NASA / TM--1999-209294

The Commtech Methodology: A DemandDriven Approach to Efficient, Productive,

and Measurable Technology Transfer

and Commercialization

Gary A. P. Horsham

Glenn Research Center, Cleveland, Ohio

Prepared for the

24th Annual Technology Transfer Society Meeting

Technology Transfer in The New Millennium

sponsored by the Technology Transfer Society

St. Petersburg, Florida, July 15-17, 1999

National Aeronautics and

Space Administration

Glenn Research Center

June 1999

https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19990063021 2018-05-11T19:21:46+00:00Z
Acknowledgments

The author acknowledges Dr. Stanton G. Cort, professor, The Weatherhead School of Management, Department of

Marketing and Policy Studies, Case Western Reserve University, and Mr. Walter S. Kim, manager, NASA Glenn

Small Business Innovative Research (SBIR) program, for their respective reviews and thoughtful comments.

NASA Center for Aerospace Information

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THE COMMTECH METHODOLOGY: A DEMAND-DRIVEN APPROACH TO

EFFICIENT, PRODUCTIVE, AND MEASURABLE TECHNOLOGY

TRANSFER AND COMMERCIALIZATION

Gary A. P. Horsham

NASA Glenn Research Center

Cleveland, Ohio 44135

INTRODUCTION

In an era of shrinking high-risk private sector

research and development expenditures there is an

increasing dependence on government long-term

technology development. Public to private

technology transfer is steadily becoming a critical,

strategic component of U.S. economic growth - both

aerospace and non-aerospace. The National

Aeronautics and Space Administration's mission is

to develop aeronautical and space technologies and

explore the frontiers of space. It is also NASA's

mission to actively seek out non-aerospace

industries and companies with technological

problems or needs that might benefit from the

transfer or application of its special, slate-of-the-art

aerospace capabilities. Where it is within NASA's

capability, the agency will help companies

eliminate shortages of knowledge or solutions, and

possibly show the way to technological competitive

or strategic advantage. In this regard, the agency

plays an important role, along with other public

sector technology producers, in contributing longterm. high-risk R&D inputs that help stimulate

investment and growth in the U.S. economy. The

NASA Commercial Technology Team (1994)

established a new, non-aerospace commercial

technology policy has been used as the guiding basis

for the development of this methodology.

The Commercial Technology Consultants program

(abbreviated to "CommTech'" program) was

developed and applied by NASA Glenn Research

Center in Cleveland, Ohio. This paper presents a

comprehensive review and assessment of the

program's demonstration or pilot cycle - from its

conception and initiation in early to mid-fiscal year

1995, and planned activities extending roughly three

years into the future. Market

research sources were used to initially gather

primary technological problems and needs data from

non-aerospace companies in three targeted industry

sectors: environmental, surface transportation, and

bioengineering. Company-supplied information

served as input data to activate or start-up an

internal, phased matchmaking process. This process

was based on technical-level relationship

exploration lollowed by business-level agreement

negotiations, and culminated with project

management and execution. Space Act Agreements

represented near-term outputs. Company product or

process commercialization derived from NASA

Glenn support and measurable economic effects

represented far-term outputs. The paper begins with

an overview of the program's obiective followed by

an overview of the input/output model. A

description of the core development and

implementation strategy is presented next. This is

followed by a presentation of the overall results of

the implementation phases. Finally, the program's

performance and comparative metrics are

summarized and conclusions arc drawn.

GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

The goal of this initial CommTech program cycle

was to demonstrate the potential low-cost/high

productivity advantages of a demand-driven

technology transfer model. If successful, then this

"technology pull" approach could perhaps

complement or bca complete substitute for the

"technology push" methods that had been employed

throughout the agency to date. In practice,

CommTech would apply a "company-lcd'" strategy

to systematically foster, track and measure the

establishment, development and execution of I to 2-

year relationships between non-aerospace companies

and Glenn scientists and engineers (referred to in

this report as "lead participants").

