Military and Security Developments Involving 

the 

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

2012

A Report to Congress

Pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act 

for

Fiscal Year 2012

Section 1236 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Public Law 

112-81, provides that the Secretary of Defense shall submit a report “in both classified 

and unclassified form, on the current and future military power of the Democratic 

People’s Republic of Korea” (DPRK). The report shall address an assessment of the 

security situation on the Korean Peninsula, the goals and factors shaping North Korean 

security strategy and military strategy, trends in North Korean security, an assessment of 

North Korea’s regional security objectives, including an assessment of the North Korean 

military’s capabilities, developments in North Korean military doctrine and training, an 

assessment of North Korea’s proliferation activities, and other military security 

developments.
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Table of Contents 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1

CHAPTER ONE: ASSESSMENT OF THE SECURITY SITUATION 3

KEY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH KOREAN AND PENINSULAR SECURITY 3

NORTH KOREAN SECURITY PERCEPTIONS 3

CHAPTER TWO: UNDERSTANDING NORTH KOREA’S STRATEGY 5

STRATEGIC GOALS 5

NATIONAL STRATEGY 5

REGIONAL OBJECTIVES AND REGIONAL BEHAVIOR 6

CHAPTER THREE: FORCE MODERNIZATION GOALS AND TRENDS 7

OVERVIEW 7

MAINTAINING THE THREAT 7

AN AGING FORCE... 8

...WITH EMERGING CAPABILITIES 8

CHAPTER FOUR: PROLIFERATION 11

OVERVIEW 16

CONVENTIONAL ARMS AND MISSILE SALES 16

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION 16

NORTH KOREA’S WMD PROGRAMS 16

INTERDICTED TRANSFERS 17

CHAPTER 5: SIZE, LOCATION, AND CAPABILITIES 

OF NORTH KOREAN MILITARY FORCES 18
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Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) remains one of the United States’ 

most critical security challenges in Northeast Asia. North Korea remains a security threat 

because of its willingness to undertake provocative and destabilizing behavior, 

including attacks on the Republic of Korea (ROK), its pursuit of nuclear weapons and 

long-range ballistic missiles, and its willingness to proliferate weapons in contravention 

of its international agreements and United Nations Security Council Resolutions. 

North Korean aspiration for reunification – attainable in its mind in part by expelling U.S. 

forces from the Peninsula – and its commitment to perpetuating the Kim family regime 

are largely unchanged since the nation’s founding in 1948, but its strategies to achieve 

these goals have evolved significantly. Under Kim Jong Il, DPRK strategy had been 

focused on internal security; coercive diplomacy to compel acceptance of its 

diplomatic, economic and security interests; development of strategic military 

capabilities to deter external attack; and challenging the ROK and the U.S.-ROK 

Alliance. We anticipate these strategic goals will be consistent under North Korea’s 

new leader, Kim Jong Un.

North Korea fields a large, forward-deployed military that retains the capability to inflict 

serious damage on the ROK, despite significant resource shortfalls and aging hardware. 

The DPRK continues to be deterred from conducting attacks on the ROK largely 

because of the strength of the U.S.-ROK Alliance. On a smaller scale, however, the 

DPRK has demonstrated its willingness to use military provocation to achieve national 

goals, such as in 2010 when it sank the ROK naval vessel CHEONAN, killing 46 ROK Navy 

sailors, and shelled Yeonpyeong Island, killing two ROK Marines and two civilians.

North Korea’s continued pursuit of nuclear technology and capabilities and 

development of long-range ballistic missile programs, as reflected in the December 

2012 Taepo Dong 2 missile launch and April 2012 display of a new road-mobile 

intercontinental ballistic missile, underscores the threat to regional stability and U.S. 

national security posed by North Korea. These programs, as well as North Korea’s 

expressed hostility toward the ROK and proliferation of items prohibited under United 

Nations Security Council Resolutions 1718, 1874, and 2087 make the DPRK a continued

security challenge for the United States and its Allies and partners. 

North Korea’s third nuclear test in February 2013 and its 2010 revelation of a uranium 

enrichment facility highlight the continued challenge posed by North Korea’s nuclear 
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programs. Both the September 19 Joint Statement of the Six Party Talks and United 

Nations Security Council Resolutions 1718, 1874, and 2087 call for the complete and 

verifiable denuclearization of North Korea. Given North Korea’s unwillingness to abide 

by these commitments, the Department of Defense will continue to manage the North 

Korean security challenge through close coordination and consultation with the 

international community, particularly with our ROK and Japanese Allies.

The United States remains vigilant in the face of North Korea’s continued provocations 

and steadfast in commitments to Allies in the region, including the security provided by 

extended deterrence commitments through both the nuclear umbrella and 

conventional forces. 
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CHAPTER ONE: 

ASSESSMENT OF THE SECURITY SITUATION

KEY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH 

KOREAN AND PENINSULAR 

SECURITY

The Democratic People’s Republic of 

Korea (DPRK or North Korea) has stated

that it is entering what it calls “the door in 

a strong and prosperous nation” in 2012. 

The transfer of power to Kim Jong Un, 

after the death of Kim Jong Il in 

December 2011, has shaped the internal 

political landscape of North Korea and 

its international relations. In April 2012, 

Kim Jong Un assumed top-level positions 

in the Korean Worker’s Party (KWP) and 

the National Defense Commission, 

formalizing his role as the North’s top 

leader. 

Yet North Korea continues to fall behind

the rising national power of its regional 

neighbors, creating a widening military 

disparity and fueling its commitment to 

improving asymmetric and strategic 

deterrent capabilities as the primary 

guarantor of regime survival. 

Tensions on the Korean Peninsula have 

grown as relations between the DPRK 

and the Republic of Korea (ROK) 

worsened through 2011 and remained 

uneasy through mid-2012. The DPRK’s

frustration with the ROK’s close policy 

coordination with the United States and 

its linkage of assistance to the North to 

progress in denuclearization grew over 

the past five years of President Lee 

Myung-bak, and is unlikely to change

significantly under the tenure of President 

Park Geun-hye.

NORTH KOREAN SECURITY 

PERCEPTIONS 

North Korean threat perceptions are 

shaped by a legacy of guerilla warfare 

dating back to its anti–colonial struggle

against the Japanese, political and 

economic isolation, experience during

wartime, and a political culture that is 

defined by an unending existential 

struggle with outside forces. North Korea 

has portrayed the ROK and the United 

States as constant threats to North 

Korea’s sovereignty, in a probable 

attempt to legitimize and justify the Kim 

family rule, its draconian internal control 

mechanisms, and its existing strategies as 

the best defense against encroachments 

on the North’s sovereignty. 

The regime’s greatest security concern is 

opposition from within, and outside 

forces – primarily South Korea – taking 

advantage of internal instability to 

topple the regime and achieve 
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unification of the Korean Peninsula. In 

North Korea’s view, the destruction of 

regimes such as Ceausescu, Hussain, and 

Qadhafi was not an inevitable 

consequence of repressive governments, 

but rather a failure to secure the 

necessary capabilities to defend their 

respective autocratic regime’s survival. 
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CHAPTER TWO: 

UNDERSTANDING NORTH KOREA’S STRATEGY

STRATEGIC GOALS

Regime survival in a zero-sum 

competition for legitimacy on the 

Peninsula with the South has been the 

consistent, overarching strategic 

objective of the Kim regime since 1945, 

but North Korean goals and supporting 

strategy have evolved significantly over 

the years. Throughout the 1960s and 

1970s, North Korea boasted a viable 

economy and military and international 

relationships that either matched or 

outclassed those of the ROK. During this 

period, North Korea had reason to 

believe its goal of reunification on its 

terms was a possibility. Since the loss of 

the Soviet Union as a principal 

benefactor, devastating famine of the 

1990s, and the economic rise and 

political maturation of the ROK, North 

Korea has largely abandoned unilaterally 

enforced reunification as a practical 

goal. North Korean goals and strategies 

reflect the reality of political isolation, 

significant economic deprivation, a 

deteriorating conventional military, and 

the increasing political and military power 

of nearby states. Nevertheless, the North 

has pursued a military posture that allows 

it to influence coercively South Korea

through provocation and intimidation, 

and to attempt to have as equal a voice 

as possible in the future of the Peninsula.

North Korea’s pursuit of a “military first 

policy” demonstrates its view that 

ultimately the national security of North 

Korea is disproportionately dependent on 

military might in the absence of any other 

notable elements of national power. The 

DPRK seeks recognition as an equal and 

legitimate international player and as a 

recognized nuclear power that is 

eventually able to normalize its 

diplomatic relations with the Western 

world and pursue economic recovery 

and prosperity. The DPRK’s rhetoric 

suggests the regime at this time is unlikely 

to pursue this second goal, at the 

expense of the primary goal of pursuing 

its nuclear and missile capabilities.

NATIONAL STRATEGY

Beyond its fundamental role as a 

guarantor of national and regime 

security, the North Korean military 

supports the Kim regime’s use of coercive 

diplomacy as part of its larger diplomatic 

strategy. Through the use of limited 

provocations – even those that are 

kinetic and lethal in nature – North Korea

uses small-scale attacks to gain 

psychological advantage in diplomacy 

and win limited political and economic 

concessions, all while likely believing it 

can control escalation. 
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Closely tied to this strategy of political 

coercion are North Korea’s nuclear and 

ballistic missile programs which – absent 

normalized relations with the international 

community – it sees as essential to its 

goals of survival, sovereignty, and 

relevance. 

REGIONAL OBJECTIVES AND 

REGIONAL BEHAVIOR 

North Korea is dependent on China as a 

key benefactor, both in terms of 

diplomatic and economic support. North 

Korea also maintains friendly relations 

with Russia, although the relationship is 

not as robust as North Korea’s relations

with China. In its pursuit of nuclear and 

missile capabilities, and in its use of limited 

provocations for diplomatic objectives, 

North Korea is always conscious of how 

China and Russia will respond, and likely 

calculates both are more concerned 

about limiting U.S. responses than trying 

to control or dictate North Korea’s 

behavior.

In its approach to the ROK, North Korea 

seeks to extract aid and investment from 

the ROK using a combination of 

diplomacy and coercion while minimizing 

any influence or leverage the ROK might 

try to wield in return. North Korea

adopted a largely adversarial posture 

toward former ROK President Lee Myung 

Bak and his administration given his 

insistence on reciprocity and linking of aid 

to progress in denuclearization, leading 

to the failure of the North’s traditional 

approach to exact concessions from the 

ROK and drive a wedge in the U.S.-ROK 

relationship. North Korea’s objectives in 

delinking inter-Korean relations from 

denuclearization and minimizing political 

concessions it makes in response to ROK 

economic and development assistance 

are likely to be unchanged in its 

approach to the new Park Geun-hye 

administration.

North Korea has a contentious 

relationship with the Japanese 

Government. Absent a breakthrough on 

the issue of North Korean abductions of 

Japanese citizens, there is little prospect 

for improvement in relations or for a lifting 

of Japanese economic sanctions against 

North Korea. 
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CHAPTER THREE: 

FORCE MODERNIZATION GOALS AND TRENDS

OVERVIEW 

North Korea’s large, forward-positioned 

military can initiate an attack against the 

ROK with little or no warning, even though 

it suffers from resource shortages and 

aging equipment. It retains the 

capability to inflict significant damage on 

the ROK, especially in the region from the 

De-militarized Zone (DMZ) to Seoul. 

Although North Korea is unlikely to attack 

on a scale that it assesses would risk the 

survival of its government by inviting 

overwhelming counterattacks by the ROK 

or the United States, we do not know how 

North Korea calculates this threshold of 

behavior. North Korea’s use of smallscale attacks and provocative acts 

leaves much room for miscalculation that 

could spiral into a larger conflict.

