Cite as 2023 Ark. 101

SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS

No. CR-22-21

STACY ANTHONY MITCHELL

APPELLANT

V.

STATE OF ARKANSAS

APPELLEE

Opinion Delivered: June 8, 2023

APPEAL FROM THE BENTON

COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT 

[NO. 04CR-19-368]

HONORABLE BRAD KARREN, 

JUDGE

AFFIRMED; COURT OF APPEALS’ 

OPINION VACATED.

SHAWN A. WOMACK, Associate Justice

On February 2, 2019, Stacy Mitchell stabbed Mark McCoy at JJ’s Grill in Rogers. 

Mitchell was arrested the same day, and a jury convicted him on May 20, 2021, nearly twoand-a-half years later, of first-degree battery and failure to appear on a felony. Mitchell was 

sentenced to twenty-one years’ imprisonment as an habitual offender. Mitchell appealed 

his conviction and sentence to the court of appeals, arguing there was insufficient evidence 

to support his conviction for first-degree battery and that the circuit court abused its 

discretion by denying his motion to substitute counsel. The court of appeals affirmed, and

we granted Mitchell petition for review. Because the circuit court did not abuse its 

discretion by denying Mitchell’s motion to substitute counsel, and there was substantial 

evidence to support his conviction for first-degree battery, we affirm the circuit court’s order

and vacate the court of appeals’ opinion.
2

I. Facts

On May 20, 2021, a Benton County jury convicted Stacy Mitchell of first-degree 

battery and failure to appear.1 This conviction followed Mitchell’s request to substitute 

counsel, seeking to replace his appointed public defender with a private attorney from the 

James Law Firm. Mitchell’s effort to substitute counsel began on March 21, 2021, when 

the James Law Firm filed a motion to “authorize the withdrawal of Sam Hall[,]” Mitchell’s 

public defender, and permit the substitution of William O. “Bill” James, Jr. as attorney of 

record. At that time, Mitchell’s jury trial was scheduled for May 4, 2021.

The circuit court first considered Mitchell’s motion to substitute counsel during a 

virtual, pre-trial status hearing on April 15, 2021—just 19 days before the scheduled jury 

trial. Alex Morphis, an associate attorney at the James Law Firm, attended the hearing.

After Hall raised the issue of the James Law Firm’s motion to substitute counsel, the circuit 

court announced “I have a jury trial set for May the 4th[,] and I’m not going to change 

counsel at this late in the game . . . . Defense motion to substitute counsel is denied.” A 

colloquy between the circuit court and Morphis followed, and Morphis informed the court 

“we can be prepared to move forward on May 4th.” 

The circuit court immediately noted a problem with Morphis’s assertion and stated, 

“If I change counsel right now and there’s some issue, it’s an automatic Rule 37 problem.”

The circuit court again denied Mitchell’s request to substitute counsel. Dissatisfied with the 

denial, Mitchell himself pled for the circuit court to grant his motion. But before Mitchell 

could make any substantive argument in support of his motion, the circuit court demanded 

1The jury acquitted Mitchell on a separate second-degree battery charge. 
3

he stop and threatened: “If you interrupt me one more time, Mr. Mitchell, you’ll be 

incarcerated[,] and you can try your case on May the 4th while you’re sitting in the Benton 

County jail. Don’t interrupt me again.” As the discussion continued, Hall raised the 

prospect of the James Law Firm serving as co-counsel on the case. Even though the circuit 

court noted that it was possible, the court nevertheless explained that no such motion was 

presently pending before the court.

Although Mitchell’s jury trial was originally scheduled for May 4th, the circuit court 

granted a joint motion for a continuance and rescheduled the trial for May 18, 2021. At a 

pre-trial status hearing on May 4, Mitchell’s motion to substitute counsel was again a topic 

of discussion. There, the circuit court clarified the denial with the following announcement:

Now, Mr. Hall, last time I believe Bill James’[s] office had filed a motion to 

substitute counsel, which I denied because we were too close to the jury trial 

date. I did not prohibit—and I want it to be clear—I did not prohibit either 

Bill James’[s] firm or another firm if they want to be as co-counsel. If they 

want to file their motion, I certainly will entertain that. But I just want to 

make clear on the record I wasn’t prohibiting co-counsel, what I didn’t want 

to do is change counsel this close to trial and create an issue.

