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THAILAND: A DEMOCRACY IN PERIL

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JUNE 24, 2014

Serial No. 113–191

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

PAUL COOK, California 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

SEAN DUFFY, Wisconsin 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio, Chairman 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

AMI BERA, California 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESS 

The Honorable Scot Marciel, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau 

of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State ........................... 5

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Scot Marciel: Prepared statement ................................................ 8

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 24

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 25

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress from the 

Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement .............................................. 26

Written responses from the Honorable Scot Marciel to questions submitted 

for the record by the Honorable Steve Chabot, a Representative in Congress 

from the State of Ohio, and chairman, Subcommittee on Asia and the 

Pacific .................................................................................................................... 28

(1)

THAILAND: A DEMOCRACY IN PERIL 

TUESDAY, JUNE 24, 2014

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 o’clock p.m., in 

room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Steve Chabot 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. CHABOT. The subcommittee will come to order. 

Good afternoon and welcome to this afternoon’s subcommittee 

hearing. I want to thank the gentleman from California, Mr. Bera, 

for serving as today’s ranking member and also thank our distinguished witness, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary Scot 

Marciel, for being here. For reasons beyond our control we had to 

reschedule today’s hearing from last week, so I appreciate your 

flexibility. While the Department of Defense was previously scheduled to also testify, they rescinded their participation and were no 

longer able to join the panel, which is unfortunate. Mr. Marciel, I 

hope you will be able to address some of their perspectives on the 

situation in Thailand and the responses to the coup in their absence to the best of your ability. I note the nodding of your head 

that indicates you will be able to do that and we thank you for 

that. 

Today’s hearing was called to examine the implications of the 

Royal Thai Army’s coup d’etat on Thailand’s alliance with the 

United States and to assess the administration’s responses to the 

junta’s seizure of power. 

Over the past year or so, we have witnessed Thailand descend 

into a state of complete political impasse. Since late last year, protests of up to 200,000 people immobilized Bangkok, challenging the 

government’s right to rule; the February 2014 elections were boycotted by the opposition Democratic Party and Thailand’s Constitutional Court declared them null and void; Prime Minister Yingluck 

was forced out of office on corruption charges and faces impeachment by the Senate; and finally on May 20th the Royal Thai Army 

declared martial law and formally took control of the country on 

May 22nd. 

Almost immediately, the junta suspended Thailand’s Constitution, imposed a nationwide curfew, blocked international media, 

banned public gatherings of more than five people, detained journalists and academics, arrested political leaders, shut down nearly 

3,000 local radio stations, and censored over 300 Web pages. While 

2

the curfew has since been lifted, restrictions on media remain in 

place, some activists still remain in detention, and civil society is 

living under a dark shadow fearing reprisal by the junta, which 

has issued harsh warnings against all political activities or public 

comments seen threatening to the monarchy or the junta’s control. 

The latest coup is Thailand’s second since 2006 and twelfth since 

1932. But even amid a series of coups, Thailand has long been considered an outpost of democracy and liberal ideas in Southeast 

Asia. Surely, against the likes of Hun Sen’s dictatorial hand in 

Cambodia, the long-time junta-controlled government in Burma, 

and the authoritarian communist regimes in Vietnam and Laos, 

this was not so difficult of a status to maintain. 

Today, however, former political leaders, activists, and workers 

are fleeing Thailand for Cambodia to escape the increasing intolerance of dissent imposed by the junta. Only 1 year ago, this direction of migration would have been unheard of. While this flight of 

people continues, Thailand faces a serious reputational reckoning 

as the international community questions Thailand’s status as a 

beacon of democracy in Asia. Its political crisis has already created 

a sense of unease among foreign investors, and because of the instability and uncertainty, those investors are running cold. 

The junta claims that seizing power was necessary to save Thai 

democracy’s long-term prospects—also what they said during the 

2006 coup—yet, military junta chief Prayuth Chano-cha has said 

there will be no win-win situation following the coup and that citizens must temper their expectations. The military has one goal, 

though, which is to decrease the power of the Thai Rak Thai Party, 

whose followers are called the ‘‘Red Shirts.’’ Promulgating a new 

constitution to reduce the power of the political parties in the Parliament, just as it did in 2007, and further strengthening the role 

of military and monarchy is likely how the junta will accomplish 

this. Whichever way you cut it, Thailand’s democracy is in peril. 

The United States and Thailand have been allies since 1954 and 

friends for 180 years, but this latest coup raises a myriad of challenges for the alliance. Thailand serves as a regional operational 

platform for over 50 U.S. Government agencies, and acts as an anchor for a multitude of U.S. regional security initiatives. According 

to U.S. law, though, any country whose duly elected government is 

deposed by military coup is prohibited from receiving any direct 

foreign assistance until a new democratically elected government 

has taken office. 

