2018 IL App (1st) 171409
No. 1-17-1409 Opinion filed on November 20, 2018.

Second Division

IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST DISTRICT

OMID SHARIAT RAZAVI, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff -Appellant, ) Cook County. ) v. ) ) No. 16 L 8406 SCHOOL OF THE ART INSTITUTE ) OF CHICAGO, EVA WALKUSKI, and ) ARIEL ZEKELMAN, ) The Honorable ) Moira Johnson, Defendants , ) Judge Presiding. ) (Eva Walkuski and Ariel Zekelman, Defendants

­ ) Appellees). )

JUSTICE LAVIN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Presiding Justice Mason and Justice Pucinski concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION ¶ 1 Plaintiff Omid Shariat Razavi now files his second interlocutory appeal relating to his
defamation action against defendants Eva Walkuski and Ariel Zekelman. Defendants filed separate motion s to dismiss under section 2-619 of the Code of Civil Proced ure (Code) (735No. 1-17-1409

ILCS 5/2-619 ( West 2016)), both of which the circuit court granted after finding an absolute privilege precluded the lawsuit from proceeding. Plaintiff now contests that judgment on appeal.
For the reasons to follow, we affirm. ¶ 2 BACKGROUND ¶ 3 In fall 2011, plaintiff , then age 29, and also Walkuski, then age 19, and Zekelman were
students at the School of the Art Institute of Chicago (SAIC), a private institution , and all three
lived in the SAIC dormitory. Walkuski and Zekelman were friends, and at some point before
December 2011, plaintiff and Walkuski were also friends. In early September 2013, Walkuski reported to the SAIC campus security director and the dire ctor of student outreach that plaintiff had sexually assaulted her in 2011 and had stalked her in 2012 and 2013. Specifically, she reported to SAIC that plaintiff “repeatedly engaged in harassing behavior by following her
around campus, contacting her against her wishes, and staring at her for extended periods of time
dur ing” spring 2012 and fall 2013. ¶ 4 About a week after Walkuski told SAIC campus security and authori ties about plaintiff’s
actions , on September 13, 2013, SAIC’ s campus security director escorted Walkuski to the Chicago Police Department where she filed an incident report pertaining to the sexual assault and stalking. Around the same time, Zekelman reported to campus security an in cident in p laintiff ’s dormitory, where while sleeping in a s eparate bed, she awoke to find p laintiff on top of her and kissing her in spite of Zekelman ’s expressed wishes not to have any physical contact. ¶ 5 These reports prompted s everal conversations between p laintiff and Patrick Spence,

a ssoci ate dean of student a ffairs, along with the campus security director. Plaintiff did not deny
the sexual contact with Walkuski but claimed it was consensual and sometimes initiated by
Walkuski. He presented campus security with a photograph and text messages and also denied

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any harassm ent, claiming no contact with Walkuski since August 2012. As to Zekelman, plaintiff
claimed he never engaged in any sexual contact with Zekelman, denying that she even slept in
his dorm room. Cam pus security then investigated p laintiff, resulting in his interim suspension
while the investigation proceeded. SAIC campus security informed Felice J. Dublon, SAIC’ s vice president and d ean of student a ffairs (VP of Student Affairs), of the allegations against
p laintiff

. In turn, Dublon informed p laintiff via a letter, dated October 1, 2013, that the
information indicated he may have violated several rules of conduct from the SAIC student
handbook and that a “S tudent Conduct Board Meeting” would be held in response. She wrote,

“ [t]he purpose of this Meeting is to discuss what has occurred, to determine whether or not you

are responsible for violating SAIC ’S Rules of Conduct and if so, to determine what sanctions, if
any, will be imposed.” She further stated that if p laintiff disagreed with the information in the
l etter and wished to provide additional information, he could do so prior to the meeting. He could
also bring an “advisor” there or a person of his choosing to serve as an advocate or bystander
witness to the proceedings. ¶ 6 That meeting took place before the Student Conduct B oard (Board) on October 3, 2013,
with Walkuski reconfirm ing reports of ha rassment and sexual assault by p laintiff. While
Zekelman formally withdrew her complaint, the Board nonetheless considered her complaint in assessing Walkuski’s. Prior to the meeting, Zekelman also had reconfirmed her report of
p laintiff ’s inappropriate sexual conduct, and the Board found it both relevant and credible. At the meeting, “[t]he members of the Board carefully reviewed the information presented and fo und
the information and answers provided by [Walkuski] to be credible. They also found that, in many respects, the information and answers provided by [plaintiff] were not credible.”

