FILED

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

JUNE 11, 2009

THOMAS K. KAHN

CLERK

 [PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 08-14064

________________________

D. C. Docket No. 08-00046-CV-ORL-22-GAP,

BKCY No. 01-00533-BK-ABB

6:08cv00046 

In Re: EVERGREEN SECURITY, LTD., 

 Debtor. 

____________________________________________

PETER R. GINSBERG, 

PETER R. GINSBERG, P.C., 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

versus

EVERGREEN SECURITY, LTD., 

Defendant-Appellee. 

____________________________________________

6:08cv00268 

In Re: EVERGREEN SECURITY, LTD., 

 Debtor. 
____________________________________________

PETER R. GINSBERG, 

PETER R. GINSBERG, P.C., 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

versus

EVERGREEN SECURITY, LTD., 

Defendant-Appellee. 

____________________________________________

6:08cv00269 

In Re: EVERGREEN SECURITY, LTD., 

 Debtor. 

____________________________________________

PETER R. GINSBERG, 

PETER R. GINSBERG, P.C., 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

versus

EVERGREEN SECURITY, LTD., 

Defendant-Appellee. 

____________________________________________

 6:08cv00270 

2
In Re: EVERGREEN SECURITY, LTD., 

 Debtor. 

____________________________________________

PETER R. GINSBERG, 

PETER R. GINSBERG, P.C., 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

versus

EVERGREEN SECURITY, LTD., 

Defendant-Appellee. 

____________________________________________

6:08cv00271 

In Re: EVERGREEN SECURITY, LTD., 

 Debtor. 

____________________________________________

PETER R. GINSBERG, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

versus

EVERGREEN SECURITY, LTD., 

Defendant-Appellee. 

____________________________________________

3
6:08cv000272

In Re: EVERGREEN SECURITY, LTD., 

 Debtor. 

____________________________________________

PETER R. GINSBERG, 

PETER R. GINSBERG, P.C., 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

versus

EVERGREEN SECURITY, LTD., 

Defendant-Appellee. 

________________________

No. 08-14536

________________________

D. C. Docket No. 08-00046-CV-ORL-GAP,

BKCY No. 01-00533-BK-ABB

6:08cv00046 

In Re: EVERGREEN SECURITY, LTD., 

 Debtor. 

____________________________________________

4
PETER R. GINSBERG, 

PETER R. GINSBERG, P.C., 

Plaintiffs-Appellees, 

LAURO LAW FIRM, 

 Interested Party-Appellee,

versus

EVERGREEN SECURITY, LTD., 

Defendant-Appellant. 

____________________________________________

6:08cv00268 

In Re: EVERGREEN SECURITY, LTD., 

 Debtor. 

____________________________________________

PETER R. GINSBERG, 

PETER R. GINSBERG, P.C., 

Plaintiffs-Appellees, 

LAURO LAW FIRM, 

Interested Party-Appellee, 

5
versus

EVERGREEN SECURITY, LTD., 

Defendant-Appellant. 

____________________________________________

6:08cv00269 

In Re: EVERGREEN SECURITY, LTD., 

 Debtor. 

____________________________________________

PETER R. GINSBERG, 

PETER R. GINSBERG, P.C., 

Plaintiffs-Appellees, 

LAURO LAW FIRM, 

Interested Party-Appellee, 

versus

EVERGREEN SECURITY, LTD., 

Defendant-Appellant. 

____________________________________________

6:08cv00270 

In Re: EVERGREEN SECURITY, LTD., 

 Debtor. 

6
____________________________________________

PETER R. GINSBERG, 

PETER R. GINSBERG, P.C., 

Plaintiffs-Appellees, 

LAURO LAW FIRM, 

Interested Party-Appellee, 

versus

EVERGREEN SECURITY, LTD., 

Defendant-Appellant. 

____________________________________________

6:08cv00271 

In Re: EVERGREEN SECURITY, LTD., 

 Debtor. 

____________________________________________

PETER R. GINSBERG, 

Plaintiff-Appellees, 

LAURO LAW FIRM, 

Interested Party-Appellee, 

versus

7
EVERGREEN SECURITY, LTD., 

Defendant-Appellant. 

____________________________________________

6:08cv000272

In Re: EVERGREEN SECURITY, LTD., 

 Debtor. 

____________________________________________

PETER R. GINSBERG, 

PETER R. GINSBERG, P.C., 

Plaintiffs-Appellees, 

LAURO LAW FIRM, 

Interested Party-Appellee, 

versus

EVERGREEN SECURITY, LTD., 

Defendant-Appellant. 

________________________

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

_________________________

(June 11, 2009)

8
Before BIRCH, HULL and FAY, Circuit Judges.

FAY, Circuit Judge:

Peter R. Ginsberg and Peter R. Ginsberg, P.C. appeal the district court’s

decision to affirm the bankruptcy court’s imposition of sanctions. The bankruptcy

court awarded sanctions based on Ginsberg’s actions in conjunction with the filing

of a Recusal Motion. 

Ginsberg asserts three issues on appeal: (1) the district court abused its

discretion in affirming the bankruptcy court’s Sanctions Order and its imposition

of sanctions; (2) the district court abused its discretion in affirming the bankruptcy

court’s decision not to testify about or discuss the complaint of judicial

misconduct; and (3) the district court abused its discretion in affirming the

bankruptcy court’s denial of Ginsberg’s Ore Tenus Motion to Transfer the

Sanctions Motion. We affirm the district court which affirmed the bankruptcy

court. 

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This appeal arises from the adversary proceeding instituted by Evergreen

Security, Ltd. (“Evergreen”) in the Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of

Florida. Evergreen, deemed a “ponzi scheme,” filed a voluntary petition for

Chapter 11 bankruptcy (“the main case”). Jon Knight and Anthony Huggins were

9
principal actors in the scheme, both individually and through various corporate

entities. R.W. Cuthill was appointed as the Chapter 11 trustee to recover funds

belonging to Evergreen in order to pay Evergreen’s creditors. 

Cuthill instituted an adversary proceeding for $6.5 million fraudulently

transferred from Evergreen Trust (an entity wholly owned by Evergreen) to

Mataeka, and later to Knight, Huggins, and others. This action is referred to as 1

the “Mataeka AP.” Judge Briskman served as the bankruptcy judge in the main

case and the Mataeka AP. Peter Ginsberg, of Peter R. Ginsberg P.C. (collectively

“Ginsberg”), represented Knight. GrayRobinson attorneys Scott Spradley and

Maureen Vitucci served as local counsel for Ginsberg, as well as main counsel for

Huggins, Mataeka and Atlantic Portfolio Analytics & Management, Inc.

(“APAM”). R. Scott Shuker and his firm Latham Shuker Eden & Beaudine LLP 2

(“Latham”) represented Cuthill and Evergreen.

Cuthill prevailed in the Mataeka AP. The court issued a judgment against

Knight, Huggins, and Mataeka jointly and severally for nearly $8 million, and

against APAM for $2.5 million. In an effort to collect on the Mataeka AP

Judgment, Evergreen (through Cuthill) filed three involuntary Chapter 7

 Knight and Huggins pled guilty to criminal charges arising from this theft. They were

1

sentenced to probation and fined. 

 APAM was also a named party in the Mataeka AP proceeding.

2

10
bankruptcy petitions against Knight, Huggins and APAM and Judge Briskman

appointed an interim trustee in both the Knight and Huggins involuntary actions. 

On July 26, 2006, the court began the final evidentiary hearing on the involuntary

petitions, and Evergreen completed its prima facie case that day. 

The next day, on July 27, 2006, Knight, Huggins, Mataeka, and APAM,

through counsel Ginsberg, filed a Motion for Recusal, Motion to Disqualify,

Disclosure of all Ex-Parte Communications and Revocation of all Prior Orders

(“Recusal Motion”) in the main case only. The parties requested the court recuse 3

itself, disqualify Latham, disclose all ex parte communications and filings, and

revoke all orders previously entered in this case and all other adversary

proceedings. Less then a month later, Ginsberg filed a Petition for Writ of

Mandamus with the district court asking for a stay of all pending proceedings until

the resolution of the Recusal Motion. A Supplemental Petition for Writ of

Mandamus was filed a week later, seeking Judge Briskman’s removal from ruling

on the Recusal Motion and all related proceedings. Both of these writs were

denied.

 Although Ginsberg and Spradley both had a hand in drafting the Recusal Motion, it

3

appears that Ginsberg did the lion’s share. (Sanctions Order at 61) (“The Tenor and content of

the Recusal Motion and the Respondent’s billing records establish Ginsberg was its principal

drafter and driving force.”). Since Spradley has not appealed the imposition of sanctions, we

refer to Ginsberg as the author of the Recusal Motion.

11
On October 10, 2006 Evergreen filed a motion seeking sanctions against

attorneys Spradley, Vitucci, and Ginsberg, and the law firms of GrayRobinson and

Peter R. Ginsberg, P.C. (“Sanctions Motion”). Ginsberg then filed a third Petition

for Writ of Mandamus requesting that the district court compel Judge Briskman to

reconsider and reverse the decision to exclude himself as a witness. The district

court denied the third Petition for Writ of Mandamus. 

Evidentiary hearings on the Recusal Motion were held on November 29,

2006, December 11, 2006 and January 29, 2007. On February 27, 2007 the

bankruptcy court denied the Recusal Motion, and on August 17, 2007 Judge

Briskman issued an Order to Show Cause whether sanctions should be imposed. 

On August 28, 2007 Judge Briskman conducted an evidentiary hearing on the

Sanctions Motion. The court granted the Sanctions Motion on January 2, 2008. In

the Sanctions Order, Judge Briskman imposed monetary sanctions of $371,517.69

against Ginsberg and barred him from practicing before the United States

Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Florida for a period of five years.

4

Ginsberg appealed both Orders. On June 17, 2008, District Court Judge Anne C.

 Pursuant to an August 8, 2007 settlement agreement with Evergreen, GrayRobinson 4

agreed to pay Evergreen $300,000 in resolution of the Sanctions Motion. The court found this

settlement amount “an appropriate sanction to redress all wrongful acts of GrayRobinson,

Vitucci, and Spradley falling within the purview of the Sanctions Motions, Section 105(a) of the

Bankruptcy Code, and the Court’s inherent powers to sanction wrongful conduct.” (Sanctions

Order at 84-85.)

12
Conway entered an order affirming, among other things, the bankruptcy court’s

denial of the recusal motion and imposition of sanctions. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal courts, including bankruptcy courts, possess inherent authority to

impose sanctions against attorneys and their clients. In re Walker, 532 F.3d 1304,

1309 (11th Cir. 2008). “This power is derived from the court’s need to manage

[its] own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.” 

Sunshine Jr. Stores, Inc., 456 F.3d 1291, 1304 (11th Cir. 2006) (internal citations

omitted). Federal statute 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) also gives the court the authority to

“sua sponte, tak[e] any action or mak[e] any determination necessary or

appropriate to enforce or implement court orders or rules, or to prevent an abuse of

process.” 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2005). 

We review the exercise of these powers for abuse of discretion. In re

Sunshine Jr. Stores, Inc., 456 F.3d at 1304. Under this standard, “we ask whether

[the court] ‘applie[d] the wrong legal standard or ma[de] findings of fact that are

clearly erroneous.’” Id. (quoting Byrne v. Nezhat, 261 F.3d 1075, 1106 (11th Cir.

2001)).

III. DISCUSSION

13
Ginsberg appeals the bankruptcy court’s imposition of sanctions for the

drafting, filing and litigating of the Recusal Motion. Ginsberg alleges that the

district court erred in affirming the sanctions because (1) the Recusal Motion was

proper; (2) the bankruptcy court should have disclosed the existence of a

complaint of judicial misconduct and testified to its contents; and (3) the

bankruptcy court should not have presided over the Sanctions Motion. We

address each contention below.

A. Recusal Motion

A party may file a Recusal Motion when a Judge’s impartiality may

reasonably be questioned. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (“Any justice, judge, or

magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in

which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”). “The inquiry of whether

a judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned under § 455(a) is an

objective standard designed to promote the public's confidence in the impartiality

and integrity of the judicial process." Davis v. Jones, 506 F.3d 1325, 1332 n.12

(11th Cir. 2007) (internal citations omitted). Thus, the court looks to “the

perspective of a reasonable observer who is informed of all the surrounding facts

and circumstances.’” Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. of Columbia, 541 U.S.

913, 924 (2004) (quoting Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301, 1302

14
(2000)); see also Glass v. Pfeffer, 849 F.2d 1261, 1267 (10th Cir. 1988) (“Under

this section, factual allegations need not be taken as true, and the test is whether ‘a

reasonable person, knowing all the relevant facts, would harbor doubts about the

judge’s impartiality.’” (quoting Hinman v. Rogers, 831 F.2d 937, 938 (10th Cir.

1987))). 

Ginsberg essentially pled three bases for the appearance of impartiality: (1)

the filing of a complaint of judicial misconduct against Judge Briskman in a

previous matter involving Shuker; (2) the bankruptcy court’s acceptance and

consideration of Shuker’s ex parte and oversized filing; and (3) Shuker’s

violations of the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct. The bankruptcy court

found that Ginsberg failed to establish any legal or factual support for these

allegations and that the Motion was filed for an improper purpose. We find that

the bankruptcy court was not clearly erroneous in its findings of fact and that it

applied the correct legal standards.

1. Hudson’s Judicial Council Complaint

On appeal, Ginsberg asserts that the filing of a complaint of judicial

misconduct with the Judicial Council of the Eleventh Circuit was his main basis

for filing the Recusal Motion. Ginsberg’s Recusal Motion repeatedly referenced

this complaint of judicial misconduct (“the Complaint”), which was filed by Phil

15
Hudson (“Hudson”) with the Judicial Council, regarding Judge Briskman’s

conduct in the bankruptcy action Advanced Telecomm. Network, Inc. v. Daniel

W. Allen (“ATN”). (Recusal Mot. at 2.) 

In ATN Shuker represented ATN, Hudson represented the

defendants/creditors Daniel and David Allen, and Judge Briskman initially

presided. Cuthill served as a witness in that case, but there is no overlap in the

parties or the issues between ATN and the instant bankruptcy proceedings. 

According to the Recusal Motion, Shuker filed an ex parte motion in ATN,

Judge Briskman held an ex parte hearing on that motion, and Judge Briskman

ordered the ex parte motion be removed from the docket. These allegations are

generally accurate. However, it is important to note the context. ATN was

attempting to recover funds from the Allens. At the motion hearing, Shuker

expressed ATN’s concern that the Allens would secret assets in other corporations

to avoid turning them over. The Allens had already been ruled in contempt of two

orders relating to the disclosure or repatriation of assets, so ATN did not want to

give the Allens any advance warning of its attempt to have a temporary receiver

appointed. At the hearing, Shuker and Judge Briskman also discussed the

possibility of the Allens being arrested for contempt. Judge Briskman agreed to

take the hearing off the docket sheet so that the Allens would not have advance

16
warning of the matters discussed therein. A court reporter who transcribed the

hearing was also present and a full record was made. 

Hudson later learned of the ex parte motion and hearing and filed an

Emergency Motion to Disqualify Opposing Counsel. At some point ATN was

transferred to Bankruptcy Judge Jenneman, who held a hearing on the Motion and

denied it. In her Order denying the Motion, Judge Jenneman stated, “ex parte

hearings, while discouraged, are sometimes appropriate. In this case, the decision

to allow ATN to proceed with a hearing without notice to the Allens does not

appear improper. Moreover, the hearing was held on the record.” (Am. Memo.

Op. Den. Defs.’ Emergency Mot. to Disqualify at 8.) Thereafter, Hudson also

filed the Complaint with the Judicial Council of the Eleventh Circuit.

In this case, Ginsberg first learned of Hudson’s Complaint from Spradley on

July 7, 2006. Spradley received an email from an attorney with his firm named

John Anthony informing him that Hudson had filed a Complaint related to the

ATN matter. Anthony heard this from another attorney (not Hudson). On the

same day, Spradley spoke to Hudson about the Complaint, confirmed that Hudson

had in fact filed one, and informed Ginsberg of what he had learned. (Sanctions

Tr. Vol. II at 119.) On July 8, 2006 Ginsberg began researching the Recusal

Motion. (Id. at 18.) Ginsberg himself never spoke to Hudson before filing the

17
Recusal Motion (id. at 30), and neither Spradley nor Ginsberg asked Hudson for a

copy of the Complaint or other proof of its filing (see id. at 30; 142, 153-54).

