UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-1127

HIPOLITO J. ESTRELLA; SALVACION H. ESTRELLA,

Plaintiffs - Appellants,

v.

WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.; THE FEDERAL HOME LOAN MORTGAGE 

CORPORATION; SAMUEL I. WHITE, P.C.,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Mark S. Davis, District 

Judge. (2:11-cv-00414-MSD-TEM)

Submitted: November 20, 2012 Decided: November 29, 2012

Before WILKINSON, KING, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Henry W. McLaughlin, III, LAW OFFICE OF HENRY W. MCLAUGHLIN, 

P.C., Richmond, Virginia, for Appellants. Hunter W. Sims, Jr., 

David J. Sullivan, KAUFMAN & CANOLES, P.C., Norfolk, Virginia, 

for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Hipolito and Salvacion Estrella filed a complaint 

against Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., the Federal Home Loan Mortgage 

Corporation (“Freddie Mac”), and trustee Samuel I. White, P.C.

(collectively, “Appellees”), seeking to quiet title,

compensatory damages, and declaratory relief, based on their 

claim that the foreclosure of their home was invalid due to an 

inadequate pre-acceleration notice. After the action was 

removed to federal court under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1442(a) (West Supp. 

2012), the district court dismissed the action pursuant to Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The Estrellas now appeal the district 

court’s judgment dismissing their complaint for failure to state 

a claim. On appeal, the Estrellas contend that the district 

court abused its discretion in denying leave to amend the 

complaint and erred in dismissing the complaint based on its 

finding that they received proper pre-acceleration notice. 

Finding no error, we affirm.

We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s 

denial of leave to amend a complaint. See Cozzarelli v. Inspire 

Pharms. Inc., 549 F.3d 618, 630 (4th Cir. 2008). When a party 

moves for leave to amend his pleading, the court must grant 

leave to amend “when justice so requires.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 

15(a)(2). However, where, as here, the plaintiff fails to 

formally move to amend and fails to provide the district court 
3

with any proposed amended complaint or other indication of the 

amendments he wishes to make, “the district court [does] not 

abuse its discretion in failing to give the plaintiff[] a blank 

authorization to ‘do over’ [his] complaint.” Francis v. 

Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 197 (4th Cir. 2009); see Cozzarelli, 

549 F.3d at 630-31 (finding no abuse of discretion in “declining 

to grant a motion [to amend] that was never properly made” but 

raised only in opposition to a motion to dismiss and in 

objections to the magistrate judge’s report).*

 Thus, the 

district court’s denial of leave to amend was not an abuse of 

discretion.

Turning to the Estrellas’ remaining argument, we 

review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a complaint under 

Rule 12(b)(6). WEC Carolina Energy Solutions LLC v. Miller, 687 

F.3d 199, 202 (4th Cir. 2012). While we must accept all wellpled allegations as true and draw reasonable inferences in favor 

of the non-moving party, “legal conclusions, elements of a cause 

of action, and bare assertions devoid of further factual 

enhancement” are not entitled to such deference. See Nemet 

Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 255 

 * While the district court relied substantially on 

alternative grounds in denying leave to amend, we may affirm for 

any reason appearing on the record. See Republican Party of 

N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992).
4

(4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Under

Virginia law, whether a pre-acceleration notice is adequate to 

support subsequent foreclosure is “a matter of contract between 

the parties,” to be determined by reference to the deed of 

trust. See Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC v. Simmons, 654 S.E.2d 

898, 901 (Va. 2008).

Here, the pre-acceleration letter clearly indicated 

that the Estrellas defaulted by falling delinquent in their 

payments, and that such default would be cured only by bringing 

the payments current by August 18, 2009, thirty days after the 

notice was deemed to have been given. The letter also clearly 

indicated the amounts required to bring the loan current before 

and after an intervening payment came due, and it provided the 

Estrellas with the option to cure the default by paying either 

amount during the applicable time period. Because this method 

of curing the default complied fully with the notice 

requirements set out in the deed of trust, we conclude that the 

Estrellas’ underlying claim of improper notice is meritless. 

Thus, the district court did not err in dismissing the

Estrellas’ claims on this basis.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 
5

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED