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Military and Security Developments Involving

the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

2017

A Report to Congress

Pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act

for Fiscal Year 2012

Section 1236 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Public Law 112-

81, as amended by Section 1292 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year

2013 and Section 1245 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014,

provides that the Secretary of Defense shall submit a report “in both classified and

unclassified form, on the current and future military power of the Democratic People’s

Republic of Korea” (DPRK). The report shall address an assessment of the security situation

on the Korean Peninsula, the goals and factors shaping North Korean security strategy and

military strategy, trends in North Korean security, an assessment of North Korea’s regional

security objectives, including an assessment of the North Korean military’s capabilities,

developments in North Korean military doctrine and training, an assessment of North

Korea’s proliferation activities, and other military security developments
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Table of Contents

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ......................................................................................1

CHAPTER ONE: ASSESSMENT OF THE SECURITY SITUATION .......................3

KEY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH KOREAN AND PENINSULAR SECURITY ..................................... 3

CHAPTER TWO: UNDERSTANDING NORTH KOREA’S STRATEGY...............5

STRATEGIC GOALS ......................................................................................................................5

NATIONAL STRATEGY ..................................................................................................................5

REGIONAL OBJECTIVES AND BEHAVIOR....................................................................................6

CHAPTER THREE: THE CAPABILITIES AND MODERNIZATION

GOALS OF NORTH KOREA’S MILITARY FORCES ...........................................9

OVERVIEW...................................................................................................................................9

GROWING CAPABILITIES TO BOLSTER AN AGING FORCE .........................................................9

CHAPTER FOUR: WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 

PROGRAMS AND PROLIFERATION ..............................................................21

NORTH KOREA’S WMD PROGRAMS .........................................................................................21

PROLIFERATION.........................................................................................................................22

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION ........................................................................................................22

ARMS AND MISSILE SALES ........................................................................................................22
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Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 1

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

North Korea’s primary strategic goal is perpetual Kim family rule via the simultaneous 

development of its economy and nuclear weapons program – a two-pronged policy known 

as byungjin. Pyongyang portrays nuclear weapons as its most effective way to deter the 

threat from the United States. However, regime propaganda began emphasizing “final 

victory” over the United States and Republic of Korea (ROK) in 2017, suggesting Kim Jong Un

has larger ambitions, including use of nuclear weapons to deter interference if it attempts to 

reunify the Korean Peninsula. Internally, the regime seeks to maintain control over a 

populace that is decreasingly reliant on it, and Kim Jong Un has embraced coercive 

measures such as purges and public executions to quell dissent. Regionally, the North has 

been willing to accept a decline in relations, including with its main benefactor China, to 

further its nuclear program. 

North Korea conducted more than 20 missile launches in 2016 alone with a similar number in 

2017. 2017 also saw North Korea’s first intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) flight tests in July

and intermediate-range missile (IRBM) tests over Japan in August and September. In addition 

to ICBMs, North Korea is developing and testing longer-range solid-propellant missile systems, 

submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), and short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) as

countermeasures against U.S. and allied missile defenses. North Korea conducted its sixth 

and largest nuclear test in September 2017 after two in 2016, and continues to invest in its 

nuclear infrastructure.

North Korea’s conventional force continues to emphasize large defensive and asymmetric 

attack capabilities to counter the technologically superior forces of the U.S. and ROK

Alliance. The (North) Korean People’s Army’s (KPA) large artillery force is deployed along the 

demilitarized zone (DMZ), posing a constant threat to the Greater Seoul Metropolitan Area

(GSMA). In 2016, the North publicized tests of a new close-range ballistic missile (CRBM), the 

KN-SS-X-9, which, if deployed, could extend North Korea’s artillery reach to U.S. Garrison 

Humphreys (current location of U.S. 8th Army HQ and future location of U.S. Forces Korea and 

the United Nations Command) and beyond. North Korea uses offensive cyberoperations as 

a cost-effective and deniable asymmetric tool to carry out regime goals on a global scale.

North Korea continues to market, sell, and deliver weapons-related goods and services to a 

small set of countries in Africa, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East, providing a vital source 

of foreign currency. Global concern about North Korea’s proliferation activities has led some

countries to halt new purchases from North Korea and has led other nations to take action to 

prevent arms-related deliveries.
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Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 3

CHAPTER ONE:

ASSESSMENT OF THE SECURITY SITUATION

KEY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH

KOREAN AND PENINSULAR

SECURITY

During the past two years, the Democratic 

People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK) ballistic 

missile and nuclear weapons development

has been trending in a more dangerous 

direction for the United States and its allies. In 

2016, North Korea conducted more than 20

missile launches with a similar number in 2017.

In addition to testing new longer-range 

missiles, North Korea has also made progress 

with solid-propellant technologies, 

submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and 

probably has an interest in countermeasures 

against U.S. and allied missile defenses. This 

period also includes three nuclear tests: two 

in 2016and one, the largest to date, in 2017.

On January 6, 2016, North Korea claimed a 

successful hydrogen bomb test. In response, 

the previous ROK administration of President 

Park Geun-hye expanded its propaganda 

campaign using loudspeakers along the DMZ 

and unilaterally suspending operations at the 

Kaesong Industrial Complex, a jointly run 

industrial park in North Korea. In addition, the 

UN Security Council (UNSC) unanimously 

adopted Resolution (UNSCR) 2270 in March 

2016 to sanction North Korea’s primary 

sources of revenue, such as iron, iron ore, 

coal, etc. and require all member States to 

inspect North Korean cargo transiting their 

ports.

North Korea conducted its fifth nuclear test 

on September 9, 2016. This was met with the 

unanimous adoption in November 2016 of 

UNSCR 2321, which strengthened existing 

sanctions and included measures meant to 

cap North Korea’s revenue from coal, its 

main export and a vital source of hard 

currency.

In February 2017, China announced a total 

ban on imports of North Korean coal for the 

year. China’s willingness to support UN 

Security Council resolutions and restrict coal 

imports has led to deepening North Korean 

animosity toward China.

North Korea conducted its inaugural test of 

an ICBM on July 4, 2017, followed by a 

second test less than four weeks later on July

28, 2017. In August 2017, the UN Security 

Council adopted UNSCR 2371, which

included sectoral bans for the first time. These 

bans target North Korean coal, iron ore, lead,

and seafood.

In early August 2017, North Korea threatened 

to launch four IRBMs toward Guam, a U.S. 

territory, and in late August and September

2017, North Korea tested an IRBM over Japan.

North Korea conducted a sixth and 

significantly larger nuclear test on September 

3, 2017, claiming that the detonation had 

been a “successful hydrogen bomb test for 

an ICBM.”
Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 4

NORTH KOREAN SECURITY

PERCEPTIONS

The internal security situation remains stable 

despite greater international pressure and 

sanctions. North Korean security perceptions 

have not substantially changed during the 

past two years, although regime 

propaganda has more frequently and 

harshly articulated a perceived threat from 

the United States. Deterring foreign 

intervention, eliminating perceived threats to 

the Kim family regime, and a belief that North 

Korea is entitled to respect as a world power 

are the primary drivers of North Korea’s 

security strategy.

The regime sees itself beset by internal and 

external threats. It does not trust regional 

actors, including China and Russia, nor does 

the regime trust its own population. The 

regime embraces the worldview of a garrison 

state, cultivating fears of an imminent threat 

and external hostility, which serves to justify

draconian internal security controls, vast

expenditures on the military, and the

continued unchallenged rule by the Kim 

dynasty, which it portrays as uniquely able to 

defend Korea.

North Korea portrays nuclear weapons as its 

most effective way to deter the threat it 

claims from the United States and its allies. 

North Korea repeatedly points to 

interventions in Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, and 

Libya as evidence that possession of nuclear 

weapons is necessary to prevent U.S. action 

in North Korea. However, the increased pace 

of nuclear and ballistic missile testing under 

Kim Jong Un, and its new rhetoric about 

achieving “final victory” over the United 

States and “reunification under Juche,”

suggest the regime seeks to achieve a 

capability that goes beyond minimal 

deterrence to one that could provide greater 

freedom of action for North Korean 

aggression or coercion against its neighbors. 

North Korea may reason, incorrectly, that 

possession of nuclear weapons makes it 

immune from retaliation if it attacks a nonnuclear state.
Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 5

CHAPTER TWO:

UNDERSTANDING NORTH KOREA’S 

STRATEGY

STRATEGIC GOALS

The regime’s overriding strategic goal is to 

ensure the Kim family’s perpetual rule of North 

Korea. The means to achieve this goal have 

remained consistent under Kim Jong Un: 

ending the U.S.-ROK Alliance and removing 

U.S. forces from the Korean Peninsula; gaining 

international recognition and acceptance as 

a nuclear state; possessing a viable nuclear 

strike capability; simultaneously developing its 

economy and nuclear weapons program 

(i.e., the byungjin policy); maintaining tight 

control over communications, borders, 

movement, and trade; and eventually

reunifying Korea under North Korea’s control. 

Reunification with the ROK, by force if 

necessary, is a key component of North 

Korea’s national identity, validating its policies 

and strategies, and justifying the sacrifices 

demanded of the populace. However, North 

Korea’s leaders almost certainly recognize 

that achieving forceful reunification under 

North Korea’s control is unattainable so long 

as the ROK has greater military capabilities 

and an alliance with the United States.

