United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit 

Chicago, Illinois 60604 

Submitted January 14, 2019*

Decided January 15, 2019 

Before 

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge 

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge 

DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge

No. 17-2647 

WALLACE ARNOLD, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

VISIONTEK PRODUCTS, LLC, 

 Defendant-Appellee.

 Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Northern District 

of Illinois, Eastern Division. 

No. 13 CV 00613 

Andrea R. Wood, 

Judge. 

O R D E R 

Wallace Arnold sued Visiontek Products, LLC, his former employer, asserting 

that he was subjected to a hostile work environment based on his race and that he was 

later terminated in retaliation for complaining of racial discrimination, all in violation of 

42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2 to 

 

*

 We have agreed to decide this case without oral argument because the briefs 

and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would 

not significantly aid the court. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a)(2)(C). 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION 

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 
No. 17-2647 Page 2 

2000e-3. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of Visiontek, and we 

affirm. 

Many facts in this case are contested, but on appeal we recount the facts in the 

light most favorable to Arnold, the opponent of summary judgment. See Giles v. Tobeck, 

895 F.3d 510, 512 (7th Cir. 2018). Beginning in 2006, Arnold worked as a member of 

Visiontek’s production team, which required him to pack and ship boxes of products 

from Visiontek’s warehouse to customers. His immediate supervisor was Wendell 

Calip, Visiontek’s Vice President of Operations. 

In August 2010, Visiontek’s President and Chief Operating Officer, Michael 

Innes, sent an email to many of Visiontek’s employees, including Calip, directing 

warehouse employees to enter and leave through the building’s rear door. Arnold, who 

does not have an email address, never received that email, and he asserts that he never 

was made aware of Innes’s instructions. Arnold’s coworkers, however, testified that 

they were told to use the rear door and that they used the rear door exclusively to enter 

and leave the warehouse until Arnold was fired. For his part, Arnold asserted that he 

was “singled out” as the only employee who was required to use the rear entrance. 

Visiontek’s first complaint with Arnold’s performance is reflected in an email 

that Innes sent Calip in February 2011. In it, Innes describes an after-hours 

confrontation that broke out when Arnold tried to tell a temporary worker in the 

warehouse how to perform his job duties. Arnold maintains that he was simply alerting 

the worker to a safety concern, but the worker “snapped” and caused a scene. Innes 

also recounts a confrontation between Arnold and another coworker, Jeff Anderson, 

after Arnold propositioned a female employee of another company that shared 

warehouse space with Visiontek. According to Innes, Arnold left work angry and 

showed up late to work the next day. Arnold disputes this account, maintaining that the 

female worker gave him a ride to his bus stop one day and he tried to show his 

appreciation by bringing her breakfast and a flower. He denies confronting Anderson, 

though he admits being late for work the next day. 

Arnold received two disciplinary notices from Visiontek. The first was in 

response to his confrontation with Anderson: The notice states that Arnold made 

“negative verbal comments toward another employee” and warns Arnold that he could 

be subject to dismissal if his behavior did not improve. The second addressed his 

tardiness: The notice instructs him to call his supervisor if he was going to arrive late. 

Even though both notices bear Arnold’s signature, he swore in an affidavit opposing 

Visiontek’s motion for summary judgment that he was “never presented with the 
No. 17-2647 Page 3 

notice[s], never given the opportunity to review, understand or acknowledge the 

notice[s], and was not aware [they were] placed in my personnel file.” 

In early 2012, Arnold became involved with the Occupy Wall Street movement 

and protesting the death of Trayvon Martin. In support of those movements, Arnold 

brought protest signs—seen by his coworkers and Innes—to work, including signs that 

Arnold admits included vulgar and inappropriate language. Arnold’s coworkers 

testified that he would make signs using Visontek materials when he was supposed to 

be working, and that his sign-making activity affected his productivity. Arnold’s 

coworkers said they resented having to do more work to make up for his inefficiency, 

which caused “bottlenecks” on the production line. Arnold denies that he ever made 

signs when he was supposed to be working or that his productivity suffered. 

After seeing one of Arnold’s signs, Calip issued Arnold a third disciplinary 

notice in March 2012. In this notice, Calip asks Arnold to take down his signs because 

they were not appropriate in the workplace. Arnold responded by stating that Calip 

was “violating his civil rights.” Calip then reiterated “that the workplace is not a place 

to display such signage.” The notice then warns Arnold not to display his signs in the 

workplace or he could be fired. Arnold agrees that Calip spoke to him around this time 

about displaying signs in the workplace, but he asserts that he never received this 

disciplinary notice, which is unsigned. 

