S. HRG. 112–80, PT. 2 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR 

APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012 AND 

THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM 

HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

ON 

S. 1253 

TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012 FOR MILITARY 

ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND FOR MILITARY 

CONSTRUCTION, TO PRESCRIBE MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES 

PART 2 

SEAPOWER 

MAY 18, 25, AND JULY 13, 2011 

( 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM—Part 2

SEAPOWER 

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68–085 PDF 2012

S. HRG. 112–80 PT. 2 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR 

APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012 AND 

THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM 

HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

ON 

S. 1253 

TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012 FOR MILITARY 

ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND FOR MILITARY 

CONSTRUCTION, TO PRESCRIBE MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES 

PART 2 

SEAPOWER 

MAY 18, 25, AND JULY 13, 2011 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/ 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut 

JACK REED, Rhode Island 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

MARK UDALL, Colorado 

KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina 

MARK BEGICH, Alaska 

JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York 

RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts 

ROB PORTMAN, Ohio 

KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

JOHN CORNYN, Texas 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

RICHARD D. DEBOBES, Staff Director 

DAVID M. MORRISS, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER

JACK REED, Rhode Island, Chairman 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina 

RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

(II) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES 

MARINE CORPS ACQUISITION PROGRAMS

MAY 18, 2011

Page 

Stackley, Sean J., Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, 

and Acquisition; Accompanied by Lt. Gen. George J. Flynn, USMC, Deputy 

Commandant for Combat Development and Integration/Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command; and VADM John T. 

Blake, USN, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Integration of Capabilities and Resources ................................................................................................ 5 

NAVY SHIPBUILDING PROGRAMS

MAY 25, 2011

Stackley, Hon. Sean J., Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition ...................................................................................... 45 

McCoy, VADM Kevin M., USN, Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command ... 57 

Galinis, Captain William J., USN, Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Gulf Coast ....... 59 

THE REQUIRED FORCE LEVEL OF STRATEGIC AIRLIFT AIRCRAFT MANDATED BY

TITLE 10, UNITED STATES CODE, AND THE ADMINISTRATION’S REQUEST TO ELIMINATE THAT REQUIREMENT

JULY 13, 2011

Fox, Hon. Christine H., Director, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, 

Department of Defense ........................................................................................ 96 

McNabb, Gen. Duncan J., USAF, Commander, U.S. Transportation Command ..................................................................................................................... 98 

Johns, Gen. Raymond E., Jr., USAF, Commander, Air Mobility Command ...... 102 

(III) 

(1) 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION 

FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 

2012 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE 

PROGRAM 

WEDNESDAY, MAY 18, 2011 

U.S. SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC. 

MARINE CORPS ACQUISITION PROGRAMS 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:42 p.m. in room 

SR–232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators Reed, Hagan, 

Blumenthal, Wicker, and Ayotte. 

Majority staff members present: Creighton Greene, professional 

staff member; and Thomas K. McConnell, professional staff member. 

Minority staff member present: David M. Morriss, minority staff 

director. 

Staff assistants present: Kathleen A. Kulenkampff and Brian F. 

Sebold. 

Committee members’ assistants present: Carolyn Chuhta, assistant to Senator Reed; Gordon Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; 

Roger Pena, assistant to Senator Hagan; Laurie Rubiner, assistant 

to Senator Blumenthal; Lenwood Landrum, assistant to Senator 

Sessions; Joseph Lai, assistant to Senator Wicker; and Brad Bowman, assistant to Senator Ayotte. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED, CHAIRMAN 

Senator REED. The subcommittee will come to order. Let me 

begin by once again thanking Senator Wicker for his great cooperation. I look forward to working with Senator Wicker for another 

year. We had, I think, a very productive and successful session last 

year. 

I want to welcome Senator Ayotte from New Hampshire, who 

brings great insights and skill. Thank you very much, Kelly. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator REED. We, I think, had a very successful fiscal year 

2011, despite all the challenges, in terms of coming up with the 

necessary resources for the Marine Corps and for the Navy. I again 

am confident, working together, we can provide the resources necVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:23 Jan 11, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\68085.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
2 

essary for the mission of the Marine Corps and the Navy in very 

difficult times and, I emphasize, on a bipartisan basis. 

This afternoon we’re convening to hear the testimony concerning 

the Marine Corps acquisition programs. I want to welcome Secretary Sean Stackley, Vice Admiral John Blake, and Lieutenant 

General George Flynn back to the subcommittee. Welcome, gentlemen. We are grateful for all your service to the Nation and to the 

Navy. We certainly want to have you convey our best to the Navy 

and the Marine Corps, the men and women who do the real work 

and do it so well. 

The Marine Corps has continued supporting the national interests around the world, including significant participation in Afghanistan. I want to express the committee’s, indeed the Nation’s, 

thanks for these outstanding efforts of the Marine Corps and others who are involved there. 

Since last year, the Marine Corps completed a force structure review which recommended several actions. Among these was the following, and I’m paraphrasing: retain the capacity and capabilities 

to conduct amphibious operations with the assault echelons of two 

Marine Expeditionary Brigades, reinforced by one or more additional Marine Expeditionary Brigades aggregated from flying-in 

forces and equipment forward-positioned in maritime prepositioned 

ships. 

I commend the Marine Corps for completing this review and 

reaching this conclusion. The uncertainties we face in the world 

make it even more imperative than before that we develop a vision 

of the world as we would hope to shape events in it. 

Also since last year, we have seen the Marine Corps recommend 

cancellation of what was one of their premier modernization programs, the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV). Since the mid1980s the Marine Corps had focused on several programs that 

would enable what was then known as a ship-to-objective maneuver. These included the V–22, the Landing Craft-Air Cushion 

(LCAC) and the EFV. 

We called this hearing to better understand the rationale behind 

making this change and to understand the path forward for maintaining that capability to conduct amphibious operations. However, 

this hearing is not solely about that issue. We need to understand 

what progress the Marine Corps is making in resetting the force 

and in modernizing other portions of its equipment inventory. We 

also need to understand how Navy investment is enabling the Marine Corps to exercise the capabilities that are inherent to the Marine Corps. 

I believe that the world we face will continue to be one of uncertainty and unrest. Therefore, I continue to believe that great emphasis should be placed on lighter, more lethal forces and on the 

mobility of forces. But we must not let the outstanding performance of our Marine Corps distract attention from some of the real 

fiscal challenges that the Marine Corps faces. In 2002, Senator 

Kennedy, then the Seapower Subcommittee chairman, noted that 

the Navy needed to work diligently to address some of these very 

important problems, including improving fire support capability, including organic Marine Corps fire support and Navy shore fire support, enhancing our tactical mobility for Marine Corps forces, and 

3 

augmenting our mine countermeasures capability both for sea and 

land combat. 

In each of these areas, we have made some progress, but 

progress has been slow. The Navy cancelled the DDG–1000 program, capping it at three ships. These ships would have provided 

a volume of fires to support marines until the time when they are 

able to establish organic fire support ashore. 

We have been able to enhance tactical mobility in some respects, 

but now we see the end of the EFV with uncertainty about the system or systems that will replace that capability. We have seen the 

Navy begin to shift the mine countermeasures mission to the Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) and their mission packages. These ships 

should be much more deployable, but progress on completing the 

mine countermeasures systems that would be deployed from their 

mission modules has been subject to a number of setbacks. 

There are other examples, but in the interest of time I will just 

stop there. I hope we can explore these and other issues with the 

witnesses today. 

Before we begin with our opening statements by the panel, I 

would now like to recognize Senator Wicker for his comments. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROGER F. WICKER 

Senator WICKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this important hearing, and thanks to our panelists. We certainly appreciate their service and don’t want to pass up on an opportunity to 

say that publicly. 

The focus of today’s hearing is Marine Corps procurement and 

the President’s fiscal year 2012 budget request and Navy support 

to Marine Corps operations. In particular, we hope to focus on Secretary Gates’ decision, announced in January, to end the Marine 

Corps EFV program after nearly 15 years in development and more 

than $3 billion in sunk costs. 

This decision has raised concerns among many supporters of the 

Marine Corps, and I count myself as one of those, because the ability to conduct an amphibious assault against a defended shoreline 

is the core competency that distinguishes our Marine Corps from 

other ground combat forces. It is a capability that has been honed 

to perfection over years of investment and development of doctrine, 

training, and specialized equipment, that has proven invaluable in 

countless missions. 

Amphibious operations made possible by the legacy vehicles that 

have come before the EFV have been as large as the Inchon landing during the Korean War in 1950 and the feinted landings in Kuwait during Operation Desert Storm in 1991. Such operations have 

also been as small as the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Somalia 

in the mid-1990s and the ongoing contingency operations currently 

underway off North Africa. The ability to perform such complex operations is a force multiplier for the United States that must be 

taken into consideration by any adversary we might face. 

Secretary Gates’ decision to end the EFV program as part of the 

budget cuts sought in the fiscal year 2012 defense budget is supported by the Secretary of the Navy and the Commandant of the 

Marine Corps. They believe it will cost too much to continue EFV 

development, to purchase vehicles, and to operate them over the 

4 

long term. However, the Department of the Navy’s cost projections 

for the EFV are being evaluated in comparison to the portion of the 

budget historically available to the Marine Corps to purchase and 

operate its ground combat vehicles. 

Mr. Chairman, I question whether or not historical cost proportion should be the primary factor in determining the systems required for the Marine Corps to meet its mission requirements. As 

all of us recognize, the cost of even the most basic utility vehicle, 

the general purpose Humvee, drastically increased as requirements-driven modifications were implemented. 

As such, I hope the witnesses will explain carefully the methodologies that were used to evaluate our current requirements for 

an amphibious vehicle and how that analysis led to their decision 

to abandon the EFV and start over with lesser requirements. I 

would specifically appreciate our witnesses addressing some specific questions regarding the proposed termination of EFV. 

First, how are essential criteria like speed and the distance the 

vehicle will travel to the beach consistent with the Marine Corps’ 

and the Navy’s concept for ship-to-objective maneuver? 

Second, if we lower the requirements how do we ensure that a 

vehicle other than the EFV is going to be any less expensive to buy 

or operate, or that an alternative vehicle fundamentally changes 

the budget crunch the Marine Corps faces in updating its total inventory of ground combat vehicles? 

Third, how do we ensure that the new vehicle can be delivered 

to the Marine Corps in a timely manner if we start over again, 

given that we’ve been working on a replacement for the current 

Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV) since the mid-1990s? 

The Navy-Marine Corps planning concept which underlays the 

requirement for the EFV has been that Navy ships should be over 

the horizon at 25 miles from shore when launching marines. The 

new concept of the amphibious combat vehicle (ACV) now being 

discussed to replace the EFV may be launched as close as 10 miles 

from shore. I’d like to hear from our witnesses about our current 

naval capabilities to protect marines and sailors from threats such 

as anti-ship cruise missile systems, anti-ship ballistic missile systems, sea mines, and hostile aircraft. 

Given the Marine Corps’ requirement for naval surface fire support that was intended to be met by the DDG–1000 Zumwalt destroyers, now capped at only three ships, as the chairman stated, 

I would like our witnesses to discuss whether only three DDG– 

1000 ships can meet the Marine Corps naval surface fire support 

requirement, or what will be done to upgrade the fire support capability of our other surface ships. 

Gentlemen, there are a lot of issues for us to discuss and I look 

forward to the testimony of our witnesses. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator REED. I wonder, Senator Ayotte, if you would have a 

comment? 

Senator AYOTTE. I don’t. Thank you very much. 

Senator REED. Thank you. 

Secretary Stackley, your testimony has been made part of the 

record, so feel free to summarize and abridge freely. 

Mr. Secretary. 

5 

STATEMENT OF SEAN J. STACKLEY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY 

OF THE NAVY FOR RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND ACQUISITION; ACCOMPANIED BY LT. GEN. GEORGE J. FLYNN, 

USMC, DEPUTY COMMANDANT FOR COMBAT DEVELOPMENT 

AND INTEGRATION/COMMANDING GENERAL, MARINE CORPS 

COMBAT DEVELOPMENT COMMAND; AND VADM JOHN T. 

BLAKE, USN, DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS FOR INTEGRATION OF CAPABILITIES AND RESOURCES 

Mr. STACKLEY. Yes, sir. Chairman Reed, Senator Wicker, Senator 

Ayotte, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today 

to address Marine Corps programs. I’ll be testifying alongside Lieutenant General Flynn and Vice Admiral Blake, and if it’s acceptable I will keep my opening remarks brief and submit a formal 

statement for the record. 

Your Navy and Marine Corps serves as America’s expeditionary 

force in readiness, a balanced air-ground-naval force, forward deployed and forward engaged. The deployment of Kearsarge Amphibious Readiness Group (ARG), which returned home to Norfolk 2 

days ago, offers a great example of utility, flexibility, and responsiveness provided by a forward-deployed Marine Corps air-ground 

task force. The three ships of the Kearsarge ARG, the Kearsarge, 

Ponce, and Carter Hall, got underway in August of last year with 

2,200 marines of the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) embarked. The group deployed 1 month ahead of schedule in response 

to a disaster relief call for flood-stricken victims in Pakistan. Upon 

completing its relief mission in January, elements of the 26th 

MEU, disembarked to conduct the fight in Afghanistan alongside 

20,000 other marines in Helmand Province. 

The balance of the MEU remained embarked on the Kearsarge 

group to conduct theater security cooperation engagements in Jordan, Kenya, Djibouti, and other countries in Sixth Fleet’s area of 

operations. As the world’s attention was drawn to events in northern Africa, the Kearsarge group was among the first to respond, 

conducting air operations in support of Operations Odyssey Dawn 

and Unified Protector. Then, when relieved by the Bataan ARG, 

which likewise got underway early in response to the crisis, Kearsarge returned home this week. 

In all, in the course of their 81⁄2 month deployment, the group 

and MEU conducted 1,500 air sorties, 150 well deck evolutions, 

covering 3 continents, and 8,000 miles of ocean. All the while, marines of the 31st and 15th MEUs embarked on Boxer and Essex 

amphib groups were doing likewise in operations stretching from 

Japan, the rim of the Pacific, Latin America, and Africa. 

The success of these operations, built upon the spirit of innovation and flexibility, has been the bedrock of the Marine Corps in 

the post-Cold War era. To retain this amphibious capability, our 

ship-to-shore tactical mobility is a key priority as the Marine Corps 

shapes its future force. The transition from operations at sea to operations ashore necessitates a mix of lift and combat vehicles, and 

to this end, as you described, the Marine Corps initiated the development of a ground and combat tactical vehicle strategy in 2008 

with the goals of fielding vehicles with the correct balance of performance, protection, payload, mobility, transportability, and fuel 

efficiency. 

6 

The challenge we’ve encountered, which will be an enduring and 

pervasive challenge, is that the lessons learned from Operation 

Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) bring 

increased performance requirements to our vehicle programs, requirements that translate to increased procurement and operating 

and support costs, threatening to make new vehicles exponentially 

more expensive than the systems they’re replacing. 

So with the focus on balancing mission needs, force structure 

constraints, and affordability, a four-phase review has been conducted, as you described, where the early phases have identified 

impacts associated with the increased requirements and later 

phases are intended to address impacts to the amphibious force, as 

well as vehicle requirements going forward. 

An important outcome of this is as the Marine Corps has looked 

at their total vehicle inventory they made a decision that the 

42,000 vehicles they currently operate will be reduced by a total of 

10,000 in the course of executing the results of this review. 

In conjunction with the formulation of this strategy and the conduct of the Marine Corps force structure review, two clear and important determinations were made. First, the Secretary of Defense, 

the Secretary of the Navy, and the Commandant of the Marine 

Corps have reaffirmed the necessity of the Nation to possess the 

full range of amphib operations, including forcible entry, which will 

require a self-deploying amphibious vehicle, able to project readyto-fight marines from sea to land in permissive, uncertain, and hostile environments. 

This capability is a key to building power ashore and overcoming 

access challenges posed by either lack of improved infrastructure or 

the threat of an adversary. The EFV has been the program of 

record to provide this capability. However, over time as the EFV 

unit cost and operating and support costs grew, as production costs 

entered the budget alongside increasing costs for other vehicle programs, driven largely by increased vehicle complexity and survivability requirements, and as affordability assessments have become 

tempered by more realistic projections of post-OIF, OEF budgets, 

it was also determined that the program of record, EFV, was not 

affordable based on either procurement or operating and support 

cost estimates. 

Cost projections for the EFV procurement alone would consume 

the projected budget for all Marine Corps vehicles, while placing 

great pressure on the balance of Marine Corps procurement for the 

balance of this decade, including critical upgrades to C4I systems, 

radar systems, and logistics systems, all of which are necessary to 

replace obsolete systems of the expeditionary force, all of which 

offer improved capability while reducing operating and support 

costs for the future force. 

Accordingly, we have concluded we must revise our approach for 

developing and future ACVs, with increased emphasis on affordability to ensure we’re able to field this capability in the numbers 

that would be required for amphibious operations. To this end, 

we’ve commenced the front end effort leading to an analysis of alternatives (AoA) and technical demonstration of a new ACV, with 

the intent of mitigating cost, risk, and schedule associated with the 

new vehicle through an integrated portfolio approach: leveraging 

7 

investments made in the EFV; engaging with industry to foster a 

competition for ideas and innovation; weighing the vehicle performance requirements across the larger portfolio of capabilities required to ensure successful operations, including amphibious ship 

operations; and building upon the long history and force structure 

inherent to the legacy AAV. 

We need to open the trade space for vehicle performance requirements and include cost as a requirement to drive affordability 

trades. Ultimately, we need to procure at a rate that brings healthy 

competition and efficient production. 

Integrating the three separate programs that are in our program 

today, the Marine Personnel Carrier (MPC), the service life extension program (SLEP) and upgrades for a portion of the existing 

AAVs, and a new ACV would create greater opportunity to field 

this critical capability within the challenging resource constraints 

that we’re facing. 

We recognize the significance of this course change relative to 

the EFV program and, further, we recognize that the challenges to 

our ground and combat tactical vehicle programs in total cannot be 

solved through this single program change, but will require similar 

focus across the vehicle portfolio. We’re committed to conducting 

this work with full transparency with Congress. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to appear before 

you today and we look forward to answering your questions. 

[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Stackley, General Flynn, 

and Admiral Blake follows:] 

JOINT PREPARED STATEMENT BY HON. SEAN J. STACKLEY, LT. GEN. GEORGE J. 

FLYNN, USMC, AND VADM JOHN TERENCE BLAKE, USN 

INTRODUCTION

Chairman Reed, Senator Wicker, and distinguished members of this subcommittee, we are honored to appear here today. We want to thank you for your 

continued support to our sailors, marines, and their families, and we appreciate the 

opportunity to address our ground investment strategy. 

As America’s Expeditionary Force in Readiness our ground program investments 

support our ability to engage forward to build partners, assure allies and protect 

our interests; build access to a global economic system, deter aggression, and respond to crises; assist others when disasters strike; provide the only sustainable 

means to overcome access challenges; and, when required, defeat threats to our interests ashore. Key is the ability to deploy and employ from the sea in austere environments at a time and place of our choosing—a significant asymmetric, strategic, 

and operational advantage that has been used 137 times since 1990. 

Our ground investments allow us to develop and sustain a ready, middleweight 

force that is easily deployable, energy efficient, and highly expeditionary. Complementary to our ground investment, we require parallel investments in amphibious ships, amphibious combat vehicles, connectors such as the landing craft air 

cushion and landing craft utility, naval surface fire support assets, mine counter 

measures, radars, command and control, vertical lift, and fixed-wing, short takeoff 

and vertical landing aircraft and many other programs critical to maintaining tactical and operational readiness. These investments are designed to provide a full 

range of complementary capabilities for our Nation’s Expeditionary Force in Readiness. 

THE OPERATING ENVIRONMENT

The adversaries we face and will likely continue to face are diverse and not easy 

to characterize into a monolithic threat. They learn and adapt quickly to counter 

our actions and target our vulnerabilities simultaneously across multiple domains. 

Surprise is a reality that cannot be eliminated; it must be mitigated by properly organizing, training, equipping, and employing our forces. 

8 

Access must be created and maintained during all phases of conflict against a 

wide range of adversaries. Today, we face a number of challenges to access that 

must be overcome. The American Association for the Advancement of Science concluded in 1995 that within 30 years ‘‘75 percent of humanity . . . will reside in coastal areas’’ (defined as 150 km inland). This prediction appears to be coming to fruition, as densely populated urban centers become increasingly common in the 

littorals—precisely where access is required. 

Environmental challenges caused by major disasters not only inflict intense 

human suffering and loss of life, the resultant damage to roads, buildings, fresh 

water resources, communications systems, and electrical power distribution impede 

first responder actions and can quickly overwhelm local governments. Therefore, the 

execution of disaster relief operations and restoration of basic governmental services 

present a high degree of danger and uncertainty. 

The military challenges we face span the full spectrum from improvised explosive 

devices (IEDs) through high-tech weaponry, to include precision munitions that target our vulnerabilities both on land and at sea. 

Additionally, growing sensitivities to U.S. and coalition presence on, near, or in 

the air over sovereign boundaries present increasing political challenges. 

In combination, these changes in the operating environment are having a profound impact of the complexity of combat and tactical vehicle designs. 

The Nation needs an expeditionary force-in-readiness that can overcome impediments to access and immediately respond to a crisis anywhere in the world across 

the range of military operations. 

POSTURING FOR THE FUTURE

While supporting operations in Afghanistan remains the Commandant’s top priority, the Marine Corps Service Campaign Plan directs the Marine Expeditionary 

Force commanders to continue to develop and maintain amphibious capabilities. In 

2010, the Navy-Marine Corps team returned to conducting large-scale Marine Expeditionary Brigade/Expeditionary Strike Group exercises in order to hone these critical amphibious skills. On the west coast, I Marine Expeditionary Force and Expeditionary Strike Group-3 commenced its annual Marine Expeditionary Brigade-level 

amphibious exercises Dawn Blitz and Pacific Horizon. On the east coast, II Marine 

Expeditionary Force and Expeditionary Strike Group-2 conducted the first in a series of Marine Expeditionary Brigade-level exercises known as Bold Alligator. While 

these exercises are critical to enhancing our proficiency in large-scale amphibious 

operations, they also serve as a valuable platform from which new concepts can be 

tested that lead to the development of updated joint operating doctrine. 

These exercises and our force development experiments inform future amphibious 

capability requirements in mobility, command and control, intelligence, fires, seabased logistics, organization, doctrine, training, and education. The landing force of 

the future requires surface and vertical assault systems with the speed, range, precision location and navigational capabilities, protection, and firepower to launch 

from over-the-horizon positions, maneuver through tactical points of entry, and 

achieve the objective regardless of whether it is on the low- or high end of the spectrum of conflict. The technologies required to enhance these capabilities are under 

development, and the combat systems implementing these technologies are the highest priority in the Marine Corps. 

Both the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Navy have reaffirmed the 

necessity of the Marine Corps’ amphibious assault mission. Accordingly, we must 

develop an affordable and capable amphibious combat vehicle to project Marines 

from sea to land in permissive, uncertain, and hostile environments. This remains 

the Corps’ top priority. We ask for your continued support to reach this goal. 

In order to adapt to the future operating environment and address access challenges, the Navy and Marine Corps are pursuing a number of other programs that 

leverage operational lessons learned and adopt acquisition best practices. 

GROUND AND COMBAT TACTICAL VEHICLES

Over the next two decades the Marine Corps will replace or upgrade a large portion of the ground combat and tactical vehicle inventory. Unit costs for new vehicles 

have risen substantially, on the order of 300 to almost 500 percent, over their predecessors. The Marine Corps is facing increasing fiscal pressure across all investment 

categories. Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance capabilities, requirements and costs have increased significantly. Some programs that were initiated in response to urgent universal needs 

statements and joint urgent operational needs and initially funded with overseas 

9 

contingency operations funds are being integrated into standard force structure and 

will therefore need to be funded in the base budget. 

The Marine Corps initiated its Ground and Combat Tactical Vehicle Strategy 

(GCTVS) in 2008 to provide a basis for planning, programming, and budgeting for 

balanced maneuver and mobility capabilities to our force. This effort is evolutionary 

in approach, and it includes combat vehicles such as the M1A1 Main Battle Tank, 

Amphibious Assault, and Light Armored Vehicles, as well as tactical vehicles such 

as the Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement (MTVR), Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle, High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV), and Joint 

Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV). The strategic goals of the GCTVS are to field vehicles 

with the correct balance of performance, protection, payload, mobility, transportability, and fuel efficiency. This balance will enable rapid concentration and dispersion of Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) combat power, support strategic deployment concepts, and meet and sustain worldwide Marine Corps commitments. 

Our end-state is to develop a more relevant and affordable portfolio of combat and 

tactical vehicles. Through procurement, recapitalization, and service-life extension, 

we will provide the capacity for Marine forces to conduct irregular warfare and sustained operations ashore, and, when necessary, conduct Marine Expeditionary 

Force-sized forcible entry operations from the sea. The enduring challenge to the 

strategy is that the cost to procure and sustain new vehicles is exponentially more 

expensive than their predecessors. 

GCTVS is evolving in four phases. Phase I supported the 2010 Program Objective 

Memorandum, and identified the boundaries of our strategic lift capacity and assessed the negative impact that increased armor protection is having on our ability 

to remain a sea-based expeditionary force. During Phase II, which supported planning for the fiscal year 2012 Program Objective Memorandum, we assessed the capacity needed to meet operational requirements. As a result of this analysis, we will 

be able to reduce our overall inventory by about 10,000 vehicles across all vehicle 

types, resulting in savings in both procurement and long-term operations and maintenance costs. 

We will continue to refine our vehicle inventory requirements as we move into 

Phase III as part of our reconstitution strategy to inform POM–13 planning, update 

our tables of equipment to reflect our reduced inventory, and plan to have the reductions fully implemented by the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2013. We will also 

continue to move into the engineering manufacturing and development phase of the 

JLTV program and examine the feasibility of a HMMWV recapitalization program 

to address critical performance and protection requirements in our light tactical vehicle fleet. 

Subsequent to the decision to cancel the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) 

program, we broadened the strategy objectives to include a comprehensive cost-informed, systems engineering review of amphibious combat vehicle operational requirements. This ongoing review will analyze costs and requirements of water and 

land mobility, lethality and force protection in order to develop trade-space to drive 

down procurement and sustainment costs for future amphibious combat vehicles. 

Phase IV of the strategy will inform POM–16, providing the fully cost-informed 

plan to modernize our vehicle fleet to support the Marine Corps’ objective force 

which was developed during the Force Structure Review Group. 

AMPHIBIOUS COMBAT VEHICLES

The high production and operating costs of the EFV were the principal factors 

leading to the recommendation to cancel the program. Based on Marine Corps cost 

projections, the EFV would have consumed 44–57 percent of the Marine Corps’ projected procurement account during the years 2018–2025; consumed 90–100 percent 

of funding for all ground vehicles during the years 2018–2025: and consumed 91 

percent of the Marine Corps’ vehicle-related operations and maintenance account 

when fully fielded. 

Following several years of theater operations, we are facing competing demands 

across all elements to reset war-weary equipment and to modernize capabilities. 

Funding identified for EFV will be used to address overall modernization and to 

pursue an integrated vehicle program crafted from inception to provide affordable 

capabilities and where possible leveraging the investment made in the EFV. We intend to balance capability with cost while mitigating the risks associated with a new 

vehicle program through the use of an integrated acquisition portfolio approach. 

This approach will initially examine three integrated efforts: a service life extension 

program and upgrades for a portion of the existing Amphibious Assault Vehicles upgrade, the development of a new Amphibious Combat Vehicle, and the procurement 

of Marine Personnel Carriers. Utilizing best practices in systems engineering, cost 

10 

estimating, and government/industry teaming during concept refinement and technology development, we intend to develop operationally relevant and technically 

achievable requirements that are affordable. 

Our fiscal year 2012 budget request was based on early cost estimates for the initial development of these three vehicle programs. We have since refined our program management approach and our cost estimates, necessitating a shift in some 

budget categories while maintaining a zero-sum profile. This year we will begin an 

analysis of alternatives (AoA) of amphibious combat vehicles that will evaluate cost 

versus capability of several different vehicle configurations. This AoA will also consider the input we have received from industry in response to requests for information that we released earlier this year. We will also conduct a series of wargames 

in collaboration with the Navy to evaluate the operational impacts of closing the 

ship-to-shore distance from 25 nautical miles (nm) to 12 nm while also reducing the 

water speed of the vehicle. 

In the wake of the cancellation of the EFV, we intend to pursue an aggressive 

and responsible acquisition timeline for new and upgraded amphibious vehicles. To 

meet these challenges, we will utilize a disciplined systems engineering process and 

sound cost analysis. Where possible, we will streamline acquisition activities to ensure capabilities and requirements are met. We look forward to working with this 

committee to help meet these objectives. 

OTHER PROGRAMS SUPPORTING GROUND VEHICLES

To complement our future ground and amphibious vehicles, the Marine Corps is 

investing in other key support areas. For example, the Corps is leading the way to 

build a next generation medium-range radar called the Ground/Air Task-Oriented 

Radar. This system will replace five radars, and will be significantly more advanced 

in its capabilities. It will improve threat detection and be more deployable, able to 

be set up in a fraction of the time compared with current systems. In addition, we 

are investing in the Common Aviation Command and Control System, an ACAT I 

program which will help better network our communications, radars, intelligence, 

and ultimately our forces. To better protect the Marine on patrol, the Corps is also 

planning to replace its electronic jamming equipment to counter IED threats with 

the next-generation, open architecture JCREW 3.3 system. 

CONCLUSION

In order to contribute to the stability of the global system and thrive in the 21st 

century, amphibious forces must: engage forward to forge partnerships, prevent crises, promote diplomatic access, reassure allies and friends of our commitment, build 

partner capacity, and facilitate the security and stability of our allies; respond rapidly and effectively to protect national interests, contain disruptions to global stability, overcome access challenges by operating from the sea base, reinforce U.S. 

credibility, solidify relationships with international partners and forge new ones; 

and project power in order to assure access allowing us to prevail when conflict 

arises by rapidly transitioning from the open hand of engagement to the closed fist 

of power projection that can impose our Nation’s will and defeat our adversaries. 

The sea is a vast maneuver space—one that can be used to our advantage provided we maintain the capability and capacity to conduct amphibious operations. 

Equally integral to overcoming access challenges from the sea is our ability to conduct a wide range of missions ashore against various threats. The mix of ground 

assets we are developing will provide the best flexibility for the Nation’s Expeditionary Force in Readiness. 

In this age of uncertainty, the demand for adaptable forces—capable of immediately responding to crises—is certain. It is true that all things are not equally important or affordable, and thus as the Nation resources its future national security, 

it will be forced to make tough choices between capabilities, capacities, and levels 

of readiness in and among the Services. Although it is impossible to know where 

the next flare-up will be, it is clear that well trained and equipped amphibious 

forces will be ready to respond and protect interests or prevent undesired effects. 

With the continued support of Congress and the American people, we will ensure 

amphibious forces are well prepared to secure our national interests in an uncertain 

future. Thank you for the opportunity to be here today and we look forward to answering further questions. 

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. I presume 

that General Flynn and Admiral Blake have no statements. 

We’ve included and provided everybody with two charts, and 

we’ve shared them with the panel. One is the basic procurement 

11 

course for Marine Corps combat ground vehicles, including the EFV 

for illustration purposes, and that is the operation and maintenance (O&M) costs. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

[Deleted.] 

Senator REED. But the point really is, as we’ve talked about before, in a very few years we’re looking at a huge bow wave, even 

if you factor out the EFV and assume you’re getting a cheaper replacement, probably it’s not that much cheaper. It might be more 

efficient, more effective. 

As General Flynn and I discussed, this is not unique to the Marine Corps. The Navy has a similar challenge when it comes to trying to build ballistic missiles, ballistic submarines, attack submarines, carriers, et cetera. 

It really has to focus our attention as to how are you going to 

deal with this issue. Even assuming the EFV is cancelled or a replacement comes on line, the cost of these other vehicles that are 

essential are also increasing. So, Secretary Stackley, please comment, and I’d like General Flynn to comment and Admiral Blake 

also from his perspective. 

Mr. STACKLEY. Yes, sir. Let me start with the specific question 

on the vehicles and then there’s a broader issue there that wraps 

around all of this. As I mentioned in my opening remarks, the decision to cancel the EFV to go to another ACV with a greater focus 

on affordability is not going to fix this problem. It’s not going to fix 

the vehicle problem. It’s one step of what needs to be a number of 

steps in each of the program areas to create a more affordable vehicle portfolio. 

As I described, General Flynn led an effort looking at vehicle inventories. That’s another important piece here, which is reducing 


518sea2.eps
12 

the total inventory of vehicles required, and I’ll let him go into that 

in more detail. 

But we have a significant looming challenge. When we look at 

our budget projections and we look at our recapitalization of many 

systems that we procured back in the 1980s and 1990s at higher 

rates of procurement, we can’t look at the numbers and arrive at 

a one-for-one replacement knowing that the systems that we’re 

fielding going forward are far more capable, far more complex, and 

therefore far more expensive. 

So we are across the board looking at making tough decisions in 

terms of our investments; what are the priorities in terms of fielding new capabilities? Depending on what the capability is, we look 

at do we extend the service life of the legacy capability? Is that sufficient to meet the requirements? Do we buy new? When do we 

have to make that decision? We go system by system into the specific list of requirements and challenge the requirements, cut back 

where it’s the right risk decision, where the risk is, can you afford 

the thing, and you put a risk even procuring the thing versus getting some measure of increased capability. 

So there’s no single silver bullet. There is no sacred cow. We 

know that there is no more money and we have to live within the 

resource constraints we have and make the right capability decisions. Hopefully, we have them correctly lined up against our overarching requirements. Then we have to deliver in accordance with 

what we estimate to be the right price for those things. 

Senator REED. You mentioned that part of this complete analysis 

is looking at legacy systems and effectively extending their lives. 

Does that go to EFV too, in terms of a possible solution? 

Mr. STACKLEY. That is not counted out. We’re at the front end, 

as I described, of the analysis. We have over 1,000 AAVs. Part of 

the technology demonstration that we would like to get into is, 

using some of those AAVs as a hull form, let’s talk about bringing 

off-the-shelf systems to that hull form and see what performance 

level we can get the existing AAV up to; and separately look at 

technology demonstration of an alternative hull form where we 

could potentially port those same systems over now to a separately 

developed hull form, and what does that point towards in terms of 

cost versus capability. In any AoA there’s likely to be an alternative that says extend the existing vehicle, and we don’t have 

cause to discount that on the AAV. 

Senator REED. General Flynn, please. 

General FLYNN. Mr. Chairman, it’s always good to see one of 

your slides used at a hearing. This is the slide that keeps me up 

at night and this is the problem that keeps me up at night. This 

includes our vehicle challenges, and if you notice the mountains in 

the sand chart are all in the out years. So this problem is coming 

and we’re not ignoring it. 

Aircraft have gotten more expensive and ships have gotten more 

expensive. But on the ground side, because of our need for protection, whether it be in vehicles or individual protection, because of 

the battlefield that we’re operating in right now, there’s been an 

exponential increase in costs. About 5 years ago, it cost us about $1,500 to outfit an individual marine. Today that’s $7,500. The Humvee when we bought it in the 

13 

mid-1990s, about $50,000. When I look at replacements for a light 

vehicle, what I get across my desk is in the range of $300,000. So, 

there’s an increased cost there. 

The other part is I know we can’t buy our way out of here. Over 

the past couple years the budget projections were more optimistic 

than we’re seeing today. So we have to do more than just settle for 

the fact that it’s more expensive. When we did the force structure 

review, we tried to design a force as part of Secretary Gates’ and 

Secretary Mabus’ guidance, was to tell us what the 21st expeditionary force in readiness was. That wasn’t just about manpower. 

It was also how we are going to equip it. 

Because you can’t buy your way out of this, what should be the 

table of equipment for that force? The table of equipment for that 

force should be a crisis response TE, which would be lighter than 

what you see that force looking like in Afghanistan right now; and 

that you need to have the capability to heavy it up when you need 

it to be. 

Very similar to what the Third Battalion, 8th Marines, did when 

they came off the 26th MEU. They deployed with a crisis response 

TE, but on their way to combat in Afghanistan they heavied up 

with mine resistant ambush protected (MRAP) vehicles and MRAP 

all terrain vehicles (MATV). 

So we’re going to look at ways to reduce our vehicle inventory, 

by going out light for the normal crisis response missions, and having the ability, either through prepositioning on the land or by 

operational use of the Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF), to be 

able to heavy it up from using those assets as well. That’s why it 

was critical that we operationalize the MPF to be able to do at-sea 

transfer of vehicles and selective offload. 

The other thing is, as Mr. Stackley mentioned, we took a hard 

look at our vehicle inventory and we said, ‘‘Okay, to reduce costs 

we’re going to reduce the vehicle inventory by about 10,000 vehicles.’’ That’s a significant savings in replacement costs and in operating costs, and that’s going to happen over time. 

We also have to fix the requirements-acquisition relationship. In 

other words, early on we have to be able to do those cost-capability 

tradeoffs early in our process. That’s what we’re going to do as we 

look for a solution to the EFV and our approach to the ACV. 

We’ll also take a hard look at our table of equipment. The other 

thing we’ll look at, sir, is we are exploring everywhere that we can 

for new ideas. You mentioned about the recapitalization of legacy 

equipment. We’re looking at that for the Humvee. Is there a way 

we could do something, by either capsule technology that we talked 

about last year or structural blast challenge, also known as chimney, has a way of mitigating costs. So we’re pursuing technology, 

we’re pursuing new ideas, and we’re pursuing new concepts, all as 

a way to try to drive this down and to take some of the peaks off 

those hills. 

But when you look at this chart, the only thing on there is vehicles. Vehicles exceed our total procurement dollars. I know we’re 

using historical norm, but that was 30 years of procurement history, when at the beginning of those 30 years we had over $4 billion in procurement for the ground side and some parts in the middle we had less than $1 billion a year. 

14 

What I tell my people is, ‘‘Okay, what makes us think that history is going to change?’’ Like I say to them, sometimes you can 

have anything you want; you just can’t have everything. 

Senator REED. Thank you. 

Admiral, in the next round I’ll ask if you have any comments. 

But let me recognize Senator Wicker for his questions. 

Senator WICKER. Thank you. 

General Flynn, let me ask you first about the 10 miles versus 25 

miles that I mentioned in my opening statement. Has the requirement changed? Do you stand behind the requirement to conduct 

amphibious operations against a defended shoreline? Is the amphibious assault mission still relevant for the future, and what 

about the point I made about 10 miles versus 25? 

General FLYNN. Senator, in context of that, it’s not just about the 

amphibious assault. It’s about amphibious operations across the 

range of military operations. When we did the recertification of the 

program in 2007, the launch distance that was used for the EFV 

was launched anywhere between 10 and 20 miles, and that was for 

the amphibious assault. 

When we released the request for information (RFI) for the replacement for the EFV, what we had in the RFI was a launch distance of 12 to 18 miles. That 12-mile mark is not a static position. 

That is normally where the ships would come in for the high-speed 

launch. We think it’s going to be dependent on a number of factors: 

our tactics, techniques, and procedures of using the sea as maneuver space. 

If you’re going to have to do a large amphibious assault, a twobrigade operation, there is no doubt that we’ll have a significant 

amount of time to be able to do shaping operations, because it’ll 

take us about 60 days to assemble the shipping to be able to do 

that. So there is going to be significant shaping operations that 

have to take place to knock down the threat as well. 

Since we had the original requirement for the EFV, as Admiral 

Blake briefed last week, there have been significant improvements 

in the Navy’s ability to deal with the threat. For the crisis that 

we’re likely to respond to today, we’re going to have to mitigate 

those risks, because you could have a high-end threat there, but it 

may not be the same volume that you would expect against a nearpeer competitor. We’re going to have to continue to go where they 

don’t think we’re going to go, to use improved tactics, techniques, 

and procedures, and also to rely on the new defensive systems or 

integrated defensive systems that the Navy’s bringing to the fight. 

Senator WICKER. Thank you for your answer. If I could break 

that down, would you explain in a little more layman’s terms what 

happened between 2007 and 2011, or I guess 2010, and what the 

difference is? It seems to me that 10 to 20 miles is not that different from 12 to 18 miles. So what happened? What is the reason 

for the change between the recertification in Nunn-McCurdy, which 

favored continuing the EFV, and today? 

General FLYNN. One of the key drivers of the EFV was the ability to come up on plane, sir, and be able to go above 17 knots. It 

was to be able to do that high-speed launch. The EFV on the water 

in a planing configuration could do in excess of 25 knots. That 

capability’s pretty expensive and that was one of the key drivers, 

15 

to be able to hydraulically configure the vehicle, to be able to develop the engine thrust to be able to do it. That part of the capability was a key expensive piece of that. 

What we’re saying in the future is to make the vehicle affordable 

we have to look at all the mission sets that the vehicle’s going to 

have to perform, and then we’re going to have to try to make those 

tradeoffs. Part of that tradeoff is do we need that level of speed? 

If we don’t need that level of speed to be able to do the operation, 

can you reconfigure the program to be more affordable? 

The threat launch in the Nunn-McCurdy certification was 10 to 

20 miles launch. It’s the speed to be able to do that, but it’s also 

the ability of the task force to be able to protect the ship when it 

comes in to do the launch. Now, they wouldn’t stay there in a static 

position, but we’re also launching aircraft, we’re also launching 

other types of connectors at the same time. 

Senator WICKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We’re going to have 

a second round? 

Senator REED. Yes, sir. 

Senator WICKER. I think I’ll defer to others and then come back. 

Senator REED. Thank you, Senator Wicker. 

Senator Blumenthal. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you, Senator Reed. 

Thank you for all of your great work and the extraordinary dedication of the men and women who work with you and under you. 

As I’ve listened to some of the discussion today and read the testimony and other material to prepare, from a very simplistic standpoint some of the variants here, maybe the major variants, are 

weight, protective value, and cost. I know that the MRAP vehicles 

were once regarded as extraordinarily heavy vehicles and perhaps 

disregarded in their importance because of it. 

I wonder if you could comment on whether vehicles with that 

kind of bulk, for protective value and other reasons, have become 

the new normal, whether there is almost inevitably an increase in 

weight, bulk, and whether that variant is inevitably tied to cost, or 

whether technology may enable us to reduce both? 

General FLYNN. Sir, one of the key things on weight is weight is 

a factor in being able to mitigate under-belly blast. But in the end, 

explosives tend to always win. You can always pack more explosives to do that. So the combination of the technology that you saw 

in the MRAP vehicle was not only weight. It also had a new hull 

shaping form, the single-V hull; your standoff distance from the 

blast. All contribute to your ability to mitigate blast and protect the 

servicemen and women inside the vehicles. 

What we’ve learned over time is, though, with weight comes a 

tremendous lack of mobility and transportability. We had to field 

an MATV in Afghanistan because the MRAP vehicles couldn’t go 

everywhere because of the road structure and the ability to get 

around where you needed to go. 

We also found in some areas of the country that our light armored vehicles worked very well, because they could go anywhere, 

and you can’t put improvised explosive devices (IED) everywhere. 

So there’s a degree of protection that comes with mobility. 

What we’ve realized is, if we continue on this trend as an expeditionary force we may not be able to load ships any more with that 

16 

much weight. So that’s why we’re looking for technology, and we’ve 

learned more in I think the last 5 to 10 years about blast than 

we’ve learned over maybe 2 or 3 decades. That’s why in the future 

the single-V hull may not be the solution. A double-V may be the 

solution, and in some cases a rigid flat hull could actually be the 

solution. 

That’s why we’re continuing to pursue alternative technologies to 

see if we can find that sweet spot, if you will, between transportability, mobility, and protection. 

But you’re right; on the basis of where we are now, sir, the more 

weight you have, the more expensive it is, but the lesser mobility 

and transportability you have on the battlefield. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Are you satisfied, General, that the Nation is investing in the technology in sufficient amount and timeliness to do whatever it can to improve the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle and all the other vehicles under development to take advantage 

not only of what we’ve learned in the last 5 years, which has been 

impressive, but also what we need to learn going forward about the 

threats that may be in our future that haven’t been in our past? 

General FLYNN. Sir, everything I see, down working on the requirements aspect for the Marine Corps, is we don’t discount any 

idea. We’ve gotten help from Mr. Stackley and we’ve gotten help 

from the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. We go out 

to this one company that was working on structural blast channel, 

technology which is known as chimney. That could have applications to a lot of different things. The double-V hull. All of that has 

a tendency to take weight off the vehicle. We’ve also seen some advances in material science as well. 

But we haven’t found the silver bullet, so we’re still looking. 

We’re still discovering. But when we find something, sir, we see if 

it’s going to work and we try to take advantage. I think we’re at 

the stage of maybe seeing some successes in the not too distant future, but I don’t see anything tomorrow. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you, General. 

Mr. STACKLEY. Weight is just one part of the solution, and really 

on our learning curve what we’re focusing on is a total system design that provides the best solution. So there is a shaping of the 

hull. The element of weight itself provides a benefit. There’s the degree of armor protection. But then, as General Flynn described, 

things like the double-V and the structural blast channel, there’s 

an element of stiffness associated with the vehicle that’s starting 

to emerge as this is an important characteristic that we need to 

consider in the design of the vehicles. 

Ultimately, what you’re trying to do is protect the marines or soldiers inside the vehicle. So now you’re starting to deal with designs 

of floors, designs of seats, and you’re starting to get down to a certain level of detail. I believe we still have a significant amount of 

learning to do as we put together optimal system designs. When 

you start to talk now about an AAV, weight’s a huge penalty. 

When we’re looking at speed and range, when weight starts arriving as a requirement for protection, now you’re really trading off 

total system performance. So we need to look at the entire design, 

where the ultimate goal is protecting the marine inside the vehicle 

and not go first to weight. There are a lot of ways to add stiffness 

17 

without adding weight. There are armor solutions that are lighter 

in weight. In fact, we have some armor solutions that float. Those 

are more costly, so there’s a cost element that we wrestle with. 

This front-end design work that we’re doing for the ACV, we’re 

trying to bring all of that innovation to the table and look at a total 

system approach to that protection thing, which does drive costs 

and does trade off in performance in other areas of the vehicle. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral BLAKE. Sir, if I could just add to that, when we look at 

the issue from the Navy perspective, you have ships with expected 

service lives anywhere from 25 to 40 years, and so when we build 

a ship and we’re going to build it for a period of 25 to 40 years, 

what I have to do is I have to sit down with General Flynn and 

we have to look at it and say, all right, we have to have give and 

take here, because the displacement of that vehicle is what it is 

and weight is a critical factor. 

So when we have to sit down and look at it, if a vehicle increases 

in weight then we have to figure out where our tradeoffs are, because we still have to get that composite force of marines ashore 

and get them ashore safely. 

Senator REED. Thank you, Admiral Blake. 

Senator Ayotte. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank all 

of our witnesses for what they do for our country. 

I wanted to follow up, Secretary Stackley, on a question about 

the EFV program termination. As part of it, we know that we invested approximately $3 billion. Then part of it is this $185 million 

that we have to pay to terminate the program. I wanted to understand that piece of it and understand it from the perspective of 

going forward what is it that we need to do to inform our acquisition process? 

Was it something in our terms that we need to be conscious of 

in terms of how we’re contracting for these types of vehicle, obviously acquisition overall, where we can put ourselves in a better 

position to deal with the cost issue, but also to have more favorable 

terms for our country, so that we’re not put in a position where we 

actually have to pay money to terminate a program. 

So if you can help me with that, I’d really appreciate it. 

Mr. STACKLEY. I want to help you 100 percent here. My view is 

termination costs should be approximately zero. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you. 

Mr. STACKLEY. Particularly in this program, with, I’ll call it, 

knowledge upfront. There are termination costs associated with a 

major program if you slam the door shut. You have a large workforce and the company has responsibilities to that workforce in 

terms of everything from relocation, they might owe them severance, or they might have 2 months pay they have to pay out. So 

there are definite costs associated with termination if it’s not managed. 

What we’ve attempted to do here is to manage the termination. 

So we’ve done a couple of things. We’ve taken a look at the workforce. We’ve taken a look at things like tooling and material. Those 

have to be disposed of at the end of the contract. So we’ve put a 

18 

plan together on what do we want to do with these things, and we 

work our way out of the EFV by getting value out of the dollars 

that are otherwise considered to be termination dollars. 

So the workforce, for example; I’ve given a Warren Act notice. 

General Dynamics would have to provide 2 months notice to folks 

that they’re going to be laid off. There’s a bill, and if they’re not 

being gainfully employed then we get nothing for that cost. So we 

took a look at the workforce. We took a look at where we are in 

the EFV program, and we want to harvest as much of the learning 

and technology that we invested in that program as possible to 

help us to transition to the ACV. 

So we put together a plan that matches the rolloff of staff at 

General Dynamics with harvesting of technologies from the EFV, 

which includes everything from subsystems on the EFV that might 

apply to the ACV, to taking the vehicles that are in piece parts and 

finishing their testing, so we actually get the test results that will 

inform the ACV. 

So you could call it a termination cost, but we’re calling it a 

smart termination as we exit the program, so that we get the maximum value out of the program as we exit, and we don’t incur unnecessary costs associated with terminating. 

I don’t know if that answers your question or not. 

Senator AYOTTE. It does. I think what we’re all trying to figure 

out is how we can avoid this. What are the lessons learned from 

this experience, because we’re not picking on the Marine Corps in 

all of this because we’ve seen this in other weapons systems across 

the Services. Whether it’s putting more of the burden on the contractor in terms of if they don’t produce the product that we want 

that they bear more of the risk, just in terms of, obviously we’ve 

been talking about the acquisition process, but what are some of 

the lessons learned overall so that we can make sure that we avoid 

these situations again? 

Mr. STACKLEY. Yes, ma’am. First, there are different types of termination. I’ll just be frank. In the case of the decision to terminate 

the EFV program, as discussed, in 2007 we had the Nunn-McCurdy. At that point in time we decided we’re going to continue with 

the program. We restructured it, and since 2007 General Dynamics 

has been performing in accordance with the plan. 

So this isn’t in 2010 their performance has led us to terminating 

the program. This is DOD looking at the future costs of the program and saying, we can’t get there from here. So there’s not fault 

on the contractor here. What he’s been doing is he’s staffed up to 

ramp into production, so he does have tooling. He has infrastructure. He has people on the program. 

If you try to close the program immediately, there’s a lot of work 

in process. He has subcontractors throughout the country who are 

going to be invoicing for the work that they’re doing, all allowable 

costs on the contract that would have to be paid. So that’s just a 

practical matter of we are terminating, we’re limiting our exposure 

in that termination, but we do have liabilities for this work that 

was started before the decision to terminate. 

Senator AYOTTE. I appreciate that. I guess at the end of the day 

really where I’d like to be is, how do we avoid this from happening 

again? I know we’ve been talking about it, but when we look at the 

19 

fiscal state of our country and the need that our Armed Forces 

have; I think this is just one example across. We’ve seen this on 

multiple areas at DOD. 

Mr. STACKLEY. Depending on the contract type, we have clauses 

and terms and conditions that protect the government’s liability. 

Typically, for example, for our cost-plus contract, which development contracts are, the clause would describe that there’s a limitation of funds. So the government’s liability is limited to the amount 

of funds that are put onto a contract. That causes the contractor 

to have to measure, gauge, and ensure that he doesn’t go spending 

money beyond the limitations that are imposed in that case. 

On a fixed-price contract, he owes us the deliverable. We owe 

him the amount of money we signed up to; he owes us the deliverable. Typically, on a fixed-price contract we’re fully obligated at the 

front end. If we terminate while all that work is in place, then 

we’re stuck with a legal review in terms of what his actual costs 

are versus what he’s billed and the differences inside the termination. 

But we do not encumber Congress, for example. We don’t encumber future Congresses on things like termination or cancellation 

without notifying you and telling you what the amount of that liability is in advance. 

Senator AYOTTE. I appreciate your answer, Mr. Secretary. 

My time is up, but I still don’t have a clear picture on when you 

have a situation like this you have to take the lessons learned. We 

need to take the lessons learned from this, all of us, and I think 

we need to do it across the Services. So I don’t have a clear picture 

in my own mind how we avoid this again. 

General FLYNN. Ma’am, I think one of the key lessons learned is 

we have to do the cost tradeoffs early on in the requirements process, not in the acquisition process. So as we’re looking for the capability, those cost tradeoffs have to be done in requirements development early, so that you’re not in acquisition, so that you know 

what technology you’re asking for and you’re not overreaching, and 

that you understand the costs. 

That’s what’s going to be different about how we’re approaching 

the ACV, is that we’ve set up the method and the methodology 

right now to inform the requirements process, with cost as an independent variable. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you, General. 

Senator REED. Thank you, Senator Ayotte. 

Senator Hagan. 

Senator HAGAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Flynn, Secretary Stackley, and Admiral Blake, thank 

you for your work and being here today. 

I wanted to talk about the amphibious ship requirement. I know 

that the Marine Corps’ stated amphibious ship requirement remains 38, and the Nation currently has an amphibious fleet of less 

than 30, despite an agreement within the Navy to maintain a minimum of 33. 

Amphibious ships should not be decommissioned earlier than 

their expected service life spans, obviously, without replacements. 

I’m concerned that the Marine Corps will not have sufficient amVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:23 Jan 11, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\68085.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
20 

phibious capabilities to fully support the combatant commanders’ 

requirements within an acceptable level of risk. 

I’m also concerned that the Marine Corps will not have sufficient 

amphibious capabilities to meet its demands for operational deployments. Maintaining a sufficient amphibious capability I believe is 

critical in order to project power, to evacuate essential and non-essential U.S. personnel stationed overseas, and engage in crisis response and humanitarian relief operations. 

General Flynn, can you share your thoughts regarding the impact of not having the minimum amphibious ship requirement and 

how does it affect the Marine Corps’ ability to respond to crises, 

such as what we’ve seen recently in Libya and in Japan? 

General FLYNN. Ma’am, we’ve agreed within the Navy on the 38- 

ship requirement, and that is both for what we would need to be 

able to do amphibious assault operations at the high end, but it’s 

also that inventory of ships that is needed to do what we’re actually doing today. So it’s not based on desires or needs. It’s actually 

what’s being employed today. 

With a 33-ship inventory, you could meet both your day-to-day 

needs and your larger requirements. When you get below that, obviously you take on additional risk in terms of availability, especially as you heard from the operations that are going on now, 

when you’re surging. 

So where are you going to pay the bills? You’re going to pay a 

bill in maintenance. Ships need to have time to be maintained, and 

if they don’t have the time to be maintained we could have a challenge in getting them to their 40-year service life. The other place 

you pay the bill is in training; training of the ship and the crews 

together. So there is the ability to happen there. What we’re going 

to see for the first time in recent memory when the 11th MEU deploys this summer is all ships will be together when they deploy. 

That’s the additional risk that you take. 

So 38 was the requirement, 33 was an acceptable level of risk, 

and the further you get away from that the more risk you assume 

in being able to meet your day-to-day requirements, and where you 

pay the bill is in maintenance and in training. 

Senator HAGAN. Where are we right now? 

General FLYNN. I think we’re at 30 right now in the inventory, 

ma’am. 

Senator HAGAN. I’m concerned about the number. In last year’s 

National Defense Authorization Act, Senator Webb and I included 

report language mandating a report on the expeditionary amphibious warfare ship force structure. The report directs the Secretary 

of Defense to complete an operational capabilities-based assessment that reviews and reconciles the amphibious requirements, the 

ship retirement schedules, as you mentioned, and the 30-year shipbuilding plan. Can you give me, Secretary Stackley, the status of 

that report? 

Mr. STACKLEY. Ma’am, I’m going to have to take that one for the 

record. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

The Expeditionary Amphibious Warfare Ship Force Structure Report to Congress 

was provided to the congressional defense committees on June 3, 2011 by the Deputy Secretary of Defense. 

21 

Senator HAGAN. Okay. 

Mr. STACKLEY. Let me assure you, though, I’ll take it for the 

record and we’ll pull this thing forward and make sure it gets back 

to you in a timely manner. 