North Korea is making some efforts to 

upgrade its conventional weapons. It 

has reinforced long-range artillery forces 

near the DMZ and has a substantial 

number of mobile ballistic missiles that 

could strike a variety of targets in the ROK 

and Japan. However, we assess that the 

DPRK’s emphasis will be to leverage the 

perception of a nuclear deterrent to 

counter technologically superior forces. 

We expect that North Korea will seek to 

continue to test-launch missiles, including 

the TD-2 ICBM/ Space Launch Vehicle 

(SLV). Missile tests and other 

improvement efforts, including denial 

and deception, artillery, development of 

a road-mobile ICBM, and special 

operations forces, are driven by North 

Korea’s desire to enhance deterrence 

and defense, and enhance North Korea’s 

ability to conduct limited attacks against 

the South.

MAINTAINING THE THREAT

Despite its many internal challenges and 

constraints as well as deterioration in 

conventional capabilities, the North 

Korean military poses a serious threat to 

the ROK, its other neighbors, and U.S. 

forces in the region.

Two key events demonstrated North 

Korea’s willingness to employ its military as 

part of a coercive diplomacy strategy. A 

multinational Joint Civilian-Military 

Investigation Team concluded that a 

North Korean midget submarine sank the 

ROK naval corvette CHEONAN on March 

26, 2010 near the contentious Northern 

Limit Line in the Yellow Sea, killing 46 ROK 

sailors. In November 2010, North Korea 

shelled Yonpyong Island, killing two ROK 

Marines and two civilians. The ROK’s 

response to these provocative acts was 

restrained, but the attacks have 
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strengthened the ROK’s resolve to react 

more forcefully in the future.

AN AGING FORCE... 

The Korean People’s Army (KPA) – an 

umbrella organization comprising ground, 

air, naval, missile, and special operations 

forces – ranks in personnel numbers as the 

fourth largest military in the world. Four to 

five percent of North Korea’s 24 million 

people serve on active duty, and a 

further 25-30 percent are assigned to a 

reserve or paramilitary unit and subject to 

wartime mobilization. The KPA fields 

primarily legacy equipment, either 

produced in, or based on designs of, the 

Soviet Union and China, dating back to 

the 1950s, 60s and 70s, though a few 

systems are based on more modern 

technology.

...WITH EMERGING CAPABILITIES

During military parades held in 

Pyongyang in October 2010 and April 

2012, a number of new weapon systems 

were displayed for the first time, 

highlighting continued efforts to improve 

the military’s conventional capabilities, 

despite financial hardships. 

Ground. The parades featured several 

newly identified North Korean tanks, 

artillery, and other armored vehicles. 

New infantry weapons have been 

displayed as well. The display of these 

systems shows that North Korea continues 

to produce, or at least upgrade, limited 

types and numbers of equipment. 

Air and Air Defense. The North Korean Air 

Force (NKAF) operates a fleet of more 

than 1,300 aircraft, primarily legacy Soviet 

models. The NKAF’s most capable

combat aircraft are its MiG-29s, procured 

from the Soviet Union in the late 1980s. 

North Korea’s most recent aircraft 

acquisition was in 1999 when it 

surreptitiously purchased used Kazakh 

MiG-21s.

As the NKAF’s aircraft continue to age, it 

increasingly relies on its ground-based air 

defenses and hiding or hardening of 

assets to counter air attacks. During the 

2010 military parade, North Korea 

introduced a new vertical launched 

mobile surface-to-air missile launcher and 

accompanying radar. It bears external 

resemblance to the Russian S-300 and 

Chinese HQ-9. 

Naval. The North Korean Navy (NKN) has 

displayed very limited modernization 

efforts, highlighted by upgrades to select 

surface ships and a continued program 

to construct small submarines. The 

submarine force, unsophisticated but 

durable, demonstrated its capabilities by 

covertly attacking and sinking the ROK 

warship CHEONAN with an indigenously 

produced submarine and torpedo. 