After that incident, Arnold maintains, he stopped making protest signs at work 

and kept all his signs out of sight. Shortly thereafter, he says, he stopped bringing signs 

to work altogether. But Calip and Arnold’s coworkers say that Arnold continued to 

bring signs to work, and Arnold himself testified in his deposition that he was still 

bringing signs to work in July 2012. It was at that point that Calip had another 

discussion with Arnold about the signs, and Arnold accused Calip during that 

conversation of violating his “constitutional and civil rights.” 

Visiontek fired Arnold in August 2012. The notice of separation states that 

Arnold failed to be a “team member,” caused friction with his coworkers, and worked 

at a “slow pace when we were busy causing bottlenecks during peak shipping hours.” 

Arnold sued, alleging that Visiontek violated Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 by 

creating a hostile work environment and by retaliating against him for complaining 

about the discrimination. Specifically, he asserted that Calip created a hostile work 

environment by (1) forcing him alone to use the back door to the warehouse, 

(2) assigning him “impossible” tasks that his coworkers did not have to complete, and 
No. 17-2647 Page 4 

(3) keeping a secret disciplinary file on him—a reference to the disciplinary notices that 

Arnold says he signed but never reviewed. He also asserted that his termination was 

retaliation for his complaints in March 2012 and July 2012 that Calip was violating his 

civil rights. 

The district judge entered summary judgment for Visiontek. She reasoned that 

Arnold’s Title VII claims failed because he had admitted that they were untimely. As 

for his § 1981 claims, Arnold could not show that he was treated differently because of 

his race, so he could not establish that his work environment was racially hostile. And 

Arnold lacked evidence that his complaints to Calip of discrimination were connected 

to his termination, she concluded, so he had not shown retaliation. 

On appeal, Arnold generally contests the district court’s entry of summary 

judgment against him. But the district court’s analysis was correct. Arnold’s Title VII 

claims were untimely because he admitted that he did not file suit within 90 days of 

receiving the EEOC’s right to sue letter. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); Averhart v. Sheriff of 

Cook Cty., 752 F.3d 1104, 1106 (7th Cir. 2014). Arnold also has not shown he was 

subjected to a racially hostile work environment because he lacks evidence that Calip’s 

allegedly discriminatory actions “had a racial character or purpose.” Yancick v. Hanna 

Steel Corp., 653 F.3d 532, 544 (7th Cir. 2011); see also Cole v. Bd. of Trs. of N. Ill. Univ., 

838 F.3d 888, 896–97 (7th Cir. 2016). Arnold could not identify a single “impossible” task 

that Calip assigned to him, his coworkers testified that they, too, used the back door, 

and there is no evidence that the disciplinary action in this case was racially motivated. 

Regarding his retaliation claim, the judge correctly explained that Arnold has not 

shown that Visiontek’s desire to retaliate against him for his complaints was the but-for 

cause of his firing. See Robinson v. Perales, 894 F.3d 818, 830 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing Univ. of 

Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 352 (2013)). There is no direct evidence of 

retaliatory motive, and the only circumstantial evidence is that Visiontek fired Arnold 

about one month after Arnold told Calip he was violating his “constitutional and civil 

rights.” That timing, alone, is not sufficiently suspicious to create an inference of 

retaliation. See O’Leary v. Accretive Health, Inc., 657 F.3d 625, 635 (7th Cir. 2011); see also 

Kidwell v. Eisenhauer, 679 F.3d 957, 966–67 (7th Cir. 2012) (five weeks between protected 

activity and adverse action insufficient in § 1983 suit). Moreover, Visiontek presented 

legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for Arnold’s termination, and Arnold cannot show 

that those reasons were mere pretext. See Burton v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 

851 F.3d 690, 697 (7th Cir. 2017). Arnold protests that we should consider his age and 

other “mitigating circumstances” in evaluating this claim. But that contention asserts 
No. 17-2647 Page 5 

that Visiontek’s decision to fire him was flawed, not that it was a pretext for a 

retaliatory motive. See Liu v. Cook Cty., 817 F.3d 307, 316 (7th Cir. 2016). 

We have considered Arnold’s other contentions, but none merits discussion. The 

judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.