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NUCLEAR DEAL FALLOUT:

THE GLOBAL THREAT OF IRAN

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, 

NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

MAY 24, 2017

Serial No. 115–28

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

BRIAN J. MAST, Florida 

FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida 

BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

THOMAS A. GARRETT, JR., Virginia 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

AMI BERA, California 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

NORMA J. TORRES, California 

BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York 

ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York 

TED LIEU, California

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

TED POE, Texas, Chairman 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

PAUL COOK, California 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

BRIAN J. MAST, Florida 

THOMAS A. GARRETT, JR., Virginia 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

NORMA J. TORRES, California 

BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Mr. Ilan Berman, senior vice president, American Foreign Policy Council ........ 5

Ray Takeyh, Ph.D., Hasib J. Sabbagh senior fellow for Middle East studies, 

Council on Foreign Relations .............................................................................. 16

Daniel L. Byman, Ph.D., senior fellow, Center for Middle East Policy, Brookings Institution ..................................................................................................... 24

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Mr. Ilan Berman: Prepared statement .................................................................. 7

Ray Takeyh, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ............................................................... 18

Daniel L. Byman, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ....................................................... 26

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 52

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 53

The Honorable Bradley S. Schneider, a Representative in Congress from 

the State of Illinois: Prepared statement ........................................................... 54

Written responses from Mr. Ilan Berman to questions submitted for the 

record by the Honorable William Keating, a Representative in Congress 

from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts ....................................................... 56

(1)

NUCLEAR DEAL FALLOUT:

THE GLOBAL THREAT OF IRAN 

WEDNESDAY, MAY 24, 2017

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:09 p.m., in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ted Poe (chairman of 

the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. POE. The subcommittee will come to order. 

Without objection, all members may have 5 days to submit statements, questions, extraneous materials for the record, subject to 

the length limitation and the rules. 

I will make my opening statement. 

Two years ago, Iran and six major world powers reached an 

agreement regarding its program of nuclear capability. That deal 

was a result of a decade of tough U.S. and international sanctions 

placed on the Iranian regime because of its dangerous nuclear ambitions. 

The mullahs in Tehran felt the pain of sanctions. That is why 

they came to the negotiating table. At that moment, we had the 

most leverage over the regime. But, unfortunately, a deal that the 

past administration brokered turns out to be seriously flawed. 

For starters, the deal simply put Iran’s nuclear plans on hold for 

10 to 15 years. After that time, Iran is free to develop a nuclear 

weapon and menace the world. Even worse, the deal did not address Iran’s continued sponsorship of terrorists with American 

blood on their hands. It also did nothing to curb the development 

of ballistic missiles. 

Iran gained immediate access to hundreds of billions of dollars, 

and the promise of yet more to come, due to the sanctions’ relief. 

Only weeks after the announcement of the deal, reports indicated 

that Iran had significantly increased funding to Hezbollah and 

Hamas, both terrorist groups. This increased funding allowed 

Hezbollah to increase its operations in Syria, where the group has 

deepened its sectarian divide. Hezbollah has also used this new 

funding to obtain highly developed new armaments, including advanced technologies used by professional state militaries. While 

Hezbollah has been busy helping its Iranian masters prop up the 

brutal Assad regime in Syria, they have contracted out their violently anti-Israel agenda. 

2

In 2016, Israeli authorities arrested a Palestinian cell organized 

and funded by Hezbollah that had planned to carry out suicide 

bombings. Iran also cemented its ties with the Palestinian terror 

group Hamas by providing them with missile technologies that enabled them to build their own rockets to target Israeli citizens. Iran 

helped Hamas build its terrorist tunnel infrastructure that was destroyed by Israel in 2014. 

Since the nuclear deal, Iran terrorist plots have been uncovered 

in Kuwait, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia. Hezbollah and Iran also remain active in Latin America where they operate criminal networks that yield even more money for Tehran to invest in terrorism. Back at home in Iran, the mullahs are busy dedicating 

more time and money to their ballistic missile program. 

Since the announcement of the nuclear deal, Iran has conducted 

14 ballistic missile tests. Earlier this month, Iran attempted to 

launch a cruise missile from one of its midget submarines, the 

same type of submarines the terrorist regime in North Korea is developing. Iran and North Korea are the only countries that deploy 

this class of submarine. 

The failed test reminded the world of Iran and North Korea’s 

long history of collaboration on this ballistic and even nuclear programs. Their dangerous relationship goes all the way back to the 

1980s. Now the two rogue regimes are believed to be working on 

developing intercontinental ballistic missiles, ICBMs. Why is Iran 

moving ahead with a ballistic missile program? Because ballistic 

missiles are the best delivery system for nuclear weapons. 

So while they wait 10 years till they can develop a bomb, Iran 

is ensuring they have the technology to deliver that payload. And 

there are some doubts about whether Iran is actually complying 

with the deal. 

Members of the National Council of Resistance of Iran claimed 

last month that Iran is still working on weaponization, the final 

step on the path to nuclear weapons. It is clear this deal has allowed the mullahs to increase their support of terrorism and proliferation. 

Leading up to the deal, the past administration assured us that 

the U.S. would continue to fight against Iran’s maligned behavior. 

It is time now we get serious about that. We cannot allow Iran to 

continue threatening the United States and our allies unchecked. 

The question is: How do we do that? That is why we are having 

this hearing, and we have these three experts that will give us the 

answers to all of that. 

And I will now yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. 

Keating, for his opening statement. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Chairman Poe. And thank you for the 

witnesses that are here today to testify. 

This hearing is very timely, coming less than a week after the 

reelection of Iranian President Rouhani, who was a key figure in 

reaching the nuclear agreement. It also comes at a time when 

President Trump is making his first trip abroad in the sphere 

threatened by Iran’s malign acts. So it is fitting that we take up 

Iran in this subcommittee this afternoon, as this is a time when 

both countries are reassessing their security posture toward each 

other. 

3

I supported, and continue to support, the Iran nuclear deal because it made us and our allies more secure and brought Iran more 

in line with international principles of nonproliferation. I also support aggressive, robust monitoring and enforcement of the deal so 

that we are certain that Iran never waivers in upholding their commitments under the agreement. 

However, Iran’s nuclear ambitions were not the only threat they 

posed to the region and to the United States’ security interests. 

Iran has continued to conduct several ballistic missile tests in defiance of U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231, and to support terrorist organizations operating throughout the region, actively involved in the civil conflicts in Syria and in Yemen, and, as a result, 

is exacerbating the continued bloodshed in both countries, and further stalling resolutions to these conflicts. 

Iran’s human rights record is also appalling. Participation in 

civic life is severely restricted with the regular arrest of journalists 

and activists and repression of free speech, not to mention the ongoing imprisonment of American citizens. The United States’ posture toward Iran must take into account all layers of Iran’s aggressive stance toward the world. 

However, that also includes taking into account the powerful role 

of Iranian public opinion. As we consider U.S. policies toward Iran 

and our response to Iranian threats to stability and security, we 

cannot do so without also considering Iran’s domestic context, and 

recognizing that the President, President Rouhani, just received 

broad support from a diverse range of voters in Iran on Friday. 

Here in Congress, and within the U.S. Government, we must be 

committed to curbing Iran’s malign activities, and we must do so 

diligently. Iran’s destabilizing action throughout the Middle East 

threatens the United States and must be met with clear condemnation for the sake of the countless human lives at stake and of the 

global rule of law. Yet we must take note of the complex reality 

that accounts for the domestic context in Iran today. 

Therefore, I look forward to hearing from our witnesses and hear 

about how Congress can navigate these many security threats from 

Iran without running afoul of our international commitments, without backsliding on progress made so far and bringing Iran into 

compliance with international law and norms. 

With the reelection of President Rouhani, I believe we must seize 

any possible opportunity to move forward in curbing Iran’s support 

for terrorist organizations, undeterred ballistic missile testing, continued involvement in conflicts across the region, and its gross 

human rights violations. We should do so with the support of our 

allies, and our actions should be carried out swiftly, yet deliberately. 

I thank the witnesses. I look forward to your testimony. 

I yield back. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentleman for his comments. 

The Chair will now have opening statements by members of the 

committee, 1-minute opening statements. 

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Mast. 

Mr. MAST. Thank you for recognizing me. I appreciate it. And 

thank you for your testimonies. 

4

I think it is important, on the heels of Memorial Day, that we 

really identify what it looks like for Iran to be the largest state 

sponsor of terrorists. It has become a phrase that has become so 

cliche in recent past. And what that really means, on the heels of 

Memorial Day, is it is Iranian hands that have made IEDs, the explosively formed projectiles that tore through our Up-Armored 

Humvees in Iraq. And it is Iranian hands that packed improvised 

explosive devices with nuts and screws and bolts and so many 

pieces of shrapnel that were placed in places like Afghanistan to 

put so many holes in our servicemembers that they could never be 

plugged before they bled out. That is what it looks like to be the 

largest state sponsor of terror. And I just think it is important that 

we keep that as a frame of reference, especially on the heels of Memorial Day, as we have this conversation. 

I thank you for your time testifying today, and I look forward to 

hearing from you. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentleman from Florida. 

The Chair will recognize the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. 

Boyle. 

Mr. BOYLE. Thank you to the chair and ranking member. 

I would say that—and I happen to have been someone on the 

democratic side of the aisle who voted against the Iran deal. And 

I know there were good, principled arguments on both sides of that. 

What I am most interested in, though, is not continuing to beat 

a dead horse of the political fight over this and moving beyond the 

politics of the deal, and whether or not it was a good idea, and accepting the reality, and moving forward. And, specifically, focusing 

on—my comments very much dovetail after the last ones we just 

heard—going after Iranian funding for Hamas, for Hezbollah, for 

their continued role in the Syrian civil war, for what they are doing 

in Yemen. I believe that should be our focus. 

And rather than continuing to relitigate the past of the Iran deal, 

let’s focus on that. Because, at the end of the day, it is cliche for 

a reason, they are the largest state sponsor of terrorism throughout 

the world. And that will continue unless we go after their funding. 

Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. POE. The gentleman yields back his time. 

Without objection, all of the witnesses’ prepared statements will 

be made part of the record. 

I ask that each witness keep their presentation to no more than 

5 minutes. When the red light comes on in front of you, that means 

stop. And I will help you enforce that rule. I will introduce each 

witness and give them time for their opening statements. 

Ilan Berman is the senior vice-president of the American Foreign 

Policy Council. He is an expert on regional security in the Middle 

East and has consulted for both the CIA and the Department of 

Defense. 

Dr. Ray Takeyh is a senior fellow for Middle East studies at the 

Council of Foreign Relations. Prior to joining the CFR, he was a 

senior advisor on Iran at the State Department. 

And Dr. Daniel Byman is a senior fellow in the Center for Middle 

East Policy at Brookings. His research focuses on counterterrorism 

and Middle East security. 

Mr. Berman, we will start with you, and you have 5 minutes. 

5

STATEMENT OF MR. ILAN BERMAN, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, 

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY COUNCIL 

Mr. BERMAN. Thank you, Judge Poe. And thank you, Judge. And 

thank you, Ranking Member Keating. And I really appreciate the 

opportunity to be here today to discuss the 2015 nuclear deal between Iran and the P5+1 powers. 

A good place to start is to recognize that more than a year after 

its implementation, the effects of the agreement have been profound, and they have been profoundly negative both for the stability of the Middle East and for American interests there. And 

much of this problem revolves around the fact that, while the 

agreement was only intended to be tactical in nature, to deal strictly with one aspect of the global threat that is posed by Iran, its effects for Iran have been both extensive and they have been strategic in nature. 

Most notably—and I have a more detailed discourse in my written statement, which you have in front of you. But, most notably, 

I would point out that the JCPOA has had a material effect on reinvigorating the global ambitions of a regime that truly thinks 

globally, that thinks about itself as a regional hegemon and as a 

country with power projection capabilities far beyond its borders. 

And you can see this evident in several lines of effort that the Iranian regime is pursuing currently. 

The first is a multispectrum military modernization that is both 

reinvigorated and is sustained in nature. And it encompasses 

things like the expansion of Iran’s national defense budget to 5 percent of GDP; the acquisition of billions of dollars of new hardware 

from supplier states, like Russia and China; and substantially 

deeper investments in cyber warfare capabilities both for defense 

and for offense. 

You can see Iran’s focus on stepped-up regional activism, including greater assistance to the Assad regime in Syria, and also serving as a facilitator for a secondary state-directed foreign fighter 

flow that is bringing Afghans, Yemens, Shiites of non-Syrian origin 

to the Syrian battlefront. And you can see this in the solidification 

of Iranian influence over Iraqi politics through its extensive sponsorship of both Shiite militias and patronage of Shiite politicians 

in Iraq. 

And, also, as all the members noted, you see a substantial surge 

in the amount of money, already extensive, that Iran has allocated 

toward the activities of organizations like Hezbollah in Lebanon 

and also in Syria and Hamas in the Palestinian territories. 

The cumulative effect of this is that General Joseph Votel, the 

commander of U.S. Central Command, testified about approximately 11⁄2 months ago, that these initiatives have made Iran ‘‘the 

most significant threat to the central region and to our national interests and to the interests of our partners and allies there.’’ And 

I think that is a significant development. It is a significant escalation in the threat that is posed by Iran. 

And this, I think, leads us to the question of: What can be done? 

I think that the Trump administration’s Iran policy is still a work 

in progress. They are undergoing a comprehensive policy review 

that is going to touch on all aspects of Iran policy, including the 

6

nuclear deal, and other issues. But, as they do, I think they would 

be very well-advised to focus on four priorities. 

The first is to reestablish economic leverage over Iran. The 

JCPOA has put in motion a fundamental unraveling of the global 

sanctions regime against Iran for a host of reasons. And Washington needs to restore the economic leverage that it once had 

against Iran, and it can do so through measures like the additional 

blacklisting of entities engaged in illicit behavior, and also a comprehensive blacklisting on the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, 

which controls a third or more of Iran’s national economy. 

The second priority should be to ensure compliance with the 

terms of the nuclear deal. Because as much as termination of the 

JCPOA was a campaign issue last year, it is abundantly clear that 

the contours of the agreement will remain in force, at least for the 

near future. And that means that we have to focus on ensuring 

compliance, in material terms, the hiring of additional inspectors, 

gaining access to facilities that are currently obscured, and, most 

of all, constructing a menu that talks about what constitutes a material breach of the agreement so that all the members of the P5+1 

can be on the same page about whether Iran is in violation of its 

obligations. 

Very briefly, the other two priorities that the administration 

should focus on would be mechanisms by which it can constrain 

Iranian expansionism, to include the construction of a regional security architecture very much along the lines of what the Trump 

administration has begun discussing in its current trip to the Middle East. 

And, lastly, the reconstruction of American credibility, vis-a-vis, 

the Iranian people. Historically, the United States has served as a 

champion for ordinary Iranians in their struggle against the clerical state. This is a moral high ground that the U.S. has retreated 

from over the last 8 years in the service of a tactical arrangement 

with the Iranian regime. And this is ground that we need to make 

up. And we can make this up in a number of different ways, from 

different statements, to more robust broadcasting, to other demonstrations of the fact that this administration is not prepared to 

accept the current political status quo in Tehran. 

And the time to do so, in my opinion, is now. The U.S. Government needs to move robustly to implement a new approach that begins to roll back Iranian influence and activities in the region, activities that have been emboldened, in no small measure, by the 

agreement that was signed in July 2015. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Berman follows:]

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American Foreign Policy Council 

Congressional Testimony 

Nuclear Deal Fallout: The 

Global Threat of Iran 

Han Berman 

AFPC Senior Vice President 

Statement before the House Foreign Affairs Committee 

Subcommittee on Terrorism, l\,'onproliferation, and Trade 

May 24,2017 
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American Foreign Policy Council ••• 

Chairman Poe, Ranking Member Keating, distinguished members ofrhe Subcommittee: 

It is a privilege to appear before you today to discuss the strategic efrects of the 2015 nuclear deal between 

Iran and the PS+l powers, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action ()CPOA). 

More than a year after its implementation, the effects of that agreement have been profound-and 

profoundly negative for the stability of the Middle East, as well as for American interests there. 

FRmTs oF THE NucLEAR DEAL 

From the start, the accord concluded between Iran and the P5-d was intended to be tactical in nature, 

focusing on just one aspect of the Iranian regime's rogue behavior: irs persistent nuclear ambitions. 

However, the ben eAts that have been conferred to Iran as a result have been both extensive and strategic 

in nature. 

Most directly, as a core condition of the JCPOA, rhe United States and its partners in the PS+ 1 agreed 

to release to Iran some $100 billion or more in previously escrowed oil revenue. For Iran, this represents 

an enormous windfall, amounting to roughly a quarter of its annual GDP, which totaled $415 billion 

in 2014 1 Byway of comparison, that sum nearly rivals the entirety of the European Recovery Program 

(colloquially known as the Marshall Plan) launched by the Truman administration in 1948 in the 

aftermath ofWorld War Il-an initiative that disbursed more than $13 billion (roughly $130 billion 

in today's dollars) to sevemeen countries in Europe over the span of lour years. As of "Implementation 

Da}l' (January 16, 201 6), rhe Islamic Republic has complete. unencumbered access to these funds. 

This direct benefit, moreover, has been amplified by a range of other measures, such as the reintegration 

oflran into global markets via mechanisms like the electronic payment system run by the Society for 

Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT), 2 as well as by the easing of multilateral 

restrictions on international involverneru: in Iran's econotnic sector. The cutnulatiye irnpact has been 

profound: Iran's economy. which was teetering on the brink of collapse in the Fall of2013, is now on a 

path of sustained growth, according to the estimates of international financial institutions such as the 

International Monetary Fund and \V'orld Bank.3 

Notably, however, this newfound prosperity has not trickled down to the average Iranian. A January 

2017 survey ofiranian public opinion conducted by the Center for International Security Studies at 

rhe University of Maryland found a broad consensus among respondents that, a year on, "there haYe 

been no improvements in people's living conditions as a result of the nuclear deal." 4 This, in turn, has 

1 "lnu1 COP: 19115-2017," 
9


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American Foreign Policy Council ••• 

led to declining enthusiasm for the nuclear deal within Iranian society, and helped make the agreement 

a significant political issue in the country's most recent presidential contest, which concluded in recent 

days.' 

