J-S44001-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: K.M., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: K.K., MOTHER

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2166 EDA 2023

Appeal from the Decree Entered July 21, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County Orphans' Court at 

No(s): 2023-00002

IN THE INTEREST OF: A.F.S., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: K.K., MOTHER

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2167 EDA 2023

Appeal from the Decree Entered July 21, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County Orphans' Court at 

No(s): 2023-00003

BEFORE: OLSON, J., NICHOLS, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 29, 2024

K.K. (“Mother”) appeals from the July 21, 2023 decrees involuntarily 

terminating her parental rights to her sons, K.M, born January 2011, and 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S44001-23

- 2 -

A.F.S., born November 2019 (collectively, “the Children”).

1 After review, we 

affirm.

We glean the following relevant factual and procedural history from the 

certified record. On December 30, 2020, Monroe County Children and Youth 

Services (“CYS” or “the Agency”) received a referral concerning Mother’s 

mental health and alleged use of illegal substances.

2

 Specifically, Mother “was 

seeking help for her mental health. At that time, she was diagnosed with 

[m]ajor [d]epressive [d]isorder, [a]nxiety, and [d]epression. [S]he stated 

that she was experiencing fits of uncontrolled rage and . . . admitted to daily 

methamphetamine use [a]nd . . . to recently using heroin.” N.T., 6/16/23, at 

15-16. Mother tested positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine on 

January 20, 2021. See Petitioner’s Exhibit 21. Thereafter, the Agency 

obtained protective custody of the Children on January 22, 2021, which was 

confirmed at a shelter care hearing on January 25, 2023. See N.T., 6/16/23, 

at 24-25, 29. 

On February 4, 2021, the court adjudicated the Children dependent and 

established their respective permanency goals as return to parent or guardian 

with concurrent goals of adoption. Mother’s permanency objectives included, 

____________________________________________

1 By the same decrees, the orphans’ court also terminated the parental rights 

of K.M.’s father, M.M., and A.F.S.’s father, C.S. These individuals neither filed

an appeal nor participated in the instant appeals.

2 The family had come to the attention of the Agency on three prior occasions, 

dating back to May 2012, related to substance abuse and housing issues. See

N.T., 6/14/23, at 14-15.
J-S44001-23

- 3 -

in part, participating in drug and alcohol treatment and screening, engaging 

in mental health treatment, and maintaining safe and stable housing. See

Petitioner’s Exhibits 1 & 2. Mother was additionally required to participate in 

regular supervised visitation with the Children, and a referral was made to 

Justice Works for weekly supervised visitation. See Petitioner’s Exhibit 18. 

Throughout the ensuing dependency proceedings, the court conducted 

regular review hearings at which it maintained the Children’s commitment and 

placement. During this time, Mother was charged with possession of a firearm 

with the manufacturer number altered in February 2022. The disposition 

and/or status of this charge is unclear from the certified record. See

Petitioner’s Exhibit 27. Mother additionally pleaded guilty to drug-related 

charges in April 20223 and was sentenced to six months’ probation in June 

2022. See id. The probation department filed a violation of probation 

petition in December 2022.

4

 A bench warrant was issued the following month, 

in January 2023. See id. 

On June 2, 2022, the Children’s permanency goals were changed to 

adoption. See id. at 51, 78.

As to Mother’s progress, the orphans’ court stated:

____________________________________________

3 The record reflects unknown periods of incarceration in March and April 2022, 

the latter stemming from an April 2022 incident between Mother and her 

current paramour. See Petitioner’s Exhibit 27; N.T., 6/14/23, at 48.

4 We are unable to discern from the certified record the genesis of the

probation violation. 
J-S44001-23

- 4 -

. . .

13. Goals were discussed and services were offered to Mother, but 

she has not met any goals set forth in the Permanency Plan. . . .

. . .

16. While the [Children have] been in care, Mother has had 

continued use of drugs and violated the terms of her probation.

17. Mother has lacked stable housing and employment.

18. Mother appeared for at least one visit with [the Children] 

where she was under the influence. She also had injuries to her 

face at that visit that appeared to be from domestic violence.

19. Mother is currently unemployed and has a warrant outstanding 

for her arrest.

