t

defines neutrality in terms of >pecific standards for canal operation.

It establishes that the United States as well as Panama ha the respmnsibility to maintain those standards. We have in the treaty the foiundation for acting, if need be, to keep the canal neutral and open.

And these treaties will gain international support for the continuing

U.S. role and respon-ibility during this century and beyond.

Since 1964, four succes'ive Pre idents, representing both political

parties, have concluded that the achievement of a new treaty relationship with Panama was important for the long-term security and foreign

policy interests of the United Statez. All four Presidents have engaged

in negotiations based on the conviction that a modernized relationship

embodving shared commitment and responsibility would best a-zure

our basic interest in continuing access to an efficiently run, nondiscriminatory, and secure canal.

All four Presidents have felt strongly that the present 1903 treaty

does not adequately assure that interest. In February 1974, 1 signed

on behalf of the United States, in the presence of a bipartisan congressional delegation, a joint statement of principles that was an

important step in the negotiation of the new treaties.

The new treaties, freely negotiated and signed in 1977 with the

support of the other nations of this hemisphere, will improve the

political environment for the protection of our interests. While the

98-991-77- 10
128

United States would, in any event, continue to have the physical

means to defend the canal unilaterally, we could exercise that ability

under the present 1903 treaty only at the risk of considerable cost to

our other Western Hemisphere interests.

Were the new treaties rejected, it would be impossible for even our

friends in the hemisphere to support us. No leader and no public

opinion anywhere in this hemsiphere would be willing to go along with

the United States in defense of the consequences of a refusal to

modernize the canal relationship with Panama. Rejection of the

treaties would poison our relationship with all the countries of Latin

America on all other issues, and leave us, for the first time in our

history, facing the unanimous hostility of all the nations to the south

of us in our own hemisphere.

Even on the extreme assumption that Panama might not live up to

the terms of the treaties, a new agreement freely worked out and

signed in 1977 in the presence of Western Hemisphere heads of government places the United States in a far stronger moral and juridical

position to defend its interests in such a case than does a treaty concluded in 1903 which was not even signed by a Panamanian and which

is universally regarded as inequitable.

The new treaty arrangement will provide us with international

conditions vastly more favorable than currently exist to defend both

the agreement and the canal itself should the need arise. The new

arrangement, above all, accords with the reality that cooperative

endeavor is the only possible basis for the satisfactory operation by

the United States of a canal located within Panamanian territory and

even now run by a labor force which is predominantly Panamanian.

We shall not again have the opportunity to safeguard our real interests in the canal on terms as favorable as those that have been

negotiated.

The new Panama Canal Treaties present us with the opportunity

both to advance our basic interests in the canal and to solidify our

long-term friendship and cooperation with the other nations of the

Western Hemisphere. A creative Western Hemisphere policy must

have many components, but the fate of these treaties will be its

touchstone for the countries of Latin America in this period.

Of course, even if the treaties are ratified there will be considerable

anti-U.S. agitation in the Western Hemisphere. But it will not have

the unifying focus of explosive opposition to what will be considered

American power politics throughout the Western Hemisphere. And if

the treaties are accepted, our friends-the moderate nations that wish

to work closely with us on other issues-will have the possibility of

elaborating their cooperation with us.

I understand the reluctance and concern of the opponents of the

treaties. But there is no viable alternative. It is not a question of

"giving" the canal to Panama, it is a question of the United States

ability to distinguish between symbol and reality, to plan for our

future needs and to preserve and, in fact, enhance our basic interest

in the accessibility, neutrality, and security of the canal.

Firmness in the defense of essential national interests is vital to

any nation. But unreasoning adherence to the status quo has never

beci the test of an, ellective foreign policy. A nation assures its international position by understanding clearly what its interests are and

by takmg timely and effective action to safeguard those interests.
129

We have often acted on this principle. At the end of World War II,

we embarked on a number of new initiatives-the Marshall plan, the

North Atlantic Treaty, Point 4, to cite a few-that constituted a

dramatic change in course from those we had followed in the past.

We did so because we realized that the new circumstances of the

postwar era called for new responses-that we could not assure the

security and prosperity of our Nation by adhering to the isolationist

policies of the past. To cling to outmoded approaches was to allow

ourselves to be overwhelmed by future events.

And there are many more recent examples of constructive responses

to changing world conditions. The SALT agreements, the opening of

relations with China, our efforts to modernize the institutions of international economic cooperation are cases in point. In each case, we did

not hesitate to modify old policies when we felt that our national

interests required change.

I firmly believe that the new Panama Canal Treaties should be

viewed in the same light. They are a step forward-an improvementover what has existed heretofore. They present the Congress and the

people of this country with an opportunity to modernize an outdated

arrangement that has itself become a threat to the very interests it

was designed to protect.

I would like to stress a final point. These treaties represent the

most important and serious international undertaking presented to

the Congress by the administration of President Carter. A defeat of

the Panama Canal Treaties would weaken the President's international

authority at the beginning of his term. It would jeopardize our entire

Western Hemisphere relationships.

The undermining of Presidential authority at home would be a

demonstration of fundamental weakness and a grave responsibility

for the Congress to assume.

I feel this all the more strongly because in my opinion we have

every reason to consider that the new treaties are to our advantage.

They make the efficient and neutral operation of the Panama Canal

a joint commitment with the broad support of the international community. They are the essential foundation of a long-term relationship

of cooperation with the nations of the Western Hemisphere. And they

enhance our security and raise new prospects for a peaceful and

constructive international order.

These treaties, in conclusion, advance fundamental national purposes. The consequences of failure would be serious. Their passage

undoubtedly would be an act of courage. But we are all accountable

to history for our action, and for the consequences. I believe that

passage of these treaties is the only possible act of wisdom and the

course of true patriotism. It is the necessity of statesmanship. I

therefore urge your support.

PURPOSE OF COMMITTEE HEARINGS

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Thank you Secretary Kissingrer. Your

scholarly and concise presentation of support for the pro)Posed treaties,

like that of Secretary Rusk, will add to the purpose for which these

hearings are held.

I have been asked the question why should this committee hold

hearings on the pro posed treaties when only the Senate ratifies
130

treaties. I think it is very necessary and very valuable that the

Congress as a whole, including the House of Representatives, which

will be asked to act on legislation which will implement the treaties, should be fully informed, and more so, the people need to know about

the treaties. Your statements have added much to a better understanding of the validity of the treaties, and also have signaled some

of the dangers that might be forthcoming if the treaties are not

ratified.

I think this will help the understanding on the part of the public of

what is really entailed in the treaties and I hope will engender broader

support for the efforts of the past administration and this administration in a new treaty with Panama.

REMOVAL OF U.S. MILITARY BASES

Secretary Rusk, you have stated at one point that what really

convinced you to fully support the treaties was the provisions in

article IV, the protection and defense of the Panama Canal.

Concern has been raised in prior testimony and in reports in the

press that after the year 2000 the United States will have to remove

its military bases and forces, in order to comply with the neutrality

provisions of the treaties. How important will it be for the United

States to maintain bases in the Canal Zone after the year 2000 and is

the removal of our military bases a valid point of concern?

Mr. RUSK. I would think that from a military point of view, if it

should become necessary, unhappily, some time in the future, to

use force with respect to the canal, there will be considerable convenience in having forces already ashore rather than making an ab

initio landing from the sea. But, on the other hand, that is not a

matter of decisive effect because our capacity for doing what is

necessary would be there in any event.

I am a little hesitant to inject this next comment at this stage of

the debate in both countries but we have 23 years in which to work out

an effective relationship with Panama and with the Panamanian

people. I think we have a chance to demonstrate there that just as we

need the canal in certain aspects the Panamanians need us and if we

conduct ourselves well I don't abandon the possibility that some of

these bases might be retained beyond the year 2000 by additional

agreements with Panama. That depends upon circumstances.

As you know, there have been some OAS training schools down

there and some other functions, but I would not think that the military difference between having forces ashore would be important

enough to frustrate the broad purposes of these treaties.

LATIN AMERICAN SUPPORT FOR THE TREATIES

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Thank you.

Secretary Kissinger, you made a point that the treaties are in the

interest of all Latin America. Is it your understanding that all other

Latin American nations are in support of the treaties?

Mr. KISSINGER. It was my experience when I was in office that all

the Latin American leaders with whom I dealt at the yearly OAS

meetings, the foreign ministers, at least of all of the represented nations
131

as well as all of the heads of government that I met, were unanimous

that this treaty relationship should be modernized. This was true even

of countries that might themselves not be overwhelmingly interested

in the Panama Canal, but all of them felt that whatever their personal

convictions, their public opinion would make it impossible to stand

with the United States if a showdown developed over the 1903

treaties. This is what convinced me that the negotiations started by

our predecessors should be continued and brought to a conclusion.

I support what Secretary Rusk has said, that if these treaties fail of

ratification, this would be considered in the Western Hemisphere

universally as an insistence by the United States on resting its position on a demonstration of force and would provide a rallying point

for anti-U.S. sentiment throughout the hemisphere, even in countries

whose leaders are very well disposed to us.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

I might point out there is an innovation in the box in front. A questioner is limited to 5 minutes under our rules and when he begins, the

green light goes on. It does not necessarily mean, however, that when

the red light comes on the witness has to stop in the middle of a

sentence. It just means the member should not ask another question.

Mr. KIssINGER. After 5 minutes I am likely to be in the middle

of my first sentence. [Laughter.]

Chairman ZABLOCKI. It has been a custom on matters that are of

deep interest to a particular subcommittee that the chairman of the

subcommittee is given the courtesy of asking questions first, so I will

call upon the subcommittee chairman of the Inter-American Affairs

Subcommittee, Mr. Yatron.

Mr. YATRON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I, too, would like to welcome both of you gentlemen here today, Secretary Rusk and Secretary Kissinger. Last week, when we had hearings, Ambassador Linowitz said

the treaties have the full approval of all countries in Latin America.

However, the Latin American leaders were not strong in their support during my subcommittee's recent study mission in Latin America.

We visited six countries. We left on August 9 and returned on the

23d. We talked to five Presidents as well as other leaders in those

particular countries. Now my question, is there intensity of support in Latin America for the treaties? Would either of you gentlemen care

to comment?

Mr. RUSK. Since I was involved with this prior to my colleague here I might comment first.

When this matter came up, during the mid-1960's, very few but

some of our Latin American friends said to us privately, look, Panama

has had 60 Presidents in 62 years, this canal is a lifeline for us, you must not turn this canal over to so uncertain a political regime or

situation. On the other hand, even then, publicly, they were compelled to support Panama because of the strong public opinion impact of

this issue. My view is that there would have been some nervousness

in some of the Latin American countries had it not been for, say, article IV of the Neutrality Treaty and also for the supplementary document which most of them signed, which in effect expresses a

hemispheric interest in passage and safety of the canal.
132

So I would think now there would be considerably more satisfaction with these arrangements on the part of governments than there

would have been without the neutrality treaty.

Mr. YATRON. Well, it was the feeling of the committee as well

as my own

Mr. RUSK. May I ask when your committee was down there?

Mr. YATRON. August 9, and we returned on the 23d. We were

there for approximately 14 days.

Mr. RUSK. That was before the text of the two treaties was

available?

Mr. YATRON. That was about the same time.

Mr. RUsK. Article IV of the Neutrality Treaty would make a

very substantial difference to a number of them.

Mr. KISSINGER. I don't know which countries you visited. My

instinct would be that some of the countries might be lukewarm in

their support because they think it gives us too much of a right of

intervention rather than too little of a right of intervention. But this

I couldn't judge unless I know the countries.

Mr. YATRON. We visited Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Chile, Argentina, and Brazil.

Mr. KISSINGER. And again I can only base it on the experiences

I had prior to the unfortunate event of January 20. [Laughter.]

At that time, at every OAS meeting we confronted a unanimous

request by all of the Latin American countries in favor of a modernized

treaty relationship; and whatever private misgivings individual leaders

would have, if they are this reluctant to express themselves publicly,

I think this is a fact of life that has to be taken into consideration.

Mr. YATRON. OK, thank you.

PROSPECTIVE SOVIET INFLUENCE IN PANAMA

I would like to ask you what are the prospects for an increased

Soviet influence in Panama, particularly in light of these July 19

agreements between the two countries?

Mr. KIssINGER. Well, the possibility of Soviet influence in Panama

exists in any event with or without the treaties. The question is

whether the treaties make it more or less likely.

I would think that given the past instability of Panamanian

governments, it would be hazardous to predict what that government will do over a period of the remainder of the century. Even

more so what they will (1o over a longer period of time.

Mr. RUSK. 1 might add a very brief comment there, sir. I don't

know of any better or quicker way to radicalize politics in Panama or

in some other countries in the hemisphere than for us to reject these

two treaties.

Mr. KISSINGER. That would have been also my judgment. The

question is whether the Soviet Union can develop a degree of influence

that can jeopardize the neutral passage of shipping and the free

access to the canal. And I believe that the neutrality treaty, especially

article IV of it, gives us the legal basis to prevent this, and that if we

(1o not have the preponderance of power in the Western Hemisphere

to protect the canal against Soviet military interference, then the

legal status will not be a. determinant factor in this.
133

Chairman ZABLOCKI. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. Findley.

LATIN AMERICAN SUPPORT FOR THE TREATIES

Mr. FINDLEY. You will learn before the morning is over, if you

did not realize it already, that people on congressional study missions

sometimes form different impressions from the same experience. I

was on the mission with Mr'. Yatron as were Mr. Lagomarsino and

Mr. Fascell. We met with the heads of government in all of the six

countries we visited with the exception of Brazil. I raised this question

with each: Is there any aspect to the proposed treaty with Panama

which troubles your government. The answer without exception was

"No." In each case, the head of government followed up with a comment

that he felt it was important that the treaty be ratified, he hoped the

ratification would occur soon, and he felt it would be a setback if

ratification did not occur.

Now, I wasn't privy to all of the discussions that other members

had but my impression was that Latin America is solidly behind the

treaty.

ARTICLE IV-NEUTRALITY OF THE CANAL

In my discussions with constituents back home I find enormous

opposition, very little support. Sometimes a constituent will ask

what is in the treaty that guarantees the United States the right to

intervene to kee) the canal open? From your testimony I judge that

article IV of the Neutrality Treaty is that portion.

Is there anything else in the treaties which limits, which restricts,

which conditions, the rights set forth in article IV?

Mr. RUSK. I know of none, Mr. Findley. I agree with you that

there is very strong feeling against these treaties out in the grassroots

where you and I live. I think part of it is that the public does not know

all that is in these treaties.

For example, when I meet with groups and talk to them about

article IV, for most of them that is the first time they ever heard about

it and that makes a very considerable difference. I do think the administration must get the terms of these treaties out to the grassroots

because there is too little understanding of what in fact is present in

these two treaties. I have read over these treaties very carefully, from

the point of view of the question you raised, because you among others

can help me remember when I was here in this town that I got very

lively criticism from those who thought I was too hardnosed, and so I

read over these treaties rather sensitively from the point of view of a

future President and a future Congress who might have to take action.

Mr. FINDLEY. There is no time limit on article IV?

Mr. RUSK. That is correct. I believe that the officials call that indefinitely, no time limit into the future, but I do call to your attention that the treaty is entitled, "Treaty Concerning the Permanent

Neutrality and Operation of the Panama Canal."

Mr. FINDLEY. Is that not in itself an extraordinary conveyance of

right by one nation state to another?

Mr. RUSK. I think it is. I think this article IV will be the principal

subject of opposition within Panama.
134

Mr. FINDLEY. I don't know of any precedent myself in which a

nation has guaranteed indefinite free passage through its territory to

another nation. Do either of you gentlemen know of another circumstance in which such a conveyance has occured?

Mr. RUSK. One would have to look at the special arrangements

with respect to, say, the Dardanelles, the Kiel Canal, one or two things

like that, special regime. Offhand I don't have a ready example.

Mr. KISSINGER. Well, I think there are precedents for establishing

the principle of free passage. I think the Suez Canal guarantees it

under the Constantinople Convention of 1888. But I know no precedent where one nation gives to one other nation the unilateral right of

assuring the neutrality. Even in those cases where there is a general

agreement to have free passage I know no precedent, but I would have

to do some more research. I know no precedent where one other nation

has been specifically designated as having the right to guarantee

that neutrality and, moreover, in which the conditions of the free

access is rather specifically detailed. So we could invoke not only a

general condition but also very specific provisions for the passage of

shipping.

Mr. FINDLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Mr. Fascell.

Mr. FASCELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

NEED FOR CHANGE TO MEET NEW CIRCUMSTANCES

Gentlemen, I never cease to marvel at the dedication both of you

have. Already having made great contributions to our country you

continue in every way to carry on your activities and present your

experienced views. All of us should be extremely grateful to both of

you.

I believe as you do that the American people once given the facts

will make the right decision. Americans are noted for not being blind

adherents to the status quo. We are good at change, we initiate it,

understand it and accept it. And it is obvious that the change is called

for and required in the relationship between the United States and

Panama on the canal.

We have always been for change based on a judgment for what

we consider the best interests of the United States and the world.

I think that has been our motivating force. And our actions have been

subjected to the closest scrutiny perhaps that any government has

ever had in the history of the world.

Is it fair to say the U.S. view on the Panama Canal has been predicted on our assessment that the military and economic benefits

and necessities were overriding the obvious political disadvantages

that were involved? In other words, we had to take a political loss

because of the military and economic necessities. Now we find that

the situation has changed, that military and economic considerations

are such, that we no longer have to take this tremendous political

loss and, therefore, we can, without endangering our economic and

military requirements, eliminate the political disadvantages which

have existed and gotten worse.

Is that a fair statement?

Mr. RUSK. I would agree with that, Congressman Fascell. I think

we can retain the heart of our own interests, which is the passage and
135

safety of the canal. The rest of it is cosmetic frosting on the cake, the

zone, for example, extraterritorial rights, things of that sort. Our

real interest is passage and safety of the canal. I think these two new

treaties very adequately do so in modern terms and free us from the

very severe limitations of the 1903 treaty.

Mr. FASCELL. Secretary Kissinger, would you care to comment?

Mr. KISSINGER. First of all, I agree with your statement. I would

say as a general proposition that we are better off if we have to defend

the canal to do it under the terms of a 1977 treaty, which is perceived

as having been freely negotiated and which was signed in the presence

of most heads of government of the Western Hemisphere, than to

defend our rights in the name of a 1903 treaty where the rights themselves will be questioned by most of the countries in the Western

Hemisphere.

So I would think that these treaties improve the political environment for assuring our basic interests and do not significantly affect

our political capability to defend the canal.

I think that is also the judgment of the military leaders of this

country.

NATIONALIZATION OF THE CANAL

Mr. FASCELL. That leads to the next question, my last question.

It has been raised by some opponents to the new treaty that a government in Panama could nationalize the canal immediately under the

1977 treaty. Is there any difference between nationalization under the

1903 treaty and under the 1977 treaty, and aren't we better off if

we have to face that fact under the 1977 treaties than we were under

the 1903 treaty?

Mr. KISSINGER. I don't know, Mr. Fascell, what is meant by

nationalizing the canal.

Mr. FASCELL. Abrogating the treaty, I guess.

Mr. KISSINGER. Because I was just going to say the manner in

which the canal will be run, the hiring procedures, the composition

of the Commission that is responsible for the operation of the canalall of this is specified in great detail in the agreement and could be

changed only by abrogating the agreement. And it would have to be

changed at a time when we still have military forces in the Canal Zone

under the terms of the agreement, and I (o not see how any Panamanian

Government could conceive that we would accept such a procedure,

or how it w-ould implement its so-called nationalization in the face of

the continued American presence in the canal.

In that case, they would have abrogated the treaties and we would

be in a state where our relationships would depend on the relative

position of force, but we would then be defending an arrangement

that any fair-minded person would have to recognize as having been

freely negotiated. I can't accept this proposition of nationalization.

Mr. RUSK. There is to me a very amusing question on which I have

had differing views from my colleagues in the international law

field. Here we have a 190:3 treaty which by its terms reaches into

perpetuity. These two present treaties contain the instrument of

abrogation of the 1903 treaty.

Now, suppose the 1977 treaties, which are bound together organically by their terms-suppose those treaties are destroyed by the

kind of massive violations that you spoke of on the part of Panama;
136

if you destroyed the instrument of abrogation, does that revive the

1903 treaty? I am not sure I know the answer. I think it is a rather

amusing question but some day some Secretary of State may want

to take a position on that point.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Time has expired.

Mrs. Meyner.

Mrs. MEYNER. Yes, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE IV

Secretary Rusk, you pointed out in your testimony that article IV

of the treaty played a major role in your support of both treaties

and in your testimony you state that article IV says the United States

of America and the Republic of Panama agree to maintain their

regime of neutrality established in the treaty, but there seems to be a

difference of opinion between the American and Panamanian negotiators of these treaties concerning just how free the United States is to

take unilateral action to protect the security and operations of the

canal.

What would you define as sufficient grounds for unilateral American

military action in defense of the canal after the year 2000? I know that

that is a long way in the future but I think it is something that

troubles people and we have to consider.

Mr. RUSK. It would not surprise me if (luring the process of ratification in the two countries different emphasis will be put upon different

parts of the treaty and I can well imagine that some spokesmen in

Panama will try to minimize the impact of article IV just as I for one

would maximize it in this country. But I would think the negotiating

record is very clear on this point because I understand that it was made

very clear, indeed, to Panama that absent article IV it would be impossible to expect approval of these treaties in the United States. As you

read article IV I should think that is all that a future President and

Congress would need, certainly a stronger base than the 1903 treaty

for whatever action might have to be taken.

Mrs. MEYNER. Thank you.

Secretary Kissinger.

Mr. KISSINGER. I would think, first of all, it is not inappropriate

for the Congress as it goes through the process of ratification to record

its agreement with the interpretation given to the treaty by the administration, namely, that article IV gives us the unilateral right to guarantee the neutrality of the canal, and to leave no doubt in anybody's

mind about the legal significance of article IV as it is conceived by the

United States, exl)ressed by the administration and endorsed in this

case by the Congress.

To define now the specific conditions under which the United

States migbt choose to exercise its right, what it is that in the year

2001 night be considered as jeopardizing the neutrality of the canal,

I think would be hazardous to sI)eculate. One would have to rely on

the fact that the administration then in office would be sufficiently

sensitive to the vital interests of the United States to know when its

rih1ts had to be exercised. But I repeat, as this treaty goes through

ratification, I am certain that the administration will express the

interpretation of article IV that Secretary Rusk and I have given it,
137

and I would consider it very appropriate for the Congress to record its

agreement with that interpretation.

Mrs. MEYNER. Thank you.

IMPORTANCE OF THE CANAL TO THE UNITED STATES

Many people don't realize how little our Navy uses the Panama

Canal. I was interested to discover that from 1971 to 1975, only 12

small U.S. warships passed through the canal, and in terms of displacement tonnage the U.S. Navy tied for 19th with Communist

China in use of the canal, well behind the navies of Sweden, Turkey,

Spain, and Japan, for example.

Do you think, first, that it is possible that the closure of the canal

would have a more serious effect on many other nations than it would

on the United States, and, number two, how important do you think

it is that we seriously consider building a new sea-level canal next to

the Panama Canal?

Mr. RUsK. On the first point, I don't have the tonnage figures in

front of me. I am sure the committee will wish to have those figures.

Mrs. MEYNER. They are remarkably small.

Mr. RUSK. Relative to our economies, I would think the canal would

be somewhat less important to us than it would be to some of the

countries on the west coast of South America, because the canal is their

access to our east coast ports and to Europe. But I still think we have

a substantial interest as far as commercial shipping is concerned, and it

may grow some depending on what happens to the North Slope oil and

how that is transported in this country.

SEA LEVEL CANAL

Mrs. MEYNER. Do you think we should seriously consider building

a new sea-level canal that would be big enough to take large tankers

and aircraft carriers, which the present canal cannot accommodate?

Mr. RUSK. We have looked at that very hard over the years. There

was a lot of talk at one time about digging a sea level canal with

nuclear explosives. The more we looked at that the less attractive that

looked from the point of view of cost and evacuating several million

people while all that was going on.

But now apparently there are a few geologic and oceanographic

problems. You would have a major pressure of water from the Pacific

towards the Atlantic and my ecology friends tell me there are some

kinds of living things in the sea in the Pacific they don't want at all to

admit into the Atlantic.

Subject to that, I think there would be some advantage some day in

having a sea level canal. It would be much less vulnerable to sabotage

and that sort of thing and it might be easier to operate.

Mrs. MEYNER. Mr. Chairman, could I just vield myself a minute for

Secretary Kissinger to give his view of the sea level'canal?

Chairman ZABLOCKI. "eS.

Mr. KIssINGERl. On the sea level canal, I would say this depends on

a technical judgment on how urgently it is needed. I have to confess

that it is not self-evident to me, if we build a sea level canal, why it

should be in Panama. I would have thought one canal in a country is

enough.
138

Mrs. MEYNER. Where would you put it, Mr. Secretary?

Mr. KISSINGER. Well, I could see an argument of spreading our

risk, but I have never gotten myself briefed on why it is thought

desirable to have a sea level canal in Panama. I did understand the

argument for having a sea level canal as a supplement or eventually as

an alternative to the Panama Canal.

Mrs. MEYNER. Thank you.

Mr. KISSINGER. I have an open mind on this question. I have simply

not studied this limited question of why it should be in Panama.

Mrs. MEYNER. Thank you.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Mr. Buchanan.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, you have both spoken eloquently and without any

equivocation in support of this treaty and yet, I am sure you know,

the popular opposition seems to be overwhelming. I would say the

average person in my congressional district-and I am afraid in almost

every congressional district-would say "It is ours; we built it; we

paid for it; and we ought to keep it. If we are going to give it away,

it ought not to be to a dictator who is in bed with the Communists,

and if we are going to give it away to him, we ought not to pay them to

take it."

Now, how do you get from that world view to where you are? I

think it would be a miraculous achievement. It would seem to me our

President is going to have to perform the kind of miracles he did in

getting himself nominated and elected, getting this sold to the U.S.

Senate. I think you will need all your eloquence to get that done.

'POSITION OF U.S. MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT ON THE TREATIES

One of the things that the critics say is that our high-ranking

military people are not really in their hearts on board, that they are

going along because they have to, but that this does not serve our

national security interests and that this is a matter of having to

submit to civilian control rather than an honest evaluation of this

being in our national security interests.

Would you comment on that from your experience?

Mr. RUSK. Mr. Buchanan, it would astonish me if the Congress

does not or cannot have before it the full and frank views of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff. It is true we have civilian control in this country

and that the President determines policy, as far as the executive

branch is concerned. But, on the other hand, the Joint Chiefs have a

constitutional responsibility to be responsive frankly and candidly

when asked by committees of Congress to express their views.

You know that the Joint Chiefs, for example, opposed the B-1

bomber decision. You know that the Joint Chiefs were not in favor of

proposals for withdrawing forces from Korea. Quite apart from public

statements which they can make to Congress, as you know in this

town, there is a kind of process of osmosis by which you and the Congress can ascertain the views of the military. I think I would be very

s urprised if you did not find that, from a military point of view, they

support these two treaties-but you can find that out. That doesn't

concern me very much.
139

Mr. BUCHANAN. Dr. Kissinger, you said specifically you had had

conversations with

Mr. KISSINGER. First of all, I would support strongly what Secretary Rusk has said. Certainly, in my 8 years here in Washington,

we never managed to intimidate the Joint Chiefs of Staff to a point

where it was not generally known what they opposed. I would think

that their views would be known as they have been known on these

interests that Secretary Rusk mentioned.

With respect to my conversations, when the President talked to

me, I said to him I would like to hear from the military and from the

negotiators. I met for an hour with General Jones, who was acting

chairman, and I had another conversation with General Brown. They

both assured me that the Joint Chiefs stand behind those treaties

and that they consider them a preferable situation to the one that now

obtains. I cannot believe they would mislead me. I do not believe that

they would mislead the Congress on their real convictions.

ACCEPTANCE OF THE TREATIES BY FORMER SECRETARIES OF STATE

Mr. BUCHANAN. Now, if the present treaty had been offered during

your term as Secretary of State, would you have accepted it and all of

its parts at that time?

Mr. RUSK. I personally would have and with considerable relief

because where we started back in 1965 was so far behind where we are

now that I think this is a very substantial achievement on the part of

the American negotiators.

Mr. KISSINGER. I must say that these treaties contain the essential

provisions that were being negotiated when I was in office. The

modifications are what one would expect in the course of the negotiations and I would have recommended that the President accept these

treaties and consider them in the best interests of the United States.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Gentlemen, I am very glad that old Secretaries of

State do not necessarily fade away. We need your good judgment and

your wisdom in all things.

Mr. RUSK. Thank you, sir, but it is great to be a private citizen

again.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. The Chair would like to advise the gentleman

from Alabama that we will have the Secretary of Defense, Harold

Brown, and Gen. George Brown, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, on September 26 to pursue the questions you have asked.

Mr. Bonker.

Mr. BONKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

GUARANTY OF CONTINUED OPERATION OF THE CANAL

Following up on what Representative Buchanan stated about the

growing opposition to the treaty, which is a reality we have to face on

a day-to-day basis. The chief opponent to the treaty is former Governor Reagan, and when he appeared before the Senate committee

he urged them to reject the treaty because of a fatal flaw; and that

fatal flaw, according to Mr. Reagan, is a false premise that the United

States will insure trouble-free operation of the waterway in the future

by surrendering rights acquired by America in the first treaty in 1903.
140

I would like to have you comment on Mr. Reagan's comment and

his premise for opposing the treaty.

Mr. RUSK. Well, it seems to me that what he apparently referred

to as a fatal flaw has to do with his fear that some future President

and Congress will not act to support our interests in Panama. There

is no answer to that. A President and Congress would not have to act

under the 1903 treaty. We have 9,000 troops there-so I hear, roughly that-at the present time. During World War II, with a friendly

population there, we had about 100,000 there, because that is what

we thought it took to insure 500 square miles against sabotage. I

don't know any way in which we can now compel a future President

and Congress to act one way rather than another, but I would hope a

President and Congress would see to it that our interests in the canal

are adequately protected. I know no way to guarantee that.

Mr. KISSINGER. The problem with the existing treaty is that it

raises the question of the significance of a right that nobody else

recognizes, and the insistence on exercising a right now accepted by

any other nation in the world amounts to an insistence by the United

States on resting its case on force and not just its case when there is a

treaty but its mere presence in the Canal Zone. This I consider the

fatal flaw in the 1903 treaty.

The present agreement lays down specific criteria for the neutrality

and for the operation of the canal. It gives us the right to maintain

those criteria. Whether a future administration will in fact exercise

its legal rights, no one can predict, but I think it is extremely pessimistic to assume that a future administration would not be sufficiently

alive to America's vital interests to fail to exercise rights that have

been so clearly spelled out, that juridically will be on a much firmer

foundation than the existing anachronistic relationship.

WILL THE CANAL BE OBSOLETE IN 2000?

Mr. BONKER. Mrs. Meyner has mentioned her surprise that so few

of our military ships go through the canal, and I read somewhere that

less than 4 percent of our commercial ship traffic actually use the

canal. The trend these days is to build larger ships-ships too large

to passage through the canal.

Is it true by the time we reach the turning point in the year 2000

that the canal may well be obsolete?

Mr. RusK. It is possible but I would think not very likely that it

would be obsolete in the sense that it would not be pretty heavily used.

It is true that it is less useful because big oil tankers and certain

aircraft carriers and such things can't go through there.

But the transcontinental railroads lobbied very heavily against the

Panama Canal when the Congress was considering what to do about

it for the half century leading up to 1903, and we have competing

transportation now-truck, railway.

A friend of mine who is a member of the board of directors of one

of the big railroads said he can move sand from New York to San

Francisco by air now more cheaply than he can by rail if you take

into account the capital costs of the railroad. He was rather sorry we

didn't jump from oxcart to air transportation straight away. So that will impose some limits on the way the Panamanians must

conduct themselves because they have got to make the passage through
141

the canal easy, competitive and attractive if they are to get anything

like the kinds of returns on it they now expect.

Mr. KISSINGER. While the Secretary was speaking I was pondering

why anyone would want to move sand from New York to San

Francisco. [Laughter.]

I will ask him that later.

U.S. INTEREST IN THE CANAL

It seems to me that we ought to look at the realities of the situation.

Here Panama is a country of less than 2 million. To believe that

Panama by its unilateral decision could simply close a canal in defiance

of international treaties, with the United States impotent to insist on

its rights, is really making a projection into the future that seems to

me wildly unrealistic.

The real problem, as I see it, is whether we can act now to prevent

our presence in the Panama Canal from becoming the unifying force

for all anti-American sentiment in the Western Hemisphere and for

becoming an issue which will make it impossible to develop a cooperative relationship with countries whose interests in the Panama Canal

otherwise would be marginal. After we have modernized the relationship in the Panama Canal, we will have to have enough confidence

that future Presidents will know how to defend vital American interests when the disparity of force is so enormous, when there is no

outside country that has any real means of reaching the canal against

our opposition.

So everything depends on our understanding of our vital interests

and on our willingness to insist on rights that are clearly spelled out

in a document recently negotiated.

U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL VOTE

Mr. RUsK. Mr. Bonker, in connection with the attitude of other

governments toward this, the validity of this 1903 treaty, the negative attitudes are not just a bunch of kooks we are sort of becoming

accustomed to. In that vote in the U.N. Security Council where

Ambassador Scali had to cast a veto-the Ambassador is sitting here

this morning in another role-those who voted for the resolution

defending a new era in Panama, included Australia, Austria, Indonesia, Kenya, responsible countries. So this is a very, very rough road

to hoe politically in the general world scene if we try to stand on the

1903 treaty.

Mr. KISSINGER. None of the other members supported us.

Mr. RUSK. That is right.

Mr. KISSINGER. A few of our friends abstained.

Mr. RUSK. One, the United Kingdom.

Mr. KISSINGER. The United Kingdom abstained but no country

actually voted with us, even of our closest friends outside the

hemisphere.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Time has expired. I would like to advise the

gentleman from Washington and others of what I said in my opening

statement that we did invite Governor Reagan of California to testify

but he declined. His office stated other scheduled commitments

prevented his appearance. We still hope that he will appear before

the committee.
142

As a matter of fact, the chairman at one time entertained the

notion of having him appear at the same time as Secretary Rusk and

Kissinger. That would be a departure from our policy of not holding

an open debate. But I hope Governor Reagan can indeed come before

the committee and testify and present his point of view.

Mr. Ireland.

Mr. IRELAND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE IV ON NEUTRALITY

I would like to pursue for a minute, gentlemen, this different

interpretation that apparently exists in Panama and the United

States on issues that have been referred to earlier as the real heart

of the treaty.

The chief negotiator in Panama, as I think most of us are aware,

was on the radio in Panama in late August saying that the treaty

does not establish that the United States has the right to intervene

or send troops into Panama, and that we do not have the rights that

have been alluded to as the strong point in the argument presented

this morning.

My real concern is, should the Congress approve such a treaty

based on article IV, based on the interpretation that we do have these

rights, and the Panamanians approve the treaty based on the fact

that we don't have the rights, what good is the treaty with such a

very basic difference of opinion in it.

In other words, this is admittedly the guts of it on both sides and

we have two entirely different views growing up here at our table, and on the chief negotiator's part in Panama that is.

Mr. RUSK. I expressed earlier that to me this article IV is a very

important part of these two treaties and I would hope that this

committee, for example, in its committee report, would make this

point very clear in terms of U.S. interpretation.

Now, if at the time of the exchange of ratifications there is a fundamental difference publicly expressed by the two sides on this point, then we may have to go back to the drawing board and see what can

be worked out.

There have been times when such matters have been left for the

future. For example, when we concluded the Non-Proliferation Treaty, article I of that treaty says we cannot transfer nuclear weapons to

any entity whatever. The United States and United Kingdom made

identical statements at that time saying if there should come into

being a unified Europe where there is European control of foreign

policy and defense matters, that if that unified Europe were to be

nuclear, that would not be inconsistent with the Non-Proliferation

Treaty, and we said to the Soviets at that time, here is what we are

going to say, we gave them a copy of the statement, and we are not

asking you to state publicly your agreement with that, because we

knew they would not. If you state publicly you disagree with it then

there is no agreement and we go back to the drawing board.

So sometimes you leave some of those problems for the future.

Whether that would be wise in this circumstance I am not sure, but

as far as this committee is concerned, Mr. Chairman, I would hope

that whatever your understanding is, after talking with Mr. Bunker
143

and Mr. Linowitz and others, on the meaning of article IV, you make

it very clear.

Mr. KISSINGER. I would think this is a case in which it is important

to spell out the meaning of article IV and I would support a congressional attempt to express in turn its support for the administration's

interpretation of article IV.

I must say my own support of the agreement hinges importantly

on the neutrality clause, and it is my understanding that it gives us

the possibility to defend the neutrality of the canal unilaterally, and

I think it would be appropriate for the Congress to register its agreement with the administration's stated view on the subject.

I wouldn't even consider that a reservation, I would consider that

an act of unison between the administration and the Congress.

Mr. RUSK. Over in the other body, for example, in their resolution

of advice and consent they might include this as an understanding. I

would hope it would not be raised as a technical reservation, because

that creates some technical problems, but as understanding so there

is no doubt as to what this treaty means as far as we are concerned.

Mr. IRELAND. How would that operate mechanically should they

say this is our understanding and it be dramatically different from

what has been expressed in Panama? Where would this going back

to the drawing board occur, in your opinion?

Mr. RUSK. If this should happen and then at that time of the exchange of ratification, or when you approach the exchange of ratification, if Panama then does not want to ratify, in the face of that

expression of our interpretation, then you are back to the drawing

boards. In other words, the public still has some misunderstanding

about what ratification means.

The Senate gives advice and consent, the President ratifies, and you

have this problem at that stage of ratification.

Mr. KISSINGER. I would think at the time of exchange of ratifications the act of exchanging should make clear that the other side

understands our interpretation of this treaty and I think this can be

worked out. I haven't discussed it with the administration but,

technically, it should not be difficult to work this out between the

administration and the Senate since this would not be a new interpretation by the Senate, this would simply support what the negotiators

have testified to and what the President has asserted.

Mr. RUSK. This point is a basic consideration in exchange for an

abrogation of the 1903 treaty, among other things. It is part of the

basic consideration.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Mr. Lagomarsino.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

USE OF THE CANAL BY THE U.S. NAVY

I want to welcome both of you gentlemen here. You have the very

difficult task, thankless in a way, of talking to people who are already

converted, and on the other hand, of talking to people like me who

you are probably not going to be able to convert. I would like to

respond to what Mrs. Meyner and Mr. Bonker said a little while ago;

I think perhaps they left an erroneous impression on the record. The

fact is that some 93 percent of all U.S. Navy ships can use the canal,

9S-991-77-11
144

and as a matter of fact, only the 13 largest carriers cannot use it. The

largest noncarrier ship we have on active duty is the new class, Tarawa. It went through the canal last year.

During the Vietnam war, for example, in 1965, 284 warships went

through; 591 in 1966; 1967, 879; 1968, 1,504; 1969, 1,376; 1970, 1,068;

and in 1971, 503.

So it is not small usage in times of emergency, at least.

I would like to point out also that of all the world shipping only 3

percent cannot use it, and only the largest oil tankers are now in the

category of not being able to transit through the canal. And I also

understand the trend is away from larger ships.

I would like to point out also that the canal becomes even more important right now. We have a surplus, or soon will have, of Alaskan

oil on the west coast. The only practical way to move that now is

through the Panama Canal. It is vitally important, and as important

as it is to us, it is extremely more important to the countries of Central

and South America, particularly to those countries on the west coast

of South America.

LATIN AMERICAN SUPPORT FOR THE TREATIES

I feel a little bit like one of the three blind men asked to describe an

elephant, in talking about the mission to South America. We all saw

the results of our mission a little bit differently on this question, although

I come down very close to what our chairman, Mr. Yatron has said. As

he pointed out, we talked to the Presidents of five different countries,

to the Foreign Ministers of six countries, and to many other government officials in all of those countries. This was right during the height

of the publicity about the conceptional agreement on the Panama

Canal. Our papers were full of it and so was the foreign press. It was

certainly the topic of lively discussion, at least in the news media.

Not a single one of those officials mentioned it to us, with the exception of the prime minister of one western South American country who

raised it at the end of a 3-hour discussion about all kinds of other matters; and then he raised it in the concept of being concerned about the

increase in the tolls.

Now, it is true, as Mr. Findley pointed out, when asked about it

they all said "yes, publicly, we are for it." Several mentioned later in

private that they didn't like it too well, they were concerned about the

tolls, and one or two even said they were concerned about the treaty

itself.

The point that Mr. Yatron and I want to make is that if this is such

a burning issue in Latin America why wasn't there more interest shown

in it, why did they respond only to the questions asked by us?

One very protreaty President became quite excited, when he was

asked if he approved of the raising of the tolls that would be necessary

under the agreement; he said, "that is a rumor, that is not true,"

and I understand there was a flurry of cable communications after

we left his office.

There is great concern about the question of tolls, and I heard some

concern, although not definitely expressed in clear terms, but certainly

the implication, about whether and how Panama would respect the

rights t ha t they now have and which have been very well protected for

them to use the canal.
145

INTERPRETATION OF NEUTRALITY PROVISION

I would certainly agree with you, Dr. Kissinger, that the Congress,

especially the Senate, in going through the ratification process, should

be very, very careful to nail down the language especially where there

is any doubt about interpretation, particularly with regard to neutrality; and I might like to ask you this.

If you were drafting this treaty-I will ask both of you-if you

gentlemen had been drafting this treaty would this question be

raised about what neutrality means and whether that does include

the right to intervene, as we say it does, and apparently some Panamanians say it doesn't, would not you have spelled that out clearly

in the treaty itself?

Mr. KIsSINGER. Well, we have to understand that the treaty is a

serious domestic problem not only in this country, but in Panama,

as well as in several other countries of Latin America, and for a country

as well as in several other countries of Latin America, and for a

country to write into an agreement some of the explicit language

that we have used here might be considered needlessly offensive or

injurious to the process of ratification.

I myself read this paragraph, and it does not say jointly-I don't

have the text here-but the text says, as I recall it, that the United

States and Panama agree to assure, agree to maintain the regime of

neutrality established in the treaty which shall be maintained in

order that the canal shall remain permanently neutral, notwithstanding termination of any other treaties entered into by the contracting parties.

If this had been written in my period they would have said it

was drafted first in German-it's not the most elegant sentence of

which history informs us. But I think it makes it clear to me and to,

I think, anyone else who has studied this, that we have the right

individually to maintain this regime of neutrality.

But if there is any doubt about it I would certainly support a

clarification, especially if it is arrived at through cooperation with the

administration.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. I might say that I hope that the Senate in

going through this, and the House, if we do have implementing

legislation before us, studies this very, very carefully because it

might not be drafted as clearly and precisely as some had thought.

For example, there is a report in this morning's Washington Post

that through, I guess is thought to be inadvertence, the American

Panama Canal Zone employees may not have to pay U.S. income

taxes after the treaty is ratified.

Mr. KISSINGER. If I may say another thing. I do not believe one

should justify this treaty on the basis that the canal is becoming

obsolete or obsolescent. 1 think we should start from the assumption

that the canal is important and will remain important and that this

in the view of the advocates is a better way of maintaining our interests, not that the canal has no longer become important and therefore it doesn't make any difference what agreement we make.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. I certainly agree with the first part of your

statement.

Mr. RUSK. I am not sure we should insist upon this word "intervention", because in law and diplomacy-the cameras may not want
146

to pick this up-in law and diplomacyy there is a fundamental distinction between rape and seduction.

The statute of the Organization of American States prevents intervention by one State into another in this hemisphere for any reason

whatsoever. Here we have a treaty right to share with Panama, and

also individually, for the protection and development of the Panama

Canal. It may be necessary someday for somebody to argue that this

is not intervention in the strictest sense, it is something else.

So I am not sure we should insist upon that word "intervention".

Chairman ZABLOCKI. A very good point.

The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. Fowler.

FOREIGN MILITARY SALES CREDITS TO PANAMA

Mr. FOWLER. I will also associate myself with the remarks of the

chairman and Mr. Fascell, and others, about my fellow Georgian and

his return to his home State where he continues his public contribution

through the private sector.

Neither of you gentlemen have spoken this morning about the

economic provisions of the treaty, and some of its critics question

that portion of the treaty as to the amount of money that the treaty

commits to the Government of Panama.

I wonder if you could tell us anything about the proposed $50

million in foreign military sales credits that is proposed under the

treaty. Are there any restrictions on that? And do you know what

type of military sales are contemplated? If you will address the

economic factors overall, I don't know how you judge how much is too

much, but I know of no two gentlemen that could enlighten me

better.

Mr. RUSK. Mr. Chairman, do you know in my hometown of

Atlanta we are proud of our new Congressman, and I am personally

delighted he is a member of this great committee. I am sure you are all

going to enjoy working with him.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. We already have.

Mr. RUSK. It is my understanding, and there are those who can

speak more authoritatively on this, that when we get into such things

as military sales, guaranteed loans, and Export-Import Bank transactions, things of that sort, that that is within the framework of existing

general policy in both countries.

I would myself hope that those transactions on the military side

would be relatively modest, but even modest transactions are fairly

expensive these days.

But, in any event, it is my understanding they will be governed by

existing general policies with respect to such sales, and I am not

competent, quite frankly, to speak to those in detail.

Mr. KISSINGER. My understanding is, in addition to the general

policies-not just my understanding, it seems to be mandated by law,

that any foreign military sales above a certain amount would have to

go before both Houses of the Congres. and, therefore, the Congress

would have an opportunity to approve sales of any magnitude.

\1r. FOwLER. Yes, sir. We are having considerable experience with

that in other areas now, but I did not know whether in the negotia-
147

tions-I should ask this question of the Ambassadors-there were

any specific discussions as to what was anticipated in these foreign

sales.

Mr. KIssINGER. I have no knowledge of this. My experience in

this kind of negotiation has been that in the general negotiation you

agree on a figure and you do not generally agree on specific item-, that

this is then handled separately as part of another transaction, which

then will be separately submitted to the Congress on a yearly basis.

PUBLIC REACTION TO THE TREATIES

Mr. FOWLER. As we are down toward the end of your testimony,

I don't want to let an additional opportunity with two capable public

philosophers to go by. Dr. Kissinger just described this treaty as one

of "our most pressing domestic problems." Why in your opinion has

this treaty caused '.uch a visceral response in the country?

I don't want to give any of my opinions, I would like for you to give

yours. Would the reaction in the country have been different 10 or

20 years ago? What is there about the Panama Canal and the attempts

to modernize this treaty that has made it the top controversy in

public policy today? Mr. KIsSINGER. Well, I have the impression that the Panama Canal

in the public consciousne'- has always been a great American technological achievement, and that has entered the public consciousness

as an American possession and, therefore, I think the public never

really focuses on the fact that it is located in the territory of another

country, so this required an adjustment. But I think fundamentally

my impression is that after the upheavals and the frutrations of the

Vietnam period, the American people are tired of being pushed around,

and this is one of the first things that comes along of this nature. I

consider the reaction itself healthy, and I think it is healthy for a

country to want to protect its vital intere-ts.

The administration has now the obligation to educate the public

and to make clear that this vital interest is best protected by the

measures it is proposing and that this Is not yielding to force; this i'_

precisely to avoid the pJossibility of having it adjudicated. But it's

a general reaction of feeling that the United States should not constantlv be on the defensive in the face of foreign or domestic pressure-.

This is what I interpret .orne of this visceral reaction to represent.

Mr. RUSK. I think there is a procedural point. The debate vas

launched substantially before the actual texts of the treatie, were

available. Had the treaties been pre-ented as a ba&is for the debate,

through a fireide chat, or soiie general exchange of what i' in the

treaty, mv gues; is some aspect> of the debate 'v ould have taken a

different direction. I held off aiy public endorrnement of the-e treaties

until I saw the treaties and I think that it was a little unfortunate

that the debate generated so much steam before we knew what we

were talking about.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Time has expired.

Mr. Fountain.

Mr. FoUNTAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I w ant to join my colleague in welcomin Seecretary Riusk and

Secretary Ki:inger and expre- my appreciation for the pre1enAe of
148

both of you here today, you who I think have contributed so much

to the well-being of America, our own national security, and improved

international relations reflecting great credit not only upon yourselves

but upon our country.

I think we have already seen a demonstration that what you just

said, Secretary Rusk, is true: We are doing a lot of debating and

talking and speculating before we really know too much about what

is involved in the treaty. Frankly, I myself have not yet had a chance

to read it word for word and each time I read portions of it questions

arise which I want answered, and I can't always find anyone to

answer them.

I would like to reiterate what Mr. Buchanan said. It is going to

take a miracle of some kind, if public opinion is to be followed, to

change it in my particular area of the country, from which I am getting

so many letters. And not yet have I read one which favors ratification

in its present form.

Yet I am mindful and I think my constituents are also concerned

about all of the things you have said here today, and sensitive to the

problems and the need for the conciliation which would be brought

about by a mutually acceptable treaty of its kind, and so forth. But

I do think we ought to be sure what we are doing, and I think the

Senate needs to take some time to analyze every provision of the

basic treaty and the ancillary treaties and documents thereto.

EXPIRATION OF THE TREATIES

As I understand it, this treaty terminates December 31, 1999. Is

that correct?

Mr. RUsK. The first treaty does, yes, sir.

Mr. FOUNTAIN. When does the second treaty terminate?

Mr. RUSK. It has no termination (late.

Mr. FOUNTAIN. What is the second treaty?

Mr. RUSK. That is the treaty concerning the permanent neutrality

and operation of the Panama Canal.

INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE IV ON NEUTRALITY

Mr. FOUNTAIN. Article 4, as I remember it, and maybe I can get a

response from both of you, on the second treaty which you just referred to says the United States of America and the Republic of

Panama agree to maintain the region of neutrality established in this

treaty, which shall be maintained in order that the canal shall remain

permanently neutral, notwithstanding the termination of any other

treaties entered into by the two contracting parties.

Can you tell me what that means?

Mr. KIssINGER. What this means is that the regime of neutrality

will continue even after the period of the first treaty-that is to say,

after December 31, 1999. This is the provision that extends the applicability of the regime of neutrality into the indefinite future.

It separates this neutrality provision from the other agreement

which has a termination date.
149

MAINTENANCE OF U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE

Mr. FOUNTAIN. I think we should also make clear, that article 5

says that after the termination of the Panama Canal Treaty, only the

Republic of Panama shall operate the canal and maintain military

forces, defense sites, and military installations within its national

territory.

So I think it is clear that by 1999 we will no longer have any right

for any of our troops, or for a military base within the territory of

Panama. Is that right?

Mr. KISSINGER. Unless we make a new agreement with them of the

type, for example, we have with other countries to maintain bases.

Mr. FOUNTAIN. Under the terms of the treaty

Mr. KISSINGER. Under the terms of these agreements we cannot

maintain military bases in Panama, but under the article 4 we have a

right to take what steps may be needed to assure the neutrality of the

canal.

Mr. FOUNTAIN. Article 4 doesn't say it in the language which you are

speaking now. It is written in language which seems to me to be very

ambiguous, in that respect. It appears to be deliberately written so

that, depending upon who they are, Americans or Panamanians, they

can take any position they want to. Treaties should not be written and

ratified that way.

The second question I want to ask you is this: Is there no other

necessity for our presence in the Panama Canal under the existing

treaty, and such modifications as we have had down through the

years, other than to protect and defend the canal?

Is there no need for us to have a military base there-something

which it seems to me might have been negotiated during the course of

this treaty. However small, is there no necessity in the interest of our

own national security and the national security of our allies and those

to whom we are committed for us to have a military base in Panama?

Mr. KISSINGER. I think, of course, that Secretary Brown and

General Brown should answer this question in terms of the military

requirements.

To the best of my knowledge, in my experience in the Government

we have never thought of the troops in Panama for any other purpose

except the defense of the canal. Given the range of other means of

communications now I would not think that we need Panama as a

staging area for any military operations that might be necessary in the

defense of the Western Hemisphere, but at any rate, I (1o not recall

during my period in office that this issue was ever raised. It is, however,

an important question to ask of the defense and military advisers.

Mr. RUSK. We have had in the Canal Zone a base for training in

jungle warfare, for example, and we have had a headquarters there at

times that had within the framework of our own military establishment

some responsibilities for the hemisphere as a whole. But given the

long legs of present military forces I think such considerations diminish

very rapidly, and I would think it is clear, as Mr. Kissinger said, that

our military bases in Panama are strictly now related to the canal.

Mr. KISSINGER. And in fact this military headquarters was abolished

on the recommendation of the Defense Department, and over the
150

initial opposition of some of us who were concerned about the symbol- ism that this might have for Latin America, and it was abolished for

reasons totally unconnected with these treaty negotiations. It was that

the Pentagon felt it no longer needed this facility. Mr. FOUNTAIN. Of course I have in mind Russian and Cuban influence in Panama after we are out and all of the other things which

have taken place in that part of the world which present a potentiality in the future.

PUBLIC REACTION TO THE TREATIES

Mr. Chairman, let me modify a statement. I said I have not received

a letter, in support of ratification. I haven't had a chance to read all of

the mail I received within the last 2 weeks. I have been assured by

my staff about those letters recently received and they tell me that

all oppose it.

Mr. RUSK. I am going to write you one so you can't make that

statement.

Mr. FOUNTAIN. I have not read one, of all I received from my congressional district, which favors a ratification of this treaty. So there

is a big job to be done, if the Senate is expected to approve ratification.

SENATE CONSIDERATION OF THE TREATIES

Are there any limitations on the time which the U.S. Senate can

take to carefully consider this treaty before it takes action on it.

Mr. KISSINGER. I don't think so.

Mr. FOUNTAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Mr. Guyer.

Mr. GUYER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, we are happy to have you as you have come many times

before on behalf of our country.

PUBLIC PRESENTATION OF THE TREATIES

I only have one consuming problem, and that is an area in which I

have spent most of my life, called public relations. I was PR director

for a small company for 20 years and as a public speaker I have been up

and down the country most of my life. We have a saying in public

relations, "Don't treat the public like you do your relations."

Without being facetious, I think the biggest mistake in the whole

thing is the time at which it was done. There could not have been a

worse time to have made the announcement. The announcement was

made when we were on recess. The President said he wanted input

from the American people. He didn't ask for it. The poll I had last

year indicated that 91 percent of our people think we do own the

canal and should not give it up. They are saying "how can you give up something you don't have-if they say we don't own it."

More importantly, I think the job of now making the public aware

of the necessity of what we are trying to accomplish is coming a bit

too late. We don't celebrate the world series until the games are over.

Here we had a big celebration the first day we came back from recess,

which to me was very premature, and I don't think we should celebrate anything until such time as we have something certain to

celebrate.
151

I think we owe the American people a chance to speak out on this

subject. Congress has not been consulted. Most of us have to go back

and reread history. What I read is not what I hear today.

The skirmish back in 1965 I think had to do with putting a flag on

the schoolhouse. These are emotional issues that are going to come out

more and more and more, and I am not going to get into a diatribe

as to whether we bought something, or didn't own it.

The President said during his campaign in 1976 he would in no way

give up control of the canal. I don't find a thing in here where we keep

any bases.

Could you enlighten me on that?

Mr. RuSK. In the terms of the treaties we don't keep them beyond December 31, 1999. Whether any subsequent agreements will

emerge if things go well in the canal I don't know. But you are quite

right, this does not provide bases beyond December 31, 1999.

Mr. GUYER. Wouldn't you agree after we waited 73 years we should

have waited a little bit longer to bring this issue to the public, and

find out what they were thinking and maybe have a little missionary

work done before we make the announcement? I think the flag waving

was a little premature.

Mr. RUSK. I don't want to sound naive in politics and I am well

aware that free advice is worth what you pay for it. But there are

some situations where governments find it very difficult to bridge

the gap between their two peoples and come to an agreement.

For example, in the Middle East these days I doubt that the governments in the area can make the concessions necessary to make peace

and survive as governments. I think back to some situations where

I am driven to Edmund Burke's exposition of the duty of a Member

of Parliament against the wishes of his own constituents.

For example, when we demobilized in tumultuous fashion in 1945, by 1946 we did not have a single division of our Army or single group

of our Air Force ready for combat. That was the very popular thing

to do. We should not have done it. We have been picking up the pieces

ever since.

My generation of students was led down the garden path into a

World War II that could have been prevented, but public opinion

reflected pacifism and isolationism and when the Japanese attacked

Manchuria everyone said it is too far away, it is none of our business.

And a few years later I found myself in a uniform in Burma, which

was even farther away.

There may be moments when a Member of Congress must say to

his constituents-please forgive this preaching answer-you may

have to say to your constituents I had to do what I thought was right

for my country, I hope you will understand that even though you

disagree with me.

Mr. GUYER. I would not interfere with that because it is a very

lonely shelf where a President or head of country has to stand and 'I

can appreciate that when Mr. Truman made the decision on the atom

bomb it was a tremendous decision, but I have difficulty representing about 470,000 people, who I think are thoughtful people, to explain

to them things like how Vietnam came into the United Nations and

no mention made of human rights when that was the big issue this year.
152

I am sure you gentlemen are aware of the Freedom House ratings, and Panama rates with Cuba and the Soviet Union, at the very top

of the list of offenders. In political rights they all rate seven, which is

the worst they can rate. That is political rights. Civil rights, sixth.

All of them, no freedom. I am sure you can't ignore that.

How are we going to go back home and explain you are going to

hold the torch up for human rights and compliance for all the world

and come back and concede something to a leader who is not

trusted by his own people?

As a matter of fact, the first response we had the other night after

the signing was asking a long-time U.S. employee and his wife what

they thought. He said, "we are afraid." I am sure the American

people share that concern.

Mr. KISSINGER. Well, first of all, I would like to express my agreement with Secretary Rusk's view and his eloquent advice to the

Congress. I think one should make clear to one's constituents that

this is not a favor we do to Panama, that this is independent of the

merits of the Panamanian Government. This is something we do

for ourselves based on a consideration of our long-term interest in the

Western Hemisphere and how best to develop our interest and achieve

our purposes in a constructive relationship.

On balance every Secretary of State, every President since 1963, has come to the conclusion that we need a modernized relationship in

our interests, not because Panama deserves it, or because we want to

do a favor to it, and regardless of what-what changing constellations

we might see there.

1r. GUYER. Dr. Kissinger, I think everyone would agree with you

on that. In 1960 this came up again without having a treaty. You

remember we brought an equalization of the pay to the Panamanian/

American workmen in the same zone. Every Member of Congress, I

think, believes we are long overdue in improving relations with the

Panamanian people who came from slavery up through the ranks and,

as you know, the entire history of the canal without being an exi remist in this issue, I just very, very seriously say it is only lamentable now we could not have men of your caliber. We are going to

have the Secretary and Chief of Defense and we had the two Ambassadors here if they could have appeared before the signing our job

would have been much simpler.

Chairman ZABLOCK1. Thank you.

A fr. Pease.

Mr. PEASE. Thank you very much, M1r. Chairman.

I am basically in support of the treaty. I think it was good work

dlone by our negotiators, but the mail I get is similar to that of many

other 'Members of Congress, in opposition. In a way it is a shame that

the program of economic aid was announced and worked out at the

sane time as the two treaties because even though Ambassadors

Bunker and Linowitz have told us that they are not connected,

ncce-arily, it appears in the eyes of the public that we are paying

$345 million to the Panamanians.

SHOULD PANAMA PAY FOR THE CANAL?

But that aid package aside, the basic question which is raised in

many letters written to me is why should not the Panamanians pay

us for our investment in the canal.
153

I would appreciate the viewpoint of you two gentlemen as to a

reply that can be given to the American people to that question.

Mr. KISSINGER. My friend to my right has very generously given

me that question.

I must say, incidentally, the mail I receive is very similar to that

all of you gentlemen receive. I haven't received a letter in support of

the treaty myself but many anguished letters in the opposite direction.

Mr. PEASE. Perhaps Secretary Rusk would, write you a letter, too,

so you can have one.

Mr. KiSSINGER. I have to say quite candidly I have not reflected on

this particular question. Obviously Panama doesn't have the means

to pay us for our original investment and the arrangement that would

undoubtedly be made in Panama. We had two generations in which we

could set the rates for the canal to serve our own economic interests

and the economic interests of other countries in the Western Hemisphere. The rates were ridiculously low for a very long period, and

the amount that was paid to Panama was very small: and, therefore,

I think if this issue were raised we would get into an endless debate

about what we owed them for what they would argue was colonial

exploitation.

I think one should look at the treaty, as I have said on several

occasions, as a means of putting our relations to the entire hemisphere

on a constructive basis, and at a mininun of removing an issue which

can rally all anti-American sentiment. Therefore, we ought to look to

the future more than scoring debating points about the past.

Mr. RusK. That is an important question and I have spent a good

deal of time in my day trying to resist the high charges that other

countries have tried to impose upon us with regard to various facilities

and bases, and so forth.

Mr. Chairman, you might want, to have a member of the committee

staff take a look at some of the other quid pro quos that we have

exchanged with Spain, Ethiopia, Pakistan, Turkey, and some other

countries, to see what the going rates on these things seem to be,

because in terms of our experience in these matters I think these

Panamanian arrangements are really modest, or at least within the

balLgame.

I also think, Mr. Chairman, I believe you have this in mind, trying

to make some assessment on how the canal is to be evaluated because

the figures run all the way from $700 million to $9 billion, depending

on what you put into the computation, and the committee could

render a useful service in clarifying some of that, if possible.

INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE 1903 TREATY WITH PANAMA

Mr. PEASE. Secretary Rusk, I was especially interested in your

testimony and the scholarly comments you had about the 1903 treaty,

and interested in your comment that you do not believe that we can

afford to allow the validity of the 1903 treaty to be tested in the International Court of Justice.

You followed on by saving that you are glad that the treaty has not

been pursued in the U.N. General Assembly.

If the treaty were not to be agreed to by the Senate, what are the

possibilities that the 1903 treaty would be raised or brought to the

International Court of Justice, or to the U.N. General Assembly

without our wishing it to be so?
154

Mr. RUSK. Because of the Connally reservation we have reserved

the right to determine which questions we are prepared to let go to

the International Court of Justice.

In that sense we did not, although we did it on the face of it. We

did not really accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the International

Court, so I don't know any way in which a country can take us before

the International Court against our wishes.

In terms of the General Assembly, I am sure, I am absolutely

certain that if the Senate does not give advise and consent to these

two treaties it will go into international bodies immediately and we

would have great difficulties.

Mr. PEASE. Thank you.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. If there are no further questions, I would like

on behalf of the members of the committee, and again on my own, to

thank you gentlemen for your excellent statements and the direct

answers to the questions. Certainly we are deeply appreciative of the

time and the enlightenment you have given us on this complex issue.

It must be very gratifying and satisfying to learn that, despite some

members who may not agree with your positions, they nevertheless

have a high regard, for both of you gentlemen, great public servants

of the past and continuing to be so in the interest of our country's

national security.

We want to thank you sincerely, and we do hope that your visit

with us was just as satisfying to you as it was to us.

Mr. RUSK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. The committee stands adjourned subject to

the call of the Chair.

[Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m. the committee adjourned.]
PROPOSED PANAMA CANAL TREATIES

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 15, 1977

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,

Washington, D.C.

The committee met at 10:10 a.m., in room 2172, Rayburn House

Office Building, Hon. Clement J. Zablocki (chairman of the committee)

presiding.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. The committee will please come to order.

The Chair understands there are other members on their way. We

were hopeful a quorum call will not interrupt.

We meet this morning to continue the committee's hearings on the

proposed Panama Canal treaties and related legislation.

Thus far the committee has heard the principal U.S. negotiators,

Ambassadors Ellsworth Bunker and Sol Linowitz, and former Secretaries of State Dean Rusk and Henry Kissinger.

Today. we are plea'.ed to have before the committee spokesmen for

three of the leading American veterans organizations.

Representing the Veterans of Foreign Wars is Dr. John Wasylik,

national commander in chief of the VFW. Dr. Wasylik is accompanied

by Mr. Cooper T. Holt, executive director of the VFW, Washington

office, and Col. Phelps Jones, director of national security and foreign

affairs for the VFW.

Speaking for the American Legion is William J. Rogers, immediate

past national commander. He is accompanied by Dr. Robert P.

Foster, chairman of the Legion's National Foreign Relations Commission. I understand Mr. Milio Kraja is also present.

Appearing for the AMVETS is Mr. Frank D. Ruggiero, national

commander. He is accompanied by Mr. C. Dennis McClure, national

service and legislative director.

Gentlemen, it is my pleasure to welcome you on behalf of the

Committee on Internationql Relations.

In order to assure that the members may have an opportunity to

question all of the witnesses during our limited time this morning,

may I suggest that each spokesman present his prepared statement or

a summary of his prepared statement, whichever way you prefer, following which the witnesses may be questioned as a panel.

Dr. Wasylik, as the spokesman for the oldest of the organizations,

would you please begin.

STATEMENT OF DR. JOHN WASYLIK, NATIONAL COMMANDER IN

CHIEF, VETERANS OF FOREIGN WARS OF THE UNITED STATES

Mr. WASYLIK. Mr. Chairman and members of this distinguished

committee, my name is Dr. John Wasylik, and my home is in

(155)
156

Sandusky, Ohio. As national commander in chief of the Veterans of

Foreign Wars of the United States, I am pleased and honored to

appear before this distinguished body to share with you our views on

the proposed treaties affecting the interoceanic canal and its framework, the U.S. Canal Zone on the Isthmus of Panama.

I am accompanied here today by two of my VFW colleagues, Mr. Cooper T. Holt, executive director of our Washington office and

Col. Phelps Jones, U.S. Army (retired), my director of national security

and foreign affairs.

As you may be aware, positions in the Veterans of Foreign Wars

are arrived at democratically at our annual national conventions.

Our 78th national convention was held in Minneapolis, Minn., during the period August 20-26, 1977; 14,000 delegates, representing

more than 10,000 VFW posts and 1.8 million members were joined

by delegates representing more than 600,000 members of the VFW's

Ladies Auxiliary.

Our delegates gave respectful attention to arguments supporting

the proposed treaty advanced by the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, Gen. Bernard W. Rogers, U.S. Army, and arguments opposing the

treaty as set forth by Senator Strom Thurmond.

Following these two thoughtful presentations by two patriotic and

dedicated Americans on Tuesday, August 23, both the VFW and the

Ladies Auxiliary delegates were asked by the Chair for an expression

of their views. Both groups of delegates voted unanimously to accept

Resolution No. 402, "U.S. Sovereignty Over the 'United States Canal

Located on the Isthmus of Panama."

Following this display of solidarity, the Chair gaveled the convention

into order and repeatedly asked if there was anyone there present who

desired to speak in favor of the treaty and assured the delegates that

anyone who so desired would be given a courteous and respectful

hearing.

No one rose to oppose the unanimous views of the delegates.

With the chairman's permission, I would like to read the "Be it

resolved" portion of the Resolution No. 402, with the request that

the entire resolution be included in the transcript of these hearings.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Without objection, so ordered.

[The resolution follows:]

RESOLUTION No. 402

U.S. SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE "UNITED STATES CANAL" LOCATED ON THE ISTHMUS

OF PANAMA

Whereas, Article II of the 1903 Convention between Panama and the United.

States, modified in part by the 1936 Treaty between the two Governments, states:

ARTICLE II

"Republic of Panama grants to the United States in perpetuity the use, occupation and control of a zone of land under water for construction, maintenance,

operation, sanitation, and protection of said canal of the width of ten miles

extending to the distance of five miles on each side of center line of the route of

the Canal to be constructed; the said zone beginning in the Caribbean Sea three

marine miles from mean low water mark with the proviso that the cities of Panama

and Colon and the harbors adjacent to said cities, which are included within the

boundaries of the zone above described shall not be included in this grant. * * 

"The Republic of Panama further grants in like manner to the United States

in perpetuity all islands within the limits of the zone above described and in
157

addition thereto the group of small islands in the Bay of Panama, named Perico,

Naos, Culebra and Flamence; and"

Whereas, the United States has more than fully met its obligations to Panama

under existing treaty arrangements and, moreover, has efficiently and responsibly

accommodated a large number of transits and amount of tonnage through the

canal; and

Whereas, the United States has paid for the Canal and the Canal Zone four

times (1) to Panama, (2) to the failed French Consortium, (3) to private citizens

of Panama, and, finally, (4) to Colombia; and

Whereas, the revolutionary government of Panama, a product of coup d' etat,

has since June 1971, under the guise of seeking new canal treaty arrangements,

undertaken a bitter and sustained campaign of anti-American propaganda fueled

in large part by Cuban and Soviet communists; and

Whereas, given the emotionally irrational situation in Panama, a political/psychological "timebomb" is being consciously fabricated by the revolutionarY

government of Panama, set to explode to the detriment of the United States and

the world shipping community; and

Whereas, due largely to our unswerving V.F.W. support, patriots in the United

States Senate, led by Senators Thurmond (S.C.), Helms (N.C.) and McClellan

(Ark.), have gone on record in opposition to the unprincipled "Statement of

Principles" signed by former Secretary of State Kissinger and the Panamanians,

and a parallel effort is being similarly supported in the Hiouse of Representative-,

led by Congressman Dan Flood (Pa.): Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, by the 78th National Convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the

LUited States, That:

(a) U.S. operation, control and defense of the Canal are non-negotiable;

(b) tensions relating to the administration of the Canal Zone be resolved on the

spot without disturbing present treaty arrangements;

(c) U.S. citizens and employees in the Canal Zone continue to meet their

responsibilities under U.S. sovereignty;

(d) the foregoing position be again communicated to both the President (who

in October 1976 asserted that he would "never give up complete or practical

control" of the Canal) and the Congress;

(e) the Panama Canal Zone send to the Congress of the United States a delegate such as is done in Puerto Rico, the District of Columbia, and the Virgin

Island; and

(f) the proposed treaty being put forward by the Carter Administration be

defeated in the 95th Congress.

Adopted by the 78th National Convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars of

the United States, held in Minneapolis, Minnesota, August 19 through 26, 1977.

Mr. WASYLIK. On the canal treaties issue, the heart of our mandate

reads:

Be it resolved, by the 78th National Convention of the Veterans of Foreign

Wars of the United States that:

(a) U.S. operation, control and defense of the Canal are nonnegotiable:

(b) Tensions relating to the administration of the Canal Zone be resolved on

the spot without disturbing present treaty arrangements;

(c) U.S. citizens and employees in the Canal Zone continue to meet their

responsibilities under U.S. sovereignty;

(d) The foregoing position be again communicated to both the President (who

in October, 1976 asserted that he would "never give up complete or practical

control" of the canal) and the Congress;

(e) The Panama Canal Zone send to the Congress of the United States a delegate

such as is done in Puerto Rico, the District of Columbia, and the Virgin Islands:

and

(f) The proposed treaty being put forward by the Carter Administration be

defeated in the 95th Congress.

This is where we stand. Now, why do we hold so resolutely to this

view?

In the first instance we are totally unpersuaded both by the asumptions which led to the treaty negotiations and by the proposed treaties

which emerged from these negotiations.
158

Since August 1914, the U.S. canal on the Isthmus of Panama has

been responsibly operated and defended to the benefit of the United

States, the international shipping community, Panama, Central

America, and Latin America.

The "payaway treaty" clique has fallen back on (1) implied blackmail-"unless we give it to the Panamanians, they may blow it up";

(2) self-fulfilling prophecy-forecasts of Vietnam like guerrilla warfare; and (3) self-inflicted descriptions of "colonialism."

The current ploy of much of the "prestige media" on the canal

question is, feigning more disdain than anger, to dismiss all who have

stood in steadfast opposition to the proposed "payaway"-an accurate

term, "sellout", would imply the Panamanians are seeking to buy

our $7 billion canal; they are not-as jingoistic nonreaders of history

who are carelessly calling for war.

Nothing could be farther from the truth.

Long before the canal and the Canal Zone turned into a political

issue, the VFW sought to inform the American public of the true

nature of the issues involved.

There follows arguments advanced by the "payaway apologists"

and the relevant VFW response.

"Payaway" apologists: How can anyone in 1977 argue for a policy

of "colonialism"?

VFW response: Colonialism is, definitively, an exploitative arrangement wherein a natural resource, that is, cotton, rice, tin, et

cetera is farmed, harvested, or mined by an oppressed people for processing, manufacturing, packaging and sale of the finished product

abroad.

Panama "oppressed"? Clearly not. Panama (a) has the highest per

capita income of any of the seven countries of Central America and

stands fourth of 20 nations in all of Latin America; (b) is dependent on

the canal and the zone for 30 percent of her foreign currency earnings

while 12 percent of her gross national product arises from the same

source.

Panamanian per capita wealth is about twice that of Colombia who,

until 1903 was the country of which pre-1903 Panama was a province.

Panama oppressed? Tell that to Cambodia.

"Payaway" apologists: What is needed is a modern arrangement

to replace a treaty-Hay-Bunau-Varilla-now 74 years old.

VFW response: Modernity, like beauty rests in the eye of the beholder. Britain has occupied the Rock of Gibraltar since the 1713

Treaty of Utrecht which ended the War of the Spanish Succession.

Sensible people are thankful the British have been on the Rock for the

past 264 years. Unlike the canal, Gibraltar has not played any significant role in Spanish economic growth. Like the Panamanians, the

Spanish are unhappy about the status quo. Unlike our State Department, the British Foreign Office has kept a lid on the situation-to the

benefit of us all-for 264 years, not 74.

Perhaps we should ask the British Foreign Office to conduct a crash

course on how to protect vital national interests for our State Department.

Payaway apologists: But the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty of 1903

gave the U.S. all rights, powers and authority "as if it [the U.S.] were

the sovereign of the territory." The words "as if" indicate that it is
159

Panama, and not the United States, which holds either titular or

residual sovereignty.

VFW response: Those who so happily produce the "as if" clause

conveniently forget to add what follows in this "in perpetuity"

treaty, that is, "to the entire exclusion of the exercise by the Republic

of Panama of any such sovereign rights, power or authority."

The bulk of scholarship of the sovereignty issue supports the VFW

view. A family of treaties (a) with "New Granada" in 1846; (b) with

Britain in 1901; and (c) with Colombia in 1922, all undergird, and extend the sovereign preeminence of the United States as clearly

recognized in the 190:3 Treaty of Panama; a treaty, incidentally, deliberately ratified after the signing by the Panamanian Senate.

Payawayi apologists: Secretary of State John Hay advised President

Theodore Roosevelt that the 1903 treaty was advantageous to the

United States and disadvantageous to Panama.

VFW response. Is there some natural order that mandates that most

of all of the treaties entered into by the United States must be disadvantageous to America; the Paris accords of 1973 bringing "peace"

to Southeast Asia comes readily to mind.

Hay's view notwithstanding, as earlier indicated, the 1903 treaty has been a success story for all concerned, most specifically including

Panama.

Payaway apologists: How would you like to see America divided

in two by the Mississippi River as the canal divides Panama?

VFW response: Unlike the example of the Mississippi, the construction of the canal and the birth and continued existence of a Panama,

independent from Colombia, are inextricably linked. So while the

U.S. canal and the U.S. zone, given hmnan nature, may never be

objects of popular admiration in Panama, nonetheless, the clear linkage between the U.S. presence and their national existence is there and,

we suspect., most Panamanians understand this unalterable fact of

their nationhood.

Payaway apologists: Who wants to fight another Vietnam over the

canal?

VFW response: No noninstitutionalized person ever wants (a) any

war, or, (b) most especially a Vietnam-type encounter in which we

win the battle but not the victory.

The warlike language about the canal and the zone arises from occasional flights of oratory by General Torrijos-"W1e will walk the

Ho Chi Minh Trail. It is long and exerts a heavy toll in blood"-

from various Panamanian student grroups, from supportive revolutionary rhetoric from Castro, and most disturbingly, by U.S. officials

who, I would judge, believed that even an allusion to our defeat in

Vietnam would suffice to unnerve the American people in their natural

desire to retain our preeminence in the canal. This latter tactic has

backfired badly, and if anything, has produced an opposite effect.

The real question is: Apart from the 1964 student disorders we have

had 74 years of peace, stability, and progress in the canal. Can this

record be sustained or improved upon by the transparent "partnership" with Panama being advocated by the State Department?

Remember, once America is meeting her responsibility as a matter of

Panamanian sufferance and not unequivocal U.S. rights, we can be

asked to pull out overnight.

9S-991-77-12
160

Payaway apologists: But the canal is especially vulnerable to

sabotage.

VFW response: It always has been, but it has only been in the last 3

years that this longstanding vulnerability has been pointed out to us, often by our own negotiators. Again, how would the pullout of the

U.S. garrison enhance the security of the canal from any group or

faction seeking to make some irrational Third World point by blowing

a lock or draining Gatun Lake?

If the Panamanian Government's reply is that they are unable to

control their own citizens' actions in the face of a continued U.S.

presence in the canal, the question then looms, how reliable a partner

would the Government of Panama be in any partnership with the

United States in confronting any non-Panamanian, that is, Cuban

pressure?

Payaway apologists: But the canal and the Canal Zone are Panama's

most important natural resource.

VFW response: The canal is not a natural resource. It was built over

a 10-year period by the Corps of Engineers. It is a quintessentially

artificial or manmade enterprise. Second, the weight of history, law, and logic demonstrates that it is ours not theirs.

Payaway apologists: But whatever the merits of the case might have

been in the past, aren't we painted into a corner by the February 1974

"Statement of Principles" agreed to by Secretary Kissinger and

Foreign Minister Tack and the recent treaty signing extravaganza?

VFW response: When you are painted into a corner, you have two

basic choices: (a) keep on painting, or (b) use whatever turpentine is

on hand to unpaint and get out.

In 1967, Panama rejected an initialed draft of a new treaty. Our

State Department can well use this earlier Panamanian rebuff as a

valid precedent for reexamining the validity of the 1974 "Statement of

Principles" and the resultant proposed treaties.

Payaway apologists: Have you ever seen the stark contrast between

the manicured lawns of the U.S. Canal Zone and the poverty and

squalor of Panmma over the fence?

VFW respons-: Yes. A ridiculous bit of imagery insulting to both

the Zonians and the Panamanians, who are placed in the nonsensical

position of favoring litter and uncut grass.

The Canal Zone is not Grosse Point, Beverly Hills, Tuxedo Park, or

Chevy Chase. It is-and it should be-a typical American community

adjusted for the life of the tropics.

The best way to assure that Americans in the zone have a spokesman

is to have the Canal Zone send a delegate to the U.S. Congress as does

Guam, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and the District of Columbia.

Payaway apologists: But the United States pays an annual rent to

Panama. Doesn't this mean that Panama owns the canal?

VFW response: It is not rent for land or the canal-we bought the

property four times; from Panama, from the individual landowners,

from the failed French enterprise, and from Colombia. It is an annuity

paid to Panama-as it was earlier to Colombia-for displacing the old

Trans-Isthmus Railroad. Not even the U.S. Government is so soft in

the head that it pays rent on land that it owns four times over.

Payaway apologists: What is the matter with the proposed treaties'

goals on this issue; that is, "to assure that the canal is operational,
161

secure, efficient, and open, on a nondjsciinatory baeis to \\wUrd

shipping."

VFW response: The goals cited above are a preisel aur e Icscription of the prPeselt arrangement. In short, why seek goals hait

have already been achieved?

Payaway apologists: Do you mein break off Iegotiat1ions and the ueby iniur the wrath of all of Latin Amelrica, bring an abuse of Amenica

in the United Nations, and incur, perhaps, the public cppos io1 o,

even our NATO allies?

VFW response: If we retreat when we are clearly right, we will

have surrendered, in advance, all our influence on other and m1ore

ambiguous international disagreenlents.

There are 3 or 4--of 20-l,tin American countries, not of c lrs

including Panama, that enjoy a significant, degree of (emocratic

freedoms. Democrate or authoritfaian, 1u8my need the canal operation even more tlwn we do. I have neither seeil nor heard of any

hard intelligence that even suggests an international n!army (1 diavn

from L.,tin American States would either march on the canal or seek

to infiltrate th zone in an -Internititonal Vietnam-type oper tion.

Cuba, of course, having tasted a revolutionary victory in Angola i a

separate matter.

As for NATO, as the Arab-Israeli Yom Kippur wNar of 191- so

clearly underscored, our allis do not have concerted policies apart

fromn the defense of the N AT treaty area. I would expect a r-esolute

U.S. stand on the canal wouid ga.ji the indtrstandingi and support

of our mav-jor European friends.

As to the United Nations, we are in a classic no-win posture with

the General Assembly and its T hird World pl)s Ciomunist majority.

Former Ambassador Pat Moynihan's perception that many Third

World countries in wanting to rip off the wealth of others arc really

calling for "duly sanctioned looting." His view has relevance here.

To sum up our total opposition to the proposed treaties:

If we wrongfully cave in on the sovereignty issue, we are on the

isthmus at the sufferance of the volatile dict atorship of Eriga dier

General Torrijos. We could be asked to leave overnight. Do we

then skulk out or do we stand our ground?

The canal is much closer to Cuba than is Angola. Soviet

inspired Cuban involvement on the isthmus could well wear a

Panamanian cloak. We would undoubtedly agonize, but we would

probably acquiesce.

The proposed Neutrality Treaty, which, we are told, would

permit U.S. military action to defend the canal, is wailing

brought to an art form. The Panaimanians have agreed to no

such thing in writing or in their rhetoric. The administration

may kid itself. It should not be allowed to kid the American

people.

Panama's wretched record in human rights, as attested to by

the January 30, 1977, Freedom House study, needs no amplification here. The administration seems unembarrassed by this manifest hypocrisy. Our President went so far as to embrace,

literally, General Torrijos following the signing extravaganza.

I mean no disrespect to the Joint Chiefs of StafF, but until late

1975, they were silent upon the treaty negotiations. I will not
162

comment upon their recent shift in view, but the unfettered military advice of four former chiefs of naval operations calling for

continued U.S. preeminence makes the compelling military case.

In reviewing the Panamanian student riots of 1964, I note the

following prominent Americans were then quoted as follows:

Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker: The assault on the Canal Zone had been led

by "persons trained in Communist countries for political action of the kind that

took place" and that "the Government of Panama instead of attempting to

restore order, was through controlled press, television, and radio, inciting the

people to attack and to violence."

Former President-then Minority Leader-Gerald R. Ford: "With Cuba

under the control of the Soviets through its puppet, Castro, and with increased

Communist subversion in Latin America, a Communist threat to the Panama

Canal is clearly a grave danger. The American people will be shocked by the

terms of this [Johnson administration] treaty."

Joseph A. Califano, Jr.-current Secretary of HEW, then an Assistant to the

Secretary of Defense: "We know that some of the leaders were known and identiTiable Communists, members of the Communist Party of Panama, and people

who belonged to the Vanguard of "National Action" which is openly and proudly the Castro Communist Party in Panama."

Now, I realize that 13 years have passed and that people often

change their minds over time.

My question is: What hard evidence, availa ble to all of us in 1977, caused these three distinguished Americans t o change their minds

over recent years about the nature of the Communist threat in

Panama? We would all profit if they would share their new information

with us.

In conclusion, what the proposed treaties embody is a slow motion

act of strategic self-mutilation.

Only 13 of our warships cannot transit the canal today. As Navy

ships get smaller even this small number will decrease.

The canal and the zone (a) save 8,000 miles and 15 to 30 days; (b)

have the only ship repair f acilities within 1,600 miles on the Atlantic

side and 2,500 miles on t he Pacific side; (c) have, in Howard Air

Force Base, the only high performance airbase within 1,000 miles;

and (d) is the only U.S. logistical base south of the Rio Grande.

As to the possibility of violence should the treaties not be ratified,

no one in America, especially including the VFW, is threatening

anybody. We are being threatened by a P anamanian strong man

who seemingly on alternate days, either threatens or abhors it. And

this is the man with whom we see a partnership?

What then does the VFW propose?

(a) A revised U.S. position which would immediately disabuse

Panama of any major territorial, defense, control or operational

aspirations; that is, America is not running the canal on Panamanian

sufferance.

(b) Generosity and imagination on real life human grievancesranging from parking places to job opportunities-where a long term

U.S. administration may have needlessly chafed Panamanian citizens;

and

(c) A major modernization packet to ready the canal for ships now

too large for passage and other measures all of which would combine

to give a major boost to Panama's diversifying, albeit debt-ridden

economy.
163

To conclude, an opinion research poll indicated that Americans

favor by 76 to 16 percent, continued U.S. sovereignty over the canal

and the adjacent zone.

Change is an imperative when a given status quo is unworkable.

Change does not equal progress when current arrangements not only

do a job, but do it superbly

The Panamanians want very badly to have their way and far too

many in the State Department see it their way, that is, reciting

Panamanians perceptions ad nauseam.

Our people can, should, and must be brought unapologetically to

defen(l a 74-year record America and the world maritime community

have unarguably benefited from.

Thank you.

Chairman ZABLOCKT. Thank you, Commander Wasylik, for your

very forceful presentation of the VFW point of view on the Panama

Treaties.

There is a rellcall and rather than have the next witness, Comdr.

William Rogers be interrupted, the committee will stand in recess

and I am hopeful that the chairman of the subcommittee can come

back as soon as possible to reopen the hearing. Unfortunately I have

a conflict but I will be here as promptly as I can after I meet with the

Select Committee on Intelligence.

The committee standIs adjourned.

[A short recess was taken.]

Mr. YATRON [presi(ling]. We will resume our committee hearing and

the next gentleman to speak will be Mr. William J. Rogers, immediate

past national commander.

Mr. Rogers.

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM 3. ROGERS, IMMEDIATE PAST

NATIONAL COMMANDER, THE AMERICAN LEGION

Mr. ROGERS. It is a distinct pleasure for me to appear before you

today representing the American Legion.

You have met the members of the staff who are with us but I would

like to take a point of privilege to introduce our national president of

the auxiliary

Mr. XATRON. 'Without objection.

Mr. ROGERS [continuing]. Mrs. Viola Moltzen from North Dakota.

Mrs. MOLTZEN. Good mornilg.

Mr. ROGERs. An(l the members of the National Security and

Foreign Relations Commission of our auxiliary.

Needless to say, we are each aware of the thousands of inches of

newsprint and the hours of television coverage which have been

devoted to the proposed Panama Canal Treaty in the past month.

My reason for appearing before you today is twofold:First, to represent

the viewpoint and position of the American Legion as adopted by our

recently concluded 59th national convention an(l mv observations

in traveling (luring 12 months throughout the United States and

Panama.

Second, I will spell out-objectively and(l dispassionately-what our

concerns are and why we object to this specific treaty.
164

Dining these past 12 months, it has been my honor and privilege

to visit all of the departments of the American Legion. We have a

depai ment in every State and territory making up the United States.

At eIch meeting, without exception, our members were concerned

about the possibility that the U.S. Government would relinquish

sovej (ignty of t he U.S. Canal Zone and canal. Furthermore, we would

give it to a dictatorship in Panama which runs contrary to our natural

ins incts as American citizens.

Today, I have to speak for our 4 million members of the American

Legion and the American Legion Auxiliary. We represent miners in

West Virginia, grain growers in Illinois and Iowa, energy producers in

Texas, machinery manufacturers in New York; and shipping industry

of all States where rivers and harbors open to the sea-altogether we

represent a composite and microcosm of the United States. For most of

us in the American Legion and all our citizens are either buyers or

sellers of commodities passing through the Panama Canal.

Moreover, all of us are dependent on the protection of the U.S.

Navy to control the seas surrounding our country in the center of the

Western Hemisphere. Quite frankly, the main thrust from every

Legion Post was the same, deep apprehension about the proposed

treaty with Panama. Did the United States really intend to abandon

its citizens to a dictatorship? If so, what did the United States stand

to gain from such a giveaway?

I don't think it will come as a surprise to the members of the committee, but I think it may come as a surprise to certain of our leaders

in the executive branch and to certain of our national cartoonists in

recent weeks, but the typical Legionnaire, who also happens to be

the typical American, understands the Panama Canal situation. The

average Legionnaire understands the facts and the realities of standing

straight for what is right, and objecting to something which is wrong

and not in the American interest.

Though we have opposed any treaty which would surrender U.S.

control and ownership since 1960, Legionnaires throughout the

country have been given both sides of the picture. In the American

Leoion magazine, which goes to every member, we invited the top

spokesman for the Republic of Panama, Ambassador Gonzalez

Revilla, to state the case for the Panamanian Government. The Ambawsador's position to transfer ownership of the zone and canal to

Panama. was printed in full in the October 1976 issue of our magazine.

Con-ressman Daniel Flood was invited to state the case for U.S.

sovereign ty in the same issue.

At our national convention recently completed in Denver, we

invited Ambassador Sol Linowitz to come and to take as long as he

liked to state the case for giving the U.S. zone and canal to Panama.

As you know, Ambassador Linowitz is articulate and knowledgeable

on all the issues as the U.S. negotiator, and presented the administrat ion's viewpoint to our Foreign Relations Commission for well over

an hour.

Since this was the major issue to be decided by our National Convention in 1977, we decided to set the Panama resolution aside from

otlie'r foreign policy considerations and vote on it separately, by

rollcall department by department if necessary, so we could be sure

that the National Convention did not trespass on the will of our

members, so we would know the real vote.
165

After the chairman of the Foreign Relations Commiion, Dr.

Robert P. Foster, seated here beside me, rea( the resolution, the

convention members in a voice of one, called out for a vote. The vote

to oppose giving the U.S. zone and canal away was unanimous. Although there were over ",000 delegates representing the 2.7 million

members of our organization, there was not one dissenting vote. The

silence of the nays was as persuasive as vocal shouts of the yeas.

The truth is that the American Leogioni has expressed its collective

judgment.

I will now discuss the reservations and objections wbich we have

to this proposed treaty. The first is the strategic and military importance of continued U.S. control of the canal and the Canal Zone. At

the onset, we realize that the United States has a one-ocean Navy

with a global responsibility.

Today, all but 13 of the ships in the U.S. Navy-the exception

being the large aircraft carriers-can pass through the canal. Moreover, we, along with the Congress, must be "forward looking'' and

long-range prognostica tors regarding the true effects now and in the

future of the proposed treaty. As each of you are aware, we have

made a national commitment to the minicarrier concept. And, when

they come on line in 3 to 5 vears, I have been assmed by the Navy

that they can transverse the canal, making the canal even more

important in a military sense in the years ahead.

Hanson Baldwin has recently written:

It is ironic, indeed, that in an era when the U.S. Navy needs the canal to a

greater degree than at any time since the end of World War II, Washington is

considering its abandonment. The Navy today is in the same strategic bind it

was in prior to World War II. It is a one-ocean Navy (in size and power) with

two-ocean responsibilities. We are outnumbered in submarines and surface ships

by the Soviet Union and, more than at any period since 1945 the Navy must

have a quick transfer capability between Atlantic and Pacific in order to meet

sudden crises.

Gen. V. H. Krulak, USMC (retired), writing in the summer 1976 issue of

Strategic Review, summarized the canal's naval importance; "In truth the Panama Canal is an essential link between the naval forces of the United States

deployed in the Atlantic and in the Pacific. It is only because of the waterway

that we are able to risk having what amounts to a bare bones, one-ocean Navy."

During the Vietnam war about 98 percent of all supplies for our forces were

shipped by sea; of this total, approximately 33 percent were loaded in east and

gulf coast ports and transited the canal. The volume of military sponsored cargo

in the 4 years from 1964 to 1968 increased, for dry cargo, by 640 percent and for

petroleum products by about 430 percent. And the number of U.S. Government

vessels (chiefly naval) transiting the canal increased from 284 in 1966 to more than

1,500 in 196S.

Within the military community, and among the retired and active

military, there is great diversity of opinion. In addition to the historic

letter of four distinguished Chiefs of Naval Operation, including the

former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Adm. Thomas H. Mfoorer, saying

that the proposed treaty is contrary to the security interests of the

United States, we are hearing from many military leaders and the

majority of these opinions, like the majority of our citizens, are opposed to the giveaway of the zone and the canal.

From a military viewpoint, a commander never gives away strategic

territory which he may have to fight to regain. The U.S. Canal Zone

is strategic territory. All the military, both active and retired, agree

on that point.
166

From an economic perspective, the canal is vital to U.S. interests.

In 1975, approximately 14,000 ships transited the canal of which 45

percent originated in the United States and 23 percent were bound for

the United States. No other nation even approaches the invaluable, economic stake which we have in the canal. However, the canal is

important to all maritime commercial nations since 96 percent of the

world's merchant fleet can transit it.

The canal is just this year assuming an additional commercial

importance to the United States as Alaskan oil begins to flow. When

the Alaskan pipeline reaches its full capacity, it will yield 1.2 million

barrels of oil a day. The west coast of the United States can accommodate only 700,000 barrels a day. This means that approximately

500,000 barrels a day cannot be used on the west coast, and must be

transported east. No pipeline has yet been constructed across the

United States, and the trip around the Horn, as has been demonstrated, is not economically feasible. Unhindered use of the Panama

Canal is critical until an adequate pipeline can be constructed.

Moreover, at the present time, the United States has an overall

investment in Panama of $7 billion. By the year of our total evacuation under the terms of the treaty, that interest will have grown to

$9.3 billion. To add insult to injury the treaty proposes that we pay

some $50 million per year, plus about $350 million in economic and

military aid to have the Torrijos group take over the territory and

property.

Contrary to popular argument, control of the canal by the United

States serves the best economic interests of the people of Panama

In 1976, U.S. agencies purchased over $29 million worth of goods in

Panama, and we paid over $18 million in wages to non-U.S. citizens.

U.S. private investments amount to 50 percent of the capital investment in Panama. And U.S. employees spend $39 million there.

In the preamble to the American Legion constitution, we pledge to

"safeguard the principles of justice, freedom and democracy"-in

1977 terms this translates into human rights. As this committee is

aware, Panama is a dictatorship, or in the words of Ambassador

Bunker before Congressman Murphy's committee, an "authoritarian"

government.

The aspect of the Torrijos government which is most significant, is

that it is a repressive dictatorship. Freedom House, the respected

organization which ranks countries on the basis of human rights,

gives Panama the lowest rating in Latin America. Panama received

the same 1977 rating on political and civil liberties as the Soviet

Union and was rated even lower than Cuba.

General Torrijos came to power in Panama by a coup and is governing without the consent of the people. The truth is that since General

Torrijos participated in the overthrow of Panama's constitutional

government by gunpoint in 1968, 1.6 million people have lost their

human rights. There is no political party except the Communist

Party, called the People's Party, El Partito del Pueblo. Furthermore, the moneys from Panama Canal annuities do not go directly

to the people, the money goes to the Torrijos power group.

As you are probably aware, the Panamanian Constitution requires a

plebiscite vote of the people for ratification of any new treaty, which

will be held on October 23. The sad irony is that the controlled and
167

censored Panama press-" guided" in the terms of our chief negotiator-will never give a full and objective account of the treaty to the

Panamanian people.

Another concern which we have is the political association and

economic stability of the Government of Panama. On the economic

side; under Gen. Omar Torrijos, Panama's national debt has grown

from $167 million to $1.5 billion. The debt service alone will consume

:39 percent of that country's budget this year. Panama's Department

of Planning indicates that to refinance loans coming due, together

with the $139 million deficit, a total of $323.6 million will be required.

Obviously, Panama cannot financially afford to have the treaties

rejected either.

Politically, Panama's Omar Torrijos has alined himself with the

most repressive pro-Communist regimes in this hemisphere-those of

Cuba's Fidel Castro, Jamaica's Michael Manley, and Guiana's

Forbes Burnham. According to U.S. Information Agency, Torrijos

issued a communique last April with pro-Arab terrorist dictator

Col. Moammar Qaddafi of Libya denouncing what they called "Zionist

aggression by Israel." The communique was issued at the end of a

weeklong visit by Torrijos to Libya, for the purpose of creating close

economic and political ties between the two countries.

Jack Anderson and Les Whitten stated in their nationally syndicated column on June 16, that they had evidence that this TorrijosQaddafi meeting had also resulted in a secret deal between Libya and

Panama to give Arab extremists a foothold in the Americas and to

cooperate with the Arab boycott against Jewish manufacturers.

Torrijos has also busied himself with making closer political and

commercial ties with the Soviet Union. Again, according to the U.S.

Information Agency, top officials from the Soviet Politiburo and

Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party visited Panama

last June. Almost immediately after the Soviet Politiburo team left

Panama, a Soviet commercial delegation headed by Nikolai Zinoviev

arrived and concluded a major Soviet-Panama commercial agreement

with the Torrijos regime. This agreement, according to news reports

in the Torrijos controlled newspaper Critica, could result in the

opening of a Soviet bank to run Soviet commercial activities throughout Latin America, as well as a series of other multimillion dollar

trade and construction projects with Panai a.

Whether it was a treaty of intent or a pact of infinite promise, we

don't know. The treaty was signed by Omar Torrijos' brother-in-law,

Marcelino Jaen, and Soviet leader Nikolai Zinoviev who is also listed

as a KGB agent. After the signing, Panama's Jacmi declared the Soviet

treaty-

* . . is an event of deep historic signing, not only for our country, but for the

American continent as well who are always facing strong forces that represent

philosphy that is contrary to the destiny of Latin America.

Of deepest concern is Torrijos' close ties with Fidel Castro and

Cuba. Cuba under Castro continues to aggressively export and pursue

Communist domination and control of other nations. Just this past

weekend the New York Times reported that 4,000 more Cubans were

sent to Angola recently to "stabilize the nation's most serious crisis

since the 1976 civil war." The 4,000 Cuban troops would increase
168

Cuban troop strength in Angola to 19,000. This to me clearly indicates

that Castro hasn't backed off 1 inch from his declared goal of Communist domination of the Western Hemisphere and the world.

Also of concern is the reliability of the Panamanian dictator to live

up to what he signs. Panama has violated the present treaty at least

11 times during the past 2 years. These violations included such militant acts as the Panamanian National Guard taking up positions in

December 1975, within the U.S. Zone; attempting to arrest and

actually shooting a citizen in the U.S. Zone in January 1976; setting

off bombs and explosions in the U.S. Zone in October 1976, and

capturing a vessel, the Sea Wolf, which was operating inside Canal

Zone waters and burning and desecrating our U.S. flag.

Our Ambassador has protested such lawless treaty violations, but

one must question the wisdom of appeasing and making further

concessions to a government whose recent history is pockmarked with

deliberate violations of the current treaty. If our current treaty with

Panama is being violated on a routine basis, where is the logic that

such attitudes and behavior will improve between 1977 and 1999, the

magic year when Torrijos is supposed to get everything, lock, stock,

and barrel?

I would like to turn now to the question of U.S. sovereignty. Many

of the arguments for the switch in sovereignty and much of the conscious or subconscious motivation for it stem in part from ignorance or

distortion of the manner in which the Panama Canal Territory was

acquired by the United States and of the wording of the original

treaty of 1903.

Contrary to these assertions from public officials who should know

better, we did not steal the canal, nor does Panama have residual,

titular, or any other kind of sovereignty over it. The United States

bought the Canal Territory-a strip across the Isthmus of Panama

some 50 miles long and 10 miles wide-at a cost to the American taxpayer that far exceeded the cost of the Louisiana Purchase, the

Mexican cession, the Florida Purchase, the purchase of Alaska, or any

other territorial acquisition. I have today for the committee the actual

prints of the purchase price paid by the United States individual by

individual as part of the 1903 treaty which I will give to the committee.'

Mr. YATRON. Without objection.

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you.

Despite current contentions by the State Department that the 1936

treaty revisions recognized Panama's sovereignty over the Canal

Zone, it is clear that in both wording and intent the treaty actually

reenphasized the sovereignty, in perpetuity of the United States.

History and the law appear to indicate in no uncertain terms that

there is no merit whatsoever to the concept that the treaty of 1903

vested so-called titular sovereignty or residual sovereignty in Panama.

The wording is clear and unequivocal:

The Republic of Panama grants the United States in perpetuity the use,

occupation alnd control.

Of the Canal Zone:

The RepuIblic of Panamna grants to the United States all the rights, power, and

:Uaumty within the Zone niitioned * * * which the United States would

1 Material was retained in committee files.
169

po-sses 'nd exercise if it were the sovereign * * * to the tiree exclhl- ion of the

exercise by the Republic of Panama of any such sovereign right<, pow_ , or

authority.

One cannot transfer soverehgntv unless one exerci-ses it. The United

States has, and will retain until Congress decides-; otherwise, complete

sovereignty and control of the Canal Zone in perpetuity.

Even General Torrijos in his remarks following last Wednesday's

signing acknowledged U.S. sovereignty and I quote:

What noiiri- hed the hope, of Piunminanians for the recapture of their sovereignty

was their feeling that the North American people funidamentally iarboreo no

colonial aspirations.

I will now turn to the treaties and the accompanying annex and

protocol. This analysis is based upon the limited time in which these

treaties have been available to this layman and I urge each member

of this committee to scrutinize these (ocuments.

(1) Sovereignty is the crucial factor in the new treaties. Both the

prologue to the canal treaty, and at least six other times in the (locument, Panamanian sovereignty over the U.S. Zone and the canal is

acknowledged. As I stated earlier, once Torrijos is granted sovereignty

all other questions are irrelevant.

(2) According to recent analysis of the treaty, should Panama abrogate the treaty, the United States would have no legal basis in international law to maintain its position in the former Canal Zone.

(3) Article II, section 1, of the Canal Treaty specifies that it should

"be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional proce(lures of the two parties". However, it would appear that the executive branch is seeking ratification of the treaties without seeking

enabling legislation from the House of Representatives to transfer

real properties, appropriation of funds and perhaps other legislation

which is not spelled out, as required by the Constitution of the United

States. This is bypassing the louse of Representatives and appears

to be an uvurpation of legal powers which is clearly conveyed to the

House by the Constitution.

(4) Article X11, section 2(b), states that:

During the duration of this treaty the -United States of America Fha' rot

negotiate with third stte- for the right to construct an inter-oceanic canal n LIEV

othIer route In the Western Hemisphere, except as the two parties may otherwvi-c

agree.

In plain terms, the United States has surrendered its r:1hts to

negotiate for a competing canal elsewhere in the Western Hemisphere

unless it has Panama's consent.

(5) Article V of the canal treaty directss that employees of the

Panama (anal Company, their dependents and other American nationals should "abide by the laws of the Republic of Panama and

abstain from any activities in competition with the s1pirlt of this

treaty." This article also directs that they abstain from any political

acts in the Republic of Panama. As I state(l earlier, there are American

Legion Posts in the Canal Zone and I am (leei)ly concerned about

forcing American citizens to sullbmit to a dictatorship and their

surren(ler of rights as Americans.

() Article IX, section 3, recognizes the right of ownership of improvements to realty but does not recognize the right to own real

estate. While we do not know how many Americaqns own property in
170

the Canal Zone, if any, it would appear that article condones or perhaps authorizes expropriation of property by the Panama Government.

(7) Article XIlt relates to payments to Panama for the right to

operate the canal. One such payment of $10 million per year from

profits is cumulative which means there is a possibility that we could,

over the 23-year period of the treaty, end up owing the Panama

Government $230 million.

Additionally, I have strong reservations and objections to the

Neutrality Treaty:

(1) Only article IV of this treaty bears upon U.S. responsibility

concerning the neutrality of the canal and the entire document is so

vague as to be virtually meaningless. In my lay reading of the entire

neutrality treaty, I find no assurance that the United States can intervene to assure the neutrality of that vital area.

Dr. Romulo Escobar Bethancourt, the Chief Negotiator on the

part of the Panamanians said: "The treaty does not establish that the

United States has the right to intervene, that is, send in troops, in

Panama", he said. He denied that the treaty gives the United States

the right to decide when neutrality is violated or not. Neither, in his

view, do U.S. warships have the right of expeditious transit without

conditions.

(2) Article III(e) states that "vessels of war and auxiliary vessels

of all nations shall at all times be entitled to transit the canal". This

statement assures the passage of warships through the canal of nations

which may be at war with the United States.

(3) Article VI, section 1, states that vessels of war and auxiliary vessels of the United States and the Republic of Panama "will be entitled

to transit the canal expeditiously". The exact meaning of the word

"expeditiously" is vague at best. Dr. Escobar said, I refer to the Congressional record: referring to the people of the United States, "If

their warships say I want to go through first, then that is their problem

with the other ships there."

Moreover, article VI, section 1, of the Neutrality Treaty appears to

be in direct conflict with the protocol accompanying the treaty which

states that vessels of all nations will be insured permanent access to

the canal "on the basis of entire equality".

In brief summary, an evaluation of the facts about the treaty have

brought us to the (lay of the signing September 7, 1977-a bad day

for the United States.

U.S. military and national security losses are sufficient to reject the

treaty. We are giving up our naval fleet flexibility at a time when we

have fewer than 400 ships in the entire U.S. Navy. Economic losses

of the United States are difficult to calculate, but logic dictates that

U.S. consumers and exporters are going to pay the toll increases.

Additionally, the cost of the U.S. taxpayer is in the billions. Moreover,

someone will pay the billions of dollars owed international bankers

by the Torrijos government. It will not be Panama. The Torrijos

government is living on borrowed money and borrowed time.

Politically, human rights under Torrijos are no better than they

were under I fit ler during the 1980's and vet by supporting this treaty,

our U.S. Government is propping up a dictatorship. Worse yet, our

Government is forcing Americans to live under totalitarian rule and

abide by its laws and decrees. That is what World War I was all

about.

L
171

The pressures the White House can bring are enormous as all of us

know. The resources at the Presidelnt's (lis)osal almost defy oulr

collective imagination. The recent treaty signing festivities vere an

example of Presidential style an(l substance. We in the Legion, while

recognizing the awesome power of the Presidency and the Executive

bureaucracy, also believe that the ultimate power in the United States

resides with the people-with pI)ople like our members.

I will close with one question-if this treaty is basically good for

the United States, why does the administration have to make such

an effort to prove to Americans that it is in our national interest?

Those of you in the House who return to your districts every 2 years

know what the people back home are thinking. You know the Legion

posts and grassroots opinion runs about 80 percent against the giveaway.

We believe this proposed treaty will ultimately be decided by the

people. We believe this is one defeatt the United States should avoid.

It is a loss we nee(l not accept and you can count on the American

Legion posts to stand firm.

Thank you.

Mr. YATRON. Thank you very much, Commander Rogers, for an

excellent statement.

The next speaker will be Commander Frank D. Ruggiero.

STATEMENT OF FRANK D. RUGGIERO, NATIONAL COMMANDER,

AMVETS

Mr. RUGGIERO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mv name is Frank

Ruggiero and I represent the AMVETS, the American Veterans of

World War II, Korea and Vietnam. I hail from a little town Lvndhurst, N.J., and I am principal of a school on leave to come here and

represent this great organization.

To my rear is Dennis McClure, my legislative director for AAIVETS, seated. I will say that the convention in Atlantic City embodies the

principles and the decisions that were made about the statement I am

about to real.

Mr. Chairman and honorable members of the committee, AMVETS

is grateful for this opportunity to present the views of our organization on such a vital issue as the much publicized and highly controversial Panama Canal Treaties. It is our opinion that few matters

in recent history have held the importance or portentousness of this

fateful issue.

In concert with our great brother organizations, AMVETS speaks

to this matter in the sense that we, the veterans of our Nation's wars,

are of a right and necessity deeplyy concerned with the future of the

U.S. defensee posture in general and in the Western Hemisphere

specifically. As (1o other concerned Americans, we a(l(Iress ourselves

also to those issues which affect international and hemispheric commerce and embrace our national economy. Therefore, the issues involved here are directlyy germane to our concerns and activities , for

what segment of our society has more right to oppose that which we

believe threatens the U.S. defense and economic position on the

"American lan(lmass."

The administration an(l some Members of Congress have challenged

the term sovereigntyv" as that term pertainis to the Hay-Bunau
172

Varilla Treaty of 1903. They claim that the United States was never

granted sovereignty over the Canal Zone in the legal sense. We do

not argue that point. The dictionary definition of the term sovereignty

is of little importance in this issue as we see it. The fact remains that

any reduction of American military forces on the Isthmus of Panama

and the loss of U.S. control over the Canal Zone could be disastrous.

The U.S. defense posture, south of the Rio Grande would be virtually

nonexistent. The canal, regardless of its inability at present, to accommodate the supercarriers and supercargo vessels remains as the single

most important waterway on the western half of the globe. I would

like to say that American shipping represents approximately 43 percent of all traffic transiting the canal. The isthmus itself, the canal

notwithstanding, serves as the roadway between all of the Americas

and is, in our opinion the crossroads of the hemisphere. This demands

American presence and control to insure that communistic or otherwise adverse influences will not choke off North America from South

America. The President's concern over human rights can best be served

by maintaining our strong position in Panama and preventing the

influence of Castro Cuba and other elements from establishing a

toehold.

Furthermore, we are not convinced that the people of Panama, and

we refer to the common people not the pseudointellectuals, are desirous

of having the United States pull out of the Canal Zone. Indeed, we

have reason to believe that is the last thing they want to see happen.

In this regard we quote from an article which appeared in the Chicago

Tribune of March 25 by Mr. Ronald Yates:

Incredibly and in spite of an almost daily diet of government-inspired antiAmerican rhetoric in the Panamanian press, the poor and the unemployed of this

nation of 1.7 million say they are not ready to run the Americans out of Panama

but rather are prepared to fight to keep the canal in United States hands.

And Mr. Yates found this to be a typical remark of a Panamanian

on the street:

You see, the only people in Panama who have ever given the United States

trouble are the Communists, rich university students, and parasitic intellectuals

who live off the blood and sweat of people like us.

He continued:

*We have nothing against the Americans or the Canal Zone because we know as

long as America has control of the Canal, there will be jobs for Panamnanians.

But as soon as you [America] give it back to Panama, it is going to go all to hell

and nobody will have jobs.

We fully appreciate that the passage of seven decades would

necessitate adjustments in monetary considerations commensurate

with today's values. We do not oppose any reasonable arrangements

in this connection. Our sole opposition is to any treaty which would

dilute or compromise U.S. control of the Canal Zone now, or in the

future.

General Torrijos was reported to have said:

In the event that peaceful negotiations for a phasing out of United States

control were closed, a campaign of violence against the 15,000 Americans in the

Zone would be inevitable.

Two options would be open to me, he continued: "To smash it or

to lead it-and I am not going to smash it." If we give in to this threat,
173

how could we guard against sabotage by subversive elements of

Panamanian military forces? This prompts other questions:

First, If we-the United States-grant the desired concessions to

Panama, what guarantee will we have that Panama will live up to its

end of the bargain?

Second, If communistic influences prevail, such as those we suspect

exist currently in the Carribbean area, how will we defend the Canal

Zone should Panama succumb to these influences?

A strong stand must be made if we are ever to regain the image we

once projected abroad. Some would say that by granting the Panamanian demands the United States would gain the respect of the Third

World nations. We think not. We believe that the opposite reaction

would take place and that America would be looked upon as a pusfiover. Respect is given to the strong, the assertive, the fair. Again, we

do not oppose a fair financial arrangement, but not in the form of

tribute.

We are asked if we were in the position to make the decision:

"Would we be willing to go to war in order to retain U.S. control of

the Canal Zone?" We ask, in turn: "War with whom?" Are we to believe

that Panama by herself or all of the Latin American nations collectively would wage war against the United States over this or any other

issue? Or do we believe that the Third World an(d/or the Communist

nations including Red China and the Soviet Union would jon forces

in such an adventure? We believe the p)ossibilities of such an occurrence

are too remote to merit consideration.

It has been further sug tested that should the tireatties not be ratified, the veterans' organizatiOns and other anti-treaiy groups would

share collectively the blame for whatever reprisals are taken against

American personnel in the Canal Zone. That, in effect, "their Wood

would be on our hands."

It is, and would be, the responsibility and solemn obligation of the

Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force to take

whatever measures are necessary, incitidinig aried force, to insure the

defense of the Canal Zone and the safety of its inhabitants.

In conclusion, _Mr. Chairman and members, we offer no alternatives

to the current status of the United States on the bthmus of Panama

except in the area of more financial equity, and indeed, recogize no

need to enter into any further negotiations with the IRepublic oF

Panam.a which would attempt to eliminate or phase out U.S. control

of the Canal Zone.

Again, and finally, Mr. Chairmlian, we thank the committee for this

opportunity and will attempt to answer any questions the member>

may wish to ask at this time or we will be hiap)py to respond in writing,

for the record.

Mr. YATRON. Thank you very much, Commander Ruggiero, and

we thank you and the other gentlemen who have testified as well as

the other members of your delegation.

I will address this to Dr. WVauslik; perhaps you could respond to

this question, or anyone else who wants to respond.

TRANSIT RIGHTS OF U.S. WARSHIPS UNDER NEUTRALITY TREATY

Do vou see any conflict between the regime of neutrality and the

right of the U.S. warships to transit the canal?
174

Mr. WASYLIK. We don't feel that the neutrality statement is an

accurate one; in reading it, it doesn't appear to be neutral. It says

the Panamanians are going to have control and if, at a future time,

they want to control that canal and say we can't get through, I don't

know of any way we are going to do it except by fighting our way

through.

U.S. RIGHT TO DEFEND THE CANAL

Mr. YATRON. Does the Neutrality Treaty, in your view, stipulate

an affirmative U.S. right to intervene in defense of the canal and the

canal operations?

Mr. WASYLIK. No; it does not say that. In fact, I guess really I

gave your second question answer first. I am sorry for that. But,

basically that is our contention, that it does not.

MILITARY VALUE OF CANAL TO THE UNITED STATES

Mr. YATRON. Well, would you please explain precisely what you

feel is the military value of the canal to the United States?