Senator HAGAN. Any comments on why we have fewer than the 

minimum required, and why the Navy has continued to decommission vessels from the amphibious fleet despite the shortage? 

Mr. STACKLEY. Yes, ma’am. A couple pieces there. One, we’re balancing across the ship portfolio in total. The commonly referred to 

number is a 313-ship Navy, which dates back about 5 years when 

that total force structure requirement was established. At that 

time, we were at about 280 ships. Today we’re at 287 ships. So in 

total we’re far below what we’ve established as a requirement class 

by class. 

Inside of the amphibs themselves, we have two specific amphibious shipbuilding programs ongoing, and we’ve had challenges in 

terms of schedule on those programs. So part of the shortfall is associated with delays in delivering amphibious ships. 

Senator HAGAN. The schedule problems being what? 

Mr. STACKLEY. Ship delivery schedules. Frankly, there have been 

some performance issues at the shipyards that have driven delays 

on the LPD and LHA class ships. It’s also been a long-term impact 

associated with Hurricane Katrina. All of our amphibious ships 

today are built at Ingalls and Avondale on the Gulf Coast. There’s 

been a long-term impact associated with Hurricane Katrina on everything from schedules to productivity, and we’re still working our 

way back from those impacts. 

The third element is the new construction side. Then there is the 

decommissioning side. We spend a lot of time reviewing decom 

schedules, and each decision in terms of decom is, I would say, 

made on its own merits or otherwise in terms of how many deployments does that ship have left in it, does it require another service 

life upgrade to get another deployment, so what’s the balance of investment required to keep the amphib on line versus what’s the 

useful service we would get out of it. 

I can only assure you that there’s a lot of tough discussion and 

debate with each of those, because we’re below the 33 number, and 

we’re not going to be able to quickly get back to 33 just through 

new construction. So we have to look at the existing amphib ships 

in the fleet, and do what we can to make sure that we get the service life that’s required out of them. 

Senator HAGAN. Thank you. 

Admiral BLAKE. Senator, one of the issues that we have taken 

up is because of the fact that we recognize that there are delays 

in the delivery of, say, the big-deck amphibs. We have already 

looked at and are putting in place funding so that we can extend 

ships that are currently on service and not decommission them, 

delay their decommissionings, if you will. 

But that comes at a cost and that’s what we work. We recognize 

that we need to meet the commitment to put the number of 

amphibs out there in order to meet the requirement. We also recognize that, because of the level of operational tempo that we’ve had 

over the past several years, that we have now made a concerted effort to make sure that not only do we have to look at extended 

22 

service lives, we have to get the ships to their expected service 

lives. 

One of the best programs I can give you is the LSD–41s with 

their mid-life program. We’ve actually put a tailored package together in order to ensure that we get those ships to the end of their 

service lives. We’ve actually tailored it for each of those ships to get 

them out there, so that they can meet the end of their service. 

In addition, we’re also looking at ships as they’re coming up at 

the end of their service and seeing if we can work it that we can 

get additional life out of them. But again, that comes at a cost and 

we have to do the tradeoffs. 

Senator HAGAN. Thank you. 

Let me ask about the Humvees. The use of the Humvees is limited in theater due to the survivability and the crew protection concerns. Obviously, with the mine blast and the IEDs, the Humvees 

have been exposed to these underbody attacks, which really concerns me greatly. The current Humvee underbody protection levels 

are inadequate in meeting the current and emerging threats that 

our troops are seeing. 

I’m very supportive of anything that we can do that can increase 

the survivability, the mobility, and the operational utility of our 

Humvees. In last year’s authorization bill, I inserted language requesting the Army and the Marine Corps to report their Humvee 

acquisition and recapitalization plan. In the Marine Corps the report mentions that an armored capsule system was evaluated as a 

possible survivability upgrade for the Humvee, and the report goes 

on to say that, despite doing well in blast testing, challenges were 

discovered integrating it onto the current Humvee chassis, including the automotive and performance issues. 

General Flynn, can you describe some of the challenges in integrating the capsule onto the Humvees? 

General FLYNN. Yes, Senator. We’re trying to look at a cost-effective way of making our light tactical vehicle fleet last longer and 

be able to perform in the current threat environment. We looked 

at the capsule. The idea was to build a survivable capsule that 

could fit on an existing frame, using the existing drive train and 

power plant. What we found is when we married the two up we did 

significant frame damage when we took it out and tested it out in 

the field. 

It did well in blast testing. So now we have to look at what 

would be the cost of redoing the frame and would we have to redesign a frame? 

A similar effort is what we’re looking at in structural blast channel, the chimney, that is again taking a look at an existing frame, 

an existing power plant and a power train, and seeing if we could 

recapitalize that way. Where we’re at in that, it is doing well in 

its blast testing. Recently we took it out to the Nevada Automotive 

Test Center and we’re seeing how its frame has done. In some 

cases we’ve seen some frame damage. 

Now, we have to analyze and say, okay, what’s causing the frame 

to be damaged? Is it weight? Is it how we’re marrying it up? Is it 

how the frame was manufactured? Was it manufactured to the 

right tolerances? So we’re all in the information-gathering, information analysis part. But we definitely are trying to pursue some 

23 

way of recapitalizing the light vehicle fleet at an affordable cost 

and getting us an acceptable level of protection. 

Senator HAGAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator REED. Thank you, Senator Hagan. 

I think one of the obvious impressions in the questioning of everyone is that these are a series of very critical decisions that are 

interrelated in so many different ways; the Navy shipbuilding program in terms of accommodating whatever you decide to build as 

an ACV, et cetera. 

There’s another aspect of this. The Nunn-McCurdy breach, at 

that point there was the decision to reduce the total number of 

EFVs and to complement them with the MPC, and you face a milestone B decision next year, basically. That raises the issue again 

of what is the relationship between the new ACV and the MPC? 

Is that part of the analysis? 

Then there is a whole set of issues. One, if you can reduce the 

speed and increase the armor of the ACV, does that mean it can 

act in some respects as a replacement for in certain cases the MPC, 

that you can reduce the total there? 

I know General Flynn has been extraordinarily, I think, thoughtful about systems engineering and making decisions early. But 

there’s a whole set of decisions that go not just to the replacement 

EFV, but to the MPC, LCACs, and a host of other things. 

General Flynn? 

General FLYNN. Sir, when we cancelled the EFV the best option 

at the time that we had was to simultaneously pursue potentially 

three alternatives or three programs together. One was the new 

ACV, one was the MPC, and one was service life extension to the 

AAV. 

I don’t have the final answer for you as to say in the future are 

we going to be pursuing all three, two, or one. We’re working 

through the data right now. We’re working through the AoA to do 

that. The MPC was added to the mix as a way of trying to get cost 

back then under control for the EFV. It was a less expensive vehicle, and we were trying to meet the cost requirements back then 

by doing a mixed fleet. 

That’s back on the table now and we have to do that quickly, because I know in the current program there is a milestone B decision, I think in fiscal year 2014. So we need to get to those answers 

quickly, and that’s one of the reasons why as we pursue our way 

forward on this we need to be able to do an AoA faster than we 

have traditionally or historically done. In the past it’s taken 18 

months to do an AoA. We need to do that in about 9 months. At 

the same time, we need to be able to be pursuing some type of technology demonstrator so we can determine what the real requirement is going to be, because right now I wouldn’t commit to all 

three and say we’re definitely going to do all three. I don’t think 

that would be wise at this time because I don’t have the data to 

back up a decision like that, sir. 

Senator REED. Mr. Secretary, you have $12 million in the budget 

for the AoA. Is that enough, given the complexity of evaluating several moving parts? 

Mr. STACKLEY. Yes, sir. The budget that you’re looking at today 

was best estimates put together in a pretty constrained period of 

24 

time, and I can guarantee you we have adjustments coming. An 

AoA by itself doesn’t require a whole lot of money. 

Senator REED. Right. 

Mr. STACKLEY. So I don’t think the AoA is going to be the issue. 

It’s going to be some of the other costs. We have a lot of talent from 

the EFV program that we don’t want to lose. So what we have to 

do is get productive work for them consistent with the time line 

that General Flynn described for technology demonstrator. I think 

that’s really where we want to be investing dollars, is on identifying those mature technologies that would apply to a future amphibious vehicle. 

The 9-month timeline for an AoA is more aggressive than most, 

but we’re not starting standing still. We’re not starting with a 

clean sheet of paper, and the last thing we want to do is disband 

the corporate knowledge that we have and have to bring brand new 

folks in and climb the learning curve for the AoA. So we want to 

leverage the hot operation that we have from the EFV as we transition. 

Then the question on the MPC and its role. We’re bringing all 

three of these—the AAV SLEP, the MPC, and the ACV—together, 

same room, same group of people managing the capability, recognizing that we have one pot of money that’s going to have to manage both the development and ultimately procurement of the vehicles and the necessary upgrades. 

So do we have an MPC plus ACV fleet? We’re going to look real 

hard at whether or not that makes sense. 

Senator REED. Another aspect here is LCAC is something you’re 

looking at with a new ship-to-shore connector program. Is that 

group going to be in the room, too? That begs the question, too, and 

then obviously the Navy in terms of the amphib fleet, the basic delivery vessels, they’ll be in the room, too? Are we looking outside 

the proverbial box at all these interrelated issues to make a comprehensive presentation? 

Mr. STACKLEY. Yes, sir. Let me describe a couple things there. 

The LCAC SLEP is wrapping up now and we’re going out very 

shortly here with a request for proposal for the ship-to-shore connector. Its set of requirements are set and the things that the shipto-shore connector would be carrying are well set. So we don’t see 

the ship-to-shore connector’s performance requirements changing 

as a result of the discussion with regards to the amphibious vehicle. But it might impact the quantity that we end up procuring. 

Senator REED. Thank you. 

Just one other question, then I’ll recognize the ranking member. 

As General Flynn said, we’d like to think that all of these decisions 

are driven by threats and doctrine, but we know there’s a budget 

lurking around every corner that has to be met, too. But part of 

your conclusion is going to be based on can the Navy neutralize the 

opposition on the shore, successfully get the marines either 25 nautical miles or 10 nautical miles from the launch point in a changing 

environment, air threats, cyber threats, et cetera. 

So just if you could comment briefly on that, Admiral Blake. 

Then specifically, both you and Secretary Stackley about the mine 

countermeasure module, because some areas which we would anticipate a potential use of amphibious forces the most significant 

25 

threat would be mines. So Admiral Blake, then Secretary Stackley, 

and then I’ll recognize Senator Wicker. 

Admiral BLAKE. Sir, I think what you’re referring to in general 

terms is anti-access. I think the Navy has put in place a number 

of programs. I’ll only hit a couple of the highlights. We won’t go 

delving down into every detail. But I think we’ve put together a 

family of systems. We’ve bundled them together and we’ve said this 

is how we think we can engage, if you will, in the anti-access environment. 

One of the premier ones would be Naval Integrated Fires 

Counter-Air. That program is, as I said, a family of systems. It 

comes in two varieties, if you will, from the air and from the sea. 

There are key components within that, everything from the E–2D, 

the aircraft, to the SM–6 missile. Then you’re going down, of 

course, to the Aegis ships, Aegis cruisers and destroyers. I think 

that’s how you sort of look at it, and we are evolving that. 

The second one I would mention is the Surface Electronic Warfare Improvement Program. We recognize that we have to make 

advances there because of the proliferation of systems, and that is 

one of the areas where we will have three levels, and each one 

builds on the other so that we put it as the potential adversary 

evolves so do we evolve. 

You mentioned mine warfare briefly. We recognize that the LCS 

module for the mine warfare is a key component and we have to 

get it out there. We have to get it out there because we have to 

get the man or the woman out of the minefield. Right now the way 

we deal with it is the individual has to go into the minefield in 

order to clear it. We’ve recognized that. 

One of the key components of that program for the LCS is that 

we get that individual out of the minefield. If we don’t, then we are 

going to have to look at the current capability we have, which is 

in programs like the Avenger class, which keeps a man in the 

minefield. Then we recognize we’ll have to extend that program. 

We do not want to do that. We want to get the LCS modules out 

there. 

Indications are now that we are going to get that module out 

there on time. So we believe we have a way ahead and that we will 

address the issue, as you put it. 

Senator REED. Just for the record, Secretary Stackley, on time? 

Mr. STACKLEY. Yes, sir. Let me add on to what Admiral Blake 

said. The mine countermeasures (MCM) mission package actually 

gets delivered in phases. So we have a four-phased approach. It’s 

incremental capability, and so the first increment initial operational capability (IOC) is in 2013. The key pieces we have there, 

we have the remote mine-hunting system (RMS), which has gone 

through Nunn-McCurdy and has been rebaselined, restructured to 

improve its reliability, but all the other performance parameters 

have been met for the RMS. 

The other elements are: a sensor system, where we have a sensor 

system today that’s operated off of an aircraft, that provides orders 

of magnitude greater capability than what the current MCM fleet 

provides. What we’re working on is we fall short of the key performance parameters (KPP) by about 5 percent. So we have a system that’s order of magnitude more capable, doesn’t meet the full 

26 

KPP. So we’re looking at, okay, let’s test it with what we have, let’s 

field it with what we have, and let’s figure out is it worth the 

added investment to get the other 5 percent. 

So the first increment, right now we’re still holding to a 2013 

date. Then the subsequent increments provide added capability. As 

I described, the first increment will provide a capability equivalent 

to your MCM fleet. The added capability, what it will do is increase 

your sweep rates. so basically you can cover a greater area over 

less amount of time, and also allow us to retire the MH–53, the airborne mine countermeasure program that we have today. 

So many piece parts that have to be integrated together. One of 

the things that we’ve done there is we’ve taken the piece parts and 

put them all inside of one program executive officer for a LCS. So 

we’re bringing the mission packages, the ship, the test and evaluation team, and the in-service team all together in one organization, 

and we have to ensure it’s robustly funded. 

The history of these systems is when these ships were struggling 

the funding was cut on the mission package side. Now we have the 

ships up in production, we have this lag that we have to overcome 

on the development side, and we’re focused on that because it is 

a priority. 

Senator REED. Thank you. 

Senator Wicker. 

Senator WICKER. Secretary Stackley, the decision to cancel the 

EFV, how close of a call was that? 

Mr. STACKLEY. Sir, to be honest, I wasn’t part of that decision. 

Senator WICKER. Okay, that’s a fair answer. 

If we had proceeded on with the EFV, when would the first vehicles have been available for our troops? 

Mr. STACKLEY. In 2016. We had about another year, this year 

plus a year in terms of development, and then we go through the 

operational testing, to lead to IOC. The full operational capability 

would be about a decade later. 

Senator WICKER. So what is the answer? 

Mr. STACKLEY. It would have been 2016 for the IOC. 

Senator WICKER. Available for the troops. 

General FLYNN. Sir, to make that clear, in 2016 we would have 

had one set for a battalion, but it would have taken us to 2026 to 

buy the whole 570-some odd vehicles. 

Senator WICKER. Okay. Best guess, if we instead moved to the 

ACV concept, when will they be available for the troops? 

Mr. STACKLEY. Let me describe that. I talked about the three different capabilities that we’re looking at between the MPC, the AAV 

SLEP, and the ACV. 

Senator WICKER. Right. 

Mr. STACKLEY. We’re looking at tradeoffs between those three capabilities. So for example, what we’d like to do is move forward on 

a technology demonstrator for the ACV, about a 2-year effort, to 

take a vehicle and demonstrate its capability, and see if we can go 

from there into the completion of development, where you’d have 

that same IOC that was 2016 for an EFV, could be in the 2017, 

2018 timeframe. 

So you’re really in the same ballpark in terms of time that we 

had with the EFV program, and what we would do is as we look 

27 

at this, do we want to go forward with the MPC as a stand-alone 

program, that would slide left or slide right depending on what we 

decided on the ACV. 

Senator WICKER. The prime contractor of the EFV very vigorously disagrees with the decision of DOD, and they have an estimate saying let’s finish what we’ve started with 200. They estimate 

that doing so would cost $4.6 billion, and that would be less than 

the combined cost of termination and replacement, which all told 

would be $6.1 billion. What do you say to that? 

General FLYNN. Sir, first of all, 200 vehicles doesn’t meet the requirement. Two hundred vehicles does not give us the capability to 

do a two-brigade operation. It falls short in the number of vehicles. 

The other part is the O&M cost of those vehicles. It’s not just the 

procurement cost of the vehicles; it’s also the O&M cost of the individual vehicles, which was another reason why the decision was 

made to cancel the program. 

Then we’d also have the challenge of having to have a mixed vehicle fleet with different capabilities. So 200 vehicles does not meet 

the requirement and it gives us a mixed vehicle fleet. 

Senator WICKER. You might have that under this three-pronged 

approach. 

General FLYNN. No, sir. The three-pronged approach, the AAV 

SLEP would have been designed to give us the time. Even if we 

were fielding the EFV, we would have had to have invested in extending the life of the AAV because of the time limit that it would 

take us to go from IOC in 2016 to full operational capability in 

2026. So we would have to do an AAV SLEP along the way to 

bridge the gap. 

Senator WICKER. So there’s not much difference, in your judgment, in the cost of the AAV SLEP based on the termination of the 

EFV? You would have had to do that in either scenario. 

General FLYNN. We would have had to have done some type of 

SLEP in survivability, mobility, and communications to get the vehicle mix, because we would have only been purchasing 50 vehicles 

a year. 

Senator WICKER. Gentlemen, I’m learning a lot today, and I 

guess that’s the point of these hearings. It occurs to me that we 

really don’t know how much we’re going to save because of this decision to cancel the EFV because we don’t know what we’re going 

to replace it with. 

I think, General, your testimony is that of the three-pronged approach to where we go from here, we’re not sure which ones we’re 

going to do; is that correct? 

General FLYNN. That would be correct, sir. I’m not ready to tell 

you what the specific vehicle mix would be until I got a better idea 

of the cost-capability trades that we could get and the capabilities 

of each of those individual programs. 

Senator WICKER. Mr. Secretary, what’s your most informed estimate for this subcommittee of how much we’re saving because of 

the cancellation of the EFV program? 

Mr. STACKLEY. Yes, sir. We’re going to do these all in constant 

year dollars. Today the estimate for the EFV at 573—not 200, at 

573—is north of $17 million. It’s approaching $18 million per vehicle. Now, we’re going to put requirements on the table and do some 

28 

trades to get to a more affordable vehicle. You’re not going to get 

the same capability at any significant cost reduction. So we have 

to trade off capability. 

Senator WICKER. Yes, we’re going to get a slower vehicle and a 

less capable vehicle for sure. 

Mr. STACKLEY. Yes, sir. What we’re going to do is, as General 

Flynn described, get requirements and acquisition in the room at 

the same time, open up, unlock the requirements, and price out a 

more affordable vehicle, where you take those KPPs on things like 

speed, range, level of protection, and number of marines that you’re 

carrying, and instead of saying it will be the following, we create 

a range. So there’s a range of speed, for example, that we’re going 

to put on the table and that will influence everything from the size 

of the engine to endurance and things of that nature. 

So in doing that, we’ve gone one time through in terms of just 

a rough idea to figure out no-less-than values, what would it cost. 

While we are talking about an $8 to $10 million vehicle, the first 

cut going around is more like a $10 to $12 million vehicle. So 

there’s that. Today if you asked me a best-informed estimate, I 

would tell you that we’re going to be going from an $18 million vehicle to a $2 million vehicle based on what we know today, but 

we’re very, very early in the process with the focus on figuring out, 

okay, how do we get that cost down further. 

But we’re going to trade off capability to do that. We’re going to 

trade off speed, and we’re looking at things like a mix of ACV vessels, for example, where they don’t all have to have the same level 

of capability when it comes to things like command and control, 

communications package, or maybe even lethality when you get to 

the gun system that’s embarked on board. 

General FLYNN. Senator, one area where we’ve learned a lot is 

in the area of protection. So there is an opportunity right now to 

take advantage of everything we’ve learned on protection in the 

next hull design, because if we have three big areas that we’re 

looking at right now as to how to make this affordable in terms of 

capability, obviously it’s performance over the whole mission set, 

not just the ship-to-shore transit, which is water speed, but also 

the performance on land and the protection that’s needed. 

By some of the other discussions we’ve had today, hull design 

could change significantly in this, and that’s why it’s important 

that we pursue a technology demonstrator to see if that protection’s 

going to be different, because that’s one thing that’s changed a lot 

over the last 10 years, is our approach to protection and the different technologies available to do it. 

The third factor that we have to look at is habitability, which 

also affects how the marines do in the back of the vehicle. That’s 

one of the reasons as the program cancellation is proceeding one 

of the key things we’re going to do with the technology demonstrators or the system demonstrator vehicles this summer is we’re 

going to do some habitability experimentation to see how the marines embarked on the vehicles do in different lengths of time in 

the back of the vehicle. Air quality, air temperature, all of that affects your ability to fight when you get out of the vehicle. 

So we’re going to take a look at that, and that’s going to inform 

some of these tradeoffs that we’re going to have to make, so that 

29 

we can get from an $18 million vehicle somewhere down to a $10 

to $12 million vehicle. 

The other point about the 200 vehicles, sir, is the cost would have grown from $18 million to well over $20 million a vehicle. 

That was one of the other reasons why we didn’t think that was 

affordable. 

Senator WICKER. You heard Secretary Stackley’s answer to my 

question about whether this was a close call. He said he was not 

really involved at that level. How close of a call was it in your estimation? 

General FLYNN. Sir, I don’t know how close of a call it was, but 

I would tell you it was difficult. All these decisions are difficult. It 

was a difficult decision because we realized how much we had invested in the program. But there was also a realism that, could 

this be affordable. The graphs that we have here, we were facing 

a pretty stark budget reality. So the reality was when you look at 

where we were on budget, whether we could afford the capability, 

and what had changed over time in terms of threat, and in terms 

of the Navy’s ability to do it. 

Although it was a difficult decision, I believe it was the right decision to do it, sir. 

Senator WICKER. If it turns out it was a $15 million vehicle instead of $12 million vehicle, it becomes a dicier choice, doesn’t it? 

That’s not outside the realm of possibility. 

Mr. STACKLEY. It’s not outside the realm of possibility, but I don’t 

see us heading on that course. Affordability is going to be a heavy 

factor in determining the design of the ACV. So if we find ourselves 

ending up in the $15 million per vehicle range, we’re going back 

into the requirements to figure out how do we get that cost back 

down so we can get the quantity that’s needed to perform the mission. 

But today we don’t have information that is looking at a $15 million a copy vehicle. 

Senator WICKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This has been most 

informative and it does occur to me that we’re well served by these 

gentlemen in front of us. 

Mr. STACKLEY. Can I take one more piece on? This discussion 

today, this is beyond just a hearing and beyond just a briefing. 

What we’re serious about is doing this work as transparently as 

possible. We set up a war room just for having discussion across 

the table, sometimes government to government, and potentially 

down the road with industry. But this story is going to continue to 

unfold with time and we intend to make ourselves available as 

your questions continue. I know it’s been a hard spot in the past 

and we want to get to a better place in that regard. 

Senator REED. Let me associate myself with the thoughtful comment of my colleague that this was a very productive hearing, as 

a result of your questions particularly. 

I want to thank you, gentlemen, not only for your testimony, but 

for your service. Also, there may be other colleagues that have 

written questions which will be submitted, and I would ask everyone to get those questions in, let’s say before next Wednesday for 

your prompt response. I know you’re taking one for the record for 

Senator Hagan already. 

30 

Mr. STACKLEY. Yes, sir. 

Senator REED. Gentlemen, thank you very much for your service 

and for your testimony. 

With that, the hearing is adjourned. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JACK REED

NAVAL SURFACE FIRE SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS

1. Senator REED. Vice Admiral Blake and General Flynn, in my opening statement I mentioned the long-term efforts to address some very important problems, 

including the need to improve fire support capability, both organic Marine Corps fire 

support and Navy shore fire support. I also referred to the mixed results we have 

achieved to date addressing that problem. Please describe what your efforts have 

achieved to date in improving fire support capability for sustaining Marine Corps 

forces in a conflict. 

Admiral BLAKE. In 2005, the ‘‘Joint Fires in Support of Expeditionary Operations 

in the Littorals’’ Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) documented four gaps in our 

fires capabilities: 

(1) The ability to transmit/receive targeting information from Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) sources to Command and Control systems 

assets; 

(2) The ability to engage moving targets in adverse weather; 

(3) The ability to engage known targets when friendly forces are in close contact 

or when collateral damage is a concern; and 

(4) The ability to provide volume fires to suppress targets. 

For Gap (1), the Navy-Marine Corps team focused on three areas: Unmanned Air 

Systems (UAS), Target Processing Systems, and Counter-fire Radar. Unmanned air 

systems provide expanding warfighting options and are frequently employed in conjunction with ground spotters to improve targeting. For target processing systems, 

the Naval Fire Control System (NFCS) automates shipboard naval fires planning 

and coordination for DDG–81 and following hulls (currently fielded). The Supporting 

Arms Coordination Center-Automated (SACC–A), integrates the capability to plan 

and coordinate supporting arms fires on LHA/LHDs (currently fielded). The Distributed Common Ground Station-Navy (DCGS–N) will employ common geopositioning 

services capable of deriving aim points for precision coordinate seeking weapons 

(Initial Operational Capability (IOC) planned for 2011). POM 12 investments to address Gap (1) include: Intelligence Carry-on Program (ICOP) and Multi-Function 

Radar (MFR). ICOP will provide critical ISR capabilities to unit level platforms and 

forces ashore (IOC planned for 2015). MFR will provide a sea-based counter-fire capability to the DDG–1000 (IOC planned for 2016). 

Gaps (2) and (3) are addressed by a number of systems including tactical aircraft 

(TACAIR) delivering weaponry specific to the threat. Over the last 20 years, NavyMarine Corps aviation has significantly increased its target prosecution capability 

through use of improved aircraft-to-weapon connectivity that enables in-flight target 

updates to data link equipped weapons. Today a single aircraft can attack multiple 

targets. Additionally, there are a number of currently, or soon to be, fielded weapons 

that are critical to ‘‘mitigating’’ these gaps including: 

- Tactical Tomahawk (currently fielded) 

- Low Collateral Damage Bomb (currently fielded) 

- Joint Stand Off Weapon (currently fielded) 

- Direct Attack Moving Target Capability (IOC planned for 2011). 

- Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (IOC planned for 2011) 

- Harvest Hawk Airborne Weapon Mission Kit (currently fielded) 

POM 12 investments to address Gaps (2 & 3) include: The Joint Air-to-Ground 

Missile (JAGM) and Small Diameter Bomb (SDB) Increment II. Both improve our 

ability to deliver precision fires and address moving targets in adverse weather (IOC 

planned for 2016). 

To address Gap (4), the ability to mass aircraft, missiles, and NSFS can under 

most scenarios provide volume fires when needed. There are over one hundred 5’’ 

guns in the CG/DDG fleet today, all with a 13nm range and most of which have 

a fire control system that has much improved accuracy over previous systems. Additionally, the TACAIR leg of our ‘‘Fires Triad’’ (TACAIR, sea-based fires, groundbased fires) provides a significant improvement in the volume of fires as compared 

to past generations of aircraft and munitions. POM 12 investments to address Gap 

31 

(4) include: DDG–1000’s Advanced Gun System (AGS) with its Long Range Land Attack Projectile (LRLAP), and Electro-Magnetic Rail Gun (EMRG). LRLAP will have 

the capability to deliver precision and volume fires (IOC planned for 2016). In future 

years, EMRG may offer a system that could launch projectiles at ranges over 

100nm. The Office of Naval Research’s EMRG Innovative Naval Prototype (INP) effort is underway and the system could IOC in the 2025 timeframe. 

General FLYNN. The character of future operations in the littorals has been proffered in several key Marine Corps and Naval documents, to include Operational Maneuver From The Sea and Ship-to-Objective Maneuver (STOM). These future visions 

call for an increased capability with regard to fire support, especially during the 

critical transition of combat power ashore. We have made great strides in improving 

the aviation and ground-based fires but much work still is needed with naval surface fires. The STOM concept of operations identifies the need for fires throughout 

the littoral battlespace in order to support both the vertical and surface assault elements of the amphibious force. Effective fire support is provided by a combination 

of tactical aviation, naval surface fires, and ground-based indirect fires. This triad 

will ensure that the supported commander has fires available when and where he 

needs them. The complementary nature of the triad is essential. 

DoN/USMC Aviation are investing in two weapon systems for air-to-ground employment that will help mitigate fire support gaps. 

1. The JAGM will be the replacement air-to-ground missile for current Hellfire, 

TOW, and Maverick missile systems. It has a tri-mode seeker (millimeter wave 

(MMW), Semi-active Laser (SAL), and Imaging Infrared (IIR)) and is an allweather, forward-firing, low collateral damage weapon for both moving and 

stationary targets. IOC for use on AH-1Z aircraft is 2016. 

2. The SDB II is the second iteration (first for USMC/DoN) of the miniature munition weapon system family. It uses a tri-mode seeker (mmW, SAL, IIR) and 

will provide the F–35B increased standoff against defended targets. It is a 250 

lb. weapon, that will give the JSF the advantage of increased kills per sortie 

compared to current families of 500, 1000, and 2000 lb weapons. It has day 

and night capability against fixed and moving targets in all weather conditions. IOC for use on F–35B is 2018. 

The Marine Corps has made considerable investments in fire support programs 

over the last two decades resulting in significant improvements in organic, groundbased fires support. The principal programs are: 

1. High-Mobility Artillery Rocket System 

2. M777A2 Light Weight 155mm Howitzer 

3. Expeditionary Fire Support System includes weapon system and development 

of Precision Extended Range Munitions 

4. Improved 81mm and 60mm mortars 

5. Family of Artillery Munitions (Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munition 

replacement and munitions modernization) 

6. Rocket Assisted Projectile replacement 

7. Infrared 155mm Illumination 

8. BiSpectral Smoke 

9. Non-incendiary smoke 

10. Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System 

2. Senator REED. Vice Admiral Blake and Lieutenant General Flynn, what plans 

are represented in the budget and the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) to address this problem? 

Admiral BLAKE. In 2005, the ‘‘Joint Fires in Support of Expeditionary Operations 

in the Littorals’’ ICD documented four gaps in our fires capabilities: 

(1) The ability to transmit/receive targeting information from ISR sources to Command and Control systems assets; 

(2) The ability to engage moving targets in adverse weather; 

(3) The ability to engage known targets when friendly forces are in close contact 

or when collateral damage is a concern; and 

(4) The ability to provide volume fires to suppress targets. 

For Gap (1), the Navy-Marine Corps team focused on three areas: Unmanned Air 

Systems (UAS), Target Processing Systems, and Counter-fire Radar. Unmanned air 

systems provide expanding warfighting options and are frequently employed in conjunction with ground spotters to improve targeting. For target processing systems, 

the NFCS automates shipboard naval fires planning and coordination for DDG 81 

and following hulls (currently fielded). The SACC–A, integrates the capability to 

plan and coordinate supporting arms fires on LHA/LHDs (currently fielded). The 

DCGS–N will employ common geopositioning services capable of deriving aim points 

32 

for precision coordinate seeking weapons (Initial Operational Capability (IOC) 

planned for 2011). POM 12 investments to address Gap (1) include: ICOP and MFR. 

ICOP will provide critical ISR capabilities to unit level platforms and forces ashore 

(IOC planned for 2015). MFR will provide a sea-based counter-fire capability to the 

DDG–1000 (IOC planned for 2016). 

Gaps (2) and (3) are addressed by a number of systems including TACAIR delivering weaponry specific to the threat. Over the last 20 years, Navy-Marine Corps 

aviation has significantly increased its target prosecution capability through investment in precision munitions with advanced guidance capabilities and data linked 

weapons, both of which contribute to the ability of TACAIR assets to prosecute targets in challenging weather conditions and in close proximity to friendly forces. Additionally, there are a number of currently, or soon to be, fielded weapons that are 

critical to ‘‘mitigating’’ these gaps including: 

- Low Collateral Damage Bomb (currently fielded) 

- Joint Stand Off Weapon (currently fielded) 

- Direct Attack Moving Target Capability (IOC planned for 2011). 

- Advanced Precision Kill Weapons System (IOC Planned for late fiscal year 2011 

- Harvest Hawk Airborne Weapons Mission Kit (Initial kits fielded) 

POM 12 investments to address Gaps (2 & 3) include: The JAGM and SDB Increment II. Both improve our ability to deliver precision fires and address moving targets in adverse weather (IOC planned for 2016). 

To address Gap (4), the ability to mass aircraft, missiles, and NSFS can under 

most scenarios provide volume fires when needed. There are over 100 5′′ guns in 

the CG/DDG fleet today, all with a 13nm range and most of which have a fire control system that has much improved accuracy over previous systems. Additionally, 

the TACAIR leg of our ‘‘Fires Triad’’ (TACAIR, sea-based fires, ground-based fires) 

provides a significant improvement in the volume of fires as compared to past generations of aircraft and munitions. POM 12 investments to address Gap (4) include: 

DDG–1000’s AGS with its LRLAP, and EMRG. LRLAP will have the capability to 

deliver precision and volume fires (IOC planned for 2016). In future years, EMRG 

may offer a system that could launch projectiles at ranges over 100nm. The Office 

of Naval Research’s EMRG INP effort is underway and the system could IOC in the 

2025 timeframe. 

General FLYNN. The Marine Corps does not plan or budget for NSFS capabilities. 

The DDG–1000 is the Navy’s only funded Program of Record for NSFS. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROGER F. WICKER

EXPEDITIONARY FIGHTING VEHICLE

3. Senator WICKER. Secretary Stackley, the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) 

program went through a Nunn-McCurdy breach and recertification in 2007 during 

which the Department of Defense (DOD) certified to Congress that requirements for 

an amphibious assault capability were still operationally necessary and that the 

most cost-effective means to achieve that capability was the EFV. Not much has 

changed in terms of the need for the Marine Corps to have the capability to carry 

out an amphibious assault. If anything, the area denial capabilities of our adversaries that would oppose Navy-Marine Corps amphibious operations have increased. 

What leads DOD and the Navy to believe that lesser requirements for a vehicle like 

the EFV are adequate to accomplish the amphibious assault mission? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Based on the assessment conducted in support of NunnMcCurdy certification requirements, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

validated that ‘‘The Amphibious Joint Forcible Entry Operations capabilities defined 

by the EFV Capabilities Production Document remain essential to national security.’’ The most essential of those capabilities were: 

• the ability to self-deploy from over-the-horizon, thus reducing the reliance 

on surface connectors whose limit of advance was the beach or a port; 

• the ability to carry a reinforced squad of marines in a single lift to facilitate the rapid buildup and projection of combat power; 

• the inherent protection against most likely threats encountered during 

the early phases of projection ashore (ballistic threats from enemy combatant direct-fire weapons). 

While the tactical advantages of at-sea speed capability provided by the EFV are 

not dismissed, the principal driving factor leading to the EFV’s water speed requirement was the assumption that Marines would not be combat ready after spending 

more than a hour in the vehicle at sea—a legacy of the current amphibious assault 

33 

vehicle (AAV). Testing conducted during the EFV’s development indicated that improvements in habitability (air conditioning and improved vehicle exhaust) may permitted Marines to ride in the vehicle longer without suffering ill effects associated 

with the legacy AAV. Confirmation testing is currently planned to occur in the Aug/ 

Sept timeframe. At-sea speed requirements were a significant system complexity 

and cost driver. With information gained from EFV testing, we are reevaluating atsea speed requirement. 

Our requirement remains to be able to deploy from amphibious shipping from 

over-the-visual-horizon but at ranges less than 25 nm. The Navy has supported 

campaign analysis and a war game, examining scenarios requiring power projection 

from the sea using the EFV as well as the legacy AAV and our current and projected suite of air assault connectors. The analysis used official threat assessments 

and modeled battlespace preparation in order to define threats to landings. The 

analysis assessed concurrent and separate landings from 25 nm with one force using 

EFV and another force using AAVs delivered by Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC). 

The analysis did not specifically compare EFV and AAV, in that the forces landed 

were in different locations and facing different opposition. While both missions were 

accomplished, suggesting that the EFV may not be required, higher risk was incurred using the LCAC/AAV as a result of a slower build-up of combat power 

ashore. 

Using fielded and planned capabilities to conduct pre-assault battlespace preparation, the Navy assessed that U.S. weapons and sensors will allow amphibious ships 

to operate at 12 nm from the coast with acceptable risk against any residual 

threats. In March 2010, the Office of Program Appraisal ‘‘Assuring Operational Access’’ Wargame conducted three separate and distinct excursions using the then Program of Record (EFV), the current capability set (AAV) and alternative capabilities 

(Marine Expeditionary Maneuver Vehicle (MEMV) (notional), and Ultra Heavy-lift 

Amphibious Connector (UHAC) (experimental)). The results indicated that each option with its CONOPs has slightly different risks, but similar successful outcomes. 

As part of our ongoing systems engineering analysis and in the analysis of alternatives to be conducted in support of the EFV’s replacement, we intend to evaluate 

the costs and operational effectiveness of high vs. lower water speeds as well as distance requirements. 

4. Senator WICKER. Secretary Stackley, do the Navy and the Marine Corps stand 

behind the requirement to conduct amphibious operations against a defended shoreline, or can requirements and costs be reduced to support landings in only 

uncontested areas? In other words, is the amphibious assault mission still relevant 

for the future? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, the amphibious assault mission is relevant now and in 

the future, as it has been throughout recorded history. 

An amphibious assault, as defined by the Department of Defense, ‘‘involves establishing a force on a hostile or potentially hostile shore.’’ As that definition implies, 

an amphibious assault is not necessarily against a defended shoreline. In fact, Marine Corps maneuver warfare doctrine specifically espouses avoiding fixed defenses 

if at all possible. This doctrine reflects both common sense and operational experience. In 1943 General A.A. Vandegrift, who was awarded the Medal of Honor for 

his command of the 1st Marine Division at Guadalcanal, summarized his experience 

in the Solomon Islands campaign. ‘‘A comparison of the several landings’’ he said, 

‘‘leads to the inescapable conclusion that landings should not be attempted in the 

face of organized resistance if, by any combination of march or maneuver, it is possible to land unopposed within striking distance of the objective.’’ That is exactly 

what the Marine Corps is advocating in the ship-to-objective maneuver concept. 

What General Vandegrift clearly understood was that in war the enemy gets a 

vote. While it is always preferable to avoid a contested landing, that option is not 

always available. Thus, when conducting amphibious operations in a hostile or uncertain environment, the Navy-Marine Corps team must do so from a ready-to-fight 

posture. 

We are in an era of great uncertainty. The Secretary of Defense himself has acknowledged that the United States has been ineffective at predicting the next conflict. In order to protect U.S. citizens and interests overseas when crises erupt, we 

must maintain our capability to project power—and that includes projecting power 

in the face of armed opposition. Amphibious power is the only sustainable means 

of doing so. 

5. Senator WICKER. Secretary Stackley, fundamentally, what has changed since 

the Nunn-McCurdy certification in 2007 that favored continuing the EFV as the 

most cost-effective way to meet the amphibious assault requirement? 

34 

Secretary STACKLEY. The requirement has not changed. As stated by the Secretary of Defense, we are firm in the requirement for a Marine Corps amphibious 

combat vehicle (ACV). It is the key to allowing ship-to-shore operations in permissive, uncertain, and hostile environments; assuring access where infrastructure is 

destroyed or nonexistent; and creating joint access in defended areas. 

What has changed, however, is that since 2007 unit costs for all other vehicles 

have risen substantially, on the order of 300 to almost 500 percent, over their predecessors. The enhanced threat environment in Iraq and Afghanistan has pushed increased counter improvised explosive device and location requirements onto all future combat and tactical vehicles. At the same time, C4/ISR capabilities, requirements and costs have increased significantly. These fiscal pressures combined with 

fiscal pressure across all other investment categories have forced the Marine Corps 

to develop a top-to-bottom approach that affected the EFV program. 

6. Senator WICKER. Secretary Stackley, when the Marine Corps provided information to Congress in January supporting the decision to end the EFV program, the 

case for termination was made by citing the affordability of the EFV, not whether 

the EFV would be reliable and capable of meeting mission requirements. The Marine Corps said that continuing with the EFV would: consume about half the Marine 

Corps total procurement budget for 2018–2025; consume all of the budget that was 

projected to be available for procurement of ground combat vehicles over that period; 

and consume about 90 percent of the operation and maintenance (O&M) budget for 

Marine Corps ground vehicles when the EFV was fully fielded. These cost projections were made against historical cost averages. The affordability concerns raised 

by the Marine Corps are significant, but should we allow comparisons to historical 

costs drive an assessment of what is required to do the mission? 

Secretary STACKLEY. The Marine Corps provides the Nation with a comprehensive 

capability that is neither defined by nor limited by a single vehicle platform. In 

order to maintain that capability and to improve it to meet future challenges and 

threats, we must consider affordability. In the case of EFV as with all of our other 

programs, the Marine Corps did not measure costs of future systems strictly against 

those of legacy systems. 

Over the next two decades the Marine Corps will replace or upgrade a large portion of the ground combat and tactical vehicle inventory. The Corps assessed the affordability of EFV along with other key elements of its ground combat and tactical 

vehicles against several affordability metrics, one of which was based on historical 

vehicle investments projected into the future. EFV was unaffordable by every metric 

but it is just as important to note that even without EFV, the potential required 

investment in vehicle modernization and sustainment is also unaffordable when 

measured against the same metrics which means that our fiscal trade-space within 

the vehicle portfolio is very limited, even for a capability as important as that provided by an ACV. 

7. Senator WICKER. Secretary Stackley, since almost all new procurement programs are more technically sophisticated than the equipment they replace, is the 

historical cost of legacy programs relevant to the requirements needed to execute 

the mission today? 

Secretary STACKLEY. The Marine Corps assessed the affordability of EFV along 

with other key elements of its ground combat and tactical vehicles against several 

affordability metrics, one of which was based on historical vehicle investments projected into the future. EFV was unaffordable by every metric, but it is just as important to note that even without EFV the potential required investment in vehicle 

modernization and sustainment is also unaffordable when measured against the 

same metrics. This effectively means that our fiscal trade-space within the vehicle 

portfolio is very limited, even for a capability as important as that provided by an 

ACV. 

Over the next two decades the Marine Corps will replace or upgrade a large portion of the ground combat and tactical vehicle inventory. Unit costs for new vehicles 

have risen substantially, on the order of 300 to almost 500 percent, over their predecessors. At the same time the Marine Corps is facing increasing fiscal pressure 

across all investment categories. 

Previously we have stated that procurement and sustainment of 573 EFVs would 

have: 

• consumed on average 49 percent of the Marine Corps total procurement 

account during the years 2018–2525 (Based on historical average procurement); 

• consumed more than 100 percent of what is projected to be available for 

all procurement of ground vehicles during the years 2018-25; 

35 

• consumed more than 90 percent of the Marine Corps’ vehicle-related operations and maintenance account when fully fielded. 

Our supporting analysis was based on the fact that in recent history the Marine 

Corps has committed about a third of its baseline ground procurement budget to 

ground vehicle programs. Examining the Marine Corps budget historically from fiscal year 1982–2015, and projecting forward based on historical averages, we project 

a total future vehicle procurement budget of $5.9 billion ($TY) during the fiscal year 

2018–2025 timeframe, which is a third of the total ground procurement budget projection of $17.7 billion (TY$). The programmed vehicle procurement cost for EFV 

during the same timeframe was $8.6 billion PMC, which equates to 49 percent of 

the projected total procurement budget and 146 percent of our projected vehicle procurement budget. 

Our supporting analysis also projected available ground equipment O&M funding 

against the O&M requirements for ground vehicles. Since Marine Corps O&M funding is a large account, this analysis focused only on baseline O&M dollars that supported: 

• organizational, intermediate, and depot level maintenance; 

• acquisition and program support costs to include life-cycle management 

and logistics and technical support; 

• sustainment programs associated with current equipment sets, such as 

funding for secondary repairables and corrosion prevention. 

To determine O&M costs and affordability for the EFV, the annual O&M would 

be about 6 percent of the average unit cost of the vehicle, based on the program 

manager’s estimate (analogous to other vehicles). By fiscal year 2027, when the EFV 

was to be fully fielded, we projected that the annual O&M cost for the EFV program 

would be about $750 million, or about 97 percent of the USMC O&M budget allocated to vehicles. While this projection is very coarse, based on historical vehicle 

O&M costs, and the Department would aggressively attack these costs had we pursued procurement of the EFV; without question, the complexity of this vehicle would 

have significantly impacted all other Marine Corps O&M accounts. 

8. Senator WICKER. Secretary Stackley, what sort of methodology or analysis of 

the operational requirements went into making the decision to end the EFV other 

than concern about its cost? 

Secretary STACKLEY. The Marine Corps assessed multiple options to reduce EFV 

program costs balanced against operational (capability, readiness, strategic depth 

and training) risk including: 

(a) Reduced procurement. We looked at various reductions ranging from 37–48 

percent of the Approved Acquisition Objective (AAO) of 573 vehicles. Each 

AAO reduction assessed increased our operational risk. Each reduction option 

decreased or removed EFV from the operating forces, the Reserve component, 

the training support establishment, prepositioned equipment, and the Depot 

Maintenance allowance. 

(b) Capability Modifications. 16 modifications were identified and considered; 

however, only 2 carried acceptable operational risk. 

(c) Compressed procurement cycle. This would have required an additional $1.4 

billion within the FYDP. 

(d) Sustainment of current AAV in current configuration. 

CONCEPT OF SHIP-TO-SHORE MANEUVER

9. Senator WICKER. Vice Admiral Blake, the concept of ship-to-shore maneuver 

supporting the EFV considered anti-ship threats from land-based mobile cruise missiles, air-to-surface weapons, and mines sufficiently serious that amphibious assaults were planned to be launched from over-the-horizon to minimize the chances 

of loss or damage to Navy ships. In the years since the EFV program was started 

in 1996, anti-ship ballistic missile capabilities have been added as a potential threat 

to large Navy ships, including the large-deck amphibious ships, and the sophistication of the other threats has increased. What has changed about the Navy-Marine 

Corps concept of ship-to-shore maneuver that makes the Navy more willing to bring 

marines closer to shore to launch the assault phase? 

Admiral BLAKE. In the 20 years since the EFV Cost and Operational Effectiveness 

Analysis, the threat in the littorals has indeed evolved in new and challenging ways. 

These changes are characterized by the proliferation of anti-ship cruise missiles, 

guided rockets, artillery, mortar and missiles, advanced diesel submarines and 

36 

mines. The threat has also changed with the emergence and evolution of coordinated 

small boat tactics and ‘‘anti-access’’ doctrine. 

The Navy’s area and self defense capabilities have also evolved to pace this 

threat. Key to countering the threat is improved ISR capabilities, and the ability 

to share a common operational picture. The proliferation of Aegis combatants, the 

evolution of AN/SPY–1 radars and the ongoing fielding of the Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) in those combatants represents a significant enhancement 

in both area and self defense capabilities. Additionally, the Naval Integrated Fire 

Control-Counter Air (NIFC–CA) Project Office was established to ensure that the 

Navy and Joint component programs of record (Aegis modernization, CEC, Standard 

Missile-6, and E–2D) are aligned from a systems engineering, integration, and test 

perspective. NIFC–CA expands on the CEC sensor netting capability to provide Engage on Remote Over-The-Horizon air defense capability to engage threats at the 

maximum kinematic range of the missile. For a significant amphibious operation involving a high threat environment, there will also be significant shaping operations 

that occur to reduce risks associated with the threat prior to commencing amphibious operations. 

Amphibious ships have also improved and will continue to improve self defense 

systems. Lower radar cross section (RCS), and the Rolling Airframe Missile improve 

survivability. New gun systems including the Mk 38 MOD 2 25mm gun, the Close 

In Weapons System) Block 1B with anti-surface capability has been mounted on 

LHD and LSD Class ships, and the LPD–17 employs the highly capable and extremely lethal Mk 46 30mm gun. 

Enhanced naval capabilities are also being fielded to address the submarine 

threat. An improved Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) combat system suite as well 

as advanced versions of existing torpedoes greatly enhance our capability to detect, 

track, and engage submarines operating in the littorals. 

The mine threat remains a challenge, but systems such as Littoral Combat Ship 

with Mine Countermeasures Mission Module are being developed to help counter 

this threat from deep water through the surf zone. 

A viable standoff range will provide sufficient reaction time to counter the expected threat with a reasonable amount of risk. Acceptable operational risk is determined by considering the mission, the nature of the threats that can potentially oppose that mission, and the capabilities of friendly forces to counter those threats. 

The final decision to conduct amphibious operations is based on mission requirements and risk, regardless of standoff range. 

10. Senator WICKER. Vice Admiral Blake, if a 25 knot water speed is no longer 

required to launch from about 25 miles from the shore, what range of speed and 

distance from shore are being considered for the EFV’s replacement? 

Admiral BLAKE. Projected speed of the EFV replacement, the ACV, is currently 

8–10 knots. The speed of the amphibious vehicle, the distance traveled, along with 

temperature, sea-state, and cabin atmosphere have a direct impact on a marine’s 

combat effectiveness once ashore. Past studies have indicated that an individual 

combat effectiveness diminishes after an hour of transit of time. In order to ensure 

optimal combat effectiveness, stay-time for the marine within the vehicle is targeted 

at one hour or less. Launch distance therefore is a function of the speed of the vehicle and the other factors listed above. 

The Marine Corps continues to evaluate these requirements, and will do Human 

Affects Testing (HAT) to determine transit time versus combat effectiveness, a key 

factor in the determination of speed and distance to shore. 

The Navy is working to support the Marine Corps in the development of the requirements for the ACV and its associated doctrine. Further detail with regard to 

ACV requirements would be more appropriately addressed by the Deputy Commandant Combat Development and Integration & Commanding General, Marine 

Corps Combat Development Command. 

11. Senator WICKER. Vice Admiral Blake, what drives the speed and distance requirement in terms of how long marines can stay in an amphibious vehicle and be 

effective when they reach shore? 

Admiral BLAKE. The intent of the requirement is to deliver combat ready marines 

ashore regardless of the distance traveled. The speed of the amphibious vehicle and 

the distance it travels will yield a direct relationship to the amount of time that 

a marine spends inside the vehicle. In addition to the time spent in the vehicle, 

there are several other factors known to affect human performance, including: temperature, sea-state, and cabin atmosphere. The Marine Corps will be conducting 

testing to further refine our understanding of human physiology as it relates to sustained travel aboard amphibious vehicles. 

37 

The Navy is working to support the Marine Corps in the development of the requirements for the ACV and its associated doctrine. Further detail with regard to 

ACV requirements would be more appropriately addressed by the Deputy Commandant Combat Development and Integration and Commanding General, Marine 

Corps Combat Development Command. 

12. Senator WICKER. Vice Admiral Blake, can this be improved? 

Admiral BLAKE. The Marine Corps will be conducting studies in August 2011 to 

determine the relationship between time spent in the amphibious vehicle and combat effectiveness and identify potential improvements. 

The Navy is working to support the Marine Corps in the development of the requirements for the ACV and its associated doctrine. Further detail with regard to 

ACV requirements would be more appropriately addressed by the Deputy Commandant Combat Development and Integration and Commanding General, Marine 

Corps Combat Development Command. 

MARINE CORPS RESPONSE TO THE EXPEDITIONARY FIGHTING VEHICLE TERMINATION

13. Senator WICKER. Lieutenant General Flynn, the Marine Corps proposes responding to the EFV termination through a three-phased acquisition policy. It will 

upgrade a portion of the legacy AAV inventory through a Service Life Extension 

Program (SLEP) that will extend their life and add capability. It will accelerate the 

Marine Personnel Carrier (MPC) program designed to complement the EFV, AAV, 

or the replacement for the EFV known as ACV. The MPC would not be designed 

to swim ashore, but would be a fighting vehicle on land. Design requirements are 

being developed. It will also develop the new ACV building on the lessons learned 

from the EFV. The wind up of the EFV is focused on harvesting relevant technology 

from the EFV program to transfer to the new ACV. How many of the legacy AAVs 

now in service will undergo a SLEP? 

General FLYNN. We estimate that approximately 400 of our legacy AAV will be 

required to undergo SLEP in order to the required operational availability of vehicles as a bridge until we field the ACV. 

14. Senator WICKER. Lieutenant General Flynn, what capabilities will be added 

to the AAV? 

General FLYNN. The initial priority is to make survivability and force protection 

improvements while restoring land and water performance lost through previous 

survivability improvements. This will likely require modifications and improvements 

to power-train and suspension components to mitigate the effects of weight growth 

and component obsolescence. 

15. Senator WICKER. Lieutenant General Flynn, how old are the AAVs and how 

much additional life will the SLEP provide? 

General FLYNN. Today’s AAV are built upon the LVT–7 family of vehicles which 

began fielding in 1971. Over the past 40 years these systems have been service life 

extended, product improved, rebuilt to standard, upgraded and continuously maintained at all echelons. Depending on the extent of the SLEP, it may be possible to 

extend the serice life by up to 20 years. Our current plan is limited to those survivability-related upgrades to improve the capability until we can field the ACV. 

16. Senator WICKER. Lieutenant General Flynn, how much funding does the Marine Corps estimate will be required, or how much is available, for a SLEP? 

General FLYNN. The funding available in PB–12 is sufficient to begin work on 

AAV SLEP. The detailed cost estimates necessary to determine total program costs 

will be developed as part of acquisition strategy. We estimate that we will need to 

SLEP approximately 400 of our legacy AAVs to address force protection, survivability, durability and obsolescence modifications and improvements. 

17. Senator WICKER. Lieutenant General Flynn, given budget constraints, how 

confident is the Marine Corps that improvement of the amphibious assault capability may not be limited to a SLEP of the AAV? 

General FLYNN. Development and procurement of the ACV will remain a high investment priority; however, we are assessing AAV affordability options and risks. 

In the absence of a modern replacement for the AAV, the limitations and risks associated with relying solely on the legacy system will be assessed and mitigated where 

possible. 

38 

18. Senator WICKER. Lieutenant General Flynn, in terms of the MPC, how expensive is this vehicle estimated to be in comparison to the EFV or its proposed replacement the ACV? 

General FLYNN. In order to better distribute combat power for sustained operations ashore, two MPCs are required to lift the same reinforced rifle squad that 

is concentrated in a single EFV or single ACV. Based on responses we have received 

from industry, the cost to lift a reinforced rifle squad in comparison to EFV was approximately half. Given current ACV cost targets, the comparative costs to lift a reinforced rifle squad are estimated to be approximately two thirds that of the ACV’s 

targeted cost. 

19. Senator WICKER. Lieutenant General Flynn, how much money will actually be 

saved by cancelation of the EFV if the Marine Corps must extend the life of the 

AAVs, and design and build two new vehicles, the ACV and the MPC? 

General FLYNN. The plan to procure MPC and to upgrade AAVs is independent 

of the decision to cancel EFV as the AAV upgrade was a necessary activity to bridge 

to EFV and MPC was a complementary capability to EFV to address overall tactical 

lift capacity. Both initiatives pre-dated the cancellation of the EFV program. The 

principal cost avoidance will be attained by developing an ACV that costs less to 

procure than the EFV would have. We have set a cost target of approximately $12 

million for the ACV. 

20. Senator WICKER. Lieutenant General Flynn, what is the timeline for designing 

and building the MPC? 

General FLYNN. We are working to fully develop an integrated acquisition plan 

in support of ACV, MPC, and AAV SLEP. Early returns in this process point to a 

required initial operational capability of 2018. 

21. Senator WICKER. Lieutenant General Flynn, won’t an improved AAV that will 

be in service for a long time together with the new ACV leave the Marine Corps 

with two different sets of amphibious vehicles and the associated higher costs of a 

mixed inventory? 

General FLYNN. Improvements to the AAV are intended to enable the Marine 

Corps to sustain its amphibious capability until the ACV is fielded. As with other 

equipment replacement programs, the transition period between the initial fielding 

of a new capability and attainment of full operational capability will result in a 

mixed fleet of vehicles. During this transition period, the AAV inventory will be disposed as the ACV inventory increases. 

22. Senator WICKER. Lieutenant General Flynn, how will the MPC get ashore if 

it doesn’t swim as the EFV and APC would? 

General FLYNN. Introduction of the MPC into theater is planned as part of a Maritime Prepositioning Force deployment. MPC is a reinforcing capability relative to 

the self-deploying ACV. MPC will transit to the beach or port via connectors such 

as the LCAC, conventional landing craft, the Improved Navy Lighterage System or 

via pier-side offload. The ACV will be optimized to support ship-to-objective water 

and land mobility as the main effort of an amphibious assault, while the MPC is 

optimized to provide a combat vehicle capable of protected land mobility in support 

of sustained operations ashore. 

23. Senator WICKER. Lieutenant General Flynn, does this mean that the Marine 

Corps will be operating two different combat vehicles during the land phase of the 

amphibious assault, the ACV, and the MPC? 

General FLYNN. The Marine Corps operates multiple combat and tactical vehicles 

including AAVs, Light Armored Reconnaissance Vehicles, and tanks as well several 

tactical vehicles. The role of providing tactical mobility in armored personnel carriers would have been fulfilled by a combination of the EFV and the MPC. The ACV 

will fulfill the role intended for the EFV and it will be complemented by the MPC 

to achieve the required mobility capacity. 

24. Senator WICKER. Lieutenant General Flynn, won’t protection from improvised 

explosive devices and other threats necessarily be different in the two vehicles? 

General FLYNN. Yes. Each system will need to be designed to counter and mitigate the effects of the IED threat. The ACV design will be driven, in part, by its 

strenuous amphibious requirements which will likely mean a different survivability 

and force protection approach than for the MPC which will be designed for superior 

land mobility. However, common materials and approaches will be evaluated in 

order to reduce life cycle costs. ACV protection methodologies, performance and payVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:23 Jan 11, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00044 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\68085.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
39 

load protection trade-space assessments and capability level estimates will be a critical part of early technology demonstration and development efforts just they were 

for the MPC. 

[Whereupon, at 4:09 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.] 

(41) 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION 

FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 

2012 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE 

PROGRAM 

WEDNESDAY, MAY 25, 2011 

U.S. SENATE, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER, 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

Washington, DC. 

NAVY SHIPBUILDING PROGRAMS 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:27 p.m. in room 

SR–232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators Reed, Blumenthal, Wicker, and Ayotte. 

Majority staff member present: Creighton Greene, professional 

staff member. 

Minority staff member present: Christopher J. Paul, professional 

staff member. 

Staff assistants present: Jennifer R. Knowles and Brian F. 

Sebold. 

Committee members’ assistants present: Carolyn Chuhta, assistant to Senator Reed; Gordon Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; 

Jeremy Bratt, assistant to Senator Blumenthal; Lenwood Landrum, 

assistant to Senator Sessions; Joseph Lai, assistant to Senator 

Wicker; and Brad Bowman, assistant to Senator Ayotte. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED, CHAIRMAN 

Senator REED. Let me call the hearing to order. I want to welcome our witnesses to the hearing this afternoon. We’re honored to 

have: Sean Stackley, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Research, 

Development, and Acquisition; Vice Admiral Kevin M. McCoy, 

Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA); and Captain William J. Galinis, Supervisor of Shipbuilding (SUPSHIP) for 

the Gulf Coast. Thank you, gentlemen. We’re grateful for your service to the Nation and certainly grateful for the service of your fellow naval personnel and marines who do so much to assure our 

safety and our freedom. Thank you. 

The Navy continues to be faced with a number of critical issues 

as it tries to balance its modernization needs and procurement 

needs against the costs of current operations. The shipbuilding 

42 

budget remains at a level where it will be difficult at best to field 

the Navy we want, and indeed even the Navy that we need. 

With that in mind, we need to ensure that we are getting good 

value for every shipbuilding dollar that we spend. We were very 

pleased to see the Department’s decision to continue budgeting for 

two Virginia-class submarines per year. We believe that what the 

Navy and the contractor team have been achieving in driving down 

costs and reducing construction should be a model for other Navy 

programs. 

We support the Navy’s efforts to drive costs out of the Ohio replacement ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) program. SSBNs will 

remain a vital leg of the nuclear triad for the foreseeable future. 

Achieving cost reduction goals in these two programs will yield significant stability to our Navy’s submarine industrial base and provide the Navy with a modern, capable submarine fleet for many 

years to come. As we have been told on numerous occasions, stability is a very important factor in achieving quality and affordability. 

We now have the prospect of achieving some stability in the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program. Since last year, after conducting 

a winner-take-all competition, the Navy decided that by awarding 

10 ships to each shipbuilder the Navy could save $2.9 billion, or $1 

billion more than the program of record, and could purchase an additional LCS vessel during the same period of the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), 20 ships rather than 19. 

We understand that each builder has been making much better 

progress on the second ship in terms of cost, quality, and schedule. 

Stability in the program should permit the contractors to make further improvements. 

On a somewhat less happy note, there have been lingering problems in some shipbuilding programs. The highest profile among 

these has been the LPD–17 program. We have had a host of problems on these ships, not the least of which has been cost growth, 

schedule delays, and construction problems, particularly on the earlier ships in the program. 

The Navy took delivery of the first and second ships while they 

were still in an incomplete form and has subsequently identified 

numerous construction problems on the first two ships. We also 

know that the Navy has had problems with the later ships in the 

class as well. There have been welding problems, pipe hanger installation problems, lube oil contamination problems, and others. 

Now, the goal here is not to single out a particular shipyard. In 

fact, you can look at every naval program over the last several decades and find significant problems. When I was first elected in 

1991, the Seawolf was suffering from cost overruns, from quality 

control, et cetera. So our purpose is not singling out shipyards. It’s 

really to find out systemically what we have to do to ensure that 

all the shipbuilding programs of the Navy are operating on budget, 

on time, and with high quality. That’s the challenge we all face. If 

we understand these systemic issues, we can help the Navy deal 

with them, and that is our intention. 

Secretary Stackley, we talked last week about the bow wave in 

procurement costs and bow wave of operating and support (O&S) 

costs facing Navy and Marine Corps ground systems. I suspect that 

43 

we could have a similar discussion today about Navy ships. Later 

in this decade we will need to ramp up surface ship construction 

to meet missile defense and fleet air defense requirements, and 

we’ll have to begin construction of an Ohio-class replacement submarine. The 30-year shipbuilding plan lays out all of these programs along with the resources necessary to execute the plan. 

However, in our country’s current fiscal environment it is very 

unlikely that we will have as much money to spend on the 30-year 

shipbuilding plan as that plan assumes. Fundamentally that is 

why this hearing is so important. 

We need to focus on harvesting the savings from quality improvements and efficiency improvements in the shipyards across the entire shipbuilding program without exceptions. We need to do this 

not only because of the direct savings, but also because we need to 

demonstrate to the taxpayer that we are using defense dollars 

wisely. 

There are significant challenges and we fear they have the potential to add a great deal of instability to the Navy shipbuilding 

budget even in the near term. If the Navy is not able to control its 

acquisition program and drive our cost growth down while still getting quality ships, the Navy will not be able to afford the 313-ship 

fleet the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) says he needs to meet 

the requirements identified by the Quadrennial Defense Review. 

We look forward to hearing your testimony this afternoon on 

these and other issues facing the Navy. 

With that, I will recognize my colleague Senator Wicker, then 

Senator Ayotte if she has any comments. 

Senator Wicker. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROGER F. WICKER 

Senator WICKER. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for holding this very important hearing today. 

I’d like to thank our witnesses for their attendance today as well 

as their selfless service to our Nation, and also thank all the 

attendees in the hearing room today for their interest. 

I’m sure I speak for all subcommittee members when I say that 

our thoughts and prayers are with all our deployed sailors at sea 

and ashore, including those expeditionary sailors from Mississippi, 

our Seabees, explosive ordnance disposal teams, and riverine and 

maritime security forces, particularly those who are currently engaged in combat. Their hard work and dedication reflect the very 

finest traditions of the Navy, and of course their sacrifices are 

matched only by those of their families, who have supported these 

men and women in the service of their country. 

There are many issues for us to discuss today. I know our esteemed witnesses as well as the tens of thousands of dedicated 

naval shipyard workers throughout our country share a joint commitment to providing our sailors and marines with the finest ships 

in the world on time and on budget. I look forward to the testimony 

of our witnesses in this regard. 

The Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding plan sets a course to build from 

the current battle force inventory of only 286 ships to a goal of a 

minimum of 313. Over the next decade, the Navy will begin to 

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44 

port ships, submarines, LCSs, oil tankers, and Joint High Speed 

Vessels (JHSV). 

I’m concerned about the amount of funding needed for ship construction going forward. The Ohio-class replacement SSBNs run about $6 to $7 billion each and the Virginia-class submarines cost 

about $2 billion each. With more than half of the construction and 

development cost dollars being needed to build extraordinarily expensive nuclear submarines, I am concerned that our commitment 

to submarines may be crowding out funding needed to build large 

surface ships and to modernize the fleet. I hope the witnesses can 

tell us what they are doing to reduce the cost of building these submarines and give us their views on the impact of submarine construction costs on surface shipbuilding, including amphibious ships, 

and how it may impact the shipbuilding industrial base. 

In addition, there are concerns that continued design problems 

and the Navy’s recent decision to continue a dual sole source LCS 

strategy may increase cost risks in these and other complex acquisitions. From the first ship in its class, the LPD–17 San Antonio- class amphibious ship program has displayed chronic problems in 

terms of safety, engineering, design, and oversight. These problems 

have been so significant that they give rise to broader concerns 

about a widespread readiness problem afflicting our surface fleet. 

I’m pleased with the leadership of the Atlantic Fleet Commander, 

Admiral Harvey, in starting to turn these problems around. But 

I’m troubled by how we got to this point. As to the LPD–17 class 

of ships, for example, how, with five already delivered and four 

under construction, have we been left with an entire class of ships 

that, according to the Pentagon’s chief independent weapons tester, 

is ‘‘not effective, suitable, and not survivable in combat.’’ 

With Northrop Grumman’s sale of its shipyards, I’d like to know 

what the Navy’s plans are for the construction of the last LPD–17 

ship. 

In addition to these points, I would also like the Gulf Coast 

SUPSHIP and the NAVSEA Commander to address the apparent 

downward trend in funding for maintenance, with the negative impact falling more heavily on surface combatants than on carriers 

and submarines. 

Now let me say a quick word about the F–35 Joint Strike Fighter 

(JSF) program, which has a couple of important test events coming 

up this year that relate to the shipbuilding portfolio, in particular 

shipboard testing on a carrier and on the L-class ship for the 

Navy’s F–35C and the Marine Corps’ F–35B respectively. 

Given the well-deserved focus on the JSF program recently, I’d 

like to know from our witnesses what challenges do they see in 

having each of those F–35 variants effectively integrated to the 

ships from which they are supposed to operate. 

The Navy faces many difficult challenges. That said, the performance of our sailors and marines has never been more gratifying to 

watch. They make us proud every day. 

I look forward to hearing from the witnesses on these and other 

tough but important issues which go squarely to how we arm and 

equip those men and women who serve their Nation so selflessly 

at home and abroad. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

45 

Senator REED. Thank you, Senator Wicker. 

Senator Ayotte, do you have any comments? 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would just again 

welcome the witnesses and thank you for your service. I do want 

to give a special welcome to Vice Admiral McCoy, who is a former 

Commander of the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, and we’re very 

honored to have him since I’m very proud of our shipyard. 

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Senator. 

Secretary Stackley. 

STATEMENT OF HON. SEAN J. STACKLEY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY FOR RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND 

ACQUISITION 

Mr. STACKLEY. Yes, sir. Mr. Chairman, Senator Wicker, Senator 

Ayotte, thank you for the opportunity for Vice Admiral McCoy, 

Captain Galinis, and myself to appear before you today to address 

Navy shipbuilding. Thank you, of course, for your steadfast support 

to our sailors and marines as you provide and maintain our Navy. 

With your permission, I propose to keep my opening remarks 

brief and to submit a formal more detailed statement for the 

record. 

Senator REED. Thank you. 

Mr. STACKLEY. Today’s Navy is a battle force of 286 ships, as 

many as half of which are under way on any given day, providing 

presence and maintaining readiness to respond to crisis or conflict 

wherever our Nation’s interests are challenged. Our Navy’s ability 

to reliably meet the demands that come with global presence and 

readiness rely upon certain enduring qualities: the size of the force, 

measured in numbers of ships; the capabilities designed and built 

into these ships, the skills and productivity of our government and 

industry workforce responsible for building and maintaining these 

ships; and the skill, dedication, and resourcefulness of our sailors 

and marines who put to sea in them. 

The CNO and the Commandant have defined the 313-ship Navy 

as the force necessary to meet our naval requirements. In fact, the 

CNO has emphasized that 313 ships is the floor. So to this end, the 

2012 budget request includes funding for 10 ships and over the 5- 

year FYDP includes 55 ships, an increase of 5 ships over the plan 

of a year ago. 

This increase reflects a priority placed on shipbuilding and reflects efforts to improve affordability within our shipbuilding program, efforts which must prove effective if we are to succeed in recapitalizing ship classes which were constructed during the buildup 

of the 600-ship Navy. 

Our budget request includes continued funding for CVN–78, advanced procurement for CVN–79, and funding for the refueling 

overhaul of CVN–72, all necessary to sustain an 11-carrier force 

over the next 3 decades. 

We continue Virginia-class construction at two boats per year, a 

build rate essential to recapitalizing our submarine force, essential 

to affordability, and essential to ramping up our industrial base as 

we approach construction of our next fleet SSBN. 

We sustain DDG–51 production, adding capability and capacity 

to our sea-based missile defense, and to our plan of a year ago we 

46 

have added a second destroyer in 2014 which, with the planned 

proposal for a multi-year procurement in 2013, will leverage the 

stability of this mature program, improve build rates for our two 

combatant shipbuilders, and improve affordability. 

Our Aegis modernization efforts are equally critical, serving to 

increase the number of missile defense platforms from 21 today to 

41 by the end of the FYDP, while also improving their material 

condition to meet readiness demands in the second half of their 

service lives. 

We increase LCS construction to four ships per year. Efforts to 

stabilize design, improve production planning, invest in shipbuilder 

improvements, build at efficient rates, and leverage long-term vendor agreements, all within the framework of competitive fixed price 

contracts, have markedly improved affordability for this 55-ship 

program. 

We increase our amphibious lift capacity and capability with procurement of the 11th LPD–17 class ship and our extending the 

service of the USS Peleliu to maintain 9 operationally available big 

decks while awaiting delivery of the lead ship of the America-class, 

LHA–6. 

We’re also increasing our logistics lift capability with procurement of the third Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) and a JHSV. Actions by Congress and the Navy to accelerate the MLP program 

significantly improve affordability while also addressing a critical 

work load valley confronting that shipbuilder. 

In the second half of this decade, we will need to proceed with 

recapitalization of three major ship programs. We’re accelerating 

introduction of our next fleet oiler, T–AOX, beginning in 2014. T– 

AOX will bring modern commercial design to our refueling at sea 

capabilities while also providing critical stability to an important 

sector of our industrial base. 

We plan to commence replacement of the LSD–41 class amphibious ships in 2017 following definition of lift requirements for this 

new ship class. Most significantly, we will procure the lead ship of 

the Ohio-class replacement in 2019. It is vital that we sustain development activities for this submarine with sufficient lead times 

to ensure our ability to produce this highly complex, uniquely capable ship on schedule. But it’s equally vital that we address cost risk 

on this program or we place other ship programs at risk. So we’ve 

carefully defined capabilities necessary to ensure the ship’s ability 

to meet its requirements while embarking on a focused design for 

affordability effort to capitalize on lessons learned in the Virginia 

program at a much earlier stage in the Ohio replacement program. 

In the most pragmatic terms, in balancing requirements, risk, 

and realistic budgets, affordability does control our numbers. So to 

this end we’re focused on bringing stability to the shipbuilding program, finding the affordable 80 percent solution, strengthening our 

acquisition workforce, imposing cost discipline as we define our requirements, clamping down on contract design changes, placing 

greater emphasis on O&S costs in our designs, and placing greater 

emphasis on competition and fixed price contracts. 

Modernizing today’s force and recapitalizing the fleet affordably 

cannot be accomplished without strong performance by industry. So 

we are working with industry to benchmark performance, to idenVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:23 Jan 11, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00052 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\68085.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
47 

tify where improvements are necessary, to provide proper incentives for capital investments where warranted, and to reward sustained strong performance. 

As well, we’re working with industry to improve quality in construction and reliability and readiness in service. LPD–17 reliability, Aegis wholeness, completion levels of new construction carriers, and isolated quality issues on even our most reliable construction program, the submarine, have caused us to methodically 

and aggressively attack root causes in design, construction standards, workforce training and qualifications, oversight and compliance, ship’s force manning and training, documentation, software 

maintenance, and logistics support. 

Much progress has been made in these areas. Quality of delivered ships continues to improve. Readiness measures are improving. Underlying issues that have affected readiness are being identified. But much work remains. We need to sustain these efforts to 

improve quality and readiness while also ensuring the higher 

standard becomes the standard practice. 

In sum, the Navy is committed to building the fleet required to 

support the National Defense Strategy, to which the 2012 budget 

request addresses near-term capability needs, while also laying the 

foundation for long-term requirements. Ultimately, we recognize 

that as we balance requirements, affordability, and industrial base 

considerations, it is vital that we, Navy and industry, improve affordability within our programs in order to build the Navy needed 

by the future force. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to appear before 

you today and we look forward to your questions. 

[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Stackley, Admiral McCoy, 

and Captain Galinis follows:] 

JOINT PREPARED STATEMENT BY HON. SEAN J. STACKLEY, VADM KEVIN M. MCCOY, USN, AND CAPT WILLIAM J. GALINIS, USN 

Mr. Chairman, Senator Wicker, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, 

thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to address Navy shipbuilding. The Department is committed to the effort to build an affordable fleet 

which supports the National Defense Strategy, the Maritime Strategy, and the 2010 

Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The Department’s fiscal year 2012 budget will 

provide platforms that are capable, agile, and able to respond to the dynamic nature 

of current and future threats. The fiscal year 2012 shipbuilding budget funds 10 

ships, including 2 Virginia-class attack submarines, 1 Navy Joint High Speed Vessel 

(JHSV), 1 LPD–17-class amphibious transport dock, 1 Mobile Landing Platform 

(MLP), 1 DDG–51-class destroyer, and 4 Littoral Combat Ships (LCS). In addition, 

the Navy will procure an oceanographic ship and the Army has funded one JHSV 

which the Navy will procure. Our budget also funds advance procurement for CVN 

79, the second increment of full funding for LHA–7, and advance procurement for 

the two fiscal year 2013 DDG–51s and Virginia-class submarines. 

The Navy continues to ensure our shipbuilding plan is affordable, stable, and increases capacity and capability as needed to meet the most likely evolving threats. 

In 2010, six ships were placed in commission; two Virginia-class submarines, three 

Arleigh Burke destroyers, and one LCS. In addition, two T–AKEs were delivered. 

Today, our sailors and marines are conducting combat operations in Afghanistan. 

In addition, our aircraft carriers are providing about 30 percent of combat air support for troops on the ground in Afghanistan, with more sorties being provided by 

AV–8B Harriers flying from amphibious assault ships. While the drawdown in Iraq 

continues, we still have more than 24,000 sailors and 22,000 marines ashore or 

afloat in the Central Command Area of Responsibility. 

Because our national interests extend beyond Iraq and Afghanistan, so do our 

sailors and marines. More than 40 percent of our ships are underway daily, globally 

present and persistently engaged. Recently, U.S. naval forces supported efforts in 

48 

Japan. Last year, U.S. naval forces provided deterrence against North Korea, conducted counter-piracy operations in the Indian Ocean with a coalition of several nations, trained local forces in maritime security as part of our Global Maritime Partnership initiatives in Africa and the Pacific, responded with humanitarian assistance and disaster relief to the earthquake in Haiti and flood in Pakistan, and conducted the world’s largest maritime exercise, our biannual Rim of the Pacific 

(RIMPAC) multi-national training exercise. RIMPAC brought together 14 nations 

and more than 20,000 military personnel, including 25 of our Navy ships and submarines, a Coast Guard cutter, and elements of the III Marine Expeditionary Force. 

Through RIMPAC and follow-on exercises, our forward-deployed forces, in partnerships with naval forces from the Republic of Korea, demonstrated a strong, credible 

deterrent against continued North Korean aggression. Off the coast of Africa, as 

part of an international coalition of more than 20 other nations, U.S. naval forces 

continue to provide deterrence and maritime security in the form of counter-piracy. 

Specifically, our Navy-Marine Corps team successfully intervened and freed the 

crew of the German merchant vessel M/V Magellan Star after pirates captured the 

vessel in the Gulf of Aden last September and during that same deployment rescued 

62 Somali and Ethiopian persons. We are also continuing to partner with U.S. Coast 

Guard law enforcement teams in the Caribbean to conduct counter-narcotics and 

anti-trafficking operations and deny traffickers use of the sea for profit and exploitation. 

Our USS Kearsarge (LHD–3) Amphibious Ready Group (ARG), and U.S. marines 

assigned to the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), deployed early to reinforce 

the Peleliu ARG/15th MEU in providing humanitarian assistance to Pakistan after 

a flood placed almost one-fifth of the Nation underwater, devastating the population 

and the land. Our disaster relief effort also continued in Haiti with 15 ships including the USNS Comfort (T–AH–20), USS Carl Vinson (CVN–70), USS Nassau (LHA– 

4) ARG with the 24th MEU, USS Bataan (LHD–5) ARG with the 22d MEU, and 

the maritime prepositioning ship USNS 1st Lt Jack Lummus (T–AK–3011), as part 

of Operation Unified Response. In Central and South America, the medical staff and 

Seabees embarked aboard the multi-purpose amphibious assault ship USS Iwo Jima 

(LHD–7), working with partner nations, provided medical, dental, veterinary, and 

engineering assistance to Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Nicaragua, Panama, and Suriname during Continuing Promise 2010. During the deployment, Continuing Promise 10 personnel provided medical, dental, and optometry 

services to more than 161,000 patients. Operation Pacific Partnership, led by the 

Commander, Destroyer Squadron 21 aboard the USNS Mercy, provided treatment 

to 109,754 patients. In addition, they completed 22 engineering projects and treated 

more than 2,800 veterinary patients in Vietnam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Palau, 

Timor-Leste, and Papua New Guinea. 

Our sailors and marines remain on point throughout the world, projecting U.S. 

influence, responding to contingencies, and building international relationships that 

will keep the maritime commons safe and secure. This is critical to the free flow 

of commerce, a foundation of our economic prosperity. 

Our ballistic missile submarines are providing nuclear deterrence year-round, 

while our Aegis cruisers and destroyers are providing conventional deterrence in the 

form of ballistic missile defense (BMD) of our allies and partners in Europe, the 

Mediterranean, and the Western Pacific. Our Carrier Strike Groups and ARGs continue to prevent conflict and deter aggression in the Western Pacific, Arabian Gulf 

and Indian Ocean, while their forward deployments afford the United States the 

ability to influence events abroad and the opportunity to rapidly respond to crisis. 

Global demand for naval forces remains high and continues to rise because of the 

ability of our maritime forces to overcome diplomatic, geographic, and military impediments to access while bringing the persistence, flexibility and agility to conduct 

operations at sea. Our fiscal year 2012 budget submission properly balances our 

naval forces to support this demand and includes five more ships than our fiscal 

year 2011 plan, which were achieved through competitive contracting, reduced overhead and increased efficiencies. We continue to pursue steps to buy smarter, 

streamline our organizations and operations, realign manpower, and pursue energy 

efficiencies. 

The Department has conducted a Force Structure Analysis based upon the minimum 313 ship force needed for our Navy-Marine Corps team. The plan is designed 

to provide the global reach; strategic deterrence; persistent presence; and strategic, 

operational and tactical effects expected of naval forces within reasonable levels of 

funding. The plan balances the combatant commanders’ demand for naval forces 

with expected future resources, and takes into account the importance of maintaining an adequate national shipbuilding design and industrial base and using realistic 

cost estimates. 

49 

The global proliferation of land-attack ballistic missiles and the anticipated proliferation of anti-ship ballistic missiles, and the challenges associated with gaining 

and sustaining access for shore-based BMD systems worldwide suggest the demand 

for BMD-capable surface combatants will continue to increase beyond 2024 even 

with the introduction of Aegis Ashore. 

Over the next decade (fiscal year 2012 to fiscal year 2021), the Department of the 

Navy begins to ramp up production of ships necessary to support strategic deterrence, persistent presence, maritime security, irregular warfare, intra-theater sealift, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and partnership building missions; 

namely the LCS, JHSV and Fleet Oiler Replacement programs. At the same time, 

the Department continues production of large surface combatants and attack submarines, as well as amphibious landing and support ships. Yearly new construction 

shipbuilding spending during this period is projected to average $15 billion (fiscal 

year 2011$). Beyond fiscal year 2021, Navy investments at a sustainable average 

of $15.7 billion (fiscal year 2011$) a year in new ship construction, which is roughly 

the 30-year average. The overall size of the battle force begins a steady climb, reaching 324 ships by fiscal year 2021. 

In the second decade (fiscal year 2022 to fiscal year 2031), the recapitalization 

plan for the current Fleet Ballistic Missile Submarine (SSBN) inventory is realigned. Current plans call for 12 new Ohio-class replacement submarines 

(SSBN(X)) with life-of-the-ship nuclear reactor cores to replace the existing 14 Ohioclass SSBNs. Advance Procurement funds for detail design for the first SSBN(X) 

begin in fiscal year 2015 with funds following in fiscal year 2017 to support procurement of long lead time material for the lead ship of the class scheduled to begin 

construction in fiscal year 2019 ensuring that 12 operational ballistic missile submarines will be available to perform the vital strategic deterrent mission. Since 

SSBNs have not been procured since the early 1990s, shipbuilding expenditures 

have not included funds for this class of ships in over 20 years. To support the recapitalization of the seaborne leg of the Nation’s strategic deterrent, yearly shipbuilding expenditures during the second decade are projected to average about $17.5 

billion (fiscal year 2011$) per year, or about $2 billion more than the steady-state 

30-year average. Even at this elevated funding level the total number of ships built 

per year will inevitably fall because of the percentage of the shipbuilding account 

which must be allocated for the procurement of the SSBN(X). Recognizing these impacts, we have already embarked on a program of aggressively challenging capability improvements and design and construction practices to identify means to deliver this important capability at least cost, including leveraging technology and lessons learned from the highly successful Virginia SSN shipbuilding program. 

In the last decade (fiscal year 2032 to fiscal year 2041), average new construction 

shipbuilding expenditures are projected to fall back to a more sustainable level of 

about $14.5 billion (fiscal year 2011$) per year. Moreover, after the production run 

of Ohio replacement SSBNs comes to an end in fiscal year 2034, the average number of ships built per year begins to rebound. 

AIRCRAFT CARRIERS

Our aircraft carriers are best known for their unmistakable forward presence, 

ability to deter potential adversaries and assure our allies, and capacity to project 

power at sea and ashore; however, they are equally capable of providing our other 

core capabilities of sea control, maritime security, and humanitarian assistance and 

disaster response. Our carriers provide our Nation the ability to rapidly and decisively respond globally to crises with a small footprint that does not impose unnecessary political or logistic burdens upon our allies or potential partners. 

CVN–78

The Gerald R. Ford is the lead ship of our first new class of aircraft carrier in 

nearly 40 years. Gerald R. Ford-class carriers will be the premier forward deployed 

asset for crisis response and early decisive striking power in a major combat operation. They incorporate the latest technology, including an innovative new flight 

deck designed to provide greater operational flexibility, reduced manning requirements, and the ability to operate all current and future naval aircraft. Among the 

new technologies being integrated is the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System 

(EMALS) which will support Ford’s increased sortie generation rates. EMALS is 

moving from a promising technology to a proven operational capability, which will 

deliver the warfighting enhancement needed in the future. Recently, the program 

successfully demonstrated a controlled launch sequence with the full-scale EMALS 

production representative unit and a successful aircraft launch demonstration. 