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¶ 7 Based on the Board ’s recommendation and in the exercise of her discretion, Dublon found p laintiff had committed multiple violations of the rules of conduct, including sexual
assault as defined in the handbook; physical harm to any person or verbal threats, intimidation,

or coercion to an SAIC community member or any other conduct threatening to the health, safety, or well

- being of such person; discrimination, harassment, or retaliation as defined in the handbook; and failure to comply with SAIC officials’ directions. Plaintiff was expelle d as a result. Dublon not ified p laintiff that he could appeal the decision, but the appeal would only proceed if there was new information not available at the time of the original student conduct
meetin g. Plaintiff did in fact appeal but cited no new evidence, and his appeal was therefore
denied. The determination of the Board remained final, as did his expulsion from SAIC. ¶ 8 Some 10 months after p laintiff’s formal expulsion, on July 17, 2014, a hearing w as held
before the Cook County domestic violence division of the circuit c ourt, with testimony from both
Walkuski and p laintiff. Walkuski testified that while she had previously been friends with
p laintiff, around January 2012, she had decided against maintaining the friendship and told him multiple times in person that she no longer wanted to have contact with him. Between January
and April 2012, and about twice a week, p laintiff would knock obsessively at her dorm room
door. Sometimes he would stand silent ly near the door until she peered through the peephole only to see him st aring at her. This prompted Walkuski to remain in her dorm room quietly so as
to avoid any contact with p laintiff. Plaintiff’s behavior apparently only stopped after he was expelled from the residence halls in April 2012 for hitting a teacher. ¶ 9 Undeterred, however, between De cember 2012 and February 2013, p laintiff appeared at Walkuski’s workpl ace, pacing around the desk while staring at her even though she repeatedly
told him to stay away. About once a week, p laintiff also approached Walkuski wh en she was

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studying and stared at her from a cross the room. In August 2013, p laintiff attended Walkuski’s
class staring at her. This all prompted Walkuski to contact the director of student outreach and
head of security, leading to the above- stated student conduct hearing and sanctions against plaintiff. Because of p laintiff’s s talking, Walkuski felt fear, anxiety, and stress and had an escort

to all of her classes. ¶ 10 At the protective order hearing , p laintiff denied that Walkuski told him to have no contact
with h er and essentially denied the stalking incidents. ¶ 11 Following the hearing, the circuit court found Walkuski’s test imony more credible than
p laintiff’s. The court determined that Walkuski had proven her case by a preponderance of the evidence, insofar as it was more probably true than not that the incidents Walkuski alleged in her
amended petition had occurred, and p laintiff harassed and follow ed her repeatedly causing her
fear. T he court therefore entered a plenary stalking, no- contact court order against p laintiff

. The order, which remained in effect until July 15, 2016, prohibited p laintiff from stalking or contacting Walkuski or knowingly com ing within or remaining within 100 feet of he r residence, school, and place of employment. The protective order was extended from August 2, 2016, until August 2, 2018. ¶ 12 Several days after the hearing on the protective order, on July 22, 2014, p laintiff filed a defamation suit against SAIC, Walkuski, and Zekelman. He alleged Walkuski and Zekelman
defamed him by falsely reporting to campus security and SAIC that he had committed criminal sexual assault, stalking , and other sexual misconduct. Walkuski and Zekelman filed separate
motions to dism iss, arguing the reports to campus security were either absolutely privileged
because they were made to “law enforcement” or fell under a qualified privilege. They argued
these defenses were affirmative matters that shielded them from defamatory liability. The trial

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court denied their motions, and they thereafter filed an interlocutory appeal under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 308 (eff. Jan. 1, 2016), allowing for certified questions of law

. ¶ 13 In Razavi v. Walkuski , 2016 IL App (1st) 151435 ( Razavi I ), this court was tasked with addressing the circuit court ’s certified question of whether the absolute privilege applied to a college student’s reports of sexual violence made to campus security. Specifically, the certified question asked whether campus secu rity should be considered law enforcement for purposes of
the alleged victim ’s report of sexual violence on campus. On appe al, p laintiff acknowledged that absolute privilege would attach to any statements made to local law enforcement but contended
that statements made to campus security should expose defendants to liability for defamation.
This court disagreed, holding that an “absolute privilege extends to statements made by alleged
campus crime victims to campus security. ” Id. ¶ 10. We reasoned that th e underlying rationale
for the privilege, including the goal of protecting individuals who report crimes and also the public policy aimed at preventing campus sexual assaults, warranted treating campus security as
law enforcement. We likewise held that whe n reports of sexual violence are made to campus security, courts must presume that the statements are made for the purpose of instituting legal proceedings, notwithstanding a defamation plaintiff ’s claim that the statements were false, maliciously motivate d, or made for an unrelated purpose. In addition, we noted that “ generally once a privileged statement is made to law enforcement any subsequent restatements made in
furtherance of an investigation fall under this privilege. ” Id. ¶ 8. Accordingly, we remanded the

case for further consideration in light of our answer to the certified question. ¶ 14 Following remand, on October 7, 2016, p laintiff filed a first amended complaint, again asserting defamation claims against Walkuski, Zekelman , and SAIC, among other claims. Rather
than focusing on campus security, he alleged that Walkuski falsely, or with reckless di sregard for