Therefore, North Korea’s nuclear weapons 

development is probably designed with the 

assessment that nuclear weapons will deter 

foreign intervention if Pyongyang attempts to 

reunify the peninsula by force or coercion. This 

idea is repeated in 

North Korea’s internal propaganda and 

rhetoric about nuclear weapons enabling 

“final victory over the United States.” 2017 saw 

growing and repeated emphasis of this 

phrase, which is always linked to the nuclear 

program.

NATIONAL STRATEGY

North Korea ultimately seeks the capability to 

strike the continental United States with a 

nuclear-armed ICBM. This pursuit supports

North Korea’s strategy of deterring the United 

States as well as weakening U.S. alliances in 

the region by casting doubt on the U.S. 

commitment to extended deterrence. In the 

long term, North Korea may see nuclear 

weapons as permitting more frequent 

coercive behavior and may further increase 

Kim Jong Un’s tolerance for risk. Internally, the 

Kim regime seeks to maintain ideological 

control over a population that is growing less 

reliant on the state because it no longer 

provides basic goods and services outside the 

capital and major cities. The regime 

continues to give top priority to ideological 

indoctrination, intimidation, and preferential 

treatment of the privileged elite in Pyongyang 

and of select military units. Kim Jong Un has 

embraced the coercive tools used by his 

father and grandfather—a repressive police 

state backed up by force and the threat of 

force, combined with inducements—to quell 
 Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 6

domestic dissent, strengthen internal security, 

and co-opt the North Korean military and 

elites. Periodic purges and public executions 

serve as a mechanism to ensure loyalty, instill 

fear, and eliminate perceived rivals.

REGIONAL OBJECTIVES AND

BEHAVIOR

In early 2015, Kim began reaching out 

diplomatically to Southeast Asia, Africa, and 

Russia to improve North Korea’s economy

and lessen its dependence on China. Those

efforts have met with little success; North 

Korea remains a pariah – unable to 

significantly expand ties because of

international sanctions and the stigma of 

gross human rights violations and the

development of weapons prohibited by 

UNSCRs. However, North Korea’s skill in 

navigating black markets and hiding funds,

and its “no-questions-asked” philosophy on 

illicit trade and slave labor, make it an 

attractive partner to some actors.

North Korea remains willing to temporarily

disrupt relations with regional neighbors,

including Russia and China, and absorb the

associated cost when it believes its actions

will advance its strategic objectives. For 

example, relations with Southeast Asian 

nations have broken down somewhat 

following the assassination of Kim Jong Un’s 

half brother in Malaysia in February. Despite 

this, North Korea probably believes periodic

“charm offensives” will eventually lead to

improvements in regional relationships and

gradual advancement of its strategic

objectives.

North Korea remains dependent on China as

its key economic benefactor, and North 

Korea’s leaders realize that efforts to 

advance its nuclear and missile capabilities 

have angered China. Over the last two years, 

relations with China have reached their 

lowest levels in decades. The two nations 

conducted no high-level engagements in 

2016, and North Korean official media has 

made uncharacteristically critical statements 

toward China after it announced its February 

2017 coal import ban. Nevertheless, the 

regime likely thinks China’s highest priority is 

preserving the status quo and therefore will 

not punish North Korea too severely.

North Korea maintains friendly relations with

Russia. Although Moscow has publicly

criticized Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons 

testing and has supported additional UNSC

sanctions after North Korea’s nuclear and 

ICBM tests, Russia vetoed a UN Presidential 

Statement following North Korea’s July 4,

2017, ICBM test. Economically, long-stalled 

plans for the creation of a natural gas pipeline 

from Russia to the ROK through North Korea—

a project that could earn North Korea millions 

of dollars annually in transit fees—have made 

little concrete progress in recent years. Still, 

the countries began marginally expanding 

bilateral economic relations in early 2017.

North Korea’s relations with Japan 

deteriorated in the last decade and remain

stagnant. Tokyo has become increasingly

alarmed over North Korea’s nuclear and 

missile development, as Japan is within range 

of its medium-range and intermediate-range 

ballistic missiles (IRBMs). North Korean IRBMs
 Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 7

overflew Hokkaido in August and September 

2017, and a number of North Korean missiles 

have dropped in Japan’s exclusive 

economic zone. 

A persistent unresolved irritant is the history of 

North Korean abductions of dozens, 

potentially hundreds, of Japanese citizens in 

the 1970s and 1980s for a variety of purposes, 

including gathering intelligence and training 

its special forces. The issue remains 

unresolved, and North Korea has failed to 

account for them despite repeated promises.
 