20. Mother last visited the [Children] in September 2022. She has 

had no contact with the [Children] since that date, and very little 

contact with CYS.

. . .

Orphans’ Court Opinion and Decree, 7/21/23, at 3.

5

On January 11, 2023, the Agency filed petitions for the involuntary 

termination of parental rights. The orphans’ court held a hearing on the 

petitions on June 14, 2023, at which time the Children were twelve and three 

years old.

6

 The Agency presented the testimony of the former caseworker, 

____________________________________________

5 While the orphans’ court entered separate opinions and decrees for each 

child, as they are substantially similar, we will cite to the court’s opinion and 

decree with respect to K.M. in the interest of clarity.

6 On January 13, 2023, the orphans’ court appointed Hillary A. Madden, 

Esquire, as the Children’s legal counsel and guardian ad litem (“GAL”). The 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
J-S44001-23

- 5 -

Victoria Lipyanic, and current caseworker, Rachel Starkes.

7

 The Agency 

further proffered Agency Exhibits 1 through 30, which were admitted without 

objection. See N.T., 6/14/23, at 70. Mother, while not present, was 

represented by counsel. She did not offer any additional evidence.

By opinions and decrees dated and entered July 21, 2023, the orphans’ 

court involuntarily terminated Mother’s parental rights to the Children

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1) and (b). On August 21, 2023, Mother 

filed timely notices of appeal at each docket number noted above, along with 

concise statements of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).

8 On August 28, 2023, the orphans’ court issued 

____________________________________________

certified record confirms that the Children’s legal and best interests do not 

conflict. See id. at 60, 62, 71; see also 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2313(a); In re 

K.M.G., 240 A.3d 1218, 1238 (Pa. 2020) (holding appellate courts should 

engage in “limited sua sponte review” concerning a child’s statutory right to 

counsel in the termination context).

7 Ms. Lipyanic testified that she was involved with this matter from January 

22, 2021, at the time the Agency took protective custody of the Children, until 

January 29, 2021, when the case was transferred to the Agency’s Permanency

Unit. See N.T., 6/14/23, at 27, 29. Ms. Starkes testified that she did not 

commence her role as caseworker until July 2022. See id. at 38.

8

 We note that Mother’s time in which to file a timely appeal with respect to 

the orphans’ court’s decrees technically fell on August 20, 2023. See 

Pa.R.A.P. 903(a). Since that day was a Sunday, however, Mother’s time in 

which to appeal was extended until Monday, August 21, 2023, by operation of 

statute. See Pa.R.J.A. 107(a)-(b) (relating to the computation of time and 

setting forth a rule of construction that excludes the last day of any period 

that falls upon a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday); Pa.R.A.P. 107 

(incorporating by reference the rules of construction set forth in the 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
J-S44001-23

- 6 -

statements pursuant to Rule 1925(a) referencing the reasoning set forth in its 

prior opinions and decrees. On September 18, 2023, this Court consolidated 

Mother’s appeals sua sponte.

On appeal, Mother challenges the sufficiency of the evidence pursuant 

to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1) and (b).

9

 Mother’s Brief at 4 (cleaned up). We 

review Mother’s issue under an abuse of discretion standard, which our 

Supreme Court has explained “is limited to a determination of whether the 

decree of the termination court is supported by competent evidence.” In re 

Adoption of C.M., 255 A.3d 343, 358 (Pa. 2021). When applying this 

standard, appellate courts must accept the trial court’s findings of fact and 

credibility determinations if they are supported by the record. See Interest 

of S.K.L.R., 256 A.3d 1108, 1123 (Pa. 2021). “Where the trial court’s factual 

findings are supported by the evidence, an appellate court may not disturb 

the trial court’s ruling unless it has discerned an error of law or abuse of 

discretion.” In re Adoption of L.A.K., 265 A.3d 580, 591 (Pa. 2021). An 

abuse of discretion in this context exists “only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.” Id. 

____________________________________________

Pennsylvania Rules of Judicial Administration with respect to the Pennsylvania 

Rules of Appellate Procedure); see also Pa.R.A.P. 903, cmt.

