NISTIR 8150

Government Data De-Identification 

Stakeholder’s Meeting

June 29, 2016

Meeting Report

Simson L. Garfinkel

This publication is available free of charge from:

http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.8150

 
NISTIR 8150

Government Data De-Identification 

Stakeholder’s Meeting 

June 29, 2016 

Meeting Report

Simson L. Garfinkel

Information Access Division

Information Technology Laboratory

This publication is available free of charge from:

http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.8150

September 2016

U.S. Department of Commerce

Penny Pritzker, Secretary

National Institute of Standards and Technology 

Willie May, Under Secretary of Commerce for Standards and Technology and Director
i

National Institute of Standards and Technology Internal Report 8150

9 pages (September 2016) 

This publication is available free of charge from:

http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.8150

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National Institute of Standards and Technology

Attn: Computer Security Division, Information Technology Laboratory

100 Bureau Drive (Mail Stop 8930) Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8930

Reports on Computer Systems Technology

The Information Technology Laboratory (ITL) at the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 

promotes the U.S. economy and public welfare by providing technical leadership for the Nation’s measurement 

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physical standards and guidelines for the cost-effective security and privacy of other than national securityrelated information in Federal information systems.

Abstract

The first Government Data De-Identification Stakeholder’s Meeting was held at the National Institute of 

Standards and Technology on June 29, 2016. This meeting featured 80 participants from 67 different 

government agencies. Following the keynote, five panels discussed agency case studies, agency needs, 

available solutions, governance, and evaluation of de-identification techniques. Eighteen presenters from 

eleven agencies spoke for 10-minutes each. After each speaker's presentation, audience members asked 

questions and elaborated on points that the speakers made. Overall, it was the sense of the attendees that 

there is a need for collaboration and the sharing of techniques for the de-identification of government data.

Keywords

De-identification; HIPAA Privacy Rule; k-anonymity; differential privacy; re-identification; privacy

Audience

This document is intended for use by employees of the US government, advocacy groups, researchers and 

other members of communities that are concerned with technical issues involving the removal of personal 

information from government datasets so the datasets can be released to the general public.

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1 

Government Data De-Identification Stakeholder’s Meeting 

June 29, 2016. 

National Institute of Standards and Technology

Heritage Room, 101 Bureau Drive, Gaithersburg, MD

MEETING REPORT 

1 

Executive Summary

The first Government Data De-Identification Stakeholder’s Meeting was held at the National Institute of 

Standards and Technology (NIST) on June 29, 2016. This government-only meeting featured 80 participants 

from 67 different government agencies. 

The meeting opened with an inspirational charge regarding the government-wide importance of deidentification techniques by Marc Groman, Chair of the Federal Privacy Council and Senior Advisor for 

Privacy at the Office of Management and Budget. Dr. Ron Jarmin, Assistant Director for Research and 

Methodology, Census Bureau, followed with a keynote presentation that explored the need to quantify the 

balance between data quality and the potential harm to individuals that results from the application of deidentification techniques.

Following the keynote, five panels discussed agency case studies, agency needs, available solutions, 

governance, and evaluation of de-identification techniques. Eighteen presenters from eleven different 

agencies spoke for 10 min each. After each speaker's presentation, audience members asked questions and 

elaborated on points that the speakers made. The audience was engaged and many important issues were 

raised; roughly 2.5 h of the 7-h program was devoted to audience participants.

Meeting attendees stressed the need for clear technical guidance for de-identification, the need for metrics, 

the lack of tools, and the lack of trained individuals. Several attendees expressed interest in helping NIST to 

evaluate de-identification technologies. 

1 Background 

President Obama’s executive order “Making Open and Machine Readable the New Default for Government 

Information” 2 and its implementation in OMB Memorandum M-13-133 charges US Government agencies 

with making government information resources publicly available whenever possible and legally permissible 

while simultaneously safeguarding “individual privacy, confidentiality, and national security.” 