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Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 9 

CHAPTER THREE:

THE CAPABILITIES AND MODERNIZATION GOALS

OF NORTH KOREA’S MILITARY FORCES

OVERVIEW

The North Korean military poses a serious 

and growing threat to Northeast Asia, U.S. 

forces in the region, and the world. This is

despite its many internal challenges and 

shortcomings, such as a degraded 

conventional military force that has been 

modernized only selectively.

North Korea’s national military strategy is

designed to support its national security

strategy by defending the Kim regime’s

rule. This strategy relies heavily on

deterrence: strategic deterrence throughits

nuclear weapons program and supporting

delivery systems; and conventional

deterrence through the fielding of a large,

heavily armed, forward-deployed military

that presents a constant threat to the ROK, 

particularly the GSMA

North Korea’s force-modernization goals

areaimed at enhancingthe credibility of its

strategic capabilities by advancing its

nuclear and missile programs, and 

retaining sufficient conventional strength to 

inflict large-scale damage on the ROK and 

defend North Korea in the event of an 

invasion or attack. North Korea is attempting 

to accomplish this through modest levels of 

production on new systems and maintaining

the credibility of its conventional forces

through more realistic training. North Korea

directs its scarce resources to areas where it

sees the potential for localized

comparative advantage.

North Korea offsets logistic resupply 

problems, resource shortages, and dated 

equipment by maintaining a large, forwardpositioned force. This allows North Korea the 

ability to initiate an attack against the ROK

with little to no warning. 

GROWING CAPABILITIES TO 

BOLSTER AN AGING FORCE

The Korean People’s Army (KPA)—a large,

ground-force–centric organization

comprising ground, air, naval, missile, and

special operations forces (SOF) units—has 

more than 1 million soldiers, making it the 

world’s fourth-largest military. Six percent of 

North Korea’s 25 million people serve on 

active duty, and another 25 to 30 percent 

are assigned to a reserve or paramilitary unit 

subject to wartime mobilization. About 70

percent of North Korea’s ground forces

and 50 percent of its air and naval forces

are deployed withinapproximately 60 miles

of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), making 

the KPA a continuous threat to ROK and U.S.

forces. The KPA’s general disposition has

not changed in the last two years.
 Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 10

The KPA primarily fields legacy equipment

either produced in or based on designs

from the former Soviet Union and China

dating to the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s.

Although a few weapon systems are based

on modern technology, the KPA has not

kept pace with regional military

developments. The KPA has not acquired

new fighter aircraft in decades, relies on

older air defense systems, lacks ballistic

missile defense, and its Navy does not train

for bluewater operations.

To overcome many of these shortfalls, Kim 

Jong Un seems to prioritize the development 

of new weapon systems, as demonstrated 

by his numerous appearances with military 

units and research and development 

organizations. He has personally overseen 

land- and submarine-based ballistic missile 

and anti-ship cruise missile testing activity. 

He has also overseen events designed to 

demonstrate the proficiency of his

conventional military forces.

Ballistic Missile Force. North Korea has an

ambitious ballistic missile development

program that has made substantial 

advances in the last two years. North Korea

has several hundred short- and mediumrange ballistic missiles (SRBMs and MRBMs)

available for use against targets on the

Korean Peninsula and Japan and is 

developing longer-range systems. 

North Korea is committed to developing a 

nuclear-armed ICBM that is capable of 

posing a direct threat to the United States. 

On July 4, 2017, North Korea flight-tested an 

ICBM for the first time; a second test 

followed on July 28, 2017. These events 

marked a significant milestone in North 

Korea’s ballistic missile development 

process—the first flight tests of 

intercontinental ballistic missiles intended to 

reach the U.S. mainland. 

However, ICBMs are extremely complex 

systems that require multiple flight tests to 

identify and correct design or 

manufacturing defects. ICBM trajectories 

impart significant structural and thermal 

stresses on the reentry vehicle (RV), requiring 

repeated testing to ensure that the RV will 

survive and that the warhead will operate as 

designed. 

In the last two years, North Korea has 

diversified its ballistic missile force to include 

longer-range, solid-fueled systems. In 2017,

North Korea test- launched a new solidpropellant MRBM from a tracked 

transporter-erector-launcher (TEL),

describing this system as a land-based 

variant of its submarine-launched ballistic 

missile (SLBM). The North successfully flighttested its SLBM from a submerged 

submarine in August 2016. In May 2017, after 

North Korea’s second successful SLBM 

launch, Kim approved deployment of the 

land-based variant.