Special Operations. In addition to the 

Special Operations Forces (SOF) wartime 

mission of deep strike infiltrations in a 
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combined arms peninsular attack, SOF 

may also conduct limited asymmetric 

attacks for political aims. 

Ballistic Missile Force. North Korea has an 

ambitious ballistic missile development 

program and has deployed mobile 

theater ballistic missiles (TBM) capable of 

reaching targets throughout the ROK, 

Japan, and the Pacific theater. North 

Korea continues to develop the TD-2, 

which could reach parts of the United 

States if configured as an intercontinental 

ballistic missile (ICBM) capable of 

carrying a nuclear payload. Developing 

a SLV contributes heavily to North Korea’s 

long-range ballistic missile development, 

since the two vehicles have many shared 

technologies. However, a space launch 

does not test a re-entry vehicle (RV), 

without which North Korea cannot deliver 

a weapon to target from an ICBM. 

Development also continues on a new 

solid-propellant short-range ballistic 

missile (SRBM). 

North Korea showcased its TBM force in its 

October 2010 military parade in honor of 

the 65th anniversary of the KWP’s 

founding, including two missile systems 

shown publically for the first time: an

intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) 

and a version of the No Dong mediumrange ballistic missile (MRBM) fitted with a 

cone-cylinder-flare payload. All of these 

systems, as well as what appeared to be 

a new road-mobile ICBM, were paraded 

in April 2012. This new mobile ICBM has 

not been flight tested.

These advances in ballistic missile delivery 

systems, coupled with developments in 

nuclear technology discussed in Chapter 

4, are in line with North Korea’s stated 

objective of being able to strike the U.S. 

homeland. North Korea followed its 

February 12, 2013 nuclear test with a 

campaign of media releases and 

authoritative public announcements 

reaffirming its need to counter perceived 

U.S. “hostility” with nuclear-armed ICBMs. 

North Korea will move closer to this goal, 

as well as increase the threat it poses to 

U.S. forces and Allies in the region, if it 

continues testing and devoting scarce 

regime resources to these programs. The 

pace of its progress will depend, in part, 

on how many resources it can dedicate 

to these efforts and how often it conducts 

tests. 

Cyberwarfare Capabilities. North Korea 

probably has a military computer network 

operations (CNO) capability. Implicated 

in several cyber attacks ranging from 

computer network exploitation (CNE) to 

distributed denial of service (DDoS) 

attacks since 2009, the North Korean 

regime may view CNO as an appealing 

platform from which to collect 

intelligence. 

• According to a ROK newspaper, 

Seoul’s Central Prosecutor’s office 

attributed to North Korea a CNO 

activity on the ROK’s National 

Agricultural Cooperative Federation 

(Nonghyup Bank) servers in April 2011. 

Through remote execution, actors 
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rendered the bank’s online services 

inaccessible and deleted numerous 

files concerning customer bank 

accounts while removing all evidence 

of CNO activity in the bank’s servers.

• In the years spanning 2009-2011, North 

Korea was allegedly responsible for 

conducting a series of distributed 

denial of service (DDoS) attacks 

against ROK commercial, government 

and military websites, rendering them 

inaccessible.

Technical attribution of cyberspace 

operations remains challenging due to 

the internet’s decentralized architecture 

and inherent anonymity. Given North 

Korea’s bleak economic outlook, CNO 

may be seen as a cost-effective way to 

modernize some North Korean military 

capabilities. As a result of North Korea’s

historical isolation from outside 

communications and influence, it is likely 

to employ Internet infrastructure from 

third-party nations.
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Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