The actions taken by the State Department immediately following the coup, which included suspending an estimated $10.5 

million in foreign assistance to Thailand for Fiscal Year 2014, and 

the Defense Department’s suspension of two bilateral military exercises and high-level official visits scheduled this month, were appropriate. However, there are estimations that this coup could last 

for up to 2 years. The administration’s actions thus far only impose 

penalties through September—the end of the 2014 Fiscal Year. 

Thailand’s military is a regular recipient of FMF and IMET assistance, totaling about $8 million for the past 3 years. But over 

the course of the last few decades, the U.S. has spent millions promoting good governance through democracy and rule of law activities in Thailand. With so much invested in training and empowVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:13 Sep 30, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AP\062414\88457 SHIRL
3

ering the Thai military, I have to question the effectiveness of this 

assistance and whether it has had any real impact on encouraging 

democratic values within the Thai military itself. 

I hope, Mr. Marciel, you can discuss the administration’s longterm plans regarding additional restrictions that may be put in 

place while the junta remains in power, and how the administration will reformat its aid programs in Thailand to support true 

democratic forces within the country. 

Finally, while I understand that imposing restrictions or suspending certain activities raises fears of damaging multilateral relations beyond Thailand, the U.S. must stand by its commitment 

to support the democratic values that millions of Thais support, 

versus the junta’s notion of a guided democracy that will weed out 

political party influence. The U.S. needs to act with prudence and 

measure, with acknowledgment that bilateral relations cannot proceed as they did only a couple months ago until free and fair elections allow the people of Thailand to duly elect their leaders. 

I think we all look forward to hearing from our witness this 

afternoon. I would now like to yield to Mr. Bera for his opening remarks for 5 minutes. 

Mr. BERA. Thank you, Chairman Chabot, for calling this important hearing and, obviously, a very timely hearing and thank you 

to Mr. Marciel for being here. 

For the past 6 years, Thailand has been a crucial ally and a longstanding friend. The Thais have been critical partners in carrying 

out many U.S. Government programs in a variety of areas such as 

health care, refugee assistance and defense cooperation. 

Nevertheless, I am concerned along with the chairman with 

Thailand’s political deadlock, the restriction of freedom of the press 

and assembly and the detention of political leaders and journalists. 

As the world’s greatest democracy, we must call on the Thai military to respect human rights and free speech and to refrain from 

the crackdown of press, protests and arrested people for free speech 

and political beliefs. 

Furthermore, the last decade has proven to be a particularly 

challenging one for Thailand as it has been embroiled in a great 

power struggle between the Red Shirts and the Yellow Shirts—two 

movements with clear fundamental socioeconomic differences. 

In 2006, the Prime Minister was accused of corruption and was 

deposed by a military coup. Since then, there have been sporadic 

outbreaks of violence from both sides of the political divide. 

In 2011, Thaksin’s sister, Yingluck, became Prime Minister of 

Thailand. Last November, thousands of anti-government protestors 

assembled in Bangkok to object to an amnesty bill that many believed would allow Thaksin to return from exile without facing corruption charges. 

Due to the mounting pressure from the opposition, Prime Minister Yingluck announced that elections were going to take place in 

February of this year but she stated that she would not step down 

from her position until the newly elected government could take office. 

Unfortunately, the February election results were found to be invalid due to the opposition’s boycotting of the polls. Prime Minister 

Yingluck remained in power until May 7th when the Thailand conVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:13 Sep 30, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AP\062414\88457 SHIRL
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stitutional court ousted her and several officials from office for 

abuse of power. 

On May 20th, martial law was implemented throughout Thailand and on May 22nd the military established Thailand’s interim 

government. As a result of Thailand’s military takeover, the U.S. 

suspended military training exercises and froze $10.5 million in 

foreign assistance. 

In late May, Army Commander Prayuth, the head of the National Council for Peace and Order, stated that he expected the interim government to be in charge for at least the next 14 months 

or until peace, order and reform is achieved. 

As one of our oldest geopolitical allies, I do hope that the Thai 

military moves quickly to hold free and fair elections so they can 

transition to a peaceful, democratic civilian-led government. 

I am also encouraged that Thailand revealed a three-phase roadmap last month which is a positive step toward bettering the lives 

of the Thai people and restoring democracy. 

Again, thank you, Chairman Chabot, for holding this important 

discussion where we have an opportunity to review our positions 

and policies on Thailand. I would like to again thank Ambassador 

Marciel for being here and I look forward to his testimony. I yield 

back. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. The gentleman from California, who is also the ranking member of the Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade Subcommittee, is recognized for 1 minute. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. Thailand has been our friend for a 

long time. I associate myself with the chair and the ranking member. It is a shame to see this division. The Shinawatra group might 

not be the one that I would support if I was a citizen of Thailand. 

I am not. We need to support democracy even if a majority of the 

people that we would interact with—the business class, the most 

educated, those in the capital—are wearing yellow shirts. 

It is not which group can put the most people on the streets in 

central Bangkok. It is which side can win elections. One hopes that 

some middle ground is found. 

I would like to go to Thailand and see orange shirts on everyone. 