Nor has the agreement yielded a fundamental change in Iran's political outlook. Contrary to the 

fervent wishes of the Obama administration, the JCPOA did not foster a kinder, gentler polity within 

the Islamic Republic. While the Obama White House lobbied heavily in favor ofrhe agreement based 

on the argument that it would help empower moderate forces within Iran," nothing of the sort has 

happened. I nsteact last summer's elections fOr Iran's _parliament, or rnajle.r, savv a resounding reaffirmation 

of the conservative status quo in Iranian politics 7 So the situation has remained, notwithstanding the 

electoral victory of incumbent President Hassan Roul1ani in bst week's presidential run-oll: 

What the JCPOA has succeeded in doing, however. is reinvigorating the global ambitions of the 

Iranian regime. After laboring lor years under international sanctions and with limited means to make 

its fOreign policy vision a reality, the lshmic Republic is now in the throes of a landmark expansion of 

both its regional activities and its strategic capabilities. 

Long moribund as a result of international sanctions, the Iranian regime's military modernization 

efforts have now shifted into high gear. In June of 2015, ahead of the formal conclusion of 

the JCPOA, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamcnei formally unveiled his government's Sixth 

Development Plan, which outlines its intent to expand the national defense budget (then at $14 

billion) hy nearly a third, to five percent of total GDP"-a surge predicated entirely on Iran's ability 

to access additional resources as a result of the nuclear deal. Since then, Tehran has concluded tens 

of billions of dollars in new accords for military hardware and materiel with both Russia and 

China9 Over time, this drive can be expected to significantly expand the Iranian regime's strategic 

capabilities, as well as the potential threat that it can pose to U.S. and allied forces in the Middle 

Eastern theater. 

While not yet a first-tier cyber power like Russia and China, Iran is nonetheless fast emerging a.s a 

signitlcant threat actor in cyberspace. Over the past several years, the Iranian regime has made the 

strengthening of its cyber capabilities a major priority. The results have been visible in a spate of 

high-profile cyber attacks against both U.S. and international targets carried out by the regime and 

afllliated actors over the past hall~decade. And while such instances have declined since the signing 

of the .JCPOA (reflecting Iran's satisfaction with the terms of the agreement), the Iranian regime 

2 
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American Foreign Policy Council ••• 

is nonetheless making major inwstments in its cyber capabilities. Since 2013. Iran is estimated to 

have increased its overall cybersecurity spending twelve-fold. 10 with the JRGC now boasting an 

annual cyber budget of nearly $20 million." This surge accurately reflects the Islamic Republic's 

interest in the exploitation of cyberspace for both defensive and offensive purposes-a maturing 

capability that could be used against the United States and allied nations in the event of a conflict. 

Since the start of the Syrian civil war in 2011, Iran has emerged as a key player in that conflict, 

providing extensive arms, training and materiel ro the regime of Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad. 

More recently, the Islamic Republic has become a major conduit for foreign fighters as well. 

Working together with its Lebanese proxy, Hezbollah, the Iranian regime has played a key role 

in organizing pro-Assad militias among the country's Alawite and Shi'a communities, as well as 

coordinating pro-regime foreign fighters from Iraq, Yemen, Leb,uwn and Afghanistan. 12 As of 

January 2017, this secondary, state-directed foreign fighter stream was estimated to number as 

many as 20,000 "volunteers."ll 

J ran's activism elsewhere in the region has surged as well. In Yemen, the Islamic Republic has emerged 

as a significant source of support for the country's 1-Iouthi rebels, providing vital weaponry as well as 

sustained logistical, political, and financial support to the rebellion.'' This assistance was crucial to 

the Fall20 14 Houthi takeover of portions of the Yemeni capital, Sana' a, and their consolidation of 

power (and periodic targeting of \X/ estern interests) since. In Iraq as well, Iran's historic asymmetric 

strategy-pursued since 2003 and intended "to limit American power-projection capability in 

the Middle East, ensure the Iraqi government does not pose a threat to !ran, and build a reliable 

platform for projecting influence further abroad"''-has expanded significantly. In response to 

the rise of the Islamic State terrorist group (ISIS), the Islamic Republic has commenced a major 

mobilization, providing both arms and advisors to Kurdish peshmerga guerrillas battling ISIS in 

northern Iraq,"' and sending detachments of its Revolutionary Guards to tight the group on Iraqi 

soil.~' It has also organized ;md deployed some 40 Iraqi Shi'a militias against ISIS 18 Pursuant to a 

l> "b:m Is Building a No:J.-:mclear Threat Faster than Experts "'V7ould have Imagined·'' Business bwder l\1arch 27• 20 13, 

''Seized Arms OffYeme:1 Raise Alarm Over Iran," 1Ve-t.V Yor!? Times, 1\1arch 2, 2013, 

H.1k!m 

Offin:1.l Dt'nit's Recl;'iving A.rms ffom Inn," The JVationai, l'Y1arch H), 2012, htQdi~~'L~\.Jh0t:1d£'1L--J 

112Ll1e':>_Y5/""-(l_ddLrCli'-1d]~~- _(,!~J:[I}\:~l.~h; __ ofJh::ial Q_ell'<''<HC<'l''•n;; :>•n:n_•:,rr•<Hl' '-'''"' 

Felter and Brian Fishman, "Iranian 

Paper. October l.J.. 2008, hrr~,~. re:lp2:\V<<L''"'lfnrd,<:dvi'J'I1b·li<::U:i0<~U.irJJlt'l><_£r,"'"''-'''-''' "~-"''E« 

3 
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American Foreign Policy Council ••• 

December 2016 law passed by the Iraqi government, these militias are now offlcially considered 

a part of Iraq's anned forces, giving the Iranian regirne signitlcant influence over Iraq's future 

political direction. All told, Iran can now be said to control four separate Arab capitals: Beirut, 

Lebanon; Damascus, Syria; Sana' a. Yemen; and Baghdad, Iraq. 

Iran's regime has historically served as the world's leading state sponsor of terrorism, providing 

economic support to a range of radical causes. At the time of the signing of the .JCPOA in the 

summer of 2015, the Congressional Research Service estimated that the lslamic Republic was 

spending between $3.5 billion to $16 billion annually on terrorism and insurgency worldwide, 

including bankrolling the entire operating budget of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad terrorist 

organization, providing tens of millions of dollars to the Hamas terrorist group, and transferring 

between $100 and $200 million annually to Lebanon's Hezbollah militia19The concrete economic 

benefits of the JCPOA have allowed Iran to expand this sponsorship significantly. According to 

:V!iddle Eastern sources, Iran has ramped up its support to Harnas in recent weeks, including the 

provision of as much as $27 million to the Palestinian movement."' Iranian aid to Hezbollah is also 

believed to have ballooned 10 as much as $1 billion annually in recent times." 

The cumulative impact of these developments is that Iran now represents "the most signiflcam threat 

to the Central Region and to our national interests and the interests of our partners and allies," in the 

judgmcm of Gen. Joseph Vote!, the commander of U.S. Central Command." 

CoPING WITH AN F.MBOLDENED IRAN 

How can the United States best counter the expanding threat posed by the Islamic Republic? The 

Trump administration is currently in the midst of a comprehensive review of U.S. policy toward Iran, 

and that process can be expected to yield significant changes to both the way the new \'Vhite House 

approaches both the 2015 nuclear deal and Iran's broader activities in the Middle East. As it formulates 

its approach, the Administration should focus on tour distinct priorities: 

11 General Joseph L. Votel, Statement for the Record l3efore the House Armed Services Committee, J\{arch 15. 2017, 

ht[p:/ /rJ)l·s.!J<J'.l<;~'.;ri'-.r/mcni•1t;'Ji\S!A.SOti/ 21~ 17~:,.)29/ l U)r,<J:~/l:-[l- WJ~ ·: ] 5 ·..['\,'::,()0-'IPstat.> \·t~td [ ·21)170329 .pdf. 

4 
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American Foreign Policy Council ••• 

Reestablishing Economic Le11erage 

Perhaps the most pernicious effect of the JCPOA has been to set in motion a fundamental unraveling 

of the global sanctions regime against Iran. The Obama administration's efforts in support of the 

agreement-including attempts to encourage greater international commerce with Iran and the 

assumption of a direct investment role in Iran's nuclear programn---hdped to compromise the integrity 

ofrhe sanctions architecture that had been painstakingly erected against the Islamic Republic over the 

preceding decade-and-a-half. A key future priority of the U.S. government, therefore, must be to 

restore the economic leverage that Washington once wielded over Tehran. 

The Trump administration has !ar more clout to do so than is commonly understood. Since the signing 

of the JCPOA (and despite the Obama administration's best efforts to encourage trade normalization 

with Iran), banks and other financial institutions have proven generally timid in reengaging the Islamic 

Republic, fearful of the potential consequences of doing so.:' That caution was rdnrorced by Mr. 

Trump's election in November, and by the widespread view that his administration is prepared to apply 

greater economic pressure than its predecessor against both Tehran and its trading partners. However, 

such hesitance is not a permanent condition, and over time companies and banks can be expected to 

grow bolder in their pursuit of new business oppormnities with the Iranian regime. As a result, the 

new administration needs to move resolutely to enact measures (such as the blacklisting of Iranian 

individuals and entities suspected of illicit activity, and the levying of onerous fines on those doing 

business with them) which send a clear signal that it will not condone a return to "business as usual" 

with the Islamic Republic. As of last week, it appears to have begun this process." 

Perhaps the most promising step that can be taken in this regard is a comprehensive blacklisting of 

Iran's clerical army, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (Septih-e Pasdtirtin-e Enqeltib-e Esldmi, 

!RGC). That idea, floate<l in the early days of the Trump administration, deserves a serious second look 

by both the W'hite House and Congress. This is because the IRGC is an economic powerhouse, in 

control of a sprawling empire of companies and corporate entities within the Islamic Republic. All told, 

the IRGC is believed to command as much as one-third of the country's total economy. 26 As a result, 

a comprehensive designation would have a profound impact, rendering large swathes of the Iranian 

economy (such as its construction and tdecom sectors) radioactive as a matter of trade policy, and 

thereby helping prevent a further normalization of international trade with Iran. Of equal significance, 

~'''~'"'~" •ecce"''-'-''"''-''-'"'''-'""' See also Solomon, --u.S. To Buy V!atcrl,ll Used ln !ran Nudcar Program," Wdl! Streetjournal, Apti! 22, 2016, bi~p;;~! i"'C\''-'-S~''!:~j. 

Pinancid Times, August 26, 201G, b~u_;s_:}.l-'f''].\_->!_{, 

20 U.S. Department of the Treasury. ''Treasury Sanctions Iranian Defense Officials and a China-based Nenvork for 

Su?pMtlng [ran's Ballistic .~·fissile Program," ~~lay 17,2017, httj[JStljwc,\V:tJ•,:<t>lttY.tl"''i£J''-''"'''"-'~rlf'i'·"··r,;k"'"'CI 

2010, 
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American Foreign Policy Council ••• a ban would send a major warning to international flrms and foreign nations now beginning to dip 

their toes back into the Iranian market that, if they continue to do so, they are in danger of running 

afoul of U.S. counterterrorism laws, with potentially disastrous monetary and political consequences. 

Ensuring Compliance 

While the abrogation oftheJCPOA emerged as a major campaign issue during the 2016 election, it is 

increasingly clear that the Trump administration will continue to abide by the terms of the agreement, 

at least for the foreseeable tiJture. There are practical reasons for this; the multilateral nawre of the 

JCPOA means that a U.S. withdrawal from its terms would not automatically trigger its collapse, 

and a meaningful rollback of the deal may not be possible without provoking major trade disputes 

with counties such as China and France-something which the Trump administration. despite 

its conuninnent to a rnore coercive Iran policy, is nonetheless eager to avoid. As a result, the new 

Administration is likely to remain within the conflnes of the JCPOA in the near term, even while it 

attempts to slgnifkantly adapt and strengthen its provisions and penalties. 

There is a great deal that must be done in this regard. During its time in ofllce, the Obama administration 

proved loathe to hold the Iranian regime accountable tor substantive breaches of the accord itselt; or 

for related activities (such as ballistic missile testing) that violated its spirit. The Trump administration 

must take a more active role in tracking Iran's compliance with the terms of the JCPOA, including 

by ensuring the hiring and deployment of additional inspectors to Iran's nuclear facilities, and by 

demanding access from ]ran to additional nuclear facilities not currently being monitored under the 

terms of the deal. The White House should also consider constructing an explicit menu of what 

constirutes a "material breach" oft he JCPOA (and which enumerares the concrete penalties associated 

with such viohtions) as a way of eliminating ambiguities and political disputes that prompted the 

Obama administration to turn a hlind eye to Iranian infractions in the past. 

Constraining Iranian Expansionism 

More than a year after "implementation," there is no shortage of evidence that the benetlts of the 

.JCPOA have enabled a significant strategic expansion on the part of the Iranian regime, with concrete 

negative effects for regional security. For Washington, reinforcing stability in the Middle East will hinge 

on constraining Iran's advances, and implementing policies that can serve to deter or counterbalance 

luture Iranian adventurism. 

One such initiative is the creation of a regional security architecture encornpassing countries in the 

Islamic Republic's immediate periphery. Such a regional partnership would help to expand America's 

relationship with the Gulf States, and transform the GCC into an operational military alliance capable 

of deterring the Iranian regime. Notably, movement in this direction appears to already be underway; 

the President's visit to the Middle East has entailed significant efforts to erect an "Arab NATO" capable 

of serving. in part, as a counterweight against Iran." 

6 
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American Foreign Policy Council ••• 

A bbcklisting of the IRGC could provide benefits in this arena as well. U.S. forces bave labored 

for years under restrictive "rules of engagement" in the Iraqi theater due to worries that battletleld 

contact with Iranian paramilitary elements could result in an uncontrolled escalation of hostilities 

between Washington and Tehran. This has hampered the effectiveness of U.S. counterinsurgency and 

stability operations, and continues to exert a profound effect on the freedom of action that fldd 

commanders believe they possess roday. fn turn, U.S. military officials have been outspoken about 

the destabilizing role being played by Iran in the region and about the need to push hack forcefully 

against it. A bbcklisting of the IRGC would begin that process by providing U.S. commanders with 

greater authority to counter Iranian destabilizing behavior on the ground throughout their area of 

responsibility. 

Rebuilding American Credibility 

Historically, and in spite of its limited ability to aHect internal change, the United States has been 

viewed by ordinary Iranians as a champion of their struggle against the repressive, theocratic Iranian 

state. During its time in oHlce, however, the Obama administration progressively ceded this moral 

high ground. In irs pursuit of accommodation with rhe Iranian regime, the previous administration 

focused less and less upon the plighr and potential of the Iranian people, and more and more on 

ingratiating itself with the repressive government that ruled over them, culminating in the signing of 

the .JCPOA in 2015. 

An important priority for the Trump administration, therefore, must be to reestablish the credibility 

of the United Stares in the minds of the Iranian people. This requires that the White House articulate, 

and then demonstrate, that it is not content with the current political status quo within the Islamic 

Republic. High-protlle political steps, such as a comprehensive blacklisting of the IRGC, could send 

a potent message to Iranian and international audiences alike that the United States is no longer 

prepared to pursue "business as usual" with Iran's ayatollahs. So could official messagine that focuses 

more intently on highlighting endemic corruption within the Iranian regime, the country's repressive 

domestic practices, the Iranian regime's failure to provide broad-based prosperity (despite the material 

benefits of the JCPOA), and the plight of individual political prisoners within the Islamic Republic. 

The goal of such messaging should be strategic: to diminish the credibility and authority of Iran's 

clerical regime, and to increase that of the United States. 

7 
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American Foreign Policy Council +++ 

Ilan Berman 

Senior Vice President, AFPC 

llan Berman is Senior Vice President of the American Foreign 

Policy Council in Washington, DC. An expert on regional security in the Middle Ea>t, Central Asia, and the Russian Federation, he has consulted for both the U.S. Central Intelligence 

Agency and the U.S. Department of Defense, and provided 

assistance on foreign policy and national security issues to a 

range of governmental agencies and congressional offices. He 

has been called one of America's "leading experts on the 1\1 iddle East and lrar{ by CNN. 

Mr. Berman is a member ofthe Associated Faculty at :Vlissouri 

State University's Department of Defense and Strategic Studies. A frequent writer and commentator, he has written for the 

\Vall Street journal, Foreign Affitirs, the New York Times, Foreign Poliry, the Washington Post and USA 

Today, among many other publications. 

Mr. Berman is the editor oF three books- Dismantling Tyranny: Tramitioning Beyond Totalitarian Regimes (Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), co-edited with J. Michael Waller Taking on Tehnm: 

Confronting the Islamic Republic (Rowman & Littlefield, 2007), and Irans Strcttegic Penetmtion 

America (Lexington Books, 201 5), co-edited with Joseph Hurnire- and the author offour others: TehTran~'" L'hallenge to the United States (Rowrnan & Littlefield, 2005), the War: 

Offinsive Against Radical Islam (Rowman & Littlefield, 2009), Implosion: 

wrntrm·1ca (Regnery Publishing, 20 13), and most recently, Irans DMd!y Ambition: 

Questfor Global Power (Encounter Books. 2015). 

AboutAFPC 

For more than three decades, the American Foreign Policy Council (AFPC) has played an important 

role in the U.S. foreign policy debate. Founded in 1982. AfPC is a non-profit organization dedicated to bringing information to those who make or influence the foreign policy of the United States. 

!\FPC is widely recognized as a somce of timely, insightf[JI analysis on issues of foreign policy, and 

works closely with members of Congress, the Executive Branch and the policymaking community. 

It is stafFed by noted specialists in foreign and defense policy, and serves as a valuable resource to 

officials in the highest levels of government. 

WWW.AFI'C.ORG I 509 c ST NE \WASHINGTON, DC I 202.543-1006 
16

Mr. POE. Thank you, Mr. Berman. 

Dr. Takeyh. 

STATEMENT OF RAY TAKEYH, PH.D., HASIB J. SABBAGH SENIOR FELLOW FOR MIDDLE EAST STUDIES, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

Mr. TAKEYH. Thank you. 