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North Korea, Ground Forces

Total 

Tanks 4,100

Armored Vehicles 2,100

Field Artillery 8,500

MRLs 5,100

Note: With a maximum strength of approximately 950,000 

personnel, the ground forces comprise the vast majority of 

North Korea’s military. Most of the conventional weapons 

systems were developed based on 1960s and 1970s era 

technology. However, they have attempted to overcome this 

technological disadvantage by relying on massive numbers of 

artillery systems while simultaneously increasing its light infantry 

forces.
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North Korea, Ballistic Missile Forces

System Launchers Estimated Range 

KN-2

Fewer than 100

75 miles 

SCUD-B 185 miles

SCUD-C 310 miles 

SCUD-ER 435-625 miles

No Dong Fewer than 50 800 miles 

IRBM Fewer than 50 2,000+ miles

TD-2 Not yet deployed 3,400+ miles

Note: North Korea has an ambitious ballistic missile development 

program and has exported missile technology to other countries, 

including Iran and Pakistan. North Korea has produced its own 

version of the SCUD B, as well as the SCUD C, an extended-range 

version of the SCUD B. North Korea will continue using and 

improving the TD-2, which could reach the United States with a 

nuclear payload if developed as an ICBM. An intermediaterange ballistic missile (IRBM) and a new short-range, solidpropellant ballistic missile are also being developed.
Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

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CHAPTER FOUR: PROLIFERATION

OVERVIEW

North Korea has been an exporter of 

conventional arms and ballistic missiles 

for several decades. Despite the 

adoption of United Nations Security 

Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) 1718, 1874,

and 2087 which prohibit all weapons 

sales and certain categories of technical 

training from North Korea, the DPRK 

continues to proliferate weapons-related 

goods and technology. Weapons sales 

are a critical source of foreign currency 

for North Korea and North Korea is 

unlikely to cease export activity in spite 

of UN Security Council sanctions or 

successful interdictions of its weaponsrelated exports.

CONVENTIONAL ARMS 

AND MISSILE SALES 

North Korea uses a world-wide network 

to facilitate arms sales activities and 

maintains a core group of recipient 

countries including Burma, Iran, and 

Syria. North Korea has exported 

conventional and ballistic missile-related 

equipment, components, materials, and 

technical assistance to countries in 

Africa, Asia, and the Middle East.

Conventional weapons sales have 

included ammunition, small arms, 

artillery, armored vehicles, and surfaceto-air missiles.

• In addition to Burma, Iran, and Syria, 

past clients for North Korea’s ballistic 

missiles and associated technology 

have included Egypt, Iraq, Libya, 

Pakistan, and Yemen.

North Korea uses various methods to 

circumvent UNSCRs, including falsifying 

end-user certificates, mislabeling crates, 

sending cargo through multiple front 

companies and intermediaries, and 

using air cargo for deliveries of highvalue and sensitive arms exports.

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

One of our gravest concerns about North 

Korea’s activities in the international 

arena is its demonstrated willingness to 

proliferate nuclear technology. North 

Korea provided Libya with uranium 

hexafluoride, a compound used in the 

uranium enrichment process that 

produces fuel for nuclear reactors and 

nuclear weapons, via the proliferation 

network of Pakistani nuclear scientist A. 

Q. Khan. North Korea also provided Syria 

with nuclear reactor technology until 

2007.

NORTH KOREA’S 

WMD PROGRAMS

Nuclear. North Korea conducted nuclear 

tests in 2006, 2009, and most recently in 

February 2013. North Korea could 

conduct additional nuclear tests at any 

time. North Korea continues to invest in its 

nuclear infrastructure. In 2010, North 

Korea revealed a uranium enrichment 

facility at Yongbyon that it claims is for 

producing fuel for a light water reactor 

under construction.
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These activities violate North Korea’s 

obligations under United Nations Security 

Council Resolutions 1718, 1874, and 2087, 

contravene its commitments under the 

September 19, 2005 Joint Statement of 

the Six-Party Talks, and increase the risk of 

proliferation. 

Biological. Open sources have often 

reported defector allegations of a North 

Korean biological warfare program.