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the truth , reported to agents and employees of SAIC that p laintiff had sexually assaulted her in
2011 and had subseque ntly contacted her against her wishes and stalked her in 2012 and 2013.
Plaintiff alleged that Walkuski made these statements to SAIC authorities knowing that they
would constitute rule violations leading to his expulsion. Regarding Zekelman, p laintiff all eged
she falsely, or with reckless disregard for the truth, reported to agents and employees of SAIC
that p laintiff battered or sexually assaulted her in March 2012. He alleged her false allegations
were considered in re l ation to Walkuski’s allegations and contributed to SAIC ’s decision to expel him. ¶ 15 Again, Walkuski and Zekelman filed motions to dismiss under section 2-619 (a)(9) of the
Code. They argued that an investigation is a continuum and that it would make little sense to apply different levels of privilege to the same statements made at different points in an investigation. They argued that since their initial reports to campus securi ty were absolutely privileged, so too were their subsequent statements to SAIC officials during the investigation and
resolution of their complaints. In addition, Walkuski argued the restatements to SAIC officials of
her initial crime report were absolutely privileged because they “were made as part of
communications required by law.” ¶ 16 On May 3, 2017, the circuit court granted their motions and dismissed the relevant counts
in p laintiff ’s first amended complaint based on absolute privilege. The case remained pending as
to SAIC, and accordingly, the court made an Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (eff. Mar . 8, 2016) finding that there was no just reason to delay enforcement or appeal of the order. Plaintiff
then filed this interlocutory appeal, challengi ng the trial court’s judgment. ¶ 17 ANALYSIS

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¶ 18 A motion to dismiss under section 2-619 admits the legal sufficiency of the complaint but

asserts an affirmative defense or other matter that avoids or defeats the plaintiff ’s claim. Busch v.
Bates , 323 Ill. App. 3d 823, 831-32 (2001); 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West 2016). While the
motion admits well

- pleaded facts, it does not admit conclusions of law and conclusory factual allegations unsupported by allegations of specific facts. Better Government Ass ’n v. Illinois High
School Ass ’n , 2017 IL 121124, ¶ 21. A section 2-619 motion should be granted by the circuit

court if, after construing the documents supporting the motion in the light most favorable to the opposing party, it finds no disputed issues of fa ct and concludes that the affirmative matter negates the cause of action completely. Busch , 323 Ill. App. 3d at 832. The existence of an absolute privilege is such an affirmative matter , which warrants the dismissal of a defamation
action. Id. ; Krueger v. Lewis , 342 Ill. App. 3d 467, 473 (2003) (“ In a defamation action, the issue of privilege is an affirmative defense that may be raised and determined in a section 2-619
motion. ”). We review an order granting a section 2-619 motion to dismiss de novo . La wler v. University of Chicago Medical Center , 2017 IL 120745, ¶ 11. ¶ 19 Plaintiff maintains that absolute privilege does not apply and therefore his amended complaint asserting defamation should be allowed to proceed

. To establish defamation, plaintiff
must show that defendant made a false statement about the plaintiff and published the statement

to a third party, causing damage

. Anderson v. Beach , 386 Ill. App. 3d 246, 249 (2008). A defamatory statement is one that harms a person ’s reputation by lowerin g him in the community’s eyes or deterring the community from associating with him. Mauvais- Jarvis v.

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Wong , 2013 IL App (1st) 120070, ¶ 67. For example, statements that impute a person has
committed a crime constitute defamation per se
. 1 Id. ¶ 69. ¶ 20 As noted in our previous opinion, defamatory statements are not actionable if they are protected by an absolute or conditional privilege. Anderson , 386 Ill. App. 3d at 249. Where only

a qualified privilege is granted, the person making the statment is immu ne from liability unless

some element , such as malice , is present. Mauvais- Jarvis , 2013 IL App (1st) 120070, ¶ 72. On the other hand, w here absolute privilege is granted, no cause of action for defamation lies against the person making the statement , even if it is made with malice. Id. ¶ 71. In light of the complete immunity provided by an absolute privilege, the classification of absolutely privileged statements
is necessarily narrow. Krueger , 342 Ill. App. 3d at 473. “ ‘A communication is absolutely privileged when its propagation is so much in the public interest that the publisher should speak fully and fearlessly. ’ ” Anderson , 386 Ill. App. 3d at 249 (quoting Weber v. Cueto , 209 Ill. App. 3d 936, 942 (1991)). This is because , as a matter of public policy, the person making the defamatory statement should not be deterred from speaking by the threat of civil liability. Weber , 209 Ill. App. 3d at 942; see also Defend v. Lascelles , 149 Ill. App. 3d 630, 635 (1986) (“ The law
thus clearly allows for an absolute privilege where there exists a significant interest in protecting
the type of speech involved. ”). In other words, the defense of absolute privilege rests on the idea
that conduct, which otherwise would be actionable, must escape liability because the defendant
is acting in furtherance of some socially important interest, like the investigation of an alleged crime, that is entitled to protection even at the expense of uncompensated harm to the plaintiff ’s reputation. Morris v. Harvey Cycle & Camper, Inc. , 392 Ill. App. 3d 399, 404 (2009); Weber , 209 Ill. App. 3d at 942. The privilege is based on a policy that regards the ends to be gained by

1 Here, p laintiff alleged both defamation per quod , requiring him to plead and prove actual damages, and defamation per se , which does not require proof of actual damages for recovery. See Mauvais- Jarvis v. Wong , 2013 IL App (1st) 120070, ¶ 68.

