[Cite as State v. Hough, 2011-Ohio-3690.]

Court of Appeals of Ohio

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

No. 95953 

STATE OF OHIO

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE 

vs.

 TERRANCE HOUGH 

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 

JUDGMENT: 

AFFIRMED

Criminal Appeal from the 

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Case No. CR-499308 

BEFORE: Jones, J., Kilbane, A.J., and Sweeney, J. 

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: July 28, 2011 
FOR APPELLANT 

 

Terrance M. Hough, Jr., Pro se 

Inmate No. A550-442 

Toledo Correctional Institution 

2001 East Central Avenue 

Toledo, Ohio 43608-0033 

 

 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

William D. Mason 

Cuyahoga County Prosecutor 

BY: Katherine Mullin 

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney 

The Justice Center, 8th Floor 

1200 Ontario Street 

Cleveland, Ohio 44113 

 LARRY A. JONES, J.: 

{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Terrance Hough, pro se, appeals from the trial court’s 

findings of fact and conclusions of law. We affirm. 

I. Procedural History and Facts 

{¶ 2} A capital indictment was returned against Hough in April 2007, charging him 

with three counts of aggravated murder with prior calculation and design, with mass murder 

and firearm specifications, and two counts of attempted murder. The charges stemmed from 
Hough shooting at a group of young adults who had been shooting off fireworks next door to 

Hough’s house. Five victims were shot; three died and two were injured. 

{¶ 3} Hough was found guilty by a jury on all charges. The jury recommended a 

sentence of life without parole on the aggravated murder convictions. The trial court 

sentenced Hough to life in prison without the possibility of parole on each of the three 

aggravated murder convictions; ten years for each of the two attempted murder convictions; 

and a merged three-year sentence on the firearm specifications. The sentences were ordered 

to be served consecutively. 

{¶ 4} Hough appealed. The transcript was filed with this court on August 4, 2008. 

This court affirmed the convictions. State v. Hough, Cuyahoga App. No. 91691, 

2010-Ohio-2770. 

{¶ 5} On December 30, 2009, Hough filed a petition for postconviction relief, which 

was denied on January 4, 2010. On July 16, 2010, Hough filed a second petition for 

postconviction relief, which was denied on July 29, 2010. On September 9, 2010, Hough 

requested that the trial court issue findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court 

filed findings on October 5, 2010. On November 1, 2010, Hough filed a notice of appeal and 

attached the trial court’s October 5 findings as the judgment he was appealing. According to 

his brief, he is challenging the denials of his postconviction petitions. His sole assignment of 

error reads: 
“[The] Trial Court erred in denying Appellant’s Post Conviction Petition through its 

Order of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, as to not ordering an evidentiary 

hearing, per R.C. §2953.22.” 

II. Law and Analysis 

{¶ 6} R.C. 2953.21(A)(1) provides in relevant part that: 

“Any person who has been convicted of a criminal offense and who claims that there 

was such a denial or infringement of the person’s rights as to render the judgment void 

or voidable under the Ohio Constitution or the Constitution of the United States * * * 

may file a petition in the court that imposed the sentence, stating the grounds for relief 

relied upon, and asking the court to vacate or set aside the judgment or sentence * * *.”

{¶ 7} R.C. 2953.21(A)(2) provides in relevant part that: 

“ * * * a petition under division (A)(1) of this section shall be filed no later than one 

hundred eighty days after the date on which the trial transcript is filed in the court of 

appeals in the direct appeal of the judgment of conviction or adjudication * * *.”

{¶ 8} The transcripts in Hough’s direct appeal were filed on August 4, 2008. 

Hough’s postconviction petition, therefore, should have been filed by February 2009. He 

filed his petitions in December 2009 and July 2010, and therefore, they were untimely. 

{¶ 9} In State v. Sharif (Sept. 27, 2001), Cuyahoga App. No. 79325, this court held 

that under R.C. 2953.23(A), a trial court cannot entertain an untimely petition for 

postconviction relief unless the petitioner shows: (1) either that he was unavoidably prevented 

from discovering the facts upon which he relies in his petition, or that the United States 

Supreme Court has, since the expiration of the period for timely filing, recognized a new 

federal or state right that applies retroactively to the petitioner; and (2) by clear and convincing 
evidence that a reasonable factfinder would not have found him guilty but for constitutional 

error at trial. 