NAS A/TM--1999-209294 I
The CommTechprogramwas conceivedon the

premiseorunderstandingthat:

publicto privatetechnologytransferdrivenby

privatesector"'market"demand(or pull) is

potentiallymoreefficientandproductivethan

traditionaltechnology"push"approaches;

public to private, value-addedtechnology

transfer accrues best when public

technologies/capabilities areappliedto private

sectorproblems/needs whosesolutionsareeither

limitedorbeyondcurrentindustrycapabilities;

mostcompaniesthatoperatein non-aerospace

industrysectorsare generallyunfamiliarwith

NASA technologiesand are not in the

NASA/Glenncommunications loop;and

public sectorentitiesoperateundergeneral

policyguidelinesthat prohibitthe offeringof

services,which are alreadysuppliedin the

marketplacebyprivateor privatizedsources.

Basedonall theabove,theprogramwasdeveloped

withthefour-foldobjectiveto:

EnhanceGlenn'spositionas an accessible

nationaltechnologicalresourcefor all taxpaying,"for-profit"companiesin the United

Statesregardlessof location;

Pro-actively identify companies with

product/processtechnology development

problems/needs thatarebeyondthecommercial

state-of-the-art, and which(to the bestof a

company'sandGlenn'scombinedknowledge)

havealoworzeropotentialof beingmetinthe

commercial suppliermarketplace;

Increasetheestablishment of highqualitynonaerospacetechnologytransferrelationshipsviaa

controlled,structuredprocesswith clearly

definednearandfar-termdeliverables, including

clearprogramentryandexit-ways;

Broadenparticipationin the Agency'snonaerospacetechnologytransfermission by

providing a clear structure, which

accommodates andsupportstheinvolvementof

GlennS&E'swhohavenothadtheopportunity

to participate.

PROGRAM PROCESS OVERVIEW

Figure I illustrates the basic eight-step (two staged -

explained in the next section) process used to

develop start-up and operate the CommTech

program.

(i) The NASA Glenn Commercial Technology

Office released a request to determine

product/process development problems/needs within

specially targeted non-aerospace industry sectors

(companies). Market research intermediaries were

used. (2/3) The intermediaries conducted primary

market surveys and (4) forwarded the results to the

CTO (CommTech) program manager. Surveys were

designed to produce respondents with a high "match

potential." Care was taken to limit company

expectations since it was known that CommTech

would only accommodate the interests of a few

company respondents (depending on the size of both

the companies' and lead participant responses) per

cycle. (5) The survey results were then used as input

data for an internal Glenn activity that identified

individual scientists and engineers. (6) Interested

S&E's admitted into the program proceeded to

engage companies to further understand their needs.

If requested, program funds were used (at the

discretion of participating S&E's) to demonstrate

their capabilities to companies that were unfamiliar

with Glenn. Every effort was made to avoid

subsidizing private sector commercial interests. (7)

If commercial potential were apparent, then a

company would be expected to fund the transfer

"Space Act Agreement" (mechanism) needed to

realize that potential. (8) The expectation was that

companies that participated would eventually

produce and commercialize new (or improved)

products or processes. These would incorporate

enabling or unique, state-of-the-art support and/or

technological contributions directly traceable to

NASA Glenn.

_hliqLallt for HOflalti, on _ | Market

NASA GRC v Research

CTO .d _ O.V. _.n= Sources

4"_

Stage 1

Figure 1. Start-up and process model.

NASA/TM--1999-209294 2
DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION

STRATEGY

Program development and implementation was

conducted in two stages. Figure 2 portrays the twostaged process schedule and all necessary activities

and outputs. Stage I consisted of six key activities

and was directed toward the development,

packaging and release of a program plan and a fourpart compilation (appendix) of company needs.