9 The Children’s GAL/counsel filed a brief advocating for this Court to affirm 

the decrees.
J-S44001-23

- 7 -

The involuntary termination of parental rights is governed by Section 

2511 of the Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis. See 

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511. The trial court must initially determine whether the 

conduct of the parent warrants termination under one of the eleven 

enumerated grounds set forth at Section 2511(a). Only if the court 

determines that the petitioner has established grounds for termination under 

Section 2511(a) does it then engage in assessing the petition under Section 

2511(b), which focuses upon the child’s needs and welfare. See In re T.S.M., 

71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). To involuntarily terminate parental rights, the 

petitioner must satisfy both Section 2511(a) and (b) by clear and convincing 

evidence, which is evidence that is so “clear, direct, weighty, and convincing 

as to enable a trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of 

the truth of the precise facts in issue.” C.M., 255 A.3d at 359 (citation 

omitted). 

In the case sub judice, the orphans’ court terminated Mother’s parental 

rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1) and (b), which provide as 

follows: 

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may 

be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at 

least six months immediately preceding the filing of the 

petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of 

relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or 

failed to perform parental duties.
J-S44001-23

- 8 -

. . . 

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights 

of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of 

environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, 

income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the 

control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant 

to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any 

efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein 

which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the 

filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (b). 

To establish grounds for termination pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1),

“[a] petitioner. . . must demonstrate by competent, clear and convincing 

evidence, ‘[t]he parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least six 

months immediately preceding the filing of the petition either has evidenced 

a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or 

failed to perform parental duties.’” C.M., 255 A.3d at 363-364 (citation 

omitted) (footnote omitted). While undefined,

our courts long have interpreted parental duties in relation to the 

needs of a child, such as love, protection, guidance and support. 

Parental duties are carried out through affirmative actions that 

develop and maintain the parent-child relationship. The roster of 

such positive actions undoubtedly includes communication and 

association. The performance of parental duties requires that a 

parent exert himself to take and maintain a place of importance 

in the child’s life. 

L.A.K., 265 A.3d at 592 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 

Furthermore, “[f]ortitude is required, as a parent must act with ‘reasonable 

firmness’ to overcome obstacles that stand in the way of preserving a 
J-S44001-23

- 9 -

parent-child relationship and may not wait for a more suitable time to perform 

parental responsibilities.” Id. at 592 (citation omitted).

In assessing Section 2511(a)(1), trial courts should consider the entire 

history of the case and avoid applying the statutory six-month requirement 

mechanically. C.M., 255 A.3d at 364. However, the General Assembly’s 

emphasis on the six months immediately preceding the filing of the 

termination petition indicates this timeframe is the “most critical period for 

evaluation” of a parent’s conduct. L.A.K., 265 A.3d at 592. 

“[T]he question of whether a parent has failed or refused to perform 

parental duties must be analyzed in relation to the particular circumstances of 

the case.” In re Burns, 379 A.2d 535, 540 (Pa. 1977). Thus, “even where 

the evidence clearly establishes a parent has failed to perform affirmative 

parental duties for a period in excess of six months. . ., the court ‘must 

examine the individual circumstances and any explanation offered by the 

parent to determine if that evidence, in light of the totality of circumstances, 

clearly warrants permitting the involuntary termination [of parental rights].’” 

L.A.K., 265 A.3d at 593. The totality of the circumstances includes 

consideration of the following: “(1) the parent’s explanation for his or her 

conduct; (2) the post-abandonment contact between the parent and child, if 

any, including any efforts made by the parent to reestablish contact with the 

child; and (3) the effect that termination of parental rights would have on the 

child pursuant to Section 2511(b).” Id. As explained by our Supreme Court, 

“the purpose of this analysis is to give effect to our mandate that courts avoid 
J-S44001-23

- 10 -

a mechanical application of the law regarding the termination of parental 

rights. The law must be applied with the purpose of serving needs and welfare 

of each individual child in his or her particular circumstances.”

Id. 

Instantly, the orphans’ court concluded that Mother failed to perform 

her affirmative duties, satisfying grounds for termination pursuant to Section 

2511(a)(1). The court stated: 

In this case, [Mother has] failed to perform parental duties for a 

period exceeding the last six months. . . . The [Children have]

been in foster care for two and a half years. Mother has continued 

to lack housing and employment and failed to remain drug free. 