I know from previous representations in front of Judge Poe, 5 

minutes means 5 minutes. So I will stay diligently within the timeframe that I am sure you will insist upon. 

Terrorism, the use of political violence, is an enduring aspect of 

the Islamic Republic. The regime’s victims, as was mentioned, span 

the region. But the most vulnerable targets of that state-sponsored 

violence have always been the Iranian people themselves. 

The key actors defining Iran’s regional policies are not its diplomats but its Revolutionary Guard Corp, particularly the famed 

Quds Brigade. For the commander of the Quds Brigade, General 

Soleimani, the struggle to evict America from the region began in 

Iraq, has now moved to Syria. For the hardliners, the Sunni states’ 

attempt to dislodge Bashar Assad is really a means of weakening 

Iran. Thus, the survival or the success of the Assad regime at this 

point is one of the central elements of the Iranian foreign policy. 

The question then becomes what impact the nuclear deal have on 

Iran and its regional surge. The proponents of the agreement at 

one point insisted that whatever windfall there was would be funneled for domestic purposes and Iran’s depleted economy. By their 

telling, Iran had prioritized its malign activities even during the 

times of economic stress. Two years later, we see some of the aspects of those claims cannot be substantiated. 

Iran’s defense budget has gone up by about 50 percent. It used 

to be about 2.7 percent of the GDP. Between now and year 2020, 

it is likely to be 5 percent of the GDP. So it has about doubled. 

Iran’s model for operating in the Middle East today is drawn 

from its experiences in Lebanon in the early 1980s. It was at that 

time that Iran amalgamated various Shia parties into the lethal 

Hezbollah. In essence, Iran created a militia outside the control of 

the weak Lebanese state. In the meantime, Iran sought to manipulate the politics of Lebanon to its advantage by making sure that 

the central government remains weak. 

A decentralized state not in full command of coercive power is a 

model that Iran has used first in Lebanon and now in Iraq and, 

of course, in Syria. 

Since the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, Iran has sought to take 

advantage of the disorder there and extend its influence. The Islamic Republic has trained Shia militias, as was mentioned, that 

are responsive to its orders and has sought to sharpen the sectarian divides in Iraq as a means of dividing that nation against 

itself. The rise of the Islamic State has actually provided Iran an 

opportunity for further inroads in Iraq. Under the auspices of fighting the Islamic State, Iran has further projected its power in that 

nation. So long as Iraq’s trouble continues, Iran can be counted on 

to further exacerbate them. 

Since the beginning of the Syrian civil war, Iranian officials 

maintained that the Assad regime will survive. This assessment 

17

stood in contrast to those Western powers who assure themselves 

that the forward march of history would envelop the Syrian dictator. The Iranian model of operation in Syria, again, is very much 

similar to that of Iraq and, previous to that, Lebanon. 

Once more, Iran deployed to develop militias outside the control 

of the state, deployed a large number of Revolutionary Guards and 

Hezbollah proxies, and, essentially, took command of the ground 

forces. Without Iranian assistance and guidance, Syrians may have 

been spared some of the carnage that has wrecked their country. 

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei today stands as the most successful Persian imperialist in the history of Iran. In the 1970s, at the 

height of his power, the Shah did not enjoy commanding influence 

in Iraq, Lebanon’s confessional politics eluded him, and the Assad 

regime was not a mere subsidiary of Iran, and the Persian Gulf 

States resisted his pretensions. 

Today, Iran has essential control of much of the Iraqi state. It 

is the most important external actor in Syria, and Hezbollah provides it with not just means of manipulating Lebanese politics, but 

also shock troops that can be deployed in various war fronts. 

It is important to appreciate that, actually, Israel remains the 

principal victim of Iranian terrorism. Iran’s hostility toward Israel 

is one of the most enduring and perplexing aspects of its history. 

Iran’s animosity toward Israel can be traced back to the founding 

of its revolution. In the eyes of the founder of the revolution, the 

creation of Israel was the most unforgettable sin. In a perverse 

way, Iran’s opposition to Israel exceeds even its opposition to the 

United States, because it objects to various American acts, not to 

its existence as it does with Israel. 

A regime as dangerous to U.S. interests as Islamic Republic requires, as was mentioned, a comprehensive strategy to counter it. 

This means exploiting all of Iran’s vulnerabilities, increasing the 

cost of its foreign adventures, weakening its economy, supporting 

its domestic discontents. Pursuing this strategy will take time, but, 

eventually, it will put the United States in a position to impose 

terms on Iran. And we should, as was mentioned, put human 

rights at the top of the agenda, not look the other way as Iran’s 

leaders oppress their people. 

And my time has ran out exactly at 5 minutes. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Takeyh follows:]

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The Nuclear Dal Fallout: The Global Threat oflran 

Before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade 

The Committee on Foreign Affairs 

For much of the past three decades, the Islamic Republic's inflammatory rhetoric and aggressive posture concealed a 

measure of strategic loneliness. Iran is, after alL a Persian nation surrounded by Arab states who \vere suspicious of it 

re-volution and its proclaimed objectives. TI1c Gulf nations arrayed themselves behind the American shield. Iraq sustained 

its animosity toward Iran long after the end of its long war_ and the incumbent Sunni republics maint.'lincd a steady 

belligerence. Iran nurtured its lethal Hezbollah protege and aided Palestinian rejectionist groups, but appeared hemmed in 

by the \vall of Arab hostility. All this changed when Iraq vvas reclaimed by the Shias and the Arab Spring shook the 

foundations of the Sunni order 

The ke~ actors defining Iran's regional policy are not its diplomats mingling v.ith their We stem counterparts, but the 

Revolutionaf) Guards, particularly the famed Quds Brigade. For the commander of the Quds Brigade. General Qassim 

Soleimani. the struggle to evict America from the region began in Iraq and has now moved on to Syria. For the hardliners. 

the Smmi states attempting to dislodge Bashir Assad is really a means of\veakening Iran. The survi,ial and success of the 

Assad d)' nast~ is nm\ a central element of Iran's foreign polic~. 

The question then becomes what impact the nuclear did have on Iran and its regional surge? The proponents of the 

agreement insisted that Iran ''muld funnel much of this newfound \vcalth into its depleted economy. By their telling, even 

during economic times. Iran prioritized funding for its malign acti,·ities and thus did not need to steer new money in their 

direction. Two years later, we see the hollm\ness of those claims. Iran "s defense budget has more than doubled since the 

advent of the nuclear deal and its activities in both Iran and Syria have intensified. 

The proponents of the vic\Y that Iran \\'ould not become a more aggressive regional pmv-er as a result of the deal ignored 

how the Middle East has evolved since the Arab awakenings. l11e post-colonial Arab state system that featured the 

dominant nations of Egypt and Iraq is no more. Egypt is too preoccupied \\'ith its intemal squabbles to offer regional 

leadership \v-hile Iraq is a fragmented nation mled by a Shiagovernment ostracized from Sunni Arab councils. Iran has 

embarked on a dramatic ne\Y mission and is seeking to project its power into corners of the Middle East in \Yays that were 

never possible before. This is not the traditional Iranian foreign policy \Vith its sponsorship of terrorism and support for 

rejectionist groups targeting IsraeL imperialism beckons the mullahs but it is also economicall~ burdensome. \Vithout an 

arms control agreement and the financial re,vards it offered-such as sanctions relief the release of entrapped funds 

abroad. and nev.: investments-Iran \YOuld find it difficult to subsidize its imperial surge 

Iran· s model of operating in the Middle East toda~ is drawn from its experience in Lebanon in the 1980s. It v\as at that 

time that Iran amalgamated various Shia parties into the lethal Hezbollah. In essence. Iran created a militia that v .. ·as 

outside the control of the weak Lebanese state. In the meantime. Iran sought to manipulate the politics of Lebanon to its 

advantage by making sure that a strong central government did not emerge in Beirut. A de-centralized state that in full 

command of its coercive power is a model that Iran has used first in Lebanon and now in Iraq and Syria. 

Since the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, Iran has soughtto t.'lke advantage of the disorder there to extend its influence. The 

Islamic Republic has trained Shia militias responsive to its orders and has sought to sharpen the sectarian divides in Iraq 

as a means of dividing that nation against itself. The rise of the Islamic State (ISIS) prm·ided Iran \Vith an opportunity for 

further inroads in Iraq. Under the auspices of fighting the Islamic State. Iran has further projected its po,ver in that hapless 

nation. So long as Iraq's troubles continue. Iran can be counted on to further exacerbate them. The additional funds that 

the JCPOA has provided Iran arc indispensable for its operations there. 
19


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2 

Since the onset of the S~rian civil v .. ·ar. Iranian officials maintained that Assad vvould sunive. TI1is assessments stood in 

stark contrast to that of the \\!'estern pmYers \Yho assured themselves that the fOrward march of history would envelop the 

Syrian despot. l11e Iranian model of operation in Syria \Yas eerily similar to the one they used in Iraq and before than in 

Lebanon. Once more, Iran de\ eloped militias outside state control, deplo~ an increasing large number of its Revolutional! 

Guards and Hezbollah proxies and essentially took command of the ground operations. Assad's war crimes are 

Khamenei's war crimes as \\ell. \Vithout Iranian assistance and guidance. S: ria may have been spared the cam age that 

has \'\Tcckcd that country 

Supreme Leader Ali Kharnenei stands as one of the most successful Persian imperialists in the history of modem Iran. h1 

the 1970s, at the height of his power. the shah did not enjoy the commanding influence in Iraq. Lebanon's factional 

politics continued to elude him. the Assad dynasty was no mere subsidiary of Iran, and the Persian Gulf emirates resisted 

his pretensions. Today, Kharnenei has essential control of much of the Iraqi state. he is the most important external actor 

in Syria, and Hczbollah prm·idcs him \Vith not just a means of manipulating Lebanon· s politics, but also shock troops who 

can be deployed on various v.-ar fronts. In the Gulf, the previous American indifference oft'ered Iran many temptations. 

Iran. Israel and the Instruments o(Terronsm 

It is import..'lnt to appreciate that Israel remains the principal victim of Iranian terrorism Iran· s hostility toward Israel is 

one of the most enduring and perplexing aspects of the Middle East conflict. Since the inception of the Islamic Republic, 

Iran's clerical politicians have persistently denounced Israel and questioned its legitimacy. if not the right to exist. This is 

curious, as Iran has never fought a v.ar v.ith Israel and has no territorial disputes vvith the Jewish state. Indeed. Israel and 

Iran under the shah had established constructive relations. 

Iran· s animosity tmvard Israel can be traced back to the founder of the republic. Ayatollah Ruhollah I<homeini. In his 

e) es. the unforgi' able sin was the creation of a Jewish state in the Middle East. Iran· s antagonism toward Israel exceeded 

even its opposition to the United States. After alL the United States ma)' have been a pemicious imperial pov.er, but it vvas 

America's conduct. not its right to exist, irrespecti,·e of its actual policies and behavior. No peace compact or negotiated 

settlement \vith the Palestinians could ameliorate that essential illegitimacy 

Iran· s \ iew oflsraeL like its \ iew of America. was religious defined. as a struggle between a pristine Islamic civilization 

and a blasphemous Zionist creed. In this conflict betv.een good and e\il, light and dark. it \\US religious obligation to resist 

the profane Jewish entit). The reclaiming of Jerusalem \\as not considered a Palestinian responsibilit) alone, but an 

obligation to be undertaken by the entire Muslim '''orld. Such a conflict \Yould lead not just to the destruction of IsraeL but 

also to a greater Islamic cohesion and solidarity. It was natural. cYcn incYitablc. for the new Islamic regime in Iran to lead 

this crusade 

Iran's position on Israel has gone even beyond the Arab states and mainstream Palestinian organizations. For the past 

three decades, the Arab struggle has implicitly acknowledged the reality of Israel and has sought territorial concessions to 

establish a Palestinian homeland. Both terrorism and diplomacy have been emplo) ed to redra\\ the boundaries. but all 

such schemes appreciated the existence of Israel. l11e Iranian polic) is designed not to readjust territorial demarcations. bit 

to evict the Je\Yish populace from the Middle East. The sacred land of Islam was not to be partitioned to accommodate 

Zionist aspirations. but reclaimed for the Muslim world. 

Like man) regimes in the Middle East, Iran has indulged in its share of historical revisionism. l11e infamous Protocol.c.,· of 

the fJders o_(Zion has been routinely published b) state agencies. \\hile prominent Holocaust deniers are at times oft'ered 

a platfom1 in Iran for spewing their odious vie\',:s. 1l1e Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has eYen gone as far as to claim that 

"'there are documents showing close collaboration of Zionists with Nazi Gennatl)'. and exaggerated numbers relating to 

the Jewish Holocaust \\'ere fabricated to solicit the sympath~ of world public opinion, lay the ground for the occupation of 

Palestine, and justify the atrocities of the Zionists.'· In essence. Khamenei views the Holocaust as an embellished narrative 

to justif)· a Jewish homeland 

A similar!! incendia~ approach has characterized Tehran's attitude toward the ideolog)' of Zionism. While Iran· s clerical 

leaders may have sporadically displayed a benign attitude toward the local Je\Yish community, their condemnation of 

Zionism has been stark and uncompromising. To them. Zionism is a racist, exclusionary ideology· that should be opposed 
20


25556b-3.eps

by all \\ho care about human rights, Iran's propaganda insists that Zionism \\as inflicted on the region b~ force of am1s, 

sust.'lined by bloodshed. and perpetuated by the sinister designs of cynical politicians inclined to achieye power by 

subjugating the indigenous population. l11e complex history of the Zionist movement and its claims and aspirations has 

been caricatured as fie~ sennons and Jerusalem da~ s and conferences calling for the annihilation of Israel replaced a 

rational assessment 

Over the past three decades, Iran has forged intimate ties with leading Palestinian militant groups such as 

Hamas and Islamic Jihad, as well as Lebanon's Hezbollah, which it essentially created. Iran has provided funds 

to these organizations, implored them to attack Israel and celebrated their terrorist operations. The leaders of 

these groups maintain representatives in Iran and have easy access to the theocratic state. No nation has suffered 

more at hands ofT ran then Israel. 

Toward New US' Policy 

l11e Islamic Republic's relentless e-xpansionism stems in part from the belief that its revolution can be consolidated at 

horne only if it is exported abroad. This was alwa~ s. after alL a revolution \vithout borders. Moreover. threats from the 

outside have ah\ays been a convenient wa~ for the Re\·olutionary Guards and other state instruments to seek to justify 

their brutality. Thousands of executions since the revolution testify to the oppressive nature of the regime and to its 

overriding goal of shoring up its rule at home, particularly by eliminating the threat that emanates from its own people 

Toda~, the theocratic state is ruled b~ clerical ideologues who claim to kilO\\ the mind of God. For them, the Islamic 

Republic is not merely a nation-state. it is a combatant in a struggle bet\\een good and eviL at home and abroad-a battle 

\Yagcd for moral redemption and genuine emancipation from the political and cultural tentacles of a profane West The 

mullah's internationalist vision has to hmic an antagonist and the United States and its allies. particularly IsraeL arc it. 

StilL in the 1990s, it looked as if the Islamic Republic would follow the trajectory of other rc\ olutionar~ states and 

gradually dispense with its ideological patrimony. TI1e rise of the reform mm--ement led by enterprising intellectuals \vho 

sought to harmonize religious values \Yith republican norms led to hopes of a different future. The election of Muhanmmd 

Khatami in 1997 was the culmination of efforts to cmmcct the reformers to the larger public. The so-called Tehran Spring 

led to the rise of cio;iil society groups, critical media and a string of electoral victories by leaders committed to genuine 

change. And then can1c the counter-reaction. Under the watchful eye of the Supreme Leader Ali Khamcnci, the 

conservatives struck back. TI1e clerical oyersight bodies negated parliamentary legislation. the judiciary closed reformist 

nc\Yspapcrs and the vigilante groups assassinated key officials and terrorized others. To the detriment of the Islamic 

Republic, the possibility of cYolutionary change through the usc of Iran's own constitutional provisions died. 

TI1e st..'lrting point of any sensible policy is to recognize that the summer of2009 \'.aS a \\atershed moment in the history 

of Iran. As we haye seen_ the presidential election that retumed Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to pO\Yer by rigging the vote 

presented the theocratic state '"'·ith the most consequential crisis of its life-time. The Green Movement that e-xploded on the 

scene \\aS a coalition of disenchanted clerics, restive ~outh, disenfranchised women and impoverished elements of the 

middle class. TI1e regime managed to regain control of the streets through brutal violence against its 0\\n citizens. shO\\ 

trials in \\hich regime loyalists confessed to fant..'lstic crimes. and continued repression. Hovve\er. the essential link 

between the state and society \Vcrc scYcrcd. The Islamic Republic was ncYcr a typical totalitarian state, as its electoral 

procedures and elected institutions provided the public with at least impressions of democratic representation. That 

republican element of the regime provided it with a veneer of legitimac~ -and in 2009 that legitimac~ vanished. No less 

than Khamenei has acknowledged that the moYcmcnt brought the system to the '·edge of the cliff.'' The clerical regime 

lingers on. but a state that relics on a terror apparatus cannot forcYcr stifle the forces of change. 

The task of American diplomac~ is similar to the one that Ronald Reagan faced with the Sm iet Union: not just 

renegotiating a better am1s-control agreement but devising a comprehensive policy that undennines the theocratic regime. 

In this regard, there is nothing as pov;;erful as the presidential bully pulpit. Reagan's denunciations of Communist mlc did 

much to galvanize the opposition and undermine the Soviet empire. Dissidents in jail and others laboring under the Soviet 

system took heart from an American president \\ho championed their cause. Barrack Obama chose the opposite course 
21


25556b-4.eps

and remained silent as protesters in 2009 called on America to support their cause. His administration was one that paid 

scant attention to Iran's human rights abuses 

As it did with Solidarity in Poland. the United States should find a way of establishing ties \\ith forces of opposition 

v\ithin Iran. Given the Islamic Republic· s cruelty and corruption. the opposition spans the entire social spectnnn. The 

Iranians have gi,.en up not just on the Islamic Republic. but even on religious observance. as mosques go empt~ during 

most Shia commemorations. Tiucc decades of theocratic rule has transfonncd Iran into one of the most secular nations in 

the world. The middle class and the \Vorking poor arc equally hard pressed by the regime's incompetence and corruption 

E,,en the senior a)atollahs are beginning to realize the toll that has taken on Shia Islam b~ its entanglement with politics. 