Stage 2 consisted of four phases with the ultimate

objective to match specific company needs with

Glenn capabilities and then establish and execute

agreements. The four phases of stage 2 were

entitled: I - Response and Participant Selection, II -

Company Relationship Exploration, III

Relationship Definition and Agreement, and IV -

Agreement Implementation and Execution. The

estimated duration of both phases II and II1 had a

built in slack of about 3 months considering the

inherent uncertainty associated with accomplishing

those objectives. Essentially, the rate at which a

lead participant transitioned from phases I1 to phase

III, and then finally to phase IV, largely depended on

a particular company's pace. Although it is implied

that companies were aware of the CommTech

process, this was not the case. For this first program

cycle, the process described in this report was only

known internally within NASA Glenn by those

familiar with the program plan (mai ',, prospective

and eventually only lead participantProgram Development - Stage 1

As indicated earlier, the objective of stage I was to

prepare a program plan and develop the

accompanying appendix of company needs required

for use during phase I of stage 2. The program plan

was designed to present a comprehensive, end-toend description of the program and attract the

interest and commitment of Glenn scientists and

engineers' in becoming lead participants. A threepart application was included within the plan lbr the

convenience of any prospective participant (i.e.,

scientist or engineer) to apply for entry. The

availability of an appendix with descriptions of

company problems/needs (discussed below) enabled

any interested scientist and/or engineer to apply and

compete in phase I for entry into CommTech's key

external interaction phases (II, III, and IV). Phase I

was counpetitive since a pool of limited funds (to be

used only for technology/capability demonstrations)

had to bc allocated to each applicant selected to

participate in phase II. A total of $230K was

budgeted to support requests from high potential

companies/clients lor technology/capability

demonstrations during phase 1I.

The NASA Technology Transfer Network members

consisting of the Far West Regional Technology

Transfer Center (RTTC), the Mid-Continental

RTTC, the Southeast RTTC, the Mid-West RTTC,

the Mid-Atlantic RTTC, the Northeast RTTC, and

Research Triangle Institute, were used to supply

primary market research data. Each network

member was tasked to

FY95 FY96 FY97

0C1 _ov Dec Jan _eb Mar Apt May Jun Jul _ug Sep Jan Sep Jan

-.. '.,

-X\

.,.\

•,..-.,

• L_ Pm'_p_s _ian "..,

tASA Te_W_--_er Nm,_ork Sunmy

i  ̧

• S_A Req_-mlbll_m

e su_oe_ mo_ms

• TrlK_lf_ mid Mem_

eemer_ Fomm_n

_Q

Figure 2: Two-staged development and implementation schedule.

N A SA/TM-- 1999- 209294 3
identify45companies(fromwithintheirrespective

region'senvironmental, surfacetransportation, and

bioengineeringindustry sectors), and obtain

descriptionsof technologyproblemor needs. In

addition,bothbusiness-andtechnical-level pointsof-contactweresoughtforeachcompany.

Companiesfromwithintheenvironmental, surface

transportation, andbioengineeringindustrysectors

werethe mainlocusof this first programcycle.

Theseindustrieswerethoughto havecompanies

with high potential synergies with Glenn

technologies.Both written correspondenceand

telephonesurvey instrumentswere specially

developedandemployed.Writtensurveysprovided

a basic,comprehensiveoutlineof NASAGlenn's

areas of technologyexpertise. This helped

companiesmakepreliminaryassessments aboutthe

potentialapplicabilityof NASAGlenn'saerospace

technologies/capabilities - andincreasedthe"match

potential."

Over 350 companiesprovidedinformationabout

their special (proprietaryor non-proprietary)

product/process development problemsor needs.In

addition, they also indicated which Glenn

technologies/capabilities areastheythoughtmight

bestservetheir needs. All surveyresultswere

forwardedtotheGlennprogrammanager.Following

receiptof therawdata,a programplanandfour-part

appendixof companyneedswerefinalized.In total,

thefinalpackagecontained212pages:25pagesfor

theprogramplanand187pagesfor the complete

appendix.The appendixcontained142 company

technologyneedsprofiles, and was produced

primarilyto enableapplicantswithoutanyprevious

non-aerospace technologyexperienceto participate

(andcompetc)inthephaseI process.