North Korea continues to research 

bacterial and viral biological agents that 

could support an offensive Biological 

Weapons program. Infrastructure, 

combined with its weapons industry, 

gives North Korea a potentially robust 

biological warfare capability. 

Chemical. North Korea probably has had 

a longstanding Chemical Weapons (CW)

program with the capability to produce 

nerve, blister, blood, and choking agents

and likely possesses a CW stockpile. 

North Korea probably could employ CW 

agents by modifying a variety of 

conventional munitions, including artillery 

and ballistic missiles. In addition, North 

Korean forces are prepared to operate 

in a contaminated environment; they 

train regularly in chemical defense 

operations. North Korea is not a party to

the Chemical Weapons Convention.

INTERDICTED TRANSFERS

Global concern about North Korea’s 

proliferation activity continues to mount, 

leading various nations to take action. 

Notable recent interdiction events 

pursuant to UNSCRs include:

• In June 2011, a vessel bound for 

Burma, suspected of carrying militaryrelated cargo, returned to North Korea 

after refusing a U.S. Navy inspection 

request.

• In February 2010, South Africa seized 

North Korean-origin spare tank parts 

destined for the Republic of Congo.

• In December 2009, Thai authorities 

impounded the cargo of a chartered 

cargo plane containing about 35 

metric tons of North Korean weapons 

including artillery rockets, rocketpropelled grenades, and surface-toair missiles.

• In October 2009, the ROK seized North 

Korean-origin chemical warfare 

protective suits destined for Syria.

Despite these successes by the 

international community, North Korea will 

continue to attempt arms shipments via 

new and increasingly complex routes. 
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CHAPTER 5: 

SIZE, LOCATION, AND CAPABILITIES 

OF NORTH KOREAN MILITARY FORCES

The Korean People’s Army (KPA) is a 

large ground-centric military, supported 

by a large ballistic missile arsenal, 

extensive special operations forces and

limited air and naval forces. With 

approximately 70 percent of its ground 

forces and 50 percent of its air and naval 

forces deployed within 100 km of the 

demilitarized zone, which has served as 

the de facto shared border since 1953, 

the KPA poses a continuous threat to the 

ROK and deployed U.S. forces. However, 

after decades under a failed economy 

and the resulting food shortages, the KPA 

is a weakened force that suffers from 

logistical shortages, aging equipment, 

and poor training. 

Ground Forces. The KPA’s ground forces 

are dominated by conventional and 

light infantry units, supported by armor 

and mechanized units and heavy 

concentrations of artillery. These forces 

are forward deployed, are fortified in 

several thousand underground facilities, 

and include long-range cannon and 

rocket artillery able to fire deep into the 

ROK from their garrisons. 

The ground forces possess light and 

medium tanks armored personnel 

carriers, and multiple rocket launchers 

(MRLs). This large artillery force includes 

long-range 170-mm guns and 240-mm 

MRLs, many of which are deployed 

along the DMZ and pose a constant 

threat to northern parts of the ROK,

including its capital city of Seoul.

Air Forces. The Air Force is primarily 

responsible for defending North Korean 

air space. Its other missions include 

special operations forces insertion, 

transportation and logistics support, 

reconnaissance, and bombing and 

tactical air support for KPA ground 

forces. However, due to the 

technological inferiority of most of its 

aircraft fleet and rigid air defense 

command and control structure, much 

of North Korea’s air defense is provided 

by surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and antiaircraft artillery (AAA). 

The NKAF’s most capable combat 

aircraft are its MiG-29 and MiG-23 fighters 

and its SU-25 ground-attack aircraft. 

However, the majority of aircraft are less 

capable MiG-15s, -17s, -19s (F-6), and -

21s. The NKAF operates a large fleet of 

AN-2 COLT aircraft, 1940s vintage singleengine, 10-passenger, bi-planes, which 

are likely tasked with inserting SOF into 

the ROK. The air force is rounded out 

with several hundred helicopters, 

predominantly Mi-2/HOPLITE and U.S.-
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made MD-500 helicopters (obtained by 

circumventing U.S. export controls in 

1985). The rotary-wing fleet is used both 

for troop transport and ground attack.

