IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

STATE OF MONTANA, 

plaintiff and Respondent, 

-VSDOUGLAS LEE LAVERDURE, 

Defendant and Appellant. 

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APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fourth Judicial ~ist3ict.~ 

In and for the County of Missoula, 

The Honorable Douglas Harkin, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Douglas C. Anderson, Missoula, Montana 

For Respondent : 

Won. Marc Racicot, Attorney General, Helena, Montana 

Paul D. Johnson, Asst. Atty. General, Helena 

Robert Deschamps, 111, County Attorney, iss sou la, 

Montana 

Filed: 

Submitted on Briefs: Dec. 7, 1989 

Decided: January 19, 1990 
Justice Fred J. Weber delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

Defendant, Douglas Laverdure, was charged in the ~istrict 

Court for the Fourth Judicial ~istrict, Missoula County, with the 

felonies of aggravated burglary and criminal mischief, and 

misdemeanor assault. At the close of the State's case, the defense 

moved for directed verdict, alleging that the State had not 

presented sufficient evidence to sustain a verdict. The motion was 

denied, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on all three counts, 

and defendant was convicted. He appeals. We affirm. 

Defendant presents the following two issues on appeal: 

1. Did the District Court err in denying the defendant's 

motion for directed verdict? 

2. Did the prosecutor's remarks during closing arguments 

deprive defendant of a fair trial? 

Substantial evidence in the record shows: The victim, Betty 

Bullchild, and her two children lived in a trailer court near 

Frenchtown, Montana. Living in the same trailer court were 

defendant, who lived with Lori Wessel, and defendant's sister, 

Debbie Laverdure. At around 3:19 a.m. on October 4, 1988, 

Bullchild called the Missoula County sheriff's Department to report 

that someone had thrown a rock through her trailer window. A 

friend of hers, Mervin Pine was with her when the rock came through 

the window, and when the Deputy Sheriff came to investigate. The 

Deputy testified that both Pine and Bullchild were drinking but 

appeared sober. He testified Bullchild suspected defendant was the 
person that threw the rock through the window so the Deputy went 

to his trailer to investigate. He testified that the lights were 

all out at the defendant's trailer and that there was no one 

outside. He further testified that this ill-fated relationship 

between defendant, his sister, girlfriend and Bullchild had been 

going on for some time and he had personally dealt with the same 

group of people before on other vandalism calls. 

About an hour later, the Deputy received a second phone call, 

this time to report that Bullchild had been assaulted and had been 

taken to her sister's house. The Deputy testified that Bullchild 

was llpossibly in shock1' when he talked to her and had blood all 

over her face and hands. Bullchild testified that defendant, 

Wessel and Debbie Laverdure had broken windows in her trailer and 

then forced their way into the house and beat her. She testified 

that defendant found her in her bedroom, yelled to the others "Here 

she isv', and then beat her up. During the assault, Bullchild's two 

children were beneath the covers on the bed. 

After investigating the trailer, the Deputy testified that he 

found blood on the floor in the kitchen and down the hallway and 

that all the windows in Bullchild's trailer had been broken out. 

The windows of Bullchild's car were also broken out. 

Defendant personally testified but gave a completely different 

version of the facts. When the Deputy went to defendant's home 

after the second call, defendant and Wessel came to the door. The 

Deputy testified that defendant reported to him that somebody had 

broken out one of his windows. Defendant's testimony painted 
Bullchild and Pine as the aggressors, and he denied beating up 

Bullchild. The Deputy testified that defendant told him that an 

Indian, (Mewin Pine) had thrown a rock at him, missed and broke 

the window. The Deputy arrested defendant, Debbie Laverdure and 

Wessel. Separate charges were filed and separate trials were held. 

At the close of the State's case against defendant, the defense 

moved for directed verdict, alleging that the State had not 

presented sufficient evidence to sustain a verdict based on the 

inconsistencies in the various versions of the incident as told by 

Bullchild. The motion was denied. Defendant was convicted and 

this appeal follows. 

Did the District Court err in denying the defendant's motion 

for directed verdict? 

Defendant contends there was not sufficient evidence to 

support his conviction, and that the denial of his motion for 

directed verdict was an abuse of discretion. He maintains that 

the State's case was based solely on the testimony of Bullchild 

and that her story varied from the time of the initial 

investigation through the trial. 

The State urges that a district court may only grant a motion 

for directed verdict when: 

there is no evidence upon which the jury could base a 

verdict; that is, the defendant is entitled to an 

acquittal if reasonable men could not conclude from the 

evidence taken in a light most favorable to the 

prosecution that guilt has been proven beyond a 

reasonable doubt. 

State v. White Water (Mont. 1981), 634 P.2d 636, 38 St.Rep. 1664. 
The State further maintains that it is "within the province of the 

trier of fact to determine" which evidence shall prevail when it 

is conflicting, and that the jury is the exclusive judge of a 

witness' credibility. We agree. 

When reviewing the denial of a motion for directed verdict, 

only substantial evidence in the record supporting the jury's 

finding is required. Lane v. Dunkle (Mont. 1988), 753 P.2d 321, 

45 St.Rep. 686. The standard of review on issues of substantial 

evidence is that the conviction cannot be overturned if evidence, 

when viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, would 

allow a rational trier of fact to find essential elements of the 

crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Buckingham (Mont. 1989), 

P. 2d , 46 St.Rep. 2102. The weight of evidence and 

credibility of witnesses is exclusively within the province of the 

jury. State v. Urness (Mont. 1989), 778 P.2d 419, 46 St.Rep. 1510. 

The jury heard the evidence and testimony of the witnesses and 

found defendant was guilty of the charges against him. Bullchild 

never changed her testimony as to who assaulted her. Even with the 

inconsistencies in her testimony, the jury found defendant to be 

guilty of the charges against him beyond a reasonable doubt. We 

hold the District Court did not err in denying the defendant's 

motion for directed verdict. 

I1 

Did the prosecutor's remarks during closing arguments deprive 

defendant of a fair trial? 

Defendant contends that the prosecution made several improper 
comments during closing argument indicating that defendant was 

lying. Defendant concedes that no objection was made at trial to 

these comments but contends that failure to object should not 

necessarily bar review by this Court, citing case law from other 

jurisdictions. 

The State maintains that the statements made were not improper 

and that failure to object at trial does bar review. The State 

further urges that even if the issue is reviewable, there was no 

error in the statements made. We agree. 

Objections to closing arguments made for the first time on 

appeal are too late. State v. Pease (1986), 222 Mont. 455, 472, 

724 P.2d 153, 163. Furthermore, the State's comments were nothing 

more than an opinion and "an opinion based on the State's analysis 

of evidence1' does not constitute an expression of the State's 

personal opinion of guilt and is not prejudicial. State v. Clawson 

(Mont. 1989), 781 P.2d 267, 46 St.Rep. 1792. We hold the 

prosecutor's remarks during closing arguments did not deprive 

defendant of a fair trial. 

Affirmed. 

We Concur: