NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as 

precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). 

2020 IL App (3d) 170764-U

Order filed August 13, 2020 

____________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

2020 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF )

ILLINOIS, ) 

 ) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) 

 ) 

MICHAEL J. KACZKOWSKI, ) 

 ) 

 Defendant-Appellant. ) 

Appeal from the Circuit Court

of the 12th Judicial Circuit, 

Will County, Illinois,

Appeal No. 3-17-0764 

Circuit No. 16-CF-781 

Honorable 

Daniel L. Kennedy, 

Judge, Presiding. 

____________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE McDADE delivered the judgment of the court.

 Justices Holdridge and O’Brien concurred in the judgment. 

____________________________________________________________________________

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The circuit court erred by denying defendant’s motion to suppress evidence 

because the traffic stop that led to the discovery of the controlled substance was 

not supported by reasonable suspicion or probable cause and the officer’s mistake 

of law was not objectively reasonable. 

¶ 2 Defendant, Michael J. Kaczkowski, appeals his conviction for unlawful possession of a 

controlled substance. Defendant argues the Will County circuit court erred by denying his 

motion to suppress evidence because the officer lacked reasonable suspicion or probable cause to 

stop defendant, and the officer’s mistake of law was not objectively reasonable. We vacate
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defendant’s conviction, reverse the denial of defendant’s motion to suppress evidence, and 

remand for further proceedings. 

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 The State charged defendant with unlawful possession of a controlled substance (720 

ILCS 570/401(c) (West 2016)). Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence, 

arguing that Bolingbrook Police Officer Patrick Kinsella lacked reasonable suspicion or probable 

cause to justify the stop of his vehicle. 

¶ 5 At the suppression hearing, Kinsella testified that he observed defendant turn into the farleft lane of Route 53. Defendant then activated his right turn signal and moved from the far-left 

lane to the far-right lane, traversing four lanes of traffic in a continuous motion. Defendant’s turn 

signal flashed for the duration of this maneuver. The far-right lane of Route 53 is an exit-only 

lane, becoming an on-ramp for Interstate 55. The exit-only lane does not offer drivers any 

alternate paths—all vehicles in the lane must continue onto the interstate. Kinsella stopped 

defendant for improperly signaling a lane change. According to Kinsella, defendant “did not 

travel a long enough distance within those second two [middle] lanes prior to exiting and that 

was the cause for the stop.” After issuing defendant a warning citation, Kinsella searched him, 

finding capsules containing a white powdery substance that later tested positive for heroin. 

¶ 6 Defense counsel played a dashcam video recording of the incident. The video recording

showed that once defendant turned onto Route 53, he braked, activated his right turn signal, 

continued in the far-left lane for approximately three seconds, and carefully moved across traffic 

into the far-right lane. Defendant’s right turn signal continued to flash until Kinsella initiated the 

stop. 

¶ 7 The court denied defendant’s motion to suppress evidence. 
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¶ 8 After a bench trial, the court found defendant guilty of unlawful possession of a 

controlled substance. The court sentenced defendant to 38 days in jail and 24 months’ probation. 

Defendant appeals.

¶ 9 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 10 Defendant argues the circuit court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence 

because Officer Kinsella lacked reasonable suspicion or probable cause to conduct the traffic 

stop. We agree. Kinsella did not have reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop defendant, 

and his mistake of law was objectively unreasonable. 

¶ 11 We review a circuit court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence under a two-part test. 

People v. Absher, 242 Ill. 2d 77, 82 (2011). “The circuit court’s factual findings are upheld 

unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence.” Id. We review de novo whether 

suppression is warranted. Id.

¶ 12 The fourth amendment’s reasonableness requirement applies to traffic stops; if an officer 

can “ ‘point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from 

those facts, reasonably warrant’ ” a stop, then the stop is reasonable. People v. Close, 238 Ill. 2d 

497, 505 (2010) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)). “The officer’s suspicion must 

amount to more than an inarticulate hunch,” but need not satisfy probable cause. Id. We utilize 

an objective standard to judge an officer’s conduct: “would the facts available to the officer at 

the moment of the seizure *** warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action 

taken was appropriate?” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-

22). 

¶ 13 Section 11-804 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Code), which governs vehicle turn signal 

usage, requires a driver to activate his turn signal at least 100 feet before executing a turn in a 
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business or residential district. 625 ILCS 5/11-804(b) (West 2016). According to section 11-804, 

a driver executes a turn by “enter[ing] a private road or driveway,” or by “otherwise turn[ing] a 

vehicle from a direct course.” Id. § 11-804(a). Under section 11-801, which lays out required 

vehicle positioning and turn methods, a driver executes a turn “at an intersection.” Id. § 11-

801(a). To comply with the statute, a driver need only activate his or her turn signal to indicate a 

lane change—the statute contains no signaling distance requirement where a driver simply 

changes lanes. See id. §§ 11-801, 11-804. 