At the sanctions hearing Ginsberg testified that after reviewing the ATN

docket he detected “parallels” between the ATN case and this one. (Sanctions Tr.

Vol. I at 169.) Ginsberg said he was troubled by the appointment of an interim

trustee in both cases. (Id.) Additionally, Ginsberg claimed that Shuker’s threats

of imprisonment in ATN reminded Huggins and Knight of Shuker’s threats of

imprisonment in this case (discussed below), and they were concerned about the

implication that Shuker would have Judge Briskman’s approval in doing so. (Id.)

Ginsberg therefore filed the Recusal Motion.

In the Motion, Ginsberg alleged that “Judge Briskman presiding here is,

himself, under investigation by the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals following ex

parte, allegedly inappropriate communications with Mr. R. Scott Shuker.” 

(Recusal Mot. at 2.) Ginsberg claimed that Judge Briskman’s failure to notify the

parties of the ongoing investigation, as well as Shuker’s role as a future witness in

the investigation, further bolstered the appearance of partiality. (Id. at 21, 27.) 

a. Lack of Factual Support

18
We find that the bankruptcy court was not clearly erroneous in finding no

factual support for Ginsberg’s assertion that the existence of the Complaint created

an appearance of impropriety requiring recusal. 

The mere filing of a complaint of judicial misconduct is not grounds for

recusal. As Shuker’s expert witness Lubet explained, it would be detrimental to

the judicial system if a judge had to disqualify himself anytime someone filed a

complaint about his conduct. A party would only have to file a complaint to get a

different judge. Lubet testified that the Rules of the Judicial Council of the

Eleventh Circuit Governing Complaints of Judicial Misconduct or Disability

(“Judicial Council Rules”) allow lots of complaints to be filed, many of which are

frivolous. (Recusal Tr. Vol. II at 13-14.) The Rules therefore create their own

screening mechanism for these complaints; a stage one “limited inquiry” to

determine whether a “formal investigation” into the validity of the complaint is

necessary. (Id.); see also Judicial Council Rule 4(a) (“the Chief Judge may

conduct a limited inquiry for the purpose of determining – (1) whether appropriate

corrective action has been or can be taken without the necessity for a formal

investigation; and (2) whether the facts stated in the complaint are plainly untrue

or are incapable of being established through investigation.” (emphasis added)). 

This limited inquiry resolves 98% of all filed complaints; only 2% of all

19
complaints ever proceed to the formal investigation stage. (Recusal Tr. Vol. II at

13-14.) It would create an absurd result to force a judge to recuse himself because

of the 2% possibility that the complaint will become an investigation and the even

smaller chance that an involved party will be called as a witness in that

investigation. (Id.) Thus, the mere existence of a complaint of judicial misconduct

does not create an appearance of impropriety. 

While a formal investigation into a complaint may trigger recusal, there is

no evidence of an impending investigation here. Yet, the Recusal Motion referred

to the Complaint as an “investigation” twelve times, made fourteen implications

of the existence of a formal investigation, and referred to Shuker as a “key player

in the investigation” and a “future witness.” (Recusal Mot. at 21.) During the

Sanctions Hearing, Ginsberg testified that he assumed there was an “ongoing

investigation” by virtue of the fact that Hudson’s Complaint had not been

dismissed for a number of months. Yet, according to the Judicial Council Rules

5

the length of time that a complaint remains pending is irrelevant. Ginsberg 6

further asserted that Spradley used the term “investigation” when relating his

 At the time the Recusal Motion was filed the Complaint had only been pending for five 5

or six months. (Sanctions Tr. Vol. II at 162.)

 Shuker’s Expert Witness Lubet testified that the House Judiciary Committee has held a 6

series of hearings about the length of time it has taken to handle these complaints. (Recusal Tr.

Vol. II at 50.)

20
conversations with Hudson (Sanctions Tr. Vol. II at 5) and Spradley testified that

Hudson had used the term “investigation” when relating the events to him (id. at

136-37, 142). In Hudson’s deposition, however, he testified that he never used the

term “investigation.” (Sanctions Order at 28.) Anthony’s deposition revealed he

did use the term “investigation,” but Anthony admitted that he had no first hand

knowledge of the Complaint. (Recusal Ex. II at 56-57, 62.) Anthony compared

his knowledge of the Complaint to knowledge about “Britney Spears’ divorce . . .

a lot of people have heard a lot.” (Id. at 56-57.) 

Moreover, the Judicial Council Rules clearly state that if the Chief Judge

was conducting a formal investigation, Hudson (the complainant) would be

informed. See Judicial Council Rule 4(c) (“If the complaint is not dismissed . . .

the Chief Judge shall appoint a special committee . . . to investigate the allegations

of the complaint . . . . The Chief Judge shall notify the complainant and the

complained-of judge of the appointment of a special committee . . . .” (emphasis

added)). Hudson was never notified of such and never indicated to anyone that he

had been. Spradley testified that Hudson’s only correspondence with the Judicial

Council of the Eleventh Circuit was immediately after he filed his Complaint. 

(Sanctions Tr. Vol. II at 142.) Hudson received a letter confirming the Complaint

was received and submitted to the Chief Judge. (Id.) Spradley further testified

21
that he spoke with Hudson three or four times after that “with the expressed reason

to ask if he had heard the result or an update, and he replied in the negative.” (Id.

at 154.) Even though the Judicial Council Rules clearly state that Hudson would

be informed if his Complaint was dismissed or moved to the investigation stage,

Ginsberg relied only on the fact that Hudson was not informed of a change in

status to deem it an “investigation.” This is clearly an unreasonable reliance and

7

jump to an unsupported conclusion.

Similarly, the mere existence of an ex parte hearing is not grounds for

recusal. As Lubet explained there are many reasons judges properly hold ex parte

hearings, such as a temporary restraining order or bail revocation proceedings. 

Indeed, in ATN Judge Jenneman stated that ex parte hearings may be appropriate. 

(Am. Memo. Op. Den. Defs.’ Emergency Mot. to Disqualify at 9.) In fact, Judge

Jenneman held that the ex parte hearing in ATN did not create the appearance of

 On appeal Ginsberg asserts that “a technical definition of investigation” was not 7

suggested. (Initial Br. at 34.) Spradley also testified at the Sanctions Hearing that he looked up

the term "investigation" in Webster's dictionary and believed it to apply to the present situation. 

(Sanctions Tr. Vol. II at 137.) Yet, at the same hearing Ginsberg testified that his “unequivocal

understanding was that the complaint had passed through the first phase, that the chief judge had

come to the conclusion there was merit to the complaint, and that whether it was the chief judge

or the committee, witnesses were going to be contacted, information was to be gathered.” 

(Sanctions Tr. Vol. I at 80.) This is not the dictionary definition of “investigation,” but a

definition in accordance with the procedure outlined by the Judicial Council Rules indicating that

Ginsberg was asserting the technical definition of investigation in the Recusal Motion.

22
impropriety. (Id.) (“[T]he conversation [did] not rise to the level of a specifically

identifiable impropriety.”).

b. Lack of Legal Support

The bankruptcy court also found that the Recusal Motion lacked legal

support. We agree.

The only case Ginsberg relied on for the proposition that a complaint of

judicial misconduct (which Ginsberg equates with an investigation) requires

recusal was United States v. Garrudo, 869 F. Supp. 1574 (S.D. Fla. 1994). 

(Recusal Mot. at 20.) In Garrudo, a district court judge was under investigation by

the United States Attorney’s Office “for accepting gratuities worth thousands of

dollars . . . .” Garrudo, 869 F.Supp. at 1576. While presiding over criminal cases,

the judge was told he was the “subject” of a pending United States Attorney’s

Office investigation. Id. The Judge was subsequently interviewed by federal

agents and served with a grand jury subpoena duces tecum. Id. Once he was

informed that his status was elevated to that of a “target” the judge recused himself

from all pending criminal matters. Id. Criminal defendants convicted or

sentenced by the judge while the investigation was pending, but before the judge

recused himself, challenged their convictions. Id. The defendants claimed that the

23
judge had an incentive to curry favor with the government. Id. The district court

held that recusal was appropriate.

8

Ginsberg argues that the criminal grand jury investigation in Garrudo and

the present judicial misconduct complaint are analogous. (Recusal Mot. at 20)

(“Fortunately there are few cases in which courts have had to apply the recusal

statute to a circumstance in which a judge is under an investigation like the instant

investigation. A notable exception is Garrudo.” (emphasis added)). However,

there is no evidence that Judge Briskman was under investigation, let alone a

criminal one. In our view, a civil complaint of judicial misconduct and a criminal

grand jury investigation are not analogous.

The facts at issue here are further distinguishable from Garrudo. Ginsberg

relies on Garrudo for the principle that “an alignment of interests between the

presiding judge and counsel in a position to influence the outcome of an

investigation or inquiry affecting the judge would cause a reasonable objective

observer to question the impartiality of the court.” (Initial Br. at 32.) In Garrudo,

however, the party conducting the investigation (the United States Government)

was actually before the court, so the court may have had an incentive to curry

 This decision was affirmed by an 11 Circuit panel. A subsequent en banc court split 8 th

evenly on the question of recusal, thereby affirming the previous ruling by operation of law.

24
favor. Here, there was no investigation, only a complaint which had a 2% chance

of becoming an investigation. Moreover, the existence of the investigation was

well known in Garrudo and could therefore affect public confidence in the

judiciary. The investigation was discussed in various newspapers and was printed

on the front page of the Miami Daily Business Review. Garrudo, 869 F. Supp. at

1576. On the other hand, evidence of this Complaint was not in the public forum

until Ginsberg filed the Recusal Motion. A confidential complaint that the public

is not aware of does not have any affect on the “public's confidence in the

impartiality and integrity of the judicial process.” See Davis, 506 F.3d at 1332

n.12. 

In this regard, we agree with the rulings of the bankruptcy court and the

district court.

2. Ex Parte Communications

In the Recusal Motion Ginsberg cites to two allegedly inappropriate ex

parte communications between Shuker and Judge Briskman in the Mataeka AP

proceeding: a discovery motion and proposed findings of fact and conclusions of

law (“FOFCOL”).9

 On appeal, Ginsberg asserts that these incidents "were not intended as separate 9

instances of misconduct warranting recusal." (Initial Br. at 34.) The incidents merely

demonstrate that an objective observer would question the court's impartiality. (Id.) These

25
a. Discovery Motion

The bankruptcy court found that Ginsberg had no factual support for his

assertion that Shuker “apparently” filed an ex parte emergency motion to compel

10

production of documents (“Emergency Motion”) and that Judge Briskman’s

subsequent order “was accomplished without a hearing” even though Spradley

objected to the requested relief. The record supports the conclusion that such an

assertion was groundless.

The facts surrounding this showed that Shuker filed an Emergency Motion

in the Knight proceeding on July 17, 2006, six days before the July 24, 2006 trial

date. Upon receipt, Judge Briskman’s chambers called Spradley’s office to

schedule a hearing, but Spradley was out of town and unavailable, and there was

no offer to send someone else from his office. As the trial was set for six days

after the Emergency Motion was filed, “[w]aiting to conduct a hearing upon

Spradley’s return from vacation was not an option.” (Recusal Order at 28.) A

hearing was therefore held and an Order was entered. 

allegations, however, lack factual support and therefore do not affect the appearance of partiality. 

See Cheney, 541 U.S. at 924 (the decision to disqualify must be “made from the perspective of a

reasonable observer who is informed of all the surrounding facts and circumstances.” (citations

omitted) (emphasis in original)).

 Ginsberg testified that he hedged his allegations with the word "apparently" because

10

Ginsberg was never given either Shuker's motion or the Judge's order. (Sanctions Tr. Vol. II at

43.) 

26
There is no evidence, however, that the Emergency Motion was filed ex

parte. Before filing the Emergency Motion Shuker emailed Spradley, requesting

expedited discovery. Spradley copied Ginsberg on his response, denying Shuker’s

request. Thus, both Spradley and Ginsberg were on notice that Shuker was

seeking discovery and that a hearing was imminent. Moreover, both Spradley and

Ginsberg were given formal notice of the filing of the Motion. The certificate of

service attached to the Motion indicates that GrayRobinson and Ginsberg were

both served electronically, by fax and first-class mail. Finally, the Order entered 11

was not Shuker’s proposed order, and in fact granted only some of the relief that

Shuker requested. In our view, Judge Briskman appropriately addressed an

evidentiary issue within the time constraints and there was in fact no basis for the

allegations made in the Recusal Motion. 

b. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

The record also fully supports the finding of the bankruptcy court that

Ginsberg’s contention that the court ordered the parties to file ex parte FOFCOL

and relied on Shuker’s oversized FOFCOL was without any basis whatsoever. 

 Ginsberg’s allegation of lack of service is even more confusing because Ginsberg’s 11

pro hac vice application listed GrayRobinson attorney Vitucci as the designated person to be

served in the Mataeka Proceeding. Service to Ginsberg was not required.

27
 A June 20, 2005 email from Susan Coberly, Judge Briskman’s assistant,

inviting the parties to file FOFCOL, not to exceed 15 pages, is the only written

document Ginsberg presented to prove the filings were court ordered. The email

did not discuss service. Both sides subsequently submitted FOFCOL to the court

without serving each other. Shuker’s FOFCOL was 46 pages long. Months later

in a deposition, Spradley and Ginsberg learned of this 46-page submission when

the deponent referred to it. 

Spradley immediately sent Shuker an email expressing his concern about

Evergreen’s failure to comply with the court’s 15-page limitation. (Email from

Spradley to Shuker of 10/10/05.) Shuker responded to the email, stating “I

understand that you called Susan about the page [length] and were informed the

Judge has not yet looked at either proposed findings. Thus, it seems the simple

solution is for me to cut mine down to 15 pages and replace the longer one.” 

(Email from Shuker to Spradley of 10/17/05.) On November 3, 2005 Shuker again

emailed Spradley to inform him that he had submitted a revised, 15-page

FOFCOL. “By the way, we submitted revised FOFCOL today which were 15

pages; the Judge never reviewed the longer one. Thus, I assume that is now a

moot issue.” (Email from Shuker to Spradley of 11/03/05) (emphasis added). The

next day Spradley responded in apparent understanding: “Thanks for the note re:

28
findings and conclusions. I’ll call you in a while.” (Email from Spradley to

Shuker of 11/04/05.) 

At the end of trial the court allowed the parties to file another set of

FOFCOL. Shuker testified that Spradley and Ginsberg objected to his suggestion

of not exchanging these submissions. An objection was filed and a hearing was

scheduled but Spradley and Ginsberg opted out of the hearing and their objection

was thereby withdrawn. Both sides then submitted FOFCOL to the court without

serving each other. This time Shuker submitted a 15-page document. Spradley

and Ginsberg, however, submitted a 23-page filing: a 15-page document entitled

“Defendants’ Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law” and an 8-page

document entitled “Citations to the Record.” All of the submissions were

manipulated to maximize word space: the parties used smaller font and margins

than the local rules allow. 

I. Ex Parte Nature

There is no evidence that the ex parte nature of the filings were courtordered. Spradley testified that “I cannot state with certainty that [Ms. Coberly]

said the Court specifically says you are not to give the other side the documents. 

But whatever words were said, I came away with the impression that’s what we

were to do, and then the fact that the parties acted in conformity with that.” 

29
(Recusal Tr. Vol. IV at 133.) Ginsberg did not directly communicate with Ms.

Coberly, but testified that he was told by Spradley the court had ordered ex parte

filings. (Sanctions Tr. Vol. I at 95-96.) Ginsberg further testified that the court

ordered the second FOFCOL be filed ex parte in open court and that he objected at

that time. (Id.) However, Ginsberg could not locate a transcript or any other

evidence of this directive. (Sanctions Tr. Vol. II at 49-51.) Neither can we.

On the other hand, Shuker testified that the FOFCOL were filed ex

parte based on a mutual understanding between the lawyers; it was not based on a

court order. (Id. at 185-86.) Shuker explained that during the first filing the trial

was still ongoing and he did not want the opposition’s witnesses to read his

clients’ FOFCOL and change their testimony. (Id.) For the second filing, Shuker

testified that the trial had been so expensive that he did not want to add the costs

of exchanging and objecting to each others submissions. (Id.) 

At best, Ginsberg presented evidence that the attorneys had some

understanding about not serving each other. We find no evidence, however, that

the court ordered the parties to submit the filings ex parte or that the court was

aware that such was being done. 

ii. Reliance on 46-page Filing

30
We also find no evidence that Judge Briskman read, let alone relied on,

Evergreen’s 46-page FOFCOL and Ginsberg has presented none.