Mr. WASYLIK. Well, as I said in my prepared statement, it is the

only military establishment we have south of the Rio Grande. We

have ship repair facilities there. We do not have them on the Atlantic

side for 1,600 miles from there, and from the Pacific, we would have

to go 2,500 miles. We have an Air Force base there. We do not have

another Air Force base below the Rio Grande. We have ability to

move logistics through that canal that are important, and in time

of war, we would not have any other way except to go around South

America, which takes so much more time and mileage.

Mr. YATRON. At what specific points do you feel our defense posture will be weakened by the treaties if they are ratified?

Mr. WASYLIK. I feel that they would be weakened the day the

treaties are ratified, particularly if General Torrijos was overthrown;

then, who do we have an agreement with? It is a dictatorship-you

have no elected representatives in Panama, and if he is replaced by

another dictator, that person could have the right to say, I didn't

sign it, I don't agree with it, and it is null and void. We now have the

canal though so we will tell you what to do.

Mr. YATRON. Thank you.

Mr. Winn.

Mr. WINN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First, I want to commend you gentlemen for some very fine statements and I would like to apologize for the lack of attendance of the

members of this committee. This room was packed yesterday with

the proponents but when the opponents appear today, we have got

very, very few members in attendance. I apologize for that.

1 am particularly interested in the defense and the national security

aspects of the Panama Canal and I just wondered if any of you would

like to comment whether you think the Panama Canal is more or less

militarily important to the United States than it was 25 years agothat statement has been made-and what you think about the future

of the Panama Canal as far as security and defense is concerned 25

years from now?

Mr. RUGGIERO. I would like to answer that question, if I may.
175

I believe any base-established base-where we have American

defense groups or American defense troops available for distributionn

among the areas in which it enconl)asses is ipij)ortant to our defense.

You have the naval base at the end of Cuba; you have others around

the world that are strategically locate(1, so we can, in the event of

aggression by some nation who we find is not favorable to our sets of

standards, we would have that available to us, and yet we still have

our 43 percent, as we said, of our shipping going through there-and

there is an economic factor. Should that be denied us, of course, commodities would have to go up because we would have to sfend our

ships around the long way, around the Horn. I don't think that

would be practical.

So I would think that any thing that we have that is standard defense procedure shouldn't be eliminated at any time unless we feel

that we should give this concession to other people, an(l I think that

the American people will not stand for that, sir.

Mr. ROGERS. When I was in Panama the first of this year I had an

opportunity to talk with McAuliffe-General McAufiffe-and the

other military people. I think the troops we have in Panama are the

finest trained troops that we have. The general stated that every day

they are being traine(l or acting as though this was the day that the

problem was coming. It was the area that we tiained troops for Vietnam

because of the terrain and because of the jingle. I don't know whether

the canal could be defended. It is a long 58-mile area. I think if you

put men every 2 feet apart you couldn't defend it. One man with a

stick of dynamite could put it out of commission but we do have the

capability, we do have the troops and the will to defend it down there.

Mr. WiNN. I don't know if any of you gentlemen heard the figures

that my colleague from California, Mr. Lagomarsino, put in the record

yesterday. He put some figures in that you would be interested in

about the increased use militarily of the canal since 1966. He may care

to comment on it when he gets his time.

Mr. Rogers, you made a statement on page 8 that either I don't

understand or you may know something we don't know. In the last

sentence of the first paragraph you said:

Furthermore, the money from the Panama Canal annuities do not go directly

to the people, the money goes to the Torrijos power group.

Mr. ROGERS. May I refer that to our expert on Panama for the

American Legion who is with us?

Mr. WINN. Yes; I would prefer that he identify himself.

STATEMENT OF DR. ROBERT P. FOSTER, CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL

FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMISSION, THE AMERICAN LEGION

Mr. FOSTER. I am Dr. Robert Foster, chairman of the Foreign

Relations Commission.

I think it's obvious in our conversation with those who will talk to us

in Panama that much of the payment that goes to the so-called

structured government, which does not mean that it gets back to the

use of the people of Panama.

It's interesting, too, to note that there seems such affluence among

this particular group and so much poverty among the people.

I think it is very significant as to what is taking place.

9,S-991-77--13
176

U.S. BANK LOAN TO PANAMA

Very little has been said about the program that General Torrijos has followed in making loans. I think it's very enlightening to realize

that the banks of the United States have loaned tremendous amounts, several hundred millions of dollars, and I think this is a factor that

is often not brought to light or fully understood.

Mr. WINN. Well, thank you very much.

PANAMA' S ABILITY TO MAINTAIN THE CANAL

Do any of you have any confidence in the ability of the Panamanians to maintain the canal when they are on their own?

Mr. ROGERS. None whatsoever.

Mr. WASYLIK. That is one of the major problems, they will not

have the managerial expertise to run the canal.

VALUE OF CANAL DURING VIETNAM WAR

May I also point out with regard to your former question, during

the Vietnam war better than 90 percent of our logistics that went to

Vietnam went through the Panama Canal. It was very important at

that time. Although, of course, I want to stress that we as a panel are

not for war, we certainly hope there are no wars and no violence, we

all work for the strength of this country in the hopes that through

strength, we will have peace.

We have been there, we know what war is like, it's terrible, it's

bloody, it's horrible. We believe in peace through strength. We

believe by continuing to back off, give in and placate our enemies that

we are going to place ourselves in a position we may well regret.

Mr. WINN. Thank you very much. That red light means my time

is up.

Thank you.

Mr. YATRON. Time has expired.

Mrs. Meyner.

MI's. MEYNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, I thank you for your testimonies and as Veterans of

Foreign Wars and American Legion and Amvets, people who have

fought for your country, I can understand your concern over both

these new treaties, but I am puzzled by something, and that is that it

seems to me that our top military leaders in this country favor this

treaty. There hasn't been a hint of opposition from the Joint Chiefs

of Staff.

SUPPORT FOR TREATIES BY JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Yesterday Gen. George Brown, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, said that without question the United States must prepare for

difficulties down there-he meant in Panama-if the treaties aren't

ratified. Ile stated that the Joint Chiefs of Staff are proud--that was

the word he used-to have the treaties as negotiated.

Now, certainly the Joint Chiefs of Staff are men that know more

bloit the importance of U.S. security interests and about our defense

tln almost any of the rest of us.
177

Do you think that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, including General

Brown, are being dishonest about these treaties, coming out in favor

of them?

Mr. WASYLIK. I won(ler if I miight refer that question to my

security adviser, Col. Phelps Jones, U.S. Army retire(d--

Mrs. MEYNER. I think this is a question that puzzles us all.

M\rl. WASYLIK [Continiuinlg]. Who lias fough'it in three wars, by the

way.

STATEMENT OF COL. PHELPS JONES, DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL

SECURITY AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS FOR THE VETERANS OF

FOREIGN WARS

Colonel JONEs. Thank you.

My name is Phelps Jones, I am from your neighboring State of

Connecticut, some vears back.

I spent 30 years in the Army, all of which were in the infantry, and

had the good or bad fortune, depending on the point of view, to have

perfect attendance at all these wars.

Along the line I have worked for some very distinguished military

people, Maxwell Taylor, Gen. George Brown.

Our senior military people are the most convinced constitution)lists

in this country. I know that. They have been put in, I think, a particularly difficult position here.

General Brown said in his press report, which I read this morning, that the Joint Chiefs have been involved in this problem for years.

Well, until November 1975, it was on the other side of the problem.

At that time, then Deputy Secretary of Defense Clements accompanie(l General Brown to the Republic of Panama, and following that

visit the Chairman then announced the Joint Chiefs' support of the

ongoing negotiation.

I don't believe along with some critics of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

that they are fear ridden little people or worried about their jobs.

That is cruel, canard, absolutely inappropriate.

But the Carter administration has made this their No. 1 foreign

policy priority and with convinced constitutionalists, who like the rest

of us aren't looking for a narrow precipice of principle to leap off of, I

can certainly understand how the Chiefs could be brought on board.

wORK OF PAST PRESIDENTS ON A NEW CANAL TREATY

Mrs. MEYNTER. W ell, thank you for that explanation.

Another thing that puzzles me along this same line is that four

Presi dents, President Johnson, President Nixon, President Ford, and

President Carter, have all worked toward this treaty, and I would

suppose that they would have the best interests of the United States

at heart.

Colonel JONES. Of course they (10, but I think it would be fair to

state with the treaty its incubus was the U.S. Department of State

and we are guessing about the nature of the future.

Some dedicated people think that this would be a helpful thing, a

forthcoming act of sovereign grace, all these other things, but the

hard arithmetic, and geography, endure when everybody's rhetoric

ends and the military and the security aspect in our judgment are

paramount.
178

Mrs. MEYNER. Thank you.

Mr. ROGERS. Could I add something to the Colonel's statement?

Mrs. MEYNER. Certainly.

Mr. ROGERs. I last year had an opportunity to visit military bases

throughout the world. I visited with many naval, Army people, and,

of course, the Panama Canal subject came up because it was of importance. I think without question all of the military leaders, as the often

referred letter by the four admirals, I think that opinion is shared by

them but they are not going to do a General Singlaub, they are going

to keep their opinions to themselves. Off the record we have been told

what their opinions are.

Mr. RUGGIERO. I would like to add to that if I may.

Mrs. MEYNER. Yes.

Mr. RUGGIERO. There are two discussion periods the Chiefs of Staff

make. One is under the control of the President whom they are

pledged to serve, and the other is when they make individual analysis

as personal privileges. I think you would find that the differential

between the two is absolutely astounding.

Thank you.

HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN PANAMA

Mrs. MEYNER. Commander Rogers and Commander Wasylik, in

your statements you both gave as one of the major reasons for opposing

the treaties the human rights situation in Panama.

The human rights situation in many countries is not very good. I

know it isn't good there, but do you also oppose U.S. defense agreements and economic relations with other governments charged with

serious human rights violations, such as Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Indonesia? All of those countries have autocratic men that run

them. I mean why do you single out just Panama?

Mr. WASYLIK. We are not singling out just Panama. We pointed

that out to the administration.

To the contrary, I should say we should look at administration

policy, which seems to single out one area and not another. There are

differences of opinion on the part of the administration. They have

singled out countries in Latin America, Chile, Argentina, Brazil,

from which they have withdrawn economic and military aid, and

here they want to give additional economic aid.

So I would say let's ask the administration to explain that policy.

Mrs. MEYNER. Were you aware that Panama has announced that

it has invited the OAS Commission on Human Rights to make au

onsite inspection of alleged human rights violations?

I wondered by any chance if the OAS findings were to show a substantial improvement over the conditions described in the Freedom

House report, would such a finding change your standard on the proposed treaties?

Mr. WASYLIK. No; it would not.

Mrs. MEYNER. Because the OAS did discover and report that the

human rights situation wasn't as terrible as we all are led to believe

it is.

Mr. WASYLIK. It would improve our opinion of Panama but it

would not change our standard now.
179

Mr. ROGERS. Mrs. Meyner, again in my visit to Panama I had an

opportunity at first hand to see what some of the human rights violations were.

I, inci(lentally, had a visit from a gentleman who came in from the

United States, a Panamanian, who came to talk and speak before our

convention. Ile was detained at the airport because he had the temerity

to address our convention against the treaties. We had people from

Panama at our convention this year who stayed just as far away from

the press as they could.

Mr. YATRON. Time has expired.

Mr. Guyer.

Mr. GUYER. I thank you and we are sorry, gentlemen, that we have

to go vote. We only have 15 minutes to get over there from the time

the buzzer sounds. I just want to first of all say how proud I am that

Mr. Wasvlik is from my home State. We have been friends a long time

and I know that all of our servicemen share my esteem of him.

Mr. WASYLIK. Thank you.

TIMING OF TREATY SIGNING CRITICIZE)

Mr. GUYER. Commander Rogers also, I sat here yesterday and I

am like Mr. Winn, I apologize for the empty seats. Yester(lay they

had a battery of TV cameras. It seems strange to me in America when

we want this new sunshine, outgoing, reach for the people, that Vietnam came into the United Nations without anybody being consulted,

that the Panamanian treaty was signed the day we got back from

recess without anybody being here to talk about it.

In a poll in my fourth District of Ohio taken last fall when there was

no talk of a treaty, my people were 91 percent opposed to it. I am convinced that the American people are largely in agreement of what you

have sai(d today, an(l you do speak for about 7 million members. I

think that it is a shame that your testimony was not aired across the

country and (riven the coverage it deserved.

One more thing anti then I will yield to Mr. Lagomarsino. It has

nothing to do with Panama. But 1 think you are aware that so far

more than 1,500 (leserters have been given a red carpet free ride home

from points around the world, and have toll-free numbers they can

call, as well as use all the Embassies for that purpose. Yet, my people

can't even make a telephone call to a VA hospital free and a Gold Star

Mother can't go and visit the grave of her son free, and I think that is

outrage) ous. [Applause.]

PRESIDENT CARTER'S POSITION ON CANAL NEGOTIATIONS

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Dr. Wasylik, you referred to the position of

President Carter (luring the campaign. I happen to have a copy of the

statement he made during his debate with President Ford. I think we

should read it into the record. This has not been done yet in this

proceeding. Ile was asked about the Panama Canal anI he said

Well, here again, the Panamanian question is one that's been confused by Mr.

Ford. He had directed his diplomatic repre'entatives to vield to the Panamanians

full A-Voeignt Overhe Panama Canal Zone at the end of a certain period of

timle. Whei Mr. Reigan i-ed this question in Florida Mr. Ford not only di saVmd Ihis instructions, but he also eVe dropped pairenthetically the uite of the

w'OFr "ditentC.''
180

I would never give up complete control or practical control of the Panama

Canal Zone, but I would continue to negotiate with the Panamanians. When the

original treaty was signed l)ack in the early 1900's, when Theodore Roosevelt

was President, Panama retained sovereignty over the Panama Canal Zone. We

retained control as though we had sovereignty.

Would negotiate: Now I would be willing to go ahead with negotiations. I

believe that we could share more fully responsibilities for the Panama Canal

Zone with Panama. I would be willing to continue to rise the payment for

shipment of goods through the Panama Canal Zone. I might even be willing to

reduce to some degree our military emplacements in the Panama Canal Zone,

but I would not relinquish practical control of the Panama Canal Zone any time

in the foreseeable future.

I want to also congratulate you gentlemen on your statements.

\r. YATRON. Mr. Ireland.

Mr. IRELAND. I want to say I echo what was said and I am proud

and pleased to be one of the people who were here.

Mr. YATRON. We thank you gentlemen for appearing here today

and we will certainly be in touch with you when we need more information.

[Whereupon, at 12 noon the committee adjourned.]
PROPOSED PANAMA CANAL TREATIES

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 20, 1977

HousEc OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,

/a shnqlgtol, D.C.

The committee met at 9:45 a.m. in room 2172, Ravburn toi-ve

Office Building, Hon. Clement J. Zablocki (chairman of the coinmittee) presiding.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. The committee will please cone to order.

We meet this morning to continue the committee's hearings on the

proposed Panaina Canal treaties and related legislation.

The first witness is our colleague, lion. Sainuel S. Stratton, a

Representative from the State of New York.

(ongressnan Stratton, on behalf of the committee members, I

welcome vou to tIhe committee. It iS my understanding that von must

leave to chair another committee meeting at 10 a.m. In order to meet

your deadline, may I suggest that vo sumnarize your prepared

statement, all of which will of course be incuded in the record, and

then we will proceed with the nenbers' questions.

Mr. Stratton.

STATEMENT OF HON. SAMUEL S. STRATTON, A REPRESENTATIVE

IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Mr. STRAxTTON. Thank you very much, iMir. Chairman.

I will try to summarize this if I can. I am not sur- that I can siunmarize it exactly, but let me proceed and see how I do on tine, and

I express my appreciatioi to you for allowing ine to testify here this

inorning.

I appear here in opposition to the treaties, Mr. Chairman, not to

the treat es in toto, let me make clear, but as we s-y in the ITouse, I

am oppo--ed to them in their present form, and that means if I were

in the U.S. Senate or were to pess along' atiy recommjuendations to

Members of the senalte I would be supporting several reservat to

these treatZes which believe ought to be incorporated in them before

they will prop-rly reflect and protect the national interest and thus

be suitable for ratificat ion.

Jo this extent I think vou will find that my position differs to soine

extent from that of oth er tre.vty opponentts who have previously

testile d before you. I am not o _poSe(d to some adjustment in the

existing tretv that governs our position in the canal. I have beetn to

the canal, Panama, myself. I have seen the glaring economic dispariti es that exist there between those who live in the zone and those that

(18)
182

live outside. I recognize the potentiality for civil disturbance and even

guerrilla warfare that have been heavily stressed by those who have

negotiated these treaties, and I would agree we ought to take steps

to eliminate many of the glaring inequities that are more appropriate

to an early age.

What I object to is the fact that the treaties go too far, Mr. Chairman, they throw out the baby with the bath. The Panama Canal

is a valuable American asset, it is important to our seaborne commerce.

That is why we built it and that is why we have paid heavily over

the years to maintain it.

One might argue that the canal is not quite perhaps as valuable

to us today as it was 30 or 40 years ago, and that may be true, but it

is still valuable to us and it continues to be valuable to us into the

future, especially as it now seems likely that we will begin to ship our

new oil supplies from the North Slope of Alaska around to the east

coast. Therefore, whatever changes may be made in the operation or

the financing of the canal, it is absolutely essential that the canal

remain available to us and that control of it be denied to our enemies

into the indefinite future, which certainly means well beyond the

next 22 years.

That is why throughout all of these negotiations the question of

the defense of the canal has been a key issue in the minds of the

American people.

The main treaty specifically spells out in article IV our right to

defend the canal until the year 2000, and in addition the press statements by the canal negotiators and by the administration spokesmen

have maintained that the second treaty, the so-called Neutrality

Treaty, also gives the United States the right to defend the canal

after the year 2000.

I cite as an example, Mr. Chairman, a report that appeared in the

September 19 issue of the U.S. News & World Report about the canal,

"What it gives up and what it keeps." It says that the United

States will have the permanent right to share defense of the canal

with Panama even after it comes under Panamanian jurisdiction

after December 31, 1999.

Now that is absolutely not true. The alleged right is supposed to be

implicit in the text of article IV of the Neutrality Treaty but the

word "defense" never appears in that article. Here is what is says:

The United States of America and the Republic of Panama agree to maintain

the regime of neutrality established in the treaty which shall be maintained in

order that the canal shall renain permanently neutral.

Not a single word in there about defense. It only mentions neutrality. How do you get defense out of neutrality?

In his original press conference President Carter said on this, commenting on this article:

We will have an assurance in perpetuity following the year 2000 that the canal

will be neutral, that our ships will have unlimited access to the canal, along with

the ships of other nations. We have no constraints on the action that we can take

as a nation to guarantee that neutrality.

Well, there is a lot of difference between a right of defense and the

assumption that there are no restraints since nothing has been menlioned in the article about any restraints that are placed on the action

that we can take to preserve neutrality.
183

I would point out to the committee that the Panamanian Foreirn

Minister, the chief Panamanian negotiator of the treaty, Dr. Romulo

Escobar Bethancourt declaredd in a news conference in Panama City

on August 24, and I quote:

The tr-:ty do(- not e(tabli-h that the United States has the right to intervene

in Panama.

So how rmeaning fltl is this supposed "'right," when one of the high

contracting part ie> has already (enic(l that the treaty a-sures it? If we

leave this wording as it is we will have to ro to the World Court,

presumably, for an interpretation before we know whether we can

really resist an attack on the canal bV aresive forced after the year

2000.

>o Mr. Chairman, the only po- ible concision is that these treaties

are in fact -erlousIy deficient in, rotetingr America'. vital interest.

Thev have been presented to the American people lle(lr fale and

mile ading color-. a containing what they in fact do not contain.

So here is iny firSt re ervation to the treatie- : They mui>t specifically

spell out the right of the United State- after the year 2000 to (fefd

the canal from any aggressor hostile action that might clo-e off the

waterway to U.S. ships or render the canal itself inoperable.

In these critical dav, with poK-ible threat> that might arise from

soviett or Cihan action in the Caribbean, we cannot possibly rest our

national interests on -ome abstruse interpretation of vague and

ambiguous language in the treat\- that has already in fact been

repudiated by a lea(ling official of the other ignatory power even

before the document is sige(d.

Second, Mr. Chairman, this i> my second reservation, there must

be no doubt that thi- defense right is expresslv incorporated in the

basic treaty itself. A. long as there are two treatie-, a we have now,

one dealing with before the year 2000 and the other after, there are

going to be disputes as to which is the real treaty and which ultimately

prevails, and on this crucial point of defen-e we can afford no such

ambiguity.

Therefore, I would propose a; my second re-ervation that thi> U.S.

defen-e right after the year 2000 be incorp)orated in the ha treaty.

As a matter of fact, thi, is the onlv way we can make a lerallv binding

contract so that the certain rights and priv ilege which we are giving

up are in con-ideratlion for other privilege, that are )ein! given up on

the other side. and we mu t make it perfectly clear that in thi, treaty

what we are agreeing to do up to the year 2000, giving them the

operating capability and giving them all of this additional money is

in direct return for the explicit rirht that we are beinr guaranteed in

Panama after the Year 2000. Otherwise the treaty become, a, many

of its critics have charge(l, a mockery and a one--ided giveaway.

Finally, M\r. Chairman, I have a third re-ervation to propo e. aid

I make 'this from my own experience as a long-time member of the

Armed Services Committee. If thi, rijht of defen-e which I propo e

that Panama mu-t confce(le to u, after the year 2000 is to b meaningful, then it is absolutely e--ential that we have on the >pot in

Panama itself the mrean to'exercie that right.

In the present treaties as now drafted we not onlv have no -uch

right but for all intent, and pmlpoiI e,( ; we are explicit>y barred from
184

exercising it, because article V of the Neutrality Treaty forbids us to

maintain military forces, defense sites and military installations

within the Republic of Panama.

Clearly, if we are going to deter or oppose any effort to capture the

canal and close it down, we can only exercise that right effectively

from a military base located in the vicinity of the canal. Without such

a base our defense would be limited to trying to destroy or recapture

the canal from Florida or Texas or Guantanamo after an initial

assault had already been made on the canal primarily by paratroops

or an amphibious landing. Such an attack might come from Cuba.

For example, if the Cubans can operate in force in Angola they

certainly can mount a surprise attack on the Panama Canal. Once

they have taken over physical possession of the canal our defense

right would have largely disappeared. In fact, once the Cubans were

in possession of the canal territory, one wonders whether the Americans

would really be prepared to retaliate in a contested amphibious

landing.

Mr. Burton, I think, has had some comments to make to his colleagues on that point. But if our military forces are already in place

in Panama, if our defensive radars are working and our patrol planes

are on station out of American air bases, then we almost certainly

would deter in advance any possibility of attack.

So I would propose again in the main treaty, Mr. Chairman, that

we require our right of defense, that it involve at least one U.S.

military base in Panama which would include an airfield.

We already have 14 in the zone, we are going to reduce them,

presumably, to zero. But there is no reason under the sun, if the

treaty really gives us the right to develop the canal, why we shouldn't

retain at least one defense base. It wouldn't be on American soil, it

would be on Panamanian soil. We would be there under a treaty to

aid in the canal's defense and the Panamanian flag could fly over that

field just as the Spanish flag now flies over our Torrejon Base in

Madrid. Anything like that would make a sham and mockery of the

pretense of American defense rights.

Mr. Chairman, I realize that these are reservations, they would

require the opening of negotiations, but let me point out that this

would never have been necessary if the negotiators had made a

serious effort to listen to the American people and to the Congress

before they began their negotiations rather than after they had wound

them up.

With these reservations the treaty is, of course, not quite as generous to the Panamanians as it is in its present form, but after all, we

are promising to give them not only the canal but to pay them generously to take it away. Surely in return for all of these concessions

it would be little enough to ask that we have and maintain a realistic

and meaningful right to protect and defend something we built and

kept in operation.

The American people were led to believe that was what was actually

contained in these treaties, but somehow it just never managed to get

written in. And so it is up to the Senate and up to our own body in

the House to see that these omissions are corrected.

Thank you very much.

[Mr. Stratton's prepared statement follows]
1 5

PREPARED STATEMENT OF lION. SAMUEL S. STEATTON, A IEPHEsENTATIV 1N

CoxNunmtss iFOM Till- S TATE oF NEW Yoi I

\[r. Chairman: I appear here this morning in opp position o the Panaiua Ca nal

treties-not to the treOtiOs ill toto, let ime make clear, but, as we say here in the

H1oue, I am opposed to them -in their present for m. ' Which neanis that if I were

ill the Senate or was to pass along any advice to t he members of the Senate, I

would be sup' orting several major "reser:vat 0 Itn or amen clients to these

tretes which I believe m lIst Ihe in(ot rpor e1 d il he efo-o they will properly

r!flet and nrotert the national interest :ind tus hI stiibl fol r AtifictlonI.

Tto this extent I believe you will find that my posit ion ii 10,s to s0ne extent from

that of other treaty opponents who have previously te tified before yoN. I am not

opposed to some :Iljustmnent in the existing treotv that governs our position in

the canal. I have been to P amn. I have seen the glaring econ'mie disparities

there bet ween those who live in the Zone and those who live out side. I recognize

the potentialities for civil disturbIlance and even guerrilla warfare that have all

bwon heavily stressed by thoso wh have negt atel these t o new treaties. I

would agree that we should tke steps to eliminate mny of these glaring inequities thvt are more appropriated to an earlier ae. We ought to turn over more

and more of the operation of the canal to the Panaanians. and we ought to make

available to them a greater share of the financial benefits of the canal-if, indeed.

at this point there are ny net financial benefits still left for those who operate

and manage the canal.

So I do not quarrel with t his general thrust of he maj or trealy. What disturbs

me. though, is that these treaties no munch o, far. They clearly throw out the

baby with the bath.

The Paniama Can:al is a valuihle America n asset. It is import ant to our seaI orne Commeree. That's why we built it, in i why we h:vo h ai heavily to mI intain it over the yeirs. One might arie, as it has ini, ed been argued, that the

canal is not quite as valuable to s todav as it was 'o or -40 years ago. That may

well be true. But it is still vAluable and it will continue to be valuable into the

future, especially, as now seems likely, we soon begin to ship our new oil sapplie

frain the North Slope of Alaska around to the Ea.ast Coast.

Therefore, whatever ch:1nes may 1e male in the eat ion or finmAeing of the

can:., it is abslutelv essent ill that the canal rotmainl available to us and that

control of it he denied to our enemies into the ind etinite future--which cert ainly

moans well beyond the next 22 years. That is why throughout all those negotiations

lie question of the defense of the canal ha1s heelt a key ionSue in minds of

('onfress and the Americati people. The inin tr'trIV s)ocificallv spells ont ill

Article IV, the right of the United States to defend I the canl until the year 2000.

In addition all of the press statemeinets m:lde bY the( neaoti:tors themselves, and

by Administration spokesmen, have asserted th: the IOcond treaty, the so-called

neut rtlity treaty, also gives the United States the right to defend the canal after

the year 2000.

inf-rortunatelv, these assertions are simply not Irue. This alleged right is supposed to be implicit in the text of Article IV of the neutrality treaty. But the

worn i "defense'" does not even appear thero! All that Article IV says is:

"The United States of America and the Republic of Panaiiima agree to maintain

the regine of neutrality etablished in this Treaoty, which shall he maintained

in order that the Canal shall remain perianently neutral * * * 

But this doesn't say a word about defense. It only mentions neutrality. And

how do you get "defense'' out of "neutrality"?

In his original press conference on the treaty, Prsident Cartor, comientting on

tib Article, said "we will have an assurance in per tnit following the year 2000

that the Panma C'anal will he nettral, that our ships ill have uunlimited access

to the canatl, along with the ships of other nit ions: we have no constraints on the

action that we can take as a nat ion to guarantee that i in alitv.

But, Ir. Chairman, there iow world of difference b t worn a Clearlv deIed

-ight" of defii c, and ''no cost taints" phced oi th aCtion we can ake to

preserve nentiraiityv!

Ind eIed tle Panamianian Foreign 'Minister, Dr. 11 omulo E'cohar Bethancourt,

declaredl in a news conference in Panama Cit v w Augmust 24th that "The treaty

dot".; not establish that the United St ates has thoe righi to intervene in Panma:m.

So how meaningful iV this supposed right wlhon one of the high cont racting

parties already denies that the treaty assures if?

If we leave this wording 'Is it is we will have to go to the World Court for an

nt erprotation, presumably, before we know whether we can legally resist an attack

on the canal by aggressive forces.
186

So, Mr. Chairman, the only possible conclusion is that these treaties are in fact

seriously deficient in protecting America's vital interests. They have been pre- sented to the American people under false and misleading colors as containing what they do not in fact contain.

So here is my first reservation to these treaties: they must specifically spell out

the right of the United States, after the year 2000, to defend the canal from any

aggression or hostile action that might close off the waterway to United States

ships or render the canal itself inoperable. In these critical days, with possible

threats that might arise from Soviet or Cuban action in the Caribbean, we cannot

possibly rest our national interest on some abstruse interpretation of vague and

ambiguous language in the treaty that has already been repudiated by a leading

official of the other signatory power even before the document is signed.

Secondly, Mr. Chairman, there must be no doubt that this defense right is

expressly incorporated in the basic treaty itself. As long as there are two treaties,

one before 2000 and the other after, there will always be disputes as to which is

the real treaty and which ultimately prevails. On this crucial point of defense we

can afford no such ambiguity. Therefore, I would propose as my second reservation

that this U.S. defense right after the year 2000 be incorporated in the basic treaty.

Only in this way can we make the treaty a legal binding contract which gives

certain rights and privileges in consideration of other privileges given up on the

other side. We must make it perfectly clear in this treaty that what we are agreeing

to do up to the year 2000 is in direct return for the explicit rights that are being

guaranteed to us in Panama after the year 2000. Otherwise, the treaty process

becomes a mockery, just a one-sided give-away.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I have one third reservation to propose. If this right of

defense which I propose that Panama must concede to us after the year 2000 is

to be meaningful-and not just mere rhetoric to assuage the American peoplethen it is absolutely essential that we also have on the spot in Panama itself the

means to exercise that right.

In the present treaties as now drafted we not only have no such explicit right,

but for all intents and purposes we are expressly barred from exercising it because

Article V of the Neutrality Treaty forbids us to "maintain military forces, defense

sites and military installations" within the Republic of Panama.

Clearly, if we are to deter or successfully oppose any effort to capture the canal

and close it down we can only exercise that right effectively from a military base

located in the vicinity of the canal. Without such a base our "defense" would be

limited to trying to destroy or recapture the canal from Florida, Texas, or Guantanamo after an initial assault had already been made on the canal-perhaps by

paratroopers or amphibious landing. Such an attack could well come from Cuba.

If the Cubans can operate in force in Angola, then certainly they can mount a

surprise assault on the Panama Canal. And once they take over physical possession

of the canal, our defense "right" would have largely disappeared.

Once the Cubans were in possession of the canal, would America really be

prepared to retake it in a contested amphibious landing? I wonder. But if our

forces are already in place, if our defensive radar is working and our patrol

planes are on station out of an American air base near Panama City, then we can

almost certainly deter any possibility of such an attack well into the future, or,

if it did come, wipe it out.

So I would propose, again in the main treaty, that we require that our right to

defend the canal involve at least one United States military base in Panama,

including an airfield. We have 13 or 14 in the Zone already. There is no reason

under the sun, if the treaty really does give us the right to defense, why we should

not retain at least one U.S. defense base. It would not be American soil, of course;

it would be Panamanian soil. And we would be there under treaty to aid in the

canal's defense. So the Panamanian flag could fly over the field, just as the

Spanish flag now flies over our Torrejon base in Madrid. But anything less than

that would make a sham and a mockery of the whole pretense of American

defense rights.

I realize, Mr. Chairman, that these reservations would require reopening the

negotiations. But let me point out that this would never have been necessary

had the negotiators made a serious effort to listen to the American people and

the Congress before they began their negotiations rather than after they had

concluded them.

With these reservations the treaty is of course not quite as generous to the

Panamanians as in its present form. But after all, we are promising to give them

not only the canal, but to pay them generously, perhaps too generously, for taking

it away. Surely in return for all these sweeping and expensive concessions, it is
187

little enough to ask that we have a realistic and meaningful right to protect and

defend something we built and have kept in operation. The Amer ican people were

led to believe that that right was actually contained in these treaties. But somehow

it just never managed to get written in.

It is up to the Senate and the House to see that these serious omissions are

corrected.

Chairman ZABLOCK1. Thank you very much, Mr. Stratton, for an

excellent statement.

U.S. DEFENSE OF THE CANAL

Congressman Stratton, in view of President Torrijos' description of

the neutrality treaty as one which places the defense of the canal

directlv under the Pentagon umbrella, and in view of the interpretation

of the treaty by our negotiators, which gives this country the right to

unilaterally defend the canal, if necessary, after the year 2000, what

in practical terms could or should the United States do to further

assure the canal's defense?

Mr. STRATTON. I think I have already answered that question in

my remarks, Mr. Chairman, but in the first place the reference you

make to General Torrijos' statement is to the one contained in this

article that appeared in the U.S. News & World Report. He is talking

about the period up to the year 2000. The Pentagon is maintaining

that we have a right to defend the canal after the year 2000.

The views of our negotiators to the contrary notwithstanding, there

is not a single word in that treaty that gives us any such right, and

this, as I say, is an absolutely fundamental point. If the treaty means

anything, the most fundamental point must be put in there in words

of one syllable so that any American can understand it, not have some

abstruse interpretation of some second echelon flunky in the State

Department, which is what somebody tried to give to me the other

day. I said, "where is the word defense contained in these treaties?"

He said, "in Article IV." I said, "w-here is it in Article IV?" "Well, it

is implied in there."

We don't want to rest the protection of a vital interest of ours

in an implication. Let it be operated by the Panamanians, I don't

care, but we want it maintained open and viable for us. Let's not

make that important interest rest upon somebody's interpretation in

the State Department when the Foreign Minister of Panama says that

it isn't there.

We don't want to have to argue this in the world court. You say

what could we do to correct it? Well, 1 have suggested, I think, we

should put in there that the United States shall have the right to defend the canal against any country that would take it over or occupy

it or deny its use to us after the year 2000, and to carry out that right

the United States shall have the right to maintain forces on at least

one base in the Republic of Panama from which air and antiaircraft

defense, and so forth, can be mounted.

I think I would leave up to the Senate the precise wording but if

you wanted some specific wording I would be glad to give it to you.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Thank you very much, Congressman Stratton.

Mr. Lagomarsino.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Stratton, your testimony is excellent, as always, and I think

you make several very good points.
188

Let me first of all observe that we don't have very many members of

the committee here today to listen to this side of the story. When

Secretary Kissinger was here last week the committee benches were

full, the press gallery over here was full, there were so many television

cameras that you could hardly get up here. I want to observe that

for the record.

Mr. STRATTON. Some of us apparently are not quite as sexy a

witness as Mr. Kissinger.

CLARIFICATION OF THE TREATIES

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Maybe you are on the wrong side of the issue.

In any event, there is a startling contrast in that regard. When

Secretary Kissinger was here last week I asked about some of the very

specific points you are mentioning now. As a matter of fact, during

his presentation he expressed some concern and stated that the Senate

should make it clear that the United States has the right to intervene militarily. He was saying somewhat the same thing you are,

although not quite as strongly. I made the point that if this is such an

important issue, and certainly it is, and even the President must

think it is because he says we do have that right, I don't know why

he would say that unless he thought it was important-if that is

important, why isn't it spelled out in the treaty?

The only answer either he or Secretary Rusk could give to that question was that the Panamanians wouldn't sign it if it were in the treaty.

My comment to that was if they would not sign it if it is in the treaty, they certainly aren't going to agree we have that right.

In any event, I think it should be spelled out. I asked why didn't

we negotiate the right to have a base or bases in the Panama Canal

Zone. Again they said because the Panamanians would not agree

to that.

We have bases all over the world that we have agreed on and we

have no particular problems except the traditional problems of how

much to pay, what are the rights, whose flag flies, and that sort of

thing.

It seems to me rather than leave these things to later determination,

we should decide them right now, spell them out clearly. If we are

going to have trouble about interpretations, it is far better to have

that trouble now, iron it out, and come to some sort of conclusion than

to wait until some later (late, in the year 2000 or thereafter, and have to

go back and argue about it.

I might say also, in my opinion, if we were to adopt the provisions

that you recommend, and see that they are actually written into any

treaty that is ratified by the Senate, at least with regard to defense

and the keeping of the canal open to world trade, there would be an

improvement.

I think that a lot of our friends in South America could feel a lot

better about this treaty than they do now-not better than they do

publicly, but better than they do privately. Again I commend you for your testimony.

Air. S-RAT'ON. Well, 1 thank the gentleman, very much. As a

matter of fact, you have hit on a point that is a very important one.

in the first statement that I made on the Panama Canal Treaty,

during the recess on the 17th of August, I pointed out that the absence
189

of any clearcut explanation in the statements that the negotiator

were passing out, we still hadn't the actual text of the treaty, yet

there they were, trying to sell it to us, and we hadn't even seen the

fine print.

I pointed out Secretary Kissinger Lad aed fb his conditional approval

of the treaty on the (question of whether it adequately protecte(t our

right to defend the canal, and I iterpreted hi> statement as saving

that he was going to wait and see the actual text of the treaty before

he made a final decision.

Then Mr. Linowitz and Amba-ssador Bunker viuited him and a-p

parently won hin over without ever seeing the fine print. To me it

was just incredible when we finally got the fine print that that rght

simply wasn't tiere. We ,ere being told something that wasn't true.

And I think there is no question but that this right should be incorporated in the treat V.

You say the argtum ent was given that the Panamanians wouin't

sig jn the treaty- with that stipulation. I would remind the conmittee

that the Panamanians up until the last couple of days were insisting

on getting-what was it-55 or $6 billion a year from uN in addition

to the canal. And then President Carter had them up to the White

House and said, Look, this is ablolutelv impossible, Congress will

never paN it; -o they promptLiy backed down.

I think they will sign; they will go for any treaty that would give

then a substantial interest in the operation of the canal. All we have

got to do is have the -;nate say thi Is iwhat we nee in the ireaty in

order to ratify it, amdt I an sure the Panaiamans would accept.

From all I can gather on the negotiations, all we have done i< simply

to gve in, and in spite of the fact that more than a third of the Senate

went on record several years ag'o against this kind of a treaty, the

negotiators never bothered to comne up here and sk anybody in

Congress what ther thought really ouwht to be in the treatv before

the negotiations began.

Mr. LAGoMARsINo. I might say I Lhve talked to some of the Senators who are counted as supporters of the treaty who have very grave

reservations. They would like to have a treatv. the\ are very much for

doing something, they have reservation> about some of the provision,

including the provisions you have pointed out.

Mr. STRATTON. I think, if I may say so, my proposal crives them a

middle way. I think a lot of people recog ized, perhaps they have

been to Panama, that you have a very explolve situation down there,

if we just flatly rejected the treaty we probably are going to have

trouble. There is no real reason why the Paniamanians could not learn

how to run a ship through the caial in 22 years. But we don't want

to give away the full responsibility for the protection of that very

vital waterway to a country that has very little in the war of a military defense.

Thank you.

Chairman ZABLOCKri. Thank you, Mr. Lagomarsino.

Mr. Nix.

U.S. DEFENSE OF THE CANAL

Mr. Nix. Mr. Stratton, will you state again your reasons for your

conviction that the United States has an inherent right to have incorporated in this treaty a right to defend? How do you morally or

logically support that position?
190

Mr. STRATTON. Well, I will say to the distinguished gentleman

from Pennsylvania, I don't think I maintained that there was any

"inherent" right. I am not trying to get into metaphysics in this kind

of thing. We are in the process of a hardnosed negotiation over a treaty.

We happen to be in possession of the canal at the moment and we have

got a treaty that was negotiated back in 1903 which gives us a great

deal of authority there. Although the present Panamanians have

forgotten it, their country probably wouldn't be what it is today

if the canal weren't there.

All I am saying is that if they want us to get out, if they want us

to give thern a larger share of the operation of the canal, and a larger

share of the benefits-if there are any left; I don't know whether

there are any left now anyway-then we ought to spell out those

things that we think are important in return. In my judgment the

one thing that is most important is that we make sure that no outside

force comes in and takes over that canal and denies it to us.

The whole discussion of defense which I have seen in the papers, from General Brown and a lot of others who ought to know better, is that what they are talking about is defending the canal against

the Panamanians. General Brown says we couldn't defend the canal

from the enraged Panamanians if we had 100,000 men. But that

isn't what we should be talking about.

Obviously it is to the benefit of the Panamanians to keep the canal

operating. What I am saying is that once the United States pulls out

and leaves a small country of 1%/ million people in charge of this

very valuable engineering establishment, what is to prevent the

Cubans for example, from moving in and taking it over for their

friend, the Soviets? And so it seems to me that our major interest

is simply to see that there is enough protection down there so that

nobody is tempted to move in and take the canal away from the

Panamanians.

Mr. Nix. Your position, therefore, is that adequate protection of

the canal is of vital interest to the United States of America?

Mr. STRATTON. Absolutely.

Mr. Nix. Could you conceive any set of circumstances in which

the United States, if it deemed its interests to be threatened, any set

of circumstances when the United States would sit idly by, treaty or

no treaty, and not move in?

Mr. STRATTON. Well, a lot has happened since we went into Vietnam, Mr. Nix, and the interest of Americans in going into areas from

which they have already withdrawn is not particularly strong. That

is one of the reasons why I have very strong reservations about the

President's proposal to pull all of our troops out of Korea. If they are

attacked, he says, we will go back in. But I have my doubts.

So I think the important thing for us as far as the canal is concerned is to deter an attack ahead of time. If we had this right spelled

out clearly and had a small force of American soldiers in place and a

base in Panama, then I think the Cubans or anybody else would

think twice before moving in.

Mr. Nix. Well, I appreciate the expression of your opinion. I

understand the basis for it. I am in agreement with it to a certain

extent. I think, however, that the reality, as you stated it to be, that

the United States would never sit supinely by if its interest is adversely affected, without taking affirmative action, treaty or no treaty.
191

.\r1'. STRATTON. For example, suppose the Cubans landed on the

canal and took it over. The only way we could get it back then would

be to go in there and bomb them out. And in the process we would

probably destroy the canal just the way we destroyed villages in

Vietnam in order to "save" them.

That is why I think it is much better for us to be on the spot and

deter an attack in advance than to move in afterward because that

would damage the canal in the process.

Mr. Nix. Sometimes I wonder if there were others saved.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Time has expired.

Mr. Fowler.

RENEGOTIATION OF THE TREATIES

Mr. FOWLER. Mr. Stratton, in your very concise and very fine

statement citing the need for us to maintain military bases or a military presence in Panama in order to defend the canal, based on your

reading of the treaties, for that to take place would it require renegotiations of the treaties, the present treaties, or a third treaty, a

separate agreement?

Mr. STRATTON. As I understand it, that would require renegotiation.

Mr. FOWLER. YOu Say it would?

Mr. STRATTON. It would because that would amount to a reservation on the part of the Senate. The Senate would simply have said we

will accept the treaties provided that article so and so is amended to

read as so and so. And that, of course, would be up to the Panamanians

then to accept; or it would require some further negotiation, but this

is the normal course for treaties, as I understand it.

I haven't been in the Senate. I am just talking from what I have

read of their actions over there.

POSITION OF JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ON THE TREATIES

Mr. FOWLER. What is your reaction to the statement of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff that under the present two treaties we will be able to

defend the canal?

Mr. STRATTON. Well, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, particularly, this

year, have been put on notice that they either express the party line

or else. General Singlaub's case made that perfectly clear. I don't

think we can rely entirely on the Chief's formal statements. But just

to make certain we know what they are talking about, we are having

them up before our Armed Services Committee to discuss in detail

just what defense of the canal they would envisage, especially if our

troops are no longer in place down there.

But as I mentioned earlier in response to another question, the

thing that has disturbed me most in all of these interviews and comments, from General Brown and others, mostly General Brown, is

that the entire attention has been paid to defending the canal from

the Panamanians themselves. To me that is not the real problem.

Once the Panamanians are part of this operation they are certainly

not going to take over the canal and destroy it. What I am thinking

about is mostly are the Cubans or somebody else who could come in

from the outside. I just don't honestly think that the Joint Chiefs of

98-991-77-14
192

Staff have given that situation any thought or have developed any

contingency plans to deal with it.

Mr. FOWLER. You are not saying, Mr. Stratton, if I understand

the first part of your statement, that you as a Member of Congress

are douibting-are you saving that you are doubting the commitment

or the veracity of the statements of General Brown and the Joint

Chiefs of Staff as to their belief that not only can we defend the canal

but our national security is not in jeopardy?

Mr. STRATTON. Well, ever since Mr. NeNarmara was Secretary of

Defense, Members of Congress have found that it is very difficult

to get military uniformed officials to come up here and tell us what

they really think. Mr. McNamara insisted that everybody that

testified would have to testify on the party line. So Congress made a

point of insisting that whenever any military person came up, to

testify, if Congress asked him for his personal opinion he would be

required to give it. So when you get an official statement these days

you can't tell in this particular climate whether it represents the

officer's personal views or not.

But when you get the Chiefs before a congressional committee and

ask them their personal opinion, then they are honor bound to give

it to you. This is what we found out with respect to the Korean troop

withdrawal question.

General Brown said he was all in favor of the President's Korean

withdrawal plan. We got him before the Armed Services Committee

and asked him what the Joint Chiefs of Staff had actually recomimended. Well, he said, we recommended that by the year 1980 they

withdraw 6,000 troops from Korea and then that they wait and see

what happens after that.

We said, isn't that substantially different from the President's

proposal? And he said, yes. Mr. FOWLER. Mr. Stratton, if we can not rely, we being Members

of Congress, on the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their public declarations,

Washington being the way it is, and the Government working the

way it (oes, you know and I know that there are means of discerning

the true feelings of those top military officials, even if they do not

make public the accurate declarations.

I certainly hope that this committee can rely on you as a distinguished senior member of the Congress, and my colleagues from

Georgia, Congressman McDonald, both of whom are members of the

Armed Services Committee, that if you are not satisfied that they

are giving us and the American public their true feelings that I know

you will be able to determine that either after the meeting or that

evening and that if you decide that they are not telling the truth in

public you will be back before this committee to tell us.

Mr. STRrr-ON. That is absolutely the case. That is precisely why

we are trvinr to ret General Brown up before our committee, so we

can ask him his personal views and go into some much greater detail

on whether the Joint Chiefs of Staff have actually staffed out this

whole military problem of a possible invasion of Panama from Cuba,

for example.

Mr. FowLER. Thank you very much.

Mlr. Nix [presiding]. Congressman Burke.

Mr. BURKE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
193

(Con--m >tiom. I want to welcome you here ttOUd . I am

oiTv I waInlt here a little ezriiei to hear all our tes timjon b)ut it 1s

ood to have you before i

Nr. STRATTON. Thak you.

INTERPRETATION OF NEUTRALITY TREATY

Mr. BURKE. 0; e thin t hat ( 11()C7I'1n-' Me. and I lhink (o1 ('1,

i3 the -o-czialled neuiCtralitV pPOvsiz-on III the 1ropo-cJ Ted ti i t-elf

which a thoizi2 Panama to Icrran neiutral in the event we O:t(-!V(

become involved in a conflict with any foreimn nation.

Now. how would you intrrtCIiT the 70-( alc d uti ahty 1 0\Iin

wherein Panama would a to us then we are nc utral and th!urefor

would p any -hip that may want to come throuzl the Tai en

if they may be fighting s and even though we (U:elve are ccmmitted to )rotec Panama

Mr. >TRATTON. Well. I think you have razied a gCo d point. I had

debated whether to include one more reservation in mV rem arl k to

include in the treaty a prov-ison that in such an event our >hips would

have prioritv in going through the canal. I think what they -iv now

is that our shils wiL be passd through the canal expeditiou-Iy But

that might mean after 2.5 other hips have gone through.

It see ms to nie if we neledd to get through rapidly beeaue our own

interests were involved, we ought to have a priority right.

USE OF THE CANAL BY ENEMY wARsHIP5

If it waz a caze of not necesmzarilv wanting our own shipv to go

through, but rather let's say, of letting .oviet c h ps go through, then

I think the aniver would be what >omebodv has suggested already,

that in case of war we will just park our;zelves outside of eithr the

Atlantic or Pacific exits of the canal and 1 sink those - hip either before

they go in or after they have come out.

Mr. BURKE. I think that probably is a good idea. Would w nv ot

then at the -ame time Pirobablv put the canal in the poitior whre it

was unu-abl . becau-e if that w ( done isn't it more than o -b1o

that there would be 'abotaze at that point to the canal it-elfY

Mr. >TRATTON. We1, ~ain I ean't anticipate everything. ht it

would seem to me from the point of view of the Panamanians it 1i to

their advantage e. since they are going to be colectin g the toW. to

keep the canat operating. >o if the only thin; we are con erne about

is that they mihht be letting Ru>in or Cuban slips through the

canal when we didn't want them through, the -Imple-t course 1or 

would be simply to dispo-e of tho-e enemy hip' when they ntti

the canal. not inie he canal itself, but several miles away.

After all, with a ship heading to the canal. you have got a p)rfect

target situation. No evasion would be lOssible when you are headCd

into a canal. All you need to do is get your torpedo .n-ie correctL

you sink the ship.

Mr. BURKE. That sounds ea--v. What if the Panamanians themseive

gave sanctuary to them let's say that they were hips of a nation that

we ourselves are fighting and Panama is a neutral nation.

Mr. STRATTON. Well, if they were to provide sanctuary ,r something

like that, obviously we would have to take whatever action was needed
194

to protect our own interests. I think we would.

Mr. BURKE. Exactly.

Mr. STRATTON. We would certainly have an interest in not trying

to blow up the canal, if we could help it.

Mr. BURKE. Congressman Stratton, that is exactly the answer I

wanted. Wouldn't it be better then if we protect ourselves in advance

under a treaty wherein we ourselves have some protection rather than

waiting until some incident occurs where we would have to go to war,

perhaps even with Panama, the very same nation we are talking about negotiating with?

Mr. STRATTON. Well, that is true; but at least if we have the right

to defend the canal put in a treaty and in addition we have a base in

Panama from which to defend it, we are in a little bit better position.

Mr. BURKE. I don't mean to be argumentative because we are on

the same side, but the idea that you say the right to go in and defend

it, defend it against whom?

If Panama itself was a neutral nation what would we be defending

the Panama Canal against except our own enemies, in which event

Panama would object and we would find ourselves in a conflict with

Panama at the same time, which to me is a little ironic, since this

whole idea, as I understand it, is to make sure that the Panamanians

are happy and satisfied. What about our own stake in our future in

making them happy?

Mr. STRATTON. I tried to spell out what I felt was necessary here,

that we be in a position to prevent any outside country-and I would

think of Cuba as being the most likely-from trying to come in and

take over the canal from the Panamanians. They might not think the

Panamanians are being tough enough, for example, they could drop

paratroops, or they could mount an amphibious landing.

It seems to me it is better for us to be down there on the spot in a

position to prevent any outside power from taking the canal away from the Panamanians, than to have to go down there afterwards,

as Mr. Nix suggested, when we might have to vote on it first under the

War Powers Resolution. By the time we got the vote through the

Cubans would be in possession of the entire canal, locks and all

the rest.

Mr. BURKE. Well, I feel that the language itself should be made

stronger to cover some of the provisions you are talking about.

Mr. STRATTON. I certainly would agree with you. There are many

other weak points. These seem to me to be the most serious.

Mr. BURKE. Thank you very much.

Mr. Nix. Congressman Pease.

Mr. PEASE. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Nix. Congressman Cavanaugh.

Mr. CAVANAUGH. No questions.

Mr. Nix. Congressman Guyer.

Mr. GUYER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

OPPOSITION TO THE TREATIES

I apologize, Mr. Stratton. We have been in the Veterans Committee

and they needed a quorum over there. Senator Goldwater was

testifying in behalf of the WASPS. They have never been given any

benefit for their services in the war, and I did not get to hear your

questioning. But I just want to make a very flat statement that
195

everything I have heard and read and discerned about this whole

situation is itself not to our best interests to relinquish what is rightly

ours, particularly from a defense standpoint. I am sure you have

touched on this.

We would be in a horrendous situation to come in as a Johnny-comelately and, as I read the entire treaty, what I have read of it, the great

privilege we get is giving them some help if they get in trouble, and

that is all we really do have.

I understand, there are all together about 14 military bases over

there, if you count all the various stations, and strategically, particularly when everything else is crumbled now, the war in Vietnam

is over, yet Vietnam came into the U.N. without consulting the

American people.

This erosion after erosion has gone on until we have very few friends

left in the world or any strategic places in the world. I would feel from

the standpoint that has been brought out by much testimony we can't

even get oil from the Alaska pipeline to the other side of the United

States without the Panama Canal. And more than that, we do buy

now 90 percent of all that country's exports, in addition to the $2

billion investment.

And having come to their aid this many times, as was given here,

they have had 62 Presidents in 63 years. They are far from being

stable. I just received a letter yesterday where the claim was made

that the present leader of that country ordered the body of a Catholic

priest to be dropped from a plane into the ocean, back in 1971 during

one of the melees. I can't substantiate that, except to say it reached

my desk.

It seems to me this is an unwise move, and what I said before when

the proponents were here, the timing was outrageous, it occurred

when we were on recess, without a voice being lifted, or anybody

consulted. Just from the standpoint of bad judgment, the whole thing

seems to me out of place and out of text.

Mr. STRATTON. rfbank you very much. I agree.

Mr. Nix. Congressman Lagoimarsino.

USE OF GUANTANAMO BASE

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. I wanted to mention that in vour statement

you say if difficulty should arise in the future that we would have the

task of trying to take the canal back from bases in Florida, Texas,

or Guantanamo.

I wonder if the gentleman really believes with the present state of

affairs, the way we are moving to recognize ('astro, tile way we are

taking Vietnam into the United Nations, and so on, that we will st ill

have the Guantanamo Naval Base by the year 2000.

Mr. STRATTON. Well, I hope that we will still have it because it

seems to me that it is an important base. If by then we have recognized

Cuba, maybe the barbed wire fence that separates the base from

Cuba now will not be quite so high. But actually in spite of all our

troubles with M r. ('astro over the years, there has been a very intereting situation at Guantanamo Bay. I was down there, I remember, in

1963 and we discovered that our water in Guantanamo was coming

from Cuba and Castro had never made any effort to cut it off.

By the same token, several thousand Cuban people came over to

work on the base every day and went off every night and took back a

lot of American dollars.
196

So, I hope we will not be so foolish as to give Guantanamo up, although I understand the pressures the gentleman refers to. But

perhaps the administration is beginning to get the feeling of Congress and the American people on those issues and will move a bit more

slowly.

There was a great deal of pressure several weeks ago, you will

remember, when some of the members of this committee sat in on a

discussion about normalizing relations with Communist China and

abandoning our friends on Taiwan. And then when Secretary Vance

went over to China we read in the papers that the administration

felt that too much was being (lone already in terms of withdrawing

troops in Korea, turning over the Panama Canal, and recognizing

Cuba, and so forth, that maybe they would back away from the

proposal to normalize relations with China.

as, hope maybe we will back away from giving away "Gitmo"

as well.

ROLE OF THE HOUSE IN APPROVING THE TREATIES

Mr. GUYER. One question. In view of the fact the Constitution

does have a provision that alludes to the setting of territory as it

affects congressional authority, an( in view of the fact there is about

$350 million in this package which has to be implemented, would you

say that it is proper that Congress on this side of the House does

actually have a voice in approval of this whole treaty?

Mr. STRATTON. Absolutely; I think we should have, and I believe

we do. That question of whether we can even give away those bases

without the approval of the House is still a problematical question,

but I would think we certainly do have that authority. The only

problem that would bother me under the circumstances is whether we

could get a majority in the House. At this point I think we probably

Mr. GUYER. Thank you.

I vield back the balance of my time.

WATER SUPPLY FOR GUANTANAMO

Mr. BURKE. I would just like to make a correction, Sam, in a

statement you made, because I was there in 1967 or 1968, and Castro

did c(1t off the water. We had to get into a crash program and we now

make the water from the ocean water with a salinity plant we now

have there. So we use our own water now. We are not depending on

Castro.

Mr. STRTOx. I know we were getting ready to make our own

water if we had to, but I had forgotten he had finally cut it off.

Mr. GUviR. In view of the fact Mr. Castro has never given back

$2 billion worth of property he seized, I don't think his nature is

giving thing-s back.

Mr. Nix. Congressman Gilman.

U.S. DEFENSE OF THE CANAL

Mr. GLAuN. Thank you, and I want to commend the gentleman

from New York for taking the time and devoting so much attention

to this important issue. I am pleased that you raised the defense
197

concerns, that you have and that Iiinv of us5 oil thIn committee have.

The aiinistratioii has been, ol course, ad1vocatinug the eventual withdrawtal of troops stating that the policvimakers in defense have indicated that there is no need to have troops actually on the soil in

Panama. It would seem to me it would cause a great deal of difficulty

in bringing the troops in when there is a crisis as compared to having

them there on hand when needed.

Have you had any discussion with some of the strategists with

regard to that issue about whether there i- any advantage of act uallv

being there on the soil and being on haind?

Ir. STRATTON. No; I haven't had any discussions on that matter

so far, but I indicated earlier in response to a question fron Mr.

Fowlr-I don't think vou had come into the room-that the Armed1

Services Committee ha invited General Brown to testify 1)efore US,

in early October on this whole subject of what the Joint Chiefs of

Staff plan to do with respect to defense of the Panama Canal, especivlly after the year 2000.

It seems to me, as I indicated in my statement, the real problem

would be one of air and antiaircraft defense, basing planes close enough

to the canal so that you can prevent an invasion or a parachute drop.

Obviously von can't do that from Florida or even from Guantanamo.

You have to be right there on the spot.

I we can deter an attack that is infinitely better than having to go

back in mnl try to take the Panama Canal away from some aggrRssor

that has taken it over.

USE OF THE CANAL BY THE U.S. NAVY

r'. GOIAN. Of course, there has been a lot of loose language aIbout

how the canal is no longer that important to our Navy and that many

of our ships cant traverse the canal. When our subcommittee went

to the canal recently we found there were only 1:3 naval ships in our

whole fleet that could not go across the canal because of their size or

width. I am certain that yoi have probably reviewed that aspect with

some of the naval people.

I note that four prior naval Chiefs of Staff have indicated their

concern about giving up our military position in the canal. Do you

have some comment to make about that?

Mr. STRATTON. I would agree completely. I think voi can le:itimatelv argue as to whether the canal is as valuable now a- it was,

let us say, :30 or 40 years ago. But it is still very valuable and, as you

point out, only a very small portion of our own fleet can't go through

the canal. We have got a lot of other ships that can go through, and

we need to have them go through.

In addition to that, we have got oil coming down from the Alaskan

Slope. If we are going to get it over on the east coat so that we can

have some of that benefit, it is going to have to go through the canal.

So the canal is still a vital interest of ours, and I think our major

(conlern should be to make sure nobody is able to deny that canal to

us and to interrupt our use of the canal.

Mr. GIUMAN. I thank the gentleman for his comments and for his

joining us this morning on this important i-sue.
198

DEFENSE OF THE CANAL

Mr. STRATTON. I might also say, if I could add one other pointyou talked about defense. The thing that has bothered me the most

is to read in some of these Time and Newsweek articles and elsewhere

that so many people say the canal is indefensible; you can't defend

the canal! As I have said before, these comments seem mostly to be

addressed to the idea of trying to defend the canal against the Panamanians. But certainly the canal is defensible against attack from the

outside, provided we have the forces in place there to dlo it.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Nix. Thank you, Mr. Stratton.

Mr. STRATTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, you have

been very generous with your time.

Mr. Nix. Thank you very much.

The next witnesses are our colleagues, the Honorable Larry McDonald of Georgia and the Honorable Philip M. Crane of Illinois.

Congressman Crane is also appearing today in his capacity as chairman of the American Conservative Union.

Gentlemen, welcome to the committee. May I suggest that you both

present your statements and then we will have questions. If this

procedure is agreeable, we will begin with Congressman McDonald's

statement.

STATEMENT OF HON. LARRY P. McDONALD, A REPRESENTATIVE

IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF GEORGIA

Mr. McDONALD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee.

I appreciate this opportunity of coming before the committee and

expressing unbridled opposition to the proposed Panama Canal Treaty, and I will submit for the record, as the chairman has already suggested, a complete statement and simply summarize at this time some

of the major points that are brought out in the full statement.

The first point I think that we need to consider as Members of the

House of Representatives deals with the question of our involvement

with the Panama Canal Treaty. Article 4, section 3, clause 2, makes

it very clear to all Members of the Congress and to the American

people that it is the full Congress that should have deliberations and

take action with regard to ceding of any territory, and I would hope

that the House of Representatives would exercise its full authority

with hearings going into this matter in depth, and also to fulfill its

special responsibility to the American people, being that body that

is closest to the American people, in informing the American people

as to the details, the aspects of the treaty, and also the long-term

consequences.

I think a major point that has not been adequately pursued by the

other body has been the question of conflict of interest. When today 40

percent of the Panamanian budget is going to service a national debt,

with a sirnificant portion of that coming due to New York City banks,

you have Mr. Sol Linowitz, one of the negotiators, has been associated

with one of those banks, with heavy loans to the Republic of Panama,

I think that the whole question of conflict of interest is one that the

Louse should review in depth.
199

There has been much said regarding the strategic importance of the

canal. The question of the canal is not as important today as it has

been in the past, and yet last year 13,000 ships transited the canal.

That is twice the number that passed through the canal in 1946.

Twenty-four percent of the shipping in the canal begins in ports,

and the canal to me seems to be every bit as strategic today as perhaps

at any time in the past. And since we do not have fully a two-ocean

Navy, I know that back just prior to the McNamara period-there

were ques tions we needed a three-ocean Navy. But that option wasn't

ptdby the Congress, and today we actually do not have a twoocean Navy. And if we are going to be able to transfer ships of war

in time of need, certainly the canal is going to play an extremely

important part.

The defense of the canal has been, I think, covered very well

regarding the major deficiencies in the treaty by my colleague Congressman Stratton of New York, but the issue of violence or terrorism

if the treaty were rejected, in my opinion, the American people and

our best interests will face greater problems, violence, terrorism,

potentially war, if the treaty is ratified, and I think that beyond that

and dealing with the merits of the treaty, it is a bad policy to succumb

to blackmail as national policy.

Members of the State Department have suggested that if we do not

deal with Mr. Torrijos, we may be dealing with our last best chance

at a rational leader in Panama, and yet at the same time we realize

that once again this is sort of a blackmail situation, if you don't deal

with this man he may not be Abraham Lincoln, he might be better

than what is coming down the line.

Panama has been a country that has been very unstable in the past

with rapid changes of government. Mr. Torrijos himself came to power

illegally, has disbanded the Panamanian Legislature and shredded the

Panamanian Constitution. If he has no regard for his own documents

of government, regarding his own country, why are we so foolish to

think he is going to pay great heed to any treaty that he signs, and

indeed mv feeling is, in view of his past, performance, that he might

view it as Lenin did treaties; namely, the treaties are like pie crusts,

made to be broken.

The American people are overwhelmingly against this treaty, Mr.

Chairman and members of the committee, and as that body of the

Congress that is closest to the American people, I would hope that

the House of Representatives would very clearly come out and be

overwhelmingly against the treaty.

We face the very clear matter of history. On page 5 of my statement

I quoted from the debate with then President Ford. Former Governor

Carter in the debate stated, "I would never give up complete control

or practical control of the Panama Canal Zone." Once again, "But I

would not relinquish practical control of the Panama Canal Zone any

time in the foreseeable future."

And we are finding out that perhaps the foreseeable future might last

less now than 12 months, just as the term "in perpetuity" seems to

last perhaps 74 years.

We are being told that in this treaty that we are being guaranteed

certain rights and so forth for a lengthy period of time, but looking

on the past histories these lengths of time have not been very clear.

In the matter of sovereignty I think it is quite clear that the United
200

States does have sovereignty in the Canal Zone, but also if the United

States ceases to exercise interest in the zone or in the canal, then it

reverts; the reversionary interest then goes, only then, to the Republic

of Panama; if not Panama, perhaps to Colombia; if not Colombia, perhaps to Spain. There has been much said by I think members of

the State Department that the matter of sovereignty is not involved, that we do not have sovereignty, but the past history is very clear

that we do.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity of appearing before

the committee and expressing these views which I think overwhelmingly represent the views of the American people.

[Mr. McDonald's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. LARRY P. McDONALD, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF GEORGIA

Mr. Chaiman, I appreciate the opportunity to appear here today and testify

against the proposed Panama Canal Treaty recently signed by President Carter.

While the treaty will primarily be dealt with by the Senate, the House can and

should have a say in this matter. If the treaty is approved by the Senate, and

I hope it is not, the cession of the land and property to Panama has to be approved

by the Congress and the term Congress means both bodies. And here, of course,

I refer to the United States Constitution, Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2 which

states that "The Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful

rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the

United States." And, while this will be the central point of my testimony, I

will also develop other specific reasons why this treaty is not in the best interests

of the United States or the Free World. As Members of the House are closer to

the people than the Senate, it is our special responsibility to inform the people on

these matters and reflect their feelings.

First of all, there are many unanswered questions as to the motives on the

timing of this treaty. It appears to coincide with a very bad point in the Panamanian economy wherein a disproportionate amount of the Panamanian budget

(40%) is being used up in debt service. And interestingly enough, some of the

major loans coming due are to New York City banks. So, my strong feeling is

that the Carter Administration needs to explain to the American people the role

of these banks in the negotiations and whether the very generous financial terms

of the treaty are designed to assure these New York City banks of repayment of

their loans. As is well known, our negotiater, Mr. Sol Linowitz, had associations

with one of these banks. With Mr. Linowitz operating under a six-month deadline

(and avoiding Senate confirmation hearings), how many concessions were made

to Panama due to this factor? I think the Congress needs an answer to this

question.

Now the American people are being told that the canal is no longer strategic.

This is not so. All of our Navy ships can go through the canal except the large

carriers, as the Members here well know. With our present smaller fleet, it is

even more vital that our ships have unrestricted access to the canal, as it could

become necessary to shift our strength on short notice. In addition, Alaskan oil

is now being transported through the canal and this is terribly important to the

east coast population. This oil is being offloaded at the western end of the canal

onto barges and pushed through the canal and loaded onto tankers at the eastern

end. Last year about 13,000 ships transited the canal. Alaskan oil will add 700

more transits a year by 1982, it is felt. This is almost twice the number that usetd

the canal in 1946. The canal can handle 20,000-22,000 transits a year and the

volume is building. The canal can handle 96%7 of the world's shipping. 42( of

all cargo presently going through the canal originates in the United States. 20%

of our exports pass through the canal; so much for the canal not being strategic.

Certainly one of the most important factors to consider in the treaty is the

defense of the canal. The defense of the canal is simply not provided for after

the year 2000. If the United States were to re-enter the canal after the year 2000,

we would be the "Gringo invaders" such as the French and British were at the

Suez in 1956. The so-called "neutrality protocol" to the treaty is practically

worthless in the real world of international law. Dr. Bethancourt, the Panamanian

negotiator, denies that the "neutrality protocol" gives the United States any

particular right except to use the canal, the same as any other nation. We are
201

rut the guarantor Panamanian neutral .ccorine t Betha L

nt n thn pr aV fr the Panaman n a an a a r(if'!,

toe present ine- of h a an drt, te Epartn-r. f

suppose a Panarmnin n i T

C nationss of nthwh C r

How long woi I eiin taaSp> ai~r-P namnn C G rr~n

ri-i >4 tu invite FiBiCasr nn:t-: t n-r ~ olIw a ih

Ca tro? No e v71 ar th- in i v _U c cnk in. Punat Acana Govennpa- t p : fa n se : t ne v fot an w n vont gentleme he>un i

th Trhuie hasre nxth tra , anc tis :ie oaproved, i approtvea. Iut, t I to m e-al va mth i- u otawith itl t. thrats an- mIne tfl ie

wi- e to erwhe mng. Winth th-ei pr-rs > n hd ~c- > the uasdiy insr:i in th

ifhutnj ai Penam~aI t fol th. traty Imz f tUntIngtt vontdes hy:.h

However, thi ha-re itheinal wethr the rntsaz pafsth rai to houl iw W

rechan a nhoul dweFen: there Cana. it i- thevPou-sthat witv t Cna Ke~ng U.S livrge

an pratoer we an Ihld n:t preen ia t sa.otage eand iniets or owi:: the

Canahi Zonetni ut In t;rrio tach is B-n h. ense. Cethild enake nprprat

cani lehiftwhile tri m> not r e an 'I raha -e~m rLincn it wuilieyb

replaced byelmnu. wirth thi- hav> dly Ive th' Confi> nLV inth -a-futuinA . Panama it wo d 5' h execive in5 ea ant w oc

THoerri hns t w ith thagnert c the tra r hf nAn c a n a n : shf u n ff ni h~- C a n l. it h > b i ' t wth t h e C aafiistavatleon weny truat n teey ir mareK raia t"ean inciheett~- all Tcr

CaaZoe utiT~riozt9e hi th then weh 14i- mit ~

measure auinz him, k c nh v Pasnamita cin e inathelo. Fredn.Hue an

The Sta zatnt wha the etn in.,r11ent i n int evert no he

cIan that whil T, rio a~~ n ezn A, aaaLn n he xci

relae Iv zme~n- r .-. Th> hE v~v~ > f .L in zh, f

Pangr .- : paaa Arh rv hac r9 ci e e. :iv in : Art am: Pth oer raing n areem w the an Chile. Herue we hc w thee ftun si tuari' Patf whLr

weewilln to n-:etvw ifen the x:i' grat iz at. the Pnna C1a e

Nowis dlett us -nd yea the Coe~ngrt enaicir lin Patnaa t eepx Chi rro ' 

purihang orspaie tir whic te Sfthei menitment aicr in ihe Un-t- p tts

alie'r rting oner aI :n tha y'hiu aeawa, whae termite Torri at uc

wore armilg, r fo his ue. he ir or rie I ' P h?

The-: armo red cal' hav' onlv :wo po-i' Bl 1.r c-iate '------- ine.aganL hi n

pe 4 ple or two, against American - :d>-: in the Can>l Z ne T : rijo- hi:sii

B ong-time adimirer of Ca'.tro and, : doubtl s thi- a lmiration ha,' b'en a .itt ule

of late out deference to treaty ne; i w:. -ai t hax hf e- _atin'. n

3 M1arxist organization n caleI Y ung Uaga in hi- yth y at lat 

and from his pr nouncement, he iI radica The am. - rc al-'. hzt

Torrijos' parnt- were mc er- C a Cnmuni'. ce in the 'ame provin>-. The

i> a''. the re{Cnt N viet mi>-i-n Po Pan ma negotiating cer tarn a5 ' e-m-nt' -t. -y

nothing of the out-ztanding IIani ;y the oviet Narodny Bank 'y.ve - P- am

A-z ReprentativRs of the pnl re the bcdy c o--t t th------------

b ef r'. What ye the per ple of the Uniuted Statc- want? The ' wan r k'e Uh

canal. I have here a small sampling cf over 50,00 signe pw-ti nI

again-zt the treaty. lIy own mail rut' out 95 percen aga'n-' - -

know that even the White Hou-c mail iz against the treaty. I know of no

of Congrez whose mail favor- the tr-aty. S , I think it >a but im. h

Pre-zident and the State Department, for a change. take into account th

ef the American people. For one, I feel the American people a'e grmwing w va

of a foreign policy that has 1een con U*ted without inter:'ptin -in WV W

I giving away other people's land to radical and Communit an now th

policvmakers have run out of other people' 1 and to give away thev want

giving away U.S. tPrritory. Whatever happened, cne night a-tP

candidate Carter, who tated in a debate with r. Fri Ia't Octob

"I would never give up e n: or racial ctntrl r th Prnam2

Canal Zone * 

And again:
202

"* * * But I would not relinquish practical control of the Panama Canal Zone

any time in the foreseeable future."

evidently, the foreseeable future lasts about a year with President Carter.

Now back to the question of U.S. territory and sovereignty in the Panama

Canal. In my strong view, our sovereignty is unquestioned and in this connection,

I cite the following:

I. Claims to Sovereignty

Three U.S.-Panananian treaties provide the basis for U.S. claims to sovereignty in the Canal Zone.

hAY-B-UNAU-VARILLA CONvENTION, 1903

ARTICLE II

"The Republic of Panama grants to the United States in perpetuity the use,

occupation and control of a zone of land and land under water for the construetion, maintenance, operation, sanitation and protection of said Canal of the width

of ten miles extending to the distance of five miles on each side of the center line

of the route of the Canal to be constructed . .

ARTICLE III

"The Republic of Panama grants to the United States all the rights, power and

authority within the zone mentioned and described in Article II of this agreement

and within the limits of all auxiliary lands and waters mentioned and described

in said Article II which the United States would possess and exercise if it were the

sovereign of the territory within which said lands and waters are located to the

entire exclusion of the exercise by the Republic of Panama of any such sovereign

rights, power or authority." [U.S. TS 431; 33 Stat. 2234-2235; II Malloy, Treaties, etc. (1910) 13221

GENERAL TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP OF COOPERATION, 1903

ARTICLE I

"In view of the official and formal opening of the P.nama Canal on July 12, 1920, the United States of America and the Republic of Panama declare that the

provisions of the Convention of November 18, 1903, contemplate the use, occupation and control by the United States of America of the Canal Zone and of the

additional lands and waters under the jurisdiction of the United States of America

for the purposes of the efficient maintenance, operation, sanitation and protection

of the Canal and of its auxiliary works."

ARTICLE XI

"The provisions of this Treaty shall not affect the rights and obligations of

either of the two High Contracting Parties under the treaties now in force between the two countries, nor be considered as a limitation, definition, restriction or

restrictive interpretation of such rights and obligations, but without prejudice to

the full force and effect of any provisions of this Treaty which constitute addition

to, modification or abrogation of, or substitution for the provisions of treaties."

U.S. TS 945; 53 Stat. 1807, 1808, 1825."

The effect of the latter article was to leave the juridical status of the Canal

Zone as defined in Article III of the 1903 convention unaltered.'

TREATY OF MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING AND COOPERATION, 1955

The Preamble to this treaty states that both parties recognize that: ".

neither the provisions of the Convention signed November 18, 1903, nor the

(eneral Treaty signed March 2, 1930, nor the present Treaty, may be modified

except by mutual consent, .[. ." 6 U.S. T.S. 2273; TIAS 3297]

II. Sovereignty

On pages 2 and 3 of his letter, Mr. Bell discusses the question of whether or

not the territory comprising the Canal Zone was transferred from Panamanian

to U.S. sovereignty.

111 Iackworth. Digest of International Law 809 (1941). 3 Whiteman, Digest of International Law 1130 (1964).
203

The United States government has never denied that Panama has retained

titular sovereignty. The important issue to be faced is, what is the nature of a

"titular sovereignty?" Or, can "titular sovereignty" be equated with territorial

sovereignty?

On page 2 of the letter, Mr. Bell utilizes part of an oft-quoted statement

made by William H. Taft, then Secretary of War in President Theodore Roosevelt's

cabinet. The portion of the statement Mr. Bell quotes is as follows:

"* * * The truth is that while we have all the attributes of sovereignty

necessary in the construction, maintenance, and protection of the canal, the very

form in which these attributes are conferred in the treaty [of 1903] seems to preserve the titular sovereignty over the Canal Zone in the Republic of Panama * * *."

The conclusion of that statement, which Mr. Bell omits, is also of interest.

"'* * * and as we have conceded to us complete judicial and police power

an(l control over the Zone and of the two ports at the end of the canal, I can see

no reason for creating a resentment on the part of the people of the Isthmus by

quarreling over that which is dear to them but which to us is of no real moment

whatever."

Has the element of titular sovereignty even been construed to limit the powers

exercised by the United States in the Zone? The following excerpts from Padelford's The Panama Canal in Peace and War 2 describe the response of the United

States to such claims.

"All contentions of this nature have been forthrightly refuted by the United

States, to the extent that they deny, or appear to do so, the right freely to exercise

sovereign powers within the zone. Secretary Hay, in the note to Senor de Obaldia

already quoted above, insisted that the United States 'cannot concede the question

to be open for discussion or the Republic of Panama to possess the right to chillenge such exercise of authority,' and he laid much weight upon the words of

Article III: 'to the entire exclusion of the exercise by the Republic of Panama of

any such sovereign rights.' [Secretary Hughes reiterated this in 1923: "The grant

to the United States of all the rights, power and authority which it would possess if

it were sovereign of the territory described, and to the entire exclusion of the exercise by Panama of any such sovereign authority, is conclusive upon the question

you raise. The position of this Government upon this point was clearly and definitely set forth in the note of Mr. Hay to Mr. de Obaldia of October 24, 1904."

For. Re!., 1923, Vol. II, pp. 638, 653 et seq. In conversation Secretary Hughes said:

"This Government would never recede from the position which it had taken in the

note of Secretary Hay in 1904. This Government could not and would not enter

into any discussion affecting its full right to deal with the Canal Zone under Article

III of the Treaty of 1903 as if it were the sovereign of the Canal Zone and to

the exclusion of any sovereign rights or authority on the part of Panama. . .

This must be regarded as ending the discussion of that matter." Ibid., p. 684.

"[Cf. the citation of J. N. Gris v. The New Panama Canal Co., Supreme Court

of Panama, in Secretary Hughes' note of Oct. 15, 1923, quoted above, in which

that Court said: "The Republic of Panama agreed that the United States should

possess and exercise, to the entire exclusion of the Republic, those rights, powers

and authority, that is to say, the rights, power and authority that a sovereign

alone can have . . ." Ibid., p. 656.

["In a note dated Oct. 13, 1923, the Secretary refused to agree to arbitrate

"any question attacking the exercise of sovereign rights of the United States

explicitly granted under Article III of the Treaty of 1903 with Panama." Ibid.,

1). 710.] At length in 1923, the Panamanian Minister, in a conversation with

Secretary Hughe;, 'said that the position taken by the Secretary might be sound

from a technical, legal standpoint.' [Ibid., p. 685.]

* * * * * * 

"Secretary of State Hay enunciated the stand of the United States, which has

been adhered to since: 'The position of the United States is that the words 'for

the construction, maintenance, operation, sanitation and protection of the said

canal' were not intended as a limitation on the grant but are a declaration of

the inducement prompting the Republic of Panama to make the grant.' Asserting that the great object of the United States was to construct and operate the

Canal, he added that the right to exercise sovereignty, conferred by Article III, left the United States exclusive right to determine what things should be done

in the zone ancillary to the main objective. [For. Rel., 1904, pp. 613-630. This

2 Cited in Whiteman at 1142-44.
204

position was strongly sustained by Secretary Hughes in 1923. Ibid., 1923, Vol.

Ii, pp. 652-653.1 The successful operation, sanitation, and protection of an

enterprise of the magnitude of the Panama Canal, located as it is far from the

United States, must entail the provision of many subsidiary services in the

Canal Zone. Of the necessity of providing any such services or activities within

the Canal Zone the authorities of the United States must be the judges."

What then is the net legal effort of the concept of titular sovereignty? Mr.

Bell's broad description of U.S. rights ("* * * the most complete transfer of

jurisdiction over a territory without its being a cession in the technical international law sense * * *"-pg. 3 of letter, quoting Vali) appears to be correct.

In fact, Panama possesses no sovereign powers in the Canal Zone until the U.S.

ceases to maintain and operate the canal. (See Treaties of 1903 Art. II and 1906

Art. i.)

Now the Department of State has made much over the two words, "titular

sovereignty." Is "titular sovereignty" territorial sovereignty? No, I think not.

What is meant is that if the United States ever ceases to exercise its rights over

the Canal Zone, Panama has a reversionary interest in the land, and I suppose

should Panama evidence no interest in such a case, then Colombia would have

such an interest and should Colombia evidence no interest, then Spain would

have a reversionary interest etc. Even the State Department has spoken of this

as a reversionary interest. Here I have reference to page 421 of the Panama Canal

Hearings of the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries entitled:

"Panama Canal Finances" held April 6, 7, and 9, 1976. At that time, Mr. Carl

F. Salans, Deputy Legal Advisor to the Department of State, in discussing sovereignty said:

"That leaves something for Panama and that is something that is a reversionary

interest in normal property terms."

Therefore, since we do indeed appear to be sovereign, then Article IV, Section

3, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution applies to the present proposed

treaty. Clearly, then, this treaty has to come before this body for approval. Certainly, if the House is not permitted to consider the treaty, it should provide no

funds and in no way facilitate the implementation of this proposed treaty. Thank

you.

Mr. Nix. Thank you, Mr. McDonald.

PUBLIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE TREATIES

You stated a moment ago the American people were overwhelmingly opposed to this treaty. I put this question to you.

What and where are they to be found, the figures upon which you

base that conclusion?

Mr. McDONALD. Well, certainly in my own mail I have received

over 50,000 responses to an opinion poll on the matter of the canal.

My own mail is running about 97, 98 percent against the canal. I know

of no Member of Congress that has polled his district in a newsletter poll-I know of no Member of Congress that has received

answers coming back where over 50 percent favor relinquishing U.S.

control, sovereignty and so forth over the canal and Canal Zone.

In the polls, Harris polls, and so forth, have consistently shown

the American people have been against giving up U.S. control of the

Panama Canal. I know of no poll by Members of Congress that have

stated otherwise and certainly my mail shows this. I think the White

House has admitted that the White House mail shows this. SenatoI

Talmadge in my State of Georgia has stated in his travels during the

August recess that only one person in the entire State expressed agreement with turning over the canal to the Panamanians, the Canal

Zone to the Panamanians, and yet he was besieged by thousands of

individuals that have stated don't give up the Panama Canal.

I know that the Members of the Senate in public statements returning back from the August recess period in their home areas, even
205

those who have been in favor of the canal treaty, have made very

clear that back home there is massive opposition to the treaty.

M\r. Nix. Because there are no polls available except your own,

is it logical to assume that the American people are inclined to feel

that this treaty should not be entered into?

MNr. McDONALD. \Ir. Chairman, as i stated, going far beyond

my own. I know of no Member of Congress who has sent out a newsletter questionnaire and has reported back to the Congress or to any

of his colleagues or her colleagues that the questionnaire showed 51

percent were in favor of the treaty. I know of no M\ember and yet I

know innumerable M\embers of Congress all have stated overwhelming

opposition to the treaty.

We do have national polls available. We also have other 'Members

of the other body of the Congress, the Senate, who made it very clear

in their public statements that the sentiment in their own home town

areas is overwhelmingly against the treaty. So, fortunately, we are

not dealing with the opinion of just one district, 435, but instead I

think we are dealing with a fact of life, and the administration knows

this very clearly, that they have got quite a selling job if they are

going to sell this one.

M r. Nix. Before we go into interrogation further of Mr. _McDonald,

I would like M\r. Crane to give his statement.

STATEMENT OF HON. PHILIP M. CRANE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

\fr. CRANE. Thank you, 'Mr. Chairman.

I would like to request, if I may, that the full text of my remarks

this morning be inserted in the record and then I will attempt to

summarize for the sake of time.

I appreciate the opportunity to appear before the committee. I am

here in two capacities. One as a colleague in the House of Representatives and the other as chairman of the American Conservative Union,

a position that I was elected to in February of this year.

The American Conservative Union is probably the largest conservative organization in the United States with over 100.000 members

in the national body and 40 State affiliates. Through that organization we created a special task force on Panama back in the early spring

of this year which is chaired by the (listinguished Senator from South

Carolina, Strom Thurmond. And speaking both as a chairman of that

organization and member of Congress, and I might add as a historian

who had a minor in Latin American history and taught Latin American

history for several years before coiingr to Congress, I would like to

suggest that one of the paramount concerns in this whole debate

is the role of the Panama Canal and the Canal Zone as a symbol.

The action that we are contemplating here is one involving the will

of the United States to stand up for that which belongs to the United

States.

I think a retreat in this instance can have far-reaching implications,

and it would also appear to coincide with what many have already

interpreted as an American retreat from world affairs, as in the case

of Vietnam, or even to sugigest that we are abaindoning our friends in

South Korea and Taiwan. Some will rationalize this on the grounds

that they are not American territory and should not be our concern.
206

But with the Canal Zone, Mr. Chairman, we are dealingg with a

territory that clearly and indisputably belongs to the United States

of America. 1 say that based upon the history of the transfer of that

territory to the U.S. Government in the initial treaty in 1903, but

subsequently ratified by other treaties with elected governments in

Panama.

Further, there was a special court challenge in 1907 as to the validity

of investing American taxpayers' money for internal improvements

in other people's territory and the Supreme Court in Wilson v. Shau?

at that time clearly upheld the fact this was a complete conveyance

of property and un(lerstood as such by the Panamanian Government.

Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have upheld that interpretation.

In U.S. v. Husband R. Roach in 1972, for example, the Court held that

the canal zone was unincorporated territory of the United States; and

as such it comes under the plenary authority of Congress.

That leads me to another point, one touched upon by other witnesses

this morning, and that is the terms under which American territory

can be alienated. Based upon Supreme Court interpretations plus

precedent because we have had minor territorial alterations with

Panama in the past and the House has participated in those alterations-the House must participate in any proposed alienation of the

zone or canal.

The other point I would like to make deals with reassurances by

the administration that the neutrality of the canal will be preserved, that the canal will be kept open, that the United States in time of

war when our vital interests were threatened would somehow receive

some kind of preferential treatment in passage of our vessels through

the canal, an(], finally, that the United States will continue to reserve

a rihht to intervene to guarantee the neutrality of the canal.

The reason I raise these points is because Dr. Romulo Escobar

Bethancourt, who was head of the Panamanian negotiating team,

specifically denied every one of these points. He has done so repeatedly

in public statements in Panama that have appeared in the Panamaian press, and I would refer members of the committee specifically to

his statements on August 19 of this year before the Panamanian

National Assembly which were published on August 20 in the Panamaman newspapers.

The only reason I put some stress on this is it seems to me when

you compare Dr. Escobar's statement as to what he feels is in that

treaty and what the treaty itself states, that the treaty is silent in

areas of controversy or the language is sufficiently vague as to be subject to widely varying interpretation and with that, of course, dispute.

What this means, in my judgment, is that with the ratification of

this treaty and the cession of sovereignty to Panama in that entire

area, that when you get into definitions of such words as neutrality,

which is not defined in the treaty, that you could have a disagreement

on how it will be resolved, and Panama will prevail. One can't assume

only that Dr. Escobar is stating what he understands to be the meaning

of this treaty and, if his understanding prevails, then indeed there is

no right on the part of the U.S. Government to intervene. This disagreement could open a Pandora's box in terms of what course of

action would then be available to us. If we think we have image

problems now in the world, I can assure you they pale into insignificance with the problems we are going to encounter when we unilat-
20 7

erally decide to send the U.S. Marines in to enforce otir interp )retation

in the event of a dispute. That is going to be a vastly more serious

matter than anything that we have encountered to (late.

The other point I would like to make deals with the point that was

made by my distinguished colleague front Georgia. If the unstable

dictator in Panama would treat so cavalierly the miost precious doc1-

ment of the Panamanian people, their own Constitution, why is he

going to view a treaty with the United States any more seriously?

The United Nations has already upheld the "right" of expiropriation, and it seems to me that the canal becomes in effect nothing more

than a multinational corporation after the treaty is ratified.

That being the case, it may very well be that the dictator in Panama,

or a succeeding dictator, might view the treaty as a scrap of paper and

insist he will nationalize the canal. Based upon the American experience with Cuba, when Castro did exactly the same thinr I don't

think we have the assurances that the United States will act with the

appropriate response to guarantee the neutrality and continued operation of the canal in the best interests of all nations of the world.

One argument advanced by proponents of the treaties suggests that

somehow we will improve our image with our Latin Americanii neighbors if we give the canal to Panama. If you look at past experience,

you will find that at the time of the Bay of Pigs fiasco the United

State's lack of will to carry that intervention on to a successful conclusion cost us a great loss of prestige in the eyes of our Latin

American neighbors.

On the other hand, when President Kennedy acted firmly as in

the instance of the Cuban missile crisis, as well as when President

Johnson did so at the time of the Dominican problems, our poplarity

according to polls soared in the eyes of our Latin American neighbors.

In short, what I am suggesting is the Latin Americans don't look

with respect upon demonstrations of weakness but rather that strength

and firmness are what command the respect of the Latin Americans.

And I think further one must realize that it has been a longstanding

tradition in Latin American politics to rail against the colossus of the

North, and unless one has a chance to talk to many Latin American

politicians personally, it is hard to distinguish between public declarations that are for political consumption at home and what are their

true feelings.

Yet, another issue deals with the matter of defense of the canal.

One of the things I have been puzzled about listening to this debate

is the argument that the canal is not defensible, but somehow if we

give it to Panama it becomes defensible. That logic eludes me totally.

We have been warned about the possibility of sabotage of the Canal.

I think anyone will concede that there is always the p ossibility of

sabotage. But as our distinguished colleague from New York observed,

the Panamanians have the least interest in sabotaging the canal.

Furthermore, just because it is potentially subject to sabotage is Do

reason for giving it to the Panamanians much less paying them $70

million a year on top of that.

In my testimony I observed that the metro subway here in Washington is equally indefensible, but we would not consider subsidizing

the Hanafi Muslims to take it over for that reason. In short, I think

that is an irrelevant argument in the whole debate.

98--99t-77-13
208

One final point, Mr. Chairman; we are contemplating construction

right now of smaller aircraft carriers, and of the 480 combat vessels

in the U.S. Navy only 13 aircraft carriers cannot transit the canal at

the present time, smaller aircraft carriers will be able to transit the

canal.

Mr. Chairman, on behalf of myself and the American Conservativo

Union, I again would like to express my appreciation for having had

the opportunity to testify today, I would urge that this committee

take a point position on one aspect that I touched upon in my testimony, and that is guaranteeing that the House exercise its prerogatives in any action undertaken to alienate the canal.

[Mr. Crane's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. PHILIP M. CRANE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

Mr. CHAIRMAN: I appreciate the indulgence of the committee in permitting me

to testify this morning on the proposed Panama Canal treaty. Actually, I am

wearing two hats today as I wish not only to express a personal view but to present the position of the American Conservative Union, of which I am chairman.

The American Conservative Union, which has 100,000 members and 40 state

affiliates, is the nation's largest conservative organization. As such it has strongly

opposed any proposed giveaway of the Panama Canal, going so far as to establish

a "Task Force to Save the Panama Canal" headed by the distinguished senior

Senator from South Carolina, Strom Thurmond. It is that task force which has

placed the full page ads in a number of newspapers around the country, bringing

the canal issue into its proper focus.

Speaking as both a representative of ACU and as an historian with a long term

interest in Latin American affairs, let me stress that it is not just a physical

facility that is at stake here with a book value of over $560 million, a replacement

value that has been estimated at $3.5 billion, and a cost over the years that has

totalled roughly $7 billion. What is even more important is the Panama Canal

as a symbol-a symbol of America's strength as a free nation and its willpower

to act in behalf of its better interests-and those of the free world. If we, as a

nation, not only give away a $7 billion investment but pay almost $2 billion more

to do it even though we are not the slightest bit obligated, then other nations

will rightly wonder if there is anything we think is worth defending. After all, it

could be just as easily argued that $7 million was a ridiculously low price for

Alaska, that we took advantage of the Soviet Union and that, because we allegedly did so, we should now pay the Soviets to take it back along with all its

oil and natural gas.

Now, to some, that may seem like a ridiculous analogy but believe me it is not.

The Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty of 1903 between the U.S. and Panama gives

the U.S. rights to the Canal Zone "* * * as if it were sovereign," "in perpetuity"

and "* * * to the entire exclusion of the exercise by the Republic of Panama to

any such sovereign rights, powers, or authority." That adds up to a treaty of

territorial cession and it was recognized as such by both Panama and the U.S.

in the Davis-Arias boundary agreement of 1904. Moreover, the Supreme Court,

in Wilson v. Shaw (1907), ruled that the U.S. had valid title to the Canal Zone,

a ruling reaffirmed in 1972 in U.S. v. Husband R when the Court stated that the

Canal Zone was "* * * unincorporated territory of the United States" and therefore subject to the "* * * complete and plenary authority of Congress." And, if

all that were not enough, the U.S. has paid $10 million to Panama for its rights,

S40 million to Ferdinand De Lesseps' construction company for its rights, almost

$90 million to some 3,000 plus individual landowners for their rights and, somewhat later, $25 million to Colombia to compensate that nation for its loss. In

return. I might note, the Colombians recognized our clear title to the Canal and

Canal Zone.

Which brings me to a key point. Inasmuch as this is U.S. territory we are talkig a bout, and not Panamanian territory, the House, as well as the Senate, should

he involved in the final decision over the appropriateness of this treaty. Article

IV, Section 3, Clause 2 of the Constitution clearly states that Congress-not just

the Senate-shall have the power to "* * * dispose of and make all needful

rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the

United States." Both past practice and various Supreme Court decisions indicate
209

that this is an exclusive, rather than concurrent, grant of power. As a matter of

fact, and as I probably need not remind any of you, there have been several

previous instances where small alterations in Canal Zone territory have taken

place and in each instance the House has passed implementing legislation. It is

unthinkable, where the amount and value of territory is of this magnitude, that

an exception to this practice would be made. The House should insist upon exercising its prerogatives in this matter.

Constitutional questions aside (and the question of House jurisdiction is not

the only one), there are so many solid arguments that can, and should, be raised in

objection to this proposed treaty that, in the interests of time, I will only look

at those which come under the direct jurisdiction of this committee. That is not

to denigrate the importance of other arguments, such as the possibility that one

of the principal effects of this treaty will be to bail out U.S. banks that have made

extensive loans to Panama that Panama would otherwise have great difficulty

repaying. In fact, I have urged the Banking and the Judiciary Committees of

the House and Senate to look into these matters at the same time this committee

continues its examination of the negotiations process, the implications of the

proposed treaty on our foreign policy and our relations with the rest of Latin

America.

I include the negotiations themselves because it is not only what is in the treaty

that counts, but how the treaty was arrived at and what the other side expects to

get out of it. Only by so doing can we ascertain what kind of compromises were

involved, whether they were justified, and what problems might be expected if the

treaty is implemented. Fortunately, in this case the Panamanians themselves

have provided some help. On August 19, 1977, Dr. Romulo Escobar Bethancourt,

head of the Panamanian negotiating team, made a speech before the Panamanian

National Assembly, wherein he outlined what was asked, what was offered, what

was compromised and what Panama understands the results to be. To say the

least, Dr. Escobar's commentary presents a far different picture of the course

of negotiations and the final product than one gets from reading the newspapers

and listening to the explanatory statements here in the United States. More

important still, when one looks carefully at the treaty, it would appear that

Dr. Escobar's conclusions about the substance of the treaty are anything but

chimerical.

In his speech, Dr. Escobar made eleven points about the Neutrality Treaty and

its Protocol but, reduced to basics, four items stand out. First, the U.S. will not

have any defense rights past the year 2000 and will not be the guarantor of the

neutrality of the Canal. Second, U.S. warships will not get preferential treatment

in terms of transiting the Canal, even in time of war, after the year 2000. Third,

the Panamanians believe they have no obligation to keep the canal open if it is

losing money (something that can happen or be arranged) and, finally, the Panamanians think that it will not be necessary for them to abide by the Neutrality

Treaty in cases of foreign attack or internal disorder. In short, from the Panamanian standpoint, the U.S. role in Canal affairs will be very limited up till 1999

and virtually non-existent thereafter, which is a far cry from what we have heard

about how the Canal will be kept open and that adoption of this treaty will make

it easier to defend our interests.

It is also a matter of tremendous concern, particularly in light of the recent

news reports discussing the possibility that our negotiators were blackmailed, to

note the tremendous number of compromises the U.S. appears to have made. To

read Dr. Escobar's version, the Panamanians got their way on almost everything.

However, there are always two sides to a story so I think it behooves us to get the

other side. To that end the American Conservative Union has filed a request

under the Freedom of Information Act for all State Department records relative

to the Canal negotiations from January 1, 1974 (just before the Kissinger-Tack

agreement was signed) to September 7, 1977. Consistent with the demands of

American security, I would trust that the State Department would make the

fullest possible explanation of the facts to the American people. After all, the

Canal belongs to the American people and there is no reason for them not to know

why they are being asked to pay to give it away.

It should also be noted that this new Canal treaty also gives Panama immediate

sovereignty over the Canal thus raising concerns over neutrality and guaranteed

transit to the "best case" category. For them to even come into play, one must

assume that a country that has had 59 governments in 74 years will not, at some

point, simply repudiate the treaty and nationalize the Canal. Such a temptation

was too much for the Egyptians vis-a-vis the Suez Canal and, with no claim of

U.S. sovereignty to stand in the way, history is likely to repeat itself.
210

And what if Panama did try to nationalize the Canal? If we are reluctant to

fight for it when it is ours, it is far less likely we would try and intervene once we

said it was theirs. And if we did, the publicit-Y and the repercussions would be far

worse than if we are perceived as simply trying to defend what is ours. In short, without retaining our claim to sovereignty, our leverage is extremely limited

There are several other aspects that should be considered. One of the arguments

that treaty proponents raise in favor of the treaty is that it will improve relations

with our neighbors in Central and South America. However, that is a somewhat

dubious proposition for two reasons. One is that "anti-yanqui" rhetoric has always

been part of Latin American politics and is primarily for domestic political

consumption. The other is that, despite the rhetoric, Latin American respect for

the U.S. goes up when we stand firm and down when we give way. This explains

our loss of prestige after the Bay of Pigs and the rise in our stock after the missile

crisis of 1962 and the Dominican crisis of 1965. One has to remember that many of

these nations have been threatened by Communist subversion, both from Cuba and

the Soviet Union, and they are not all that anxious to have Soviet influence

increase, or appear to increase, so dramatically.

In that light, it should be remembered that General Torrijos, aside from being

a dictator with a manifest contempt for human rights, has been most friendly with

Castro during the course of negotiations. Also, you will note from Dr. Escobar's

speech that the Panamanians rejected our request that Cuba be excluded from

participation in the Neutrality Agreement.

Finally, let me conclude by discussing for a moment the idea that without a

new treaty the safety and continued operation of the Canal cannot be ensured.

Several points need to be made here. First of all, we have been able to protect

and defend the Canal against sabotage and everything else through four wars

under the current arrangement; why shouldn't we be able to do it now? Second,

if the Canal cannot be defended now, how (toes it become more defensible in the

hands of an unstable dictator and the Panamanian National Guard after the

United States is out? Third, there is risk of sabotage in almost any investment. For

instance, there is always the chance someone could throw a bomb in Washington's

new subway, but that does not mean we should pay the Hanafi Muslims to take

control of it. And, finally, there is a matter of practicality; if the Panamanians

sabotage the Canal, it is their own people they will hurt the worst. Approximately

13%( of Panama's GNP, 20% of its jobs and 33% of its foreign exchange comes

from the Canal Zone, none of which most Panamanians are going to want to lose.

There is one other point relative to the military and that is this business about

the Canal being too small for our warships. The fact of the matter is that all but

our 13 big aircraft carriers can transit the Canal, many use it regularly and the

trend is, as you will all remember from our votes earlier this year, towards smaller

aircraft carriers in the future. As a matter of fact, from 1972 to 1975, there were

no less than 750 transits of the Canal by our warships (which now total 480) and,

by not having to go around the Horn, these ships saved not only time by some

$2( million worth of fuel. Which reminds me; it is estimated that, by 1980 approximately 45% of our Alaskan oil will be shipped to the eastern U.S. through the

Canal-provided we still can keep it open by then.

In closing, let me mention one final point about the treaty which, I think,

illustrates superbly just how one-sided it is. Under terms of the treaty, the question

of a new sea-level canal will be studied by both countries, but during the life to

the treaty, the United States is not allowed to negotiate to build a canal anywhere

else. The meaning of this is clear: either we build a new canal on Panama's terms

or we cannot do anything at all. Contrasted with normal procedure where the two

parties would look elsewhere if negotiations broke down, this arrangement is anything but fair to the United States. At hest, it is a high price to pay for keeping

Panama from being able to invite in the Russians or the Chinese or someone else

to build a new canal. A much cheaper and more effective way of accomplishing the

same result would be to simply reject the proposed treaty outright.

Mr. Chairman, for myself and on behalf of ACU, I am convinced that ratification and implementation of this treaty is not in the best interests of the United

States or the free world. Not only is it ludicrous from a business standpoint, but

it is unlikely to accomplish its other purported objectives. Instead of being viewed

as a gesture of generosity it is more likely to be seen as a further sign of weakness,

a further indication that the United States is unwilling to stand up either for

itself or for its long-time friends and allies in various parts of the world. Money

aside, that is a high price to pay to placate a petty dictator and I urge this commit tee to recommend that we not pay it.

Thank you very much. If you have any questions, I will be happy to try and

answer them.
211

Mr. Nix. Thank vou.

We will now revert to Mr. McDonald.

I call uponi Mr. Pease.

1\1r. PEASE. I have no questionS, 'Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Nix. Mr. Burke.

Mr. BURKE. Thank you, \1r. chairman. I would like to extend to

both (ongressman Crane and you, Congressmaln MciDonald, my

thanks for your testimony before us and for your interest in what I

consider a very serious and vital matter as far as the U.S. Government

is concerned. Unfortunately, it doesn't hal)pen to me very oftenI , but

since I agree with both of you I have no questions to ask.

Thank you, Mr. (Chairinan.

Mr. Nix. Mr. Gilman.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

IMPACT OF NOT RATIFYING THE TREATIES

I, too, want to commend both the gentleman from Georgia, Mr.

McDonald, and my good colleague, the gentleman from Illinois, Mr.

Crane, for having taken the time to address himself to this critical

issue, and I particularly welcome their analysPs of some of the arguments that have been raised.

The argument that the canal is subject to terroristic activities anld

can be closed down at any time is sOmthillg that has beenI utilized

quite frequently by the advocates of tile turnover of the canal at an

early date and our withdrawal of our forces.

This has been an argument that was voiced both by the administration and voiced by some of the Panamanian representatives when

we visited Panama.

What would you foresee to be the result it we were not to adopt

this treaty? What do you see as our relationshil) with Panama and

some of our Latin American neighbor's if we maintain our position in

the canal?

I address my question to both the gentlemen on the panel.

Mr. McDONALD. Well, I think we have to realize, first, that we are

not dealing with a I duly constituted government in Panama, it is not

a freelv elected government. We are dealing with a dictator that

seized power by force of arms, and disbanded the legislature of his own

country. lie has, as my distinguished colleague from Illinois has very

ably pointed out, shredded his own lprecieus document, the constitution of the Panamanian people. When you are dealing with a totalitarian

system of one-man rule, or an olig .chv of rule by that few under

force of arms, we have to realize that any demnonstrations that then

take )Vce, so-called spontaneous student demonstrations, just as in

1964-but once again any that might occur in 1978, say, when the

treaty is not ratified, that this is actually a function am expression it

that totalitarian system because a spontaneous riot is not going to

occur except with the agreement and the blessings of the totalitarian

system.

So what you are really dealing with is an expression of that government. I think that, yes, we will face down absolutely some (lemonstrations, especially in Panama. WAe have to be willing to face those. I

think in part we are to blame for those because we began a couple of

decades ago waffling on this whole issue trying to be apologists for our
212

being there and giving, I think, a great deal of free fuel to our enemies

worldwide as well as those in the Western Hemisphere and those that

for political reasons as well would like to whoop up on the concept of

throw the Gringo out, and so forth. In the long run we face, I think, unquestionably far greater consequences if we do ratify the treaty.

Mr. GILMAN. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Crane.

Mr. CRANE. Yes; I would agree wholeheartedly with what my

colleague from Georgia has said. I think if one goes back to the 1964

riot, which was used as the reason for the initiating of negotiations

under the Johnson administration, one can find testimony by both

Elsworth Bunker as well as by Califano, who is at the present time

our Secretary of HEW, and both of them indicated that they were

Communist instigated riots. They were riots that were created to be

used as a pretext for opening up negotiations in response to what

propagandists endeavored to describe as an expression of nationalism.

This summer Dr. Escobar urged students to resort to violence in

the event the United States does not ratify the treaty. He did that

after the negotiations were over. So there are incendiary forces that

are being urged on by the totalitarian dictatorship. I think one can

reasonably expect that with General Torrijos' Soviet leanings, and

particularly the cozy relationship he has with Fidel Castro, coupled with the disproportionate number of Cubans in Panama right now,

vou will have an orchestrated demonstration in the event the United

States does not ratify this treaty.

On the other hand, General Torrijos knows full well that he can do

nothing to put in jeopardy the continued operation of that canal, if

it means the possible risk of loss of revenue, because under his tutelage

over the past 8 years he has virtually bankrupted Panama.

So I think you can be safely assured that the dictator is going to

on the one hand produce the kind of predictable demonstration that

happened in 1964, and on the other hand do nothing to jeopardize the

operation of that canal.

Mr. GILMAN. I thank the gentleman for his comments and I certainly agree that the financial aspects of the Panamanian Government

probably had a great deal to do with where we are today.

MODIFICATION OF THE TERMS OF THE TREATIES

As a matter of fact, when we were (]own there a few months ago,

when our subcommittee went into Panama, I suggested to the Presi-

(lent at that time that they consider a renegotiation of the terms and

new terms and that an accommodation position would probably be

reached where we could consider paying more revenue, possibly

readjusting some of the land holdings. I don't know that we need as

much land as we have down there. And consider a phased withdrawal

of some of our military and maybe a little better proportion of Panamanians to Americans in employment, but certainly not to take

away completely, as we are doing today.

I would assume that that kind of accommodation would sit fairly

well amongst many of our colleagues. What would your thoughts be

of that kind of accommodation, really some periodic review of terms,

maybe a better financial return to the Panamanians than they are

getting at the present time, readjustment of the proportion of execu-
213

tive positions in the zone, maybe some jurisdictional questions, to be

resolved, civil jurisdiction in the zone to give them more of a voice

in the zone, but yet not walk away from the canal and give it tip

completely as we are doing now by the year 2000?

Mr. CRANE. I can only speak for myself in response to that question.

As far as giving the Panamanian Government greater control over

the operation of the canal, I would be totally opposed to that under

any and all circumstances. I think the history of instability of that

country clearly indicates that they have not demonstrated the capability to (1o the job and until we see positive evidence over an extended Deriod of time I would be opposed to taking that step.

I would be equally opposed under any circumstance contributing cne

penny to the Torrijos regime so he can salt it away in some Swiss bank

account for his own selfish interest.

One concession I would support you have touched upon, and that is

providing greater employment to Panamanian citizens, because then

at least you have some assurance that the Panamanians themselves

will benefit instead of the government they are faced with under

General Torrijos.

Mr. GILMAN. I thank the gentleman.

I thank both Congressman McDonald and Congressman Crane for

their giving us their time and benefits of their views and their thorotugh

views on this important issue.

Mr. Nix. Mr. Winn.

MLr. WINN. I thank you,Mr. Chairman.

Either one of you can answer this.

ADMINISTRATION'S HANDLING OF THE TREATIES

First, I want to commend you on your statements as I agree with

you. I just wondered what your thinking is why the administration

has handled this thing the way it has, not making the announcements

of the meetings and the treaty until the Congress had a(Ijournwe for

the August recess, not furnishing Members of Congress the iitire

treaty until a day or two before the Panamanians and the Latin

American countries came up for a big 2-day party signing, whatever

you want to call it, and the fact that Congress, both the House and the

Senate, have been completely ignored on this, until all of the siLings

and the signing party were all orchestrate(, then they came up here

with a so-called educational procedure.

I just wondered if either one of you have any answer as to why they

handled it that way?

Mr. McDONALD. Well, speaking for my own part, I think this has

been handled in such a way as to not put fears to rest but possibly

to raise new fears, sometimes fears that are not justified, but, nevertheless, they are raised because of the rather unusual procedure

under which this whole measure has been handled.

I think when Mr. Sol Linowitz, was appointed as our negrotiator, this was not brought up for Senate confirmation because it was stated

that this was only a temporary post of 6 months and, therefore, did

not require Senate confirmation. Of course, the 6 months time was

running out.

Here you have a gentleman who has been very closely associated

with one of the New York banks where there is a tremendous loan

from that bank to the Republic of Panama.
214

)oiu have another individual, Mr. Kissinger, who has some degree of relationship with another one of the New York banks. Certainly there is a tremendous amount of debt by Panama to New York

bankinig interests and these debts are coming up to be either rolled

over, to be paid, or renewed, or what-have-you.

I think that whole area has to be explored by the full Congress.

Are we dealing more with a question of conflict of interest?

It has not been handled in a forthright and aboveboard manner.

I think there are many aspects of this treaty if fully brought out to

the American people as to what they would mean, that the American

peop-le would be even more overwhelmingly against this treaty than

what has been evidenced to date.

But for whatever reason, and for whatever motive, unfortunately

our State Department for the last 30 years, when they blow the bugle, the only tune that comes out is retreat, and we have seen since the

end of World War II that American policy has been a steady retreat

from greatness, and, in my opinion, the giving up or turning over of

the Panama Canal is just another example of that.

Mr. CRANE. In response to your question, it is always difficult

and dangerous to attempt to assess other people's motivations, but

I would start out by making an observation that former President

Kennedy made; namely, that in 1962, he was still working under the

policy initiatives of a decade before because of the inherent momentum

of bureaucracy, and I think it was Barry Goldwater who indicated

hadl he been elected in 1964 it would have taken him 4 years, if there

had been a conscious effort, just to stop this momentum, before you

could begin to change direction. It is clear that our State Department

has had some perverse motivation to give this canal away and it has

been working strenuously in behalf of this objective at least since

1967 during the Johnson administration. The Chicago Tribune

published the treaty at that time. I remember then minority leader

Ford expressed his horror over that document. He said it was shocking to the American people and he appropriately expressed concern

over the Communist threat to the security of the canal because of

Castro's presence in the Caribbean.

At any rate, from that time on to the present (lay within the State

Department there has been a continuing effort to alienate the canal

whether Democratic or Republican administrations. I think the

reasoning behind the way in which this was presented-that extravaganza with Congress out of session-was a recognition of the weakness

of the position of the administration in trying to sell this. Presumably, the average American, not knowing a great deal about the treaty

ratification process, assumes it is a fait accompli. In fact, I suspect it

probably comes as a suprise to some American citizens that we are

still talking about it, because they assured that we already gave it

away.

Mr. WiNx. Doesn't that procedure that you just mentioned leave

Congress on the spot because now all those gentlemen were brought

in here for the big signing ceremony, and all of the worldwide publicity,

and then it looks like we are pulling the carpet out from under the

Presi(dent and the ad ministration?

Mr. McDONALD. Well, I think certainly there has been an effort to

create the impression that any adverse consequences of, say, failure

to ratify must be assumed by the Members of the House and more
215

specifically the Senate because the State Department still insists that

we can give this away by treaty.

On the other hand, I would argue that when the American people

have a full understanding of what has transpired more recently and a

better understanding of the history-unfortunately, one of tie

problems of the whole debate is how, if you include public officials, and

that includes some of our Presidents, who seem to understand the

history, historic circumstances behind not only the formation of

Panama but the creation of this treaty and the subsequent reinforcement with Governments of Panama, duly elected governments as

well as our own, to the extent that there are a lot of Americans who

didn't understand that, they honestly believe that that property

belongs to Panama, that in fact this is some vestige of colonialism

when it is nothing of the sort.

I think that has been contributed to at least a sufficient misunderstanding to date that once understood, though, as I am sure it will be,

the longer this discussion is dragged out, will cause the Members of

Congress to suffer a great (teal more, if they take the wrong action

by giving this away, when it comes time to be accountable to the

American electorate at the polls.

Mr. WINN. My time is about up.

CONGRESSIONAL ROLE IN DRAFTING THE TREATIES

I would like to ask both of you are you aware of or can you name

any Member of Congress, either the House or the Senate, that sat in

on the design, the wording, the actual treaty agreements?

Mr. CRANE. I cannot.

Mr. McDONALD. I cannot speak on that. I don't know of anyone.

Mr. WINN. I have never heard anyone mentioned. I just wondered

because I make this statement Congress has been completely bypassed and I have sat in on several briefings down through the last

3 or 4 years with Ambassador Bunker. We were not consulted, we were

informed of what was going on in some of the discussions that had

been held with the Panamanians, but we were never consulted or

asked for our ideas, and I don't know of anyone that ever was.

Thank you very much.

Mr. Nix. Mr. Lagomarsino.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, I welcome your testimony and, as I am sure you know,

agree with what you say.

I would like to ask the chairman, for the record, if we might consider

holding a further hearing or additional hearing with the CIA so we can

look into the allegations of bugging by our negotiators of the Panamanian negotiators? I think that is something we should clearly conSider. Of course, I imagine it would have to be a closed session.

Mr. Nix. I might advise the gentleman we will be having Secretarv

Vance here and thereby an opportunity to go into that question.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. I thank the gentleman.

With regard to the briefings and colloquy that Congressman Winn

had with you just now, I have attended several briefings with our

negotiators, off-the-record briefings, and as Congressman Winn indicated, at all these sessions they told us what they were doing, what

they had in mind, and invariably at the end we would be adv-i.ed
216

don't t say anything about this because this might foul up the negotiations."

So I think it is certainly accurate to say we were not consulted, perhaps we were informed in a very general way as things went along.