But—and I think we should try to do what we can that is appropriate to facilitate that. But ultimately this is a case where we 

need to respect democracy, and I yield back. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. The gentleman yields back 

and I would now like to turn to the gentleman from California, Mr. 

Rohrabacher, who is the chairman of the Europe, Eurasia, and 

Emerging Threats Subcommittee. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. It seems like a lifetime ago I had spent some time in Vietnam in 1967. I wasn’t with 

the military but I was up with the Montagnards in the central 

highlands and I—when I left Vietnam I was very disillusioned by 

the hatred and the murder and the killing and the mayhem that 

I saw going on. 

And I went to Thailand on the way home and there were people 

who were smiling and they were happy people and they were an 

island of tranquility and goodness in the middle of bloodletting and 

despotism that was happening all around them. 

5

This was true. The stability and happiness and prosperity that 

Thailand has had over the years has always been such a blessing 

that we have all thought we have all rooted for that. And it is 

heartbreaking now for those of us who have always considered the 

Thai people to be brothers and sisters to see that island of happiness and stability and good will now turning into chaos and negative sentiments and vitriol. 

We would hope that the military does not make the wrong decision and stay too long. Perhaps they needed to—we’ll find out from 

our witness—whether or not they needed to go in in the first place. 

But the worst thing that can happen to Thailand now is if the 

military who came to stop all of this decides that they are going 

to stay and then systematizes and cements this negativity into 

their society. 

So we wish the Thai people success in recapturing the positive 

spirit they once had. Thank you very much. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. And I would now like to introduce our witness panel this afternoon. It is a witness panel of 

one and that is Mr. Scot Marciel, who has served as the Principal 

Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of East Asia and Pacific 

Affairs since August 2013. Previously, he was U.S. Ambassador to 

the Republic of Indonesia. Prior to that, Mr. Marciel served as Deputy Assistant Secretary, East Asia and Pacific Bureau, where he 

was responsible for relations with Southeast Asia and was Ambassador for ASEAN Affairs. He has been a career member of the Senior Foreign Service since 1985 during which time he has served in 

Vietnam, the Philippines, Hong Kong, Brazil and Turkey, as well 

as in the Economic Bureau’s Office of Monetary Affairs. Mr. 

Marciel grew up in Fremont, California. He is a graduate of the 

University of California at Davis and the Fletcher School of Law 

and Diplomacy. We welcome you here this afternoon. 

I am sure you are familiar with our 5-minute rule and we would 

suggest that since you are one you can expand a little bit but if 

you could keep it close to 5 minutes we would appreciate it. Thank 

you very much. You are recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE SCOT MARCIEL, PRINCIPAL 

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN 

AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. MARCIEL. Chairman Chabot, members of the subcommittee, 

thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss 

the recent coup in Thailand. 

Mr. Chairman, last year we celebrated 180 years of friendly relations with Thailand, one of our five treaty allies in Asia. We have 

enjoyed very close relations and U.S.-Thai cooperation on a wide 

range of issues has been a extremely good for a long time. 

Our militaries engage in bilateral and multilateral exercises that 

provide invaluable opportunities to develop relationships and increase coordination and cooperation. For many years, Thailand has 

also been an important partner on important humanitarian goals 

and priorities. 

We enjoy excellent cooperation on health, health research and 

many other issues. In addition, diplomatically Thailand has played 

6

a constructive role in the Asia Pacific region including as a member 

of ASEAN and APEC. 

The United States is both Thailand’s third largest trading partner, with more than $37 billion in two-way trade, and its third 

largest investor with more than $13 billion in cumulative foreign 

direct investment. 

Our Embassy in Bangkok is a regional hub for the U.S. Government and remains one of our largest missions in Asia. Very importantly, we also enjoy extremely close people-to-people ties with 

Thailand. So for all these reasons, we care deeply about our relationship and about the people of Thailand. 

For many years, we were pleased to see Thailand build prosperity and democracy, becoming in many ways a regional success 

story as well as a close partner. Over the past decade, however, 

Thailand has grappled with an internal political debate that has divided not only the political class but society as a whole. 

Describing this complex debate would take more time than we 

have today, but in the simplest terms it is between the supporters 

and opponents of former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, 

whose approach to politics and governance made him—gave him 

significant influence but also made him a polarizing figure. 

The debate also reflects deeper conflicts between segments of society based both on socioeconomic status and on geography and 

these divisions contributed to a coup in 2006 and again, unfortunately, last month. 

This latest coup came at the end of 6 months of intense political 

struggle between rival groups that included months-long demonstrations in the streets of Bangkok. Military leaders argued that 

the coup was necessary to prevent violence, end political paralysis 

and create the conditions for stronger democracy. 

Our position during the entire past decade of turbulence and specifically during the last 6 months of turmoil has been to avoid taking sides in Thailand’s internal political competition while stressing our support for democratic principles and for the bilateral relationship. 

Prior to the coup, we publicly and privately stated our opposition 

to a coup or other extra constitutional actions, stressing that the 

solution in a democracy is to let the people select their leaders 

through elections. 

We consistently communicated that message to Thai officials 

through our Ambassador, visits by senior officials and through 

military channels. When the coup nonetheless took place, we immediately criticized it. 

Beginning with Secretary Kerry’s statement on May 22, we have 

consistently called for the restoration of civilian rule, a return to 

democracy and full respect for human rights. 

We have told Thai officials that we understood their frustration 

with their longstanding political problems but also stressed that 

coups do not solve these problems but are themselves a step backwards. 

Recent events have shown that the current coup is both more repressive and likely to last longer than the previous one. The ruling 

military council has summoned, detained and intimidated hunVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:13 Sep 30, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AP\062414\88457 SHIRL
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dreds of political figures, academics, journalists, online commentators and peaceful protestors. 

It continues to censor the media and the Internet. The military 

government has said they will appoint an interim government by 

September and has laid out a vague time line for elections within 

approximately 15 months. 

Its stated intention is to reduce conflict and partisanship within 

society, thereby paving the way for a more harmonious political environment when civilians return to control. Frankly, we do not see 

how the coup and subsequent repressive actions will produce the 

political compromise and reconciliation that Thailand needs. 

Like most Thai, we want Thailand to live up to its democratic 

ideals, strengthen its democratic institutions and return to democratic governance. The coup and post-coup repression have made it 

impossible for us to proceed with a business as usual approach to 

Thailand. As required by law, we have suspended more than $4.7 

million of security-related assistance. 

In addition, we have cancelled high-level engagements, exercises 

and a number of training programs with the military and police. 

For example, we have halted a bilateral naval exercise that was 

under way when the coup occurred and cancelled an Army exercise 

scheduled for this month. 

We continue to review other programs and engagements and will 

consider further measures as circumstances warrant. At the same 

time, mindful of our long-term strategic interests, we remain committed to maintaining our enduring friendship with the Thai people and nation, including the military. 

The challenge we face is to make clear our support for a rapid 

return to democracy and human rights while also working to ensure we are able to maintain and strengthen this friendship and 

alliance over the long term. 

After democracy is restored, we fully hope and intend that Thailand will continue to be a crucial partner in Asia for many decades 

to come. 

Thank you for inviting me to testify. I look forward to trying to 

answer your questions. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Marciel follows:]

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Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. We appreciate your testimony here this afternoon and we will now have members ask questions and I will recognize myself for 5 minutes to ask the first 

question. 

Thailand’s second coup in a decade has demonstrated what 

seems to be a greater trend emerging in Southeast Asia. Democracy is hanging by a thread in Cambodia, Burma, and has regressed in Malaysia. It never really existed in Vietnam or Laos and 

it is in peril now in Thailand. In addition, efforts to establish a 

more effective democracy—as the Royal Thai Army is attempting 

under its latest coup—is setting a bad precedent and really sending 

the wrong message. My question is this: Is the administration concerned that the deterioration of the democratic process in Thailand 

is doing just that, sending a bad precedent for the region, particularly in Burma where the military has been reluctant to live up to 

its reform commitments? 

Mr. MARCIEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Certainly, promoting 

democracy and human rights is a key part of our foreign policy, of 

course, everywhere, and certainly in Southeast Asia. 

So we look at the coup in Thailand primarily bilaterally in the 

impact on Thailand itself. But you are right, also the negative example it sends—it sets for the region. 

I guess maybe I am slightly on the more optimistic side but I 

would note that in Southeast Asia over the last 10 to 20 years I 

think we have actually seen some significant progress, most notably, of course, in Indonesia, which is a free democracy and will 

have its elections very soon. The Philippines, in Burma, as you 

mentioned, there is a lot more—a lot of room to go. 

I think there has been some significant progress in recent years 

but, as I said, a huge amount of work still to be done and we would 

rather have positive examples. One other point I might highlight, 

Mr. Chairman, is that it was interesting to me to see the regional 

response to the coup in Thailand. 

I would argue that 10 years ago none of the neighbors in ASEAN 

would have said anything. But in this case, certainly Indonesia 

spoke out and others did as well, expressing concern and a hope 

for a return to normalcy and to stability and I think that is a positive sign in the region. 

I don’t want to exaggerate it but I think what we are seeing is 

that democracy is more the standard and things like coup are less 

acceptable even in the region than they used to be and I think that 

is a positive sign. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. Their military has been largely silent 

about the whereabouts of certain citizens that remain in detention. 

The National Council for Peace and Order, NCPO, claims it is only 

talking with citizens it detains to explain to them why the military 

took over. It also claims most people are detained for only a few 

hours while those with stronger political views are detained not 

more than 7 days. However, over the weekend the NCPO revealed 

that it has kept a Red Shirt activist, Ms. Kristuda, in detention for 

3 weeks to ‘‘help her mediate, restore consciousness and reconsider 

many things so that they can adjust her understanding.’’