Americas has read) allies in Iran and must make an effort to empower those v\110 share its \·alues. 

Economic sanctions arc a critical aspect of any policy of pressuring the Islamic Republic. The experience of the past fc\Y 

years has shown that the United States has a real capacity to shrink Iran's economy and bring it to the brink of collapse. 

TI1e fev,,er resources the regime has at its disposaL the less capable it is of sust.:1ining a cadre \vhose loyalty is purchased 

TI1c guardians of the revolution arc well em-arc of their unreliability of their coercive services: the government had 

difficulty in repressing the Green Movement or mobilizing counter-demonstrations in the summer of 2009. Designating 

the RcYolutionary Guards as a terrorist organization and imposing financial sanctions could go a long \Yay tmvard 

cripphng Iran's econom). Once depri,.ed ofmone). the mullahs will find it difficult to fund the patronage networks that 

are essential to their rule and their imperial ventures. 

B) generating such pressures. it is hoped that the Islan1ic Republic begins negotiating with the opposition elements. This 

v\ill involve releasing political prisoners. allowing those barred from public service to stand as candidates for parliament, 

and ceasing its attacks on civil society groups such as trade unions and professional syndicates. TI1e rulers of Iran v-.·ill 

only embark on such acti,·itics if they arc subject to sustained intcmational pressure and condemnation. Iran should be 

held as accountable for its dismal human rights record, as its nuclear infractions or support for terrorism 

For the recalcitrant mullahs to yield to international nonns, all the walls around them have to close in. So as it stresses 

Iran· s economy and divides its society. the United States should also push back against its influence in the Middle East 

By contesting Iran's gains, W ashinh,rton can impose additional costs on the regime and contribute to regional stability 

4 

Iran· s leaders bcliC\'c that the \italit)' of their rc\olution mandates its export. And it is that export that must be jeopardized 

as means of undermining the revolution. 

An essential insight of any such policy is to dispense with the false notion that Iran and America have a common enemy 

in the Islamic State (ISIS) or other Sunni terrorist organizations. Beneath Iran's expressions of concem about the rise of 

ISIS is a more C)'nical stratcg). Iran toda~ is using ISIS- asccndance in the Middle East to consolidate its pm\CL The 

theocracy is now the key to keeping both Iraqi Shias and Almvite Bashar al-Assad"s regime standing against \v-ell-anned 

and tenacious Sunni Jihadists. In those battles, Iran will do just enough to make sure the Sunnis don't conquer the Shia 

portions oflraq and Assad's enclave in Syria, but no more. Mean\v-hilc, in ISIS' wake. Tehran \vill strengthen its own 

Shia militias. It is important to stress the fact that Sunni radicalism is the necessary b)'-product of Iran's Shia chauvinism. 

Destroying the Islamic St.'lte requires diminishing the tides of Sunni militanc)'. which in tum necessit.'ltes tempering Iran's 

regional ambitions 

The best arena in \\hich to achie\-e the objective of pushing back on Iran is in the Persian Gulf region. The Gulf 

sheikdoms, led by Saudi Arabia, are already locked into a region-wide rivalry v-.·ith Iran. The Sunni states have taken it 

upon themselves to contest Iran's gains in the Gulf and the Levant. Washington should not only buttress these efforts but 

press all Arab states to embark on a serious attempt to lessen their commercial and diplomatic tics to Tehran. The price of 

American guardianship is for Sunni Arab states to do their part in resisting the rising Shia power of Iran. 

Getting the Gulf states to agree to take common action has ah\ays been difficult. The United States should help the Gulf 

states no only as they battle Iranian proxies in Syria, Iraq andY cmen. but also as they deal with a range of other 

challenges. These include protecting thcmsclYcs against Iran· s efforts to undcm1inc their intcmal security. defending their 

economic infrastructure (such as oil and gas platfonns, \\ater-desalinization plants, and tourist sites), and pre,,enting Iran 

from interdicting their energy exports along key transit routes. 
22


25556b-5.eps

To confront Iran. the Gulf states will need capabilities commensurate with the challenge. In particular. the United States 

should consider supplying them \vith systems that defend against guided rockets and mort.'lrs, such as the Centurion c-ram. 

And in the long-run, the Gulf states have the financial resources, even at reduced oil prices, to invest in the next 

generation of missile defense technologies, such as directed-energ~ v.eapons, which would diminish Iran's ability to 

attack them. 

The countries in the region '''ith fom1idablc special-forces capabilities. such as Jordan and the United Arab Emirates. 

should usc that ad\·antagc to help some of the more n.Jincrablc countries, such as Bahrain. deal \vith their internal security 

problems-arrangements that \Vashington could help broker. Iran's a(h-ersaries could e\·en de\elop a subset of special 

forces capable of operating inside Iran to exploit the grievances of various ethnic minorities. The goal ,,.·ould be to make 

Iran think twice about its campaign of regional subversion by demonstrating that t\vo can play that game. 

The Gulf states need to further reduce Iran's ability to chock off oil exports by blocking the Strait ofHonnuz. Although 

they have already built pipelines to bypass the strait. they should also take steps to increase those pipelines capacity. The 

Gulf states should invest in capabilities such as air-to-air missiles to take do\Yn Iran ·s aircraft and land-attack cruise 

missiles to destroy its anti-ship cmise missiles. And they should augment that effort \vith the lmdersea capabilities needed 

for a campaign against Iran· s surface naval assets. including its many small boats. 

Eyen in a disorderly Middle East. there are opportunities to forge ne\Y constructive alliances. The enmity that Saudi 

Arabia and Israel share to\Yard Iran should be the basis for bringing these t\Yo countries closer together. Instead of 

lecturing the Saudis to share the Middle East with Iran and hectoring Israelis about settlements, the United Should focus 

on imaginatiye wa~ s of institutionalizing the nascent cooperation that is already taking place between Riyadh and 

Jerusalem. The U.S. should press both countries to move beyond intelligence sharing and perhaps force complementar~ 

trade tics. with Saudi oil exchanged for Israeli technological products. History rarely offers opportunities to realign the 

politics of the Middle East: a truculent Iran has presented this chance 

Another alliance that needs refurbishing after years of neglect and rancor. is the US-Israeli relationship. One of the most 

spurious yet pervasive arguments has been that America's tics with Israel damages its standing in the Middle East To be 

effective in the Middle East. it is claimed. W ashinf:,rton should put some distance bct\vccn itself and the only democracy in 

the region. An~ stratcg~ of pushing back on Iran has to hm c Israel as one of its core clements. 1l1c fact is that the lslan1ic 

Republic respects Israeli power and fears its integration in the Middle East. An Israel closel~ tied to the United States 

enhances our deterrent pm\er. And an Israel that is mending fences with Sunni Arab states on I~ empm\ers the anti-Iran 

alliance and further isolates the theocracy in the region. America's task should not be to distant itself from Israel but to 

bring all clements of its anti-Iran coalition together 

Although today Iraq seems like a protectorate of Iran, this is a predicament that most Iraqi leaders want to escape. Iraq 

\Yas once the scat of Arab civilization and the center of the region's politics. 1l1c Shia leaders inlraq take Iranian advice 

and money for the simple reason that they arc locked out of Sunni Arab councils and abandoned by the American 

superpower. Iraqis understand that Iran has exercised a pemicious influence in their countr~. further accentuating its 

sect..'lrian divides as a means of ensuring Iranian influence. Iraq cannot be '"hole and free so long as Iran intetferes in its 

affairs. A commitment by the United States to once more rehabilitate Iraqi army and bureaucracy can go a long \Yay 

toward diminishing its tics to Tehran. No Iraqi Arab wants to be subordinate to imperious Shia Persians. Once Iraq tCcs 

itself oflranian dominance. it may ~et find a path back to the Arab \\Orld and once more serve as a barrier to Iranian 

power. 

At a practicallc,iel. Washinf:,rton should also push Baghdad to govem more inclusively. so that the central govcrmncnt is 

seen as benefiting Sunnis and Kurds. and just the Shias. It should make an outreach to the Sunni tribes on a scale 

equi\-alent to what took place during the 2007 surge of U.S. troops. And it should ramp up its milit:a.0 assistance to Kurds 

and the Sunni tribal forces. intensit~ the air campaign against ISIS in both Iraq and Syria and embed U.S. personnel in the 

Iraqi military at lower levels than it currently docs. A heightened U.S. presence in Iraq need not entail a massi\;e combat 

force there, but it would mean a larger troop presence and thus a greater risk of casualties. Again. the price for greater 

U.S. im·olvement should be a commitment on the part of local actors to press back against Tehran and its enablers 
23


25556b-6.eps

TI1e traged~ of Syria is that as the Obama administration stood aloof and preoccupied itself v .. ·ith useless intemational 

summits, Iran and Russia possibly succeeded in saving the Assad Dynasty. TI1e Syrian army_ buttressed by Iran's 

Revolutionary Guards, Hezbollah terrorists, and Russian airpower. is poised to control most of the population centers 

6 

This hardly ends the ci,.il war. but the attempt to unseat Iran's client in Damascus will take considerable effort and 

commitment by the United States and its Sunni alhes. For both strategic and humanitarian reasons, we should embrace 

this task. Pushing back on Iran means harassing its Syrian proxy. At the \-ery least. as the opposition strengthens, Iran will 

have to face the dilemma of sinking more resources and men into a quagmire or cutting its losses. as the Soviet Union \Vas 

forced to do in Afghanistan 

As regime as dangerous to U.S. interest as the Islamic Republic requires a comprehensive strategy to counter it This 

means exploiting all of Iran's \ulncrabilities; increasing the costs of its foreign adventures. weakening its economy, and 

supporting its domestic discontents. Pursuing that strategy \Vill take time, but eventually. it will put the United States in a 

position to impose tenus on Iran. \Ve should not settle for an anus control agreement that paves the way for an Iranian 

bomb. but a restrictive accord that ends its nuclear \Yeapons aspirations. We should seek to compel Iran to cease its 

regional subyersion. not create po\Yer vacuums that encourage it. And \Ye should move human rights up the agenda, not 

look the other way as Iran's leaders oppress their people. 

Some in Washington beheve that Iran problem is ofsecondat;. import..1nce to the United States compared to violent 

Jihadists. For all their achievements. those radical movements do not yet possess the resources and capabilities of a large, 

sophisticated state. It must be noted that the Iranian regime \Yas the original Islamic revolutionary state. Its successes 

inspired a vvaye of radicals across the Middle East At its most basic le\el, the confrontation between the United States 

and Iran is a conflict bet\\een the world. s sole superpower and a second-rate autocracy. \Vashington does not need to 

settle for hopes that theocrats with no interest in rela:xing their grip will somehmv become moderates. A determined polic~ 

of pressure would speed the day ·when the Iranian people replace a regime that has made their lives miserable. And in the 

interim. it would reduce the threat of a triumphant regime posed to the Middle East and the world be~ ond 

In the end, the nuclear agreement offered Iran all that it ,,.·anted. TI1e accord conceded a vast enrichment capabihty. as well 

as accepting both a heavy v1ater plant and a well-fortified underground enrichment facility· that the United States once 

vowed to shutter. It penuitted an elaborate research and deYclopment program while relying on an inspection regime that 

falls short of the indispensable "'anytime, anywhere'· access. In the meantime, the sanctions architecture is diminished. and 

the notion of ever --snapping back'' sanctions into place once the) are lifted is delusional And the financial di,.idends of 

the agreement hm-e once more re\· i\·ed Iran· s imperialist dreams in the Middle East. 
24

Mr. POE. Dr. Byman. 

STATEMENT OF DANIEL L. BYMAN, PH.D., SENIOR FELLOW, 

CENTER FOR MIDDLE EAST POLICY, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION 

Mr. BYMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will try to emulate Dr. 

Takeyh. 

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Keating, members of this subcommittee, 

thank you very much for this opportunity to testify. 

Iran’s terrorism and destabilization efforts are primarily a threat 

to U.S. interests and U.S. allies in the Middle East. Support for 

militant and terrorist groups in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and elsewhere 

enable Tehran to show up key allies like the Syrian regime, Bashar 

al-Assad. It also gives Iran leverage with regional rivals like Saudi 

Arabia. And ties to militant groups strengthen pro-Iran voices in 

the region, increasing Iran’s influence in some of the capitals in the 

region, but also in some of the more remote hinterlands. Iran believes that support for militants pays policy dividends. 

The Assad regime, once teetering, is now ascendant or at least 

in a stronger position. Iran’s support to various groups in Iraq have 

given Tehran influence at both the local and national level. And 

Hezbollah has proven a loyal ally that has helped Iran project its 

influence in Lebanon and in neighboring states and against Israel. 

Iran does not appear to be actively targeting the U.S. homeland 

with terrorism, but its capacity remains latent. Tehran uses its 

ability to strike U.S. assets outside war zones to deter the United 

States and as a contingency should the United States attack Iran. 

Iran spends billions of dollars on supporting its proxies and deploying its own military forces. This is a huge sum for a country 

with significant economic problems and a limited military budget. 

In addition, the nuclear deal raised expectations of economic improvements among the Iranian people, and spending more on militants abroad makes it harder for the regime to satisfy these demands at home. 

For the Trump administration to better counter Iranian influence 

in the Middle East, it should seize the opportunity to reset U.S. relations with key regional allies. Many Middle Eastern allies had 

lost faith in the Obama administration, and several, notably Israel 

and Saudi Arabia, are going to elaborate lengths to ignore the 

missteps and often contradictory behavior of the Trump administration in hopes of closer cooperation. Additional pressure on entities like the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps would help send 

the right message to allies and to Iran. Washington should also 

highlight the cost of Iran’s adventurism to ordinary Iranians to 

raise domestic awareness and discontent with the regime’s foreign 

policy. 

The United States should step up efforts to build a credible and 

modern Syrian opposition to put additional pressure on Iran’s Syrian ally. And in Yemen, Washington should support negotiations to 

end the war, as the current Saudi approach is giving both Iran and 

the al-Qaeda affiliate in Yemen an opportunity to expand their influence. 

At the same time, the Trump administration must remember 

that Iran can push back. The 2015 nuclear deal, for all its flaws, 

25

remains better than any current plausible alternative, and pulling 

out of the agreement would be a mistake. In addition, Iran has leverage and many vulnerabilities to exploit, given its role in fighting 

the Islamic State and the exposure of U.S. troops in Iraq and Syria 

to Iranian-directed violence. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you, again, for this opportunity to testify. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Byman follows:]

26


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Nuclear Deal Fallout: The Global Threat of Iran 

Prepared Testimony of Daniel Eyman 

Professor, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University 

Senior Fellow, Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution 

House Committee on Foreign Affairs 

Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade 

May 24,2017 

Chairman Poe, Ranking Member Keating, members of this distinguished 

subcommittee, and subcommittee staff, thank you for the opportunity to testify. 

Relationships with terrorist and militant groups are integral to Iran's foreign 

policy. The clerical regime in Tehran sponsors a range of organizations in the Middle 

East and maintains the capacity to conduct international terrorism outside the region. 

Iran's terrorism and destabilization efforts are primarily a threat to U.S. interests and 

allies in the Middle East: Tehran's activities worsen civil wars and contribute to the 

destabilization of the region. Iran does not appear to be actively targeting the U.S. 

homeland with terrorism, but its capacity remains latent. Tehran uses its ability to strike 

U.S. assets outside war zones to deter the United States and as a contingency should the 

United States attack Iran. 

Support for militant and terrorist groups in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and elsewhere 

benefits Iran in several ways. It enables Tehran to shore up key allies like the Syrian 

regime ofBashar al-Asad. It also gives Iran leverage against regional rivals like Saudi 

Arabia. Ties to militant groups strengthen pro-Iran voices in the region, increasing Iran's 

influence in some capitals and in the more remote hinterlands of several countries. 

Finally, the threat of Iranian terrorism against otherwise stable countries is a factor these 

countries must consider if they choose to confront Tehran. 

For the Trump administration to better counter Iranian influence in the Middle 

East, it should seize the opportunity to reset U.S. relations with key regional allies. Many 

Middle Eastern allies had lost faith in the Obama administration and several, notably 

Israel and Saudi Arabia, are going to elaborate lengths to ignore the missteps and often 

contradictory behavior of the Trump administration in the hopes of closer cooperation. 

Additional pressure on entities like the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps would help 

send the right message to allies and to Iran. Washington should also highlight the costs of 

Iran's adventurism to ordinary Iranians to raise domestic awareness o( and discontent 
27


25556c-2.eps

with, the regime's foreign policy. The United States should step up its etJorts to build a 

credible and moderate Syrian opposition, putting additional pressure on Iran's Syrian 

ally. In Yemen, Washington should support negotiations to end the war as the current 

Saudi approach is giving both Iran and the AI Qaeda affiliate in Yemen opportunities to 

expand their influence. 

At the same time, the Trump administration must remember the limits of U.S. 

power and Iran's ability to push back. The 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 

(JCPOA), for all its flaws, remains better than any current plausible alternatives, and 

pulling out of the agreement would be a mistake. In general, Iran's use of militant groups 

is well-entrenched: a successful policy would reduce the scope and scale of Iranian 

support but not end it In addition, Iran has leverage and many vulnerabilities to exploit 

given its role in fighting the Islamic State and the exposure of US troops in Iraq and 

Syria to Iranian-directed violence. 

My statement first details Iran's motivations for supporting militant and terrorist 

groups, with an emphasis on Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. I then discuss the threat to the 

United States, both directly and indirectly. I argue that Iran's overall stance toward 

militant groups is not likely to change in the near-tenn. I conclude by offering policy 

recommendations for the Trump administration.' 

