IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

MADISON C., Petitioner,

v.

THE HONORABLE SUZANNE MARWIL, Judge of the SUPERIOR 

COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA, in and for the County of 

MARICOPA, Respondent Judge,

and

ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, Real Party in Interest.

No. 1 CA-SA 22-0202

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JD42176

The Honorable Suzanne Marwil, Judge

JURISDICTION ACCEPTED; RELIEF GRANTED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Public Advocate, Phoenix

By Natalie Jones

Counsel for Petitioner

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson

By Autumn L. Spritzer

Co-Counsel for Real Party in Interest

FILED 5-11-2023
MADISON C. v. HON. MARWIL/DCS

Opinion of the Court

2

The Huff Law Firm, Tucson

By Daniel R. Huff & Laura J. Huff

Co-Counsel for Real Party in Interest

OPINION

Judge Angela K. Paton delivered the opinion of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Maria Elena Cruz and Judge Michael J. Brown joined.

P A T O N, Judge:

¶1 Madison C. (“Mother”) filed this special action challenging

the superior court’s exercise of temporary emergency jurisdiction and 

temporary custody over her child (“the Child”) under Arizona’s enactment 

of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act 

(“UCCJEA”). See A.R.S. §§ 25-1001 to -1067. In this Opinion, we clarify the 

UCCJEA’s requirement that a party seeking to invoke the superior court’s 

temporary emergency jurisdiction must prove that a child is being 

subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse. Because the 

Arizona Department of Child Safety (“DCS”) presented insufficient 

evidence that the Child was “subjected to or threatened with mistreatment 

or abuse” by Mother, see A.R.S. § 25-1034(A), to support the court’s exercise 

of temporary emergency jurisdiction, we accept special action jurisdiction

and grant relief. We vacate the court’s minute entry exercising temporary 

emergency jurisdiction.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Mother and the Child are Arkansas residents. In late July 

2022, Mother sent the Child to stay with Child’s maternal grandmother 

(“Grandmother”) in Arizona, intending to join her shortly thereafter.

¶3 On August 10, the Arkansas Department of Health and 

Human Services (“ADHHS”) received a report alleging that Mother abused 

drugs, her home was unsafe for the Child, and the Child had inadequate 

food and was being educationally neglected. That same day, an ADHHS 

investigator visited Mother. Mother lied about who she was and denied 

the investigator access to her property. About three weeks later, an 

Arkansas court granted ADHHS’s request for an order permitting the 

agency to access Mother’s property.
MADISON C. v. HON. MARWIL/DCS

Opinion of the Court

3

¶4 When the ADHHS investigator and police officers returned to 

the property two days later and presented Mother with the court order, 

Mother cooperated. ADHHS asked Mother to provide a urine sample—

even though not required by the court order. Mother tried but was unable 

to produce one. She offered to go to another testing location to provide a 

urine sample but ADHHS—per department policy—declined to facilitate 

another test. 

¶5 Mother told ADHHS during the visit that the Child was with 

Grandmother in Arizona and ADHHS asked DCS to conduct a courtesy

wellness check on the Child. DCS did so that same day, and, although 

Grandmother did not permit DCS to enter the home, DCS saw the Child, 

who appeared to be safe. DCS informed ADHHS that there were no 

concerns about the Child’s safety. 

¶6 Meanwhile, in Arkansas, the investigator examined Mother’s 

home and found adequate housing and food and no evidence of drug use. 

Consequently, ADHHS closed the investigation, and found the report of 

abuse or neglect unsubstantiated.

¶7 One week later, the Child, Grandmother, and a third-party 

driver were involved in a car accident in Arizona. Police found what they 

characterized as a “meth pipe” in Grandmother’s jacket, and “four bags, a 

little bit bigger than quarter-dollar size,” containing methamphetamine in 

the car. Based on the drugs found in the car and Grandmother’s 

hospitalization following the accident, DCS took the Child into custody. 

The court granted DCS’s request for temporary custody of the Child the 

next day, based on allegations that Mother abused substances and failed to 

properly care for the Child by leaving the Child in Grandmother’s care.