Public defender Hall then informed the court that the James Law Firm had rejected an offer 

to serve as co-counsel for Mitchell. Speaking to Mitchell directly, the circuit court then 

offered: 

[I]f you want co-counsel or you either want a change of counsel, I’ll consider 

it, but the problem was at that late date I didn’t want to change counsel so 

close to the trial date. So if you still want to do that, I just want to make sure 

you understand I'm not prohibiting that. If you want that done, then please 

contact additional counsel to find out what you want to do. Okay?

Mitchell responded, “Yes, sir, I will.” 
4

At another pre-trial hearing on May 10, the issue of substitution of counsel arose 

again, and the following colloquy between Mitchell and the circuit court ensued:

MR. MITCHELL: Your Honor, may I say a word real quick?

THE COURT: Mr. Mitchell, you’ve got an attorney and once you’ve 

been appointed that attorney you’ve waived your right 

to represent yourself. And I don’t want you to say 

anything that might be used against you so I’m not going 

to allow you to.

MR. MITCHELL: I’m not going to testify or anything. With all due respect 

to the court, me and my family we have been talking. 

My wife talked the Sam Hall several times, on several 

occasions and she believed in her heart that he’s not the 

attorney for me, and I also believe in my heart that he’s 

not the attorney for me. And the last time we talked 

you said you would take this on consideration. I’m 

humbly asking you to take this on consideration right 

now.

THE COURT: Well, Mr. Mitchell, there’s been no motion filed by any 

other law firm asking to join as co-counsel or 

substitution of counsel. We’ve got trial here in eight 

days. So I’m not going to change—I’m not going to 

change counsel at this point, Mr. Mitchell. I’m not 

going to do that. Mr. Hall has been in this court for 

years, eight years if I’m not mistaken. He’s tried several 

jury trials in this court. He’s conducted himself very 

competent.

MR. MITCHELL: I have (unintelligible simultaneous speech) –

MR. HALL: Mr. Mitchell –

MR. MITCHELL: I’m sorry, I don’t mean to cut you off, Your Honor. I 

do understand where you're coming from. I truly do. 

But in conversation me and Mr. Hall had with me and 

my family is that I’m going to lose this jury trial. He’s 

one hundred percent sure of that. So he’s going in there 

with doubt in his mind. I can have my wife to testify to 

that. He told her that.
5

THE COURT: All right. Well, there’s no motion –

MR. MITCHELL: So if he’s going in there with doubt in his mind, why 

would I even have an attorney to defend me? There’s 

no one to defend me. 

THE COURT: There’s no motion pending, Mr. Mitchell. I’m going to 

go ahead and keep this trial on May the 18th. Mr. Hall 

is going to be your attorney of record on the case.

Just before the hearing concluded, the State noted that it would object to “further 

interference by other attorneys,” asserting that Hall knew the case well and had been 

“extremely diligent in his participation.” The court thanked the State and advised Mitchell 

that he would need to appear in person on May 18. Mitchell said that he would and then 

added, “I’ll go hire me an attorney.”2 He did not, however, hire another attorney, and the 

jury trial proceeded with Hall representing him.

After a three-day trial, the jury convicted Mitchell of first-degree battery and failure 

to appear but acquitted him of second-degree battery. The James Law Firm then filed a 

motion to declare Mitchell indigent and sought appointment as his appellate counsel, which 

the circuit court granted. The court of appeals affirmed Mitchell’s conviction and the circuit 

court’s denial of Mitchell’s motion to substitute counsel, but this court granted Mitchell’s 

petition for review. On appeal, Mitchell presents two theories for reversal: first, the circuit 

court abused its discretion by denying Mitchell’s motion to substitute counsel; and second, 

there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for first-degree battery.

2The record transcript erroneously attributes this quote to Hall. 
6

II. Discussion

When this court grants a petition for review, it considers the appeal as though it had 

originally been filed with this court. In re Estate of Haverstick, 2021 Ark. 233, at 3, 635 

S.W.3d 482, 484. 