U.S. INVESTMENTS IN PANAMA

You mentioned, especially you, Congressman McDonald, that part

of the motive for action on the treaty might be to protect U.S.

investments.

Do you have any idea what the amount of the investments of

Americans is in Panama?

Mr. McDONALD. I can't, Mr. Lagomarsino, I do not know the

amount of the investments in terms of free enterprise investment.

What I was particularly referring to was the amount of outright loans

to the Panamanian Government from outside banking interests,

which a sizable portion of the loans to the Panamanian Government

appear to be New York loans, and I think that whole question, the

percentage, the degree of debts, and so forth, that needs to be fully

explored. If we are going to take a look at this, if we are going to go along with

this treaty, we certainly should have all of the facts, and that seems to

be a very major area of fact.

Mr. Lagomarsino, just to add to something you have said with

regard to the problems that you have had, sitting in on briefings and

then being urged not to say anything, as a member of the majority

party-I don't know the situation in your party-but as a member of

the majority party I think all members of the majority party received a telegram not only from the President, as you probably did,

but also from the majority leader, urging that we not make any

statements at home until we have an opportunity to come back, and

so forth.

I think there has been a great effort to suggest that everybody stay

m1m, at least through the period of the extravaganza.

Mr. LAGOMARSiNo. Thank you.

USE OF THE CANAL BY U.S. MILITARY

In a previous hearing I made a statement for the record regarding

the amount of naval transport through the canal duringg the Vietnam

war, and I think perhaps my statement was misleading because I

included the total amount of U.S. Government vessels and cargo

transits, and I have a sheet from the Department of Defense that

describes exactly what would happen. I would like to ask this be

inserted into the record.

Mr. Nix. Without objection, so ordered.
217

[The information subsequently provided follows :1

U.S. GOVERNMENT USIE 01 PANAMA CANAL BEFORE, DURING, AN) A ETjtu ViETNAM

YeIr: U.S. naral ship transit %umbr

1 9 6 4 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - -- - - --8 6

11965 112

148

1968 ------------------------------------------------------------ 147

1970 ---------------------------------------------------- 12: 1970 25

1971 ----------------------------------------------------- 99

1972 -------------------------------------------------------------- 6

197--------------------------------------------------------------61

1974 _ _9_-_-_-_-_-__-_-_-26

U.S. GOVERNMENT VESSEL AND CARGO TRANSITS'

Number of Long tons

transits of cargo

Fiscal year1964- -285 1,177,269

1965--------------------------- -------------------------- 284 1,923, 538

1966 ----------------------------------------------------------------- 591 3, 220, 190

1967-879 6, 147,479

1968- ----------------------- --- 1, 504 8,497, 221

1969 ---------------------------------------------------------------- 1,376 7,210,068

1970 ------------------------------------- 1,068 4,410,451

1971---------------------------- 503 2,236,619

1972------------------------------------- 413 1,742,303

1973--------------------- -------------------------------- 37, 1, 405, 428

1974 --------------------------------------- 248 1, 748,963

1975 ------------------------------------------------------------------ 170 526, 497

1976--------------- 85 177, 508

U.S. GOVERNMENT CARGO SUPPORT FOR VIETNAM 2

Fiscal year1967 1968 1969 average

Via Panama Caial ------------------------------------------------ 5.1 7.7 6.1

Total support provided -------------------------------------------- 12.7 13.0 12.9

Panama Canal s percent of total- 40.0 69.0 47.0 49.0

Source: Annual report, Panama Canal Company included warships, auxiliaries, and Military Sealift Command controlled ships. Millions of long tons (approximations provided by Military Sealift Command and Military Airlift Command).

\1r. CRANE. Would vou yield for a second, because that goes back

to a question that was lplt earlier to Cong(rt-essmnan Stratton about

"preferential" versus "expeditiolis" passatre.

WhZ-t Dr. Escobar said "expeditious" means is that we will g'et in

line and wait our turn.

Touching upon the logistical backup of our fortss in Vietnam, 'Ind

the enormous increase in shipping that went thriougrh the ctanl during

those years, I can think of a scenario where if I were the Soviet Union,

not involved in Vietnam, directly, I would try to position the Soviet

tuna fleet outside the canal opening just as a means of delaving the

U.S. effort to back up a military involvement somewhere in the world.

The Panamanians could rightly say, "Look, they got here before you

did, all we guaranteed was you will get in line and wait your turn.''
218

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. I might just point out one statistic from the

sheet: During 1968, 69 percent of all cargo that went to Vietnam went

through the canal.

There has been a lot of mention of the position of South American

leaders. It is true all of them publicly support the treaty.

LATIN AMERICAN SUPPORT FOR THE TREATIES

We recently returned from a trip to South America where we talked

to the Presidents of five South American countries, including the

Foreign Ministers of six countries and many other officials and it is

very interesting that, with one exception, not a single official even

mentioned the Panama Canal or the treaty until asked about it after

he had finished his remarks. In all of those countries apparently there

were many more important issues.

As a matter of fact, the only official who did mention the treaty was

the Foreign Minister of a western South American country. He

mentioned it at the end of a 3-hour discussion, and then in the context

of "we are worried about the tolls going up."

So I think that certainly a treaty could be devised that would be not

only something they could really support, not just publicly, but

privately. I believe many of them are quite concerned about the

provisions of the treaty, especially with regard to defense.

PRESIDENT CARTER' S CAMPAIGN STATEMENT

Congressman McDonald, you mentioned the statement by President

Carter during the campaign. You didn't quote his entire quote. I

would like to do that because I think it is interesting to note what he

said in a positive way as well as in a negative way.

You read what he said he would not do; namely, give up complete

or practical control of the canal.

He was asked about the Panama Canal in his second debate with

President Ford.

Well, here again, the Panamanian question is one that has been confused by

Mr. Ford. He had directed his diplomatic representatives to yield to the Panamanians full sovereignty over the Panama Canal Zone at the end of a certain

period of time. When Mr. Reagan raised this question in Florida, Mr. Ford not

only disavowed his instructions, but he also even dropped parenthetically the use

of the word "detente.''

I would never give up complete control or practical control of the Panama

Canal Zone, but I would continue to negotiate with the Panamanians. When the

original treaty was signed back in the early 1900's, when Theodore Roosevelt was

President, Panama retained sovereignty over the Panama Canal Zone. We

retained control as though we had sovereignty.

Now, I would be willing to go ahead with negotiations. I believe that we could

share more fully responsibilities for the Panama Canal Zone with Panama. I

would be willing to continue to raise the payment for shipment of goods through

the Panama Canal Zone. I might even be willing to reduce to some degree our

military emplacements in the Panama Canal Zone, but I would not relinquish

practical control of the Panama Canal Zone any time in the foreseeable future.

So, you are indeed correct. He has either changed his mind or perhaps

he didn't understand the situation at the time.

Mr. MCDONALD. I think, Mr. Lagomarsino, on that point, without

question, that was in the second television debate, so called television

debate and, generally speaking, I think that former Governor Carter

at that time, it was viewed, had taken a very strong position more
219

along the Reagan line and had actually put President Ford on the

defensive.

I think many people felt that he had come out ahead of that particular debate in large measure because his words were interpreted as

being a firmer stand on the very volatile issue of the Canal Zone and

it is, of course, upsetting to find that not 12 months have passed and

now he has flip-flopped.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. I might say that a number of my constituents

were very unhappy about that when they learned later that the

negotiations were continuing just as they had been, and there were

some who indicated they probably wouldn't even have voted for

President Carter had they not misunderstood his statement.

HUMAN RIGHTS IN PANAMA

You mentioned also the survey (lone by Freedom House; this has

come up many times in the hearings. And just to complete the record,

not only does the Freedom House rating show Panama with a worse

rating than Chile, as you mentioned, it shows them with a worse

rating than any country in South America, Central America, or for

that matter, any country in the Western Hemisphere. As a matter

of fact, it shows Panama with a slightly worse rating than that of

Cuba. And, I might add with exactly the same rating as the U.S.S.R.

Mr. McDONALD. Mr. Lagomarsino. I think that is very good to

have brought out that point. In my own mail from individuals in

Panama, both living in the zone as well as Panamanians, that is the

common view without exception, we have not received mail urging

the ratification of the treaty, instead in the mail to my own officeperhaps other offices have had similar experiences-but that mail

coming from Panama, both from the zone and from the Republic of

Panama, has been that the majority of the Panamanians are not for

this treaty-and even though we are silent we must be silent because

of the nature of our Government. And in some cases the letters are

unsigned, in some cases they are signed and say this is a fictitious

name. And in one of two cases of individuals I have known personally, they have signed but said do not use my name because of fear of

reprisals from a totalitarian dictatorship.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. I had a similar experience when I was in Panama. The official people we talked to were without exception for the

treaty, including many American businessmen. However, some people

came to our hotel room, very nervous, very worried. They asked

if we had seen the secret service people in the lobby, and so on.

When they were assured that we weren't there to harass them or to

put upon them, they told us that in their opinion that 90-some percent of the Panamanian people were in favor of a treaty but not

with General Torrijos.

Mr. CRANE. Could I add one thing to the human rights discussions

and this earlier subject of the attitude of other Latin American

countries.

Consider, in the human rights discussion the actions taken by

Congress and the administration to date, how you would feel if you

were the head of the Government of Chile, or the Government of

Argentina, or the Government of Brazil, where we have taken punitive action in response to the administration's assessment of their
220

observance of human rights. Why should they now act cordial toward

the United States?

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. With regard to having just (lone that, I might

say that the heads of all the South American governments that we

discussed various issues with were very polite, they did not criticize

our Government in most cases. Some of the lower-ranking officials

did, but certainly the private citizens in those countries had strong

questions about "why are you treating us this way when you are

treating Cuba in such a nice way."

Mr. CRANE. Exactly. Panama rates the lowest of all the Latin

American nations in observance of human rights according to Freedom House, along with Cuba. Yet, we are rewarding them while

simultaneously taking punitive actions against our friends.

There is one other quick point that might be brought up. In an

interview with black Panamanian employees in the Canal Zone,

they expressed the hope that we would not give up the canal because

they would be the first ones fired as soon as the Panamanians took

control. The Panamanian Government is practicing racism against

its own native black population. Black Panamanians hold well-paying

jobs only because of the U.S. presence there.

Mr. Nix. Mr. Guyer.

COMMITTEE HEARINGS

Mr. GUYER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, I want to compliment our committee, despite the fact

we have a very sparse attendance today. I think that our leadership

has provided this as a forum for everyone to be heard, and as testimony of the fact that we have to come into the ball game after the

lights are out and the people have gone home. This is the greatest

testimony to that fact. No criticism of the committee. But here we

have four or five members left today, and when the commanders of

three veterans organizations were here a week ago, we had only four

left that day, and not due to the fault of the members at all. I have

five committees today alone, not that I am that important but here

again is a situation that we should understand.

Now, all I have heard the last couple of years is people want sunshine in America, want to come out of the dark, want everyone to know

what is going on.

Barry Goldwater said this morning in the other committee, for 2

weeks I have been taking a course in how to run a bank. That is all

they have (lone over there to the exclusion of the very important

things we should be doing.

Here we are talking about going home before the 1st of November,

and there again my deepest criticism of this whole scenario is the fact

that nobody calls it important.

I sat up the other night for 5 hours reading the history of Panama

again. My brother was head of the history department of a college.

That was my favorite subject. I thought maybe I have missed something here I didn't know about. I went back to the year 1600 and

started with slavery from Africa, then slavery from the West Indies

and the evolution of people, and I have to admit, with Mr. Nix and

others here, that the Panamanian people have a long ways to go and

they, like everybody on earth, want something a little better.
221

But I still go back to the fact that, we should not have these thing

drafted and architected by people back in the corner.

PUBLIC OPINION ON THE TREATIES

I talked to President Ford, was ill the car with him for an hour. le

was in two places in my district. I said, "-Mr. President, why don't

you say something about the canal?" Ile says, "It is not anis

Maybe that was just either before or after he finally went on the

national coverage. It is and has been an issue.

I didn't take a poll this year. By the way, I would like for Mr. Nix

to have some figures I think he Jeserves, if you can provide then.

Mr. CRANE. One thing that we can provide, Mr. Chairman, we did

poll through the American Conservative Union the senatorial offices

about :3 weeks ago. Sixty-six Senators responded with a breakdown of

their figures, others didn't have them except to say that the mail was

heavy, a majority were opposed to giving the canal away. Based on

over 100,000 communications in those 66 senatorial districts the inail

was running almost 94 percent opposed and 6 percent in support.

Mr. BURKE. I just had a phone call or made a phone call to one of the

weekly newspapers in my area that took a poll, and their figure> are

1,286 against and 94 in favor. I do feel in my district that, the proportion, certainly even if you presume that was high, I would bet that it

would be 8 to 1 against but I'm sure it would exceed that.

Mr. CRANE. I did put it on my questionnaire and I would urge every

Member of Congress, if he is planning a questionnaire in the near

future, to get that question on, because I think that is a far more

accurate barometer of public sentiment than that editorializing

question that was put by Mr. Gallup. His poll, incidentially, is the

only poll I have seen that indicates anything less than a majority of

Americans opposed. Every other poll has been overwhelmingly in the

other direction, and I think that we in Congress could provide a,

service by polling our constituents.

My own mail to date has been about 7,000 communications on this

subject, only 2 in support of giving away the canal.

Mr. BURKE. I would like to make one other comment, if vou will

yield further, and that is I think the basis on which we should make

this, this being an international issue and is going to involve our future

and our children's future, should be on the logic of the treaty itself

that is the purpose of the treaty, and what the ultimate result might

be insofar as our own national security is concerned. Sometimes polls

can become pretty emotional on yes and no answers, but in this case

I think the people are very well informed about most of the reasons

why the White House feels that we should have this treaty. I don't

think they agree with the White House.

Thank you.

Mr. GUYER. If I can conclude. I am very much concerned that

the American people have an input in this, and I did not take a poll, I just recently had a questionnaire, and the response was overwhelming

in interest, but not this subject, because I had it last year. But my

poll last fall-I have had one a year since I have been here-I think

they are important. My people were 91 percent opposed to giving

up the Panama Canal. We get criticized and people say those questions

are loaded or slanted. That is not true.
222

I put out my last questionnaire and got 30,000 back so far. They

have to pay the 13 cents to send it in so you know they care.

PROVIDING THE PUBLIC WITH INFORMATION

I want to say I think we have been very, very remiss in the conduct

of our affairs of state, in the way we push things off the front burner

and out of the spotlight and then get back to lusher things where we

swallow camels and strain gnats, and that is exactly what we have

been doing here. We are getting down to the wire, the energy bill

hasn't come out. You have tension in the Middle East, all of these

consuming things going on, we have not physically responded and here

we are talking about the transfer of something so important.

I read the entire history of the Panamanian people, their present day economy. I have not seen one overt gross act of American impropriety in the way we have been taking away anything from the people,

or a violation, and I think in fairness to both the American and Panamanian people, they are getting the short end of the stick because

the people of Panama will not profit by this. In fact, the other night

after the signing was consummated they took the TV cameras down

to Panama and the only utterance we got was fear, they were afraid.

Back in the 1960's I recall, before the incident that Mr. Johnson

had in 1964, which was when 4 Americans were killed and 20 Panamanians were killed, the incident was raising a flag over a

schoolhouse.

To go back to even before that time, we at least 12 times improved

relationships with the Panamanian people, without disturbing the

treaty. One case at point, in 1960, I think it was, it was resolved that

all Panamanians be paid the very same pay as Americans working in

the same zone.

That can be done now and I agree with the chairman and the leadership of this committee and with our people that we are long overdue

in Africa. There are 50 countries, 35 of them, 35 of them have received

independence just since 1960 with 15 to go. It is going to come and

I am opposed to colonialism and I think poeple want to emerge with

all these rights. This is not the way to do it. This is back-door diplomacy. What we have done is end run. The Washington Redskins were

ready to celebrate on Sunday, and 7 seconds later there was nothing

to celebrate about. You don't in America celebrate until after the

game is over.

As I told Mr. Kissinger the other day, I have been in public relations all my life. The first thing I learned was don't treat the public

like you do your relations. That is exactly what we have to do, we

have to go to the American people and let them know. Most of them

don't even know. They have been told we don't have any advice, they

have been told Congress can't act on it. Why are we holding the

hearings? They know very well they have to come back to this body

for approval of every expenditure, of every cessation or ceding of territory. And, incidentally, I would like to know, since we are having

all of the banking instruction here of late, I would like to know the

names of the banks and how much they have loaned to the Panamanian Government. I think we can ask Mr. Vance when he comes in.
223

COMMITTEE HEARINGS

I want to say to the gentleman the empty seats are not evidence of

your popularity. Right now every Member of Congress is trying to

shuttle back and forth and attend all the meetings where we have a

desperate need for quorums. But I am happy for your testimony which

I want to read now at length and thank you for coming in, and I want

to thank the chairman for the way in which they have conducted the

fairness of these hearings.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Thank you.

At the very outset I want to join with my colleagues in welcoming

our distinguished colleagues to the hearing of this committee. I want

to extend my apologies for not being here on time. I shall read your

testimony. I had a very imperative and necessary meeting at S o'clock

on personal matters. I was supposed to be finished by 9 in order to

be here on time, but it took much longer than anticipated. So that is

the only reason I have not been here.

However, as I said, I wiii read your testimony with great interest.

Mr. Guyer has said it is one of the intentions, certainly of myself

as chairman, to hold these hearings on a fair and equitable basis to get

all points of view. I think that thus far we have (lone so.

Your presentations today, I am sure as the members wxil read it,

also give a point of view that will better acquaint them with the issue

and provide us with a better understanding of what should be (one

when legislation atithorizing some of the implementation of the treaty, should the Senate ratify, and puts us in a better position to vote

properly. I am sure that as these hearings g'o along some of the misconceptions on both sides will be corrected. I think that the proponents as well as the opponents made some extravagant statements in

the past. What we want is facts so we can make the proper decision.

Again, I want to thank you gentlemen for coming and I shall not

keel) you. I don't really at this point have a question. I may after I

read your testimony. Then, if I may, I will write to you to satisfy

whatever question I may have.

Before closing I would like to extend my appreciation to Congressman Nix for chairing the meeting in my absence. le has done a great

job. I understand and I am sure that he has missed some work that

he had intended to do, but he very graciously and courteously had

chaired the meeting in my absence. I want to thank you very much.

Mr. WINN. Mr. Chairman, there is another witness.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. I understand,

Mr. MCDONALD. Let me say I appreciate your comments. I certainly appreciate the courtesy of the acting chairman, Mr. Nix, and

his courtesy in large throughout the committee hearing. I think that

the American people would be best served if all sides are able to be

evenly presented in the media so as to form their opinions.

It is unfortunate, as Mr. Stratton did point out, perhaps this

particular point of view is not as sexy as when Mr. Kissinger testifies,

under a little bit perhaps different, publicity circumstances, and it is

unfortunate that this particular hearing in this particular point of

view that the members of my own party, the majority party, have

had pressing duties that have prevented their participating because

I feel like in questions perhaps that might be antagonistic to the

98-991-77-16
224

point of view presented this morning, we perhaps could have developed a dialog that would have been helpful not only to ourselves

but to the American public.

But I do appreciate and understand the pressures of the congressional office because we all have those same pressures, but to those

who have been in attendance and have participated in the hearings, I am very thankful.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. On behalf of the committee we want to thank

you, Congressman Crane, and Congressman McDonald, for your

testimony. As you well know, we will have the testimony printed and

available for wide distribution to all of our members, to all Members

of Congress, and to the public as well.

Our final witness today is Mr. Alfred Graham, president of the Central Labor Union/Metal Trades, Canal Zone.

Mr. Graham, it is my pleasure to welcome you to the committee.

I understand you have an associate with you. Would you please

identify him for the record.

STATEMENT OF ALFRED GRAHAM, PRESIDENT, CENTRAL LABOR

UNION/METAL TRADES COUNCIL, CANAL ZONE

Mr. GRAHAM. Yes, Mr. Chairman, my associate is Mr. William

Drummond, legislative chairman of the Central Labor Union/Metal

Trades Council.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. You may proceed

Mr. GRAHAM. Thank you very much.

Chairman ZABLOCKI [continuing]. To summarize your statement.

Mr. GRAHAM. It is very short, really. It shouldn't take long.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, my name is Alfred J.

Graham, president of the Canal Zone Central Labor Union and

Metal Trades Council, AFL-CIO.

The CLU-MTC in the Canal Zone represents 14 local unions

affiliated with 9 national AFIr-CIO unions. We represent the largest

organized group of U.S. citizen employees of the Panama Canal

Company-Canal Zone Government.

The Canal Zone Central Labor Union and Metal Trades Council

thanks you and your committee, Mr. Chairman, for providing us

with the opportunity to express our views on the proposed new Panama-United States Treaty.

Our presentation will be in two parts. The first part will cover

employee privileges and immunities along with labor provisions

written into the treaty. The second part will cover our views on the

political impact of the treaty on the Canal Zone and the U.S. Government employees working there.

EMPLOYEE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES

As written into the new Panama-United States Treaty, employee

privileges and immunities are for the most part satisfactory.

We are not satisfied with the lack of treaty provisions that would

solve the dual citizenship problem once and for all.

The Republic of Panama has a citizenship law that, in our opinion,

was enacted for the sole purpose of harassing U.S. citizens born to

American parents on the Isthmus of Panama. The law states that
225

these Americans are Panamanian citizens. These Americans do not

want Panama citizenship, they serve in the U.S. Armed Forces,

pay U.S. income tax, for the most part without representation, and

consider themselves to be U.S. citizens. The U.S. Government agrees

that they are U.S. citizens, but Panama disagrees and says they are

Panamanians. When crossing into Costa Rica they must carry a

Panamanian passport. The U.S. State Department agrees with the

dual citizenship problem by doing nothing to correct it.

If Panama becomes sovereign over the Canal Zone these employees

fear that they will be subject to further harassment from the Government of Panama.

We requested that the treaty stipulate that Panama will surrender

all claim of Panamanian citizenship, in the past and for the duration

of the treaty, on all U.S. citizens born on the Isthmus of Panama, if

the U.S. citizen states his or her intention of U.S. citizenship at age

21 to the U.S. State Department. This request was denied.

LABOR PROVISIONS IN NEW PANAMA-UNITED STATES TREATY

As a result of the July meeting of the AFL-CIO Panama Canal

Committee, I was elected by the committee and appointed by AFILCIO President George Meany to be the AFIr-CIO labor adviser to

the U.S. treaty negotiating team.

I worked with the U.S. treaty team on treaty labor provisions

until August 26.

We are satisfied that most of the labor prov-isions we require are

included in the new treaty.

One of the most important labor provisions, optional open-ended

early retirement will require legislation. However, we are grateful

for the attention President Carter and his staff gave this matter by

stipulating that the U.S. Government would sponsor this legislation

in the treaty.

We face other labor problems with DOD. Canal Zone Government

operations that will become DOD functions, if the treaty is ratified,

are in danger of losing the Washington, D.C., pay base and Canal

Zone leave benefits. T his will cause serious labor unrest in the Canal

Zone. Our schools and hospitals are very important to aVl of us in the

Canal Zone and any disruption of these operations could affect the

entire Panama Canal operation.

Labor legislation: We will be seeking labor legislation for the following:

1. Optional open-ended early retirement.

2. Unemployment compensation for non-U.S. employees.

CONCLUSION

Although treaty labor benefits are, for the most part, satisfactory

we wish to go on record at this time opposing the New PanamaUnited States Treaty.

President Meany does not speak for the affiliated local unions of

the CLU-MTC when he supports this treaty.

This concludes the labor section of our testimony. I will be glad

to answer any questions that the House International Relations

Committee members wish to ask.
226

It is our opinion that President Carter's treaty signing ceremony in Washington, D.C., set democracy in Latin America back 100

years. It amazes us to witness a U.S. President, with a human rights platform, gather together the largest group of antihuman rights dictators in Central and South America and honor them by signing

a treaty with another dictator.

Ambassador Bunker and Mr. Linowitz testify over and over again that the Canal Zone will be turned over to the Panamanian people. This is what they label as "educating" the American voter so that

they will not oppose the new treaty.

You can be assured that $7 billion worth of land and property will not be turned over to the Panamanian "people." As usual with

military dictators the "people" will get little or nothing out of this

treaty.

The U.S. citizen employees are observing the "educational" program of both countries very carefully. Ambassador Bunker is trying

to paint an oppressive government lily white. The Panamanian

Government has a different tactic. Their action is to print anti-U.S.

articles in the Government-controlled press and 24 hours a day broadcast imperialist yankee go home slogans on the Government-controlled

TV and news media.

Communist and pro-Communist elements within the Panamanian

Government are working diligently to "educate" the people of Panama

to throw the U.S. presence out no matter what guarantees are written

into the treaty concerning continued U.S. military presence in Panama.

U.S. citizen employees who would be asked to remain in Panama

to operate the waterway until Panama could operate it are rightfully

concerned over their loss of civil rights under the sovereignty of the

present Panamanian Government. There is no freedom of the press,

speech or the broadcasting media.

Many of our members fear the actions of the Guardia National.

Some think that the Americans will be harassed so that they will

leave Panama sooner than they planned. Already one Canal Zone

labor leader, opposed to the treaty, has been arrested and harassed

by the Government of Panama, and this included the blowing up of

his private automobile. I might make note this individual is sitting

to my right at the present time.

To bring this point home to committee members, the fact that I

am reporting to you our feelings about the oppressive Government of

Panama, I am placing in jeopardy the well-being of my family and

myself at this very moment. I am also putting my career with the

Panama Canal on the line. You can be assured that I will go on the

list of Americans to be dealt with should sovereignty become a reality.

We (1o not pretend to be experts on national defense matters.

However, the Neutrality Treaty provides that if the United States

goes to war, the enemy nation will have guaranteed access to the

Panama Canal. To put it another way, if an ally of the United States

sent an expeditionary force to Panama to stop the. enemy nation

from using the Panama Canal, the U.S. military would be required

to stop them so that our enemy could be free to transit ships of war

to attack the United States.

Our Joint Chiefs of Staff have approved this treaty and we say

we want our share of income tax money back that is helping to pay
227

their salaries, because these fine gentlemen are not earning their

pay.

In conclusion, we oppose any treaty given to a military dictator.

We believe that the United States should live up to its image as the

leader of the free world and consider a treaty only with a constitutional

government in Panama. Do not be fooled by the word plebiscite.

Plebiscite by threat is no substitute for democratic government.

Furthermore, we are convinced that the Panama Canal will be in

the hands of the Communists, if not before, then shortly after the

year 2000.

We believe that the American people are being misled and lied

to about the Panama Canal. It is too small, too old. The Canal Zone

is an area dividing Panama. The Panama Canal can be blown up with

one hand grenade. All nonsense.

It is the largest lock-type canal in the world. The Queen Elizabeth

II transits as well as ships up to 946 feet long and 105 feet wide drafting 40 feet.

It has been maintained and is in better condition today than it

ever was.

The people of Panama are free to enter the Canal Zone whenever

they wish, and anyone who says it can be destroyed with one hand

grenade has never seen the canal.

Finally, we believe that no Senate or Congress of the United States

should be told by a dictator to "ratify or else."

Again, I thank the committee for permitting us the opportunity

to express our views.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Thank you, Mr. Graham, for your very

eloquent statement presenting your point of view.

LABOR PARTICIPATION IN THE TREATY NEGOTIATIONS

Now, you did state that you were assigned as a member to the

negotiations.

Mr. GRAHAM. I was assigned by Mr. George Meany who had a

meeting with Ambassador Bunker. They had agreed that if the

members of the Pan Com Committee could come up with a representative that Mr. Bunker would approve, that member being a

labor adviser, representing the national AFL-CIO.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. What was your role in the treaty negotiations-as a member of the treaty negotiating team?

Mr. GRAHAM. I was not a member of it. f was an adviser to the

Congressman. My role was to present to the negotiating team what

we call a labor annex. We had hoped to get a labor annex into the

treaty. However, we were unsuccessful in doing that, but we did settle

for having the labor provisions put into the treaty in another method

without having it called a labor annex.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. You are satisfied, however, that your concerns

were adequately taken care of?

Mr. GRAHAM. Yes, sir. For the most part, yes.

EXEMPTION OF U.S. EMPLOYEES FROM TAXES

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Now, I gather that the U.S. employee; are

particularly satisfied as to one aspect of the treaty; that is, it exempts

them from paying either United States or Panamanian taxes.
228

It is your understanding that this will be rectified to exempt them

only from Panamanian taxes?

Mr. GRAHAM. Yes. While I was working with the U.S. State Department on this, it was absolutely the understanding that the intent

of that was to eliminate the U.S. citizens from Panamanian taxes, not

from the U.S. tax.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. It would not be a choice of the U.S. citizen

from paying one or the other tax?

Mr. GRAHAM. No, sir, it would not be the choice.

ACCESS TO COMMISSARIES

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Now, there are some questions about the

provisions regarding commissaries in the treaty. Is it a correct understanding of the treaty and the agreement on implementation that

commissaries will only be open to military personnel and to U.S.

civilian employees of the canal; that is, Panamanian employees would

not be given access to the commissaries? If so, will this cause any

hardship, in your opinion?

Mr. GRAHAM. Yes, sir. First, I think we need a bit of clarification.

The Panama Canal commissaries will be closed. The employees of the

agencies, U.S. citizens only of the new commission will be given post

exchange Army commissary privileges for a period of only 5 years.

And will this create hardship on non-U.S. citizens now residing in the

Canal Zone? Yes, it will, financial hardship, yes, sir.

PLACEMENT OF PANAMA CANAL WORKERS

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Now, Mr. Graham, there have been press

reports there might be a strike by Panama Canal workers if the

President has not determined expedited procedures for the placement

of Panama Canal workers in other Federal jobs. Is this true?

Mr. GRAHAM. There have been discussions among the employees

concerning a work action. Congressman, understanding that these

employees are U.S. Government, to use the word "strike" is very

difficult. There has been discussed a work action along the lines that

you are addressing, yes, sir. However, it was decided that that was

not the proper course of action. The employees at this time will not

support any kind of work action whatsoever.

EXISTING TREATY: LONGSTANDING IRRITANT

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Now, I have been in Congress 29 years, and

I know that from the very first year I was here that the Panama

Canal question was under consideration. So, it was not merely during

the present Panamanian Government's tenure, but over many years

and regardless of who was the leader in the Government of Panama,

he was requesting a renegotiation of the treaty. Is that true?

Mr. GRAHAM. Yes; that is true.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Do you think that if we did not have the

treaty negotiated at the present time-I have some concerns and

questions about it myself-do you believe that this issue would,

nevertheless, even after Torrijos is gone and there is another government in Panama, be an irritant between the United States and

Panama?
229

Mr. GRAHAM. Absolutely.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. So eventually we would have to renegotiate

a treaty?

Mr. GRAHAM. Yes.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. And what you maintain is we could have

gotten a better deal?

Mr. GRAHAM. No; what we maintain is that, first of all, we shouldn't

be talking to a military dictator. The first problem he has is those

people are enslaved. It would have been better had the United States

years ago made it quite plain to the Panamanian people you will get

a treaty of some kind, you will get a treaty when you have a constitutional government in power. That would have served to eliminate

the military dictator.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Well, my time has expired, but wouldn't that

be intervention on our part?

Mr. GRAHAM. I don't think intervention is the proper word. I think

it is just simply telling them the truth. It is not a matter of

intervention.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. That is the way I like it myself. The people

themselves must determine what government they have.

Mr. GRAHAM. When you have a military dictatorship you cannot

determine it.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. I know. Thank you very much.

Mr. WINN.

Mr. WINN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Mr. Graham, for a very strong statement.

RIGHTS OF U.S. EMPLOYEES

I would like to ask you a couple of questions, if I may, about the

rights of U.S. employees, what rights will be guaranteed to the U.S.

employees under the new treaty.

Mr. GRAHAM. Labor rights?

Mr. WINN. Labor rights.

Mr. GRAHAM. OK. Well, under the labor rights we will get collective

bargaining. This has been important to the employees in the Canal

Zone because as far as we know we are the only Federal agency in the

entire U.S. Government that is not covered by Executive Order 11491.

This will also be the first time a Federal agency has ever gotten it by

law, a wise and important labor breakthrough.

Placement service is included for employees who will no longer be

needed by the new Commission. There will be hospitalization provisions and social security provisions included for the non-U.S.-citizen

employees who will have to move over into the Republic of Panama.

There will be continued recognition of all national and international

labor unions. There will be civil service provisions automatically

instituted without the request of the agency for early retirement procedures, and also the provision that legislation will be enacted to

liberalize the present civil service retirement system for employees in

the Canal Zone.

Mr. WINN. Basically, you got most everything in there that you

desired?

Mr. GRAHAM. Yes, sir.
230

REDUCTION IN U.S. LABOR FORCE

Mr. WINN. Do you expect most of the American employees to

remain in their jobs or do you expect a considerable attrition rate?

Mr. GRAHAM. The attrition, I think, is a mistake the way that has

been written up. Perhaps you have read the same document I have.

Twenty percent of the U.S.-citizen work force has to be eliminated

within 5 years. There is no way in the world that I can see that this

can be done by attrition. These are canal policemen, customs officials.

How do you attrition something like that? There is no job for them to

attrition into, actually. It would appear they are either going to lose

their jobs outright or have to transfer to a Federal sector in the United

States in a similar-type position.

Mr. WINN. Does that concern you as a. labor leader?

Mr. GRAHAM. Absolutely. We have discussed this problem with the

U.S. Civil Service Commission, and hopefully they will freeze open

certain positions in the United States in the Federal service that these

people can be transferred into on a priority basis.

IMPACT OF DEPARTURE OF U.S. EMPLOYEES

Mr. WINN. Another point I would like to ask you, if large numbers

of employees leave-there have been several articles along that linedo you think that the canal can be operated efficiently?

Mr. GRAHAM. No; particularly if these employees are the employees

that operate the actual waterway itself.

Mr. WINN. What percentage would that actually involve, do you

have any idea?

Mr. GRAHAM. No; I don't.

Mr. WINN. Is it a large number?

Mr. GRAHAM. The Marine Bureau is the largest Bureau in the

Panama Canal. So that would be high. I think you are probably

dealing with about 1,000 employees. Because the Dredging Division,

which is not in the Marine Bureau today, obviously would become part

of the waterway. That would increase the work force a little bit more.

Mr. WINN. Go ahead.

Mr. GRAHAM. That would be our problem. The pilot force. The

people left. We have approximately 200 pilots. The locks craft force

left. Dredging Division force, marine tropic people, tugboats. If those

people left, the waterway would be in serious difficulty.

Mr. WINN. Most of us have received mail from employees down

there or who are friends or relatives of employees basically saying that

they don't think that the Panamanians are capable of running the

canal without us taking practically the entire lead. Would that be

your opinion?

Mr. GRAHAM. Yes; that is true. I think the proof in that was that

there was a work action by U.S. citizen-employees over a year ago,

and it was strictly a U.S.-citizen employees work action, and it closed

the Panama Canal.

To put it another way, in the marine traffic section, for instance,

you have maybe six Panamanians. In the locks force, you have one

control house operator, no lock masters, less than half the craft work

force, and the pilot force you have only two Panamanians. So to now

the actual physical operation of the plant is in the hands of U.S.

citizens.
231

Mr. WINN. It is really our show, isn't it?

Mr. GRAHAM. Yes, sir.

Mr. WTINN Mr. Chairman, I see the yellow light is on. We have

also gYot a vote on on the floor. I woul(l hope that the committee could

come back to gyo over here the background of Mr. Drummond.

Is that your name?

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM DRUMMOND, LEGISLATIVE CHAIRMAN,

CENTRAL LABOR UNION/METAL TRADES COUNCIL, CANAL ZONE

Mr. DRUMMOND. Yes, sir.

Mr. WINN. Who has been involved, as I un(lerstand it, in the

lawsuit against the treaty, the signing of the treaty.

r.DRUMMON0,\D. Yes,1 sirl.

Mr. WN. Also involved in personal harassment, as Mr. Graham

said.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. If the witnesses are able to stay, the Chair is

Willing to come back.

We will vote and come back within 10 minutes.

Mr. GRAHAM. Fine.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. The committee will stand adjouincd until

12:20.

[Whereuoni, a short recess was taken.]

Chairman ZAmBoCKI. It is my understanding Mr. Winn is on his

way, so the Chair will call upon Mr. Lagomarsino.

Mr. LAGOMARSINo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

HUMAN RIGHTS IN PANAMA

If Mr. Winn returns before I am through, I will yield to him because

he did have time ahead of me. I think Mr. Winn was about to ask Mr.

Drummond if he woul(I care to comment on the human rights situation

as it applies specifically in his case and those of others that he knows

about. We hear(d some of this ourselves when we were (lown there in

March, but I think it would be well to get it on the record.

Mr. DRUMMOND. Mr. Lagomarsino, if I could (efine where I am

coming from. I consi(ler myself in respect to the treaty to have a

liberal view. I feel erplexed andl (ismayed that there are not more

people with a liberal bent to come before the several committees that

have brought this issue up to declare their opposition for this treaty.

Specifically, I can't understand how in the thrift of our Government's view that this treaty is going to be good for the people of

Panama and the people of Central and South America when you view

the fact that, as Mr. Graham pointed out, these people will be under

the dictatorship Government of Panania.

There has been discussionn here in the fact that our relations with

other countries of Central an(l South America will be jeopardized if

we don't have this treaty.

If you view these other Governments of Central an(l South America,

you will find about 90 percent of them are dictatorships that don't

represent their people; they dictate to them.

Now, I don't think the United States, the people of the United

States, have a market on the aspirations of freedoms. That is the
232

freedom of speech, the freedom of association, due process and assembly. This treaty will restrict and do away with these basic freedoms

not only for Panamanian workers living in the canal, but U.S. citizens

as well.

I feel there is a great number of people in Panama and in the canal

that are not willing to give up those basic freedoms without opposition, without some physical protest. I believe that is true in Panama as well.

I am sure you have noticed it in Central and South America where

the people have not been able to fight against the governments of

those countries, they have taken their anger and frustration out on the

multinational banking interests and concerns. You are seeing the

bombings and the riots, et cetera.

Well, it is not going to be any different in the circumstances of the

canal. So when you state that there is going to be sabotage if we don't

give up the canal, I use that term generally, you are going to have at

least that much not only from the people of Panama, but those who

live and work in the canal if their freedoms are restricted.

ACTIONS AGAINST MR. DRUMMOND

Now, in respect to my bombing, my car and so forth, this came

about because I am in opposition to the treaty and I spoke out for

civil and human rights in Panama and in the Canal Zone and this

treaty, what my view is in the future.

After reading the documentation that is available I haven't been

able to change my view. If anything, I have been more opposed to it.

The issue of my car itself I don't believe was caused by the Panama

Government against me personally. I believe it was caused only

because of the fact that the treaty negotiations were not moving

forward. It wasn't just my car that was bombed, there were other cars

throughout the Canal Zone, and there was damage to buildings,

including one hospital.

The Panama Government caused those bombings. There is no

doubt. There is documentation to prove it.

Ambassador Jordan, our Ambassador in Panama, presented to

Dictator Torrijos a protest letter in which he specifically stated we

have positive proof that members of the Guardia National were

involved in the bombings. I make a supposition that the reason for the

bombings was the fact that the Panama Government wanted to move

forward in the negotiations at that time.

We made nothing more than a protest. In fact, in that letter it

specifically states we should keep this out of the public, out of the

public news media, that here in the United States, and I would imagine

in Panama, the peoples of these countries and the Congress will not be

fully aware of who caused these bombings.

In any case, I have had a number of occasions where I have been

arrested in Panama because of my views only based on the human

rights issues.

ROLE OF CANAL EMPLOYEES

I am against the treaty and could cite many issues that it is not to

the interest of the United States, not to the interest of the Panamanian people. I believe they have been stated generally, but I continually

point out that if you do not give people these basic freedoms you are

not going to have an efficient canal. The employees are not going to be
233

captive lieutenants or captive employees, they are going to take

physical actions, some protest. That is just not the workers that are

the cause of the sabotage that everyone is talking about. I don't know.

But I do know this. That from the people I have talked to in the canal,

they are not going to be pawns in this treaty for the interests of a

dictatorship and what amounts to, in my view, the protection of

multinational banking interests in the Republic of Panama as well as

Central and South America.

The canal, as I read the treaty, is not protected, will not be protected. The interests of the taxpayers of the United States will not be

protected.

You talk about $80 million. There is a lot more money involved

here. As I count it, it is $1.5 billion and $2.5 billion over and above

the assets of the canal, and you are talking about $7 million for the

canal alone. The taxpayers are going to pay for this. It is not going

to go to the people of Panama. Panama, I believe, has a $1.4 billion

outside debt. The service on that by Panama's own Minister of Finance admits as of last year was close to $300 million which is the

loans and grants apart from the treaty.

So where are the Panamanian people going to benefit from it.

Now, the dictatorship has indicated to its people that they are

going to get a pot of gold, that everything is going to be resolved when

this treaty takes place, and to ignore the fact he is a dictator or an

oppressive one at that. We are going to have a plebiscite, they will

probably vote for the treaty. If they don't they will stuff the ballot

box and they will vote for it anyway.

I don't make that as a facetious statement. The point to be made

is what happens after that time when they find out that they have

been hoodwinked? They are going to go right back at the canal'again.

But it is not only going for the military bases, not because they just

got hoodwinked, but also because of the joint administration of the

canal which will be attacked.

I don't believe that the United States or the people of Panama or

the people of Central and South America or those countries are best

served through this treaty.

LABOR PARTICIPATION IN THE TREATY NEGOTIATIONS

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Mr. Graham, you indicated you sat in, you

were a special adviser.

Mr. GRAHAM. Yes, sir, I was AFL-CIO adviser to the U.S. treaty

team.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Did you meet with our negotiators in that

capacity.

Mr. GRAHAM. All but Mr. Linowitz. Mr. Linowitz was never in

town while I was working in the State Department. I did meet

Ambassador Bunker, Mr. Weyrough, General Dolvin, people that

were actually doing the staff work on the treaty.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Do you feel you had input into the decisions

that were reached on the labor matters?

Mr. GRAHAM. Yes.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. I congratulate you on having apparently more

influence than we have, because as far as I know no Member of Congress was consulted and asked for suggestions, so you have something

that is unique.
234

Mr. GRAHAM. This is one of the problems why we were asked not

to advertise my presence there. The shipping lobby and others would

be interested also in having advisers.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. I am quite sure they would be.

Mr. GRAHAM. However, the outcome I think speaks for itself. That

obviously the U.S. State Department was interested in Mr. Meany's

final approval, and it stands to reason that Mr. Meany has 13 million

members in the AFL-CIO, active AFL-CIO opposition to the treaty

could well result in its defeat. I believe that was the overriding factor

that persuaded Mr. Bunker to put a labor representative on the treaty

team.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. On the other hand, overwhelming opposition

by Members of Congress can result in its defeat.

GOVERNMENT OF PANAMA

Mr. GRAHAM. That is one of the things that has been bothering me

all along about this. The Government of Panama seems to think that

the Congress of the United States is some kind of big judge you didn't

have to deal with. He is a military dictator who walks into his handpicked national assembly and says all in favor say "aye" and rubberstamps every bill he hands them. Perhaps that influences his thinking

when it comes to the Senate and the Congress of the United States.

That man is really, in the United States, I think, we would term him as

somewhat of a hick.

His ignorance, for instance, of the operation of the Panama Canal is

appalling. I have personally spoken to him, and he seems to have a

notion that the ship shows up and somebody goes out in a row boat,

and picks up the check, and says go ahead, and takes off, and that is all

there is to it. A slight obstruction in the wakes of the locks never

seems to enter his mind. I also believe that he has no real knowledge

of the American legislative process, and so that, I believe, influences

him also.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. The chairman has to leave, but two very quick

questions, if I might, with the indulgence of the chairman.

ATTITUDES OF SHIPS' CAPTAINS ON THE TREATIES

When we were in Panama in March we heard, or I heard, it was sort

of indirect, it wasn't from anybody who actually told me, from somebody who heard from somebody else, the pilots of the ships that go

through, take the ships through the Panama Canal, had reported that

the captains of ships from every nation that use that canal were almost

unanimous in their opinion that the United States should not give up

the treaty. I have heard reports of that kind.

Mr. GRAHAN. No, sir, I have not, but to tell you the honest truth,

I am not a bit surprised.

LABOR SUPPORT FOR THE TREATIES

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Just one further thing. You say that President

Meany does not speak for your union when he supports the canal in

your statement here.
235

Mr. GRAHAM. Absolutely true.

Mir. LAGOMARSINO. Do you know or have any knowledge of whether

or not he speaks for other unions? In other wor(s, is this something

that has been derived from a local-on-il)-basis, or was it jist a matter

of President Meany deciding what he thought would be the right (ourse

of action?

Mr. GRAHAM. The way the operation worked, the Pan Com Committee, which was a short version of what we call a Panama Canal

Committee of AFL-CIO, held regular meetings called by me. Mr.

Polara, who was assistant to Mr. Meany, was the chairman of these

meetings. I would make progress reports and there would be international representatives from all the different international and

national unions that has locals in the Canal Zone.

As a result of our final meeting on August 26, Mr. Polara seemed

to at that time in(licate that they' were quite satisfied with the labor

provisions. We had told them at that time we were not vet satified,

that we had to round out a few problems with the Department of

Defense, which I have outlined there in my presentation. However, it

is my belief Mr. Polara did report to Mr. Meany that he felt that the

provisions were satisfactory and on the 30th of the nionth we had an

executive council meeting of the AFL-CIO.

Now, this is a very important group of international and national

presidents who sit on the executive council. Mr. Mean asked them

if they felt that the labor provisions were satisfactor a nd they for

the most part agreed that they were. There were a number of (1ssenting presidents. However, they were dissentingr more on the ground

that the treaty was not a proper document in itself rather than the

labor issues in it, and so Mr. Meany elected to come out and support

the Panama-United States Treatv.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. But the discussion was about the labor provi

sions in it?

Mr. GRAHAM. Yes, sir.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Thank you.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE wITNESSES

Chairman ZABLOCKI. I believe Congressman Winn wanted for the

record some background information of both of you gentlemen. Perhaps you could supply that for the record. For example, how long

you have been in Panama, what your activities are.1

Mr. GRAHAM. OK.

Chairman ZABLOCKJ. If you would supply it for the record. You

don't have to do it now.

Likewise, your associate, if you will supply that. I think that is

what Mr. Winn had in mind. I am not sure. Some background information of your activities, how long you have been in Panama, and

so forth.

Thank vou very much, gentlemen.

The committee stands adjourned subject to the call of the Chair.

[Whereupon, at 12:45 p.m., the committee adjourned, subject to

the call of the Chair.]

I The material had not been submitted at time of printing.

PROPOSED PANAMA CANAL TREATIES

MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 26, 1977

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,

Washington, D.C.

The committee met at 10:45 a.m. in room 2172, Rayburn House

Office Building, Hon. Clement J. Zablocki (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. The committee will please come to order.

It is the Chair's understanding some of the members will be coming

very shortly and, as you know, Secretary Brown, and General Brown,

on Monday morning it is difficult for members to get in on time.

This morning we meet to continue the committee's hearings on the

proposed Panama Canal Treaties and related legislation.

One of the major issues which has arisen in the course of our hearings

is the continued ability of the United States, under the terms of the

treaty, to defend the canal, particularly after the year 2000.

In order to respond to this, and related issues, we are honored to

have before us today two distinguished witnesses from the Department

of Defense, Hon. Harold Brown, Secretary of Defense, and Gen.

George S. Brown, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Gentlemen, on behalf of the committee members, it is a pleasure to

welcome you to the International Relations Committee this morning.

May I suggest, if it is agreeable with our witnesses, that we first hear

the prepared statements, after which we will proceed with questions

from the members.

We will start with testimony from the Secretary of Defense, Hon.

Harold Brown.

Mr. Secretary, if you will begin, please.

STATEMENT OF HON. HAROLD BROWN, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Secretary BROWN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, it is a great privilege

and pleasure to appear before you today to testify on these matters.

Just over 63 years ago last month the first U.S. vessel crossed

through the Panama Canal from one to the other of the two great

oceans which border our country.

Let us strip the matter to its essentials. The deliberations that begin

in this committee room today are vital. As much as any other factor,

they will determine whether we can be confident that our ships of war

and vessels of commerce will continue to use that important but

fragile waterway during and beyond the last quarter of the 20th

century as they did in the first.

(237)
238

We have always been a pract ical people-proud of our history, but

not sentimental; remembering where we have been, but oriented

toward the future. The members of this committee are all practical

individuals, or you would not hold the offices you do. In my judgment, the issues before you are practical ones, and it is in practical terms

that I shall address them.

On September 7, 1977, the President signed two treaties affecting

the operation and control of the Panama Canal. I am pleased to

appear before you this morning with Gen. George Brown, Chairman

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to state that the Department of Defense

whole-heartedly and fully supports these treaties, and to explain

why I believe they deserve our-and your-full support.

Quite properly, the fccus of your deliberations must be on whether

these treaties promote the national interest-and specifically the

national security interest-of the United States. To help in answering

that (question, there are three points that I consider critical:

Use of the canal is more important than ownership.

Efficient operation of the canal in the years ahead is more important

than nostalgia for a simpler past.

Ability to defend and control access to the canal is essential. But the

issue is how that ability can best be assured-by a cooperative effort

with a friendly Panama, or by a garrison amid hostile surroundings. I have examined these issues personally and in some detail. So have

the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Department of Defense has been fully

involved in all stages of the drafting and negotiation of these treaties.

Specifically, the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs have been

represented during the past couple of years by retired Army Lt. Gen.

Welburn Dolvin, who was a deputy negotiator on the negotiating team,

and is with us todav.

As a result of the participation and these examinations, the Department of Defense position and my position personally is as follows: Mr.

Chairman, I believe, personally, and in the light of my responsibilities

as Secretary of Defense, that these treaties fully serve, and greatly

promote, our national security interests. The joint Chiefs of Staff, as

General Brown will tell you, share that assessment. These treaties

deal with today's realities. They provide the security which we need

for the future.

I see three elements which together make up our national security

concerns relating to the canal. These are:

First, unimpeded use;

Second, effective operation; and

Finally, physical security of the canal.

These are our paramount objectives.

The first requirement includes free and unimpeded use of the canal

both by our Navy and by our merchant ships. Free use of the canal is

essential to assure optimum ability to shift our forces and materiel

rapidly between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. That capability

enhances our defense posture in both the European and Pacific

regions.

The neutrality treaty-more formally, the Treaty Concerning the

Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama Canal-provides

that the canal shall be open permanently to all vessels of all nations.

Moreover, it contains an important additional provision. The United

States is given a preferred position with respect to the use of the canal,
239

a position which no other country except Paiimia will enjoy: U.S.

vessels of war, and the U.S. auxiliary fleet-import ant examples of

which are oilers and su pply ships-are gua ranteed rapid transit t hrotugh

the canal. This is so irrespective of the cargo they carry. These provisions assure us that the United States will remain able to use the canal

in timely fashion whenever military necessity dictates, just as we can

today.

Our second national security requirement is that the canal operate

effectively. The Panama Canal Treat y provides that during its

term the United States will operate the canal, with increasing participation of Panamanian managers and workers operating under the

treaty terms according to U.S. laws and regulations. Thus, the United

States can continue the present efficient operation of the canal for

many years to come, and the Panamanians will be in a position to

operate it successfully when the treaty expires.

Our third national security requirement is that we must be able to

defend the canal from hostile acts. Our Armed Forces now control, and

they will continue to control with overwhelming forces, the sea upproaches to the canal, on both the Pacific and Caribbean ends. This

is not affected by the treaty.

The treaty goes even fuirther, however. It states unequivocally that

during the life of the treaty, the U.S. Armed Forces shall enjoy the

right and the primary responsibility to defend the canal itself. It

further provides that during that period the United States may station,

train, and support units of our Armled Forces in Panama, and that the

United States will decide unilaterally whether and how to modify the

force levels we maintain there. All key military bases and training areas

which we now operate in the Canal Zone will remain under U.S.

control.

When the Panama Canal Treaty expires, as the year 2000 dawns, the

neutrality treaty provides that United States and Panama are to

maintain jointly the permfanent neutrality of the canal, and that no

troops other than Panamanian may be stationed in Panama. The United

States is also made a guarantor of the neutrality of the canal. In that

capacity, we have the right to take appropriate measures to enforce

this guarantee. In my judgment, these provisions insure that the

U.S. ability and unilateral right to defend the canal against any

external threat remain unimpaired.

There is another aspect of the third national security requirement-ability to defend the canal from hostile acts-which cannot

be ignored. Such hostile acts might not be external. If Panama and

other Latin American countries, or major elements of the Panamanian

population, became hostile to the United States, then protecting the

canal against internal threats, terrorism, and guerrilla actions would

become more difficult. Such occurrences are far less likely under the

new treaty than they would be if the long unsettled status quo were

to continue. The treaty is a gauge of our Olood faith, toward Panama

and all of Latin America. It also provides Panama with a tangible

stake in the continued effective operation of the canal. Further, the

treaty contemplates a combined defense agreement between the United

States and Panama as a result of which Panama's armed forces will

be able to protect the canal against threats from within Panama more

effectively than they can at present. Nothing in life, and still less in

international life, is certain. But all these elements should add to the

9S-991-77---17
240

real security of the canal, and make its availability for United States

use much more sure than any alternative course of action.

As I see it, and I do not think anyone with national security responsibilities disagrees, the Panama Canal will, for the foreseeable

future, be an important defense artery for the United States. The

treaties which you are examining provide real security, not paper

claims. They offer the firmest and, most practical guarantees obtainable that the canal will remain operational, secure, and available to

the United States.

The canal was built for shipping, not slogans. We seek to guarantee

transit of vessels, not theoretical claims of title. These goals we have

sought, as I said at the beginning, are practical. The issues before you

are practical ones. Our negotiations have obtained instruments

which-more certainly than thousands of forces and their armaments

on the spot-will assure those practical objectives for generations to

come. I am convinved that approval of these treaties will best provide

for our national security.

Following General Brown's prepared statement, we will both be

prepared to answer any questions you may have, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ZABLOCK. Thank you, Secretary Brown.

General Brown.

STATEMENT OF GEN. GEORGE S. BROWN, CHAIRMAN, JOINT

CHIEFS OF STAFF

General BROWN. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee,

I am here to discuss the security aspects of the proposed Panama

Canal Treaty.

Th Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize the Panama Canal as a major

defense aset, the use of which enhances U.S. capability for timely

reinforcement of U.S. forces. The strategic military value of the

canal is reflected in our ability to accelerate the shift of military forces

and logistic support by sea between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.

The strategic value of the canal is not expected to change substantially

throughout the life of the new Panama Canal Treaty and beyond, so

long as the canal provides the sole means of transiting ships across the

American continent.

U.S. military interests in the Panama Canal are in its use, not its

ownership. Therefore, any new treaty must assure that access to and

security of the Panama Canal are protected in times of war and peace.

This assurance is provided by a permanent regime of neutrality to be

maintained by the United States and Panama, which specifies that

the canal will remain open to all world shipping at reasonable tolls,

without discrimination, in accordance with specific rules of neutrality, and that it will always be operated efficiently under rules that are

just, equitable, and reasonable and necessary for safe navigation and

efficient, -anitary operation.

Defenv-e of the Panama Canal has two components: internal security

and external defense. Both are presently the responsibility of the U.S.

Government.

Internal security entails surveillance and control. It is primarily

concerned with countering sabotage and terrorist activities. Currentfly, the Canal Zone's police and security forces are responsIble

for internal security. When required, reinforcement is provided by the
241

U.S. military units assigned to U.S. Southern Command. Under the

new Panama Canal Treaty, there will no longer be a Canal Zone, and

police functions will become the responsibility of the Government of

Panama. However, the Canal Commission will continue to provide

security for canal installations. The military units of U.S. Southern

Command will be available to augment the Panamanian Forces and

Commission guards.

External defense is concerned with defense against armed attack by

hostile forces using guerrilla or conventional tactics. Under the new

Panama Canal Treaty, the United States will have primary responsibility for the defense of the canal during the balance of this century.

Under the new Panama Canal Treaty, the Panamanian Guardia

Nacional and the appropriate U.S. Forces Commander will develop

plans in concert to provide for mutual defense. The Joint Chiefs of

Staff will continue to plan for rapid reinforcement of U.S. Southern

Command in the event of emeroencv need.

Our capability to defend the Panama Canal will be enhanced

through cooperation with the Government of Panama. The new

treaty provides a. basis for such cooperation between the United

states and Panama. The alliance relationship should develop and

strengthen during the life of the Panama Canal Treaty and be further

enhanced by the Neutrality Treaty. The regime of neutrality provided in the Neutrality Treaty calls for a canal open to all ships

of all nations in times of peace or war. It specifically provides that

United States and Panamanian naval ships shall transit expeditiously

without impediments or preconditions. Since both the United States

and Panama agree to this regime, our right to take the measures

that we may deem to be necessary to maintain the canal's neutrality

is assured.

For these reasons, the Joint Chiefs of Staff support the treaty as

being protective of the military interests of the United States and

as providing an effective basis for defense of the canal.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Thank you, General Brown.

Gentlemen, we thank you for both of your statements. Some of the

questions I had you have already addressed; nevertheless, I think wdesire to have some further elucidation on the questions.

SECRETARY BROWN AND GENERAL BROWN DENY BEING "UNDER THE

GUN" TO SUPPORT TREATIES

In your prepared statement, Mr. Secretary, on page 2, yon say,

"The Department of Defense has been fully involved in all stages of

the drafting and the negotiating of these three treaties." Nevertheless4,

I am prompted to ask you this question because the opponents of the

proposed treaties have charged that Defense Department, particularly

the Joint Chiefs of Staff, support the ratification of the treaties only

because they are under the gun.

If vou both were not presently serving in the executive branch,

would vou still support the ratification of the treaties?

Mr. Secretary, then General Brown.

Secretary BRoWN. Yes.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Does the assumption that you are supporting

it "under the guin" have any validity?
242

Secretary BROWN. No; it has not. I will let General Brown speak

for himself, but I am confident that in his case it does not as well.

There is no doubt, Mr. Chairman, that if a member of the executive

branch wants actively to oppose a Presidential decision, the appropriate way to do it is to resign and then oppose it-if he wants to oppose

it publicly. But it is quite a different matter to say that active and

enthusiastic support can be obtained that way. As all of you who have

been in the Government know, active and enthusiastic support is

not so commanded and, therefore, when I make a statement as strong

as this and speak publicly on the issue and answer questions on it

favorably, it is because I genuinely support the treaties and believe

that they are the best action that we can take to preserve our national

security interests in the Panama Canal.

General Brown may want to speak.

General BROWN. Mr. Chairman, the charge has been made by one

or more columnists and several individuals around the country that

the Joint Chiefs of Staff and I particularly support these treaties

because the Commander in Chief has made a decision. As Secretary

Brown has stated, the only appropriate way for us to fail to be supportive of a decision is to leave active duty and then take an adversary

position. But there is another fact of life. The rules of the game quite clearly

provide that we will testify before Congress and in response to interrogation will respond fully and factually to every question. This I

have (lone for many years.

OPPOSITION OF THE JOINT CHIEFS TO TROOP WITHDRAWAL FROM KOREA

I testified before this committee, if you will recall, on the issue of

the proposed withdrawal of the U.S. ground combat forces in Korea,,

and the public record will show that the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not

support that proposed action in January. We addressed a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense and in turn to the President, which

stated that three provisions should be accounted for: (1) That we

should withdraw our forces in such a manner that the military balance,

was retained or not disturbed; (2) that there should be a public

pledge to the continued mutual security treaty with the Republic of

Korea; and (3) that we remain a Pacific power. These were accepted,

and at that point, the Joint Chiefs of Staff supported the proposed

program and have worked diligently to plan for that to occur over 4

or 5 years.

JOINT CHIEFS POSITION ON THE B-1 BOMBER

Similarly, and it will come as no surprise, we did not share the

judgment on the B-1, we thought the B-1 should go into production.,

and so recommended, but that judgment went against us.

So it is not right to say that the Joint Chiefs of Staff are supportive

of the President in all cases. The public record is quite clear in testimony before Congress. Particularly, on the Panama Canal Treaty

issue, I have personally worked hard for 4 years to achieve these

treaties. And we have had General Dolvin as a member of the negotiating delegation. We have worked out in detail, that is, the Joint

Chiefs of Staff and the U.S. Commander of the Southern Command,
243

the so-called waters and land issues, that is, what land and waters we

could give up from the Canal Zone that were no longer required for

defense or operation of the Canal.

ROLE OF DOD IN THE FORMULATION OF THE NEUTRALITY TREATY

Similarly, I think I share with Secretary Brown a pride that it was

in the Department of Defense that the formulation which found its

way into the form of the Neutrality Treaty was given birth. As a

matter of fact, it came from Secretary Brown in our conversation one

day. From that it evolved into what we now find as the Neutrality

Treaty, which was the hard essential thing to achieve, because we

had asked in effect for Panama, and they have now agreed to (1o

something forever, which they had said they would not do, perpetuity

was to be ended. And so it is just not right to say that the Joint

Chiefs of Staff are with these treaties only because of the decision.

Chairman ZABLOCKi. To put the doubt to bed, I will restate the

question, and maybe you can answer yes or no, you have no reservations whatsoever?

General BROWN. I realize I could have answered with a no. I have

heard it repeate(l, too often, Mr. Chairman.

DEFENSE OF THE CANAL AGAINST GUERRILLA ATTACK

Chairman ZABLOCKI. General, on page 2, referring to the external

defense, defense against armed attack by hostile forces using guerrilla

and conventional tactics; what are the plans in this regard?

General BROWN. Well, I think it would be inappropriate in open

session to go into them in any detail but let me say as a generalization it, like all of our contingency plans, is conceptional in nature

simply because we don't have the details of the situation that would be

needed to do a detailed plan. We don't know what the situation will

be with precision. But as a generalization, we have designated units

by type in response to General McAuliffe's stated needs, in the Unite(l

States, they are alerted to move under certain conditions on orders

from the Secretary of Defense to Panama.

Composition of these units is as felt would be needed to respond

principally to guerrilla tactics and a conventional landing. The size

of the deployment would depen(l entirely on the specific circumstances.

They would move principally by air making use principally of

Howard Air Force Base and would round out the force that are currently in the Panama Canal Zone.

ABILITY OF UNITED STATES TO DEFEND CANAL ABSENT A U.S.

MILITARY PRESENCE

Chairman ZABLOCKI. General, a related question. You described

on page 2 the dual components of the defense of the canal as being

internal security and external defensee. Opponents of the treaties

have chare(ed that once actual U.S. military presence in the canal

ceases, the capability of this country to defend the canal will be diminished. Would you please respond to this charge?

General BROWN. Well, Mr. Chairman, once all of our forces are

withdrawn from Panama, which must be no later than the turn of the

century, we feel we will leave the Panamanian security force-the
244

Guardia Nacional-in adequate strength and composition and equipment to provide for internal security.

As Secretary Brown said in his statement, do not doubt for one

minute the capability of U.S. naval and air forces to surveil the approaches to the canal. So I don't think it is a realistic worry that we

will have an invasion.

Internally, I think, when Panama gives a sign of needing help we

can respond in a matter of hours to Panama.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Would you expect that they would seek such

help from the United States rather than from Cuba?

U.S. RIGHT TO REINTRODUCE FORCES IN PANAMA TO DEFEND THE

NEUTRALITY OF THE CANAL

General BROWN. Oh, certainly. As a matter of fact, should they

not, those Americans that we have down there in the Embassy or any

other source of information we have that indicate that the canal is

threatened, we certainly under this treaty have the right to reintroduce forces to maintain that regime of neutrality.

RELATIONSHIP OF THE PANAMANIAN AND CUBAN GOVERNMENTS

Chairman ZABLOCKI. The closeness of the Panama Government

at the present time to Cuba is what the real concern is about among

some of the Members of Congress, as you well understand. In my

opinion, if we normalize relations with Cuba our problems would

cease.

I will, however persue that question with the Secretary of State;

my time has expired.

Mr. Lagomarsino.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

WERE THE JOINT CHIEFS "SINGLAUBED"

General Brown, I presume that you don't agree with the witness

who testified last week or the week before and who when asked why

the Joint Chiefs of Staff supported the treaty suggested perhaps they

had been "Singlaubed". You would not agree with that characterization, I take it?

General BROWN. No; I don't agree with it and I read what the

press had to say about the testimony. Apparently the witness has

information I don't have.

OPPOSITION OF FORMER MEMBERS OF THE JOINT CHIEFS

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Why are so many former members of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff in opposition to the treaty. I understand they are.

Although we have not heard from them yet.

General BROWN. Well, all I can say, Mr. Congressman, is that a

letter was sent to the President signed by four former Chiefs of Naval

Operations, one of whom was the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff-they were all members at one time or another-and in going

through that letter, first of all, it was written before the treaties were

available, they had not been read by these men, they couldn't have

been, they hadn't been consummated, and when I read the letter and
245

went through it point by point, most of it I agree with. I don't find

reasons to disagree.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. You just come to a different conclusion, is

that right?

General BROWN. Yes.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Let me ask you, in fact both of you, I would

hope we could keep the answers rather brief, so I can finish the line

of questioning if I might.

U.S. RIGHT TO DEFEND CANAL'S NEUTRALITY-KEY TO 1)L SUPPORT

Would you support the treaties if they did not contain the right of

this Nation to intervene in Panama to protect the neutrality of the

canal, even against Panama?

General BRiOwN. I would not.

Secretary BROWN. I would have to think very carefully about what

exactly it said, Mr. Lagomarsino, but I believe that the assured

neutrality is the key to my support.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Do you read the agreements to give the United

States the right to determine if and when neutrality is violated?

U.S. MAY DETERMINE, UNILATERALLY, ANY NEED TO DEFEND CANAL

Secretary BROWN. Yes. I read the treaty to provide the United

States the right to determine by itself the need to assure the neutrality. I believe that both Panama and the United States are under

the arrangements of the Neutrality Treaty, empowered to determine

separately for themselves.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. General, do you agree with that?

General BROwN. I do. As I understand article IV, while I am not

a lawyer, since it does not limit the responsibility, in time or condition,

therefore it is open ended that the United States and the Republic of

Panama agree to a regime of neutrality, to do exactly as you said.

U.S. INTERPRETATION OF NEUTRALITY TREATY CONTRADICTED BY

PANAMANIAN NEGOTIATOR

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Now, as you may know, Panamanian negotiator Escobar Bethancourt recently stated, quote, "The pact does

not establish that the United States has a right to intervene in

Panama". And he also said, "The Neutrality pact does not provide

that the United States will say when neutrality is violated".

Apparently, he at least, does not believe ihat Panama agreed to

allow the United States to intervene for the protection of the canal

and you can make the determination when the neutrality has been

broken.

We had a discussion with former Secretary of State Kissinger last

week on this issue and he expressed some concern about this apparent

ambiguity, the U.S. Government saying one thing and apparently

at least some Panamanians saving exactly the opposite, and it would

seem to me that that being as fundamental an issue as it is, and I

certainly agree with what you said, that it is fundamental, that we

can't afford to have an agreement that is ambiguous, and my question

is why don't we spell this out, if there is such a disagreement?
246

Secretary BROWN. Mr. Lagomarsino, since we are quoting, let me

quote what General Torrijos said.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. I understand what he said.

Secretary BROWN. He is a man of some influence there.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. A little bit, which bothers me also, incidentally.

GENERAL TORRIJOS: CANAL IS UNDER "UMBRELLA" OF PENTAGON

Secretary BROWN. Perhaps what he says about this then reassures

you. He says that the treaty does not enjoy the approval of all our

people because, among other things, he said we are agreed ng to a

treaty of neutrality which places us under the protective umbrella

of the Pentagon, that is a farily strong statement.

I would also add that what we need to do is compare the situation

now with the situation under the Neutrality Treaty. I would be very

surprised if Panamanians who believe that our ability to intervene

is limited under the Neutrality Treaty would consider it unlimited

now. I think that this is the comparison that has to be made.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. As long as you are quoting General Torrijos

I will quote him back to you, a statement he made after the one you

mentioned.

This was on September 15, to the opening of the 10th Congress of the

Panamanian Students Federation at the Augusto Samuel Boyd

National Agricultural Institute in Pamana.

I am not afraid nor am I denying we signed a clause which if misinterpreted

by future U.S. generations could give place to intervening but I am not afraid, I

know the youth we are producing, and in order for there to he intervention there

must be a people willing to accept intervention, and these people have no intentions of accepting it.

NEED TO CLARIFY AMBIGUITY IN NEUTRALITY TREATY

All I am suggesting is there appears to be ambiguity, as Secretary

Kissinger said, I think that if we are going to have a treaty we should

certainly not have one that starts out in an ambiguous way.

He suggested that the Senate, he didn't use the word, "reserve,"

but I guess that is what it amounts to, they make it very plain if they

do rat ify the treaty, that we do have the right to intervene militarily.

Would you oppose that?

Secretary BRowN. I consider that we do have the right to intervene

to preserve the neutraility of the canal and that is clear so far as I am

concerned.

Again, I would urge that we make a comparison not between what

some people say now and what they might say then, but between

our rights now and our abilities now and our abilities under those

circllmnstances; that is, if the treaty is ratified. My judgment is that

the need to intervene would be much less if the treaty is approved

and that our right to intervene is fully preserved by the Neutrality

Treatv.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. We have apparently a disagreement between

the two sides. Again, my point is I think we should not have ambigruities when we know about them. They are bad enough when

they come ulp later.
247

RIGHT OF EXPEDITIOUS PASSAGE THROUGH CANAL

With regard to the "right of expeditious passage,'' I believe that

is a term used In the treaty, for our ships, not only our commercial

ships but our warships. Apparently again there is some atmlbigtity

there in the statement, Mr. Secretary, let's see if I ca fitnd it.

Yon say the United States is given a pieferied position with respect

to use of the canal, a positions which 11o other country except Paiaina

will enjoy.

Apparently, again Mr. Bethancourt has said:

When they, United States, saw there wA8 no we would allow privileged

passage, then they told us, we have to seek a formula so the Pentagon will see

we are somehow taking them into coinsideration. This is how the expeditions

passge came about. We do 11t believe 111A when they explain the expeditious

passage terni thev will give the stm1e expmam8tion I un giviiig here. Tiny have

to sell their merchn11(di e. It is the sanle Iere hanlildise but with different wIr'1ppinlg,

they do not think as we do. 'lev have to (el this tre'ltv to their country, '11n

for this reason vou see that both of us give different information on the same

prov'ision.

Are you maintaining that we have preferred position or only

expeditious passage which could indicate only that if we get ii line

they will take our ships when our turn comes?

Secretary BRoNio . I will read from article VI which undoubtedly

you have read. It says:

In recognition of the important contiut iions of the Uiiitfid States of America

and of the Republie of Panama to the constructioi, operation, mainitenalice, and

protection and defense of the canal, vessels of war antI auxiliary vese I

of those nations shall, nothwith4t ending any ether provisions of t1his treaty, be

entitled to transit the cai11 irrv spective of their internal operations, 11letans of

propulsion, origin, destimation1, 1 mi alrielit or earlo carried. Such vessels of war

-Ind auxiliary vessels will he entitled to transit the canal, expeditiously.

I can't read that any way except as a preferred position for the

United States and PanaImnaniian vessels.

Mr. LAGOMARsINO. Well, again, apparently we have a different

interpretation on the part of the Panaimanians. Again if these things

are as important as we all agree, why aren't they spelled out in the

treaty?

Secretary BROWN. this tell, is spelled out.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. But there apparently is a dispute as to what the

term "expeditions" means. The Panamanians, at least Mr. Belh ancourt, who is one of the negotiators, says it (toes not mean privileged

p~assage.

Secretary BROWN. Expeditious maeis without delay. So long as it is

without delav it meets our needs.

Mr. LAGOMA1RSINO. Thank You.

Chairman Z.nm OcKI. Mr. Danielson.

Mr. DANIELSON. First, I observe, I mess both of you gentlemen

do favor the treaties?

Secretary BROwN. Yes, sir.

RIGHTS OF TRANSIT DURING WARTIME

Mr. DANIELSON. 1 have one specific item to inquire on.

As I read the treaties, they provide for the right of transit for

vessels of war and vessels of commerce in time of peace or war for

all nations.
248

Am I correct at that point?

Secretary BROWN. That is correct.

Mr. DANIELSON. I want you to help me answer some questions that

I am asked when I appear before local groups at home.

Does this encompass the right of nations which are at war with

each other to have their vessels of war transit the canal?

* Secretary BROWN. I believe it does, Mr. Danielson. There is, I think,

some reason to believe that the present situation also is that way, The Hay-Ponsforth treaty between the United States and the United

Kingdom requires free transit. Some people say that is not so, that if

we were at war we could keep ships from going through the canal.

Mr. DANIELSON. I would like to narrow the focus just a little bit.

Let's go back, 35 years, 36 or 37 years, 37 years-Great Britain and

Germany are at war, we are not.

Secretary BROWN. Yes, sir.

Mr. DANIELSON. A British man-of-war seeks to transit the canal.

Could we under the terms of this treaty, if it were then in effect,

prevent that or must we permit it?

Secretary BROWN. I think that passage is permitted.

Mr. DANIELSON. How about a German ship, the same thing?

Secretary BROWN. I think passage is permitted, certainly if we are

not at war with either of those two.

Mr. DANIELSON. Just the hypothesis I gave you, 1940, we are not

at war.

Secretary BROWN. Passage through is permitted.

Mr. DANIELSON. Suppose both of them showed up at the same time.

Suppose they both show up with a ship at the same time, may they

transit?

Secretary BROWN. I believe the answer is yes.

Mr. DANIELSON. Assuming now they are going in the opposite

direction, they are meeting in the big lake in the middle, are they going

to line the rails and render honors to each other, are they going to start

shooting?

Secretary BROWN. That is a matter of procedures for passing

through the canal. I think that the last thing that we would want

under any circumstances is to have a ship sunk in the canal.

Mr. DANIELSON. That is what I want to talk about. Suppose you

have a vessel of commerce under the German or British flag, under

the same circumstances. Under the treaty, we may not inspect the

cargo, as I see it?

Secretary BROWN. Of United States or Panamanian ships?

Mr. DANIELSON. You may inspect the cargo of foreign ships?

Secretary BROWN. I am not aware of that situation. The passage

that I read to you regards United States and Panamanian ships.

Mr. DANIELSON. Well, I hope that you are answering my question.

I don't question your response, but I hope you are giving me the

answer I have been looking for.

As I see it, on page 14 of this protocol that we have here, article

III, subparagraph (e):

Vessels of war and auxiliary vessels of all nations shall at all times be entitled

to transit the canal irrespective of the internal operation, means of propulsion

or origin, destination or armament without being subjected as a condition of transit to inspection, search or surveillance.
249

That would include cargo, as I see it, because if you can't conduct

an on board inspection, how are you going to know but what they

have explosives down in the hold?

I remember during the war the Japanese had some dedicated troops

called kamikazes who would have been delighted to blow up their

ship in the middle of the locks in order to stop the canal. Would you

respond at least generally to that, because it is a question I have a

tough time answering and I am supporting the treaty. I have a tough

time answering that question when my constituents put it to me.

Secretary BROWN. I think it is a legitimate question. Although it

may be somewhat theoretical.

Mr. DANIELSON. Theoretical, yes, but I do remember a war, sir,

and I do remember people willing to blow themselves up.

Secretary BROWN. In addition the treaty states that a vessel shall

be entitled to refuse to disclose its cargo but written assurances may

be required.

Mr. DANIELSON. I would say that a kamikaze would be glad to

write out a letter-I hereby certify under the penalty of perjury that

I don't intend to blow up this ship in the locks-and then go ahead

and blow it up. That is my honest opinion.

Secretary BROWN. I would have to defer to the lawyers on this

question. What I am told is that no inspections would be possible

under such circumstances.

Mr. DANIELSON. Well

Secretary BROWN. But I think you better get a definitive answer

from the State Department legal people.

Mr. DANIELSON. No pun intended. When I hear generals and Secretaries of Defense generalizing, I worry a little bit, and in all frankness

I urge that you work out some kind of explanation to this point, because although I am supporting the treaties, I will tell you it is tough

when you face a citizens group and they ask that question and you

don't have an answer, they tell me I had better get one. That is what

I am looking for.

Secretary BROWN. I should say again what we ought to find out. I

am not well informed enough to answer as to how this differs from the

present situation.

Mr. DANIELSON. Well, I can remember, let's move up to 1944, we

are in the war now. Do you suppose we would have allowed a Japanese

ship to transit the canal?

Secretary BROWN. No; but we would not have sunk them in the

canal. We would have taken care of it at the approaches. This guarantees transit through the canal; it does not guarantee transit to it.

Mr. DANIELSON. I'm glad you said that because that is the answer I

have been giving and I am glad that somebody in Defense gives it,

too. In other words, though they can go through the canal, once they

get into it you don't guarantee they are going to get into it in the first

place?

Secretary BROWN. Yes.

Mr. DANIELSON. A few good picket ships might help?

Secretary BROWN. Our military forces really would have to deal

with the situation outside of the canal, as they would now.

Mr. DANIELSON. Well, thank you very much.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Mr. Fountain.
250

Mr. FOUNTAIN. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Mr. Fascell.

USE OF TERM "INTERVENTION

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Chairman, gentlemen, I think we ought to talk

about the word intervention and its meaning. Otherwise a misconception could be created in the record. Intervention against whom for

what? It seems to me that the treaty guarantees neutrality or a

regime of neutrality. If the United States acts militarily to carry out

its responsibility under the treaty, it is not proper to call that action

intervention as the term is commonly used. 1 think the intervention is

used too loosely.

Both countries have a responsibility to guarantee or maintain a

regime of neutrality. That is all the treaty says, isn't that correct?

Secretary BROWN. That is what it says.

Mr. FAsCELL. To describe or define the right of the United States

under that treaty to exercise its military forces, is an incorrect use of

the word intervention. Do you agree?

Secretary BROWN. It is a loose use, I agree with that. I think that

what we would do

Mr. FASCELL. Intervention in the military sense means you are

going to intervene in the state of hostility, armed warfare.

Secretary BROWN. Yes sir, you are quite right. One would have to

say whom one is going to intervene against; whether it takes place will

depend on the circumstances. Certainly this does not give us any right

to interfere in the internal affairs of Panama.

What it does, is to give us the right to assure the neutrality of the

canal.

Mr. FASCELL. So, if a third force were engaged against the country

of Panama, if it is actually military, and the United States has the

responsibility of helping maintain the regime of neutrality, in that

sense if the United States acted, you could use the word intervention,

could you not?

Secretary BROWN. Yes, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. Intervention in the sense, in the political sense, in

terms of intervening in the activity of the Panamanian Government

is quite another thing. But it doesn't in any way derogate or lessen

the responsibility of both countries to maintain the regime of neutrality, isn't that correct?

Secretary BROWN. That is correct.

Mr. FASCELL. So under inter-American treaties that now exist

which proscribe intervention by any American government in the

processes of another American government, the United States could

subscribe and does subscribe to that treaty.

But it still maintains its obligations and its right under this new

Panama Canal treaty, which is for the maintenance of a regime of

neutrality with respect to the canal. Isn't that true?

Secretary BROWN. Yes.

General BROWN. I would agree.

Mr. FAsCELL. That leaves only one question then, and that would

be the question, if in some way the Government of Panama, regardless

of its nature, decides that it wants to expropriate the canal. In that
251

situation, I want to see if you gentlemen agree, there is no greater

problem or lesser problem for the United Sta tes under the new treaty

than there was under the old treaty, is that correct?

Secretary BRowN. I see no difference.

\Mr. YASCELL. Let's talk about the blocked canal. If a ship is going

to be used to block a canal during transit it wouldn't make any

difference what the treaty said, would it?

Secrelarv BRowN. If the canal is blocked?

Mr. FASCELL. If it is blocked.

Secretary BRowN. It doesn't matter whether there is a Canal Zone

or not.

Mlr. FASCELL. If Somebody wants to block the canal now with a ship

you can't stole) them under this treaty, can you?

Secretary BROWN. I don't see any substantial difference between

the present and the future situation.

ir. FASCELL. I like the gentleman from California's approach,

don't let them get to it. I like that better, I think that makes a lot

more sense.

MILITARYY IMPORTANCE OF CANAL

One other point, General, regarding the military use of the canal.

Obviouily it has important military use,. First, the United States

maintains and operates a two-ocean navy, is that true?

General BRowN. A qualified yes.

Mr. FAs CELL. A qualified yes. You want more aircraft carrier>.

General Buowx. No, not necessarily. But there are conditions. sir,

where under certain planning conditions, we have to take forces from

the Pacific to support the Atlantic operation.

M r. FASCELL. A very good point.

Now, during the time of peace, or during times when the United

States is not directly involved in hostilities with a major sea power,

air power or missile power, I can see a naval commander or the Joint

Chiefs moving their Navy forces from one ocean to another and usinlg

the canal, can't vou?

General BRoWN. Certainly.

Mr. FASCELL. If the United States, however, is in direct hostilities

with a major force which has a sea, air, and missile capability do yoU

think -ny naval commander in his right mind in the course of hostilities

would run his fleet through the Panama Canal?

General BnowN. That depends on the situation. Just because a

country has a strategic nuclear

Mr. FASCELL. It doesn't

General BROWN. Ballistic missile force

Mr. FASCELL. It doesn't mean they are going to blow up the canal?

General BRowN. That is the point.

Mr. FASCELL. So you can take a chance depending on where the

forces are?

General BROWN. You couldn't get the whole fleet in the canal at one

time like we had at Pearl Harbor.

Mr. IAsCELL. I will tell you what, if I was a naval commander on

the other side, I am certainly not a military expert, I think I would

have my submarines at each end of the canal, when they came up I

would pick them off like ducks.
252

General BROWN. We are not totally impotent in the approaches to

the canal.

Mr. FASCELL. All I am saying, these are military factors which

would have to be considered?

General BROWN. Absolutely.

Mr. FASCELL. And that is also true with respect to commerce, is it

not? In time of war, you do have to face the fact that your opponent could sink your ships either going in or coming out of the canal.

Secretary BROWN. That was assumed so in World War II.

Mr. FASCELL. It doesn't make any difference what the treaty says, does it?

Secretary BROWN. I agree with you that the military situation

around the Panama Canal

Mr. FASCELL. The only point I am making, Mr. Secretary, which is

obvious, I hope, is that the responsibilities, the questions, the military

and economic factors that you have to take into consideration, with

regard to the utility of the Panama Canal are exactly the same under

the new treaty as they were under the old treaty, is that correct?

General BROWN. I agree.

Secretary BROWN. In the circumstance you describe I think that

is right.

Mr. FASCELL. Don't qualify it unless you have got a reason to

qualify it.

Secretary BROWN. I agree with your view of this.

Mr. FASCELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Mr. Hamilton.

Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

STATUS OF U.S. FACILITIES IN CANAL ZONE UNDER TREATY PROVISIONS

Let me get in mind what happens to our facilities in Panama under

this treaty. Could you indicate to us during the term of the first

treaty that runs to the end of the century, which facilities we now

operate and control in the canal we will be relinquishing and which

ones we will be keeping?

General BROWN. Well, as a generalization, we will keep those that

we needl for our responsibilities until the year 2000 and we will release

those facilities and areas that we do not need.

Mr. HAMILTON. Has there been any determination?

General BROWN. There has been a specific determination of what

areas of water and what areas of land, including training areas and

ammunition storage areas, communications sites, barracks, housing,

all of it. I can give you a list if you want it. It is quite lengthy.

Mr. HAMILTON. I wonder if it might not be appropriate to include

that.

GENERAL BROWN. We will provide it for the record if we may.

[Material subsequently provided follows:]

LIST OF U.S. FACILITIES IN CANAL ZONE To BE RELINQUISHED AND KEPT UNDER

TREATY PRovIsIONS

Canal Zone lands and water areas which will be retained by the United States

are provided by the two Agreements in Implementation of Articles LII and IV of

the Pta mna anil treaty. Facilities which will be retained by the canal operating

agency are described in Annex A and B of the Implementing Agreement to Article

III. Further questions on canal operating facilities could be more fully addressed

by) the SeCretarv of the Army.
253

The United States will retain most major military installations currently used

by U.S. Forces. Below is a sunnary of the facilities wV which will be transfI rcd to

Panama:

(a) On treaty day: the troop billets at Ft Amador, the Hdqts building fur the

193rd Infantry Brigade at Ft Amador, Albrook runway and area east of the

runway, and 30 sets of family housing.

(b) Three years after treaty is in force: barracks for one Panamanian campamy

of troops at Ft. Gulick, warehouses on Albrook Pacific Depot area, somie family

quarters near the Panama city border (Curundu Heights) and an Antenna farm at

Curundu.

(c) Five years after the treaty is in force: additional barracks, storaget, and

maintenance facilities at Ft. Gulick; and housing at France Field.

A detailed list of facilities retained by the US military and facilities tr ferred

to Panama is extracted from Annex A and an agreed minute of the Inplieinting

Agreement to Article IV of the Panama Canal treaty and is provided at the

attachment.

ANNEX A

DEFENSE SITES, MILITARY AREAS OF COORDINATION AND OTHER INSTALLATIONS

(1) The defense sites, military areas of coordination, and other in-tallations, the use of which is made available by the Republic of Panama to the United

States, are described below and identified, but not definitively, on thw aps attached hereto and referenced herein, in the manner indicated on the hagenus

thereof. When areas or installations are depicted on more than one map of divi(rent scales, the identification on the map with the largest scale shall be controlling.

More precise identifications and exact boundaries shall be agreed upon as -uin :e

practicable by the Joint Committee established in Article 11 of this Aganwn

after a Joint Survey to be conducted by representatives of the two Parti'. hn

the aforementioned identifications have been completed and agreed upun. thv

shall be controlling as to the boundaries of the installations and areas de-cribid

in this Annex.

(2) The defense sites are described generally as follows:

(a) Howard Air Force Base-Fort Kobbe-Farfan (including thI Fa;ran

Radio Reciever Facility, Farfan Annex), and United States Naval Statien.

Rodman, and Marine Barracks (including 193rd Brigade Animunition Storauc

Area, Cocoli Housing Area and Arraijan Tank Farm) (Attachment 1)

(b) Fort Clayton-Corozal Army Reservation and Aibrook Air Fue >ation (west) (Attachments 1, 2 and 3);

(c) Fort William D. Davis Military Reservation, to include Dock 475 and the

adjacent water area and Atlantic general depot area, (Attachments ' iii 4

(d) Fort Sherman Mlitarv Reservation, (Attachment 1); and

(e) Galeta Island; Unield States Navy Transisthinian Pipejin ; and 

phore Hill Long-Range Radar and Communications Link, (At arla a t 1".

(3)(a) The Military Areas of Coordination are described gunerahly a ifi vs:

(i) General Military Areas of Coordination:

(aa) Quarry Heights, except for housing made available to .ana

pursuant to paragraph (.)(b) of Annex B to this Agreement Attachments 1 and 5);

(hb) United States Naval Station, Panama Canal, Fort Amador

(Attachments 1 and 6); and

(cc) Fort Gulick (Attachments 1 and 7).

(ii) Military Areas of Coordination for Training (Attachment 1):

(aa) Empire Range;

(bb) Pina Range;

(cc) Fort Sherman West; and

(dd) Fort Clayton Training Area.

(iii) Military Areas of Coordination for Housing:

(aa) Curundu Heights, except for housing made available to the

Republic of Panama pursuant to paragraph (5)(b) of Annex B to this

Agreement (Attachments 1 and 8);

(bb) Herrick Heights (Attachments 1 and 9);

(cc) Coco Solo South (Attachments 1 and 10);

(dd) Fort Amador, except for Buildings 1 through 9, 45 through 48,

51, 57, 64 and 93, and for housing made available to the Republie of

Panama pursuant to paragraph (5) (b) of Annex B to this Agreement

(Attachments 1 and 11);

(ee) France Field (Attachments 1 and 12); and

(ff) Curundu Flats (Attachments 1 and 8).
254

(iv) Special Facilities:

(aa) Curundu Antenna Farm (Attachments 1 and 3);

(bb) United States Navy Communications Station, Balboa (Attachments 1 and 6);

(cc) Summit Naval Radio Station (Attachment 1);

(dd) Quarry Heights Communications Facility (tunnel) (Attachments 1 and 5);

(ee) Ancon Hill Communications Facilities (Attachments 1 and 5); (ff) Battery Pratt Communications Facility (Coordinate 119326) (Attachment 1);

(gg) Ammunition Supply Point, Fort Gulick (Attachments 1 and 13); (hh) Navy Communications-Electric Repair Facility (Building 43-F) (Attachments 1 and 14);

(ii) United States Army Transport-Shipping Facility (Building

39-C) (Attachments 1 and 14); (jj) Gorgas Hospital Complex (Buildings 223, 233, 237, 238, 240, 240-A, 241, 241-A, 242, 253, 254, 255, 257, 257-G, 261, hospital grounds and building 424) (Attachments 1 and 9);

(kk) Coco Solo Hospital (Buildings 8900, 8901, 8902, 8904, 8905,

8906, 8907, 8908, 8910, 8912, 8914, 8916, 8920, 8922, 8926, tennis court, grounds and miscellaneous buildings and structures) (Attachment 1); (11) Balboa High School (Buildings 74, 701, 702, 704, 705, 706, 707, 713-X, Stadium, 723, 723-A, 723-B, 723-C, 723-D, 723-E, 723-F, 723-G, parking area, and play slab) (Attachments 1, 14, 15 and 16);

(mm) Curundu Junior High School (Buildings 0615-A, 0615-B,

0615-C, 0615-D, 0615-F, cooling tower structure, playgrounds, tennis

courts, and equipment, storage and music buildings, swimming pool and bathhouse, and parking areas (Attachments 1 and 8);

(nn) Cristobal Junior High School (Buildings 1141, 1143, 1149, 1150,

1151, 1153, 1154, 1156, 1239, 1158, 1186, 1288, 2000, playfield, and

parking areas) (Attachments 1 and 10);

(oo) Balboa Elementary School (Buildings 709, 710, playground, and

parking area) (Attachments 1, 15 and 16);

(pp) Diablo Elementary School (Buildings 5534, 5536, 5634, 5636, 5638, playground, air conditioning building, and parking area) (Attachments I and 17);

(qq) Los Rios Elementary School (Buildings 6225, 6226, playground, parking area and chilled water building) (Attachments 1 and 18);

(rr) Gamboa Elementary School (Buildings 56, 56-A, playground, and

parking area) (Attachments 1 and 19);

(ss) Coco Solo Elementary School (Buildings 98, 98-A, parking area, playground and chilled water building (Attachments 1 and 20);

(tt) Margarita Elementary School (Buildings 8350, 8352, playground, parking area, chilled water building and storage building) (Attachments 1

and 21);

(uu) Fort Gulick Elementary School (Buildings 350, 351, 352, playground and parking area) (Attachments 1 and 7);

(vv) Canal Zone College (Buildings 1030, 1031, 1032, 1033, 1034, 1035, 980, 982, 838, athletic field and parking lots) (Attachments 1, 15, and

22);

(ww) Ancon School Administration Office (Partial use of Panama

Canal Commission Building 0610) (Attachments 1 and 9);

(xx) Margarita Community Health Center (Partial use of Panama

Canal Commission Building 7998) (Attachments 1 and 21);

(yy) (amboa Community Health Clinic (Use of Panama Canal Commission Building 63) (Attachments 1 and 19);

(zz) Ancon Dental Clinic (Building 297-X, partial use of Panama

Canal Commission Building 287) (Attachments 1 and 9);

(aaa) Corozal Mental Health Center (Buildings 6521, 6523, 6524,

6525, (526, 6537 and grounds) (Attachments 1, 18 and 23);

(bbb) Corozal Animal Care Station/Veterinary Hospital (Buildings

655:3, 6554, 6555, and grounds) (Attachments 1 and 18);

(ccc) Corozal Cemetery (Buildings and facilites) (Attachments 1, 18

and 23);

(ddd) Balboa Community Health Center (Use of Panama Canal

Commission Building 721) (Attachments 1 and 15); and

(eee) Coco Solo Community Health Center (Room in Building 1140)

(Attachments 1 and 20).
255

(b) The following install ati(ns, not contiguous to the defense sites or milit ar

Areas of Coordination, which shall be subject to the provisions of the Planamna

Canal Treatv and this Agreement applicable to the Militarv Areas of Coordilla 

tion are described generally as follows:

(i) Buildings 430, 433 and 435 in the Corozal Antenna Field (Attachments

1 and 2);

(ii) AAFES Warehouse, Buildings 1008 and 1009 (At tachments I and :;

(iii) United States Army Meddac Warehouses, Buildings 490 and 1010

(Attachments 1 and 8);

(iv) Defense Mapping Agency-It er-American Geodetic Survey Ileadquarters and warehouse, Buildings 1019, 1007 and 1022 (Attachments I and

3);

(v) Balboa We -t bombing range, as defined by coordinates PA 350056, PA 381074, PV 433990 and PV 404799 (Attachment 1);

(vi) United States Navy Salvage Storage Area, Building 29-B (Attachments I and 14);

(vii) United States Army NBC Chambers, Buildings 922, 928, 924, 925,

926 and 927 (Attachments I and 8)

(viii) United States Air Force Com munieations Gr uj p storage/training

facility, Building 875 (Attachments 1 and 8);

(ix) Inter-American Air Force Academy Jet Engine Test Cell, Building

1901 (Attachments 1 and 8);

(x) Quarry -feights Motor Pool (Building 159) (Attichment- I and 5):

(xi) Ammunition Transfer Point, Cerro Pelado (C)ordinates 4150s8)

(Attachment 1); and

(xii) Fort Amador (Buildings S-103, 104, 105, 105--A, 1 05-B, 107, 110, 190, 218, 228, 229, 268, 270) (Attachments I and 11).

(c) The following areas described in paragraph (a) above shall cease to be

Military Areas of Coordination three years from the entry into force of this

Agreement:

(i) Curundu Antenna Farm;

(ii) Curundu Heights Housing Area; and

(iii) Barracks facilities at Fort Gulick for a company of the Forces of the

Republic of Panama in specific buildings as agreed in the Joint C'omniittee.

(d) The following areas described in paragraph (a) above shall c(ea-k to be

Military Areas of Coordination five years from the entry into force of this

Agreement:

(i) Fort Gulick, except for family housing, community service areas, and

the ammunition storage facility; anld

(ii) France Fiold.

(e) The following areas described in paragraph (a) above shall cease to be

Military Areas of Coordination during the life of this Agreement:

(i) Fort Clayton Training Aren;

(ii) Fort Amador;

(iii) Fort Gulick Iaminv housing, community service areas and the

ammunition storage facility

(iv) Coco Solo Family iHousing; and

(v) That portion of the Curundu Flats Housing Area comprising the

contractors' trailer housing area.

(4) The installations outside of the defense sites, which may be used as provided in Article Xl, are de-.cribed generally as follows:

i(a) Miscellaneous facilities as follows: Post Exchange Facility in Building 100, Coco Solo; packing and crating, Building 40G, Albrook; Post Exchange warehouse,

Building 304; household goods crating warehouse, Building 1081; Contractor's

air conditioning facility, Building 1002; and household goods warehouse, Building

1067 (Attachments 1, , S and 20);

(b) Recreation Facilities as follows: Camp Chages Boy Scout Camp at Madden

Dam; and Surfside Theater at Naos Island (Attachment 1); and

(c) Post Exchange Facility, Curundu, Buildings 1025, 1026 and 1027; Photo

Shop Building S21 (Attachments 1, 3 and 8).

ANNEX B

TERMS FOR ADMINISTRATION OF MILITARY AREAS OF COORDINATION

(1) Purpose: To establish and delineate the respective respon il)ijities Of the

United States Forces and the Forces of the Republic of Panama colenernilg

certain areas which the Republic of Panama makes available for coordinated use

by the United States F1orces and the Forces of the Republic of Panama.

98-991-77 18
256

(i) To be present at his trial which shall be public. However, without prejudice

to the procedural guarantees in this Annex, persons whose presence is not necessary

may be excluded, if the court so decides for reasons of public order or morality. (j) In his proceedings to have the total burden of proof laden upon the Pubfic

Prosecutor or the prosecution.

(k) To have the court consider only voluntary confessions and evidence properly

obtained in accordance with the requirements of the law.

(1) Not to be compelled to testify against or otherwise incriminate himself.

(m) Not to be required to stand trial if he is not physically or mentally fit to

stand trial and participate in his defense.

(n) Not to be tried or punished more than once for the same offense.

(o) To have the right to appeal a conviction or sentence.

(p) To have credited to any sentence for confinement his entire period of pretrial custody.

(q) Not to be subject to the application of martial law or trial by military

courts or special tribunals.

(r) To enjoy other guarantees and rights provided for in the Constitution,

Judicial Code and other laws of the Republic of Panama.

AGREED MINUTE TO THE AGREEMENT IN IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE IV OF

THE PANAMA CANAL TREATY

1. With reference to paragraph 5(c) of Article VI of the Agreement in Implementation of Article IV of the Panama Canal Treaty (hereinafter referred to as

"the Agreement"), the five offenses under Panamanian law referred to therin are

understood to be:

(a) "Murder" means the intentional killing of one person by another.

(b) "Rape" means the commission of an act of sexual intercourse by violence

or threat and without consent with a person not his spouse, or with a person who

is not capable of resisting by reason of mental or physical illness, or with a minor

less than twelve years old.

(c) "Robbery with violence" means the act of appropriating an object of value

belonging to someone else with the purpose of depriving its owner of his possession

and deriving benefit from it, using violence against such person or a third person

present at the scene of the act.

(d) "Trafficking in drugs" means the unlawful sale, exchange or transfer for

gain of marihuana, hashish, heroin, cocaine, amphetamines, barbiturates, or L.S.D.

(e) "Crimes against the security of the Panamanian State" means espionage,

sabotage, or terrorism directed against the constituted powers or authorities of

Panama, with the purpose of overthrowing them.

2. With reference to paragraphs (2) and (3) of Annex A, it is understood that

the United States agrees to the construction by the Republic of Panama of an

Atlantic Coast Highway, and a new highway on the Pacific side of the Isthmus,

at locations and with right of way widths to be mutually agreed. It is further

understood that the bridge over the Canal, in each case, will be of a design sufficiently high so that it will not interfere with the operation of the Canal or with

any improvement that may be made to the Canal.

3. With reference to paragraph (2) (a) of Annex A, it is understood that the

United States agrees to the construction by the Republic of Panama of a road

from Panama City to Vera Cruz at a location to be agreed upon by the Parties,

the use of which will be subject to certain agreed conditions and restrictions, which

will include the following:

The right of way through the defense site shall be used only for the construction, use and maintenance of the road,

The United States Forces shall have access to the right of way and the

right to cross it at any point.

It is understood that upon completion of such road, the access road through

Howard Air Force Base to Vera Cruz may be closed by the United States to

through traffic. It is further understood that the Republic of Panama will prechlde any activity in the coastal areas in the vicinity of Kobbe and Venado Beaches

which, in the determination of the United States Forces, might interfere technicallv with the activities of the United States Navy Receiver Site at Farfan, the

United States Air Force communications activity in the vicinity of the Howard

Koble Defense Sites, and aircraft operations at Howard Air Force Base.

An illustrative listing of activities which would interfere with aircraft operations at howard Air Force Base is as follows:

Any construction within 1 kilometer on either side of the runway as extended to the sea.
257

Construction of structures or objects more than 8 meters high in an area

from 1 to 3 kilometers east of the runway as extended to the sea.

Construction of structures or objects more than 8 meters high in an area

from 1 to 2 kilometers west of the runway as extended to the sea.

It is further understood that the general public shall have free access to those

portions of Venado and Kobbe Beaches lying within defense sites, in accordance

with procedures to be developed by the Joint Committee.

4. With reference to paragraph (2)(h) of Annex A, it is understood that the

airstrip at Albrook Air Force Station which is transferred to the Republic of

Panama as provided in Article XIII of the Panama Canal Treaty, will not be

used for any aviation flight purposes other than helicopter operations. It is further understood that the United States Forces may conduct helicopter operations

on the west taxiways, adjacent grassy areas and runway at Albrook Air Force

Station until such time as the Republic of Panama determines that development

of this area adversely affects flight safety.

5. With reference to paragraphs (2)(c), (2)(d), (3)(a)(ii) (bb) and (3)(a)(ii)(cc)

of Annex A, it is understood that the general public shall have free access to and

use of the R-6, 836, R-2, S-10, S-2, and S-8 Roads.

6. With reference to paragraph (2)(e) of Annex A:

(a) it is understood that the Republic of Panama will restrict any activity

within a 6,000 foot radius of the Galeta operating antenna (coordinates 238393)

which, in the determination of the United States Forces, might interfere technically with the communications at Galeta. It is further understood that there will

be no construction within a 10,500 foot radius of the Galeta operating antenna

for purposes of heavy industry or of installations with high voltage electrical

emission, unless the two Parties otherwise agree;

(b) it is understood that the Republic of Panama shall keep the R-12 Road

open from Coco Solo to Galeta Island; and

(c) it is understood that the United States will consider authorizing use by the

Republic of Panama of the Navy pipelines, under terms and conditions to be

mutually agreed.

7. With reference to paragraph (3)(a)(i)(aa) of Annex A, it is understood that

the United States shall have tie of and access rights to a helicopter landing site

at grid coordinates 596898, in accordance with procedures to be developed by

the Joint Committee.

8. With reference to paragraphs (3)(a)(i)(bb) and (3)(a)(iii)(dd) of Annex A, it is understood that the United States Forces and the Forces of the Republic of

Panama will permit the general public to have free access to the Amador Load.

It is further understood that the Joint Committee shall agree upon the location

and operating procedures for a joint control point. Until such a new control point is established, the present entrance control point shall remain in operation and

members of the Forces of the Republic of Panama shall participate with the

United States Forces in its manning. It is also understood that joint patrol. of

the United States Forces and of the Forces of the Republic of Panama shall patrol

the Amador Road. Such joint patrols shall be conducted in accordance with the

procedures established for joint patrols in Article XI of the Panama Canal Treaty.

It is further understood that the members of the Forces of the Republic of Panama

and of the United States Forces, the civilian component, and dependents shall

have free access to and use of the beach at Naos Island.

9. With reference to paragraphs (3) (a) (ii) (bb) and (cc) of Annex A, it is understood that the Republic of Panama shall maintain the S-10 Road open from

Escobal north along the We:t Bank of the Canal from coordinates 140115 to

160228 in order to permit access to and from Pina Range and Fort Sherman West

Training Area.

10. With reference to paragraph 3(a) (iii) (ff) of Annex A, it is understood that

joint military patrols of the United States Forces and the Forces of the Lepbll)ic

of Panama shall patrol the C-12 Road from coordinates 591939 to 601927. Such

joint patrols shall be conducted in accordance with the procedures established for

joint patrols in Article XI of the Panama Canal Treaty.

11. With reference to paragraph (3) (a) (iv)(ee) of Annex A, it is understood that

the Republic of Panama will preclude any activity on Ancoi lHll which, in the

determination of the United States Forces, might interfere technically with the

communications activity of the United States Forces or of the Federal Aviation

Administration on Ancon Hill.

12. With reference to paragraphs (3)(b) (ii), (iii) and (iv) and (3)(b)(vi) of

Annex A, it is understood that the following facilities shall cea:e to be areas of

coordination as stated:
258

United States Navy Salvage Storage Area, Building 29B-Five years from

the entry into force of the Agreement.

Buildings 1008 and 1009-Three years from the entry into force of the

Agreement.

Buildings 490 and 1010-Two years from the entry into force of the Agreement.

Buildings 1019, 1007 and 1022-One year from the entry into force of the

Agreement.

13. With reference to pai'agraph (3) (b) (v) of Annex A, it is understood that the

Balboa West Bombing Range will cease to be subject to the provisions of Annex

B to this Agreement at such time as the Republic of Panama provides an alternative facility, acceptable to the United States, for the use of the United States

Forces as a bombing range.

14. With reference to paragraph (5)(b) of Annex B, it is understood that the

selected housing units to be made available by the United States to the Republic

of Panama shall include:

(1) Upon entry into force of the Agreement:

(a) Two family housing units at Quarry Heights for officers of the

Forces of the Republic of Panama serving on the combined Board;

(b) Eight family housing units in Fort Amador for members of the

Forces of the Republic of Panama assigned to Fort Amador. It is further

understood that the members of the Forces of the Republic of Panama

residing at Fort Amador may use the community facilities at Fort

Amador under the same conditions as are applicable to the United States

Forces.

(c) Twenty family housing units at Curundu Heights.

(2) Within three years after the entry into force of the Agreement, all

family housing units at Curundu Heights. It is understood that the laundry

and the Bachelor Officers' housing units at Curundu Heights are not family

housing units and will remain under the control of United States Forces for

the duration of the Agreement.

Maps of the Land and Water Areas for the Operation and Defense of the

Panama Canal, Referred to in the Agreement in Implementation of Articles III

and IV of the Panama Canal Treaty.

[The maps are not printed here. The map atlas is deposited in the archives of the

Department of State where it is available for reference.]

STATUS OF U.S. MILITARY TRAINING SCHOOL

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, without your reciting it to us, what

will be the status of that Latin American military training school

that we operate in the zone?

General BROWN. There are four schools. With regard to Fort Gulick,

where the Army school is, we have a period of 5 years to make some

arrangements as to whether the school will be continued or moved and

how it will be administered by the end of 5 years. The other schools

will be operated by the United States until the end of the century.

Secretary BROwN. The agreement is that we have the right to determine for the next 5 years what is (lone. After that it is dependent on an

agreement with the Panamanians.

U.S. POPULATION IN CANAL ZONE

Mr. HAMILTON. How many people do we have in the Canal Zone?

General BROWN. About 9,300 at the moment.

Mr. HAMILTON. And what would be your projection on that force

level over the period of the first treaty?

General BROWN. I think it would remain essentially the same for

the future.
259

PROPOSED FOREIGN MILITARY CREDIT SALES PROGRAM FOR PANAMA

Mr. HAMILTON. What about the foreign military sales credit

program over the next several years. I think the figure $50 million has

been presented to us.

General BROWN. $50 million over 10 year or about $5 million a year

on the average.

Secretary BROWN. That is credits.

Mr. HAM\ILTON. Yes; I understand. What is that to be used for?

General BRoWN. I have a pireliminary list. It is generally for

Mr. HAMILTON. Is it for the Panamanian National Guard?

General BROwN. It is indeed, and it will equip them to do the sort

of thing that we have been doing in security -internal security for the

canal-light arms, a naval program of coastal and river patrol craft,

two C-1:30's, and one helicopter.

Mr. HAMILTON. It is basically related to their responsibilities for

the defense of the canal?

General BROWN. It is totally related to that.

NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATION OF NO TREATY

Mr. HAMILTON. Then, just finally, what would be the national

security implications if we had no treaty, no new treaty? How would

yon state it, what would happen there if you had no treaty?

Secretary BROwN. In my judgment, Mr. Hamilton, it would produce

a decision, I believe that Panama would not feel it had an adequate

stake in the canal. It would, I think, hurt us throughout Latin

America. I can't predict what specific acts might take place over the

next decade or so as a result of no treaty. But I believe that our

security would be lessened, I believe our assurance of being able to

continue to use the canal, even though the present treaty's provisions would continue to run, would be reduced very substantially.

Mr. IHAMILTON. There would be a greater likelihood, in your judgment of hostile acts against the operation of the canal if we have no

new treaty than if we have a new treaty?

Secretary BROWN. I think that is probable. One can't predict the

future for sure and there have not been threats or statements that

that would happen, I am just judging how things would go.

Mr. HAMILTON. How about your statement with regard to the impact on Latin America generally? How do you make more specific

the statement that administration witnesses have consistently made

that your relations in Latin America would be damaged? in what

way would they be damaged?

Secretary BROWN. It would be in my view, Mr. Hamilton, a general

attitude. How it would then be reflected in terms of specific actions

by those governments, I can't say. I am not sure they know themselves. But I believe that we would find it increasingly difficult to get

diplomatic support for our programs in Latin America in terms of

diplomatic support and would be reflected by a shift of their attitudes

in general. Again, I would not anticipate that another Latin American

country would resort to force against us as a consequence of our failing

to approve these treaties, but I believe that we would see an increase

in penetration by unfriendly countries into Latin America.

Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Mr. Ryan.
260

POSSIBILITIES OF AN ALTERNATE CANAL

Mr. RYAN. I would like to pursue the possibility of an alternative.

What studies have been done, if any, to consider the potential of

con-i ructing another canal someplace else?

Secretary BROwx. During the 1960's, Mr. Ryan, there was extensive study by a group chaired by Robert Anderson, the former

Secretary of the Treasury, looking at a number of different canal

sites, excavations of a sea level canal, and various sites in Central

America. There turned out to be a number of them but the most

favorable ones and the least expensive ones, the best from an engineering point of view, are in Panama.

Mr. RYAN. Aside from the best, how about the second best,

someplace else?

Secretary BRowN. It is in Panama, too. In other word,, the first

two or three are in Panama, then I think there is one in Nicaragua,

one in Colombia. All of these would be quite expensive.

Mr. RYiN. How expensive.

Secretary BROWN. Well, at the time, I think they were estimated at

approximately $2 billion. The least expensive were $2 to $3 billion.

Mr. RYAN. How about Nicaragua or Colombia?

Secretary BROWN. Those turned out to be about double and I

think that as of now all of those prices would have gone up a great deal.

Mr. Ryrkx. So we are talking about $4 or $5 billion?

Secretary BROWN. That is what I would expect.

Mr. RYAN. As part of a Defense Department budget of, what is

it this year?

Secretary BROWN. It is almost $120, billion.

Mr. RYAN. When you consider the strategic value of such an

alternative over a period of 30 or 40 years, it becomes more attractive

as an alternative without the political implications or uncertainties with

Panama. In the event of damage to one, we would still have the other.

If the canal makes that much sense to keep, or to negotiate, then

I don't understand why it wouldn't be for almost any reason you

can think of, a viable alternative other than just simply keeping it

as a ditch that is too narrow in many ways, and a minimally acceptable canal at best right now.

I think one of the reasons I am in favor of the present canal treaty

is because we are essentially giving away something which is rapidly

amortizing itself. By the end of the year 2000 it will be rather obsolete

piece of machinery, certainly from a military standpoint.

Secretary BROWN. Certainly, the past costs have been amortized.

The canal carries a decreasing fraction of the commercial and naval

traffic. I think a new canal would have to be justified on the grounds

of its future capability and its cost.

As you say, this treaty gives the United States exclusive rights

to build a canal, another canal in Panama, and confines it to Panama,

which is where the best routes are during the term of the treaty.

That is until the end of the century. I think that is an advantage.

Whether we take advantage of it or not depends upon how much it

cost- and I think we would have to update the cost estimates.

Mlr. R AN. Wouldn't a second canal in a different country produce

an enormous amount of competition between the two countries for
261

the commerce so that you would not have the situation to(lav politically throughout South America you have where we are in effect at

the mercy of the political powers of Latin America because we have

no other alternative?

Secretary BRowN. Another canal would also be through Central

America.

Mr. RYAx. True.

S ecretarv BROWN. I am quite sure we would not be able to get as

favorable terms for it as we have in these treaties.

Mr. RYAN. So one of the reasons for supporting this treaty is

because it is much more economical, looking at our own strategic need?

Secretary BROWN. I can't express an opinion on whether it is a

good idea to do that now or later because I haven't looked at it

recently. This treaty is the best way to get assurance of being able

to lo that.

Mr. RYAxN. All right.

Thank vou, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. The Chair notes that the next member in

order under the rules would be Mr. Solarz but since he just entered

he has agreed to be recognized a bit later.

Mrs. Mevner.

Mrs. MEYNER. Thank you Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Solarz.

I appreciate that.

U.S. MILITARY LEADERSHIP'S POSITION ON TREATIES

General Brown, I questioned the leaders of the veterans organizations when they testified last week, the American Legion, VFW,

et cetera, about their claim that the military leadership of this country

secretly opposes the Panama treaties. I pointed out that you and the

rest of the Joint Chiefs of Staff favored the treaty, and one of them

replied, and I quote, "The military leaders are not going to do a

'Singlaub' they are going to keel) their opinions to themselves. Off

the record we have been told what their opinions really are." End

quote.

Would you like to respond to that statement?

General BROwN. Well, I did earlier. That was the first question by

the Chair, as a matter of fact. But let me say again that perhaps in a

little different way.

Mrs. MEYNER. I would appreciate it.

General BROWN. I don't personally know a single senior officer on

active duty, and admittedly I have not talked with all of them, but

all of the members of the Joint Chiefs, the senior planners in each of

the military departments, the Vice Chiefs of Staff, all feel that these

treaties should be ratified.

Now, I got a little notoriety for having ordered the senior retired

officers in the city to assemble while I twisted their collective arms.

That was not so. I offered the Chiefs of Staff, if they would invite

their senior retired people, General Dolvin and I would be happy to

spend whatever time they wanted to explain the treaties. I made it

clear that they would then have to do whatever their conscience

dictate d.

Quite a number, the last of them being General Westmoreland,

have voluntarily taken a stand endorsing ratification. In fact, General

Westmoreland wrote the President a nice brief note to that effect.
262

I talked to two of the CNO's who signed the letter to the President

and they were not as adamant after the treaties were inlhand as they

had been before the treaties were available for them to study.

But I know of no active duty officers, and admittedly I have not

talked to all of them, who feel we should not ratifyithese treaties.

