NOS. 4-00-0767, 4-00-0768 cons.

	IN THE APPELLATE COURT

	OF ILLINOIS

	FOURTH DISTRICT

In re: S.E., a Minor,

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,

		Petitioner-Appellee,

		v.

BERNICE BLACK,

		Respondent-Appellant.

--------------------------------------

In re: L.H., a Minor,

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,

		Petitioner-Appellee,

		v.

BERNICE BLACK,

		Respondent-Appellant.	)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)	Appeal from

Circuit Court of

Vermilion County

No. 98JA121

No. 98JA122

Honorable 

Thomas J. Fahey,

Judge Presiding.

_________________________________________________________________

		PRESIDING JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the opinion of

the court:

	In August 2000, the trial court entered a permanency

review order, pursuant to section 2-28 of the Juvenile Court Act

of 1987 (Act) (705 ILCS 405/2-28 (West Supp. 1999)), changing the

permanency goal for L.H. (born August 18, 1993) and S.E. (born

September 22, 1998), the minor children of respondent, Bernice

Black, to substitute care pending the court's decision on termi

nation of parental rights.  Respondent appeals, arguing that (1)

the court’s decision to change the permanency goal was against

the manifest weight of the evidence, and (2) the court erred by

failing to indicate in writing its reason for changing the

permanency goal, pursuant to section 2-28(2) of the Act (705 ILCS 405/2-28(2) (West Supp. 1999)).  We affirm.  

	I. BACKGROUND

	The record before us establishes the following.  In

December 1998, the State filed a petition for adjudication of

wardship, alleging that respondent failed to provide a clean,

safe, and healthy home environment in that she and S.E.'s father,

Clarence Ewing, were intoxicated to the point of being unable to

supervise L.H. and S.E. and had a history of failing to provide

for respondent's children due to substance abuse.  705 ILCS

405/2-3(1)(a) (West 1998).  Following a hearing, the trial court

entered an order granting temporary custody of L.H. and S.E. to

the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS).  

	In January 1999, the trial court conducted an

adjudicatory hearing at which respondent stipulated to the facts

contained in the State’s petition.  After a February 1999

dispositional hearing, the court made L.H. and S.E. wards of the

court and ordered respondent to cooperate with DCFS and any

services recommended by DCFS.  The court further ordered respon

dent and Ewing to (1) attend and participate in alcohol-abuse

treatment, parenting education classes, and domestic-violence

programs; and (2) submit to psychological and psychiatric evalua

tions.  DCFS set a permanency goal of returning L.H. and S.E.

home.  

	According to a permanency review hearing report filed

in the trial court in September 1999, respondent had made minimal

progress as an outpatient at the Prairie Center.  She had tested

positive for alcohol and cocaine within the previous six months and had been terminated from participating in group sessions for

violating confidentiality rules.  She was participating in

parenting classes and had completed a psychological evaluation.

	In October 1999, the trial court conducted a permanency

review hearing and determined that the permanency goal would

remain return home.

	According to a status review report filed in December

1999, respondent and Ewing had both been terminated from drug and

alcohol treatment at the Prairie Center for nonattendance or

uncooperative behavior.  Respondent admitted to Dennis Gaugler,

the DCFS caseworker assigned to her case, that she continued to

drink and had tested positive for cocaine within the previous six

months.  Respondent had completed parenting classes and the

psychological and psychiatric evaluations.  The psychologist

reported that respondent either did not understand the serious

ness of her problems or did not wish to understand them.  She had

not obtained suitable housing despite the help of a home inter

ventionist and was not employed.  

	The report also showed that S.E. and L.H. continued to

live in the foster home where they had lived for one year.  S.E.

was thriving.  L.H. was struggling academically but was receiving

additional assistance from the school and her foster parents, who

were tutoring her at home. 