Iran's Motivations for Supporting Terrorist and Militant Groups 

Iran has supported terrorist and militant groups in the Islamic world since the 

1979 revolution. In his 2016 testimony, Director ofNationalintelligence (DNI) James 

Clapper warned: "Iran-the foremost state sponsor of terrorism-continues to exert its 

influence in regional crises in the Middle East through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard 

Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF), its terrorist partner Lebanese Hizballah, and proxy 

groups"- an assessment that has stayed roughly constant for many years 2 

Iran has long sought to "try hard to export our revolution to the world," in the 

words of Ayatollah Khomeini, the clerical regime's dominant revolutionary leader3 This 

goal is embedded in Iran's constitution and in the missions of organizations such as the 

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), a military and paramilitary organization that 

oversees Iran's relationships with many substate groups. 

Revolutionary ideology, however, has long taken a backseat to more strategic 

goals. In the decades since the I 979 revolution, Iran has used terrorism and support for 

militant groups to undermine and bleed rivals, intimidate the Gulf states and other 

1 This testimony dra\vs in part on t\VO of my books: Dead~v Conn(;'cfions: Slates Lhal ,Sponsor Terrorism 

(Cambndge: Cambndge University Press, 2005) and A Htgh Pnce: The Tnumphs and Fmlures oflsraell 

Counterterrorism (Chford: Oxford University Press, 20 I 1 ). Al~o rch:vanl to my tc~timony and to thi~ 

hearing are my articles, ''Tran, Tenotism, and \Veapons of Mass Destruction," ,)'tudies in Cm?flict and 

Terrorism 31, no. 3 (2008): 169-U-n; ··The Lebanese llizballah and Israeli Counterterrorism," Studies m 

Conflict and Terrorism 34, no. 12 (2011) 917-941; and Daniel Hyman and lcl!bl Saab, "HcLbollah 

HesitatesT' T'oreign Affairs. January 2 [. 20 [ 5, https://w\V\v.foreignaffair~.com/articles/israel/20 [ 5-01-

21/hezbollah-hesitates. 

2 James Clnpper, Worldwide Threul Assessment (~fihe U.5{ lnLelligence Communii_v: S'tutemeni./(Jr the 

Record fOr the ,)'enate Armed Services Committee (Febmary 9, 2016): 6, https://w\VW.m1nedservices. senate.govlimo/media/doc/Clapper_ 02-09- I 6.pdf. 1 As quoted in A.noushiraYan Ehteshami. After Khomeini: The Iranian Second Republic (Ne\Y York: 

Routledge. 1995), 131. 

2 
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25556c-3.eps

neighbors, project power to make itself a player in the Israeli-Palestinian dispute and 

other arenas, disrupt peace negotiations that might isolate Iran and benefit Israel, and 

deter enemies, including the United States, that might otherwise use force against it. Iran 

has also sponsored terrorist attacks to take vengeance on countries that have supported its 

enemies, hosted its dissidents, or killed its operatives. 

Finally, as a relatively weak state with hostile neighbors, Iran maintains ties to 

violent groups for contingencies, strengthening the relationship as need be depending on 

changing circumstances. Given Iran's considerable success in spreading its influence in 

the Middle East and hostility to the United States and its allies, many observers often 

overrate its power. Iran's conventional military is weak, and its economy, while 

beginning to improve, remains in poor shape. Ties to terrorist and militant groups is a 

relatively cheap way for Iran to offset its weaknesses. 

Because Iran works through terrorist and militant groups, it gains a degree of 

deniability for some of its actions. This deniability, however, is better characterized as 

willing disbelief on the part of many countries rather than true uncertainty. If a group like 

the Lebanese Hizballah carries out an attack, observers may debate whether Iran gave the 

order. However, the broader Iranian policy that facilitates and supports such attacks is 

rarely in question. The depth of Iran's ties, the shared goals between Iran and many 

proxies, the clerical regime's long history of association with violent groups, and the fact 

that many past instances of terrorism showed involvement of individuals at or near the 

top of Iran's hierarchy should lead observers to err on the side of Iranian responsibility. 

Current Iranian Activities: A Brief Review 

Tehran's closest militant ally is the Lebanese Hizballah, perhaps the most 

capable terrorist group in the world. Iran helped create Hizballah in the early I 980s, and 

in subsequent decades has armed, trained, and otherwise nurtured it. This assistance is 

massive: Iran regularly gave Hizballah over $100 million a year, and in many years the 

figure is significantly higher. Iran's military aid includes relatively advanced weaponry, 

such as anti-tank and anti-ship cruise missiles, as well as thousands of rockets and 

artillery systems. Hizballah has emerged as a key bulwark of the Syrian regime, and 

Hizballah operatives work with Iran globally to prepare and conduct terrorist attacks 4 

Tehran has long worked with Palestinian groups. Relations are especially close 

to Palestine Islamic Jihad, though these ties discredited the group among many 

Palestinians. Tehran has also had extensive ties to Hamas at different times in the group's 

history, though their fallout over the Syrian and Yemeni civil wars lead to a decline in 

funding and military aid and frayed, but did not end, relations in general. In 2016, 

however, the pragmatic Ham as again resumed its public praise for Iran, in part because 

the coup in Egypt deprived Ham as of a key ally and because by then revolution in Syria 

looked less likely5 Iran, unlike other states, was willing to offer Hamas serious weaponry 

as well as funding. 

4 For a revie\v of IIizballah 's intemational agenda, see Matthe\:v LeYitt, Hczbollah: The Global Footprint of 

T.ehanon 's Pariy (~[Cod (Vi ashington, DC CJeorgetnwn Universrty Press, 201 J). 

-; IIazem Balousha, "'Vlhy llamas Resumed Relations \Yith Iran," June 29, 2016. Al-Afonitor, http:I/\V\V\v.almonitor.com/pulse/originals/20 16/06/ gaLa -h.:m1as-resume-rdutions-iran html. 

3 
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25556c-4.eps

In Iraq, Iran has played an influential role since the toppling of Saddam 

Hussein's regime in 2003. Iran has close ties to the Haider al-Abadi government in 

Baghdad, but its goals differ from those of its Iraqi partners. Iran wants a state that is 

weak and vulnerable to its influence, while Iraqi leaders seek a strong regime and 

country. In addition to relations with the Abadi administration, Iran maintains influence 

by supporting a host of militant groups, particularly within the Hashd al-Shaabi (or 

Popular Mobilization Forces), an umbrella militia organization that is playing a leading 

role in pushing the Islamic State out oflraq 6 Many preexisting Shi' a militias supported 

(and even created) by Iran, such as the Badr Organization, Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, and 

Kata'ib Hizballah, joined the Hashd al-Shaabi, thus gaining greater popular legitimacy, 

combat experience, and state recognition. Iran gives these groups, which number perhaps 

100,000 in total, money, arms, training, and other forms of assistance. Through these ties, 

Iran exercises influence is both at the national level in Iraq and at the local level. 

In Syria, Tehran is the chief patron of the regime of Bashar al-Asad, and without 

Iran's help it is likely the regime would have fallen by now. Iran has long seen the Syrian 

regime as a vital ally- it is Tehran's only true state ally in the Arab world, and perhaps 

even in the entire world. To save the Syrian regime, Iran has deployed several thousand 

IRGC and regular army forces, 7 and Iran also commands another 25,000 or so foreign 

Shi'a fighters from Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, and Pakistan8 Regime forces number 

perhaps 250,000 in total, counting both regular and irregular forces, so Iranian-supported 

foreigners represent at least I 0 percent of the total and an even larger percentage of the 

forces on which the regime can truly rely 9 

Iran anns, trains, and funds these foreign fighters. Quasi-government foundations 

in Iran also provide financial support for the wounded and the families of the slain. In 

Syria, Iranian officers often command these fighters (as they also do for many Syrian 

groups), and Iran works with Syria to provide logistical support. 10 The foreign fighters 

have played a role in almost every aspect of combat, helping guard key areas, storm 

cities, and shore up Syrian regular army forces. 

Hizballah in particular has played critical roles in battles for Qusayr, Damascus, 

Aleppo, and other cities, bolstering Syrian government forces and providing key shock 

r; Priyanka Boghani, "'Iraq· s Shia Militias: The Double-Edged s-vwrd against ISIS,'. Frontline, March 21, 

20 [ 7, http: //vv-\\'"\V .pbs. org/\vghh/fmntl inc/ artie lc!iraq s-shia -mi liti as-thc-doub lc-cdgcd -s\vord -against-isis/ . 

., See Paul Ducal a, ··Iran· s Ne\v V.lay of \"lar in Syria,'· Institute for the Stuc~v C?(War, february 2017, 

http./ /w '"' w. understundmgw ar org/sites/ defaul Llfiles/ln:m%20Ne\v%20 W ay%20o1%20W <Jr%20in%20Syria 

_FRR%21l21ll7.pdr. 

8 Parzin Nadimi, '·Iran's Afghan and Pakistan Proxies: In Syria and Beyond?'. Washington In.stituf(;', August 

22, 2016, http: //\V\VW. w.nshmgtoninsti tute. org/policy -.nn.n1ysis/view !irans-afgh.nn-.nnd -p.nkist.nni -proxies-insyria-and-h~.:yond: Hashmatallah Moshh. "Tran ·forClf:.'l1lcgion' kanson Afghan Shia in Syria V'lar, .. . 11 

Jaze(;'ra, January 22, 2016, http·//vnvv.' aljazeera com/ne\vs/20 16/0 1/iran-foreign-legion-leans-afghan-~hiasyri.n-\vm·-160 l22130355206.html. N.ndimi gives the figure of 14,000 .Afghan forces and 5,000 Pakistani 

forces, whc-re<Js Moslih gives thL: llgurL: of 20,000. For thL: Afghan fighte-rs, thL: numbers mclude significant 

numbers of Afghan refugees \vhose famihes live in Tratl. See also: Cody Roche, "Assad Regime Mihtias 

and Shi'ite Jihadis in the Syrian C'iYil \Var, .. Bellingcat, November 30,2016, 

https: I IY\'W\V. bell ingcat.com /news/mena/20 I h/1 1/30/ as sad-regime-militias-and -shii te-ji hadi s-in -the-syrinncivil-\:var/; Phillip Smyth, The ,Shiite Jihad in /)'yria. (\Vashington Institute, Febmary 2015): 41, 

https:/IY\'W\V.\vashingtoninstitute.org/uplonds!Documents/pubs/Policyf ocus I 38 _ Smyth-2. pdf. 

'}Roche, '·Assad Regime Militias and Shi' ite Jihadis in the Syrian CiYil \Var." 

Iu Nadimi, .. lnm 's Afghan and Pakistan Proxies ... 

4 
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troops when necessary." The intervention has come at a high cost for Hizballah-an 

estimated 1,500-2,000 dead and many thousands more wounded, which are significant 

numbers for the relatively small group. 12 The Syria contlict has also forced Hizballah to 

devote less attention and resources to its traditional adversary, Israel. In addition, the 

contlict is exhausting for the Lebanese Shi' a and may make Hizballah more cautious in 

the future. However, as much as the war has been a serious strain on the organization and 

its personnel, it has also provided valuable combat experience, greater access to weapons 

and technology, and, through Russia, an education in conventional maneuver warfare. 13 

In addition to giving the Syrian regime more combat power, using proxies from 

Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan to fight in Syria will have the long-tenn impact of 

increasing Iran's intluence in these countries in years to come. When these fighters 

return, they will have organizational and personal ties to Iranian leaders. In addition, their 

increased military power will make them more important local actors, helping their 

communities but also Iran. 

In Yemen, Iran provides small arms to Houthi forces, and the use of anti-ship 

cruise missiles against U.S. and Emirati warships suggests greater Iranian investment as 

well as technical training and assistance. However, there is little publically available 

evidence of any significant personnel presence." In contrast to Iran's presence in Iraq 

and Syria, Yemen is not a strategic priority for Tehran, and it is probably using its 

support for the Houthis as a way to gain leverage against the UAE and Saudi Arabia, 

drain their attention (and coffers), and counter what it perceives as the Gulf states' 

aggressive stance against it. 

Because Iran's approach is more strategic than ideological, it is willing to work 

tactically with groups like AI Qaeda, even though mutual mistrust limits cooperation. 

Iran has at times allowed Sunni jihadists to transit Iran and given Al Qaeda operatives a 

de facto safe haven, albeit one that Al Qaeda has contended is restrictive." 

Iran's partnering with various Shi'a and minority groups in the Middle East has 

worsened the sectarian climate, made existing civil wars bloodier, and contributed to a 

back and forth with Saudi Arabia and other Sunni states that further ratchets up regional 

tension. For Sunni states, Iran's support to militant groups is proof that the clerical 

regime is bent on spreading its revolution and that it supports subversive activities in their 

own countries. Iran, however, sees itself as an "Islamic" actor, not a Shi 'a power, and 

often works with Shi' a groups by default because few Sunni groups are willing to ally 

with it- an approach that increases its isolation from the Sunni powers. 

11 Mona Almni, ''Hezbollah Embedded in Syria," Atlantic Council, March 2. 2017. 

http://\v\nv.athmticcouncil.org/blogs/syriasource/hezbollah-is-embedded-in-syria. 

~ Mona AI ami, "Aflcr Ah:ppo vi dory, \vhaC s nc:--1 for Hc:;.hollahT .11-Afonitor, .Tamtary 24. 2017. 

http·//v..r\nv al-monitnr com/pulse/origina\s/20 1710 I Jhezbollah-~yna-aleppo-victory -role-lebanon html 11 Muni Katz and Nadav Pollak, "llezbollalf s Russian Military bducation m Syria," rJ ·ashington institute, 

December 24, 2015, http://w\" w. \-\ <JshingloninstitLllc.org/policy -<Jnaly sis/vicw/hcLbollahs-russwn-milil<Jl}'-

education-in-svria. 

14 Sam LaGr01;e_ "USS Mason F1red 3 Missiles to Defend from Yemen Cruse Missile Attack;- cr::c,:vi .Neu·s, 

October II, 2016, http:-.://ne\vs.usni.org/20 16/10/l 1/uss-mason-fired-J-missiles-to-defend-from-yemencruise-missiles-attack. 

15 /\1 Qaeda impre:-.sions of the relationship with Iran can be found in Nelly T.ahoud et al., "Letters from 

Abbottabad: Bin Ladin Sidelined?'. Combating Terrorism Center at West Point May 3. 2012, 

http :1 /w \" w .etc. usma. edu/postslld l ers-froma b bolla bad -bm-ludin-siddined. 

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Most ofiran's e±Iorts against Israel involve aiding proxies such as Hizballah or 

assisting groups like Hamas to fight Israel. The killing of Iranian scientists before the 

JCPOA, which Tehran blamed on Israel, and Israel's killing of key operatives also 

fostered a desire for revenge, which Iran has attempted to take through terrorist attacks. 

The Implications of Iran's Actions for the United States 

Iran's use of extra-regional terrorism directly against the United States appears to 

have declined since negotiations over Iran's nuclear program began in earnest. Iran has 

not repeated any plot similar to the 2011 plot on the Saudi ambassador to the United 

States. DNI Clapper's public testimony in 2016 stressed the danger Iran's terrorism posed 

to U.S. allies and interests, not the U.S homeland. 

However, Iran probably has at least some capacity to use terrorism to strike the 

U.S. homeland and almost certainly has the ability to strike U.S. assets around the world. 

Iranian leaders probably fear any strike would create a dangerous escalation with the 

United States. Nevertheless, they want to maintain the capacity as a possible deterrent to 

increases in U.S. pressure and especially direct U.S. military action against Tehran. 

A military strike by Israel or the United States on Iran would probably prompt a 

more massive terrorism response. Tehran backs terrorist groups in part to keep its options 

open: after a U.S. strike, it would call in its chits. Iran would probably attempt terrorist 

attacks around the world, using its own operatives, the Lebanese Hizballah, and other 

groups. Tehran would also step up militant activity against U.S. forces in Afghanistan, 

Syria, and Iraq, using its proxies and perhaps its own paramilitary forces to conduct 

attacks. The scope and scale of the Iranian response would depend on the level of 

casualties from the initial attack against it as well as the political circumstances of the 

regime in Tehran (and those of strong groups like Hizballah) at the time the attack 

occurred. 

Iran's support for the Iraqi government and other forces fighting against the 

Islamic State adds a further degree of complexity to U.S. efforts to diminish Iran's 

influence. Iran-backed forces in Iraq have proven effective, often far more so than the 

Iraqi government. Although U.S. officials contend that there is no formal cooperation 

between U.S. forces and the IRGC or Hizballah, the United States does coordinate with 

the Lebanese government and especially the Iraqi government- and both of these 

coordinate with Iran and have militaries and security forces that Iranian intelligence has 

probably penetrated extensively. So de facto coordination, or at least deconfliction of 

operations, is likely occurring. 

Successes against the Islamic State in the last two years are posing additional 

challenges regarding the Iranian role. Many Shi 'a militias claim they will resist any 

lasting U.S. presence in lraq. 16 This would represent a serious security challenge as the 

Iraqi Security Forces cannot be expected, either militarily or politically, to effectively 

protect U.S. forces or defeat remnants of the Islamic State without U.S. assistance. 

If the United States targets IRGC forces in Syria or that of its proxies, they might 

strike back against U.S. forces in Syria and elsewhere in the region. If the United States 

16 Rikar Hussein and Mehdi Jedinia, '·Shi 'ite Mihtias Could Tum against U.S. forces after TS T ,eaves 

Mosul," I~oice ofAmerica News. March 23, 2017, http://\V\V\v.voane\vs.com/a/shiite-militias-could-Ulrnagainst -us-foro:..:es-after -is-lea ves-mosul/3 7 7920 7 .hlml. 

6 
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more aggressively targets the Syrian regime, there is greater potential for con±lict with 

Iran, especially if Tehran believes the United States is playing a significant role and is 

likely to maintain this role until the Syrian regime falls. 

Support for Militant Groups Likely to Continue 

Iran is likely to continue to put support for militant groups at the front and center 

of its foreign policy, but Tehran also faces problems should it seek to significantly 

increase its support for radical groups. 

Iran can sustain its high levels of support. In April 2017, the World Bank reported 

Iran's economy did well in 2016 due to sanctions relief facilitated by the JCPOA. This 

economic relief has in turn certainly helped Iran sustain its regional military activities, 

proxy support, and weapons development17 In addition, Iran believes support for 

militants pays policy dividends. The Asad regime, once teetering, is now ascendant or at 

least in a stronger position. Iran's support to various groups in Iraq have given Tehran 

influence at both the local and national level. Hizballah has proven a loyal ally that has 

helped Iran project its influence in Lebanon and in neighboring states. 