Mr. Marciel, can you explain what this means and whether the 

detention of individuals without charges are in accordance with 

14

international human rights standards? And also even though we 

have not heard of any detainees being harmed or mistreated to 

date, at least that I am aware of, they were all required to sign 

documents saying that they were not harmed, intimidated, coerced, 

misled, tortured or forced to give or commit any inappropriate act 

before they were released? However, I might add, a number of people have said they were subject to intimidation and an aggressive 

interrogation and, before released, issued direct warnings. Don’t 

these actions betray the junta’s claims that it is not harming or intimidating targeted individuals and does the State Department 

have any idea how many people may still be detained against their 

will? 

Is it the administration’s plan to address this clamp down on 

fundamental freedoms by restricting certain engagement activities? 

So that is a lot to respond to but you have 38 seconds. 

Mr. MARCIEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

We are deeply troubled by the—by the military council’s actions. 

They are continuing to summon and detain and intimidate political 

figures, academics, journalists, peaceful protestors. 

We have publicly and in our private conversations with government authorities have emphasized that, you know, priority number 

one for us is to end this practice of detaining people. 

To be honest, our information is very similar to yours in terms 

of what is happening that we—though we haven’t seen evidence of 

physical mistreatment but certainly intimidation that is leading a 

lot of people to choose not to talk. 

This is a problem. I don’t know the particular case of Ms. 

Kristuda but we will certainly look into it but——

Mr. CHABOT. If you could look into that we would appreciate it. 

Mr. MARCIEL. Sure. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. My time has expired. The 

gentleman from California, Mr. Bera, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. BERA. Thank you, Chairman Chabot. 

A hundred and eighty years of friendship certainly makes Thailand one of our oldest and most reliable friends and, certainly, listening to my colleague from California, Mr. Rohrabacher, Thailand 

has in its past represented a bastion of stability and peace and certainly, Ambassador Marciel, you talked about the people-to-people 

ties. 

So, certainly, the strong relationship there. So it is a very important relationship to the United States and one that we would love 

to get back to as quickly as possible to the mutual benefit of both 

countries. 

Could you expand on why this relationship is so important to 

U.S. interests and what benefits we have seen from the relationship? 

Mr. MARCIEL. Thank you, Congressman. It is a good questions 

and I know Congressman Rohrabacher talked about being there, 

you know, some years ago when it was a bastion and, of course, 

the relationship goes back 180 years. The treaty relationship goes 

back to 1954. 

And we have, over the many years, built up extremely close relations and cooperation on a huge range of issues. Of course, we have 

15

the security alliance where we have worked together in many areas 

including the Vietnam War back in the ’60s and early ’70s. 

We worked very closely with Thailand for many years after the 

war and even since then, dealing with huge refugee outflows from 

neighboring countries. There are still about 140,000 refugees in 

Thailand. 

But on other areas we work—do great work doing health research together, working on disaster relief. I remember flying into 

Burma in 2008 from a Thai air force base with a Thai general to 

start the process of delivering relief supplies to the Burmese after 

the terrible cyclone that hit there. 

We have had Peace Corps there, thousands of Peace Corps volunteers and students. What we have had is we have built up a huge 

amount of trust over the years. The main—you know, the Thai are 

very proud and very nationalistic so they don’t surrender their sovereignty at all. 

But they have been willing to work with us to fix common problems without a lot of bureaucracy and so on, just a very practical, 

pragmatic opportunity, and it has also been, as we said earlier, become a huge center for our regional operations. 

We do a lot of our regional assistance out of there just because 

we have very good pragmatic cooperation on a wide range of issues. 

So it is a hugely valuable relationship to us. 

Mr. BERA. And, certainly, an important one for us to get back to. 

But as we have all pointed out, this has been a difficult decade for 

Thailand. You know, when we think about how we get back to 

some normalcy, what are some possible scenarios with regards to 

how long the military rule could last in Thailand and, you know, 

what are some things that we can do from our side in the U.S. that 

informs the junta’s decisions to move a little bit more swiftly toward conducting elections? 

Mr. MARCIEL. Well, the military leaders have talked about a 

rough time frame of 15 months. What we have said is that there 

is a couple of steps. First and foremost, we have urged them and 

continue to urge them every day to end the practice of detaining 

people and the censorship. 

So these sorts of things are things that could be done, we think, 

quickly—lift martial law—that would not bring about a return to 

democracy immediately but certainly change the environment significantly, and then we think they can move more rapidly to elections. 

They have talked about the need for reform. Pretty much every 

government in the world can benefit from some reforms as long as 

the process is inclusive and reflects the will of the people. 

So we will continue to urge them and many other countries are 

continuing to urge them to move more rapidly. It is, to be honest, 

very hard to predict, though, how long they are going to stay in 

power at this point. 

Mr. BERA. I have got two quick questions. One, knowing that this 

is tourist season and many Americans will, you know, often will go 

visit Thailand, are there any threats to U.S. citizens in this period 

at this juncture? 