	A permanency review report filed on May 15, 2000,

showed that respondent had completed the intensive phase of

alcohol- and substance-abuse treatment at New Directions Treat ment Center (New Directions) and was participating in aftercare

treatment.  She had not entered into a domestic-violence program,

and she had not found suitable housing.  Ewing had not entered

substance-abuse or alcohol treatment and had been drinking prior

to one of his visits with L.H. and S.E.  DCFS recommended that

the trial court change the permanency goal to substitute care

pending the court's decision on termination of parental rights.  

	A letter from James Calvert, the executive director of

New Directions, was also filed in May 2000.  Calvert reported

that respondent had been doing well in treatment but manifested a

sudden change in attitude and behavior after Ewing had been

released from prison.  Her attendance dropped, her grooming

ceased, and she stopped attending support group meetings and

church.  

	At the June 2000 permanency review hearing, Gaugler

testified that L.H. and S.E. had been in the same foster home for

17 months and were doing very well.  Their foster parents were

interested in adopting them.  Calvert testified that respondent's

participation in the aftercare phase of her drug treatment had

become inconsistent after Ewing's release from jail.  Respondent

had stopped spending time with sober individuals and was spending

time with drug users.  When she attended treatment she was not

attentive.  Gaugler concluded that she had a high potential for

relapse.  At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court ruled

that the permanency goal would remain return home.

	In a status report filed on August 1, 2000, DCFS again recommended that the permanency goal be changed to substitute

care pending the court's decision on termination of parental

rights and filed another letter from Calvert along with the

report.  According to Calvert, respondent was not responding

appropriately to treatment and very seldom participated in group

discussions.  Her attendance was inconsistent and it appeared to

him that she attended the aftercare treatment only to appease the

court and DCFS.  His agency had been working with respondent

since December 1999, and she still had not obtained housing. 

Calvert also expressed concern that respondent remained in a

relationship with Ewing.

	At the August 4, 2000, permanency review hearing,

Gaugler testified that DCFS sought to change the permanency goal

for the following reasons:  (1) Calvert's report regarding

respondent's substance-abuse treatment was not favorable, and she

had been in treatment for several months; (2) in June 2000, Ewing

battered respondent, requiring stitches in her lip; and (3)

respondent and Ewing had not obtained suitable housing.  In

Gaugler's opinion, respondent had not made substantial progress

on her goals.  

	Gaugler further testified that respondent had been

looking for housing since L.H. and S.E. were removed.  She had

been offered housing three times but did not have $230 to make a

down payment.  He explained that DCFS funds are not available to

help with housing unless the children are to be returned within

60 days.  Because L.H. and S.E.'s return home was not certain, DCFS housing funds were not available for respondent.

	Mary Dickenson, the home interventionist supervisor

with the Center for Children Services, testified regarding

respondent's efforts to obtain housing.  Dickenson, who had been

involved with respondent's case since December 1997, stated that

a couple of weeks before the August 2000 hearing, the Danville

Housing Authority had contacted respondent about available units. 

Respondent was told that she would need about $234 for a deposit

within two days to secure an apartment.  Respondent was not able

to come up with the money.  This had happened on more than one

occasion.  Dickenson had advised respondent to put money aside

for a deposit.  She understood that respondent received close to

$500 per month in social security benefits and that Ewing worked. 

	Ewing testified that respondent and he were staying

with his sister and that their only expenses were $150/month in

food, transportation, and rent expenses.  He had recently ob

tained a full-time job and was earning $8 an hour.  Ewing also

testified that respondent did not have the money for the housing

deposit because she had to pay $339 to the housing authority on a

past debt.  He further testified that at various times Gaugler

and Dickenson failed to keep their word to respondent and provide

her with the help that they had promised.  

	After considering the evidence and the arguments of

counsel, the trial court entered an order changing the permanency

goal to substitute care pending the court's decision on termina

tion of parental rights.  The court explained its ruling, in pertinent part, as follows:

	"There's been absolutely no participation by

these parents in order to try to get them

selves out of their situation and into some

stable housing.  They knew that from the get

go $309 [sic] was needed to be paid for this old debt.  They didn't do this, so they knew

they weren't getting to get into housing

authority.  They've done absolutely nothing

on their own and have been pointing the fin

ger at everybody else and it's their problem. 

It's because of them that we're here, not

because of Mr. Gaugler or anyone else, and

they've done absolutely nothing on their own

to help themselves, and made absolutely no

progress in the case, and I think the goal

needs to be changed for the benefit of the

children. 

		This case has a rather storied history. 

The adjudication of wardship was January 14th

of '99.  When the salient factors the [c]ourt

recalls since taking over this call[,] which

was in March of 1999[,] was that for a rela

tively substantial period Mr. Ewing was in

jail.  The court, if I recall correctly, kept

this thing open so that Mr. Ewing could show that he's responsible, reasonable, that he

could make progress.  In their wisdom the

legislature has indicated that their reason

able progress from the date of adjudication

is nine months.  The Supreme Court recently

indicated that those nine[-]month periods for

that particular part of the statute would be

the material portion.  We have a case where

we've had the adjudication over 18 months

ago.  We're still spinning our wheels.  [Re

spondent's counsel] attempts to blame every

body except where the blame should be[,]

which [is on] the parents it would seem to

me.  Mr. Ewing was testifying that no one

would give [respondent] help.  Well, he's the

father.  ***  He's making $320 a week.  She's

making $500 per month SSI.  There's been no

planning whatsoever.  For 18 months they've

been trying to get some type of housing.  

* * *

		*** Neither of you have followed the

case service plan nor tried to finish the

things that you have [to do].  I told you two

eight months ago the problem is alcohol and

drugs.  ***  You haven't made substantial

progress.  You're still violen[t].  There's still homelessness.  There's substance abuse. 

There's antisocial behavior on both sides and

criminal behavior.  There's failure to comply

with the case service plan, Prairie Center

and New Horizons, both.  For those reasons I

believe it's evident that the goal should be

changed to substitute care pending and it

shall be.

		There's another point that should be

made, that the children have been in substi

tute care *** for 20 months.  One of the

prime objectives of the new legislation ***

was to give stability to the children.

[Twenty] months is long enough to give you

people time to change, and the evidence is

rather clear today that the goal of return

home is not workable, therefore the goal will

be changed to substitute care pending court

determination."

	The trial court's August 28, 2000, written order

articulated the court's findings, in pertinent part, as follows:

		"The parents *** are unfit for reasons

other than financial circumstances alone to

care for, protect, train[,] or discipline the

minors, and appropriate services aimed at

family reunification and family preservation have been unsuccessful in rectifying the

conditions which have led to such a finding

of inability to care for, protect, train[,]

or discipline the minors."

The court's order also stated that the court found that it was in

the children's best interest that they remain wards of the court. 

Accordingly, the court ordered that L.H. and S.E. remain wards of

the court and granted DCFS the power to place them.  The court

further ordered that (1) the permanency goal be changed to

substitute care pending the court's decision on termination of

parental rights and (2) respondent continue to cooperate with

DCFS.  This appeal followed.

	II. ANALYSIS

	A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

	Respondent first argues that the trial court's order

changing the permanency goal to substitute care pending the

court's decision on termination of parental rights was against

the manifest weight of the evidence.  We disagree.

	A trial court's determination of a permanency goal will

not be reversed on appeal unless it was against the manifest

weight of the evidence.  In re J.B., 311 Ill. App. 3d 868, 870, 726 N.E.2d 9, 11 (2000).  Pursuant to section 2-28(2) of the Act,

the court must set a permanency goal that is in the children's

best interest, and the court's determination must include the

following factors:  (1) the age of the children; (2) the options

available for permanence; (3) the current placement of the children and the intent of the family regarding adoption; (4) the

emotional, physical, and mental status or condition of the

children; (5) the types of services previously offered and

whether the services were successful and, if not successful, the

reasons the services failed; (6) the availability of services

currently needed and whether the services exist; and (7) the

status of any siblings.  705 ILCS 405/2-28(2) (West Supp. 1999). 