Kim’s public emphasis on the missile force

has continued, highlighted by an April 2017 

military parade that included four previously 

unseen missile systems and other 

equipment. These included a modified 

SCUD SRBM on a tracked transportererector-launcher (TEL), a new liquidpropellant IRBM on a modified Musudan TEL, 
 Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 11

and launchers for two canister-launched 

probable solid-propellant systems. One of 

the canister systems was mounted on a 

modified Hwasong-13 eight-axle TEL, and

the other canister system was mounted on a 

semitrailer or mobile-erector-launcher with a 

three-axle prime mover. Although airframes 

were not displayed, the canister systems 

probably can support IRBMs and ICBMs.

North Korea also still has the TD-2, an ICBM

configured as a space launch vehicle (SLV),

which could reach the continental United 

States if configured as an ICBM. The past use

of the TD-2 as an SLV contributed to the 

long-range ballistic missile capability North 

Korea now possesses because the two

configurations have many shared

technologies. However, a space launch

does not test a reentry vehicle (RV).

Advances in ballistic missile delivery

systems, coupled with developments in

nuclear technology discussed in Chapter 4,

are in line with North Korea’s stated

objective of being able to strike the

continental United States. North Korea

followed its 2016 nuclear tests with a

campaign of media releases and

authoritative public announcements

reaffirming its need to counter perceived

U.S. hostility with nuclear-armed ICBMs. In 

photos published by North Korean state 

media the day before Pyongyang’s 

September 2017 nuclear test, Kim Jong Un 

appeared with a device it described as a 

hydrogen bomb capable of being 

mounted on an ICBM. North Korea

continues to devote scarce resources to

these programs,but the pace of its progress

may depend partly on how much

technology and other aid it can acquire

from other countries.

Ground. The KPA’s ground forces are

predominantly regular and light infantry

units supported by armored and

mechanized units and heavy

concentrations of artillery. These forces are

forward-deployed, fortified in several

thousand underground facilities, and

include long-range cannon and rocket

artillery forces that are capable of

reaching targets in Seoul from their

garrisons.

The ground forces have numerous light and

medium tanks and many armored

personnel carriers. The KPA’s large artillery

force includes long-range 170-mm guns

and 240-mm multiple rocket launchers

(MRLs), many deployed along the DMZ

posing a constant threat to northern parts of

the ROK.

North Korea publicized multiple tests of the 

KN-SS-X-9 CRBM, the most recent occurring 

in March 2016, after which Kim Jong Un 

declared it ready for deployment. If added 

to the North’s ground forces, this system with 

a range of 118 miles could extend North 

Korea’s long-range artillery and rocket 

threat to points south of U.S. Garrison 

Humphreys. In recent years, North Korea

has unveiled other new ground-forces

equipment, including tanks, artillery guns,

armoredvehicles, andinfantry weapons.

North Korea periodically conducts large 

live-fire exercises and firepower 

demonstrations, often coinciding with 
 Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 12

important national holidays or observances. 

In one such event held on April 25, 2017, to 

celebrate the 85th anniversary of the KPA’s 

founding, North Korea fired more than 300 

heavy weapons along the east coast into 

the ocean. These pre-planned, pre-scripted, 

showcase events are intended for internal 

propaganda and to demonstrate 

continued capacity to inflict substantial 

casualties and damage on the ROK, 

including in the GSMA.

Air and Air Defense. The North Korean Air

Force (NKAF), a fleet of more than 1,300

aircraft, is primarily responsible for

defending North Korean airspace. Its other

missions include special operations forces 

(SOF) insertion, transportation and logistics

support, reconnaissance, and tactical air

support for KPA ground forces. However,

because of the technological inferiority of

most of its aircraft fleet, which are mostly 

legacy Soviet models, and the 

country’s rigid air defense command

andcontrolstructure, much of North Korea’s

air defense is provided by surface-to-air

missiles (SAMs) and anti-aircraft artillery

(AAA).

The NKAF’s most capable combat aircraft

are MiG-29s (procured from the Soviet

Union in the late 1980s), MiG-23s, and Su-25

ground-attack aircraft. However, the

majority of its aircraft—MiG-15s, MiG-17s,

MiG-19s, and MiG-21s—are less capable.

The NKAF operates a large fleet of An-2 Colt

aircraft, which are 1940s-era, single-engine,

10-passenger biplanes, likely tasked with

multiple missions, including ground attack 

and insertion of SOF into the ROK. The NKAF is

rounded out with several hundred

helicopters that would be used for troop

transport and ground attack. These 

helicopters are predominantly Mi-2 Hoplites

but also include some U.S.-made MD-500

helicopters obtained by circumventing U.S.

export controls in 1985.