Mrs. MEYNER. Thank you, General.

MILITARY IMPORTANCE OF CANAL

We hear, or I have heard, very different estimates as-to the military

importance of the canal to the United States. One study claims that

only 12 small U.S. warships passed through the canal between 1971

an(d 1975, and that in terms of displacement tonnage, the U.S. Navy

tied for 19th with Communist China in the use of the canal during

those 4 years.

Representatives of the veterans organizations who testified before

us, however, emphasized how much of the supplies for the Vietnam

war went through the canal, and claimed that the availability of the

canal, even if it wasn't used a lot, was the only thing that allowed us, the United States, to maintain only a one-ocean Navy, in their

opinion.

Just how important is the canal at this moment to the U.S. Navy?

General BROWN. Well, the canal is important. There is no question

about it.

Mrs. MEYNER. Were we tied for 19th with Communist China in

use of the canal?

Secretary BROWN. That is certainly not true with naval ship

transits. It may be true wxith

Mrs. MEYNER. Oil tankers?

Secretary BROWN. With cargo. But we have got the figures for

the naval ship transits. They were high during the Vietnam war.

They ran about 150 a year, and then began to fall in 1970. They were

down to 49 in 1974, 33 in 1973, 23 in 1976. At the same time, a large

fraction of the cargo, U.S. Government cargo for support for Vietnam

war did go through the canal-40 percent of it in 1967, 69 percent in

1968, then it went back to 47 percent in fiscal year 1969.

The main value in military terms is the ability to bring naval

ships other than carriers, which won't go through the canal, through

the canal. So I would say it is important, it may not be as important

as once it was, but the Defense Department support of the canal

treaties is because we think it is important from a national security

point of view, and because we think this is the best way to preserve

access and transit through the canal.

So I think the argument that as to its being very important or not

being very important doesn't change where we come out.

Mrs. MEYNER. Thank you, Secretary Brown and General Brown.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time to my patient

colleague, Mr. Solarz.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Mr. Pease.

Mr. PEASE. Mr. Chairman, could I clarify whether I am on my time

or Mrs. Meyer's time or Mr. Solarz's time?

Mrs. MEYNER. My time is your time.

Mr. PEASE. Not in front of all these people. [Laughter.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. You are on your own, you had better start.
263

Mr. PEASE. Gentlemen, like my colleague, who is just about to

leave, Mr. Danielson, I also am a supporter of the treaty, but I would

like to clarify some points so I might respond to my constitutents

who raise legitimate concerns. Again, this relates to what happens

after the year 2000 when we have exited from Panama.

U.S. OPTIONS UNDER THE NEUTRALITY TREATY

You say the regime of neutrality gives us the right to enter Panamanian territory. Let me first ask if Panama is attacked from the

outside, which I consider to be unlikely, let's say it is possible, attacked from the outside, Panama feels that it is in control of the situation, we feel that Panama is not in control, are we able to under this

regime to go into Panama regardless of the Panamanian Government's evaluation of the situation?

Secretary BROWN. What we would do, Mr. Pease, I think would

depend upon the military situation and our evaluation of it, the diplomatic situation, and our evaluation of it, the political situation and

our evaluation of it, and so I can't judge what we would do. I believe

the Neutrality Treaty gives us freedom of action if we conclude the

neutrality of the Panama Canal is in danger.

Now, I am sure that we would in addition take into consideration

not only what the Panamanians thought but what the other Latin

American countries thought as well as all those other factors I mentioned. I can't predict what we would do. I can only say that in my

judgment the Neutrality Treaty gives us freedom of action that we

need.

Mr. PEASE. Would you also feel that it gives us the freedom of

action that we need in the event of a civil war in Panama, where the

threat is not external, but internal, and it appears that fighting beween two elements in Panama might result in the closing of the canal?

Secretary BROWN. Again, I think we would have to evaluate the

situation at the time. I myself have grave doubts that we can under

present circumstances or under future circumstances, given the fragilitv and vulnerability of the canal, defend it from the Panamanians.

But the freedom of action I think is there.

IMPACT OF DOMESTIC POLITICAL SITUATION ON TREATY INTERPRETATION

Mr. PEASE. Finally, this question. I was interested in Mr. Lagomarsino's comments and reading of statements by Panamanian

officials. My guess is that the Panamanian officials are having trouble

defending what they did from the element on the left in Panama who

oppose any yielding of Panamanian authority, just as we seem to be

having some difficulty defending the treaty from more conservative

forces in the United States, and that the statements of the Panamanian

leaders may be designedd to try to head off that sort of opposition

from the left and, therefore, may tend to overexaggerate what they

think the treaty really says.

It is conceivable that that is happening on our side, too, that we

are overemphasizing a little bit what our options are in order to head

off opposition from the right?

Secretary BROWN. Given the difficulty of persuading people that

we mean what we say, I don't want to go into the question whether
264

one or the other Panamanian means what he says. I think that my

own statements about the freedom of action are correct. What I will

qualify and what I have qualified is what we would do, because I

think that depends on the circumstances at the time.

Mr. PEASE. Thank you.

MILITARY IMPORTANCE OF CANAL: TODAY AND 25 YEARS AGO

Mr. BUCHANAN. Secretary Brown, General Brown, in your judgment, is the Panama Canal more or less militarily important to the

United States than it was 25 years ago, and what would you project

for the future as to the military value of the canal itself?

Secretary BROWN. I guess I would say it is important. It may be

less important than it was 25 years ago. I think it will continue to

be important, but I can't quantify that.

General BROWN. Well, my statement, as you will see, talks to and

recognizes the military importance today and into the future. I don't

seek to quantify it because I don't think it is possible to do that.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Your case is not based on declining military importance but on the fact you feel even given military importance this

is the right decision, is that correct?

General BROWN. That is correct.

Secretary BROWN. We support the treaty on national security

grounds as the best way to assure the continued availability of the

canal because we expect it to continue to be important militarily.

Mr. BUCHANAN. General Brown, there seems to be persistent reluctance to believe that the Joint Chiefs of Staff really are for this

treaty. There is no equivocation in your position on this subject?

General BROWN. Absolutely not.

INTERPRETATION OF STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT

Mr. BUCHANAN. I am concerned also about the difference in the

Panamanian interpretation of some of these things, at least as stated

by some of their people, and our own.

For example, Adolfo Ahumada, a Panamanian Cabinet Minister,

recently explained his nation's view of the role of American military

forces under the new agreement, as follows:

This military force must be harnessed by some sort of legal or political restraint,

which would define its extent of legal activities in Panama. Therefore, the broad

range of action without limitations will be, according to the agreement in principle,

subject to rules and have definite laws and regulations that the two countries

have agreed upon.

Additionally, these are not final-not in their wording or application-because

they may be revised every 2 years.

Secretary BROWN. I assume that he was referring to the Status of

Forces Agreement which we have negotiated and which will govern

the conditions under which U.S. military people serve in Panama. I

don't think any of this affects what we were talking about in terms of

U.S. freedom of action.

N 1r. BUCHANAN. Is it your understanding that such changes would

be by mutual agreement rather than Panamanian decision?

Secretary BROWN. Status of Forces Agreements are mutually

arrived at.
265

General BROwN. This is an article in the Status of Forces Agreement

which deals with the administration, privileges, and so on of our

military people that reside in Panama, and it is based on the Status of

Forces Agreement worked out with Japan. That is the model that was

used.

Mr. BUCHANAN. I see.

General BROWN. There is provision for it to be reviewed and

amended by mutual agreement, and when our forces come out at the

turn of the century, obviously there is no more Status of Forces

Agreement, no more need for one.

Mr. BUCHANAN. I gather there is no question in your minds that the

United States will have continuing access, that should in any way,

the neutrality of the canal be threatened or violated, there is no

question in your mind we would have the ability to intervene?

General BROWN. There is absolutely no doubt in my mind that

Article IV of the Neutrality Treaty places us in a position of agreeing

to maintain the regime of neutrality, which is defined as maintaining

the canal open and accessible to all nations on a nondiscriminatory

basis. If that is threatened, then we have an obligation, as I read this

treaty, to maintain this regime of neutrality.

Mr. BUCHANAN. And, pragmatically as to our ability to do so, you

don't see anything in any of these agreements that would violate that?

General BROWN. There is absolutely no inability in the defense

posture of the United States to carry out the obligations in this treaty

if there is decision and political will to do so.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Do you find objection, and we asked this of the

Secretary of State, I believe, to the Congress and specifically the U.S.

Senate, spelling out some of our understandings of this treaty where

there seems to be some difference of understanding?

Secretary BROwN. I think it would depend upon the form that took,

so I couldn't give a blanket statement. Certainly there is a legislative

history involved in the debates on approval. That will apply in any

event.

Mr. BUCHANAN. But your support indeed is contingent, I believe,

on certain provisions of the treaty, being enacted from the Defense

point of view, so I assume you have no objection to the Congress

making plain those elements?

General BRoWN. Well, I think that makes sense. The question of

how it is made plain is another matter.

Mr. BCANAN. Thank you, -Mr. Secretary and General Brown: and

Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of mv time to the gentleman from

New York, Mr. Solarz.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Mr. Solar.

Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you very much.

EXPEDITIOUS PASSAGE ISSUE

In my case I hope you will forgive me, gentlemen, if I cover some

ground which my colleagiies on the committee have already gone over,

but I gather that there is some disagreement over the meaning of expeditious passage in the context of the treaty.

Mr. Bethancourt, as you undoubtedly know, made the point quite

explicitly that, the phrase "privileged passage" was rejected by the

negotiator and that "expeditious passage" has to be seen in the context
266

of the rejection of "privileged passage." So I wondered if you could

give us what you understand to be the operative definition of "expeditious passage" if and when an American warship shows up at the canal

expecting to transit and there are ships of other nations which got

there first.

Secretary BROWN. To me it means without delay.

Mr. SOLARZ. What does without delay mean? Does without delay

mean it can go to the head of the line, or does without delay mean that

the other ships are processed as quickly as possible and we come next?

Secretary BROWN. If being processed in turn means delay, then I

think it would mean being processed out of turn. But you know that

depends on how you define delay.

General BROWN. Mv reading of this indicates that the only vessel

that would cause a U.S. naval vessel to stand behind anybody would

be a Panamanian naval vessel that had arrived ahead of it. So it would

take precedence over those standing off waiting to enter.

Mr. SOLARZ. Is that the understanding of the Panamanians as well?

General BROWN. I don't know.

Mr. SOLARZ. Has this point been discussed with them?

General BROWN. I am sure by the negotiators, but I don't know.

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. WELBURN DOLVIN, MEMBER, U.S.

NEGOTIATING TEAM FOR THE PANAMA CANAL TREATY

General DOLvIN. I think it only applies to the two countries, Panama and the United States.

Mr. SOLARZ. Expeditious passage?

General DOLvIN. Yes, sir, it would not have been written that way.

MIr. SOLARZ. So.

General DOLVIN. Expeditious passage

General BROWN. This is General Dolvin who was a member of the

negotiating team representing the Department of Defense.

Mr. SOLARZ. Your point is that only Panamanian war ships would

have precedence over American warships or both merchant ships as

well: does expeditious passage apply to merchant ships or just warships?

General DOLvIN. And auxiliaries.

General Brown. Vessels of war and auxiliary vessels.

Mr. SOLARZ. They would presumably take precedence over the

ships of any other nation except Panama?

General BROWN. Yes, sir.

Secretary BROWN. We are privileged with respect to others and not

with respect to Panama. That would explain both what we are saying

and what Mr. Bethancourt is saying.

Mr. SOLARZ. Presumably that means the most delay, such as it might

be, would be a very brief one. I can't imagine there are too many

warships in the Panamanian Navy.

General BROWN. No, although there are a great many maritime

ships in the Panamanian

Mr. SOLARZ. Do we get expeditious passage with respect to American

merchant ships of Panama or are they on the same level as us? In

other words, does an American warship take precedence over a merchant Panamanian ship?

General BROWN. Yes, sir, it does.
267

Secretary BRowN. Neither Panamanian nor any other merchant

ships are covered in article VI.

Mr. SOLARZ. So it is only the Panamanian warships?

Secretary BROWN. And all auxiliary vessels.

Mr. SOLARZ. If they arrive first then they would get precedence?

Secretary BRowN. That is my interpretation.

U.S. RIGHTS UNDER THE NEUTRALITY TREATY

Mfr. SOLARZ. What about the disagreement over the question of

the right of the United States to unilaterally intervene to maintain

the regime of neutrality. -Mr. Bethancourt as I understand it takes

the position that the treaty provides for a mutual determination on

the part of both Panama as well as the United States that the neutrality of the canal has been breached or threatened and that, according to his rather explicit statement at this press conference of August

24, the treaty does not accord to the United States the right to make

a unilateral determination on its own. So, if I understand him correctly, what he is saying is that, the United States does have a security

right to maintain the neutrality of the canal but the decision and

determination as to whether or not the canal neutrality has been

violated is a joint determination in which Panama presumably has

an implicit veto.

Secretary BRowN. Well, in Panama and in the United States you

can get different people to (ay differentt things. When this came up

earlier this morning I quoted what General Torrijos said and I will

quote it again. "We are agreeing to a treaty of neutrality which places

us under the protective umbrella of the Pentagon." It is clear from

the context he doesn't necessarily feel overjoyed about that either,

but it is clear that that is what it means to him.

Mr. SOLARZ. Well, that is a rather ambiguous statement, because

I don't know that that speaks directly to the point Bethancourt

made in the press conference. I am just trying to pin this down,

because obviously opponents of the treaty are going to make this

point.

Is it your firm assertion that, as the administration reads the treaties,

we have the right on our own to determine whether the neutrality

of the canal had been breached or threatened?

Secretary BROWN. That is what the words mean to me and that is

what I believe they mean.

MIr. SOLARZ. So you disagree then with the Bethancourt

interpretation?

Secretary BRowN. I believe that the words of the treaty give the

United States the freedom of action that it needs to assure the neutrality of the canal.

Mr. SOLARZ. So that even if there were disagreement in some

hypothetical worst case situation between Panama and the UnIted

States with respect to whether the neutrality of the canal had beun

threatened, if we felt it had, we would then have the right, if we deem

it appropriate under the circumstances, to move ahead?

Secretary BROWN. Yes. I don't predict what we will do. I merely

assert that we have the right to do it.

Mr. SOLARZ. Well, you couldn't predict what we would do even if

Panama was screaming for our help?
268

Secretary BROWN. That is right.

Mr. SOLARZ. And it is possible that we might decide at that point, for whatever reasons, we didn't want to give it.

CANAL' S VULNERABILITY TO SABOTAGE

General, would it be fair to say there are somewhere in the vicinity of a dozen or so locations along the canal in which an individual or a

group of people bent on putting the canal out of commission, could in

fact incapacitate the canal for a substantial period of time-at least

a year or two, through the strategic location of one explosive device, assuming they could get the thing there in the first place.

General BROWN. Without any question the canal is subject to

sabotage by trained and dedicated people in very small numbers.

Mr. SOLARZ. And would you say there are a substantial number of

locations along the canal where saboteurs could incapacitate the

entire canal for a prolonged period of time?

General BROWN. Oh, yes.

Mr. SOLARZ. It isn't just one location, there are several?

General Brown. Yes, sir.

IMPACT ON SAILING TIME WITHOUT THE CANAL

Mr. SOLARZ. How many steaming days does it take to get around

the cape?

General BROWN. The problem we worked with was reinforcement

to Gibraltar in the Mediterranean from the west coast of the United

States using the canal and not using the canal, and the difference

was it depended on the ship, from about 12 to 18 days; heavier new

carriers, about 10 to 12 days.

Mr. SOLARZ. Carriers? But carriers can't go through the canal

anyway.

General BROWN. That is right.

Mr. SOLARZ. But for the kind of ships that can go through the

canal, if you wanted to move shipping.

General BROWN. Two weeks.

Mr. SOLARZ. You will excuse the naivete of these questions. Assuming a contingency developed where we wanted to utilize the

canal, is it for the purpose of bringing material and men or is it more

for the purpose of getting our Navy to where you want it to be for

fighting purposes?

General BROWN. It depends entirely on the scenario, but you would

need it in either event. As a specific example, there is an amphibious

lift that we have available, it is split between the Atlantic and Pacific.

It takes that total lift to move the total Marine amphibious division

force from Camp Lejeune across the Atlantic. You have enough lift

in the Atlantic to handle about one-half of it at one time.

Mr. SOLARZ. So it takes you 12 to 18 days, according to our scenario, to get to Gibraltar. What about to the Far East?

General BROWN. I don't know.

Mr. SOLARZ. Was that worked out at all?

Secretary BROWN. If you are trying to get forces in the Atlantic to

the Far East it takes a similar extra time to go around the cape as

compared to going through the canal-about 2 weeks.
269

Mr. SOLARZ. Can you envision a scenario in which by the year

2000-because there is no question presumably about our right to

use the canal until the year 2000-those 12 to 18 days could conceivably be critical. In other words

Secretary BROWN. Yes.

Mr. SOLARZ. I am talking about a worst-case situation. We can't

use the canal and we have got to go around the cape, and it is 12

to 18 days. How could that really be so harmful?

Secretary BROWN. Well, I would say, Mr. Solarz, that there are

situations in which prompt action is very important, that forces

that arrive within a few days after combat begins are much more

valuable than forces that arrive 2 weeks after that. Therefore, I

think that transit through the canal can be important as to the outcome of something of this sort. On the other hand, there are lots of

other things that can delay action by more than 2 weeks.

Mr. SOLARZ. But, if I can pursue this a little bit further, with us,

obviously we have forces overseas in both the Pacific and the Atlantic

and Europe and the Far East, Japan, et cetera.

Secretary BROWN. Right.

Mr. SOLARZ. We have an air-lift capacity; troops and material

could be flown over.

Secretary BROWN. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOLARZ. I wish you could be more specific. I don't understand

the situation. If we had a prolonged conflict like in Vietnam, 12 to

18 (lays are helpful. I don't see how they are indispensable. And if it

is a short-term thing where we have to plug up the hole in the line,

it seems to me if we have to depend on sending the ships over there

to (10 it, we are in real trouble.

Secretary BROWN. Let me make up one. It has to be made up

because you are talking about sometime after the year 2000.

If not having the canal meant that additional carriers would arrive,

for example, in the Mediterranean 2 weeks later than they otherwise

would, then you might be in a situation where you were dealing in

one case with two U.S. carriers and in the other case with four.

Mr. SOLARZ. Carriers in any case can't go through the canal.

Secretary BROWN. I am giving you an analogy. I am talking about

a situation in which a task force goes through. Maybe it is not the

carriers but maybe it is auxiliaries that you are talking about. Depending upon how many of these cruisers, submarines and frigates, there were, your strategy might be quite different in the Mediterranean one way, from another. I think this is very hypothetical. But

it is the kind of thing that could make a difference.

Alternatively, look at the example that General Brown gave wherein

we are trying to lift a Marine division into a distant place, where we

didn't have forces, in one case you can lift half of it with sealift

assets that are on the east coast, and the other case you can bring

the sealift around through the Panama Canal, 12 to 14 days sooner

than you could otherwise.

That could make the difference between moving a division and

moving half a division and one can imagine circumstances under

which that would make a difference.

Mr. SOLARZ. Assuming the validity of your scenario in terms of

an immediate crisis, is there some value in utilizing the canal? Is

there a comparable value in terms of a protracted conflict? Is there a

real advantage?
270

Secretary BROWN. There it is a matter of resupply.

General BROWN. It is a longer pipeline which you have to fill with

a greater investment required; you have more ships at sea with more

things than you would if you had a shorter pipeline.

Secretary BROWN. Which you could make up for with money.

TRANSrORTATION ECONOMIES OF CANAL DURING WARTIME

Mr. SOLARZ. Has anyone ever calculated in those terms how much

money the canal saved us during the Vietnam war?

General BROWN. Not that I know of.

Mr. SOLARZ. Would it be possible to do that?

Secretary BROWN. We might get a statement. I think we could

probably give you a statement.

Mr. SOLARZ. I think that would be useful. Could you off the

top

Secretary BROWN. Assuming we had to go around instead of going

through, how much more would it have cost?

Mr. SoLARz. Right. Off the top of your head do you think you are

talking about billions, hundreds of billions?

Secretary BROWN. I would say hundreds of millions perhaps, perhaps in the low billions.

General BROWN. Well, if you put, I think the figure was about

probably 1,200 ships a year, at peak, so that is about 311 ships a day,

and you have been talking about an 18-day additional time, so you

have probably got close to 60 ships, their values, their crews, whatever their cargoes. So it is an appreciable number, 1,500 a year at

peak. Mr. SOLARZ. If you could give us that estimate.

General BROWN. Yes, sir.

[Information subsequently provided follows:]

ESTIMATE OF COST TO THE UNITED STATES DURING THE VIETNAM WAR

The average daily cost to the U.S. Government for each commercial ship

operating between the United States and Vietnam during the peak war years

was $4,600 per day. This is a fully allocated cost which includes the basic charter

hire; wage escalation; fuel; port charges; miscellaneous expenses such as insurance,

overtime, subsistence; and administrative overhead expenses. During the peak

war years of 1967 through 1970, there was an average of 1,200 U.S. Government

interest cargo and tanker ship transits of the Panama Canal. If the ships making

those 1,200 transits were required to spend an additional 13 days at sea to sail

around Cape Horn and directly to Vietnam, the average annual additional cest

would have been approximately $72 million. This then equates to an accumulative 4 peak year cost of $288 million.

The above costs are presented in light of having to sail around Cape Horn

in lieu of using the Panama Canal and a 13-day increase in sailing time. This is

not the only alternative as cargo can be shipped from its Conus origin across

the United States by rail and by sea from a west coast port. The 18-day additional sailing time without the Panama Canal referred to earlier in the discussion

is only applicable if the ship sails from an east coast port and touches a west

coast poft prior to proceeding onward to Vietnam.

While the above estimates cover fully allocated steamship operating costs,

they do not include additional inventory costs to the U.S. Government owing to

a longer pipeline time.

Mr. SoLA RZ. One final question.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. The time of the gentleman has expired and

with the additional time granted by Mrs. Meyner and Mr. Pease,

I will come back to you after recognizing the gentleman from North

Carolina.
271

Mr. FOUNTAIN. Mr. Chairman, I think most of the key questions

on this side have been asked. I am not sure they have all been answered, at least not to my satisfaction.

QUID PRO QUID OF TREATIES

Mr. Secretary, this is the same question I have asked before, what

are we getting for what we are giving?

Secretary BIowN, in my view, Mr. Fountain, what we are getting

is a greater likelihood of being able to use the canal.

Mr. FOUNTAIN. Why (1o you say that?

Secretary BRowN. For all the reasons that I have given. I think

that the environment in which the operation of the canal takes

place has in my view more to (to with its continued neutrality and

its continued availability than the fact that the United States owns

and operates it. Use is more important than ownership in this case.

Mr. FOUNTAIN. Well, I appreciate that and 1 noticed in your

statement you emphasized that use is more important than ownership, and that may be fine. At the present time, we have a responsibility for both internal and external security over the canal. On

December 31, 1999, we will no longer have the responsibility or the

right to insure the internal security and, as I understand it, the only

right we have to protect the canal externally for security reasons is

employed in article IV, is that right?

Secretary BROWN. The right to preserve its neutrality, that is

correct?

General Brown. I would

Mr. FOUNTAIN. That is a mutual right, but when that time comes

it seems to me that Panama, must agree.

Secretary BROwN. I disagree. We have the right and they have the

right.

Mr. FOUNTAIN. Will you read to me the language which gives us

that right?

General BROWN readingg:

The United States of America and the Republic of Panama agree to maintain

the regime of neutrality established in this Treaty, which shall be maintained in

order that the canal shall remain permanently neutral, notwithstanding the turmination of any other treaties entered into by the two Contracting Parties.

Now, that doesn't address internal or external threats. If the regime

of neutrality is threatened, and we have a responsibility to maintain

it, then it seems to me we have a right to act.

NEUTRALITY TREATY QUESTIONED

Mr. FOUNTAIN. We agree to maintain the regime of neutrality

together mutually.

General BROWN. It doesn't say together.

Mr. FOUNTAIN. It says the United States of America and Republic

of Panama agree to maintain the regime of neutrality established in

this treaty which shall be maintained in order that the canal shall

remain permanently neutral, notwithstanding the termination of any

other treaties and so forth. Then, of course, article V says after the

termination of the Panama Canal Treaty, only the Republic of

Panama shall operate the canal and maintain military forces, defense

sites and military installations within its national territory.

9S-991--77 19
27-2

So to whatever extent we may find it necessary to become involved

to protect the neutrality of the canal, or our right to use it, we would

have to do that from outside the Panama Canal Zone area, would we

not?

General BROWN. Yes, sir, I might add, by further negotiation a

bilateral agreement could be reached to base forces there, as we have

in Korea or Japan or Europe, but that is not contemplated to my

knowledge at the moment.

Mr. FOUNTAIN. How many governments have fallen since we first

started negotiations for this treaty?

General BROWN. I don't know.

Mr. FOUNTAIN. Five or six?

General BROWN. General Torrijos has been in power about 8 years

or a little over. He has been in real stability down there.

Mr. FOUNTAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. The Chair wishes to put a unanimous consent, before recognizing Mr. Solarz again. Congressman William L.

Dickinson has submitted a statement for the record on this issue and

if there is no objection his statement will be included in the testimony

of the record of September 20, 1976. There being no objection so

ordered.

[Congressman Dickinson's statement follows:]

STATEMENT OF HoN. WILLIAM L. "BILL" DICKINsON, A REPRESENTATIVE FRoM

THE STATE OF ALABAMA

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to testify to this committee on

probably the most important matter that the Congress will consider this sessionthe ill-considered, ill-timed decision by the Administration to conclude treaties

which give to Panama the Canal. Put aside for a moment the question of whether

or not we should give the Canal to the Republic of Panama; what I cannot comprehend at the outset is why we should pay Panama an astronomical amount of

money to take from us one of the richest pieces of capital property in Latin

America. What we will be giving away is worth approximately $7 billion. It seems

that if we are intent on giving this valuable property away, we wouldn't have to

give them another $3 billion to take it. Now let's talk about the deal with the

Panama regime.

We hear talk a lot these days about human rights. But we do not always

practice what we preach. The present government of Panama is not a democracy which practices normal western humanitarian standards. Miami, Florida, is full

of dissenters whom Torrijos has run out of Panama-and they are probably the

lucky ones because they are alive. Our colleague, Larry McDonald, has mentioned

the fact that Freedom House, a non-partisan organization, gives Panama a lower

rating on "freedom" than Chile. We hear a lot about how bad Chile is-but

Panama is apparently worse.

Libertarian Panamanians who grieve about the totalitarian conditions in their

country are not given much audience on the human rights issue. They have to

make a real splash to be heard-like Leopoldo Aragon, the Panamanian reporter

and law professor who burned himself to death in front of the American Embassy

in Stockholm on September 1 in protest to this Treaty.

Why deal with Torrijos? Even if we do at some point want to transfer the Canal

to Panama it is inconceivable to me that we would do it now-with this particular

left-wing dictator. These negotiations have been going on for years-Why did

we conclude them now, with Torrijos? Look at the people he proudly deals withCastro, Kadaffi, the North Koreans-all extremists when viewed from a human

rights perspective, regimes which kill or imprison thousands of political dis-

-Titers. It is not in the American character to prop up, through the lavish financial

features of this Treaty, such a gross violator of human rights. Why do it now?

Why Torrijos?

Nly next concern deals with Panama's financial situation. When the Torrijos

groupp overthrew a democratically elected Panamanian government, the Panamanian national debt was $167 million. Nine years later under the irresponsible
273

management and leadership of Torrijos, that debt has grown to $1.7 billion. his

inflationary domestic programs and "big spender" practices have priced Panana'

exports out of world markets. Interest on the national debt consumes about 40

percent of the annual budget. Refinancing this debt, paying interest coming due.

and handling a deficit of $139 million, will require $323.6 million that Torrijos does

not have. From Torrijos' perspective I can see that he needs the "quick-fix"

financial features of the Treaty.

But I cannot understand why we should be hurried in concluding this Treatv

now, with this dictator, when the agreement will keep suchi a violator of human

rights in power. Why not let him fall of his own mismanagement of the affairs of

Panama? Why be the "Johnny-on-the-spot" savior for this guy? Let him fall

and maybe the people of Panama will be free to choose again, a democratically

elected government.

The next point I would like to make concerns the question of the str ange

timing of the agreement with the financial needs of Torrijos. As I said before, if

the rationale is that we must give away the Canal, and I hasten to say that's

not my view, why give Panama all this money to take the Canal? Why did the

State Department and our negotiators make this recommendation to the President now? I will make no accusations about the apparent stake of U.S. banks in

the financial solvency of Panama, but I would suggest that this key committee

examine the questions of the relationships of the banks to Panama and the

financial features of this Treaty. There are suggestions that banks, which have

made speculative loans to Torrijos, stand to lose large sums of money if he

defaults--that he will not meet these financial obligations without this Treaty.

Are these suggestions true? The answer to this question is certainly a key point

on the whole C'inal Treaty question. Our people deserve to know all the facts

about the financial arrangements. I will not go into the questions of conflict of

interest that have surfaced about persons involved in the negotiations, but these

questions should also be examined more closely. These are serious questions.

My final point concerns our national security. I cannot overestimate the value

of a secure Canal to our national defense. As you know I am a member of the

Armed Services Committee. There are many self-proclaimed experts saying the

Canal is not important. They give the impression that the Canal is hardly used

anymore, that our commercial and naval vessels don't use it. These suggestion

are not true. Approximately 70 percent of Canal shipping originates or terminates

in the United States. The Canal can handle approximately 96 percent of all the

world's commercial shipping. We have a small, two-ocean navy and 98 percent

of our naval vessels can go through the Canal, avoiding 7,700 additional miles

and weeks around the Horn. Three former Chiefs of Naval Operations have

warned that to give up the Canal would be to "sacrifice the strategic advantages

of the Canal." Admiral Tom Moorer, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, suggests that with the political character of the Torrijos government and

the company he likes to keep, "the Canal zone could become a satellite base of

an adversary, and the advocates of the 'giveaway' do not appear ti take this

factor into account." I accept the judgmeent of these distinguished retired officers

who have no personal "ax to grind" in this matter.

We developed and have operated the Canal legally and morally. The world

needed this waterway. Before we built it, others had failed. We have paid our

way-to the benefit of Panama, Latin America and the world. This is nut the

time, nor is the present Panamanian dictatorship the party to whom we should

relinquish ownership and control of the Canal. And while I do not agree with

them, I have listened to the arguments put forth about U.S. colonialism and

imperialism. But I cannot understand the line that if we give Panama the Canal,

we should pay them to take it.

NEED TO RETAIN U.S. BASES IN CANAL ZONE

Mr. FOUNTAIN. 'Alay I ask one further question?

During these negotiations was there any discussion of the pro- priety or advisability or probability of our desire or need to maintain

at least a base in that area just as we are paying for bases all over the

world to defend our security and the security of the free world.

Secretary BROWN. I am not aware of it.

General DOLVIN. It was addressed in the negotiation but there

seemed to be a feeling that when you were not operating the canal
274

there was no great deal of military advantage to having troops in

Panama and also it was objected to, of course, by the Panamanians

because they saw a perpetuity, a continuation of

Mr. FOUNTAIN. Notwithstanding the fact that from that area you

would have access to both the Pacific and the Atlantic.

General DOLVIN. There is some military advantage to having troops

on the ground but it is also unworkable, I believe.

General BROWN. It would be a military operation. To carry out

the responsibilities we accept in article IV, it would be easier if we

retained Howard Air Force Base and had some small force there to

accept other forces but that is not essential. We can still carry out our

responsibilities, given today's equipment, organization, and techniques

without a base down there.

Mr. FOUNTAIN. From where?

General BROWN. From the United States.

Mr. FOUNTAIN. Thank you.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Mr. Solarz.

Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you.

VULNERABILITY OF CANAL TO SABOTAGE

Gentlemen, if in fact the canal can be put out of commission relatively easily by a saboteur, and I assume equally easily by a wellaimed missile, I am not sure that I understand why it is so terribly

important for us to retain the right to send in forces so as to preserve

the continued operation of the canal. It would seem to me that if

somebody undertakes to deny us its use by putting the canal out of

commission, and they are really determined to do it, it is rather doubtful that we are going to be able to prevent them even if we station

100,000 troops arm to arm across the canal. So why is this so important?

General BROWN. Well, first of all, let us get rid of the nuclear

ballistic missile attack. Obviously that is possible. I don't think it

is a very practical concern. Without question it would put the canal

out of commission, but at a terrible cost to everybody.

So the practical problem in a real sense is the concern for disruption

by a saboteur and that type of thing. That is possible and we feel

that that is the more likely threat if Panama is uncooperative, not

at ease, but aroused because of the failure of the United States to

rectify what they see as colonialism, and to renege now on what has

been a promise in good faith by four Presidents to seek to achieve

a renegotiation of the treaty.

Mr. SOLARZ. General, I agree that is the argument in favor of the

treaty. What I am asking is a slightly different question. In light of all

of the things you point out, what is the value to us in retaining the

right to unilaterally intervene in order to preserve the neutrality of the

canal, when given the fact, as you point out, and Secretary Brown

pointed out, we are more interested in use than ownership. If someone

wants to put the thing out of commission so we can't use it, it is

practically impossible to prevent anyway.

General BROWN. Well, I think the task that a saboteur could do

would be really short term. The most drastic obviously is to break the

dtam and let the water spill out and it is estimated even after the dams

are repaired it would take 2 years to accumulate the water that is

needed.
275

But, that is not an easy thing to do. T hat is not the task which a

single saboteur, with all the TNT he can lug up there, can do, that is

a rather major undertaking. The type of things an individual could do

might have to do with the gears in one of the locks or something like

that, and that would be a temporary displacement, short term,

relatively short term.

Mr. SoLARZ. So what threats is this clause designed to enable us to

prevent? This clause which gives us the right to send in the troops?

General BROWN. I think not an isolated incident but a campaign,

if you will, a surge of these things, that determination by some element to disrupt an open canal available to all users and under those

con(litions I woild hope Panama would han(de the problem. If they

can't, the United States would have an obligation to (1o so.

>ecretarv BROwN. The alternative is attempted takeover from outside uzing activities inside. I am not saying whether we would choose

to take action under those circumstances because I don't know. But

the right to intervene under such circiumstances is worth something.

Mr. SOLARZ. Let me take one hypothetical example. Let us assume

there were a feeling in Colombia which gained strength and force over

the years and in the year 2001 they (ecide to reclaim what had all

along in their view been rightfully theirs, and they seized the canal

and brought Panama back under their jurisdiction? From their point

of view, wouldn't they have every incentive to keep the canal open

and permit us to use it since we are one of the principal users?

Secretary BROWN. This is consistent with my statement. That

what we (1o, would depend on the circunm-tances. Our interest is in

keeping the canal open and neutral and if that neutrality is not threatened I think there would be little reason for us to intervene.

Mr. SOLARZ. I just have the feeling in conclusion, Mr. Secretary,

that this clause is designed to deal more with the threat from the Senate

than any realistic threat on the ground to our continued ability to

use the canal.

Secretary BROWN. It comes into ef!'ect after the year 1999. I find

it difficult to imagine all the contingencies under which its use, its

invocation might be suggested and either accepted or rejected.

Chairman ZABLOCKi. Thank you, Secretary Brown and thank you

General Brown, for your testimony and for the time you have given

to the committee.

The committee stands adjourned until 9:30 tomorrow morning

when we will consider sundry resolutions.

[Whereupon, at 12:35 p.m. the committee adjourned, to reconvene

at 9:30 a.m., Tuesday, September 27. 1977.]
L
PROPOSED PANAMA CANAL TREATIES

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 28, 1977

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,

Washington, D.C.

The committee met at 11:20 a.m. in room 2172, Rayburn House

Office Building, Hon. Clement J. Zablocki (chairman of the committee)

presiding.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. The committee will please come to order.

The Chair understands that the Democratic Caucus has just

adjourned so the members will be coming very shortly.

This morning we meet to continue the hearings on the Panama

Canal treaties and related legislation.

During the course of our hearings one of the major issues of concern,

under the terms of the treaty, is the continued ability of the United

States to defend the canal. It is this question which we would like to

address this morning.

We are privileged to have with us today Adm. Thomas H. Moorer,

former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Admiral, it is a pleasure to welcome you, once again, to the

committee.

If it is agreeable with you, we will begin by hearing your prepared

statement, after which I am sure the members would like to azk

questions.

Admiral Moorer, you may proceed.

STATEMENT OF ADM. THOMAS H. MOORER, FORMER CHAIRMAN

OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Admiral MOORER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I note I am speaking to an unbalanced line, but nevertheless, I am

certainly honored to be here as a witness.

I would like to emphasize at the outset that I am not here representing a particular group, an organization, or a political party. Rather, I

am here as a concerned citizen who has had far more than average

involvement in the Panama Canal as it relates to the vital security of

the citizens of these United States. I view this isue of the Panama

Canal in global maritime terms.

MVy military experience during the last 12 years of active duty, from

1962 to 1974, offered me some extraordinary and unique opportunities

to assess the importance of the Panama Canal to the United States, as

well as its value to our allies and friends and, indeed, to all maritime

nations.

My evaluation of this waterway as an invaluable possession of the

United States was intensified in 1962. At that time I was commander,

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278

7th Fleet, operating in the Western Pacific. Frequently my fleet's

capabilities depended on the prompt arrival of supplies from the Atlantic seaboard, supplies loaded aboard ships which were utilizing the

Panama Canal.

From the 7th Fleet I went to Commander in Chief, Pacific; from

there to Commander in Chief, Atlantic, and NATO's Supreme

Allied Commander, Atlantic; from there to Chief of Naval Operations

and from there to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Each of these

commands provided unique opportunities, and sometimes urgent

reasons, to evaluate the Panama Canal. I saw this strategic waterway

from many vantage points and under stressful circumstances.

As Commander in Chief, Pacific, I recall in some detail the Tonkin

Gulf era of 1964. During that period I saw the Panama Canal as a

conduit for rapid reinforcement from the Atlantic Fleet should the

naval forces of the Soviet Union or mainland China become involved

in the Vietnamese war. The U.S. high command was never sure

during those early phases of the war of the intentions of either the

Soviet Union or mainland China. We knew they had the naval and air

capabilities to make trouble and therefore we had to draw up contingency plans for such eventualities.

In order to equalize the wartime exposure and hardship throughout

the entire Navy, large numbers of Atlantic Fleet units were continuously rotated through the canal to the combat theater in the Pacific.

In addition, as the Pacific Fleet Commander I looked to the Atlantic

side for rapid logistics support. The U.S. Army, the U.S. Air Force,

the U.S. Marine Corps, and the U.S. Navy all required a continuous

and heavy flow of logistic support; such necessities as fuel, ammunition,

spare parts, and food.

Our allies fighting with us in Vietnam also required considerable

support from the United States. If the Panama Canal had not been

open and available, the war in Vietnam would have been much more

difficult and costly to conduct. This conclusion is also true for the

war in Korea. Going back a few years, there is no question but the

availability of the Panama Canal shortened World War II by many

months.

To give you some idea of the magnitude of the Panama Canal usage

and its relationship to military operations, in 1963 there was a total of

300 U.S. Government transits through the Panama Canal. As the

Vietnam war escalated, the number of Government ships transiting

by 1966 had almost doubled. The records show for the year-1966-a

total of 591 Government ships transited the canal. Most of these ships

were carrying critically needed logistics support to the forces operating

under my cammand.

As Commander in Chief, Atlantic, and NATO's Supreme Allied

Commander, I saw the situation at Panama in another perspective.

That was for the period 1965 to 1967. The war in Vietnam was still

expanding, but now I was looking at the canal not only as a means of

sending support to the Commander in Chief, Pacific, but also from the

Atlantic perspective. I saw the possible need to reverse the flow of

ships through the canal, particularly if the situation deteriorated in

the Middle East or in the Caribbean during those volatile months of

tenwion and conflict in both these areas.

Both in our U.S. planning and in our NATO planning we envisioned

contingencies calling for reinforcements from the Pacific area to the
279

Atlantic. We clearly foresaw the need for transfer of combatant

tonnage, Army and Marine divisions, and in particular we saw the

need for transfer of amphibious lift.

As Chief of Naval Operations I had to look at the Panama Canal

as an essential means of equalizing the strength and providing the

balance between the Atlantic and Pacific fleets. The canal Iiade it

possible to pre-position certain types and tonnages, but always with

the knowledge that the balance could be shifted to meet unforeseen

situations. The Panama Canal gives the naval planner much flexibility and versatility that he would be deprived of without it.

As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff I became even more

sensitive to the strategic value of this U.S. canal as a means of protecting the security of the United States. My job as Chairman involved

all of the Armed Forces of the United States-their collective requirements-and I was primarily resl)onsible to the President for

their ability to carry out their roles and missions as assigne(ld by the

Congress. Any Commander in that capacity will Miinnediately perceive that it is vital to U.S. interests to retain complete ownership

and control of the Panama Canal.

In view of the above, I am very much concerned about the proposals to surrender the Panama Canal to a leftist oriented government

allied with Cuba. There exists the potential danger for giving this

U.S. advantage to a man who might allow or might be persuaded

that it was in his best interest to permit Soviet power and inftuence

to prevail by proxy over the canal, in much the same maimer as

happened in Cuba. I was convinced as Chairman of the J(S-and

I remain convinced today-that if the Soiet Union ever gained even

proxy sovereignty and control over the U.S. Canal Zone and canal

through Cuba, U.S. security as well as U.S. prosperity would be placed

in serious jeop)ardy.

The United States would be placed in jeopardy because interocean

mobility would be threatened. The mobility of allied commercial

shipping and naval forces would face the same threat. The economic

lifelines of the entire Western HlenisI)here would be needlessi v

jeopardized, an( the point is: There is no point in surenlerino this

vital interest.

Also, by relinquishing control of the Canal Zone and the canal,

we would force all those nations who depend on our power and leadership to accommodate to the adverse implications of such action on

our part. Recent history clearly indicates that the Canal Zone could

quickly become the satellite base of an adversary. The advocates of

this proposed treaty do not appear to take this factor into account.

The Panama Canal is one of the four maritime gateways of the

world, together with the Malacca Strait, the Suez Canal, and the

Gibraltar Strait. Anyone who reads Soviet literature concerning

maritime affairs soon learns that the Soviets fully understand the

strategic importance of the Panama Canal, even if some here in

Washington (1o not.

In my view, the prime reason for the burdensome si)l)ort of Cuba by

the Soviet Union is related directly to their interest in the canal as they

greatly expanded their maritime capabilities, both warships and merchant ships. We have in fact a Torrijos-Castro-Moscow Axis. Castro

has sent thousands of troops to Africa aboard Soviet ships. He has

been to Moscow where he was greeted with open arms. Torrijos has
280

been to Havana where be has been decorated by Castro while both extolled the success of their respective revolutions.

When Torrij os overflew Havana on his return from visiting Washington a few days ago, he sent the following message to Castro:

On my return trip to my country and flying above the sky of Cuba, I salute you

with friendship always. I wish that the Cuban people under your skillful leadership, continue its ascendent march toward progress. In Latin America your name

is associated with feelings about dignity that have been channeled toward the

ending of a shameful period of colonialism.

In other words, it is quite clear that there is a very close relationship

between Torrijos and Castro and, of course, everyone knows there is a

very close relationship between Castro and Moscow.

In addition, a large Russian commission has recently visited Panama

seeking concessions and offering economic assistance.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, do not be surprised

that if this treaty is ratified in its present form to see a Soviet and/or

Cuban presence quickly established in the country of Panama. Such a

presence will seriously complicate the exercise of the implied right of

the United States-I can find no such specific right contained in the

treaty. In any event, any confrontation then becomes one with the

Soviets rather than with the Panamanian guerrillas or terrorists. With

the Soviets already on the scene, fighting our way in will not be simple.

A permanent U.S. presence on the other hand is the only feasible

posture to insure defense of the canal and the Canal Zone.

In view of the above, Mr. Chairman, I have yet to hear any justification advanced as to why the United States should willingly sacrifice

the strategic and economic advantages afforded the United States and,

for that matter, all the nations in the Western Hemisphere by our

exercise of full control of the Panama Canal as provided for in the current treaty. In fact, stripped to the essence I have heard only three

reasons put forward in support of the proposed treaty:

(1) By signing the new treaty we will divest ourselves of the stigma

of colonialism harped on by Mr. Torrijos and thereafter everyone will

love us;

(2) If we do not surrender the canal some unknown individuals in the

Isthmus of Panama will blow it up;

(13) The canal is of not much use anyway. Traffic between oceans

is a convenience but not vital. Further, the big ships of the Navy

cannot use the canal and only about 10 percent of the merchant ships

passing through the canal are U.S.-flag ships. So what is the fuss all

about?

Let me briefly discuss each of these reasons in turn.

First, the United States does not have to apologize to anyone for

its generous outpourings of blood and treasure in an effort to assist

the underprivileged and make life more peaceful and more livable for

everyone. This great committee has participated and masterminded

our aid program for years.

However, from observing the verbal attacks on the United States

in the United Nations and other places, it is apparent that a great

nation such as ours cannot buy affection: One more move in this

direction, in my view, will have little or no effect. What we should

strive for is not affection but respect. I am seriously concerned about

the trends in recent years wherein we have withdrawn from Vietnam,

are planning to withdraw from South Korea, have lost considerable
281

influence following the Angola affair, and overall are suffering from a

gradual change in the perception by the nations of the world of the

will and determination of the most powerful democracy in the world.

Ever since the negotiations were initiated with Panama in 1964

the rationale has been advanced that if the United States did not

divest itself of the canal the Panamanians would sabotage it. To

respond to this concept to me would be a retraction under threat.

If this is to be our course of action in the future we niiht as well

throw in the international towel.

One should note from a practical point of view that the Panamanians enjoy the highest per capita income of any of the contemporary

Latin American countries only because of the presence of the canal.

The activities surrounding the presence of the canal contribute about

one-tlhird of the employment and one-third of the gross national

product to Panama. If they were to attempt to damage or sabotage the canal they would be doing nothing more than cutting off their

nose to spite their fiscal face.

Furthermore, they would be the ones who would be committing

violence, not the United States. To me a pulling back under threat

will simply place our country open to additional threats and we will

lose the respect of which I spoke. Under such a condition one could

expect many of the nations of the world to tilt toward those who they

know are willing to take a firm stand in their national and international interest.

So far as the question of a two-ocean navy and the passage of aircraft carriers through the canal is concerned, let me say first that we

do not have a two-ocean navy. In recent years the Navy has been

rapidly reduced from over 900 ships to less than 500. This while the

Soviets are rapidly building up both warships and merchant ships.

Most war plans and contingency plans are infeasible unless one

assumes that full use of the canal will be available. With respect to the

large carriers, the Navy has only 13 of these ship. The vast majoritywell in excess of 90 percent-of the ships of the Navy can transit the

canal and will be required to transit the canal. I should note that the

other alternative, namely, going around Cape Horn will add 8,000

miles, 25 to 30 daYs and a considerable increase in the cost of fuel to

naval operations. It will add $93 million to the cost of our exports and

$583 million to the cost of our imports, a cost which will be borne by

the American consumer. And certainly in wartime the 30 (lays around

the Horn could very well be vital.

As far as the merchant ships are concerned, it is true that only about

10 percent of the ships flying the U.S. flag transit the canal. But that

is not the point. It is well known that the United States has a very

small merchant marine and that the shipping interests in our country, for various legal and fiscal reasons, resort to what is known as a flag

of convenience. What really counts is the tonnage which transits the

canal en route to and from ports in the United States. It so happens

that out of about 14,000 ships that transit the canal, 8,000 are either

en route from or bound for U.S. ports.

So much for these three reasons.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, there are several questions somewhat outside my purview, but troublesome nevertheless, and I will simply list

them for you.
282

One: Do the negotiators for Panama and the United States have the

same perception as to the real meaning of the language of the proposed

treaty? Public statements by both sides subsequent to the negotiations seem to indicate otherwise. Certainly this matter should be

cleared up without delay. Let me give you a few examples of what I

am talking about.

First, with respect to the right of unilateral military intervention

which has been testified to over and over. This is implied in article IV

under the treaty concerning the permanent neutrality and operation

of the Panama Canal, but nothing in this article guarantees the

United States a right to unilaterally intervene, although the proponents say we have this right in perpetuity.

In a radio broadcast on August 24, Mr. Bethancourt, the Panamanian negotiator, said and I quote:

This pact does not establish that the United States has a right to intervene in

Panama. The word was discussed and eliminated. The neutrality pact does not

provide that the United States will say when neutrality has been violated.

Again, with respect to the guaranteeing of U.S.-flag ships having

priority passage through the canal, article VI only guarantees U.S.

ships expeditious, not priority passage.

Again, Mr. Escobar disagrees with the interpretation testified to

by our negotiators and he says, and I quote:

Expeditious passage does not mean privileged passage. As a matter of fact,

the concept of privileged passage was rejected. If after examining the provision

the gringosthat is ussay I want to go through first, then that is their problem with the other ships

waiting there. We cannot go that far.

Mr. Chairman, in my view, the wide divergence in the interpretation of the meaning of the treaty concerning neutrality between

the two sides is cause for grave concern. If not cleared up in advance

the Neutrality Treaty does not solve problems, it makes them, and

big ones at that.

Coming back to some more questions:

(2) If the OAS nations so strongly support the treaty, how do we

account for the absence of the Presidents of the two largest and most

influential countries at the signing ceremonies in Washington a couple

of weeks ago? I refer, of course, to Brazil and Mexico.

(3) What will Panama do with a 2,000-percent increase over the

$2.3 million she received last year as income from the canal? To me

that appears to be a fantastic amount for a country with a population

not much larger than Detroit. Where will the money really go?

(4) In the event that the tolls are raised 30 percent-which I

think Mr. Linowitz testified to at one time-resulting in serious impact

on the economies of the other Latin American countries-particularly

those on the west coast of South America-will these countries continue their strong support of the proposed treaty or will in the final

analysis the U.S. taxpayer be asked to foot the bill in order to make

certain that everyone loves us?

There are other questions which concern me, Mr. Chairman, but I

think I will simply close by saying that regarding the question of

control and ownership of the U.S. Canal Zone and the canal I am

satisfied with the Supreme Court's decision in the famous Wilson v.
283

Shaw case to the effect that the United States does in fact have legal

control and ownership as if she has sovereignty for the purposes

enumerated in the treaty of 1903.

This ruling was reaffirmed iis recently as 1972. Also, our Constitution states in article IV, section 3, clause 2, that only Congres

has the authority to dlispose of U. territory and other property of

the United States. The language in the Supreme Court's decision of

1907 is quite precise. It is not ambiguous. So is the language in our

Constitution. Since the Supreme Court's decision of 1907 still stands,

it has never been overruled- nd since the Constitution in my opinion

is still the soundest governing document in existence, I can only

conclude that we would be well advised to abide by such documents

in our negotiations with other countries.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ZA13LOCK . Thank you, Admiral Moorer, for your forceful,

effective statement in support of your view of the advisability of the

treaties.

NEED TO REVIsE CURRENT PANAMA CANAL TREATY

Admiral, do you believe that the treaty of 1903 should be revised or

stand as a treaty for the indefinite future?

Admiral MOoORE1". 1 think certain aspects of it should be modernized

in order to provide to the Panamanians more assistance. They are

victims of inflation like everyone else and certainly in the administrative aspects of it I think some revisions might be in order, but I do

not think that the Urited )tates should pick up and leave.

Now, many people sugcest that after all it is going to be 23 years.

Well, I think that, of course, in 30 months the Panamanians are going

to assume administration and jurisdiction. I don't think that is long

enough time and I think some kind of arrangement is mandatory in

my view to maintain a presence in the Panama Canal. I do not consider this, I think I said before, a simple treaty between the United

States and a small country in the isthmnus of Panama. I consider this

to have Jlobal ramifications associated with the entire stability of the

free world and conseqjuentlY since the United States is a maritime

power-we have lonr coastlines on two of the largest oceans in the

worl2--it is vital for us to maintain and guarantee that we can

transfer warships as well as merchant ships back and forth from one

ocean into another in an eI-"peditious way.

DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN ADMIRAL MOORER AND GENERAL BROWN

ON T11EATIEs

Chairman ZA3LOCKL Acmniai Moorer, we had before the committee

Secretar% of Defenie Brown and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, General Brown. I -ik.ed them to re-pond to charges that they

had "Singlauhed" on the (_'ama Canal Treaty, that they were under

the gun from the President and could not express their true onJIion of

the treaties. They both cateroricalilv denied such ch1narges and pointed

out on recent t issues, for ex.mpli, U ,. t 1 ithdrawal from Korea

and corvtruction of the B6-1 bomber, thcyv ii)eed had (ijsagreed

publiclv with the Presideat. 'iy fLurther pointed oit that the Pentagon has been involved in negotiations over the treaties and they were

primarily responsible for the treaty on neutrality.
284

What is your evaluation of the situation? How do you account for

the differences of opinion between those currently responsible for the

U.S. national security and certain retired military officials who are

opposed to the treaties?

Admiral MOORER. First, Mr. Chairman, the treaty on neutrality

which you mentioned as having been the responsibility of the Defense

Department contains the two items that I just listed which Escobar

Bethancourt does not accept. But to get down to your basic question, I think this is not the first time that I have disagreed with a contemporary in uniform. Again I want to repeat that I am looking at this

from the context of the worldwide global maritime aspect rather than

a simple treaty between the United States and a small country in the

Isthmus of Panama.

I can't answer your question as to why they disagree with me.

What I tried to do in my statement is to put forward the reasons

why I disagree with them.

NEED TO MAINTAIN A U.S. TROOP PRESENCE

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Admiral, if article IV of the Neutrality Treaty

before being ratified by the other body, includes some reservation or

more decisive language, would this satisfy your concern about the

permanent neutrality of the canal and the U.S. ability to maintain

not only the regime of neutrality but the security of the canal?

Admiral MOORER. You are referring to article IV in the treaty

concerning the permanent neutrality and operation of the canal,

Mr. Chairman. I come back to what I said before, as now written it

does not guarantee the right for the United States to intervene and

Mr. Bethancourt said absolutely not.

The point I want to make is that any intervention by the United

States is far more difficult if we have to fight our way in, and there is

another aspect of the treaty that says only Panamanian forces will

be stationed in Panama, and that part I do not agree with. I think

that the United States should maintain a military presence in Panama

and this treaty forbids that and so, no.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. After the year 2000?

Admiral MOORER. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman, 2000 is right around the

corner. As the electronic people would say, it is a nona second in

overall history. It will be here before vou know it, and what we are

doing by zeroing in on the year 2000 is simply passing the buck down

to our children.

ADMIRAL MOORER'S SUGGESTED AMENDMENTS TO CURRENT TREATY

Chairman ZABLICKI. Admiral, would you share with the committeehow you would suggest that the current treaty be amended?

Admiral MOORER. Yes, sir, I would have simply, as I said, provided

for additional economic assistance and I would have provided for

additional training of the Panamanians in the technical aspects of

the operation of the canal so hopefully they could augment their

employment.

However, I would insist on the right to intervene. Of course, in the

real world if the United States is in a major war I don't think that

the American people would stand for us getting permission from

Panama to intervene if we had that kind of confrontation going.
2S5

The other thing I think that certainly we must demand is priority

passage. In wartime time it is of the essence. If we are going to do,

as Mr. Bethancourt suggests, if he says again:

If after examining provisions the gringos say I want to go through first, then

that is their problem with the other ships waiting there.

I think that the United States should have absolite and total

priority to go through the canal.

POSSIBILITY OF U.S. TROOP PRESENCE IN CANAL AFTER THE YEAR 2000

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Admiral, your understanding of the treaty is

that it prohibits U.S. forces after the year 2000. It is niy understanding

the treaty does not foreclose the possibility that an agreement can be

reached on use of U.S. forces after the year 2000. Is it possible in your

view, that an agreement can be reached with Panama to permit U.S.

forces in Panama after the year 2000?

Admiral MOORER. Well, I can only go by what the Panamanian

negotiators say, and I quote again: "The pact does not establish

that the United States has the right to intervene in Panama" period.

And so are we going to get their permission to intervene in an emergency or major war? That is what I don't think the American people

would stand for.

The point here is-again I come back to the global aspects and

the relationships being Torrijos, Castro, and Moscow-the minute

you permit the Soviets either by proxy with the Cubans or with their

own people-they just had a Commission down there-to establish a

presence in Panama., any confrontation that comes about down there

becomes then a confrontation between the United States and the

Soviet Union, not between the United States and Panama. That is

why I think this is far different from a treaty that the United States

might make with Guatemala, Nicaragua, or Costa Rica.

PANAMANIAN QUALIFICATIONS TO ADMINISTER THE CANAL

Chairman ZABLOCKI. As I understand your position, the 1903

treaty should have been renegotiated with additional economic assistance provided to Panama but the United States should not to

have gone as far as it did in the transfer of the administration of the

canal and the security of the canal?

Admiral IOORER. Yes, sir, it is my understanding that there are

only two Panamanians qualified as pilots, Mr. Chairman, and very

few can operate the complex machinery. I think when you have a

small, weak, unstable country, as I said, about the size of Detroit,

Mich., charged with responsibility of operating and maintaining a

complex operation, that as far as the Panama Canal is concerned,

you run the grave risk of having either the canal slowed down or

being completely interrupted by one reason or another.

I call your attention to Egypt's acquisition of the Suez Canal.

First, we got into a problem. Egypt denied the use of the canal by

the Israelis. Then the Israelis blocked the canal completely. It was

blocked for 6 years. It would still be blocked if the United States

hadn't gone over there. Egypt could never unblock it. And you can

get the same situation on the Panama Canal. I repeat that the

Malacca Strait, Suez Canal, Strait of Gibralter, and the Panama
286

Canal are the maritime belt around the world and when any one of

those are stopped all countries suffer. I don't think Panama has the

capability derived from 1.6 million people, or whatever it is, to

guarantee that that canal is always going to be open, and I think that

is a must.

I might point out we already had our first ship come through the

canal with Alaskan oil going to refineries on the east coast. That is

another aspect of the utility of the canal that I think is going to

impact on the U.S. security and economy.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Thank you.

I believe my time has expired.

Mr. Winn.

Mr. WINN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral, I want to compliment you on a very strong statement.

TIME REQUIRED TO REINTRODUCE TROOPS TO THE CANAL AREA

While we are speculating, after the year 2000, if we withdrew all

of our troops, from a military standpoint, if for some reason we had to

go back in there, how long would it take us to get troops back in there

and how many would we have to take back in there to protect the

Panama Canal?

Admiral MOORER. Well, sir, that would depend on (a) what the

situation was insofar as the combat posture of the moment and, (b)

what the opposition happened to be.

Mr. WINN. Look at it from the worst situation. Let's say that it

is the Russians.

Admiral MOORER. Well, if the Russians were firmly established in

there with their aircraft and so on, even if you fight your way in

there would be so much destruction the canal would not be available

for many months. This is why I insist that it is necessary for us to

maintain a military presense in the Canal Zone at all times, because

if we come out 100 percent I would predict you would have the same

thing you have with Wheelis Air Force Base in Libya. The Russians

are now using that air field with their Mig's and the first thing you

know the Cubans are going to be using Howard Air Force base in

Panama and maybe the Russians, too.

I wouldn't be surprised to see a Russian maritime aircraft hopping

over from Havana. Why not come down to Panama. You get a slow

infiltration and when you get a presence like that it makes fighting

your way in far more difficult than it would be if we were already

on the scene with communications and air bases.

LIKELIHOOD OF CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL OF FUNDS TO SEND TROOPS

TO PANAMA QUESTIONED

Mr. WINN. In view of our past performance in Vietnam, somewhat

the same in Angola and some other places, do you think Congress

would vote the funds to send troops back into Panama after we are

already out?

Admiral MOORER. Well, I think that the American people, of

course, are somewhat unpredictable. I happened to visit Japan at the

end of World War II to determine as be t we could as to why the

Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor. They said it was very simple, they
287

said the Congress only passed a draft law by one vote, the Congress

refused to fortify Wake and Guam, and the U.S. Army was in Louisiana with wooden guns. The Japanese were walking up and down the

Ginza shaking their heads, they could not understand how we could

vote that way one day and a little over a month later declare war

unanimously. Orientals would never (1o that.

I won't predict. I will tell you when the American people get aroused,

they would definitely go back into the canal. Why put ourselves in

that kind of position? Why make a problem for our children or for

the future, because I think there is another point here. The zone

didn't get created because of Panama, Panama was created because

of the zone. And it was recognized at that time as vital to have a

link between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. That necessity is just

as vital today as it was then, because of the fact the Soviets are shifting

from purely a land power to a very powerful sea power.

Mr. WINN. Do you read anything into the method that was used

by the executive branch in not consulting Members of Congress or

Congress as a whole before this treaty signing celebration took place?

Admiral MOORER. Well, I would have thought, particularly in view

of the resolution that was previously passed by the Senate, that

there would have been a very careful rollcall made on the Congress

first. But I am not privy as to why this sudden ceremony was set up.

FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF TREATY

Mr. WINN. Admiral, you say on page 8, 1 believe it is, it appears

to be a fantastic amount for a country with a population not larger

than Detroit; where will the money really go? That is the question

you ask. Where do you think it is going to go?

Admiral MoOREiI. I don't know what they are going to do with all

that money except that they have a national debt of over $1 billion

and it requires 40 percent of their income to carry it.

They have been continuously borrowing money from banks in the

United States. But I think that that is a question that the Congress

should determine the answer to. I don't know where the money is

going, but I (1o know it is a fabulous increase.

Mr. WINN. Do you think the little people, the people in the fields

and the streets, are going to see much of that money?

Admiral MOORER. I doubt it seriously.

Mr. WINN. Under that type of government?

Admiral MOORER. Having watched the administration of several

countries like Panama, if I was the little people I wouldn't be very

optimistic.

Mr. WINN. Thank you, Admiral.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ZAI3LOCKI. Mrs. Meyner.

Mrs. MEYNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

ROLE OF PAST ADMINISTRATIONS IN CANAL NEGOTIATIONS

Admiral Moorer, as we know, these negotiations have been going

on for 13 years since, as you point out in your testimony, 1964. That

means that four Presidents of the United States have worked hard

and pushed on these negotiations. Were they just being naive, in

98-991-7T 20
288

your opinion? Why would they have worked hard, President Johnson,

President Nixon, President Ford, and more recently President Carter,

on something if they felt it was selling the United States down the

river, so to speak?

Admiral MOORER. Well, Mrs. Meyner, I think the fact it took 14

years is indicative of part of the problem. As you may know, there

was a riot in Panama in 1964. At that time we were just getting involved in Vietnam. The last thing that President Johnson wanted to

happen was to have these diversionary activities going on. When the

Pueblo was seized by the North Koreans we essentially overlooked it

because we were so submerged in Vietnam. So the solution was to

send negotiators down to Panama and they have been there ever since.

In 1967 or 1968, I have forgotten exactly which year, Mr. Johnson

came forward with a treaty and it was sent up then and the Senate

said there was no way that it could be ratified and it never was really

submitted; and so it is true that efforts have been made to remove the

threat of sabotage and terrorism and I think that was the basic

objective because of the turbulence and so on in the sixties.

But in my opinion, this threat goes too far, because again I don't

look at it as a situation similar to having riots in Chicago. I think it

impacts on the entire world military balance, because this happens to

link the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans, and so for the reasons I have

given, I think that the treaty in its present form is inimical to the

national interests and security and prosperity of the United States.

Mrs. MEYNER. Thank you.

SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF DISAPPROVAL OF THE TREATIES

I would like to just discuss for just a moment the security implications of not approving these treaties. A 1976 report by the Ford

administration to Senator Clark suggested that about 100,000 troops

might be needed to adequately defend the canal against a determined

military attack. Is that a fair statement and could you describe just

briefly for us the military situation we would confront in Panama if

we tried to retain complete control indefinitely? Do you think that

is a concern?

Admiral MOORER. In answer to your first question about the

100,000, I will refer you to General Brown's testimony of Sept. 26,

because that was really a number taken out of context from a reply he

made to a question, and he was speaking in terms of a certain situation

that was set up by the question.

Certainly I do not think it would take 100,000 men to defend

Panama. Let me say that the defense should be looked on, in my view,

in two aspects.

One, when we are in fact in a world war III and we have to concern

ourselves not only about the canal itself but also about enemy ships

and aircraft approaching either side of the canal. You may not know

the Japanese, for instance, actually dispatched submarines with kamikaze aircraft aboard with orders to kamikaze locks and they were

intercepted. So you have the problem of defending the approaches in

a war against organized military forces.

The other problem is what I would call internal security against

sabotage and terrorist activity. Well, I am not saying you can't set

off a single charge. As a matter of fact, we have been unable to defend
289

the ladies' washroom in the Capitol. If somebody wants to go and set

off a bomb here they can do that.

Mrs. MEYNER. It is now more difficult because bags and parcels

are inspected as people enter the Capitol and House Office Buildings.

Admiral MOORER. Yes. They recently blew up La Guardia and set

off two explosives in downtown Wasbinrton a short time ago.

Mrs. MEYNER. It can be done.

Admiral MOORER. That will not interfere with the canal. For

instance, to breach the dani, the lake, that supplies the water for the

locks would take a terrific engineering effort, and so I think with an

adequate security patrol it can be well protected against that kind of

attack.

But I point out to you once again- why would the Panamanians

want to do that, because without the canal they are in abject poverty

and I don't think they have the slightest idea of destroying the canal.

That has always been brought up.

As I said in my statement, people say that if we don't give it to

them they are going to blow it up. But that is a threat and I think

we ought to tell them, all right, go ahead and blow it up, because they

are the ones that will really suffer. But I don't think they are going to

do it and I think it can be adequately patroled.

Mrs. MEYNER. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Mr. Lagoiarsino.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Thank youi, Mr. Chairman.

NEUTRALITY TREATY PROVISIONS WITH RESPECT TO MILITARY FORCES

Admiral, I want to compliment vou also on your statement, and

in furtherance of your colloquy with the chairman about what

happens after the year 2000, I would like to mention article V of

the Neutrality Treaty. It says after the termination of the Panama

Canal Treaty only the Republic of Panama shall operate the canal

and maintain military forces, defense sites, and military installations

within its national territory. So the treaty makes it very plain that

we are not allowed, at least by treaty, to have any troops in Panama

after the year 2000.

I think if we want to have troops there after that year, we had

better decide that now and not rely on some change in the future.

Admiral, I take it you would agree with, then candidate Carter,

who said in the second televised debate with then President Ford,

when he said "I would never give up complete or practical control of

the Panama Canal Zone."

Admiral MOORER. Yes; we have a perfect meeting of the minds on

that one.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. At that time?

Admiral MOORER. Yes, sir.

U.S. RIGHT OF EXPEDITIOUS PASSAGE

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. You quoted Mr. Escobar Bethancourt, who was

the chief Panamanian negotiator, in his statements on neutrality, on

the question of privileged as against preferred passage, or expeditious

passage through the canal.
290

You might not be aware of a statement that General Torrijos made

in Panama on Septenber 15. This was a speech by Gen. Omar Torrijos

at the opening of the 10th Congress of the Panamanian Students

Federation at the Augusto Samuel Boyd National Agricultural Institute in Divisa, Herrera Province, Panama, and wherein said:

I am not afraid nor am I denying that we signed a clause which if misinterpreted

by future U.S. generations could give rise to intervention, but I am not afraid.

I knov the youth we are producing, and in order for there to be intervention there

must be a people willing to accept intervention, and these people have no intention

of accepting it.

Then it says "applause."

So I think you are perfectly correct in pointing out that there is at

least a very great ambiguity about what even the President and your

successors claim is the most important part of this treaty. There is

ambiguity about it and I think it is absolutely imperative that that be

cleared up and not just by some further statement made by the

Panamanians. I think if we are going to have a treaty there should be

a reservation to the treaty or the treaty should be renegotiated to

take care of that point specifically.

NEED FOR A UNITED STATES-PANAMA BASE RIGHTS AGREEMENT TO

PROTECT THE CANAL

Admiral, do you think perhaps a bases agreement like we now have

with Spain would take care of the problem of not having a base there

in the future, as suming that the base agreement would be made either

part of the treaty or negotiated at the same time?

Admiral MOORER. Yes, Sir, I think something of that kind would, as

I said, be certainly in order to give the Panamanians economic assistance, but again, I would delete completely article V with respect to

withdrawal of U.S. forces.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Right.

Admiral iMOORER. And there is no way you can get around it. The

canal is far more vital to the security of the United States than it is to

the security of Panama. It is vital for the economic well being of

Panama. It has nothing to do with the defense of Panama as a country,

but it is vital to the security of the United States and it contributes

heavily to the prosperity of the United States.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. When asked to comment on the letter that

you and the other admirals sent to President Carter on June 8, 1977,

Gen. George Brown and Secretary of Defense Harold Brown replied

that they agreed with some of what you wrote; however, they said the

fact that it was written before the treaty, before the treaty terms were

revealed, indicates that the concerns raised were made without your

having read the treaties and the assurances that they contain.

Now that you have had a chance to read the treaties, do they provide the assurances that you feel are needed for the concerns you

expressed in that letter?

Admiral 'MOORER. Well, Sir, in view of article , in view of the

statements by Mr. Escobar Bethancourt, in view of the statements

you just read from Torrijos, I have not in any way changed my mind

because of the contents of the treaty.

As I say, my basic problem has to do with maritime aspects of

global warfare and I just don't agree with the idea of the United

States completely withdrawing and leaving the control and operation
291

of that vita1 link between the two major oceans totally to a little

country. And I am not saving this in disrespect, but Panama is a

little country, as I said, the size of Detroit, MHch. I don't think the

city of Detroit can operate and insure that the canal be onen all the

time. And certainly in Panama where the technical capabilities are

far less than they are in Detroit, I am convinced I know they can't

operate it.

N1'. LAGOM ARSINO. Thank you, Admiral.

Chairman ZAB LOCKI. Mr. Pease.

Mr. PEASE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

EXISTENCE OF A "TORRIJOS-CASTRO-MOSCOW AXIS" QUESTIONED

Admiral, on page 5 of your statement you flatly state that, "We

have in fact a Tlorrijos-Castro-Moscow axis."

I would like to have you amplify your statement. In other words,

what evidence do you have other than contacts not unlike our own

recent efforts to normalize relations with Cuba, or to establish detente

with Runsia, that such a Torrijos-Castro-Moscow axis does e st?

Admiral MOORER. Well, I think the behavior of Castro and Torrijos

is clear indication of such an axis. I will ask you this question: Who

would have thought when we had the Cuban crisis in 1962-1 said at

that timo that it would have been much better if the United States

had left the missiles in Cuba and taken the Russians out-who would

have thought at that time that a few years later the Cubans were

going to send 12,000 troops to South Africa at the insistenc-e of the

Russians? That to me is clear proof that the Russans are using the

Cubans by proxy. The Russians have just visited Panama, a big commission. Mr. Torrijos has been to Havana and Libya. Ile waved at

Mr. Castro as he went by when he left Washington. Ile didn't call

any other Latin American chief of state, he just talked to Mr. Castro.

I don't see how you can have any doubt that there is a very close

rapport among this axis that I mentioned.

Mr. PEASE. Thank you very much.

ADEQUACY OF CURRENT LEVEL OF U.S. FORCES IN PANAMA

Given the relationship which you see between Castro, T lorrijos, andl Moscow, is the current level of U.S. forces in Panama adequate

to protect the canal, or should it increase?

Admiral MOORER. Well, I believe there are 9,000 or 10,000 men in

Panama. I think under the present climate, Mr. Pease, they are adequate. But that is the kind of thing that has to be watched in terms

of increase in tensions or predicted movements, and I would hope

that the Pentagon-I never have quite found out who that is-that

the Pentagon will respond to an increase in the threat. But obviously

it is going along right now satisfactorily. I mean, we have to watch

it over a period of years.

I do know that the Soviet intelligence system is firmly established

in Cuba and is working in other places like Trinidad, Puerto Rico,

and the South American countries, and we are very naive if we don't

think that the Soviets have a very intense interest in the Caribbean

and Panama Canal.

Mr. PEASE. Well, I think it is understandable they would have their

intelligence people working there, presumably as we also have our

intelligence people working around the world.
292

ABILITY OF SOVIET UNION TO INTRODUCE TROOPS TO PANAMA

Let me ask you: In your opinion is there anything that would bar

right now under the old treaty, the Panama Government from

welcoming Soviet troops or bases to their territory?

Admiral MOORER. Well, I would think that they certainly cannot

welcome them to inside the zone.

Mr. PEASE. I mean outside the zone.

Admiral NIOORER. I guess technically they could invite Soviets to

build an airbase outside the zone. although I don't think that is a very

practical approach. I don't know of any legal reason why they can t

do it.

Mr. PEASE. What would be impractical about that? You mentioned

you didn't think it was practical.

Admiral 'MOORER. Well, I think that the United States would react

rather strongly to that.

1r. PEASE. Don't you also feel that the United States would react

rather strongly if after the year 2000 and the treaty of neutrality were

in force, the Soviets tried to put a base or troops in Panama?

Admiral MOORER. I would hope so. But I tried to explain before

that the problem of reacting strongly with U.S. forces completely

withdrawn is far different from being able to react strongly if we

already have a military presence in the zone.

Mr. PEASE. I would doubt if that is true at the beginning of the

move to put in the Soviets. It certainly would be after the Soviets

were well established. But I would think that under the terms of the

treaty of neutrality that the U.S. Government would not stand by

with that treaty in effect and allow the Soviets to put bases or troops

into Panama. That in itself would be interpreted as a violation of the

treaty of neutrality.

Admiral MIOORER. Mr. Pease. I think the action by the United

States should be determined regardless of whether you have a neutrality treaty or not. I don't think that has anything to do with what

action we would take if the Russians established a base in Panama.

Under those conditions this country would be faced with a dire threat

and I don't think the United States would pay any attention to any

kind of treaty under those circumstances.

IMPORTANCE OF WORLD OPINION ON THE CANAL ISSUE

1r. PEASE. Let me turn for just a moment to one other subject. I

am curious to know, Admiral, what your feeling is as to how the United

States ought to react to world opinion?

Secretaries of State, two of them, former ones and one present one,

have come before us and said that they believe it is imperative to

ratify these treaties because of our whole relationship with the nations

of Latin America and the less-developed countries of the world.

If it were true-I am not saying it is-if it were true that the world

opinion in two-thirds of the world, three-fourths of the world, would be

opposed to our maintaining our current position in Panama, would it

be your feeling we should ignore that?

Admiral M1OORER. Well, I tried to touch on this in my statement. I

think there have been efforts on the part of the United States since

World War II to purchase affection and this committee has approved
293

many, many aid program; throughout the world. One should view

what i said about us throughout the world, the votes in the United

Nations and so on. I think this is a little late to worry about what

everybody thinks about us, and I don't think you can buv that kind

of approval. So my personal opinion, and I certainly am not Secretarv

of State, but, nevertheless, I don't think that the nations as a whole,

the other nations feel so strongly about the canal.

As a matter of fact, there was an article in the New York Tim&e

this morning that points out that their enthusiasm is waninz.

fr. PEASE. As I understand it, your position would be that if the

world opinion would be rather solidly against ur staying there, it

would be to your position we should ignore that.

Admiral MOORER. Absolutely.

Mr. PEASE. Thank vou.

Admiral MOORER. Because I don t think we are running a popularity

contest. We are trvinZ to survive in a very difficult world.

Chairman ZABLOCKi. The Chair would like some guidance from the

members. The House is in the process of a quorum call. If the Admiral

would be willing we would adjourn for 10 minutes and come back.

How is your time'?

Admiraf MOORER. That is fine. I have until 2 o'clock.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. The committee will stand in recess for 10

minutes.

[Whereupon, a shot recess was taken.]

Chairman ZABLOCKI. The committee will resume the hearin.

I want to apologize, Admiral. and to my colleagues. I wa.s detained

on the floor on another matter.

Admiral MOORER. All right, zir.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Mr. Buchanan.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Thank you. Mr. Chairman.

Admiral, vou have made your usual forceful and effective Dreentation and it is a pleasure t'o have you before our committee azain.

Mr. chairmann, we are very lrOul oi this ditinguished SOn 0: OU

Late Of Alabama for the 1ead- hi e has gfven our country thiouJh

many -ears.

Admral MOORER. Thank you.

sUPPORT OF TREATY BY CURRENT JOINT CHIEFs CHAIRMAN

\r. BUCHANAN. AdMlial. yesterday n his testimony in the other

bjdv. General Browin -emed' to rather fir1 answer questions perta: iL to whether or not this x was his own honest opinion and not one

he was required to take because of h-s posziton as Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff.

For example. he said that he had worked for 4 years himself to get

a treaty. He said that when a person in his position was asked a direct

questIon by Members of Congress :t wa s hs obligation to answer az

to his own position. and that this had taken -lace in the case of the

B-1 bomber, in the case o:' the Korean troop w ithdrawal, and in those

instances he had in fact spoken out publicly his reservations and they

had been met by the administration.

Now. I will go into with you what is to most of us a crucial question.

and that is, do the-e view reflect the honest. good faith opinion o

the present Defense Department people, or is there substantial pres-
294

sure on a peison in a position of General Brown to conform to a Presidential decisioli regardless of his personal judgment. Also, does he

have the freedom to speak out as he indicates he did do on the B-i

and Korea?

Admiral MOORER. Well, Mr. Buchanan, I can't answer for General

Brown. I think, though, that the Pentagon focused on the treaty in

terms again of the treaty between two countries, a very small country

and a big country, looking at the primary possibility of sabotage. But

I believe the issue should be viewed in the context of global maritime

problems and I, of course, was over there at the peak of a big war.

That war disappeared, not because I left but when I left. [Laughter.]

So perhaps General Brown has a different perception than I do.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Excuse me, sir. Would it be your appraisal of the

situation that it is more an honest difference of opinion than a position

he is forced to take. Do you perceive this as simply an honest difference

of opinion between yourselves?

Admiral MOORER. I certainly would say nothing else, but that

because I don't know what kind of conversations General Brown has

had with others about his position and I wouldn't speculate about

something like that.

Generally speaking, in an executive pyramid, whether it is in the

executive branch of the Government or whether it is in General

Motors or what-have-you, the way it should work is that the subordinates certainly should be allowed to express their opinion. Having

done so, if the Chief said, I hear you, but I am going to do it another

way, then the subordinates are obligated to support the Chief. There

is a difference, however. There is a fine point between supporting a

Chief and agreeing with a Chief. But certainly after the Chief has

made his decision there is no useful purpose in the subordinates

continuing to peck away at it. I certainly, having been Chief several

times, took a dim view of anyone working for me that after I had told

him in no uncertain terms what the course of action was to be, he set

about to pull the rug from under me. He wouldn't stay around very

long.

Mr. BUCHANAN. I wonder what you would do, feeling as strong as

you do, if you were Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and I asked,

as I did ask General Brown, if there was any equivocation in your

position, if in your personal judgment this was clearly in the interest

of our country. You might have a problem with that.

Admiral MOORER. Well, so far as I am concerned, I would not

equivocate because the President always has the option of dismissing

the individual or saying that despite the fact he disagrees, I am going

to take this action anyway.

Mr. BUCHANAN. I want to thank you again for your testimony.

I see my time is about to expire. I have a question on a questionnaire

I am about to send out to my constituents in Birmingham. Based on

the knowledge you possess, do you support President Carter's Panama

Canal Treaty? This is one I know what the response is going to be.

I gather your response is clearly no.

Admiral MOORER. I don't think the treaty in its present form is in

the best interests of the United States either from a security or

economic point of view.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Thank you.
293

REACTION OF PANAMA AND OTHER LATIN AMERICAN STATES TO A

REJECTION OF THE TREATIES

Chairman ZALOCKI. Admiral, I have two "ifly" questions on

which I would like to have votur opinion.

What would happen in Panama if there is no treaty and the present

status quo is maintaine! In your opinion, what would happen? Admiral MOORER. If, in other words, we just continue? I don't

think anything would happen.

Chairman ZABiLOCKI. You don't think there would be any reaction

at all from some of our sister states in Latin America.

Admiral MOORER. No. In the first place, there is an article in the

New York Times this morning indicating that the support in some

cases was cosmetic in nature and is waning. As I said in my statement,

the South American countries are going to take a very dim view of a

30-percent increase in their tolls. They are not going to look with favor

on pouring money, their money, into Panama. As I remember, the

OAS States have passed a resolution objecting to any arrangement

which raises the tolls. So I think to answer your question, that if the

treaty was not ratified, or if the Congress in its wisdom votes amendments to it and which generate additional negotiations. I don't think

anything would happen.

SIMILARITY BETWEEN THE SUEZ AND PANA'A CANAL DISPUTES

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Admiral, you mentioned the Suez Canal. You

don't maintain that Great Britain turned over the Suez Canal voluntarily? Apparently public opinion played a role in the decision on the

part of Great Britain to relinquish control of the Suez Canal. Do you think Great Britain should have kept the control and operation of the

Suez Canal in light of world opinion?

Admiral MOORER. Yes, sir, I do, because the Egyptians demonstrated that they could not defend it. It was denied to the entire world

for 6 years. I don't think that would have happened if the British

had maintained it.

As you recall, Mr. Chairman, that was a nip-and-tuck proposition.

For instance, the commander of the 6th Fleet was queried at that time

when the United States took the opposite position from the British

and French. He got a message from the Pentagon asking him, "Are

you ready?" His reply was, "I am ready, but whose side am I on?"

That was a kind of shaky situation.

But the main point I am trying to make about the Suez, is that it is

a far simpler operation. It is a sea level canal. But the Egyptians were

unable to keep it open. The historical fact is that it was closed for 6

years. So I am saving Panama, regardless of why it is closed, unilaterally does not have the know-how, the technical know-how or the ability

to keep the canal open by themselves.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Did you take a position publicly at the time in

opposition to the turnover of the Suez Canal to Egypt?

Admiral MOORER. Well, of course, in those days-that was quite a

while ago--no one was very much concerned about my position, public

or private.

Chairman ZA13LOCKI. What was your private view?
296

Admiral MOORER. I did not think that it was in the interest of the

world at large.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. I had better go to my other "iffy" question.

Perhaps this is an unfair one.

IMPLEMENTATION OF TREATIES

Admiral, should the other body ratify the treaty, what is your advice to this committee and to the House of Representatives on implementation of the treaties?

Admiral MOORER. Well, I believe that according to the Constitution the House of Representatives is definitely involved in the conditions set forth in this treaty, and since I am opposed to the treaty

I hope 51 percent of the Congressmen would be opposed.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. But my question is once the treaties are

ratified, legislation will be necessary to implement the treaties. Should

then the Congress, nevertheless, even though the treaties are ratified,

withhold necessary authorization and funding, for example, to implement the treaties?

Admiral MOORER. Mr. Chairman, I am not a parliamentarian. I

would hope that the leadership in the Congress wouldn't permit

themselves to get in that box and that there could be sufficient discussion back and forth to avoid that situation. I think that would be an

undesirable situation to permit to arise.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. If the treaties are ratified, the Congress really

has no alternative but to authorize legislation to implement the

treaties. Do you agree?

Admiral MOORER. Well, I would hope that there would be a large

number of amendments appended that would somewhat ease what I

consider to be the undesirable aspects of this treaty.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. We may have to call upon you, Admiral,

when we get to that point.

Admiral MOORER. Mr. Chairman, I am ready.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Whose side are you on? [Laughter.]

Are there any other questions?

Admiral, again thank you. You have been an excellent witness. I

think you have given some additional insight on a very difficult, emotionally charged issue. We thank you sincerely.

Admiral MOORER. Mr. Chairman, I would like to emphasize I am

a total stoic; there is no emotion involved in this whatever.

Chairman ZABLOCK1. I didn't mean the reference to emotion on

your part.

The committee stands adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.

[Whereupon, at 1:10 p.m., the committee adjourned, subject to the

call of the Chair.]
PROPOSED PANAMA CANAL TREATIES

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 11, 1977

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,

Washington, D.C.

The committee met at 9:50 a.m., in room 2172, Rayburn House

Office Building, Hon. Clement J. Zablocki, chairman of the committee, presiding.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. The committee will please come to order.

It is my understanding that members are on their way.

We meet this morning to continue the committee's hearings on the

Panama Canal Treaties and related legislation.

Our first scheduled witness was Hon. John M. Murphy, chairman of

the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries. Unfortunately, due to a scheduling conflict, Chairman Murphy will be unable

to present his testimony in person. Without objection, however, his

prepared statement will be included in the record of today's hearing.

Is there any objection to including Congressman Murphy's statement in the record?

The Chair hears none. It is so ordered.

[The statement of Chairman Murphy follows:]

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN M. MURPHY, CHAIRMAN, HOUSE COMMITTEE ON

MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you for giving me the oppor- tunity to present my views on the proposed Panama Canal treaties and a major

constitutional issue that is connected with the treaties-congressional power to

dispose of U.S. property and territory.

At the outset, let me state that the proposed Panama Canal treaties should be

accepted or rejected on the basis of whether they serve the best interests of the

United States, not on the basis of who is supporting or opposing them, not on the

basis of party, or region. The only question to be considered is whether the proposed treaties are good for the United States, or whether they would be better

amended, or rejected in favor of the present treaty relationship.

As chairman of the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, I (10

favor the concept of a new treaty relationship with the Republic of Panama with

respect to the Panama Canal. For example, I indicated as long as 7 years ago, when

I chaired the House Subcommittee on the Panama Canal, that real estate adjustments can be made in canal zone boundaries. I also think we can find a way to

bring additional economic benefits to Panama from the canal, although we cannot

demean the gigantic benefits that Panama has reaped from the waterway over the

years. Further, every assistance should be afforded to Panamanian private enterprise to take advantage of the economic opportunities which the canal zone offers.

While I agree with President Carter that there is a need for a new treaty

relationship, the haste and self-imposed deadline that characterized the most

recent phase of the negotiations has resulted in defective treaties which do not

achieve the objectives they sought to attain-"an open, safe, efficient, and neutral

canal" under a treaty relationship which "protects the national security interests

(297)
298

of the United States." Neither will the said treaties help to endear us with our

Latin American neighbors, ior will they better protect the canal against sabotage. I want to miake clear that my observations on the treaties today are not meant

to reflect in a:ny way on the dedication and patriotism of our fine negotiators, Ambassadors Bunker and Linowitz. They worked hard in attempting to resolve

one of the most dillicult foreign policy questions that has ever faced this Nation.

Perhaps they have come up with as good a set of documents as could be permitted by the tliine limitations that were imposed by Ambassador Linowitz's

6-month appointment, but I submit that such haste and failure to seek the

assistance and guidance of many Members of Congress has resulted in fatally

defective treaties which will create more problems than they will solve.

In this statement, I will briefly outline some of the defects in these treaties

which make them unacceptable in present form, and then discuss those matters

with respect to the documents which, in my view, are in need of special analysis.

I will also address the overstatements and inaccuracies that have unfortunately

served as somewhat faulty prernises for adoption of the proposed treaties.

The circumstances which attended negotiations in recent times have led to

the following flaws in the Panama Canal treaty and the treaty for permanent

neutrality of the canal:

1. The attempt to circumvent the House of Representatives in the matter of

disposal of U.S. property and territory;

2. The attempt to circumvent the House in the matter of appropriations;

3. The absence of clear and unequivocal language to allow U.S. action to

protect the canal in times of hostility;

4. The absurd prohibition until the year 2000 precluding the United States

from negotiating for a new sea level canal with any country other than Panama,

a prohibition which places the United States in a totally dependent position

without any logic or reason;

5. The formulation of an over-generous economic compensation package which

will likely ruin the economic viability of the canal as a self-sustaining operation

and result in enormous U.S. subsidies to run the canal in future years;

6. The location of many key items with respect to control of the canal in

accompanying executive agreements rather than in the body of the treaties, thus

allowing for piecemeal erosion of the tenuous and limited rights found in the

treaties themselves;

7. The failure of the treaties to address the disposition of other relevant canal

agreements such as the United States-Great Britain Hay-Pauncefote Treaty of

1901 which sets forth the international obligations in connection with the neutral

operations of the canal, and the Thomson-Urrutia Treaty of 1914, which gives

to Colombia certain privileged rights with respect to transit.

8. The pervasiveness of vague and ambiguous language and, in fact, the absence

of language, with respect to many important subject areas, including:

(a) The U.S. rights of invervention;

(b) The boundaries of the properties being immediately taken over by Panama;

(c) The taxation of canal properties by Panama;

(d) The obligation to turn over the canal to Panama in the year 2000 free from

debt and in good operating condition;

(e) The Panamanian takeover and the U.S. use of docks, housing, railroad,

et cetera.

(f) The rights of passage for U.S. vessels of war and auxiliary vessels.

In terms of precedents, the most harmful aspect of the entire treaty process

could be the circumvention of the House of Representatives in disposing of the

properties belonging to the United States in the Panama Canal and Canal Zone.

This circumvention results from the administration's incorrect interpretation of

what should be the appropriate constitutional process in this matter.

Administration officials have repeatedly stated that the congressional power

to dispose of U.S. territory and property is a concurrent constitutional power

that does not override the treaty-making powers of the President, and that the

power of the Congress to legislate for the Canal Zone does not preclude the disposal of this territory by treaty. The support for this view is based on cases involving Indian treaties, boundary treaties and a few instances of congressional

acquiescence which are fundamentally different from the transfer of Canal Zone

properties comprising a major U.S. territory and a $7 billion investment.

Cases Involving Indian treaties are fundamentally different from the disposal

of the Canal Zone because:

1. They involve a recognition of the existing Indian rights over the particular

territory.
299

2. In each instance the Indian tribes conveyed by treaty to the United States

enormous tracts of land and selected members of the tribe were allowed to retain

small reservations for their own use. Thus, it could be readily argued that there

was no disposition of U.S. property.

3. The United States retained residual rights in connection with the lands reserved to the Indians and, of course, maintained its rights of eminent domain.

4. Even if such reservations could be deemed disposals, the Congress authorized

the same and acquiesced to executive action over a long period of t ime.

5. More than a century has passed since Congress withdrew its acquiescence

to transfers of property by treaty, and the Senate concurred.

6. The status of the American Indians' interest in land in the United States is

unique and entirely different from that which would entail a transfer of the

canal property to a foreign sovereign.

The boundary treaties which are put forward as one of the chief precedents for

the disposal of the Canal Zone by treaty are distinguishable by reason of the fact

that they involved property that, for purposes of jurisdiction, was in dispute and

entailed an exchange of, rather than a disposition of, property.

If the practice of disposing of U.S. territory and property has followed various

procedures, as the executive conten(is, then past practice with respect to the disposition of canal property and Canal Zone territory ought to he the key to a decision

with respect to relinquishing the Canal Zone. The past practice is clear. The House

of Representatives has tenaciously asserted its role, and the general rule has been

that the disposal of property is accomplished only by a legislative enactment of

Congress. In 1932, 1937, 1942, and 1955, property was transferred to Panama

after the house and Senate authorized it. If the House as well as the Senate played

a key role in the process of divestment of relatively minor assets in the Canal Zone,

it seems only logical to obtain House Approval in the determination of the fate of

the entire Canal Zone and Panama Canal and the disposition of Ibillions of dollars

of U.S. properties.

The case for the involvement of Congress under the propOrty clause in the

Constitution (article IV, section 3, clause 2) rests, of course, upon U. property

interests in the Canal Zone. It is indisputable that we do have such property interest. On August 17, Ambassador Bunker acknowledged that interest before the

committee I chair. It is sufficient for our purposes here to state that the United

States holds much of the land in the Canal Zone in fee simple, that deed, to such

lands were obtained, and that Panama ceded even reversionary rights to the

French Canal Company assets and property purchased by the United States.

All of the U.S.-owned property with respect to the Panama Canal and the Canal

Zone constitute property interests of the United States within the purview of the

congressional powers vested under article IV of the Constitution. Such ownership, of course, includes the waterway, appurtenant installations, biuildings and other

structures in the zone, as well as the assets of the Panama Canal organization and

military departments and U.S. Government agencies in the zone.

With all due deference to the Hlonorable Griffin Bell, I should like to respond

briefly to the statements made by him on September 29 before the Senate Foreign

Relations Committee.

Attorney General Bell places great emphasis on some selected references to the

constitutional debates which indicate that territorial disposal rights were of major

concern in connection with treaties. This, of course, begs the question, since it

could be argued that the insertion of article IV, section 3, clause 2 in the Constitution giving such powers of disposal to the Congress obviated the concern of authorizing the President to dismember the republic Lv treaty.

In "Elliot's Debates"', p. 501, James Madison responded to Patrick Henry's

concern that two-thirds of a quorum could make a treaty an relinquish and

alienate territorial rights."' Mr. Madison stated:

"He thinks that, by the power of making treaties, the Empire may 1e dismembered in time of peacc. The King of Great.Britain has the pow r of inak ing peace, 1but he has no power of dismembering the Empire, or alienating any\ paurt of it.

Nay, the King of France has no right of alienating part of his dmennioiPs to any

power N% hatsoever. The power of making treaties does not involve a ri ght of dismembering the Union."

Article IV, section 3, clause 2 of the Constitution gives to the Congrss not

only the "power" to dispose of, but also the power to nmke "all nee(Iful rules aod

regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United

States***." The use of the word "all" clearly indicates that such power is

exclusive.
300

The Percheman case, cited at page 10 of the Attorney General's statement

before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, involved an attempt to

confirm title to property claimed by virtue of a grant from Spain in 1815 before

the 1819 treaty in which Florida was ceded to the United States. The court

held that the cession of property from one sovereign to another cannot interfere

with private property. It does not explicitly or implicitly stand for the proposition that Congress' power to make all rules and regulations respecting American

territory could be implemented by self-executing treaty. Nor did the court rule

that power to be concurrent. The case involved statutory construction-not

constitutional interpretation.

Moreover, Congress did act in connection with the 1819 treaty with Spain and authorized the President to take possession of the Spanish cessions and to

provide rules for their government. By implication, it is obvious that by expressly accepting the territories of Florida, the Congress also acquiesced in the- fixing of

the boundary line between the two countries to the east and west of the Mississippi.

Furthermore, we are again dealing with an adjustment of a boundary line

dispute which, even absent congressional approval, would be quite different

from the proposed transfer to Panama.

The Congress has limited the President's power under the Panama Canal

Zone code to acquisition of additional land or exchange of land. No authority

was granted by Congress to the President to dispose of land in the zone and

prior practice in connection with property disposals in the Canal Zone clearly

indicate that no such authority was ever intended.

It would also appear that the treaty provisions for transfer of property of the

United States without congressional approval runs counter to the language

contained in the last sentence of article IV, section 3, clause 2, namely: "* * 

nothing in this constitution shall be so construed as to prejudice any claims of

the United States." Clearly, the United States has "claims" in the Panama

Canal Zone and the treaty clause should not and must not be construed to prejudice such claims.

Governor Randolph, during the debate in the 1788 Virginia Convention, in

specifying the limitations and restraintR of the President and the Senate under

the treaty-making authority, stated:

"* * * will not the last clause of the 4th article of the Constitution secure

against dismemberment? It provides that 'nothing in this Constitution shall be

construed as to prejudice any claims of the United States, or of any particular

State.' And if this did not constitute security, it follows from the nature of civil

association, that no particular part shall sacrifice the whole." ("Elliot's Debates,"

pp. 504-5)

Attorney General Bell shrugs off the fact that the U.S. Supreme Court has

consistently, in literally dozens of cases over two centuries, ruled that the power

of the Congress under article IV, section 3, clause 2 is exclusive. Because these

cases related to the authority of the executive and judicial branches does not

diminish the relevance or impact of such clearly established authority just because

"none of them dealt with the * * * power of the treaty-making authority to make

such disposition." The fact is that that the Supreme Court has never held that the

powers of Congress under articles IV are not exclusive and certainly none of the

decisions dealing with Indian treaties could be so construed.

The dictum of Holden v. Joy is not controlling because of its irrelevance to the

case as stated by the Court in its opinion " * * * But it is not necessary to decide

the question in this case, as the treaty in question has been fully carried into

effect, and its provisions have been repeatedly recognized by Congress as valid."

Furthermore, the decision of the Supreme Court in a much more recent case,

Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United States (316 U.S. 317) (1942) appears to be controlling. In that case the Court stated:

"Section 3 of Article IV of the Constitution confers upon Congress exclusively

'the power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the

territory or other property belonging to the United States' * * * 

"Concededly, where lands have been reserved for the use and occupation of an

Indian Tribe by the terms of a treaty or statute, the tribe must be compensated

if the lands are subsequently taken from them. * * 

"Since the Constitution places the authority to dispose of public lands exclusively in Congress, the Executive's power to convey any interest in these lands must

be traced to Congressional delegation of its authority." (316 U.S. 317, at 342)

In Youngstown Sheet and Tube Company v. Sawyer (343 U.S. 579) Mr. Justice

Jackson noted that opinions of Attorney Generals are partisan comments. Justice

Jackson was, of course, a former Attorney General fully aware of the atmosphere
301

in which the Attorney General opinions are written. The Attorney General is, in

fact, the President's lawyer. But, if we are to look to opinions of Attorneys General

in this matter, then may I refer you to an extract from an opinion rendered by

Attorney General Harlan Stone in 1924 to the Secretary of the Navy:

"The Constitution (Art. IV, Sec. 3, Cl. 2) gives to Congress the power to

'dispose of * * * property belonging to the United States' and Mr. Justice

Thompson, sitting in Circuit in U.S. v. Nicoll 27 Fed. Case 15879 (pp. 149-50)

said:

" 'No public property can therefore, be disposed of without the authority of law

either by an express act of Congress for that purpose, or by giving the authority

to some department of the government, or subordinate agent.'

"It follows then that property once acquired by the Government may not be sold,

or title otherwise disposed of, except under the authority of the Congress, and in

the manner provided by law, and this prohibition extends to any attempt to

alienate a part of the property or in general, in any manner to limit or restrict the

full and exclusive ownership of the United States therein. * * * "(34 Op. Att.

Gen. 320, 322)

In summary, the text and history of the Constitution, case law, and prior

practice in connection with disposal of property in Panama all support the proposition that the disposal of territory and property belonging to the United States,

requires congressional approval.

The 1903 treaty with Panama was entered into by virtue of the powers granted

by Congress (the Spooner Act of 1902). No less than full congressional approval

should be required for the annulment of this historic treaty.

I hope that this committee would agree with the view that one of the chairmen

of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee took in 1942 when, concerning a

dispute over the role of the House in disposing of canal property, Senator Connally, then chairman of that committee, said:

"The Constitution itself confers on Congress specific authority to transfer

territory or lands belonging to the United States. So, if we had a formal treaty

before us and if it should be ratified, it still would be necessary for the Congress

to pass an act vesting in the Republic of Panama the title to the particular tracts

of land; because 'the Congress' means both bodies. The House of Representatives

has a right to a vote as to whether any transfer of real estate or other property

shall be made either under treaty or otherwise." (88 Cong. Rec. at 9257)

I was delighted, while testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee

on October 5, to hear Chairman Sparkman say that his committee's continued

policy is to recognize the necessity for House concurrence in this vital matter of

transferring canal property to the Republic of Panama.

I wish to summarize on one important point: We, as Members of Congress are

trustees for the powers vested in us by the Framers of the Constitution, and as

such, have the duty to preserve and protect such powers.

For the committee's consideration and with your permission, Mr. Chairman,

I would like to submit for the record several documents, including a memorandum

of law, which more fully discuss the interpretation of article IV, section 3, clause 2

of the Constitution. Also, if the committee wishes to make inquiry into the

boundary treaties, the Indian treaties, or other contentions with respect to the

property clause, I will be happy to address those matters.

There is another constitutional question here of great importance-and that

involves the constitutional requirement that "no money shall be drawn from the

Treasury, except in consequence of appropriations" (Article I, Section 9, Clause 7).

In spite of these requirements, the proposed treaty requires the payment of

billions of dollars to Panama without specific approval by the House of

Representatives.

The provisions of the proposed treaty for payment to Panama "out of canal

operating revenues'' are appropriations of public funds that under the Constitution

require prior action by the Congress.

The proposed Panama Canal Treaty provides that the United States will

operate the canal "by means of a United States Government agency called "The

Panama Canal Commission" which shall be constituted by and in conformity

with the laws of the United States." The functions to be assigned to the new

agency are now performed by the Panama Canal Company and by the Canal

Zone Government.

The treaty does not purport to further specify the form of the government

agency to be established for the indicated purpose and the Congress might well

establish the agency either as a government, corporation, such as the Panama

Canal Company, or as a noncorporate establishment, such as the Canal Zone
302

Government. In either case, the canal operating agency would be subject to the

laws of the United States applicable to the disbursement of public funds, and

payments of expenses by the new agency, including the payments to Panama, would have to be provided by appropriations. Provision for such payments out

of canal operating revenues without appropriation by the Congress is clearly in

contravention of article I, section 9, clause 7 of the Constitution.

In addition to the paramount constitutional questions, I must, as chairman of

the House committee which oversees canal operations, voice my concern as to the

economic compensation package provided in the Panama Canal Treaty.

The Panama Canal's commercial value rests upon the provision of efficient

service at reasonable toll rates. As one financial expert said, the reliability of user

charges and open disclosure of financial results are the key to the financial worth

of the canal. The increase in tolls of approximately 40 percent or more that will

be required immediately under the new treaty, and the inflationary indices that

will cause future toll increases, will inevitably result in diversion of traffic from

the canal and strike a mortal blow at the concept of operation of the canal on a

self-sustaining basis. The required toll increases will simply be beyond the capacity of the canal to handle. Incidentally, I find it difficult to understand how

we can aggressively pursue minimizing tolls at the St. Lawrence Seaway through

various congressional actions, such as the creation of a tolls advisory committee, while at the same time maximizing tolls at the Panama Canal, which is at least of

equal importance to U.S. commerce.

The United States will be forced inevitably to directly subsidize the operation

of the canal through appropriations under the proposed treaties. This result, of

course, does not comport with the frequently-made assertion that there will be

no additional burden on the taxpayer as a result of these treaties. The discontinuance of the payment to the treasury of interest on the investment of the

United States in the canal, which is implicit in holding a tolls increase to 40 percent, will itself diminish the treasury of the United States by a half-billion dollars

by the year 2000, and in effect, result in payment to Panama of interest on funds

invested by the United States.

In summary, the abrupt changes in canal finances that will result from the proposed treaty will have irreversible consequences that will pose a threat to use of

the canal and the economies of the United States, our allies, and nations in Latin

America.

With respect to the important question of the prohibition to the year 2000 on

U.S. construction of an interoceanic canal in any location other than Panama, it

has been stated that there is a quid pro quo in that Panama is precluded from

negotiating with anyone else for the construction of an interoceanic canal. That

is not so. In fact, we do not even have a right of first refusal. The language only

gives us a right to negotiate. It is not an exclusive right. The treaty, however,

makes it clear that the United States is precluded from negotiating with thirdparty states.

While my testimony to this point has addressed the organic defects of the

proposed treaties, it is clear that the underlying premises for these treaties are a

major part of the on-going debate. In very brief fashion, I would like to address

the three premises upon which approval of the treaties is suggested. All three of

the premises have been so overstated or inaccurately drawn that they often bear

little resemblance to reality.

It is said that the Panama Canal is of diminishing and minor importance to

the United States both commercially and militarily. This is incorrect. Commerciallv the canal is of major and continuing importance to the United States and

militarily the Panama Canal and Canal Zone remain major military assets of our

country, and in essence, constitute the southern flank of our defenses.

There are many statistics which point to an increasing rather than decreasing

role for the canal in our commerce and security. I have appended some of those

st;! istics to this statement and ask permission that they be inserted for the record.

It has also been said that should the treaties fail to gain approval there will be

violence and sabotage of the canal. Selling these or any treaties that must endure

for generations on the basis of response to a threat of violence does great injury

to the conduct of our foreign relations. This issue is not a proper one for consideration.

Threats always cut two ways. If we are going to respond to threats, could that

provoke disgruntled canal employees or fanatic superpatriots to proclaim they

will sabotage the Panama Canal if the United States can no longer own and

control it? The general U.S. policy to resist threats from terrorists has worked

well. We must apply it in this debate on the treaties. To support or oppose a

treaty because one side or another is more prone to violence is most unwise.
303

The Panama Canal is only one of many major facilities that are vulnerable.

The U.S. Capitol was vulnerable to the Weathermen several years ago.

Finally, it is said that the Panama Canal Treaties are the top issUe on the

Latin American agenda, and that the United States would face hostility from

Latin America if the treaties are rejected.

This overstatement is contradicted by the experience of many of our officials

in Latin America. None of us can believe that the countries on the west coast of

South America or the countries in Central America will be happy about the tolls

increase that is implicit in the treaty. In fact, at the gathering of the Organization

of American States in Grenada this year, that organization voted 19 to 0 (the

United States abstained, Panama did not vote) for a resolution stating that canal

tolls should reflect only the actual operating costs of the waterway.

The success that Panama has had in garnering support in Latin America should

be juxtaposed against the fact that Paiiaina has consistently failed to obtain the

degree of Latin American support she has sought for her position in reference to

the Panama Canal. With respect to the treaties themselves, in September, despite

some pressure salesmanship from the United States, the Latin countries refused

to endorse the agreements and signed only a watered-down resolution.

In conclusion, a properly conceived treaty arrangement may serve United

States and Panamanian interests, but I do not believe the treaties should be

accepted, at least in their present form. Above all, I think we should be realistic

enough to recognize that because of the manner in which these treaties were

negotiated, an atmosphere has been created in which violence or stoppage of the

canal will probably occur regardless of approval or disapproval of the treaties.

Thank you.

DATA IN SUPPORT OF THE CONTENTION OF THE CONTINUING

IMPORTANCE OF THE PANAMA CANAL AND CANAL ZONE

COMMERCIALLY

The Panama Canal is a U.S.-oriented Canal because two-thirds of the vessels

transiting have a port in the U.S. as a point of origin or destination.

The Maritime Administration estimates that by the year 2000 U.S. exports

through the Canal will have doubled and U.S. exports will be at 22 times today's

levels.

The percentage of the total dollar value of U.S. ocean foreign trade transiting

the Panama Canal has steadily increased in the last generation, and is expected

to increase in the future.

96 percent of the U.S. fleet and 92 percent of the world's merchant fleet can

transit the Canal today. The great majority of those sulpertankers which cannot

transit the Canal were built for trade routes which do not come near the Isthmus

of Panama.

70 percent of all the cargo that has transited the Canal has done so in the last

25 years.

MILITARILY

The lack of a true two-ocean navy while the U.S. has commitments in five

oceans makes the Canal's availability for transit ever more important.

98 percent of our naval fleet can transit the Canal. Only our Nimitz class

aircraft carriers cannot transit. The trend toward naval ship design is toward

a smaller and faster vessel.

The Canal has been a major resource in hostilities and confrontations that

occurred in World War II, Korea, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and Vietnam.

The Canal Zone has the only major ship repair facilities within 1,600 miles on

the Atlantic side and 2,500 miles on the Pacific side.

The Canal Zone also has the only U.S.-controlled air base within 1,000 miles, and it is a military and communications crossroads of the hemisphere.

The only existing trans-Isthmian pipeline for ship bunker oil and aviation fuel

are in the Zone.

The lack of adequate West Coast port facilities for the loading of supplies and

ammunition makes the Canal crucial to U.S. military efforts, especially those

in the Pacific theater.

Chairman ZABLOCKi. The remaining witnesses appearing before the

committee today will address the role played by the human rights

issue in the debate over the Panama Canal Treaties.

98-991-77 21
304

We will first welcome to the committee Mr. William P. Stedman, Senior Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American

Affairs.

Mr. Stedman, you may proceed.

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM P. STEDMAN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS

Mr. STEDMAN. Thank you, sir. I do have a brief statement I would

like to read.

Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to be here today to discuss with you

and the members of this committee the human rights situation in

the Republic of Panama. President Carter has stated that human

rights is a central component of our foreign policy. We have an interest in the observance of basic human rights in all countries of the

world. If we are to be true to the best and most deeply held traditions

and beliefs of our Nation, expressed in our Declaration of Independence and Constitution, then we must infuse our foreign policy with our

convictions. We believe that the human rights situation in Panama

should be viewed in this context and for these reasons the Department

of State has followed the human rights situation in Panama closely.

I would like to state at the beginning that one of the tests of a

commitment to human rights which can be applied to any government

is its receptivity and willingness to receive outside observers genuinely

concerned about human rights. It is therefore gratifying that on

September 13, 1977, the Panamanian Government invited the InterAmerican Human Rights Commission to visit Panama to investigate the various charges of human rights violations which have been

made and to report its findings. Torrijos promised that if any political

prisoners were found, they would be released. Another positive indication of the Government's attitude toward human rights in Panama

is that in May 1977, in response to criticism from a Venezuelan youth

group, Copei Juventud, General Torrijos personally invited the group

to visit Panama "to see for themselves" what the state of human

rights is in Panama. The group has not yet acted on that invitation.

The Government has also invited the Secretary-General of the United

Nations and several Latin American and United States universities

to observe the national plebiscite on October 23, on whether to ratify

the proposed Panama Canal Treaties. We welcome these invitations

because of the charges that have arisen and expect that these visits

and the resultant studies and observations will provide an objective

standard against which to test the accusations regarding conditions

there. We further welcome it as an indication that Panama takes

its obligations seriously.

Our own assessment at the present time is that Panama is neither

a model open society, a traditional liberal democracy, nor a repressive

totalitarian government. I should say candidly that this assessment

differs with those of some other reports.

At this time Panama is ruled by an authoritarian government, but

its control of Panama is by no means total or heavyhanded. Amnesty

International's International Report for 1975-76 did not have a

section on Panama. Occasional police brutality does arise as a problem

as it does in many countries.
305

There is a reasonable guarantee of a fair, public trial. In certain

cases involving state security when the Government does not desire a

trial, the accused may be interrogated, judged, and sentenced without

due process as we understand it. Instead the procedure is administrative. The Government does not take this kind of action often.

Exile has been the most commonly used measure to deal with certain dissent that the Government did not wish to tolerate, despite the

fact that expatriation is prohibited under article 29 of the 1972 Panamanian Constitution. In 1976 there was a case of multiple exilings. It

involved 14 men who were exiled by the Government in January af ter

public antigovernment activity. After a short detention, in all cases

a matter of a few hours, they were sent to Ecuador without any trial.

Many of these men were conservatives; some were leftists. The Government charged at the time that most of them had been engaged in

an active conspiracy with exiled opponents of Torrijos to overthrow

the regime.

In addition, during the student demonstrations and riots of September 1976 in Panama City, three more people left Panama under

duress. We know of no incidents of forced exile in 1977.

To the best of our knowledge, the Government has not expropriated

any property belonging to these men. Nor has it stripped them of

their Panamanian citizenship.

The Panamanian Government has allowed 5 of the 14 people exiled

in January 1976 to return to their country. In addition, it has published a list of 82 exiles, mostly lesser known individuals from the

politically turbulent period of 1968 to 1972, who are now permitted

to return if they choose to do so.

Worship, internal movement, foreign travel, emigration, and the

import and export of currency are entirely free. Freedom of assembly

is limited, and rallies or open meetings of those opposed to the Government have not generally been permitted. However, it is noteworthy that, for the debate on the proposed treaties in Panama,

many of these controls have been relaxed. Political parties are banned,

although this is not strictly enforced. They have maintained their

organizational identities and structures, and operate informally as

movements or under the camouflage of business, labor, or trade

groups. The Panamanian Communist Party, the Partido del Pueblo

(PdP), may operate semiopenly, but only on the condition that it

support the Government. The Government monitors the party's activities and harasses them from time to time to the extent necessary

to keep the PdP in line.

Students are permitted more leeway, and on many occasions the

student demonstrators have criticized government policies and officials sharply. Such public criticism of specific government policies

often occurs at public meetings of interest groups such as business

or labor.

In the past several weeks, controls over political activity have been

significantly reduced in order to allow free debate of the proposed

Panama Canal Treaties. The Liberal and Panamenista Parties have

held public meetings which have been reported freely in the press.

There have also been calls for full restoration of political and civil

rights and a return to full democracy.
306

Regardless of the context or the speaker, however sharp, direct

criticism of General Torrijos, or public attack on the legitimacy of

his government is not accepted.

The press and broadcast news media, while not subject to prior

government censorship, practice self-censorship. Periodically, the

government cautions them. The media avoid direct criticism of the

top-level officers of the national guard and sensitive topics which

might tend to disturb public order. Despite an overall caution, on

occasion the media, particularly radio and television, do discuss controversial issues. The most celebrated recent example was a television

panel discussion, in unusually frank terms, of human rights in Panama on May 26 of this year. Following this, there was a fair amount

of discussion in the press regarding the existence of racial prejudice

in Panama, in which existence of such prejudice in Panamanian society

was discussed with considerable frankness. The country's present economic slump has been frequently discussed.

The Torrijos government has made major strides in extending economic and social benefits to its people. It is expanding economic

development to those areas of the country previously outside the

nation's economic life. The government is also expanding educational

benefits, medical facilities and services, and economic development

projects to wide sectors of the population which had been previously

ignored.

Panama is goverened by the Constitution of 1972. Under that

charter, there is a National Assembly of Community Representatives, whose 505 members were elected by popular vote in 1972 for 6-

year terms. The executive and legislative organs of the Government,

which hold the real power in Panama (Presidency, Cabinet, Judiciary

and National Legislative Commission) are either elected indirectly or

appointed. Under the terms of the constitution, General Torrijos

holds special temporary powers as Supreme Chief of the Revolution

for a 6-year period which will end in 1978.