The court also must consider (1) the permanency goal contained in

the service plan, (2) the appropriateness of the services con

tained in the plan and whether those services have been provided,

(3) whether reasonable efforts have been made by all the parties

to the service plan to achieve the goal, and (4) whether the plan

and goal have been achieved.  705 ILCS 405/2-28(2) (West Supp.

1999).  

	According to respondent, the record contains insuffi

cient evidence that she was provided with adequate assistance in

finding housing.  Specifically, she points out that (1) the trial

court received no reports enumerating the steps that had been

taken to help her find housing, (2) Dickenson testified that she

contacted the Danville Housing Authority only two or three times

on respondent's behalf, and (3) no evidence was presented regard

ing the exact type of help that respondent received.  Respondent

further alleges that DCFS stopped assisting her in February 2001

when it decided that the permanency goal should be changed.  We

are not persuaded. 

	As the trial court pointed out, respondent had 18 months in which to make progress toward obtaining suitable

housing.  At the time of the August 2000 hearing, respondent was

virtually no closer to obtaining housing than she had been at the

outset of her case.  The court need not be presented with an

"enumerated" plan for it to determine that adequate services were

provided.  The record shows that resources were made available to

respondent.  In particular, a home interventionist was assigned

to respondent, and Gaugler testified that on three occasions

respondent was offered apartments by the Danville Housing Author

ity but could not take them because she did not have money for a

down payment.  The record also reflects that respondent was not

able to begin her housing search in earnest until she had com

pleted alcohol- and drug-abuse treatment.  Respondent opted not

to undergo such treatment until January 2000.  Accordingly, the

court's finding that respondent failed to take significant

initiative despite the resources that were made available to her

was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.  

	Respondent also contends that the weight of the evi

dence showed that she had made substantial progress on her

service plan goals.  We disagree.  Eighteen months after L.H. and

S.E. were removed, respondent had not entered treatment for

domestic violence and remained in a violent relationship with

Ewing, evinced by the serious injury Ewing inflicted upon her

just two months before the August 2000 hearing.  Although she had

completed a drug- and alcohol-treatment program, her attendance

and participation in aftercare treatment were poor, and she was socializing with drug users.  Calvert considered her to be at a

high risk of relapse. 

	Moreover, when determining an appropriate permanency

goal, the trial court is obligated to consider the children's

best interest.  705 ILCS 405/2-28(2) (West Supp. 1999).  At the

time of the August 2000 hearing, L.H. and S.E. had been in

substitute care for 20 months with a family that had expressed an

interest in adopting them.  S.E. was thriving, and L.H.'s aca

demic performance was improving.  Meanwhile, respondent was at a

high risk of relapsing into drug and alcohol abuse and lacked

adequate housing for her family.  Given the minimal amount of

progress respondent made over 18 months' time and her alcohol-

and drug-abuse prognosis, we conclude that the court's order

changing the permanency goal was not against the manifest weight

of the evidence. 

	B. Written Findings

	Last, respondent argues that the trial court erred by

failing to indicate in writing its reasons for changing the

permanency goal as is required by section 2-28(2) of the Act. 

705 ILCS 405/2-28(2) (West Supp. 1999).  Section 2-28(2), in

pertinent part, provides:  "In selecting any permanency goal, the

court shall indicate in writing the reasons the goal was selected

and why the preceding goals were ruled out."  705 ILCS 405/2-

28(2) (West Supp. 1999).  Citing In re K.H., 313 Ill. App. 3d 675, 730 N.E.2d 131 (2000), in which this court affirmed a trial

court's order changing the permanency goal but remanded the cause and directed the trial court to enter written findings pursuant

to section 2-28(2) of the Act, respondent urges us to remand her

cause for compliance with section 2-28(2) of the Act.  We decline

to do so.