She last visited with the [Children] in September 2022, after only 

[resuming] visits in July 2022. Mother did not appear at the 

[subject] hearing, nor did she provide any evidence as to her 

efforts to overcome her lack of performance of parental duties. 

She also had a warrant outstanding at the time of the [subject]

hearing. CYS provided clear and convincing evidence for 

termination of parental rights under Section 2511(a)(1) as to

Mother.

Orphans’ Court Opinion and Decree, 7/21/23, at 8.

Mother nonetheless argues that she attempted to maintain 

communication with the Children and “a place of importance in their lives as 

their mother.” Mother’s Brief at 9-10. She further asserts that she suffered 

from substance abuse and mental illness and, as such, her conduct was 

reasonable. See id. at 10. 

A review of the record supports the orphans’ court’s finding of grounds 

for termination under Section 2511(a)(1). The testimony of Ms. Starkes 

reveals that Mother declined to participate in services, but for a brief period 
J-S44001-23

- 11 -

in the beginning of 2022, and failed to satisfy her objectives aimed at 

reunification with the Children. See N.T., 6/14/23, at 41, 65-66, 71, 83. On 

direct examination, Ms. Starkes stated:

Q. As far as goals and objectives for each parent, let’s talk about 

[Mother] for a moment. Has she achieved any kind of housing to 

the best of your knowledge?

A. No.

Q. To your knowledge, she is still homeless at this point?

A. Correct.

. . .

Q. To the best of your knowledge, is she receiving any mental 

health services?

A. None that I am aware of.

. . .

Q. And when was the last time she submitted any urine screens?

A. I believe it was September of 2022 as well.

Id. at 65-66. 

Mother in large part failed to comply with drug screens. See id. at 37, 

40-41, 46, 84; see also Petitioner’s Exhibit 21. As evinced, she completed a 

total of four drug screens since the Children came into custody of the Agency10

____________________________________________

10 We observe that a screen collected on March 8, 2021, was positive for 

methamphetamine and amphetamine. See Petitioner’s Exhibit 21. 
J-S44001-23

- 12 -

and executed refusals11 on 16 occasions from September 2021 through 

September 2022. See Petitioner’s Exhibit 21. Similarly, despite several 

reported attempts, she failed to successfully complete a drug and alcohol 

evaluation and/or treatment. See id. at 35, 38, 40-46, 52, 55-57, 84.

As such, on cross-examination by counsel for Mother, Ms. Starkes 

confirmed:

Q. Okay. And -- So -- And to date, mom has not achieved any of 

the goals laid out for her?

A. No. [Mother] hasn’t met any of the goals, to my 

knowledge. I haven’t had contact with her since September

2022.

Id. at 71 (emphasis added).

Furthermore, Ms. Starkes testified that, as of January 1, 2022, Mother 

had cancelled her visitations for the last four weeks. See id. at 41. Over the 

next three months, Mother participated in a total of five visitations.12 See

Petitioner’s Exhibit 18. Significantly, Mother’s visitation was then placed on 

hold in April 2022 due to lack of contact. See id. at 48-49, 82; see also

Petitioner’s Exhibit 18. Ms. Starkes then testified that, after resuming 

visitation in July 2022, Mother had not engaged in visitation with the Children 

since September 2022, nearly one year prior:

____________________________________________

11 These refusals were executed in connection with Mother’s visitation with 

Children. See Petitioner’s Exhibit 21.

12 Notably, Mother failed to show for two scheduled visitations in February 

2022. See id.; see also N.T., 6/14/23, at 47. 
J-S44001-23

- 13 -

Q. Has she not visited the children since September of 2022?

A. That’s correct.

Q. So it’s been almost a year since she visited with them?

A. Yes.

Id. at 65, 83; see also Petitioner’s Exhibit 18. 

Since that time, Mother had irregular telephone contact, until K.M. 

requested such contact cease. Id. at 71, 83. Ms. Starkes testified:

Q. Has she -- up until the point where [K.M.] said he didn’t want 

phone contact with [M]other, was she regularly contacting them 

after September of 2022?

A. I think it was more sporadic. It was -- we tried to set up some 

type of schedule that way it didn’t interfere with the foster parents’ 

work schedules as well as [K.M.]’s extracurricular activities and 

bed times and things like that. But [Mother] was calling at any 

hour and would not leave the foster parents alone some days. 