Mr. MARCIEL. Congressman, this is something, of course, our 

Embassy and we monitor extremely closely. We haven’t seen 

16

threats. We haven’t seen things that are really dangerous. We did 

issue a travel notice just making people aware of the overall situation but not of specific threats, no. 

Mr. BERA. Okay. And just very briefly, the Thai junta has talked 

about this three-phase roadmap. Do you think you could describe, 

you know, in brief that three—those three phases for us? 

Mr. MARCIEL. Well, they have talked about, first, kind of a—I 

don’t remember the term they used but kind of a cooling off period 

to try to reduce the tensions and then a period of reform, which has 

been quite vague, to be very honest. 

We don’t know what types of reforms they are talking about, the 

interim government being established this September, which we—

you know, we don’t know much about what that would be. 

It wouldn’t be democratically elected, though. It would be appointed and then leading to elections roughly a year after that. But 

it is quite vague, to be honest. 

Mr. BERA. Okay. 

Mr. CHABOT. Gentleman’s time has expired. The gentleman from 

Pennsylvania is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. PERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Scot, for 

your testimony today. Just wondering how China has responded to 

the events, and with the luxury of hindsight if you can speak to 

how they responded or tried to influence Bangkok after the 2006 

coup. What were there successes? Are there any parallels currently? 

Mr. MARCIEL. It is a good question, Mr. Congressman. I would 

say that I don’t think there is any outside power that has undue 

influence in Thailand, including us or China. I mean, these political issues are being dealt with very much on an internal basis 

with Thai decisions. 

So I don’t think there is an outside hand, per se. I can’t really 

speak for the Chinese Government. I would assume, looking at 

what they are doing around the region, that they are doing all they 

can to build closer relations with all the countries and I would assume that goes for Thailand. 

It is a very close trading partner already and right on their border. I don’t know of anything significant after 2006, certainly as a 

result of the coup that—anything that changed. So, again, this is 

pretty much a domestic driven matter. Again, I am hesitant to 

speak on behalf of the Chinese Government where they are. But we 

are not seeing anything dramatic. 

Mr. PERRY. All right then. If they don’t move back to a representative government within some reasonable time, and I don’t know 

what the reasonable time frame and I have never visited but I am 

just trying to gauge through you the sentiment of the people, at 

what point have they had enough? 

Is there a concern—is there any propensity to civil war over this 

or are they going to be satisfied for a fairly long period of time? 

What is a reasonable period of time? Is the 14—I have read 14 

months somewhere as reasonable as the expectation people and is 

that acceptable? 

Mr. MARCIEL. It is a very good and difficult question, one that 

we are asking ourselves as well. My own view is that the Thai people have embraced democracy and while there was no doubt much 

17

frustration with the political paralysis and corruption and all these 

issues that people have been talking about for some time, my 

strong sense and our strong sense is the Thai people very much 

value their freedoms and their democracy. 

So I wouldn’t want to put a time on it but I would expect that 

the Thai people over time, if there is not movement toward a restoration of civil and political liberties and movement toward reasonable elections, that over time there will be more and more Thai 

people who will look for opportunities to express their unhappiness. 

Can’t really put a time frame on it but I do think the majority 

of Thai people have made clear they want democracy and, certainly, that is our view as well. 

Mr. PERRY. Is there any concern regarding U.S. policy toward 

other important issues such as the transition in Burma or 

ASEAN’s South China Sea diplomacy with China and human trafficking in the region? Is there any concern with those issues? 

Mr. MARCIEL. Well, Thailand is an important player on all of 

those issues. Certainly, we have had good cooperation with Thailand authorities in terms of support for the reforms in Burma. 

They are very active as—within ASEAN they are the dialogue 

partner at this time for China on South China Sea issues. So they 

play an important role. Certainly, on trafficking in persons we have 

a lot of work to do with the Thai in that area. 

It is a little bit early to know what is going to happen under this 

military council. What I can say is that political problems over the 

last decade have sometimes limited Thailand’s ability to be as active as it normally would. 

But the Foreign Ministry is a very professional group and they 

have actually, generally speaking, continued to be very active and 

constructive and we would hope that that will continue going forward. 

Mr. PERRY. All right. In the limited time I have, just as a narrative and maybe you can comment, it seems, you know, based on 

what I have read and what you have testified so far today is that 

this is the quintessential example of all politics is local. 

There is not much we could have done or should have done. 

There is not much we can do. It is going to play itself out and 

seems like at least for the United States interest at this point life 

in Thailand is going to continue on and our relationship is going 

to continue on and they are going to figure out where they want 

to be or not, and in the next period of time we are going to sit and 

observe. That is what I gather from this. 

Mr. MARCIEL. Mr. Congressman, I agree with you that, you 

know, most of the fixing of this problem really has to come from 

the Thai people themselves, like most other countries. 

