1 Pursuant to Lo cal Rule 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule

47.5.4. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For the Fifth Circuit

___________________________

No. 96-30612

Summary Calendar

___________________________

ELLEN SALLY BROWN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

VERSUS

LAFAYETTE GENERAL MEDICAL CENTER,

Defendant-Appellee.

___________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

For the Western District of Louisiana

(94-CV-186)

____________________________________________________ November 22, 1996

Before DAVIS, EMILIO M. GARZA, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 1

After being terminated from her position as a nursing director

at Lafayette General Medical Center, Ellen Sally Brown filed suit

against her former employer alleging that she was discriminated

against on the basis o f her age in violation of the Age

Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1994).

The district court found that Brown failed to meet her burden of

showing her employer’s age-neutral reasons for the termination were

pretextual and granted summary judgment in favor of Lafayette2

General. We affirm the district court’s order.

I.

The district court made detailed findings of facts, which are

fully supported by the record and which we need not repeat here.

The record established that Brown a nd her immediate supervisor,

Camille Claibourne, vice president of nursing, had a difficult

working relationship for some time pr ior to Brown’s termination,

stemming in part from Browns disagreem ent with several policies

instituted by Claibourne, particularly those regarding the staffing

of nurses. The tension between the two grew worse when, in midDecember 1992, Brown admittedly failed to follow specific

instructions Claibour ne gave her regarding the posting of a new

staffing policy.

On December 30, 1992, Claibourne met with Brown and told her

that she could no longer work with her because Brown had become

untrustworthy. Claibourne informed Brown that she had the option

of resignation or termination. Brown responded that she would be

eligible for early retirement in June of 1993 and requested that

Claibourne allow her to remain employed until that time.

Claibourne said that she would defer her decision for the time

being and meet with her again on January 3, 1993.

However, Brow n decided not to attend the scheduled meeting

with Claibourne and instead met with John J. Burdin, Jr., the

president of Lafayette General. Brown admitted that she violated

the hospital’ s chain-of-command policy by going directly to the3

hospital president rather than Claibourne’s immediate supervisor.

On January 5, 1993, Burdin informed Brown that she was terminated.

Claibourne confirmed Brown’s termination in a letter dated the same

day and stated that the grounds for termination were “ineffective

communication to staff and Vice Preside nt; insubordination.” At

the time of her termination, Brown was 61 years old.

II.

We rev iew de novo the district court’s grant of summary

judgment. T opalian v. Ehrman

, 954 F.2d 1125, 1131 (5th Cir.),

cert. denied , 506 U.S. 825 (1992); Bodenheimer v. PPG Industries,

Inc.

, 5 F.3d 955, 956 (5th Cir. 1993). The parties do not contest

that Brown has stated a prima facie case of age discrimination

under the ADEA. S ee O’Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp.

,

116 S.Ct. 1307, 1310 (1996) (clarifying the elements of a prima

facie case under ADEA); Bodenheimer

, 5 F.3d at 957. The only issue

on appeal is whether Brown has successfully rebutted Lafaye tte

General’s age-neutral justifications for her termination.

Under the framework this Court recently articulated Rhodes v.

Guiberson Oil Tools

, 75 F.3d 989, 994 (5th Cir. 199 6) (en banc),

once a plaint iff has made out a prima facie case of age

discrimination under the ADEA, the burden shifts to the defendant

to proffer a non-discriminatory reason for the action. The

defendant satisfies this burden by producing evidence tha t “if

believed by the trier of fact, would support a finding that

unlawful discrimination was not the cause of the employment

action.” I d. at 993. Once the defendant has proffered4

nondiscriminatory r easons for the action, a plaintiff can only

avoid summary judgment “if the evidence taken as a whole (1)

creates a fact issu e as to whether each of the employer’s stated

reasons was what actually motivated the employer and (2) creates a

reasonable inference that age was a determinative facto r in the

actions of which plaintiff complains.” Id. at 994.

Lafayette General successfully proffered an age-neutral

justification for terminating Brown, namely her failure to

communicate adequately with her staff and supervisor and

insubordination. Because the employer has come “forward with a

reason which, if believed, would support a finding that the

challenged action was nondiscriminatory,” the inference raised by

the prima facie case drops out and the burden retur ns to the

plaintiff to show the reasons given are mere pretext for

discrimination. L aPierre v. Benson Nissan, Inc.

, 86 F.3d 444, 448

(5th Cir. 1996).

Brown has failed to make such a sh owing. The only evidence

Brown relies on to demonstrate that the hospital’s reasons are

pretextual are (1) her alle gations that several other employees

over th e age of forty have been “forced to resign” and replaced

with younger e mployees and (2) a letter signed by many of her

coworkers in which they stressed Brown’s many accomplishments and

expressed their regret at her dismissal. As for her allegations

that other employees have been forced to resign because of their

age, we agree with the district court that Lafayette General’s

unrebutted evidence concerning these employment actions remove any2 Brown lists seven employees who she claims were either

terminated or forced to resign from Lafayette General during a

three-year period. During that period, Lafayette General employed

an average of 1,500 to 1,600 employees. Lafayette General also

prod uced unrebutted evidence that, of the seven employees Brown

names, o ne was discharged because his position was eliminated, a

second took medical leave and never returned, a third resigned to

relocate to another city, and a fourth resigned and was replaced

with an older employee.

5 inference that age played a determinative role in Brown’s firing. 2

Nor does the letter from her coworkers raise an inference that

age played a role in her termination. At best, this letter shows

that she was well liked by her staff and others. However, “to

demonstrate pretext, the plaintiff must do more than ‘cast doubt on

whether [the employer] had just cause for its decision’”; she must

produce “some proof that age motiva ted the employer’s actions,

otherwise the law has been converted from one preventing

discrimination because of age to one ensuring dismissals only for

just cause to all people over 40.” Moore v. Eli Lilly & Co. , 990

F.2d 812, 815 (5th Cir.) (citations omitted), c ert. denied

, 5 1 0

U.S. 976 (1993).

In Rhodes

, we stated th at “if the evidence put forth by the

plaintiff to establish the prima facie case and to rebut the

employer’s reasons is not substantial, a jur y cannot reasonably

infer discriminatory intent.” 75 F.3d at 994. We conclude that

the evidence presented by Brown was insubstantial and inadequate to

support a finding of age discrimination.

Accordingly, the district court’s order granting summary

judgment in favor of Lafayette Medical is AFFIRMED.6

AFFIRMED.