General Torrijos is clearly the leader of the Panamanian Government. When he chooses to make decisions, his will prevails. However, he does not involve himself in all areas of the Government, and the

President and cabinet exercise considerable influence of their own.

Only one member of the Cabinet is a military man. The rest are civilians, many educated in the United States.

The National Assembly of Community Representatives was intended to foment greater grassroots participation in national political

life. The Assembly does not reflect the one-man-one-vote philosophy, but is skewed to favor the rural population, whose interests were poorly

represented in the past. The assembly serves and is intended to serve

primarily as a consultative mechanism; its affirmative powers are

limited to election of the President and Vice President, approval of

treaties and international agreements, and passing nonbinding resolutions on the activities of the Government.

The Government also normally consults with a broad range of

-ectoral groups and associations during the formulation of policy

initiatives. These groups are more or less analogous to our National

Association of Manufacturers, Chambers of Commerce, and AFLCIO1, but they also play a limited political role partially comparable

to political parties.
307

In terms of democratic participation, therefore, the results are

mixed. There are elected representatives, but with little influence on

major national policy formulation. There is broad consultation and

major opportunities for participation on political issues at ) local leveI

for a broad segment of the populace previously uninvolved in politics

of any sort.

I WUold be remiss, Mr. Chairman, if I did not comment on the effect

of the administration's human rights policy. We believe that o0ur

policy has reaped benefits in Panama. In 1976, in the aftermath of the

January and September exilings, we indicated our concern to the

Government about its actions. Since September 1976 there have been

no further eases of exile. Our policy has also set a tone internationally

which individual Panamanians have assured us has led to a mild general relaxation politically in Panama. Specificallv, many Panamanians

have credited our human rights policy for the May 26 televised discussion of human rights to which I referred earlier. We believe our

influence has been positive. We feel that Panama's human rights

situation has improved during the past year and hope it will continue

to (10 so.

Mr. Chairman, I have given yon the Department of State's evaluation of the human rights situation in Panama at this time in broad

terms. As I have pointed out, the Panamanian Government has offered

to open the country to the Inter-American Human Rights Commission, which has the ability to make a thorough, impjartial study in

the country. We believe this to be an important step forward in demonstrating Panama's own interest and in fact openness in receiving an

objective and impartial report on the human rights situation in tha t

country.

Thank you, -'.fr. Chairman.

STATE DEPARTMENT AND "FREEDOM hOUSE RATiNG OF 1PANAMA ON

HUMAN RIGhTS

Chairman ZABLOCKi. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. Secretary, the most recent executive branch report on human

rights in Panama made pursuant to section 502(b) of the Foreign

Assistance Act, gives the Government of Panama a comparatively

favorable rating and does not recommend that Government assistance

to Panama be terminated or limited in any way due to human rights

violations.

On the other hand, the organization called Freedom House rates

Panama below both Cuba and the Soviet Union with respect to human

rights guidelines.

[The report referred to follows:]

FREEDOM HOUSE HUMAN RIGHTS RATING IN PANAMA

I. POLITICAL SITUATION

Panama is a republic governed under the provisions of a constitution which

entered into force October 11, 1972. The present government came into power in

1968 following a coup. Organized opposition by political parties is not permitted.

A transitory provision of the 1972 Constitution grants General Omar Torrijos

broad powers as Chief of Government for a six-year period.

Torrijos has based his government on broad support within Panama, and has

made a number of concessions to both the left and the right to assure the continuation of this support.
II. LEGAL SITUATION

The Constitution guarantees equality before the law. It guarantees a hearing

before a competent authority within 24 hours of detention, and writ of habeas

corpus. Warrants are required before a search can be undertaken. The Constitution

also guarantees freedom of movement, religion, assembly and expression. These

guarantees are generally observed.

Justice is generally administered fairly and without regard to race, social class

or wealth.

III. OBSERVANCE OF INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED HUMAN RIGHTS

A. Integrity of the Person

Article 3.-Panamanians enjoy the guarantee of life, liberty, and security of

person. A very few exceptions have occurred where individuals engage in political

activities which the Government considers inimical. Nearly all of the exceptions

involving arbitrary imprisonment occurred prior to 1972. The noteworthy exceptions in recent years occurred when 14 participants in the January 1976 political

protests and three persons who allegedly fomented riots in September 1976 were

exiled.

Article 5.-There is no evidence that the Panamanian Government makes a

practice of arbitrary imprisonment, torture, or murder for political purposes. A

"Panamanian Committee for Human Rights" has published an anonymouslyauthored pamphlet alleging brutality on the part of the Government. There is no

independent corroboration of the allegations and it appears that nearly all of the

alleged incidents are believed to have occurred during the 1968-71 period.

Article 8. -In general, Panamanians can obtain an effective remedy from the

courts if their rights are violated. Exceptions to this are more frequent for political

opponents of the Government.

Article 9.-The Government has exiled opponents who it felt threatened its

existence. This occurred most recently in January and September 1976, when the

government summarily exiled 17 prominent Panamanians. Although this latest

group was composed primarily of lawyers and businessmen, opponents who have

been exiled represent the full political spectrum including radicals on the left and

leaders of the Communist party (PDP). Some exiled persons have been permitted

to return to Panama after a time.

Article 10.-The practice of amparo (habeas corpus), which requires that a

hearing to determine charges and rights be held within twenty-four hours after

arrest, is generally observed in Panama

Article 11.-Panamanians have reasonable assurance of obtaining afair trial in the

vast majority of civil and criminal cases. The guarantee of a fair trial might not

be observed in a case with important political considerations, however.

B. Other Important Freedoms

The Government does not condone discrimination although some evidence of it

remains in Panama's racially-mixed population. In general, Panamanians can

move freely within the country and may travel abroad without restrictions.

Property rights are respected.

There is freedom of religion. Freedom of assembly is observed. However,

political organization and activity are limited. Organized open political opposition

is not tolerated. The media are monitored by the government. While strict

censorship is not imposed, editors and others in positions of responsibility are

made aware of what will be tolerated by the government; and editors of one

newspaper chain, which is owned primarily by high officials of the GOP, take

guidance from the Government. While radio criticism of the GOP has occasionally

been sharp, criticism appearing in the press is aimed primarily at low-level officials

and at failures in the implementation of policies rather than broadside attacks

on top leadership.

IV. OTHER HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTING

The "Amnesty International Report on Torture," published in 1973, states

that the most serious allegations of torture in Panama date from before 1970,

but notes allegations of single instances in 1971 and 1972. The "Amnesty International Report 1975-76" does not contain a section on Panama.

Freedom House describes Panama as "not free."

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Would you please comment on those apparent

divergent conclusions?
309

Mr. STEDMAN. Mr. Chairman, the Department's report is as you

have characterized it, and it does differ from that of the Freedom

House report. The Freedom House report, however, does not give us

enough narrative to be able to determine on what, they base their

statistical findings of the various elements that they have used to

measure the human rights situation. So I am not really able to make

any kind of profound analysis of why they reach their conclusion

because I don't have a statement such as the one that we have prepared and submitted to the Congress.

IMPACT OF CONGRESSIONAL REJECTION OF TREATIES ON HUMAN RIGHTS

IN PANAMA

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Mr. Secretary, would congressional disapproval of the proposed treaties affect the human rights situation

in Panama and in what way?

Mr. STEDMAN. This is a matter of speculation and analysis. It is

our view that the existence of tension in Panama now to a considerable extent arises from an unsatisfactory treaty relationship, and we

would believe, therefore, that successful resolution of this situation

would alleviate some tensions in Panama and conceivably, therefore,

could create an environment in which there would be some easing in

the human rights situation.

IMPACT OF TREATY APPROVAL ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN PANAMA

Chairman ZABLOCKI. What assurances have we that if the treaties

are ratified that Panama will not go back to some of its former prakctices of allowing the violation of human rights to persist?

Mr. STEDMAN. I think one can be encouraged from the trends which

are currently visible. That is to say, there has been very wide and

open discussion in Panama of the treaties themselves with the opposition being given the freedom to make its voice heard. It would

be our hope, therefore, that these treaties, with the alleviation of the

tension that I think exists because of the unsatisfactory treaty relationship now, would give us some hope matters would continue

along this trend line.

Absolute assurances or guarantees would not be possible to make,

but it is our interest in Panama, as it is in all other countries, to continue to take a very careful interest in the human rights situation,

and we would follow the situation there just as we follow it elsewhere

after the termination of the treaties.

POSITIONS OF PANAMANIAN POLITICAL PARTIES ON TREATIEs

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Secretary Stedman, in your statement on

page 5 you say that controls over political activity have been relaxed

in order to permit debate on the Panama Canal treaties and that the

Liberal and Panamenista Parties have held public meetings on the

treaties. What are their positions on the treaties?

Mr. STEDMAN. With the assistance of my officers here behind me, sir, their positions are not formally yet decided and they have formed

commissions to produce their definitive position, but I must say that

at this time there are student groups and lawyer groups who have

voiced very strong opposition to the treaties so that this relaxation
310

and the permitting of groups to express themselves has brought out

some opposition to the canal in Panama.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. If the treaties were not ratified by the United

States would it be interpreted in Panama by these groups that we are

unwilling to renegotiate the 1903 treaty unless is was to our benefit;

is that true?

Mr. STEDMAN. That is correct.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Mr. Lagomarsino.

FREEDOM HOUSE REPORT

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Mr. Stedman, let's refer back to Freedom

House. I think it would be appropriate to point out for the recordthis has been done before-that there are two members of the administration, who should be very influential in this entire situation, Mr.

Brzezinski, the President's security adviser, and Gale McGee, who, of course, is the Ambassador to the Organization of American States, who are on the Board of Trustees of Freedom House. So it would seem

to me that inasmuch as Freedom House has described Panama as the

worst country in the Western Hemisphere with regard to human

rights the State Department would make an effort to find out why.

Has that been done?

Mr. STEDMAN. I am not aware of direct communication with

Freedom House to find the basis for their judgment, sir. But I think

that you do move me to say something which I had neglected to say

and that is that Freedom House is a respected organization and its

people are genuine and sincere. Therefore, I did not wish to

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. No; I didn't understand it that way. I just

wanted to underscore that for the record for people who didn't know

what Freedom House is and tell them that it is a respectable organization.

Mr. STEDMAN. I neglected to say that.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. My understanding was that the State Department in making its human rights analyses in various countries takes

into consideration the findings of Freedom House?

Mr. STEDMAN. We do and I think, as a matter of law, bring into

our report, which we submit to the Congress, the conclusion of Freedom House, as we do with Amnesty International, that is correct.

But I am not aware that we have asked Freedom House to go behind

its categorization of "free," "partly free" or "not free" to give us a

detailed accounting of how they arrive at those conclusions.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Don't you think that would be a good idea?

Mr. STEDMAN. It sounds like a reasonable proposition to me.

[The information subsequently supplied by the Department of

State follows:]

FREEDOM HOUSE's FORMULA FOR DETERMINING ITS RATINGS

We have attached a copy of Freedom House's description of its general methodology as it appeared in that organization's magazine Freedom at Issue dated

January-February 1977.

In order to learn how Freedom House determined its ratings of freedoms in

Panama, Ambassador Gale McGee, a member of Freedom House's board of

NOTE.-Desplte Freedom House's low ratings of freedoms in Panama. the organization

endorses the proposed Panama Canal treaties. A copy of its announcement is attached.
311

trustees, contacted the organization. Freedom House's representative stated

that they found the exilings of Torrijos' political opponents without trial and

in contravention of the Panamanian constitution to be especially obnoxious.

Beyond this, Freedom House referred back to its Freedom at Issue dated January-February 1977.

Attachment:

RANKINGS FOR POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS

In the Survey, states are ranked in terms of their political and civil rights on

separate seven-point scales, from (1), most free, to (7), least fre,. The njniber.

hy which the ranks are identified do not represent quarititis, nor can they Ie

simply calculated from other quantities. A nurmeredl ranking sim ply indicates

that the state in question seems to fall within a grouping of states at a certain

point along an arbitrarily divided continuum from free to unfree. Ratings are noN

based on the comparison of ratings on a check list of political alnl civil rights.

Ideally, for each item on the list each country is given a rating of igh, medium,

low, or very low. There is no attempt to mathematically comn put> the PsUlts, iut

the patterns of those states which enjoy more freedom must obviously lie to tle

high side ot those which are less free.

To achieve a high ranking (I or 2) in political rights a country mut have the

critical rights provided by a fully operative electoral procedure, goni ally including an electoral confrontation of multiple parties with a significant opposition

vote, and those elected must receive the great preponderance of political power.

A state ranked (1) will also he strong in subsidiary indicator., such as a recent

change of government from one party to another, lack of foreign domnination,

decentralized political power, or a broad informal consensus that alows all segments of society de facto power. A state at (2) must have a high rating for most

critical rights, and a relatively strong position elsewhere. Viclonce, foriign (oiination, high illiteracy, or extreme poverty are environmental co ~ditions that

may cause a ranking of (2) instead (f (1). States ranked at (3) andl (4) generally

have competitive voting procedures, but these may he marred by the banning of

opposition parties, unfair electoral procedures, or elimination fromn the rolls of

large portions of the population. States at (5) have poor, if any, electoral procedures, but significant opposition may be allowed to organiz-for example,

through legal opposition parties. Alternatively, such states may strive for a broad

consensus among segments of the population, or accept a high degree of decentralization. Regimes at (G) have merely a facade voting procedure (outcomes generally

95 to 99.9 percent favorable to the government), or none at all, but they show

some responsiveness to common public pressures, have some claim to consensual

support, or provide a voting procedure that allows limited choice among selected

individuals. At (7) political competition is narrowly restricted to in-fighting

within party hioiarchies, and all other attempts to influence policy or personnel

are considered illegitimate.

In general a low civil-rights score will reduce political rights-although not

vice versa. An election without a right to express opinion publicly is hardly free.

States are also reduced by one point on political rights by a less than high rating

on freedom from foreign control. Foreign control is defined for this purpose rather

narrowly, emphasizing the extent to which the government and people of a state

are free to publicly criticize a hypothetically dominating state, or how much the

government is allowed to diverge from the dominating state's position in international consultations and organizations.

In civil rights we consider four critical rights: freedom from political Censorship, open public discussion, the maintenance of a rule of law (especially as signified by the ability of the courts to decide against the government), and freedom

from government terror (for example, freedom from imprisonment or torture for

political reasons). Here also, foreign control may impede rights, especially the

first two. In addition to these four, we consider two types of supporting or subsidiary freedoms. First are those from totalitarianism: economic independence of

the media from government, and freedom of individuals to move about, choose

among educational systems and occupations, obtain private property, operate

in the market freely, or organize and join private organizations of choice. These

latter freedoms include freedom of religion, as well as freedom to organize and

join unions. Civil rights are also affected by the presence or absence of nongovernmental, environmental inadequacies, such as illiteracy and debilitating poverty.

In this second category of subsidiary freedoms we also place losses to freedom

occasioned by private forces such as bosses, landlords, or labor leaders (and, at
312

the extreme, private slave-holders). Questions of illiteracy and poverty bring us

back, of course, to the positive rights which we argued above should be outside

our concern. Yet they must be taken into account in so far as they affect a popu- lation's ability to express opinion or vote effectively. (In passing it should be

noted that evaluating the effects of such factors needs a great deal more study.) A country ranked (1) in civil rights must rank high on all critical rights, and

medium or higher on nearly all other rights. In this consideration the most important subsidiary rights are those to individual movement, choice of occupation and organizational affiliations, and freedom from private terror (especially as

related to political opinion). Level (1) countries must also not have very low levels

of poverty or illiteracy (although this is much less important in very small countries). Rank (2) in civil rights generally implies a high ranking on three of the four

critical rights, and not more than two lows in the subsidiary rights. Successively lower patterns are then attached to succeeding rankings, until rank (7) implies a

very low score on all critical rights and low scores on most of the other check list

items.

In considering these rankings it is well to remember that the foregoing patterns

are highly generalized. There are special situations in which one or a few considerations override the general picture, or in which lack of information forces reliance

on only a portion of the full spectrum of evidence that should be considered. An

example of both of these problems is Lebanon. This formerly free country is now

split into areas with widely varying local and foreign leadership and security conditions, and must for the time being be very roughly estimated for the purposes of the Survey.

PRESS RELEASE FROM FREEDOM HousE "URGES APPROVAL OF CANAL TREATIES

DESPITE PANAMA'S 'DEPLORABLE' HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD," DATED

NOvEMBER 17, 1977

NEw YORK, November 17-John Richardson, Jr., president of Freedom

House, today released a board advisory calling upon the United States Senate

to ratify the Panama Canal treaties, despite "the deplorable record on human

rights of the present regime in Panama." Ratification, said the human rights

group, "would best protect American interests and maintain the security of the

Canal."

The organization released a 1,000-word analysis and advisory on the treaties.

"This advisory was approved by the Board of Trustees of Freedom House

after extensive study and review, and an overwhelmingly favorable vote," declared

Mr. Richardson. "Expressing their views to their colleagues on our board were

some of the principal supporters and an opponent of the treaties," said Mr.

Richardson, until January an assistant secretary of state.

"Zbigniew Brzezinski, national security advisor to President Carter, on leave

from our board, expressed his views to us, as did Gale McGee, U.S. ambassador

to the Organization of American States. Both supported the treaties. We also

received an extensive opposition memorandum from our colleague, Karl R.

Bendetsen, former under secretary of the army and chairman of the Panama

Canal Company, which presently controls the canal zone," Mr. Richardson added.

The advisory said that if the treaties are not ratified, "the immediate winners

will be the communist parties of Latin America and the Caribbean, and Marxist

regimes throughout the Third World." The cry of "Yankee imperialism" would be

raised again, Freedom House predicted. It noted that "South American communists as well as North American conservatives oppose the treaties."

The organization declared that the "proclaimed U.S. concern for human rights

will have been disavowed by our refusing to restore rights in the canal area to the

sovereign."

Freedom House acknowledged that it is supporting the treaties despite the

organization's "frequent analyses and reporting of the deplorable record on

human rights of the present regime in Panama." The organization conducts

year-round surveys of human rights in every country. Its latest finding reveals a

"recent improvement attributable to the national referendum on the treaties."

Freedom House concluded, however, that "the level of political rights and civil

liberties in Panama is still low."

The advisory added that "most Panamanian governments, however, regardless

of ideology or political or civil practices, have sought a new treaty with the

United States." In considering ratification, the United States does not now face
313

"a real choice," if it is "to recognize the severe losses we would almost certainly

suffer from rejecting thirteen years of responsible negotiations by both Panama

and the United States."

The advisory said that by ratifying the treaties "we will demonstrate that we

not only support a higher world order based on the advancement of human rights

and collaborative international agreements, but that we act on those moral

commitments."

This action, the statement continued, would "also demonstrate that a major

power can negotiate as an equal with a smaller nation, yield to the latter those

rights which were inherently its own, and yet retain for the large power the

fundamental advantages which it is in their mutual interest to reinforce."

The treaties, signed by President Carter and Brig. Gen. Omar Torrijos, have

been approved by a national referendum in Panama but must be ratified, pres umably in January, by two-thirds of the U.S. Senate.

Under the treaties, Panama would immediately share control of Canal Zone

facilities and services. The U.S. would have primary responsibility to protect the

Canal until the year 2,000. After that, the United States would indefinitely have

the right to defend the Canal's neutrality, with "expeditious" use of the waterway

assured.

The organization maintained that the United States "is not yielding what it

owns, as would be the case with Alaska or Louisiana." The government of Panama

"has been the sovereign over the Canal and the surrounding zone" since 1903, said the statement.

A FREEDOM HOUSE ADVISORY IN SUPPORT OF PROMPT RATIFICATION OF THE

TREATIES RELATING TO THE PANAMA CANAL

The Relevant History

Since the United States built the Panama Canal in 1903 the government of

Panama has been the sovereign-over the Canal and the surrounding zone. Under

terms of the earlier treaty, the Canal Zone and the waterway became "territory

of the Republic of Panama under the jurisdiction of the United States." The U.S.

Supreme Court in 1948 described the Canal Zone as "territory over which we do

net have sovereignty."

The United States, therefore, i- not, yielding what it owns-as would be the

case with Alaska or Louisiana. Instead, this country in a mature, indeed wise

decision in 1964-since renewed Iby three successive a(ministrations--recognized

that policies acceptable for a major power at the turn of the century were no

longer defensible, morally or even militarily.

The Security of the Canal

The present status of the Canal increasingly has generated disapproval throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. The Canal has become the ft cal point of

political attacks and fourteen years ago, anti-U.S. riots which resulted in the

(!ath of 20 Panamanians and four Americans. Negotiations culminating in the

present treaties began shortly thereafter, and there has been relative calm since

the treaty talks opened. Some attacks on the American presence may have been

exacerbated and exploited 1y fOreign or domestic communists. Antipathy to the

American presence, however, was rooted in incontrovertible facts:

1. Panamanians long resented the splitting of their country in two, and

the carving out of 550 square miles on which to maintain a foreign enclave.

2. No Panamanian ever signed the 1903 treaty.

3. Under that treaty, in exercising U.S. jurisdiction in the Canal Zone,

the U.S. operates the schools, courts, prisons and police force.

4. Though the tide of anti-U.S. feeling has ebbed and flowed throughout

Latin America and the Caribbean, the Canal has always been a symbol of

North American intrusion into the sovereignty and affairs of southern

America.

By the manner in which the United States secured and retained control of the

area, the considerable technological and medical achievements of the United

States in constructing and operating the Canal have been overshadowed. We

continue to perform a great service to the international maritime and trading

communities. That service should not be diminished by anachronistic political

arrangements.

For indeed the old political arrangements, continuing into this era, serve to

undermine rather than bolster the security essential to the protection of the canal.
314

There have been negotiated two agreements. The Panama Canal Treaty sets

forth the terms for a new political relationship between Panama and the United

States, and describes new operating procedures. For the remainder of this century, the United States shall have primary responsibility to protect and defend the

Canal. After the year 2000, the second treaty-on the Permanent Neutrality and

Operation of the Panama Canal-will give the United States the right to continue

to defend indefinitely the Canal's neutrality. The treaty also guarantees U.S.

warships "expeditious" use of the waterway. Neutrality of the Canal-certainly

in the best interest of America and of all maritime nations-is explicitly defined

in the treaty. No limit is set on the means the U.S. can use to guarantee the

Canal's neutrality. We are free to interpret unilaterally when the Canal's neutrality is violated or threatened.

Will the Canal Function as Efficiently?

The basic treaty provides for the training of Panamanian specialists and

administrators. They would move into responsible positions and ultimately

operate Canal installations. If both countries agree, a new sea-level canal or a

third lane of locks may be constructed to expand the present facilities. Approxiniately $60 to $70 million in revenues will be paid Panama at the onset. The

proper, uninterrupted operation of the Canal is patently in Panama's national

interest. Revenues from the Canal will become a mainstay of Panama's economy.

The Dangers of Non-Ratification

Without question, if the present Canal treaties are not ratified by the U.S.

Senate the immediate winners will be the communist parties of Latin America

and the Caribbean, and the Marxist regimes throughout the Third World. The

cry of "Yankee imperialism!" will once again be raised. Curiously, South American

communists as well as North American conservatives oppose the treaties. The

proclaimed U.S. concern for human rights will have been disavowed by our

refusing to restore rights in the Canal area to the sovereign.

We support the ratification of the treaties despite Freedom House's frequent

analysis and reporting of the deplorable record on human rights of the present

regime in Panama. Despite a recent improvement attributable to the national

referendum on these treaties, the level of political rights and civil liberties in

Panama is still low. Most Panamanian governments, however, regardless of

ideology or political or civil practices, have sought a new treaty with the United

States.

Does the U.S. Face a Real Choice?

If we are to recognize the severe losses we would almost certainly suffer from

rejecting thirteen years of responsible negotiation by both Panama and the

United States, we do not now face a real choice.

The gains in ratifying the treaties promptly are, we believe, apparent:

We will demonstrate that we not only support a higher world order based on

the advancement of human rights and collaborative international agreementsbut that we act on those moral commitments.

We will also demonstrate that a major power can negotiate as an equal with

a smaller nation, yield to the latter those rights which were inherently its own,

and yet retain for the large power the fundamental advantages which it is in their

mutual interest to reinforce.

Because we are convinced that these treaties would best protect American

interests and maintain the security of the Canal, we warn against any Senatorial

recommendations that would force the reopening of negotiations, a return to an

uncertain status quo, and thereby fuel political and paramilitary attacks on the

American presence in the Canal area.

Freedom House believes that the U.S. Senate, after full and careful study of

the history of the Panama Canal, the extensive negotiating process, and the

texts of the agreements already signed, should act promptly to ratify the Panama

Canal treaties now before it.

PROPOSED RESERVATION TO TREATY ON HUMAN RIGHTS

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. I understand Senator Dole has proposed a

reservation to the treaty, that Panama should improve its human

rights situation. What would be the State Department's position on

that?
315

Mr. STEDMAN. Would you repeat that, please?

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. I don't have the exact language before me, but

I understand Senator Dole has proposed that there be a reservationi

to the treaty that would require Panama to improve its human rights

situation.

Mr. STEDMAN. We would not want to see such reservations attached.

I think that our position is that we would like to see the treaty

approved in its present form and that the human rights situation

would be treated separately and apart as it is a matter of great

concern to us as it is in other countries. But the negotiation of the

treaty in our own interests should be a matter kept separate from the

human rights performance in Panama.

VIEWS OF INDIVIDUAL PANAMANIANS ON TREATIES

\fr. LAGOMARSINO. In March several members of this committee

and the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs made a trip to

Panama. We talked to a number of people, officials of the Panamanian

Government, our Government, business people, bankers, church

people, and so on. My assistant and I talked to them privately and

they told us 95 percent of the people want a new treaty but not with

General Torrijos.

Is this, in your opinion, an accurate statement of feeling in Panama?

Mr. STEDMAN. I don't know whether we can find out the exact

percentage of Panamanians who want a new treaty, but I think we

could say it would be 95 percent or almost closer to 100 percent. I

don't think lumping the other part of the sentence; that is to say, not

with Torrijos would be 95 percent. I think I would turn it around

and say virtually all Panamanians, less many who are in exile, or

who are opposed to General Torrijos, which I would say is a tiny

minority.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. You say the people opposed to Torrijos are a

minority?

Mr. STEDMAN. I think they are.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. You said a tiny minority?

Mr. STED!MAN. I think it would be a very small number, I think the

major point I was trying to get at, even those who have feelings

against Torrijos except for a small number favor having a new treaty

with the United States.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Mrs. Pettis.

Mrs. PETTIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

IMPACT OF U.S. MILITARY AID ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN PANAMA

I am wondering about your assessment of U.S. military aid vis-avis Panama as it would relate to the Government's human rights

situation?

Mr. STEDMAN. Are you suggesting that for the future if we are

considering military assistance activities we should consider the human

rights concerns in the future?

Mrs. PETTIS. Yes; I am.

Mr. STEDMAN. In our Latin American Bureau, which is the only

Bureau I can speak for, we now closely monitor all forms of economic

and military assistance in the formulation stages with countries in
316

Latin America, and whether by law or not, take into account the

human rights situations and in making policy determinations we

consider that the economic and military assistance and the human

rights activities' performance in the country are all matters we should

consider seriously.

I think it is fair to say that in the future if the Panamanian record

were to be that of the constant pattern of outrageous performance, it

would have a bearing on our military and economic assistance

activities.

Mrs. PETTIS. Could you define "outrageous performance" for me?

Mr. STEDMAN. I guess the word is "egregious"-I am thinking of

the law, it is a constant pattern of gross violations. That is a very

difficult subject to get into, but I would characterize it as mass torture, the frequent use of arrests, prolonged detention, torture in jail, inhuman treatment of persons arrested, and other matters of this sort.

Mrs. PETTIS. Thank you.

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TORRIJOS AND QADHAFI OF LIBYA

I am also curious as to what you perceive the relationship between

Torrijos and Libya's leader al-Qadhafi to be? What was the meaning

of the Panama-Libyan pacts between the two nations in April of this

year?

Mr. STEDMAN. I am not myself personally familiar with that. If I

might take that question and supply information

Mrs. PETTIS. We would be happy if you supplied information for

the record.

[The information follows:]

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TORRIJOs AND QADHAFI OF LIBYA

Panama and Libya have not had close ties. There is a Libyan Embassy in

Panama, but no Ambassador has been accredited. No Panamanian Ambassador

to Libya has been named either.

On April 1977, the Panamanian Chief of Government, General Omar Torrijos

visited Libya at the invitation extended by Libyan leader Muammar Kaddafi at

the 1976 Non-Aligned Conference in Sri Lanka. The visit served Panama's continuing objective of seeking broader international support in its efforts to negotiate

a new canal treaty with the United States. It also provided Torrijos an opportunity

to seek Libyan financing for Panamanian development projects.

Three agreements-on general cooperation, cultural affairs, and economic and

trade matters-were signed during the visit. In addition, Panama offered to make

available to Libya one hectare of land in the Colon Free Zone, a duty-free warehousing, light manufacturing, and distribution center used by many international

trading enterprises. There were also reports that Libya was given the opportunity

to establish a bank in Panama (which is a significant international banking center)

and to invest in Panama. However, to date, Libya had not acted on these offers.

Moreover, there has been no confirmation of any agreement of financial assistance

by Libya to Panama.

We believe that the results of the visit were marginal. This may have been

because of General Torrijos' unwillingness to abandon Panama's longstanding

policy of support for Israel as evidenced by its vote against the Zionism-racism

resolution in the United Nations General Assembly. The Panamanian communique

issued at the close of Torrijos' visit neither responded to nor endorsed a Libyan

statement assailing Zionist aggression. Anti-Semitism has never been strong in

Panama. In fact, Torrijos' wife is of Jewish descent.

We believe that Panama's relations with Libya have recently become strained

because of Torrijos' visit to Israel between September 27 and 30 of this year.

Mrs. PETTIs. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Mr. Gilman.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
317

GOVERNMENT CONTROL OF ELECTRONIC AND PRINT NEWS MEDIA IN

PANAMA

I notice in your statement that you mention that the press and

broadcast news media are not subject to Government censorship but

impose upon themselves self-censorship. Yet, I note in the statement

by the Panamanian Committee for Human Rights, a reference to

decree 343 which is used to control radio and television by imposing

rigid self-censorship and it is seldom violated.

In January 1974 the committee observed that the Government

prohibited the publication of the newspaper Quibo even before the

first edition came out and confiscated its equipment and arrested the

editors. They also note the same decree was used in 1976 to close radio

station Impacto which was expressing dissenting opinions. According

to the decree, all radio and television stations are required to tape

their programs and submit them to the Government. It sounds like

more than self-censorship. What is your information?

Mr. STEDMAN. The information we have is not in accord with that

final procedure there, sir. We do not know of this procedure of Government prior censorship of all the-I think you said radio broadcasting. It is true, though, that the self-censorship practiced by the

media is such that they know limits to which they can or can't ro and

attacking the revolution per se it would provoke reprisals from the

Government.

Mr. GILMAN. What did you base today's statement upon? Did you

communicate with any individuals representing the news media in

Panama?

Mr. STEDMAN. I have not. I am basing this on Embassy analysis of

the situation.

Mr. GILMAN. Did the Embassy note the Quibo incident, or the

Radio Impacto incident in their report?

Mr. STEDMAN. I would have to consult whether there was knowledge of that incident here. I personally am not aware of this.

Mr. GILMAN. 1 think the gentleman behind you has information.

Mr. STEDMAN. Apparently these incidents have been reported an(l

so this has been part of the Embassy reporting.

Mr. GILMAN. Taking those incidents into account and, if it is true

according to decree 343, if all radio stations are required to deliver

their program tapes to the Government, would you say that is state

censorship or self-imposed censorship?

Mr. STEDMAN. The terms are clearly censorship but our people are

saying the stations are not delivering tapes of the programs

Mr. GILMAN. Do you know that to be a fact?

Mr. STEDMAN. I don't know that personally, but the Embassy

believes that.

Mr. GILMAN. I would appreciate it if you would clarify that.

With your permission, Mr. Chairman, could we leave the record

open for clarification?

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Without objection.

[The clarification follows:]

CLARIFICATION OF CABINET DECREE NO. 343-SELF-CENSORSHIP OF T1lE

PANAMANIAN MEDIA

The mechanism of "self-censorship" in Panama is based on Cabinet Decree

No. 343 of October 31, 1969, which reads:

"The expression of opinions and, in general, the public transmission of thought, orally, in writing or by any other medium, is not subject to prior censorship, but,
318

the exercise of freedom of expression engenders the responsibilities which this

Cabinet Decree establishes when through any of these media an attempt is made

against the reputation or the honor of persons or against the security of society

or public order."

The Office of the National Director of Communications Media of the Ministry of Government is legally responsible for the enforcement of Decree No. 343, but actual enforcement is informal. Strict control is unnecessary because, since

1969, the media have usually chosen to err on the safe side of the Decree rather

than risk being sanctioned. Editors tend to shy away from controversial issues

unless they receive prior clearance from the government. Three of the five Panamanian newspapers are government controlled, receiving direct government

guidance.

Radio and television censorship are normally handled through the Ministry

of Government. Radio stations are expected to record their broadcasts and, on

request, to supply tapes afterwards to the Ministry. Television stations must

record the audio portions of their programs.

NoTE.-On November 12, 1977, during a visit to Panama by a group of Senators

led by Majority Leader Robert Byrd, General Torrijos promised to review

Decree 343 in order to liberalize it and remove those provisions which restricted

freedom of expression. To this end, he promised to discuss the Decree with the

journalists' union. This meeting took place on December 20. Legislation is now in

preparation to replace Decree 343 and to protect against libel and slander in the

media.

OFFICIAL U.S. GOVERNMENT POSITION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

IN PANAMA

Mr. GILMAN. A respected syndicated columnist for the Los Angeles

Times wrote that Mr. Todman, the State Department's top official

for Latin American affairs said: "Of course, we are not going to challenge human rights in Panama because we want a treaty." Is that

State Department policy?

Mr. STEDMAN. No, sir, we are treating the human rights situation

in Panama as we would elsewhere and we have made representations to

the Panamanian Government about incidents, including the exiles

in 1976. So we want to keep a close eye on the situation there as we

would in other countries.

Mr. GILMAN. Would vou consider Mr. Todman one of the policymakers in the Department?

Mr. STEDMAN. Certainly.

Mr. GILMAN. This is from the L.A. Times, Tuesday, August 7, 1977, paragraph written by Geogieanne A. Gever. She wrote: "Secretary for

Latin America, Terence Todman, told me with admirable candor,

'of course, we are not going to challenge human rights in Panama

because we want the treaty'."

Mr. STEDMAN. I am not familiar with the quote and have not had

a chance to talk with Assistant Secretary Todman about the remarks.

Mr. GILMAN. Could you tell us what the relationship between

Torrijos and Libyan's leader al-Qadhafi is? We have heard there have

been some pacts signed between the two nations. What are your

thoughts on that relationship?

Mr. STEDMAN. In response to Mrs. Pettis' question similar to that

I have indicated I would like to take the question and supply something for the record.1

ALLEGED ANTISEMITISM IN PANAMA

Mr. GILMAN. There have been also prior comments there was

growing antisemitism in Panama. Can you tell us to what extent

those reports are accurate?

1 The information appears on p. 316.
319

Mr. STEDMAN. I think we have some information on that.

Our opinion, sir, is that there is very little antisemitism in Panama.

If I may read this answer: "The Jews have played an active role in

Panama's politics. Torrijos is married to a Jewish woman and there

are good relations between the Panamanian and gentile communities."

Mr. GILMAN. There has been inserted into the Congressional

Record not too long ago, by Mr. Rosenthal I believe, information in

regard to antisemitism in Panama. Have you had an opportunity

to read that?

Mr. STEDMAN. I personally have not.

Mr. GILMAN. I believe Mr. Cutter is handing you a copy of that.

Mr. STEDMAN. This is a communique from the Embassy of Panama

dated June 9, 1977. If it is of interest, I could read it.

Mr. GILMAN. I would welcome hearing the contents.

Mr. STEDMAN [reading].

No anti-semitic policies or sentiments exists in Panama. On the contrary, Jews residing or born in Panama constitute part of the community same as other

people who are part of the national life, in commerce, industry, the professions.

The position of the Government of Panama on the question of Israel has been

very clear and definitive; wherein:

First: Panama voted affirmatively for the creation of the State of Israel.

Second: Panama opposed and voted against the resolution equating Zionism

with racism.

Third: Panama voted and voiced opposition when becoming a member of the

Organization of Non-Aligned Countries, at Lima, Peru, to resolutions directed

against Israel.

Panama and Israel actually maintain very fruitful relations, with frequent

exchanges of technical, cultural and youth relations.

The Panama-Israel Friendship Institute has operated in Panama for many

years, with many distinguished Panamanians among its members, including high

officials in the Revolutionary Government.

We would like to emphatically state that any statement considered antiSemitic, made by any citizen on his own, does not have the approval and does not

represent the sentiments of either the Government or the people of Panama.

This is signed by George Fisher, Press Attach6 at the Embassy of

Panama.

NO EVIDENCE OF ACTION AGAINST PANAMANIAN EXILES

Mr. GILMAN. One last question. Is there any evidence the Torrijos

government has ever taken any action against the Panamanian exiles

living in this country?

Mr. STEDMAN. Not that I am aware of, sir.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Any further questions?

Thank you, Secretary Stedman.

We will now hear from a panel composed of the following witnesses:

Dr. Winston Robles, assistant professor of political science at Florida

International University and the founder and director of Panamanian

Committee for Human Rights; Mrs. Rose Marie Aragon, who will

also speak for the Panamanian Committee for Human Rights; and

Father Leo Mahon of St. Victor's Parish in Calumet, Ill., and a former

parish priest in Panama.

May I welcome you to the committee and may I suggest you either

read or summarize your statements in succession and we will then

proceed to questions.

98-991-77-22
320

We will begin with Dr. Robles, who will be followed by Mrs.

Aragon and then Father Mahon.

Mr. ROBLES. Mr. Chairman, Mrs. Aragon prefers to start her

testimony first if you don't have any objection. Chairman ZABLOCKI. You would prefer that Mrs. Aragon start?

Mr. ROBLES. She prefers.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. We always defer to the ladies.

STATEMENT OF ROSE MARIE ARAGON, SPEAKING ON BEHALF

OF THE PANAMANIAN COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Mrs. ARAGON. Mr. Chairman, I deeply appreciate the opportunity

of appearing before this committee.

I am Rose Marie Aragon, born in Argentina, a naturalized citizen

and the widow of the Leopoldo Aragon who immolated himself last

month before the American Embassy in Stockholm protesting the

violations of human rights in Panama and the signing of a treaty

with the Torrijos dictatorship.

Gentlemen, I sometimes think that the blessings of freedom and

democracy are more appreciated and more precious to a naturalized

citizen. Some of you in this prestigious chamber may well remember

those feelings expressed by your own parents.

With deep personal pain, I will describe the jailing without trial,

the torture and imprisonment of my late husband, Leopoldo Aragon, in the infamous penal colony of Coiba, the Devils Island of Panama.

I will tell of, and offer documentation of the systematic and continuing pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human

rights by Panama's dictator, Omar Torrijos.

Until now, Panama's flagrant violations of human rights has been

one of Washington's best-kept secrets. This September 9; the Washington Post editorial page article raised questions:

First, the reasons for State Department's coverup of the true

nature of the Torrijos regime;

Second, the reasons State Department devised elaborate falsehoods

to deny my husband a visitor's visa to accompany his American wife

and American daughters to the United States this past August. I

look to the Members of Congress to explore these implications.

I met and married Leopoldo Aragon, a Panamanian international

journalist when he was assigned to Washington. He had received his

law degree in the United States and completed graduate studies in

international law and journalism in Spain and France. Our twin

daughters, now attending college in the United States were also born

here. Leopoldo covered the White House, State Department and the

Organization of American States for several Latin American and

European newspapers. His first book, in Spanish, "The Kennedy

Era-Inside Washington" was published then. At that time I worked

for State Department with a top secret clearance. Later I worked

with the Organization of American States. I have long been deeply

involved with civil liberties and civil rights as my husband was devoted to the cause of human rights.

In 1967 my husband was assigned to Czechoslovakia by Interpress

Service. We, our twin daughters and I, went with him. After 9 months

he was summarily given 48 hours to leave the country. He had written

too many truths about communism.
321

In 1971 Leopoldo was assigned to Panama. For the first time since

our marriage we went to make our home in his native land.

He was to set up Interpress Service. He also wrote articles for the

local press and later developed a daily news analysis program for R adio

Impacto. At first he viewed the political scene with a hopeful and

open mind. As his views developed he began to express them privately

and then publicly.

As a working journalist, he wvas shown a Corps of Engineers draft

position paper dated February 16, 1968. That paper, according to

notes my husband gave me to carry to the United States, noted that

popular opposition had rejected the 1967 proposed canal treaties that

the Panamanian democratic government had negotiated with the

United States. The paper concluded that a new treaty could not be

passed in Panama except under a strong military dictatorship.

By the way, Mr. Dean Rusk said almost word by word the same

thing.

This U.S. paper recommended Torrijos as the likeliest man to do

the job. At that time, my husband told me about this in Panama, but

suggested it was better that I not know further details.

At the end of July 1972 Leopoldo, on his return trip from a short

assignment in Mexico, stopped in Costa Rica at the invitation of

Gonzalo Facio, Minister of Foreign Affairs. At the dinner that evening

there was also President Figueres. They held a frank conversation

about the situation in Panama. These were the subjects on which

Leopoldo was later interrogated.

The next day, on his arrival at the Panama International Airport, Leopoldo was arrested by the G-2, the security arm of the national

guard.

His arrest was witnessed by a friend who informed the family. But

the guard headquarters told me they knew nothing about my husband.

After 4 days G-2 admitted to a lawyer friend that they were holding

Leopoldo, but warned him not to take the case. The lawyer suggested

another who had worked for other political prisoners. This Mr. Faundes

agreed to present to a writ of habeas corpus though he accurately

predicted no result. T hrough his contacts he learned that my husband

was charged with possession of marihuana.

He advised me to see the attorney general. After many long days

of waiting, I was told they were questioning my husband on drug

charges.

I protested it was absurd and that no civilized country held a person on vague charges, denied counsel and ignored a writ of habeas

corpus. He replied, "In other countries, not in Panama."

I began to contact journalists throughout the world and Amnesty

International, the International Committee on Human Rights and

International Organizations.

My lawyer advised me to see Minister of Justice Materno Vasquez. For 10 days, day after day, from morning till night, I sat and I waited.

When finally the minister admitted me, it was only to say that Leopoldo was held for subversion of public order.

Repeatedly I begged to see my husband. The minister relented. I

went to the jail only to be told they had received no orders. This continued for days. At last the doors of the prison opened for me and I

talked with my husband after more than 4 weeks. He had been kept
322

incommunicado for 4 weeks while tortures were inflicted on him which

he later told us were:

* * * blows with a rubber hose; fist blows to stomach and chest, * * * long questioning under strong lights without sleep, * * * electric shocks to the vital parts of the body, the ears, genital organs, and the anus that made him feel his insides were bursting, * * * hanging by the wrists and acted out executions with blank cartridges so

that each time he did not know whether he was alive or dead.

My daughters and I, having had the mental torture of not knowing

whether lie was dead or alive and imagining what they might be doing

to him, were to start on a new stage in our anguish. I extract from the

journal of my daughter, Yarmila; which she writes now for one of

her classes:

Reading other people's journals of high school romances, marijuana smoking, spaced out, partying * * * I feel rather young and inexperienced. Though

other experiences, I suppose, will make up for the lack of those. Like waiting in

line in the torrrential tropical rains or scorching sun for an hour or more outside

the 'Model Prison' * * * most infamous place * * * where men whose ideas

are too liberal and criticism too out spoken are thrown in among common criminals and tortured, most often to death * * * only waiting to catch a fleeting

glimpse of a father's ravaged but beloved face.

My lawyer and I kept demanding that my husband be brought to

trial. Instead, in December 1972 he was condemned, by simple writ,

to 5 years in prison, and one day while standing in line to bring food

and bedding to him we were told he was no longer there.

He had been sent to the penal colony on the island of Coiba.

Reverend MAHON. I will read the excerpts from Leopoldo's document [reading].

The prisoners are driven to Pier 18 in the Canal Zone port of Balboa under

American jurisdiction, because Panama has no deep water port and are loaded

into the boat. If the trip to Coiba is hellish, it is worse if one tries to escape as I

did at Pier 18 by jumping into the water. It had been my hope that by doing so, I

would be taken by American police who might be persuaded to take me to the

hospital for injuries resulting from by torture.

The shooting at me by the guards attracted a large number of American police.

The shooting stopped and I shouted of my condition. The Americans agreed to

take me to the hospital and so I surrendered. Then there, in front of the passive

Americans I was given a severe beating with clubs, fists, rifle butts and kicks by

the Panamanian guards. They handcuffed my hands behind my back. They

heaved me toward the boat, but they missed. I fell into the water. I dove under

the ship and made it to the underside of another pier. But I was spotted there by

an American policeman. Recaptured I was turned over to the Panamanian guards

who again beat me.

Half drowned, I was hanged from the handcuffs to a mast for several hours.

When darkness came I was chained to a ring on the deck * * * Luckily the

crammed conditions prevented the guards from kicking me as hard as they might

have wished.

It was dusk of the next afternoon when the boat tied up to the jetty at the

southern tip of Coiba. There were some 20 guards waiting with clubs and whips * * * someone gave me a kick that sent me reeling over the jetty into the water

* * * my delay in reaching the beach saved me from one of the most bestial

practices of Coiba: the running of the gauntlet of the prisoners from the jetty to

the central yard. The other prisoners were running like cattle under the whips

and savage cries of the guards.

These were swinging their clubs, rushing the prisoners to gallop, prodding them

to run faster. The guards would run ahead of them, among them, and from behind,

hitting and skipping in a happy demoniacal frenzy. If someone fell, several guards

would converge on him, kick him, whip him, beat him and screaming louder, drag

him to his feet, forcing him to sprint like crazy, the remainder of the 300-yard

distance * * *.

Slumped on the ground, I watched from a distance. At first, the whole spectable

was incomprehensible because I did not grasp what was going on. It was a strange
323

state of mind * * * The black night in the background and the lights illuminating

the goings on, sort of transported me to the environment of a theater. The play

would soon be over and one would walk out with friends, have dinner or a drink

and discuss the play. I felt no part of it * * *.

Then suddenly I realized with terror that the thing was real. I was in it, at the

receiving end like the others. The Captain's welcoming speech was short and to the

point: "You just got the Coiba shock treatment. You will get it any time you

are lazy or don't figure out what we want. In Coiba there is no God, no law,

no nothing, only what is for our pleasure."

Mrs. ARAGON. I will continue now.

Thank you, Father Mahon.

The horrors continue. At Coiba, Leopoldo was told how Floyd

Britton another of the political prisoners had died there. The Government had announced he suffered a heart attack. The truth as Leopoldo

recounted it was: "With his hands handcuffed behind his back, he

was placed on a stool. Guards surrounded him and clubbed him until

his brains flew out."

My husband stayed in Coiba for 6 months. Our appeals to the

international human rights organizations and to important friends of

Leopoldo in other countries bore fruit. Leopoldo was brought back to

the city prison hospital. Although there are about 1,500 prisoners in

Coiba, there is no medical facility. He was urinating blood and had

Meniere's disease from beatings. His physical condition was terrible.

Though I was told Leopoldo would be exiled, he was sent back to

Coiba. Again we almost went mad. Finally in December 1973, I was

ordered to buy him a one-way ticket to Sweden and he was placed on a

plane to Stockholm * * * where he spent 2 months in Karolinska

hospital, recuperating from the physical and psychological tortures.

He gave several press interviews until G-2 gave me a message: "Tell

Leopoldo to keep quiet. While you are still in Panama there are ways

of making him come back." I had to stay to complete the teaching jobs

I had taken to support us. I, too, had a severe weight loss and was

emotionally drained. When we finally left Panama they made trouble

at the airport, even delaying the plane, but we had many witnesses

with us.

While my husband was in prison he asked me to notify the American

consul of at least two Americans detained for no apparent reason. One

was a graduate student, writing his thesis on Panama, who had come

to watch the so-called election of "Corregidores" (Justices of the

Peace). He was picked up and denied access to the consul. Another

American almost died of a beating in the cellars of the jail. U.S.

consul, Dodson's letter of resignation substantiates the U.S. passivity

and the 1977 case of American citizen David Mendelson (with no

political involvement) beaten and exiled, brings these cases into the

present. (State Department and Senator Sparkman have documentation.)

"Let my people decide freely" was Leopoldo Aragon's dying plea.

His act of sacrifice, he said, was to "call attention to the enormity of

the deprivation of human rights and political freedoms under the

Torrijos dictatorship."

The exile or release of those who have been cruelly imprisoned and

tortured is not the end of the story. The person changes. Psychological changes have now been recognized and a commission has been

formed in Norway to study the effects of imprisonment and torture.

I saw change take place in my husband. He immersed himself completely in the movement to restore human rights and democracy in
324

Panama. Despite his dedication he did not isolate himself and had a

mulltitude of friends. le corresponded with his colleagues who speak

and write of his warm human qualities. One, at the New York Times

in a personal note to me, spoke of him as "a man of great character

pJassionately devoted to a cause of extreme importance."

Ile was a lovingr husband and devoted companion to his daughters.

Others remark that he was a consistent and rational man. This consisteucy and rationality was demonstrated in his methodical planning

for his final sacrifice for his high ideals.

Twelve years ago he wrote of another "To immolate oneself is to

sacrifice oneself for others-for an ideal-for a conviction. It is an

individual decision which doesn't involve or harm another."

In a letter I received on September 2 he had sent from Stockholm:

"I know what I have to do to be faithful to my destiny. I feel it with

all the depth of conviction that a man can have * * * and I am going to

do something that can be instinctively understood and appreciated."

On September 1, in front of the American Embassy in Stockholm he

immolated himself. In his last personal message he asked me to continue the struggle, "your battle post is there."

I am here to carry on. I am here as one who has also suffered the

tortures of Torrijos, tortures that continue. But mine is only one

story, the only one you will hear in detail today. It started in 1972. ** 

The many cases of others each year since then are documented in the

volumes of the Panamanian Committee for Human Rights.

Yet Ambassador Bunker has repeated in the Congress and elsewhere what I quote from his national television interview on "Meet

the Press" of August 14.

The transcript reads:

"What is your impression of the record of the Torrijos government

in the area of human rights?"

Ambassador Bunker answered:

Well, there have been some violations of human rights by the Torrijos government. Most of those occurred prior to 1970 when he was consolidating his position. Amnesty International in 1973, I think, did report that most of those violations

had occurred in the early years of the regime. A year ago, they did exile some 13

people of the right and left who had been accused of subversion. Those, I think

have all since returned to Panama. General Torrijos recently has received back

nearly 100 exiles. In our report which the administration made this spring to the

Congress, as required by law, the report stated that there was no evidence of any

systematic abuse of human rights. Whenever there have been, we have called it

to the attention of the Panamanian Government and have expressed our views

about it.

The President of the International League for Human Rights,

Attorney Jerome J. Shesteck gave the Panama human rights report

as an example of State Department's inaccuracies and lack of candor.

What actually happened in 1976 or that which is known:

January 30-Thirteen professionals, businessmen and farmers, at

least in the United States this does not place them either on the right

or the left. In addition, an Argentinian-born British subject, who had

served the United States as a parachutist medic in Vietnam, was

arrested, held incommunicado, tortured, and then deported.

February-A Panamanian professor, a self-described Trotskyite was

picked up at the airport on his return to Panama and planed to

Ecuador to join the 13 exiles.
325

Sayv-M arlene IeJizabal, a high school st udent of humible

country family, and her fiance, Jore E. Falconet, an enigilneerifng

student disapp eared. Her body was found and (UUtopsy prcvIt(ed by

the National Guard. Falconet was never found.

Septemnber-Attorneyv Eusebio Marehosky v :as arrest ed, to't urel,

and exile to Nitani. Blanca de Mhrchosky, Alma Robles de Samos,

Fulvia Morales are imprisoned and nialtreated, but later released.

Querube de Carles was exiled. Three nin, one an American employed

in the Canal Zone were arbitrarily arrested on trumped up charges of

fomenting riots for the CIA. A formal protest was lodged with the U.S.

Embassy, but later withdrawn * * * Carlos Gonzales de la Lastra,

an executive, and Humberto Lopez, a student, escape arrest and are

exiled to Venezuela.

More than 150 students are arrested and tortured, according to a

letter written by Rev. Fernando Guardia Jean, S.J., in the

Panama Archiodese monthly publication.

Following the January exiles there were a series of five mysterious

bombings at the places of business or homes of the exiles or their

associates. The bombs were all of the same type. At the end of October

and on November 1, a series of similar bombs exploded in the Canal

Zone, damaging Government property and automobiles owned by

American critics of the dictatorship and treaty negotiations. On

November 29, a similar bomb was exploded in the Volkswagen of

Jorge Rodriquez, seriously wounding his wife Gilma, but leaving

untouched in the rear seat Dolores Montoto.

On December 23, 1976, an official press release of the Panama

Embassy in Washington makes public a letter from Torrijos protesting

that the U.S. Ambassador in Panama had told Torrijos that "certain

members of the National Guard are involved in terrorist activities

which have taken place in the Panama Canal Zone in connection with

explosions which last October destroyed six automobiles and damaged

certain buildings * * * that the U.S. authorities had proof of their

assertions."

Let us sum up the 1976 human rights violations listed here, which

are only a small part of the known violations by Torrijos in 1976.

Exiled_----------------------------------------------------------- 18

Arbitrarily arrested------------------------------------------------ 3

Arbitrarily arrested and maltreated ---------------------------------- 3

Arrested and tortured---------------------------------------------- 151

Bombings (1 person seriously injured) -------------------------------- 12

Imprisoned without trial ------------------------------------------- 3

Murdered_-------------------------------------------------------- 1

Disappeared.------------------------------------------------------ 2

Returning to Mr. Bunker's assertions. Of the January 13 exiles four

only have returned. Ambassador Bunker says also that Torrijos has

recently received back nearly 100 exiles. This is simply untrue.

Let us look at the numbers. In one year 181 persons are known to

have had their human rights violated in Panama's tiny population of

1.7 million-as opposed to heavily populated Chile, Brazil, or Argentina. Translating that number of the U.S. population is the equivalent

of human rights violations of more than 21,000 citizens.

Gentlemen, I think it is abundantly clear that Panama shows a

consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized

human rights.
326

These are the submissions for the appendix:

1. Article entitled "The Panamanian who died in Stockholm," Steven

S. Rosenfield, from the Washington Post of September 9, 1977.

2. Leopoldo Aragon, biographical sketch.

3. Jerry L. Dodson, U.S. Consul in Panama, letter ofjresignation

June 1969.

4. Miami Herald, August 20, 1969, "Military'Aid Policy Suffers a

New Bruise," and April 5 hearing before a subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, part 3, 1977, pages 337, 338, 339, 340.

5. Statement of Jerome Shestack, president of International League

for Human Rights.

6. Congressional presentation, fiscal year 1978. "Security Assistance

Program Reports on Human Rights Practices."

7. Embassy of Panama, press release of December 1976.1

Mr. Chairman, I would ask you, if possible, Mr. Carliner, my

attorney is here with me today, if he could add a few words to my

testimony.

STATEMENT OF DAVID CARLINER, ATTORNEY FOR ROSE MARIE

ARAGON

Mr. CARLINER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

My name is David Carliner. I am an attorney at law practicing in

Washington, D.C. I am here for two reasons: one, I represented

Mr. Aragon in an effort before the U.S. State Department to secure

a nonimmigrant visa, a visitors visa for him to come to the United

States. As you have learned, Mrs. Aragon is a citizen of the United

States. Mrs. Aragon has twin daughters who are also citizens of the

the United States and are now attending college.

During the month of August, or a little earlier, Mr. Aragon applied

before the U.S. Consul in Stockholm for a visa to come to this country

to visit his family and also as a leading Panamanian journalist to be

able to meet with colleagues with whom he bad previously served in

the United States and in order to engage in public discussion regarding

the Panama Treaty.

Mr. Aragon was refused a visa under section 212 (A) (27) of the

Immigration and Naturalization Act which had a catchall phrase

which provides that persons may not be given visas if their admission

to the United States is contrary to the public interest, security or

welfare of the United States.

As Mr. Aragon's attorney, I was in communication with the State

Department to request a reconsideration of the decision and to ascertain if possible the grounds upon which Mr. Aragon was refused a visa.

The Visa Office in the State Department, in accordance with its

virtually universal practice, declined to give me or Mr. Aragon any

statement of reasons and it reaffirmed as late as August 28 or 29 its

decision to deny Mr. Aragon a visa.

To my considerable surprise I read in the Washington Post of

September 9 a column by Mr. Stephen Rosenfeld in which at that

time after Mr. Aragon's death, the State Department is quoted as

stating that Mr. Aragon was refused a visa because he had "Communist links."

I The material submitted by Rose Marie Aragon for the appendix is retained in the

committee files.
327

I am here to urge upon this committee that a report of this episode

be requested of the State Department. It is singularly inappropriate

to describe a person in pejorative terms after his death to a newspaper

journalist in the context of a previous refusal to give the applicant

himself any information regarding the grounds for the refusal and to

say things about him which he is no longer able to refute. His life

history shows he is not a Communist. He was expelled from Czechoslovakia. He was an esteemed journalist and he belonged to the Social

Democratic Party in Panama. Significantly that party seems to be

opposed to the Panamanian treaty. While the Panamanian Communist

Party is in favor of the Treaty and supports the present government.

We have no definitive evidence of the grounds upon which the

State Department refused to give Mr. Aragon a visa; we surmise that

the principal reason was that Mr. Aragon was a leading Panamanian

journalist, an effective spokesman for his cause. The Panamanian

treaty was at issue and to have one more opponent was not in the

State Department's interests.

As an attorney dealing in this subject matter for years, I am left to

wonder why one individual with no apparent connection, or even

secret, could be so powerful as to terrify this country while citizens

of Soviet countries can come in by the hundreds through the United

Nations or as representatives of their governments.

From my own experience, I believe that when the State Department

excludes people, it is done as much for political reasons as it is done

for reasons which truly affect the national security of the United

States.

I am impelled to ask this committee to ask for a report on this

episode because it appears to be contradictory of the policies of the

administration and to the Helsinki Treaty in that the United States

should be open to persons with whatever views.

If persons are really spies, they can be placed under surveillance by

appropriate agencies of the U.S. Government. Keeping people out of

this country, I would suggest, is counterproductive. It doesn't prevent

espionage; it serves more to give the impression the U.S. Government

is curbing opposition views than it does to protect true interests of the

United States.

The second reason I appear before this committee is that, as an

individual who has been associated with civil liberties and civil rights

movements, I have been sympathetically aware of the pronouncements

by the President and the State Department that human rights are a

goal that this administration seeks to pursue in implementation of its

foreign policy.

Mr. Stedman, in his statement before this committee this morning

states,

If we are to be true to the best and most deeply held traditions and beliefs of our

Nation, expressed in our Declaration of Independence and Constitution, then we

must infuse our foreign policy with our convictions.

I don't seek to express any views either for myself or as an attorney

on behalf of Mrs. Aragon on the ratification of the Panamanian

treaty, but I must say that the evidence which has been produced

before the various committees of the Congress relating to the violations

of human rights in Panama, has not been adequately reported to this

committee by the State Department.
328

In Mr. Stedman's testimony, he seems to be looking for reasons to

downplay the violations of human rights and the terror in Panama.

The fact that the Commission on Inter-American Human Rights is to

be allowed to visit Panama and the suggestion that the Panamanian

Government, therefore, is an open Government and has nothing to

hide is not sufficient. The Commission went to Chile but it did not

decide that Chile was an open society.

Allowing the Commission to go to Panama is commendable but it

is early to anticipate its report. Nor is the fact that Amnesty International did not include any reference to Panama in its current report

conclusive evidence of what is happening in Panama.

Amnesty has indicated that their next report will contain evidence

of violation of human rights in Panama.

The evidence before this committee from witnesses appearing here

and from materials appearing in the public press indicates that there

are gross violations of human reghts in Panama and significantly that

the violations have been accomplished through the actions of the

National Guard of Panama which has been financed, supported, and

kept in power in large part by the assistance of the U.S. Government.

So I believe it is especially appropriate for this committee to look to

the conduct, the operations, and policies of the State Department, of AID, and other agencies to make certain that none of our programs

are being used to assist the violations of human rights in Panama as

well as in other countries.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Could I interrupt at this point?

In Mrs. Aragon's statement and Mr. Carliner's statement which he

just made, they both referred to asking the State Department to

report to us on the circumstances surrounding the refusal to grant Mr.

Aragon his visa. I think it is appropriate to do that and I ask the committee to make such a request.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. We will make such a request and I will advise

there is a representative of the State Department here.

Mrs. Aragon, your testimony on page 4, where Father Mahon read

Mr. Aragon's statement and he is quoted as having been beaten by

the Panamanian police and the Americans watched passively, is there

documentation of this incident? Does the State Department have

documentation? Have any of the Americans involved been identified?

For the record, I would ask that representatives of the State Department, I believe Mr. Cutter, if the Department has any information

on these incidents, you will provide it for the record or you may comment now if you are prepared.

STATEMENT OF CURTIS CUTTER, LEGISLATIVE OFFICER,

CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. CUTTER. We do not have documentation on that particular

incident with us here now, but if we have any, we will supply it for the

record.

[Material supplied by Department of State follows:]

VIsA CASE OF LEOPOLDO ARAGON EsCALONA-DEPARTMENT OF STATE

The Department originally determined Leopoldo Aragon Escalona to be

ineligible for a visa under Section 212(a)(28) of the INA-in January of 1978. The

refusal was based on information contained in a confidential report.
329

A chronological listing of the Visa Office's actions in processing Aragon's case

when he applied for a visa during June 1977 at our Embassy in Stockholm follows

below:

July 12.-Visa Office, Department of State, received cable from our Embassy

in Stockholm requesting us to complete a security name check and to render a

security advisory opinion on Aragon's eligibility to receive a visa.

July 13.-Visa Office requested name checks from the Washington intelligence

community.

July 14.-Visa Office informed Stockholm by cable that we could not complete

the processing in time to permit Aragon to travel on schedule.

July 15.-Visa Office sent cable to our Embassy in Panama requesting the

post to verify Aragon's imprisonment from 1972 to 1973 and subsequent deportation to Sweden.

July 19.-Department was requested by FBI that Aragon be denied a visa

under Sections 212(a) (27) and (29) of the INA.

July 26.-Department informed our Embassies in Stockholm and Panama

that FBI had requested Aragon be refused a visa under Sections 212(a) (27) and

(29) of the INA.

July 27.-Our Embassy in Panama reported the results of its name check on

Aragon.

August 3.-Department determined that it would not be in the public interest

to seek a 212(d) (3) (A) waiver of visa ineligibility for Aragon.

August 4.-Department informed Stockholm and Panama that Aragon was

ineligible to receive a visa under Section 212(a)(28) and the Department would

not recommend a 212(d)(3)(A) waiver of Aragon's visa ineligibility. We also

instructed Stockholm to advise Aragon that he was ineligible under 212(a)(26).

August 15.-After further review of Aragon's case, Department informed

Stockholm and Panama that he was ineligible under Sections 212(a)(27) and

(28) of the INA.

August 25.-Mr. David Carliner, an immigration attorney, informed the Visa

Office that Mr. Aragon was his client and asked for a status report on Mr. Aragon's

case.

August 26.-Department called Mr. Carliner back and informed him that

Mr. Aragon's case was under active review.

September 1.-Stockholm reported self-immolation attempt by Aragon and

provided press guidance.

September 2.-Department provided additional press guidance for our Embassy

in Stockholm.

September 6.-Stockholm cabled a wrap-up report on the tragic episode and

described the efforts of the Embassy staff who attempted to assist Aragon after

he had set himself on fire.

THE CANAL ZONE POLICE INvOLVEMENT IN THE CAPTURE AND BEATING OF

LEOPOLDO ARAGON

It should be noted that Mrs. Aragon's testimony is vague with respect to

various dates when certain events allegedly occurred, and the descriptions of

the events themselves lack specificity. Nevertheless, using her narration as a

general point of departure, we have been able to ascertain that the National

Guard apparently transferred Leopoldo Aragon across Canal Zone piers for trips

to Coiba on two separate occasions.

With respect to the first transfer, a search of the files of the Canal Zone Police

disclosed that an incident involving the transfer of prisoners by the National

Guard occurred in the Canal Zone on February 23, 1973. According to the report,

a prisoner identified as "Aravan" jumped into the water in an attempt to escape

while being transferred to a National Guard launch at Dock 17 in Balboa. The

entry further indicates that two members of the National Guard entered the

water and apprehended the prisoner under Dock 16 and placed him aboard the

launch without further incident.

Two Canal Zone Police officers who were on duty on February 23, 1973, were

located and interviewed. The first officer, who arrived at Dock 17 as the transfer

of prisoners was taking place, recalled that at one point a commotion broke

out and that one of the National Guardsmen at the scene leaned over the edge

of the Dock and fired his carbine iut) the water. The guard ce as( firing when
330

he was ordered to do so by the Canal Zone policeman. The policeman then observed

two other National Guardsmen enter the water and retrieve a prisoner (apparently Mr. Aragon). Aftcr a brief struggle, the prisoner was handcuffed, placed aboard the launch and tied to the mast. The National Guard launch departed

approximately two minutes later. The Canal Zone policeman stated that in his

opinion no more force than necessary was used to subdue the prisoner.

The second officer interviewed was sent to Dock 17 in response to a report that

one of the prisoners had attempted to escape. He recalled that the prisoner in

question had been apprehended and was on the launch when he arrived at Dock

17. The officer st ated he did not see the prisoner being mistreated, but learned from

his fell(w officers at the scene that the prisoner had been struck once or twice by

the National Guard while being put on the launch, but, again, that no excessive

force had been used. This officer added that he himself observed the prisoner from

about ten feet away and saw no visible signs of mistreatment.

Both officers indicated that, to the best of their knowledge, the prisoner never

requested Canal Zone Police intervention nor did he try to reach the Canal Zone

Police at the scene while attempting to escape.

The second transfer occurred on September 15, 1973. After about two-thirds of

the prisoners had departed the buses which had brought them to Dock 17 and

had boarded the National Guard launch, the two Canal Zone policemen present

went down onto Dock 17 and, while standing there, noted a bearded white male

standing in the center of the launch. He was the only prisoner that was handcuffed.

The prisoner called to one of the Canal Zone policemen and said in perfect

English, "I want political asylum. I am a political prisoner, not a common criminal." The policeman ignored the prisoner for several minutes, but finally asked

him his name. He replied, "My name is Leopcldo Aragon. I'm a Panamanian and

a graduate ef Stanford University in San Francisco, California, and I'm a doctor

of law." He also stated, "The American Embassv would like to know of my

plight. They are involved in this and would like to know of my arrest." He further

stated, "You can arrest me as your prisoner because I have committed a misdemeanor. I have a book in my possession from the Canal Zone Library, and I

admit that I stole it." The policeman informed Mr. Aragon that he could not help

him, as he was a prisoner of the Panamanian government and was in the custody

of the Panamanian authorities. At this time, the launch began departing the Dock,

and Mr. Aragon began cursing the Canal Zone policemen, calling them Comnmunist gringos, stupid s-, etc.

Mr. Aragon was handcuffed behind his back and just prior to the launch's

depai ture, a National Guardsman who appeared to be guarding only Mr. Aragon

removed the right handcuff and attached it to an object aboard the launch.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. On page 6, Mrs. Aragon also mentions

documentation provided to the State Department and Senator

Allen. The committee would appreciate it if that information were

made available to the committee as a part of the record at this point,

without objection.

Mr. CUTTER. We also have some documentation on the case of Mr.

David Mendelson, which is mentioned. I can supply for the record a

copy of a letter we sent to Senator Allen in response to a query from

him which sets forth our views, what our investigations have produced

on that case and some attachments in addition to a response from

Senator Allen.

(The information to be furnished follows:]

DOCUMENTATION ON THE CASE OF MR. DAVID MENDELSON

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

Washington, D.C., June 24, 1977.

f on. JAMEs B. ALLEN,

U.S. Senate.

DEAR SENATOR ALLEN: I would like to amplify on my previous letter to you

about the case of Mr. David Mendelson.

Since learning about the complaint of Mr. Mendelson, the Department of State

has tried to obtain additional facts and information and to render Mr. Mendelson
331

all appropriate assistance. It has requested and obtained from the Panamanian

National Guard (the combined police and army in Panama) reports of the incident (Enclosures 1 and 2). The United States Consul in Panama has also talked

to Mr. Mendelson's wife, Omaira Judith ("Mayin") Correa de Mendelson, and

submitted a report (Enclosure 3).

When Mr. Mendelson first contacted the department soon after his arrival in

Miami on April 4, we strongly recommended that he prepare a sworn statement

and send it to us and that he immediately consult a physician who could confirm

his allegations of physical mistreatment by the National Guard.

On April 5, Mr. Mendelson completed his statement and had it notarized

(Enclosure 4). In it, Mr. Mendelson claims that on April 3 he was moving his

possessions from the apartment he shared with his wife to another apartment

where he was going to live during their separation. At the time of his apprehension, he was seated on the tailgate of the moving van at his new apartment. While

in the National Guard's custody he alleges he was punched with fists, hit with a

rubber hose, denied access to lavatory facilities, denied food and water, denied

permission to take medication prescribed by a physician for a previously existing condition, denied permission to call the United States Embassy or a friend, and

threatened. At 3:30 a.m. on the following morning, after ten hours of detention,

he was put on a Braniff Airlines flight for Miami.

Mr. Mendelson's version of the incident is contradicted by some official reports

and records of the Panamanian authorities. The reports of the detaining officer

dated April 3, 1977, states that the police intervened at the request of Mrs.

Mendelson for assistance because Mr. Mendelson was destroying property inside

and outside the apartment and allegedly was striking his wife and her son and

brandishing a small firearm. According to the police report, it was Mrs. Mendelson

who requested that he not be sent to jail but, instead, be sent to the United States

because of a psychiatric condition for which reason he would not he able to

withstand the stresses of incarceration. The report states that Mr. Mendelson

concurred with this arrangement and purchased his own ticket to M\Iiaii with a

check given to him by his wife. This account was confirmed by the policeman's

commander Lieutenant Colonel Manuel A. Noriega, in a report to the United

States Consul. We have also learned that the National Guard would have charged

Mr. Mendelson with illegal possession of a firearm, assault with a deadly weapon

and battery, breaking and entering and possession of marijuana.

Mrs. Mendelson told the United States Consul that as a result of a domestic

argument, they had decided to separate. le agreed to vacate their apartment

by Tuesday, April 5. In the meantime, Mrs. Mendelson stayed with a friend. On

Sunday, April 3, her son returned to her and her husband's apartment and found

Mr. Mendelson emptying the apartment of all its furnishings. She also claims that

Mr. Mendelson struck her son. As a result, she called the National Guarn and had

her husband detained. Because she feared that her husband could not hold up

to the pressures of incarceration, she prevailed on the National Guard to send

Mr. Mendelson to the United States.

As we compared and analyzed the three versions of the events, we realized

that they contained strongly conflicting accounts of the same incident. The

Department is not, at this time, in a position to verify either Mr. Mendelson's

version of the incident, the statement of his wife, or the statements of the Panamanian authorities.

It was apparent, however, that the cause of the incident was the domestic differences between the Mendelsons. Mr. Mendelson told a Department desk officer

that "99%" of his troubles were his "wife's hatred" for him. The National Guard

detained Mr. Mendelson at his wife's request. His wife paid for his flight to the

United States; she prevailed on the National Guard to send him back to the

United States; and, according to Mr. Mendelson, she is in possession of most, if not all, of his personal property.

The Department also found that the National Guard apparently did not observe certain procedures in Mr. Mendelson's case. During his detention, the

Panamanian government had an obligation under the provisions of the Vienna

Convention on Consular Relations to inform the United States Embassy in

Panama that he was being held. We have no record of any such notification being

made. The Department of State did not learn of Mr. Mendelson's plight until he

arrived in the United States. In the absence of any mitigating circumstances, the

Department would take a serious view of this aspect of the case which denied
332

Mr. Mendelson protection under the Vienna Convention. We requested an explanation from the Panamanians. We have not yet taken any further action on

this particular matter in order not to jeopardize our Consul's efforts with Mrs.

Mendelson and the National Guard to have Mr. Mendelson's property sent to

,him.

Mr. Mendelson claimed that he was physically mistreated by the Panamanian

National Guard. From the first the Department strongly recommended that Mr.

Mendelson see a physician and even tried unsuccessfully to arrange an appointment for him. However, Mr. Mendelson was reluctant to see a doctor. He told a

Department desk officer on both Monday and Tuesday, April 4 and 5, that he

had no bruises or other marks on his body. On Tuesday, he told the desk officer

that he had had a good night's sleep and felt "pretty good." However, on Wednes-

(lay, April 6, he claimed to feel some pain and went to the Veterans Hospital for

an examination. On April 7, he was admitted to the Veterans Hospital for tests

for a possible kidney contusion and psychiatric consultation. He was released

on April 12. The Department requested a copy of the medical records of his hospitalization and his permission to consult with the doctors who treated him. He

sent us the records and his permission to consult. Physicians in the Department of

State examined the records and consulted with his doctors in Miami. They found

no evidence that Mr. Mendelson had suffered a kidney contusion or any other

injury during his detention by the National Guard.

Mr. Mendelson has requested the State Department to perform certain actions

for him. To the extent that it has been able, the Department has complied.

Mr. Mendelson asked the Department to arrange for the removal of his personal

property from Panama. We contacted Mrs. Mendelson, who states that she had

sent some items, mainly clothing, to Mr. Mendelson's parent's home in Mobile, Alabama, by air freight. Mr. Mendelson also prepared a list of his possessions

(Enclosure 5) with a total value of $43,370. Included on the list were a car valued

at $4,000 which Mr. Mendelson had asked his wife to liquidate for $3,500 in a

separate letter, and a bank account in his wife's name for approximately $3,000.

Mrs. Mendelson, on the other hand, claimed that her husband owed her sums of

money and that she would deduct what he owed her from whatever amount she

sent him. Even though a property settlement would obviously be a disputed

matter, the Department is doing everything it can to see that Mr. Mendelson's

property is returned to him. We have also suggested to Mr. Mendelson that he

hire an attorney or find a friend to act as an intermediary between him and his

wife to the extent permitted by Panamanian law. We understand that Mr. Mendelson did contact a mutual friend of his and his wife.

Mr. Mendelson has also asked the Department to consider espousing and interposing his claim for maltreatment against the Panamanian government. The

burden is upon him to present to the Department a clear legal case supported by

convincing evidence. He must show that he has exhausted the administrative and

legal remedies available in Panama in seeking redress, and that he has sustained

a denial of justice as that term is normally understood in international law. At

this time, the available record does not contain sufficient information and evidence

of any probative value to enable the Department to pass judgment on the merits

of Mr. Mendelson's case.

To facilitate Mr. Mendelson's legal actions, the Department sent him a list of

attorneys in Panama. He has written to seven attorneys asking if they "would

please represent me in a suit against the Republic of Panama." Mr. Mendelson

has also made several other inquiries for legal information, which the Department

has answered to the extent that it can. However, many of his questions should

be discussed with an attorney.

The remainder of the issues involved are part of the private dispute between

Mr. and Mrs. Mendelson and as such must be settled by them. The Department

of State has quite properly not involved itself in their personal affairs.

If you have further questions, please contact Mr. David G. Wagner in our

Inter-American Affairs Bureau, on 632-2060.

Sincerely, DOUGLAS J. BENNET, Jr.,

Assistant Secretary

for Congressional Relations.

Enclosures:
333

(Enclosure 1)

National Guard's Report

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

DIVISION OF LANGUAGE SERVICES,

Panama, April 8, 1977.

No. 810-G2-77

Mr. BLAINE C. TUELLER,

U.S. Consul General,

Panama, Republic of Panama.

REPUBLIC OF PANAMA-MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, G-2

GUARDIA NACIONAL

DEAR SIR: As you requested I herewith transmit the report made by the units

of the Police Division of the Guardia Nacional, Patrol Section, which investigated

the case of Mrs. Mayin Correa Mendelson involving differences with her husband

and request of protection for her physical safety. The particulars are as follows:

1. Mrs. Mayin Correa requested Guardia Nacional protection because she was

being threatened by her husband, United States citizen David Dale Mendelson.

2. The Patrol Section of the Police Division, led by Lieutenant Ricardo Corcho

investigated the case.

3. United States citizen David Dale Mendelson, who had destroyed the apartment and was holding their minor son at the point of a Browning .25 caliber

pistol, was disarmed.

4. At his wife's request, he was not jailed or brought to court, and it was Mendel

son's own decision to use his wife's money to buy a ticket to Miami.

5. Mendelson's wife said that he was under psychiatric treatment and had

been previously reported for drug addiction. A search uncovered marijuana

cigarettes which the attending police officers reported as belonging to Mendelson.

The foregoing information was set forth in the report submitted by Lieutenant

Ricardo Corcho of the Police Division of the Guardia Nacional.

Sincerely,

Lt. Col. MANUEL A. NORIEGA,

G-2, Guardia Nacional Headquarters.

Enclosure 2

(Policeman's Report)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

DivIsiON OF LANGUAGE SERVICES,

Panama, April 3, 1977.

LS No. 61720-B

To: Lt. Col. Manuel A. Noriega, Departmental Chief.

Subject: Case report.

SIR: Today at 6:40 p.m. a call was received on line 104, the patrol extension,

from a woman who identified herself as journalist Mayin Correa and requested

that a unit he sent to her residence since her husband was destroying everything

in the home and had struck her and their son like a madman. She asked me to

handle this request for assistance and I went to her home immediately.

Upon arriving at the scene of the incident, I could see that someone was

destroying everything inside and outside the residence. I saw a boy about 17 years

of age whose face bore signs of physical abuse. A hammer and a screwdriver were

in the hone. Living room furniture and other things were damaged. A man, who

appeared to be a foreigner, was brandishing a small firearm. I warned him to

hand over the firearm after I had sufficiently convinced him and calmed him

down. In my opinion, he reacted in a normal manner. I took the firearm, which

t rned ot to be a Browning 25 caliber pistol, and one box of 50 of the same

caliber cartrid es.

When I detained the subject and saw the excited and nervous look on his face, his expression seemed strange and, thinking that he might have another weapon,
334

I ordered a search of his car where various marijuana cigarettes were found

(verified by laboratory test). The car belonged to United States citizen David

Dale Mendelson, the husband of the woman making the complaint. Mr. Mendelson

should have been brought to Headquarters to answer to charges of illegal posses- sion of drugs. However, his wife requested that he not be put in jail since he was

under psychiatric treatment with Dr. Hernin Higuero and Dr. B.ez.

Mrs. Correa, Mendelson's wife, requested that he not be jailed and instead

sent to his country of origin, since sending him to jail would aggravate his psychiatric condition. Mendelson concurred with this.

After a report was made to the Departmental Chief, Mendelson was permitted

to leave the country with money in the form of a check given him by his wife, with which he purchased a Braniff ticket to Miami. le left Panama without

difficulty.

I afterward completed my duty without further incident.

Lt. RICHARDO CORCHO,

Police Division.

Enclosure 3

MRS. MENDELSON 'S VERSION OF THE EVENTS OF APRIL 3, 1977

On April 5, the United States Consul in Panama had a lengthy talk with

Mrs. Omaira Judith ("Mayin") Correa de Mendelson. She told him that she and

her husband had been having marital problems since shortly after their marriage

three years ago. Both of them had been seeing doctors and marriage counselors

for more than two years. About two weeks before Mr. Mendelson's detention, their troubles had come to a head after he had been particularly violent and upset.

Mrs. Mendelson engaged a lawyer to work out a separation agreement, and

Mr. Mendelson was to move to a separate apartment on April 5. On Sunday, April 3, her son found Mr. Mendelson with a moving van at their apartment in

the process of removing the entire contents of the apartment, which was not part

of the agreement. She states that Mr. Mendelson struck her son; so she called the

National Guard who arrested him.

According to Mrs. Mendelson, the National Guard officer found that

Mr. Mendelson had a pistol in his possession for which he had no permit. Consequently, the National Guard was ready to arrest him on charges of illegal

possession of a weapon and theft of household goods. However, Mrs. Mendelson

did not want to press charges because she knew that in his emotional condition

he could not endure the rigors of local jail. Therefore she made arrangements

with the Guard officer to have him sent to the United States on the first available

flight.

The Consular Officer questioned Mrs. Mendelson about her husband's treatment by the National Guard. She stated that she did not see him from the time

he was detained until he left on the Braniff flight at 4:30 a.m. on April 4 for

Miami. She did call the Guard who were holding him at Tocumen Airport and

inquired agout his condition. She was told he was all right, but she declined the

Guard's invitation to speak to him.

Enclosure 4

MR. MENDELSON' S STATEMENT

My name is David Mendelson, American citizen, born in Mt. Pleasant, Tex.,

July 15, 1940. I have lived the last 6 to 7 years in and about Latin and South

America. I have lived the last 2 years and 11 months in Panama City, Republic of

Panama. I am married to a Panamanian citizen whose name is Omaria Judith

Correa who is commonly called Mayin Correa. We, my wife and I, have been

having matrimonial difficulties for about 2 years. I have no political connections

nor have I had any political connections in or about Latin or South America. This

past Friday, April 1, 1977, my wife called a Dr. Adolgenis Arosemena to come to

our house to properly discuss separation of properties that she and I had accumulated before and during our marriage. A list of properties was made and agreed

upon by my wife and I. It was also agreed upon that I should stay in the house

until Tuesday, April 5, at which time Dr. Arosemena would supervise the moving of my furniture and personal belongings from where we were living to my

own apartment.

The address where we were living is called El Congrejo Calle F Edificio La

Fuente, apt. No. 1. I was moving to the following address El Congrejo Calle J,

apt. No. 13 to which a contract had been signed by myself and Mr. Abadi, owner
335

of the building. Friday night, April 1, my wife stayed with her relatives in Panama

City and I stayed at our residence in Edificio La Fuente. Saturday, April 2, I

spent the day buying appliances such as refrigerator, stove, washing machine,

dryer for the apartment at Calle J, apt. No. 13. I spent the night in the residence

at Calle F Edificio La Fuenta. Sunday morning, April 3, I left my residence to

make further purchases for my new apartment. When I returned arwnd 2 p.m. oil

April 3, I found that my keys did not fit the door of the building and I realized that

my wife had stolen my house keys or had the door lock changed.

On the outside of the door of the building there was a note saying that my

personal belongings were in the basement. I went to the basement and had the

groundskeeper open the door and I saw that my wife had moved all of my personal

clothing possessions to the basement. I then had the groundskeeper open the

door of the building for me with his key and paid him $5 to move all my personal

clothing possession back into the apartment. I then proceeded to the apartment,

opened the iron door of our apartment to which I found I had the key still on my

keychain. After opening the door I found that she had turned the automatic

alarm system on and when I looked for my key to turn off the alarm I found it

was missing from my keychain.

I then proceeded to try to open the wooden door "principal door" of the house

to which I found none of the keys on my keychain to fit the lock. I forced the door

open with my shoulder and the alarm system was turned on; I then ran to the

kitchen and turned it off. The groundskeeper then moved all my personal belongings back into the apartment during which time I tried to local te my wife 1by

telephone by calling all of her relatives in Panama City, none of wich could

give me an answer to her whereabouts or had seen her. I then tried to call the

attorney, Dr. Arosemena, the same as mentioned, but there was ho aiwer Oin

the telephone.

I then decided to call a moving van company and move out the s:in Wiy or 2

days earlier than agreed upon. The moving van company ar-rived and 1 I movert only

the possessions that were agreed upon by my wife, Dr. Arosemtna tn ivelf;

that is to say moving these possessions to my new address on Calle J, tot. No. 1:3.

The moving van company arrived about 2:30 p.m. or 2:45 p.m. I Iiiectii them to

move only certain items that were on the list that were previously mentioned.

We then drove to my new residence on Calle J, apt. No. 13 :1n proceedotd to

unload. While the moving company was unloading I was sitting in the hack of

the truck and a police van and several civilian automobiles drove uT)( and everyone jumped out of the cars and police van at one time. Imme(iatelY they asked d

the moving van chief where these possessions were coming from, he told them

they were coming from Calle F Edificio La Fuente.

As soon as this information was made known I was immediately apprehended

forcibly by three civilians who showed me no identification or said to me whom

they were, what they were doing, or anything. I was then physically, roughly

searched, all my possessions were taken from me-my money, credit cars and

keys: Then I was forcibly pushed into a station wagon with my arms twisted

behind my back. When I asked what was happening I was struck in the face by a

rubber hose and punched in the shoulders several times by their fits then one of

the men told me if I don't like it I could keep on talking so I kept my mouth

shut and said no more for the time being. Five men entered the station wagon

with me, drove me to the old address where I previously moved from J. Edificio

La Fuenete where they also directed the moving van to return; 1 then saw my

wife for the first time.

I tried to ask her what was going on and she said don't worry you are getting

what you deserve. I was detained at the old address for approximately 1 hour

being pushed around whenever the men felt like and calling me violent names in

front of everyone there. They then drove me in the same car with hand cuffs

behind my back to the G-2 headquarters where we stayed for about 10 minutes.

Then without leaving the car they took the hand cuffs off and put on thumb

cuffs which were very tightly fitted and drove me to Toqumen "Tocumen"

Airport where they took me to the investigation department inside the airport

and they took off the thumb cuffs. The personnel who had driven me to the airport had roughened me up, beat me on my arms and legs with rubber hoses

then left. As soon as they left I asked to make a telephone call which was denied.

I asked for a drink of water which was denied. I asked to go to the men's room

and that also was denied. I was cursed at and spoken to very violently that if I

dared moved they would beat the hell out of me.

Then, approximately 2 hours later a man who I did not recognize, took me

from the investigation department in the airport to a military installation on

98-991-77 23
336

foot surrounded by 8-10 ft. hurricane fence with strands of barb wire at the top of the fence. We were permitted to enter by a guard who carried a rifle. I was

then taken to a room where there were several other people in civilian clothes

sitting in chairs against the wall. In the same room there were three armed

military officials. I don't know their ranks or grades but I asked one of the civilians who was in charge and he pointed out one man. I raised my arm to ask

permission to ask a question. The man said "what do you want," I said "I would

like to call the American Embassy or make a telephone call to my friend in

Panama City" he said "no calls are permitted."

By the way, various times during the course of the evening I had consistently asked to make a telephone call and on all occasions I was struck with a rubber

hose and told no telephone calls were permitted nor was anyone permitted to

speak with me. I was not allowed to have any water nor was I allowed to go the

the rest room. I tried to explain to the man in charge that I was on medication

and that they had taken my medication away from me and would they please

return it but this was declined. I was left waiting in this chair unmolested until

approximately 3:30 a.m. April 4, when I was then escorted through the immigration in the airport to the Braniff Terminal. At this time again I asked if I

could make a telephone call and they said I was not allowed a telephone call nor

was anyone permitted to speak to me. I asked if my baggage was going to be on

the airplane with my personal clothing belongings yes. I then asked how many

baggages they were giving me and they answered four. I then asked for the baggage claim checks they told me that the captain of the airplane had the claim

checks in his possession.

I waited outside of the airplane under guard when I saw the captain of the airplane approaching I went to him and asked him if he had any baggage claim

checks, He said of course not why should I have your claim checks. I was then

escorted aboard the airplane; my passport was then given to the main steward

of Braniff who was told to give my passport to the Braniff agent in charge at

Miami International Airport. Upon arriving in Miami I immediately contacted

a friend of mine who allowed me to stay at his apartment and allowed me to use

his telephone. I looked in the Miami directory looking for information of how to

contact the State Department and I contacted Mr. Hugh Culverhouse who in

turn told me to contact the Panamanian Affairs Office whom I called and spoke

with Mr. John Becker. All of the abovementioned was taken place on April 4.

I then went to the Chase Manhattan International Bank to try to retrieve my

funds from the bank in Panama. They gave me directions on Tuesday, April 5.

A David Wagner from the Panamanian Affairs Office called me and asked to

make this report and to go and have a doctors examination and told me that the

Federal Investigation Bureau would be in contact with me.

On this 5th day of April 1977 before me appeared David Mendelson a citizen

of the United States, who swears that all of the above statements are true.

I Marvin Steele do hereby swear that the signature appearing below is that

of David Mendelson as it appears in his American passport Z1766017.

David Mendelson.

MARVIN STEELE.

April 5, 1977.

Enclosure 5

MR. MENDELSON' S LIST OF POSESSSIONS

1 1975 Silver Grey 4 Door 5 shift Fiat 131 excellent condition---------- $4, 000

1 19" Zenith Color TV _------------------------------------------- 400

1 Morantz Amplifier w/2 speakers---------------------------------- 800

1 Morantz Turntable, 25 records

2 Refrigerators-_------------------------------------------------- 250

1 4 Burner Gas Stove-------------------------------------------- 100

1 Vacuum Cleaner------------------------------------------------ 50

1 White Bar open both sides w/4 doors & locks stocked---------------- 200

1 Standup Bar (brown)------------------------------------------ 50

1 Coffee Pot----------------------------------------------------- 10

2 Tables 1 meter Xl meter white w/glass tops---_---____-_-___-_-----. 250

2 Tables % meter X Y meter white w/glass tops ----------------------- 150

3 Rugs, 1 red & orange 2 meters X 1 meter -------------------------- 300

2 Rugs, Equadorian 2 meters X 2 meters_ _.---- - -- _---500

2 A/C Units, one 9000 BTU one 11,000 BTU.-_-_ --------- _--300

1 White King Size Bed w/Head Board, Box Springs & Mattress.--_- 500
337

2 Night Tables matching above bed-------_-----------.----.-.-------100

1 Men's Valet white ---------------------------------------------- 25

1 Credenza walnut w/4 doors --------------------------------------- 150

1 Set Dishes (12 place setting) ------------------------------------- 300

1 Chrome overhead lamp 12 bulbs--------------------------._--------150

1 Chrome Swing Lamp 12 Bulbs----------------------------------- 150

1 Chrome Standing Spiral Lamp 8-9 bulbs--.---.------.---_-_--_-_ -150

1 Large Sofa 2 meters X I meter feather filled covered in wool---------- 1, 500

4 Large Matching Chairs_----------------------------------------- 1, 000

4 Large Cushions filled w/feathers---------------------------------- 400

1 Dining Table Octagon w/6 arm chairs_--------__----_------_---_-_-500

Jewelry:

1 Ladies Emerald Ring w/Diamonds ---------------------------- 6, 000

1 Ladies Emerald Ring 6-8 stones uncut in rough ---------------- 6,000

1 Diamond Ring Yellow Gold old fashion style- __----_----.----1, 500

1 Emerald 1 ct. & 1 diamond 1 et-_-----.-_-------_-_--- _ 1, 500

1 Emerald single stone 2.5 ets_------_----_----_-------------1, 200

1 Emerald & Diamond Bracelet -------------------------------- 1, 500

1 Set Emerald Earings ---------------------------------------- 200

Business:

1 Executive Desk in wood ------------------------------------- 300

1 Executive Swivel Chair black leather-.------_-------------------150

1 Pile Cabinet 4 drawer legal size------------------------------- 135

1 Safe 3'X2'X2' color grey-.--._-_-__-----------.-_-----_-250

1 IBM Selectric Electric Typewriter ---------------------------- 700

Various personal items, pictures, puzzles, etc--_----------.-.-----300

Washing Machine & Dryer ---------------------------------------- 400

Total --------------------------------------------------- 32, 670

Bank Account in the name of Omaira C. De Mendelson with Chase-Manhattan

120 Via Espania with a balance of approximately $3,000.00.

Bank Account in the name of DiDi Em. S. A., same bank as above with a balance

of about $900.00.

Banco Nacional, Bonds, $5,000.00.

Banks--------------------------------------------------------- 8,900

Personal items, furniture, all listed page 1 -------------------------- 32, 670

Loan: Dora Afre: Owes 1800.00 plus Interest-----_------.---------__-1, 800

Grand total --------------------------------------------- 43, 370

SENATOR JAMES B. ALLEN's LETTER TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

U.S. SENATE,

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,

Washington, D.C., July 14, 1977.

Mr. DOUGLAS J. BENNET, Jr.,

Assistant Secretary for Conqressional Relations,

Department of State, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. BENNET: Thank you very much for your letter of June 24, 1977,

in which you report in some detail on the case of Mr. David Mendelson, formerly

a resident of the Republic of Panama.

I found the report you rendered on the Mendelson matter quite thorough, and

I appreciate very much the obvious extra effort that you and others at the Department of State have given in seeking to investigate and establish the facts. I commend you for this particularly fine work, and I thank you for your willing cooperation in helping me to advise my constituent.

With kindest regards, I am

Very truly yours,

JAMES B. ALLEN.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Dr. Robles.
338

STATEMENT OF WINSTON ROBLES, ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF

POLITICAL SCIENCE, FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY,

AND DIRECTOR OF THE PANAMANIAN COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN

RIGHTS

Mr. ROBLES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to

express the opinions here that I am not allowed to express in my own

country. I am a citizen of Panama and was forcibly exiled from my

country.

In 1968, through a military coup, for the first time in their history, Panamanians found themselves under the brutal rule of one of the

most corrupt and arbitrary dictatorships of Latin America.

Since then, prison, torture, expatriation, and murder have become

the common procedure used by the Government to deal with dissident opinion.

Following the coup, the University of Panama was closed for 1

year. All political parties were banned. Newspapers and radio stations

were seized and all the independent media controlled. Many Panamanians were tortured, incarcerated, murdered, or simply disappeared, many were forcibly expatriated.

Today Panamanians live in constant fear, telephones are tapped, mail intercepted, houses searched in the dark of night, people arbitrarily arrested, and the population intimidated by an organization

of paid informers.

Arrests are made on the grounds of "insults to the General" or

"disrespect of the authorities" because of private conversations in

which there was criticism of the Government or its officers.

From time to time the Government-controlled press publishes

special Government telephone numbers to which "citizens should

call to denounce counterrevolutionary practices."

The Government, using every imaginable resource-intimidation,

blackmail, bribery-to name a few-maintains strict control over

labor unions, professional associations, farmers organizations, and

other organized groups.

The very few organizations that at one time or another have expressed criticism of Government policies or practices have been

subjected to harassment, threats, and reprisals. The instinct for selfpreservation forces conformity.

The Government, its officers and its friends are involved in all kinds

of legal and illegal businesses. The involvement of high-ranking officers

in drug traffic is well known.

Before the coup, Panama maintained for many years the highest

sustained rate of economic growth in Latin America and one of the

highest in the world. Today, the military are the social, political,

and economic aristocracy of a country in bankruptcy. There was a

negative, 1-percent growth in 1976, and unemployment was the

highest in the history of the country.

All governments that come to power by force try to give legitimacy

to their origins and legality to their malpractices. In 1972 the Torrijos

dictatorship called elections for a "constitutional assembly." With

all political parties and activities proscribed, except the Government
339

party "Movimiento Nuevo Panama" and the "Partido Del Pueblo"-

Moscow oriented Communist party-and absolute control of newspapers, television and radio stations, it was not surprising that the

Government won 504 of the 505 carefully screened "representatives."

This selected, rather than elected, assembly held its first meeting

October 1, 1972. A week later the "new constitution" was approved

without discussion and the "constitutional assembly, even to the surprise of its members, found itself transformed into a "Legislative

Assembly"-but one without power to legislate.

The new constitution subordinates the legislative, executive and

judicial power to the national guard. It eliminates the separation of

powers and places the legislative power in a "legislative council"

composed of the Cabinet Ministers and any number of members appointed by Torrijos. It also states that Torrijos is the "Maximum

Leader." His constitutional powers are illustrated by a literal translation of article 277:

General Omar Torrijos Herrera, Commander-in-Chief of the National Guard

is hereby recognized as the Maximum Leader of the Panamanian Revolution. As

a consequence and to guarantee the fulfillment of the objectives of the revolutionary process, General Torrijos is hereby granted, for a term of six years, the

following powers: To coordinate all the work of the Public Administration;

appoint and remove freely all Cabinet Ministers, member of the Legislative Commission, the Comptroller General, and the Sub-Comptroller General of the

Republic, the general Directors of all Autonomous and Semi-Autonomous Institutions and the Magistrates of the Electoral Court to be named by the Executive

Branch according to this Constitution and the law; to appoint the Commanders

and officers of the Armed Forces, according to this Constitution, the law, and the

military hierarchy; to appoint, with the approval of the Cabinet, all the Justices

of the Supreme Court, the Attorney General, Attorney of the Administration and

their respective alternates; to approve government contracts, negotiation of

Government loans and conduct the foreign relations.

General Omar Torrijos will have, in addition power to participate with the

right to be heard and to vote in all the meetings of the Cabinet, the Legislative

Commission, the National Assembly of Representatives, the Provincial Councils

of Coordination, and the Communal Committees.

The new constitution subordinates everything to Torrijos as the

"Maximum Leader," and subjecting all powers to him except for those

exercised by people he may, at will, appoint and remove.

Despite the dictatorial nature of the constitution, it grants the

individual greater human and civil rights than even the United Nations Human Rights Declaration and the American Convention on

Human Rights. However, the unlimited powers of the dictator effectively denies these rights in practice.

This concentration of dictatorial powers, without parallel in the

constitutions of any other Latin American country, do not give, however, a complete idea of the real power that the dictator and the

national guard exercise.

Despite the dictatorial nature of the 1972 constitution, the individual and civil rights are broader than even the United Nations

Human Rights Declaration and the American Convention on Human

Rights. However, the constitution does not limit the powers of the

dictatorship and the freedoms and rights recognized in theory, are

constantly denied in daily practices.
340

Thus, the constitution exists only for "cosmetic" reasons and does

not impose in practice any limits to the use and abuse of the governmental powers. For example, the 'article 29 of the constitution prohibits expatriation, but several hundred Panamanians live in exile and

are not allowed to return to their country.

In 1969 the Government promulgated the Cabinet decrees 341, 342, and 343. Under these decrees, the exercise of the rights of peaceful

assembly is a crime against the state, dissident opinions are subversive

and all political activities are counterrevolutionary.

Decree 341, "guarantees the right of peaceful assembly, but prohibits public meetings in the cities of Panama and Colon, where more

than half of the Panamanians live."

Decree 342 authorizes administrative authorities to impose up to

15 years of prison terms without the right to a hearing, without due

process of law, without defense, without appeal, and without intervention of the courts. The decree is so vaguely written that it could be

and has been applied to punish all kinds of activities "against the

security of the state," including such "criminal" acts as written or

verbal criticism against the Government.

A recent case illustrates the procedures under decree 342: On

November 1976 a bomb exploded in a car driven by Jorge Rodriguez,

a well-known opponent of the Government. Rodriguez was slightly

injured and his wife was badly hurt. The third passenger, Dolores

Montoto, was unharmed. The G-2 men arrested the three persons, but due to the delicate condition of Gilma Rodriguez, she was hospitalized. Four weeks later the controlled press published an administrative resolution condemning to prison Rodriguez, his wife-at

that time still in critical condition in the hospital-and Dolores

Montoto to 15, 7, and 5 years respectively. None of them had legal

counsel and they never had an opportunity to answer the charges

against them. Since then, nobody knows where Mr. Rodriguez is

imprisoned. On January 1977 the Panamanian Committee for Human

Rights sent a letter to Amnesty International requesting their intervention in this case.

Decree 343 is used to control newspapers, radio, and television by

imposing a rigid self-censorship seldom violated.

On January 1974 the Government prohibited the publication of

the newspaper Quibo-What's Happening-even before the first

edition came out, confiscating the equipment and arresting the editors.

The same thing happened in March 1975 when the Government prohibited the publication of La Opinion Publica-The Public Opinion.

The same decree was used in 1976 to close "Radio Impacto," a

radio station that expressed independent opinions. The equipment of

the station was confiscated and its owner, forcibly expatriated.

According to the decree, all radio and television stations are forced

to tape their programs and deliver them to the Ministry of Government and Justice.

Obviously the decrees contradict the constitution and violate the

United Nations Declaration on Human Rights, but, nevertheless,

they are systematically enforced by the dictatorship.

As far as we know, no other Latin American dictatorships have a

legislation more repressive and which violates all internationally

recognized standards on human rights. Human rights violations

are documented in volume I and II published by the Panamanian
341

Committee for Human Rights, and in the testimony presented

March 30 of this year before the Foreign Operations and Related Agencies Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations of the House

of Representatives. I would like to know if there is something more

consistent than a law, than legislation that violates human rights.

Since 1968 Panama is listed by the Inter-American Press Association

as a country in which, "freedom of the press does not exist." Amnesty

International has made reports on human rights violations during the

early years of the regime. Freedom Hcuse lists Panama in 1976 as a,

"not free country." By contrast, Brazil is listed as a "partially free"

country.

Yet, the U.S. State Department, with an unbelievable lack of information or selective standards of ethics that give little honor to the

moral commitments of President Carter's administration, has denied

that human rights in Panama are an area of concern, and the International League for Human Rights has criticized the State Department reports.

In Panama the rule of law does not exist. Since the inception of the

dictatorship, judiciary members can be removed freely and no justice

or judge has dared to resolve a case against the military wishes. The

dictatorship often violates its own laws.

On several occasions the then Minister of Government and Justice,

Materno Vasquez, declared to the press that, "the interest of the State

is above the law." This man is now Chief Justice of Panama's Supreme

Court and recently signed on behalf of Panama, "The American Convention of Human Rights."

Frequently the courts' decisions as well as the orders of civil authorities are ignored by the military.

The writ, of "habeas ccrpus" is useless in political cases and severely

limited in cases of common arbitrary detentions, because the courts

do not have the authority to enforce their decisions. In all cases, a

national guard officer exercises an overriding decision on the decisions

of the courts.

On the other hand, the members of the national guard are personally

above the rule of law and the citizens do not dare to initiate criminal

or civil procedures against them.

Since 1968 hundreds of Panamanians have been murdered and not

even one case of political assassination has been successfully solved. In

many cases the national guard refuses to deliver the body to the family

or to allow the identification of the victims.

National guard members have earned the reputation of, "shoot

first and ask questions later."

The security of the person does not exist. People are arrested without

formalities of any kind. Often people are detained and the national

guard refuses to ackncwledge their detention.

Under these conditions the courts cannot offer effective remedy

against the frequent abuses of the authorities.

Political freedom can be defined as the right to participate in,

modify, or change a government.

None of those possibilities are within the reach of the Panamanian

people. The only elected representatives are the members of the Assembly cf District Representatives, a powerless body without any

significant role in the Government.
342

Although the right to organize political parties is recognized in the

constitution, the political parties were extinguished by decree in 1968

and, since then, the dictatorship systematically has denied the right to

carry on political activities of any kind.

The only exception to this rule is the, "Partido del Pueblo"-

People's Party-a Communist Moscow-oriented party which has

complete freedom since 1969, when the party decided to support the

dictatorship.

In 1970 the government tried to organize a one-party political

system the, "Movimiento Nuevo Panama." After 2 years of great

effort and propaganda, using all the resources of the government, public opinion would not accept it. The whole idea was abandoned

after one use. Thus, today the only officially allowed party is that of

the Moscow/Castro Communists.

The most prominent Panamanian politician, Dr. Arnulfo Arias, who was overthrown 11 days after his inauguration as President, elected by the overwhelming majority of votes, lives in exile and is

not allowed to return to Panama. Hundreds of other Panamanians

also live in exile because of their political beliefs.

Your committee has called these hearings to study the Panama

Canal Treaties-it is appropriate to explore the parallel process of

the other signatory.

The Panama Constitution provides that any Canal Treaty must

be submitted to a national plebiscite.

However, there is a confusion. The plebiscite does not have any

binding effect because the power to approve a treaty belongs to the

Assembly of District Representatives--(Article 141 of the Constitution.

The plebiscite is an expedient to give the treaty the appearance of

a popular approval. However, what kind of a plebiscite can be held

without a free press, without freedom of assembly, and without freedom of thought and expression? What is the value of a plebiscite under

the constant manipulation of information by the government-controlled press, radio, and television?

In 1975, 100 Panamanians signed a document stating that without

freedom of speech and assembly to discuss the Canal Treaty, a

plebiscite on the pact, "will be neither legitimate or authentic."

Since then, 15 of the persons who signed the statement have been

expatriated, others incarcerated, and all of them slandered by the

press and harassed by the Government.

The lack of freedom has been so criticized that, after the signing of

the treaty, the dictatorship has deemed it necessary to allow a carefully controlled degree of freedom to discuss the new treaty. However,

the Government is rushing the plebiscite in order to limit discussion.

The plebiscite will be held on October 23, despite the protest of many

groups that demand more time to study and discuss the canal pacts.

The farce of the plebiscite is so evident, that today, less than 2

weeks from the plebiscite, the Government has still not approved the

law that is supposed to establish the voting procedures. The negotiators of both countries have contradictory views of major points of the

treaties.

With some precedent, many Panamanians define the plebiscite as

a procedure that gives the people the freedom to choose between

voting "yes" or being expatriated.
343

Even under the assumption that a plebiscite would be held with all

the necessary rights and freedoms guaranteed, it is impossible

to think seriously that a dictator who obtained and maintained his

power by sheer force, against the will of the people, is going to respect their vote in an essential matter for the survival of the dictatorship.

The plebiscite is a simple problem for the Panamanian Government.

It does not matter how many vote yes or no. What matters is who is

going to count the votes.

The State Department knows very well that the plebiscite is a farce.

Mr. John L. Jackley prepared "A Study of the Impact of a New

Canal Treaty" for the U.S. Embassy in Panama and, among other

things, he wrote,

A lot of good press would be essential for success; in this situation we could make

good use of the controlled press situation of the Isthmus. If it doesn't work, no

propaganda would sell it. But it can be given at least an initial breath of promise

through skillful manipulation of the available media.

Many Americans express concern about a military dictatorship in

Panama that consistently violates the most elemental human and political rights of its citizens, but-they argue-that is a fact and the

United States must deal with reality.

The argument neglects the most important side of the problem: the

dictatorship remains in power because it is continually armed, generously financed, politically supported, and morally approved by the

United States.

The officers of the National Guard-including Torrijos-were

trained by the United States under the military assistance program.

Since the inception of the dictatorship, Panama "has been No. 1 in

terms of per capita aid" and has received more economic aid than all

previous Governments of Panama together. In fact, this very month,

AID transmitted a notice to Congress of an increase in the funding

level of the proposed fiscal year 1977 program in Panama.

Recently, Ambassador Bunker told a congressional committee that

Panama does not have a dictatorship, but an "authoritarian regrime."

However, the negotiators of the Canal Treaty do not seem to be so sure

of the Panamanian Government's respect for human rights, because

the treaty contains elaborate provisions to protect American citizens

rights when those citizens are arrested by Panamanian authorities.

Ironically, the Panamanians in their own land are going to have less

rights than Americans.

A few days ago, President Carter acknowledged that Torrijos is a

dictator, but praised him as an "enlightened" man who works for the

good of his people.

Constantly, the State Department denies that human rights are

violated in Panama despite the fact that the Department's intervention is often requested by American citizens that have been beaten,

tortured, and arbitrarily jailed by Panamanian authorities.

The United States is alienating Panamanians who cannot understand why the champions of democracy in their own land advocate, defend, and justify a dictatorship in Panama.

To the Panamanian, it is clear that the dictatorship, without U.S.

support, would have fallen many years ago by the weight of its errors

and the democratic efforts of the people.

Thus, the argument that the United States has to deal with reality is not a valid one, when that reality is a direct consequence of a foreign
344

police oriented to support a dictatorship under the shortsighted prem- ise that a strong military rule is easier to deal with, and, for that

reason, more convenient for U.S. interests.

Lat in American intellectuals observe that U.S. support of dictatorl ips s reng hens anti-American sentiment in the area. History shows

ihe re-iilt of that support. For example, in the Dominican Republic, the United States found it necessary to intervene militarily. In Cuba, the opening wvas made for Fidel Castro's revolution.

Panamanians are not radical. But the U.S. policy of unconditional

support to the dictatorship is pushing us in that direction.

Panamanians do not want U.S. intervention in their country. Panamanians want their freedom to fulfill their national aspirations, without any foreign power-not the United States, nor Cuba, nor

Russia imposing a corrupt, dishonest, and brutal dictatorship, which

is a tragedy for their country and shames any civilized political

standard.

Since 1903, all Panamanians have wanted a new treaty to replace

the one that was signed by a foreigner on behalf of Panama and imposed under the threat of losing the independence of the newborn

Republic.

But Panamanians do not want to replace a bad treaty with a worse

one that is going to be imposed with Torrijos playing the same role

that Bunau-Varilla played in 1903.

The new treaty does not solve "the causes of conflict" between the

two countries. On the contrary, it adds a few new ones, as, I am sure,

many Members of Congress are already aware. Among other things, it is going to condemn future generations of Panamanians to live

under a dictatorship as permanent as the interventionistic rule that

the U.S. negotiators state the new treaties give the United States.

However, in this ever-changing world, permanent does not mean

eternal. Sooner or later, the dictator will fall. Then the treaty is going

to be rejected by the Panamanians and their Government and all the

resentment against the dictatorship will be reflected in the future

relations between Panama and the United States.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Father Mahon.

STATEMENT OF REV. LEO T. MAHON, ST. VICTOR'S PARISH, CALUMET, ILL.; FORMER PRIEST IN PANAMA

Reverend MAHON. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, my name is Leo Mahon. I am a priest of the Roman Catholic

Archdiocese of Chicago. After 11 years of work, first among the

blacks, later among Spanish-speaking people in Chicago, I was sent in

1962 to the Republic of Panama. Together with, two other priests, I

founded an experimental mission in the area adjacent to Panama City

which is called San Miguelito. The area, largely a "squattersville,"

had a population in 1962 of 22,000 but now has grown to almost

200,000 people. There we worked to establish a sense of dignity and

justice as well as faith, not only in God but also in themselves as a

people. It is impossible tolive even a year in Panama without coming to feel

the impact of the American presence and the depth of the Panamanian

feeling about the Canal Zone. Panamanians, perhaps, paradoxically,
345

are vastly pro-American. Yet alnost to a person, they feel so very hurt

by- what we did in 1903-in their mind, a great injustice wich they

Claim the United State, up until recently, has refused( to admit or

redress s.

I was raised i the United State- on the popular Aie(rican vt rUion

of how the treaty wa e&f Cted and how the canal wa-s built. I was

surprised to find out that "our" version left out -ome very pertinent

facts, facts known by every single Panamanian but by very few Americttn;. I then began to study the whole affair, the 190. treaty, and the

various later attempts to revi-e it. I witnessed the anti-American

riots in 1964 when the smoldering resentment against the United

States broke out into open violence. I have followed the protracted

negotiations over the years. I have talked to the men who have sat on

both sides of the conference table. At one point, I was invited to

be an interpreter at those negotiations. I truly believe that I know

the issue well, that I know how I feel as an enlightened American,

that I know how Panamanians feel, especially the poor with whom I

lived for 12 years.

I shall presume that the honorable gentlemen on this committee

have been adequately briefed on all the historical data so necessary

to understand the making of the original treaty, the contract which

enabled the United States to build the canal and operate it ever

since. I presume, in particular, that you know:

First, that no Panamanian ever signed the treaty of 1903.

Second, that the American side could hardly believe its "luck"

in getting a deal so favorable to the United States.

Third, that the treaty has been an open wound in the body politic

of Panama ever since and a scandal to Latin American and to other

nations.

Fifth, that, finally, the entire issue has become a test in the eyes

of many, of our willingness and ability to deal equitably with the

poor, developing nations of the world, countries which do not come

any way near matching our military, economic, and technical might.

Since the focus of this hearing is the issue of human rights, in

Panama, I shall confine myself to the issue of justice. It is indubitably

the obligation of every human being, of every nation to seek after

justice. Our Nation was founded on that principle. We fought the

Revolutionary War to defend our right as a people to rid ourselves of

foreign domination, to govern ourselves without outside interference,

to possess our territory as sovereign and independent.

People after people followed our example and began to throw off

the yoke. We became the beacon of liberty and the proof of the

viability of modern democracy. One of the peoples inspired by our

insights, our courage and by our success was the people living on the

Isthmus of Panama. They rose several times in the 19th century to

rebel, first against Spain and then against Colombia, but each time

they failed and had to return to the rule of foreigners.

Another opportunity presented itself when in 1903 Philippe BunauVarilla, representing the French Canal stockholders, brokered a deal

whereby the United States obtained the right to build a canal in

return for the recognition of Panama as an independent and sovereign

nation.

One might have thought that this historic encounter between the

first of modern revolutionary democratic republics and the people of
346

Panama would have resulted in a fair and just arrangement satisfaetory to both countries. But, no, it did not. Panama was saddled with

an outrageously unjust treaty while the United States gleefully

accepted an arrangement with something of the feeling we get when

we pay for an article with a dollar bill and get change for $10.00.

Why did the nation, which a little over 100 years before had championed the right of peoples to declare their independence and sovereignty, ever sign a treaty which gave it the right to use another

country's territory in perpetuity and to act "as though it were sovereign in that land?"

One answer, I submit, lies in the fact that in 1903 the United States

was no longer the young revolutionary republic that it was in 1803. It

had undergone a change-a "change of life" one might call it-whereby

it took on the posture of an imperial power.