¶8 Also on the next day, DCS called Mother while she was 

traveling to Arizona. When Mother arrived in Arizona, DCS asked her to 

complete a urinalysis and hair follicle test. The drug testing provider

(“PSI”) returned documentation indicating Mother was unable to produce 

a urine sample, and on the advice of her attorney, Mother declined a hair 

follicle test. DCS filed a preliminary report with the court, alleging that 

Mother was “very shakey [sic] and fidgety” and “had scabs and sores on 

her legs.”

¶9 The superior court held an evidentiary hearing in late 

September regarding temporary custody and whether to exercise 

temporary emergency jurisdiction pursuant to Section 25-1034(A), given 

that the Child had not been in Arizona for six consecutive months.
MADISON C. v. HON. MARWIL/DCS

Opinion of the Court

4

Mother’s counsel and the Child’s counsel objected to the court’s proposed 

exercise of jurisdiction.

¶10 The court heard testimony from the ADHHS and DCS 

investigators. The DCS investigator admitted that, as of the date of the 

hearing, DCS’s only concern “[was] the unknown of substance abuse[.]”

The DCS investigator testified that Mother appeared surprised when 

informed of evidence of Grandmother’s possession of drug paraphernalia

and the methamphetamine found in the car.

¶11 After the presentation of evidence, Mother moved for 

judgment as a matter of law, arguing insufficient evidence supported a 

finding that she either abused substances or knew that Grandmother was 

an unsafe caregiver. She argued that the court’s exercise of jurisdiction was 

inappropriate because the Child was not at immediate risk of abuse or 

mistreatment if returned to her care. The Child’s counsel joined in Mother’s 

motion.

¶12 The court found it had temporary emergency jurisdiction

over the Child and probable cause that temporary custody of the Child 

“remain[ed] necessary to prevent the Child from being subject to further 

abuse or neglect, such as being exposed to methamphetamines or under the 

care of a substance exposed caregiver, whether that be either her parents or 

[Grandmother].” The court determined it had “jurisdiction to order that 

Mother undergo a drug test so we can know whether there’s an ongoing 

concern over drugs for Mother.” 

¶13 This timely special action petition by Mother followed. After 

Mother filed this petition, she submitted a negative urinalysis, and the 

superior court dismissed the temporary custody order at the State’s request

at a hearing on October 31.

DISCUSSION

I. We accept special action jurisdiction despite the dismissal of 

the temporary custody order.

¶14 The decision to accept or deny special action jurisdiction is 

discretionary. See Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act. 1(a) (special action jurisdiction is 

appropriate when a party has no “equally plain, speedy, and adequate 

remedy by appeal”); Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act. 3(b), (c) (providing for special 

action jurisdiction when a respondent party “has proceeded . . . without or 

in excess of jurisdiction or legal authority” or has made “a determination 

[that is] . . . an abuse of discretion”).
MADISON C. v. HON. MARWIL/DCS

Opinion of the Court

5

¶15 This court may accept jurisdiction when the matter involves a 

purely legal question of first impression, is of statewide importance, and is 

likely to recur. See State ex rel. Adel v. Covil, 252 Ariz. 40, 41, ¶ 2 (App. 2021). 

If the matter “can be resolved on legal principles,” this militates in favor of 

accepting jurisdiction. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. v. Super. Ct., 171 Ariz. 688, 

690 (App. 1992).

¶16 After filing her special action petition, Mother submitted a 

negative urinalysis. At the State’s request, the superior court dismissed the 

temporary custody order, returning the Child to Mother’s care. The State 

now argues we should dismiss this special action as moot. While we 

ordinarily decline to review a question when its resolution “will have no 

effect on the parties,” this is a prudential concern rather than a jurisdictional 

bar. Cardoso v. Soldo, 230 Ariz. 614, 617, ¶ 5 (App. 2012).

¶17 Whether a superior court errs by exercising temporary 

emergency jurisdiction over a child is an issue capable of repetition yet 

likely to evade appellate review, meaning special action jurisdiction is 

proper here. Id. at 617, ¶ 7. Specifically, in this case, the short timeline from 

the initial investigation to dismissal described above suggests that a 

temporary exercise of this type will likely evade appellate review in the 

ordinary course. Consequently, despite the dismissal of the underlying 

dependency action, we accept special action jurisdiction to address an issue 

of statewide importance: the findings necessary to establish temporary 

emergency jurisdiction and award temporary custody of a child under the 

UCCJEA. See A.R.S. § 25-1034(A).