A. Motion to Substitute Counsel

Mitchell first argues he is entitled to a new trial because the circuit court denied his 

right to counsel. This court reviews the denial of a motion to substitute counsel for an 

abuse of discretion. Bullock v. State, 353 Ark. 577, 581, 111 S.W.3d 380, 383 (2003). An 

abuse of discretion is a high threshold that does not simply require error in the circuit court’s 

decision but requires that the circuit court acted improvidently, thoughtlessly, or without 

due consideration. Collins v. State, 2019 Ark. 110, at 5, 571 S.W.3d 469, 472.

Although a criminal defendant is generally entitled to the counsel of his choice, this 

right “does not extend to defendants who require counsel to be appointed for them.” United

States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 151 (2006). Once a criminal defendant has obtained 

competent counsel, “any request for a change in counsel must be balanced against the 

public’s interest in the prompt dispensation of justice.” Arroyo v. State, 2013 Ark. 244, at 6, 

428 S.W.3d 464, 469. However, “[i]n each situation[,] the court must look at the particular 

circumstances of the case at bar, and the issue must be decided on a case-by-case basis.” Id.

at 6–7, 428 S.W.3d at 469. Relevant factors for the circuit court to consider include:

[W]hether other continuances have been requested and granted; the length of 

the requested delay; whether the requested delay is for legitimate reasons; 

whether the motion for a continuance was timely filed; whether the defendant 

contributed to the circumstances giving rise to the request for a continuance; 

whether the reason for the discharge of existing counsel was solely for the 
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purpose of obtaining a continuance; and whether the request was consistent 

with the fair, efficient and effective administration of justice.

Id., at 7, 428 S.W.3d at 469. If these factors weigh in favor of denial, there is no 

“[e]rroneous deprivation of the right to counsel of choice[]” that “qualifies as ‘structural 

error.’” Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 149 (quoting Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 282 

(1993))

As noted above, the circuit court (over the course of multiple hearings) considered 

many of the relevant factors articulated in Arroyo when denying Mitchell’s motion to 

substitute counsel. Arroyo, 2013 Ark. 244, at 7, 428 S.W.3d at 469. Taking the factors in 

order, the circuit court found that imminently scheduled jury trial weighed against granting 

Mitchell’s request to change counsel, especially considering the number of continuances 

already granted at both Mitchell’s requests and because of the response to COVID-19.

Relatedly, the circuit court was concerned about the timeliness of the request. 

Mitchell submitted an affidavit of indigency on July 10, 2019, and the circuit court 

appointed a public defender the same day. The public defender’s office continued to 

represent Mitchell without issue for the next twenty months until the James Law Firm filed 

its initial motion to substitute counsel less than six weeks before Mitchell’s scheduled jury 

trial. Although Mitchell’s request did not come on the eve of trial, see Tyler v. State, 265 

Ark. 822, 827, 581 S.W.2d 328, 330 (1979), it was nevertheless belated, considering how 

long the prosecution had been pending and seemingly imminent disposition of the case; the 

circuit court did not consider the motion until nineteen days before the originally scheduled 

jury trial. See Arroyo, at 7, 428 S.W.3d at 469. Unlike this court’s recent opinion in Stanton 
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v. State, the denial of Mitchell motion to substitute counsel came at the end of the pre-trial 

preparation, not the beginning. 2023 Ark. 81, at 6–7, ___ S.W.3d ___, ___.

The circuit court thoughtfully and repeatedly considered “whether the request was 

consistent with the fair, efficient and effective administration of justice.” Id. Even though 

the circuit court did not explicitly articulate these factors one by one, the circuit court noted 

several additional problems with Mitchell’s request to change counsel. First, the circuit 

court was concerned about a potential ineffective assistance-of-counsel claim arising from 

the James Law Firm having only six weeks to prepare for a jury trial without any 

continuances. The circuit court did not reach this conclusion thoughtlessly, improvidently, 

or without due consideration; a criminal defendant may have ineffective counsel when there 

was “actual prejudice that arose from the alleged failure to investigate and prepare for trial 

and demonstrate a reasonable probability that additional preparation and the information 

that would have been uncovered with further investigation could have changed the 

outcome of the trial.” Mason v. State, 2013 Ark. 492, at 8, 430 S.W.3d 759, 764–65. The 

circuit court’s concern that an ineffective assistance-of-counsel claim could (but likely would 

not) lie was sufficiently grounded in law and was not an abuse of discretion. See id.