Due to the overlap between the court’s ultimate FOFCOL and Evergreen’s

46-page FOFCOL, Spradley and Ginsberg contended that Judge Briskman relied

on the 46-page document. (See Recusal Tr. Vol. IV at 97; Sanctions Tr. Vol. I at

100.) Spradley and Ginsberg also felt it significant that the court never disclosed

the 46-page submission or formally rejected the oversized filing. 

Yet, neither Spradley nor Ginsberg had any reason to believe Judge

Briskman or his law clerk actually read the 46-page FOFCOL. (See, e.g., Recusal

Tr. Vol. III at 67, 153; Sanctions Tr. Vol. I at 101.) The only evidence produced

was the emails discussed above, which suggest that Judge Briskman did not read

the 46-page FOFCOL and that it was a “moot issue.” Further, at the time the

Motion was filed, neither Ginsberg nor Spradley had seen the 15-page replacement

FOFCOL or the FOFCOL submitted at the conclusion of the trial. (Recusal Tr.

Vol. III at 97.) At the recusal hearing Shuker testified that all of the facts and

conclusions contained in the 46-page submission could be found in Evergreen’s

two 15-page submissions or in the FOFCOL in the Kime opinion, a related case

cited in Evergreen’s 15-page submission. Spradley and Ginsberg conceded that

they had never reviewed either of Evergreen’s 15-page submissions or compared

31
those documents with the court’s ultimate FOFCOL. Ginsberg says he assumed

that Judge Briskman read the oversized FOFCOL. This is another unjustified

position in the face of emails to the contrary. 

Moreover, Shuker’s expert witness Professor Lubet explained that even if

the emails are incorrect and Judge Briskman actually read the 46-page submission,

he could have easily disregarded it. Indeed, judges are asked to disregard

evidence all of the time. 

Finally, we note that although Ginsberg and Spradley were quick to accuse

Shuker of filing an oversized FOFCOL (“Mr. Shuker took advantage of the

clandestine filings by blatantly flaunting the page limits imposed on Movants”

(emphasis added)), their own FOFCOL was oversized and in violation of the Local

Rules. (Recusal Mot. at 27.)

Once again, the record supports the bankruptcy court’s findings.

3. Shuker’s Behavior

Finally, the Recusal Motion complained of Shuker’s behavior and

statements which allegedly violated Rules 4-3.4(g) and 4-3.4(h) of the Florida

Rules of Professional Conduct. The Motion alleged Shuker made “unethical 12

 On appeal Ginsberg does not address the allegations of Shuker’s improper conduct. 12

Because Shuker’s conduct was alleged as a basis for filing the Recusal Motion we still address it

below.

32
threats of seeking, and promises of obtaining, the incarceration of the individual

Movants and similar threats directed at Movant’s Counsel.” (Recusal Mot. at 3.) 

The bankruptcy court found that Shuker’s behavior did not rise to the level of a

disciplinary rule violation or create doubts about the bankruptcy court’s

impartiality. The record supports this finding.

a. Threats to Knight and Huggins

After a court hearing in which Shuker sought orders directing Knight and

Huggins to repatriate certain funds or be held in civil contempt, the Recusal

Motion asserts that Shuker told Knight and Huggins they would end up in jail if

they did not settle, and Huggins would “die in jail.” (Recusal Mot. at 9.) It is now

clear that this never happened.

Knight’s own testimony belies the facts as stated in the Recusal Motion. 

The Motion states that “Mr. Shuker approached [Knight and Huggins] outside the

door of the Court and announced that . . . [Knight and Huggins] would ‘end up in

jail’ and that Mr. Huggins, 67-years old, ‘would die in jail.’” (Id.) According to

Knight, however, Shuker did not approach either Knight or Huggins, his

comments were made only to Spradley and Ginsberg. (Recusal Tr. Vol. IV at 162;

Knight Aff. at 2.) Knight testified that while Spradley and Shuker were speaking

in the hallway, Shuker told Spradley if he did not have a settlement on his desk

33
soon, Spradley’s clients were going to go to jail and Huggins would die in jail. 

(Id.) Knight claims that although he was not part of the conversation, he was

within earshot and overheard Shuker’s threats. (Id.) Huggins, however, was in

the bathroom (out of earshot) at the time. (Id.) Being within earshot of two

lawyers negotiating is much different than being approached by opposing counsel. 

Further, if Huggins was in the bathroom during Shuker’s alleged threats, Shuker

could not have told Mr. Huggins that he “would die in jail.” 

Moreover, Shuker testified that this was a warning, not a threat. (Recusal

Tr. Vol. IV at 196.) If Huggins and Knight did not make a settlement offer for the

money already owed they risked being found in civil contempt and sent to jail. 

(Id.) 

Again, there is simply no support in the record for these allegations. Such

misstatements reflect either a failure to investigate or a deliberate attempt to

deceive.

b. Threats to Spradley

In another example of “Mr. Shuker threaten[ing] to use what he apparently

thought was his court-granted right to threaten imprisonment,” the Motion

references an incident at Knight’s deposition. (Recusal Mot. at 9.) Shuker was

allegedly enraged when he saw Spradley at the deposition. Shuker told Spradley

34
to leave the room and threatened that he would be arrested for trespass if he did

not leave. Spradley did not leave. Shuker then left the room, calmed down, and

returned a few minutes later. The deposition was taken with Spradley present.

Again, the Motion fails to put the incident in context. Shuker testified that

the Knight deposition at issue was not for the general Mataeka proceeding, but for

the private purpose of accessing Knight’s funds in aid of execution of an existing

judgment. Shuker did not believe that Spradley had a right to be at the deposition. 

Further, Huggins was to be deposed immediately after Knight. Thus, Shuker did

not want Huggins’ counsel in the room for Knight’s deposition. He did not want

Huggins to know what Knight was being questioned about or testifying to. 

Shuker himself acknowledged that his behavior was improper. Spradley

emailed Shuker the next day outlining the inappropriate comment and Shuker

responded with an apology email. 

The language used in the Recusal Motion fails to tell the whole story and

thereby exaggerates what occurred.

c. Threats to Ginsberg

The Motion further mentioned that Shuker threatened to file a bar grievance

against Ginsberg during the deposition of Charles Baron on August 9, 2005. 

35
In our view, Shuker’s conduct is understandable in context. At the recusal

hearing, Shuker testified that during a previous deposition Ginsberg interrupted

him on numerous occasions and even stopped the deposition mid-question to take

Knight (the deponent) out of the room. Knight allegedly returned to the

deposition and, without being asked a related question, immediately retracted a

previous answer. During the Baron deposition Shuker testified that he threatened

Ginsberg with the filing of a bar grievance if Ginsberg continued with the same

conduct. Shuker did not want Ginsberg to further interfere with the deposition by

telling Baron how to respond to questions. Shuker explained that he threatened a

bar grievance to stop this unethical conduct. Ginsberg does not contest his alleged

conduct.

d. Appearance of Impropriety

Finally, the Motion asserted that Judge Briskman’s apparent endorsement of

Shuker’s behavior created the appearance of impropriety. (See, e.g., Recusal Mot.

at 10) (“Mr. Shuker continued to craft his own set of procedures, as endorsed by

the Court”); (id. at 28) (“The proceeding, and prior proceedings, so empowered

Mr. Shuker that he felt able to threaten the individual Movants with incarceration .

. . ”) (id. at 26) (“Similarly, [Shuker] appears to have received a judicial nod to

continue to ignore the automatic stay . . .”); (id. at 9) (“Mr. Shuker threatened to

36
use what he apparently thought was his court-granted right to threaten

imprisonment.”) (emphasis added). Spradley and Ginsberg also testified that they

believed the court endorsed Shuker’s actions. During the recusal hearing,

Spradley testified that he drew an inference from Shuker’s conduct - threatening

imprisonment on two occasions - that Shuker believed he only had to call Judge

Briskman to secure an arrest. (Recusal Tr. Vol. III at 103-07.) He testified that he

was not aware of any additional facts that would support these allegations, but that

the allegations reflected his “impression” based on Shuker’s behavior. (Id.)

Ginsberg also testified that it seemed Shuker felt empowered by Judge Briskman

to act as he wanted. (Sanctions Tr. Vol. I at 104-05.) He stated: 

In the context of reviewing the ATN matter, the idea that Mr.