While land-based testing is ongoing and identifying engineering issues that will 

50 

allow us to retire risk prior to ship operations, EMALS’ production schedule supports the planned delivery of CVN–78 in September 2015. 

THE SUBMARINE FLEET

Our attack and guided missile submarines have a unique capability for stealth 

and persistent operation in an access-denied environment and to act as a force multiplier by providing high-quality intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) 

as well as indication and warning of potential hostile action. In addition, attack submarines are effective in anti-surface ship warfare and anti-submarine warfare in almost every environment, thus eliminating any safe-haven that an adversary might 

pursue with access-denial systems. As such, they represent a significant conventional deterrent. While our attack submarine fleet provides considerable strike capacity already, our guided missile submarines provide significantly more strike capacity and a more robust capability to covertly deploy Special Operations Force personnel. Today, the Navy requires 48 attack submarines and 4 guided missile submarines (SSGN) to sustain our capabilities in these areas. The Navy is studying alternatives to sustain the capability that our SSGNs bring to the battle force when 

these ships begin to retire in 2026. 

VIRGINIA-CLASS SSN

The Virginia-class submarine is a multi-mission submarine that dominates in the 

littorals and open oceans. Now in its 14th year of construction, the Virginia program 

is demonstrating that this critical undersea capability can be delivered affordably 

and on time. The Navy is mitigating the impending attack submarine force structure gap in the 2020s through three parallel efforts: reducing the construction span 

of Virginia-class submarines, extending the service lives of selected attack submarines, and extending the length of selected attack submarine deployments. 

BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES

Our ballistic missile submarines are the most survivable leg of the Nation’s strategic arsenal and provide the Nation’s only day-to-day assured nuclear response capability. They provide survivable nuclear strike capabilities to assure allies, deter 

potential adversaries, and, if needed, respond in kind. The number of these submarines was delineated by the Nuclear Posture Review 2001 which established the 

requirement of a force comprised of 12 operational SSBNs (with 2 additional in overhaul at any time). Because the Ohio SSBNs will begin retiring in fiscal year 2027, 

their recapitalization must start in fiscal year 2019 to ensure operational submarines will be available to replace these vital assets as they leave operational service. In addition, because of a life-of-ship reactor plant, the replacement SSBN program inventory will be 12 ships to support the seaborne leg of the nuclear triad. 

To maintain an at-sea presence for the long term, the United States must continue 

development of the follow-on to the Ohio-class submarine. Throughout the past year, 

and throughout the program, all aspects of the Ohio replacement program continue 

to be thoroughly reviewed and aggressively challenged to drive down engineering 

and construction costs. 

SUBMARINE MODERNIZATION

As threats evolve, it is vital to continue to modernize existing submarines with 

updated capabilities. The submarine modernization program includes advances in 

weapons, integrated combat control systems, sensors, open architecture, and necessary hull, mechanical and electrical upgrades. These upgrades are necessary to retain credible capabilities for the future conflicts and current peacetime ISR and Indication and Warning missions and to continue them on the path of reaching their 

full service life. Maintaining the stability of the modernization program is critical 

to our future Navy capability and capacity. 

SURFACE COMBATANTS

As in the past, cruisers and destroyers will continue to deploy with strike groups 

to fulfill their traditional roles. Many will be required to assume additional roles 

within the complex BMD arena. Ships that provide BMD will sometimes be stationed in remote locations, away from strike groups, in a role as theater BMD assets. The changes necessary to meet demands for forward presence, strike group operations, and BMD place additional pressure on the existing inventory of surface 

combatants. The current baseline for number of ships in the surface combatant inventory is 88. While future force structure analyses may require the Navy to procure a greater number of these ships, we will also have to consider redistributing 

51 

assets currently being employed for missions of lesser priority for these new missions as a result of the 2010 QDR and the President’s commitment to supporting 

the missile defense of our European allies. 

DDG–51

To address the rapid proliferation of ballistic and anti-ship missiles along with 

deep-water submarine threats, we have restarted production of the Arleigh Burke- class DDG–51 Flight IIA series. The Flight IIA ships will incorporate Integrated Air 

and Missile Defense (IAMD), providing much-needed BMD capacity to the Fleet. 

These ships will also be the first flight of Aegis ships to be built with the Open Architecture Advanced Capability Build (ACB) 12 Aegis Combat System. ACB 12 will 

allow these surface combatants to be updated and maintained with commercial offthe-shelf technology, yielding reduced Total Ownership Cost and enhancing the ability to adapt to future military threats. The approach for the Flight IIA restart 

leverages the cost-savings of existing production lines; reduces the potential for cost 

overruns and delays through the incremental approach of developing new technologies; and strengthens and stabilizes the industrial base to more efficiently and 

cost effectively produce ships to meet our national needs. This budget request procures one ship in 2012. 

We intend to deliver highly capable, multi-mission ships tailored for IAMD by advancing the DDG–51 design into the next future destroyer, DDG Flight III. This approach will develop and install the Air and Missile Defense Radar on a DDG–51 

hull with the necessary hull, power, cooling, and combat systems upgrades. Additionally, in support of the Navy’s energy goals, a hybrid electric drive system is in 

development for the DDG–51-class and land-based testing of this system is expected 

this summer. Our fiscal year 2012 budget requests funding for a total of eight DDG– 

51 ships, including funding for an additional DDG–51 Flight IIA ship in fiscal year 

2014 and the first Flight III ship in fiscal year 2016. The Navy intends to pursue 

multiyear authority in fiscal year 2013 for fiscal year 2013–2017 procurements. The 

MYP would generate significant cost savings, and provide a long-term commitment 

to the shipbuilding industrial base that stabilizes shipyard employment levels. 

LCS

The Navy remains committed to procuring 55 LCS. These ships expand the battle 

space by complementing our inherent blue water capability and filling warfighting 

gaps in the littorals and strategic choke points around the world. LCS design characteristics (speed, agility, shallow draft, payload capacity, reconfigurable mission 

spaces, air/water craft capabilities) combined with its core Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence, sensors, and weapons systems, make it an 

ideal platform for engaging in Irregular Warfare and Maritime Security Operations. 

LCS capabilities address specific and validated capability gaps in Surface Warfare, Mine Countermeasures, and Anti-Submarine Warfare. The concept of operations and design specifications for LCS were developed to meet these gaps with focused mission packages that deploy manned and unmanned vehicles to execute a 

variety of missions. In 2010, the Navy deployed USS Freedom (LCS–1) with Surface 

Warfare (SUW) mission package capabilities (MH–60S helicopter, two 30mm guns, 

two 11m Rigid Hull Inflatable Boats, Maritime Security Module, a Surface Warfare 

DET and an Aviation Detachment in support of counter-illicit trafficking operations). By 2018, 11 Mine Countermeasures (MCM) mission packages will be delivered, supporting the decommissioning plan for the USS Avenger (MCM–1)-class 

ships. The core capability of the Anti-Submarine Warfare mission package will be 

provided by a Variable Depth Sonar (VDS) and Navy will begin at-sea testing in 

2012 with a VDS Advanced Design Model (ADM). 

Affordability remains the key factor in acquiring the needed future capacity of 

this highly flexible and capable ship. To stay on path to deliver this ship in the 

quantities needed, the Navy announced this past December that we awarded 2 competitive contracts for 10 ships of each version of the LCS under a dual award strategy. Each ship brings unique strengths and capabilities to the mission and each has 

been designed in accordance with overarching objectives for reducing total ownership cost. Our 2012 budget funds 4 ships in fiscal year 2012, with a buy of 19 across 

the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). We request your continued support as 

we take the measures necessary to deliver this much needed capability at the capacity we need to meet future demands. 

DDG–1000

The DDG–1000 Zumwalt guided missile destroyer will be an optimally crewed, 

multi-mission surface combatant designed to provide long-range, precision naval 

52 

surface fire support to marines conducting littoral maneuver and subsequent operations ashore. The DDG–1000 features two 155mm Advanced Gun Systems capable 

of engaging targets with the Long-Range Land Attack Projectile at a range of over 

63 nautical miles. In addition to providing offensive, distributed and precision fires 

in support of marines, it will provide valuable lessons in advanced technology such 

as signature reduction, active and passive self-defense systems, and enhanced survivability features. The first DDG–1000 is approximately 50 percent complete and 

is scheduled to deliver in fiscal year 2014 with initial operating capability planned 

in 2016. 

MODERNIZATION

To counter emerging threats, we continue to make significant investments in 

cruiser and destroyer modernization to sustain our combat effectiveness and to 

achieve the 35 year service life of our earlier Aegis fleet. Our destroyer and cruiser 

modernization program includes Hull, Mechanical, and Electrical (HM&E) upgrades, 

as well as advances in warfighting capability and open architecture to reduce total 

ownership costs and expand mission capability for current and future combat capabilities. 

USS Arleigh Burke (DDG–51) and USS John Paul Jones (DDG–53) are the first 

two DDGs to undergo the HM&E phase of this comprehensive modernization. Due 

to the scope of the design changes, we extended these availabilities by 2 months to 

allow for adequate execution and system testing. The lessons learned from these 

first two modernization efforts will be included in subsequent upgrades. The second 

phase of the modernization will be conducted 2 years after the initial yard period 

and provide DDGs with an improved processing capability in their SPY–1D radars 

and an open architecture combat computing environment that will also be adapted 

to DDG–113 and following ships. Focusing on Flight I and II DDG–51 ships (hulls 

51–78), the modernization process will also include the addition of BMD capability, 

installation of the Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM), an upgraded SQQ–89A 

(V)15 anti-submarine warfare system, integration of the SM–6 missile, and improved air dominance with processing upgrades and Naval Integrated Fire ControlCounter Air capability. In fiscal year 2012, USS John Paul Jones (DDG–53) will be 

the first destroyer to be modernized with ACB 12. 

Through December 2010, Navy has completed the modernization of two additional 

cruisers, USS Mobile Bay (CG–53) and USS Philippine Sea (CG–58). Combat System upgrades to USS Antietam (CG–54) and USS San Jacinto (CG–56) are in 

progress. Hull, Mechanical, and Electrical (HM&E) upgrades to USS Hue City (CG– 

66) are also in progress. The key aspects of the CG modernization program include 

an upgrade to the Aegis weapons system to include an open architecture computing 

environment, installation of the AN/SPQ–9B radar, addition of the ESSM, an upgrade to Close In Weapon System Block 1B, an upgraded SQQ–89A (V)15 anti-submarine warfare system, and improved air dominance with processing upgrades and 

Naval Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air capability. Nine Baseline 4 cruisers will 

receive the BMD upgrade beginning in fiscal year 2014. 

Our budget for fiscal year 2012 requests funding for the modernization of four 

cruisers (three Combat Systems and one HM&E) and three destroyers (one Combat 

System and two HM&E). 

AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS

Amphibious ships are multi-capable, agile, and responsive to the dynamic nature 

of the security era. In an era of declining access and strategic uncertainty, the geographic combatant commanders’ have an increased demand for forward-postured 

amphibious forces capable of conducting security cooperation, regional deterrence, 

and crisis response. For example, their cumulative fiscal year 2010 request for amphibious forces equates to 3.4 ARGs/MEUs plus 4 smaller, task-organized amphibious formations like Global Fleet Stations. These demand signals reflect the operational flexibility and value of amphibious forces for missions across the range of 

military operations. This value is well-illustrated by the 2010 deployment of the 

Peleliu ARG/15th MEU, which concurrently conducted humanitarian assistance and 

disaster response operations in Pakistan, strike operations in Afghanistan, and the 

recovery of the M/V Magellan Star from pirates in the Gulf of Aden. During the 

same deployment, they also conducted a wide variety of cooperative activities with 

forces from Australia, Indonesia, the Maldives, New Zealand, Sri Lanka, TimorLeste, Turkey, and Pakistan, in addition to supporting to the U.S. Secret Service 

during the Presidential visit to India. As articulated by the Secretary of the Navy, 

the Navy’s amphibious ships are the fleet’s most ‘‘flexible’’ asset. 

53 

There are two main drivers of the amphibious ship requirement: maintaining the 

persistent forward presence, the largest driver, which enables both engagement and 

crisis response, and the episodic aggregation of sufficient numbers to deliver the assault echelons of up to two Marine expeditionary brigades for major operations and 

campaigns. 

The Chief of Naval Operations and Commandant of the Marine Corps have determined that the force structure requirement is 38 amphibious ships. Understanding 

this requirement, and in light of the fiscal constraints, the Department of the Navy 

will accept risk by sustaining a minimum of 33 total amphibious ships in the active 

fleet. The Department has 30 amphibious ships in the inventory now and will reach 

33 ships by fiscal year 2017. Once 33 is attained the Department will retain 33 amphibious ships through the maintenance of current assets and the planned procurement of amphibious vessels. 

LSD/LSD(X)

A fully funded LSD mid-life program, to include repairs, will ensure these ships 

meet their expected service life. Material readiness in regards to LSD’s readiness 

for tasking will be enhanced by a fully funded program. LSD(X) will replace 12 of 

the aging LSD–41/49 Whidbey Island/Harpers Ferry-class vessels and will perform 

an array of amphibious missions. Eleven LSD(X) platforms will provide one third 

of the total amphibious lift necessary to meet USMC mission requirements. LSD(X) 

Initial Capabilities Document is currently under review, the Analysis of Alternatives 

will be conducted in fiscal year 2012 with a planned fiscal year 2017 lead ship procurement. Affordability remains the key factor in acquiring the needed future capacity and operational capabilities of this highly flexible multifaceted ship. 

LPD–17

The San Antonio-class LPD (LPD–17) has a 40-year expected service life and 

serves as the replacement for four classes of older ships: the LKA, LST, LSD–36, 

and the LPD–4. Lessons learned from the effort to resolve material reliability concerns identified in the early ships of the class are being applied to ships currently 

under construction. Quality continues to improve with each ship delivered as the 

Navy continues to work closely with the shipbuilder to address cost, schedule, and 

performance issues. Five ships have been delivered, and four more ships are under 

construction. The construction contract for the 10th ship was recently awarded and 

the 11th and final LPD is planned for procurement in fiscal year 2012. 

Ships of the class have deployed seven times including two ships that are currently on deployment. USS San Antonio (LPD–17) has deployed once (2008), USS 

New Orleans (LPD–18) has completed two successful overseas deployments (2009 

and 2010). USS Mesa Verde (LPD–19) has also completed two successful overseas 

deployments. Today, LPD–19 is again deployed overseas; and USS Green Bay (LPD– 

20) is in the middle of her first overseas deployment. LPD–18 and USS New York 

(LPD–21) are fully operational, conducting local operations in their homeport areas. 

LPD–17 is completing her major post-deployment repair availability prior to next 

sea trials. 

In February of this year, LPD–21 successfully passed an inspection by the Navy’s 

Board of Inspection and Survey (INSURV) to support the Final Contract Trials. The 

President of INSURV remarked that LPD–21 was the best LPD–17-class ship they 

had seen and that lessons learned from the first ships of the class were clearly being 

implemented. 

The Navy and Industry have made significant progress in correcting early class 

design and construction issues on the LPD–17-class. Early ships of the LPD–17- 

class were delivered to the Navy with pipe welding quality, engine alignment problems, inadequate lube oil cleanliness and bearing wear which led to unplanned engine repairs and overhauls. These material issues, combined with an optimized sized 

crew and a reliance on computer-based vice classroom training, led to decreased reliability and operational availability of the class. 

The above issues, as well as inadequate initial reliability of the ships computer 

network and some of the engine and ship control systems led the Navy and DOD 

independent operational testing organizations to rate the ships as not operationally 

suitable during the initial operational testing conducted in 2007–2008. Follow-on 

Test and Evaluation, which commenced in July 2010 and runs through fiscal year 

2012, is being conducted by the Navy’s Commander, Operational Test & Evaluation 

Force and the Marine Corps Operational Test and Evaluation Activity to confirm 

adequate corrective actions have been taken. 

54 

Over the last couple of years, the shipbuilder (Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding, 

now Huntington Ingalls Industries, (HII)) has implemented several initiatives to address the quality issues associated with ship construction and delivery. 

The shipbuilder significantly revised their welding, quality and production processes to improve quality and ensure consistency across all of their shipbuilding facilities. Their workforce was retrained and recertified to the updated process. The 

Navy and HII have improved the oil flushing procedures to get all the contaminants 

out of the ship’s lube oil system and improvements to the lube oil filters and strainers have been developed to better remove any contaminants that might be introduced through normal operation of the engines. These more stringent flushing procedures are being used on all ships in the class and the improved filters and strainers are planned for installation on all ships in the class. Additionally, the shipyard 

has taken several steps to ensure pipe sections are maintained in a clean condition 

from fabrication in the pipe shop to installation on the ship including a new cleaning process in the pipe shop and improved pipe capping procedures to prevent contaminants from entering the pipe during shipping and installation onboard the ship. 

The Navy has also significantly improved its lube oil sampling and analysis process. 

This process has been incorporated into the ship construction process. The shipbuilder is responsible for the overall quality of the ship. To manage quality, the 

shipbuilder utilizes a Quality Management System comprising of Quality Control 

(ensuring the correct product requirements, manufacturing processes, et cetera) and 

Quality Assurance (focused on end product quality and conformance). 

The Ship Wide Area Network (SWAN) design, which was based upon 1990’s Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) technology, experienced multiple failures resulting 

in failover monitoring, maintainability, and supportability issues. The ATM-based 

SWAN is being replaced by current Gigabit Ethernet technology hardware and software. Today, this ‘‘Gig-E’’ SWAN is installed on LPD–17, –18, and –21 with no reported failures to date. LPD–19 and –20 will receive this upgrade in fiscal year 

2012; and the baseline for LPD–22 and follow ships has been updated to include 

the Gig-E SWAN. Initial system reliability issues with the engine controls, ship controls, and interior communications systems have been addressed through major software upgrades to each system, as well as the replacement of critical obsolete parts 

with more rugged, current technology hardware. 

Government oversight by the Navy’s Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Gulf Coast 

(SSGC) has been revamped with an increase in overall SSGC manning by 21 percent from 2005 through the end of 2010, including an intensive focus on critical waterfront Quality Assurance (QA) billets. All Government QA weld inspectors were 

required to undergo retraining and recertification in critical process areas, and QA 

oversight was increased across all phases of production. Within the last 18 months, 

the QA organization has been restructured to include more surveillance of in process 

work and compliance with formal ship construction procedures. A revamped training 

program has been implemented, providing an ‘‘apprentice to subject matter expert’’ 

career roadmap for QA specialists. SSGC has implemented a process of ‘‘critical 

process pulse audits’’ to ensure HII maintains production quality across the critical 

shipbuilding areas of structure, pipe, electrical, and coatings. Navy critical process 

metrics have been aligned with the shipbuilder to better assess performance trends 

leading to earlier identification of issues when they arise. 

In addition, Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) sent teams of 

QA experts to assess SSGC ability to provide QA oversight and HII’s production 

quality in spring 2009, July 2010, and January 2011. The NAVSEA audits confirmed initial improvement by both SSGC and HII. The focus going forward, and 

a key element of the critical process pulse audits, is ensuring sustainment of that 

performance. 

The Navy is also strengthening the LPD–17-class crew training by establishing 

more traditional shore-based schoolhouses for critical systems that will result in a 

blended philosophy of classroom, on-ship, and computer-based training rather than 

solely relying on the previously emphasized computer-based shipboard training. 

The Ship Manning Document was recently approved, increasing the LPD–17-class 

crew size to 381 from the original ‘‘optimized’’ manning level of 360. 

The LPD–17-Class System Sustainability Strike Team, made up of personnel from 

the Fleet, the Navy regional maintenance centers, the shipbuilder, the Supervisor 

of Shipbuilding, the class planning yard, and the Navy Warfare Centers was established in fiscal year 2009. The Strike Team has focused resources on developing and 

prioritizing correction plans addressing system design, production/quality, operations and maintenance issues identified in recent test/evaluation reports, as well 

as those discovered during normal shipboard operations. Lessons learned from this 

effort are being incorporated in the ship construction process. 

55 

Quality and reliability problems seen on the early ships of the class are being systematically addressed by the shipbuilder and the Navy. Additionally, the Fleet has 

recognized the need for additional manning for each ship and training for the crews, 

which is being implemented. The above-listed corrections and improvements are already being realized in the later ships of the class, as evidenced by LPD–21’s recent 

success during Final Contract Trials. The Navy recently discovered quality problems 

with repairs on various ships during Fleet maintenance availabilities. We are addressing these issues by providing additional government oversight to ensure strict 

compliance with all required maintenance and repair specifications and holding the 

contractor accountable to provide quality. 

LHD/LHA/LHA REPLACEMENT (LHA(R))

The LHA(R) will provide flexible, multi-mission amphibious capabilities that span 

the range of military operations from forcible entry to humanitarian and disaster 

relief. LHA(R) will replace our Tarawa-class ships that reach the end of their already extended service life between 2011 and 2015 for the remaining ship of the 

class. The America (LHA–6) is now more than 30 percent complete and is scheduled 

for delivery in fiscal year 2014. The decommissioning of USS Peleliu (LHA–5) has 

been tied to the delivery of the America in order mitigate any possible gaps in future deployment cycles. In support of the Navy’s commitment to advancing our energy security, the hybrid propulsion drive in use on USS Makin Island (LHD–8) is 

being installed on LHA–6. Beginning with LHA–8, the Navy will reintegrate the 

well deck onto the large deck amphibious assault ships. Our budget for fiscal year 

2012 requests funding for research and development to support reintegration of the 

well deck into the design of the large deck amphibious ship and the construction 

of LHA–8 in fiscal year 2016. Funding has been added to install a critical self defense capability for LHD–2–6 during the fiscal year 2016 Mid-Life Upgrade program. The Capstone Ships Self Defense System is essential to ensure ships survivability in any environment. 

MARITIME PREPOSITIONING FORCE

The MPF(F) concept envisioned a forward-deployed squadron of ships to enable 

rapid closure to areas of interest, at-sea assembly, and tactical employment of forces 

to areas of interest in the event of crisis. Although useful across the range of military operations, this squadron was primarily designed for use in major combat operations. Due to refocusing of priorities and cost, this program has been deferred until 

the 2025 timeframe. The Secretary of the Navy stated that he was especially interested in enhancements that would give the legacy MPS squadrons additional capabilities and illuminate capabilities that would guide the development of MPF(F). 

Ships previously discussed in the context of the MPF(F) have been moved to the 

Command and Support section for battle force accounting. As noted in PB11, the 

Department has determined the large-deck aviation ships previously designated for 

the MPF(F) would better serve the Navy and Marine Corps in the amphibious ship 

inventory—hence the LHA(R)-class ships described previously. 

In support of this enhanced Maritime Prepositioning Squadrons (MPSRON) concept of employment, three T–AKE auxiliary dry cargo ships were added to the program to provide persistent logistic support to Marine Corps units afloat and ashore. 

Further, the Navy recognizes the need to provide for at-sea transfer of personnel 

and equipment from a cargo ship and to provide an interface with Landing Craft 

Air-Cushioned (LCAC) vessels, both key capabilities the MPF(F) program was to 

provide. To fulfill this capability, the Navy will procure three MLPs. The third MLP 

is included in the PB12 budget. Operationally, the three current MPSRONs will add 

an MLP, a T–AKE, and a Large Medium-Speed Roll-on/Roll-off (LMSR) cargo ship. 

Future MPF capabilities will increase capacity attributed to new ship designs along 

with seabasing enabling capabilities such as at-sea arrival and assembly, employment, persistent sustainment and reconstitution. 

JOINT HIGH SPEED VESSEL

The JHSV provides high-speed support vessels for the combatant commanders 

who clearly communicated to the Navy their desire for the unique capability to move 

assets throughout marginally developed theaters of operation while requiring a less 

well developed port facility. In addition, the JHSV’s relatively shallow draft permits 

operation in a greater number of port facilities around the globe. The combination 

of these attributes permits rapid transport of medium size payloads over intra-theater distances to austere ports, and load/offload without reliance on a well developed, heavy port infrastructure. A Memorandum of Agreement with the Army transferring programmatic oversight and mission responsibility for the entire JHSV proVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:23 Jan 11, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00061 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\68085.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
56 

gram, including operations and maintenance, to the Navy was signed by the Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of the Navy on May 2, 2011. All delivered 

JHSVs will be operated by the Navy’s Military Sealift Command and manned by 

civilian or contract mariners. The budget request for fiscal year 2012 includes funding for construction of the one Navy JHSV. Army has funded its final JHSV in fiscal 

year 2012. Army funded JHSVs will be considered part of the Navy’s ship inventory. 

FLEET OILER REPLACEMENT (T–AO(X))

The Navy plans to procure the lead ship for the replacement T–AO fleet oiler in 

fiscal year 2014 with follow-on production at one ship every year until 2032. Ultimately, this will likely result in a complete recapitalization of the existing T–AO 

and T–AOE-classes and will include a total of 19 ships procured. Legacy fleet oilers 

will begin retiring in fiscal year 2017. The new oilers will have a double-hull design 

to ensure compliance with the environmental protection requirement for this type 

of ship. The T–AOX AoA will also consider the business case of recapitalization of 

the four T–AOE fast combat support ships that begin retiring in fiscal year 2032. 

SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRIAL BASE

Beyond balancing requirements and resources, the fiscal year 2012 President’s 

budget submission for shipbuilding also weighs the shipbuilding industrial base, 

achieving a balanced and executable shipbuilding program which provides additional capability while striving for efficiency. Our goal is to build from the current 

(fiscal year 2011) battle force inventory of 286 ships to a battle force inventory goal 

of a minimum of 313 ships. This budget submission includes increases in large surface combatant capability and capacity and both new construction and modernization to support the President’s directive to meet the growing ballistic missile threat 

to the United States and its allies. It also continues the Navy’s long-term plan for 

small surface combatants by awarding competitive contracts for 10 ships of each 

version of the LCS. 

We will continue to closely monitor our shipbuilding industrial base and especially 

the planned closure of Avondale shipyard by 2013. Northrop Grumman completed 

the divestiture of its shipbuilding segment by distributing shares in Huntington 

Ingalls Industries Inc. to its shareholders on March 31, 2011. After months of discussions and evaluation, the Navy did not object to NGC’s spin-off of its shipbuilding business. The Navy’s position on the spin-off was based on its conduct of 

due diligence with respect to proprietary forward-looking projections, including key 

financial assumptions. 

Robust competitive opportunities do exist across our industrial base as evidenced 

by shipbuilding contract awards for MLP, LCS, and JHSV. A stable shipbuilding industrial base, underpinned by level loading and predictable ship procurement, is 

critical to meet the Navy’s requirements for an affordable and capable future force. 

ACQUISITION WORKFORCE

The Department has embarked on a deliberate plan to increase the size of the 

Department of Navy’s (DoN) acquisition workforce (AWF) over the FYDP. The 

Navy’s position is to continue its current plan as stated in the DON AWF Strategic 

Plan, to rebuild the (DON) civilian AWF. In fiscal year 2010, the DON AWF grew 

by approximately 3,000 people (DAWDF – 499, In-sourcing – 759). The remainder 

of the growth was in the Warfare Centers (NWCF organizations). 

We started last year and aggressively increased our AWF based upon bottom-up 

requirements from our program executive officers (PEOs), Systems Commands, and 

Warfare Centers. In fiscal year 2010, we have added approximately 1000 acquisition 

personnel (122 DAWDF, 325 In-sourcing, and 600 other growth) to support shipbuilding programs at NAVSEA. Approximately 70 percent of these new acquisition 

positions were added to our warfare centers across the country. These warfare centers provide critical engineering, integration support, testing, and contracting oversight to all of our sea, air, land, space acquisition programs. These personnel are 

critical since they represent a part of the pipeline of future Program Managers and 

Senior Systems Engineers. 

We have also taken advantage of the Defense Acquisition Workforce Development 

Fund (DAWDF), initiated by Congress, and added nearly 400 acquisition interns 

this past year. We are on target to bring aboard an additional 500 this year and 

next. About 30 percent of our DAWDF AWF hires are now in shipbuilding organizations. We have also improved our education and training programs in two critical 

areas of need: shipbuilding program management and contracting. 

We have used DAWDF funds to pilot a shipbuilding program manager’s course 

that was successful enough that we are moving it permanently to our Defense AcVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:23 Jan 11, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00062 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\68085.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
57 

quisition University program. Other training initiatives include the integration of a 

‘‘Navy Day’’ into the current PMT–401 course that introduces all Program Managers 

to DoN’s S&E infrastructure (Warfare Centers/Labs/FFRDCs/UARCs) and the development of an Acquisition War Room focused on shipbuilding programs and acquisition lessons learned. In addition, because of the difficulty in hiring experienced contracting officers, we have implemented an intense accelerated contracting training 

program at NAVSEA to increase the number of qualified contracting officers as well 

as increase retention rates among this important group. It will take several years 

to rebuild and rebalance the DON’s AWF, but these measures and continuing them 

with this budget is an important step. 

The Navy continues to emphasize the significant value added by having a professional cadre of onsite Supervisor of Shipbuilding (SUPSHIP) personnel colocated 

with our Nation’s shipbuilding industrial base in an oversight role. Over the last 

year, the number of onboard SUPSHIP staff reached 1,100. This marks a continued 

growth trend of SUPSHIP staffing from approximately 900 onboard in fiscal year 

2007 and marks another successful year of achieving hiring targets, as SUPSHIPs 

have done every year from fiscal year 2007-fiscal year 2011. Leadership will work 

to continue to align resource needs and staffing requirements. 

SUMMARY

The Navy’s shipbuilding submission for fiscal year 2012 President’s budget and 

fiscal year 2012–2016 FYDP supports the requirements addressed in the National 

Defense Strategy, the Maritime Strategy, and the 2010 QDR. The plan sustains an 

11 CVN force from 2015 through 2045; sustains Virginia-class build rates at two 

submarines per year through the FYDP; increases Air and Missile Defense capability with increased DDG–51 construction and Aegis modernization; increases amphibious lift capability with the 11th LPD–17; sustains intra-theater lift capability 

with JHSV procurement; leverages strong competition in the LCS program to buy 

additional ships; accelerates procurement of fleet oilers; and continues Ohio-class replacement design and development by funding Research and Development efforts 

within the FYDP as well as Advance Procurement funds for detail design in fiscal 

year 2015. In the near years, this plan relies heavily on your support for our fiscal 

year 2012 budget. 

Through the long range plan for naval vessels, the Navy instills affordability, stability, and capacity into the shipbuilding plan and advances capabilities to meet the 

most likely evolving threats. The plan continues DDG–51 construction to leverage 

a stable design and mature infrastructure to achieve affordable capabilities. DDG– 

1000 technologies will provide long-range, precision naval surface fire support to 

marines conducting littoral maneuver and subsequent operations ashore. LCS will 

address specific and validated capability gaps in Mine Countermeasures, Surface 

Warfare, and Anti-Submarine Warfare, and our selection of both LCS designs 

leverages the unique capability delivered by each platform while providing stability 

to the shipbuilding infrastructure. Restructuring of our Maritime Prepositioning 

Force to augment our current MPS squadron with a T–AKE, MLP, and an existing 

LMSR will enhance the existing capabilities of the MPSs. The Navy has also increased the emphasis for meeting and extending service lives of in-service ships. We 

are sustaining the CG/DDG Modernization while also providing critical mid-life 

overhauls of LSDs. We have deferred command ship replacement and intend to sustain the current command ships until 2039. 

The Department of the Navy has addressed realism in our shipbuilding plan by 

incorporating realistic budget projections. The Department has addressed the industrial base in leveraging stable designs to minimize disruption experience with first 

of class constructions and provides stable production rates within the constraints of 

requirements and budget. Finally, the Department of the Navy’s plan supports the 

Secretary of Defense’s guidance to significantly reduce excess overhead costs and 

apply the savings to warfighting capability and capacity. 

Senator REED. Well, thank you, Mr. Secretary. I presume that 

Admiral McCoy and Captain Galinis do not have statements; or do 

you, sir? 

STATEMENT OF VADM KEVIN M. MCCOY, USN, COMMANDER, 

NAVAL SEA SYSTEMS COMMAND 

Admiral MCCOY. I have a short statement, sir. 

Senator REED. Excellent. Please go ahead. 

58 

Admiral MCCOY. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and distinguished subcommittee members, thank you very much for the opportunity to testify on shipbuilding initiatives and the material 

readiness of our Navy. As the Commander of NAVSEA, I have been 

actively engaged with senior Navy leadership, the shipbuilders, 

and the NAVSEA organization to improve the quality of ships delivered to the fleet and ensure that our ships retain their 

warfighting effectiveness and achieve their full service lives. 

Let me speak up front to the LPD–17 class program. Similar to 

previous shipbuilding programs, the LPD–17 class continues to improve and mature as lessons learned on early ships are rolled into 

follow ships and each successive hull completes the building process. NAVSEA and SUPSHIP Gulf Coast are working closely with 

the shipbuilder to incorporate lessons learned from the lead ship 

into follow ships. 

Relative to this class, NAVSEA’s focus has been in three areas: 

One, addressing the shortcomings of government oversight at the 

SUPSHIP. SUPSHIP Gulf Coast has hired over 284 new employees 

in the past 6 years, resulting in a 21 percent increase in manning, 

including having a second Navy captain assigned as the deputy supervisor for operations. 

SUPSHIP has already conducted quality audits and made improvements in the shipbuilding process, including better foreign 

material exclusion from piping and increased quality assurance 

compliance inspections, with particular focus on working with the 

shipbuilder to assess and improve the compliance with critical ship 

construction processes. These efforts are independently validated 

by my staff on a regular basis, including an annual comprehensive 

quality assurance audit conducted by outside experts focusing on 

both the SUPSHIP and the shipbuilder. 

Two, ensuring shipbuilder compliance in all areas of construction 

and having the metrics and situational awareness of deckplate performance to catch trends early as possible in the shipbuilding process. 

Three, implementing strike team modifications to make the ships 

more reliable in service. We have created a cross-functional strike 

team that includes engineers and fleet representatives to address 

issues associated with this new class of ship. Significant focus 

areas include: redesigning the filtering elements of the diesel engine and steering systems; improving the reliability of electrical 

generation and distribution systems; and updating the software in 

the engineering and ship control systems. 

The LPD–17 class brings tremendous warfighting capability to 

the Navy and the Marine Corps and it’s imperative that we continue to ensure that our warships are available for tasking now 

and in the future. Moving forward, we are committed to leveraging 

lessons learned during the fleet introduction of LPD–17 class into 

our initiatives to improve overall service readiness. 

I will add that last week we had all five delivered LPD–17 class 

ships underway, two on deployment, two on local operations, and 

one is just back from successful sea trials. 

I think we’re over the big hurdles on that class, sir. In fact, San 

Antonio, which has been off line for about 18 months during a 

59 

major rebuild from some earlier construction issues, is back at sea, 

having been at sea over a week on sea trials, and so far doing well. 

With respect to surface force readiness in general and the findings and recommendations of the fleet review panel in 2010, at 

NAVSEA we fully embrace our responsibility to: one, define with 

rigor the processes and methods of ensuring our ships meet their 

full service lives; and two, ensure that maintenance and modernization are executed in a formal, deliberate, and efficient manner to ensure the operational readiness, reliability, safety, and effectiveness of our ships. 

We’re working hard to address these issues in order to keep 

America’s Navy number one in the world. 

I’d be happy to take any of your questions, sir. 

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Admiral, for that excellent 

testimony. 

Captain Galinis, do you have a statement? 

STATEMENT OF CAPTAIN WILLIAM J. GALINIS, USN, 

SUPERVISOR OF SHIPBUILDING, GULF COAST 

Captain GALINIS. Sir, I do have a short statement. 

Senator REED. We’d like to hear that. Thank you. 

Captain GALINIS. Mr. Chairman, Senator Wicker, Senator Ayotte, 

thank you very much for this opportunity to testify on Navy shipbuilding and the quality issues affecting some of our ship construction programs. I have been the SUPSHIP Gulf Coast since September 2009 and before that served as the LPD–17 class program 

manager. 

As the SUPSHIP, I serve as the Navy’s on-site or waterfront representative responsible for the day-to-day administration of Navy 

shipbuilding contracts with private shipyards under my area of responsibility. At SUPSHIP Gulf Coast my team currently oversees 

ship construction work across the Gulf Coast from Alabama to Louisiana and as far north as Wisconsin. The shipyards we oversee are 

currently constructing the DDG–51 class, LHA–6, and LPD–17 

class ships at the Ingalls Yards in Mississippi and Louisiana, the 

LCS class Freedom variant LCSs in Marinette Marine, WI, oceanographic and special purpose ships at VT Halter Marine in Mississippi, and several smaller yards, including foreign military sales 

work at many of the yards in Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana. 

As the Navy’s waterfront representative for these contracts, I am 

responsible for overseeing shipbuilder quality compliance and ensuring that the ships delivered for Navy service meet all of our requirements. My team works on a daily basis with the shipyards to 

ensure that contractors satisfy their contractual obligations. It’s no 

secret that we have struggled with quality of some recently delivered ships from Gulf Coast shipyards. We, my organization and the 

shipbuilders that we work with, have done a lot of work in this 

area over the last 2 years implementing many improvements to improve quality. 

In some cases, this is simply getting back to the basics, namely 

reinstituting a culture of quality and a culture of compliance with 

well-engineered written processes and procedures, monitoring 

deckplate execution, and then measuring our performance against 

these requirements. Both the supervisor and the shipbuilders are 

60 

heavily focused on process compliance and are continually assessing our performance in this area. 

We are not done yet. Namely, we are executing quality work, but 

the near-term additional oversight measures are causing cost increases. We need to continue to improve our first-time quality and 

reduce rework. My team and the shipbuilders building these ships 

are committed to improving overall ship construction quality, building these ships as affordably and on schedule and delivering ships 

that are safe and reliable. I believe that our sailors and marines 

deserve nothing less, and I look forward to discussing these efforts 

with you. 

Thank you. 

Senator REED. Thank you very much. 

Gentlemen, thank you for the very insightful testimony. Let me 

begin with Secretary Stackley. Both Senator Wicker and I have 

commented on the LPD–17 and both Admiral McCoy and Captain 

Galinis also. Just a preliminary question. We took delivery of these 

ships and found there were significant shortcomings, at least the 

initial ships. Were we obligated to take delivery? As someone who 

did not have the benefit of an Annapolis education, Mr. Secretary, 

I assumed that we’d only take delivery if everything was okay. 

Mr. STACKLEY. Yes, sir. In the case of LPD–17 we were not compelled to take delivery. The ship delivered in the summer of 2005. 

She did receive an acceptance trial. There was a unique circumstance with regards to funding and completion of the ship. A 

decision was made that work would be deferred, to be completed 

in post-delivery, that deferred work would be documented by the 

Board of Inspection and Survey (INSURV) and they would actually 

come back and do a final acceptance trial after that post-delivery 

period. 

Literally days after that event, Hurricane Katrina hit the Gulf 

Coast and all good intentions were abandoned. The ship basically 

stayed at the shipyard for the amount of time necessary to get it 

ready to get under way and all the deferred work moved with it 

to its home port in Norfolk, where it was contracted out under a 

competitive bid process. 

So there was a confluence of events there. The Navy was not required to take delivery by any means. It was a conscious decision, 

but the planning went awry when Katrina basically overturned 

events. 

Senator REED. But when you took delivery, was it contemplated 

that the Navy would pay the additional costs for the rework, or is 

that somehow still the responsibility of the yard? 

Mr. STACKLEY. The reality is that the first four ships were 

awarded back in about the 1996 timeframe under a single cost-plus 

contract. Within the terms of a cost-plus contract, the government 

is responsible for paying the cost of the work and then industry basically puts at risk fee. But if there are allowable and allocable 

costs incurred on the contract, then the government is responsible 

for paying those. That does include rework so long as there isn’t 

any fraud or mischarging or things of that nature. 

Senator REED. Just to be clear in my mind, because of the nature 

of that cost-plus contract taking delivery of the ship did not shift 

costs to the government or the contractor? 

61 

Mr. STACKLEY. Not at all, no, sir. 

Senator REED. My presumption is that we’re not contracting like 

that in the future. 

Mr. STACKLEY. In fact, the fifth ship of the class was also costplus, and what we did several years ago was convert that to a fixed 

price to basically stop the bleeding. In general, we have contracted 

lead ships of a class inside of a cost-plus contract because of all the 

parallel development that takes place with the lead ship, and then 

we look to move to a fixed price environment as quickly as possible 

after that. 

In this case, a single contract awarded the first four as cost-plus. 

Senator REED. I think what Admiral McCoy indicated was that 

the recent ships that have delivered have much fewer problems. 

Your sense is that the trend line is now in the right direction, that 

they’re leaving the yard basically ready for sea trial? 

Mr. STACKLEY. Absolutely. I’ll let the two gentlemen on either 

side of me add to that, but there are several aspects of that. First, 

the program is just far more mature now. So the design deficiencies 

have been corrected, the build plans associated with the shipbuilder and how he builds the ship have matured. The vendor base 

has matured. 

Equally important is the government’s oversight has matured. 

Admiral McCoy mentioned the strengthening of the SUPSHIP. A 

complete audit and review of processes and procedures is in place 

to ensure compliance. 

The challenge that we have is going after the first-time quality, 

as opposed to the inspected-in quality. So we’re working side by 

side with the shipbuilder, because it’s impacting them as well inside of this. They’re in a fixed price environment now, so they’re 

paying for their cost of rework. We’re both working to get it right 

the first time, so that we’re not incurring costs late in a ship’s build 

cycle correcting deficiencies. 

Senator REED. Admiral McCoy? 

Admiral MCCOY. Mr. Chairman, let me add. Fundamental completion and fundamental quality improved on 21, for example, the 

last one that we took delivery of. We did have, I would say, two 

lingering problems that were late in discovery for the class, that 

did affect the 21, and that is grit in the lube oil system, so we had 

some rebearing and flushing to do to the engines; and insufficient 

socket weld length of material, and so we had a significant number 

of welds to go back and redo. 

But all the other stuff greatly improved from the first. In fact, 

we had a highly successful final contract trial just earlier this 

spring on New York and received lots of praise from INSURV during that trial. 

Senator REED. Admiral, you’ve made the very explicit point that 

you’ve beefed up dramatically your supervisory staff. I think that 

quite clearly implies that one of the defects was a lack of Navy supervision. I think that’s the case, correct? 

Admiral MCCOY. Yes, sir. First let me just say, though, the fundamental responsibility for constructing the ship right lies with the 

contractor. However, as a backstop we have a SUPSHIP in place 

that we expect to monitor the contractor’s quality performance and 

62 

be able to pull the penalty flag out of the back pocket when necessary. That did not effectively happen here. 

I’ll let Captain Galinis talk about some of the things that he’s 

done to get us much more in a compliance mode and looking at the 

same metrics the shipbuilder is looking at to backstop the shipbuilder effectively. But I would say yes, that is a fundamental responsibility of the government and that did not happen here, sir. 

Senator REED. One follow-on question before I recognize Captain 

Galinis. You have learned a great deal. We’ve all learned a great 

deal. I presume that you’re operationalizing these lessons, not just 

along the Gulf Coast, but in every aspect of shipbuilding. 

Admiral MCCOY. Yes, sir. 

Senator REED. Also, you’re taking this and you’re trying with 

Secretary Stackley to plug it into the design phase and the build 

phase of future vessels, so that we don’t have to relearn this lesson 

every time we have a new class of ship. Can you just comment 

briefly on that? 

Admiral MCCOY. Yes. Let me just address the first part first. As 

part of what we learned coming out of the Gulf Coast issues, we 

instituted across the four SUPSHIPs what we call back to basics. 

It’s heavily focused on compliance, as well as contract oversight 

and training. 

We have increased the staffing across all four SUPSHIPs by over 

200 just in terms of gross numbers. We were at about 900 across 

the force SUPSHIPs. We’re now at about 1,100. So we recognized 

that across the board, particularly with this ramp-up of shipbuilding—two LCS classes, JHSV, two Virginias—that we weren’t 

postured the way we needed to be and we needed to get back down 

to the fundamentals; and that we also had in many cases a green 

workforce that needed significantly more training. 

So we went off on that direction across the board, across the corporation. I can let Captain Galinis talk about some of the things 

that he’s done. 

Senator REED. Before he does that, just a final point about how 

you, Mr. Secretary, have taken these lessons learned and put them 

into the development of new ships or new classes of ships? 

Mr. STACKLEY. I would say if you look at the LPD–17 class of 

ships, fundamentally it’s a great class of ship. The Marine Corps 

loves it. The Navy operators love it. The Achilles heel has been 

some of these nagging reliability issues, like the grit in the lube oil, 

which has been kind of a mission kill from a propulsion standpoint. 

But yes, we have been looking at those issues across the board and 

looking at our other classes and saying, okay, where could we have 

the same problem? 

For example, welding. We have beefed up welding oversight and 

compliance at every one of our four SUPSHIPs because we know 

that is one of those critical processes that if it gets away from you 

it’s very difficult to recover from. Critical coatings is another one, 

in terms of paint and things like that. So we’re looking at that 

across the board, Senator. 

Senator REED. Let me do this. Because my colleagues have been 

very indulgent and I’ve taken a lot of time and I want to recognize 

Senator Wicker. I’m going to come back with the second round and 

ask you sort of the same question, which is how are you working 

63 

to take these lessons, incorporate them, not just in shipbuilding supervision but in design, in decisions about what ship classes you 

can build on the force. So you can think about that. 

But one reason I requested that Captain Galinis be here is that 

Admiral McCoy is a great commander and he probably reaches out 

every day, in fact several times a day, to you, Captain, and says, 

what’s going on on that waterfront, what are we doing, et cetera? 

I wanted to be able to get the benefit of the kind of advice that Admiral McCoy, because of his leadership skills, gets. So can you give 

us, as Admiral McCoy suggested, some sort of feel of what you 

think the problems are and how we’ve addressed them and where 

we have to do more? 

Captain GALINIS. Yes, sir. Fundamentally what I’ve seen since 

I’ve been down there, the basic root cause of this really comes down 

to process compliance. We look at it at four functional areas in 

shipbuilding: piping systems, electrical, coatings, and structure. 

Across those four major processes that it takes to build a ship, fundamentally the work items and the processes are sound. What we 

found—and this is on both the Navy side and the shipbuilder—we 

have gotten away from or deviated from following those written 

processes. 

Collectively there has been a renewed focus to look at the work 

processes that are in place, and ensure that we’re following those, 

and then measure our compliance to those processes. 

What did we do at SUPSHIP Gulf Coast specifically for our 

workforce? In addition to the increased hiring that we’ve been able 

to do over the last several years, training has been a big factor in 

our quality organization. Essentially, we’ve restructured our quality organization and we’ve provided a career path now where a person can enter the quality workforce at an entry level and work his 

way all the way to essentially a subject matter expert as a quality 

assurance specialist. 

That was not there before. That training comprises two aspects 

of it. There’s formal training, classroom, schoolhouse type training, 

as well as experience that needs to be documented and logged. For 

example, a nondestructive tester who would inspect welds, he goes 

through a formal training course and then he’s required to incur 

so much time on the job performance, that essentially gets documented and he works under the supervision of a more qualified 

welder. 

The second thing that we’ve done working with the shipyard is 

we have aligned our inspection attributes and the things that we 

look at, so that we know when we get reports from the shipbuilder 

that we understand what they’re looking at and they understand 

what we’re looking at, so our metrics, if you will, are somewhat 

aligned. That was a tremendous process. It sounds fairly basic, but 

it was something that over time we had gotten away from. 

Once we aligned those metrics, what we started doing is what we 

call critical process pulse audits. Across those four areas that I 

mentioned—electrical, piping, structure, and coatings—we’ve been 

doing this every other month now, a joint inspection using the common attributes that we’ve developed. That has allowed us to realize 

and understand where our risk areas are, where the crafts are deviating from the processes that are in place. 

64 

We’ve been doing this for probably about 14 or 16 months, since 

the early part of 2010. We have a pretty good track record now that 

we can go back and we can see where our risk areas are. So where 

in the past we didn’t know what we didn’t know, now we know 

where our risk areas are. 

Then the results of those processes are fed directly back to the 

operations, the craft leadership, and I meet on a monthly basis 

with the craft directors and we literally go through these metrics. 

Then from that they either adjust the shipyard training for the 

craftsmen or we adjust training for the quality inspectors if we 

need to do that. In some cases maybe we do make changes to the 

processes. 

So that in a nutshell is kind of the process that we’ve been 

through over the last almost 20 months or so. 

Senator REED. Thank you very much. 

Senator Wicker. 

Senator WICKER. Let me just observe that the chairman, with 

neither an Annapolis education or a fine Reserve Officers’ Training 

Corps education, seems to have been able to drill down on some 

very good points here. 

Let me see if I can summarize in layman’s terms. Things are better now with the LPD–17 because the program has matured, and 

that stands to reason. Admiral McCoy says that actually things are 

going pretty well there now and the people love it. Yet, as late as 

the winter 2010, we did have this independent weapons tester saying that the ship is not effective, suitable, and is not survivable in 

combat. 

Admiral McCoy, do you take issue with that? Was it correct at 

the time it was made and in a short time that’s been rectified, or 

what can you tell the committee? 

Admiral MCCOY. Senator, I think if you look at the issues that 

they identify, I don’t take issue with the issues. We were having 

mobility issues, no doubt about that. We were in the middle of grit 

and lube oil on just about all our ships that we were dealing with, 

so that was a mobility issue. 

Senator WICKER. When was the grit solved? 

Admiral MCCOY. I’d say right now with San Antonio going to sea 

and doing well I think we can say the grit is behind us now. 

Senator WICKER. Just behind us? 

Admiral MCCOY. Yes, sir. We’ve had to flush, we’ve had to 

change system design, and we’ve had to prove with a significant 

number of hours on the engines that these ships are reliable. I hate 

to knock on wood, but I’ll knock on wood here and say, with two 

deployed and last week three others out at sea doing well, and I 

think a good understanding of the issues both at the shipbuilder 

and how we get the grit out, flush, service, and some of the system 

design changes, that I think that one’s behind us. 

There were also issues with the Ship-Wide Area Network 

(SWAN). On the earlier ship, you had the less reliable, outdated, 

obsolete, almost the ATM version, and we’re now putting the Gig 

E version. Two of the ships have it and we have a program to put 

that on the others. 

We had issues with interior communications that we’ve been 

dealing with. So we have been systematically going through some 

65 

of these issues and I think we’re in a much better place. We have 

answered this question before and I’m happy to give an update to 

the committee, sir. We’ll take that one for the record in terms of 

the status of each one of those items. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

The LPD–17 Class of ships has met or exceeded all Key Performance Parameter 

objectives outlined in the LPD–17 Class Operational Requirements Document with 

the exception of one information exchange requirement that still needs to be validated. 

Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) found the LPD–17 Class ‘‘not 

operationally effective, suitable, or survivable in a hostile environment’’ during testing in 2007–2009; and its report identified 68 deficiencies grouped under 3 major 

issues—reliability, self defense, and recoverability. The Navy has completed its review of operational test reports by DOT&E, developed corrective active action plans, 

and has substantially resolved or is in process of resolving the deficiencies cited. 

The LPD–17 Class operational evaluation was conducted with a legacy asynchronous transfer mode (ATM) version of the Ship Wide Area Network (SWAN) and 

an early version of the Engineering Control System (ECS). The first two ships of 

the class have received the upgraded GIG–E SWAN; and no issues have been cited 

since installation. Upgrades to LPDs–19 and –20 are scheduled for completion by 

the end of 2012. All remaining LPD–17 Class ships in construction will include the 

GIG–E SWAN upgrade. New ECS software to improve performance and provide additional built-in test/monitoring capabilities has been installed on all LPD–17 Class 

ships. 

Main engine reliability issues have been observed on four of the first five LPD– 

17 Class ships. The root cause of those issues can be traced back to lube oil cleanliness. Poor initial system cleanliness led to steering reliability issues. A major redesign of the lube oil filtration system was completed in early 2010. Damaged bearings 

and lube oil piping segments have been replaced on all affected ships. New filters 

and/or modified strainers have been or will be installed on all delivered ships. New 

flushing procedures have been developed and implemented; LPD–22 and follow 

ships will all be delivered with the new designs and components. 

Interior/Exterior Communications (IVCS) components demonstrated unreliability 

and could not support high volume traffic capability beyond existing amphibious 

ships; and the Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) batteries failed prematurely resulting in total power loss for some components. The IVCS software has been upgraded; and new batteries, along with revised preventive maintenance procedures, 

have been installed on all LPD–17 Class ships. Additionally, a new UPS monitoring 

system is being implemented across the class. 

Recoverability refers to the ability of a ship and its crew to prevent loss and restore mission essential functions given a casualty from accidents or threat weapon 

effects. Systems that directly impact recoverability include UPS, SWAN, ECS, damage control equipment, shipboard damage control features and crew training. Ship 

system issues and associated resolutions have been identified in the preceding paragraphs. Additional isolation valves in the chill water system are planned for installation on all LPD–17 Class ships; and fire detection system software deficiencies 

have been identified and corrected across the class to improve the ship’s 

recoverability. 

Follow-on Operational Test and Evaluation, which commenced in July 2010, is 

being conducted by the Navy’s Commander Operational Test and Evaluation Force 

and the Marine Corps Operational Test and Evaluation Activity under DOT&E 

oversight to confirm these corrective actions resolve the problems noted by DOT&E. 

The evaluation is scheduled to run through the end of fiscal year 2012. 

The first three ships of the class have successfully completed their maiden deployments, meeting not only their anticipated operational requirements but also responding to emergent missions requests. Today, USS Mesa Verde (LPD–19) and 

USS Green Bay (LPD–20) are deployed overseas; and the other three commissioned 

ships in the class are conducting local operations. 

A classified brief providing the status of DOT&E deficiencies and associated corrective actions was presented to the Senate Armed Services Committee professional 

staff on August 6, 2010; and the Navy can present an updated classified level brief 

with additional clarification and detail of each deficiency, if desired. 

Senator WICKER. Okay. Do you think the independent tester 

went a little overboard late last year in stating, as I have quoted, 

66 

not effective, not survivable in combat? Went a little too far in your 

judgment? 

Admiral MCCOY. I certainly don’t want to second guess the inspector. I will tell you that in my mind I had serious issues a year 

ago on reliability of the propulsion plant because we were still coming through it, and I think we’re through that. So I don’t want to 

take issue with the tester, sir. 

Senator WICKER. Okay. Secretary Stackley, are you trying to 

jump in? 

Mr. STACKLEY. I was going to add to that. We did a thorough review of the findings from the test and evaluation (T&E) community 

coming out of operational T&E and three basic categories emerged. 

One was a reliability issue associated with the propulsion plant, 

which Admiral McCoy has highlighted and the efforts that have 

gone into identifying things from the low boil system to engine 

alignment. Those issues technically understood; fixes are either in 

place or being completed throughout the class. 

The second category was reliability associated with, the Admiral 

mentioned, the SWAN and the obsolete technology. That technology is being refreshed. This touches everything from the propulsion system to interior communications to motor-operated valves. 

Senator WICKER. Was that a design defect or a manufacturing 

failure? 

Mr. STACKLEY. Actually, at the time that was state-of-the-art. 

This mid-90s technology was state-of-the-art for basically passing 

signals from one end of the ship to the other. You get to a decade 

later and it’s obsolete technology. It has been far surpassed by this 

gigabit ethernet approach which we’re incorporating throughout 

the class. 

The third category is the combat systems. On LPD–17, the combat systems—I will call them Navy standard systems are the same 

systems that you’ll find on other Navy ships. There are some deficiencies associated with those systems against certain threats that 

are known throughout the Navy, that are being addressed Navywide in terms of upgrades to those systems, and when we have the 

Navy-wide solution that will be back-fit on the LPD–17 class. 

So the findings we found to be generally accurate and the final 

determination, that’s the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation’s call. 

Senator WICKER. Let me try to boil this down with regard to the 

LPD–17. We had gotten away from a culture of quality, and I take 

it from the testimony that the shipyard itself had gotten away from 

the culture of quality. 

Number two, the Navy didn’t follow the process closely enough. 

Number three, part of that was not enough Navy personnel were 

assigned to this task to make sure we stayed with this culture of 

quality. 