{¶ 10} Hough did not offer any reasons for his untimely first petition, and therefore, 

the trial court properly denied it. Hough offered the following reasons for his untimely 

second petition: (1) he had a “reasonable belief” that the Ohio Public Defender’s office was 

going to file a petition on his behalf and he did not receive notice that the office was not going 

to file the petition until January 27, 2009; and (2) his original appellate attorney’s license was 

suspended in April 2009. 

{¶ 11} In regard to the suspension of counsel, the suspension occurred in April 2009, 

after the February 2009 deadline for filing Hough’s petition and, therefore, cannot serve as a 

justification for the untimely filing. 

{¶ 12} In support of his contention that he believed the Ohio Public Defender’s office 

was going to file a petition, Hough attached to his petition two notarized letters, one from 

Judith Hough and the other from James Hogan. Although a trial court should give deference 

to affidavits filed in support of a postconviction relief petition, it may exercise its discretion 

when assessing the credibility of the affidavits. State v. Calhoun (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 279, 

714 N.E.2d 905, paragraph one of the syllabus. A trial court may discount self-serving 

affidavits from the petitioner or his family members. State v. Moore (1994), 99 Ohio App.3d 

748, 755, 651 N.E.2d 1319. 
{¶ 13} The letter from Hogan stated that he and Judith Hough met with an attorney 

from the Ohio Public Defender’s office in November 2008, and the attorney represented that 

he would handle Hough’s postconviction proceedings. Although the letter does not identify 

Hogan’s relationship to Hough, it is contained in the record that Hogan was Hough’s 

co-worker and friend. 

{¶ 14} In her letter, Judith Hough also states the alleged representation by an attorney 

from the Ohio Public Defender’s office and the suspended license of former counsel. The 

letter does not identify her relationship to Hough, but it is contained in the record that she is 

his mother. Thus, both sworn letters were from persons “interested in the success” of 

Hough’s petition. Calhoun at 285. 

{¶ 15} In addition to the letters being “self-serving,” they offer nothing on the two 

requirements for an untimely postconviction petition: (1) either that Hough was 

unavoidably prevented from discovering the facts upon which he relies in his petition, or that 

the United States Supreme Court has, since the expiration of the period for timely filing, 

recognized a new federal or state right that applies retroactively to the petitioner; and (2) by 

clear and convincing evidence that a reasonable factfinder would not have found him guilty 

but for constitutional error at trial. Moreover, Hough did not allege in his petition that he 

was unavoidably prevented from discovering facts entitling him to relief or that the United 

States Supreme Court recognized a new federal or state right that applies retroactively to him. 
{¶ 16} In light of the above, the trial court properly denied Hough’s untimely 

postconviction petitions. 

{¶ 17} Further, the doctrine of res judicata is applicable to petitions for postconviction 

relief. State v. Perry (1967), 10 Ohio St.2d 175, 226 N.E.2d 104, paragraphs eight and nine 

of the syllabus. The Ohio Supreme Court explained the doctrine as follows: 

“Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment of conviction bars the convicted 

defendant from raising and litigating in any proceeding, except an appeal from that 

judgment, any defense or any claimed lack of due process that was raised or could have 

been raised by the defendant at the trial which resulted in that judgment of conviction 

or on an appeal from that judgment.” Id. at 180-181. 

{¶ 18} Hough’s petition was based on 15 claims. In claims one through six and 15, 

Hough contended that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain and utilize various 

experts to discuss the effects of noise, dietary supplements, “intermittent explosive disorder,”

and diabetes with mental stability. In claims seven through 12, Hough contended that various 

trial errors were committed. Claim 13 contended that trial counsel was ineffective for failing 

to call additional witnesses to testify about the victims’ reputations. And in claim 14, Hough 

contended that he was prescribed medication while in jail awaiting trial that may have 

impacted his ability to assist in his defense. 

{¶ 19} On appeal, Hough was represented by counsel different from trial counsel, and 

appellate counsel raised ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims. Hough cannot raise 

new claims that could have been raised in his direct appeal. Because Hough could have 
raised these claims on direct appeal, they are barred under the doctrine of res judicata. 

{¶ 20} In light of the above, the trial court properly denied Hough’s postconviction 

petitions without a hearing and his sole assignment of error is overruled. 

Judgment affirmed. 

It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant costs herein taxed. 

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the 

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to 

Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

 

LARRY A. JONES, JUDGE 

MARY EILEEN KILBANE, A.J., and 

JAMES J. SWEENEY, J., CONCUR