Shuker felt so comfortable with threatening people and so

comfortable with doing what he was doing, that he was prepared

to call Judge Briskman in for assistance and effectuate Mr.

Spradley’s arrest raised additionalred flags about what it wasthat

caused Mr. Shuker apparently to feel so empowered in our

proceedings. 

(Id.)

Ginsberg later recanted this basis for the Recusal Motion (the court’s

endorsement of Shuker’s behavior) in a letter to the court dated January 19, 2007. 

In the letter, Ginsberg stated: 

37
Other matters have been raised in the instant hearing, including

actions by Mr. Shuker in relation to parties and counsel. 

However, we do not believe that any evidence has been entered

regarding a relationship between your Honor and Mr. Shuker that

show [sic] that you endorsed such actions, and thus believe that,

although the activities were inappropriate, they do not serve as a

basis for the relief requested by the Motion. We believe that Mr.

Shuker was acting on his own at those times.

(Letter from Ginsberg to Judge Briskman of 1/19/07.) Ginsberg testified at the

sanctions hearing that the letter was only to clear up a misunderstanding, he never

alleged “an illicit or an improper relationship between Mr. Shuker and Judge

Briskman.” (Sanctions Tr. Vol. II at 14.) Ginsberg explained that for recusal he

was only required to prove that the public might perceive impropriety from

Shuker’s actions, not actual court endorsement. (Id; see also Sanctions Tr. Vol. I

at 117.) In our view, however, even though Ginsberg presented no evidence of

court endorsement, the Recusal Motion clearly accused the court of endorsing

Shuker’s actions. Such an allegation under these circumstances is improper. 

We therefore find that the bankruptcy court was not clearly erroneous in its

fact finding which is fully supported by the record.

4. Improper Purpose/Bad Faith

On appeal, Ginsberg alleges that the filing of the Motion was not

sanctionable; it was well justified in fact and law and was brought for a proper

38
purpose. In our view, a court could reasonably conclude that the content, timing,

and tone of the Recusal Motion indicate bad faith.

a. Sanctions

In this case, the bankruptcy court sanctioned Ginsberg under Federal Rule

of Bankruptcy Procedure 9011, the court’s inherent sanctioning powers, and 11

U.S.C. § 105. On appeal to the district court, Ginsberg argued that the Sanctions

Motion violated Rule 9011's twenty-one-day safe harbor provision. The district 13

court found that it was not necessary to decide whether the safe harbor provision

was violated because the sanctions imposed were clearly valid under 11 U.S.C. §

105. In re Evergreen, 391 B.R. at 188. We agree.

Under Section 105(a) the court may take any action “necessary or

appropriate to enforce or implement court orders or rules, or to prevent an abuse of

process.” 11 U.S.C. § 105(a). Thus, a court may impose sanctions if a party

violates a court order or rule. See, e.g., Jove Eng’g, Inc. v. I.R.S., 92 F.3d 1539,

1542 (11th Cir. 1996) (awarding sanctions under Section 105(a) for a violation of

an automatic stay provision). 

 The safe harbor provision allows attorneys to withdraw motions like this within 13

twenty-one days from the date of filing. If a party so withdraws the motion, it is not

sanctionable. Even though Ginsberg did not withdraw the Recusal Motion within twenty one

days from the date of filing, he argued that the Sanctions Motion was still in violation of the safe

harbor provision because it was filed before the expiration of the extra three days given for

mailings. 

39
Sanctions were also imposed under the bankruptcy court’s inherent power

which is similarly not affected by the safe harbor provision of Rule 9011. To

impose sanctions under the court’s inherent power, the court must find bad faith. 

In re Walker, 532 F.3d at 1309. “A finding of bad faith is warranted where an

attorney knowingly or recklessly raises a frivolous argument, or argues a

meritorious claim for the purpose of harassing an opponent. A party also

demonstrates bad faith by delaying or disrupting the litigation or hampering

enforcement of a court order.” (Id.) (internal citations omitted). “If particularly

egregious, the pursuit of a claim without reasonable inquiry into the underlying

facts can be the basis for a finding of bad faith.” Barnes v. Dalton, 158 F.3d 1212,

1214 (11th Cir. 1998); see also Jones v. Int’l Riding Helmets, Ltd., 49 F.3d 692,

695-96 (11th Cir. 1995) (finding that a court must determine whether a reasonable

inquiry was conducted prior to the filing of a pleading); In the Matter of Med.

One, Inc., 68 B.R. 150, 152 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1986) (finding that failure to make a

reasonable inquiry into whether a filing alleged valid claims was sanctionable). 

Further, continually advancing “groundless and patently frivolous litigation” is

“tantamount to bad faith.” Glass, 849 F.2d at 1265. 

b. Challenges to Adverse Rulings

40
The bankruptcy court was fully justified in finding that the Recusal Motion

was filed and litigated as “an offensive litigation strategy.” (Sanctions Order at

68.) 

Challenges to adverse rulings are generally grounds for appeal, not recusal. 

In re Walker, 532 F.3d at 1311; see also Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1239 (11th

Cir. 2000) (“[E]xcept where pervasive bias is shown, a judge’s rulings in the same

or a related case are not a sufficient basis for recusal.”). Nevertheless, a

considerable portion of the Recusal Motion disputed rulings unfavorable to the

debtors. (See, e.g., Recusal Mot. at 2) (referring to “a series of dubious judicial 14

actions taken in conjunction with Mr. Shuker.”). The Recusal Motion criticizes

the court for appointing an interim trustee; not sufficiently addressing the

15

automatic stay; granting the discovery order; making incorrect FOFCOL in the

16 17

 At least twenty-seven paragraphs in the Recusal Motion disputed adverse rulings. 14

 "Ignoring the absolute dearth of evidence justifying the appointment of an interim 15

trustee, and without making a single finding of fact on the record or in his Order, Judge Briskman

granted the appointment." (Recusal Mot. at 9.)

 Ginsberg argued that Shuker and Cuthill violated the automatic stay provisions in the 16

bankruptcy code by seeking discovery on at least four occasions and that the court "refused" to

enforce the automatic stay. (Recusal Mot. at 11-12.) 

 Ginsberg asserted that the expedited discovery motion discussed above was filed ex

17

parte and granted without a hearing even though Spradley objected to the relief requested.

41
Mataeka AP judgment; and miscalculating the damages award in the Mataeka AP 18

judgment. Spradley even conceded in testimony that he was “really frustrated at

19

that point, the fact that I felt relief was coming down in favor of the plaintiff and

against the defendants in the case and in a fashion that didn’t appear to be just.” 

(Recusal Tr. Vol. III at 146.) Yet, a recusal motion is an improper vehicle to

dispute disagreeable adverse rulings. It is a clear abuse of such a pleading.

Additionally, Ginsberg requested the revocation of all orders previously

entered in the Mataeka AP and related proceedings. In other words, Ginsberg

sought the revocation of more than 250 orders all previously entered in the

Evergreen case. Yet, Ginsberg presented no evidence that this was an

extraordinary circumstance which required vacatur. Liljeberg v. Health Servs.

Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 863 (1988) (noting that vacatur should only be

applied in “extraordinary circumstances” (citation omitted)). In our view,

requesting this kind of relief, while discussing numerous rulings adverse to the

 The Recusal Motion referenced the March 22, 2006 judgment in favor of Evergreen,

18

claiming it was factually inaccurate and providing specific examples of the alleged inaccuracies.

(Recusal Mot. at 13-14.) 

 The Recusal Motion criticized the amount of damages awarded to Evergreen, claiming 19

they were erroneously calculated because of Judge Briskman's reliance on Cuthill's testimony and

representations. (Recusal Mot. at 16-18.)

42
debtors, strongly suggests that the Motion was presented to hamper enforcement

of the bankruptcy court’s orders.

c. Delay Tactic

The bankruptcy court also did not err in concluding that Ginsberg filed the

Recusal Motion to postpone the involuntary bankruptcy proceedings against his

client and the appeal from the Mataeka AP Judgment. 

Filing the Recusal Motion frustrated Evergreen’s collection efforts on an

almost $8 million judgment. The Recusal Motion was filed the day after

Evergreen finished its prima facie case on the involuntary bankruptcy proceedings

and it apparently was clear to all concerned that Evergreen was going to prevail. 

The Motion was not filed until July 26 even though many of the incidents

th

outlined in the Motion happened much earlier. Ginsberg further petitioned the 20

district court to stay all related proceedings. 

Ginsberg also continually stalled the Recusal hearing. Two days before the

scheduled pre-hearing conference, he sought a stay of the proceedings pending the

resolution of his Petition for a Writ of Mandamus. Ginsberg then postponed the

 The Shuker/Ginsberg deposition skirmish happened almost a year before the Recusal 20

Motion was filed, the 46-page FOFCOL was filed ten months before the Recusal Motion was

filed and the issue appeared to be moot, and the Shuker/Spradley deposition skirmish occurred

seven weeks prior to the filing of the Recusal Motion. 

43
final evidentiary hearing for one month due to his availability constraints and

those of his expert witness. Days before the trial, Ginsberg again sought to

continue the trial for two weeks “in order to properly prepare for the depositions of

the witnesses and to properly prepare for the final evidentiary hearing.” (Recusal

Order at 14.) Finally, at the evidentiary hearing, after both parties finished

presenting their cases in chief, Ginsberg asked for a continuance to present his

rebuttal case. The evidentiary hearing was continued almost two months, at which

time Ginsberg sent a letter to the court saying he did not intend on presenting a

rebuttal case. 

Moreover, the record shows Ginsberg tried to delay the filing of an appeal. 

After filing the Recusal Motion, Ginsberg filed a motion for extension of time to

appeal the Mataeka AP Judgment. The district court found that “the stated reasons

for wanting to put off filing an initial brief have varied with each filing seeking

delay. Taken as a whole, the record is cause for concern.” (D. Ct. Case 06-cv00837-JA, D.E. # 43.) 

These delaying tactics further support the bankruptcy court’s finding of

Ginsberg’s bad faith.

d. Disrespectful Tone

44
Finally, the bankruptcy court did not err in finding that Ginsberg's

overzealous litigation tactics, use of factual inaccuracies, and disrespectful

behavior demonstrate bad faith. 

Quoting Blackstone, the United States Supreme Court explained that "the

law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already

sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon

that presumption and idea." Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 820

(1986) (quoting 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries at *361). That does not mean

that a judge should never disqualify himself for personal bias or prejudice, but it

should not be supposed. And as to counsel, as the Ohio Supreme Court has put it, 

[t]he law demands that all counsel foster respect and dignity for

those who administer and enforce the law. Conduct that is

degrading and disrespectful to judges and fellow attorneys is

neither zealous advocacy nor a legitimate trial tactic. Lying to a

tribunal and making false accusations against judges and fellow

attorneys can never be condoned. 

Columbus Bar Assn. v. Vogel, 881 N.E.2d 1244, 1249 (Ohio 2008).

Yet, the record shows Ginsberg indulged in disrespectful statements without

legal or factual foundation. Ginsberg ignored all facts indicating that the court did

not direct or engage in ex parte communications, rely on extra judicial materials,

or endorse Shuker's actions. Ginsberg knew about Judge Jenneman’s order, yet

45
Ginsberg did not even mention that Judge Jenneman had held that the ex parte

hearing was not improper. 

Instead of engaging in a reasonable fact finding investigation before making

allegations, Ginsberg supposed bias and favor in all of Judge Briskman’s actions. 

For example, because the court did not denounce Shuker’s 46-page FOFCOL,

Ginsberg claimed the oversized filing was intentional: “One can only reasonably

conclude that neither the Court nor Mr. Shuker had any intention of Mr. Shuker

being limited to filing the proposed findings within the page limit demanded of the

Movants.” (Recusal Mot. at 27) (emphasis added). Ginsberg also assumed the

court relied on the 46-page FOFCOL even though there was evidence to the

contrary. Further, the Recusal Motion compared Judge Briskman's conduct to

criminal judicial misconduct even though Ginsberg had no actual, personal

knowledge of the Complaint and no reason to believe that it alleged criminal

misconduct. Indeed, Ginsberg did not speak directly to Hudson about the

Complaint before calling it an “investigation” or try to contact any of the other

people present at the relevant ATN proceeding. 

Ginsberg also testified that he was advised by his expert witness Justice

Harding that "he had an ethical obligation to see this through" to convince the

court that Ginsberg did not file the Recusal Motion for tactical purposes. 

46
(Sanctions Tr. Vol. I at 90-91.) However, the record refutes this contention. The

record shows that Harding did not advise Ginsberg to file the Recusal Motion, as

Harding was not engaged by GrayRobinson until after the Recusal Motion was

filed. Justice Harding was also not given all of the evidence to develop his expert

opinion. For example, Justice Harding was never told that Evergreen filed a

subsequent 15-page FOFCOL, he was not shown the emails between Shuker and

Spradley discussing whether the court had considered the 46-page submission, nor

was he given the 15-page FOFCOL to compare with the court's ultimate FOFCOL. 

(Sanctions Tr. Vol. I at 54-57.)

Moreover, Ginsberg failed to re-evaluate his accusations after the

evidentiary hearing on the Recusal Motion. Ginsberg repeated his claim of

court-ordered ex parte filings even after the recusal hearing revealed no evidence

of such a directive. Ginsberg continued to assert that Judge Briskman relied on

the 46-page FOFCOL even though there were emails referencing the discussions

of Spradley and Shuker with the court’s staff that the 46-page submission was not

considered and all of the information in the ultimate FOFCOL could be found

elsewhere. Additionally, Ginsberg continued to allege that the Judicial Council

had launched an "investigation" into Judge Briskman's conduct even after he

learned that Hudson would have been notified if an "investigation" was initiated. 

47
Further, after Knight testified that he merely overheard Shuker’s threats of

imprisonment, Ginsberg still continued to assert that Shuker approached Knight

and Huggins and threatened them with imprisonment. Similarly, even after Knight

testified that Huggins was in the bathroom at the time of Shuker’s alleged threat,

Ginsberg contended that Shuker told Huggins he would die in jail. The evidence

produced at the hearing was sufficient for Spradley and GrayRobinson to pull out

of the Recusal Motion. Yet, even with mounting evidence to the contrary,

Ginsberg continued to argue the Recusal Motion.

Further, Ginsberg was extremely difficult to deal with and disrespectful to

the court. He refused to answer the court's questions, treated the court as an

adversary and continually made inflammatory statements. For example, Ginsberg

exaggerated the implications of Judge Briskman’s actions, alleging that his

conduct “relates directly to the judicial processes, namely the integrity of trial

transcripts, and a party’s due process rights and liberty.” (Recusal Mot. at 19.) 

Ginsberg opened the Recusal Hearing by claiming: "Your honor has compromised

my health, your Honor has compromised my immune system." (Recusal Tr. Vol. I

at 5.) Ginsberg also used accusatory, unsupported language in the three petitions

for writ of mandamus; asserted that Judge Briskman faced “potential career ending

punishment”; and accused him of trying to surreptitiously “brush the matter under

48
the carpet” so he could “retain authority over these very important issues of

judicial and professional conduct." (Response Br. at 16.) 

Ginsberg also purposefully pursued recusal very publicly. After learning of

Hudson's Complaint, Ginsberg did not first request a private hearing with Judge

Briskman and all counsel in these cases to address his concerns, nor did he file the

Recusal Motion under seal (ignoring the preference for confidentiality inherent in

the Judicial Council Rules discussed below). Instead, the first time Ginsberg

raised the Complaint was in a 31-page accusatory motion which used the term

"investigation" twelve times and referenced adverse rulings fifty-four times. 

Ginsberg also immediately brought the Recusal Motion to the attention of the

district court. He filed three petitions for a writ of mandamus with the district

court while the Recusal Motion was still pending.21

In our view, Ginsberg’s dogged pursuit of a frivolous claim indicates bad

faith.

B. Disclosure of the Complaint

 The Supreme Court has said: “Mandamus, prohibition and injunction against judges 21

are drastic and extraordinary remedies. We do not doubt power in a proper case to issue such

writs. But they have the unfortunate consequence of making the judge a litigant, obliged to

obtain personal counsel or to leave his defense to one of the litigants before him. These remedies

should be resorted to only where appeal is a clearly inadequate remedy. We are unwilling to

utilize them as a substitute for appeal. As extraordinary remedies, they are reserved for really

extraordinary causes.” Ex parte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258, 259-60 (1947).

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The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to disclose the

existence of the Complaint. 

The Judicial Council Rules have strict confidentiality requirements. 