Program Implementation - Stage 2

Stage 2, the implementation stage, commenced on

March 24, 1995. After receiving the program

package in phasc I, interested scientists/engineers

responded by completing the three part application.

During this phase I application process, all

applicants were provided with company names and

technology needs descriptions - no specific names of

technical points-of-contact were given to avoid any

premature interaction. Applicants qualified for

phase II through the phase I process based mainly on

a measure and comparative analysis of the level of

commitment and interest indicated in their

application.

The first part of the application required applicants

to choose six companies from the appendix of

company needs. The choice of six companies was

an arbitrary figure, neither too few nor too many, and

was used to increase the chances for success in

phase II. The majority of applicants submitted

required six choices, however a few submitted less.

Applicants who were presently supporting companies

or had previously worked with companies on their

own had the option to enter up to three of those

companies (i.e., if they fell into one of CommTech's

target industry sectors). The other two parts of the

application gathered additional information to help

gauge each applicant's preparedness to participate,

and the degree to which he/she might reliably

commit time toward completing the objectives of

stage 2 - phases II and III, and most importantly

phase IV.

At this point, a lead participant choice of companies

in phase I became one of the more important factors

(among others) for success. In phase II, a lead

participant's ability to quickly understand a

company's particular non-aerospace culture,

communicate and follow through effectively, was

another factor for success. Most importantly, a

company's assessment of (and/or ability to assess)

the participant's proposed technology/capability

match was critical. Even with the maximum six

companies to help reduce the odds, it was

challenging for most participants to complete phase

1I.

At the start of phase II, each lead participant was

given market-need information (as provided in the

appendix) about each of his/her chosen companies.

Several participants selected some of the same

companies in phase I. It was therefore necessary to

incorporate a high degree of inter-participant

coordination into phase II. This prevented

participants from contacting companies in an

awkward, haphazard, or uncoordinated manner. To

accomplish this, each participant was informed

about the specific company choices of all other

participants that happened to coincide with their

own. Phase I1 was subsequently kicked off and the

"virtual marketplace" of technical-level

communications between the participants and

technical points-of-contact at each company became

active. The virtual technology marketplace of

potential buyers and sellers is depicted in figures 3

and 4. It was originally intended that lead

participants would travel and visit high potential

companies at some point during their respective

phase II processes. However, due to the absence of

travel funds, only telephone, electronic, and other

non-physical means were available.

In phase II, lead participants used the limited

information provided in the appendix to _et a

preliminary sense of their companies' necds in order

to prepare for introductory discussions with the

respective

NAS A/qTVI--1999-209294 4
Figure 3: Phase Il virtual start-up configuration.

CommTech Phase II

S&E Initiated Interactions

Figure 4: Virtual marketplace activity near the planned Phase II to Phase III transition point.

technical points of contact. The aim of this initial

conversation was to quickly develop a more in-depth

technical understanding of a company's

product/process development needs - and vice-versa

[+or the company. Each lead participant (together

with his/her company technical point-of-contact)

used this deeper understanding to make a rapid and

accurate assessment of whether his/her particular

technology and/or capabilities might match a

company's need. The telephone interactions with

companies were done accordin,g to a sequential

contacl strategy to avoid raising (any company's)

NA SA/TM-- 1999-209294 5
expectations that could not be met. Therefore,

when a match was found, the participant would

cease his/her sequential contact process at that

point. Further telephone contacts occurred only if

the lead participant were willing to assume the

additional responsibility that would result from the

discovery of another match. Capability

demonstrations were provided at a company's

request if the lead participant thought the interaction

held promise- and funds were available. These

demonstrations were paid for as needed with the

lead participant's CommTech funds allotment.