Finally, Mitchell remained formally indigent throughout the entirety of the 

prosecution, and he remains indigent on appeal. Although Hall told the circuit court that 

Mitchell “has hired the Bill James Law Firm[,]” nothing in the record supports such a claim, 

including any statement by Mitchell or a James Law Firm representative that Mitchell had 

formally hired the James Law Firm. In fact, Mitchell’s announcement to the circuit court 

at the May 10 pre-trial hearing that “[he]’ll go hire . . . an attorney” suggests he had not 
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hired anyone to represent him, and that Hall remained Mitchell’s counsel, both formally 

and in Mitchell’s eyes. As noted above, one’s right to choose his counsel “does not extend 

to defendants who require counsel to be appointed for them.” Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 

at 151. Mitchell never offered any evidence that he was no longer indigent, and the James 

Law Firm rejected an offer to serve as co-counsel Hall’s co-counsel. Because Mitchell was 

(and remains) indigent, he was not entitled to the counsel of his choice, id., and the circuit 

court’s denial of his motion to substitute counsel was not an abuse of discretion. Bullock, 

353 Ark. at 581, 111 S.W.3d at 383.

B. Sufficiency of the Evidence

When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, this court considers 

whether there is substantial evidence to support the verdict and “evaluate[s] the facts of the 

record in the light most favorable to the State.” Brown v. State, 2021 Ark. 16, at 2, 614 

S.W.3d 820, 822. “Substantial evidence is evidence that would compel a conclusion one 

way or the other beyond suspicion or conjecture.” Id. It is the jury’s prerogative to resolve

inconsistent testimony and accept or reject any alternative theories. Norris v. State, 2010 

Ark. 174, at 2, 368 S.W.3d 52, 54.

A person commits first-degree battery if, with the purpose of causing serious physical 

injury to another person, he causes serious physical injury to any person by means of a deadly 

weapon or causes serious physical injury to another person under circumstances manifesting 

extreme indifference to the value of human life. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-13-201(a)(1) & (3) 

(Supp. 2019). A “deadly weapon” includes “anything that in the manner of its use or 

intended use is capable of causing death or serious physical injury.” Ark. Code Ann. § 5-
10

1-102(4)(B) (Repl. 2013). “Serious physical injury” means “physical injury that creates a 

substantial risk of death or that causes protracted disfigurement, protracted impairment of 

health, or loss or protracted impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.” 

Ark. Code Ann. § 5-1-102(21). 

Mitchell first argues that McCoy failed to specifically testify about what object he 

had been stabbed with and, therefore, there was no evidence that Mitchell stabbed him with 

a deadly weapon. But several witnesses testified they witnessed Mitchell pull a knife from 

his pocket, flip it open, and swing it toward McCoy. McCoy also testified that Mitchell 

“bumped” him from behind and that his “arm gets nailed, just hit by an object I’ll say for 

now . . . [and] when I looked at my arm, it was just open.” Considering this testimony, 

the jury rejected any alternative theory about what kind of object Mitchell may have stabbed 

McCoy with. Norris, 2010 Ark. 174, at 2, 368 S.W.3d at 54. Thus, there was substantial 

evidence that Mitchell stabbed McCoy with a knife, i.e., a deadly weapon. See Ark. Code 

Ann. § 5-1-102(4)(B).

Mitchell also argues McCoy did not sustain a “serious physical injury.” Citing the 

medical evidence introduced at trial, Mitchell points out that the injury was a fourcentimeter-long laceration that “only needed sutures to repair.” Mitchell further argues 

that McCoy did not testify about the type of medical treatment he received, did not testify 

that he sustained any injury to any part of his body other than his wrist, and complained 

only of pain and numbness around the wound. But whether a victim has sustained serious 

physical injury, and the question of temporary or protracted impairment, are issues for the 

jury to decide. Bangs v. State, 338 Ark. 515, 521, 998 S.W.2d 738, 743 (1999).
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As explained above, “[s]erious physical injury” means “physical injury that creates a 

substantial risk of death or that causes protracted disfigurement, protracted impairment of 

health, or loss or protracted impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.” 