II. The superior court must apply Section 25-1034(A) when the 

Child’s home state is not Arizona, even in the absence of 

parallel court proceedings.

¶18 We review the superior court’s exercise of jurisdiction and its 

interpretation of relevant statutes de novo. Stapert v. Ariz. Bd. of Psych. 

Exam’rs, 210 Ariz. 177, 179, ¶ 7 (App. 2005). Jurisdiction is conferred

directly by the Arizona Constitution or by statute. See generally Ariz. Const. 

art. 6, § 14; Schoenberger v. Bd. of Adjustment of City of Phx., 124 Ariz. 528, 530 

(1980).

¶19 The UCCJEA is the requisite jurisdictional basis for making 

an initial custody determination. See A.R.S. §§ 25-1002(3), 25-1031(A), (B). 

While home state jurisdiction is the typical ground for jurisdiction, see 

Section 25-1031(A)(1), (2)-(4), temporary emergency jurisdiction may be 
MADISON C. v. HON. MARWIL/DCS

Opinion of the Court

6

appropriate where necessary to protect a child in exceptional, enumerated 

circumstances. A.R.S. § 25-1034.

¶20 Section 25-1034(A) provides the basis for jurisdiction over a 

child whose home state is not Arizona in cases where “the child is present 

in this state and the child has been abandoned or it is necessary in an 

emergency to protect the child because the child . . . is subjected to or 

threatened with mistreatment or abuse.” The UCCJEA and the 

jurisdictional prerequisites under Section 25-1034(A) apply even absent a 

court proceeding or prior custody determination in another state. See 

Sha’quia G. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 251 Ariz. 212, 215, ¶ 13 (App. 2021)

(affirming an Arizona court’s exercising temporary emergency jurisdiction 

in the absence of a prior custody determination in the children’s foreign 

home state); A.R.S. § 25-1034(B), (D) (permitting the exercise of temporary 

emergency jurisdiction regardless of the status of proceedings or prior 

custody determinations in other states).

¶21 Both the requirements to confer with another court and

requirements to exercise jurisdiction are mandatory where the statute so 

requires. See Sha’quia G., 251 Ariz. at 215, ¶¶ 13-14. When Arizona is not 

the child’s home state, a court may “make an initial child custody 

determination only” in circumstances specified by statute. A.R.S. 

§ 25-1031(A) (emphasis added); see also A.R.S. § 25-1031(A)(2)-(4) 

(providing for other circumstances short of an emergency). Section 25-1034 

is an exception to this general rule, expanding jurisdiction only in specific 

circumstances, see Welch-Doden v. Roberts, 202 Ariz. 201, 209-10, ¶¶ 39-40 

(App. 2002) (interpreting Section 25-1031(A), such as in cases of 

abandonment or when “it is necessary in an emergency to protect the 

child . . . subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse.” A.R.S. 

§ 25-1034(A)).

¶22 But neither Section 25-1031(A) nor Section 25-1034(A) is 

limited to situations where a competing court order or proceedings in 

another jurisdiction exist. A court must apply these statutes in cases where 

it is asked to exercise jurisdiction over a child whose home state is not 

Arizona.

¶23 Neither party disputes that the Child’s home state is

Arkansas, not Arizona. Consequently, to acquire jurisdiction absent 

Section 25-1031 findings, the superior court had to apply Section 

25-1034(A). 
MADISON C. v. HON. MARWIL/DCS

Opinion of the Court

7

III. The superior court lacked reasonable evidence to support an 

exercise of jurisdiction under Section 25-1034(A).

