alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
### §2801. Congressional findings

The Congress finds that—

(a) international expositions, when properly organized, financed, and executed, have a significant impact on the economic growth of the region surrounding the exposition and, under appropriate international sanction, are important instruments of national policy, particularly in the exchange of ideas and the demonstration of cultural achievements between peoples;

(b) in view of the widely varying circumstances under which international expositions have developed in the United States, the different degrees to which the Federal Government has assisted and participated in such expositions, and the increasing number of proposals for future expositions, the national interest requires that Federal action concerning such expositions be given orderly consideration; and

(c) such orderly consideration is best achieved by the development of uniform standards, criteria, and procedures to establish the conditions under which the Government hereafter will (A) recognize international expositions proposed to be held in the United States, and (B) take part in such expositions.

(Pub. L. 91–269, §1, May 27, 1970, 84 Stat. 271.)
###### Editorial Note on Part 70

#### Editorial Note:

Nomenclature changes to part 70 appear by T.D. ATF-450, 66 FR 29022-29030, May 29, 2001.

#### § 70.41 [Reserved]
494 P.2d 979

#### STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Arnold BARNES, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 802.

Court of Appeals of New Mexico.

Feb. 18, 1972.

Certiorari Denied Maxell 7, 1972.

Alan A. Norwood, Roswell, for defendant-appellant.

David L. Norvell, Atty. Gen., Thomas Patrick Whelan, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Santa Fe, for plaintiff-appellee.

OPINION

WOOD, Chief Judge.

Convicted of sexual assault, defendant appeals. Section 40A-9-9, N.M.S.A.1953 (Repl.Vol. 6). The contentions, and our answers, follow.

1. Three witnesses were too young to testify.

Two boys age 11 and one boy age 10 testified concerning the sexual assault. Defendant claims the boys were too young to testify. Each of the boys was asked as to his understanding that he was to tell the truth. Each replied affirmatively. Each then testified. No objection was made to their testimony. Whether the boys were competent to testify was a matter to be resolved by the trial court in the-exercise of its discretion. Their capacity to testify was not to be determined solely on the basis of their age. State v. Manlove, 79 N.M. 189, 441 P.2d 229 (Ct.App.1968).

2. The testimony of one witness was false.

The mother of two of the boys testified that her sons reported the incident to her; that she went to the scene of the incident with her sons; that the car the boys described was still at the scene; that the boys identified the man in the car as being the person who committed the sexual assault. The mother also testified that defendant “seems to be” the same person, but she couldn’t “say definitely.” (The boys positively identified defendant).

Defendant claims the mother’s testimony was false in that she testified that she did not see the defendant but had signed a *567•statement saying she had seen defendant passed out in the car. The falsity is in the ■ claim. There is nothing in the record indicating the mother signed any statement. Her testimony, outlined above, is that she did see the defendant; she got a “[p]retty good look.”

3. Court appointed counsel did not call •defendant’s witnesses to the stand.

Defendant testified in his own defense. No other defense witnesses were ■called. In the brief, counsel states he conferred with defendant concerning the testimony of two potential witnesses and advised defendant that the two potential witnesses would do more hami than good if they testified. “ * * * The decision to ■call or not to call a witness is a matter of trial tactics and strategy within the control of counsel. * * * ” Maimona v. State, 82 N.M. 281, 480 P.2d 171 (Ct.App.1971); see State v. Ramirez, 81 N.M. 150, 464 P.2d 569 (Ct.App.1970).

Defendant’s contentions being without merit, the judgment and sentence are affirmed.

It is so ordered.

HENDLEY and COWAN, JJ., concur.
Editorial Note on Part 416
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 416 appear at 68 FR 53509, Sept. 11, 2003.

§ 416.1448 Deciding a case without an oral hearing before an administrative law judge. ( a ) *Decision fully favorable.* If the evidence in the hearing record supports a finding in favor of you and all the parties on every issue, the administrative law judge may issue a hearing decision based on a preponderance of the evidence without holding an oral hearing. The notice of the decision will state that you have the right to an oral hearing and to examine the evidence on which the administrative law judge based the decision.
( b ) *Parties do not wish to appear.* ( 1 ) The administrative law judge may decide a case on the record and not conduct an oral hearing if— ( i ) You and all the parties indicate in writing that you do not wish to appear before the administrative law judge at an oral hearing; or
( ii ) You live outside the United States, you do not inform us that you wish to appear, and there are no other parties who wish to appear.
( 2 ) When an oral hearing is not held, the administrative law judge shall make a record of the material evidence. The record will include the applications, written statements, certificates, reports, affidavits, and other documents which were used in making the determination under review and any additional evidence you or any other party to the hearing present in writing. The decision of the administrative law judge must be based on this record.
( c ) *Case remanded for a revised determination.* ( 1 ) The administrative law judge may remand a case to the appropriate component of our office for a revised determination if there is reason to believe that the revised determination would be fully favorable to you. This could happen if the administrative law judge receives new and material evidence or if there is a change in the law that permits the favorable determination.
( 2 ) Unless you request the remand the administrative law judge shall notify you that your case has been remanded and tell you that if you object, you must notify him or her of your objections within 10 days of the date the case is remanded or we will assume that you agree to the remand. If you object to the remand, the administrative law judge will consider the objection and rule on it in writing.
[45 FR 52096, Aug. 5, 1980, as amended at 51 FR 307, Jan. 3, 1986; 73 FR 76945, Dec. 18, 2008; 75 FR 33169, June 11, 2010; 76 FR 65371, Oct. 21, 2011]
United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

No. 20-10428

Summary Calendar

Louis Fred Gonzales, 

Plaintiff—Appellant,

versus

Manuel Balderas, Captain; Coby Neil, Officer; Lupe Alaniz; 

Wally Hatch, District Attorney; NFN NLN, Police Chief of Plainview 

P.D.,

Defendants—Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 5:19-CV-275

Before Willett, Ho, and Duncan, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

Louis Fred Gonzales, most recently Texas prisoner # 2299668, 

appeals the district court’s dismissal with prejudice of his pro se 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983 civil rights complaint as frivolous and for failure to state a claim upon 

* Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this 

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited 

circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

May 4, 2021

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Case: 20-10428 Document: 00515847456 Page: 1 Date Filed: 05/04/2021
No. 20-10428

2

which relief may be granted. We review the dismissal de novo. See Geiger v. 

Jowers, 404 F.3d 371, 373 (5th Cir. 2005).

In his complaint, Gonzales claimed, on behalf of himself and many 

other listed plaintiffs, that he was subjected to acts of domestic terrorism 

often in the form of overheard conversations or other strange sounds that 

were somehow broadcasted to his vicinity. Gonzales lacks standing to assert 

the legal rights or interests of the third-party plaintiffs. See Warth v. Seldin, 

422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975). Also, because Gonzales’s allegations are 

delusional, the district court correctly dismissed his complaint as frivolous 

and for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See Ashcroft 

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 

(1992).

Because Gonzales fails to raise any issues of arguable merit, his appeal 

is DISMISSED as frivolous. See 5th Cir. R. 42.2; see also Howard v. 

King, 707 F.2d 215, 220 (5th Cir. 1983). This dismissal and the dismissal of 

Gonzales’s case in the district court each count as a strike for purposes of 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(g). See Adepegba v. Hammons, 103 F.3d 383, 388 (5th Cir. 

1996), abrogated on other grounds by Coleman v. Tollefson, 575 U.S. 532, 537

(2015). Gonzales is WARNED that, if he accumulates three strikes, he may 

not proceed in forma pauperis in any civil action or appeal filed while he is 

incarcerated or detained in any facility unless he is under imminent danger of 

serious physical injury. See § 1915(g).

Case: 20-10428 Document: 00515847456 Page: 2 Date Filed: 05/04/2021
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                                            5
<LEGEND>
     THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF ACORN HOLDING CORP. AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY
REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<CIK>                   0000737243
<NAME>                  ACORN HOLDING CORP.
<MULTIPLIER>                                   1
<CURRENCY>                                     U.S. DOLLARS

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                                 JAN-1-2000
<PERIOD-END>                                   JUN-30-2000
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                1
<CASH>                                         1,079,872
<SECURITIES>                                   200,669
<RECEIVABLES>                                  519,789
<ALLOWANCES>                                   0
<INVENTORY>                                    2,324,309
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               4,281,975
<PP&E>                                         2,105,734
<DEPRECIATION>                                 1,167,165
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 8,026,595
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          1,360,587
<BONDS>                                        0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          0
<PREFERRED>                                    0
<COMMON>                                       16,280
<OTHER-SE>                                     6,358,484
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   8,026,595
<SALES>                                        3,487,707
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               3,487,707
<CGS>                                          2,435,630
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  3,248,340
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                239,367
<INCOME-TAX>                                   43,087
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            167,778
<DISCONTINUED>                                 0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                0
<CHANGES>                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                   167,778
<EPS-BASIC>                                    .103
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  .103



</TABLE>
The Honorable Jimm Larry Hendren, United States District Judge for the

1

Western District of Arkansas.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 97-4218

___________

United States of America, *

*

 Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Western District of Arkansas.

Louis Ray Jones, * [UNPUBLISHED]

*

 Appellant. *

___________

 Submitted: July 1, 1998

 Filed: July 10, 1998

___________

Before BOWMAN, Chief Judge, HEANEY, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD,

Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Louis Ray Jones appeals from the 41-month sentence imposed on him by the

district court after he pleaded guilty to possessing stolen property, in violation of 18 1

U.S.C. §§ 922(j) and 2313 (1994). In a brief filed pursuant to Anders v. California,
-2-

386 U.S. 738 (1967), counsel argues that the district court abused its discretion in

imposing the sentence. We disagree and affirm. 

We conclude the argument advanced by counsel is unreviewable, because the

district court imposed a sentence within the applicable Guidelines imprisonment range

of 33 to 41 months, and Jones does not contend, nor does it appear, that the range was

improperly calculated or that the sentence was otherwise imposed in “violation of law.”

See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) (1994) (bases for appeal of sentence by defendant); United

States v. Woodrum, 959 F.2d 100, 101 (8th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (sentence not

reviewable merely because it is at top of properly calculated Guidelines range).

Pursuant to Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988), we have conducted a de

novo review for any non-frivolous issues, and have found none.

The judgment is affirmed.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

30

31

DAY

 25,317

 30,618

 21,236

 12,568

 15,928

 16,353

 12,301

 10,611

 8,705

 8,819

 8,003

 7,281

 9,263

 9,736

 7,661

 8,088

 8,260

 10,342

 15,354

 18,520

 14,158

 18,767

 18,691

 13,391

 11,242

 9,837

 10,620

 12,828

 14,553

 16,765

 19,682

 121,632

 139,601

 161,708

 173,797

 177,047

 183,326

 189,695

 191,896

 192,382

 191,033

 189,859

 187,969

 185,487

 185,013

 185,011

 183,039

 181,570

 180,339

 181,147

 186,676

 194,936

 198,639

 206,536

 213,966

 215,989

 215,869

 214,421

 213,789

 215,286

 218,347

 223,357

 302,643

 302,769

 304,294

 304,959

 303,383

 300,161

 294,888

 286,961

 10,774

 21,557

 32,499

 43,426

 54,002

 64,114

 73,486

 81,727

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION-CENTRAL VALLEY PROJECT-CALIFORNIA

DECEMBER 2001 SHASTA LAKE FLOOD CONTROL REQUIREMENTS RUN DATE: January 24, 2002

 146,949

 170,219

 182,944

 186,365

 192,975

 199,679

 201,996

 202,507

 201,087

 199,852

 197,862

 195,250

 194,750

 194,749

 192,672

 191,127

 189,830

 190,681

 196,501

 205,196

 209,094

 217,406

 225,227

 227,357

 227,231

 225,706

 225,041

 226,617

 229,839

 235,112

 243,039

 1,289,226

 1,278,443

 1,267,501

 1,256,574

 1,245,998

 1,235,886

 1,226,514

 1,218,273

 3,252,000

 3,252,000

 3,252,000

 3,252,000

 3,252,000

 3,252,000

 3,252,000

 3,252,000

 3,252,000

 3,252,000

 3,252,000

 3,252,000

 3,252,000

 3,252,000

 3,252,000

 3,252,000

 3,252,000

 3,252,000

 3,252,000

 3,252,000

 3,252,000

 3,252,000

 3,252,000

 3,263,000

 3,274,000

 3,284,000

 3,295,000

 3,306,000

 3,316,000

 3,325,000

 3,334,000

 0.0356

 0.0712

 0.1068

 0.1424

 0.1780

 0.2136

 0.2492

 0.2848

 SHASTA

INFLOW 

C. F. S. 

 PREV DAY

 F. C. PAR 

 (COL 3) 

 X .95 

 F. C. 

 PARAM 

 (COLS. 

 1 + 2 ) 

 .0356* 

 X DAYS 

 12/23 THRU

3/20 

 530,000

 MINUS 

 F. C. 

 PARAM

 (COL 3)

 COLS 

 4 X 5 

 F. C. 

 RESERV 

 (1,300,000 

 - COL 6 ) 

 MINUS 

 14,943 

 PER DAY

 AFTER 

 3/20 

 ADJUSTED

 F. C. 

 RESERV 

 (7-8) 

 PERM 

 STORAGE 

 COMMENTS:

 * LEAP YEAR CONSTANT = .0352 

 CONSTANT .0356 = 1,300,000 / (TOTAL DAYS X (530,000 - 110,000 ) )

 IF COL 3 IS GREATER THAN 530,000 OR LESS THAN 110,000 USE THOSE VALUES FOR COL 3 INSTEAD OF THE COMPUTED VALUE. 

 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 

 128,033
### §3315. Authorization of appropriations

In addition to funds otherwise available to carry out the provisions of this chapter, there are authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary of State for the fiscal year 1980 such funds as may be necessary to carry out such provisions. Such funds are authorized to remain available until expended.

(Pub. L. 96–8, §16, Apr. 10, 1979, 93 Stat. 21.)

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Effective Date

Section effective as of January 1, 1979, see section 18 of Pub. L. 96–8, set out as a note under section 3301 of this title.
§ 422.306 Report of overdue administrative debts to credit reporting agencies. ( a ) *Debts we will report.* We will report to credit reporting agencies all overdue administrative debts over $25. Some examples of administrative debts are as follows: debts for civil monetary penalties imposed under section 1140(b) of the Act, debts for unpaid fees for reimbursable services performed by SSA (e.g., disclosures of information), and contractor debts.
( b ) *Notice to debtor.* Before we report any administrative debt to a credit reporting agency, we will send the debtor written notice of the following: ( 1 ) We have determined that payment of the debt is overdue;
( 2 ) We will refer the debt to a credit reporting agency at the expiration of not less than 60 calendar days after the date of the notice unless, within that 60-day period, the debtor pays the full amount of the debt or takes either of the actions described in paragraphs (b)(6) or (b)(7) of this section;
( 3 ) The specific information we will provide to the credit reporting agency, including information that identifies the debtor (e.g., name, address, social security number, and employer identification number) and the amount, status, and history of the debt;
( 4 ) The debtor has the right to a complete explanation of the debt;
( 5 ) The debtor may dispute the accuracy of the information to be provided to the credit reporting agency;
( 6 ) The debtor may request a review of the debt by giving us evidence showing that he or she does not owe all or part of the amount of the debt or that we do not have the right to collect it; and
( 7 ) The debtor may request an installment payment plan.
[62 FR 64278, Dec. 5, 1997, as amended at 71 FR 38070, July 5, 2006]
<PAGE>

                                                                    Exhibit 32.2

                                  CERTIFICATION

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Cellcom I Corp. on Form 10-QSB for
the period ending June 30, 2004 as filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, David A. Obal, Chief Financial
Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant
to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

     1. The Report complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.


Date: March 16, 2007                    By: /s/ David A. Obal
                                            ------------------------------------
                                            David A. Obal
                                            Chief Financial Officer


                                       18
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

NANCY MARIE HAAS,

Petitioner

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 314 MAL 2017

Petition for Allowance of Appeal from 

the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 10th day of October, 2017, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal

is DENIED.
(March 24, 1948.)

#### Holy Sepulchre Cemetery, Appellant, v. Town of Greece, Respondent.

Order affirmed, with $10 costs and disbursements, upon the opinion of Gilbert, J., delivered at Special Term. All concur; Larkin, J., not voting. (The order denies plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, and dismisses the causes of action in the complaint numbered one to five, inclusive, in an action for a declaratory judgment determining that the town of Greece is without power to restrict plaintiff from using its lands for cemetery purposes.) Present — Taylor, P. J., Larkin, Love, Vaughan and Kimball, JJ. [191 Mise. 241.]
#### § 668.710 What planning documents must an INA grantee submit?

Each grantee receiving funds under WIA section 166 must submit to DINAP a comprehensive services plan and a projection of participant services and expenditures covering the two-year planning cycle. We will, in consultation with the Native American Advisory Council, issue budget and planning instructions which grantees must use when preparing their plan.
#### In the Matter of Banner Mfg. Co., Inc., Appellant. Roadlin Realties, Inc., Respondent.

(Appeal No. 1.)

In a proceeding by the tenant (appellant) to have the court fix the reasonable rent of commercial space under section 2 of the Commercial Rent Law (L. 1945, eh. 3, § 2, subd. [e], as amd.), where it appears that the premises were unoccupied on the freeze date, and that the parties in October, 1946, entered into written agreements fixing the said rent “on the basis of the rent charged for the most nearly comparable commercial space in the same business section ”, order denying appellant’s application and granting respondent’s cross motion to dismiss the petition, unanimously affirmed, with $10 costs and disbursements. The agreements indicate that there was satisfactory recognition of the statutory elements in fixing the agreed rent; and there is nothing in the petition which warrants interference with the agreements. Present — Lewis, P. J., Carswell, Johnston, Adel and Sneed, JJ.
State of New York

Supreme Court, Appellate Division

Third Judicial Department

Decided and Entered: February 5, 2015 105576 

________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF

NEW YORK, 

Respondent, 

v MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

TRACY G. VIERRA, 

Appellant.

________________________________

Calendar Date: December 2, 2014

Before: Lahtinen, J.P., McCarthy, Rose and Egan Jr., JJ.

__________

Jon Kosich, Greenville, for appellant, and appellant

pro se. 

D. Holly Carnright, District Attorney, Kingston (Joan

Gudesblatt Lamb of counsel), for respondent.

__________

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Ulster County

(Williams, J.), rendered November 9, 2012, convicting defendant

upon his plea of guilty of the crime of criminal possession of a

weapon in the second degree. 

In satisfaction of an eight-count indictment, defendant

pleaded guilty to criminal possession of a weapon in the second

degree and was sentenced in accordance with the plea agreement to

a prison term of seven years, followed by five years of

postrelease supervision. Defendant appeals. 

Defense counsel seeks to be relieved of his assignment as

counsel for defendant on the ground that there are no

nonfrivolous issues to be raised on appeal. Upon our review of

the record, defense counsel's brief and defendant's pro se
-2- 105576 

submissions, we agree. Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed and

counsel's application for leave to withdraw is granted (see

People v Cruwys, 113 AD2d 979, 980 [1985], lv denied 67 NY2d 650

[1986]; see generally People v Stokes, 95 NY2d 633 [2001]).

Lahtinen, J.P., McCarthy, Rose and Egan Jr., JJ., concur.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, and application to

be relieved of assignment granted. 

ENTER:

Robert D. Mayberger

Clerk of the Court