	First, this case is distinguishable from K.H., in that here, the basis for the trial court's decision is clearly shown

by the court's lengthy finding and remarks on the record at the

August 2000 hearing.  In sum, the court cited (1) an overall lack

of progress and initiative on respondent's part, (2) respondent's

failure to find housing, (3) respondent's substance-abuse and

domestic-violence issues, and (4) the best interest of L.H. and

S.E.  Given that (1) the evidence of record was more than suffi

cient to support the court's decision and (2) the basis for that

decision is ascertainable from the record, we hold that we need

not remand this case for entry of more specific written findings.

	Moreover, when the record provides an adequate basis

for review of the trial court's ruling, the legislative intent

underlying the writing requirement is not compromised by a

decision not to remand.  In light of the overwhelming volume of

cases moving through the trial courts and the bare-bones support

staff at the disposal of those courts, a court's oral pronounce

ment of its ruling should be viewed as sufficient to comply with

section 2-28(2) of the Act if (1) those pronouncements appear in

the record and (2) they would constitute a sufficient statement

of the court's findings if the court had turned to the court

reporter and requested that its oral pronouncement be typed up and printed in the form of an order.  In other words, so long as

something exists in the record stating the basis for the court's

determination, the writing requirement should be deemed satis

fied, regardless of whether the "writing" was prepared by the

court reporter or the court's administrative staff.  

	In conclusion, we decline to remand respondent's cause

for the entry of a written order in compliance with section 2-

28(2) of the Act because the basis for the court's decision is

readily ascertainable from the record.

		III. CONCLUSION

	For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court's

judgment.

	Affirmed.	

	KNECHT, J., concurs.

	COOK, J., specially concurs.

	JUSTICE COOK, specially concurring:

	I concur, but I am troubled by an issue not addressed

by the parties.

	The majority states:

		"Moreover, when determining an appropri

ate permanency goal, the trial court is obli

gated to consider the children's best inter

est.  705 ILCS 405/2-28(2) (West Supp. 1999). 

At the time of the August 2000 hearing, L.H.

and S.E. had been in substitute care for 20

months with a family that had expressed an

interest in adopting them."  Slip op. at 13.

	It has been the law that, when the State seeks to

terminate parental rights, the court must determine the parent's

unfitness before it may proceed to a consideration of the child's

best interests.  In re Adoption of Syck, 138 Ill. 2d 255, 276, 562 N.E.2d 174, 183 (1990).  It is improper to take a child from

fit parents because other individuals might do a better job

raising the child.  It is not until after a parent has been found

to be unfit that the court may consider evidence of the child's

best interests.  In re M.S., 302 Ill. App. 3d 998, 1003, 706 N.E.2d 524, 528 (1999).  For that reason, it is necessary in

termination cases to conduct a separate best interests hearing

after the parent has been found to be unfit, in which evidence

will be admitted which was not admissible at the fitness hearing. 

In re J.T.C., 273 Ill. App. 3d 193, 200, 652 N.E.2d 421, 426 (1995); In re A.P., 277 Ill. App. 3d 592, 600, 660 N.E.2d 1006, 1012 (1996).  

	Does section 2-28(2) of the Act purport to change these

basic rules?  Can a decision to terminate parental rights be made

before it is determined that the parents are unfit?  Is it no

longer necessary to have a best interests hearing separate from

the unfitness hearing?  As far as I can tell, the statutes

dealing with unfitness hearings in termination cases have not

been changed.  Section 4-27(2) of the Act (705 ILCS 405/4-27(2)

(West 1998)) still requires a "finding, based upon clear and

convincing evidence, that a non-consenting parent is an unfit

person" before parental rights may be terminated.  In any event,

it must be remembered that the legislature does not have complete

freedom to act in this area; parental rights are a fundamental

liberty interest protected by the fourteenth amendment (U.S.

Const., amend. XIV).  Lulay v. Lulay, 193 Ill. 2d 455, 472, 739 N.E.2d 521, 530 (2000), quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599, 606, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 1394 (1982).