¶ 14 The video recording established that defendant moved from the far-left lane, across two 

center lanes, into the far-right lane, which becomes an entrance ramp to Interstate 55. Before 

crossing these lanes, defendant activated his right turn signal, in compliance with section 11-

804(d), to indicate his intent to change lanes. Because defendant was not “turning within a 

business or residence district,” his signal did not need to flash for 100 feet before he departed the 

furthest left lane, or any of the subsequent lanes. Id. § 11-804(b). Therefore, defendant did not 

commit the turn signal violation Kinsella cited as the cause for the stop. 

¶ 15 The State argues that defendant subjected himself to the 100-foot signaling distance 

requirement of section 11-804(b) by executing a turn onto the on-ramp leading from Route 53 to 

Interstate 55. The State misconstrues the statutory definition of a turn. A driver executes a turn 

by diverting from a direct course. See id. §§ 11-801(a), 11-804(a). Where defendant’s maneuver 

occurred, the far-right lane of Route 53 functions as an exit-only lane. The exit-only lane 

becomes an on-ramp, ultimately merging with Interstate 55. All vehicles in the exit-only lane 

must continue onto the interstate. The lane does not allow drivers to divert from their interstatebound course. Absent this opportunity, drivers cannot execute a turn. Defendant’s maneuver 
5 

constituted a lane change, not a turn, so the 100-foot signaling distance requirement did not 

apply. 

¶ 16 The State also argues that if Kinsella misinterpreted section 11-804 of the Code, then his 

mistake was objectively reasonable. An officer’s objectively reasonable mistake of law does not 

violate the fourth amendment. People v. Gaytan, 2015 IL 116223, ¶ 45 (citing Heien v. North 

Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 60-61 (2014)). However, an officer commits an unreasonable mistake of 

law by misinterpreting an unambiguous statute. Id. 

¶ 17 Sections 11-801 and 11-804 of the Code are unambiguous. These sections define vehicle

turns as instances where a driver diverts from a direct course, such as where a driver “turn[s] at 

an intersection,” “turn[s] a vehicle to enter a private road or driveway,” or “otherwise turn[s] a 

vehicle from a direct course.” 625 ILCS 5/11-801(a), 11-804(a) (West 2016). Section 11-804(b) 

applies the 100-foot signaling distance requirement to turns made within business and residence 

districts. See id. § 11-804(b). Section 11-804(d) does not extend the signaling distance 

requirement to lane changes. See id. § 11-804(d). 

¶ 18 Kinsella misinterpreted an unambiguous statute, thereby committing an unreasonable 

mistake of law. See Gaytan, 2015 IL 116223, ¶ 45; see also United States v. Stanbridge, 813 

F.3d 1032, 1037-38 (7th Cir. 2016) (“[The officer] simply was wrong about what the provision 

required, yet ‘an officer can gain no Fourth Amendment advantage through a sloppy study of the 

law he is duty-bound to enforce.’ ” (quoting Heien, 574 U.S. at 67)). Due to Kinsella’s 

unreasonable mistake of law, the traffic stop at issue violated the fourth amendment, as it was not 

supported by reasonable suspicion or probable cause. The evidence seized pursuant to the stop 

should be suppressed. See People v. McCauley, 163 Ill. 2d 414, 448 (1994) (“When police 

conduct results in a violation of constitutional rights, evidence obtained as a result of that 
6 

violation *** is to be suppressed.” (citing New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14 (1990))). The circuit 

court erred by concluding otherwise. 

¶ 19 Defendant requests that we reverse his unlawful possession of a controlled substance 

conviction outright, arguing the State cannot sufficiently support a conviction absent the 

suppressed evidence. We decline defendant’s request. Instead, we vacate defendant’s conviction, 

reverse the circuit court’s ruling on his motion to suppress evidence, and remand for further 

proceedings. In doing so, we allow the State to decide whether to pursue the charge further. 

People v. Augusta, 2019 IL App (3d) 170309, ¶ 23. 

¶ 20 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 21 The judgment of the circuit court of Will County is vacated in part, reversed in part, and 

remanded for further proceedings.

¶ 22 Vacated in part and reversed in part. 

¶ 23 Cause remanded.