It began excursions into Cuba, Santo Domingo, Puerto Rico, the

Philippines, Panama and then highly disappointed those people when

the United States turned out to be not the champion of independence

and of inalienable rights-rights which cannot be bartered away-but

rather the newest imperialistic power to arrive on the international

scene. Thus, it was that the United States had contracted for far more

than the right to build and operate a passageway between the seas-it

had established an empire-colony relationship and failed to see the

contradictions therein contained.

I am convinced, that the first and overriding issue of this treaty is

justice. Let us, first of all, be just to ourselves, to the principles of our

Nation, to the men like Adams and Paine who founded the republic,

to the generations who are to come. We rebelled against the British

Empire and fought to defend the sacred rights of sovereignty and

independence. If we have strayed from those principles, let us admit

our aberration and return to the practice of justice and integrity. How

can we proclaim inalienable rights for ourselves and then deny them

to the people of another land?

It is impossible to imagine our signing over the Mississippi River and

10 miles territory on both sides of it to a foreign power in perpetuity

with the corresponding right to fly its flag, maintain a military and

police force there, issue postal stamps, and maintain a penitentiary? No; of course not, no American Government or party would dare even

speak of such a treaty or giveaway.

Suppose in 1776 our Government because of weakness had signed

such a treaty with France. Would we not have risen in anger and

shame to demand its abrogation? And if France refused to change the

treaty, would we not have done it even with force?

The present treaties, in my judgment, while not perfect, offer the

United States a chance to do justice to its own ideals, an opportunity

to be just with another nation.

The violation of human rights in Panama has been brought up as a

reason for not ratifying these treaties. I wonder why the violation of

human rights in the United States has not been brought up as an

obligation. Have there been such violations in Panama? Yes; more at

the beginning of the present regime but even yet people are exiled

from Panama without due process of law. Even now prison conditions

are reported to be deplorable.

The issue of human rights within a given country is, of course, an

important matter. I endorse and applaud President Carter's state-
347

ments about, human rights. His words we in Panama would love to

have heard sevei al years ago. Some say that words are not enough, that more must be done. I presume they mean force. I submit that

the right words are often enough, especially when they correspond

with and speak to the deepest desires and loftiest ideals of a given

people. A man named Jesus spoke powerful words long ago and although he eschewed the use of force, those same words have (lone more

for human rights than armies, treaties, or even laws.

Yes; we should continue to speak out in favor of human rights. By

so doing we stand for justice and human dignity everywhere. We

thereby open ourselves to criticism for our own violation of human

rights and declare ourselves willing to correct such things.

The issue of human rights in the Panama treaties: Who is raising

the issue? First of all, Panamanian exiles, some of whom are in this

chamber this morning. They are friends of mine, my heart goes out to

them. I am consoled by the fact that my country has offered them

asylum and so they join the other victims of socio-political change and

injustice: Cubans, Chinese, Chileans, Hungarians-and before that

White Russians, et cetera. The fact remains, however, bitter for them

and also for us, that their peoples are governed and represented by de

facto governments with whom we must deal and at times make

treaties.

There are also good, honest Americans who are concerned by the

violation of human rights anywhere, any time. I admire them but I

also wish to remind them that in this case, justice is the overriding

issue. If I owe a man $100 then I may not say to him, "I shall repay

my debt if you stop abusing your wife." I may wish to scold him but I

may not in justice withhold that which I owe him.

Last, it seems to me that there are those who violently oppose the

treaty and use whatever auxiliary issue to defeat its ratification.

Aren't these some of the people who claimed "States rights" and

tried to deny the right cf the Federal Government to intervene in a

State which was denying civic and human rights to some of its citizens?

Would these people ever, ever grant another country the right to

intervene in ours? Why then do we demand that right in the case of

Panama?

We the United States have not been free of sins against human

rights. Look what we have done to the Indian and to the black. Look

at what, it has been revealed recently, our Government has done to

its citizens through the CIA, the FBI, and the Plumbers. Do we wish

to say to the world that our own penal system is never in violation of

human rights?

No; if such violations are the "conditio sine qua non" of international treaties, then we could never sign a SALT treaty with the Soviet

Union, nor could any other nation sign a treaty with us.

I plead with you as representatives of this Nation to expedite the

ratification of these treaties. They aren't perfect. I wish they could be

better. But apparently it is the most we are willing to offer a tiny,

friendly nation. Dare we now say that it is too much?

In the 1770's His Majesty King George's government refused to

recognize the just aspirations of the American colonies. Some Members

of Parliament rose to accuse the government of intransigence and

warn of its consequences; armed rebellion. A somewhat comparable

situation is now with us. If we say that we will not change radically
348

the treaty of 1903 then we are saying that we insist upon maintaining

our colonial policy toward Panama and that means now as it did in

the 1776 war.

We can plead with Panama to improve its human rights posture and

we can denounce such violations strongly and publicly. But if we

declare that we have the right to intervene and force Panamanians

to be just to one another, then we are declaring ourselves father,

policeman and judge for Panama. That kind of policy is offensive, patronizing and demeaning. That's the kind of language the British

used on us 200 years ago and our reply was "that means war."

Our national motto is "In God We Trust." It is God who says

"love what is right and seek after justice." Let us do that, no matter

what others do and we shall have the protection of the "God of

Freedom" and the self-respect of a people which seeks justice and

peace when it is risky, even when it conflicts with some of our lesser

interests and our baser instincts.

In conclusion I would like to say the issue of human rights has been

a burning one since 1968. I regret the issue is raised only now by

Congress. If it is raised only as an excuse not to do justice by giving

a new treaty, I think it is a specious issue.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Reverend Mahon's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REv. LEO T. MAHON, ST. VICTOR'S PARISH, CALUMET, ILL., FORMER PARISH PRIEST IN PANAMA

My name is Leo Mahon. I am a priest of the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of

Chicago. After eleven years of work first among the blacks, later among Spanishspeaking people in Chicago, I was sent in 1962 to the Republic of Panama. Together

with two other priests, I founded an experimental mission in the area adjacent to

Panama City which is called San Miguelito. The area, largely a squattersville

had a population in 1962 of 22,000 but has now grown to almost 200,000 people.

There we worked to establish a sense of dignity and justice as well as faith, not

only in God but also in themselves as a people.

It is impossible to live even a year in Panama without coming to feel the impact

of the American presence and the depth of the Panamanian feeling about the

Canal Zone. Panamanians, perhaps, paradoxically, are vastly pro-American.

Yet almost to a person, they feel so very hurt by what we did in 1903-in their

mind a great injustice which they claim the United States up until recently has

refused to admit or redress.

I was raised in the United States on the popular American version of how the

treaty was effected and how the canal was built. I was surprised to find out that

"our") version left out some very pertinent facts, facts known by every single

Panamanian but by very few Americans. I then began to study the whole affair,

the 1903 treaty and the various later attempts to revise it. I witnessed the antiAmerican riots in 1964 when the smoldering resentment against the United States

broke out into open violence. I have followed the protracted negotiations over the

years. I have talked to the men who have sat on both sides of the conference table.

I was at one point invited to be an interpreter at those negotiations. I truly believe that I know the issue well-that I know how I feel as an enlightened American,

that I know how Panamanians feel, especially the poor with whom I lived for

12 years.

I shall presume that the honorable gentlemen on this committee have been

adequately briefed on all the historical data so necessary to understand the making

of the original treaty-the contract which enabled the United States to build the

canal and operate it ever since. I presume in particular that you know:

(1) That no Panamanian ever signed the treaty of 1903;

(2) That the American side could hardly believe its "luck" in getting a deal

so favorable to the United States;

(3) That the treaty has been an open wound in the body politic of Panama

ever since and a scandal to Latin America and to other nations;

(4) That the United States has had several opportunities to amend the

original treaty but has never risen to the challenge; and
349

(5) That, finally, the entire issue has become a test in the eves of ni:my, of

our willingness and ability to deal equitably with the poor, developinig nations of the world, countries which do not come any way near matching our

military, economic, and technical might.

Since the focus of this hearing is the issue of human rights in Panama, I shall

confine myself to the issue of justice. It is indubitably the obligation of every

human being, of every nation to seek after justice. Our nation was founded on that

principle. We fought the Revolutionary War to defend our right as a people to

rid ourselves of foreign domination, to govern ourselves without outide interference, to possess our territory as sovereign and independent.

People after people followed our example and began to throw off the yoke. We

became the beacon of liberty and the proof of the viability of modern democracy.

One of the peoples inspired by our insights, our courage and by our success was

the people living on the Isthmus of Panama. They rose several times in the 19th

century to rebel, first against Spain and then against Colombia, but each time

they failed and had to return to the rule of foreigners.

Another opportunity presented itself when in 1903 Philippe Bunau-Varilla, representing the French Canal stockholders, brokered a deal whereby the United

States obtained the right to build a canal in return for the recognition of Panama

as an independent and sovereign nation.

One might have thought that this historic encounter between the first of the

modern revolutionary democratic republics and the people of Panama would

have resulted in a fair and just arrangement satisfactory to both countries. But

no, it did not! Panama was saddled with an outrageously unjust treaty while the

United States gleefully accepted an arrangement with something of the feeling

we get when we pay for an article with a dollar bill and get change for $10.00.

Why did the nations which a little over a hundred years before had.championed

the right of peoples to declare their independence and sovereignty ever sign a

treaty which gave it the right to use another country's territory in perpetuity

and to act "as though it were sovereign in that land?" One answer, I submit, lies

in the fact that in 1903 the United States was no longer the young revolutionary

republic that it was in 1803. It had undergone a change (a "change of life" one

might call it) whereby it took on the posture of an imperial power.

It began excursions into Cuba, Santo Domingo, Puerto Rico, the Philippines, Panama and then hugely disappointed those peoples when the United States

turned out to be not the champion of independence and of inalienable rights

(rights which cannot be bartered away) but rather the newest imperialistic power

to arrive on the international scene. Thus it was that the United States had

contracted for far more than the right to build and operate a passageway between

the seas-it had established an empire-colony relationship and failed to see the

contradictions therein contained.

I am convinced, that the first and over-riding issue of this treaty is justice.

Let us, first of all, be just to ourselves, to the principles of our nation, to the men

like Adams and Paine who founded the republic, to the generations who are to

come. We rebelled against the British Empire and fought to defend the sacred

rights of sovereignty and independence. If we have strayed from those principles, let us admit our aberration and return to the practice of justice and integrity.

How can we proclaim inalienable rights for ourselves and then deny them to the

people of another land?

Is it possible to imagine our signing over the Mississippi River and 10 miles

of territory on both sides of it to a foreign power in perpetuity with the corresponding right to fly its flag, maintain a military and police force there, issue

postal stamps, and maintain a penitentiary? No, of course not, no American

government or party would dare even to speak of such a treaty or give-away!

Suppose in 1776 our government, because of weakness, had signed such a treaty

with France. Would we not have risen in anger and shame to demand its abrogation? And if France refused to change the treaty, would we not have done it, even

with force?

The present treaties, in my judgment, while not perfect, offer the United States

a chance to do justice to its own ideals, an opportunity to be just with another

nation.

The violation of human rights in Panama has been brought up as a reason for

not ratifying these treaties. (I wonder why the violation of human rights in the

United States has not been brought up as an objection.) Have there been such

violations in Panama? Yes, more at the beginning of the present regime but even

yet people are exiled from Panama without due process of law. Even now prison

conditions are reported to be deplorable.
350

The issue of human rights within a given country is, of course, an important

matter. I endorse and applaud President Carter's statements about human rights. His words we in Panama would love to have heard several years ago. Some say

that words are not enough, that more must be done, I presume they mean force.

I submit that the right words are often enough, especially when they correspond with and speak to the deepest desires and loftiest ideals of a given people. A man

named Jesus spoke powerful words long ago and although he eschewed the use of

force, those same words have done more for human rights than armies, treaties or

even laws.

Yes, we should continue to speak out in favor of human rights. By so doing, we

stand for justice and human dignity everywhere. We thereby open ourselves to

criticism for our own violation of human rights and declare ourselves willing to

correct such wrongs.

The issue of human rights re the Panama treaties: who is raising the issue?

First of all. Panamanian exiles, some of whom are in this chamber this morning.

They are friends of mine, my heart goes out to them. I am consoled by the fact

that my country has offered them asylum and so they join the other victims of

socio-political change and injustice: Cubans, Chinese, Chileans, Hungarians-and

before that White Russians, etc. The fact remains, however, bitter for them and

also for us, that their peoples are governed and represented by de facto governments with whom we must deal and at times make treaties.

There are also good, honest Americans who are concerned by the violation of

human rights anywhere, anytime. I admire them but I also wish to remind them

that in this case, justice is the over-riding issue. If I owe a man a hundred dollars, then I may not say to him "I shall repay my debt if you stop abusing your wife".

I may wish to scold him but I may not in justice withhold that which I owe him.

Lastly it seems to me that there are those who violently oppose the treaty and

use whatever auxiliary issue to defeat its ratification. Aren't these some of the

people who claimed "states' rights" and tried to deny the right of the federal

government to intervene in a state which was denying civic and human rights to

some of its citizens? Would these people ever, ever grant another country the right

to intervene in ours? Why then do we demand that right in the case of Panama?

We the United States have not been free of sins against human rights. Look

what we have done to the Indians and to the black! Look at what, it has been

revealed recently, our government has done to its citizens through the C.I.A., the

F.B.I. and the plumbers! Do we wish to say to the world that our own penal

system is never in violation of human rights?

No, if such violations are the "Conditio sine qua non" of international treaties,

then we could never sign a Salt treaty with the Soviet Union, nor could any other

nation sign a treaty with us.

I plead with you as representatives of this nation to expedite the ratification of

these treaties. They are not perfect. I wish they could be better. But apparently it

is the most we are willing to offer a tiny, friendly nation. Dare we now say that it is

too much?

In the 1770's His Majesty King George's government refused to recognize the

just aspirations of the American colonies. Some members of Parliament rose to

accuse the government of intransigence and warn of its consequences: armed rebellion. A somewhat comparable situation is with us now. If we say that we will not

change radically the treaty of 1903 then we are saying that we insist upon maintaining our colonial policy towards Panama and that means now as it did in 1776,

war.

We can plead with Panama to improve its human rights posture and we can

denounce such violations strongly and publicly. But if we declare that we have the

right to intervene and force Panamanians to be just to one another, then we are

declaring ourselves father, policeman, and judge for Panama. That kind of policy

is offensive, patronizing and demeaning. That's the kind of language the British

used on us 200 years ago and our reply was "that means war".

Our national motto is "In God We Trust". It is God who says "love what is

right and seek after justice". Let us do that, no matter what others do and we shall

have the protection of the God of Freedom and the self-respect of a people which

seeks justice and peace even when it is risky, even when it conflicts with some of

our lesser interests and our baser instincts.

Chairman ZABLOCK1. I presume all the witnesses wish to have their

statements in toto with the comments they made during testimony

a part of the record.

Without objection, it is so ordered.
351

I want to thank all three of you for your thoughtful statements. I

have already referred to some of the quotations in the testiony of Mrs.

Aragon and now I would like to ask Dr. Robles at this time, on page 5

of your statement you say, "The International League for Human

Rights has criticized the State Department reports."

Can you supply that criticism for the record?

Mr. ROBLES. Certainly, the State Department has it in testimony of

April 5, 1977 before Chairman Long's subcommittee.

[The document to be furnished follows:]

EXCERPTS FROM THE TESTIMONY OF JEROME J. SHESTACK, PRESIDENT OF THE

INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE

ON FOREIGN OPERATIONS AND RELATED AGENCIES, HOUSE COMMITTEE ON

APPROPRIATIONS, APRIL 5, 1977

* * * But, what I would like to suggest is that the reports you are getting

still are not very accurate in many cases, and that some of the Carter candor

has not yet seeped through to levels of the State Department where these reports are prepared.

* * * * * * 

In Panama, for example, State Department reports say that violations of

human rights occurred before 1971, and they have not been substantiated. But,

the Panamanian Committee on Human Rights can offer ample substantiation

of numerous violations, including violations in 1976 and 1977. That committee's

reports are available for the Department.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. And does the State Department have the information of the International League for Human Rights; if so, can

we have that?

Mr. ROBLES. Certainly.

[The letter follows:]

NOVEMBER 28, 1977.

Re Panama

Mr. CHARLES MOYER,

Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Organization cf American States, Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. MOYER: I am an attorney at law and a member of the Lawyers Committee for International Human Rights. I am sending this letter on behalf of the

International League for Human Rights.

We have reviewed a considerable amount of material and have conferred with

several individuals who are familiar with the human rights situation in Panama.

Based upon the foregoing, we have reason to believe that there are violations of

human rights in Panama which warrant investigations by the mission which your

organization will be sending to Panama. What follows is a brief summary of those

alleged violations, together with copies of several supporting documents and

references to other printe(l materials which are not annexed but which can be

furnished at your request.

On the island cf Coiha it is reported that there exists a penal colony where

prisoners are allegedly subjected to inhumane treatment.

In Panama City is Carcelo Modelo, where prisoners are detained after arrest.

Conditions there are reportedly brutal. Torture is reported to be practiced there

as a matter of routine, particularly upon political prisoners.

The National Guard appears to be beyond the reach of the law. Arbitrary

arrest, torture and illegal detention by the National Guard appear to prevail

throughout the country.

Political prisoners can be held without trial for a period of 15 years.

With the exception of the recent debates preceding the plebiseite which ratified

the Treaty, public assembly has been severely curtailed. Political parties and

professional and labor organizations which oppose the government are prohibited.

News dissemination is subject to government approval, and in some instances

broadcasts have been interrupted lnd newspapers closed down for presenting

anti-government views.

Many political opponents cf the government have I been exil"l. Some have

reportedly been assassinated; others have disappeared without explanation.

9S-991-77 24
352

The constitution adopted in 1972 guarantees most basic freedoms and due

process of law. In practice, none of the constitutional guarantees applies to

political prisoners.

Article 277 of the constitution establishes General Torrijos as the "maximum

leader" giving him full power for six years to make all major executive, judicial

and military appointments.

Three cabinet decrees promulgated in 1969 are applied independently of the

constitution. Decree 341 prohibits public meetings in Panama City and Colon.

Decree 342 authorizes detention without trial for 15 years. In a recent statement

made on November 12, 1977, the President ef Panama publicly admitted that

this practice is "not right." (New York Times November 13, 1977). Decree 343

imposes self-censorship upon all forms of media.

In support of the foregoing, I have annexed copies of the following documents

which should be studied carefully for factual details not fully set forth in this

letter:

1. Manuscript of Leopoldo Aragon describing conditions at Coiba.

2. Statement of Leopoldo Aragon of his intention to immolate himself

in protest against violations of human rights in Panama.

3. Letter dated September 20, 1977 from Rose M. Aragon.

4. Letter (undated) from the Panamanian Committee for Human Rights

to Amnesty International.

5. Statement of Antonio Poore dated September 15, 1976.

6. Resolution of the Inter-American Press Association (dated October 1977)

and Report of its Committee on Freedom of the Press and Information

concerning Panama.

7. Excerpt from New York Times article (November 13, 1977 p. 1) containing an admission by General Torrijos that holding political prisoners

without trial is "not right."

Reference is made to Volumes I and II published by the Panamanian Committeefor Human Rights in 1976 particulary Chapters 1 and 5.

Reference is also made to the testimony of Rose Marie Aragon and Winston

Robles before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on October 12, 1977,

and the testimony of Winston Robles and Eusebia Marchosky before the HouseSuhcommittee on Foreign Operations of the Committee on Appropriations on

March 30, 1977. This testimony is quite detailed and informative as to alleged

human rights violations which have occurred and reportedly continue.

We are still endeavoring to obtain further relevant information. If successful,

we will forward such information to you.

It is respectfully requested that the onsite investigation to be conducted in

Panama be directed to the reported violations referred to herein.

Very truly yours,

RICHARD NADELMAN, Lawyers Committee.

U.S. SUPPORT FOR TORRIJOS GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Dr. Robles, you said on page 8:

To the Panamanians it is clear that the dictatorship, without United States.

support would have fallen many years ago by its errors and the democratic

efforts of the people.

The authoritarian or dictatorial policy, if you wish to use that

term, of the Government in Panama now, if the United States did

not rive assistance, in your opinion, would Torrijos turn to the

Soviet Union?

Mr. ROBLES. I don't think it is feasible for Torrijos to make that

decision, not now at least. I don't think the international circumstances are going to allow Torrijos to make that decision.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. I gathered from your statement he is Communist oriented.

Mr. ROBLES. If not him, at least the Communist Party is collaborating with the Government and many of the high officers in the

Government also.
353

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Wouldn't he be tempted to seek assistance

from the Soviet Union if the United States did not give economic aid,

military assistance?

Mr. ROBLES. He IS already receiving assistance from the Communist countries. The Natioial Guard of Cuba is trining the guard

of Torrijos.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Should some come from us or all from the

Russians?

Mr. ROBLES. I am talking about the military assistance the

United States provides the National Guaid.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Are you opposed to the assistance that the

United States is giving Panama?

Mr. ROBLES. The military aid, the military assistance given to

Panama.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Let me ask a final question, then I will ask

Father Mahon some questions.

CONSEQUENCES OF PANAMANIAN REJECTION OF TREATY

Of your closing sentence:

Then the treaty is going to be rejected by the Panamanians and their Government and all the resentment against the dictatorship will be reflected in the

future relations between Panama and the United States.

That is when the dictator will fall because you say permanent does not mean

eternal.

What will the new government or the government that will replace

Torrijos demand, since it is going to reject the treaty?

Mr. ROBLES. Father Mahon used a beautiful word "justice" and

I don't think the new treaties do justice to Panama. The new treaties

do not solve the causes of conflict between the two countries and the

new treaties are worse than the ones the United States offered Panama

in 1967 and the Panamanians refused.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Father Mahon also said it is necessary these

treaties be ratified, because although they are not perfect, they are a

step in the right direction for justice.

Mr. ROBLES. Father Mahon is a North American. He cannot speak

for the Panamanian people. I, as a Panamanian, can never accept

these treaties.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. There is a difference, I must agree, but I am

sure Father Mahon also had experiences in Panama.

Mr. ROBLES. Certainly, but I don't think Father Mahon made the

necessary research of the new treaties and what the new treaties

really mean to Panama.

RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN PANAMA

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Father Mahon, what is the state of religious

freedom in Panama? Is it possible church groups have not spoken

out against the new treaties because of Government reprisals?

Reverend ItAHON. I have been out of Panama except for visits

since March of 1975. Church groups had to live under the regime so

they had to be very careful what they said, especially if they go against

the Government policy.
354

Chairman ZABLOCKI. But there is religious freedom?

Reverend MAHON. To worship, yes. Chairman ZABLOCKI. And to gather? Reverend MAHON. Yes.

IMPACT OF DISAPPROVAL OF THE TREATY

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Father, what, in your opinion, would be the impact of disapproval of the treaty with respect to the situation in

Panama, from the point of view of a North American?

Reverend MAHON. If it were disapproved and was not fair to

Panama, that would be all right. If it is disapproved because it is giving too much to Panama-the Panamanians hear that "give- away"-I think it will have a bad effect.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. There is no doubt in your mind those who

are opposing the treaty are saying "giveaway." Reverend MAHON. That is right. Chairman ZABLOCKI. Mr. Gilman.

EXILE OF MR. ROBLES FROM PANAMA

-Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Robles, as one who has been personally affected

by the human rights situation in Panama, would you share with

this committee the events that led to your exile from Panama?

Mr. ROBLES. I don't understand the question.

Mr. GILMAN. Could you share with this committee the events that

led to your exile from Panama?

Mr. ROBLES. I was personally affected, but it is not my personal

situation that worried me. I certainly share the concern about human

rights in Panama and everywhere else. I have been fighting for human

rights long before I was expatriated. I was expatriated because I

fought for human rights in Panama.

Mr. GILMAN. What year was that you were asked to leave the country?

Mr. ROBLES. In 1976.

Mr. GILMAN. Was that because of the statements you were making

in the press?

Mr. ROBLES. Not in the press, but in the University of Panama

of which I was a professor, and any other public opportunities.

Mr. GILMAN. Would you be permitted to return to Panama today?

Mr. ROBLES. No, certainly not. Torrijos speaks very clear, there are

some Panamanians that never are going to be allowed to return and

I am included among those.

Mr. GILMAN. He made a list of those Panamanians?

Mr. ROBLES. Not by name, but he said that the Panamanians that

are in Miami fighting against the treaty, they are not allowed to return.

But I want to make something clear, we are against that treaty

because it is not a good treaty for us.

PANAMANIAN CENSORSHIP

Mr. GILMAN. Is there censorship today with regard to freedom

of expression in Panama by individuals who speak out against the

Government?
355

Mr. ROBLES. I would like to clarify something. It is true that the

radio stations and television stations have to send the tapes to the

Ministry of Government but they have to do it after the program,

not prior to the program.

Mr. GILMAN. I see. What about. the freedom of expression in public

places, is there some severe censorslhip with regard to speeches and

lectures?

Mr. ROBLES. T here are many ways to exercise that censorship. For

example, in 1975 we wanted to discuss publicly some of the negotiations of the treaty. The Government did not allow us to obtain any

public place, not even paying for it, in which we could speak.

On the other hand, sometimes it is possible in private meetings to

express your opinion, but then you always are taking a risk.

Mr. GILMAN. A risk of arrest?

Mr. ROBLES. Or something worse.

HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS

Mr. GILMAN. M\Trs. Aragon, in your statement you list some 181

violations of human rights in 1976 alone. Has the documentation of

those violations been provided to the State Department and to this

committee?

Mrs. ARAGON. With the State Department it has been very hard to

deal. My husband wrote constantly to them bringing this to their

attention. I had tried to contact the State Department when I came,

not only about my husband, but also the violations of human rights.

I could never talk to Mrs. Patt Derian or to Mr. Schneider. I was

finally referred to Miss Bova to whom I wrote a letter and I also

accompanied some documentation. That letter was never replied to

until just a week ago and although I wrote, I believe it was the 25th or

26th of August, Miss Bova says in her letter she received it on the 6th

of September. She says she is very sorry about what happened to my

husband, she had not been able to do anything for him about the visa.

But she says nothing about what I wrote about human rights.

Mr. GILMAN. Then up to this point you have not had an opportunity to present your documentation?

Mrs. ARAGON. No.

Mr. GILMAN. I am going to ask, Mr. Chairman, with your permission, if State Department representatives would arrange for a

reception for Mrs. Aragon so that she could present to the State

Department the list of violations for their information.

Could you also present such a list to our committee?

Mrs. ARAGON. Yes, sir.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, with your permission, I request that

that be made a part of the record.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Without objection, it will be made a part of

the record.1

CONCERN BY RELIGIOUS GROUPS FOR THE TREATIES

Mr. GILMAN. Father Mahon, we had an opportunity to meet with

the college while we were in Panama a few months ago and we met

with several representatives, also of the Catholic church and other

1 Material retained In the committee fles.
356

religious groups in Panama who expressed their concern about the

treaty. I appreciate your coming to the committee to express yourself, but I am concerned, you referred to historic wounds that the 1903

treaty caused to the Panamanian people because one man negotiated

such a treaty and apparently you feel he did not represent the thinking of that country.

Aren't we faced with somewhat the same situation today with the

Torrijos regime imposing itself upon the people and the lack of

freedom of expression in the plebiscite where they may not have the

opportunity to truly and freely express themselves. Would not this

lead to Panama once again having a treaty imposed upon them and not

having freedom of expression? As Mr. Robles suggested, if the Torrijos regime was thrown out, the people might not then accept such a

treaty if they had freedom of expression. What are your thoughts with

regard to that?

Reverend MAHON. It would seem to me the United States, particularly through its State Department, would have to say we refuse to

deal with this dictatorship, give any aid, militarily or economically, until you give human rights to the people in order to do justice to the

people. It is an interesting position.

Mr. GILMAN. Do we have to go that far in interfering with their

internal affairs. We are talking about a document that is going to

affect us for a long period of time and I am looking at the United States

interests now as well as the Panamanian interests. If the Torrijos

regime is unstable and the people are not supportive of the treatyand I don't think we will learn their true feelings under this proposed

plebiscite-I can see some problems down the road. What are your

thoughts about that?

Reverend MAHON. Would you ask specifically the question?

Mr. GILMAN. I am asking you do you feel that because Torrijos

strongly supports the treaty and there is some question about whether

the Panamanian people truly support the treaty, do you feel the

United States is doing the best thing in negotiating and signing a

treaty at this time without true support of the people?

Reverend MAHON. My opinion is it would be very dangerous for

the United States to affect, even with this government, a far more just

treaty unless it made clear to the people that is why it was not being

done.

Mr. GILMAN. Do you think it is necessary to go as far as we have

in the renegotiation of our arrangements with Panama, giving up all

our rights in the canal and walking away in the year 2000?

Reverend MAHON. Oh, yes, it belongs to the nation of Panama. I

think the only way we can really, humanly speaking, make a treaty

honest, in the Canal Zone, those are inalienable rights of the country.

Building and operation of the canal we can make a treaty on that, but

the other things we have no right to bargain. By my own sense of

justice, we can't bargain those away, we can't ask the people for those.

We are just doing justice.

Mr. GILMAN. Under the terms of the proposal we are agreeing to

walk away from the whole situation in the year 2000, turning it over

to the Panamanians, giving up all sovereignty and giving it to the

Panamanians.

Reverend MAHON. The Canal Zone, and giving up the rights to the

canal itself.
357

Mr. GILMAN. The whole works, lock, stock, and barrel.

Reverend MAHON. I think it is fair, yes, sir, it is the prime resource

,of that country, the reason for the country being formed, at least

from our end of it.

Mr. GILAAN. No further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. MrS. Pettis.

Mrs. PETTIS. Thank vou, Mr. Chairman.

BENEFIT OF THE TREATIES TO PANAMA

I was particularly moved by your testimony, Mrs. Aragon. I hope

that we can at least for the record get some of these facts before the

American public.

Mrs. ARAGON. Thank you.

Mrs. PETTIs. Mr. Robles, why specifically do you consider the

treaties not to be good for the Panamanians? Do you feel we are not

giving enough?

Mr. ROBLES. That is a very complex subject.

Mrs. PETTIS. I understand that.

Mr. ROBLEs. I am going to mention only one point. In 1967 the

United States and Panama negotiated a treaty that was rejected by

the Panamanians because it was not fair enough. However, that treaty

had an arbitration clause that these treaties do not have. Panamanian

people are not willing to accept any treaty without an arbitration

clause because we are a very small country and in negotiating of any

controversies or differences between the two countries, we are always

in an unfair position. So we need an arbitration clause. We are not

asking you to give away anything. We are only asking for a reasonable

procedure to solve the future differences.

Mrs. PETTIS. Do you feel then that the reasonable procedure is

inherent in the clause?

Mr. ROBLES. In 1967 they provided a (good arbitration clause. That

is the type of thing bothering the Panamanians.

Mrs. PETTIS. Would you be willing to go back to the 1967 treaty?

Mr. ROBLES. No, because there are also other reasons in those

treaties that make them unacceptable. But I would like to make a

point here. The Panamanians believe that the treaty is imposed by

the United States and the only purpose of the support of the Torrijo's

dictatorship is to pass the treaties so the Panamanians are looking at

the treaties as something against them, not in favor of them.

Mrs. PETTIS. That is just the reverse reaction.

Mr. ROBLES. Right.

MISMANAGEMENT OF PANAMA'S ECONOMY BY TORRIJOS GOVERNMENT

Mrs. PETTIS. 1\Ianv people have claimed because of mismanagement

there is personal gain and political payoff, the Torrijos government

has taken the Panamanian economy into crisis.

Would you, Reverenld Mahon and Mr. Robles care to comment on

your knowledge of such charges?

Reverend Mui oN. I would say in large measure, that is true, in my

opinion.

Mr. ROBLES. To give you an idea, before 1968 Panama was the

country with the highest per capita growth in Latin America and
358

one of the highest in the world. Today, Panama's economic growth is

negative, minus 1 percent.

ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES BY TORRIJOS GOVERNMENT

Mrs. PETTIS. Do you have any knowledge of the charges that have

been made that Torrijos' government has been involved in illegal

actions such as illicit narcotics traffic, prostitution, smuggling?

Mr. ROBLES. I am aware of those charges, primarily because I read

about it in the U.S. press.

Mrs. PETTIS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

ARBITRATION CLAUSE NOT INCLUDED IN TREATY

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Doctor, you have stated that one reason you

oppose the treaties is because it does not have an arbitration clause.

It is my understanding all Latin American countries reject any international arbitration clauses as intervention. I must ask you would the

Panamanians be different in this respect and would they accept an

international clause and not agree that it is intervention?

Mr. ROBLES. No, because the arbitration clause as was drafted in

1967, for example, only provides that each party would have to appoint

an arbitrator and both parties have to agree to appoint a third one;

if they do not agree then the International Courts of Justice would

have to appoint a third one or the OAS. That is not intervention for

us. That would not mean intervention in our internal affairs. That is

a very common procedure in international law.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Nevertheless, the other Latin American

countries do not agree to such a procedure, it is my understanding.

Mr. ROBLES. Well, in many treaties, many Latin American countries accept to resolve their differences through arbitration. Particularly in conflicts dealing with borders it has been a very common procedure.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. You had responded to a question of Mrs.

Pettis that "It is not a good treaty for us." But, do you fully understand that if the treaty is negotiated it would be as good for you as for

Panama, it would be acceptable to you that it would not be ratified

by us.

Mr. ROBLES. I certainly think this one is going to be worse because

the conflicts between the two countries are not eliminated, they are

maintained and new ones are going to emerge.

Mrs Chairman, the treaties still are not approved and already the

Panamanian negotiators and the North American negotiators disagree. What is going to happen tomorrow when these treaties are in

effect?

Chairman ZABLOCKI. There are a number of questions as to the

interpretation of the protocol, but in this regard, it was intended to

clarify before the treaties are indeed ratified by each government, or

each peoples.

But let's go to another question, if I may.

INSPECTION BY OAS OF HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN PANAMA

Mrs. Aragon and Dr. Robles, you are aware that the Panama

Government has invited the OAS Human Rights Commission to
359

inspect the situation in Panama, oi1 the spot and in(lee( the referendum

is to be observed. What conclusions do you draw from the Panamanian Government agreeing to somethior' like this if your statements

say that they have other policies?

Mr. ROBLEs. Well, iII the first place, PanamanianS have very little

time to stU(y the treaties. The plebiscite is going to be held the 21d of

this month. I don't think this is a reasonable time for the study of

such complex a treaty.

Chairman Zxuitocii. My question is, why would the OAS human

Rights Commission be invited to inspect the situation? How (10 you

interpret that?

Mr. ROBLES. Because TorrijOs wants to apj)ear as t bIenevolent

dictator or the enlightened man that Presi(lent Carter believes he is.

Chairman ZAni3ocKI. If the situation Were as Von have and Mnrs.

Aragon advised us in Panama now, he wouln't invite the OAS

for them to observe and see what is happening with the conditions?

Mr. RO1LES. I don't know. I don't sec why not. They could allow the

people to speak for 1 week, for 2 weeks, when those observers are

there, and after that what is going to happen?

Mrs. ARAGON. As far as human rights violation, it is very easy to

do some cosmetic work, let's say in the jail. What about the penal

colony? How many people knew about it until I brought it up today?

HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS

Chairman ZABLOCK1. Well, let me unequivocally abhor any violations of human rights. As Father MIalieon said, not necessarily should

the human rights question be brought into this as far as ratifying the

treaties. But on the issue of human rights, Dr. Robles and Mrs. Aragoin's

experience has shown that in scme cases when the United States has

taken punitive action agaiinst another ooverninei t on human r its

grounds, the effect was to worsen the human rights situaticit in the

country in question.

One example of such a rule is the impact of the Jackson-Vanik

amendment on the migration of Soviet Jewry.

IMPACT ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN PANAMA OF U.S. DISAPPROVAL

OF TREATIES

Is it not 1)0sible that the U.S. disapprovall of the treaties on the

basis of hmnan rights could have a negative impact o11 the human

rithts situation in Panama?

Mr. Ronuei.s. I don't think Ihe treaties should be rejected on ite

basis of human rights. Those are separate issues. I think tlle treat s

could be rejected for any other reason but not that one. But I don't

think either that the United States has to remain silent on human

rights violations in Panama because of the treaty. Those are separate

issues.

Mrs. ARAGON. We tried to do so, but the State Department has

brought, them together

Chairman ZAuLOcK1I. In the testimony today, some of the reasons

given by you, Mrs. Aragon, and at least I give this interpretation, and you, Dr. Robles, that the treaty should not be ratified because

of human rights in Panama.

Mrs. ARAGON. We had tried to keep the issues separate. Human
360

rights is one thing, the canal treaty is something different. But the

statements by Mr. Bunker and others have brought them together;

therefore, we have kept them together also.

(hairman ZABLOCKI. I believe, hcwever, to set the record straight, it was only because Ambassador Bunker and other witnesses frcm

the executive branch who were asked the question of the violation

of human rights by Members of Congress when they testified before

this committee. They didn't bring it together. I think the issue of

human rights was on the basis of questions and they, of course, had

to respond and give their judgment. I don't think they brought it

in cf their own volition in the testimony.

DIVERGENCE OF OPINIONS ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN PANAMA

But my final question of you, Dr. Robles and Mrs. Aragon, if the

Torrijos Government had not been condemned on human rights by

high church sources, by the International Commission of Jurists,

Amnesty International, the U.N. or OAS, how do you account for

this divergence of opinion between you and these various organizations interested in human rights?

Mr. ROBLES. Did you really believe that the OAS Commission is

impartial? To the OAS belong some of the worst violators of human

rights of this continent, Chile, Argentina. Those are countries represented on the OAS. The fact that Amnesty International did not

rate Panama in 1976 does not mean that there aren't violations in

Panama. Amnesty International is going to report next year and the

International Commission of Jurists is investigating already a few

violations, but all those organizations lack the researchers to investigate every country and Panama is a very tiny country. We were denouncing human rights violations all these years but nobody wants

to listen. Now, because of the treaty issue, everybody is interested

in the human rights issue in order to go against or in favor of a treaty.

That is not our fault.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Well, let me say from my vantage point I

want to clearly divide the two issues, the issue of the treaties, on the

basis of giving justice, albeit, totally satisfactory, and the violation

of human rights separately, and I don't think they should be intermingled because you don't mix apples and oranges

Mr. ROBLES. I agree.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. So we are of equal agreement on that.

Mr. ROBLES. I agree.

chairmann ZABLOCKI. Thank you very much.

Any further questions?

CLARIFICATION OF POSITION OF PANAMANIAN COMMITTEE FOR

HUMAN RIGHTS

Mr. GILMAN. Just one question for clarification. Is it the position

of the Panamanian Committee for Human Rights that the human

rights issue should be considered as a major part of the treaty considerations?

Mr. ROBLES. Well, the negotiators of the United States are really

concerned about human rights because the treaty contained elaborate

provisions to protect the human rights of the American citizens. In
361

fact, with the treaty the American citizens are going to enjoy in

Panama more human rights than the Panamanians. So, in certain

ways it is impossible to separate the things when the negotiators are

already introducing the human rights issue in the treaty. There is

a whole chapter about human rights there.

ROLE OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN CONSIDERING THE

TREATY

Mr. GILMAN. Well, I wanted to be quite clear, and I think this

committee welcomes your clarification. You cited numerous violations

of human rights by the Panamanian Government. Are you asking

the Congress to take those violations into consideration in making

a determination on the treaty?

Mr. ROBLEs. Only up to the extent which those violations could

affect the opinion of the Panamanians about the treaty. I mean, the

public freedoms, the freedom of speech, freedom of expression, the

freedom of the press, I think those issues are important because

without those freedoms the Panamanians cannot freely decide if they

want or do not want the treaty. I think it is important for the United

States to know what the Panamanian people think about it.

Mr. GILMAN. Mrs. Aragon, would you care to comment on my

question?

Mrs. ARAGON. Yes. I think it is correct. This was my husband's

position. He wanted freedom of expression. He wanted all the exiles to

be able to return and express themselves as to these treaties and he

asked for at least 3 months of free discussions before a plebiscite.

PANAMANIAN SUPPORT FOR THE TREATY

Mr. GILMAN. What is your feeling? Do you feel the Panamanian

people would support or not support this treaty?

Mrs. ARAGON. I feel that the Panamanian people will not support

these treaties. I feel that these treaties will bring in new conflicts if

you sign these treaties, and now I am thinking also of the United

States with the dictator, tomorrow he goes, and my husband brought

this to the attention of Mr. Kissinger when he was in Stockholn, he

said the only way you will have a valid treaty is when that treaty is

signed by a democratic government which expresses the will of the

people of Panama.

Mr. GILMAN. Father Mahon, have you been in Panama recently?

Reverend MAHON. Yes, sir.

Mr. GILMAN. What do you feel is the tenor of the thinking of the

people? Would they be supportive or not supportive?

Reverend MIAHoN. I would hesitate to answer that question,

Congressman. I would say that I think it is a confused thing. If there

is a negative vote in the plebiscite, the question might arise whether

it was a vote of discontent with their Government rather than against

the treaty. So I think those two issues are mixed there also. I would

hesitate to comment or try to answer your question.

Mr. GILMAN. I thank the panel for their opinions.

Thank voi, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Thank you, Dr. Robles.
362

RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN PANAMA

Reverend MAHON. May I say that since the Torrijos regime took

over, there was a major conflict between the Catholic Church and

Torrijos until the case of the murder of a priest which has never been

solved, and this tension still exists between the church and other

issues, but that one in particular.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. But as a result of that issue, is religious liberty

in any jeopardy?

Reverend MAHON. If religious liberty means having mass on

Sunday, religious liberties include speaking out against injustice, then it doesn't.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Can you give any homily you desire to provide without government interference?

Reverend MAHON. No, no, my phones were tapped for years. G2

agents took down every word I said in the homily. That went on for

years. So, if you talk about the purely religious, other world matters, if you talk about anything injust, there is a very definite problem, and priests have been exiled for speaking out.

Mr. GILMAN. Exiled from Panama?

Reverend MAHON. Yes, sir.

Mr. GILMAN. How many priests were exiled?

Reverend MAHON. Two, three that I know of.

Mr. GILMAN. While preaching you had to be concerned about what

you said?

Reverend MAHON. Oh, certainly.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. I think that would be, Mr. Gilman, a practice

in many countries ruled by authoritarian governments. I can't think

of many countries ruled by authoritarian governments where a man

of the cloth, just because he is a religious man, is free to say whatever

he pleases, if in the opinion of the government his statements were

placing the security of that government in jeopardy.

Mr. ROBLES. Mr. Chairman, may I observe something?

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Yes.

Mr. ROBLES. The words of Father Mahon are especially valuable

because he was a personal friend of General Torrijos in the early

years.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Was he trying to convert him?

Mr. ROBLEs. Ask him.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. That is his job. If you are going to win over

the confidence and convert them, you have to go sometimes to certain

extremes.

Reverend MAHON. The friendship ended rather abruptly.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Thank you, Dr. Robles, Mrs. Aragon, and

Father Mahon for your testimony.

The committee stands adjourned, subject to call.

[Whereupon, at 12 noon, the committee adjourned, subject to the

call of the Chair.]
PANAMA CANAL TREATIES AND RELATED

LEGISLATION

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 20, 1977

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,

Washington, D.C.

The committee met at 10:50 a.m. in room 2172, Rayburn House

Offiee Building, Hon. Clement J. Zablocki (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. The committee will please come to order.

We meet this morning to conclude the committee's initial series of

hearings on the Panama Canal Treaties and related legislation.

Appearing before the committee today is H-on. Cyrus R. Vance,

Secretary of State. Secretary Vance is accompanied by Hon.

Ellsworth Bunker and Hon. Sol M. Linowitz, conegotiators for Oih

Panama Canal Treaties.

COMMITTEE HEARING ON SALT

Immediately following the hearing on the treaties, Secretary Vance

has agreed to brief the committee on the status of the Strategic Arms

Limitations Talks. Due to the sensitive nature of the information to be

discussed in the briefing, it will be necessary to conduct that portion

of the meeting in executive session. Since a quorum is not present. a

vote will be taken when a quorum is present.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Chairman.

Due to the late start I am fearful we may not get to the point where

the Secretary will be able to give us a briefing on the SALT niegotiations. I wonder if it will be possible at some point before we adjouirn, that is, before Congress adjournis, that we would be able to have the

Secretary back with proper timing?

Secretary VANCE. Yes; I would be delighted to come back at a time

that would be convenient to you if we cannot get through the SALT

discussion in an adequate fashion.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. I don't know what the Secretary's schedule

is for this afternoon.

Secretary VANCE. I have to have lunch with Mr. Tinderman and

his Foreign Minister at 1 o'clock. That will probably last until about

2:15. I could probably be back over here around 2:30 if that would

be adequate.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. I think we ought to give the Secretary a little

more time. That would be pretty tight to come back at 2:30. If he is

amendable and it is possible, the committee would meet at 3 o'clock

in H-236 in the Capitol.

(363)
364

Secretary VANCE. All right.

PANAMA CANAL TREATIES

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Mr. Secretary, Ambassador Bunker, and

Ambassador Linowitz, on behalf of all of the members, let me welcome

you to the committee.

Since Ambassadors Bunker and Linowitz appeared before the committee in September, we have heard from a wide range of public and

private witnesses who both support and oppose the ratification of the

treaties. In the course of our hearings, a number of questions have

been raised relating to the rights of the United States under the

Neutrality Treaty and other issues.

The purpose of today's hearings is to clarify these issues.

We are confident, Mr. Secretary, you will be able to clarify these

issues. You may proceed.

STATEMENT OF HON. CYRUS VANCE, SECRETARY OF STATE

Secretary VANCE. I thank you for your confidence, Mr. Chairman.

I have a prepared statement which I would like to open with which

I think answers a number of the questions which this committee and

others would like to have answered.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, let me thank you for

the opportunity to meet with you today to review the Panama Canal

Treaties and to answer your questions.

As the Members of Congress and the American people listen to the

treaty arguments-pro and con-consider them, and reach a judgment, I believe they will conclude, as have four successive American

Presidents, that a new treaty reflecting present-day realities serves our

best interest, and that the status quo does not.

The treaties will make the canal easier to operate and easier to

defend.

They better assure for us continued access to the canal-for both

military and commercial purposes.

They advance our position throughout Latin America and, in

important respects, throughout the world.

And they fulfill the expectations of every American that this country

will continue to act as a world leader should.

The status auo promises tension, instability, and growing animosity

in Panama toward the United States.

Ambassadors Bunker and Linowitz have already presented to this

committee the basic facts about the treaties. I would like to address

some of the questions raised in early stages of these and other hearings

on the canal. They are questions on the minds of the American

people. There is a good answer to every one of them.

Some have asked if we are not surrendering our sovereignty over the

canal. After all, we built it, we paid for it, why shouldn't we keep it?

The simple fact is that we didn't obtain sovereignty over the Canal

Zone when we negotiated the existing treaty and we don't have it now.

In 1903, we acquired certain rights, similar to those exercised by a

sovereign, but nonetheless rights, not sovereignty. This principle was

recognized by the American Government at that time. It has been

recognized by our Government since. We have never considered the
365

Canal Zone as being like Alaska, which we bought from the Russians,

or Louisiana, which we bought from the French.

Our interest today is the same as in 1903-not sovereignty over

territory deep in Central America, but use of the canal. These treaties

do not prejudice that interest; they protect it, by enhancing the shared

interest of the United States and Panama in keeping the canal open

and efficiently operated.

The Panamanian people want the right to call their country their

own and they want a fair share of the canal revenues. The time has

come to recognize their legitimate interest in both. We want to use the

canal-now and for the indefinite future-and to make sure it will stay

open, secure and neutral. The treaties give us those assurances. They

reconcile our interests and Panama's interests and that is the best

guarantee of the canal's future.

What about the security of the canal? Isn't it necessary for the

United States to maintain control over the canal in order to protect it

from attack? The fact is that our military interests are better protected

under these treaties than under the existing arrangement.

In the first instance, we must look to our Joint Chiefs of Staff for

their judgment. They participated in these negotiations on a regular

basis. The treaties reflect the'r judgment on what is needed to defend

the canal. As a result, these treaties have the full support of the Joint

Chiefs. In their view-from the perspective of those who are initially

charged with protecting our military interests-these treaties advance

our defense. I share that feeling.

Until the end of this century, we will continue to control the operation of the canal. We will have primary responsibility for defending it.

Our troops will remain there.

After the year 2000, the Neutrality Treaty affords us the rights we

need to assure that the canal remains open to vessels of all nations at

all times.

Our interpretation of those rights is the same as the Panamanians.

The statement of understanding issued on October 14 makes clear that

each of the two countries-the United States and Panama-will have

the permanent right to act against any aggression or threat directed

against the canal or against the peaceful transit of vessels through the

canal. The statement also confirms that in case of need or emergency, American ships of war will go through the canal as quickly as possibleif necessary at the head of the line.

The treaties do not give the United States, nor do we seek the right

to intervene in the internal affairs of Panama. The statement makes

clear that the U.S. action solely for the purpose of insuring that the

canal remains open, secure, and accessible will not constitute action

against the territorial integrity or the political independence of

Panama.

There is a third objection raised by some to the treaties, also

connected with security. Some have suggested that the treaties are a

sign of withdrawal, of giving up our position as a great power in the

world. Others have asked whether the treaties will create a power

vacuum in the Caribbean which can be exploited by Cuba or the Soviet

Union. In fact, the treaties have just the opposite effect. 'They will

increase our influence in this hemisphere. It is the status quo which

could be exploited by others. The treaties lessen this danger by removing

a major source of anti-American feeling throughout Latin America.
366

It is the unanimous conviction of Latin American nations that the

original treaty needs to be changed. Some of our closest friends in

this hemisphere--the democratic governments of Venezuela, Costa

Rica, Colombia, Mexico, and Jamaica-issued a joint communique

in August urging the United States and Panama to conclude the new

treaties. Through the years of these negotiations, the people of Latin

America have looked forward to the peaceful resolution of this

troublesome issue.

The treaties do not settle the other important issues on the agendas

of the United States and the nations of Latin America-issues involving trade and development, regional peace and human rights.

But they do enable us to approach those issues with a fresh spirit

of cooperation, unemcumbered by the suspicion and resentment that

accompanied the existing canal arrangement.

To all nations in the world, the treaties demonstrate that we will

use our power in the manner that takes full account not only of our

security interests, but also our interest in reducing world tensions, dealing with other nations with mutual understanding, and helping

all the peoples of the world to better themselves and to live in selfrespect.

What about our commercial interests in the canal? Are we jeopardizing our interests? The fact is that the commercial importance of the

canal has diminished as world trade patterns and shipping technology

have changed. Today, only about 8 percent of our waterborne trade

goes through the canal. Nonetheless, we must protect our commercial

interests in the canal.

The most important objective for our commerce is that the canal

remain open, secure and efficient. Until the year 2000, operation of the

canal will remain our responsibility. The canal work force already is

over 70 percent Panamanian. And Panama will take over after 20

years of increasing involvement in canal operations. Panamanians

will have moved into all levels of those operations and they will be

fully capable of running it effectively.

We have a continuing basis, under the Neutrality Treaty, for

assuring that the canal remains open to our trade as well as our

warships after the year 2000. Beyond the legal rights afforded by the

treaties, we are insured that the canal will remain open and efficiently

operated because Panama's stake in the canal is enhanced. Panama

derives approximately 12 percent of its gross domestic product and

18 percent of its foreign exchange earnings from canal-related activities

and this proportion of earnings will increase in the future. If trade

were shut off by closing the canal, the biggest loser would be Panama.

Another concern is the alleged cost of these treaties. We are askedwhy should we pay Panama to take it? The answer is that we are not.

We insisted during the negotiations that payments to Panama for

its contribution to the canal enterprise be drawn entirely from canal

revenues. Panama initially sought much larger payments, which far

exceeded what could be financed from the canal's earnings. Our view

prevailed. Under the treaties, Panama will receive payments that

more nearly reflect the fact that it is making available its major

national resource-its territory. But the treaties should not require

new appropriations of our taxpayers' money.

We have agreed, outside the treaty, to seek certain arrangements

which will assist the general economic development of Panama and

enhance its stability. These are loans, guarantees and credits. All of
367

these loans must be repaid. They are not grants. And they will be used

largely to help Panama finance U.S. trade and U.S. investment. Of

these only $5 million of foreign military sales credits will require an

appropriation and this will ultimately be paid back and will help

strengthen Panama's ability to defend the canal.

Another question asked is whether we are laying ourselves open to

political instability in Panama. What-we are asked-will prevent

a future government, perhaps under Communist leadership, from

seizing the canal and barring our ships?

The first point to remember is that there is little Communist influence in Panama today-and that the most likely way to create an

atomosphere in which such influences could grow would be continued

disagreement with Panama over the canal. Throughout the negotiations, Panama's closest friends have been its democratic neighborsVenezuela, Colombia, Mexico, and Costa Rica. We should also

remember that for the next 23 years, we will retain control over the

Panama Canal's operations and maintain our forces in Panama.

Thereafter, we will be in a position to assure and protect the continuing openness, security, and neutrality of the canal.

Moreover, the Neutrality Treaty insures that after we leave

Panama at the end of the century, no foreign power may come in to

operate the canal or garrison troops in Panama or maintain bases

there.

But there is a more important fact to keep in mind. The Panamanians have lived up to their basic commitments under the 1903

treaty, even though they have considered it onerous. By eliminating

the causes for resentment and enhancing Panama's stake in the canal,

we are creating an arrangement that reflects the aspirations of the

Panamanian people. They will have their own firm interest in keeping

the canal open. I will be happy to address any other questions you may have in the

questioning that will follow my statement.

These treaties are controversial. They arouse strong emotions. They

call upon us to change with changing times, and that is never easy.

When all is said and done, however, I don't believe that an issue

which we all agree is of great importance to this Nation is going to

be decided on the basis of emotion or partisanship or simple slogans.

I believe that the Members of Congress and the American people are

going to decide based upon their judgment of what is best for

America.

These treaties serve America's interests.

They fully protect our ability to defend the canal and they make it

less likely that an American life will ever be lost defending it.

They fully meet our commercial needs.

There is another aspect as well.

The Panama Canal has always had an important symbolic dimension, quite apart from its basic commercial and security value.

When it was first built, it quickly came to symbolize the ingenuity

and perseverance of a young and emerging America. In the years

since, we have demonstrated those qualities time and time again.

The monuments to our imagination surround us.

In the years since the original treaty was signed, the canal became

a symbol of another kind. To Panama, it was a symbol of unfulfilled

nationhood.

98-991-77--25
368

With ratification and implementation of these treaties, the canal

can take on a new symbolic meaning:

A symbol of our continuing ability to recognize when it is time for

change and to seize the opportunity-for the sake of our future

interests as well as our current ones;

A sumbol of our desire to work with other nations of this hemisphere

on the basis of mutual trust and respect; and

Of our commitment to use our power, not to prove we are powerful, but to lessen the dangers of violence and conflict throughout the world.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Attachments to the statement follow:]

[Press Release of the Office of the White House Press Secretary, Oct. 14, 1977]

STATEMENT OF UNDERSTANDING

Under the Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the

Panama Canal (the Neutrality Treaty), Panama and the United States have the

responsibility to assure that the Panama Canal will remain open and secure to

ships of all nations. The correct interpretation of this principle is that each of the

two countries shall, in accordance with their respective constitutional processes, defend the Canal against any threat to the regime of neutrality, and consequently

shall have the right to act against any aggression or threat directed against the

Canal or against the peaceful transit of vessels through the Canal.

This does not mean, nor shall it be interpreted as a right of intervention of the

United States in the internal affairs of Panama. Any United States action will be

directed at insuring that the Canal will remain open, secure and accessible, and

it shall never be directed against the territorial integrity or political independence

of Panama.

The Neutrality Treaty provides that the vessels of war and auxiliary vessels

of the United States and Panama will be entitled to transit the Canal expeditiously.

This is intended, and it shall so be interpreted, to assure the transit of such vessels

through the Canal as quickly as possible, without any impediment, with expedited

treatment, and in case of need or emergency, to go to the head of the line of vessels

in order to transit the Canal rapidly.

[Telegram]

FROM U.S. EMBASSY IN PANAMA TO SECRETARY OF STATE

SEPTEMBER 29, 1977.

Subject: Negotiator's concern over hearings.

1. The political counselor called Carlos Lopez Guevara on another matter this

morning and found him disturbed over some of the testimony before the Senate

Foreign Relations Committee-particularly the first day. Two matters seemed to

trouble him most:

(a) Interpretation of the expeditious-passage clause that U.S. war vessels

get "preferential" treatment or that they may "go to the head of the line".

Lopez Guevara said that Royo and Escobar tentatively accepted preferential

treatment for U.S. and Panamanian war vessels, but in a latter session this was

specifically rejected by Panama and the word "expeditiously" was substituted.

(b) Assertions that the treaty gives the U.S. any right to "intervene" in

Panama. ie said that Article IV means nothing more than it says. "Intervention is simply forbidden by international law," he said. "Panama cannot

agree to the right of the U.S. to intervene." He urged that U.S. officials stop

using the term "intervention" in describing its rights under the treaty. e

also expressed the view that those testifying before the committee on Monday

had made too much of General Torrijos' statement that Panama was under

the umbrella of the Pentagon. "The general was stating a fact, not giving the

U.S. any right to intervene." Ie said he had no way of knowing what Torrijos

thought of the testimony, but he, Lopez, personally was disturbed with many

of our interpretations. Ile promised to "set the record straight" in a speech

he is to make tonight.
369

2. The political counselor pointed out some statements which Panamanian

negotiators had made which do not accord with our understanding of the neutrality

agreement. He said that, on balance, the positions on neutrality given by Escobar

and Royo, while not identical with our interpretation, were moderate in the

Panamanian context. However, certain statements taken by themselves and out

of the overall context, have proved difficult to explain to skeptical Senators. He

pointed out that most of the difficulties in the Senate so far have come from uncommitted Senators such as Baker and Stone, rather than hardline treaty opponents. He suggested that it might be useful if the Panamanians would establish

a 'tandard position, -ather than speak extemporaneously on this delicate question.

3. Lopez Guevara said he understood the difficulties which U.S. negotiators face

and asked for copies of some of the offending remarks. However, he cautioned

that, no matter how necessary in the American process, there were some things

that no Panamanian Government could accept.

4. Comment: As the negotiators are aware, Lopez Guevara, though a moderate

and reasonable man, is relatively inflexible on some questions. As he pointed out,

he was at the head of those who did not accept the concept of priority passage for

U.S. war vessels. He is considered a technician within the government, but he is

influential. As we talk with other negotiators and officials who are campaigning

for the treaty here, we will urge caution on any statement concerning U.S. rights

under ihe neutrality treaty. But we are likely to be faced with increasing irritation

over-and perhaps public disavowals of-our interpretations. Any assertion which

seems to claim a right to intervene in Panama's domestic affairs is almost sure to

be challenged here.

GONZALEZ.

[Telegram]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

October 1, 1977.

PANAMA: EScOBAR TELLS PRESS OF CARTER-TORRIJOS MEETING

Opening remarks by Panamanian negotiator Romulo Escobar Bethancourt at

news conference held at journalists' house-Live.

Good afternoon, distinguished journalists. We have called this news conference

on instructions from General Torrijos and the national government, the purpose

being to provide information on the meeting held in Washington between President

Carter and General Torrijos.

While General Torrijos was on his tour of Israel and West Europe he was

invited by President Carter to stop over in Washington on his return trip to have

a talk. President Carter was interested in two things: First, to exchange views

with General Torrijos on his tour of Israel and West Europe and to obtain the

reaction of those countries or their rulers regarding the treaties signed between

Panama and the United States. The second point was for the two heads of state

to meet to clarify some matters which were causing confusion in Panama as well

as in the United States. Specifically, this referred to two points, both of which are

part of the Canal Neutrality Treaty.

In Washington the two heads of State first held a private meeting during which

they discused the General's trip to Israel and Europe. Subsequently, they held

a broader meetin -- President Carter and his advisers and General Torrijos and his

advisers. The following matters arose at this meeting: President Carter pointed

out that, in spite of the fact that both he and General Torrijos clearly understood

the points concerning the Neutrality Treaty, the following had occurred: The U.S.

Senate Foreign Affairs Committee was interpreting Articles IV and VI of the

Neutrality Treaty in a manner (lifierent or contrary to the way it was being

interpreted in Panama by us, the government's spokesmen, and that this was

causing confusion in both countries.

General Torrijos expressed the same view and said he was very pleased to hold

that meeting because if a concrete interpretation was to be forthcoming on these

problems, he wanted the interpretation to be made before 23 October, the (late of

the plebiscite in Panama. The two heads of state, with the participation of their

respective advisers, continued the meeting and went right into the items in

question.

The first of these topics was Article IV of the Neutrality Treaty, which states

that both Panama and the United States pledge to maintain the neutrality (of

the canal-FBIS) in order that the Canal may remain open peacefully and in a
370

nondiscriminatory manner to all ships. This language had been perfectly understood by the negotiators and the rulers of both countries, but the confusion arose

with regard to the following: whether or not the United States had the clear and

indisputable right to defend the Canal in order to keep it open to the world's

ships, on the one hand, and whether, on the other hand, this involved the right

to intervene in the domestic affairs of the Republic of Panama.

Why did the problem arise? Because some Senators in the United States maintained that the language used in Article IV effectively gave the United States the

right of defense against attacks on the Panama Canal in violation of the Neutrality Treaty. They extended this to mean that, as a consequence of this right

of defense, they had the right to intervene in the Republic of Panama.

On the other hand, ever since the first public and official explanation in our

country on 19 August, to the Assembly of Corregimiento Representatives, we

said that the intent of Article IV was to point out that, in effect, Panama and the

United States had the right to defend the Canal against attack in order to keep it open for transit by all the world's nations, but that the scope of this right of

defense at no time could be extended to mean the right to intervene within the

Republic of Panama.

After the two heads of state managed to define these basic facts, we were able

to divide the problem in such a way as to be able to clarify it. Because the objections being made in the Foreign Relations Committee of the U.S. Senate, on the

one hand, and the objections in Panama, on the other, would have no reason to

exist once the two heads of state managed to develop this thinking and this common interpretation.

During the talks between President Carter and General Torrijos and at the

meeting, the U.S. President reiterated that at no time had his country interpreted

Article IV to mean the right of intervention in Panama's internal affairs; that it

had always interpreted this as a right of defense against any attacks on the Canal

in violation of the Neutrality Treaty; and that the U.S. interest was fundamentally based on the fact and need that the Canal must remain peacefully and permanently open to traffic by all ships of ill nations of the world. In this sense the

Panama Canal constitutes an interoceanic waterway that is vital not only to U.S.

commerce and shipping but to many countries of the world as well.

Therefore, this was President Carter's reasoning. In addition, he very wisely

pointed out that his country was not currently in a position to engage in intervention because it already has had experience with intervention in the internal

affairs of other countries. General Torrijos recognized in President Carter a very

moral stance regarding the political conduct of his government and of the United

States, based precisely on the criterion that, although his country is a great

power, it is turning away from the type of intervention that it carried out in the

past in Vietnam, Santo Domingo, and a number of other places in the world.

We honestly believe that the two heads of state developed a stronger understanding at this meeting, not only in regard to settling the negotiation and treaty

issue, but also in regard to the political conception of the new relations that must

prevail between our two countries and between the United States and the other

countries on the American Continent.

A single interpretation was then agreed upon so that no conflicting interpretation or standard would be expressed in the United States and Panama regarding

Article IV. The two heads of state agree that the correct interpretation of Article

IV is based on two facts: That attacks or acts of aggression against the Panama

Canal grant to Panama and to the United States the right to defend it, in order

to prevent such attacks, and so that the Canal may remain neutral, open and

peaceful for all nations. In addition, at no time does such defense involve, refer

to or grant to the United States the right to intervene in Panama's internal

affairs.

On the initiative of General Torrijos and President Carter to clarify the concept further, it was even pointed out that, in addition, any action taken by the

United States to maintain the Canal open to all nations would never be an action

aimed against the territorial integrity or the political independence of the Republic of Panama. We believe that in this way, through the unification of this stand,

a real separation is made between the problem of the Canal's defense against

attacks and acts of aggression and the act of intervention which we Panamanians

have always rejected and which we have said was never embodied in the Neutrality

Treaty. This position has now been strengthened with the unified interpretation

by the two heads of state on this problem.
371

In this regard this becomes specific, since President Carter said this textuallv.

AWhat I am going to do here is repeat how this Stand was reached to prevent

(ontinued confusion in Panama and in the United States with regard to the

scope of Article IV of the Neutrality Treaty.

According to the Treaty on Permanent Neutrality and the operation of the

Panama Canal-in parentheses, the Neutrality Treaty--Panama and the United

States have the responsibility of insuring that the Canal will remain secure and

open to ships of all nations. The correct interpretation of this principle is that

each of the two countries, according to its respective constitutional procedures,

will defend the Canal against any threat to its neutrality and consequently will

have the right to act in case of aggression or threat directed against the Canal

or gainst the peaceful transit of ships through the Canal.

You can see that this first part specifically states the right to defend the Canal

by Painama and by the United States, specifically to keep the Canal open, and to

prevent any obstruction of the transit of ships. The unified interpretation continues in the following manner: It does not mean and will not be interpreted as

meaning a U.S. right to intervene in Panama's internal affairs. Any action by the

United States will Le (Iirected at insuring that the Canal remains open, secure

and accessible and will never be directed against the territorial integrity or

political independence of Panama.

You can see that in this specific case, the two heads of state managed to unify

their stands regarding the true scope of Article IV, that is, to defend the Canal

against attacks or aggression directed at closing it or at obstructing the passage

of ships. The actions which Panama or the United States could take are directed

toward this specific purpose. But in the case of the United State., no action can

ever be directed toward the territorial integrity or political independence of

Panama, which is precisely what we Panamanians are defending and have been

maintaining since the signing of the Torrijos-Carter Treaty.

On the second point-in thiz case related to Article IV of the NeutralityTreatythe transit of U.S. and Panamanian warships in an expeditious manner through

the Canal, the two heads of state clearly stated what exactly was meant by expei(tious passage through the Canal by U.S. and Panamanian warships. They

discussed this problem and pointed out that, fundamentally, expeditious passage

means quick transit, without obstacles, with the least possible processing. 1i

addition, it was pointed out that in ease of an emergency or necessity, in such

specific eases expeditious passage would permit the war-hips of 1oth countriesbut naturally primarily those of the United States, because we (to not vet have

warship--to go to the head of the line of ships awaiting transit, the purpose being

to go through the Canal quickly.

generall Torrijos sad es, he did consider this necessary and appropriate because

on( of the things he did not agree with wa s the warships should spend too much

time in Panamanian territorial waters, much less in cases of emergencies or necessVt.

Why? Because a prolonged delay could make that ship an object of reprisal

within our territorial waters. Therefore, the sooner it left, the more secure our

co-ntry would be. Second, warships which would remain for a long time in our

CountrY's territorial waters would have negative social consequences because

the v generally carry large crews and a large number of soldiers, and a prolonged

sta v w ould disrupt normal i'fe in our cities.

Those who are old enough to remember what occurred in Panama during World

War II will understand exactly what kind of problem is causedI by a prolonged

presence of foreign troops in our territory-ocial problems, problems of disrepect

for women, drunk-nnes. fights, scandals and so forth. Therefore, in the case of

ne essity or in the event of war, having warships go through the canal quickly

not only fulfills an aspiration of the United States-which, naturally, in an emergenev wants its ships to transit the Canal quickly-hut also is to the advantage

of Panama, which does not want such ships to remain in its territorial waters.

On this basis, therefore, a uniform interpretation of the true meaning of expeditious

pa-sage through the Canal was achieved.

It is unified in the following manner: The neutrality treaty provides that U.S.

and Panamanian warships and auxiliary vessels will have the right to transit the

'Canal in an expeditious manner. The intention is, and it will be so interpreted, to

insure the transit of those ships through the Canal as quickly as possible, without

obstacles, with simplified processing and in case of necessity or emergency, to go

to the head of the line in order to transit the Canal quickly.
372

This is therefore the meaning which the two rulers have now accepted as the

single interpretation of the expenditious transit of warships of the United States

and Panama. Besides-and this is most important-since the General was returning

from his tour of Israel and West European States, he consulted the various chiefs of

state on the scope of this problem of expeditious passage and how it could affect

these Nations' support of the Neutrality Treaty. In this respect, those whom he consulted told him that they were not concerned about this; that the problem would

arise only if the Canal were closed; that U.S. warships would pass first was no

problem; that the serious problem, they reiterated, was if the Canal were closed

because a large percentage of those Nations' economies are based on the transit of

their vessels through the Panama Canal; that one of the reasons why they congratulated Panama and the United States for having reached a peaceful settlement

was not merely because of their solidarity with our country's just cause, but also

because of their great concern that the Canal remain permanently open, as their

economies would be seriously affected otherwise.

Consequently, we can tell this distinguished group of journalists that as a result

of the meeting between President Carter and General Torrijos in Washington, we

have made it possible for the contents of Article IV of the Neutrality Treaty to be

specifically interpreted by the two chiefs of government who signed the treaties.

I believe an important step has been taken in really clarifying what had become

cause for great concern to us Panamanians and the U.S. Senators. To us, the vital

part is clearly explained and reiterated by President Carter (when he said-FBIS)

that the article neither had been interpreted, nor would be interpreted, and cannot

be interpreted, as a U.S. right of intervention in our internal affairs and, that U.S.

actions cannot affect our territorial integrity and political independence.

Later I am going to distribute this same sheet, although you already know its

contents since it was published recently in the papers. I wanted to hold this news

conference to explain to you how this unification of positions was reached and, in

addition, to answer any questions you may want to ask.

[Telegram]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

October 1, 1977.

PANAMA: ESCOBAR BETANCOURT HOLDS PRESS CONFERENCE

Question. My question is very brief. Is it a fact, as U.S. news agencies have

reported, that a joint communique had been signed?

Answer. No, there was no joint communique. What I am reading to you is an

interpretation reached by the two Presidents. It is, however, an interpretation

which neither one signed because it was not deemed necessary since they had

signed the treaty. As signers of the treaty and as Chiefs of State, they were merely

giving their interpretation of two articles of the Neutrality Treaty. When General Torrijos said he had not signed a single autograph, he meant just tha t since

no document was signed. In these negotiations there is nothing that is secret. If

they had signed something, such a signed document would have been released

immediately to the Panamanian press for publication.

When we speak of an interpretation by the two signers of the treaty we merely

mean that the two Chiefs of Government are saying: What we signed nieans this.

They do not have to sign a statement saying we interpret it in this manner

simply because the document which includes the text of the articles was signed

by them. In fact, it is just as President Carter had said previously, that when the

United States says it can defend the canal against attacks and aggre sions and

when Panama says that this did not mean the right of intervention, they are

both actually speaking about the same thing (as heard) as being certain. What

they did now was to meet for him to confirm to his Senate, his people and we,

to our people, the interpretation of what they had signed. Question. Some Senators are asking that the interpretation be included as

part of the treaty, as they consider it important to understanding the scope of

the text. Would Panana accept this 5 days before the plebiscite?

Answer. That would be a decision for the General (Torrijos-FBIS) to make.

However, we cannot abide by what the Senators want because they have their own

problems and procedures there, their own legal system. In fact, I believe they

have already concluded the period of hearings. Nevertheless, we cannot adapt our

procedures to that of the U.S. Senate. Each country has its own procedure, and

ours is through a plebiscite which is scheduled to be held on 23 October. When
373

General Torrijos met with President Carter on this specific issue, they were not

adding anything at all to the treaty ; they were merely confirming an interpretation

which the two countries had already made in Article 4 of the Neutrality Treaty

but which, in both countries, did not seem to be very clear.

Question. Latin America is a region of political instability. Article 4 of the

Neutrality Treaty guarantees the defense of the Canal by Panama and the United

States. Ifowever, if a government should emerge which is hostile toward the

United States as a result of the Canal, do you believe that the United States would

intervene in Panama to put down the violent nature of such a government?

Answer. No. That is precisely why the interpretation points out the political

independence, that, this will not affect the political independence. This means that

the Republic of Panama could have governments which are friendly or hostile

toward the United States in the future, which we cannot know. But the commitment of Panama as a state with regard to the United States and in relation

to all the other countries of the world and those that adhere (to the neutrality

treaty-FBIS) is to keep the Canal open. It does not mean to be friendly toward

any particular country. It means that it must keep the Canal open even if it is an

enemy of that country. This is the real meaning of the concept of neutrality.

Therefore, regardless of the kind of political regime which emerges in Panam a, it

can never close the Canal, not just in the case of the United States; it cannot close

the Canal to any of the other countries. I would say that it cannot close the Canal

even if it wanted to since Panama's necessity in the case of the Canal is precisely

that it remain open. Otherwise, the ships would not transit the Canal and would

not pay tolls.

Therefore, one cannot make the Neutrality Treaty dependent on the type of

political regime that may exist in Panama or in the United States. The regimen

of neutrality demands that the Canal remain open not only to the U.S. flag, but

to all flags of the world, without discrimination.

Question. My question refers to next Sunday's plebiscite. What percentage of

the people will vote yes, in the opinion of the government?

Answer. I can not answer that because I have not really consulted the government concerning such a percentage. However, based on my very personal opinion,

starting with the fact that everyone who votes yes will be voting for a new treaty

and that everyone who votes no will be voting for keeping the H ay-Bunau-Varilla

Treaty, I believe that a largf, percentage of our people will vote yes. Naturally, I am not a prophet and cannot tell you exactly what that percentage will be.

Question. Comrade, I would like to know why the Republic of Panama in Article

aVII says: the Republic of Panama will adopt the measures necessary to insure

that no other use of the land and water of the Canal basin will exhaust the supply

of water necessary for the continuous and efficient management, functioning and

maintenance of the Canal and will not interfere with the U.S. rights to use the

waters of the Canal hasin. Panama needs water for its people to live. The Panamanian pays his for water. The Panamanian needs electrietv. Why does Panama

subsidize a country, which I respect but which is the world's largest economic

power, and why do we give it our water?

Answer. I am going to (divide your question into two parts, the one about the

Panamanian people needing water and the other concerning why we took the

decision not to deforest or not to interfere with the waters for use in the Canal.

First of all, the two points are not contradictory because the maintenance of the

hydrographic basin is important to provide water for our people and for the operation of the Canal. Second, we must protect the hydrographic basin in this case,

in relation to the Canal, because otherwise we would have to close it. If there is no

water, the Canal must be closed. That is a great, truth. And it is not a question of

subsidizing the United States in that respect. The fact is that the Canal constitutes,

according to our geographic position, one of our resources, part of our wealth, to

develop our country. That is why we are struggling to put a termination (late on

the treaty with the United States, so that the Canal will become our property. This is also the reason why during the 23-year period we have agreed with the

United States to receive approxilmately $80 million a year instead of the present

ridiculous sum of $2.6 million.

Since it is an economic resource, we must first maintain that economic resource, take care of that economic resource, and obtain the greatest possible benefit for

our country and our people. If, according to your theory, we deforest the hydrographic basin, that would be tantamount to Venezuela setting tire to its oil wells.

If Venezuela sets fire to its oil wells, it would destroy one of the principal sources

of its wealth.
374

That measure is directed at conserving sufficient water for the operation of the

Canal, not just now that the United States has it, but also after it is turned over

to us. Furthermore, it would be absurd for us to deforest the hydrographic basin, for us to alter the water situation, or not to try to better the water situation

because then we would not only have no water for the Canal, but we would not

have water for our country.

For instance, take the case of Panama, so as not to talk about other countries.

What has happened in certain regions of our country? Indiscriminate deforestation, the felling of trees, the turning of places which years ago had abundant

vegetation into barren areas has resulted in diminished rainwater reserves and

a decrease in our water levels. It has resulted in an alteration of our annual rain

levels to the point that last year we had one of our country's worst droughts.

By protecting our hydrographic basin, we are not engaging in anything blasphemous or doing this because the gringo's have such pretty faces. We are not interested in having the Canal close down. We are interested in seeing it function and

in having the Canal. . .

Question. But then why do they not pay for the water? It says here that they

will use the water free of charge. How come we have to pay for it?

Answer. We pay for its consumption.

Question. That should be free of charge because they consume it too.

Answer. For its consumption, we pay for its consumption. the water. . . Question. They consume it too. . . Answer. Enough.

Question in English. You told us about how you thought Panamanians would

vote in the Plebiscite. I would like your reading on whether or not you think

the U.S. Senate will ratify the treaty, and I also want to know if you still feel the

way you felt in August, when you said that if it does not ratify the treaty, Panama will take a course of violence, a road to violence.

Answer. When I am asked questions connected with the negotiations, I like

them to be asked in Spanish.

Unidentified person in English. Ann Susie, Ann Susie, would you be so kind to

say that in Spanish, please?

Question in English. I can't. (Words indistinct.)

Unidentified person in English. If you make that question a little shorter, I

will try.

Questioner repeats question, unidentified person in the group translates into

Spanish.

Answer. Regarding your question about whether the U.S. Senate will or will

not ratify the treaty, Susie, I cannot answer that because I am not a Senator,

and since I am not a Senator, I cannot determine what the U.S. Senate's decision

will be. I do believe that President Carter's administration, several Senators,

as well as various civic and labor organizations in the United States are making a

major effort to convince the Senators of the advisability of reaching a negotiated

solution with Panama in connection with the treaty.

Regarding your question about whether Panama will choose the path of violence if the Senate does not ratify the treaty, I cannot answer that either for a

very simple reason: one cannot predict the future. One does not know what the

fate of the people is. We do know that the Panamanian people want to be liberated,

but we also know that the Panamanian people and government have always

sought the peaceful path in this process of liberation. They have always used

peaceful means. They have always tried to reach an agreement that is mutually

acceptable to our two countries. We cannot say that Panama will choose the path

of violence because if we did we would be guessing. We believe that in this new

relationship, it is more feasible to seek the path of negotiations than the path of

violence.

Question. Dr. Bethancourt, I would simply like to get this clear: Has the text

of the articles which motivated the meeting between Carter and Torrijos been in

any way altered after their talks?

Answer. Which articles?

Question. Article IV of the Neutrality Treaty.

Answer. Oh, I see. No, no, they have not been altered in any way. Those articles

have not been touched, those articles retain their wording, those articles are

included in the Neutrality Treaty. The problem here regarding what you have

asked is that, in connection with Articles IV and VI, the two leaders have said:

This Article IV and this Article VI mean the following. . . . In other words, the

method of interpretation of the articles, not their alteration.
375

Furthermore, what they have said is what has been said all along. The only

difference is that now they got together to say it in order to unify the interpretation of the two articles in both countries.

Question. Dr. Bethancourt, there is great concern-concern which I share

with all Panamanians-regarding which country in the future will interpret or

decide if neutrality has been violated or has been or is being threatened, particularly because of the interventionist nature of the United States in the past, a

history of intervention which Panama itself has suffered from, as we are an occupied country. Only today the newspaper La Republica reported that U.S. troops

and advisers are in Nicaragua fighting the Sandinist Front guerrillas. We would

like to know if there are any mechanisms or if there will be any method of consultation between the two countries in such an event. In other words, has this

been foreseen, has this been discussed, or is this written down anywhere in the

treaty?

Answer. There is no exact method of interpretation on how violations of the

Neutrality Treaty will be determined. Generally, in these treaties one cannot

go into a multitude of juridical details. In this case they would be procedural

details concerned with juridical procedures. If one did this, one would never

conclude a treaty. One would have to draft several codes.

Therefore, it cannot be specifically indicated in the Neutrality Treaty that the

method of interpretation will be this way or that. The general treaty includes an

article which states that in case of a discrepancy between the two sides concerning

the interpretation of an article, they will reach an agreement between themselves

or, if necessary, they will appoint an arbiter to decide the issue. This is the general

way these situations are handled.

For instance, the violation of neutrality or the determination of the violation

of neutrality has an established juridical basis regarding the scope of the neutrality

concept. This is indicated in the Neutrality Treaty itself. It is stated there that

Panama declares its neutrality for the purpose of maintaining the Canal open

to all ships sailing under all flags of the world and so that the Canal and the

Isthmus of Panama will not become objects of reprisals by other countries in

case of war. That is the basic principle.

On this basis Panama concluded a treaty with the United States, after that

unilateral declaration. a treaty which reiterates the maintenance of neutrality.

But this is not an ambiguous neutrality. It is the neutrality specifically mentioned

there. Therefore, if something were to occur in Darien, for example, this would

have nothing to do with the Canal. Thousands of things could occur on the Isthmus

of Panama, as in all other countries of the world. The Neutrality Treaty indicates

a specific situation. It applies to the Canal. So as to make it possible for ships to

transit. If, for example, in Darien or in some part of the country the government

of the Republic of Panama should stop a ship for A, B or C reason, this is something which has absolutely nothing to do with the Panama Canal. What Panama

will not do, under the Neutrality Treaty, is prevent a ship that is coming exclusively to transit the Canal from doing so. This is the meaning (of the neutrality

treaty-FBIS).

Therefore, in order to discuss violations of the concept of neutrality established

in this treaty one has to look directly at the objective on which the treaty is

based; that is, to keep the Canal from being closed, thus preventing the passage

of ships, and to prevent any hindrances to the passage of ships which comfe to

transit the Canal. This is the key to how the scope of the concept of neutrality

is measured. But this is not outlined in the treaty concerning the Canal. If we

used the method you mentioned, we would have to add to each article the procedure by which the article would be implemented. This would be highly impossible. This is not (lone even in codes. You see, for example, that the penal code

lists the crimes, the criminals and the subjects. It is another code, the judicial

code, which indicates what procedures are used to judge crimes and apply the

corresponding punishment. If the penal code, in addition to defining crimes and

criminals, were to include the procedures, it would not be a functional code.

The same thing applies to treaties. Treaties indicate the points of agreementthe subject, the substance of this subject. The procedures (interrupts sentenceFBIS). For example, here in these treaties you will see that many of these things

are developed by different procedures: For example, procedures to be developed

by the Commission which will administer the Panama Canal, procedures to be

developed by the joint board for the defense of the Canal. But these procedures

are not specifically outlined. What the treaties give is the subject matter which

is being agreed upon by the two countries and the clause which I mentioned to you

concerning what procedures are followed for (sentence left unfinished-FBIS).
376

Question indistinct.

Answer. Those are different problems. One thing has nothing to do with the

other. As far as the expiration date is concerned, it is clearly established. It is

known to be 31 December 1999, at noon, Panama time. There is an article which

states this and which cannot be disputed.

The other article concerns the date of expiration on which the canal is returned

to Panama, with no cost, except as agreed upon by the two parties. (Sentence as

heard-FBIS). Why (The Phrase-FBIS) except as agreed upon by the two

parties? Because, let us suppose that in 1996 or in 1999, with 1 or 2 years remaining before the treaty between Panama and the United States expires-this is a

hypothetical case-that is, 2 years before the treaty expires, there should be the

need to make an investment for X, Y or Z reasons related to the functioning of

the Canal. Then the United States could say to Panama: Well 1 year remains

before our administration ends, but in this year it will be necessary to invest, let

us say, $5 million and we believe that to make such an investment now, when

we have a year to go, is absurd from the point of view of our economy. Panama

could then decide to say: Go ahead and invest the $5 million and when you

turn over the Canal, we will recognize this debt of $3 million. This is a hypothetical case. That is why one says except as agreed upon by the two parties, because the matter is not closed, because one does not know what contingencies

may occur. However, one says except as agreed upon by the two parties because

if they do not agree on anything, then the Canal has to be returned free of costs

to the Republic of Panama. If Panama were to say: No, do not make the investment, or if you do it will be at your expense because we are not going to recognize

this sum, then there would be no agreement. When one stipulates except as

agreed upon by the two parties, this means that the two parties must reach an

agreement in this regard.

But this has nothing to do with the treaty termination date. Because as to the

treaty termination date, if it were not a fixed date or if it were a fixed date but

with the possibility of extension, this would appear in this article and it would

say 31 December 1999, except for whatever the parties might otherwise agree

upon. It would say so there, but it does not say so because the termination of

U.S. control is emphatic with regard to U.S. presence here in Panama: At noon

on 31 December 1999, Panama time period, nothing else is said.

The other refers rather to a problem of an economic nature, a problem of some

investment that might have to be made at the last minute when there is only a

short time left before Panama recovers the Canal. In this case the two parties

will have to agree on whether Panama agrees to assume the debt or not. That

would be a problem between the two countries. However, about wanting to take

what one article states and give it a meaning in another article, this does not

make sense. This does not make sense because they are different subjects and each

article contains what one wants it to contain. When that article is related to

another article, it is so stated. You can see this in the treaty. When administration or defense is mentioned, reference is made to the schedules. You have to

refer to the schedules because the articles state that these schedules will expand

on the contents of that article. When one article is related to another, it is stated

that the article is related to another article.

In law practice we cannot prevent attempts at all kinds of interpretations.

This cannot be prevented. Furthermore, the lawyer always has a tendency to do

this. This is why we have courts where, when a prisoner is being tried, one lawyer

is accusing him and another is defending him over the same issue.

However, there is another matter, which is commonsense. Commonsense is

superior to law. Commonsense is what tells you when something is clear. Commonsense cannot be twisted or changed, no matter how much you argue against it.

For example, if you hit an egg with a hammer and the egg breaks, there is no

lawyer in the world who can deny it. Nevertheless, commonsense will tell you

that if you hit it with a hammer, the egg will break.

Therefore, this problem must be clear with regard to the fact that these documents are open to many interpretations. However, we (1o have commonsense

and this indicates to vou that there is a termination date in this treaty. It is clearly

stated in one of its articles which is devoted to, and even has as its title, the termination date. This article says that it expires on 31 December 1999 at noon

Panama time and nothing else. It doos not say that it is related to another article,

or that one has to look in an annex for more information, or that one has to seek

an exchange of notes to explain it, or that one has to seek a subsequent agreement

Or a subsequent interpretation. This article shows that it can stand on its own,

that it (toes not need interpolations or another article to indicate whether or not

it applies.
377

What is occurring now is an attempt to seek interpretations in order to create

uncertainty-to create uncertainty with regard to this problem, so that people will

think: is it true or not that it expires on 31 December 1999? That is the aim, because we are 3 or 4 days away from the Plebiscite. There are lawyers who have

said that the lay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty is better than this one. They have said

this, but they have not taken the Hay-Buniu-Varilla Treaty and read it to the

people article by article. They have not done this. They have said the HayBunau-Varilla Treaty is better than this. Let us keep that one. Moreover, this is

degrading, but they have gone that far. And worse things will happen.

However, one thing is being forgotten. They are forgetting-in an attempt to

think of themselves as very intelligent, or in believing that one can play with all

kinds of ideas-one important thing, which is the common man. The common man

is ue(l to living with commonsense daily, and he cannot be deceived. le cannot

be asked the kind of question which Plato asked in attacking Sophists, such as,

tell me the meaning of a man who i. not a man, who is sitting in a tree which is not

a tree and hitting the tree with a stone which is not a stone. This is for the Sophists, this is not for the common man.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for your eloquent

statement.

VOTE ON CLOSING COMMITTEE SESSION ON SALT

Before asking questions, as the chairman announced at the beginning

of the session, the committee will meet at 3 p.m. in room 11-236 in the

Capitol to receive a briefing on SALT 1T negotiations.

The Chair notices a quorum is now present and, in order to have an

executive session under the rules of the House, a motion would be in

order that we go into executive session and a rollcall is required.

The gentleman from Illinois moves that the committee when it

reconvenes at 3 p.m. this afternoon will meet in executive session.

All those in favor signify by saying "aye," those opposed, "no."

The chief of staff will call the roll.

Mr. BRADY. Chairman Zablocki.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Ave.

Mr. BRADY. Mr. Fountain.

Mr. FOUNTAIN. Ave.

Mr. BRADY. Mr. Fascell.

[No response.]

Mr. BRADY. Mr. Diggs.

[No response.]

Mr. BRADY. Mr. Nix.

Mr. Nix. Ave.

Mr. BRADY. Mr. Fraser.

Mr. FRASER. Ave.

Mr. BRADY. Mr. Rosenthal.

[No response.]

Mr. BRADY. Mr. Hamilton.

Mr. HAMILTON. Ave.

Mr. BRADY. Mr. Wolff.

[No response.]

Mr. BRADY. Mr. Bingham.

[No response.]

Mr. BRADY. Mr. Yatron.

Mr. YATRON. Ave.

Mr. BRADY. M. Harrington.

Mr. HARRINGTON. No.
378

Mr. BRADY. Mr. Ryan.

[No response.]

Mr. BRADY. Mrs. Collins.

[No response.]

Mr. BRADY. Mr. Solarz.

Mr. SOLARZ. Aye.

Mr. BRADY. Mrs. Meyner.

Mrs. MEYNER. Aye.

Mr. BRADY. Mr. Bonker.

[No response.]

Mr. BRADY. Mr. Studds.

Mr. STUDDS. Aye.

Mr. BRADY. Mr. Ireland.

[No response.]

Mr. BRADY. Mr. Pease.

Mr. PEASE. Aye.

Mr. BRADY. Mr. Beilenson.

Mr. BEILENSON. Aye.

Mr. BRADY. Mr. Fowler.

[No response.]

Mr. BRADY. Mr. de la Garza.

[No response.]

Mr. BRADY. Mr. Danielson.

Mr. DANIELSON. Aye. Mr. BRADY. Mr. Cavanaugh.

Mr. CAVANAUGH. Aye. Mr. BRADY. Mr. Broomfield.

[No response.]

Mr. BRADY. Mr. Derwinski.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Aye.

Mr. BRADY. Mr. Findley.

Mr. FINDLEY. Aye.

Mr. BRADY. Mr. Buchanan.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Aye.

Mr. BRADY. Mr. Burke.

Mr. BURKE. Aye.

Mr. BRADY. Mr. Whalen.

[No response.]

Mr. BRADY. Mr. Winn.

Mr. WINN. Aye.

Mr. BRADY. Mr. Gilman.

Mr. GILMAN. Aye.

Mr. BRADY. Mr. Guyer.

[No response.]

Mr. BRADY. Mr. Lagomarsino.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Aye.

Mr. BRADY. Mr. Goodling.

Mr. GOODLING. Aye.

Mr. BRADY. Mrs. Pettis.

Mrs. PETTIS. Aye.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. The chief of staff will announce the vote.

Mr. BRADY. On this vote, 22 ayes and 1 nay.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. The committee reconvenes at 3 o'clock or

thereabouts and we will meet in executive session as a result of the

vote.
379

I would further like to advise the members that the Secretary has

a very important luncheon and, knowing how direct and fully he

responds to questions, I am sure on his part he will cooperate and I

would hope the members would likewise cooperate by asking brief

questions and not making speeches.

Now, I will meet that request immediately.

INTERPRETATION OF THE NEUTRALITY TREATY

Mr. Secretary, as you have clearly indicated in your statement,

perhaps the most crucial issue which has arisen involving the treaties

is the interpretation of those provisions of the Neutrality Treaty relating to the rights of the United States to defend the canal and to

obtain expeditious passage of U.S. war vessels. You have referred

specifically to that point on page 4 of your prepared testimony.

But as you know, Mr. Secretary, Senator Dole made public the

confidential Department of State cable which reported a member of

the Panamanian negotiating team disputed the U. S. interpretation

regarding canal defense rights and priority passage.

As you noted in your statement of October 14, President Carter

and General Torrijos met in Washington and released a statement

clarifying those two issues. A copy of each of the two documents is

before the members.

I might further add, when I asked Ambassadors Bunker and Linowitz in September whether the Neutrality Treaty gave the United

States the right to unilaterally act to defend the neutrality of the

canal, the answer was "Absolutely."

Subsequently, Secretary of Defense Brown and Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff General Brown agreed with that interpretation.

For the record, Mr. Secretary, does this interpretation still stand

in light of the statement of understanding?

Secretary VANCE. Yes, sir, it does.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Was the statement of understanding signed

by the two parties?

Secretary VANCE. It was not signed, it was issued by them as a

statement of understanding to which they both subscribed and to

which they both agreed. It does not have to be signed.

Yesterday, either yesterday or the day before, the head negotiator, Mr. Escobar, held a press conference at which he released the statement and described the fact that it was a statement of joint understanding between the two heads of government and that it accurately

reflected their views to the meaning of the treaty.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. The question arises as to whether it is binding

or not. When we had an agreement for the extension of SALT I, the

Vladivostok agreement, we interpreted that agreement with the Soviet

Union as not binding. We have an agreement between two chiefs of

state not signed and we normally would agree that such an agreement would be binding.

Secretary VANCE. There is a great difference between the two. What

was said with respect to the SALT agreement was that it was the

intention of the United States to continue not to take any action

which would be inconsistent with the SALT I agreement so long as

the Soviet Union did not take a contrary position.
380

The Soviet Union declared the same to be the case on their part.

That is not an agreement, it is merely a statement of intention and

either can change their intention in the future.

Here you have something different. You have both the heads of

government saying this is what the treaty means and they are saying

it in advance of the ratification. So it is a totally different situation.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. We are happy to have that clarification.

Will the statement of understanding be submitted as a protocol or

as an annex to the treaties?

Secretary VANCE. It would be, I assume, filed along with the treaties

as a statement of joint understanding. I do not think it is necessary

to have either a construction or a reservation because this clearly

reflects the understanding of the parties in advance of ratification.

POSITION OF PANAMA CANAL ZONE LABOR GROUPS

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Mr. Secretary, on September 20 this committee heard testimony from Mr. William Drummond, chairman of

the Legislative Committee of the Canal Zone Central Labor UnionMetal Trades Council. In his testimony and in a letter to the committee, Mr. Drummond asserts the Department of State attempted

to prevent him from coming to testify before this committee. Is this

allegation true?

Secretary VANCE. False.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. I would like to read into the record a letter I

received as chairman on October 17 from Mr. J. R. Williams, president

of the Panama Canal Pilots Association, asserting that Mr. Graham's

and Mr. Drummond's testimony does not represent the views of the

majority of Panama Canal workers.

If there is no objection, the Chair would ask unanimous consent

that the letter be incorporated in the record at this point.

The Chair hears no objection. It is so ordered.

[The letter follows:

PANAMA CANAL PILOTS ASSOCIATION,

Balboa, Canal Zone, October 5, 1977.

HON. CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI,

Chairman, Committee on International Relations, Washington, D.C.

DEAR CONGRESSMAN ZABLOCKI: We have noted in a recent copy of the Congressional Record the testimony of Mr. Alfred J. Graham, who was Mr. George

Meany's representative to the U.S. Treaty negotiators.

The Panama Canal Pilots Association wishes you to be informed that, although

Mr. Graham represented the AFL/CIO and Mr. Meany, pursuant to his duties,

his Treaty statements before your committee represent only the views of the

Canal Zone Central Labor Union/Metal Trades Council.

To further place Mr. Graham's statements in more precise perspective, of the

13,500 Panama Canal employees, he represents approximately 1,500, mostly U.S.

citizens. The remaining 11,000 (2,000 U.S. and 9,000 Panamanian) have differing

representation and certainly a different point of view.

Sincerely,

J. R. WILLIAMS.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Mr. Secretary, could you or Ambassadors

Bunker or Linowitz clarify the role played by the union in the negotiating process? Are the unions satisfied with the treaties as they

impact on the Canal Zone employees?
381

STATEMENT OF HON. ELLSWORTH BUNKER, CONEGOTIATOR FOR

THE PANAMA CANAL TREATIES

Mr. BUNKER. We had an adviser from the unions as a negotiator

to Panama appointed by the AFI-CIO. Their views were taken into

consideration throughout the negotiations. We referred those to Mr.

Williams, chairman of the Pilots Association, so labor's views were

adequately represented and taken into consideration in the course of

negotiations.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Thank you, Ambassador.

Mr. Fraser.

Mr. Derwinski.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

INTERPRETATION OF NEUTRALITY TREATY

Mr. Secretary, the statement that was drawn after the meeting

between the two Presidents last week includes language that states

the United States shall never take action directly against the territorial

integrity of Panama.

Now, after the year 2000 the canal becomes a part of the territory

of Panama. The Canal Zone, as such, is abolished. If so, how can we

act to defend it without involving the territorial integrity of Panama?

Secretary VANCE. I think this is clearly answered in the paragraph

of the statement of understanding. The statement of understanding

says very clearly the following:

The correct interpretation of this principle is that each of the two countries

shall, in accordance with their respective constitutional processes, defend the canal

against any threat to the regime of neutraltiy, and consequently shall have the

right to act against any aggression or threat directed against the canal or against

the peaceful transit of vessels through the canal.

Then it goes on to say that this does not mean it shall be interpreted as a right to intervene in the internal affairs.

So I think there is a very clear distinction as long as the action

taken, the unilateral action is to defend the canal and to insure that

it remains open and secure and neutral, then there is an absolute right.

HUMAN RIGHTS IN PANAMA

Mr. DERWINSKI. Now, another subject. This will be my last

question. The President has dramatized his interest in human rights

throughout the world. There have been questions raised over the

human rights record in Panama. Is there any consideration, discussion,

or impact on these treaties of the human rights situation in Panama?

Secretary VANCE. The United States has followed the human

rights situation in Panama as it has in a number of many, many other

countries. It did not affect the actual negotiation of the treaty. However, that does not mean that the United States does not have concern

about human rights conditions in Panama as well as in other countries.

Panamanians do enjoy the guarantees of life, liberty, and security

of the person. However, opposition which appears aimed at overthrowing the Government has not been permitted and Panama has

been on occasion guilty of occasional abuses of authority.
I think it was in 1976 that some 16 people were expelled from the

country because of opposition views and we made very clear our

concern about that action.

But specifically to answer your question, the answer is no, it did

not affect the negotiation of the treaties.

STATEMENT OF HON. SOL M. LINOWITZ, CONEGOTIATOR FOR THE

PANAMA CANAL TREATIES

Mr. LINowITz. I wonder if I might add a point to that?

Secretary VANCE. Please do.

Mr. LINOwITz. In the first place, we made known our concern

and interest in the whole human rights issue. The Government of

Panama has invited the OAS rights organization to come to Panama

and view the human rights situation.

PUBLIC PRESENTATION OF THE TREATIES

Mr. DERWINSKI. I would like the Secretary and Ambassadoi

Linowitz to know I concur in the points you made in your statement, that these treaties address the present-day realities in Latin America.

But I think it is obvious that you are not convincing the American

public that this is the case. So any controversy adds to your headache.

So while you may be logical in the world of diplomacy, the ability

to communicate with the American public has to be substantially

improved.

Secretary VANCE. Yes, sir.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Mr. Yatron.

Mr. YATRON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

OCTOBER 14 UNDERSTANDING OF THE NEUTRALITY TREATY

Mr. Secretary, what role in the ratification of the treaties do you

see in the Carter-Torrijos statements of October 14?

Secretary VANCE. It, I think, clears up once and for all two questions which have been very troubling to the Members of Congress

and to the American people. Therefore, I think it plays a very important role because it makes it crystal clear that we have a single interpretation of what the treaty means on these two critically important

issues.

Mr. YATRON. What legal weight would the statement carry if it

was embodied in the language of the resolution of ratification?

Secretary VANCE. I do not think it is necessary, as I indicated, for

it to be put into the form of a reservation or, indeed, even in the form

of an interpretation as those two terms are used legally. I think it

would be sufficient merely to file along with the papers the statement of interpretation and that that would be sufficient.

Mr. YATRON. Does the language in the Carter-Torrijos statement

permit the United States to take military action against the nation

of Panama to assure that the canal remains open and secure to all

ships of all nations?

Secretary VANCE. The statement makes it very clear that either

the United States or Panama can take whatever action is required

to keep the canal open, free and neutral to all nations.
383

Mr. YATRON. Mr. Secretary, how do you interpret the phrase

"any U.S. action shall never be directed against the territorial integrity of political independence of Panama," in that context?

Secretary VANCE. I interpret that, as I indicated a little while

ago, as relating to the question of intervention in their internal affairs,

but it does not affect the fundamental issue and the fundamental

issue is, do we have the right to take action if there is anything

jeopardizing the openness and the freedom of access to the canal?

Under those circumstances we can take military action to insure

that the canal stays open and secure and neutral so that all nations

of the world can use it.

Mr. YATRON. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. The members will note that the House is in

the process of a quorum call.

The Chair would suggest we continue for another few minutes and

then we will probably have to recess for 5 to 7 minutes.

Mrs. Meyner.

Mrs. MEYNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

LEGISLATION REQUIRED TO IMPLEMENT THE TREATIES

There has been a good deal of discussion around here on whether

the House of Representatives has a constitutional duty to approve

or disapprove the disposition of American property in the Canal

Zone as a consequence of these treaties. Lawyers differ on the question and I believe the administration has said no to that. Have you

heard anything up here on the Hill that would change your opinion

or the President's opinion on this issue and what sort of implementing

legislation do you envision following the ratification of the treaty?

Secretary VANCE. I would be delighted to answer both those

questions. Nothing has come up to cause us to change our mind on

our original position. It is well established that the treaty power

extends to all areas within the legislative authority of the Congress, which are not reserved exclusively to the jurisdiction of the Congress.

It is also clear from the drafting history of the Constitution that

the framers intended that U.S. territory and property could be disposed of by treaty and that implementing legislation was not required.

This is an opinion of the Attorney General to that effect which I

know has been given to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee

and I am not sure whether it has been given to this committee. If it

has not, it should be.

So, I think there really is no question on that as long as the treaty

itself is executed insofar as the property and lands are concerned. That

is perfectly proper and correct under constitutional law.

Now, however, there is a role for the Congress and the House to

play in this. There is legislation which has to be passed. That legislation has to be drafted and is currently at the Office of Management and

Budget. It relates to several things.

First, it relates to the creation of a new Panama Canal Commission

which would take the place of the current two authorities which run

the Panama Canal.

Second, there is the necessary legislation which would deal with the

question of tolls and revenues.

98-991 0 - 78 - 26
384

Third, there is the necessary legislation which will deal with a series

of labor matters which are provided for in the treaty and which need to

be implemented by legislation.

And, fourth, it deals with certain diplomatic matters which are of

lesser moment but which should be taken care of.

STATEMENT OF UNDERSTANDING OF THE NEUTRALITY TREATY

Mrs. MEYNER. Mr. Secretary, just one final question.

It is my understanding that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has been divided on the question of whether to put the text of

the Carter-Torrijos statement of understanding into the full text of the

treaty or merely into the instrument of ratification. What is the practical difference between these two methods and the third choice of letting

the statement of understanding stand on its own? Would it really

matter legally or practically?

Secretary VANCE. Yes; I think it does make a difference.

First, if it is put in the form of a reservation, then that means that

in effect the treaty has to be opened up again for negotiation and that

you have to have formal action taken with respect to that.

Once you open it up for one piece, there is a likelihood that other

pieces might be opened up.

If it were done in the form of an interpretation, it would not mean

the treaty would be opened up, it would be merely a reflection of the

understanding of the Congress in ratifying the treaty.

The third way of doing it would be merely to rely upon the statement of understanding as such and file that with the papers. I believe

that the latter is the satisfactory way to do it.

Mrs. MEYNER. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ZABLOCKi The committee will be in recess until a quarter

of 12.

[Whereupon, a short recess was taken.]

Chairman ZABLOCKI. The committee will resume the hearings.

Mr. Findley.

Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Secretary, Ambassadors Bunker and Linowitz,

I want to make a couple of statements before I raise a question in

order to hopefully cast my position in these foreign policy matters.

I strongly support the Panama Canal Treaties and I am going to do

the best I can to create public understanding and support for the

treaties wherever I go. I think it is vitally important. I have come to

the conclusion our military problems would be far greater if the

treaties are rejected than if they are approved.

SALT NEGOTIATIONS

But I also want to voice my concern about the other subject matter

of your appearance here today, the SALT agreements.

In order to perhaps cast my concern, and again in a nonpartisan

role, I would like to call your attention to a letter of March 3, 1976,

to President Ford, a copy of which I furnished to you just a few

moments ago.

This letter was signed by 10 Republican members of the International Relations Committee. All but one are still on the committee.
385

That one is now the Governor of Delaware. I ask unanimous consent,

Mr. Chairman, to place the letter in the record at this point.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Without objection, so ordered.

[The letter follows:]

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,

HousE OF REPREsENTATIVES,

Washington, D.C., March 3, 1976.

Hon. GERALD R. FORD,

President of the United States

Washington, D.C.

IEAR MR. PRESIDENT: We write to you as concerned Members of the House

International Relations Committee, Republicans and friends. The object of our

concern i. the military balance between the Soviet Union and the United States

and the impact of the on-going SALT negotiations on that balance. We are

troubled by several things: First, by the continued toughening of the Soviet negotiating position and the steady erosion of our own; secondly, by the ambiguous

but unsettling record of past Soviet behavior in SALT and in international affairs

generally; and finally, by the dangers that would result from exposing any SALT

agreement to the supercharged atmosphere of election year politics.

To begin with, though, we draw your attention to remarks on SALT which were

quoted in Time Magazine (February 16) and attributed variously to the Secretary

of State and "a senior U.S. official." Articles such as this one-in which "a senior

U.S. official" openly derides the American cruise missile and lends support to the

Soviet rationale on the Backfire bomlber-are damaging to our position in SALT

and deprive us of much needed negotiating strength. Moreover, in the midst of

sensitive negotiations, a senior official's disagreement with key elements in the

U.S. position is intelligence information of a high order. Press "backgrounders'

of this sort make it impossible for the Soviet leaders to take our position seriously,

much less to extend themselves in the interest of accommodation.

This is most unfortunate because important national issue are at stake with

regard to the two principal systems being discussed-the cruise missile and the

Soviet Backfire bomber. As you are well aware, the Backfire has an impressive

capability for striking targets across the continental United States. Some downplay this capability by saying that one-way unrefueled missions with bomber

recovery in third countries are impracticable. Yet the main'4ay of our own strategic bomber force, the B-52, would have to fly similar one-way missions due to

the heavy fuel loss incurred as a result of low-altitude penetration. The thought

arises: Why should our B-52's count, but not the Soviet Backfire?

Some of the suggested "solutions" on Backfire make little sense. Because the

Soviets already have a tanker capability and can rapidly relocate the Backfire in

times of crisis, Soviet "assurances" on these matters do nothing to moderate the

Backfire threat.

We have even graver concerns about the fate of the American cruise missile in

the SALT negotiations. In our judgment, the long-term military utility of this

system appears to be high. And yet it may be impossible even to research this

system seriously if SALT severely constrains its range or the numbers that can

be deployed. Congressionsl support for developing this technology will be difficult

to obtain if its most interesting possibilities are prohibited by SALT.

This is particularly distressing in view of the many potential advantages of

the cruise missile for meeting our national security and arms control objectives.

For example, the missile is relatively cheap, thereby making it possible for us

to procure an efficient force with a lower drain on national economic resources.

It would be most unfortunate if SALT forces us to procure more expensive rather

than less expensive systems.

Secondly, the accuracy of the cruise missile could reduce collateral damage and

provide our political decision-makers with a wider range of options than just

mutual suicide. Potentially, this accuracy also could make possible the substitution of conventional warheads for nuclear ones, thus raising the nuclear threshold.

Last but not least important, the cruise missile should enable us to shore up

our European defense structure, while possibly replacing many of our more vulnerable and antiquated tactical nuclear weapons.

Why should we throw away the opportunity of exploiting these benefits? What

do we get in return? Moreover, it seems to us presumptuous, if not incredible, that the Russians are proposing to ban U.S. cruise missiles with ranges over 375

miles when their existing cruise missile ranges can go much farther than that.
Equally amazing is the fact that at proposed Russian ranges their cruise missiles

would be able to hit a significant percentage of important U.S. targets, while we,

given Russian geography, would be unable to do likewise.

It must be said, too, that we find the Secretary of State's description of the

benefits of an agreement to be unpersuasive. The envisioned agreement will not

noticeably affect or constrain the massive Soviet build-up that is already underway. The Soviets already allocate so much to military spending that it is difficult

to imagine how they could increase. Here in the U.S., on the other hand, a toohasty agreement could foster harmful illusions about the magnitude and nature

of the threat we face.

Regardless of where one comes down on the substantive questions, one fact

seems indisputable: A complex arms control agreement which affects our strategic

capability for the next 10 years cannot be concluded in an election year without

incurring great and probably unacceptable risks. Even the best possible agreement

is likely to come under attack. An agreement as ambiguous as the one now under

discussion inevitably will be exposed to withering blasts from all sides-some

reasoned but many not. One has only to compare the problems of cruise missile

verification with current allegations about Soviet compliance to understand how

crushing and hostile the public reaction may become. Massive public assaults on

the agreement will undermine confidence in sensible arms control. Prudence

demands that we take these factors into account.

We have given great thought to these matters and hope that you will give our

views serious consideration. Respectfully, we would ask for an opportunity to

visit with you at some point in the near future to discuss this subject in greater

detail.

Sincerely yours, WILLIAM S. BROOMFIELD,

EDWARD J. DERWINSKI,

PAUL FINDLEY,

JOHN H. BUCHANAN,

J. HERBERT BURKE,

PIERRE S. DUPONT,

LARRY WINN, JR.,

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN,

TENNYSON GUYER,

ROBERT J. LAGOMARSINO,

Minority members of the House International Relations Committee.

Mr. FINDLEY. In that letter we expressed our deep concern about

what we perceived to be wrongful concessions in the SALT proposals

that were then under consideration back in March of 1976. But the

proposals that were then before our Government and the Soviet Union

were considerably less damaging to U.S. security needs and to

international stability than those that are now pending between

these two governments. Therefore, I hope you will keep in mind that

background of our concern as we proceed with questions this afternoon.

I think there is justification for the executive branch giving close

attention to the views of the House of Representatives because,

under the Arms Control Act of 1961, there is the opportunity for

involving both Houses of Congress and not just by the Senate through

the ratification process.

I can easily cite the law if you like. It is section 33 of the Arms

Control Act of 1961. I will read that portion to you. It says:

No action shall be taken under this or any other law that will obligate the

United States to disarm or to reduce or limit the Armed Forces or armaments of

the United States except subsequent to the treatymaking power of the President

under the Constitution or unless authorized by further affirmative legislation by

the Congress of the United States.

I would like to remind you as well that the House was involved in

approving the SALT I agreement. A resolution favoring the agreement

was deliberated in the House and approved by this body.
387

Therefore, I think you should be as closely concerned with House

viewpoints as with Senate viewpoints.

I say that further out of concern for our position as a member of the

NATO alliance. We just had a meeting with the Prime Minister of

Belgium and a topic of discussion was the cruise missile question and

the protocol in the SALT agreement which would set aside for 3 years

any sharing of cruise missile technology with our allies.

This is but one of the aspects-you are shaking your head. Would

you like to respond to that point?

Secretary VANCE. Why don't you finish? There are several things I

would like to comment very briefly on.

Mr. FINDLEY. I will make it very concise. Our concern arises first

of all as to the constraints placed on cruise missile technology limits

in the 3-year protocol and restrictions on our ability to share cruise

missile technology with our allies, and, second, the throwweight issue.

At that point I will stop and be glad to hear any response you make.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Mr. Findley, we will have a SALT discussion

this afternoon.

Mr. FINDLEY. I realize that and do not expect him to make much

of a response.

Secretary VANCE. I would like to make a brief response to what Mr.

Findley said. I do not want to go into any detail in public because this

is still a delicate matter under negotiation, but there are one or two

general comments.

First, I welcome the letter and we will study it.

Second, you made reference to the proposals which were on the

table at the time you wrote this letter were much harder from the U.S.

standpoint than current ones. I do not agree with that and I will tell

you why and think I can convince you when we are in closed session.

With respect to the question of cruise missiles, I think that when we

get a chance to discuss this in detail you will agree we are, although

putting constraints on cruise missiles, keeping the various options open

through the protocol device and, finally, I think the other point that

you made with respect to cruise missiles was-let me see, I tried to

make a note of it here

Mr. FINDLEY. The range limits, sharing technology.

Secretary VANCE. Sharing technology, yes, that is the other point.

On the sharing of technology, we would be precluded from sharing

technology about things which we are prohibited from doing under the

treaty. We are not prohibited from sharing technology about things

we are permitted to do under the treaty. I want to make that clarification.

Mr. FINDLEY. We can detail our concerns this afternoon.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. The Chair would like to announce that

under the 5-minute rule that those who have been here since the

beginning of the session will be recognized first.

Mr. FINDLEY. May I ask unanimous request, Mr. Winn can't be

here and he asks that four questions be answered in the record?

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Without objection, it is so ordered.

[The questions and responses follow:]
388

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. LARRY WINN, JR., ANn RESPONSES BY THE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

Washington, D.C., October 31, 1977.

Hon. CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI,

Chairman, Committee on International Relations,

House of Representatives.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: During the appearance of Secretary Vance before your Committee on October 20, Congressman Larry Winn submitted several written

questions for response from the Department.

I am pleased to enclose a copy of Congressman Winn's questions with our

responses.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

DOUGLAS J. BENNET, Jr.,

Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations.

Question 1. It is my understanding that the Congress can, in line with the

Government Corporation Control Act, limit the use or expenditure of revenues by

the existing Panama Canal Company.

The new Panama Canal Commission proposed in Article III of the treaty would

be a U.S. Government Agency, not merely a wholly-owned corporation. Will the

Congress have at least as much authority to restrict payments from the new

Commission's account in the Treasury?

Answer. In implementing legislation to be submitted to the Congress, the

Executive will propose that the Panama Canal Commission, like the present

Panama Canal Company, be subject to the Government Corporation Control Act.