North Korea has a dense, overlapping air

defense system of SA-2, SA-3, and SA-5

SAM sites; mobile SA-13 SAMs; mobile and

fixed AAA; and numerous man-portable 

air-defense systems, such as the SA-7. As the

NKAF’s aircraft continue to age, it

increasingly relies on ground-based air

defenses and hiding or hardening assets to

resist air attacks. During a 2010 military

parade, North Korea displayed a new

mobile SAM launcher and accompanying

radar that bore external resemblance to the

Russian S-300 and Chinese HQ-9. North 

Korea most recently tested this system in 

May 2017.

North Korea publicized a March 2013 livefire military drill that for the first time

featured an unmanned aerial vehicle

(UAV) in flight. The UAV appeared to be a

North Korean copy of a U.S.-produced 

target drone. North Korean presscoverage

of the event described the UAV as being

capable of precision strike by crashing into

the target. Between 2013 and 2016, North 

Korea overflew the ROK with several UAVs 

configured for intelligence collection.

Naval. The North Korean Navy (NKN) is the

smallest of the KPA’s three main services.

This coastal force primarily comprises 

numerous agingsmall patrol craft that carry
 Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 13

a variety of anti-ship cruise missiles,

torpedoes, and guns. The NKN maintains

one of the world’s largest, albeit aging, 

submarine forces, with around 70 attack-, 

coastal-, and midget-type submarines. In

addition, the NKN operates a large fleet of

air-cushioned hovercraft and conventional

landing craft to support amphibious

operations and SOF insertion. The force is

divided into East and West Coast Fleets, 

each operating a variety of patrol craft, 

guided-missile patrol boats, submarines, 

and landing craft.

The NKN has displayed some modernization 

efforts, highlighted by upgrades to selected

surface ships and a small-scale program to 

produce modern, surface, missile-armed 

patrol boats and corvettes. 

North Korea continues to operate and test 

its GORAE-class ballistic missile–capable 

submarine as part of its larger high-priority 

ballistic missile program. 

SOF. North Korean SOF personnel are 

among the most highly trained, wellequipped, best-fed, and highly motivated 

forces in the KPA. 

Strategic SOF units dispersed across North 

Korea appear designed for rapid offensive 

operations, internal defense against foreign 

attacks, or limited attacks against 

vulnerable targets in the ROK. They operate 

in specialized units, such as reconnaissance, 

airborne and seaborne insertion, 

commando, and other specialty units. All 

emphasize speed of movement and surprise 

attack to accomplish their missions. SOF 

may be airlifted by An-2 Colts or helicopters 

(and possibly Civil Air Administration 

transports), moved by maritime insertion 

platforms, or travel on foot over land or via 

suspected underground cross-DMZ tunnels 

to attack high-value targets, such as

command and control nodes or airbases in

the ROK.

In 2016, Kim Jong Un publicly unveiled a

possible new SOF battalion of KPA Unit 525 

that may be tasked with decapitation 

missions. During a publicized exercise in 

December 2016, the SOF battalion

assaulted a full-scale mockup of the Blue 

House, the official residence of the President 

of the Republic of Korea, practicing 

helicopter insertion, probable abduction of 

the ROK President, and eventual destruction 

of the building.

Cyberwarfare Capabilities. North Korea

possesses increasingly sophisticated cyber 

warfare capabilities, including offensive 

capabilities, which are capable of 

damaging and disruptive cyberattacks.

North Korean cyber effects operations 

have been implicated in malicious cyber 

activity since 2009 and challenge widely 

recognized norms of state behavior in 

cyberspace. North Korea has invested in 

developing its cyber capabilities and 

probably views cyber operations as an 

appealing, cost-effective, and deniable 

means by which to collect intelligence and 

cause disruption against its highly 

networked adversaries, notably the ROK, 

Japan, and the United States. North Korea 

likely believes it can conduct cyber effects 

operations with little risk of reprisal, in part

because its networks are largely separated
 Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 14

from the Internet and disruption of Internet

access would have minimal impact on its

economy. In November 2014, North Korean 

cyber actors using the nom de guerre 

“Guardians of Peace” attacked Sony

Pictures Entertainment, shutting down

employee access and deleting data. For 

these types of attacks, North Korea likely uses

Internet infrastructure from third-party

nations. 

Pyongyang probably is increasingly using 

cybercrime to offset financial losses resulting 

from international sanctions, especially 

given stricter Chinese enforcement of these 

sanctions. For example, North Korea 

probably was involved in the theft of $81 

million from the Central Bank of Bangladesh 

in February 2016. North Korean cyber actors 

also are using malware to blackmail 

individuals and companies into paying large 

fees to keep sensitive information (such as 

personally identifiable information) from 

being publicly released. In 2017, North 

Korea carried out the malicious 

“WannaCry” ransomware attack that

spread across the world damaging civilian 

infrastructure, including the United 

Kingdom’s National Health Service and 

Chinese firms. North Korea exploited an 

existing vulnerability that allowed it to 

encrypt a target’s hard drive, then 

demanded payment in cryptocurrency 

within a set time period or else the users’ 

data would be wiped. Even individuals and 

firms which paid the ransom did not recover 

their data.