We have and will continue to urge—and a lot of other countries 

around the world are doing the same—trying to urge them to move 

back toward democracy as quickly as possible. We have some small 

assistance programs that we hope to continue under notwithstanding provisions that would allow us to work in those areas as 

well. What I would say is that we will have to observe certain 

things. 

The relationship we want to maintain long term but meanwhile, 

until there is a return to elected government, we won’t be able to 

18

do business as usual. In other words, there are certain limitations 

and restrictions on the relationship until democracy is restored. 

Mr. PERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. The gentleman’s time has expired. The 

gentleman from California, Mr. Rohrabacher, is recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Again, for those of us who have—consider 

ourselves friends or even part of the family of—with the Thai people it is heartbreaking to see this slide from being a positive society 

into a society where there is such negativity and animosity that 

seems to be springing up among those people who I used to think 

of as the people with smiles. 

And according to your testimony, you are telling us that this negative transition is not caused by necessarily ideology and we know 

it is not caused by religious differences like we see in other countries where people start killing each other like in Northern Ireland 

and other places. 

But instead you are suggesting it is geography and partisanship, 

and that is very interesting that we have got forces at play that 

are bringing people to this—democratically-inclined people toward 

this negative situation. 

In Europe, when you have people who seem to be at conflict with 

one another that—and there doesn’t seem to be a major ideological 

split and that it seems more on personality and then, as you say, 

partisanship and geography, there is an organization called the 

OSCE that comes in, as they are now in Ukraine to try to help the 

people there come to an understanding of where they are at and 

how they might get the situation reversed and going in a positive 

direction. Is there no OSCE in the Asia Pacific area? 

Mr. MARCIEL. Mr. Congressman, no, there isn’t and, I mean, 

there is ASEAN, which, you know, as I mentioned has raised a few 

questions about this. But it is a very different organization than 

OSCE and the Thai before the coup did not seem at all receptive 

to the idea of outside parties. 

I think there were some high-level U.N. people who looked to see 

if they might be able to engage and help and there was a lot of 

push back from the Thai. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I would call on the military in Thailand now 

from—as advice from a friend that they call in outside people to try 

to—like you would do if you were having a dispute in your family 

you might want to call someone in to help counsel both sides in a 

positive way because—and the military is not capable of that type 

of reconciliation effort. 

The military knows how to handle violence and they know how 

to use force. They do not know how to make people solve problems 

and be conciliatory toward each other. So I would think that establishing some organization like that, like the OSCE, in Asia—Asian 

Pacific would be positive. 

Perhaps in this specific situation we should advise them. There 

must be other organizations that could come in and serve in this 

capacity. In the past, the king has had such a positive impact. Has 

the king’s influence now been diminished, that he is unable to use 

this to solve some of this chaos that is going on? 

19

Mr. MARCIEL. Thank you. First, I would—I would agree with you 

that, as I said in my testimony, we don’t see how this military, if 

you will, suppression of partisanship—while perhaps it feels good 

for the moment we don’t see how this solves the underlying problem and so that is part of our argument to the Thai military. 

In terms of who could play a role, there were some outside 

groups that were very quietly behind the scenes trying to encourage a dialogue and a deal before the coup. 

In terms of the king and the monarchy, he hasn’t been seen very 

much recently and hasn’t really spoken publicly to this issue. So 

it is a little bit hard for us to tell exactly, and given the tremendous sensitivities and reverence for the king in Thailand I wouldn’t 

want to speculate unnecessarily. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. He has helped before and he has stepped in 

in the past to help bring back more stability and a better atmosphere in his country and, again, send the military back to their job 

and taking them out of government. 

Let us just note the longer the military stays in the more likely 

it is that corruption and, yes, repression will emerge from that type 

of rule because you have—where you have control it does not mean 

that people will be any more honest unless or they would be more 

likely to do their job well. 

So let us hope that this—the message we send and we are sending to the military is let us move on back to democracy as soon as 

we can and be very serious about finding someone to help reconcile 

these personality and regional and geographic differences. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. The gentleman’s time has 

expired. We will go to a second round. Since we don’t have too 

many members it won’t be a very long round but I recognize myself 

for 5 minutes. 

Mr. Marciel, after the 2006 coup in Thailand, the administration 

then decided not to cancel the annual Cobra Gold joint military exercise. The current coup will last at least 15 months according to 

the junta leaders, therefore, continuing through the spring of 2015 

and into the fall. Since the Cobra Gold exercise takes place that 

spring, does the administration intend to suspend Thailand’s participation in the Cobra Gold military exercise and couldn’t its location be moved out of Thailand, for example, to Australia where we 

have rotational troops in Darwin? 

Mr. MARCIEL. It is a very good question, Mr. Chairman. The 

short answer is we haven’t made a decision on that yet. We are certainly looking at it and our ability to go forward with it in Thailand. As you mentioned, it is a hugely important exercise not only 

for Thailand and the United States but for the region. 