 

1 The NIST Government Data De-Identification Stakeholder’s Meeting was funded by a NIST Building the 

Future proposal by Simson Garfinkel, Sean Brooks, Naomi Lefkovitz and Mary Theofanos. Erin Kenneally

(DHS) and Christa Jones (Census) assisted in planning and co-chaired the meeting. This report was prepared 

by Simson L. Garfinkel and Julie Ryan, with Julie Haney assisting with the creation and the administration of 

the attendee survey.

2 “Executive Order—Making Open and Machine Readable the New Default for Government Information,” 

Barak Obama, The White House, May 9, 2013. https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2013/05/09/executive-order-making-open-and-machine-readable-new-default-government- 3 “Open Data Policy—Managing Information as an Asset,” Sylvia M. Burwell, OMB M-13-13, May 9, 2013. 

https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/memoranda/2013/m-13-13.pdf

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Many government information resources contain personal data about private citizens. Consistent with both 

the open data policy and with the Privacy Act of 1974 (5 USC §552a), these data about individuals should not 

be made publicly available as part of an open data offering. Instead, personal data4 should be removed from 

the government information resources prior to publication, a process known as de-identification.5 

De-identification is an approach for removing personal identifying information from a dataset with the goal 

of making it difficult, if not impossible, to re-identify the data by linking the released data with specific 

identities. Because of the growing desire for access to data for a variety of purposes, such as program 

management, social science research and evidence-based policymaking, software tools are being developed 

and marketed to support the de-identification of datasets. 

Some federal agencies, such as the Census Bureau and the Department of Education, have decades of 

experience in de-identification. Other agencies are relatively inexperienced. Some agencies have created 

detailed processes for vetting de-identified information prior to release to assure that it cannot be reidentified. Others are only now beginning to address the issue. 

Thus, the meeting had multiple purposes, including: 

• Create a neutral forum to discuss and share de-identification methodologies and approaches between 

the federal statistical agencies, federal agencies involved in statistics,6 and non-statistical agencies.

• Allow the Census Bureau to share some of its best practices regarding de-identification with nonstatistical agencies. 

• Assess US Government (USG) community needs.

• Discuss data release models that can meet USG needs and requirements. 

2 Meeting Contents

The meeting consisted of two introductory speeches, a keynote, and five panels consisting of short (10 min) 

talks followed by audience discussion.

2.1 Overview

The meeting began with a welcome from Charles Romine, Director of the Information Technology 

Laboratory, NIST. Dr. Romine spoke of NIST’s goal of using measurement science to improve our 

understanding of privacy and our government’s commitment to privacy protection. He stressed that data deidentification is an important privacy protection tool, but that we need a better understanding of how deidentification works and its limitations. 

Marc Groman, Senior Adviser for Privacy at the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and Chair of the 

Federal Privacy Council, followed Dr. Romine with an inspirational charge to the meeting attendees. Mr. 

Groman said that his goal has been to change the perception of privacy within the US government from a 

compliance issue to an issue of risk-based analysis. Instead of having government leaders say that they cannot 

 

4 Personal data includes any information that can be used to identify an individual, including personal names, 

addresses that can be tied to an individual, email addresses, identifying numbers, salaries, and other kinds of 

data. 

5 In Europe, the phrase anonymization is frequently used as synonym for de-identification. 6 There are 89 federal agencies that have annual budgets of at least $500,000 for statistical activities. 