Ark. Code Ann. § 5-1-102(21). This court has before held that a five-centimeter laceration 

that required closure with staples constituted a serious physical injury. Banks, 338 Ark. at 

521, 998 S.W.2d at 743. Relatedly, a victim’s recovery from such an injury does not change 

the degree of injury. Brown v. State, 347 Ark. 308, 316, 65 S.W.3d 394, 399 (2001). Here, 

the State introduced evidence—including photographs of the wound—that McCoy suffered 

a four-centimeter-long laceration to his arm, which was deep enough to require multiple 

sutures to close. The laceration also caused scarring and resulted in McCoy experiencing 

numbness in the area two years later. The physician assistant who treated McCoy also 

testified that the stab wound extended to McCoy’s fascia, which is the layer of tissue that 

separates a person’s skin from his muscles and tendons. Considering this, the State 

introduced substantial evidence that McCoy suffered a serious physical injury from the 

stabbing, which is sufficient to support Mitchell’s conviction for first-degree battery. See 

Banks, 338 Ark. at 521, 998 S.W.2d at 743. 

Affirmed; court of appeals’ opinion vacated.

KEMP, C.J., concurs without opinion.

BAKER, HUDSON, and WYNNE, JJ., dissent.

KAREN R. BAKER, Justice, dissenting. Because the circuit court abused its 

discretion in denying Mitchell’s motion for substitution of counsel, I dissent. The majority’s 

opinion is patently flawed for three reasons.
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First, the majority asserts that “[t]he circuit court (over the course of multiple hearings) 

considered many of the relevant factors articulated in Arroyo when denying Mitchell’s 

motion to substitute counsel.” (Emphasis added.) However, this court has long held that 

deprivation of the right to be assisted by counsel of one’s choice is complete “when the 

defendant is erroneously prevented from being represented by the lawyer he wants, 

regardless of the quality of the representation he received.” Arroyo v. State, 2013 Ark. 244, 

at 5, 428 S.W.3d 464, 468 (citing United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140 (2006)). 

Therefore, any analysis of whether Mitchell’s Sixth Amendment rights were violated 

necessarily cannot extend beyond the moment that the circuit court entered an order 

denying his motion to substitute counsel. Any offers by the circuit court to accommodate 

Mitchell’s request to substitute counsel at subsequent pre-trial hearings, as well as any belated 

attempts by the circuit court to fix its earlier denial of Mitchell’s motion, were ineffectual 

to remedy the harm because the constitutional violation had already occurred. 

Second, the majority fails to recognize that our holding in Arroyo, 2013 Ark. 244, 

428 S.W.3d 464, is instructive. The majority maintains that, because the circuit court 

expressed “[concern] about a potential ineffective assistance-of-counsel claim arising from 

the James Law Firm having only six weeks to prepare for a jury trial without any 

continuances” and “[concern] about the timeliness of the request,” it properly considered 

the factors set forth in Arroyo. A review of the record demonstrates that, during the April 15 

hearing at which Mitchell’s motion was considered, the extent of the circuit court’s concerns 

was that “[w]e’ve got a jury trial set for May the 4th . . . I’m not going to allow the change 

of counsel this late. I’m not going to have a built-in Rule 37.” As the majority points out, 
13

“before Mitchell could make any substantive argument in support of his motion, the circuit 

court demanded he stop and threatened: ‘If you interrupt me one more time, Mr. Mitchell, 

you’ll be incarcerated[,] and you can try your case on May the 4th while you’re sitting in 

the Benton County jail. Don’t interrupt me again.’” In Arroyo, we reversed and remanded 

for a new trial on similar grounds, holding that the circuit court failed to consider Arroyo’s 

interests because there was “no evidence that the circuit court gave any consideration to 

[Arroyo’s] right to choice of counsel. Rather, the circuit court declined to hear from 

[Arroyo’s new counsel] about why a continuance was necessary and failed to conduct any 

inquiry into [Arroyo’s] request for new counsel.” Id. at 8–9, 428 S.W.3d at 470. The same 

is true in the present case, except Mitchell did not request a continuance as was done in 

Arroyo. Here, Mitchell sought to substitute an attorney that he had already privately retained. 

