COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Chief Judge Felton, Ju dge Haley and Senior Judge Coleman

COLIN Q. CHAPPELL MEMORANDUM OPINION * v. Record No. 0890-07-1 PER CURIAM NOVEMBER 6, 2007 CITY OF NEWPORT NEWS DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NEWPORT NEWS H. Vincent Conway, Jr., Judge (Richard H. Lewis, Jr., on brief), for appellant. (Allen J. Jackson, Chief Deputy City Attorney; Robert E. Pealo, Assistant City Attorney; Warren F. Keeling, Guardian ad litem for the minor child, on brief), for appellee.
Colin Q. Chappell (father) appeal s the trial court’s order changing the goal of the foster care plan for his son from “retur n to parent/placement with relatives” to “adoption.” On appeal, father contends the evidence does not su pport the trial court’s decision. Upon revi ewing the record and briefs of the parties, we conclude that this app eal is without me rit. Accordingl y, we summarily affirm the decision of the trial cour t. Rule 5A:27. Background We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prev ailing party below and grant to it all reasonable inferences fa irly deducible therefrom. See Logan v. Fairfax County Dep’t of
Human Dev. , 13 Va. App. 123, 128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 462 (1991). On December 6, 2005, the Newport News Depart ment of Social Servi ces (DSS) received a report that the welfare of the chil d, who was then ten mo nths old, was endangered. DSS obtained

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opin ion is not designated for publication.- 2 - an emergency removal order on December 8, 2005 and removed the child from the care of its mother. Father’s whereabouts were unknown at the time. On February 6, 2006, DSS file d an initial foster care service plan with concu rrent goals of “return to home” and “relative pl acement.” The plan required father, among other things, to maintain employment and stable housing, undergo substance abuse treatment, attend anger management and parenting classes, undergo a pare nt/child assessment, remain alcohol and drug free, and cooperate with the provis ion of services. DSS offered services to fa ther, including family stabilization services through Project LINK, transpor tation assistance, coordination of visitation, and referrals for services su ch as parenting classes and substance abuse treatment. On December 20, 20 06, DSS filed a petition in the juvenile and domes tic relations district court (JDR court) for a permanency planning heari ng related to the child. The petition proposed to change the goal of the foster care plan from “return to pare nt/placement with relatives” to “adoption.” DSS had explored the goal of “rela tive placement” but was unable to find a relative who was an appropriate placement source. DSS requested the change to adoption because both parents had not complied with the initial foster care se rvice plan and had fa iled to maintain consistent contact with DSS. The JDR court approved the change in the goal, and both parents appealed to the trial court. In the trial court, Dr. Jennifer Gildea, wh o performed a parenting/psychological assessment on father, testified that father was at risk for continued substa nce abuse, and she recommended against returning the child to father’s care until he completed several services . DSS referred father to the recommended services, but after beginning the programs several times, father failed to complete substance abuse tr eatment and a parenting course. He al so tested positive for cocaine and marijuana use. Father has a crim inal history including convictions for grand larceny auto theft, assault and battery, and possession of marijuana.- 3 - Father completed an anger management course. However, father had infrequent visitation with the child after April 2006 and he last visited with the child seve n months prior to the trial court hearing. Father also failed to maintain contact with DSS or in volve himself in planning for the child. Father testified he is employed full-time and ma intains stable housing. He stated that his visitations with the child stoppe d only because he was arrested an d that he had unsuccessfully attempted to schedule visi tations with the child in recent mont hs. He acknowledged that he had failed to complete a substance a buse program, but he testified he wa s now ready to complete such a program and to do whatever he could to maintain hi s relationship with his son. The guardian ad litem for the child opined that it was in the best in terests of the child for the trial court to approve the goal of adoption, noting that the continued drug use of both parents was “problematic.” The child has resided in a foster home since December 8, 2005. He is in good health and is doing well. His older sister is in the same foster home. Father’s parental rights to three other children have been terminated. The trial court expressed concer n about father’s admitted mari juana use and law violations. Although the court stated that fath er’s marijuana use may be “correct able,” the court agreed with the guardian ad litem that the difficulty both parents had in abstaining from drug use was “problematic.” The trial court found father had failed to demons trate that he had substantially remedied the conditions that led to the child’s pl acement in foster care in December 2005, and it approved the foster care pl an goal of “adoption.”- 4 - Analysis Proof by a preponderance of th e evidence is the appropriate standard in a case involving the modification of foster care plans pursuant to Code § 16.1-282. Padilla v. Norfolk Div. of Soc.
Servs. , 22 Va. App. 643, 645, 47 2 S.E.2d 648, 649 (1996). “When addressing matters concerning a child . . . the paramount cons ideration of a trial court is the child’s best interests.” Logan , 13 Va. App. at 128, 409 S.E.2d at 463. “In matters of a child’s welfare, trial courts are vested with broad discretion in making the decisi ons necessary to guard and to foster a child’s best interests.” Farley v. Farley , 9 Va. App. 326, 328, 387 S.E.2d 794, 795 (1990). On appeal, we presume that the tr ial court “thoroughly weighed all the evidence, . . . and made its determination based on the child’s best interests.” Id. at 329, 387 S.E.2d at 796. Furthermore, “[ w]here, as here, the trial court heard the evidence ore tenus , its finding is entitled to great wei ght and will not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.” Martin v. Pittsylvania County Dep’t of Soc. Servs. , 3 Va. App. 15, 20, 348 S.E.2d 13, 16 (1986). Father contends that DSS made little effort to achieve the go al of reuniting him with the child. He also argu es he made substan tial efforts to achieve complian ce with the initia l foster care service plan and the trial cour t erred by changing the goal of the plan to “adoption.” The evidence showed that father was employ ed and had housing. He also completed the parenting/psychological evaluation and anger manage ment classes. However, father continued to use illegal drugs. Staying drug free was a si gnificant concern of the tr ial court and the parties involved in assessin g the family. Moreover, DSS had referred father to a substance abuse treatment program on several occasions, and he never completed the treatment. Father to ld Dr. Gildea that he planned to use marijuana unless a court required him to stop.- 5 - In addition, father failed to finish a parenting class and he failed to complete other services recommended by Dr. Gildea despit e being referred to the services by DSS. “The law does not require the division to force its services up on an unwilling or disintereste d parent.” Barkey v. Alexandria Dep’t of Soc. Servs. , 2 Va. App. 662, 670, 347 S.E.2d 188, 192 (1986). Father did not maintain regular visitation with the child, and he failed to sustain contact with DSS or involve himself in planning for the child. “‘[P]ast actions and relationships over a meani ngful period serve as good indicators of what the future may be expected to hold.’” Linkous v. Kingery , 10 Va. App. 45, 56 , 390 S.E.2d 188, 194 (1990) (quoting Frye v. Spotte , 4 Va. App. 530, 536, 359 S.E.2d 315, 319 (1987)). Furthermore, “[i]t is clearly not in the best inte rests of a child to spen d a lengthy period of ti me waiting to find out when, or even if, a parent will be capabl e of resuming his responsibilities.” Kaywood v. Halifax County Dep’t of Soc. Servs. , 10 Va. App. 535, 540, 394 S.E.2d 492, 495 ( 1990). The minor child has been in foster care for almost two years, th e majority of his life. Therefore, DSS proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, that changing the goal of the foster care service plan to “adoption” was in the best interests of the child. Acco rdingly, the trial court did not err by approving the foster care service plan with a goal of “adoption.” Affirmed.