So it is something we are looking at. We have a little bit of time 

to work with and we will certainly be looking at it very closely. It 

will depend partly on what happens on the ground there. As to 

whether it would be something that could be moved, I would—if my 

military or DoD colleague were here I would defer to them. I would 

maybe take that question if I could. 

Mr. CHABOT. Sure. Yes, that is understandable and I would just 

make the point in following up you indicated you are not sure at 

this point whether we will or we won’t. But assuming that perhaps 

20

they come to the decision to move ahead with it, I would just make 

the point that in light of the repressive nature of the current coup 

and the restrictions that are imposed by our own law, I think an 

argument could be made that the U.S. cannot justify Thailand’s 

participation. Wouldn’t it send the message to other nations that, 

irrespective of whether a military or civilian government controls 

that particular country the U.S. will still engage with their military? 

I think it could, clearly, send the wrong message if we allowed 

them to participate in Cobra Gold and I would just pass that thinking along to the administration for their consideration. I assume 

you will make sure that happen, correct? 

Mr. MARCIEL. I will, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. Thank you very much. On Friday, the 

State Department released its 2014 Trafficking in Persons report, 

which downgraded Thailand from Tier 2 watch list to Tier 3 for its 

failure to appropriately fight human trafficking in the sex industry, 

in the seafood industry, and in the garment industry. Being designated to this black list with the likes of North Korea and Iran 

and Syria and Russia comes certain diplomatic and economic penalties in addition to the penalties dictated under law for the coup 

itself. Pursuant to the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, countries on Tier 3 are subject to certain restrictions on bilateral assistance such as nonhumanitarian and 

nontrade-related foreign assistance. These countries may also lose 

access to IMF and World Bank assistance, for example. Would you 

discuss what penalties could be imposed on Thailand for this downgrade in addition to restrictions being made in response to the coup 

itself? 

Mr. MARCIEL. Yes, Mr. Chairman. As you mentioned, Thailand 

was downgraded to Tier 3. Countries placed on Tier 3 on trafficking in persons could be subject to certain restrictions of nonhumanitarian, nontrade-related U.S. Government assistance and 

multilateral voting. 

These restrictions, if applied, would take effect at the start of 

Fiscal Year ’15. Humanitarian, trade-related and certain types of 

development assistance are not affected by these restrictions and 

the President may waive some or all of these restrictions if he determines that the affected assistance would ‘‘promote the purposes 

of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 or is otherwise in 

the national interest of the United States.’’

There has been no—since this decision to downgrade was just 

made we have not yet addressed that question of a possible waiver. 

Mr. CHABOT. Before I ask my final question—because my time is 

rapidly terminating here—I would just make a point that I think 

it is crazy how we do that all the time. We give all these restrictions and then we let the President waive them all if he says that 

would be against the best interests of the United States more or 

less. And so the restrictions are really not restrictions at all, and 

that is the way Congress does business, which I think is quite foolish. I will give myself 1 additional minute here so I can ask the 

final question. 

More recent attention has been given to human trafficking and 

especially in Thailand’s seafood industry. For example, Thai offiVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:13 Sep 30, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AP\062414\88457 SHIRL
21

cials are said to have been complicit in selling Rohingya Muslims, 

who are fleeing Burma, into servitude on fishing boats. In fact, personnel from the Thai Navy itself were implicated in these charges. 

Why is Thailand not doing more to address trafficking of these migrant workers and what is our administration doing to see that 

they do? 

Mr. MARCIEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We agree that one of 

the primary reasons that Thailand was downgraded was over concerns about the lack of action by the Thai Government to deal with 

the problem of trafficking in persons related to the seafood fishing 

industry. 

For several years now we and others in the international community have expressed concern about forced labor of foreign migrants 

in the Thai fishing and on-land seafood industries. 

This is something we talk to the Thai about continually. We did 

before the coup. We will continue to do after the coup. 

I would say overall that the Thai Government is more aware of 

the overall trafficking in persons problem than in the past and taking some steps but we think, given the scale of the problem, not 

doing enough and we are specifically asking them to focus on the 

seafood industry and will continue to do so. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much, and I will just conclude my 

question by making a point. I would like to reiterate what Mr. 

Rohrabacher said, that I think the United States has always 

viewed Thailand as a very strong ally, a wonderful country who is 

going through some tough times right now. And the criticism that 

might be heard in Thailand about their country is criticism directed at the instability in the government and, in some measure, 

the unhappiness with the junta and some of their restrictive behavior. Although it probably pales in comparison to some other countries who have been much harsher on their population. Nonetheless, we expect more from Thailand because they are such a wonderful country and we hope that they will in the very near future 

be in that category again. I think that concludes our testimony and 

we want to thank you very much, Mr. Marciel, for your testimony 

here this afternoon. I would ask unanimous consent that all members will have 5 legislative days to submit any questions in writing 

or to supplement their testimony. 

And if there is no further business to come before the committee, 

we are adjourned. 

Thank you very much. 

[Whereupon, at 3:38 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

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