Intelligence Services. North Korean

intelligence and security services collect

political, military, economic, and technical

information through open sources, human

intelligence, cyber intrusions, and signals

intelligence capabilities. North Korea’s

primary intelligence collection targets

remain the ROK, the United States, and

Japan. They likely operate anywhere North 

Korea has a diplomatic or sizable economic 

overseas presence.

The Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB)

is North Korea’s primary foreign intelligence

service, responsible for collection and

clandestine operations. The RGB comprises

six bureaus with compartmented functions,

including operations, reconnaissance,

technology and cyber capabilities,

overseas intelligence, inter-Korean talks,

and service support.

The Ministry of State Security (MSS) is North

Korea’s primary counterintelligence service

and is an autonomous agency of the North

Korean G overnment reporting directly to

Kim Jong Un. The MSS is responsible for

operating North Korean prison camps,

investigating cases of domestic espionage,

repatriating defectors, and conducting

overseas counterespionage activities in

North Korea’s foreign missions.

The United Front Department (UFD) overtly

attempts to establish pro–North Korean

groups in the ROK, such as the Korean AsiaPacific Committee and the Ethnic

Reconciliation Council. The UFD is also the

primary department involved in managing

inter-Korean dialogue and North Korea’s

policy toward the ROK.
 Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 15

The 225th Bureau is responsible for training

agents to infiltrate the ROK and establish 

underground political parties focused on

fomenting unrest and revolution.

Command, Control, and Communications.

North Korea exercises control of the KPA

through overlapping state, military, and 

party organizations. North Korea’s State 

Affairs Commission is the official state 

authority over the North’s military and

security services. The Ministry of People’s

Armed Forces is the KPA’s administrative

superior, and the General Staff Department 

exercises operational command and

control.

North Korea has a nationwide fiber-optic

network and has invested in a modern

nationwide cellular network. However,

telecommunication services and access

are strictly controlled, and all networks are

available for military use.
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CHAPTER FOUR:

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 

PROGRAMS AND PROLIFERATION

NORTH KOREA’S WMD

PROGRAMS

Nuclear Weapons. North Korea’s illegal 

pursuit of a nuclear weapons program is well 

documented. North Korea continues to 

invest in its nuclear infrastructure and could 

conduct additional nuclear tests at any 

time. It conducted nuclear tests in 2006, 

2009, 2013, two in 2016, and one in 2017, 

according to seismic detections and public 

claims by North Korean media.

In April 2013, less than two months after its 

third nuclear test, North Korea promulgated 

a domestic “Law on Consolidating Position 

as a Nuclear Weapons State” to provide 

both a legal basis for its nuclear program 

and another signal that it does not intend to 

give up its pursuit of nuclear development. 

The law says that “the nuclear weapons of 

the DPRK can only be used by a final order 

of the Supreme Commander of the Korean’s 

People’s Army [i.e., Kim Jong Un] to repel 

invasion or attack from a hostile nuclear 

weapons state and make retaliatory strikes.” 

In 2010, North Korea revealed a uranium 

enrichment facility at Yongbyon that it 

claimed was for producing fuel for a light 

water reactor then under construction. In 

April 2013, North Korea announced its intent 

to restart and refurbish the nuclear facilities 

at Yongbyon, including the nuclear reactor 

that had been shut down since 2007 as well 

as the uranium enrichment facility. The 

Director of the DPRK Atomic Energy Institute 

confirmed in September 2015 that all of the 

nuclear facilities in Yongbyon, including the 

uranium enrichment plant and reactor, 

were “adjusted and altered” following the 

April 2013 announcement and restarted for 

the purpose of building North Korea’s 

nuclear force. The Director also claimed that 

scientists and technicians were enhancing 

the levels of various nuclear weapons in 

quality and quantity.

These activities violate North Korea’s 

obligations under multiple UNSCRs, most 

recently 2371 and 2375; contravene its 

commitments under the September 19, 

2005, Six-Party Talks Joint Statement; and 

increase the risk of proliferation.

Biological Weapons. North Korea may 

consider the use of biological weapons as 

an option, contrary to its obligations under 

the Biological and Toxins Weapons 

Convention (BTWC). Most aspects of 

biological weapons research is inherently 

dual-use and North Korea continues to 

develop its biological research and 

development capabilities that would 

enable a biological weapons program. 