Although phase II had a planned duration of three

months, it was expected that in many cases it would

be necessary to extend this phase for an additional

three months to allow slower-to-develop

relationships to coalesce. Similar reasoning was

applied to phase III.

through fiscal year 1997. Here, the participant's"

ability to deliver on his/her commitment became

critical. The challenge all lead participants faced at

this point was incorporating scheduled, nonaerospace support obligations into their "higher

priority" aerospace work schedules.

In addition to the success/risk factors mentioned

with respect to phase II above, it was recognized

that overall success during stage 2. in particular

phase IV, depended largely on the degree of

relevance or importance each lead participant's

functional manager attached to non-aerospace

interactions. This constituted an additional risk

factor that in several cases may have negatively

impacted the performance and output of stage 2.

RESULTS OF IMPLEMENTATION PHASES

After a "technical" match between technology need

and capability (or demand and supply) was secured,

discussions shifted to the "business" level. In other

words, phase II transitioned into phase HI. In phase

II, those participants who were fortunate enough to

discover a company whose needs matched their

capabilities proceeded to phase III, Those who did

not terminated their participation in the program

with a clear and measurable eftbrt and contribution

to show for it. Phase III ended, on an individual

basis, when NASA and a particular company

officially signed a formal Space Act Agreement.

This agreement represented NASA's legal obligation

to deliver specific technologies/support to that

company at a specified cost and schedule.

Phase III participants who successfully negotiated

and established an agreement transitioned into phase

IV. Phase IV had a planned duration extending

Twenty-six (26) scientists/engineers responded to

the phase I solicitation. ()f these, 16 applied as

individuals and 10 as teams. In addition, 9

applicants had experience in non-aerospace

technology transfer while 17 had no experience.

These applicants selected a total of 73 companies to

explore in phase II of which 58 (or 79 percent) were

chosen from the appendix, and 15 (21 percent) were

included by some experienced applicants. Figure 5

provides additional aggregate information on

industry sectors and regional sources.

Figure 6 portrays the cumulative totals and the

various rates at which the scientists and engineers

initiated their company interactions during phase I1.

As shown, 125 out of a possible maximum of 128 (or

98 percent) company interactions (the total count

resulting from the

• 25 Phase II Participants Identified

• 15 as Individuals, 10 as Teams

• 9 with ENTT- And 16 without ENTT"

48 Total Participants

_xDer_ence _n Non-aarospace leCrlnokogy I tanager

• 73 Companies* Selected

For Exploration In Phase II

• 58 Selected tram the 142 in the Appendix

15 Brought in by Experienced Participants

• Surtace Transportation Sector .... 37%

Environmental Sector .................. 36%

Bioengineering Sector ................ 27%

Prcau, ceO an average el 5 companies per Lea_ Paalcloan_

baSed on a IOlal of 128 Can_anl@s including overlapping seleclion_s

Company Data By Region

Mid-West .............. 36%

Mid-Continent ...... 22%

South East ........... 19%

Norlh East ............ 11%

Far West ............... 7%

Mid Atlantic .......... 5%

• Company Data Sources

FITTC's .......... 58%

RTI ................ 20%

S&E's ............ 22%

Figure 5: Summary of Phase I aggregate input/output results.

NASA/TM-- 1999-209294 6
128

100

S&E initiated

and Reported

Company

Interactions

5O

12S •

• 26 Lead S&E's in Phase II /

• Average of 5 Companies per Lead Participant

7B

6_Cumulative 39 Totals 71 74

37

15j

Previously Established Interaclions

E

May June July Aug

1995

Figure 6: Phase II effort expended, and rate of expenditure, by participating scientists and engineers.

overlapping selections of the same company by

different participants) were recorded by August 7,

1995. At the end of phase II, eleven (11) lead

participants had successfully established

relationships, which could be transitioned into,

phase IlI.

The development and completion of technical-level

discussions varied widely from participant to

participant. As a result, the transition from phasc 11

to phase III was managed on a case-by-case basis,

since each participant progressed at a different rate

due to differences in company (oroanizational)

interface structures. Out of the initial 26 lead

participants who entered phase II. and the eleven

who progressed to phase III, four Space Act

Agreements were established. Basically, one

agreement was generated for every 6.5 participants

that entered the program in phase I.

As mentioned previously, it was expected that a

large fraction of lead participants would not progress

from phase II to phase II1. For that matter, even

fewer were expected to progress from phase III to

phase IV. It must be emphasized though, that the

lack of success in phases II or III did not constitute

failure. Thai is why one of the critical measures

used in recording CommTech's overall performance

was the effort expended by all participants during.

phases II and III.

Results for phase IV in the fi)rm of success stories

based on market introduction of derived

products/processes, commercialization activities,

etc.. are not yet available.

Performance Measurement Technique

Formulation

As indicated earlier, tracking and measurement

techniques would be devised in phase IV. In that

regard+ the private/public investment ratio was

formulated to provide a future means of providing

cycle lo cycle performance comparisons. It was

found that it would be useful for the CommTech

program to have a single overall program

performance metric that could be used as a general

perlkwmance indicator or index.

The private/public investment ratio (PPIR) is written

as"

PPIR = lu,r,,_te/Ip,m, c

where:

I_,,,,,. = The total "private dollar investment" in one

or more technology transfer and commercialization

objectives;

and,

lp,,m,_= The total "public dollar investment" in one

or more technology transfer objectives.

If the process of demand driven technology transfer

and is considered a "production" process, then ln_,.,_.

and Ipum,,. can perhaps be determined from the

following two equations. (The specific functions

NASAFFM--1999-209294 7
representedby eachtermin eachequation,along

withtherelevantorassociatedstage2 phases,are

giveninparentheses below):

I,_,,¢=A+ fl H_ WI Y L,, + fL.H_.W,. Y Ei + tp Hp Wp

Y' Pi +fm Hm Wm _ Mk

{Ipnv,t_.= Transfer (phase IIl)+ Transfer (phase III)+

Transfer (phase II/IV)+ Transfer &

Commercialization (phase IV)+ Commercialization

(post phase IV)}

and,

Ip.H,_.= D + fm Hm W,. _ M k + 1_,I'_, W_. Y _ + fj

W! ._ Lh

{Ip, h_,,= Transfer (phase II)+ Transfer (stage 1/phase

I)+ Transfer (phase II)+ Transfer (phase III)}

where the stated "labor" and "capital .... factors of

production" and their associated "price"

determinants are described by:

A = The private dollar amount committed to fund an

established (Reimbursable or Cooperative) Space

Act Agreement;

D = The public dollar amount expended to provide a

capability demonstration to a particular company;

|_t. e. p.,,, ml = Inflation factors to adjust each term:

_._. p...... , = The number of hours needed to perform

each of the key functions, respectively;

W,. _.._:.., ,_,_ = The hourly wage rates of each

respective functional area (as a function of

government, company or industry origin);

Lh = The number of legal personnel needed to

establish the technology transfer agreement;

F_ = The number of engineering personnel needed to

demonstrate and/or transfer the technology (public

and private); and/or to incorporate the transferred

technology into a new or existing product design

(private);

Pi = The number of production personnel needed to

actually produce the new or modified product

(private); and

Mk = The number of marketing personnel needed to

promote and introduce CommTech (public); and,

position and develop a promotion and pricing

strategy for the new/modified product (private).

The two equations are derived from the economic

theory of production. The validity of this approach

remains to be demonstrated in practice. This of

course depends on whether the necessary input data

would actually be provided by (any or all)

participating companies

It was beyond the scope of the CommTech program

first cycle objectives to gather all the above

investment data. As a result, a PPIR based on the

simple "A/D" approximation (see Table 1), was

determined only to serve as a rough point of

departure or baseline. In the future, however,

detailed, individual and aggregate PPIR's would

need to be estimated during Phase III, and then

adjusted and finalized during Phase IV.

It was understood that companies generally tended

not to track unpatented/unlicensed technology

transfer from source to end product application and

commercialization. As a result, a company's

technology transfer and commercialization process

(cost) data tend to dissipate. Because of this. the

required process data (above) would have to be

acquired from a company during each relevant phase

(II, III, and IV).

RESULTS SUMMARY

Table 1 displays a summary of the metrics resulting

from each of the phases in stage 2. As noted

previously, the initial 26 phase II participants

produced a participant/agreement ratio of 6.5 (based

on 4 agreements), or 2.2 with respect to phase HI

(based on 6 agreements). For all 6 phase 11I

agreements, the cost was $22K per agreement, or

$26K per project, with respect to the total $130K

(phase II/phase III) for demonstration expenditures.

The private/public investment ratio (PPIR)

described in the above section was formulated as a

key parameter or metric by which CommTech

performance could gauged and compared over time.

This ratio was designed to be a measure of the

aggregate efficiency of the program - the higher the

PPIR, the greater the efficiency. A detailed, first

cycle PPIR, however, could not be determined since

the methodology was developed as an output of this

first cycle for application with future cycles.

Instead. a simplified approximation is calculated

and given below as a rough performance measure

and basis for comparison with future cycles.

NASA/TM-- 1999-209294 8
Table 1: First cycle Stage 2 summary of results.

° ° i

_U

_'_ _

o g g _- s

Phaselll 13 _ _ 16 $60K _,_'_._ 6 ,_\N\,%\"_ 2.2 2.6 ._%,._ .%_%%,.\_

Includes 3 new participants who entered Ihe program in FYg6

• Program was open to all NASA Glenn S&E's 26 applications were submilted

Eleverl (t 1 ) Irom initial 26 phase II participants plus 2 later addilions

Market research cosl estimate (NASA Headquarters (RTTC's & RTI) contract/lask obligation)

- Includes estimB_te on all fully negotiated signed and unsigned FY97 Agreements

" Simplified estimale shown based On Pnvate Inveslmerll/Public Inveslmerll dala in Table

Four (4) agreemenls were generated by the inlhal 26 phase It parllcipants

8 Includes estimate orl all sfaded and expected FYg7 pro_ects

9 Based on 4 agreements (see note #7)

TBD To be determined

In a strict sense, technology transfer was considered

to have occurred only where phase IV was either in

progress or was completed. The information

exchanged in the numerous telephone interactions

which occurred during phase II were considered a

measure of effort only and were not considered

technology transfer. In this first CommTech cycle

therefore, only five cases of successful technology

transfer (or interaction) arc recorded.

No commercialization successcs have yet been

recorded. Commercialization can bc defined as the

creation and/or modification, and introduction into

the marketplace of a product or process. Lonk_

(1999) offers some insight into the timeframes,

challcn_cs and complexities involved in new

product/process technology commercialization.

Such timcframes appear to realistically range

between 5 and 15 years. Whcther the five candidate

technology transfcr cases mentioned above will

achieve commercialization success is largely

dependent on the respective companies' market and

strategic business interests. In other words,

commercialization is in the domain of the private

sector.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The potential usefulness, broad applicability and

measurability of the CommTech methodology wcrc

demonstrated. All stated objectives were addressed.

The most important factor contributing to success

appeared to be the availability of internal R&D

funding to support capability demonstrations. As a

result, NASA R&D fundcd technoh)gy capability

demonstrations (in responsc to requests l'rom high

potential non-aerospace clients) were a built-in,

critical component of this first program cycle

conductcd at NASA Glenn.

If a second, similar or larger scope program cycle is

undertaken sometime in the future (within NASA

Glenn, another NASA Center, or throughout the

entire agency if desired), then the folh)wing

recommendations or considerations might produce

better results:

The initial program cycle was conducted by one

individual serving as program manager. Certain

activities in Stage 1 and Stage 2 (phase II and

111, in particular) would probably benefit from

more specializcd and focused support, in this

regard.

The effectiveness of phase ll may be improved

if the inherent time lag between the discovery of

a (product/process) technology problem/need,

and the idcntification and application of an

appropriate candidate technology solution, can

bc reduced. In order to minimize this time lag,

the rate at which the lormal stage 1 and stage

2/phase I participant selcction proccsses arc

accomplishcd must be accelerated or

maximized.

Company/client awareness of technology

capabilities is of particular importance. It is

possible that, given more lead-time, combincd

with more information about CommTech

objectives, market research sources might

provide more effcctivc support in this area.

NASA/TM--1999-209294 9
Theproductivityof thismethodologymightbe

increasedif leadparticipantswereabletomeet

withselectcompaniesandobtaina face-to-face

understandingof theirrespectiveproblemsor

needs.Theadditionaltravelcostorinvestment

expenditureincurredwouldprobablyresultin

higherqualityinteractions, whichmightin turn

producebetter,moreproductiverelationships.

Finally,the methodologypresentedin this report

appearsto bebroadlyapplicablewithinmostpublic

sectortechnologyproducingentities- i.e., other

government agencies(andperhapscertainprivate

sectorentitiesaswell). Presumably, someminor

modificationswould most likely be necessary,

dependingon how the particularorganization

functionsandwhatit wishesto accomplishin the

areaof technologytransferandcommercialization.

REFERENCES

Long, William F. Advanced Technology

Program: Performance of Completed Projects -

Status Report Number 1. National Institute of

Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. MD,

NIST Special Publication 950-1, March 1999.

. NASA Commercial Technology Team. NASA

Commercial Technology: Agenda for Change,

National Aeronautics and Space

Administration, July 1994.

NASA/TM-- 1999-209294 I 0

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE ForrnApproved

OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching exisling data sources,

gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimale or any other aspect of this

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1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED

June 1999 Technical Memorandum

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE

The Commtech Methodology: A Demand-Driven Approach to Efficient,

Productive, and Measurable Technology Transfer and Commercialization

6. AUTHOR(S)

Gary A. R Horsham

7. PERFORMINGORGANIZATIONNAME(S)ANDADDRESS(ES)

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

John H. Glenn Research Center at Lewis Field

Cleveland, Ohio 44135- 3191

9. SPONSORING/MONITORINGAGENCYNAME(S)ANDADDRESS(ES)

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Washington, DC 20546-0001

5. FUNDING NUMBERS

WU-251-30-07-00

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION

REPORT NUMBER

E-I1773

10. SPONSORING/MONITORING

AGENCY REPORTNUMBER

NASA TM--1999-209294

11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

Prepared for the 24th Annual Technology Transfer Society Meeting, Technology Transfer in The New Millennium,

sponsored by the Technology Transfer Society, St. Petersburg, Florida, July 15-17, 999. Responsible person,

Gary A. P. Horsham, organization code 9400, (216) 433-8316.

12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

Unclassified - Unlimited

Subject Category: 85 Distribution: Nonstandard

This publication is available from the NASA Center for AeroSpace Information. (301) 621-0390.

12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE

13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words)

This paper presents a comprehensive review and assessment of a demonstration technology transfer and commercialization program called "CommTech". The program was conceived and initiated in early to mid-fiscal year 1995, and

extended roughly three years into the future. Market research sources were used to initially gather primary technological problems and needs data from non-aerospace companies in three targeted industry sectors: environmental,

surface transportation, and bioengineering. Company-supplied information served as input data to activate or start-up

an internal, phased matchmaking process. This process was based on technical-level relationship exploration followed by business-level agreement negotiations, and culminated with project management and execution. Space Act

Agreements represented near-term outputs. Company product or process commercialization derived from NASA

Glenn support and measurable economic effects represented far-term outputs.

14. SUBJECT TERMS

Technology transfer: Commercialization: Technology commercialization; Technology

utilization: Non-aerospace

17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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Unclassified

NSN 7540-01-280-5500

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OF THIS PAGE

Unclassified

19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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Unclassified

15. NUMBER OF PAGES

16

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A03

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Standard Form 298 trey. 2-89)

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