https://fedstats.sites.usa.gov/

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proceed on programs because of privacy concerns, he wants them to perform a privacy analysis and to either 

decrease the privacy risk of a program, or to acknowledge and “own” the privacy risk. With regards to deidentification, Groman said that the Nation sometimes faces contradicting needs of privacy protections, 

research, and transparency in an era of increasing amounts of data being collected and used. He said that the 

topic of de-identification comes up on a weekly basis in high-level meetings. He stressed that the government 

needs to break out of the mold of classifying data as being personally identifiable information (PII) or not, 

and that instead that government officials need to be able to evaluate the potential risks that might result 

from a data release and the specific techniques that could be used to mitigate those risks. Decision makers 

then need to be able to weigh the societal benefit that might result from a data release against the residual risk 

to individuals after a de-identification has taken place. Finally, agency officials need to accept the residual risk 

after mitigation has taken place. Groman said that agency officials should not cite privacy concerns as a 

reason not to move forward on a project. Instead, he said, officials need to learn how to pursue their goals 

while protecting privacy, or else make the argument that their goals are worth the privacy risk. Groman 

stressed that approaches to dealing with privacy-related issues must be based on an analysis of the sensitivity 

of datasets from multiple perspectives and that the answers needed to come from science. Closing his 

remarks, he invited all attendees to join OMB’s PRIVACY-COUNCIL mailing list78. 

Ron Jarmin, Assistant Director for Research and Methodology for the Census Bureau, spoke next about the 

problems and challenges facing the Federal Government with regards to de-identification. Dr. Jarmin 

introduced the concept of a privacy-loss budget as a way to understand how to think about the tensions 

between the quality of data and the privacy issues. This theme was repeated throughout the meeting: if the 

datasets are de-identified so thoroughly as to preclude any potential re-identification, the dataset may be 

functionally useless or using it for analysis may lead to misleading or wrong conclusions. The calculation of 

probability of re-identification (the re-identification risk) can be used to characterize a privacy-loss budget across 

a span of projects, which reflects policy decisions on how best to allocate resources and support the goals of 

de-identification. The policy decisions can be made from several different perspectives, depending on who 

owns the data. Commercial structures, such as paying for privacy, provide one such structure, while social 

norms or values, such as requiring seatbelts in cars, may provide another such structure. 

The rest of the meeting featured a series of moderated panels focusing on different aspects of the deidentification problem space. These panels were:

• Agency Case Studies, featuring speakers from the Census Bureau, the Consumer Financial Protection 

Bureau, the National Institutes of Health, and the Department of Transportation;

• Understanding the Problem Space: Agency Needs, featuring speakers from NIST, the Census 

Bureau, and the Department of Veteran Affairs;

• Solutions Available Today and Gap Analysis, featuring speakers from the Department of Homeland 

Security, the Census Bureau, and the Federal Trade Commission;

• Governance, featuring speakers from the Department of Education, the Millennium Challenge 

Corporation, and the Agency for International Development; and

 

7 For information about the Privacy Council, please see 

https://community.max.gov/display/Egov/CIO+Council+Privacy+Community+of+Practice

8 Note: The Privacy Council’s new web presence, https://privacy.org/, should be operational before the end 

of fiscal year 2016.

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• Evaluating De-Identification, featuring speakers from the Department of Veteran Affairs, Health and 

Human Services, the Census Bureau, and NIST.

After introductory remarks by the panel speakers, the moderator engaged the speakers and the audience 

members in an exploration of the panel topic. Audience participation was active, not only during the formal 

sessions, but also during the breaks. 

The meeting concluded with remarks from Simson Garfinkel from the NIST Information Access Division, 

with an invitation to join the government de-identification practice mailing list. 

2.2 Data types

Panelists and attendees discussed the range of data that are currently being de-identified by federal agencies: 

• Tabular data is the dominant format of data published by the Census Bureau. This information is 

published in summary statistical tables, in some sets containing microdata, as synthetic data created 

from microdata, and through a query interface. Census makes some data generally available, while 

other data are only made available to qualified researchers through a series of Census-approved 

research centers.

• Textual narratives consisting of consumer complaints are distributed by the Consumer Financial 

Protect Bureau (CFPB). With textual narratives, the challenge is to remove identifying names and 

other proper nouns without damaging the meaning of the document.