Pyongyang has never declared any 

relevant developments and has failed to 
 Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 22

provide a BTWC Confidence-Building 

Measure declaration since 1990.

Chemical Weapons (CW). In February 2017, 

North Korea likely assassinated Kim Jong 

Un’s older half-brother Kim Jong Nam in a 

crowded Malaysian airport via VX nerve 

agent—a class I weapon of mass 

destruction under the Chemical Weapons 

Convention (CWC). Malaysia is still 

investigating North Korea’s role in the 

incident. If proven, this supports the 

argument that North Korea has a CW 

stockpile from a longstanding CW program 

with the capability to produce nerve, blister, 

blood, and choking agents. North Korea 

probably could employ CW agents by 

modifying a variety of conventional 

munitions, including artillery and ballistic 

missiles. In addition, North Korean forces are 

prepared to operate in a contaminated 

environment; they train regularly in chemical 

defense operations. North Korea is not party 

to the CWC.

PROLIFERATION

North Korea has been an exporter of 

conventional arms and ballistic missiles for 

several decades. Despite the 

implementation of UNSCRs 1718, 1874, 2087,

2094, 2270, 2321, and 2356, which prohibit 

North Korea from selling weapons and 

providing related technical training, 

Pyongyang continues to market, sell, and 

deliver weapons-related goods and 

services. Weapon sales are an important 

source of foreign currency for North Korea’s 

weapons programs and, as such, 

Pyongyang is unlikely to cease export 

activity despite UN Security Council 

sanctions, increased international efforts to 

interdict North Korea's weapons-related 

exports, and the implementation of 

Executive Order 13382, under which 

designated WMD proliferators’ access to the 

United States and global financial systems 

are targeted.

Global concern about North Korea’s 

proliferation activities continues to mount, 

which has led some countries, such as 

Namibia, to halt new purchases from North 

Korea and has prompted other nations to 

take action to prevent arms-related 

deliveries. Although the international 

community has interdicted some of North 

Korea’s weapons-transfer attempts, North 

Korea very likely will continue to attempt 

arms shipments via new and increasingly 

complex methods.

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

North Korea has demonstrated a willingness 

to proliferate nuclear technology. Using the 

proliferation network of Pakistani nuclear 

scientist AQ Khan, North Korea provided 

Libya under Moamar Qaddafi with uranium 

hexafluoride, the form of uranium used in the 

uranium enrichment process to produce fuel 

for nuclear reactors and nuclear weapons. 

North Korea also provided Syria with nuclear 

reactor technology until the facility was 

destroyed in 2007. 

ARMS AND MISSILE SALES

North Korea uses a worldwide network to 

facilitate arms-sales activities. It has a core,

but dwindling, group of customers that 
 Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 23

includes Iran and Syria. Others core 

customers, such as Sudan and Uganda, 

have recently agreed to end arms 

cooperation with Pyongyang. North Korea 

has transferred ballistic missile–related 

equipment, components, materials, and 

technical assistance to countries in Africa, 

Asia, and the Middle East. Conventional 

weapons sales have included ammunition, 

small arms, radars, and SAMs, as well as 

repair services, technical support services, 

and military equipment production facilities.

In late 2009, North Korea was implicated in 

the attempted sale of rocket-propelled 

grenades and other heavy weapons to Iran 

or possibly to Hizballah when Thailand 

interdicted and seized a cargo plane laden 

with arms. In 2013, Panamanian authorities 

held a North Korean ship, the Chong Chon 

Gang, as it attempted to transit the Panama 

Canal laden with 240 tons of military 

equipment, including a MiG-21 fighter

aircraft concealed under a licit cargo 

shipment of sugar. North Korea claimed that 

it was repairing the equipment for Cuba.

In August 2016, Egypt inspected and seized 

a shipment of 30,000 PG-7 rocket-propelled 

grenades concealed under a cargo of iron 

ore, which was a UNSCR-proscribed item. 

According to the final report of the UN Panel 

of Experts established pursuant to UNSCR 

1718, this was the largest interdicted 

ammunition consignment in the history of 

sanctions against North Korea.

In addition to Iran and Syria, past clients for 

North Korea’s ballistic missiles and 

associated technology have included 

Egypt, Iraq, Libya, Pakistan, and Yemen. 

Burma has begun distancing itself from North 

Korea, but concerns remain regarding 

lingering arms trade ties between the two 

countries.

North Korea uses various methods to 

circumvent UNSCRs, including falsifying enduser certificates, mislabeling crates, sending 

cargo through multiple front companies 

and intermediaries, and using point-to-point 

air cargo deliveries for high-value and 

sensitive arms exports, thus limiting 

interdiction opportunities. 
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