Which got a little bit frustrating for them as well.

Id. at 83.

As such, the record supports the court’s determination that Mother has 

failed to perform her parental duties in excess of the six months prior to the 

filing of the termination petitions. We reiterate, “[p]arental rights are not 

preserved by waiting for a more suitable or convenient time to perform one’s 

parental responsibilities while others [meet] the child’s physical and emotional 

needs.” In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 855 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation 

omitted). Upon consideration of the totality of the circumstances, as we 

discern no error of law or abuse of discretion, we do not disturb the orphans’ 

court’s finding of grounds for termination pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1).
J-S44001-23

- 14 -

Having found sufficient grounds for termination pursuant to Section 

2511(a)(1), we next must determine whether termination was proper under 

Section 2511(b), which affords primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. 23 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 2511(b). Of note, we “should consider the matter from the child’s 

perspective, placing [his or her] developmental, physical, and emotional 

needs and welfare above concerns for the parent.” In the Interest of K.T., 

296 A.3d 1085, 1105 (Pa. 2023). Moreover, this determination “should not 

be applied mechanically,” but “must be made on a case-by-case basis,” 

wherein “the court must determine each child’s specific needs.” Id. at 1106. 

Thus, there is no “exhaustive list” of factors that must be considered. Id. at 

1113 n.28. While the particular facts of each case determine the factors to 

be considered, our precedent indicates that relevant points of inquiry include 

“intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability.” T.S.M., supra at 

267. 

Our Supreme Court has mandated, however, that an evaluation 

pursuant to Section 2511(b) should consider the child’s bond with his or her 

parent. See In re E.M., 620 A.2d 481 (Pa. 1993). Specifically, we must 

render “a determination of whether the bond is necessary and beneficial to 

the child[.]” K.T., supra at 1113. This evaluation involves consideration of 

the effect of severing the child’s bond with their parent. Id. at 1109. In 

termination matters, “severance of a necessary and beneficial relationship is 
J-S44001-23

- 15 -

the kind of loss that would predictably cause ‘extreme emotional 

consequences’ or significant, irreparable harm.” Id. at 1109-1110, quoting

E.M., supra at 484. Our Supreme Court has distinguished, however, 

“extreme emotional consequences” from a mere “adverse impact” in the 

termination context. K.T., supra at 1111. Specifically, Pennsylvania courts 

must not truncate their analysis and preclude severance “based solely on 

evidence of an ‘adverse’ or ‘detrimental’ impact to the child.” Id. at 1114.

Furthermore, “courts must not only consider the child’s bond with the 

biological parent, but also examine the . . . love, comfort, security, and 

stability the child might have with the foster parent.” K.T., supra at 1111 

(emphasis in original; cleaned up). Thus, we consider factors that arise from 

the facts of each case, such as: (1) the child’s need for permanency and length 

of time in foster care; (2) whether the child is bonded with foster parents; and 

(3) whether the foster home meets the child’s needs. Id. at 1113. 

Overall, “bond, plus permanency, stability and all ‘intangible’ factors 

may contribute equally to the determination of a child’s specific 

developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare, and thus are all of 

‘primary’ importance in the Section 2511(b) analysis.” Id. at 1109.

In questioning the orphans’ court’s finding that Section 2511(b) also

favors termination of her parental rights, Mother argues that it is “impossible”

that no bond exists between she and the Children, referencing in part her 

visitations and telephone calls. She maintains, “[t]his bond deserves a closer 
J-S44001-23

- 16 -

look so that the severance of that relationship can be thoroughly examined.” 

Mother’s Brief at 12.

Moreover, Mother posits that she unsuccessfully requested services to 

address her relationship with K.M. See id. at 12. Further, while recognizing 

that K.M. requested her telephone calls stop, Mother questions his relationship 

with his foster parents, stating, “[t]estimony established that [K.M.] was still

not at a comfort level to refer to his foster parents as ‘mom’ and ‘dad,’ which

raises questions as to whether being adopted best serves his welfare.” See 

id. at 12-13.