• Geographic information, such as map coordinates or street addresses, routinely appear in tabular 

data. Street addresses are not considered private when used to refer to buildings, but they are 

considered private if they are used to refer to individuals.

• Geographic trip information is a sequence of geographic information, sometimes with timestamps. 

Trip information made available to researchers by the Department of Transportation is challenging 

because some locations are highly identifying while others are not. DOT resolves this issue by not 

providing trip starts and stops. 

• Video that can contain public or private information. A speaker from DOT discussed the challenge 

in making video available to researchers in a way that would obscure the identity of the subject while 

preserving information of interest, such as direction of a person’s gaze, their expression, and other 

information. DOT contractors have developed software that replaces the human’s face with a mask 

made from another person’s image. This mask hides identity while preserving facial expression and 

the eye direction. 

Although the Federal Committee on Statistical Methodology has issued guidance to Statistical Disclosure 

Limitation,9 that technique is limited to the protection of personal information in tabular and microdata files. 

No similar guidance exists for these other modalities. Furthermore, some participants expressed concern that 

traditional statistical disclosure limitation techniques offer less protection in a world where large amounts of 

data are available for correlation with officially released datasets. For example, two speakers from the Census 

Bureau were looking to adopt new disclosure limitation techniques that offered formal privacy guarantees. 

 

9 Report on Statistical Disclosure Limitation Methodology (Revised 2005), 1994, Federal Committee on 

Statistical Methodology. https://fcsm.sites.usa.gov/files/2014/04/spwp22.pdf

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2.3 Inconsistent practices regarding de-identified data within the Federal Government

Statements by speakers and attendees indicated that there are many different practices regarding the use of 

de-identification and the distribution of de-identified data within the Federal Government.

• While some agencies have adopted formal disclosure review boards, many have not.

• Different approaches are being used to calculate re-identification risk. 

• While the Census Bureau attempts to gauge the effectiveness of de-identification through attempted 

re-identification, this approach does not seem to be commonly employed in the other federal 

agencies.

• There is a lack of guidance regarding the appropriate time horizon for the protection of deidentification: should de-identified data be warranted to be de-identified indefinitely, or should the 

de-identification determination be revisited within a certain time window, to assess whether the risk 

has changed? Is it acceptable for the data to be identifiable after a certain amount of time? Current 

policies seem to indicate that de-identified data should remain de-identified forever, even though it 

may not be necessary to do so.

• More generally, threat models for re-identification and improper data use are frequently not 

articulated as part of the data release. They may not be documented by the releasing agency.

2.4 Synthetic Data

An alternative to de-identification is the releasing of synthetic datasets that are similar to the original data but 

which are inherently privacy-protecting.

Several speakers from the Census Bureau stated that the Bureau is increasing the use of synthetic data as a 

tool for protecting privacy while still releasing information that can be broadly used by many constituencies. 

None of the data elements in a synthetic dataset map to actual humans, but the statistics performed on the 

synthetic data approximate the same statistics applied to the real data. Synthetic data offers strong privacy 

guarantees, but significant research on synthetic data generation and validation is required to make these 

methods generally usable within the federal government.

• Many attendees were unfamiliar with techniques such as field swapping, noise introduction, and the 

creation of synthetic data to satisfy a public release requirement.

• Those attendees who were familiar with the term “synthetic data” used the term inconsistently. Some 

used it to imply any process of noise addition or field swapping, while others used it to imply that 

there was no one-to-one mapping between individuals in the original dataset and the published 

dataset.

• There was a general discomfort expressed by many of the attendees regarding the distribution and 

use of synthetic data.

2.5 Research and Technology Challenges

The discussion of de-identification research and technology challenges identified several themes that have 

been underrepresented in the existing research literature. These include:

• Many techniques do not adequately protect against the problem of self-recognition — an individual 

recognizing their own data in a dataset. Many attendees felt that self-recognition was a harm that 

needed to be protected against, but many academic researchers do not recognize self-recognition as a 

disclosure harm. 

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• Natural language processing is an important part of de-identification, since many datasets contain 

free-format text. However, the de-identification tools that can perform natural language processing 

that were discussed only handle English text. This is a problem, because what needs to be deidentified comes in many human languages.

• Longitudinal datasets with successive data releases are significantly harder to de-identify reliably, 

because there are more data points for each user that can be used to re-identify an individual.

• There needs to be more clarification on remediation strategies. For example, Federal agencies have

“pulled-back” data that was improperly de-identified. Are there strategies (beyond counting 

downloads) for monitoring use of the data that were improperly released? Can data be or somehow 

watermarked so that provenance can be proven in downstream data products?

• Linkage attacks rely on finding data available for correlation with the released de-identified data. 

“High risk features” are those that may be found in many places are publicly available, while “low 

risk features” are those that may be comparatively private. However, several attendees expressed 

concern that there was no clear way to determine if a feature is high risk or low risk, or how to detect 

if a low risk feature transitioned to a high-risk feature because of an external data release. Several 

suggested that de-identified data should have a “use-by” date, after which the de-identification would 

need to be re-certified.

• In addition to the link risk and inference attacks in which other sources of available data are used to 

re-identify de-identified data, there is a related risk that the release of seemingly benign data can 

be combined to create derived data that is deemed sensitive.

• There is a need for implementation of reusable frameworks/models that take a risk-based 

approach to the balance between re-identification risk and data quality, the application of various 

technical and policy techniques for de-identification, and that offer a consistent way to articulate 

residual risk and utility resulting from the application of de-identification approaches.

2.6 Agency Challenges

Several attendees from different agencies noted that it was difficult to hire individuals with an expertise in deidentification, mirroring the problems that the government has had hiring in information security, privacy, 

and data analytics. Specific workforce issues noted by speakers and attendees included:

• Several speakers noted the difficulty of bridging concepts between technologists and policy 

specialists. 

• Several speakers were concerned about the growing amount of data that needs to be de-identified 

and the relative lack of expertise within their organizations to perform de-identification. This is 

especially troublesome because every dataset must be individually evaluated—information that is not 

identifying in one dataset may be identifying in another. 

• Organizations are looking for simple, rule-based approaches for de-identification, similar to the Safe 

Harbor provision of the Heath Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy Rule. 

However, the Safe Harbor provision has an “actual knowledge” clause that requires the exercise of 

judgement in the face of context-specific notice of certain risk factors before rendering an opinion 

on de-identification. 

These workforce challenges are having profound impact on agencies that are increasingly relying on deidentification. For example, many de-identification efforts consider the risk of re-identification, but they do 

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not consider the potential harms to the individual that would result from a successful re-identification. Absent 

such consideration, agencies may make inappropriate decisions based on misconception about true risk levels.

2.7 Governance

There appears to be little understanding of governance approaches within the Federal Government that could 

be used to exploit de-identification while minimizing the risk from the release of improperly de-identified 

data.

• Different federal organizations have created different governance structures for de-identification and 

data release. These tasks can be owned by a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) office, a Privacy 

Office, or a specially created Data Release Board or Disclosure Review board (DRB). 

• Speakers from organizations that had adopted DRBs expressed confidence in their boards and in the 

procedures that had been created.

• It is useful for a DRB to have a charter, broad participation from throughout the organization, and 

the support of senior management.

• It is unclear where the liability exists if data that are properly de-identified are later re-identified 

through some kind of inference attack. 

• Federal organizations may inadvertently release data that they deem to be “low-risk” but which 

provides linkage information allowing other datasets to be re-identified.

3 Opportunities for future work 

Following the meeting, NIST created “Government Data De-Identification Collaboration Forum” on 

MAX.GOV that contains the workshop proceedings, relevant publications, and a page of events and notices 

for the Government De-Identification Community. This virtual collaboration space is located at 

https://community.max.gov/x/IYTSPw. Included in the meeting proceedings are the speaker biographies 

and presentation materials.