North Korea possesses a dense, 

overlapping air defense system of SA2/3/5 SAM sites, mobile and fixed AAA,

and numerous man-portable air-defense 

systems (MANPADS), like the SA-7.

Naval Forces. The North Korean Navy 

(NKN), the smallest of the KPA’s three 

main services. This coastal force is 

composed primarily of aging, though 

numerous, small patrol craft that employ 

a variety of anti-ship cruise missiles, 

torpedoes, and guns. The NKN maintains 

one of the world’s largest submarine 

forces, with around 70 attack-, coastal, 

and midget-type submarines. In 

addition, the NKN operates a large fleet 

of air-cushioned (hovercraft) and 

conventional landing craft to support 

amphibious operations and SOF insertion.

Special Operations Forces. North Korean 

SOF are likely some of the most highly 

trained, well-equipped, best-fed, and 

most motivated forces in the KPA. As 

North Korea’s conventional capabilities 

decline relative to the ROK and United 

States, we believe North Korea 

increasingly regards SOF capabilities as a 

vital tool for asymmetric coercion.

Strategic SOF units dispersed across 

North Korea appear designed for rapid 

offensive operations, internal defense 

against foreign attacks, or limited attacks 

against vulnerable targets in the ROK as 

part of a coercive diplomacy effort. SOF 

operate in specialized units of light 

infantry, reconnaissance, airborne and 

seaborne insertion, commandos, and 

other specialties, all emphasizing speed 

and surprise. SOF may be airlifted by AN2 COLT and helicopters (and possibly 

Civil Air Administration transports), 

maritime insertion platforms, overland, 

and via underground, cross-border 

tunnels to attack high-value targets like 

command and control nodes or air 

bases.

Theater Ballistic Missiles. North Korea has 

several hundred SCUD SRBM and No 

Dong MRBM missiles available for use

against targets on the Korean Peninsula 

and Japan. On July 3 and 4, 2009 North 

Korea launched seven SCUD-based 

missiles into the Sea of Japan, in a 

display that was similar to the July 2006 

series of launches. 

2012 Taepo Dong 2 Launches. North 

Korea successfully launched the TD-2 

(called the Unha-3 by North Korea) on 

December 12, 2012. All three stages of 

the TD-2 appeared to operate nominally

and placed a satellite into orbit. This test 

was preceded by a launch in April 2012 

that failed shortly after lift-off and 

crashed into the Yellow Sea. Both 

launches occurred from North Korea’s 

new west coast launch facilityNorth 

Korea has pledged to continue using this 

system to conduct further space 

launches. 
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Command and Control. The DPRK 

National Defense Commission (NDC) is 

the symbolic nominal authority over the 

North’s military and security services. The 

Ministry of Peoples Armed Forces (MPAF) 

is the administrative superior of the KPA,

while operational command and control 

is exercised by its subordinate General 

Staff Department. The 1992 constitution 

shifted control from the president to the 

NDC and Kim Jong Il directly exercised 

control of the military as chairman of the 

NDC, and Supreme Commander of the 

KPA. Kim Jong Un was made the 

supreme commander of the KPA shortly 

after his father’s death and named to 

the newly created position of “first 

chairman” of the NDC in April 2012, 

when Kim Jong Il was made “eternal 

chairman” of the NDC. In the same 

month, Kim Jong Un was named first 

secretary of the Korean Worker’s Party, 

after his father was made “eternal 

general secretary” of the KWP. At the 

same time, Kim Jong Un also became 

the chairman of the Central Military 

Commission of the KWP, having 

previously been one of two vice 

chairmen.

Telecommunications. North Korea’s 

nationwide fiber optic network is 

available to every sector of society, and 

North Korea has invested in a modern 

nationwide cellular network. 

Telecommunication services and access 

are strictly controlled, and all networks 

are available for military use, if 

necessary.
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