¶24 The superior court could exercise temporary emergency 

jurisdiction over the Child in this case only if the facts demonstrated an 

emergency in which “the child . . . is subjected to or threatened with 

mistreatment or abuse.” See A.R.S. § 25-1034(A). We will affirm a superior 

court’s exercise of temporary emergency jurisdiction “if reasonable 

evidence and inferences” support the factual basis. See Holly C. v. Tohono 

O’odham Nation, 247 Ariz. 495, 505, ¶ 26 (App. 2019). But we are mindful, 

in keeping with our duty to harmonize our interpretation of uniform laws 

with other jurisdictions, that exercise of temporary emergency jurisdiction 

is “extraordinary” and “reserved for extraordinary circumstances.” 

UCCJEA § 204 cmt. (Unif. L. Comm’n 1997) (quoting Unif. Child Custody 

Jurisdiction Act § 3 cmt. (Unif. L. Comm’n 1968)).

¶25 The superior court conflated the evidentiary standard for a 

dependency, which references and considers “neglect” under Section

8-201(25), with the “mistreatment or abuse” standard under Section 

25-1034(A). See also UCCJEA § 204(a) (Unif. L. Comm’n 1997). As 

commentary to UCCJEA Section 204 explains, the Uniform Law 

Commission intentionally omitted “neglect” as a basis for exercising 

temporary emergency jurisdiction. UCCJEA § 204 cmt. (Unif. L. Comm’n 

1997); see also May v. Ellis, 208 Ariz. 229, 232, ¶ 12 (2004) (“[C]ommentary 

to . . . a uniform act is highly persuasive.”) (quoting UNUM Life Ins. Co. of 

Am., 200 Ariz. 332, 515 ¶ 25 (2001)). Arizona courts interpret uniform laws 

consistently with sister jurisdictions. Canon Sch. Dist. No. 50 v. W.E.S. 

Constr. Co., 180 Ariz. 148, 154 (1994). Other courts have found that an 

immediate risk of harm to the child upon return to the parent is necessary 

for an emergency finding, and we find their interpretations of the UCCJEA 

persuasive. See e.g., Bowman v. Bowman, 811 S.E.2d 103, 106 (Ga. Ct. App. 

2018) (“Generally, to exercise jurisdiction under this statute, there must be 

an immediate danger of harm or abuse.”); In re Cristian I., 224 Cal. App. 4th 

1088, 1097 (2014) (“An ‘emergency’ exists when there is an immediate risk 

of danger to the child if he or she is returned to a parent.”).

¶26 Of course, conduct that constitutes neglect may also qualify 

as mistreatment or abuse; such terms are not mutually exclusive, and the 

Uniform Law Commission specifically omitted neglect due to its elastic 

ability to encompass more conduct than abuse and mistreatment. See 

UCCJEA § 204 cmt. (Unif. L. Comm’n 1997). We do not mean to say that 

any specific conduct by a parent is excluded from consideration under 

Section 25-1034(A). While no statute or controlling case law defines 
MADISON C. v. HON. MARWIL/DCS

Opinion of the Court

8

“mistreatment,” the dictionary definition suggests that it—like abuse—is 

characterized based on the direct impact of the behavior of the parent on 

the child, in a manner constituting an emergency. Compare A.R.S. 

§ 8-201(25) (“neglect”) with -201(2) (“abuse”) and Mistreat, Random House 

Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary (2d ed. 2001) (“to treat badly or 

abusively”). But while we cannot say conduct that constitutes neglect could 

never rise to the level of “mistreatment or abuse,” prior conduct 

constituting neglect (such as allegations of drug use standing alone) that 

does not also establish an immediate risk of danger to the child upon return 

to the parent does not justify exercise of temporary emergency jurisdiction.

¶27 With Mother in Arizona seeking to care for her Child, the 

question for the court was whether the Child would be “subjected to or 

threatened with mistreatment or abuse” upon return to Mother’s care. See 

A.R.S. § 25-1034(A). DCS presented evidence supporting its suspicion of 

both drug abuse by Mother and that Grandmother was potentially an 

unsafe caregiver, but that evidence was insufficient to show that returning 

the Child to Mother’s care posed any risk of immediate danger. Therefore, 

no ongoing emergency was proven. On these facts, the superior court erred

by exercising temporary emergency jurisdiction.

CONCLUSION

¶28 We vacate the superior court’s minute entry exercising

temporary emergency jurisdiction over the Child.