Although it was made clear that the James Law Firm could be ready for Mitchell’s trial 

without delay, the circuit court denied the motion to substitute counsel and failed to 

conduct any inquiry into the basis for Mitchell’s request, citing vague concerns about 

creating “an automatic Rule 37 problem.” As we observed in Arroyo, the record before us 

plainly demonstrates that there is no evidence that the circuit court balanced Mitchell’s right 

to choice of counsel against the needs of fairness and the demands of its calendar. See Arroyo, 

2013 Ark. 244, at 7, 428 S.W.3d at 470 (citing Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 152).

Third, the majority’s decision is an abrupt about-face from our recent decision in 

Stanton v. State, 2023 Ark. 81, ___ S.W.3d ___, a case in which we upheld one’s right to 

counsel of choice under circumstances far more complex than the present case. In Stanton, 

Stanton’s privately retained criminal defense attorney, Patrick Benca, declared himself to be 
14

a necessary witness during Stanton’s second trial, successfully sought a mistrial, and was 

ultimately disqualified from further representing Stanton in the case. Id. at 2, ___ S.W.3d at 

___. Ahead of Stanton’s fourth trial, Stanton again retained Benca to represent him, and 

Benca was disqualified once more based on the circuit court’s prior disqualification order. 

Id. at 4, ___ S.W.3d at ___. After recognizing that violations of the right to counsel of 

choice constitute structural error, we reversed Benca’s second disqualification, concluding 

that “we believe little chance exists of [Benca] being called [as a witness] in the fourth 

[trial].” Id. at 5–7, ___ S.W.3d at ___. The United States Supreme Court has explained that 

structural errors “defy analysis by ‘harmless-error’ standards” because they “affec[t] the 

framework within which the trial proceeds,” and are not “simply an error in the trial process 

itself.” Reams v. State, 2018 Ark. 324, at 16–17, 560 S.W.3d 441, 452 (citing GonzalezLopez, 548 U.S. at 148). Therefore, structural errors require automatic reversal on appeal. 

See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, at 7–8 (1999).

The majority attempts to distinguish Stanton from the present case by pointing out 

that “the denial of Mitchell[’s] motion to substitute counsel came at the end of the pre-trial 

preparation, not the beginning.” However, this distinction is meaningless. A close review 

of the record demonstrates that there is only one marked difference to explain the majority’s 

sharp departure from the holding in Stanton—the financial means of the criminal defendants. 

This distinction is underscored by the majority’s conclusion that “[b]ecause Mitchell was 

(and remains) indigent, he was not entitled to the counsel of his choice.” As the majority 

points out, we have observed that “the right to counsel of choice does not extend to 

defendants who require counsel to be appointed for them.” Arroyo, 2013 Ark. 244, at 5, 428 
15

S.W.3d at 469 (citing Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140); see also Luis v. United States, 578 U.S. 

5 (2016) (holding that an indigent defendant, while entitled to adequate representation, has 

no right to have the Government pay for his preferred representational choice). 

While I agree that an indigent defendant has no right to choose his appointed counsel, 

the majority misconstrues both the law and Mitchell’s request. The record demonstrates that 

Mitchell had retained the James Law Firm. The majority inexplicably rationalizes its view 

that Mitchell was not entitled to counsel of his choice by pointing out that, “[a]lthough Hall 

told the circuit court that Mitchell ‘has hired the Bill James Law Firm[,]’ nothing in the 

record supports such a claim[,]

1” and “Mitchell never offered any evidence that he was no 

longer indigent[.]” The majority’s holding yields the untenable position that, once declared 

indigent, a criminal defendant may not retain private counsel unless and until his own

indigency status changes regardless of the source of funds from which the representation is 

obtained. The majority cites no authority in support of this position, as no such law exists. 

On the contrary, the fact that Mitchell remained indigent throughout the course of his trial 

is immaterial to our analysis. This position overlooks the reality that, in many instances, 

third parties provide funding for the legal defense of indigent defendants. Accordingly, the 

majority’s holding haphazardly diminishes the constitutional right to counsel of choice for 

indigent defendants. 

For these reasons, I would reverse and remand for a new trial.

1

I disagree with the majority’s assertion that there is nothing in the record to support 

the claim that Mitchell had hired the James Law Firm. On the contrary, the record 

demonstrates that the James Law Firm filed a motion for substitution of counsel and several 

pre-trial motions, and an attorney from the James Law Firm appeared on Mitchell’s behalf 

at the April 15 pre-trial hearing, notably not requesting a continuance.
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HUDSON and WYNNE, JJ., join.

James Law Firm, by: William O. “Bill” James, Jr., for appellant.

Leslie Rutledge, Att’y Gen., by: Michael Zangari, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.