Although some look to the recent election in Iran and hope for dramatic changes, 

this is not likely though halting progress is possible. President Rouhani, an early leader of 

Iranian intelligence and a member of the regime's elite, is committed to Iran's political 

system. However, he is a pragmatist who recognizes that Iran's economic weakness and 

political isolation hinder its government and is thus willing to make concessions to 

alleviate these conditions. Rouhani's priorities are economic and social, not diplomatic: 

he believes that the JCPOA and a less aggressive foreign policy will increase 

international investment and lead to an end of sanctions, enabling Iran's economy to 

flourish. Rouhani as president is better than the alternative of a clerical regime ideologue, 

but there should be no illusions. In addition, much of Iran's support for terrorist and 

militant groups is controlled by the IRGC and other more aggressive elements of the 

regilne. 

Fortunately, Hizballah at this point is leery of any escalation against Israel despite 

its continuing enmity. Because Hizballah' s forces are deeply engaged in the draining war 

in Syria- a war that also decreased Hizballah's popularity among non-Shi 'a in Lebanon 

and the broader Arab world- it is overstretched, and it would be difficult for the group to 

sustain several large wars at once. Since the 2006 war with Israel, Hizballah has been 

cautious in how it has approached Israel, and it respects Israel's fonnidable military. 

Hizballah's leaders also know that renewed conflict would lead to a devastating Israeli 

response in Lebanon, which might further decrease Hizballah's popularity there. 

The cost of Iran's support is considerable though difficult to judge from 

unclassified sources. Iran spends billions of dollars on supporting its proxies and 

deploying its own military forces- a huge sum for a country with significant economic 

problems and a limited military budget.lR In addition, the JCPOA raised expectations of 

17 The \Vorld Dank, .. Tran'sPconomic Outlook:' (April2017). 

http:/ /v.'\\\V. \\.·orldbank.org/en/country /iraru'publication/ economic-outlook -april-20 1 7. 18 ror open estimates hased on unclassified source:.., see Karim EI-nar, "Proxies and Pohtics: \Vhy Tran 

Funds Foreign Militias, .. Afiddle October 6, 2016, http:f,\Y\Y\V mtddleeasteYe.net/ess::rn/oroxies-

""'=""-'""''""-'='""'"-'-""''"='-"''"""-""-''-"""""""'-''"'-"c""'"-· See also Eli Lake, "lrun Spends Billions to Prop 

7 
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25556c-8.eps

economic improvement among the Iranian people, and spending more on militants abroad 

makes it harder for the regime to satisfy these demands at home. 

Iran's considerable economic mismanagement also limits its power. The World 

Bank also reported that Iran's oil production is nearing capacity and that continuing 

sanctions are inhibiting Iran's reintegration into international tlnancial markets. 19 Despite 

the economic benetlts gained from the JCPOA, unemployment, especially youth 

unemployment, remains high. Many among the regime, including the Supreme Leader, 

seek a "resistance economy," an approach that will diminish Iran's dependence on 

international markets but, in so doing, hinder economic prosperity in general 20 

Policy Implications and Recommendations for the Trump Administration 

Because the Islamic State has suffered signitlcant reverses in the last two years, 

Iran is emerging as more of a priority for the United States in the Middle East. The 

Trump administration has yet to articulate a coherent Iran or Middle East strategy, 

although the President's remarks in his trip to Saudi Arabia and Israel suggest Iran may 

be the focus of his administration's regional policies. The Trump administration's 

rhetoric is aggressive, but it has largely continued to fo11ow the policies of the last 

administration and has signed off on sanctions wai vers. 21 

The Trump administration appears to view Iran's cha11enges more broadly than 

did Obama' s administration. They see the flaws rather than the benetlts of the JCPOA 

and emphasize Iran's support for militant groups and other dangerous activities 22 

Because the JCPOA, for now at least, has put Iran's nuclear program on the back burner, 

there is an opportunity to focus on Iran's support for militant groups and other problems 

Iran causes in the region. 

The Trump administration has an opportunity to reinvigorate U.S. alliances in the 

Middle East. Saudi Arabia and other key allies split with the Obama administration over 

the Iran deal, U.S. support for several of the Arab Spring revolutions, the U.S. reluctance 

to engage in Syria, and other issues. As the warm Saudi reception of President Trump 

indicates, they are hoping for a closer relationship, especia11y given the Trump 

administration's signals that it is comfortable embracing dictators and does not favor 

incorporating human rights into U.S. diplomacy. 

In addition to developing closer relations with allies, the Trump administration 

should highlight the cost of Iran's support for A sad, Hizba11ah, and other organizations to 

ordinary Iranians, making it clear to the Iranian public that their economic suffering is 

Up Assnd," June 9, 2015, http~://ww\v.bloomberg.com/vie\v/articles/2015-06-09/iran-spends-billions-toprop-Ltp-assad 

19 The Vlorld Dank, .. Tran's Pconnmic Outlook,. 21 ' Rohollah t aghihi, "lran· s supreme leader calls for 'economy of resistance- in Nowruz message,-, AI-

_Monitm·, March 20, 2017, http:/1'1-V\VW .al-monilor.com/pul~c/originals/2017 /03/inm-nmvruL-\'idco-mcssagckhamenei-rouhani-2017 -1 J9h.htm I. 21 See, for example, Elise Labott and Nicole Gaouette, '·Tmmp adds to tough talk on Iran even as he sticks 

\Vlth deal- for 110\v:· evv, April 20, 20 [ 7, http://\V\VW.cnn.com/2017/04/19/politics/tlllerson-iran-nuclenrdeal-review/. 

::::::::Suzanne Maloney, '·Under Trump, U.S. policy is moving from accommodation to confrontatlon,".Hurkaz 

blog, May 11, 2017, https //www.brookmgs.edu/b1og/markaz/20 17/05/lllunder-tnunp-u-s-po1icy-on-irmlis-moving-from-accommodulion-to-confrontalion/. 

8 
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linked to Iran's aggressive foreign policy. The depth oflranian popular support for these 

groups is not clear, and the United States should try to increase the domestic price for 

Iran's aggressive foreign policy. Washington should also shine a spotlight on Tehran's 

ties to Al Qaeda and other Sunni jihadist groups. Such a relationship is embarrassing to 

both Tehran and the Sunni jihadists, and an infonnation campaign could harm this 

cooperation and further discredit both. 

The Trump administration should also lay down clear "red lines" regarding Iran's 

support for militant groups. Particularly important lines include the transfer of 

unconventional weapons to a terrorist group or any strike on the U.S. homeland or U.S. 

facilities abroad. Administration officials, in consultation with Congressional leaders, 

should decide in advance where the red lines are and what would happen if a red line 

were crossed. They must also have the will and ability to follow through on the response 

should this happen. During both the George W. Bush and Obama administrations, Tehran 

repeatedly crossed U.S. red lines in Iraq and Afghanistan with relatively few 

consequences, reducing the credibility offuture U.S. threats. If the United States is not 

serious about a response, it is better not to threaten at all. 

Although I do not favor designating the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps a 

terrorist group for technical reasons (as a state actor, it does not belong in the non-state 

category we use for terrorism), I favor similar or identical sanctions on it, perhaps using 

Executive Order 1322423 l would urge Congress to grant the President authority to 

punish the IRGC, amending legislation related to state sponsorship of terrorism as 

appropriate. In addition to supporting terrorist and militant groups, the IRGC has 

historically been used to crush anti-revolutionary forces at home and quell restive 

minorities 24 

To counter Iran's influence in the Middle East, the United States should also step 

up support for anti-Asad opposition forces in Syria, particularly those from the Sunni 

Muslim community. Greater support would give the United States more credibility with 

its regional allies and would help the United States push back against Iran's ally Syria as 

well as the Islamic State. It would also provide the United States and its allies more 

options in a future Syria. Efforts to substitute U.S. forces for local forces, however, are 

likely to create power vacuums that Iran or other hostile actors might exploit 

Any substantial new initiative or forrn of pressure is going to require allies. 

Economic pressure requires support from European and Asian allies, while military and 

diplomatic pressure requires Middle Eastern help as welL 

Another important diplomatic option is to encourage U.S. allies in the Arab world 

to improve their relationships with the Iraqi government Baghdad works with Tehran in 

part because it has few other potential partners in the Middle East Many Iraqis, including 

some Iraqi Shi'a, chafe at Tehran's dominant influence in their country and embrace their 

Arab identity. Integrating Iraq further into the Arab world will also help Baghdad win 

over Iraqi Sunnis and hinder future Islamic State recruiting efforts. 

For this proposal to use Executive Order 13224, see Mark DubO\vitz m1d Ray Takeyh, "Labeling Iran· s 

ReYolutionnry Ciuard:· Foreign .1.ffairs, March 6, 2017, https://wv·i\Y.foreJgnaffairs.com/mticles/iran/2017-

03-06/labeling-irans-revolutionary-guard. See also the State Depa1imenfs description of the Order at 

https: I IY\'W\V. state. gtw~i/ct!rls/other/de:../1 2257 0. htm 24 Afshon Ostovar, Vanguard of the Imam: Religion, Politics, and Iran's RevolutionmJ· Guards (Ne\v York: 

Oxford Universit~· Press. 2016). 

9 
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25556c-10.eps

Even as the United States engages more in the Middle East, it must also prevent 

allies from engaging in self-defeating behavior that gives Iran, Sunni jihadists, and other 

hostile actors opportunities. Saudi Arabia and other states must decrease their anti-Shi 'a 

rhetoric and otherwise be willing to deescalate sectarian tension in order to improve 

relations with the Iraqi government and to take the wind out of the sails of the Islamic 

State and similar groups. The Saudi Arabian and Emirati intervention in Yemen has made 

the civil war there worse, given the AI Qaeda affiliate there far more power, and created 

an opportunity for Iran to expand its influence2 ' Pushing allies to negotiate and end the 

war will create opportunities to reduce ties between the Houthis and Iran as well as set 

back Al Qaeda. 

Just as Iran faces limits on its power, so too does the United States face limits in 

its ability to reduce Iran's influence in the Middle East The JCPOA, for all its faults, is 

better than any current alternatives. If the U.S. unilaterally abrogates the agreement, it is 

not likely that U.S. allies would curtail their economic ties to Iran or otherwise follow the 

U.S. lead. The situation would be far worse than it was before the JCPOA was signed. In 

addition, Iranian leaders who had championed the deal would fear losing domestic 

support and would be more likely to embrace hardline policies abroad. The United States, 

with its troop presence in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, is highly vulnerable to Iranian 

proxy attacks and must recognize that escalation on the U.S. side can be met with 

escalation from Tehran. 

An effective policy against Iran will also require a sustained and steady U.S. 

commitment. Inconsistent rhetoric, bombast, and efforts to score points to domestic 

audiences at the expense of Muslims will hinder U.S. efforts to build an anti-Iran 

alliance, among other costs. Similarly, anti-Iran rhetoric that is not tied to actual policies 

and events on the group will make Iran more likely to work with anti-American local 

groups. Unless the administration is more careful in its rhetoric, allies and adversaries 

alike are more likely to see the United States as unreliable or to simply ignore signals 

they do not like, leading to misperceptions that could backfire on the United States. 

Finally, the Trump administration must set a realistic bar for success. Tehran's 

strategic options and desire to shape the Middle East to its liking will drive it to continue 

to work with a range of militant and terrorist groups and selectively use violence. Better 

U.S. policy can reduce the scope and scale of Iran's hostile activities but not end them 

altogether. 

:::s Tntematlonal Ctisis Group, '·Yemen's al-Qaeda: Pxpanding the Dase;· PebmmJ 2, 2017. 

https: //\V"\V\Y. crisisgroup .org/middle-east -nmih -africa/ gulf-and -arabian -peninsula/)' em en/ 1 7 4-y emen-s-alqueda-e:-;.pamhng-base. 

10 
36

Mr. POE. And I thank all of you for your testimony. I will recognize myself for some questions. 

I have introduced H.R. 478, the IRGC Terrorist Sanctions Act, 

and it would designate the IRGC for its terrorist activity under Executive Order 13224. 

I want to ask each of you if you support that concept or you 

don’t. And it is either a yes or a no. 

Mr. Berman? 

Mr. BERMAN. I do, sir. 

Mr. POE. Dr. Takeyh? 

Mr. TAKEYH. Yes, sir. 

Mr. POE. And Dr. Byman? 

Mr. BYMAN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. POE. There are many things that I would like to go into, but 

let me just start with the first one. 

Mr. Berman, you mentioned that the United States needs to develop a better relationship with the Iranian people, letting them 

understand that it is the regime that we don’t support, but we support the people of Iran to be able to have self-determination to rule 

their own country and not the mullahs. Can you expound on how 

we could do that? 

Mr. BERMAN. I can try, sir. 

I think that a relatively underutilized tool that the United States 

has at its disposal is our ability to bypass the regime and communicate directly to the Iranian people through mechanisms like The 

Voice of America’s Persian News Network and other broadcasting 

tools. And, here, what we say is as important as how loud we say 

it. 

Programming that emphasizes the endemic corruption within the 

regime; that elevates the plight of individual political prisoners 

that are being maligned by the regime; that demonstrates to the 

Iranian people that, despite the economic benefits of the JCPOA, 

there has been no trickle-down effect that have benefited the ordinary Iranians. All of those things, I think, would help diminish the 

credibility of the Iranian regime, elevate America’s standing in the 

eyes of the Iranian people, and really, I think, amplify all of the 

other elements of the Trump administration’s strategy as it begins 

to be formed. 

Mr. POE. So if I understand you correctly, we should do everything we can to let the world and the Iranian people know that we 

support them in changing the regime in a peaceful way, that 

should be the U.S. policy as opposed to ultimate conflict, militarily, 

with Iran. Is that a fair statement? 

Mr. BERMAN. Yes, sir. Yes, sir. 

Mr. POE. All of you mentioned Assad and also mentioned Iraq. 

What is Syria’s relationship to Iran? Is it a puppet state? Same 

question about Iraq: Is Iraq becoming a puppet state of Iran? How 

would you characterize that relationship with Iran and those two 

countries? 

Mr. Berman, you first 

Mr. BERMAN. Absolutely. I will go very quickly, and I will allow 

my colleagues to step in. 

I think it is necessary to think about Syria in the context of what 

it does for Iran, both as a strategic partner and as a buffer state. 

37

Syria is part of that access of resistance that Iranian officials continually talk about withstanding pressure from the west, from the 

United States, and from Israel. Syria is a very important link in 

that access because of the land bridge that it provides to Iran’s 

chief terrorist proxy, Hezbollah, in Lebanon. And the idea of a 

Syria that is no longer managed by a compliant partner, that is 

Balkanized or is subverted by a radical Sunni group, is anathema 

to Iran’s long-term strategic interests, which goes a long way toward explaining why Iran has sunk so much blood and treasure 

into preserving the current status quo in Syria. 

Mr. POE. Dr. Takeyh? 

Mr. TAKEYH. I would agree with that on Syria. 

I would actually suggest that—I wouldn’t characterize Iraq as a 

state that today is a subsidiary of Iran. I think Iraqis don’t want 

to be proxies of Iran. Iraq has institutions. It has some sort of a 

democratic structure, highly imperfect. And there is a lot of discussion nowadays about pushing back on Iran in the region. 

I think the place that one can do so, perhaps as effectively as 

elsewhere, would be in Iraq, because Iraq has a history of being the 

seat of civilization as opposed to being a subsidiary of a Persian 

empire. And I do think Iraqi politicians, really across the board, 

would like to be emancipated from the Iranian influence. There are 

a lot of reasons they are not. They are not welcome—Iraq is not 

welcome in the council of Sunni Arab powers. That is something 

the United States can work on. And gradual integration of Iraq as 

a Shia state in a Sunni Arab—emphasizing their ethnic identity. 

So I think Iraq is a place where it is struggling to be free of Iran. 

But it——

Mr. POE. Let me ask you this last question. 

And, Dr. Byman, you can give me your answer in writing. United 

States presence in Iraq, should it remain about the same? Should 

we ratchet up, militarily, our presence? Or should we just leave 

Iraq? Three options. 

Mr. TAKEYH. I would imagine there has to be an enhanced military presence, but also an enhanced civilian presence in terms of 

Iraqi ministries, bureaucracy, and rehabilitating the institution. 

There has to be a greater degree of American presence, military as 

well as the civilian counterparts. 

Mr. POE. Thank you. 

The Chair will yield time to the gentleman from Massachusetts, 

Mr. Keating. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I think everyone, almost universally, whether they favored or 

didn’t favor the JCPOA, acknowledged that they were about 8 to 

12 weeks away from having a nuclear weapon. That was pretty 

well understood at that time. So as we are talking about a rejuvenated Iran, in all likelihood, we would be sitting here, in the absence of that agreement, having an Iran that had nuclear weapons. 

How could that not improve their influence and their malign activities coming from a strong point of having nuclear weapons to begin 

with? We are learning in North Korea how difficult that is. 

Mr. Byman? 

Mr. BYMAN. Mr. Keating, I favored the nuclear deal for exactly 

that reason. There are plenty of flaws with it, and we could spend 

38

more than this hearing pointing them out. But there aren’t particularly good alternatives. And Iran without a nuclear weapon or Iran 

with a delayed nuclear weapon is better than Iran with a nuclear 

weapon right now. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you. That is where I—there were flaws. But 

you can’t ignore that reality. As a matter of fact, Mr. Berman mentioned the Trump administration is embedded with this. They are 

not any more embedded than when the President said, on day one, 

he would tear up the agreement. 

So what happened since the election? 

Mr. BERMAN. Well, sir, I think it is one thing entirely to talk 

about tearing up the deal on day one as part of a stump speech 

during the campaign season. It is another thing entirely to recognize that, even though the JCPOA is an executive agreement and 

therefore can be terminated at the leisure of the next executive, it 

is actually a multilateral pact, and, therefore, the United States 

walking away from the JCPOA could end up in a situation where 

American leverage, notwithstanding, the JCPOA remains——

Mr. KEATING. Wouldn’t that have been the case just at the time 

of the signing? It is all clear that the other participants in our coalition of sanctions—people, countries putting sanctions on Iran, 

they were ready to walk away then. And then we would have had 

the U.S., by itself, in Iran with a bomb. But that is just, I think, 

the real reason that tearing it up day one didn’t occur, not because 

it was embedded. 

But another question I have too, again, Mr. Berman. You said 

that it is the last 8 years that there has been a situation where 

Iran has advanced and gone through, implying that it was just 

under the Obama administration that that occurred. Nothing happened under the Bush administration? They weren’t moving forward to its nuclear weapons and that capability? Nothing happened 

during that stage? 

Mr. BERMAN. No. Sir, to clarify my point, I mentioned the two 

terms of the Obama administration in the context of America 

changing its relationship with the Iranian people directly. I think 

if you track the change in official rhetoric during the course of 

President Obama’s two terms—and you can see that, for example, 

manifested in the annual New Year’s greetings that every President since Gerald Ford has issued to the Iranian people on March 

20th of every year. What you see is a trajectory that begins with 

communications to the Iranian people. 

Mr. KEATING. Well, if I could interrupt. You know, we all know 

that security officials in the U.S. say they give Christmas greetings 

when they are making phone calls. But let me just put that in the 

context of saying, there was a progression of nuclear development 

during that year. 

You know, I think we have to get, as much as we can, beyond 

the partisanship here, and that is the reason I pointed to those 

questions. These issues are far too important, and that is why I focused on that. But I must say that I favor too very strong sanctions 

in this area. And we can do that with no interference whatsoever 

with the agreement. There is plenty of options for the U.S., and I 

support them, because of Iran’s military ballistic testing, ballistic 

missile testing, because of their human rights positions and acVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:55 Jun 13, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00042 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_TNT\052417\25556 SHIRL
39

tions, and because they are an exporter and enabler of terrorism 

through the whole region. 

So I think we could do that. There is plenty of areas of agreement in that respect. So I want to thank you all for doing this and 

just say, on this important issue that we all agree is a central issue 

to our security, the extent that we move away from branding political partisan actions, we will all be stronger. 

I yield back. 

Mr. POE. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California, 

Colonel Cook. 

Mr. COOK. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. 

Dr. Takeyh, I wanted to ask you—I want to shift gears a little 

bit. 

Saudi Arabia, since we are on the subject of nuclear weapons, 

there was a lot of speculation about the fact that with this agreement, that Saudi Arabia would unilaterally purchase or develop a 

nuclear device, because they are the, at least in recent years, the 

traditional enemy. 

Do you have any comments on that in terms—I know it is hypothetical, but there was quite a bit of talk about it at the time. 

Mr. TAKEYH. I think there were many things wrong with the Iranian JCPOA nuclear agreement. It is a flawed agreement. But I 

was never persuaded entirely of the cascade effect. Namely, that 

other countries would seek to emulate that capability. For one 

thing, I don’t think the Saudis have this scientific foundation or a 

cadre to be able to, at this point, man an indigenous atomic nuclear 

program. 

Mr. COOK. How about a purchase from a country like Pakistan? 

Mr. TAKEYH. I am not a Pakistan expert. But should Pakistan 

have sold a nuclear weapon to Saudi Arabia, it would be the first 

state to actually transfer nuclear weapons to another state. Without precedent. Now, if anybody can break precedent, it is the Pakistanis. I just don’t know enough about Pakistan. Every time I 

would ask somebody who knows something about Pakistan, they 

will say they would do it. 

Mr. COOK. Okay. Can I switch gears a little bit? 

I want to talk about Bahrain, and the number of Shia residents 

there, and the influence of Iran on a pivotal country. Obviously, 

that is where our fleet is and everything like that. Do you have any 

comments on that? Because the Bahrain is involved in the war in 

Yemen, and which I am sure is, you know, as part of the Saudi coalition, and whether that is the next, if you will, in this domino effect of countries that Iran has supported. 

Mr. TAKEYH. In the Gulf today, Bahrain remains a country that 

has been most vulnerable to Iranian subversion, and the activity 

of Iran subversion in Bahrain utilizing the Shia population is increasing to the extent of, I think, even dispatching arms. So Bahrain is becoming a specific target of Iran’s, as they will say, malign 

activities, more so than, I think, other places in the Gulf, simply 

because there have been disturbances there in the aftermath of 

2011, and Iran always tries to fish in muddy waters. So I think you 

are seeing a greater degree of subversive participation in Bahrain 

at this point. 

40

Mr. COOK. Okay. And last question or issue I want to talk—and, 

Mr. Berman, I haven’t picked on you. And I apologize. But the war 

in Yemen, and particularly, once again, the Saudi investment, in 

terms of that escalating, this is tremendous consequences for the 

Red Sea and the closure of the Suez. If that continues, with an escalation, how do you think that could play out in terms of involvement of those countries in the region and the United States? 

Mr. BERMAN. I will attempt very briefly. 

I think that the proper lens through which to view what is happening in Yemen—and, incidentally, it is worth noting that Yemen 

is in the throws of three separate security crises, not simply the 

civil war. However, the instability that is localized there now has 

the potential to have a very large catalytic effect on the safety and 

security of energy shipping through the Bab al-Mandab and other 

strategic waterways. And it is also, I think, correct to view what 

is happening in Yemen as, at least in part, a proxy battle between 

Iranian-supported rebels on the one hand, and the Saudi state, and 

the Gulf monarchy, the Sunni Gulf monarchies, on the other. 

There is, I think, a very high potential for escalation because of 

these characteristics, and it is a crisis that I think the Unites 

States needs to navigate very carefully. 

Mr. COOK. Thank you, very much. I yield back. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentleman. 

The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from Nevada, Ms. Titus. 

Ms. TITUS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

You know, we have just heard for the last few days a lot about 

the President’s trip to the Middle East and to Israel. And so we 

have heard him talk about cooperation and new directions and all 

of that. And that is why I would just point out, again, that while 

your testimony is very interesting, and I thank you for being here, 

it is not all that helpful moving forward. It is good analysis, but 

we really need to hear from members of the administration to put 

some meat on the bones here. Just what are the plans? What are 

the details? What do they have in mind going forward with this 

new direction? 

I would just ask you, quickly, Mr. Berman, you mentioned several times the need to reach out beyond the government to the people of Iran. I wonder if you know what the new budget does to 

Voice of America, for example. 

Mr. BERMAN. Ma’am, I do. I think the conversation about the 

current shape and content of U.S. broadcasting toward Iran specifically is a work in progress. I can divulge—I have on public forums—that my organization, the American Foreign Policy Council, 

has been asked to do an independent third-party review of content 

relating to Persian-language broadcasting, and I will reserve all 

judgment until the findings of that study come back. But I would 

hope that those findings will have an impact upon how the administration sees the utility of strategic communication. 

Ms. TITUS. I hope so too, because at a time when apparently we 

need it even more, it is being cut by about 9 percent. So let’s just 

get that on the record. 

I will now ask you, Dr. Byman. In your written statement, you 

note that—and I will quote you, if you don’t mind: ‘‘The new initiative or form of pressure is going to require our allies. Economic 

41

pressure requires support from European and Asian allies, while 

military and diplomatic pressure requires Middle Eastern help as 

well.’’

I would like to go back to the point that our ranking member was 

making about the nuclear agreement. Another statement that came 

out of the travels of the President from Saudi Arabia was that, and 

I quote again: ‘‘Iran’s interference poses a threat to the security of 

the region and the world, and the nuclear agreement with Iran 

needs to be reexamined and some of its clauses.’’

This was a statement coming from the U.S. and Saudi Arabia. 

Now, Saudi Arabia wasn’t part of that original agreement. So it is 

kind of confusing. And on the other hand, we are hearing that Iran 

lived up to its agreement. Now we are hearing we need a new direction involving Saudi Arabia. 

Could you tell us what you think the other members of the original agreement are going to think about opening up again and looking at some of these provisions and working with people who 

weren’t even part of the original agreement? 

Mr. BYMAN. As you know, the agreement required painful and 

also painstaking diplomacy. And I think many countries walked 

away, not completely satisfied, but at least getting some sense of 

what they were hoping for. The problem with opening this up again 

is that it looks like it is the United States that is doing it when, 

at the same time, the United States is certifying that Iran has 

lived up to its side of the bargain in letter. Not always in spirit but 

in letter. 

And, as a result, many of our allies would be skeptical of this, 

and I think we would end up worse off than we were in 2011, that 

the economic pressure that was brought to bear in 2011 would be 

very difficult to rebuild because the problem would be seen as emanating from Washington rather than from Tehran. 

My hope would be that we could build economic pressure on 

other issues, not the nuclear issue, but terrorism, such as the subject of this hearing, for exactly that reason. I think Iran should be 

pushed to move away from much of its nasty activity, but doing so, 

on the nuclear agreement, without a clear violation from Iran, in 

my mind, would be a mistake. 

Ms. TITUS. So you don’t think that, say, Russia or China or some 

of the European countries would think this was a good idea? 

Mr. BYMAN. I hate to invoke Russia or China, because I think 

they would happily rush in to exploit any sense of a U.S. misstep 

or a weakness. But I would even say real allies, allies in Europe, 

for example, most of them would think it was a mistake. 

Ms. TITUS. Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentlelady. 

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. 

Perry. 

Mr. PERRY. Good afternoon, gentlemen. 

Thank you, Chairman. 

Mr. Berman, looking for, and I think you kind of enumerated 

some in your testimony, but I would like to go back through it a 

little bit. Iran’s use of the funds released from the JCPOA to increase funding to terrorist organizations and activities. If we could 

42

kind of delve into that a little bit, the amount, to who, and how 

that is verified. 

Mr. BERMAN. Thank you, sir. And I am happy to provide more 

details. I have written about it and I have documented it elsewhere. So please forgive if I provide—if my incomplete memory——

Mr. PERRY. An overview will be good. 

Mr. BERMAN. The Congressional Research Service in July 2015, 

about 2 or 3 weeks after the passage of the JCPOA, was asked by 

the office of Congressman Mark Kirk—of Senator Mark Kirk to 

outline what it believed was the scope of Iranian, then-sanctioned 

Iran, its funding, the scope of its funding for international terrorism. At that time, what was returned by the CRS was not a figure, but it was a range. It was a range between $31⁄2 billion and 

$16 billion annually, at a time when Iran was still constrained by 

multilateral sanctions. And that range encompassed everything 

from between $100 million and $200 million annually to Hezbollah 

to up to $6 billion annually, at that time, for support for the Assad 

regime in terms of troops and materiel, to several dozens of millions of dollars for Iraqi militias. There were sort of very clear sort 

of line items that were enumerated in that report. And I am happy 

to make that available to you. 

I think sort of the takeaway from the time that has elapsed since 

has been that while a full snapshot of how much Iran is spending 

on this portfolio is still incomplete, at least in the Open Source, it 

is clear from certain data points in the Open Source Press, for example, that Iran has ratcheted up this financial activity with regard to Hamas, with regard to Hezbollah, in a way that is very detrimental to regional security because it expands the threat capabilities. 

Mr. PERRY. So at what level? How do we determine at what 

level? And can you, with any confidence, conclude, for instance, 

missile technology Tomas, is directly attributable to the money that 

was received from Iran, from the United States as a result of the 

JCPOA? 

Mr. BERMAN. Sir, I think it would be very hard to point to a 

smoking gun in terms of direct transfer as a result of the JCPOA. 

What I would note, at least for the purposes of this hearing, is the 

overall expansion of available funds that are fungible that Iran can 

use for a variety of——

Mr. PERRY. We all get that, obviously. So currently, only the 

IRGC Quds force is designated by the Treasury for its terrorist activities. And I am thinking, you know, Mr. Mast, my time in Iraq 

where Iran, it was directly attributed, their use and manufacture 

of EFPs, explosive form penetrators, which is a cheap manned 

sabot round, goes right through an engine block, and certainly a 

human is—you can understand the devastation. I am wondering 

how we are going to—how we are going to sanction the broader 

IRGC under the requirements designated in the Executive Order 

13224 and if we want to. But, first of all, I think we should. But 

maybe you have a different opinion. But how do we justify that? 

I mean, when we know these things are—you know, the IRGC 

is a big operation in Iran, controlling most of the activities of the 

country in a meaningful sense. So how do we get to that? 

43

Mr. BERMAN. Well, sir, in sort of—in the very short time I have 

allotted, I would point out two things. First of all, there is a policy 

goal of preventing a full normalization of trade with Iran that the 

administration has articulated. And in this context, the IRGC is 

very much low-hanging fruit. They control a third or more of Iran’s 

national economy. They have controlling interests in the telecom 

sector, in the construction sector, and various other aspects of 

Iran’s economy, and, therefore, a designation would have a chilling 

effect on—can be expected to have a chilling effect on foreign countries and companies that are involved in those sectors. 

Mr. PERRY. So what would be the downside and how do you—

can we justify it currently? I know we got 30 seconds. Can we justify it currently and is there a downside? 

Mr. BERMAN. I think there is a downside. There is always a 

downside in these sort of designations. I believe that it could create 

not insubstantial trade disruptions between the United States and 

countries that are heavily leveraged in the Iranian market. I think 

this is not an insurmountable obstacle as well. And I think what 

we will find is that the lion’s share of countries and companies that 

are involved in the Iranian market are much more heavily leveraged in the American market, and we can force them——

Mr. PERRY. I am not worried about the leveraging. 

Mr. Chairman, with your indulgence—the justification, can there 

be any justification under the current circumstances to designate 

the greater IRGC? 

Mr. BERMAN. You mean a precipitating event, sir? 

Mr. PERRY. How do we know where they are spending the 

money? I mean, how do you prove the justification for designating 

them? If we haven’t done it already, what has changed? 

Mr. BERMAN. Well, the lack of a designation up until this point, 

sir, I would argue is actually a failure of policy, and it reflects sort 

of a desire to turn a blind eye to the——

Mr. PERRY. Okay. So you are saying we currently have the justification. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield. 

Mr. BERMAN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. POE. The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from California, 

Mrs. Torres. 

Mrs. TORRES. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And thank 

you to our panel for being here. 

How could the Trump administration policies toward Russia, in 

recent statements during his trip to the Middle East about Iran, 

affect the United States’ ability to pursue its objectives in curbing 

Iran’s destructive influence in the region? 

Mr. BYMAN. It is a very big question. So I will say perhaps the 

most important first step is to restore confidence of U.S. allies in 

U.S. leadership. And that requires a sense that the United States 

is going to hear their concerns, but also that the United States is 

going to become and stay a major player in the Middle East. And 

that requires military presence. It also requires a political presence. It requires high-level engagement, and it requires almost constant lower-level engagement as well. And maintaining those ties, 

making sure allies are on the same page, making sure we have a 

plan, that is going to be necessary. That is hard for any adminisVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:55 Jun 13, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00047 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_TNT\052417\25556 SHIRL
44

tration. And I hope that the Trump administration can use any momentum from the recent trip to try to restore and build that coalition, and then develop the capacity within Washington to carry 

that energy forward. 

Mrs. TORRES. Lower-level engagement as in? 

Mr. BYMAN. We need deputy assistant secretaries. We need people who are political figures throughout the administration who are 

often the counterparts. Any President, no matter how energetic, 

cannot handle every aspect of diplomacy 24 hours a day. Secretary 

of State cannot do so. And we need experts and advisors and midlevel officials, and that is vital to any administration’s success. 

Mrs. TORRES. I was hoping you would say that. Thank you. 

This subcommittee has previously heard testimony regarding the 

role of Iran and Russia in supporting the Taliban and the Shiite 

militias. How do their shared security interests impede U.S. objectives in the region and what options does the U.S. have in confronting those efforts? 

Mr. TAKEYH. This is one of the more curious aspects of Iran’s policy in a sense that it is willing to, at times, align itself with even 

radical Sunni groups. There are some indications of some level of 

relationship with al-Qaeda. There is always a relationship with 

some members or aspects of Taliban, and Russia has been doing 

the same thing. 

In this sense, there is a measure of amorality in terms of Iran’s 

policy, particularly as it looks east in terms of Afghanistan. One of 

the ways of combatting that, as Judge Poe has his own legislation 

on the revolutionary guards, one of the ways we principally over 

the time have tried to impose penalties and costs on Iran is 

through economic measures. Whether they have been successful or 

not is hard to say. But that economic leverage, I think, is important to suggest, that coercive economic leverage is attenuated because of JCPOA. There are barriers and obstacles to that. So 

JCPOA is a nuclear agreement, but its restrictions also affect the 

progress of the United States in exercising the economic leverage 

tool that historically has deployed. 

Mrs. TORRES. Anyone else? 

Mr. BERMAN. If I could, ma’am. I would point out, this, to me, 

is one of the central questions in our conversation about Russia 

and sort of where Russia fits. And I think there has been quite a 

learning process that the new White House has gone through. 

In the early days of the Trump administration, there was a lot 

of talk about whether it was possible to flip Russia on Iran, whether it was possible to get Russia, with a more specific relationship 

overall, to get Moscow to cooperate better on Tehran. But what we 

have discovered is that this is actually much harder than it looks, 

for a whole host of very practical reasons. 

Russia needs Iranian assistance and support in order to preserve 

a long-term presence in Syria, for forced projection in the Middle 

East. Russia, whose own economy is not doing well, needs those 

tens of billions of dollars of arms deals that has now concluded 

with Iran. And for these and other reasons, it is, I think, a little 

bit facile to think about the fact that Russia, with enough inducements, with enough carrots, will actually play ball on Iran. I think 

we need to start thinking more creatively about what tools of leverVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:55 Jun 13, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00048 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_TNT\052417\25556 SHIRL
45

age we have that can separate the Russians from the Iranians in 

what is manifestly a very robust——

Mrs. TORRES. I want to get a last quick question in there. What 

cooperation, if any, is there between Iran and North Korea regarding ballistic missile development? 

Mr. BERMAN. I have 10 seconds, so I will have to be very brief. 