Accordingly, with regard to the Panama Canal Commission, the Congress will have

the same authority as it now has over the Panama Canal Company to make

available and limit expenditures for administrative and operating purposes.

Question 2. I believe that under the present circumstances U.S. warships (1o not

actually pay tolls for using the Canal.

Article XIII of the treaty states that Panama will receive 30 cents per Panama

Canal net ton for "each vessel" transiting the Canal. Won't U.S. warships have to

pay this toll under the new treaty? How much would this cost the U.S.?

Answer. All U.S. Government vessels, including warships, currently pay tolls

for using the Panama Canal and will continue to do so under the new treaties.

Under the present system the toll payment is made in the form of a credit to the

Treasury account of the Panama Canal Company. In fiscal year 1976, credits for

tolls paid by U.S. Government vessels totalled $726,000.

Question 3. I understand, that a draft environmental impact statement (EIS)

regarding the effect of an increase in the Canal tolls was published for comment at

the end of August. I believe that EIS spoke in terms of the necessity of a 25 percent

to 35 percent increase in tolls to cover the cost of the Canal's operation after the

new treaty goes into effect. Other reliable sources have estimated that as much as

a 45 percent increase could easily be required.

(a) What is the status of the draft EIS? Has a copy been made available to this

committee?

(b) What is the potential effect of such a substantial increase on the United

States?

(c) Have the governments of Latin American countries whose economies rely

heavily on use of the Canal been furnished copies of the EIS to help them evaluate

the effect of such large toll increases on their countries and the corresponding

advantages and disadvantages of the new treaty to them?

Answer. (a) Public comments have been received on the draft Environmental

Impact Statement (EIS), and the Department is now preparing the final EIS,

which should be issued in early November. Copies of the draft EIS were sent to all

Members of the Congress a, well as to the House International Relations

Committee.

(b) We estimate that a toll increase in the neighborhood of 30 percent will be

required once the new treaty goes into effect, with the exact level of an initial

toll increase dependent on Canal traffic projections at the time. A study on Canal

traffic and revenue projections is now under preparation and should be available

early next year. We do not foresee a toll increase as large as 45 percent.

A toll incrNase of 30 or even 45 percent would have a minimal impact on the

United States economy because Panama Canal traffic is sensitive to the cost of

alternative supply and( transportation modes and routes available to buyers,
389

sellers, and shippers of each commodity transiting the Canal. In the case of some

commodities, cheaper alternatives to the Canal will be practicable, thereby

moderating the effect of a toll increase. For other commodities, which continue to

find the Canal the most practicable transportation alternative, the impact of

toll increases will depend on the availability of alternative markets or substitute

commodities.

In any event, we do not foresee an adverse impact on those United States export

commodities such as coal or grains for which the United States is the major

supplier, since a toll increase of 30-45 percent would not affect the U.S. competitive

position and could be shifted to the importers of these commodities. It is also

important to note that although a 30 percent toll increase might cause some

commodities to be diverted from the Canal, it would not result in a decrease in

Canal revenues and would therefore not adversely affect the financial viability

of the Canal.

(c) The draft EIS is available to anyone upon request. However, Panama is

the only foreign government to which we have so far furnished the study.

Question 4. Have any of the countries who signed the protocol to the neutrality

treaty officially acknowledged or stated their agreement with the apparent U.S.

position that we have the right to take unilateral military action to defend the

neutrality of the Canal? In other words, is the U.S. the only country to construe

the Neutrality Treaty in this way?

Answer. Our interpretation of the Neutrality Treaty is shared also by Panama.

In the October 1977 statement of understanding issued by both the United States

and Panama, it was stated that:

"Under the Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of

the Panama Canal (the Neutrality Treaty), Panama and the United States have

the responsibility to assure that the Panama Canal will remain open and secure

to ships of all nations. The correct interpretation of this principle is that each of

the two countries shall, in accordance with their respective constitutional processes, defend the Canal against any threat to the regime of neutrality, and

consequently shall have the right to act against any aggression or threat directed

against the Canal or against the peaceful transit of vessels through the Canal."

The Protocol to the Neutrality Treaty will be available for signature following

ratification of the Treaty by both the United States and Panama. We are aware

of no statement by a Latin American or other government concerning its attitude

toward Article 4 of the Neutrality Treaty-which establishes the responsibility

of the United States and Panama to maintain the Canal's neutrality.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Congressman Lagomarsino.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I would like, inasmuch as many of the members are

not here, to ask permission for questions to be submitted for the

record.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Mr. Secretary, I think I understand the position of the administration with regard to the lack of necessity for

having the statement of understanding that was reached between the

President and General Torrijos made a part of the treaty by reservation or by amendment, but what I don't understand is wat would

be wrong with doing that? What would be the problem with doing

that?

Secretary VANCE. If you take the reservation route then you open

up the whole question of negotiation and I think that is a major

problem because you then throw the whole thing open again. If you

take the interpretation route, that problem is not created. All I am

saying is I don't think it is necessary to do that because you can

accomplish the same thing by filing the memorandum along with

the treaty.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. What happens if we have a successor to General

Torrijos who does not agree with this interpretation?

Secretary VANCE. As long as it were filed as one of the documents

with it and it was the joint understanding, it would be binding upon the parties.
390

OUTSIDE INPUT INTO U.S. NEGOTIATION POSITION

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. When mention was made earlier of the labor

input into the negotiations and when Mr. Graham, who was the labor

negotiator, or labor adviser, as he described it, to our negotiators, was

here and testified, one of the things he said-I congratulated him for

having an input into the treaties and pointed out that was more than

I knew any other groups had had.

This is one of the problems why we were asked not to advertise my presence there. The shipping lobby and others would be interested also in having advisers.

My question is, Why weren't other groups given that same consideration?

Mr. BUNKER. I am not aware of other groups that asked to be part

of the negotiating team. We have consulted with the merchant shipping people, but I can't recall their having requested to be part of

the team.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Were any Members of Congress given that

opportunity?

Mr. LINOWITZ. Consultation.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. In the sense the labor negotiators or advisers

were.

Mr. LINOwITZ. Not as designated advisers, but we consulted extensively with Members of the Senate during the course of the

negotiations.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. How about Members of the House?

Mr. LINOwITz. Some of the Members of the House, yes, sir.

HUMAN RIGHTS

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Mr. Secretary, I notice in your prepared statement you made no mention of the subject of human rights. Is that

significant or is it just that you didn't feel it necessary?

Secretary VANCE. No, it was not significant. I think I covered that

in the questioning. I spoke to that question when I testified before

the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. I think the position of the

United States is very clear on this issue and I tried to avoid repeating

what I had stated before the Senate to deal with questions specifically

that had not been answered.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. There was a representative of the State Department either last week or the week before who spoke specifically

about the human rights issue and he seemed to be unaware of the

Freedom House survey that was issued in January of this year. It is

my understanding that one of the organizations that the State Department relies on in making its human rights determinations is

Freedom House; is that correct?

Secretary VANCE. That is correct.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. I am sure you are aware then that Freedom

House at least gives Panama a very, very low rating, in fact, the

lowest rating in the Western Hemisphere. Were you aware of that?

Secretary VANCE. I have read what has been said, I think, by all

of the various groups at one time or another on this issue insofar as

they are concerned. I can't remember the details of it now. Perhaps

one of my colleagues might speak to it.
391

Mr. LINOwITz. We are, of course, familiar with the reports of the

Freedom House. The fact is they have a report on civil rights in which

Panama was given a very low rating. It did not address itself to the

human rights situation, which I think your question is directed at.

But we have looked at the survey and are struck by the fact that the

human rights bodies, such as the United Nations, and Amnesty

International do not show that evaluation.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. LINOwITZ. Ambassador Bunker's point is we have no information as to where Freedom House got their information.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Mr. Goodling.

Mr. GOODLING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, Mr. Secretary, I would like to congratulate you on this

statement.

Secretary VANCE. Thank you.

PRESENCE OF FOREIGN TROOPS IN PANAMA

Mr. GOODLING. You have said what I believe, put in writing what

I believe, much better than I have been able to do up to this point.

So I assure you your memorandum will be used.

I have two questions I would like to ask. In your statement you

say no foreign power could operate the canal or garrison troops or

have bases stationed there. I am assuming you are saying any place

in Panama.

Secretary VANCE. Yes, sir.

Mr. GOODLING. In other words, that is part of the agreement I

was not familar with.

Secretary VANCE. Let me get out my copy of the agreement. I

think it is article VI of the Neutrality Treaty-I am sorry, article V.

After termination of the Panama Canal Tieaty only the Republic

of Panama shall operate the canal, maintain military forces, defense

sites and maintain military forces within its territories.

Mr. GOODLING. Not just the Canal Zone?

Secretary VANCE. No.

IMPACT OF THE TREATIES ON U.S. EMPLOYEES IN THE ZONE

Mr. GOODLING. The second question. I wish you would walk through

with me exactly what does happen with American employees in the

Canal Zone.

Secretary VANCE. I would have to ask one of my colleagues to do

this because it gets very complicated and I think it would be better

to ask one of them who has been through all of the detail in the negotiation to do that.

Would you care to do that, Ambassador?

Mr. BUNKER. The conditions of employment will continue under

the new Commission as they are now. In other words, employees will

retain the rights they have now and will certainly have rights in general no less favorable than employees elsewhere in the world.

Mr. GOODLING. That is up to the year 2000?

Mr. BUNKER. Up to the year 2000, yes, sir. That is correct. There

is a provision in the treaty which will provide earlier retirement which

Aj
392

they were very anxious to have assured. New employees in general

will be rotated every 5 years when the treaty goes into effect so that

there will not be a vested interest in the situation.

Mr. GOODLING. In other words, if they want to stay as employees

and don't want to take early retirement,. even though you are going

to increase the number of Panamanians and decrease the number of

Americans -- Mr. BUNKER. There will be a gradual increase in Panamanian

employees and a consequent decrease of American employees. The

treaty provides that within the first 5 years there would be 20 percent

less American employees than there are at the beginning. This is, of course, taken care of through attrition and resignation which average about 400 a year.

Mr. LINOwITZ. Just to add a word to that, in effect they are assured of their jobs with the Canal Commission until their retirement,

as Ambassador Bunker said, or unless their employment is terminated

for any other reason. During that period they are assured maintenance

of the schools and most of the privileges they now enjoy including

APO and PX and commissary for the first 5 years. If they leave the

company they are entitled to preference for another Government

job some place else.

Mr. GOODLING. One final statement. From the beginning I felt

you were moving in the right direction. And I feel strongly now the

treaty is good. I cannot see how anyone can oppose the treaty on the

basis we are going to spread communism through the area, or impose

a dictatorship, because our statements of policy and our negotiators

have done a good job in keeping democracy spreading in that area

and helping not to bring in communism. So I wholeheartedly support

your effort.

Secretary VANCE. Thank you.

U.S. RESPONSIBILITY FOR PANAMANIAN EMPLOYEES

Mr. BURKE. Would you yield?

Why is it necessary we guarantee jobs to the Panamanians if they

are citizens of Panama and Panama will operate the canal?

Mr. LINOwITz. We were talking of American citizens.

Mr. BURKE. Don't we assume the responsibility of the Panamanian

employees after the treaty goes into effect to find new jobs for them

or to guarantee their status and aren't they being paid by the United

States?

Mr. LINOwITZ. The Panamanian Government is responsible for

what happens to the Panamanian employees.

Mr. BURKE. I don't mean to be argumentative, but I will find it,

there was a statement made here before the committee before when

I asked the question or in a statement I have before me, that indicates

that the Panamanians-and there are 1,000 some of them-will be

transferred and their jobs will be guaranteed, I presume, by us.

Mr. LINOwITZ. I don't know where that reference would be, sir.

Mr. BURKE. Maybe I can find it before you leave.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. The time of the gentlemen from Pennsylvania

has expired.

Mrs. Pet tis.

Mrs. PETTIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
393

CANAL REVENUES AND EXPENSES

Mr. Secretary, since the Panama Canal has been running at a deficit

for the last few years and the new treaty is not providing new appropriations from Congress, where will the money to pay the increased

payments come from?

Secretary VANCE. Let me comment in general terms and then

ask Ambassador Bunker to comment more specifically.

There will have to be increases in the canal tolls in order to get the

increased funds which are necessary and that will be done. The treaty

does provide that the tolls and other charges shall be just and reasonable, but it does not say that you can't increase the tolls when necessary.

It will be necessary to increase the tolls and perhaps Ambassador

Bunker will expand on what I am saying.

Mr. BUNKER. As the Secretary said, some increase in tolls will be

necessary. How much, it is difficult to tell at this moment until we

know particularly what the increased traffic will be from Alaskan oil.

Depending on that, there may be an increase of somewhere around 25

to 30 percent. I think you mentioned the deficit that has occurred

in the canal operations. That was due in part to some falling off in

traffic due to the worldwide depression and opening of the Suez Canal

and the fact the tolls have not been raised to keep abreast of inflation.

It happens they were raised, and the indications are, the estimates are, that the operations will show a surplus this year.

Mrs. PETTIS. Thank you.

IMPACT OF INCREASED TOLLS

Since we have established then that tolls must be raised, what effect

will the economic terms of the treaty and the need for these increased

tolls have on our Latin American neighbors who are the most critical

users of the Panama Canal?

Mr. BUNKER. Raising the tolls to the extent mentioned will not

affect appreciably the traffic of the canal or the Panamanian canal

users, all of whom are supporting the treaty.

Mr. LINOwITZ. Let me add a word on this question, if I may, so it

is clearly on the record. We think there are two other sources for

additional funds for making payments to Panama. There will be a

construction in the Panama Canal that we think will be a savings and

be available for these payments.

Second, there have been payments of $20 million a year interest to

the United States on the original investments in the canal. If need be, that $20 million reserve could be used for Panama if other funds were

not available. It is a combination of the three, the tolls savings and the

$20 million hitherto designated as interest. We believe it will be

possible to avoid coming to Congress for appropriations.

Mr. GILMAN. Will the gentlelady yield?

Assuming there is not an increase in canal traffic as a result of the

Alaskan oil and, thus, these other funds are not available and assuming

that you do have these additional capital improvements needed in the

next 20 or 30 years, and that there are other continuing necessities

that arise, will you then have to go to Congress for additional appropriations if the contingency funds do not meet the needs?
394

Mr. LINOWITZ. The capitalization has been made without planning

to increase the funds from Alaskan oil. The capitalization assumes

there will be enough funds coming from the canal.

Mr. GILMAN. The Secretary suggested he did not anticipate increased utilization of the canal and you are saying you are depending

on increased utilization of the canal. Isn't there an inconsistency in

these statements?

Secretary VANCE. I do not know whether there will or will not be

increased utilization from Alaskan oil. That remains to be seen. What

I said is that we had-the amounts we used the canal had decreased

so it was only about 8 percent of our total shipping now as compared

to a higher figure in the past.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. The gentlelady may retrieve her time.

Mr. GILMAN. I thank the gentlelady for a yielding.

IMPACT OF TREATIES ON CANAL OPERATIONS

Mrs. PETTIS. In one of your statements you predicted the treaties

will make the canal easier to operate. If there is one aspect of our involvement with the Panama Canal without a critic it has been our

unbiased, efficient and economic record in the canal. How will this

record be improved by these treaties?

Secretary VANCE. With the time that we will have during the remaining period of years up until the year 2000 to train additional Panamanian employees, I think we can expect that they will be adequately

trained and, therefore, will be able to carry on with the same degree of

efficiency that we have in the past. I think in terms of the atmosphere

that will exist in terms of the stake, the enhanced stake the Panamanians will have, it will assure that a climate will exist which will

indeed make it easier to operate in the future, because it will be in the

interest of the Panamanians to see that it does operate both efficiently

and in a way that will be acceptable to all the people.

Mr. PETTIS. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have no further questions.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Mr. Bingham.

Mr. BINGHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SUPPORT FOR THE TREATIES

I just have one question, but before I ask that question I would like

to say that I think that our negotiators, Ambassador Bunker and Ambassador Linowitz have performed a great national service. I think that

those who are interested in preserving the availability of the Panama

Canal for this country to use in future years are terribly misguided in

thinking they will serve that interest if they resist the ratification of

these treaties.

I think only by these treaties can we preserve the availability of the

canal for the United States and its allies. In fact, to be sure of it under

any circumstances, but we have a better chance to know it will be open

to us and our friends if these treaties are ratified.

COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN PANAMA

One question. Mr. Secretary, on page 8 of your statement you say

there is little Communist influence in Panama today. Earlier during
395

these hearings a former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Moorer

asserted: "There is now a Castro-Torrijo,-Moscow axis." Would you

care to comment on that statement and is there any evidence of a

formal or informal alliance of that kind? What is the extent of Cuban

and Soviet presence in Panama?

Secretary VANCE. I have a great (leal of respect for Admiral Moorer,

but disagree with him on this. As far as the Soviet Union is concerned

they have neither diplomatic or trade relations with Panama at this

time. They did indeed send a trade mission of some five people down

recently to talk about the possibilities of opening up trade in the future.

We trade with the Soviet Union. To me this is not a matter of major

concern that indicates any axis between the Soviet Union and Panama.

Insofar as Cuba is concerned, Cuba is a Caribbean nation which

does have relations with many other countries in the Caribbean. I

don't think there is any basis I know of to indicate that they have

any special influence insofar as Panama is concerned, indeed, quite to

the contrary.

Mr. BINGHAM. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Mr. Harrington.

Mr. HARRINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES IN THE NEGOTIATIONS

This is addressed to any one of you who cares to respond to it.

One of the drearier episodes, or at least one I read in the press as

to what is ongoing and is something that should never have happened,

that has been referred to is that of the National Security Agency

being a, part of what was employed by this Government as a resource

in the lengthy conduct of negotiations with the Panamanians over the

last few years.

I don't know of the total lack of statements made, one attributed

to the NSA recently by Jack Anderson, but I would like you to address

it in terms of what damage that could have in terms of what your

broader objective is, some effort of dealing with increasing nationalism

in the rest of the Western Hemisphere. If so, is that sort of thing needed

and justifiable?

Secretary VANCE. I don't know what Mr. Anderson said. I took a

quick look at the column this morning.

Mr. HARRINGTON. It is not so much what he said this morning,

but the reference to the NSA or in some fashion other agencies.

Secretary VANCE. I really believe it would be inappropriate for me

to comment about intelligence matters in an open session, Mr.

Harrington, or Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HARRINGTON. If you have responded to them elsewhere, I am

perfectly willing to look at that record. I have not gotten the impres- sion that has been the case.

Secretary VANCE. I think there has been testimony on this before

other committees. I would be glad to testify in closed session or ask

one of my colleagues who has testified before another committee with

respect to this issue. to do so here.

Mr. LINOwITZ. Both Ambassador Bunker and I did appear before

the Senate Intelligence Committee which undertook to investigate

allegations there had been bugging or tapping involved in the negotiations. The findings of that committee, as you know, was that there
396

was no evidence or any reason to believe that any such activities in

any way affected the results of these negotiations. So it is quite clear

if there were such activities they had no effect on these negotiations.

Mr. HARRINGTON. My concern was not so much as to whether they

would have affected the negotiations. It was in fact the broader issue

imposed by the levels of integrity, using this country as one example

and other countries as another, when you begin to put that sort of

information in order, people who have anticipated this in a variety of

roles. I would like someone to address that apparent dichotomy of

what we say we are and what often is the case in this instance.

Secretary VANCE. I would prefer to discuss that in a closed session.

Mr. HARRINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Mr. Burke.

Mr. BURKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SEA LEVEL CANAL

Mr. Secretary, I am rather surprised that you didn't in your statement touch on the fact that you have precluded the United States

from negotiating at any time for a sea level canal I presume you are

looking forward to in the possible future. Could you tell me why this

was not touched upon in detail?

Secretary VANCE. High-level canal?

Mr. BURKE. Sea level canal.

Secretary VANCE. The sea level canal was covered in the negotiations.

Mr. BURKE. I am talking about your statement, because that is

something the American people, I believe, would like to know. Why

are we precluded as a nation from negotiating with any other country

in Latin Ameiica should another canal be necessary.

Secretary VANCE. Let me respond and then ask one of my colleagues

to expand on what I have said. The subject was discussed in the negotiations. It was covered. There was provision made in the treaty, as

you know, for a study to be made as to whether or not it would be

desirable to have a sea level canal. Depending upon the results of that

study, there will be consultation between ourselves and Panama.

Mr. BURKE. Yes, but the point is, and I am aware of that, but the

treaty also provides that Panama can veto any conclusion that we

might make.

Secretary VANCE. And we have precluded them in the treaty from

building any new interoceanic canal in the territory of Panama

except in accordance with the provisions of this treaty agreement,

which means it has to be (lone with us and if we don't agree with it

they can't do it. In return for that they asked for a quid pro quo and

the quid pro quo was that we not build anywhere else during this

period of time.

I would add in addition we -have (lone surveys on the best place to

build a canal. They were (lone as recently as 1975 and they showed

Panama was the best place to put in a sea level canal.

Mr. BURKE. I thought Lyndon Johnson said it should be in Colombia.

Secretary VANCE. No; he did not.
397

Chairman ZABLOCKI. The Chair would like to announce there is a

vote on the floor. The committee will remain in session while other

members go and then I will go vote when other members return from

voting.

You may continue, Mr. Burke.

TMPACT OF THE TREATIES ON OPERATION AND DEFENSE OF THE CANAL

Mr. BURKE. Mrs. Pettis touched on this. You said the treaty

makes it easier to operate and def end the canal. When you use the

word "easier," what conclusions and what comparison did you make to

reach those conclusions?

Secretary VANCE. I think if we do not get a new canal, it will become increasingly difficult to operate the canal because of the dissatisfaction that exists and will continue to increase in the future.

With a new treaty, a new base, I think it will be easier to operate a

canal.

In terms of the defense of the canal, it is clearly provided that we

have the responsibility for the defense of the canal through the year

2000. Thereafter we have a clear right to defend the canal in the

event that there is any jeopardy to the openness of the canal.

Finally, I would add that because Panama has a stake in the

canal, an increased stake, I think it is very, very clear that the cooperation that one can expect from simple, practical self-interest will

be much greater.

CANAL REVENUES

Mr. BURKE. Let me ask one more question. On page 7 of your

statement you state that the U.S. view prevails under the treaties.

Panama will receive payments that more nearly reflect the fact that

it is making available its major natural resource, its territory, but the

treaties should not-I emphasize should not require new appropriations of tax money.

Secretary VANCE. Yes, Sir.

Mr. BURKE. I sense the canal has been running at a deficit for the

past number of years. How do you propose we raise the money and

who will guarantee it for Panama?

Secretary VANCE. As Mr. Linowitz indicated earlier, it will be

coming from basically two sources, and the two sources are increased

revenues through increased tolls and, second, through increased

efficiency of operation by spinning off some of the parts that were

inefficiently operated.

Mr. BURKE. Presently it has been a deficit and if suggested raises

are not sufficient how

Secretary VANCE. We will have to deal with that at the time it

comes.

Mr. BURKE. How would you deal with it? Wouldn't it come from

the taxpayer?

Secretary VANCE. You might have to further increase the tolls.

That is one way you could deal with it. I cannot, you know, say

that under no circumstances, forever would there be no possibility of

an appropriation. What I am saying, and I think I was quite careful

in the words I chose there on page 7, I said should not require, rather

than would not.
Chairman ZABLOCKI. The Chair would like to advise that the

committee will be in recess very briefly until the return of Congressman Bingham who will assume the Chair and the hearing will continue.

We will recess the meeting until after he votes.

The hearing is in suspension.

[Whereupon, a brief recess was taken.]

Mr. BINGHAM [presiding]. The committee will resume its gessiott.

Mr. Solarz.

SUPPORT FOR THE TREATIES

Mr. SOLARZ. As you know, it is popular among politicians, sometimes even among Congressmen, to keep their options open. However,

I would like to come out of the political closet, as it were, at least on

this one, and say that I think this treaty is a great achievement, I

think you and Ambassadors Bunker and Linowitz can take great pride

from it. I am somewhat amazed that you have gotten much more

criticism than compliments with respect to the treaty because I think

it really does recognize the prevailing realities, adjusts our relationship

with Panama and the rest of Latin America, and preserves our interests in the Panama Canal.

As my good friend said earlier, you have not yet convinced the majority of the American people as to the good of the treaty. I think according

to the polls that is true. I think what my good friend neglected to say

is, it is not your job alone to convince them. I think those of us here

who followed this closely and understand the enormous problems to

be created for our country if the treaties were not ratified have the

obligation to go back to our people and explain the facts of life to them.

If I have any complaints about this treaty, it is the fact Ambassadors

Bunker and Linowitz did too good a job in representing our interests

and from the aspect of the Panamanian this may not look like such a

good deal. This leads to my first question.

PANAMANIAN REFERENDUM

To what extent is the treaty in trouble in Panama? They have a

system whereby it is supposed to be ratified by referendum. It would

be a peculiar and paradoxical situation if, after all we have gone

through here, it were rejected over there.

Secretary VANCE. Let me respond to that and thank you for what

you have said, Mr. Solarz. They are shortly to have their referendum

on the treaty. I believe it is on the 23d. It is our best information that

it will receive approval by the Panamanian people. It would be foolhardy of me to try and speculate on what that vote might be, but I

can say it is our best information that the Panamanian Government

expects approval by the ratification vote, mainly in the referendum

vote.

Mr. LINOWITZ. It should be noted in connection with the plebiscite

there has been fuller debate and discussion in Panama than there

has been in the last decade. The opposition has mounted a strong

stand and been given freedom of t he press to express its position.

Quite clearly there will be a sizable indication of opposition and also

the United Nations has agreed to send observers to the plebiscite
399

and some of the OAS Americans have been invited to attend to

assure that the Panamanians are allowed to express their opinions.

Mr. SOLARZ. Has the referendum been phrased in the terms of a yes

or no proposition-that is, are the Panamanians being asked whether

they approve or disapprove the treaty, by voting yes or no?

Secretary VANCE. It is yes or no.

Mr. SOLARZ. Has the President loaned General Torrijos the services

of Pat Cadell to assure that they are fair in that sense?

In the negotiations you did not persuade the Panamanians to take

over Gowands Canal in Brooklyn

Mr. LINOwITZ. We have had similar offers from--

U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE IN PANAMA

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Secretary, I was struck in reading the Israeli

press by a number of prominent figures in Israel saying that if the

Panamanian treaty insists on the right to maintain a military presence

in Panama for the next 23 years, why shouldn't, Israel be entitled to

maintain a presence on the West Bank for the next 23 years, particularly in light of the fact the West Bank is far more closely related

to the security of Israel than the Panama Canal is to the security

of the United States.

I wonder if you see an analogy in this question and how would you

respond?

Secretary VANCE. I would respond by saying that is a question to be

negotiated by the parties when they get to Geneva.

Mr. SOLARZ. Perhaps we could loan Ambassadors Linowitz and

Bunker to the U.S. delegation. If they could do for them what they

have done here, we would not have any problem in the least.

Mr. BINGHAM. Mr. Gilman.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you.

RESERVATIONS ON THE TREATIES

Mr. Secretary, I want to compliment you on your efforts to educate

this Nation concerning the benefits to accrue from acceptance of this

treaty; and wish similarly to compliment your two colleagues who

have been so diligently involved in the negotiations.

Frankly, I have some serious reservations about the administiation's canal policies an( the proposed treaties relating to the canal.

While I fully appreciate the needs for a revision of existing terms for

providing for more reasonable financial return to Panama, for the

return of possibly some of the excess land in the Canal Zone and for

providing for a higher pi oportion of Panamanians who are involved

in the operation of the canal I am not convinced of the need or the

wisdom of walking away from the canal entirely by the year 2000.

I think we should have explored some other options, some options

of possibly providing foi continual revision of terms, and extending

the treaty and not the proposed termination by the year 2000, of U.S.

authority in the Canal Zone.

I think that we have yielded to the threat of civil disorder too

readily. I believe we have important economic and strategic interests

in the canal which should be preserved and protected.

98-991 0 - 78 - 27
400

ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE OF THE CANAL

For example, I would like to explore with you the economic significance of the canal to which today you attributed a diminishing

importance. I think you stated in your earlier testimony that the

commercial importance of the canal has diminished as world patterns

in shipping and technology have changed.

With the current transit rate of approximately some 13,000 ships

per year, the future usage projections indicate an increase of up to

26,000 transits by the year 2000. The economic benefits from the

canal usage as opposed to the added 18,000 mile trip around the cape

is certainly still a significant factor. It has been estimated that of all

the cargo that transits the canal in ships of all nations, about 60 or 70

percent are bound to U.S. ports and well over half of all the ships using

the canal are coming or going from the United States.

I think it is difficult to downplay the economic importance to the

United States at a time when Alaskan oil has begun to flow south.

When the Alaskan pipeline reaches its fullest capacity, the west

coast will be unable to accommodate the entire volume, and it is

estimated that by the year 1980, 45 percent of our Alaskan oil will be

shipped through the canal to the east coast. The added commerce will

result in more than 700 added transits of oil by 1982.

I think the treaty has sprung from an overemphasis of a diminution

of the canal's economic importance and I believe the canal treaty

leaves a lot to be desired.

I think it will become more and more important to us, and I would

ask you to comment on that aspect.

Secretary VANCE. I commented first in my statement on the facts

and the facts are that the commercial importance of the canal has diminished as of this moment as compared with the past insofar as we are

concerned. I went on to say "Nonetheless we must protect our commercial interests in the canal," and I went on to describe what those

interests were and how we were going to continue to protect them.

The most important thing in protecting them is to keep the canal

open and secure and efficiently operated for the indefinite future. And

I think by achieving the new treaty we have made a major step

forward in assuring that this is going to be true in terms of our commercial interests for the future.

The commercial interests of our country I think are fully protected

and if, as we all hope but don't know, the traffic in the canal increases,

so much the better. That would be splendid.

I do not want to diminish in any way the importance of the canal

as an important commercial interest of the United States, nor do I

want to diminish the importance of it from the standpoint of security

interests. They are important.

What I am saying is I think our main task is to be sure that that

canal remains open and secure through the future and I think what we

have done with these two treaties is to accomplish that.

Mr. GILMAN. I think, too, you have said in the past, and we continually keep hearing the argument, that this treaty improves our

image in Latin America. Other Latin Americans perceive this as an

extremely important issue.

Secretary VANCE. I have, yes, sir.
401

LATIN AMERICAN SUPPORT FOR THE TREATIEs

Mr. GILMAN. In your statement, it is the original treaty that has

to be changed. And you talk about some of our closest friends having

endorsed this. You point out some five nations, Venezuela, Costa Rica.,

Colombia, Mexico, and Jamaica have endorsed the treaty in August.

Wasn't it true we invited all nations to participate and some 20

declined the invitation?

Secretary VA NCE. No.

Mr. GILMAN. What was the situation? I was informed other nations

were invited and many refused to take part.

Secretary VANCE. What you are talking about, those nations all

participated in a special meeting in Bogota and they all appeared and

at that time met with the Pan amanians and issued a statement which

I have referred to there. At the time of the canal signing when we

signed the treaties we invited the various nations and all but about

one from the whole area came and participated. We had a chance to

talk with the leaders of each one of those countries and they were

unanimous in stressing the importance of a new treaty and commended

the fact that we had been able to negotiate these new treaties.

Mr. GILMAN. My time is up.

Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Thank you, \fr. Chairman.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. As I stated at the beginning of the meeting,

the Secretary has a very important engagement that he has to attend

at 1 o'clock. We are deeply grateful, Mr. Secretary, Ambassador

Bunker, and Ambassador Linowitz, for your testimony before the

committee today. It was most helpful. We look forward to the replies

you will provide to questions from members who were unable to be

here and those that time would not permit for them to ask.

Those will be provided for the record.

Thank you again.

The committee stands adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.

[Whereupon, at 12:47 p.m., the committee adjourned, subject to

the call of the Chair.]

APPENDIX 1

STAFF SUMMARY OF THE ISSUES, PRO AND CON ON THE PANAMA

CANAL TREATIES

The following is a summary of the major issues involving the Panama

Canal Treaties as propounded by the proponents and opponents of the

Treaties in testimony before the Committee on International Relations

on September 8, 14, 15, 20, 26, 28, and October 11 and 20, 1977. The

summary is not intended to represent a judgment or conclusion with

respect to each of the issues nor is it intended to represent a

position for or against the Treaties. The purpose of the summary is

to provide Members of Congress and the public in general a concise

analysis of the issues as developed in the committee hearings and to

provide information preparatory to the consideration by Congress of

legislation to implement the Treaties assuming their approval in the

Senate.

(403)
404

OVERVIEW

Proponents - U.S. interests in the Panama Canal are manifested in

assuring that the Canal remain secure and open to the United States and

its trading partners and allies on a neutral and non-discriminatory basis;

that is, in its use, not in its ownership. The Treaties will protect

these interests in the long run better than the current arrangement.

Opponents - Only continued direct U.S. control of the Canal can

provide adequately for the protection of U.S. economic and national

security interests in the Canal.

SECURITY ASPECTS OF THE CANAL

Importance to U.S. National Defense

Opponents - The Panama Canal remains an important link in the

U.S. national defense chain. It was a crucial part of U.S. military

supply during both World Wars, the Korean War, and during the Vietnam

War. The Canal saves approximately 8,000 miles and 25-30 days transit

time between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. During the Vietnam War,

military vessels transiting the Canal reached a high of 1,504 in

1968. Such access for U.S. warships and supply vessels can only be

maintained with the United States in complete control of Canal

operations. Admiral Thomas E. Moorer, former Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff, testified that the United States no longer has a

"two-ocean" Navy since the number of ships in active commission has been
405

reduced from over 900 to fewer than 500. He noted that, in contrast,

the Soviets have rapidly expanded their fleet of warships as well as

merchant ships. He argued that a large part of U.S. war and contingency

plans are not feasible unless the full use of the Canal is assured. He

pointed out that over 90 percent of the Navy's ships can transit the

Canal.

Proponents - Treaty supporters do not dispute the Canal's importance to U.S. military requirements but maintain that the Treaties

provide the best guarantee that the Canal will be available for U.S.

military use if the movement of forces and supplies becomes necessary

in the future. However, proponents argue that the magnitude of the

Canal's military importance has diminished in recent years. They cite

the recent reductions in U.S. international commitments, particularly

since the end of the war in Vietnam. Treaty proponents also point to

the fact that naval task forces located in various parts of the world

can respond rapidly to trouble spots without using the Canal, and that,

while the Canal is still important to the Navy's mobility, it cannot

accommodate 13 attack and 4 anti-submarine aircraft carriers nor can

nuclear submarines transit the Canal without surfacing. Finally, Treaty

supporters contend that, because of the Canal's extreme vulnerability

to rocket or missile attack, the Canal cannot be realistically relied upon

as an indispensible military asset during wartime.
406

Defense of the Canal

Opponents - The Treaty requirement that the United States remove

its military bases and personnel from the Canal Zone by the year 2000

would severely restrict U.S. ability to defend the Canal. It is far

better to have forces on the ground in the Canal Zone than to be

forced to retake the Canal with an expeditionary force. U.S. forces

are better trained and equipped and are more experienced than their

Panamanian counterparts with respect to the defense of the Canal.

Any action under the Treaties would place the United States in the

position of "invader" thereby subjecting it to adverse international

opinion.

Proponents - It is almost impossible to defend the Canal

against certain types of attack of sabotage even with the U.S. military

forces presently stationed in the Canal Zone. Until the year 2000,

the United States has the primary responsibility for the defense

of the Canal, and is not precluded under the Treaties from reaching

an agreement with Panama to continue a U.S. military presence thereafter. While prepositioned U.S. forces would be an asset in any

defense of the Canal, they are not essential. Moreover, the United

States is perfectly capable of transporting troops from the United

States to Panama in adequate numbers and in sufficient strength to

defend the Canal. In any event, the current U.S. military complement

of about 9,000 troops would require a substantial augmentation from the

United States if a major defense is necessary.
40)7

U.S. Rights Under the Neutrality Treaty

Opponents - The Neutrality Treaty is vague and does not specifically state that the United States has the right to independently

defend the Canal against all actions which would threaten its neutrality.

As for the Statement of Understanding, the document was not signed

by either party and is not a part of the Treaty. As such, it

represents only the views of the present Panamanian leadership and

could be disavowed by some future Panamanian Government. Finally,

neither the Neutrality Treaty nor the Statement of Understanding is

clear with respect to the right of the United States to defend the

neutrality of the Canal in the event that Panama itself were to be

the aggressor.

Proponents - Under the terms of Articles IV and VI of the

Neutrality Treaty, the United States and Panama agree to maintain

the neutrality of the Canal and to permit U.S. military and auxiliary

vessels to transit the Canal expeditiously. A subsequent "Statement

of Understanding" reached between President Carter and President

Torrijos on October 14, 1977 clarifies the Neutrality Treaty as

giving both the United States and Panama the right to:

".defend the Canal against any threat to the regime of

neutrality, and consequently shall have the right to act

against any aggression or threat directed against the Canal

or against the peaceful transit of vessels through the Canal.
408

"This does not mean, nor shall it be interpreted as a right of

intervention of the United States in the internal affairs of

Panama. Any United States action will be directed at insuring

that the Canal will remain open, secure and accessible, and

it shall never be directed against the territorial integrity

or political independence of Panama."

With respect to the right of expeditious passage of U.S.

military vessels, the Statement of Understanding provides that such

vessels shall transit the Canal "as quickly as possible, without any

impediment, with expedited treatment, and in case of need of emergency,

to go to the head of the line of vessels in order to transit the Canal

rapidly."

According to U.S. negotiators, the terms of the Neutrality

Treaty together with the Statement of Understanding clearly sets

forth the right of the United States to take appropriate actions,

unilaterally if necessary, to defend the neutrality of the Canal.

The Statement of Understanding will be filed as an ancillary document

to the Treaty and, as such,is binding on both governments.

Internal Security

Opponents - Under the existing Treaty, U.S. troops and Canal

Zone police protect the internal security of the Canal. The Treaties

require the removal of such forces, leaving the security of the Canal

in the hands of the Panamanian National Guard. The Guard may not be

capable of defending the Canal and, for political reasons, cannot be
409

trusted to maintain the Canal's neutral status. While it is true

that the Canal's vulnerability to some forms of attack and sabotage

is the same under the current arrangement as it would be under the

Treaties, it is clearly more advantageous to have U.S. security

forces in place to protect the Canal.

Proponents - Defense Secretary Harold Brown, and other experts

in the national security community are of the opinion that the

Panamanian National Guard will be capable of defending the internal

security of the Canal as this responsibility is transferred to Panama.

The current U.S. security assistance program for Panama is designed

to provide the National Guard the wherewithal to defend the Canal.

In conjunction with the treaty negotiations, the United States pledged

its best efforts to provide Panama $50 million in foreign military

sales credits over a ten year period in order to insure that the

National Guard is adequately euqipped to maintain the Canal's security.

Moreover, proponents contend that the atmosphere which would result

from the acceptance of the Treaties would make acts of terror and

sabotage against the Canal far less likely than they would be if the

status quo were to continue.

Access

Opponents - The U.S. must maintain control of the Canal in order

to be able to assure access to the Canal for itself and its allies and

to be able to deny access to enemy nations in time of war.
410

Proponents - In past hostilities, the U.S. has never actually

denied access to the Canal to vessels of enemy nations. The ability

of the U.S. to sink hostile enemy ships at either end of the Canal

has kept them from using the Canal. The Neutrality Treaty, under

which the U.S. and Panama -- and all signatory states -- guarantee

the neutrality of the Canal, adequately assures the United States and

its allies access to the Canal.

ECONOMIC ISSUES

Opponents - The Panama Canal is still of vital economic importance

to the United States. In spite of the fact that in 1976 only 9% of

all transits were by U.S. flag vessels, 66% of the tonnage was transiting

to or from U.S. ports. Some 921 U.S. merchant ships (96% of the total)

can transit the Canal, and some 25,000 of the total world fleet of some

27,000 vessels of 1,000 or more gross tons can transit the Canal. The

Canal's economic importance to the U.S. is actually increasing because

it is currently the only means of transporting surplus Alaskan oil to

the East Coast. The current transit rate is approximately some 13,000

ships per.year, and it is projected that the rate will reach 26,000

ships by the year 2000. The United States has a responsibility to
411

ensure that Latin American neighbors continue to have a neutral, open,

and economical Canal since their economics depend far more on the

Canal. Canal economics have high impact on regional and state

economies not reflected in the U.S. average. The Canal is much more

important, for example, to Texas and Nevada, two states whose tonnage

percentage is much higher than the national average.

Proponents - No one questions that the Panama Canal is important

to the economic interests of the United States. However, it is not

as important as it once was. For example, 8% of U.S. foreign trade

was transported through the canal in 1976, compared to 13% in 1949,

and 4% of U.S. intercoastal trade transits the Canal. Notwithstanding

this decrease in activity, the Canal is of important economic value

to the United States and its closure would increase transportation

costs to U.S. trade. The Treaties should be supported, not because

of the declining U.S. economic interests in the Canal, but because

they are the best means of protecting those economic interests.

Sea Level Canal

Opponents - The Treaties prohibit the United States from building

a sea level canal elsewhere in the hemisphere without the consent of

Panama and provide no rights to build one in Panama, but merely provide

for the right to jointly study the feasibility with Panama. Since

current economics would not encourage a sea level canal, why restrict
412

U.S. options that could be a lever in any future negotiations. Under

the Treaties, U.S. hands are completely tied from any alternatives

that may present themselves for the next 23 years.

Proponents - The Treaties also give the U.S. a veto over any

decision by Panama to construct another canal with the assistance of

a third nation. Further, this provision is not as restrictive as it

may appear given the following considerations: (1) the current transit

rate of the Panama Canal is 34 vessels a day, while it could handle over

45 vessels a day; (2) the construction of another Pacific-to-Atlantic

canal seems unlikely in the next several decades; and (3) feasibility

studies have indicated that Panama would be the best location to construct a sea level canal.

NATURE OF THE PANAMANIAN GOVERNMENT

Dictatorship

Opponents - The Government of General Omar Torrijos Herrera is a

dictatorship which cannot claim to represent the Panamanian people.

How do we know a future government, representative of the people, will

not disavow the Treaties? Current treaty problems came about because

the treaty claim was not a product of the people of Panama, but one man.

Future generations can make the same argument about the proposed Treaties.
413

Proponents - The nature of the government is irrelevant to the

issue of the Treaties. Given current international political realities,

if the United Stated did not enter into treaties with governments because of their authoritarian nature, the U.S. would be party to very

few treaties and agreements. The Treaties will be binding on any

future government, no matter whit its composition. Past Panamanian

Governments have abided by the 1903 Treaty, a treaty much less

favorable to Panama, so there is no reason to believe some future

government will not abide by the proposed Treaties.

Human Rights

Opponents - The Torrijos Government has violated human rights.

Panamanian exiles, in testimony to the Committee, contended that political

rights in Panama are severely limited and that torture is practiced in

Panamanian jails. The January 1977 Freedom House report judges Panama

to be among the worst violators of human rights in Latin America,

placing it behind Chile and Cuba.

Proponents - There is no question that the Torrijos Government has

a history of human rights violations. However, the most serious violations in question occurred mainly before 1970 and have not been of

the magnitude found in several other Latin American nations. Freedom

House, despite its rating of Panama, has endorsed the treaties as fair
414

and just. Other organizations concerned with human rights, such as

Amnesty International, have not listed Panama in recent years as one

of the serious violators of human rights, and the OAS Inter-American

Commission on Human Rights has been invited by Torrijos to investigate

the human rights situation on site in Panama. Furthermore, the issue

of human rights is irrelevant to the Treaties. As expressed in

testimony before the International Realtions Committee by the Reverend

Leo T. Mahon, who lived and worked in Panama from 1962 to 1974:

"The issue of human rights re the Panama treaties: who is

raising the issue? First of all, Panamanian exiles, some

of whom are in this chamber this morning. They are friends

of mine, my heart goes out to them. I am consoled by the

fact that my country has offered them asylum and so they join

the other victims of socio-political change and injustice:

Cubans, Chinese,Chileans, Hungarians - and before that White

Russians, etc. The fact remains however, bitter for them and

also for us, that their peoples are governed and represented by

de facto governments with whom we must deal and at times make

treaties."

"There are also good, honest Americans who are concerned by the

violation of human rights anywhere, anytime. I admire that but

I also wish to remind them that in this case, justice is the

overriding issue. If I owe a man a hundred dollars, then I may

not say to him 'I shall repay my debt if you stop abusing your

wife.' I may wish to scold him but I may not in justice withhold

that which I owe him.

"Lastly, it seems to me that there are those who violently oppose

the treaty and use whatever ansiliary issue to defeat its ratification. Aren't these some of the people who claimed 'states'

rights' and tried to deny the right of the federal government

to intervene in a state which was denying civic and human rights

to some of its citizens? Would these people ever, ever grant

another country the right to intervene in ours? Why then do we

demand that right in the case of Panama?"
415

OPERATIONS OF THE CANAL

Capability

Opponents - Panama is a small, unstable country which lacks the

ability to either operate the Canal efficiently or insure its continued

protection without U.S. support. There are not enough skilled Panamanians qualified to operate the Canal. Panamanian operation would

subject the Canal to political operation that could result in diversion

of needed funds and to deal with domestic social or political pressures

in Panama. One aspect of past operations that is without a critic is

the record of U.S. management of the Canal in insuring open, economical,

and non-discriminatory use by all.

Proponents - Panama is one of the more stable countries in Latin

America, and with U.S. economic and military assistance over the next

23 years it will gain the ability to maintain the Canal on its own.

The U.S. will retain the right to protect the Canal if its neutrality

is endangered. Seventy percent of the Canal work force currently is

Panamanian; with the proper training over the next two decades, Panamanians will be able to operate the Canal. The present lack of qualified

Panamaians is the result of U.S. administration that has prevented

Panamanian participation.

Tolls

Opponents - Panamanians are likely either to let the Canal run

down so as to endanger its continued functioning or raise tolls so

high as to make its use uneconomic. Latin American countries passed

98-991 0 - 78 - 28
416

an OAS resolution this year against the toll structure Panama is

seeking. Moreover, U.S. customers will pay hidden taxes from toll

increases on Alaskan oil transit costs and other consumer products.

Proponents - The Canal is Panama's economic lifeline, so the

Panamanian Government is unlikely to allow it to fall into disrepair;

competing means of transportation -- the U.S. landbridge, supertankers,

sailing around South America -- are not much more expensive now than

using the Canal, so there is a comparatively low economic ceiling on

the amount by which tolls can be raised. Furthermore, the U.S.

controls tolls until the year 2000.

Communist Influence

Opponents - Several witnesses based their opposition to the

Treaties on alleged pro-Communist orientation of the Panamanian

Government and the existence of a "Torrijos-Castro-Moscow Axis",

as evidenced by Torrijos' visit to Cuba in 1976 and by the recent

visit of a Soviet trade mission to Panama. As stated by Admiral

Thomas Moorer, "do not be surprised that is this treaty is ratified

in its present form to see a Soviet and/or Cuban presence quickly

established in the country of Panama."

Proponents - Proponents of the Treaties, including two former

Secretaries of State and the current Secretary of Defense, deny the

existence of any undue Communist presence or influence in Panama.
417

Soviet relations with Panama are similar to trade and diplomatic

relations between the U.S.S.R. and the United States. Many American

political leaders have visited Cuba, and, during his visit, Torrijos

said that: "Communism is not for Panama."

According to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance,

"The first point to remember is that there is little communist

influence in Panama today -- and that the most likely way to

create an atmosphere in which such influences could grow would

be continued disagreement with Panama over the Canal."

Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger made the same point in

stating:

"I don't know of any better or quicker way to radicalize

politics in Panama or in some other countries in the hemisphere

than for use to reject these two treaties.'

NATURE OF CURRENT ARRANGEMENT

Sovereignty

Opponents - The Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty of 1903 and subsequent

legal precedents recognize U.S. sovereignty over the Panama Canal Zone

and there is no legal basis requiring the United States to give up

this territory. The U.S. bought the Zone the same way it bought Alaska

and the Louisiana Purchase -- no one is suggesting we would return them

to their original owners. The United States owns the land free and clear.
418

The United States paid for it fourt times over including purchase from

individual land owners of fee simple title to the land. The 1903 Treaty

extends all rights and privileges to the U.S. "to the total exclusion

of Panama."

Proponents - The 1903 Treaty ". grants to the United States all

the rights, power and authority within the (Canal) Zone . which the

United States would possess and exercise if it were the sovereign of

the territory.". The Treaty does not grant the U.S. sovereignty over

the Zone, it only grants it the powers as if it were sovereign.

Furthermore, the U.S. pays Panama an annuity for the Zone -- rent

for use of the territory -- while in cases of acquiring title to

terriroty it has paid an initial purchase price and no subsequent rent.

If the U.S. had held sovereignty over the Canal Zone, it would not

have entered into agreements with Panama altering its "rights" in

1936 and 1955.

Validity of Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty

Opponents - The U.S. has operated the Panama Canal Zone under the

Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty for more than seventy years. It has been

recognized by U.S. courts and by international law in general and continues to be an adequate basis for the protection of U.S. interests in

the Canal.
419

Proponents - According to former Secretary of State Dean Rusk,

two principles of law -- rebus sic stantibus (fundamental change of

circumstances) and jus congens (preeminence of new international legal

norms over former ones) -- make it questionable whether the 1903

Treaty could be successfully defended before the International Court

of Justice. Furthermore, the Treaty probably conflicts with the Preamble of the U.N. Charter, which recognizes "the equal rights . of

nations large and small."

Moral Considerations

Opponents - The Canal has benefitted Panamanians as well as

Americans. Panama has the highest per capita income in Central

Americ and fourth highest in all Latin America. U.S. presence through

troops and employees adds millions more. Alteration of the current

arrangement will simply put more money in the hands of the government

rather than in the hands of the people.

Proponents - As expressed by former Secretary Rusk, the Hay-BunauVarilla Treaty, negotiated for the new Panamanian nation by a Frenchman

with direct economic interests in the Treaty, is reminiscent of the

"unequal treaties" imposed on China by Western powers during the 19th

century. In the age of decolonization, the current treaty is simply

untenable. The U.S. should be proud of what it built in the Panama

Canal, but it should also adapt to changed international circumstances.
420

Opponents - The American presence has benefitted Panama's security

and financial well being, and the U.S. has nothing of which to be

ashamed.

Proponents - The glaring economic disparities between those

living in the Canal Zone and those living outside it require that the

current arrangement be altered. The Zone divides the country, and

smacks of colonialism.

Symbol

Opponents - The Treaties are a further sign of the retreat of

U.S. power. According to Representative Phillip Crane:

"The Panama Canal is a symbol - a symbol of America's

strength as a free nation and its willpower to act in

behalf of its better interests."

The United States cannot yield to Third World pressure or blackmail

as the major reason to accept new treaties. Any weakness will be used

as the example for future U.S. treaties or relations.

Proponents - Rather than the Treaties symbolizing a U.S. retreat,

former Secretary of State Kissinger testified that,

"It is not a question of 'giving' the Canal to Panama, it is a

question of the United States ability to distinguish between

symbol and reality, to plan for our future needs and to preserve

and, in fact, enhance our basic interest in the accessbility,

neutrality and security of the Canal.
421

International Diplomacy

Opponents - Failure to ratify the Treaties will not measurably

affect U.S.-Latin American relations. Some of those nations are not

in favor of the U.S. turning over the canal to Panama -- because they

are concerned that Panama will not manage the Canal properly -- and

the other nations will oppose our interests no matter what we do.

Proponents - Failure to ratify the Treaties will poison U.S.

relations with the entire southern part of the hemisphere and will

totally isolate the U.S. from its South American neighbors. It will

affect all other aspects of U.S.-Latin American relations.

OTHER ASPECTS OF THE PANAMA CANAL TREATIES

Transfer of U.S. Property by Treaty 

Opponents - Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2 of the Consitution

grants to "Congress" the power to dispose of property belonging to

the United States, so the Treaties cannot do so without the approval

of the House of Representatives. This section supercedes any other

provision of law. Opinions to the contrary by the Department of State

and Attorney General should be viewed in light of their position as

Executive branch representatives.

* Both sides cite precedents to bolster their arguments. Two suits

are pending currently in federal district court contesting the legality

of the Treaties in this regard.
422

Proponents - This constitutional provision exists along with the

Treaty power of Article II of the Constitution, under which the disposition of property belonging to the United States may be concluded

by treaty signed by the President and ratified by the Senate. The

Attorney General and Department of State have concluded opinions in

support of this Presidential power.

EMPLOYEES' RIGHTS

Opponents - The Treaties will result in the displacement of many

U.S. employees and their families.

Proponents - The Treaties and ancillary agreements provide for

the reduction in U.S. employees in a manner whereby most of the

reduction will occur through attrition or early retirement, and job

location assistance will be provided to any others displaced. Employee

benefits are protected under the Treaties.

Opponents - The Treaties will result in U.S. employees being subjected to the capricious nature of Panamanian law and the Panamanian

police and the loss of U.S. protection of civil and political rights.

Proponents - In the Annex to the Treaties, Article VI on Criminal

Jurisdiction goes into great detail assuring the legal protection for

U.S. citizens, including certain areas in which the U.S. can exercise

criminal jurisdiction, prompt notification of arrest, and visitation

rights.
423

FINANCIAL ASPECTS

Opponents - Panama should at least pay for the U.S. investment

in the Canal. Total investment is over $7 billion, including defense

and other related costs. At the year 2000, the U.S. will give up the

Canal without one cent in return for its investment that will have

reached over $9 billion including massive aid and payments to Panama.

Proponents - The U.S. has very little net investment in the

Canal. U.S. gross investments (payments made by the U.S. Treasury)

are $1.974 billion, $1.915 billion of which has been recovered,

leaving unrecovered investment in the Canal of $58.1 million. The

Canal's book value is $561.5 million. The U.S. could have easily

amortized the Canal with higher tolls; instead, the Canal Company

held tolls to a minimum to benefit world and U.S. commerce. No

one can deny that in over sixty years the U.S. has more than gotten

its money's worth from this investment.

Opponents - Not only do the Treaties give Panama the Canal, they

pay for that privilege by providing Panama $60 to $80 million annually

as follows: (1) a $10 million annual payment; (2) $0.30 per ton

transiting the Canal; (3) revenues permitting, another $10 million

apyment and (4) an annual fee of $10 million for services rendered.

Payments, while not direct U.S. funds, will be paid for in higher

tolls and indirect tax on goods to and from the Canal.
424

Proponents - First, these payments will come from the

U.S. taxpayer, they will come fron canal revenues. Second, the U.S.

has been paying Panama an annual annuity of only $2.3 million. Justice

requires that Panama receive greater financial benefit from the Canal.

The Treaties provide such benefit at no cost to the taxpayer. Third,

the '10 million for services rendered represents services such

as fire and police protection, street maintenance, and lighting, and

garbage collection -- all of which is currently being paid for from

Canal Company revenues.

Opponents - Current Canal Compay revenues are inadequate to cover

these expenses. Either increased tolls will be required, which will

reduce traffic, or Congressional appropriates will make up the shortfall.

Panama has stated it is under no obligation to keep the canal open if

it is losing money.

Proponents - It is estimated that a 25% gradual increase in tolls

will cover the payments mandated by the Treaties, without significantly

reducing traffic. In the unlikely event that tolls are insufficient,

the Treaties do not require the U.S. Government to make up the shortfall.
425

Economic Assistance to Panama

Opponents - The Treaties are accompanied by an economic package

under which the U.S. has agreed to provide Panama with $200 million in

Export/Import Bank credits over five years, up to $75 million in

Housing Investment Guarantees, a $20 million OPIC loan guarantee to

COFINA, and $50 million in foreign military sales credits over ten

years. First, the U.S. gives Panama the Canal, then pays that country

to take it, in a way that circumvents the Congress. While not a part

of the Treaties, they are nonetheless a vital part of agreements which

cannot succeed without these funds.

Proponents - First, the economic package is not part of the

Treaties; it is separate from the Treaties and could go ahead without

ratification or could be rejected or modified without affecting the

Treaties. It represents a U.S. pledge to make its best effort to

secure this economic assistance for Panama, subject to the proper

Congressional and Administrative procedures. Second, the purpose of

the economic package is to promote the economic and military development

of Panama to insure that it is capable of operating and protecting the

Canal. A strong and viable Panama is in the U.S. national interest,

and that is the purpose of the proposed economic assistance package.
L
APPENDIX 2

Texts of Treaties

Relating to the Panama Canal

PANAMA CANAL TREATY January 25, 1955, between the United States of

America and the Republic of Panama;

(c) All other treaties, conventions, agreeThe United States of America and the Re- ments and exchanges of notes between the

public of Panama, United States of America and the Republic of

Acting in the spirit of the Joint Declaration Panama concerning the Panama Canal which

of April 3, 1964, by the Representatives of the were in force prior to the entry into force of

Governments of the United States of America this Treaty; and

and the Republic of Panama, and of the Joint (d) Provisions concerning the Panama

Statement of Principles of February 7, 1974, Canal which appear in other treaties, conveninitialed by the Secretary of State of the United tions, agreements and exchanges of notes beStates of America and the Foreign Minister of teen the United States of America and the

the Republic of Panama, and Republic of Panama which were in force prior

Acknowledging the Republic of Panama's to the entry into force of this Treaty.

sovereignty over its territory, 2. In accordance with the terms of this

Have decided to terminate the prior Treaties Treaty and related agreements., the Republic of

pertaining to the Panama Canal and to con- Panama, as territorial sovereign, grants to the

lude a new Treaty to serve as the basis for a United States of America, for the duration of

ienew relationship between them and, accord- this Treaty, the rights necessary to regulate the

ingly, have agreed upon the following: transit of ships through the Panama Canal, and

to manage, operate, maintain, improve, protect

ARTICLE I and defend the Canal. The Republic of Panama

guarantees to the United States of America the

ABROGATION OF PRIOR TREATIES AND peaceful use of the land and water areas which

ESTABLISHMENT OF A NEw REIATIO-sIIIP it has been granted the rights to use for such

1. Upon its entry into force, this Treaty ter- purposes pursuant to this Treaty and related

minutes and supersedes: agreements.

(a) The Isthmian Canal Convention be- 3. The Republic of Panama shall participate

tween the United States of America and the increasingly in the management and protection

Republic of Panama, signed at Washington, and defense of the Canal, as provided in this

November 18, 1903; Treaty.

(b) The Treaty of Friendship and Coop- 4. In view of the special relationship estaberation signed at Washington, March 2, 1936, listed by this Treaty, the United States of

and the Treaty of Mutual Understanding and America and the Republic of Panama shall coCooperation and the related Memorandum of operate to assure the uninterrupted and efficient

Understandings Reached, signed at Panama, operation of the Panama Canal.

(427)
428

ATciLE II other rules with respect to navigation and maritime matters, in accordance with this Treaty

RATWICATION, ENTRY INTO FORCE, and related agreements. The Republic of PanAND TERMINATION ama will lend its cooperation, when necessary,

1. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification in the enforcement of such rules;

in accordance vith the constitutional proce- (d) Establish, modify, collect and retain

lures of the two Parties. The instruments of tolls for the use of the Panama Canal, and

rat ifat ion of this Treaty shall be exchanged other charges, and establish and modify methat Panaima at the sane time as the instrunents ods of their assessment;

of ratification of the Treaty Concerning the (e) Regulate relations with employees of

Permuianent Neutrality and Operation of the the United States Government;

Pauaana Canal, signed this date, am, exchanged. (f) Provide supporting services to faciliThis Treaty shall enter into force, simultane- tate the performance of its responsibilities

ously with the Treaty Concerning the Perma- under this Article;

nent, Neutrality and Operation of the Panama (g) Issue and enforce regulations for the

Canal. six calendar months from the date of effective exercise of the rights and responsibilithe exchange of the instruments of ratification. ties of the United States of America under this

2. This Treaty shall terminate at noon, Pan- Treaty and related agreements. The Republic

amua time, December 31,1999. of Panama will lend its cooperation, when

necessary, in the enforcement of such rules; and

(h) Exercise any other right granted under

ARICE III this Treaty, or otherwise agreed upon between

CANAL OPERATION AND MANAGEMENT the two Parties.

3. Pursuant to the foregoing grant of rights, 1. The Republic of Panama, as territorial the United States of America shall, in accordsovereign, grants to the United States of Amer- ance with the terms of this Treaty and the proica the rights to manage, operate, and maintain visions of United States law, carry out its

the Panama. Canal, its complementary works, responsibilities by means of a United States

installations and equipment and to provide for Government agency called the Panama Canal

the orderly transit of vessels through the Pan- Commission, which shall be constituted by and

ama Canal. The United States of America ac- in conformity with the laws of the United

cepts the grant of such rights and undertakes to States of America.

exercise them in accordance with this Treaty and (a) The Panama Canal Commission shall

related agreements. be supervised by a Board composed of nine

2. In carrying out the foregoing responsi- members, five of whom shall be nationals of

bilities, the -United States of America may: the United States of America, and four of

(a) Use for the aforementioned pur- whom shall be Panamanian nationals proposed

poses, without cost except as provided in this by the Republic of Panama for appointment to

Treaty, the various installations and areas (in- such positions by the United States of America

eluding the Panama Canal) and waters, de- in a timely manner.

scribed in the Agreement in Implementation (b) Should the Republic of Panama reof this Article, signed this date, as well as such quest the United States of America to remove

other areas and installations as are made avail- a Panamanian national from membership on

able to the United States of America under this the Board, the United States of America shall

Treaty and related agreements, and take the agree to such request. In that event, the Remeasures necessary to ensure sanitation of such public of Panama shall propose another Panareas; amanian national for appointment by the

(b) Make such improvements and altera- United States of America to such position in a

fions to the aforesaid installations and areas as timely manner. In case of removal of a Panait, deems appropriate, consistent with the terms manian member of the Board at the initiative of

of this Treaty; the United States of America, both Parties will

(c) Make and enforce all rules pertaining consult in advance in order to reach agreement

to the passage of vessels through the Canal and concerning such removal, and the Republic of
429

Panama shall propose another Panananianl payment should be made because of inflation

national for appointment by the United States and other relevant factors af'eting the cost of

of America in his stead. such services.

(c) The United States of America shall 6. The Republic of Panama shall be responemploy a national of the United States of sible for providing, in all areas comprising the

America as Administrator of the Panama Canal former Canal Zone. services of a general jurisCommission, and a Panamanian national a- dictional nature such as custoins and inmiigraDeputy Administrator. through December 31, tion, postal services, courts and licl'nsin. in

1989. Beginning January 1, 1990.a Panamanian accordance with this Treatv and related

national shall be employed as the Administrator agreements.

and a national of the United States of Americ, 7. The United- States of America and the Reshall occupy the position of Deputy Adminis- public of Panama shall establish a Panama

trator. Such Panamanian nationals shall be Canal Consultative Committee, composed of an

proposed to the United States of America by equal number of high-level representatives of

the Republic of Panama for appointment to the United States of America and the Republic

such positions by the United States of America. of Panama, and which may appoint such sub-

(d) Should the United States of America committees as it may deem appropriate. This

remove the Panamanian national from his posi- Committee shall advise the United States of

tion as Deputy Administrator, or Administra- America and the Republic of Panama on mattor, the Republic of Panama shall propose tears of policy affecting the Canals operation.

another Panamanian national for appointment In view of both Parties' special interest in the

to such position by the United States of continuity and efficiency of the Canal operation

America. in the future, the Committee shall advise on

4. An illustrative description of the activities matters such as general tolls policy. employment

the Panama Canal Commission wil perform in and training policies to increase the participacarrving out the responsibilities and rights of tion of Panamanian nationals in the operation

the United States of America under this Article of the Canal, and international policies on

is set forth at the Annex. Also set forth in the matters concerning the Canal. The Committee's

Annex are procedures for the discontinuance recommendations shall be transmitted to the two

or transfer of those activities performed prior Governments, which shall give such recommento the entry into force of this Treaty by the dations full consideration in the formulation of

Panama Canal Company or the Canal Zone such policy decisions.

Government which are not to be carried out by S. In addition to the participation of Panathe Panama Canal Commission. Manian nationals at high management levels of

5. The Panama Canal Commission shall re- the Panama Canal Commission. as provided for

imburse the Republic of Panama for the costs in paragraph 3 of this Article, there shall be

incurred by the Republic of Panama in pro- groVing pamticipation of Panamaman national

viding the following public services in the at all other levels and areas of employment in

Canal operating areas and in housing areas set the aforesaid commission. with the objective of

forth in the Agreement in Implementation of preparing, in an orderly and efficient fashion.

Article III of this Treaty and occupied by both for the assumption by the Republic of Panama

United States and Panamanian citizen employ- of full responsibility for the management, operees of the Panama Canal Commission: police. ation and maintenance of the Canal upon the

fire protection, street maintenance, street light- tennination of this Treaty.

ing. street cleaning, traffic management and 9. The use of the areas, waters and installagarbage collection. The Panama Canal Commis- tions with respect to which th e nited States

sion shall pay the Republic of Panama the sum of America is granted rights pursuant to this

of ten million United States dollars ($10,000,- Article, and the rights and legal status of

000) per annum for the foregoing services. It is United States Government agencies and emagreed that every three years from the date that ployees operating in the Republic of Panama

this Treaty enters into force. the costs involved pursuant to this Article, shall be governed by

in furnishing said services shall be reexamined the Agreement in Implementation of this

to determine whether adjustment of the annual Article, signed this date.
430

10. Upon entry into force of this Treaty, the (b) The planning and conduct of combined

United States Government agencies known as military exercises; and

the Panama Canal Company and the Canal (c) The conduct of United States and PanZone Government shall cease to operate within amanian military operations with respect to the

the territory of the Republic of Panama that protection and defense of the Canal.

formerly constituted the Canal Zone. 4. The Combined Board shall, at five-year

intervals throughout the duration of this

ARTICLE I Treaty, review the resources being made available by the two Parties for the protection and

PROTECTION AND DEFENsE defense of the Canal. Also, the Combined Board

1. The United States of America and the Re- shall make appropriate recommendations to the

public of Panama commit themselves to protect two Governments respecting projected requireand defend the Panama Canal. Each Party ments, the efficient utilization of available

shall act, in accordance with its constitutional resources of the two Parties, and other matters

processes, to meet the danger resulting from an of mutual interest with respect to the protecarmed attack or other actions which threaten tion and defense of the Canal.

the security of the Panama Canal or of ships 5. To the extent possible consistent with its

transiting it. primary responsibility for the protection and

2. For the duration of this Treaty, the United defense of the Panama Canal, the United States

States of America shall have primary respon- of America will endeavor to maintain its armed

sibility to protect and defend the Canal. The forces in the Republic of Panama in normal

rights of the United States of America to sta- times at a level not in excess of that of the armed

tion, train, and move military forces within the forces of the United States of America in the

Republic of Panama are described in the Agree- territory of the former Canal Zone immediately

ment in Implementation of this Article, signed prior to the entry into force of this Treaty.

this date. The use of areas and installations and

the legal status of the armed forces of the ARTICLE V

United States of America in the Republic of

Panama shall be governed by the aforesaid PRINCIPLE OF NoN-INTERvENTrIoN

Agreement.

3. In order to facilitate the participation and Employees of the Panama Canal Commission,

cooperation of the armed forces of both Parties their dependents and designated contractors of

in the protection and defense of the Canal, the the Panama Canal Commission, who are naUnited States of America and the Republic of tionals of the United States of America, shall

Panama shall establish a Combined Board com- respect the laws of the Republic of Panama and

prised of an equal number of senior military shall abstain from any activity incompatible

representatives of each Party. These representa- with the spirit of this Treaty. Accordingly,

ties shall be charged by their respective they shall abstain from any political activity

governments with consulting and cooperating in the Republic of Panama as well as from any

on all matters pertaining to the protection and intervention in the internal affairs of the Repubdefense of the Canal, and with planning for lie of Panama. The United States of America

actions to be taken in concert for that purpose. shall take all measures within its authority to

Such combined protection and defense arrange- ensure that the provisions of this Article are

ments shall not inhibit the identity or lines of fulfilled.

authority of the armed forces of the United

States of America or the Republic of Panama. ARTICLE VI

The Combined Board shall provide for coordination and cooperation concerning such matters PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT

as:

(a) The preparation of contingency plans 1. The United States of America and the Refor the protection and defense of the Canal based public of Panama commit themselves to impleupon the cooperative efforts of the armed forces ment this Treaty in a manner consistent with

of both Parties; the protection of the natural environment of the
431

Republic of Panama. To this end, they shall ARTICLE VIII

consult and cooperate wila each other in all

appropriate ways to ensure that they shall give

due regard to the protect ion and conservation of 1. The installations owned or used by the

the environment, agencies or instrumentalities of the I'nited

2. A Joint Commission on the Environment States of America operating in the Republic of

shall be established with equal representation Planama pursuant to this Treaty and related

from the United States of America and the Re- agreements, and their official archives and docupublic of Panama, which shall periodically re- iments, shall be inviolable. The t wo Parties shall

view the implementation of this Treaty and agree on procedures to be followed in the conshall recommend as appropriate to the two Gov- duct of any criminal investigat ion at such locaernments ways to avoid or, should this not be tions by the Republic of Paiiama.

possible, to mitigate the adverse environmental 2 Agencies and instrumentalities of the Govimpacts which might result from their respec- ernment of the United States of America

tive actions pursuant to the Treaty. operating in the Republic of Panama pursuant

3. The United States of America and the Re- to this Treaty and related agreements shall be

public of Panama shull furnish the Joint immune froni the jurisdictioll of the Republic

Commission on the Environment complete in- of Panama.

formation on any action taken in accordance 3. In addition to such other privileges and

with this Treat v which. in the judgment of both, imiun ities as are afforded to inplovees of the

might have a significant effect on the environ- United States Government and their dependents

ment. Such information shall be made avail- pursuant to this Treaty, the l'n itedl States of

able to the Commission as far in advance of the America may designate uip to twentyv officials

contemplated action as possible to facilitate the of the Panamia Canal Coii mi-sioni who, along

study by the Commission of any potential with tleii dependents, shall enjoy tlie privileges

environmental problems and to allow for con- amid imiimuiiities accorded to diplomatic agents

sideration of the recommendation of the (om- and their dependents inder international law

mission before the contemplated action is and practice. The United States of America

carried out. shall furnish to the Republic of Pananma a list of

the names of said officials and their dependents.

identifying the positions they occupy in the

ARTICLE VII Governiient of the United States of America.

FLAGSand shall keep such list current at all times.

1. The entire territory of the Republic of ARTICLE IX

Panama, including the areas the use of which

the Republic of Panama makes available to the APPLICABLE LAws AND LAW ENFORCEMENT

United States of America pursuant to this 1. In accordance with the provisions of this

Treaty and related agreenients. shall be under Treaty and related agreements. the law of the

the flag of the Republic of Panania, and conse- Republic of Panama shall apply in the areas

quently such flag always shall occupy the posi- made available for the use of the United States

tion of honor, of Anierica pursuant to this Treaty. The law of

2. The flag of the United States of America the Republic of Panama shall be applied to matmay be displayed, together with the flag of the ters or events which occurred in tie former

Republic of Panama, at the headquarters of the Canal Zone prior to the entry into force of this

Panama Canal Commission, at the site if the Treaty only to the extent specifeally provided

Combined Board, and as provided in the Agree- in prior treaties and agreements.

ment in Implementation of Article IV of this 2. Natural or juridical persons who, on the

Treaty. date of entry into force of this Treaty, are en3. The flag of the United States of America aged in business or non-proht activities at loalso may be displayed at other places and on cations in the former Canal Zone muay continue

some occasions, as agreed by both Parties. such business or activities at those lc-ations

98-99 ) - 78 - 29
432

under the same terms and conditions prevailing for public purposes, they shall be compensated

prior to the entry into force of this Treaty for at fair market value by the Republic of

a thirty-month transition period from its entry Panama.

into force. The Republic of Panama shall main- 7. The provisions of paragraphs 2-6 above

tain the same operating conditions as those ap- shall apply to natural or juridical persons who

plicable to the aforementioned enterprises prior have been engaged in business or non-profit acto the entry into force of this Treaty in order tivities at locations in the former Canal Zone

that they may receive licenses to do business for at least six months prior to the date of sigin the Republic of Panama subject to their nature of this Treaty.

compliance with the requirements of its law. 8. The Republic of Panama shall not issue, Thereafter, such persons shall receive the same adopt or enforce any law, decree, regulation, or

treatment under the law of the Republic of international agreement or take any other acPanama as similar enterprises already estab- tion which purports to regulate or would otherlished in the rest of the territory of the Republic wise interfere with the exercise on the part of

of Panama without discrimination. the United States of America of any right 3. The rights of ownership, as recognized by granted under this Treaty or related

the United States of America, enjoyed by natu- agreements. ral or juridical private persons in buildings 9. Vessels transition the Canal, and cargo, and other improvements to real property lo- passengers and crews carried on such vessels cated in the former Canal Zone shall be recog- palees a rew an on ed su he nie ythe Republic of Panama in conformity shall be exempt from any taxes, fees, or other nized by ths charges by the Republic of Panama. However,

4. With respect to buildings and other im- in the event such vessels call at a Panamanian

provements to real property located in the port, they may be assessed charges incident

Caona toperatingreashcaes or othe thereto, such as charges for services provided to Canal operating areas, housing areas or other the vessel. The Republic of Panama may also

areas subject to the licensing procedure estab- require the passengers and crew disembarking

lished in Article IV of the Agreement in Imple- fqrom such vessels to pay such taxes, fees and

mentation of Article HI of this Treaty, the crms tay unh as, sand

owners shall be authorized to continue using the charges as are established under Panamanian

land law for persons entering its territory. Such taxes, fees and charges shall be assessed on a accordance with the procedures established in nondiscriminatory basis.

that Article.

5. With respect to buildings and other im- 10. The United States of America and the

provements to real property located in areas of Republic of Panama will cooperate in taking

the former Canal Zone to which the aforesaid such steps as may from time to time be neceslicensing procedure is not applicable, or may sary to guarantee the security of the Panama

cease to be applicable during the lifetime or Canal Commission, its property, its employees

upon termination of this Treaty, the owners may and their dependents, and their property, the

continue to use the land upon which their prop- Forces of the United States of America and the

erty is located, subject to the payment of a members thereof, the civilian component of the

reasonable charge to the Republic of Panama. United States Forces, the dependents of memShould the Republic of Panama decide to sell bers of the Forces and the civilian component,

such land, the owners of the buildings or other and their property, and the contractors of the

improvements located thereon shall be offered a Panama Canal Commission and of the United

first option to purchase such land at a reason- States Forces, their dependents, and their propable cost. In the case of non-profit enterprises, erty. The Republic of Panama will seek from

such as churches and fraternal organizations, its Legislative Branch such legislation as may

the cost of purchase will be nominal in accord- be needed to carry out the foregoing purposes

ance with the prevailing practice in the rest of and to punish any offenders.

the territory of the Republic of Panama. 11. The Parties shall conclude an agreement

6. If any of the aforementioned persons are whereby nationals of either State, who are

required by the Republic of Panama to dis- sentenced by the courts of the other State, and

continue their activities or vacate their property who are not domiciled therein, may elect to
433

serve their sentences in their State of United States nationals working for the

nationality. Panama Canal Company immediately prior to

the entry into force of this Treaty.

ArrICLE X (d) The United States of Anmerica shall

periodically inform the Republic of Panaina.

EMPLOYMENT WrTii THE PANAMA CANAL through tle Coordinatingt Committee. estabCoMmissioN wished pursuant to the Agi cement in Impleieni1. In exercising its rights and fulfilling its tation of Article III of this Treaty, of available

responsibilities as the employer, the United positions within the Panama Canal ConmisStates of America shall establish employment sion. The Republic of Panama shall similarly

and labor regulations which shall contain the provide the United States of America any interms, conditions and prerequisites for all cate- formation it may have as to the availability of

gories of employees of the Panama Canal Com- Panamanian nationals claiming to have skills

mission. These regulations shall be provided to and qualifications that might be required by the

the Republic of Panama prior to their entry into Panama Canal Commission. in order that the

force. United States of America may take this infor2. (a) The regulations shall establish a sys- mation into account.

tem of preference when hiring employees, for 4. The United States of America will estabPanamanian applicants possessing the skills and lish qualification standards for skill training

qualifications required for employment by the and experience required by the Panama Canal

Panama Canal Commission. The United States Coimiiission. In establislhing siich standards. to

of America shall endeavor to ensure that the the extent they include a requirement for a pronumber of Panamanian nationals employed by fessional license. the United States of America.

the Panama Canal Commission in relation to without prejudice to its right to require addithe total number of its employees will conform tional professional skill, and qualifications.

to the proportion established for foreign enter- shall recognize the professional licenses issued

prises under the law of the Republic of Panama. by the Republic of Panama.

(b) The terms and conditions of employ- 5. The United States of America shall e-tabment to be established will in general be no less lish a policy for the periodic rotation, at a

favorable to persons already employed by the maximum of every five years. of United States

Panama Canal Company or Canal Zone Gov- citizen employees and other non-Panamanian

ernment prior to the entry into force of this employees. hired after the entry into force of

Treaty, than those in effect immediately prior this Treaty. It is recognized that certain exto that date. ceptions to the said policy of rotation may be

3. (a) The United States of America shall made for sound administrative reasons. such as

establish an employment policy for the Panama in the case of employees holding position

Canal Commission that shall generally limit the requiring certain non-transferable or nonrecruitment of personnel outside the Republic recruitable skills.

of Panama to persons possessing requisite 6. With regard to wages and fringe benefits.

skills and qualifications which are not available there shall be no discrimination on the basis of

in the Republic of Panama. nationality, sex, or race. Payments by the Pan-

(b) The United States of America will ama Canal Comniission of additional remiuneraestablish training programs for Panamanian tion, or the provision of other benefits. such as

employees and apprentices in order to increase home leave benefits. to United Statev nationals

the number of Panamanian nationals qualified employ 'd prior to entry into forcc of this

to assume positions with the Panama Canal Treaty, or to persons of any nationality, includCommission, as positions become available. ing Panamanian national\ who ar thereafter

(c) Within five years from the entry into recruited outside of the Republic of Panama

force of this Treaty, the number of United and vho change their place of residence. ,hall

States nationals employed by the Panama Canal not be considered to be discrimination for the

Commission who were previously employed by purpose of this paragraph.

the Panama Canal Company shall be at least 7. Persons employed by the Panama Canal

twenty percent less than the total number of Company or Canal Zone Goverinent prior to
434

the entry into force of this Treaty, who are Commission is recognized. Labor relations with

displaced from their employment as a result of employees of the Panama Canal Commission

the discontinuance by the United States of shall be conducted in accordance with forms of

America of certain activities pursuant to this collective bargaining established by the United

Treaty, will be placed by the United States of States of America after consultation with emAmerica, to the maxunuin extent feasible, in ployee unions.

other appropriate jobs with the Government of (b) Employee unions shall have the right

the Uinited States in accordance with United to affiliate with international labor organizaStates Civil Service regulations. For such per- tions.

sons who are not United States nationals, place- 10. The United States of America will proment efforts will be confined to United States vide an appropriate early optional retirement

Government activities located within the Re- progamin for all persons employed by the

public of Panama. Likewise, persons previ- Panama Canal Company or Canal Zone Govously employed in activities for which the ernment ininediately prior to the entry into

Republic of Panama assumes responsibility as force of this Treaty. In this regard, taking into

a result of this Treaty will be continued in their account the unique circumstances created by the

employment to the maximum extent feasible by provisions of this Treaty, including its durathe Republic of Panama. The Republic of tion. and their effect upon such employees, the

Panama shall, to the maximum extent feasible, United States of America shall, with respect to

ensure that the terms and conditions of employ- them:

ment applicable to personnel employed in the (a) determine that conditions exist which

activities for which it assumes responsibility invoke applicable United States law permitting

are no less favorable than those in effect imme- early retirement annuities and apply such law

diately prior to the entry into force of this for a substantial period of the duration of the

Treaty. Non-United States nationals employed Treaty;

by the Panama Canal Company or Canal Zone (b) seek special legislation to provide more

Government prior to the entry into force of liberal entitlement to, and calculation of, retirethis Treaty who are involuntarily separated ment annuities than is currently provided for

from their positions because of the discontinu- by law.

ance of an activity by reason of this Treaty, 

who are not entitled to an immediate annuity

under the United States Civil Service Retire- AircLE XI

ment System, and for whom continued employment in the Republic of Panama by the PROVIsIONs FoR THE TRANsmoTN PERIoD

Government of the United States of America

is not practicable, will be provided special job 1. The Republic of Panama shall reassume

placement assistance by the Republic of Panama plenary jurisdiction over the former Canal Zone

for employment in positions for which they may

be qualified by experience and training. upon entry into force of this Treaty and in

accordance with its terms. In order to provide

8. The Parties agree to establish a system for an orderly transition to the full application

whereby the Panama Canal Commission may, if of the jurisdictional arrangements established

deemed mutually convenient or desirable by the by this Treaty and related agreements, the protwo Parties, assign certain employees of the visions of this Article shall become applicable

Panama Canal Commission, for a limited pe- upon the date this Treaty enters into force, and

nrod of time, to assist in the operation of activi- shall remain in effect for thirty calendar

tles transferred to the responsibility of the months. The authority granted in this Article

Republic of Panama as a result of this Treaty to the United States of America for this transior related agreements. The salaries and other tion period shall supplement, and is not incosts of employment of any such persons as- tended to limit, the full application and effect

_1ioned to provide such assistance shall be reim- of the rights and authority granted to the

bured to the United States of America by the United States of America elsewhere in this

Republic of Panama. Treaty and in related agreements.

9. (a) The right of employees to negotiate 2. During this transition period, the criminal

vollectjve contracts with the Panama Canal and civil laws of the United States of America
435

shall apply concurrently with those of the Re- force of this Treaty, may continue to function

public of Panama in certain of the areas and during the transition period for the judicial eninstallations made available for the use of the forceiment of the jurisdiction to be exercised by

United States of America pursuant to this the United States of America in accordance

Treaty, in accordance with the following with this Article.

provisions: 6. In civil cases, the civilian courts of the

(a) The Republic of Panama permits the United Staies of America in the Republic of

authorities of the United States of America to Panama shall have no jurisdiction over new

have the primary right to exercise criminal cases of a private civil nature, but shall retain

jurisdiction over United States citizen em- full jurisdiction during the transition period to

ployees of the Panama Canal Commission and dispose of any civil cases, including admiralty

their dependents, and members of the United cases, already instituted and pending before the

States Forces and civilian component and their courts prior to the entry into force of this

dependents, in the following cases: Treatv.

(i) for any offense committed during the 7. The laws, regulations, and administrative

transition period within such areas and installa- authority of the United States of America aptions, and plicable in the former Canal Zone immediately (ii) for any offense committed prior to prior to the entry into force of this Treaty shall, that period in the former Canal Zone. Tha perodi the form Cal hone the to the extent not inconsistent with this Treaty The Republic of Panama shall have the pr- and related agreements, continue in force for the

mary right to exercise jurisdiction over all other purpose of the exercise by the United States of

offenses committed by such persons, except as America of law enforcement and judicial juris- otherwise provided in this Trerty arid related diction only during the transition period. The

agreements or as mayv be otherwise agreed. United States of America may amend, repeal

(b) Either Party may waive its primary or otherwise change such laws. regulations and

right to exercise jurisdiction in a specific case or administrative authority. The two Parties shall

category of cases. consult concerning procedural and substantive

3. The United States of America shall retain matters relative to the implementation of this

the right to exercise jurisdiction in criminal Article, including the disposition of cases pendcases relating to offenses committed prior to the ing at the end of the transition period and, in

entry into force of this Treaty in violation of this respect, may enter into appropriate agree- the laws applicable in the former Canal Zone. ments by an exchange of notes or other

4. For the transition period, t he United States instrument.

of America shall retain police authority and 8. During this transition period. the United

maintain a police force in the aforementioned States of America may continue to incarcerate

areas and installations. In such areas, the police individuals in the areys and installations made

authorities of the United Statesof America may available for the use of the United States of

take into custody any person not subject to their America by the Republic of Panama pursuant primary jurisdiction if such person is believed to this Treaty and related agreements, or to

to have committed or to be committing an of- transfer them to penal facilities in the United

fense against applicable laws or regulations States of America to serve their sentences.

and shall promptly transfer custody to the

police authorities of the Republic of Panama.

The United States of America and the Republic ARTICLE XII

of Panama shall establish joint police patrols in

agreed areas. Any arrests conducted by a joint A SEA-LEVEL CANAL OR A TmoD LANE OF LOCKS

patrol shall be the responsibility of the patrol

member or members representing the Party 1. The United States of America and the

having primary jurisdiction over the person or Republic of Panama recognize that a sea-level

persons arrested. canal may be important for international navi5. The courts of the United States of America gation in the future. Consequently, during the

and related personnel, functioning in the former duration of this Treaty, both Parties commit

Canal Zone immediately prior to the entry into themselves to study jointly the feasibility of a
436

sea-level canal in the Republic of Panama, and liens and debts, except as the two Parties may

in the event they determine that such a water- otherwise agree.

way is necessary, they shall negotiate terms, 2. The United States of America transfers,

agreeable to both Parties, for its construction. without charge, to the Republic of Panama all

2. The United States of America and the right, title and interest- the United States of

Republic of Panama agree on the following: America may have with respect to all real prop-

(a) No new interoceanic canal shall be erty. including non-removable improvements

constructed in the territory of the Republic of thereon, as set forth below:

Panama during the duration of this Treaty, (a) Upon the entry into force of this

except in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, the Panama Railroad and such property

Treaty, or as the two Pat-ties may otherwise that was located in the former Canal Zone but

agree; and that is not within the land and water areas

(b) During the duration of this Treaty, the use of which is made available to the United

the United States of America shall not negoti- States of America pursuant to this Treaty.

ate with third States for the right to construct However, it is agreed that the transfer on such

an interoceanic canal on any other route in the date shall not include buildings and other faciliWestern Hemisphere, except as the t'wo Parties ties, except housing, the use of which is retained

may otherwise agree. by the United States of America pursuant to

3. The Republic of Panama grants to the this Treaty and related agreements, outside such

United States of America the right to add a areas;

third lane of locks to the existing Panama Canal. (b) Such property located in an area or a

This right may be exercised at any time during portion thereof at such time as the use by the

the duration of this Treaty, provided that the United States of America of such area-or porUnited States of America has delivered to the tion thereof ceases pursuant to agreement

Republic of Panama copies of the plans for such between the two Parties.

construction. (c) Housing units made available for occu4. In the eent the United States of Anierica pancy by members of the Armed Forces of the

exercises the right granted in paragraph 3 Republic of Panama in accordance with paraabove, it may use for that purpose, in addition graph 5(b) of Annex B to the Agreement i

to the areas otherwise made available to the Imnpleientation of Article IV of this Treaty

United States of America pursuant to this at such timc as such units are made available

Treaty, such other areas as the two Parties may to the Republic of Panama.

agree upon. The terms and conditions applicable (d) Upon termination of this Treaty. all

agree C n. real property and non-removable improvements to Canal operating areas made available by the

Republic of.Panama for the use of the United that were used by the United States of America

States of America pursuant to Article III of for the purposes of this Treaty and related

this Treaty shall apply in a similar manner to agreements and equipment related to the mansuch additional areas. agement. operation and maintenance of the

a.iton ss Canal remaining in the Republic of Panama. 5In thre construction of the aforesaid works, 3. h eulco aaaare ohl

the United States of America shall not use nu11 '. The Republic of Panamna agrees to bold

theUnied tats o Amric shll ot se i~- the United States of America harmless with

clear excavation techniques without the previous t an y S ais whicha me by

consent of the Republic of Panama. respect to any claims which may be made by

third parties relating to rights, title and interest in such property.

Airricr.E XIII 4. The Republic of Panama shall receive, in

PROPERTY TANsnFER AND EcoNoMIC addition, from the Panama Canal Commission

PART1cIrPToTN BY THF REPrBLIc OF PAAMA a just and equitable return on the national resources which it has dedicated to the efficient

1. Upon termination of this Treaty, the Re- management. operation, maintenance, protecpublic of Panama shall assume total responsi- tion and defense of the Panama Canal, in acbility for the management, operation, and main- cordance with the following:

tenance of the Panama Canal, which shall be (a) An annual amount to be paid out of

turned over in operating condition and free of Canal operating revenues computed at a rate of
437

thirty hundredths of a united States dollar mediation, arbitration, or such other procedure

($o:0) per Panama Canal net ton, or it- for the peaceful settlement of the dispute as

equivalency, for each vessel t ransiting the Canal they maxy iut ally deem appropriate,

after the entry into force of this Treat y. for DONE at Washington, this 7th day of Sep- which tolls are char ed. The rate of thirtv tem ber, 1977, in luplirate, in the English

huindredths of a United States dollar (0 41.30) p 1nd ih languages. ho h texts being equally

per Panama Canal net ton, or its e(qi valentey. authentic.

will be adjusted to reflect changes in the Cnited

States wholesale price index for total mnanafactured goods during biennial periods. The

first adjustment shall take place five years after

entry into force of this Treaty, taking .nto av- ANNEX

count the changes that occurred in such price

index during the preceding two yeamr There- PROCEDURES FOR THE CrsSATIoN OR TRANsFER

after, successive adjustments shall take place at OF ACTIVrrIES CARRIED OUT BY THE

the end of each biennial period. if the Cnited PANAMA CANAL CMPANY ANL TiE

States of America should decide that, another C'a AxI. ZuNi( XRN T AND

indexing method is preferable, such method I Ls'r'mYE List otr i'

shall he proposed to the Republic of Panama TNHAINs TH.T MAY K' PEFOrME

and applied if mutually agreed. BY THE PANAMI CANAL COMMISSION

(b) A fixed annuity of ten million I 'nitedl 1. The laws of the Republic of Panama shall

States dollars ($10,W0,000) to be paid out o regulate the exercise of private economic actiViCanal operating revenues. This amount shall ie, within the area, made ava lalle by the Reconstitute a fixed expense of the Panama Canal public of Panama for use of the United

Commission. Iates of America ptisuallt o t ils Treaty.

(c) An annual aniount of tip to ten itii lieu Natural or juridical pirsoni who. i Ieam ix

United States dollars ($10,00,0It)'1) per V1ear. months prior to the dlabt of signatiie of this

to be paid out of Cainal operating revenues t Treaty, were leoalIy es ablished and engaged in

the extent that such revenues exceed expendi- t he exercise of econorn aci ivties in the former

tures of the Panama Canal ('omni -sion includ- Canal Zone, ma y continue such activities iL aing amounts paid pursuant to this TrAaty. I cordane with the provisions of paragraph 2

the event Canal operating revenun- in a:iy yeat of Article TX of thUI Treaty.

do not produce a surplus sufficient to cover bll 2. The Panama Canal Commission shall nnt

payment, the unpaid balance shall be paid ft OIn perform governmental or commercial fun ions

operating surpluses in future years in a manner as stipulated in par-ag-ph 4 of this Annex,

to be mutually agreed. provided, however, that this sh all not be deemed

to limit in any way the right of the United

Awmcu: XiV States of America to perform those functions

that may be necessary for the efficient manageSErrLENMFT OF DISPUTES inent. opeation and maintenance of the Canal.

In the event that any question should arise 3. It is understood that th Panama Canal

between the Parties concerning the interpreta- Commission, in the exercise of the rights of the

tion of this Treaty or related agreements, they Inited States of Anerica with respect to the

shall make every effort to resolve the matter management. operation an:l maintenance of the

through consultation in the appropriate con- Canal. may perform functions such as are set

mittees established pursuant to this Treaty and forth below by way of illustration:

related agreements, or, if appropriate, through a. Managenient o the Canal enterprise.

diplomatic channels. In the event the Parties b. Aids to navigation in Canal waters and

are unable to resolve a particular matter in proximity thereto.

through sich means, they may, in appropriate e. Control of vessel movement.

cases, agree to submit the matter to conciliation, d. Operation and maintenance of the locks.
438

e. Tug service for the transit of vessels ried out by the Panama Canal Commission,

and dredging for the piers and docks of the effective upon the dates indicated herein:

Panama Canal Commission. (a) Upon the date of entry into force of

f. Control of the water levels in Gatun, this Treaty:

Alajuela (Madden) and Miraflores Lakes. (i) Wholesale and r iil sales, includg. Non-commercial transportation services ing those through commissaries, food stores,

in Canal waters. department stores, optical shops and pastry

h. Meteorological and hydrographic serv- shops;

ices. (ii) The production of food and drink,

i. Admeasurenent. including milk products and bakery products;

j. Non-commercial notor transport and (iii) The operation of public restaurants

maintenance. and cafeterias and the sale of articles through

k. Industrial security through the use of vending machines;

watchmen. (iv) The operation of movie theaters,

1. Procurement and warehousing, bowling alleys, pool rooms and other recreational and amusement facilities for the use of mi. Telecommunications. ~lihacag spybe which it charge is pay able;

n. Protection of the environment by pre- (v) The operation of laundry and dry

venting and controlling the spillage of oil and cleaning plants other than those operated for

substances harmful to human or animal life and official use:

of the ecological equilibrium in areas used in (vi) The repair and service of privately

operation of the Canal and the anchorages owned automobiles or the sale of petroleum or

o. Non-commercial vessel repair. lubricants thereto, including the operation of

p. Air conditioning services in Canal gasoline stations, repair garages and tire repair

installations. and recapping facilities, and the repair and

q. Industrial sanitation and health services, service of other privately owned property, inr. Engineering design, construction and cluding appliances, electronic devices, boats,

maintenance of Panama Canal Commission motors, and furniture;

installations. (vii) The operation of cold storage and

s. Dredging of the Canal channel, terminal freezer plants other than those operated for

ports and adjacent waters. official use: T

t. Control of the banks and stabilizing of other (viii) The operation of freight houses

the slopes of the Canal. ohrthan those operated for official use;

(ix) The operation of commercial servu. Non-commercial handling of cargo on ices to and supply of privately owned and operthe piers and docks of the Panama Canal ated vessels, including the construction of vesCommission. sels, the sale of petroleum and lubricants and

v. Maintenance of public areas of the Pan- the provision of water, tug services not related

ama Canal Commission, such as parks and to the Canal or other United States Government

gardens. operations, and repair of such vessels, except in

w. Generation of electric power. situations where repairs may be necessary to

x. Purification and supply of water. remove disabled vessels from the Canal;

y. Marine salvage in Canal waters. (x) Printing services other than for

z. Such other functions as may be neces- official use:

sary or appropriate to carry out, in conformity (xi) Maritime transportation for the use

with this Treaty and related agreements, the of the general public:

rights and responsibilities of the United States (xii) Health and medical services proof America with respect to the management, vided to individuals, including hospitals, leprooperation and maintenance of the Panama sariums, veterinary, mortuary and cemetery

Canal. services;

4. The following activities and operations (xiii) Educational services not for procarried out by the Panama Canal Company and fessional training, including schools and

the Canal Zone Government shall not be car- libraries;
439

(xiv) Postal services; are to be assumed by the Government of the

(xv) Immigration, customs and quaran- Republic of Panama or by private persons subtine controls, except those ieasures necessary ject to its authority, the two Parties shall conto ensure the sanitation of the Canal; suit prior to the discoitiniance of such activities

(xvi) Commercial pier and dock services, or functions by the Panama Canal Commission

such as the handling of cargo and passengers; to develop appropriate arrangements for the

and orderly transfer and continued efficient opera-

(xvii) Any other commercial activity of tion or conduct thereof.

a similar nature, not related to the management. (b) In the event that appropriate arrangeoperation or maintenance of the Canal. ments cannot be arrived at to ensure the con-

(b) Within thirty calendar months from tinued performance of a particular activity or

the date of entry into force of this Treaty, gov- function described in paragraph 4 above which

ernmental services such as: is necessary to the efficient management. opera-

(i) Police; tion or maintenance of the Canal. the Panama

(ii) Courts; and Canal Commission may. to the extent consistent

(iii) Prison system. with the other provisions of this Treaty and

5. (a) With respect to those activities or related agreements, continue to perform such

functions described in paragraph 4 above, or *ctivity or function until such arrangements

otherwise agreed upon by the two Parties, which can be made.

TREATY CONCERNING THE or its citizens or subjects. concerning the condiPERMANENT NEUTRALITY AND tions or charges of transit, or for any other

OPERATION OF THE PANAMA CANAL reason, and so that the Canal, and therefore the

Isthmus of Panama, shall not be the target of

The United States of America and the Re- reprisals in any armed conflict between other

public of Panama have agreed upon the nations of the world. The foregoing shall be

following : subject Io the following requirements:

(a) Payment of tolls and other charges for

AXcir : I transit and ancillary services, provided they

have been fixed in conformity with the proviThe Republic of Panama declares that the sions of Article ITT(c);

Canal, as an international transit waterway. (b) Compliance with applicable rules and

shall be permanently neutral in accordance with regulations. provided such rules and regulations

the regime established in this Treaty. The same are applied in conformity with the provisions

regime of neutrality shall apply to any other of Article ITT:

international waterway that may be built either (c) The requirement that transiting vessels

partially or wholly in the territory of the Re- commit no acts of hostility while in the Canal;

public of Panama. and

(d) Such other conditions and restrictions

ArrcIE II as are established by this Treaty.

The Republic of Panama declares the neutrality of the Canal in order that both in time of AwriCE III

peace and in time of war it shall remain secure

and open to peaceful transit by the vessels of all 1. For purposes of the security. efficiency and

nations on terms of entire equality, so that there proper maintenance of the Canal the following

will be no discrimination against any nation, rules shall apply:
440

(a) The Canal shall be operated efficiently AimcLE IV

in accordance with conditions of transit through

the Canal, and rules and regulations that shall The United States of America and the Repubbe just, equitable and reasonable, and limited to lic of Panama agree to maintain the regime of

those necessary for safe navigation and efficient, neutrality established in this Treaty, which

sanitary operation of the Canal; shall be maintained in order that the Canal shall

(b) Ancillary services necessary for transit remain permanently neutral, notwithstanding

through the Canal shall be provided; the termination of any other treaties entered

(c) Tolls and other charges for transit and into by the two Contracting Parties.

ancillary services shall be just, reasonable, equitable and consistent with the principles of inter- ArriCLE V

national law;

(d) As a pre-condition of transit, vessels After the termination of the Panama Canal

may be required to establish clearly the financial Treaty, only the Republic of Panama shall

responsibility and guarantees for payment of operate the Canal and maintain military forces,

reasonable and adequate indemnification, con- defense sites and military installations within

sistent with international practice and stand- its national territory.

ards, for damages resulting from acts or omissions of such vessel- when passing through the ARriE VI

Canal. In the case of vessels owned or operated

by a State or for which it has acknowledged 1. In recognition of the important contriburesponsibility, a certification by that State that tions of the United States of America and of the

it shall observe its obligations under interna- Republic of Panama to the construction, operational law to pay for damages resulting from tion, maintenance, and protection and defense

the act or omission of such vessels when passing of the Canal, vessels of war and auxiliary vessels

through the Canal shall be deemed sufficient to of those nations shall, notwithstanding any

establish such financial responsibility; other provisions of this Treaty, be entitled to

(e) Vessels of war and auxiliary vessels transit the Canal irrespective of their internal

of all nations shall at all times be entitled to operation, means of propulsion, origin, destitransit the Canal, irrespective of their internal nation, armament or cargo carried. Such vessels

operation, means of propulsion, origin, destina- of war and auxiliary vessels will be entitled to

tion or armament, without being subjected, as a transit the Canal expeditiously.

condition of transit, to inspection, search or str- 2. The United States of America, so long as

veillance. However, such vessels may be required it has responsibility for the operation of the

to Canal, may continue to provide the Republic certify that they have complied wit t lappli- of Colombia toll-free transit through the Canal cable. health, situation and quarantine regular - for its troops, vessels and materials of war.

tions. In addition, such vessels shall be entitled Thereafter, the Republic of Panama may proto refuse to disclose their internal operation, vide the Republic of Colombia and the Repubirigin, armament, cargo or destination. How- lie of Costa Rica with the right of toll-free

ever, auxiliary vessels iiay be required to present transit.

written assurances, certified by an official at a

high level of the government of the State requesting the exemption, that they are owned or

operated by that government and in this case 1. The United States of America and the Reare being used opuly on government non-coimer- pblic of Panamna shall jointly sponsor a resohtcial service. tion in the Organization of American States

2. For the piirposes of this Treaty, the terms opening to accession by all nations of the world

"Canal," "vessel of war.""auxiliary vessel," "in- the Protocol to this Treaty whereby all the

ternal operation," "armamient" and "inspection" signatorics will adhere to the objectives of this

shall have the neanigs assigned them in Annex Treaty, agreeing to respect the regime of nellA to this Treaty. trality set forth herein.
441

2. The Organization of American States wholly or partially within the territory of the

shall act as the depositary for this Treaty and Republic of Panama, the entrances thereto and

related instruments. the territorial seas adjacent thereto.

2. "Vessel of w-r" means a ship belonging to

AimcLE VIII the naval forces of a State, and bearing the

external marks distinguishing warships of its

This Treaty shall be subject to ratification in nationality, under the command of an officer

accordance with the constitutional procedures duly commissioned by the government and

of the two Parties. The instruments of ratifica- whose name appears in the Navy List, and

tion of this Treaty shall be exchanged at Pan- manned by a crew which is under regular naval

ama at the same time as the instruments of discipline.

ratification of the Panama Canal Treaty., signed 3. "Auxiliary vessel" means any ship, not a

this date, are exchanged. This Treaty shall vessel of war, that is owned or operated by a

enter into force, simultaneously with the Pan- State and used, for the time being, exclusively

ama Canal Treaty, six calendar months from on government non-commercial service.

the date of the exchange of the instruments of

ratiicaton.4. '"Internal operation" encompasses all ma- ratification. chinery and propulsion systems, as well as the

DONE at Washington, this 7th day of Sep- management and control of the vessel, including

tember, 1977, in the English and Spanish Ian- its crew. It does not include the measures necesguages, both texts being equally authentic. sary to transit vessels under the control of pilots

while such vessels are in the Canal.

5. "Armament" means arms, ammunitions,

implements of war and other equipment of a

vessel which possesses characteristics appropriate for use for warlike purposes.

6. "Inspection" includes on-board examinaANNEx A tion of vessel structure, cargo, armament and

internal operation. It does not include those

1. "Canal" includes the existing Panama measures strictly necessary for admeasurement.

Canal, the entrances thereto and the territorial nor those measures strictly necessary to assure

seas of the Republic of Panama adjacent thereto, safe, sanitary transit and navigation, including

as defined on the map annexed hereto (Annex examination of deck and visual navigation

B), and any other interoceanic waterway in equipment. nor in the case of live cargoes, such

which the United States of America is a par- as cattle or other livestock, that may carry coniticipant or in which the United States of Amer- municable diseases. those measures necessary to

ica has participated in connection with the assure that health and sanitation requirements

construction or financing, that may be operated are satisfied.
442

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444

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445

PROTOCOL TO THE TREATY CONCERNING THE ARTICLE I

PERMANENT NEUTRALITY AND OPERATION

OFNTHE NTALT ANDOATL The Contracting Parties hereby acknowledge

the regime of permanent neutrality for the

W/wreas the maintenance of the neutrality of Canal established in the Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neutrality and ()peration of the

the Panama Canal is important not ony to the Panama Canal and associate themselves with

commerce and security of the United States of its objectives.

America and the Republic of Panama, but to

the peace and security of the, Western Heini- ARTICLE II

sphere and to the interests of world conuerce The Contracting Parties agree to observe and

as well; respect the regime of permanent neutrality of

Whereas the regime of neutrality which the the Canal in time of war as in time of peace,

United States of America and the Republic of and to ensure that vessels of their registry

Panama have agreed to maintain will ensure strictly observe the applicable rules.

permanent access to the Canal by vessels of all

nations on the basis of entire equality; and ARTICLE III

Whereas the said regime of effective neutral- This Protocol shall be open to accession by ity shall constitute the best protection for the all States of the world, and shall enter into

Canal and shall ensure the absence of any force for each State at the time of deposit of

hostile act against it; its instrument of accession with the Secretary

The Contracting Parties to this Protocol have General of the Organization of American

agreed upon the following: States.
APPENDIX 3

AGREEMENT IN IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE III OF THE PANAXA

CANAL TREATY, SIGNED SEPTEMBER 7, 1977

Whereas, pursuant to Article III of the Panama Canal

Treaty, signed this date, the Republic of Panama, as territorial sovereign, grants to the United States of America

the rights necessary to manage, operate, and maintain the

Panama Canal,

The United States of America and the Republic of Panama

have agreed upon the following:

(446)
447

ARTICLE I

DEFINITIONS

For the purposes of this Agreement it shall be

understood that:

1. "Panama Canal Commission" (hereinafter referred

to as "the Commission") means the agency or agencies of

the Government of the United States responsible for

carrying out the responsibilities and rights of the

United States under the Panama Canal Treaty with respect

to the management, operation, and maintenance of the

Panama Canal.

2. "United States citizen employees" means (a) nationals of the United States, to whom United States passports have been issued, who are employed by the Commission

and assigned for duty in the Republic of Panama (including

employees of other civilian agencies of the United States

who are on temporary duty with the Commission or are otherwise visiting the area on official business of the United

States), and (b) other categories of persons which may be

agreed upon by the two Parties.

3. "Dependents" means the spouse and children of

United States citizen employees, and other relatives who

depend on them for their subsistence and who habitually

live with them under the same roof.

18-991 0 - 78 - 30
448

ARTICLE II

COORDINATING COMMITTEE

1. A Coordinating Committee shall be established upon

the entry into force of this Agreement to be composed of

one representative of the United States and one representative of the Republic of Panama, of equal authority within

the Committee, each of whom may have one or more deputies,

on a parity basis.

2. The Coordinating Committee shall perform the functions specifically indicated by the provisions of this

Agreement, and others entrusted to it by both Governments

concerning implementation of this Agreement.

3. The Coordinating Committee shall establish its

rules of procedure within the spirit of this Agreement and

may designate such subcommittees as it may deem necessary

for the fulfillment of its functions.

4. The Coordinating Committee shall be organized so

that it may meet promptly and at any time upon request of

the representative of the United States or of the Republic

of Panama. The Coordinating Committee shall send periodic

reports on its activities to the Governments of the United

States and the Republic of Panama.

5. The Coordinating Committee shall refer any matters

which it has not been able to resolve to the two Governments

for their consideration through appropriate channels.
449

ARTICLE III

USE OF LAND AND WATER AREAS

1. Canal Operating Areas: With respect to the areas

and installations described in paragraph 1 of Annex A of

this Agreement (hereinafter referred to as the "Canal operating areas"), the following provisions will be applicable:

(a) The United States shall have the right to

use such areas and installations for the purposes of exercising its rights and fulfilling its responsibilities,

under the Panama Canal Treaty and related agreements,

concerning the management, operation and maintenance of

the Panama Canal, and for such other purposes as the two

Parties may agree upon.

(b) The United States shall have the right to

use any portion of the Canal operating areas for military

training, when such use is determined by the United States

to be compatible with continued efficient operation of the

Panama Canal.

2. Housing Areas: The areas and installations set

forth in paragraph 2 of Annex A of this Agreement (hereinafter referred to as "housing areas") shall be dedicated

to the primary purpose of housing United States citizen

employees and dependents. The housing areas shall be

administered in accordance with the regime of civil coordination established in Article VI of this Agreement.
450

3. Accessory Facilities and Installations: The United

States may continue to use those accessory facilities or installations used in connection with the management, operation

and maintenance of the Canal on the date this Agreement enters

into force, but which are located outside the areas and installations otherwise made available for the use of the

United States pursuant to the Panama Canal Treaty. A description of such facilities is set forth in paragraph 3

of Annex A to this Agreement. The United States, at its

expense, may maintain, improve, replace, expand or remove

these facilities and installations. The United States shall

have unimpeded access to these and all other facilities and

installations used in connection with the management, operation, or maintenance of the Canal.

4. Anchorages: The United States shall have free and

unimpeded access to and use of the anchorages described in

paragraph 4 of Annex A, for the purposes of exercising its

rights and fulfilling its responsibilities concerning the

movement and anchoring of vessels under the Panama Canal

Treaty and related agreements. The United States may own,

use, operate, inspect, maintain or replace equipment, facilities and navigational aids in these areas. The United States

shall have the right to increase the size of the anchorages

as may be necessary or convenient, within the areas described

in paragraph 5 of Annex A.
451

5. Special Areas: Those additional land and water

areas set forth in paragraph 6 of Annex A are subject to the

procedures set forth in Article IV of this Agreement in

order that activities incompatible with the efficient management,

operation, or maintenance of the Canal shall be precluded.

6. Annex A of this Agreement shall be examined every

five years or by agreement between the two Parties, and

shall be revised by exchange of notes or other instrument to

reflect any agreed elimination or change in areas. The

United States may notify the Republic of Panama at any time

that the use of an area, or of a specified portion thereof,

or other right granted by the Republic of Panama, is no

longer required. Under such circumstances, such use or

other right shall cease on the date determined by the two

Parties.

7. (a) The United States may, at any time, remove

from the Republic of Panama, or, in accordance with such

conditions as may be agreed upon by the two Parties, dispose

of in the Republic of Panama, any equipment, material,

supplies or other removable property brought into, acquired

or constructed in the Republic of Panama by or for the

Commission. In case of disposal within the Republic of

Panama, preference'will be given to the Government of the

Republic of Panama.

(b) All equipment, installations, material,

supplies or removable property left by the United States in

an area made available under this Agreement beyond 90 days

from the date the use of such area by the United States ceases
452

shall, unless agreed otherwise by the two Parties, become

the property of the Republic of Panama.

8. The Commission may employ watchmen to protect the

security of selected installations within the areas made

available for the use of the United States under this Agreement, it being understood that such installations do not

include housing or other installations not devoted to the

management, operation or maintenance of the Panama Canal.

Such watchmen shall not have powers of arrest or other general police powers. They may, however, temporarily detain

persons believed to be committing or to have just committed

an offense against applicable laws or regulations, and shall

promptly transfer custody to the appropriate police authorities. The Commission shall provide to the authorities of

the Republic of Panama through the Coordinating Committee

a list identifying the individuals employed by it as watchmen, and shall promptly notify the Republic of Panama of

any changes in such list. In the performance of their duties,

such watchmen shall not bear firearms except handguns.

9. The Coordinating Committee shall constitute the

means of communication and information between the two

Parties with regard to matters pertaining to the implementation of this Article.
453

ARTICLE IV

LICENSING OF OTHER LAND USES

1. Without prejudice to the rights of the United

States concerning use of areas and installations within the

Republic of Panama under the Panama Canal Treaty and related

agreements, the areas and installations set forth in Annex A

may be used for other purposes compatible with the continuous efficient management, operation and maintenance of

the Panama Canal, under land use licenses to be issued by

the Republic of Panama in accordance with the following

procedure:

(a) The Republic of Panama shall refer to the

Coordinating Committee any requests it may receive from

private concerns, or from agencies of the Republic of

Panama, to undertake specific activities within the areas

subject to this procedure.

(b) If the United States and the Republic of

Panama, acting through the Coordinating Committee, determine that the proposed use, including its terms and conditions, is compatible with the continuous efficient management, operation and maintenance of the Panama Canal, the

Republic of Panama shall issue a revocable land license

for the specific use agreed upon. The United States must

approve the license, in writing, before it becomes effective.

2. The Republic of Panama may terminate the land

license for reasons arising under its laws.
454

3. At any time that the United States decides that a

licensed land use is no longer compatible with the continuous efficient management, operation, or maintenance of

the Panama Canal, or that the licensed area is necessary for

a Panama Canal Treaty-related purpose, it may withdraw its

concurrence in the land license, at which time the Republic

of Panama shall cause the license to be terminated.

4. In the event that the United States withdraws its

concurrence in a land license issued under the procedure

established in this Article, the Republic of Panama shall

take all measures necessary to ensure that the area is

promptly vacated, in accordance with such rules as may be

established by the two Parties through the Coordinating

Committee.

5. The provisions of this Article shall not limit in

any manner the authority of the United States to use the

areas made available for its use under this Agreement, or to

permit their use by its contractors, in the exercise of its

rights and the fulfillment of its responsibilities under

the Panama Canal Treaty and related Agreements.
455

ARTICLE V

BALBOA AND CRISTOBAL PORTS AND THE PANAMA RAILROAD

1. As provided in Article XIII of the Panama Canal

Treaty, all right, title and interest of the United States

in property, installations and equipment in the Ports of

Balboa and Cristobal, the boundaries of which are set forth

in paragraph 1 of Annex B of this Agreement, is transferred

without charge to the Republic of Panama.

2. The Republic of Panama shall have the responsibility

for the management, operation and maintenance of the Ports of

Balboa and Cristobal, subject, however, to the following terms

and c'-nditions:

(a) The Republic of Panama shall exercise its jurisdictional rights over vessels within the lands and waters areas

of the Ports of Balboa and Cristobal. Movement of vessels to

or from the piers and docks of the Ports of Balboa and Cristobal shall be subject to appropriate approval by the port authorities of the Republic of Panama.

(b) The Republic of Panama grants to the United

States the following technical powers: the authority and

responsibility for marine traffic control within the waters

of the Canal operating areas and defense sites and within

the Ports of Balboa and Cristobal and to or from and within
456

the anchorages and emergency beaching areas. Such authority and responsibility of the United States includes the

right to require that vessels moving in such waters be

under the direction of Commission pilots.

(c) The United States may use, for :e management,

operation, maintenance, protection and defense of the Canal,

those port installations and equipment managed, operated,

and maintained by the Republic of Panama which are described

in paragraph 2 of Annex B of this Agreement. The Republic

of Panama shall maintain such port installations and equipment in efficient operating condition.