Judicial Council Rule 16 requires that “complaints, records of investigations and

proceedings relating to allegations of judicial misconduct or disability shall be

maintained as confidential matters, and shall not be disclosed to the public.” 

Judicial Council Rule 15(f) does allow disclosure of a complaint “upon the written

consent of both the complained-of judge and the Chief Judge,” but in our view the

strict confidentiality requirements indicate the generally secretive nature of

judicial complaints. 

This preference for confidentiality maintains public confidence in the

judiciary. Keeping the existence of the Complaint confidential kept the Complaint

from “affecting the public's confidence in the impartiality and integrity of the

judicial process." Davis, 506 F.3d at 1332 n.12 (internal citations omitted). It

defies logic for Ginsberg to file a motion asserting harm to public confidence in

the judiciary when his own actions in filing the Motion and attempting to make the

Complaint public are creating such harm. Surely if he was so concerned, Ginsberg

could have inquired about the Complaint out of the public eye. Yet, the first time

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Judge Briskman was asked to disclose information about the Complaint was in full

public view. 

Indeed, Ginsberg was relentless in his attempts to force Judge Briskman to

testify about the Complaint and make it public. First, Ginsberg listed Judge

Briskman as a witness in the pretrial disclosures for the recusal hearing. When

Judge Briskman entered an order excluding himself as a witness, Ginsberg sought

to compel Judge Briskman to testify. After postponing his rebuttal case during the

Recusal Motion hearing, Ginsberg wrote a letter to Judge Briskman again

requesting he make disclosures about the Complaint. Later, on August 8, 2007,

Ginsberg filed another Motion Requesting the Honorable Arthur Briskman Make

Certain Disclosures on the Record (“Disclosure Motion”) and before Judge

Briskman ruled on the Disclosure Motion, at the commencement of the sanctions

hearing, Ginsberg made an additional ore tenus motion to have Judge Briskman

disclose his knowledge of the Complaint on the record. 

In addition to the Judicial Council Rules’ preference for confidentiality,

Federal Rule of Evidence 605 also states that a judge cannot testify at a trial in

which he is presiding. F.R.E. Rule 605. Moreover, a judge is not required to

recuse himself so that he can testify. See, e.g., Cheeves v. So. Clays, Inc., 797

F.Supp. 1570, 1582-83 (M.D. Ga. 1992) (having a judge testify is manipulated

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harassment, as it would cause an unjustified voluntary disqualification of the

presiding judge or endless delays in the litigation); Sensley v. Albritton, 385 F.3d

591, 599 (5th Cir. 2004) (“a federal judge has a duty to sit where not disqualified

which is equally as strong as its duty to not sit where disqualified”) (quoting Laird

v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 837 (1972)). As Judge Briskman presided over both the

recusal hearing and the sanctions hearing, he could not testify at either. 

Ginsberg argued that Judge Briskman should have recused himself from

both hearings, but Section 455(a) places the burden to decide recusal on the judge

who is the subject of the Motion. Section 455(a) states that “any justice, judge, or

magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify himself.” 11 U.S.C. § 455(a)

(emphasis added). Further, judges routinely preside over motions for their own

recusal. For example, Justice Scalia presided over a motion to recuse him in a

case before the United States Supreme Court. Cheney, 541 U.S. at 913. The Fifth

Circuit also held in In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation that “[i]t is for

the judge who is the object of the affidavit (of bias) to pass on its sufficiency.” 

614 F.2d 958, 963 n.9 (5th Cir. 1980) (quoting 13 Wright, Miller & Cooper §

3551 at 375).22

 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), we 22

adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to

October 1, 1981.

52
 In the event that Judge Briskman erred in some rulings, Ginsberg should

have waited to deal with these issues on appeal. In re Walker, 532 F.3d at 1311

(“Adverse rulings are grounds for appeal but rarely are grounds for recusal . . .”). 

The district court here (through Judge Antoon) advised Ginsberg as much in the

denial of Ginsberg’s Third Petition for Writ of Mandamus, explaining that

Ginsberg should wait until Judge Briskman issued a ruling on the Recusal Motion

and then appeal it, but Ginsberg simply ignored this instruction. Further,

Ginsberg’s dogged pursuit of Judge Briskman’s testimony supports the bankruptcy

court’s finding of bad faith. See Indus. Risk Insurers v. M.A.N.

Gutehoffnungshutte GmbH, 141 F.3d 1434, 1448 (11th Cir. 1998) ("Improper

purpose may be shown by excessive persistence in pursuing a claim or defense in

the face of repeated adverse rulings."). 

For all of these reasons we find that the bankruptcy court was not clearly

erroneous in its fact finding and applied correct legal standards.

C. Presiding over the Sanctions Hearing

Finally, the bankruptcy court did not err in presiding over the Sanctions

Motion. 

On appeal Ginsberg asserts that Judge Briskman was too emotionally

involved in the matter and should have transferred the Sanctions Motion to the

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district court or another bankruptcy court judge. In certain circumstances “there

are criticisms of judicial conduct which are so personal and so probably

productive of bias that the judge must disqualify himself to avoid being the judge

in his own case.” Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 583 (1964). However, that

does not mean that every attack on a judge disqualifies him from sitting. Id.; see

also Sensley, 385 F.3d at 599. “We cannot assume that judges are so irascible and

sensitive that they cannot fairly and impartially deal with resistance to their

authority or with highly charged arguments about the soundness of their

decisions.” Ungar, 376 U.S. at 584. Requiring recusal for all disruptive,

recalcitrant and disagreeable commentary would undermine the judiciary. See

Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 463 (1971). “A judge cannot be driven

out of a case.” Id. 

As we have found that Judge Briskman appropriately presided over the

Recusal Motion hearing, we also find that Judge Briskman was in the best position

to sanction Ginsberg for his conduct therein. We further agree with the district

court that “[w]hile some of the Bankruptcy Judge’s remarks at the sanctions

hearing were immoderate, they were not sufficiently egregious to ‘reveal such a

high degree of favoritism or antagonism as to make fair judgment impossible.’” 

Evergreen, 391 B.R. at 189 n.6 (quoting Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540,

54
555 (1994)). In our view, Ginsberg’s egregious conduct - including interrupting

Judge Briskman and grossly mischaracterizing the facts - warranted some of Judge

Briskman’s admonishments. Our reading of the transcripts convinces us that for

the most part Judge Briskman showed great patience and accommodated Ginsberg,

who was experiencing health problems, over and over again. 

IV. CONCLUSION: REASONABLENESS OF SANCTIONS

Ginsberg’s unfounded allegations and improper motive support a finding of

bad faith. See In re Walker, 532 F.3d at 1310. We therefore believe the court did

not abuse its discretion in imposing sanctions under either Section 105(a) or the

court’s inherent authority to sanction improper conduct. 

“Civil penalties must either be compensatory or designed to coerce

compliance.” In re Dyer, 322 F.3d 1178, 1192 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing F.J.

Hanshaw Enters., Inc. v. Emerald River Dev., Inc., 244 F.3d 1128, 1137-38 (9th

Cir. 2001)). “On review, it is not necessary to psychoanalyze the [attorneys’

actions] to discover the smallest dollar value that would deter. Our task is to

ensure that the district court did not abuse its discretion in crafting a sanction

award reasonably calculated to deter litigation abuse.” Merriman v. Sec. Ins. Co.

of Hartford, 100 F.3d 1187, 1194 (5th Cir. 1996). 

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The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in imposing both

compensatory sanctions (monetary sanctions) and sanctions designed to coerce

compliance (suspension). In our view, Ginsberg’s relentless pursuit of the Recusal

Motion, even after the evidentiary hearing revealed no factual support for

Ginsberg’s contentions, demonstrates that a monetary sanction alone would be

insufficient to deter Ginsberg from similarly egregious behavior in the future. 

Therefore, the imposition of monetary sanctions and a suspension is justified. 

Moreover, because Ginsberg is a non-bankruptcy (by his admission), New York

lawyer who appeared pro hac vice before the Bankruptcy Court in the Middle

District of Florida, we find that a five year suspension in that court is not too

severe. Finally, the monetary sanctions imposed by the bankruptcy court were

based upon the attorneys’ fees incurred by the appellees and were fully supported

in the record. 

Based on the foregoing analysis we affirm the district court’s decision to

affirm the bankruptcy court’s imposition of sanctions.

AFFIRMED.

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