I would point out that the strategic relationship dates back to the 

late 1980s, but it extends beyond ballistic missiles. Every single 

nuclear test that the North Korean regime has carried out in the 

past decade has had observers, Iranian engineers as observers. And 

this——

Mrs. TORRES. On the ground? 

Mr. BERMAN. On the ground. And this speaks to a larger, deeper, 

and more nefarious strategic relationship, not only on ballistic missiles, but on other strategic programs as well. 

Mrs. TORRES. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the 17 seconds. 

Mr. POE. You are welcome. 

I know the State Department is looking for deputy secretaries. 

I think maybe three are right here sitting in front of us, though. 

You don’t have to comment on that. 

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Garrett. 

Mr. GARRETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Sort of trying to wrap my brain around this is something, because, you know, I have only been here for a few months, and my 

background is as a company grade military officer and a prosecutor. And yet I look at the JCPOA, which at the risk of getting 

myself in trouble, I refer to as the JCPOS, and I wonder who wrote 

it. And what I mean by that is, if you look at U.N. Resolution 1929 

that was controlling in 2010, the wording of the document read: 

Iran shall not undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles 

capable of—right? And then under the JCPOA we were handed 

language: Iran is called upon not to undertake any activities related to the development of ballistic missiles. 

Dramatic pause for effect. Right? You don’t have to be that good 

a lawyer and certainly not that experienced a legislator to understand the difference between ‘‘may’’ and ‘‘shall’’ or ‘‘shall not’’ 

versus ‘‘is called upon not to.’’

Mr. Berman, at what possible point did any individual commissioned by the United States of America and the P5+1 think this 

wording made sense, and could you please shed some light on to 

why? 

Mr. BERMAN. Sir, I can’t. And I say this advisably as a not very 

good lawyer who is recovering currently. I would point out that 

that language is dispositive. And what you have seen—and it is not 

only on the ballistic missile portfolio but on other aspects of multilateral pressure against Iran, where we have seen a watering down 

in the service of the nuclear agreement. And this is the only explanation I have for it, that in the service, in the hope that we could 

delay and potentially later derail Iran’s nuclear program, we were 

willing to roll back the language, the compulsory nature of our 

international restrictions so far. 

As we have seen, I think this was a bargain that hasn’t manifested itself as a good one, and I think we are now sort of trying 

to make up lost ground as a result. 

46

Mr. GARRETT. So, Mr. Byman, you testified that Iran has lived 

up to its side of the bargain, and this is a quote: ‘‘In a letter if not 

in the spirit.’’

I am not aware of your educational background, but does it shock 

you that when the previous oversight of Iran, as it related to U.N. 

Resolution 1929 was ‘‘shall not undertake,’’ and the JCPOA—

JCPOS—JCPOA says, ‘‘is called upon not to,’’ does it shock you 

that Iran has engaged in ballistic missile activity? 

Mr. BYMAN. Not at all, sir. 

Mr. GARRETT. And does anybody at the table know who it was 

that we empowered as a Nation and where they went to law school, 

who thought that this language is a good idea? Right? 

Mr. Chairman, if you will indulge me for a moment, it is not just 

about the procurement of a nuclear device. Right? A nuclear device 

needs a delivery mechanism. And so while you might take some 

short-term windows and say we have moved that back as we 

watched North Korea right now, not in the SCIF, we also know 

that there is miniaturization and mating a nuclear device to a delivery mechanism. 

And so you contemplate the terms of breakout. Is it not possible 

that Iran is angling toward a creep-out knowing that the mechanisms for delivery are being enhanced under our very nose by a 

language that we allowed, that someone was either criminally negligent or was aware of the intent, and that we are going to have 

a creep-out scenario where Iran not only has a nuclear weapon but 

also their delivery mechanism by which to essentially hold hostage 

the entire region if not the world? 

Mr. Takeyh. 

Mr. TAKEYH. A nuclear weapon requires a number of things. It 

requires ability to enrich uranium with dispatch. Iran is currently 

developing the capacity with the advancement of this high-level velocity centrifuges, which are permissible by JCPOA. It requires 

ability to design—weaponization design. That is impossible to detect. Weaponization design could be a room in an office somewhere, 

so I imagine that is taking place. 

Third is projectiles to deliver that missile, and that is also excluded from the agreement, and therefore, they are developing 

those ballistic missiles. So the triad of a nuclear weapon is being 

developed right now. 

Mr. GARRETT. I have a finite amount of time. I respect the answer, and I will come back to you. But essentially, it wasn’t excluded from the agreement. We included—that is the delivery 

mechanism development. We included words in the JCPOA that at 

least politicians could come back to the American and global consuming public and go, oh, look, we have called upon them not to 

undertake the development, right, whereas we all understand 

‘‘may’’ versus ‘‘shall’’ versus ‘‘called upon not to,’’ right? 

So we didn’t deny anything other than agreeing to a reduction 

of the number of centrifuges and eliminating plutonium centrifuges 

for a period of time. Am I correct? 

Mr. TAKEYH. The plutonium capability has, I think, been foreclosed but not the enrichment capacity—enrichment capability. 

And you are right. In the Resolution 1929, it was impermissible for 

47

Iran to develop ballistic missiles. That language has obviously been 

attenuated, as you know. 

Mr. GARRETT. Thank you. 

And thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentleman. 

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Schneider. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you. 

And I apologize, I am in another hearing where we are having 

a vote, so if I jump up abruptly, please don’t take offense. But 

thank you for your testimony. Thank you for your work. I was not 

able to be here for your testimony here, but I have studied your 

submitted testimony carefully, and I very much appreciate it. 

I think, Dr. Takeyh, you describe in your—you close in your remarks that, in the end, the nuclear agreement offered Iran all that 

it wanted and go on to identify that. I think that, for me, at the 

time was one of my concerns with the agreement, as well as the 

matter of time. But we are stuck with this agreement now. We are 

where we are. And I am sure you have talked about it in previous 

discussion, the need to enforce this agreement, enforce it to its letter. 

Mr. Berman, in your testimony, you talk about ensuring compliance and akin to the question. There is a great deal—you say there 

is a great deal that must be done in this regard. Could you highlight some of the specifics of what you see being absolutely necessary and what the Congress can do to move this forward to make 

sure that we absolutely lock down this agreement for the time we 

have it to make sure Iran doesn’t get any closer to a nuclear weapon? 

Mr. BERMAN. Sir, I can hazard sort of the start of a guess. I 

think there is a more fulsome response that requires some study. 

But I would point out that the current regime—monitoring regime 

structure that exists under the JCPOA is inadequate for a couple 

reasons. First of all, it is not fully sourced in the sense that the 

facilities that the United States Government believes are Iranian 

nuclear facilities are not completely covered by the inspections regime that is baked into the JCPOA. 

There are additional facilities that need to be looked at. There 

are many facilities that are co-located with military bases that are 

overseen by the Revolutionary Guard Corps, which are of specific 

concern. 

And there is also a—there have been limitations that have been 

imposed by the Iranian regime on free, unfettered access for the inspectors that do exist in their coming, going to these facilities. 

All of these ambiguities, as a start, should be assessed and discussed in order to determine whether or not we have adequate confidence that with this limited regime we can see everything there 

is to see. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Great. Thank you. 

Dr. Byman—and I promise, Dr. Takeyh, I am going to come to 

you as well. 

But, Dr. Byman, you say that the administration should, and I 

will quote you, ‘‘lay down clear red lines regarding Iran’s support 

for militant groups,’’ and other things. What are the red lines you 

see? Again, what can Congress do to help state those, articulate 

48

them as clearly as possible but make sure that if those lines are 

crossed, there is articulated consequences as well? 

Mr. BYMAN. To say some that I hope are obvious and therefore 

could gather support across a wide spectrum of Americans would 

be any targeting, of course, of the U.S. homeland or any targeting 

of American assets overseas. 

And one thing we haven’t done in the past is we have frequently 

ignored plots and focused on actual attacks, which I understand 

the political logic of that, but that is crazy, because some of the attacks could have easily happened. We were just a little lucky and 

a little skillful. And so that is where I put the emphasis. Obviously, 

any transfer of unconventional weapons to a terrorist group should 

be red lined. 

The thing I would emphasize, though, is this is something Congress should be heavily involved in because we have to show that 

this will span administrations; that regardless of who is in the 

White House, that the United States will act to stop those. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you. I can’t agree more with what you 

just said. And one of my issues with the JCPOA is that it is not 

just administrations but generations. And my concern with this 15-

year term, and we see with the recent election, is that the people 

who signed this deal on the Iranian side have every expectation 

that they will be in power when the deal expires and can just wait 

it out. 

Dr. Takeyh, I want to come back to you. I want to give you the 

last word. You very, I think, cogently said—and, again, I am going 

to quote: ‘‘A regime is dangerous to U.S. interests as the Islamic 

Republic requires a comprehensive strategy to counter it.’’

Hopefully, we can see a comprehensive strategy coming from the 

administration in conjunction with working with Congress. But are 

there things that you believe have to be—absolutely necessary—be 

a part of that comprehensive strategy, and, again, what can Congress do to further that? 

Mr. TAKEYH. Well, one of the things—one of the things I would 

say is—I think it has been mentioned before—is the rebuilding of 

the alliances in the Middle East. Those alliances for a variety of 

reasons have been battered in the past few years, and once again, 

rekindling that particular capability of those. 

I would say in terms of hemming Iran’s influence, as I mentioned 

before, I think Iraq is a place where we can more aggressively and 

effectively push back on Iran. That essentially is a very important 

battleground for Iran because it is far more important to their national interests and security objectives than I think Syria is. And 

it is the place where the United States has a greater degree of assets. 

Finally, I will say, I continue to stress that it is important to put 

economic pressure on Iran. But, again, I have to emphasize, that 

ability to impose economic pressure to some extent is weakened by 

JCPOA and its provisions of economic relief that have to come 

about, particularly in the realm of financial institutions. Because 

one of the things we found out, maybe belatedly, in between 2011 

and the aftermath, is that the United States has the ability to segregate Iran from the global financial institutions. And that has a 

49

real effect on its domestic economy and its ability to project power, 

subsidize militias, and everything. 

And I think that particular instrument is now largely—not entirely, but to some extent weakened by JCPOA, particularly in 

terms of central bank sanctions and so on. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Right. No, I think we are limited. I hope that 

as a body, as was stated, that we can make it clear to Iran that 

it is the policy of our Nation, of this Congress, not just now, not 

just for the term of the agreement but forever that this regime will 

never get a nuclear weapon. 

So, again, I thank the witnesses for their testimony, and I yield 

back my time. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentleman from Illinois. 

And I thank all three of you all for being here today, for your 

excellent testimony. There may be more questions that members 

have. They will put them in writing, and they will submit them to 

the Chair, and we will submit them to you all for quick answers. 

So thank you very much. The subcommittee is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:19 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

W ASHTNGTON, DC 20515-6128 

Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade 

Ted Poe (R-TX), Chairman 

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Committee on Foreign 

Affairs, to be held by the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation. and Trade in Room 

2172 of the Rayburn House 0±1ice Building (and available live on the Committee website at 

http :1 IWVvw.F oreignAffairs.house. gov ): 

DATE: 

TIME: 

SUBJECT: 

WITNESSES: 

Wednesday, May 24, 2017 

2:00p.m. 

Nuclear Deal Fallout: The Global Threat oflran 

Mr. Ilan Berman 

Senior Vice President 

American Foreign Policy Council 

Ray Takeyh, PhD. 

Hasib J. Sabbagh Senior Fellow for Middle East Studies 

Council on Foreign Relations 

DanielL Byman, Ph.D. 

Senior Fellow 

Center for Middle East Policy 

Brookings Institution 

By Direction of the Chairman 

if'eCI<ll 

reg,-,.rdto 

may he 
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COMMITTF:F: ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

MINUTES OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON Tarorism, N(mprolifuaJiou, m_"l_'l:_m_rl_e _____ HE/\RJNG 

Dny Wednesday Dote. ___ M_a_~l'_2_4~, _2_01_7 ___ Room ___ _:2:;:1c:7..::2 __ _ 

Shu·ting Time. 2:09p.m. Ending Time 3:19 (J.m. 

Recesses L-J ( __ to __ ) L_to __ )(____'_to __ )( __ to 

Presi<ling Member(s) 

Chaimum Ted Poe 

Check all ofllwjollowillg tflal app(i'' 

)( to ____ ) ( __ to __ ) 

Open Session CZJ Executive ~sed) Session D Televised 0 Electronically Reconlt!L(taped) 0 

Stenographic RecurLl LL1 

TITLE OF HEARING: 

"Nucle!ll' Deal Fallo/11: Tlte Global Threat of frau" 

SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBEUS PRESENT: 

Reps. Poe, ](eatillg, Cook, BoyTe, Pen)•, TilliS, Ze/di11, Torres, Mast, Sclmeider, Gmntt 

NON-SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: (Mark 1virh an • if/hey are not members o(fiill committee) 

Rolrrabaclwr 

HEARING \\'ITNESSES: Same ns meeting notice attached'! Yes EJ NoD 

({l "nn ",please Jist below and ;nclurle tille, agency, depllrJmenl, or organization.) 

STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD: (Lisr any statements submitted/or the r-ecord) 

SFR .mbmilterl by Rep. Rrarl Scfmddel' 

QFR submitted by Ranking Member Bill J(eatiug for Alr.lflm Benmm 

TIME SCHEDULED TO UECONVENE ___ _ 

or 

TIME ADJOURNED 3:19p.m. 
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Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade 

Subcommittee Hearing 

Nuclear Deal Fallout: The Global Threat of Iran 

May 24,2017 

Rep. Brad Schneider 

Opening Remarks (1 minute) 

Thank you, Chairman Poe and Ranking Member Keating, 

for holding this important hearing today. I look forward to 

hearing from our witnesses and participating in what I 

imagine will be a fruitful discussion. 

I have been working to prevent Iran from acquiring a 

nuclear weapon for almost two decades. While I did not 

support the nuclear deal with lran, now that it is in force, 

we must ensure Iran strictly adheres to the agreement and 

is held accountable for any and all violations. 

lran has not changed its malign behavior since the 

JCPOA. It is still a top state sponsor of terrorism, supports 

terrorist proxies, and continues to be a destabilizing force 

in the region. Iran also continues to work on and test its 

ballistic missile program. I support additional sanctions 

on Iran outside the purview of the JCPOA in response to 

these unacceptable actions. 
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There is no bigger threat to the existence of our greatest 

ally, Israel, than Iran. But, this is not just a problem for 

Israel. This is a global problem that every nation should 

be worried about. I look forward to continuing to work 

with my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to ensure 

Iran never acquires a nuclear weapon- not now, not 

during the life of the JCPOA, not ever. 
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Question for the Record for Mr. Han Berman 

submitted by Ranking Member William R. Keating 

Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade Subcommittee 

Expand on your comments about inadequate inspections under the JCPOA and 

your proposal to demand access to additional nuclear facilities not currently being 

monitored under the JCPOA. 

The current inspections regime enumerated under the terms of the JCPOA is not 

comprehensive, and fails to provide the international community with sufficient oversight 

over the length and breadth of the Iranian national nuclear enterprise. 

• Under the terms of the JCPOA, "routine inspections" carried out by the 

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are limited to sites that have been 

formally declared by Iran (rather than all sites believed to be involved in nuclear 

work). Moreover, the Islamic Republic has the right, as a practical matter, to 

refuse access to other facilities on its territory that are suspected of being involved 

in nuclear work, at least temporarily. 

• Pursuant to its obligations to the IAEA, the Iranian regime is required to 

proactively notify the agency of the design and construction of new nuclear sites. 

However, no independent means of verifying possible nuclear-related 

construction currently exists, and the international community is reliant on the 

Iranian regime to promptly and fully disclose its new nuclear work-something 

that Iran has repeatedly failed to do in the past 

• The protocol governing access to suspicious or undeclared sites under the JCPOA 

is both extensive and laborious. It potentially entails formal notification to Iran 

from the IAEA, a period of clarification and negotiation, and then-if 

necessary-a "dispute resolution" process involving both Iran and the P5+ l 

powers. 1 This process is highly advantageous to the Iranian regime should it seek 

to obscure relevant data and processes relating to its nuclear work. lt is also far 

short of the concept of all-access inspections originally propounded by proponents 

of the deal. 

• To supplement physical inspections, the JCPOA authorizes IAEA inspectors to 

use "modern technologies" (such as automated data collection) to carry out 

monitoring of Iran's nuclear facilities. However, prominent experts have raised 

concerns that the Iranian regime, itself a sophisticated cyber power, could "game" 

such virtual access in order to project an erroneous or fabricated picture of the 

state of its nuclear program2 

• Finally, even if it is granted full access to the entire Iranian nuclear enterprise, the 

lAEA currently lacks the manpower to police it properly. According to the 

Institute for Science & International Security, a respected nonproliferation think 

tank, there are in excess of thirty separate sites within the Islamic Republic 

believed to be involved in one way or another in the country's nuclear program 3 

However, the IAEA has only between 130 and !50 designated inspectors dealing 

with Iran, and that membership in that contingent is limited to nations that have 
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full diplomatic relations with Iran (thus expressly excluding American specialists 

from directly monitoring Iranian facilities) 4 

In sum, the provisions enumerated under the JCPOA are simply not sut11cient to ensure 

accurate and comprehensive monitoring of the totality ofT ran's nuclear work. Much more 

must be done in order for the United States and its allies to gain greater confidence that 

the Iranian regime is strictly complying with its obligations to the international 

community with regard to its nuclear program. 

1 For a succinct summary, see Iran Watch, ·'How Will Ins;pe,:ti<H1S Work in Iran m1der the Nuclear DealT" 

U,2015, 

See, for example, Samantha Ravicll remarks allhe American Foreign Policy Council's conference on 

''Iran After the Nuclear Deal:' Washington, DC, April.\. 2016. A surrnnary of Dr. Ravich's remarks can be 

fotmd here: http://\nvw.afpc.org/eveni listings/vievYConference/3159. 3 Institute for Science & International Security, "Nuclear Iran: Nuclear Sites:' n.d., 

http :/h,Y\Y\V. i si snuc lea ri ran. o rg/ sitcs/al pha/. 4 Iran Watcll "How Will Inspections Work in Iran under the Nuclear Deal'"'