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permitting such statements as outweighing the harm which may be done to the reputation of
others. Weber , 209 Ill. 2d at 942. ¶ 21 Indeed, accordi ng to the Restatement (Second) of Torts , absolute privilege recognizes
that certain individuals, due to t heir special position or status , “should be as free as possible from fear that their actions in that position might have an adverse effect upon their own personal interests. To accomplish this, it is necessary for
them to be protected not only from civil liability but also from the danger of even an unsuccessful civil action. To this end, it is necessary that the propriety of their conduct not be inquired into indirectly by either court or jury in civil proceedings brought against
them for misconduct in their position. Therefore the privilege, or immunity, is absolute
and the protection that it affords is complete. ” Restatement (Second) of Torts , ch. 25, topic 2, t it

. B, i ntro . note, at 243 (1977). ¶ 22 The privilege embraces actions required or permitted by law in the course of judicial or quasi- judicial proceedings, as well as actions “necessarily preliminary” to judicial or quasijudicial proceedings. Layne v. Builders Plumbing Supply Co. , 210 Ill. App. 3d 966, 969 (1991).
In addition, s ection 592A of the R estatement (Second) of Torts says, “ One who is required by
law to publish defamatory matter is absolutely privileged to publish it. ” Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 592A, at 257 (1977). According to the comment, “ This Section rests upon the principle
that one who is required by law to do an act does not incur any liability for doing it. ”
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 592A cmt. b, at 257 (1977). As with a motion to dismiss, the question of whether a defamatory statement is protected by an absolute privilege is one of law
for the court. Layne , 210 Ill. App. 3d at 969.

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¶ 23 In this appeal, plaintiff concedes that statements, when first conveyed to law enforcement and then repeated during a cri minal investigation, are protected by absolute privilege. See id. at
971 (statements to police pertaining to alleged criminal activities should be absolutely privileged). Plaintiff likewise acknowledges this court’s previous holding, that the victims ’
repo rts of sexual assault and misconduct to campus security 2 were absolutely privileged since campus security is akin to law enforcement. Plaintiff, however, now challenges the trial court’s ruling that these same statements, when repeated to SAIC agents and a uthorities both before and during the student conduct review process, were absolutely privileged. Plaintiff asserts that
process was not a “ ‘continuum’ of any criminal investigation,” nor was his disciplinary hearing “quasi- judicial ” in nature such that absolute privilege applied. ¶ 24 Walkuski and Zekelman have filed separate appellate briefs in response while jointly challenging p laintiff ’s contentions. They assert that the absolute privilege afforded to their initial
crime reports to campus security continued to ap ply in the context of the investigation and disciplinary hearing that flowed from the reports. In particular, Walku ski argues that the repeated allegations were made as part of communications required by law. With this, we wholeheartedly
agree. ¶ 25 In this case, the 2013-14 SAIC Student Handbook’s policy on sexual assault, relationship violence, and stalking was explicitly adopted in accordance with the Violence Against Women
Reauthorization Act of 2013 (colloquially ref erred to as the Campus SaVE Act) (Pub. L. 113-4, § 304, 127 Stat. 54, 89 (eff. Mar. 7, 2013) (amending 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f)), which was passed to

2 Although not entirely clear, Plaintiff appears to argue that Zekelman first reported plaintiff’s misconduct to SAIC authorities, including Dublon. This is contrary to the facts set forth in Razavi I , 2016 IL App (1st) 151435, ¶ 4. It is also contrary to plaintiff’s initial complaint, wherein he alleged Zekelman falsely reported the misconduct to “campus security.” In addition, Dublon’s October 1, 2013, letter addressed to plaintiff, indicates Zekelman reported his sexual misconduct to campus security. We therefore reject plaintiff’s claim.