At the time of the June 2023 termination proceeding, the Children had 

been removed for approximately two and a half years. As indicated supra, 

the record reveals several gaps in Mother’s visitation and contact with the 

Children and that she had not engaged in visitation with the Children since 

September 2022. See N.T., 6/14/23, at 36, 41, 47, 49, 57, 59, 65, 83; see 

also Petitioner’s Exhibit 18. 

Despite sporadic telephone calls since that time, in April 2023, K.M., 

then twelve years old, requested the telephone calls with Mother stop. Ms. 

Starkes testified:

Q. Do you know if mom had [tele]phone contact with the boys

since September of 2022?

A. She’s tried contacting the boys by [tele]phone, and I think she’s 

had a few [tele]phone calls. However, at a point in time, [K.M.]

had asked to no longer speak with her on the [tele]phone. And 

due to [A.F.S.] only being 3, he doesn’t really interact on the 

[tele]phone.
J-S44001-23

- 17 -

. . .

Id. at 71; see also id. at 62 (“[K.M.] had also informed me that he no longer 

wanted to speak with [Mother] and had asked the foster parents to stop asking 

him to have [tele]phone calls with her.”), 82. Further, Ms. Starkes indicated 

that K.M.’s visitation with members of his biological family caused him to 

suffer distress. See id. at 62, 80-81 (“[K.M.’s] behaviors ha[d] been declining 

ever since he had a visit with his maternal grandmother. . . . At that point, I 

was told [K.M.] disclosed to his therapist that he was acting out due to seeing 

his biological family members.”). 

As a result, Ms. Starkes, reported K.M.’s wishes to not reunify with 

Mother:

Q. Okay. And did the boys -- did they desire to be reunited with 

mom?

A. I’m sorry, can you repeat that?

Q. Do you know if the boys desire to be reunited with mom?

A. N -- I’ve discussed with [K.M.] and he said he would like to be 

adopted by the [foster parents] and that he did not want to remain 

-- he did not want to go back to [Mother].

Id.

Moreover, the Children, twelve and three years old at the time of the 

subject proceeding, had been placed together in their current pre-adoptive 

foster home for a year and a half. See id. at 64. Ms. Starkes observed that 

the Children were doing well with their medical and physical needs met. See 
J-S44001-23

- 18 -

id. K.M. was engaged in outpatient therapy.13 See id. His current therapist 

expressed support for termination of parental rights. See Petitioner’s Exhibit 

6. A.F.S. was enrolled in early intervention services.14 See id. at 64.

Significantly, Ms. Starkes observed a bond between the Children and 

their foster parents. Ms. Starkes described:

[A.F.S.] is identifying both his foster parents as his mom and dad. 

He’s very attached and bonded with [foster mother] especially, 

but he has a good bond with both the foster parents. As far as 

[K.M.] is concerned, he is very bonded to both foster parents as 

well. Although he is not a comfort level, I think, of calling them 

mom and dad. He does still sometimes call them [by their first 

names]. But he still wishes to be adopted by them.

Id. at 65. She further explained:

Myself and the foster-care coordinator took [K.M.] out for dinner 

to discuss the [subject] hearing coming up. We discussed 

everything with [K.M.] and let him ask questions, although he 

didn’t have any. We confirmed with him that he would have no 

contact with his biological parents if this termination went through 

and he got adopted by his foster parents. [K.M.] seemed very 

comfortable with that and said that he wanted to be adopted with 

his brother, [A.F.S.].

Id. at 60.

Based upon the foregoing, we conclude that the record corroborates the 

orphans’ court’s determination that termination of Mother’s parental rights 

____________________________________________

13 K.M. had been engaged in therapy with various providers since the spring 

of 2021. See N.T., 6/14/23, at 36; see also Petitioner’s Exhibits 5-7.

14 A.F.S. had been engaged in early intervention services since the spring of 

2022. See id. at 45; see also Petitioner’s Exhibit 11. He had also previously 

received behavioral, occupational, and speech therapy. See id. at 57; see 

also Petitioner’s Exhibits 12 & 13.
J-S44001-23

- 19 -

best serves the Children’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs and 

welfare pursuant to Section 2511(b). As such, we do not disturb it. Since our 

review confirms that there was a sufficient basis for the involuntary 

termination of Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1) and 

(b), we affirm the orphans’ court’s decrees.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the termination decrees.

Decrees affirmed. 

Date: 2/29/2024