Potential next steps for researchers and practitioners in this area include:

• Propose a common terminology and taxonomy for de-identification. 

• Align de-identification risk assessment with NIST SP800-30, “Guide for Conducting Risk 

Assessments,” and the forthcoming NISTIR 8062, “Privacy Risk Management for Federal 

Information Systems.”

• Formalize and socialize data release models that are workable within the Federal Government. For 

example, government agencies are limited by regulatory frameworks, policy objectives, and the 

availability of individuals who are technically able to perform de-identification and data release.

• Formalize threat models including types and methods of attacks. 

• Formalize metrics for evaluating de-identification, including data quality, faithfulness to the 

original data, for attacker types, and attack types.

• Explore opportunities for federal agencies to release synthetic datasets as an alternative to 

microdata releases.

• Create reference de-identification tools. 

• Develop a catalog of existing de-identification tools.

• Develop test methods for de-identification tools and algorithms.

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• Creating venues for the exchange of research findings.

Potential next steps in governance include:

• Develop a reproducible framework for data review boards (DRBs), so that federal agencies that do 

not have a DRB will have a model for creating one.

• Developing sharable case studies from agencies.

• Developing a community of interest for those involved in dataset de-identification and release.

• Developing training materials. 

4 Conclusion

Overall, this meeting demonstrated that there is considerable heterogeneity within the US Government 

regarding needs, uses, and policy regarding the de-identification of government data. The findings of the 

presentations, and the comments of the attendees, and the follow-up survey indicates that there is a 

considerable need for policy on both matters of technology and governance. Such efforts can embrace 

existing NIST work on risk assessment, but will need to extend that work with attention to this specific set of 

issues.

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A. Meeting Attendees and Survey Responses

NIST surveyed the government employee workshop attendees when they registered for the meeting and at 

the meeting’s conclusion.

4.1 Registration Survey Results

As part of the meeting registration form NIST asked several questions of the attendees. Based on the results 

of those questions:

• 57 of the 106 registered attendees were from 

Washington DC. 

• Of those from outside Washington, the most 

common worksites were Bethesda (7), Arlington 

(5), Suitland (4), Rockville (2), Silver Spring (2), 

College Park (2) and Reston (2). 

• Those registered came from 67 different federal 

agencies. 

• 42 % of the registered attendees (31 % by agency) stated that they were “involved in the release of 

datasets containing microdata.”

• 50 % of the registered attendees (40 % by agency) stated that there was a software or methodology 

that they were currently employing to protect PII in microdata.

• The most popular de-identification techniques were swapping, noise addition, masking, and topcoding. 

• 19 % of the registered attendees (16 % by agency) stated that they release synthetic datasets. 

4.2 Survey Results (Summarized)

NIST requested that meeting attendees complete a post-meeting survey by providing a link to the survey at 

the workshop and by sending the link to attendees a week after the meeting had concluded. A total of 45 

people visited the link, with 30 people completing the 2-page survey. Those responding to the survey 

overwhelmingly found value in the workshop, learned material that they said would be useful in their work, 

and indicated that they are interested in attending a future workshop on this topic.

Of those responding: 

• 41 % stated that they were “personally involved in the release of datasets containing microdata.”

• 76 % stated that their agency “currently use de-identification to remove PII from publicly released 

datasets.”

• 82 % stated that their agency “have plans to use de-identification in the future.”

• 63 % of the respondents strongly agreed with the statement “I found value in attending the 

workshop;” 31 % agreed with the statement.

• 52 % of the respondents strongly agreed with the statement “I gained new insights or learned about 

new approaches;” 42 % agreed with the statement. 

• 68 % of the respondents strongly agreed with the statement “I would be interested in participating in 

future workshops on this topic;” 29 % agreed with the statement. 

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