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encourage greater transparency , enhance the victims’ information and rights, and add requirements for educational institutions to address and prevent sexual violence on campus. 3
Evelin M. Clay, Colleges and Universities: A Place to Get Away W ith Rape , 28 St. Thomas L.
Rev. 256, 265 (2016). It is enforced by the U.S. Department of Education and applies to all colleges and universities that receive federal fundi ng, including student financial assistance

. See
U.S. Dep ’t of Educ., The Handbook for Campus Safety and Security Reporting (2016), https://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/safety/handbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y5H3- CUQ5 ]. Specifically, each eligible institution is required to distribute to both students and employees the campus security policies and crime statistics, including the reporting procedures and the
institution ’s response to such reports, as well as statistics on sex offenses, domestic violence, dating violence, and stalking incidents reported to campus security. 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f)(1)(A)

­ (C ), (J) (Supp. II 2014 ). The school must timely report sex offenses, and t he like, to the campus community when the offenses are “ considered to be a threat to other students and employees, ” so

as to prevent “ similar occurrences. ” 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f)(3) (Supp. II 2014 ). ¶ 26 Each school is required to develop and distribute a policy on “ programs to prevent
domestic violence, dating violence, sexual assault, and stalking, ” and also develop and distribute procedures to follow if any incidents are reported. 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f)(8)(A) (Supp. II 2014 ). A
scho ol’s policy must identify procedures for victims to follow if an offense occurs, with

3 As we noted in Razavi I , 2016 IL (1st) 1511435, ¶ 14 n.2, effective in 2015, the Illinois legisla ture enacted the Preventing Sexual Violence in Higher Education Act (Act) (110 ILCS 155/1 et seq. (West 2016)). The Act requires higher education institutions, including those that are for-profit like SAIC, to have a comprehensive policy to “address studen t allegations of sexual violence, domestic violence, dating violence, and stalking,” consistent with federal and state law. 110 ILCS 155/5 (West 2016). The Act requires the comprehensive policy to identify procedures for reporting sexual violence, the inst itution’s procedure for responding to a report of an alleged incident of sexual violence or misconduct, the complaint procedures, and possible sanctions that might be imposed, including expulsion. See 110 ILCS 155/10 (West 2016). This law is inapplicable to the present case, insofar as the policy in place and incidents occurred prior to the enactment of the Act.

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information on the importance of preserv ing evidence, while giving the victims ’ options for reporting the matter to law enforcement (including campus and local police) and campus authorities. 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f)(8)(B) (Supp. II 2014 ). The policy, for example, might inform
victims about protective orders or similar lawful orders

. Id. The policy must identify “[p]ossible sanctions or protective measures ” the school can im pose after a final decision in a disciplinary procedure for “ rape, acquaintance rape, domestic violence, dating violence, sexual assault, or stalking, ” including a statement regarding the standard of evidence used in the proceeding arising
from the victim’ s report. 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f)(8) (A), (B) (Supp. II 2014 ). The disciplinary procedures for the above- stated offenses must “ provide a prompt, fair, and impartial investigation and resolution .” (Emphasis added.) 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f)(8)(B)(iv)(I)(aa) (Supp. II 2014); see also 34 C.F.R. § 668.46 (2016). The complainant and the accused “ are entitled to the

same opportunities to have others present during an institutional disciplinary proceeding, including the opportunity to be accompanied *** by an advisor of their choice. ” 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f)(8)(B)(iv)(II) (Supp. II 2014 ). Both must also be informed about the outcome of the disciplinary proceeding and any appeal rights. 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f)(8)(B)(iv)(III) (Supp. II 2014 ). ¶ 27 Here, in accordance with the Camp us SaVE Act, the SAIC policy encourages anyone subjected to sexual assault, relationship violence, or stalking to report the incident promptly to the police and/or SAIC officials. In particular, the policy encourages victims to report those
incidents to ca mpus security or the direc tor of student outreach in the Office of Student A ffairs
and also seek immediate medical attention, among other things. The policy lists a number of

resources for victims, identifies applicable state laws, and delineates what to do if a protective
order is necessary. The victim has a right to file a complai nt with campus security or the Office
of Student A ffairs. The policy states, “ If the alleged offender is also a member of the SAIC

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community, SAIC will take prompt action to inv estigate and, where appropriate, to impose
sanctions.” An SAIC investigation is to take place especially if SAIC decides the safety of the community is at risk. If the alleged offender is a student, then the VP of Student Affairs or a designee is responsib le for investigating and resolving the complaint. In addition, the policy provides that any student offenders are subject to the “Student Conduct Procedures.” ¶ 28 M irroring the language in the Campus SaVE Act , SAIC’s policy states that these student conduct procedures provide a “ prompt, fair, and impartial investigation and resolution of the alleged misconduct .” (Emphasis added.) See 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f)(8)(B)(iv)(I)(aa) (Supp. II
2014 ). In particular, the VP of Student Affairs and/or campus security may interview anyone, including the victim and the accused, and the interviewees must provide truthful information or otherwise potentially face violating the rules of conduct. The accused mu st receive both
notification of the rules allegedly violated and notice of the student conduct meeting. A student
conduct meeting, although not a courtroom procedure allowing for formal rules of evidence, permits the accused an opportunity to respond to th e complaint and allows for review of the
student’s acts of misconduct and any prior acts