(d) The United States is guaranteed use of the

Port installations described in paragraph 3 of Annex B of

this Agreement for normal maintenance of its equipment, in

accordance with schedules established by the Commission or,

when necessary for emergency repairs, at any time. The

United States may use its employees to perform services in

such installations. United States use of such installations

and equipment shall be free of cost other than reimbursement

for labor and services provided to the United States at rates

which shall not exceed those charged the most favored

customer on a commercial basis.

(e) In order to facilitate the optimum scheduling

of vessel transits, the Republic of Panama shall ensure that

vessels transiting the Canal receive port services at Balboa

and Cristobal on a priority basis.
457

(f) The Republic of Panama shall control and

supervise the activities to be carried out under its responsibility in the Ports of Balboa and Cristobal to ensure

that such activities are compatible with the efficient management, operation, maintenance, protection and defense of

the Canal. The Republic of Panama shall take the measures

necessary to prevent, or to terminate, any activity that is

incompatible with such purposes.

(g) In the event of emergencies relating to the

protection and defense of the Canal, the Republic of Panama

shall, at the request of the United States, make the installations and equipment of the Naval Industrial Reserve Shipyard

available, without delay, to the United States for as long as

may be necessary. In any such case, the United States shall

reimburse the Republic of Panama for labor or services provided to it at rates which shall not exceed those charged

the most favored customer on a commercial basis.

3. As provided in Article XIII of the Panama Canal

Treaty, all right, title and.interest of the United States

in the property, installations and equipment of the Panama

Railroad is transferred without charge to the Republic of

Panama.

4. The Republic of Panama shall have the responsibility

for the management, operation, and maintenance of the

Panama Railroad (hereinafter referred to as "the Railroad"),

subject, however, to the following terms and conditions:
458

(a) The Republic of Panama shall maintain the

ailroad in efficient operating condition. The Railroad

will continue to provide the levels and frequency of service

necessary for efficient management, operation, and maintenan~, and effective protection and defense of the Canal.

(b) The United States shall have the right to use

and maintain the existing installations, including the 44KV

electrical transmission lines and towers, and to construct,

use and maintain additional installations along the Railroad

right of way, and may have access thereto for such purposes.

(c) The Republic of Panama shall permit the

United States to use the Railroad and its equipment, on a

priority basis, for the purposes of maintaining such transmission lines and other installations, and of transporting

equipment, supplies and personnel related to the management,

operation, maintenance, or protection and defense of the

Canal. The United States shall pay the costs resulting from

such use in accordance with rates which shall not exceed

those charged by the Railroad to its most favored

customer on a commercial basis.

(d) Spur tracks, sidings and related equipment

serving the installations in areas made available to the

United States pursuant to the Panama Canal Treaty shall

remain the responsibility of the United States. Railroad

access to such trackage shall be subject to the approval

S responsible United States authorities.
459

(e) If the Republic of Panama decides, at any

time, that its continued operation of the Railroad at the

minimum levels of service agreed upon by the two Parties

is no longer viable, the United States shall have the right

to reassume management and operation of the Railroad.

5. A Ports and Railroad Committee, to be established as a subcommittee of the Coordinating Committee

in accordance with paragraph 3 of Article II of this Agreement and composed of an equal number of representatives

of each Party, shall be responsible inter alia for coordination of the activities of the Panama Canal Commission

and the National Port Authority of the Republic of Panama

concerning the operation of the Ports of Balboa and Cristobal

and the Panama Railroad, and shall have the following functions:

(a) To consider and, upon agreement, to coordinate

the termination of United States rights with respect to the

use of areas or installations in, or in the vicinity of, the

Ports of Balboa and Cristobal which the Republic of Panama

might desire to use for port activities, or with respect to

the use of areas and installations appertaining to the

Railroad.
460

(b) To consider and, upon agreement, to coordinate

any change in the use of lands or waters in the Ports of Balboa and Cristobal or in areas or installations appertaining

to the Railroad, or any initiation of, change in, or termination of Port or Railroad services. Consequently, changes

in the use of such lands and waters and the initiation of,

changes in, or termination of such services shall occur

only in accordance with the decisions reached by the Ports

and Railroad Committee. Until such time as the Committee

agrees upon new levels and frequency of Railroad services,

the levels and frequency of service scheduled for 1977

shall be maintained.

(c) To maintain adequate standards of safety,

fire prevention and oil pollution. Until such time as the

Committee issues new regulations, the safety, fire prevention and oil pollution standards in force prior to the entry

into force of this Agreement shall remain in force.

(d) To establish procedures and mechanisms to

facilitate the movement of vessels in accordance with the

rights and responsibilities of the Parties set forth in

paragraph 2 above.

(e) To coordinate the use by the United States of

those installations specified in paragrapI 3 of Annex B

that are located within the Ports of Balboa and Cristobal and

the activities of the National Port Authority of the Republic

of Pan-m in these Ports.
461

In considering these matters, the representatives of

the two Parties on the Ports and Railroad Committee shall

be guided by the principle that the operation of the Ports

and Railroad shall be consistent with the continued efficient management, operation, maintenance, protection and

defense of the Canal.
462

ARTICLE VI

REGIME OF CIVIL COORDINATION

FOR HOUSING AREAS

1. As provided in Article XIII of the Panama Canal

Treaty, title to all housing within the housing areas,

owned by the Panama Canal Company immediately prior to

the entry into force of this Agreement, is transferred

to the Republic of Panama. The housing areas shall, however, continue to be dedicated, for the duration of this

Agreement, to the primary purpose of housing employees of

the Commission in accordance with the provisions of this

Article.

2. The Republic of Panama hereby places at the disposal

of the United States, without cost, the use of such housing,

within the housing areas, as the United States may deem necessary for United States citizen employees and dependents

throughout the duration of this Agreement. The United States

continue to manage, maintain, improve, rent and assign

such housing for United States citizen employees and dependents.

3. The use of housing units beyond those required by

the United States for housing United States citizen employces and dependents at the date of entry into force of this

Agreement, shall pass to the Republic of Panama on that date.

Within five years from the entry into force of this Agreement, the use of at least twenty percent of the housing

nit:; located in the former Canal Zone, formerly owned by

tPnama <ana~l C'omany, shall have passed to the Republic
463

of Panama. Thereafter, the use of additional units shall

pass to the Republic of Panama in accordance with the

following schedule:

(a) Within ten years from the entry into force

of this Agreement, the use of a total of at least thirty

percent of such units shall have passed.

(b) Within fifteen years, the use of a total of

at least forty-five percent shall have passed.

(c) Within twenty years, the use of a total of

at least sixty percent shall have passed.

4. In order to protect the interests and welfare of

employees of the United States who are not United States

citizen employees and who, on the date of entry into force

of this Agreement, are occupying housing units, the use of

which is transferred to the Republic of Panama, the Republic of Panama shall give such persons the following special

treatment:

(a) The opportunity to occupy, by lease or rental,

or in the event the Republic of Panama decides to sell, to

acquire by purchase at reasonable prices, the units which

they are occupying on the date of entry into force of this

Agreement;

98-991 0 - 78 - 31
464

(b) In cases of purchase, the opportunity to

obtain long-term financing arrangements.

(c) In cases where continued occupancy of a

particular housing unit is not feasible, the opportunity

to obtain other adequate housing within such areas at reasonable cost, on a preferential or priority basis.

5. In addition to housing its United States citizen

employees and dependents, the United States may use the

housing areas for other purposes related to the management,

operation and maintenance of the Canal. The housing areas

may also be used for other activities complementary to or

compatible with the primary purpose of housing employees of

the Commission under revocable land licenses to be issued in

accordance with the procedures set forth in Article IV of

this Agreement.

6. In coordination with the appropriate authorities of

the Republic of Panama, the Commission may continue to provide public services such as maintenance of streets, sidewalks and other public areas within the housing areas.

Since the utilities systems in the housing areas are

fully integrated with those of the Canal, the Commission

shall, on behalf of the utilities agencies of the Republic of Panama, continue to provide utilities such as

power, water, and sewers to industrial and commercial

enterprises and other persons in the area, other than
465

United States citizen employees and dependents. The

utilities agencies of the Republic of Panama shall be

responsible for setting rates for and billing such customers, and shall reimburse the Commission for its cost

in providing such services.

7. The Coordinating Committee shall serve as the

channel for consultation and coordination between the two

Parties with respect to matters arising under the regime

of civil coordination established in this Article.
466

ARTICLE VII

WATER RIGHTS

1. The United States shall have unimpaired use, free

of cost, of the waters of the Canal and of Alajuela (Madden),

Gatun and Miraflores Lakes, and of the waters of their tributary streams, for the purposes of the management, operation

and maintenance of the Panama Canal, including the generation

of electric power, spilling to provide flood or pollution

control, and the supplying of potable water, taking into

account the needs of the Republic of Panama for potable water.

2. The United States may:

(a) Raise the surface of Alajuela (Madden) Lake

to 260 feet above precise level datum (PLD) and of Gatun

Lake to 100 feet above PLD, and lower the surfaces of these

lakes down to elevations of 190 feet and 76 feet, respectively, for the purposes stated in paragraph 1 of this

Article. The Parties shall consult and coordinate concerning the measures necessary to assure the supply of

potable water to the Republic of Panama.

(b) Erect, operate, maintain, improve, expand,

remove and replace rainfall and river gauging stations in

the watersheds of the lakes and their tributaries, the

data and information obtained from which shall be made

available promptly to the Republic of Panama.
467

(c) Maintain and improve the saddle dams serving

Gatun, Miraflores and Alajuela (Madden) Lakes and any new

impoundment areas. The Republic of Panama agrees to take

the necessary measures to prevent any activity that might

endanger the stability of the saddle dams.

(d) Apply herbicides and conduct other water weed

control and sanitation programs in the lakes, their watershed

and tributaries. In the conduct of these programs the United

States shall take into account the environmental protection

and water standards of the Republic of Panama to the extent

feasible and consistent with the efficient management,

operation and maintenance of the Canal.

(e) Conduct flood control operations, to include

periodic flushing of the rivers, and a routine maintenance

program up to the 100 foot contour line along the Chagres

River between Gamboa and Madden Dam, and up to the 30 foot

contour line along the Chagres River between Gatun Dam and

the Caribbean Sea.

(f) Use such land and water areas as may be necessary for the purpose of constructing new dams, including the

proposed Trinidad, Manguito Point, and Panama Railroad Causeway dams, and impounding such water as may be required to

develop and regulate the water supply of the Canal for the

purposes stated in paragraph 1 of this Article. If new dams

are constructed in accordance with this Agreement, any generation of electric power in connection with such dams shall be
468

the prerogative of the Republic of Panama in the manner

agreed upon between the two Parties.

3. The Republic of Panama shall take the necessary

measures to ensure that any other land or water use of the

Canal's watershed will not deplete the water supply necessary for the continuous efficient management, operation or

maintenance of the Canal, and shall not interfere with the

water use rights of the United States in the Canal's watershed.
469

ARTICLE VIII

SOCIAL SECURITY

1. Concerning Social Security and retirement benefits

applicable to employees of the Commission who are not United

States citizen employees, the following provisions shall

apply:

(a) Such persons who are employed by the Commission

subsequent to the entry into force of this Agreement shall,

as of their date of employment, be covered by the Social

Security System of the Republic of Panama.

(b) Such persons who were employed prior to the

entry into force of this Agreexnt by the Panama Canal

Company or Canal Zone Government and who were covered under

the Civil Service Retirement System of the United States

shall continue to be covered by that system until their

retirement or until the termination of their employment with

the Commission for any other reason.

(c) The Commission shall collect and transfer in

a timely manner to the Social Security System of the Republic of Panama the employer's and employees' contributions

for those of its employees who are covered by the Social

Security System of the Republic of Panama.

2. Concerning health benefits applicable to employees

of the Commission who are not United States citizen employees and who are covered by the Civil Service Retirement

System of the United States the following provisions shall

apply:
470

(a) For the duration of a transitional period of

thirty calendar months following the entry into force of this

Agreement, all such persons shall continue to be provided

health insurance and medical benefits under tie same general

arrangements in effect prior to the entry into .;rce of this

Agreement.

(b) At the termination of the aforementioned

transitional period, none of the abovementioned persons

shall be eligible to receive health or medical benefits

from facilities operated by the United States in the Republic of Panama.

(c) Such persons shall have the rigkt, during

the aforementioned transitional period, to elect either

to continue their coverage under the Federal Employees'

Health Benefits Plan or to terminate their coverage under

that program and enroll in the Health and Maternity Benefits Program under the Social Security System of the Republic of Panama, effective upon the termination of the

transitional period.

(d) The Commission shall collect and transfer

in a timely manner to the Social Security System of the

Republic of Panama the employer's and employees' contributions to the Health and Maternity Benefits Program of that

institution for such persons who enroll in that program.
471

The employer's contribution shall be equal to that which

the employer would have paid had the employee continued

under the Federal Employees Health Benefits Plan.

3. (a) Following the entry into force of this Agreement, employees of the Panama Canal Company or Canal Zone

Government, regardless of their nationality, who become

employees of the Republic of Panama as the result either of

a transfer of a function or activity to the Republic of

Panama from the Panama Canal Company or Canal Zone Government

or through job placement efforts of the Commission or the

Republic of Panama, shall be covered by the Social Security

System of the Republic of Panama through a special regime

identical in eligibility requirements, benefits, and

employer/employee contributions to the United States Civil

Service Retirement System in which the employee was previously enrolled.

(b) In those instances in which an employee has

been separated from employment with the Commission and is

due a refund of his contributions to the Civil Service

Retirement System of the United States, said refund shall,

upon the written request of the employee, be transferred by

the Civil Service authorities of the United States to the

Social Security System of the Republic of Panama for the

purpose of the employee's purchase of an equity, which

shall be financially equal to the total of the amounts transferred.
472

(c) When such employee of the Panama Canal

Company or Canal Zone Government, regardless of his nationality, is separated from his employment with the Commission

as the result of the implementation of the Panama Canal

Treaty and becomes an employee of the Republic of Panama as

the result either of a transfer of a function or activity

to the Republic of Panama from the Panama Canal Company or

the Canal Zone Government or through a job placement assistance program, and elects to purchase an equity in the Social

Security System of the Republic of Panama, through a special

regime identical in requirements for eligibility, benefits,

and employer/employee contributions to the Civil Service

Retirement System of the United States in which the employee was previously enrolled, the United States shall provide

an equal sum to assist the employee in acquiring such an

equity, provided, however, that:

(i) The employee is not eligible for an

immediate retirement annuity under the United States Civil

Service Retirement System.

(ii) The employee has not elected a deferred

annuity under the United States Civil Service Retirement

System.

(iii) The employee has been credited with at

least five years of Federal service under the United States

Civil Service Retirement System.
473

(iv) The employee elects to withdraw the

entire amount of his capitalized contributions to the Civil

Service Retirement System of the United States and transfer

them to the Social Security System of the Republic of

Panama.

(v) The contribution provided by the United

States shall be the same as the amount withdrawn by the employee from the United States Civil Service Retirement Fund

and contributed by the employee to the Panamanian Social

Security System.

(d) Employees eligible for an immediate annuity

under the Civil Service Retirement System of the United

States shall begin to receive retirement pay at the time

of their termination of their employment by the Government

of the United States.

4. Except as otherwise provided in the Panama

Canal Treaty or this Agreement, there shall be no loss or

limitation of rights, options and benefits to which employees of the Commission who were employed by the Panama

Canal Company or the Canal Zone Government may be entitled

under applicable laws and regulations of the United States

as a result of their participation in the Civil Service

Retirement System of the United States. These rights,

options and benefits include the rights, where appropriate

under applicable laws and regulations of the United States,

to optional or voluntary retirement, discontinued service

retirement following involuntary separation, disability

retirement, and deferred retirement.
474

5. Non-United States citizen employees of the Panama

Canal Commission who were, prior to the entry into force of

this Agreement, employed by the Panama Canal Company or the

Canal Zone Government, and who continue to be covered by

the United States Civil Service Retirement System, shall

continue to be covered by United States Workmen's Compensation

and may, if they so desire, continue their coverage under the

Federal Employees' Group Life Insurance program in the same

manner as prior to the entry into force of this Agreement.
475

ARTICLE IX

ACQUISITION OF PANAMANIAN SUPPLIES AND SERVICES

1. In procuring supplies and services, the Commission

shall give preference to those obtainable in the Republic

of Panama. Such preference shall apply to the maximum extent possible when such supplies and services are available

as required, and are comparable in quality and price to

those which may be obtained from other sources. For the

comparison of prices there shall be taken into account the

cost of transport to the Republic of Panama, including

freight, insurance and handling, of the supplies and services which compete with Panamanian supplies and services.

In the acquisition of goods in the Republic of Panama,

preference shall be given to goods having a larger percentage of components of Panamanian origin.

2. Any regulations which may be necessary to carry

out this preference shall be agreed upon in the Coordinating Committee.
476

ARTICLE X

TELECOMMUNICATIONS

1. The Republic of Panama, in the exercise of its

sovereign power over telecommunications, authorizes the

United States, for the duration of this Agreement, to use

communications networks and communications-electronics

installations within the Canal operating areas, and the

radio frequencies authorized or in use, and transportable

equipment in use, immediately prior to the entry into force

of this Agreement and as may be necessary for its requirements, in order to accomplish the purposes of the management,

operation and maintenance of the Canal, and as the two Parties

may otherwise agree. The Coordinating Committee may adopt

regulations to govern the use of such transportable equipment outside of such areas.

2. The Republic of Panama also authorizes the United

States to use installations such as those described in the

preceding paragraph already existing outside the Canal

operating areas, including those operated and maintained by

the United States Forces or by contractors, which serve to

accomplish the purposes of the management, operation or

maintenance of the Canal, and as the two Parties may

otherwise agree. The United States authorities shall

have access to such installations for appropriate operation,

maintenance and replacement.
477

3. Upon the termination of this Agreement, all telecommunication equipment and facilities necessary for purposes

of operation of the Canal, which are the property of the

United States, shall be transferred to the Republic of Panama.

The United States, after consultation with the Republic

of Panama, will institute a program to train Panamanian nationals to operate and maintain such telecommunications

equipment, including ship-to-shore facilities.

4. Provided that they are available and suitable for

the purpose, the Commission shall use, to the maximum extent

practicable, the telecommunications services of public or

private enterprise in the Republic of Panama in order to

meet its growth needs, but the applicable rates shall be

no less favorable than those charged to governmental agencies

of the Republic of Panama.

5. The United States shall provide the Republic of

Panama a list of all frequencies authorized or in use by

it pursuant to this Article. This list shall be submitted

through the Coordinating Committee in ascending frequency

order and shall contain as a minimum information concerning

the power, bandwidth, and type of emission being used in

those frequencies.

6. The Republic of Panama undertakes not to authorize

the use of any frequency which would interfere with those

in use by or for the Commission or which it may use in the

future in accordance with the Panama Canal Treaty and this

Agreement.
478

7. All provisions regarding telecommunications in

this Article shall be in accordance with the obligations of

both Parties as members of the International Telecommunication Union and with the various relevant international

agreements to which both are parties.

8. Any communication with the International Telecommunication Union regarding the subject matter of this Article

shall be effected exclusively by the Republic of Panama.

9. The Coordinating Committee may adopt any further

regulations as may be necessary to implement the provisions

of this Article, including necessary technical coordination.
479

ARTICLE XI

CONTRACTORS AND CONTRACTORS' PERSONNEL

1. Whenever the Commission enters into contracts for

the performance of services or the procurement of supplies,

it shall adhere to the preferences for Panamanian sources

set forth in Article IX of this Agreement.

2. Whenever contracts are awarded by the Commission to

natural persons who are nationals or permanent residents of the

United States or to corporations or other legal entities

organized under the laws of the United States and under the

effective control of such persons, such contractors shall be

so designated by the United States and such designations shall

be communicated to the authorities of the Republic of Panama

through the Coordinating Committee. Designated contractors

shall be subject to the laws and regulations of the Republic of Panama except with respect to the special regime

established by this Agreement, which includes the following

obligations and benefits:

(a) The contractor must engage exclusively in

activities related to the execution of the work for which he

has been contracted by the Commission or related to other

works or activities authorized by the Republic of Panama.

98-991 0 - 78 - 32
480

(b) The contractor must refrain from carrying out

practices which may constitute violations of the laws of

the Republic of Panama.

(c) The contractor shall enter and depart from

the territory of the Republic of Panama in accordance with

procedures prescribed for United States citizen employees

in Article XII of this Agreement.

(d) The contractor must obtain a document indicating his identity as a contractor which the proper authorities of the United States shall issue when they are satisfied

he is duly qualified. This certificate shall be sufficient to

permit him to operate under Panamanian law as a contractor of

the United States. Nevertheless, the authorities of the Republic of Panama may require the registration of the appropriate documents to establish juridical presence in the Republic of Panama.

(e) The contractor shall not be obliged to pay

any tax or other assessment to the Republic of Panama on

income derived under a contract with the Commission, so

long as he is taxed in the United States at a rate substantially equivalent to the corresponding taxes and assessments

of the Republic of Panama.

(f) The contractor may move freely within the

Republic of Panama, and shall have exemptions from customs

duties and other charges, as provided for United States

citizen employees in Articles XIV and XVI of this Agreement.
481

(g) The contractor may use public services and

installations in accordance with the terms and conditions

of Article XIII of this Agreement and, on a non-discriminatory

basis, shall pay the Republic of Panama highway tolls and

taxes on plates for private vehicles.

(h) The contractor shall be exempt from any taxes

imposed on depreciable assets belonging to him, other than

real estate, which are used exclusively for the execution of

contracts with the United States.

(i) The contractor may use the services and

facilities provided for in Articles X and XVIII of the Agreement

in Implementation of Article IV of the Panama Canal Treaty,

signed this date, to the extent such use is authorized by

the United States; provided, however, that after five years

from the entry into force of this Agreement, the use of

military postal services by such contractors shall be limited

to that related to the execution of contracts with the

United States.

3. The Commission shall withdraw the designation of

a contractor when any of the following circumstances occur:

(a) Completion or termination of the contracts

with the Commission.

(b) Proof that during the life of the contract

such contractors have engaged in the Republic of Panama in

business activities not related to their contracts with the
482

United States nor authorized by the Republic of Panama.

(c) Proof that such contractors are engaged

in practices which in the view of the Republic of Panama

constitute serious violations of the laws of the Republic

of Panama.

4. The authorities of the United States shall notify

the authorities of the Republic of Panama whenever the

designation of a contractor has been withdrawn. If, within

sixty days after notification of the withdrawal of the

designation of a contractor who entered the territory of

the Republic of Panama in the capacity of a contractor, the

authorities of the Republic of Panama require such contractor

to leave its territory, the United States shall ensure that

the Republic of Panama shall not incur any expense due to the

cost of transportation.

5. The provisions of this Article shall similarly

apply to the subcontractors and to the employees of the

contractors and subcontractors and their dependents who are

nationals or residents of the United States. These employees

and dependents shall not be subject to the Panamanian Social

Security system.
483

ARTICLE XII

ENTRY AND DEPARTURE

1. The United States may bring into the territory of the Republic of Panama United States citizen employees and dependents for the specific purposes of the Panama Canal Treaty and as the two

Parties may agree upon.

2. In order to enter or leave the territory of

the Republic of Panama, such persons shall be required

to bear only a valid passport and a special entry/exit

permit issued by the Republic of Panama. Such documentation, upon entry into or departure from the territory

of the Republic of Panama, shall be presented to the

appropriate authorities of the Republic of Panama.

3. Such entry/exit permits shall authorize the

bearer an unlimited number of entries into and exits

from the territory of the Republic of Panama for the

duration of the employment or other duties with the

Commission of the bearer, or of his sponsor. Such

permits shall remain valid until such time as United

States authorities notify the appropriate authorities

of the Republic of Panama of the termination of the
484

employment or duties with the Commission of the bearer,

or of his sponsor.

4. The Republic of Panama agrees to issue such

special entry/exit permits to the persons described in

paragraph 1 of this Article, upon written request by

the authorities of the United States, and to implement

special procedures to ensure such expeditious issuance.

5. Whenever the status of any person described

in paragraph 1 of this Article is altered so that he

is no longer entitled to remain in the territory of the

Republic of Panama, the authorities of the United States

shall promptly notify the authorities of the Republic of

Panama, and shall ensure that the special entry/exit permit in question is returned to the Republic of Panama.

If requested by the Republic of Panama within a period

of sixty days following such notice, the authorities

of the United States shall ensure that transportation

of any such person from the Republic of Panama will be

provided at no cost to the Republic of Panama.

6. The persons described in paragraph 1 of this

Article shall be exempted from fiscal charges relating
485

to their entry, stay in, or departure from the territory of the Republic of Panama, except for nondiscriminatory charges established or which may be established for use of airports. Similarly, they shall

be exempted from obligatory services established in

favor of the Republic of Panama. They shall not acquire

any right to permanent residence or domicile in the Republic of Panama.

7. United States citizen employees who enter

the Republic of Panama to execute professional services

exclusively for the United States, or on its behalf,

shall not be subject to the licensing regimes of the

Republic of Panama, but their professional activity

shall be limited to such services with the United

States for the specific purposes of the Panama Canal

Treaty, or as the two Parties may otherwise agree.
486

ARTICLE XIII

SERVICES AND INSTALLATIONS

1. The Commission, its United States citizen

employees and dependents may use the public services

and installations belonging to or regulated by the

Republic of Panama, and the terms and conditions of

use, prices, rates and tariffs and priorities shall

not be unfavorable in relation to those charged other

users.

2. The Commission may use the facilities and

services of the United States Forces for official

purposes and may establish and operate the supporting

services and facilities it requires within the areas

used under this Agreement, and exceptionally, with

the authorization of the Republic of Panama, outside

such areas.

3. The United States may furnish to United States

citizen employees and dependents the services provided

for in Article XVIII of the Agreement in Implementation

of Article IV of the Panama Canal Treaty signed this

date, and authorize their use of the facilities provided for in Article X and Article XI of that Agrecment
487

provided, however, that their use of military postal

services, commissaries, and military exchanges may

not be authorized after five years from the entry into

force of this Agreement.

4. The facilities and services of the Commission

may be made available, exclusively for official purposes, to other agencies of the Government of the

United States operating in the Republic of Panama,

including the United States Forces.
488

ARTICLE XIV 

MOVEMENT, LICENSES, AND REGISTRATION OF

VESSELS, AIRCRAFT AND VEHICLES

1. (a) When in the performance of official

duties, the vessels and aircraft operated by or for

the Commission may move freely through Panamanian

air space and waters, without the obligation of

payment of taxes, tolls, landing or pier charges or

other charges to the Republic of Panama except for reimbursement for specific services requested and received

and without any other impediment.

(b) Such vessels and aircraft shall be

exempt from customs inspections or other inspections.

Whenever they carry cargo, crews or passengers who

are not entitled to the exemptions provided for in this

Agreement, timely notice shall be given to the appropriate authorities of the Republic of Panama. Both

Parties shall adopt procedures to ensure that the

customs laws and regulations of the Republic of Panama

are not violated.

2. (a) (i) Similarly, the vehicles and equipment of the Commission may, when in the performance of

official duties, move freely in the Republic of

Panama, without the obligation of payment of taxes,
489

tolls or other charges to the Republic of Panama and

without any other impediment. Such vehicles and equipment shall be exempt from mechanical or other inspection.

(ii) Claims arising from damage caused by

the Commission to the Panamanian road network outside

the Canal operating areas, in excess of the usual wear

and tear by reason of time and its appropriate use,

shall be settled as provided for in Article XVIII of

this Agreement.

(b) Such vehicles and equipment of the Commission shall not be assessed any license or registration fees. These vehicles shall bear means of identification as may be agreed upon by the Coordinating Committee, to be issued under the authority of said Coordinating Committee and distributed by the Commission.

3. (a) The plates, individual marks and registration documents issued by the United States for

vehicles, trailers, vessels and aircraft which are the

property of the Commission shall be accepted by the

Republic of Panama.

(b) The Republic of Panama shall recognize as sufficient the valid licenses, permits, certificates or other official classifications from the

United States, possessed by operators of vehicles,
490

vessels and aircraft which are property of the United

States.

4. (a) The vehicles, trailers, vessels and

aircraft belonging to the United States citizen employees or dependents shall also move freely within the

Republic of Panama, in compliance with the traffic regulations and those regarding the annual mechanical inspection. The license plate fee and other obligations

shall not be discriminatory.

(b) The Republic of Panama shall issue the

appropriate documents of title and registration of vehicles, trailers, vessels and aircraft which are the

property of United States citizen employees or dependents when the latter present title and registration

issued by the federal or state authorities of the United

States or by the authorities of the former Canal Zone.

Applicants may retain such documents provided they

leave with the authorities of the Republic of Panama a

copy authenticated by the Commission, duly translated

into Spanish. While the corresponding request is

being processed and within a term which may not exceed

ninety days after entry into force of this Agreement

or after the arrival of the means of transportation mentioned above in the Republic of Panama, it may be operated

with the plates or distinctive marks issued by the federal
491

or state authorities of the United States or by the

authorities of the former Canal Zone.

(c) United States citizen employees

and dependents who bear valid documents such as

drivers' licenses, vessel operators' permits, amateur

radio licenses, or licenses and classifications of

air pilots issued by the federal or state authorities

of the United States or by the authorities of the

former Canal Zone, shall receive equivalent Panamanian

licenses, permits and classifications without being

subjected to new tests or payments of new fees. The

applicants may retain the licenses, permits and classifications of the United States or the former Canal Zone

provided that they leave with the authorities of the

Republic of Panama a copy authenticated by the Commission

and duly translated into Spanish. United States citizen

employees and dependents shall be permitted to drive

vehicles, vessels or aircraft in the Republic of Panama

with such licenses, permits and classifications during

the ninety days following the entry into force of this

Agreement or their first arrival in the Republic of

Panama. During this period the processing of the
492

application in the Republic of Panama for a driver's

license, vessel operator's permit, or license and classification as an air pilot shall be completed.

(d) The Panamanian licenses, permits or

classifications shall be valid for the period of time

indicated in the Panamanian law and, during the continuous

presence of the bearer in the Republic of Panama, shall, to

preserve their validity, be renewed in accordance with

Panamanian laws. Whenever Panamanian laws require

medical certifications for the renewal of licenses,

permits or classifications, the Republic of Panama shall

accept the certifications issued by the medical services

of the United States, provided that said certifications

are submitted in Spanish translation.

(e) The Republic of Panama shall issue drivers' licenses, vessel operators' permits, and licenses

and other classifications of.air pilots to United States

citizen employees and dependents when they do not possess

valid documents. If any test is required as a prerequisite for the issuance of the documents mentioned, the

republic of Panama shall permit the interested persons

to take the examination in Spanish or in English. Any
493

material which the Republic of Panama may generally

issue in preparation for such examinations shall be

furnished, in Spanish or in English, as the applicant

may request. The fees for such documents shall not be

discriminatory.

5. The Coordinating Committee may agree on rules

and procedures that may be necessary to implement this

Article.
494

ARTICLE XV

TAXATION

1. By virtue of this Agreement, the Commission,

its contractors and subcontractors, are exempt from payment in the Republic of Panama of all taxes, fees or

other charges on their activities or property.

2. United States citizen employees and dependents

shall be exempt from any taxes, fees, or other charges

on income received as a result of their work for the

Commission. Similarly, they shall be exempt from payment of taxes, fees or other charges on income derived

from sources outside the Republic of Panama.

3. United States citizen employees and dependents

shall be exempt from taxes, fees or other charges on

gifts or inheritance or on personal property, the

presence of which within the territory of the Republic of Panama is due solely to the stay therein of

such persons on account of their or their sponsor's

work with the Commission.

4. The Coordinating Committee may establish such

regulations as may be appropriate for the implementation

of this Article.
495

ARTICLE XVI

IMPORT DUTIES

1. Except for the exemptions provided for in

this Agreement, United States citizen employees and

dependents shall be subject to the customs laws and

regulations of the Republic of Panama.

2. All property imported for the official use

or benefit of the Commission, including that imported

by its contractors or subcontractors in connection

with the various activities authorized under this

Agreement, shall be exempt from the payment of all

customs duties or other import taxes and charges and

from all license requirements. The Commission shall

issue a certificate, following the form adopted by

the Coordinating Committee, stating that the property

being imported is for these purposes.

3. Property consigned to or imported for the

personal use of United States citizen employees or

dependents shall be subject to the payment of import

duties or other import taxes, except for the following:

98-991 0 - 78 - 33
496

(a) Furniture, household goods and personal

effects imported by such persons for their private use

within six months following their first arrival in the

Republic of Panama.

(b) Vehicles imported by such persons for

their private use. The Coordinating Committee shall

establish the limitations on the quantity and frequency

of additional imports of vehicles and shall authorize

such importation of at least one vehicle every two years.

(c) A reasonable quantity of articles for the

private use of such persons, imported as personal baggage

or sent into the Republic of Panama through the mails.

(d)- Such other imports as may be expressly authorized by the competent authorities of the Republic of

Panama at the request of the Commission.

4. The exemptions granted in paragraph 3 of this

Article shall apply only to cases involving the importation of articles exempted at the time of entry and

shall not be construed as obligating the Republic of

Panama to reimburse customs duties and domestic taxes

collected by the Republic of Panama in connection with

purchases of goods from Panamanian sources subsequent

to their importation.
497

5. Customs inspections shall not be made in the

following cases:

(a) United States citizen employees travelling

on official business who enter or depart from the Republic of Panama;

(b) Official documents under official seal,

and mail sent through the military postal channels of

the United States;

(c) Cargo consigned to the Commission.

6. Property imported under this Article and subsequently transferred to a person who is not entitled

to duty-free importation shall be subject to the payment of import duties and other taxes according to

the laws and regulations of the Republic of Panama.

7. All property imported in the Republic of

Panama free of customs duties and other taxes pursuant

to paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article may be exported

free of customs duties, export permits, export taxes,

and other assessments. All property acquired in the

Republic of Panama by, or in the name of, the Commission, or acquired by United States citizen employees

or dependents for their private use, may be exported

free of customs duties, export licenses, and other

export taxes or charges.
498

8. The authorities of the United States agree

to cooperate with the authorities of the Republic of

Panama and shall take, within their legal authority,

all steps necessary to prevent the abuse of the privileges granted under this Article to United States citizen employees or dependents, which measures may include

dismissal of such employees.

9. In order to prevent violations of the customs

laws and regulations of the Republic of Panama, the two

Parties agree as follows:

(a) The competent authorities of the United

States and the authorities of tho Republic of Panama

shall mutually assist one another in the conduct of

investigations and the collection of evidence.

(b) The authorities of the United States

shall take, within their legal authority, all necessary measures to ensure that articles subject to

seizure by or in the name of the customs authorities

of the Republic of Panama are delivered to these

authorities
499

(c) The authorities of the United States

shall take, within their legal authority, all necessary

measures to ensure the payment by United States citizen

employees, and dependents, of such import duties, taxes,

and fines as may be duly determined by the authorities

of the Republic of Panama.

10. Vehicles and articles belonging to the Commission that are seized from a person by the authorities

of the Republic of Panama in connection with a violation

of its customs or tax laws or regulations shall be

delivered to the competent authorities of the Commission.

11. The Coordinating Committee will constitute

the means of communication and information between

the two Parties with regard to matters pertaining

to the implementation of this Article.
500

ARTICLE XVII

SURVEYS

The United States may carry out topographic, hydrographic, agrologic and other surveys (including the

taking of aerial photographs) within the areas made

available for the use of the United States pursuant

to this Agreement and within the watershed basin of

Gatun, Alajuela (Madden) and Miraflores Lakes. Surveys

in other areas of the Republic of Panama shall require

authorization from the Republic of Panama and shall be

carried out in the manner agreed upon in the Coordinating Committee. The Republic of Panama shall, at its

option, designate a representative to be present during

such surveys. The United States shall furnish a copy

of the data resulting from such surveys to the Republic of Panama at no cost.
501

ARTICLE XVIII

CLAIMS

1. (a) Each Party shall settle claims against

it for damage to any property owned and used by the

other Party in the following circumstances:

(i) If the damage was caused by an

employee of the Government, against which the claim

is made, in the performance of his official duties;

or

(ii) If the damage arose from the use

of any vehicle, vessel or aircraft owned and used by

the said Government, provided either that the vehicle,

vessel or aircraft causing the damage was being used

for official purposes, or that the damage was caused

to property being so used.

(b) If it is not settled in due course,

the claim may be pursued through diplomatic channels.

Both Parties hereby waive the collection of any

claims for an amount less than B/. 1400 or $1400 U.S.,

whichever may be the currency of greater value.

2. In cases of maritime salvage, each Party

waives its claims against the other if the vessel or

cargo salved was the property of the other Party

and was used for official purposes.
502

3. For the purposes of this Article, any vessel

chartered, requisitioned or seized in prize by a Party

shall be considered its property (except to the extent

that the risk of loss or liability is assumed by some

other person than such Party).

4. United States citizen employees shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the civil courts of the

Republic of Panama except in matters which arise from

the performance of their official duty. In cases in

which payment has been accepted in full satisfaction

of the claim, the civil courts of the Republic of Panama

shall dismiss any proceeding concerning such matter.

5. Non-contractual claims arising from damages

caused in the performance of their official duties by

employees of the Commission to third parties shall be

presented by the injured party through the Coordinating

Committee to the appropriate authorities of the Commission for settlement. The authorities of the Republic

of Panama may submit advice and recommendations on

Panamanian law to the claims authorities of the Commission for their use in evaluating liability and amount

of damages. The Commission shall assure payment of the

appropriate damages, if any are due.
503

6. Contractual claims against the Commission

shall be settled in accordance with the dispute clause

of the contracts, and in the absence of such clause,

through presentation of claims to the Commission.

7. The Commission shall require contractors and

subcontractors referred to in Article XI of this Agreement to obtain appropriate insurance to cover the civil

liabilities that may be incurred in the territory of the

Republic of Panama as a result of acts or omissions done

in the performance of official duty by their employees.

The Coordinating Committee shall establish the general

standards for such insurance.

8. The authorities of both Parties shall cooperate

in the investigation and procurement of evidence for a

fair disposition of claims under this Article.
504

ARTICLE XIX

CRIMINAL JURISDICTION

1. The Republic of Panama shall exercise, in the

manner herein indicated, its jurisdiction over United

States citizen employees and dependents with respect to

all offenses arising from acts or omissions committed by

them within the territory of the Republic of Panama and

punishable under the laws of the Republic of Panama.

2. Concerning offenses committed by United States

citizen employees or dependents that are punishable

under the laws of both Parties, the authorities of the

United States may request the Republic of Panama to

waive its jurisdiction in favor of the authorities of

the United States. Said authorities shall, in their

request, state the reasons therefor, and the Republic

of Panama shall give favorable consideration to such requests in the following cases:

(a) If the offense arises out of an act or

omission done in the performance of official duty. In

such cases, when requested by the authorities of the Republic of Panama or when the authorities of the United States
505

may deem it necessary, the latter shall issue a

certificate establishing that the offense originated

from an act or omission occurring in the performance

of official duty. The Republic of Panama shall

consider this certificate as sufficient proof for

the purposes of this paragraph, or shall request

a review by the Coordinating Committe, within ten

days of the date of receipt of the certificate. The

Coordinating Committee shall complete its review

within ten days from the date of receipt of the request, except when more thorough consideration may be

necessary, in which case the Coordinating Committee

shall complete its review within thirty days. A

substantial deviation from the duties which a person

is required to perform in a specific mission shall

generally indicate an act or omission not occurring

in the performance of official duty and, consequently,

the authorities of the United States will not consider

it necessary to issue a certificate of official duty.

(b) If the offense is solely against the

property or security of the United States and is

committed in a Canal operating area or in a housing

area. It is understood that offenses against the
506

security of the United States include: treason or

sabotage against the United States, espionage or violation of any law relating to official secrets of

the United States or to secrets relating to the national defense of the United States.

3. In any case in which the authorities of the

Republic of Panama waive jurisdiction to the United

States, or in cases in which the offense constitutes

a crime under the laws of the United Scates, but

not under the laws of the Republic of Panama, the

accused United States citizen employee or dependent

shall be tried outside of the territory of the Republic of Panama.

4. (a) The authorities of the Republic of

Panama shall notify the authorities of the United

States as promptly as possible of the arrest of

any United States citizen employee or dependent.

(b) The following procedures shall govern

the custody of an accused United States citizen employee or dependent over whom the Republic of Panama

is to exercise its jurisdiction:
507

(i) If the accused is detained by the

authorities of the Republic of Panama he shall, except when charged with murder, rape, robbery with violence, trafficking in drugs, or crimes against the

security of the Panamanian State, be handed over on

request to the authorities of the United States in

whose custody he shall remain until completion of all

judicial proceedings and thereafter until custody

is requested by authorities of the Republic of Panama

for the execution of a sentence.

(ii) When charged with murder, rape,

robbery with violence, trafficking in drugs, or

crimes against the security of the Panamanian State,

the accused will remain in the custody of the authorities

of the Republic of Panama. In these cases, the authorities

of the Republic of Panama shall give sympathetic consideration to requests for custody by the authorities

of the United States.

5. (a) The authorities of the United States shall

give full consideration to special requests made by

the authorities of the Republic of Panama regarding

conditions of custody of any detainee in the custody

of the United States.
508

(b) When the accused is in the custody of

the authorities of the United States, he must, upon request

by the authorities of the Republic of Panama, be

made available to them for the purposes of investigation and trial. This obligation of the United

States to ensure the appearance of an accused United

States citizen employee, or dependent shall be deemed

to satisfy the bail requirement set by the laws of

the Republic of Panama.

6. (a) The authorities of the United States

and of the Republic of Panama shall assist each other

in carrying out all necessary investigations of

offenses and in the collection and production of

evidence, including the seizure and, in proper cases,

the delivery of objects connected with an offense

and the appearance of witnesses as necessary.

(b) The authorities of the United States

and of the Republic of Panama shall, upon request by

the other Party, inform each other of the

status of cases referred to under the provisions

of this Article.

7. As is provided in the laws of the Republic

of Panama, a United States citizen employee or a
509

dependent who has been convicted by a Panamanian court

shall not be subject to the death penalty or to any form

of cruel and unusual punishment or treatment.

8. When an accused United States citizen employee

or dependent has been tried in accordance with the provisions of this Article by the authorities of the United

States or by the authorities of the Republic of Panama

and has been acquitted, or has been convicted and is

serving, or has served, his sentence, or has been pardoned, he shall not be tried again for the same offense

within the territory of the Republic of Panama.

9. Whenever an accused United States citizen employee or a dependent is tried by the authorities of

the Republic of Panama he shall be entitled to the procedural guarantees listed in Annex C of this Agreement.

10. During the detention by the authorities of

the Republic of Panama of a United States citizen employee or a dependent the authorities of the Republic

of Panama shall permit members of his immediate family

to visit him weekly. Material and medical assistance

(such as food, clothing and comfort items) which the

authorities of the United States and members of his

immediate family may consider desirable, and any other
510

assistance which is in accordance with or allowed by

Panamanian prison regulations, may be provided to him

on such visits.

11. The Coordinating Committee will constitute

the channel of communication and information between

the two Parties with regard to matters pertaining

to the implementation of this Article.
511

ARTICLE XX

GENERAL PROVISIONS

1. The activities of the United States in the

Republic of Panama shall be carried out with adequate

attention to public health and safety, and consequently,

within the areas made available for the use of the United

States under this Agreement, the authorities of the United

States shall have the right to take appropriate sanitation

measures. The authorities of the United States shall

cooperate with the authorities of the Republic of Panama

for these purposes.

2. United States citizen employees and dependents

may bear private arms in accordance with applicable

Panamanian laws and regulations.

3. The Commission shall establish regulations to

provide for the handling of matters under its competence

in the English and Spanish languages, as appropriate.

98-991 0 - 78 - 34
512

ARTICLE XXI

DURATION

This Agreement shall enter into force simultaneously with the entry into force of the Panama Canal

Treaty, signed this date, and shall remain in force

throughout the period that the aforesaid Treaty remains in force.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly

authorized thereto, have signed this Agreement.

DONE at Washington, this 7th day of September,

1977, in duplicate, in the English and Spanish languages, both being equally authentic.
APPENDIX 4

AGREEMENT IN IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE IV OF THE PANAMA

CANAL TREATY. SIGNED SEPTEMBER 7, 1977

Whereas, the Republic of Panama and the United States

of America have signed on this date the "Panama Canal Treaty" to

regulate the system pertaining to the operation, maintenance,

administration, protection and defense of the Panama Canal in

harmony with the Charter of the United Nations;

Whereas, the Republic of Panama shall permit the United

States to use certain parts of its territory for the protection

and defense of the Panama Canal, with the participation of the

Panamanian Armed Forces as is established under Article IV of the

"Panama Canal Treaty" subscribed on this date;

Whereas, in order to determine the system applicable to

the Armed Forces of the United States, the civilian component, and

dependents, accompanying them during their stay in the Republic of

Panama for the specific purposes of the Panama Canal Treaty, and

as the two Governments may otherwise agree, and for the purpose of

regulating the use of the defense sites;

Pursuant to the "Panama Canal Treaty," the following has

been agreed upon:

(513)
514

ARTICLE I

DEFINITIONS

(1) Defense Sites: Those areas, and the installations within them,

which the Republic of Panama by this Agreement permits the United States

Forces to use for the specific purposes of the Panama Canal Treaty, and as

the two Governments may otherwise agree, a list of which is set forth in

paragraph (1) of Annex A of this Agreement.

(2) United States Forces: The land, sea and air armed services of

the United States of America.

(3) Members of the Forces: The military personnel of the United

States Forces on active duty who are in the Republic of Panama for the

specific purposes of the Panama Canal Treaty, and as the two Governments

may otherwise agree.

This term includes those military personnel of the United States

Forces on active duty and present in the Republic of Panama on temporary

duty from other stations, or on board aircraft or vessels of the United States

Forces which are in transit or visiting on official business.

Solely for purposes of the privileges authorized under Articles

X, XI, and XVIII of this Agreement, this term also includes those military

personnel of the United States Forces on active duty, assigned to other

stations and present in the Republic of Panama on official leave.
515

(4) Members of the civilian component:

(a) Nationals of the United States, to whom United States

passports have been issued, who are employed by the United States

Forces and assigned to the defense sites in the Republic of

Panama.

(b) Nationals of third countries employed by the United

States Forces, who are assigned to the defense sites and who are

not habitual residents of the Republic of Panama.

(c) Other categories of persons which could be agreed upon as

exceptions by the two Governments.

This term includes personnel on temporary duty and civilian

crew members of aircraft and vessels of the United States Forces

which are in transit or visiting on official business.

For the purpose of this definition, presence in connection

with employment by the United States Forces shall not be considered

as residence in the Republic of Panama.

(5) Dependents: The spouse and children of members of the Forces

or of the civi-lian component, and other relatives who depend on them

for their subsistence and who habitually live with them under the

same roof.
516

ARTICLE II

NON-INTERVENTION PRINCIPLE

The members of the Forces or the civilian component, dependents, and

designated contractors of the United States Forces shall respect the laws of

the Republic of Panama and shall refrain from any activity inconsistent with

the spirit of this Agreement. Especially, they shall abstain from all political

activity in the Republic of Panama as well as from any interference in

the internal affairs of the Republic.

The United States shall take all measures within its authority to ensure

that the provisions of this Article are fulfilled.
517

ARTICLE IH

JOINT COMMITTEE

(1) A Joint Committee shall be established which shall start to function

upon the entry into force of this Agreement and which shall be composed of

a representative of the Republic of Panama and of the United States of America

at the level and rank to be agreed upon by both Governments, and who may

have one or more deputies, on a parity basis.

(2) The Joint Committee shall perform the functions specifically indicated

by the provisions of this Agreement, and others entrusted to it by both

Governments concerning the implementation of this Agreement.

(3) The Joint Committee shall determine its rules of procedure within the

spirit of this Agreement and may designate the subcommittees it may deem

necessary for the fulfillment of its functions.

(4) The Joint Committee shall be organized in such a manner that it may

meet promptly and at any time upon request of the representative of the

Republic of Panama or of the United States. The Joint Committee shall send

a monthly report on its activities to the Governments of the Republic of Panama

and the United States.

(5) The Joint Committee shall refer to the two Governments, for their

consideration through appropriate channels, any matters which it has not

been able to resolve.
518

ARTICLE IV

USE OF DEFENSE SITES

(1) The United States Forces may use the defense sites

listed in paragraph (2) of Annex A of this Agreement. Moreover,

Annex A includes a list of military areas of coordination which

may be used by the Armed Forces of both Governments in accordance

with Annex B of this Atreement.

(2) Annex A of this Agreement shall be examined every two

years or upon the request of either Government, and shall be revised to reflect any agreed elimination or change in areas. The

United States Forces may notify the Republic of Panama at any time

that the use of a defense site or a military area of

coordination or of a specified portion thereof,

or other right granted by the Republic of Panama is no longer

required. Under such circumstances, said use or other right shall

cease on the date determined by the two Governments.

(3) The United States Government may, at any time, remove

from the Republic of Panama, or dispose of in the Republic of Panama

in accordance with conditions to be agreed upon by the two Governments,

all equipment, installations, material, supplies or other removable

property brought into, acquired or constructed in the Republic of

Panama by or for the United States Forces. Property left by the

United States in a defense site after the date the use of such

site by United States Forces ceases shall, unless agreed otherwise

y the two Governments, become the property of the Republic of

Panama.
519

(4) At the termination of any activities or operations

under this Agreement, the United States shall be obligated to

take all measures to ensure insofar as may be practicable that

every hazard to human life, health and safety is removed from

any defense site or a military kreF of coordination

or a-v portion thereof, on the date the (nit7-e

States Forces are no longer authorized to use such site. Prior

to the transfer of any installation, the two Governments will

consult concerning,: (a) its conditions, including removal of

hazards to human life, health and safety; and (b) compensation for

its residual value, if any exists.

(5) The United States Forces shall have responsibility for

control of entry to the defense sites. The Republic of Panama

may share in the exercise of this control, in a manner to be agreed

upon in the Joint Committee. Necessary signs, in Spanish and

English, requested by the United States Forces through the Joint

Comittee will be erected outside the defense sites, expressing

that the sign is erected under the authority of the Republic of

Panama.

(6) Since the Republic of Panama is a signatory to the Latin

American Denuclearization Treaty (Tlatelolco), the United States

shall emplace no type of nuclear armament on Panamanian territory.

(7) The Joint Committee will constitute the means of communication and information between the two Governments with regard to

matters pertaining to the implementation of this Article.
520

ARTICLE V

FLAGS

(1) All of the territory of the Republic of Panama, including the defense

sites, shall be under the flag of the Republic of Panama and, consequently,

within such sites the Panamanian flag shall always occupy the position of

honor. Within the defense sites, the flag of the United States shall also be

flown jointly with the Panamanian flag. The Joint Committee shall determine

the manner of displaying the flags.

(2) At the entrances, outside the defense sites, only the flag of the

Republic of Panama will be flown.
521

ARTICLE VI

CRIMINAL JURISDICTION

(1) The authorities of the Republic of Panama shall have jurisdiction

over members of the Forces or the civilian component, and dependents,

with respect to offenses arising from acts or omissions committed in the

Republic of Panama and punishable under the laws of the Republic of Panama.

Nevertheless, the Republic of Panama permits the authorities of the United

States to exercise criminal jurisdiction within defense sites, and, consequently,

to have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction over acts which are criminal

acts according to United States law, and which are committed within such

sites by members of the Forces or the civilian component, or dependents.

(2) The Republic of Panama also permits the authorities of the United

States to have the primary right to exercise criminal jurisdiction over members

of the Forces or the civilian component, and dependents, for any offense

committed outside the defense sites, in the following cases:

(a) If the offense is solely against the property or security of the

United States. It is understood that offenses against the security of

the United States include: treason or sabotage against the United

ates, espionage or violation of any law relating to official secrets of the United

States or to secrets relating to the national defense of the United States.

(b) If the offense is solely against the person or property of a

member of the Forces or the civilian component, or a dependent.
522

(c) If the offense arises out of an act or omission done in the

performance of official duty, in which case, when requested by the

Panamanian authorities or when the military authorities of the United States

may deem it necessary, the military authorities of the United States shall

issue a certificate establishing that the offense originated from an act or

omission occurring in the performance of official duty. Panama shall

consider this certificate as sufficient proof for the purposes of this paragraph,

or shall request a review by the Joint Committee within ten days from the

receipt of the certificate. The Joint Committee shall complete its review

within ten days from the receipt of the request, except when more thorough

consideration is required, in which case the Joint Committee shall complete

its review within thirty days.

A substantial deviation from the duties which a person is required

to perform in a specific mission shall generally indicate an act or omission

not occurring in the performance of official duty, and, consequently, the

military authorities of the United States will not consider it necessary to

issue a certificate of official duty.

(3) The provisions of this Article notwithstanding, the Republic of

Panama shall always reserve the right to exercise jurisdiction over

members of the civilian component and dependents who are Panamanian

nationals or habitual residents of Panama.
523

(4) The authorities of the Government having the primary right to

exercise jurisdiction over an offense shall give sympathetic consideration

to any request from the authorities of the other Government for permission

to exercise jurisdiction. Such requests may be discussed in the Joint

Committee.

(5) (a) The appropriate authorities of the Republic of Panama and of

the United States shall assist each other in the arrest of members of the Forces

or the civilian component, and dependents, and in their delivery to the

authority which is to have custody in accordance with the provisions of this

Article.

(b) The authorities of the Republic of Panama shall notify the

authorities of the United States as promptly as possible of the arrest of any

member of the Forces or the civilian component, or a dependent.

(c) The following procedure shall govern the custody of an

accused member of the Forces or the civilian component, or a dependent,

over whom the Republic of Panama is to exercise jurisdiction:

(i) If the accused is detained by the United States authorities,

he shall, except when charged with murder, rape, robbery with violence,

trafficking in drugs, or crimes against the security of the Panamanian State,

remain with such authorities pending the conclusion of all judicial proceedings

and thereafter until custody is requested by the authorities of the Republic of

Panama for the execution of a sentence.
524

(ii) If the accused is detained by the authorities of the Republic

of Panama he shall, except when charged with murder, rape, robbery with

violence, trafficking in drugs, or crimes against the security of the Panamanian

State, be handed over on request to the United States authorities in whose

custody he shall remain until completion of all judicial proceedings and

thereafter until custody is requested by authorities of the Republic of Panama

for the execution of a sentence.

(iii) When charged with murder, rape, robbery with violence,

trafficking in drugs, or crimes against the security of the Panamanian State,

the accused shall be handed over to Panamanian authorities upon their

request, or if already in their custody, shall remain with them. In these

cases the authorities of the Republic of Panama shall give sympathetic

consideration to requests for custody by the United States authorities.

(6) (a) The United States authorities shall give full consideration to

special requests regarding conditions of custody made by the authorities

of the Republic of Panama.

(b) When the accused is in the custody or has been delivered into

the custody of the United States authorities he must, upon request by the

authorities of the Republic of Panama, be made available to them for the

purposes of investigation and trial. This obligation of the United States to

ensure the appearance of an accused member of the Forces or the civilian

component, or a dependent, will be deemed to satisfy the bail requirement

set by the laws of the Republic of Panama.
525

(7) (a) The authorities of the Republic of Panama and the United States

shall assist each other in carrying out all necessary investigations of offenses

and in the collection and production of evidence, including the seizure and,

in proper cases, the delivery of objects connected with an offense and the

appearance of witnesses as necessary.

(b) The authorities of the Republic of Panama and the United States

shall, upon request by the other Government, inform each other of the status

of cases referred to under the provisions of this Article.

(8) The authorities of the United States shall not carry out a death

sentence in the Republic of Panama. As is provided in the laws of the Republic

of Panama, a member of the Forces or the civilian component, or a dependent,

who has been convicted by a Panamanian court shall not be subject to the

death penalty or to any form of cruel and unusual punishment or treatment.

(9) When an accused member of the Forces or the civilian component, or

a dependent, has been tried in accordance with the provisions of this Article

by the authorities of the Republic of Panama or by the authorities of the

United States and has been acquitted, or has been convicted and is serving,

or has served, his sentence, or has been pardoned, he shall not be tried

again for the same offense within the territory of the Republic of Panama.

However, nothing in this paragraph shall prevent the military authorities

of the United States from trying a member of the Forces for any violation of

rules of discipline arising from an act or omission which constituted an

offense for which he was tried by the authorities of the Republic of Panama.
526

(101 Whenever a member of the Forces or the civilian component, or a dependent, is tried by the Panamanian authorities, he

shall be entitled to the procedural guarantees listed in Annex 0

of this Agreement.

(11) At any time during the detention by the authorities of

the Republic of Panama of a member of the Forces or the civilian

component, or a dependent, the Panamanian authorities shall permit

the military authorities of the United States to visit said member

or dependent. Members of his immediate family may visit him weekly.

Material and medical assistance (such as food, clothing and comfort

items) which the United States authorities and members of his

immediate family may consider desirable, and any other assistance

which is in accordance with or allowed by Panamanian prison regulations, may be provided to him on such visits.

(12) The Joint Committee will constitute the means of

communication and information between the two Governments with

regard to matters pertaining to the implementation of this Article.
527

ARTICLE VII

CIVILIAN EMPLOYMENT

The following principles shall govern civilian employment by the

United States Forces:

(1) In order to set forth their rights and obligations as the employer,

the United States Forces shall draw up regulations which shall contain the

terms, conditions and prerequisites for all categories of their civilian

employees. These regulations shall be provided to the Republic of Panama

through the Joint Committee.

(2) In conformity with the principles of the labor laws of the Republic

of Panama, such regulations shall establish employment preferences in all

levels for Panamanian applicants possessing the requisite skills and

qualifications. Accordingly, the United States Forces shall endeavor to

ensure that the number of Panamanian nationals employed by them in relation

to the total number of civilian employees will conform to the proportion

established under Panamanian law. Similarly, the terms, conditions and

prerequisites for the employment of Panamanian personnel shall conform with

the general principles contained in the labor laws of the Republic of Panama.

(3) All civilian employees of the United States Forces, except those

who are nationals of the Republic of Panama or who have obtained permanent

resident status therein, shall be subject to a system of periodic rotation

which will limit their period of employment by the United States Forces

in the Republic of Panama. The regulations providing for such rotation

shall be provided to the Republic of Panama through the Joint Committee.

98-991 0 - 78 - 35
528

(4) With regard to wages, there shall be no discrimination on the

basis of nationality, sex or race. Payments by the United States Forces

of additional remunerations to persons of any nationality, including

Panamanian citizens, who are recruited outside of Panama and must therefore change their place of residence, shall not be considered to be

discrimination for the purposes of this Article.

(5) The United States Forces shall take the measures called for under

the laws of the Republic of Panama with regard to the application of the tax

and social security laws to their employees who are subject to Panama's

taxation and social security system, including withholding of tax or social

security payments from their salaries.
529

ARTICLE VIII

ACQUISITION OF PANAMANIAN SUPPLIES AND SERVICES

(1) The United States Forces shall give preference to the procurement of

supplies and services obtainable in the Republic of Panama. Such preference

shall apply to the maximum extent possible when such supplies and services

are available as required, and are comparable in quality and price to those

which may be obtained from other sources. For the comparison of prices

there will be taken into account the cost of transport to the Republic of Panama,

including freight, insurance and handling, of the supplies and services which

compete with Panamanian supplies and services. In the acquisition of goods

in the Republic of Panama, preference shall be given to goods having a larger

percentage of components of Panamanian origin.

(2) Any regulations which may be necessary to carry out this preference

shall be agreed upon in the Joint Committee.
530

ARTICLE IX

TELECOMMUNICATIONS

(1) The Republic of Panama. in the exercise of its sovereign power

over its telecommunications, authorizes the United States Forces to use the

communications networks and communications-electronics installations

within the defense sites, and to use the radio frequencies and transportable

equipment as may be necessary for their requirements, in order to accomplish

the specific purposes of the defense of the Canal, and as the two Governments

may otherwise agree. The Joint Committee may adopt regulations to govern

the use of such transportable equipment outside of the defense sites.

Any use presently being exercised of such networks , installations,

frequencies and equipment, for purposes other than those herein authorized,

shall be subject to the provisions contained in the Panama Canal Treaty,

including those relating to any separation of non-military telecommunications

that may be deemed necessary.

(2) The Republic of Panama also authorizes the United States Forces

to use installations such as those described in the preceding paragraph

already existing outside the defense sites, which serve to accomplish the

purposes of the defense of the Canal, and as the two Governments may otherwise agree.
531

Those already existing installations outside the defense sites may

be guarded by authorities of the Republic of Panama. The United States

Forces shall have access to such installations for appropriate operation,

maintenance, and replacement.

(3) Provided that they are available and suitable for the purpose,

the United States Forces shall use, to the maximum extent possible, the

telecommunications services of the Republic of Panama in order to meet

their needs, but the .applicable rates shall be no less favorable than those

charged to governmental agencies of the Republic of Panama.

(4) The United States Forces shall provide the Government of the

Republic of Panama a list of all frequencies registered or in use by the

United States Forces. This list shall be submitted through the Joint

Committee in ascending frequency order and shall contain as a minimum

the power, bandwidth, and type of emission.

(5) Any future request for assignment, change, or elimination of

radio frequencies by the United States Forces, or utilization of any frequency

by Panama, or any changes regarding installations outside of the defense

sites shall be coordinated and granted through the Joint Committee.

(6) The Republic of Panama authorizes the United States Forces to use

codes, ciphers, and other secure cryptographic means necessary for the

specific purposes of the defense of the Panama Canal, and as the two

Governments may otherwise agree.
532

(7) All provisions regarding telecommunications in this Article shall

be in accordance with the obligations of both Governments as members of

the International Telecommunication Union and the various relevant

international agreements to which both Governments are signatories.

(8) Any communication with the International Telecommunication Union

regarding the subject matter of this Article shall be effected exclusively by

the Republic of Panama.

(9) The radio and television services of the United States Forces

operating within the Republic of Panama, will:

(a) Announce at the start and termination of each day's broadcast

that the emissions are authorized by the Republic of Panama; and

(b) In television programs originating locally, not use announcers

appearing in military uniform.

(10) The Joint Committee may adopt any further regulations as may be

necessary to implement the provisions of this Article, including necessary

technical coordination.
533

ARTICLE X

MILITARY POST OFFICES

(1) The United States may establish, maintain and operate, within

the defense sites, military post offices for the exclusive use of the United

States Forces, the members of the Forces or the civilian component, and

dependents, and for the use of such other persons and agencies as may

be agreed upon as exceptions by the two Governments through the Joint

Committee. Such post offices shall transmit mail only between themselves

or between themselves and other United States post offices.

(2) The United States Forces shall take all necessary measures to

prevent the unauthorized use of the military post offices. The Panamanian

authorities shall periodically inform the authorities of the United States,

through the Joint Committee, of all applicable provisions of Panamanian

laws, and the United States Forces shall, within their legal capacity,

ensure that such provisions are complied with.

(3) The military post offices in the Republic of Panama shall not have

direct representation before any international postal organization.

(4) The Republic of Panama may establish post offices within the

defense sites, the location of which shall be agreed upon in the Joint

Committee, for the transmission of mail between the defense sites and

any other areas not authorized to the military post offices by this Agreement.
534

ARTICLE XI

COMMISSARIES, MILITARY EXCHANGES

AND OTHER SERVICE INSTALLATIONS

(1) The United States may establish, regulate and use within the defense

sites, commissaries, military exchanges, military banking facilities, credit

unions, recreational, social and athletic facilities, schools, sanitation and

medical facilities, and other categories of service facilities as may be

periodically agreed upon by the two Governments through the Joint

Committee, for the exclusive use of the members of the Forces or the civilian

component, and dependents, and for such other persons as may be agreed

upon by the two Governments as exceptions through the Joint Committee.

These service facilities and their activities, such as the import, purchase,

sale and distribution of merchandise, medicine and services, shall be free

of taxes, duties, liens, licenses, fees and other charges imposed by the

Republic of Panama or any of its political subdivisions.

In order to take advantage of existing installations, the United States

Forces may continue to use those installations already in existence outside

of the defense sites, which are specified in paragraph (3) of Annex A.

(2) The military banking facilities shall be branches or agencies of

banking entities duly authorized to engage in the banking business in

Panama. The Government of the Republic of Panama may authorize the
535

installation and operation within the defense sites, at locations agreed

upon by the Joint Committee, of branches or agencies of Banco Nacional

or other official banking entities of the Republic of Panama.

(3) It is the express objective and purpose of both Governments that

the articles and services sold or provided at the commissaries and military

exchanges be for the exclusive use of authorized persons. To that end the

United States Forces shall, upon request, inform the Panamanian authorities,

through the Joint Committee, as to the classification, nature and quantity of

certain articles and services sold or provided at such establishments.

(4) With respect to the preceding paragraph, the Republic of Panama

and the United States shall jointly take all the necessary measures to prevent

the unauthorized use of such activities and the abuse by those who are

authorized. Such measures shall include the obtaining of pertinent

information and the carrying out of any verifications that may be necessary

by Panamanian authorities. The procedure to be followed for these purposes

shall be agreed upon by the Joint Committee.

(5) The Government of the United States shall apply appropriate

disciplinary sanctions to the members of the Forces or the civilian component,

and dependents, or other persons authorized as exceptions who abuse the

privileges granted in this Article and commit violations in that respect.

In such cases , the United States authorities shall give sympathetic consideration

to requests from the Panamanian Government to exercise jurisdiction.

(6) The service facilities referred to in this Article shall grant to

Panamanian supplies and services the preference referred to in Article VIII.
536

ARTICLE XII

CONTRACTORS AND CONTRACTORS' PERSONNEL

(1) Whenever contracts are required by the United States Forces for the

performance of services or the procurement of supplies, the United States

Forces shall adhere to the preferences for Panamanian sources set forth in

Article VIII of this Agreement.

(2) Whenever contracts are awarded by the United States Forces to

natural persons who are nationals or permanent residents of the United States

or to corporations or other legal entities organized under the laws of the United

States and under the effective control of such persons, such contractors shall

be so designated by the United States Forces and such designations shall be

communicated to the Panamanian authorities through the Joint Committee.

Such contractors shall be subject to the laws and regulations of the Republic

of Panama except with respect to the special regime established by this

Agreement, which includes the following obligations and benefits:

(a) The contractor must engage exclusively in activities related

to the execution of the work for which he has been contracted by the United

States Forces, or related to other works or activities authorized by the

Republic of Panama.

(b) The contractor must refrain from carrying out practices which

may constitute violations of the laws of the Republic of Panama.
537

(c) The contractor shall enter and depart from the territory of

the Republic of Panama in accordance with procedures prescribed for

members of the civilian component in Article XIII of this Agreement.

(d) The contractor must obtain a certificate of professional

identity which the proper authorities of the United States Forces shall

issue when they are satisfied he is duly qualified. This certificate shall

be sufficient to permit him to operate under Panamanian law as a contractor

of the Forces, Nevertheless, the Panamanian authorities may require the

registration of the appropriate documents to establish juridical presence

in the Republic of Panama.

(e) The contractor shall not be obliged to pay any tax or other

assessment to the Republic of Panama on income derived under a contract

with the United States Forces as long as he is taxed at a substantially

equivalent rate in the United States.

(f) The contractor may move freely within the Republic of Panama,

and shall have exemptions from customs duties and other charges, as

provided for members of the civilian component in Articles XV and XVII

of this Agreement.

(g) The contractor may use public services and installations in

accordance with the terms and conditions of Article XIV of this Agreement,

but shall pay non-discriminatory highway tolls and taxes on plates for

private vehicles.
538

(h) The contractor shall be exempt from any taxes imposed on

depreciable assets belonging to him, other than real estate, which are used

exclusively for the execution of contracts with the United States Forces.

(i) The contractor may use the services and facilities provided

for in Articles X and XVIII of this Agreement to the extent such use is

authorized by the United States Forces.

(3) The United States Forces shall withdraw the designation of a

contractor when any of the following circumstances occur:

(a) Upon completion or termination of the contracts with the United

States Forces.

(b) Upon proof that such contractors are engaged in business

activities in the Republic of Panama other than those pertaining to the United

States Forces, without authorization of the Republic of Panama.

(c) Upon proof that such contractors are engaged in practices

which in the view of the Republic of Panama constitute serious violations of

the applicable laws of the Republic of Panama.

(4) The authorities of the United States shall notify the authorities

of the Republic of Panama whenever the designation of a contractor has been

withdrawn. If, within sixty days after notification of the withdrawal of the

designation of a contractor who entered Panama in the capacity of a contractor,

the authorities of the Republic of Panama require such contractor to leave its

territory, the United States Government shall ensure that the Republic of

Panama shall not incur any expense due to the cost of transportation.
539

(5) The provisions of this Article shall similarly apply to the subcontractors and to the employees of the contractors and subcontractors and their

dependents who are nationals or residents of the United States. These employees

and dependents shall not be subject to the Panamanian Social Security system.
540

ARTICLE XIII

ENTRY AND DEPARTURE

(1) The United States may bring into the territory of the Republic of

Panama members of the Forces or the civilian component, and dependents,

for the specific purposes of the Panama Canal Treaty, and as the two

Governments may otherwise agree.

(2) (a) In order to enter or leave the territory of the Republic of

Panama, the members of the Forces shall be obligated to bear only a

personal identity card and individual or collective travel documentation

issued by the military authorities of the United States. Such documentation

must be presented to the Panamanian authorities. The two Governments

shall establish through the Joint Committee the procedure to be followed

in exceptional cases.

(b) To enter or leave the territory of the Republic of Panama,

the members of the civilian component and dependents must possess, in

actdition to the travel documentation issued by the United States military

authorities, a valid passport. Such documentation shall be presented to the

appropriate authorities of the Republic of Panama.

(c) The United States Forces shall furnish each member of the

Forces or the civilian component, and dependent, who remains in the

Republic of Panama for longer than thirty days, an identity card which

shall be issued under the authority of the Joint Committee in Spanish and

English. Children under the age of ten years may be included on the
541

identity card of a parent at the option of the parent. These identity cards

shall be shown to the appropriate authorities of the Republic of Panama

upon request.

The authorities of the Republic of Panama may request information

concerning the number of such cards outstanding and the validity of any

particular card. The Joint Committee and the United States Forces shall

provide such information.

(3) Whenever the status of any member of the Forces or the civilian

component, or dependent, is altered so that, at the time of such alteration, he

is no longer entitled to remain in the Republic of Panama, the United States

Forces shall promptly notify the Panamanian authorities, and shall, if

requested within a period of sixty days thereafter, ensure that transportation

from the Republic of Panama will be provided at no cost to the Government

of the Republic of Panama.

(4) (a) The members of the Forces or the civilian component, and

dependents, shall be exempted from fiscal charges relating to their entry,

stay in, or departure from the territory of the Republic of Panama.

Similarly they will be exempted from obligatory services established in

favor of the Republic of Panama. They shall not acquire any right to permanent

residence or domicile in the Republic of Panama.

(b) Members of the Forces or the civilian component who enter the

Republic of Panama to execute professional services exclusively for the
542

United States Forces, or in its behalf, shall not be subject to the licensing

regimes of the Republic of Panama, but they shall limit their professional

activity to such services with the United States Forces for the specific

purposes of the Panama Canal Treaty, or as the two Governments may otherwise

agree.
543

ARTICLE XlV

SERVICES AND INSTALLATIONS

(1) The United States Forces, members of the Forces or civilian

component, and dependents, may use the public services and installations

belonging to or regulated by the Government of the Republic of Panama,

but the terms and conditions of use, prices, rates and tariffs and priorities

shall not be unfavorable in relation to those charged other users.

(2) For the use of public services and installations made available

through a plant acquired or constructed, or equipment furnished, by the

United States Government and subsequently transferred free to the Government

of the Republic of Panama, preferential charges shall be granted to the United

States Forces taking these circumstances into account.

(3) The United States Forces may establish and operate the supporting

services and facilities it requires within the defense sites, and exceptionally,

with the authorization of the Government of the Republic of Panama, outside

sidch sites.

(4) The Republic of Panama will permit the United States Forces to

continue to use in an adequate manner, accessory facilities, such as pipelines,

communications, sanitation services and utilities, which serve the defense

sites and are installed on land outside the defense sites. The United States

Forces shall, at their cost, maintain and repair these facilities as necessary,

in coordination with the proper entities of the Republic of Panama. Detailed

98-991 0 - 78 - 36
544

identification of such facilities shall be made through the Joint Committee,

within a period of six months from the entry into force of this Agreement

unless extended by the Joint Committee for exceptional circumstances.

The two Governments shall agree, through the Joint Committee, upon

procedures to govern the appropriate use, access, maintenance and repair

of these facilities. Similarly, procedures shall be agreed upon for coordination

between the United States Forces and the competent Panamanian entities,

concerning the use, access, maintenance and repair of such facilities as

may serve the Republic of Panama and are situated within the defense sites.
545

ARTICLE XV

MOVEMENT, LICENSES AND REGISTRATION OF

VESSELS, AIRCRAFT AND VEHICLES

(1) (a) When in the performance of official duties, the vessels and

aircraft operated by or for the United States Forces may move freely through

Panamanian air space and waters, without the obligation of payment of taxes,

tolls, landing or pier charges or other charges to the Republic of Panama

and without any other impediment.

(b) Such vessels and aircraft shall be exempt from customs

inspections or other inspections. Whenever the same carry freight, crews

or passengers who are not entitled to the exemptions provided for in this

Agreement, prior notice shall be given to the appropriate Panamanian

authorities. Both Governments shall adopt procedures to ensure that the laws

and regulations of the Republic of Panama are not violated.

(2) (a) Similarly, the vehicles and equipment of the United States Forces

may, when in the performance of official duties, move freely in the Republic

of Panama, without the obligation of payment of taxes, tolls or other charges

to the Republic of Panama and without any other impediment. These vehicles

and equipment shall be exempt from mechanical or other inspection.

Claims arising from damage caused by the United States Forces to

the Panamanian road network outside the defense sites, in excess of the usual

wear and tear by reason of time and its appropriate use, shall be settled as

provided for in Article XX.
546

(b) Such official vehicles and equipment shall not be assessed any

license or registration fees. These vehicles shall bear their customary

United States military identification marks and an additional means of

identification as may be agreed upon by the Joint Committee, to be issued

under the authority of said Joint Committee and distributed by the United

States Forces.

(c) In connection with the movement of any military convoys, or

any large number of vehicles as a single unit, outside of the defense sites,

the United States Forces shall consult with the Combined Military Board so

that, if time and circumstances permit, proper traffic arrangements will be

made, including accompaniment by Panamanian traffic patrols.

(3) (a) The plates, individual marks and registration documents

issued by the United States for vehicles, trailers, vessels and aircraft which

are the property of the United States Forces shall be accepted by the Republic

of Panama.

(b) The Republic of Panama shall recognize as sufficient, the valid

licenses, permits, certificates or other official classifications from the United

States Government, possessed by operators of vehicles, vessels and aircraft

which are property of the United States Government.

(4) (a) The vehicles, trailers, vessels and aircraft belonging to the

members of the Forces or the civilian component, or dependents, shall also

move freely within the Republic of Panama, in compliance with the traffic
547

regulations and those regarding the annual mechanical inspection. The

license plate fee and other obligations shall not be discriminatory.

(b) The Republic of Panama shall issue, in accordance with its

laws, the appropriate documents of title and registration of vehicles,

trailers, vessels and aircraft which are the property of the members of

the Forces or the civilian component, or dependents, when the latter

present title and registration, issued by the federal or state authorities

of the United States or by the authorities of the former Canal Zone. Applicants

may retain such documents provided they leave with the Panamanian

authorities a copy authenticated by the United States Forces, duly translated

into Spanish.

While the corresponding request is being processed and within a

term which may not exceed thirty days after its arrival in the Republic of

Panama, the means of transportation mentioned above may be operated with

the plates or distinctive marks issued by the United States federal or state

authorities.

(c) The members of the Forces or the civilian component, and

dependents, who bear drivers' licenses, vessel operators' permits, or

licenses and classifications of air pilots issued by the federal or state

authorities of the United States or by the authorities of the former Canal Zone,

shall receive equivalent Panamanian licenses, permits and classifications

without being subjected to new tests or payments of new fees. The
548

applicants may retain the licenses, permits and classifications of the United

States or the former Canal Zone provided that they leave with the Panamanian

authorities a copy authenticated by the United States Forces and duly

translated into Spanish. Members of the Forces or the civilian component,

and dependents, shall be permitted to drive vehicles, vessels or aircraft

in the Republic of Panama with such licenses, permits and classifications

during the thirty days following their first arrival in the Republic of

Panama and during the subsequent period necessary for the processing of

the application in Panama for a driver's license, vessel operator's permit,

or license and classification as an air pilot.

(d) The Panamanian licenses, permits or classifications shall be

valid for the period of time indicated in the Panamanian law and, during the

continuous presence of the bearer in Panama, shall, to preserve their

validity, be renewed in accordance with Panamanian laws.

Whenever Panamanian laws may require medical certifications for the

fenewal of licenses, permits or classifications the Republic of Panama

shall accept the certifications issued by the medical services of the United

States Forces, provided that said certifications are issued in Spanish.

(e) The Republic of Panama shall issue, in accordance with its

laws, drivers' licenses, vessel operators' permits, and licenses and other

classifications of air pilots to members of the Forces or the civilian

component, and dependents, when they do not possess such documents.
549

If any test is required as a prerequisite for the issuance of the documents

mentioned, Panama shall permit the interested persons to take the examination

in Spanish or English. Any material which the Republic of Panama may

generally issue in preparation for such examinations shall be furnished, in

Spanish or English, as the applicant may request.

(5) Aircraft other than those of Panama and the United States may use

the runways of the defense sites only after obtaining appropriate authorization

from the Republic of Panama. When deemed convenient, the two Governments

shall adopt, through the Joint Committee, regulations governing the use by

such aircraft.

(6) The installation, change of position or alteration of lights and other

signal installations to assist in navigation of aircraft, placed or established

in the defense sites or in their surroundings, shall be subject to previous

consultation between the appropriate authorities of both Governments.

(7) The Republic of Panama shall adopt such measures as may be

appropriate to coordinate air traffic in the Republic of Panama, so that, in

a manner consistent with the mission of the United States Forces,.maximum

safety shall be offered to civil and military air navigation. All systems of control

and coordination of military air traffic shall be developed jointly as needed for

the fulfillment of the specific purposes of this Agreement. The procedures

needed to bring about this coordination shall be agreed upon by the appointed

authorities of both Governments, respecting always the sovereignty of the

Republic of Panama over all its air space.
550

The Republic of Panama agrees that, for security reasons, at the

request of the United States Forces it shall restrict overflights of certain

of the defense sites.

(8) The Joint Committee may agree on rules and procedures that may be

necessary to implement this Article.
551

ARTICLE XVI

TAXATION

(1) By virtue of this Agreement, the United States Forces are exempt

from payment in the Republic of Panama of all taxes, fees or other charges

on their activities or property, including those imposed through contractors

or subcontractors.

(2) Members of the Forces or the civilian component, and dependents,

shall be exempt from any taxes, fees, or other charges on income received

as a result of their work for the United States Forces or for any of the service

facilities referred to in Articles XI or XVIII of this Agreement. Similarly, as

is provided by Panamanian law, they shall be exempt from payment of taxes,

fees or other charges on income derived from sources outside the Republic

of Panama.

(3) Members of the Forces or the civilian component, and dependents,

shall be exempt from taxes, fees or other charges on gifts or inheritance

of on personal property, the presence of which within the territory of the

Republic of Panama is due solely to the stay therein of such persons on

account of their or their sponsor's work with the United States Forces.

(4) The Joint Committee may establish such regulations as may be

appropriate for the implementation of this Article.
552

ARTICLE XVII

IMPORT DUTIES

(1) Except for the exemptions provided for in this Agreement, the

members of the Forces or the civilian component, and dependents shall be

subject to the laws and regulations administered by the customs authorities

of the Republic of Panama.

(2) All property imported for the official use or benefit of the United

States Forces, including that imported by their contractors or subcontractors,

in connection with the various activities authorized under this Agreement, shall

be exempt from the payment of all customs duties or other import taxes and

charges and from all license requirements.

The United States Forces shall issue a certificate, following the

form adopted by the Joint Committee, stating that the property being imported

is for these purposes.

(3) Property consigned to or imported for the personal use of the members

of the Forces or the civilian component, or dependents shall be subject to the

payment of import duties or other import taxes, except for the following:

(a) Furniture, household goods and personal effects imported

by such persons for their private use within six months following their

first arrival in the Republic of Panama. In the case of persons who are

unable to obtain adequate housing when they first arrive in the Republic

of Panama, an additional period of six months from the time they obtain
553

adequate housing shall be granted them for the importation of such

articles, provided that the United States Forces issue a certificate stating

that the person concerned has not accomplished such importation and

indicating the date upon which he obtained adequate housing and its

address;

(b) Vehicles imported by such persons for their private use, and the

spare parts required for proper maintenance of such vehicles. The Joint

Committee shall establish the limitations on the quantity and frequency of

imports of such vehicles and parts;

(c) A reasonable quantity of articles for the private use of such

persons, imported as personal baggage or sent into the Republic of Panama

through the military post offices of the United States;

(d) Such other imports as may be expressly authorized by the

competent authorities of the Republic of Panama at the request of the United

States Forces.

(4) The exemptions granted in paragraph (3) of this Article shall

apply only to cases involving the importation of articles exempted at the time

of entry and shall not be construed as obligating the Republic of Panama to

reimburse customs duties and domestic taxes collected by the Republic of

Panama in connection with purchases of goods from Panamanian sources

subsequent to their importation.
554

(5) Customs inspections shall not be made in the following cases:

(a) Members of the Forces traveling under orders, other than

leave orders, who enter or depart from the Republic of Panama;

(b) Official documents under official seal and mail sent through

the military postal channels of the United States;

(c) Cargo consigned to the United States Forces.

(6) Property imported under this Article and subsequently transferred

to a person who is not entitled to duty-free importation shall be subject to

the payment of import duties and other taxes according to the laws and

regulations of the Republic of Panama. Such sales shall not be permitted

when they are motivated by commercial purposes.

(7) All property imported into the Republic of Panama free of customs

duties and other taxes pursuant to paragraphs (2) and (3) of this Article

may be exported free of customs duties, export permits, or other export

taxes and assessments. All property acquired in the Republic of Panama

by, or in the name of, the United States Forces, or acquired by members of

the Forces or the civilian component, or dependents, for their private use

may be exported free of customs duties, export licenses or other export

taxes and charges.

(8) The authorities of the United States agree to cooperate with the

authorities of the Republic of Panama and shall take, within their legal

authority, all such steps as may be necessary to prevent the abuse of the
555

privileges granted under this Article to the members of the Forces or the

civilian component, or dependents.

(9) In order to prevent violations of the laws and regulations

administered by the customs authorities of the Republic of Panama, the

two Governments agree as follows:

(a) The authorities of the Republic of Panama and the competent

authorities of the United States shall mutually assist one another in the

conduct of investigations and the collection of evidence.

(b) The authorities of the United States shall take, within their

legal authority, all necessary measures to ensure that articles subject

to seizure by or in the name of the customs authorities of the Republic of

Panama are delivered to these authorities.

(c) The authorities of the United States shall take, within their

legal authority, all necessary measures to ensure the payment by memberE

of the Forces or the civilian component, and dependents, of such import

duties, taxes, and fines as may be duly determined by the Panamanian

authorities.

(10) Vehicles and articles belonging to the United States Forces that

are seized from a person by the authorities of the Republic of Panama in

connection with a violation of its customs or tax laws or regulations shall

be delivered to the competent authorities of the United States Forces.

(11) The Joint Committee will constitute the means of communication and

information between the two Governments with regard to matters pertaining

to the implementation of this Article.
556

ARTICLE XVIII

HEALTH, SANITATION AND EDUCATION

(1) The United States Forces may furnish educational, sanitary and

medical services, including veterinary services, to the members of the

Forces or the civilian component, and dependents, and other persons as

may be agreed upon as exceptions by the two Governments through the

Joint Committee.

(2) Matters of mutual interest relative to the control and prevention of

diseases and the coordination of other public health, quarantine, sanitation

and education services shall be the subject of coordination in the Joint

Committee.

(3) The Republic of Panama authorizes the United States Forces, in

rendering such health, sanitation and education services, to apply its own

regulations.
557

ARTICLE XIX

SURVEYS

The United States may carry out topographic, hydrographic, agrologic

and other surveys (including taking of aerial photographs) within the

defense sites. Surveys in other areas of the Republic of Panama shall

require authorization from the Republic of Panama, in the manner agreed

upon in the Joint Committee, and the Republic of Panama shall, at its

option, designate a representative to be present. The United States shall

furnish a copy of the data resulting from such surveys to the Republic of

Panama at no cost.
558

ARTICLE XX

CLAIMS

(1) Each Government waives its claims against the other Government

for damage to any property owned by it and used by its land, sea or air

armed services, in the following circumstances:

(a) If the damage was caused by a member or an employee of the

armed services of the other Government, in the performance of his official

duties; or,

(b) If the damage arose from the use of any vehicle, vessel or

aircraft owned by the other Government and used by its armed services,

provided either that the vehicle, vessel or aircraft causing the damage was

being used for official purposes, or that the damage was caused to property

being so used.

(2) In the case of damage caused or arising as stated in paragraph (1) 

to other property owned by either Government and located in the Republic of

Panama, the claims shall be settled by the Government against which the claim

is made. If it is not settled in due course, the claim may be pursued through

diplomatic channels. Both Governments hereby waive the collection of any

claims for an amount less than $1, 400 U.S. or B/.1, 400 which are of equal

value.

(3) In cases of maritime salvage, each Government waives its claims

against the other if the vessel or cargo salved was the property of the other

Government and was used by its armed services for official purposes.
559

(4) For the purposes of this Article, any vessel chartered,

requisitioned or seized in prize by a Government shall be considered its

property (except to the extent that the risk of loss or liability is assumea oy some otner person than such Government).

(5) Each Government waives its claims against the other Government for

injury or death suffered by any member of its armed services while said

member was engaged in the performance of his official duties.

(6) The members of the Forces and the civilian employees of the United

States Forces shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the civil courts of the

Republic of Panama except in matters which arise from the performance of

their official duty. In cases where payment has been accepted in full

satisfaction of the claim, the civil courts of the Republic of Panama shall

dismiss any proceeding concerning the matter.

(7) When personal private property subject to seizure or attachment

by order of a competent authority under Panamanian law is within the

defense sites, the United States authorities shall render, upon request of

the Panamanian authorities, all assistance within their power in order that

such property is turned over promptly to the Panamanian authorities.

This paragraph shall not apply to personal property which, although

privately owned, is in use by or on behalf of the United States Forces.

98-991 0 - 78 - 37
560

(3) Non-contractual claims arising from damages caused in the

performance of their official duties by members or civilian employees

of the United States Forces to third parties other than the two Governments

shall be presented by the injured party through the Joint Committee to the

appropriate authorities of the United States Forces for settlement. The

authorities of the Republic of Panama may submit advice and recommendations

on Panamanian law to the claim authorities of the United States for their use in

evaluating liability and amount of damages.

(9) For other non-contractual claims against the members of the Forces

or the civilian component, the authorities of the United States, following

consultation with the appropriate authorities of the Government of Panama,

shall consider the claim and, if appropriate, offer an ex gratia payment.

(10) The authorities of both Governments shall cooperate in the

investigation and procurement of evidence for a fair disposition of claims

under this Article.

(11) Contractual claims against the United States Forces shall be

settled in accordance with the dispute clause of the contracts, and in the

absence of such clause, through presentation of claims to the United States

authorities through the appropriate channels.

(12) The United States Government shall require contractors and subcontractors referred to in Article XII of this Agreement to obtain appropriate

insurance to cover the civil liabilities that may be incurred in Panamanian

territory as a result of acts or omissions done in the performance of official

duty by their employees. The Joint Committee shall establish the general

standards for such insurance.
561

ARTICLE XXI

GENERAL PROVISIONS

(1) The activities and operations of the United States Government

shall be carried out with adequate attention to public health and safety

in the Republic of Panama. Within the defense sites, whose use Panama

makes available to the United States by virtue of this Agreement, the

United States authorities shall adopt all the appropriate measures to

cooperate for these purposes with the authorities of the Republic of Panama.

(2) When required by their official duties, members of the Forces or

the civilian component may possess and carry official arms and they will

conform to any standards which the Joint Committee establishes. The members

of the Forces or the civilian component, and dependents, may bear private

arms in accordance with applicable Panamanian laws and regulations, and

regulations of the United States Forces.

(3) The members of the Forces shall be obliged to observe proper

conduct in accordance with the order and discipline required by

Panamanian laws and the military laws and regulations of the United States.

The authorities of the Republic of Panama shall maintain vigilance that

Panamanian laws and regulations shall be observed at all times.

When the order and discipline referred to in this paragraph should

be breached by members of the Forces outside the defense sites, and the

authorities of the Republic of Panama, for reasons of language differences
562

or other circumstances, consider it convenient, they may request the presence

of personnel of the police of the United States Forces to cooperate in the reestablishment of order and discipline, and, in such cases, the United States

Forces shall be obliged to send them.

Within the defense sites, the police function shall be primarily

exercised by the police of the United States Forces. The Panamanian

authorities shall cooperate with the United States Forces in the fulfillment

of this function, for which purpose they may locate members of the Panamanian

police within the defense sites at the headquarters of the police of the United

States Forces or as the Joint Committee agrees. Such cooperation shall be

rendered particularly in those cases involving Panamanian nationals.

The Joint Committee may also agree on a procedure so that members of

the Panamanian police and the police of the United States Forces may jointly

conduct routine inspections for the maintenance of order and discipline

in those places where vigilance is especially required.

(4) The United States Forces shall restrict, to the maximum extent

possible, the wearing of military uniforms so that they will be worn only

when necessary. The Joint Committee shall adopt standards regarding the

wearing of military uniforms in other Caes, as exceptions.
563

ARTICLE XXII

DURATION

This Agreement shall enter into force when the Panama

Canal Treaty signed on this date enters into force and shall

terminate at noon, Panama time, on December 31, 1999.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorized thereto,

have signed this Agreement.

DONE at Washington, this 7th day of September, 1977, in duplicate

in the English and Spanish languages, both being equally authentic.
APPENDIX 5

STATEMENT OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND

PANAMA REGARDING THE NEUTRALITY TREATY

Under the Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the

Panama Canal (the neutrality treaty), Panama and the United States have the

responsibility to assure that the Panama Canal will remain open and secure to

ships of all nations. The correct interpretation of this principle is that each of the

two countries shall, in accordance with their respective constitutional processes, defend the canal against any threat to the regime cf neutrality, and consequently

shall have the canal or against the peaceful transit of vessels through the canal.

This does not mean, nor shall it be interpreted as a right of intervention of the

United States in the internal affairs of Panama. Any U.S. action will be directed

at insuring that the canal will remain open, secure, and accessible, and it shall

never be directed against the territorial integrity cr political independence of

Panama.

The neutrality treaty provides that the vessels of war and auxiliary vessels of

the United States and Panama will be entitled to transit the canal expeditiously.

This is intended, and it shall so be interpreted, to assure the transit of such vessels

through the canal as quickly as possible, without any impediment, with expedited

treatment, and in case of need or emergency, to go to the head of the line of

vessels in order to transit the canal rapidly.

(564)
APPENDIX 6

REMARKS OF DR. RoNIULO BETHANCOURT BEFORE PANAMANIAN

NATIONAL AsSEM BlY FROM THE AMERICAN CONSERVATIVE UNION

NEWS, DATED SEPTEMBER 7, 1977

WASHINGTON, D.C.-At a rally on the U.S. Capitol steps today, American

Conservative Union Chairman Rep. Philip M. Crane (R. Ill.) released a summary

of remarks by the head of the Panamanian Negotiating Team on the Panama

Canal Treaty which Crane said sharply contradicted the White House explanation of the proposed treaties. Crane referred to a speech by Dr. Romulo Escobar

Bethancourt before the Panamanian National Assembly on August 19. Escobar's

speech was reported in the Panamanian newspaper Matutino on August 20.

Crane stated that "Dr. Escobar specifically refuted President Carter's contention that the terms of the treaty insure the Canal's neutrality, the expeditious

passage of U.S. warships, a guarantee by Panama that the Canal would not be

closed and the right of the U.S. to intervene to defend the Canal if necessary."

In his speech before the Panamanian National Assembly, Escobar summed up

the neutrality aspect of the treaty:

"This is the reality of the facts, that with the neutrality pact, we are not giving

the United States ths right of interentio?. What we are giving is an assurance that

the Canal will be permanently neutral, that we are not going to close the Canal so

that their ships will not go through, or that this ship will not go through or this

other ship." (Emphasis added.)

Speaking of Escobar's remarks, Crane states, "Mr. Escobar's explanation of

the treaty's provisions raises the real possibility of double dealing on the part

of the Carter administration. The President owes the American people a full and

immediate explanation of the discrepancy between his interpretation and

Mr. Escobar's."

A brief summary of some of the points made by Escobar include:

1. The United States originally proposed a military pact that would operate

after the year 2000. Panama opposed this proposal and the United States withdrew

the idea of a military pact.

2. The United States originally proposed a bilateral declaration between

Panama and the United States to declare the neutrality of the Canal with the

United States as guarantor of the neutrality. Panama opposed this proposal and

the United States withdrew the idea of a bilateral agreement with the United

States as guarantor.

3. The United States originally proposed that Panama be obliged to keep the

Canal permanently open and neutral. Panama opposed keeping it open in the case

of natural causes (an earthquake), temporary causes (a landslide), and in the

case the Canal was not making money. The United States accepted the first two

reasons, but in the case of the third proposed that if the Canal was not making

money Panama could ask for funds from the United States or some other countries. Panama opposed this proposal and the United States agreed to eliminate the

article about keeping the Canal open, thus eliminating that obligation for Panama.

4. The United States originally proposed that the Neutrality Pact be between

Panama and the United States and no one else. Panama opposed this proposal.

The United States changed the proposal to be only between the United States

and the OAS countries, but not Cuba. Panama opposed, saying that all countries

of the world including any communist country that wished should be invited to

join the Pact. The United States changed and agreed that all countries of the

world, including communist countries, could join the Pact.

5. Panama proposed that the United Nations be the depositor of the Pact. The

United States opposed and proposed instead that the OAS be the depositor.

Panama accepted provided that the OAS have nothing to say about who could

or could not join the pact.

(56 5)
56

6. The United States asked for preferential right of way for U.S. warships in

time of war and in time of peace. Panama opposed this proposal. The United

States changed and asked for preferential treatment at least in time of war.

Panama opposed. The Unites States changed and asked for at least expeditiou%

passage (as prompt and rapid passage as possible). Panama accepted saying that

in any case it would want to give as prompt and rapid passage to any warships

from any country. (i.e., U.S. gets no preferential rights.)

7. The United States originally proposed a bilateral declaration of neutrality.

Panama opposed this and proposed a unilateral declaration by Panama only. The

United States changed and accepted that Panama only would make a declaration

of neutrality.

8. The United States originally proposed that the declaration of neutrality be

for the Panama Canal only. Panama opposed and said that neutrality had to be

for the whole country of Panama including the Panama Canal. The United States

changed and agreed that it would be for the whole country of Panama.

9. The United States originally proposed that it be the guarantor of the neutrality. Panama opposed, and said that all the nations signing the Pact act as

guarantors with no special role for the United States. The United States withdrew

its proposal and agreed that all the nations signing the Pact act as guarantors.

10. The United States originally proposed that the neutrality be upheld in

all circumstances. Panama opposed saying that it could not uphold the neutrality

of the Canal in the case of internal disorder in the country of Panama, or in the

case of a third country attacking the Canal. The United States withdrew its proposal so as to avoid an article saying Panama would not uphold the neutrality in

the case of internal disorder in Panama.

11. The United States originally proposed that Panama have an option to

build a sea-level canal with a date and commit herself so that the United States

would have the exclusive right to construct a sea-level canal in Panama. Panama

opposed with the support of the countries participating in the Bogota Conference.

The United States withdrew its proposal and accepted Panama's proposal that

the two countries agree only to study the possibility of a sea-level canal.

A full copy of the Spanish and English text is available on request.

OUTLINE OF NEUTRALITY PACT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES

AND THE REPUBLIC OF PANAMA

[As summarized from a speech given by Dr. Romulo Bethancourt before the

Panamanian National Assembly, August 19, 19771

(1) United States proposed a military pact that would operate after the year

2000.

Panama opposed.

United States withdrew the idea of a military pact.

(2) United States proposed a bilateral declaration between Panama and the

United States to declare neutrality of the Canal with United States as guarantor

of the neutrality.

Panama opposed.

United States withdrew the idea of a bilateral agreement with the United States

as guarantor.

(3) United States proposed that Panama be obliged to keep the Canal permanently open and neutral.

Panama opposed keeping it open in the case of natural causes (an earthquake),

temporary causes (a landside), and in the case the Canal was not making money.

United States accepted the first 2 reasons, but in the case of the third proposed

that if the Canal was not making money Panama could ask for funds from the

United States or some other countries.

Panama opposed.

United States agreed to eliminate the article about keeping the Canal open,

eliminating that obligation for Panama.

(4) United States proposed that the Neutrality Pact be between Panama and

the United States and no one else.

Panama opposed.

United States changed proposal to be only between the United States and the

OAS countries, but not Cuba.
567

Panama opposed saying that all countries of the world including any comnminist country that wished should be invited to join the pact.

United States changed and agreed that all countries of the world including

communist countries could join the Pact.

(5) Panama proposed that the United Nations be the depositor of the Pact.

United States opposed and proposed instead that the OAS be the depositor.

Panama accepted provided that the OAS have nothing to say about who could

or could not join the pact.

(6) United States asked for preferential right of way for United States warships in time of war and in time of peace.

Panama opposed.

United States changed and asked for preferential treatment at least in time

of war.

Panama opposed.

United States changed and asked for at least expeditious passage (as prompt

and rapid passage as possible).

Panama accepted saying that in any case it would want to give as prompt and

rapid passage to any warships from any country. (I.e., United States gets no

preferential rights.)

(7) United States proposed a bilateral declaration of neutrality.

Panama opposed. Proposed a unilateral declaration by Panama only.

United States changed and accepted that Panama, only, would make a declaration of neutrality.

(8) United States proposed that the declaration of neutrality be for the Panama

Canal only.

Panama opposed and said that it had to be for the whole country of Panama

including the Panama Canal.

United States changed and agreed that it would be for the whole country of

Panama.

(9) United States proposed that it be the guarantor of the neutrality. Panama

opposed, and said that all the nations signing the pact act as guarantors with no

special role for the United States.

United States withdrew its proposal and agreed that all the nations signing the

Pact act as guarantors.

(10) United States proposed that the neutrality be upheld in all circumstances.

Panama opposed saying that it could not uphold the neutrality of the Canal

in the case of internal disorder in the country of Panama, or in the case of a third

country attacking the Canal.

United States withdrew its proposal so as to avoid an article saying Panama

would not uphold the neutrality in the case of internal disorder in Panama.

(11) United States proposed that Panama have an option to build a sea-level

canal with a date, and commit herself so that the United States have the exclusive

right to construct a sea-level canal in Panama.

Panama opposed with the support of the countries participating in the Bogota

Conference.

United States withdrew its proposal and accepted Panama's proposal that the

two countries agree only to study the possibility of a sea-level canal.

ADDRESS OF DR. ROMULO BETHANCOURT, HEAD OF THE PANAMANIAN NEGOTIATING TEAM BEFORE THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF PANAMA CONCERNING

THE NEUTRALITY PACT WITH THE UNITED STATES, AUGUST 19, 1977.

Originally it was proposed that to reach a negotiation with Panama there had

to be a neutrality pact between the two countries and a military pact. The military

pact would be made before the end of this century and it would operate after the

year 2000. This kept the negotiations stalled for a long time because Panama

opposed the enactment of a military pact. Panama's opposition to the military

pact involved two things: first of all, it was opposed to the military presence of

the United States in Panama, after the end of the present treaty (2000) and

secondly, the United States as a great power is a country that frequently is

involved in wars in other parts of the world and we did not want that because of

a military pact, the future youth of our country would have to go fight at the

scenes of war of the United States with the excuse that it was engaged in order to

defend the Panama Canal. This was a position that Panama maintained until the

United States withdrew the idea of a military pact, and we then went into the

discussion of the neutrality pact only.
568

In the neutrality pact, the following situation arose: The United States raised

the question if Panama was in disagreement with the Canal being neutral. We

told them no, that on the contrary, a long-standing aspiration Panama had had

been that the Panama Canal would be neutral. They said that they wanted that

the Panama Canal be neutral and we said we entirely agreed with them. The

difference occurred in what they understood by neutrality and whAt we understood by neutrality. They proposed that Panama and the United States declare

that the Canal was neutral and that the United States would guarantee that

neutrality. Panama was opposed to this concept explaining that we did not want

that with the excuse of neutrality, the United States would maintain a guarantee

over the State of Panama. This was another cause of discussion that kept the

negotiations detained until the United States gave up on the idea of its having a

guarantee of neutrality over the Canal.

Another of the issues that they presented was that Panama must agree to

maintain the Canal permanently neutral and permanently open. We told them

that Panama could oblige herself to maintain the Canal permanently neutral

because that was her wish. Panama has no interest in other than a neutral Canal, the Panama Canal, because otherwise the Isthmus of Panama would change into

a scene of war. But we said Panama could not promise to maintain the Canal

permanently open for three reasons: 1) for natural causes. We explained that an

earthquake could happen for instance, that would close the Canal and Panama

could not be with the obligation of keeping it open. Also, we explained that for

temporary causes, that there could be landslides and it would have to be closed

in order to correct these landslides, and thirdly, it could happen that the Canal

was not producing (making money) for Panama and that then Panama would

not have the obligation to keep open a canal that did not give them money.

They (United States negotiators) accepted the first two reasons, the natural

causes and the temporary causes but they did not accept the third cause, the

lack of profitability. This also kept the negotiations stalled for a long time.

They proposed that in case that it were not profitable, Panama could get money

from the United States in order to keep it open or from the other countries who

use the Canal. We told them that when the new treaty with the United States

ended, we did not want that Panama would have either the direct or indirect

obligation to turn to the United States to request money or to any other country

to keep the Canal open. The position of the two countries remained firmly unchangeable until we reached the following agreement: They said, we can't present

to our Congress an article that states you will close the Canal for lack of profit.

And we said that we could not present an article in which we are obliged to permanently- keep a Canal open when we did not know if the Canal someday would

yield no profit. We came to the agreement of eliminating that article, so Panama

got rid of that obligation to maintain the Canal permanently open. The negotiations then went exclusively to the problem of neutrality.

The United States proposed then, that there should be made a neutrality pact

between Panama and the United States and no one else. They did not want that

either the Russians, or the Cubans nor the Chinese, (they said this verbatim) to

intervene in the neutrality of the Panama Canal. Our position was that the neutrality didn't make any sense if it was only limited to two countries by making a pact

between the United States and Panama. We opposed that the rest of the countries

did not have the right to join that pact. They changed their position and said

that they accepted that only the countries of the American continent (except for

Cuba) could join. We said no, that it had no meaning because in case of a war

between them (the United States) and Russia or China, if those countries were

not part of the neutrality pact, they would have no commitment to respect the

Canal nor the Isthmus of Panama. That was another reason for much discussion

until they ended up accepting that all the countries of the world could join the

neutrality pact.

Later, the problem arose of where the joining of the countries of the world

could be done. We said that it had to be in the United Nations. They responded

that they were not in favor of the idea of the United Nations very much because

they have a lot of problems with the non-aligned countries, the Third World,

the Arabs, etc. They proposed the O.A.S. We said that we did not disagree that

it was the O.A.S. provided that this body would be only the receiver of the pact

and the rest of the countries would go there to register, and that the O.A.S.

would have no participation as far as accepting or refusing the countries that

would like to join. This was another cause of discussion. It was solved by making

a protocol of neutrality, that famous protocol that gives the United States the
569

right to intervene in Panama because those who attack it apparently read this

in a Miami newspaper. This protocol is only a note 1 in which the existence of the

neutrality act is indicated. It says what it consists of and sets down consequently, which country will join. That is the famous protocol. The same neutrality pact

but in a protocol (that is what it is called) and the O.A.S. is the depositor.

Another problem was the preferential passage of the American warships through

the Canal. They said that they had two problems. First that they had to please

Pentagon, they had to present them something that they liked so that they would

support the treaty, and secondly, that at least after the treaty ended, since they

were going from there, that they were left even (at least) with that, because

they had constructed it. We pointed out that we recognized that indeed, they

had constructed the Canal, but writing in the neutrality pact that the United

States warships would have preferential right of way over the rest of the vessels

violated the pact of neutrality and that was contrary to the objective of the

pact we are negotiating. This was another cause of lengthy discussions and much

analysis. They searching for their books and we searching for ours, they invoking

their treaty writers, we invoking ours. This is how these discussions are carried

out. They changed their position and said that at least they should be given

preferential right when the United States was at war (originally they wanted it

in times of peace and war) and this right should be given simply at the request

of the ship's captain. We said no-that in time of war was the time when least

the preferential passage should be given because the neutrality would be violated. They, after discussing this, very much accepted that they could not have a

preferential right for the warships of the United States. Then both countries

devoted themselves to looking for a formula that would not mean preferential

right and we came to the agreement that the warships of the United States

in times of peace or in times of war, (and the ships of Panama that we still don't

have but that for the year 2000 maybe we will have [laughing]) will have the

right to prompt passage through the Canal. This means that they will have the

right to as rapid a passage as possible. In that, we agreed because it's not suitable

for any country that the warships of another country linger for a long time in its

territorial waters; therefore, the faster they go through, the better.

Another of the issues in the neutrality pact that we were, rather, this is the

true picture of what the neutrality pact consists: According to these indications,

also we did not accept from them that the United States and Panama together

declare the neutrality of the Canal. We said that declaration of the neutrality

of the Canal was an act of sovereignty of Panama and that this had to be a unilateral declaration. After much discussion, they accepted that the declaration be

made only by Panama; in other words, that Panama is the one who declares

that the Canal is permanently neutral. These other indications were made, that

the neutrality they proposed in the declaration that we were to make, should

be for the Panama Canal so that it not become a scene of war. They wanted to

separate the canal from the rest of the Isthmus. We told them that we couldn't;

that the Canal was part of our Isthmus and that our neutrality made sense only

if it was for the Canal and for the rest of the country because we didn't gain

anything if they don't throw a bomb in the canal, but they do throw it, for example, in Ocu or in Santiago. They accepted that the neutrality be declared so

that neither the Canal nor all of the territory (country of Panama) of the Isthmus

of Panama could be object to reprisal in conflicts that another power could have.

Another point in the concept of neutrality is that it is not a neutrality so only

the United States ships travel through peacefully, but that it is a neutrality so that

all ships of all the flags in the world travel through peacefully, independent of

what country it may be, if it is a communist country, if it is a fascist, if it is a

monarchy, that we were not interested in that it had to be a democratic country

for the peaceful passage of all the ships in the world. And finally, that the pact was

made between the two countries and it is declared there that Panama declares the

neutrality of the Canal (in the manner that I already explained to you) after

Panama having made the neutrality pact, based on that declaration with the

United States of America and that the countries commit themselves to maintain

this neutrality. This concept of upholding the neutrality was the concept that

replaced their original position that they would guarantee the neutrality. The

upholding of the neutrality is indicated within the pact, and in the protocol the

rest of the countries are signing this protocol.

I The meaning of "note" is not clear. It could mean a note of explanation or a small

piece of paper.
570

Then came the discussion because I proposed originally that both countries

would be committed to uphold this neutrality in all circumstances. We said that

if the phrase "in all circumstances" was written down, we would have to make

two possible exceptions, the first one-that provided that those circumstances

were not of internal order because those circumstances of internal order were

of our country or our National Guard; and secondly, we had to point out that

it was an attack to the Isthmus or the Panama Canal by a third country. This

was a cause of much discussion and they then preferred not to present this phrase

so that we wouldn't present the exception. We also pointed out that within the

neutrality pact it had to be clearly established that from the 31 of December

1999 at 12 o'clock noon or at 12 noon as Edwin (Edwin Fabrega) says or at 12

midnight as Ahumada (Adolfo Ahumada) says, that from that date on, the

American troops could not be in Panama. They, after much discussion said, we

don't like that phrase-that there could be Russian troops or Cuban troops.

Then the proposal to change the phrase rose up and that it could be said that

from the 31 of December 1999 on, in Panama there could only be Panamanian

troops with which they were happy because they were thinking more or less

that we are going to call the Russians and we were happy because one of our

aspirations is precisely that our troops be the only ones here.

So this is the "wrong" of the neutrality pact. (Sarcastic) The criticisms that

are made to it, some that you have already heard or have read by a various people

that like to be exceedingly particular in that we give the United States the right

to intervene in our country after the year 2000. These people think that the rights

of intervention are given. To the great powers, no one gives the right of intervention; they intervene whenever they feel like it with or without a pact. When

they landed in Santo Domingo, they had no military pact with Santo Domingo,

nor had any right of intervention in Santo Domingo and landed as they pleased.

But there are people here who think that it is the articles of a code (law code)

that tell a country if they have the right to intervene or not, and they don't

know that it is the bayonets, the guns, and the atomic bomb that give the force in

order for a country to intervene. And then a country such as the United States

can land in Panama whenever they feel like it after the year 2000 without there

existing any neutrality pact or the neutrality pact. But it cannot land, for example, in Russia even if Russia tells them to land. This is the reality of the facts, such

that with the neutrality pact, we are not giving the United States the right of

intervention. What we are giving is an assurance that the Canal will be permanently neutral, that we are not going to close the Canal so that their ships will not

go through, or that this ship will not go through or this other ship. Why this

neutrality pact? Because they are thinking maybe by the year 2000 this country

(Panama) may become socialist and then become our (US) enemies and we now

want to make sure that even if they become socialist, they cannot close our

passage.

And frankly speaking, they do not need this neutrality pact to intervene or not.

They need it to present it to their Congress, to tell their Congress, "But look, we

are giving the Canal to these Panamanians but we always have the right to watch

it so that they behave themselves." That's the truth. It's their internal policy,

they are resolving an internal problem with a Congress that has a great opposition

to these negotiations and that has, in additon, other members that have not been

elected by the American people but that they have turned into members of the

United States Congress with pleasure and these are the Panamanians that are

here and others in Miami. (n.b. Referring to exiled people opposed to Torrijos'

government.)

So about the neutrality pact, this is its real content, distinguished Representatives. This was a very debated matter, as you can see by all that I have been

explaining. This was the manner in which it was worked over, until it came to

this form, and by the way, we feel very proud of the way it has been resolved. You

should have seen the original form as they presented it together with the military

pact. This would have been shameful, I would not have dared to sit at this table

now to give any type of explanation to you if I would have had to present myself

with the military pact and the neutrality pact that they presented originally. 

The other problem was the option for the construction of the sea level canal.

Two months ago coinciding with the inauguration of the oil pipeline of Alaska,

President Carter delivered a speech in which he said that his government was

deeply interested in the construction of a sea level canal either through Panama

or through any other spot in Central America, and right after President Carter's

speech the American negotiators brought this problem of the option to the negotiation table. In the previous negotiations of 66 and 68, this was, indeed, a very

debated problem by the negotiators of that time, Doctor Diogenes de La Rosa
571

and others. At that time they were making the studies. And they actually did

make them and were rushing the possible construction. But in these negotiations

it seems they had put the problem aside until now when President Carter's speech

and the oil of Alaska appeared.

And thus the discussion of the option began. We talked about this about two

times and we arrived at no conclusion, and the Bogota conference came.

There, the problem of the option really made a crisis because a very complete

proposal between all the presidents, Carter through the negotiators Linowitz and

Bunker and through our Chancellor, Gonzalez Revilla and our negotiators was

established. They (United States) proposed that Panama have an option to

make a sea level canal without a date, and secondly, that Panama committed

herself that no other country could construct a sea level canal. They presented

that proposal in Bogota, we read it to the Presidents. It was the proposal that the

negotiators had brought and we read it to them and the negotiations between

the two countries were practically broken.

The General said in his comment that we had come to this conference of

Bogota to celebrate the day of a new treaty and it turns out that on the other

hand, we came to a vigil over the deceased.

There, the struggle between the two countries began, Bogota, between both, because the other presidents meddled as if they were Panamanians too.

There was no way to reach an agreement in what they proposed, Panama's

representation wrote a plan that everyone thought fine. Read word for word, it

is more or less like this:

Article 3-The possibility of constructing a third set of locks or a sea level

canal.

1. The Republic of Panama and the United States agree that a sea level canal

could be important in the future or for the international relations.

Consequently, after it is approved, it will arrange for its construction. The option

doesn't even exist. That option is for study. To sit down and study with the United

States if it is feasible. If it is, the two countries will do it during the course of 10 or

15 years. The future generations will be much more prepared. We aren't giving

you a copy of the treaty because its pending the announcement of President

Carter and of General Torrijos and it's becoming an official document. We will

publish it wholly when it does become (official), we will debate it publicly.

The ones who cannot prove that this treaty is better than the one of 1903, that

the perpetuity is better, will have the problem. That the two million dollars is

better than what is proposed now. We don't care if they say that General Torrijos

is a dictator; those who are opposed and say that we are not revolutionaries may

they grab their knapsack and their grenade and go prove it with deeds.

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