. While the VP of Student Affairs controls who to
admit to the meeting and also what information is presented, both the complainant and the
accused are responsible for presenting their own case, and both can bring one “advisor” with them, or an individual of their choosing to simply consult with before, during, or after the hearing. Whether an accused is responsible for violating rules is based on “ whether it is more lik ely than not that the student accused of misconduct violated the Rules of Conduct or other
SAIC policies, rules, or regulations.” See also 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f)(8)(A), (B) (Supp. II 2014) (requiring a statement regarding the standard of evidence). Following closed -door deliberations

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by the Board members, they can recommend possible sanctions, including expulsion, and the VP
of Student Affairs will have the final say on the case ’s disposition. ¶ 29 Given SAIC’s policy, which was implemented as required by federal law, and Illinois precedent, as well as the Restatement (Second) of Torts , we conclude that the victims’ allegedly defamatory restatements to SAIC authorities and agents about the claimed sexual assault and
misconduct were absolutely privileged. We find several cases dispositive. In Weber , 209 Ill. App. 3d 936, attorney Amiel Cueto wrote a letter to the chief circuit court judge for Madison County regarding State’s Attorney Donald Weber and his employee, Virginia. Cueto asserted on hearsay that Webe r, and by implication, Virginia, had committed numerous acts of misconduct, including the improper use of funds. Cueto noted it was his duty under the rules of professional
conduct to report the misconduct to a tribunal, including the chief judge, the Madi son County Board, and the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission (ARDC). Following these publications, Virginia filed a defamation suit against Cueto, who affirmatively claimed that his

statements were absolutely privileged as required by his ethical obligations as an attorney. The
trial court granted Cueto’s motion to dismiss as to all three “tribunals,” and the only issue on appeal was whether the trial court was correct in determining absolute privilege attached to the county board because it was a quasi- judicial body. ¶ 30 In Weber , this court noted section 592A of the Restatement (Second) of Tort’s requirement that “ ‘[o]ne who is required by law to publish defamatory matter is absolutely privileged to publish it. ’ ” Id. at 942 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 592A, at 257 (1977)). This court also noted the mandatory reporting requirement under the rules of professional conduct was in the public interest, as it was designed to protect individuals and the public at large from lawyer misconduct and maintain public confidence in the integrity of the

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legal profession. Weber further acknowledged that the county board was empowered to investigate the improprieties Cueto had alleged consistent with the rules of professional cond uct.
This court, accordingly, held that Cueto’s communications to the county board under the disciplinary rule were “cloaked with an absolute privilege” and upheld the dismissal of the Virginia’s defamation suit. Id. at 947. Weber noted that, having found Cueto required by law to publish the defamatory matter, there was no reason to also consider whether the county board

was a quasi- judicial body. ¶ 31 Similarly, in Busch , 323 Ill. App. 3d at 833-34, an absolute privilege applied to several police officers against a crime scene technician, where the officers alleged the technician
threatened a suspect in a homicide investigation and committed other misconduct to disrupt investigations

. This court found the statements were made during an internal police discplinary investigation and the officers were legally obligated to repo rt such behavior pursuant to a state police d irective. ¶ 32 In Belluomini v. Zaryczny , 2014 IL App (1st) 122664, ¶ 26, an apparently concerned
citizen reported by letter to the Chicago police superintendent that a number of police officers
committed misconduct by working at the direction of an aldermanic candidate on election day,
thus violating civil and voting r ights. Plaintiffs (the accused police officers ) sued the concerned
citizen for defamation. This court upheld the trial court’s dismissal of the defamation suit, after finding that the police department, headed by the superintendent, was a quasi

- judicial body and, significant for the purposes of this appeal, that the statements we re also made to law enforcement
officials for the purpose of instituting criminal proceedings. The police officers argued that the
concerned citizen ’s allegations were made to an administrative (as opposed to quasi- judicial) body of the police department and thus were not privileged, but this court held the statements

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were “ clearly part of the ongoing investigation that was triggered ” by the initial letter. Id. The
Belluomini court held the investigation was itself a quasi- judicial proceeding and wrote, “ An investigation is a continuum and it defies rational thinking to isolate certain portions of the investigation in order to apply different levels of privilege. ” Id. ¶ 33 We referenced the preceding sentence from Belluomini in our prior opinion when noting
that “ generally once a privileged statement is made to law enforcement any subsequent
restatements made in furtherance of an investigation fall under this privilege,” even if made to
SAIC employees not employed within the campus security department. Razavi I , 2016 IL App (1st) 151435, ¶ 8. To the extent this principle of law was dicta , we now make it our holding, and
reaffirm Razavi I for the following reasons
. ¶ 34 We already explained the rationale for treating reports of sexual assault to campus security as absolutely privileged based on public policy . It would make little sense , then, to hold
the initial report of the crime/misconduct to campus security absolutely privileged but not the

re peated allegations made in furtherance of the investigation. In this case, while the investigation
its elf was not quasi- judicial, we find it’s enough that it emerged out of a fully protected initial report

. In congruity with Belluomini , the investigation by both campus security and SAIC
officials constitutes a continuum requiring the same level of absolute privilege to be applied throughout the investigation and resolution of the complaint, including at the disciplinary
p roceeding

. ¶ 35 Furthermore, the SAIC policy was developed and impl emented pursuant to federal law and required that SAIC promptly and fairly investigate the allegations and , where appropriate, impose sanctions following a disciplinary hearing. Dublon, the VP of Student A ffairs, confirmed
this by attesting that “SAIC complies with federal education policy, which requires that colleges

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and universities respond to and address effectively allegations of harassment and sexual assault,
whenever those allegati ons are made.” Thus, SAIC was legally required to pursue the investigation. While the SAIC policy did not require Walkuski and Zekelman to file a complaint or comply with the investigation , once they did file their complaints and consistent with federal
la w, the policy provided for SAIC’s protocol. Cf. Mauvais- Jarvis , 2013 IL App (1st) 120070, ¶¶ 72, 76-80 (finding only a qualified privilege applied to allegedly defamatory statements made
in the context of a private university’s research misconduct proceedi ng, where federal regulations and university policy required reporting on basis of “good faith, ” thus injecting one of the elements of qualified privilege into the proceeding itself and where duty to report was not mandatory ). As in Weber , Walkuski and Z ekelman’s restatements made under thes e federally
mandated procedures, by implication , should be cloaked with the same privilege as if the
restatements themselves were legally required. To hold otherwise would render SAIC’s required investigatory and disci plinary procedures and policies toothless, for absent the victim’s evidence,
there would be no basis to proceed

. Therefore, in summary, we hold that repeated allegations
about a claimed sexual assault or misconduct made to campus security and school author ities,
and which are published as part of an investigation into and disciplinary hearing for the alleged misbehavior, are cloaked with absolute privilege. ¶ 36 Public policy demands this result. It is beyond a doubt that the victims’ participation in
the se proceedings is in the public interest. See William L. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 114, at 777 (4th ed. 1971) (“Absolute immunity has been confined to a very few situations
where there is an obvious policy in favor of permitting complete free dom of expression, without
any inquiry as to the defendant’s motives.”). Absolute privilege in this context encourages
victims to report crimes and misconduct promptly without fear of explicating the facts and

18No. 1-17-1409

circumstances surrounding any attack as the investigation unfolds. Cf. 735 ILCS 5/8-804 (West 2016) (“Because of the fear, stigma, and trauma that often result from incidents of sexual violence, many survivors hesitate to report or seek help, even when it is available at no cost to them.”). If sexual assault victims are at risk of facing a civil lawsuit from their attacker throughout the reporting and disciplinary process, they will be less likely to come forward and report the crime . Absent a report, the sexual assault perpetrator goes free , potential ly committing
other similar misdeeds . This places the entire campus unnecessarily at a safety risk, thus dampening the intended purpose of higher education in a safe environment. The absence of a
victim’s unfettered report not only interferes with the scho ol’s duty to investigate and risk s violating federal law, but it also potentially exposes the university to tort liability and other
financial risks for any future sexual assaults by the same perpetrator. See, e.g. , Nero v. Kansas
State University , 861 P.2d 768, 780 ( Kan. 1993) (where plaintiff , a Kansas State University (KSU) student, was allegedly raped in a coed dorm by a KSU student who had previously raped another student, supreme court reversed summary judgment for defendant university after finding university had a duty of reasonable care to protect students against certain dangers that are reasonably foreseeable and within the university’s control); Miller v. State , 467 N.E.2d 493 ( N.Y. 1984) (a victim who was raped in her college dorm could sue college for negligence based

on special relationship after college had notice of likely criminal intrusions, yet failed to lock
outer doors of dorm); Mullins v. Pine Manor College , 449 N.E.2d 331 ( Mass. 1983) (upholding negligence jury verdict against colle ge by victim for her rape on campus based on voluntary undertaking). ¶ 37 And, although plaintiff maintains that there are no repercussions for false reports in this instance, we disagree since the student handbook sets forth that the complainant, like the

19No. 1-17-1409
accused, must provide truthful information or otherwise potentially face violating the rules of
conduct. As such, a complainant who falsel y reports a sexual assault can also be subject to expulsion. See Hartman v. Keri , 883 N.E.2d 774, 778 (Ind. 2008) (noting that, where a student is subject to academic discipline for abuse of the process, that serves as a substantial deterrent to
false reporting). Likewise, it would be against public policy to force a victim of sexual assault to
parse out what statements would or would not make her subject to a potential defamation lawsuit

as she complies with the very policies and procedures of the institution to ensure a proper educational environment. See id. at 777-78 (“as long as the process is reasonably transparent and
fair and affords the subject an opportunity to respond, we think the ultimate issue focuses less on the particular process and more on the recognition of the institution’s interest in assuring a
proper educational environment” ). Thus, the ends to be gained by granting absolute privilege far outweigh the harm that may be done to the alleged perpetrator’s reputation. Weber , 209 Ill. App.
3d at 942. ¶ 38 Our holding is also consistent with our previous ruling in Razavi I

. As stated, we also
determined a presumption exists that statements alleging sexual assault or misconduct made to campus security were made for the purpose of instituting legal proceedings , notwithstanding a
defamation plaintiff ’s claim that the statements were false, maliciously motivated , or made for a
purpose unrelated to the institution of legal proceedings. Razavi I , 2016 IL App (1st) 151435, ¶ 11. The same presumption should apply to restatements made during an investigation into and hearing on sexual assault or misconduct. This is especially true where such an investigation is
aimed at culling information that could in turn determine whether a criminal charge should be brought or whether civil proceedings, like a tort or application for a protective order, should be
instituted. Plaintiff seems to argue that there’s no indicia of reliability to a victim’s report unless

20No. 1-17-1409

a criminal proceeding follows. Notwithstanding that it is the s tate’s attorney who decides
whether to file charges in any particular case ( id. ¶ 15), that position is untenable when one considers the policy behind section 587 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts

. That section by analogy provides that a party to private litigation or defendant in a criminal prosecution “ is absolutely privileged to publish defamatory matter concerning another in communications preliminary to a proposed judicial proceeding, or in the institution of or during the course and as

a part of, a judicial proceeding in which he participates, if the matter has some relation to the proceeding. ” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 587, at 248 (1977). Comment b to section 587 explains that the rul e “ applies to communications made by a client to his attorney with respect to proposed litigation as well as to information given and informal complaints made to a prosecuting attorney or other proper officer preliminary to a proposed criminal prosecution
whether or not the information is followed by a formal complaint or affidavit. ” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 587 c mt. b, at 249 (1977). ¶ 39 Adopting that rationale , we conclude that it is immaterial whether a formal criminal complaint or civil legal procee ding actually followed the victims’ reports of p laintiff’s sexual assault/misconduct. Likewise, it matters not whether a formal school disciplinary hearing flow ed
on the heels of the report. Nevertheless, the evidence in this case supports th e above- stated presumption, where Walkuski filed an incident report with the police, then participated in the
di sciplinary proceedings against p laintiff , and also appeared before the Cook County circuit

court where she testified in support of a protective order. Like the SAIC Board, the court found
her testimony more credible than p laintiff’s insofar as it was more likely true than not that the
incidents Walkuski alleged in her amended petition regarding p lain tiff’s creepy behavior had
occurred and p laintiff harassed and s talk ed her repeatedly. The court accordingly granted her the

21No. 1-17-1409
protective order, which she had extended up until just several months ago
. As such, contrary to
p laintiff’s view , the evidence undeniably shows the legal proceedings emanated from Walkuski’s initial allegation s to campus security and the ensuing investigation and hearing. ¶ 40 In finding absolute privilege, as in Weber , we find it unnecessary to address whether the disciplinary h earing was quasi- judicial in nature, even though p laintiff vigorously pursues this
line of argument in his appeal. We note that SAIC’s rules permit that disciplinary hearings may be taped or r ecorded, but there is no evidence of that occurring in this case
. In ad dition, p laintiff
has failed to provide this court with a report of proceedings on Walkuski and Zekelman’s
motions to dismiss presented to the trial court, although he quotes that oral argument at some length

. Where, as here, an appe llant fails to ensure the record on appeal contains a report of proceedings and his argument fails to cite to the record appropriately , he violates our supreme
court rules , which have the force and effect of the law and are binding on litigants

. See Ill. S. Ct.
R. 323 ( eff. July 1, 2017); R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Nov. 1, 2017) (the argument section must contain
the contentions of the appellant and the reasons therefor, with citation of the authorities and the
pages of the record relied on); In re Marriage of Thomsen , 371 Ill. App. 3d 236, 241 (2007). Finally, we note that to the extent p laintiff relies on attachments to his brief, we cannot consider
them. See Walczak v. Onyx Acceptance Corp. , 365 Ill. App. 3d 664, 672 (2006) (documents the appellate court may consider must be included in record, and not simply in appendix). ¶ 41 Along the same lines, while p laintiff insists the trial court incorrectly found the SAIC
student disciplinary hearing to be quasi

- judicial , the trial court’s order simply reflects its
determination that Walkuski and Zekelman’s s tatements were absolutely privileged absent identifying any rationale. However, as this opinion reveals, a reviewing court may affirm a

22No. 1-17-1409

correct decision for any reason appearing in the record, regardless of the basis relied upon by the
trial court. See Weber , 209 Ill. App. 3d at 947. ¶ 42 CONCLUSION ¶ 43 For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of p laintiff’s
defamation claims against both Walkuski and Zekelman. ¶ 44 Affirmed.

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