Then number four, getting down to specifics, there were written 

instructions as far as the process that simply were not followed. 

Captain Galinis, I’ll let you take the first stab at this. Have I 

summarized at least four important parts there correctly? If not, 

what did I miss? I think the chairman is asking the exact right 

question. This program has matured and it’s going to be fine and 

folks like it now, but it sure has been a mess. 

67 

Are we learning lessons, not just for this system, but for the next 

system, so that it can be avoided again? 

Captain GALINIS. Yes, sir. First of all, I believe you did characterize the points correctly there. Again, the written processes that 

we have I think are good processes. As I said, what we have in 

place now, I believe, the inspections that we have, working with 

the shipyard, give us the ability to measure compliance with those 

processes. I believe that probably in the past we were not as effective in that area collectively, both the Navy and the shipbuilder, as 

we should have been or certainly could have been. I think that’s 

what led to some of the issues that we’re seeing. 

The pipe weld issue that Admiral McCoy referred to. The mil 

standard that’s in place to measure weld quality has about 18 different attributes, and I’ll say over time our inspectors both on the 

Navy and the shipbuilder side maybe were only looking at 6 of 

those, as an example. We were not catching all of the particular attributes that would lead to a quality weld. 

That’s just one example that over time we’ve atrophied how we 

look at particular issues. I think through the training processes 

now that we’ve put in place both on the Navy side and the shipbuilder side, one of the things that Admiral McCoy referred to, his 

teams that have come down, since I have been down there, in almost 20 months we’ve had eight different quality or technical authority type-based assessments done between the shipbuilder and 

the SUPSHIP, as well as a number of other informal audits. 

So one of the things that came out of that early on was the training of the craftsmen on the deckplate, not knowing exactly what 

process they should be using. In the Ingalls yard that we work 

with, they have three different contracts in place at the same time. 

So there are different requirements across those different contracts. 

For the craftsman on the deckplate, to do the job correctly he had 

to understand what the requirements were for the ship that he was 

working on and the processes he should follow. 

A lot of times that information wasn’t being flowed down to the 

craftsman. I’ll tell you that’s one thing that the shipyard has corrected, and within the last year they have a very robust training 

program in place now, not just for new hires, but also for people 

in the workforce to go back and refresh those skills. 

Just 2 months ago I had the opportunity to go through that 

school myself and we walked through what they’re doing for the 

welders, how they’re training the electricians and the pipefitters. 

There is a very good effort in that place, and I think that gets us 

to that process compliance piece that we’re striving for. 

Senator WICKER. Thank you very much. I’ll stick around for a 

second round, but I know Senator Ayotte has been very patient, so 

I’ll let her take a turn. 

Senator REED. Senator Ayotte. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you so much, 

Senator Wicker. 

Secretary Stackley, I wanted to ask you about the issue of modernization of our shipyards. In your written testimony you cite the 

impending attack submarine force structure gap that you anticipate coming in the 2020s. You’ve also stated that you plan to address this impending attack submarine force structure gap by reVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:23 Jan 11, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00073 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\68085.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
68 

ducing the construction span of the Virginia-class submarines and 

extending the service life of selected attack submarines and extending the length of selected attack submarine deployments. 

The Portsmouth Naval Shipyard is a very important public shipyard in our country. There is a gap in the modernization of our 

shipyards in terms of the backlog there. I’m sure that the other 

shipyards have backlogs as well, but the backlog at Portsmouth is 

approximately $500 million in modernization. 

What steps do we plan to take to address that, given if we’re 

going to focus on extending the life and the maintenance? A shipyard like Portsmouth is very critical in having the ability and modernization to be able to do that in the most efficient and appropriate manner to meet your goals. 

Secretary Stackley, what steps do you think we should be taking 

to prepare for an increased workload, as I would see it actually, in 

what we do at the shipyard? 

Then also, Admiral McCoy, if you could comment, based on your 

previous experience as the commander at the Portsmouth Naval 

Shipyard, how you think the Navy’s plan to address the attack submarine forces structure gap will impact Portsmouth, and also what 

steps we can be taking now and what steps you anticipate taking 

to address this backlog so that we can be prepared to meet what 

your proposal is. 

Mr. STACKLEY. Yes, ma’am. Let me start by describing first the 

mitigation efforts that you highlighted from our written statement. 

Those are mitigation only. They don’t close the gap. If you look at 

the force structure tables, in fact our submarine force structure 

drops down to a low of about 39 submarines in about 20 years. 

That’s of deep concern to us. When we look at what that potentially means with regards to operational cycle and turnaround 

times, turnaround ratios, it means that we have to stay right on 

top of the maintenance plan for the Virginia-class. Historically, 

submarine and carrier maintenance has been funded to about 100 

percent. It’s at the top of the priority list when it comes to our Operation and Maintenance account and so we ensure that we do fully 

fund the maintenance that’s planned. 

You’re getting at the flip side, which is, how about the infrastructure that’s going to be responsible for executing the maintenance? 

We have a couple of benchmarks that we look at. The investment 

in terms of infrastructure for our depots, we’re required and we do 

meet the requirement to ensure that at least 6 percent of our maintenance budget would be going through those depots, into the infrastructure. We carefully ensure that we meet that benchmark. 

The backlog is the delta between that benchmark and then the 

long potential list of things that we’d like to do to upgrade or modernize our facilities. That comes back to the rest of the budget process. After we hit our benchmarks in terms of ensuring that we’ve 

fully funded the maintenance and the modernization and that 

we’ve met the benchmarks for taking care of the infrastructure, 

this remaining list of work has to compete inside of the budget 

process based on priority. 

We’re looking across the board in terms of our depot investments 

and the projects that either are a higher priority or return the 

greatest bang for the buck. Looking at the future requirements for 

69 

those depots is how it plays out. Each of the depots are looking at 

that type of a backlog and it simply comes down to the budget 

that’s available, prioritizing the requirements inside of the budget, 

and ensuring that we meet the maintenance demands for the force 

today and for the foreseeable future. 

Senator AYOTTE. Just as a brief follow-up, you said you are deeply concerned about the 39-submarine structure, and then also the 

purpose of the modernization would be to make sure that we can 

most efficiently use our shipyards. In terms of your deep concern 

about that, please tell me a little bit more. 

Mr. STACKLEY. It’s both maintenance and modernization. One of 

the other things that we’ve done with Virginia, the latter half of 

the LA class, Seawolf, and for the replacement, is gone towards the 

ARC–E concept, which is basically modernizing as you go. In other 

words, rather than bring submarines in to deep modernization periods to upgrade their capability to pace the threat, we’ve gone towards a more open systems approach, so that the impact associated 

with modernization periods is less dramatic. 

But the other aspect of it then is just class maintenance plan, 

doing the periodic maintenance and the condition-based maintenance on a regular cycle. That’s the two parts. It’s ensuring the 

maintenance is funded, which it has been and foreseeably will continue to be; and the other is to ensure that the infrastructure is 

there to conduct the maintenance. 

I haven’t reviewed the backlog list at Portsmouth. I suspect that 

Admiral McCoy has. But I’m not aware of an issue at Portsmouth 

regarding the backlog of upgrading that facility that directly places 

at risk our ability to maintain the submarine force that will be relying on Portsmouth as a depot. 

Senator AYOTTE. Admiral, I know you’re quite familiar with the 

shipyard. I wanted to get your thoughts on this. 

Admiral MCCOY. If you did know, I’m one of the fiercest defenders of the four naval shipyards within DOD, because they are so 

critical to sailing in the Navy. As a matter of fact, I tell people 

every single man-day at least for the next 5 years has already been 

accounted for in the four naval shipyards with known work. It’s 

that critical to the fleet. 

I watch and evaluate the military construction (MILCON) and 

the sustainment and restoration money that goes into the four 

naval shipyards. I am satisfied, and we argue vehemently inside 

the Navy rack and stack process, that the critical maintenance, 

piers and drydocks, the things we need to do to execute our mission 

every single day, is in fact done, and the critical replacements that 

we need to do. 

After that, as Secretary Stackley said, it becomes where in the 

budget in terms of this thing or that thing. Maintenance, MILCON, 

modernization, equipment buys, hiring people, apprentice training, 

and things like that where in the priority is the best expenditure 

of our dollars at any given time. But we are very conscious to make 

sure that our four naval shipyards get the critical maintenance 

that they need and MILCON that they need to execute their mission. 

Now, I’d like to address the attack submarine backlog. That’s an 

issue that all of us are working on within the Navy. There are 

70 

things that we can do that I will just point out that the folks up 

in Portsmouth are intimately involved with. We have the SUBMET 

folks, about 250 people up there at the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, colocated along with the shipyard, and in fact we’re looking 

at ways to collapse the maintenance cycle down. Can we do less 

maintenance with good engineering, the track record, and the 

trending that we’ve been doing over the years? 

For example, a year ago we signed out a change to the second 

half of the 688 class life where, instead of doing 4-year on-center 

selected restricted availabilities, we’re now doing 6-year on centers. 

That one change just between 2010 and 2016 gave us 12 submarine 

years back. 

I think there’s a tremendous opportunity for the submarine repair industrial base that Porstsmouth is deep in the middle of to 

look at how on the repair side we can reduce the amount of maintenance required to give more operational time to the fleet. 

We’re looking at right now how do we get engineered overhauls 

from about 20 months down to 18 months? That gives us 2 more 

months of submarine time. There’s a huge role for our public shipyards in helping that submarine gap out there in the future, as the 

Secretary said. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you very much for your answers. I appreciate it. 

My time is up. 

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Senator. 

Let me go back to the question that both Senator Wicker and I 

alluded to, Mr. Secretary. 

That is, we’ve learned a lot through not just the LPD–17 program, but so many programs that you’ve all spoken about. How are 

we capturing these lessons, not just in terms of oversight of the 

shipyards, but in the design and the contractual arrangements that 

we are going to see in the future to ensure the ships come in on 

time, on budget, and at high quality? 

Just as a footnote, I think one of the lessons we have learned is 

you have to have the Navy personnel on the shipyard. My sense 

was in the 90s that presence was a billpayer for a lot of things we 

did. With the tough budget ahead of us, we can’t do the same thing 

again or we’ll squander these lessons. 

With that as a prelude, Mr. Secretary, your comments please. 

Admiral McCoy, if you have comments I’d appreciate it; and Captain Galinis also. 

Mr. STACKLEY. Yes, sir. Let me start at the very front end of the 

process, which is requirements. If you get the requirements wrong, 

you can’t fix them downstream. What we’ve spent a lot of time and 

effort on more recently is requirements definition, looking at risk, 

how much development is being required to meet the capabilities 

that are being lined up with the requirements, and what’s it going 

to cost. 

I can tell you that with the LPD–17 program cost realism was 

approximately nonexistent at the front end. LCS had a similar 

problem getting out of the starting blocks. If you don’t understand 

the cost and if in defining the requirements you bring a lot of risk 

associated with developing new capabilities, then downstream 

when you’re trying to actually execute what was planned on the 

71 

front end you’re going to run into cost problems. You’re going to 

run into schedule problems when you have concurrent development, design, and construction going on. 

So we’ve been focusing on the front end, bringing cost realism, 

looking for that 80 percent solution to achieve the requirements, reduce the risk, and reduce the cost as we get into the design and 

construction phase. The Ohio replacement program is a good example. We spent a year unlocking those requirements and looking at 

trades inside of capabilities to figure out how we get the cost of this 

large program down so that later in 5 to 10 years report that we 

are not breaking other shipbuilding programs to meet that national 

strategic requirement. 

There’s the requirements piece and there’s the cost realism piece. 

To go with that is design for affordability. It’s really bringing lessons learned from other shipbuilding programs into the front end. 

We’re in a much better position to do that today with the design 

tools that we have. We’re away from vellums, we’re away from 

paper. We’re going into standard computer-aided design tools that 

allow us to design a ship many times before we build it. 

We can catch and capture design deficiencies and interferences. 

We can bring standard practices. We can have more people reviewing the design, and then look at producibility in that process. So 

it’s get the requirements right, it’s leveraging some of the lessons 

learned in the design tools that we have. 

The other key piece is to get the design done before you build so 

you’re not carrying concurrency into the construction cycle. One example is something like a product ion readiness review; before you 

go cutting steel on this new ship program, you certify that the design is done, it’s mature, so that we’re not incurring concurrency 

in the construction process. 

Those are probably the three key things on the front end. Then 

a lot of the discussion today has been about compliance and oversight. I can tell you that the focus on that today is where it needs 

to be, from the top, the Secretary, CNO, on down, to ensure that 

we’re investing in terms of putting the right people, right skills, 

and right location to perform that oversight function, and also reviewing, as we talked about all the procedures and processes so 

that we don’t have disparity, relying on judgment at the deckplate 

level, but in fact we have certified processes and procedures in 

place driving that compliance. 

Then it’s ensuring that you have a contract vehicle that enforces 

what you’ve tried to set up through the requirements, design, and 

specs and standards piece. I can tell you we need to continue to 

work on that. There’s a lot of experience that’s required to write 

a good contract, and we’ve lost a lot. Not only are SUPSHIPs 

attriting, but also at our headquarters. 

Those folks who are extremely experienced, that have the 30 

years school of hard knocks on what the right terms and conditions 

are and how to structure a good contract, they’re small in number. 

We’re going towards things like peer review process, where we 

bring in the larger acquisition workforce to review contracts to try 

to harden up everything from terms and conditions, incentives, and 

contract type. 

72 

You see a lot of this coming through in the discussion with Dr. 

Carter and the better buying power initiatives. That is largely 

about how we buy what we buy, to write a good strong contract to 

enforce the intention that was on the front end. 

So there are a lot of parallel efforts. They need to be sustained. 

There is a lot of training of the workforce that goes with that. I 

think we’re seeing early returns. We’re seeing early good trends. 

But it really is a long-haul effort, and as we get into the challenges 

ahead with regard to the budget and new ship programs, we really 

have to carry this discipline further forward to ensure that we 

don’t have breakage at a period when the budget is potentially 

coming down and major programs are trying to rise. 

Senator REED. Admiral McCoy or Captain Galinis, any comment? 

Admiral MCCOY. I agree with everything that the Secretary said 

relative to getting the requirements right and flowing that into the 

design. I would say probably 90 percent of my problems over the 

last almost 3 years now with the LPD–17 class have not been design or requirements. They have really been fundamental compliance with known requirements that were not built into the ship, 

either welding or foreign material exclusion from critical fluid systems, that kind of thing. 

What we’ve been trying to do is across the four SUPSHIPs hire 

up to adequate staff, proper staff, get the training, and then focus 

really on a compliance mentality and oversight with the shipbuilder. 

Senator REED. Thank you. 

Captain Galinis, any comments? 

Captain GALINIS. Sir, I would take it to a little bit more of a tactical level. What we’re doing day-to-day on LPD–22, which is our 

next LPD to deliver and is going to deliver this year, the program 

office and the program executive officer several years back stood up 

the strike team. This is an organization with input from the fleet, 

from the builders, and from the program side, to kind of capture 

lessons learned across the class. 

They have developed a pretty good database of issues. They’ve 

solved a great deal of those. What we have done is we’ve leveraged 

off of that database and put together what I’ll call focus groups to 

go and look at high-risk areas for this class, many of the things 

that Admiral McCoy and Secretary Stackley talked about: main 

propulsion; electrical; the mission systems area, which is your hydraulic ramps; the stern gates; some of the big heavy equipment 

on board the ship; ventilation systems; and coating systems. Those 

are the high-risk areas that we’ve had problems on the ship. 

We’ve put together focus teams that include resident experts 

from the warfare centers, from the fleet, from the program office, 

and the SUPSHIP’s office, to work with the shipbuilder to ensure 

that we have those captured. Where we can get design changes in, 

we’re doing that. Where some of the other fixes are really just performing the work correctly the first time, we’re ensuring that. So 

there’s a laser focus on those issues for LPD–22 as we go forward. 

Senator REED. Thank you. 

I have some questions that I’ll submit in writing, and we’ll recognize Senator Wicker. 

73 

Senator WICKER. I want to thank the panel for being willing to 

go in depth with us on this issue. 

Let me ask about the cost of the 2011 30-year shipbuilding plan. 

The Navy says it’s going to cost $16 billion per year. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) says it will cost $19 billion per year. 

What can we make of that? 

Mr. STACKLEY. We tend to take the 30-year plan and break it 

down into three windows: first 10, second 10, and third 10, recognizing that in the first 10 years of the 30-year plan we have a lot 

of fidelity, better accuracy, and better understanding of the ships 

in the plan, what the requirements are, and what their costs are. 

So we believe we have fairly high fidelity in our cost estimates 

for the first 10 years of the plan, and that’s $14 to $15 billion per 

year, maybe just a tad north of that. 

The second 10 years, you start to lose some of that fidelity, and 

that’s a critical 10-year window because that’s also where you’re 

into heavy construction of the Ohio replacement program and other 

new ship programs are starting to emerge. 

Senator WICKER. Let me interject. Does CBO approach it with 

three windows of 10 years each also? If so, are they closer in the 

first 10 years? 

Mr. STACKLEY. Yes, sir. I was going to wrap around to that. I will 

cut to the punch line in terms of the difference between CBO and 

the Navy. Dr. Labs and I have had this conversation on a number 

of occasions. We have a difference in terms of how we escalate and 

then de-escalate the price of ships in the out years. It’s a difference 

between the way the Navy cost estimators account for inflation 

versus the way CBO accounts for inflation. That difference makes 

up the majority of the difference between CBO’s estimates and the 

Navy’s estimates. 

What happens between that 10-, 20-, and 30-year window is the 

further out you go obviously the greater the impact the inflation 

will have, and that’s where it tends to exacerbate the difference between the Navy and CBO. 

Going back to the 10-, 20-, 30-year look, in the first 10 years I 

think we’re fairly close in our estimates. We start to diverge in that 

second window, which is a combination of that escalation difference 

and also some assumptions regarding largely the Ohio replacement 

program. Then when you get out to the third window, the last 10 

years of the 30-year plan, we’re fairly far apart, again driven by 

difference in escalations, but now you’re also starting to get into 

programs that don’t exist and what assumptions are you going to 

make, for example, regarding a DDG–X out 30 years from now. 

That’s why I break it down to those three windows. We’re very 

much focused on the first 10-year window. We’re very concerned 

about the second because that Ohio replacement program is so 

dominating. The third window we look at for long-range planning 

and consideration, but we don’t do a whole lot in the near term to 

try to affect that last decade of the 30-year plan. 

Senator WICKER. That makes sense. Let me ask in conclusion 

about the industrial base. We want our shipyards to do right and 

to get this right, but also we want to keep them viable. There are 

concerns that the relatively low orders for new ships in the 2011 

74 

plan may jeopardize the administration’s plans to support the shipbuilding industrial base over the intermediate to long term. 

Tell us what you can to reassure us in that regard, Mr. Secretary. 

Mr. STACKLEY. Yes, sir. We talked about adding five ships to the 

FYDP. If you look at the ships we’ve added, there was a very heavy 

focus on, one, it’s a valid requirement, but two, the industrial base. 

So we’ve added a 2014 destroyer, for example. We have two surface 

combatant builders. We have a sawtooth profile, which is marginal 

to support two surface combatant builders. What we would really 

like to do is get that build rate up to a more stable flow of work 

that helps our affordability, helps their viability, and meets the 

force structure requirement. 

Senator WICKER. We’d like to help you on that. 

Mr. STACKLEY. Yes, sir. 

So there’s the surface combatant piece. We’ve added a destroyer 

in the FYDP. I believe we have further to go and we need to continue to work on that. 

We also added the T–AOXs and we pulled the MLP to the left. 

Today we have two auxiliary builders and we need to pull that 

work into the FYDP to keep the auxiliary sector of our shipbuilding 

industrial base viable, recognizing that by itself is not going to be 

able to support two auxiliary shipbuilders or we are at risk of losing both. 

That was critical to the sector, but if the shipyards were side by 

side with me they would describe that as not sufficient to support 

both of the auxiliary builders today. 

The other aspects of our shipbuilding plan, submarines are going 

to two per year. In fact, in some years in the out years when Ohio 

starts up we’re at three. I think that sector is very healthy compared to the past 10 to 15 years. For carriers, we are very stable 

between new construction and refueling and complex overhauls, so 

that sector is healthy. Then the last piece is amphibs and between 

our big deck build plan and the LPD–17 winding down, we have 

in fact pulled the LSD–X, which was originally going to be out in 

the 2020s, in to the 2017 timeframe and are going to be kicking 

off that analysis of alternatives, again with concerns for the industrial base. 

So we keep a close eye on the industrial base when we build the 

shipbuilding plan. We are in a $15, $16 billion rate over that 30- 

year window. Some people would argue that we’re going to be challenged to meet that budget plan. But in the near term we’re doing 

everything we can to address the rise in the budget and the types 

of ships that we build with an eye on the industrial base. 

Senator WICKER. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Chairman, this is going to do it for me today. I really appreciate this panel working with us to help us increase our understanding of these very large, expensive, and complex issues. 

Senator REED. Thank you, Senator. I want to join you in thanking the panel for very insightful and very, very helpful, constructive testimony this afternoon. We look forward to working with 

you, because this is a long-term ongoing, mutually involved exercise. So thank you very much. 

75 

Admiral, thank you for your service. Mr. Secretary and Captain, 

thank you, because you brought a real from-the-dockside view of 

the process and we appreciate it very, very much. 

With that, there will be some written questions provided to you 

within the week and we hope you respond as quickly as possible; 

and we’ll now adjourn the hearing. Thank you. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS

LITTORAL COMBAT SHIPS

1. Senator SESSIONS. Secretary Stackley, a May 12, 2011, Congressional Research 

Service (CRS) Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) report stated that the Navy lacks an Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) authority for executing the two block-buy contracts for 

the LCS class ships. According to CRS, the provision that granted the Navy authority did not include wording explicitly permitting the Navy to use EOQ purchasing 

in procuring the 20 LCSs covered under the two 10-ship LCS block-buy contracts. 

The CRS report states that EOQ purchasing would shift the procurement of certain 

LCS seaframe components from later years of the two block-buy contracts to earlier 

years, funding these EOQ purchases would increase LCS seaframe procurement 

funding requirements in the earlier years of the two block-buy contracts, and reduce 

(by an even larger amount) LCS seaframe procurement funding requirements in the 

later years of the two LCS block-buy contracts. Does the Navy support authorizing 

language that would provide EOQ authority? 

Secretary STACKLEY. The Navy plans to use EOQ authority for the LCS program 

and would support additional statutory language authorizing EOQ for the program. 

However, the Navy believes that Congress has already authorized the Navy to make 

EOQ purchases under the two Block Buy contracts that were awarded on December 

29, 2010. This statutory authority is granted by section 121 of the National Defense 

Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. 111–84 (section 121); as 

amended by Section 150 of the Continuing Appropriations and Surface Transportation Extensions Act, 2011, Pub. L. 111–322 (section 150). 

Subsequently, the Navy sought authorization from Congress to award 10-ship construction contracts to both LCS shipbuilders, thereby enabling the Navy to construct 

a total of 20 LCS vessels (acquiring 10 each of both designs) for less than it had 

budgeted to acquire only 15 ships of one design under its original acquisition strategy. 

In response, Congress enacted section 150 providing that ‘‘ . . . the Secretary of the 

Navy may award a contract or contracts for up to 20 LCSs.’’ Section 150 does not 

repeal or amend other portions of the prior authorization in section 121, including 

authorization to acquire ‘‘material and equipment in economic order quantities when 

cost savings are achievable.’’ This position is supported by the fact that Congress 

subsequently included $190,351,000 of EOQ funding for the LCS Program in the Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011, Pub. L. 

112–10. 

2. Senator SESSIONS. Secretary Stackley, do you agree or disagree with CRS’s 

characterization of how EOQ authority would affect the cost of future LCS ships? 

Please explain your position. 

Secretary STACKLEY. The Navy plans to use EOQ authority for the LCS program, 

and would support additional statutory language authorizing EOQ for the Program. 

However, the Navy believes that Congress has already authorized the Navy to make 

EOQ purchases under the two Block Buy contracts that were awarded on December 

29, 2010. This statutory authority is granted by section 121 of the NDAA for Fiscal 

Year 2010, Pub. L. 111–84 (section 121); as amended by section 150 of the Continuing Appropriations and Surface Transportation Extensions Act, 2011, Pub. L. 

111–322 (section 150). 

Subsequently, the Navy sought authorization from Congress to award 10-ship construction contracts to both LCS shipbuilders, thereby enabling the Navy to construct 

a total of 20 LCS vessels (acquiring 10 each of both designs) for less than it had 

budgeted to acquire only 15 ships of one design under its original acquisition strategy. 

Congress responded by enacting section 150, providing that ‘‘ . . . the Secretary of 

the Navy may award a contract or contracts for up to 20 LCSs.’’ Section 150 does 

not repeal or amend other portions of the prior authorization in section 121, including authorization to acquire ‘‘material and equipment in economic order quantities 

76 

when cost savings are achievable.’’ This position is supported by the fact that Congress subsequently included $190,351,000 of EOQ funding for the LCS Program in 

the Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011, 

Pub. L. 112–10. 

With respect to how EOQ authority would affect the cost of future LCS or Navy 

ships in general, the Navy agrees with the CRS characterization. EOQ purchasing 

shifts procurements from later years to earlier years, increasing earlier year funding 

requirements but reducing by a larger amount funding requirements in later years 

as industry is able to negotiate with suppliers lower prices for items purchased in 

greater quantities. The Navy had projected more significant EOQ savings based on 

a combination of Government Furnished Equipment and ship component purchases 

prior to House Appropriations Committee rescission of those funds. 

REPAIR FACILITIES

3. Senator SESSIONS. Secretary Stackley, as we discuss the Navy’s shipbuilding 

plans and fleet size, I want to recognize the important role that high-quality ship 

repair activities play in all of this. For decades, open competition has provided the 

Navy with a reliable and capable private sector workforce made of both large and 

small businesses. In non-nuclear ship repair this open competition was encouraged 

by the Competiveness Demonstration (Comp Demo) program that began in 1988. 

However, at the end of last Congress this successful program was unfortunately repealed. Since that time, more than 30 government vessels have been set-aside, 

thereby eliminating numerous shipyards from competing to work on them. I know 

the negative impact this has on shipyards in Alabama and their skilled workers. 

In your opinion, should the Comp Demo program be reinstated for non-nuclear ship 

repair? 

Secretary STACKLEY. The purpose of the Comp Demo Program was to evaluate the 

ability of small businesses to compete without the use of general small business setasides. The DOD Office of Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, specified in their 

memo of June 16, 2010 that set-asides could only be implemented if small business 

received less than 40 percent of the awarded dollars for industries covered under 

the Comp Demo Program. In fiscal year 2010, for the industry code that governs 

non-nuclear ship construction and repair, according to the Federal Procurement 

Data System, small businesses received over 55 percent of the Navy’s awards thus 

exceeding the minimum required by DOD. 

The DON Office of Small Business Programs is presently conducting an analysis 

covering the past 5 years to fully evaluate and understand the participation small 

business has had in this and other areas formerly covered by the Comp Demo Program to fully assess the impact of the repeal. Upon completion of this review DON 

will evaluate an appropriate action. 

In the meantime, prior to approving any acquisition strategy the DON will continue to perform comprehensive market research analysis to determine the availability and capability of small business, the depth of potential competition, the 

present health of the industry and the appropriateness of applying set-asides in accordance with the Federal Acquisition Regulations. 

4. Senator SESSIONS. Secretary Stackley, if it is not done soon, then what impact 

do you think this decrease in competition will have in the ship repair area? 

Secretary STACKLEY. The purpose of the Comp Demo Program was to evaluate the 

ability of small businesses to compete without the use of general small business setasides. Elimination of the Comp Demo program may impact the level of competition 

for all Navy and Military Sealift Command (MSC) operated vessels, although competition would exist under small business set-asides. 

For non-nuclear repair of U.S. Navy ships, the repeal of the Comp Demo program 

may require that future Multi-Ship/Multi-Option (MSMO) contracts be set aside as 

appropriate per Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR). For non-nuclear ship repair 

of MSC-operated vessels, while it is reasonable to expect that the majority of MSC 

non-nuclear ship repair contracts on the east coast will be set-aside, recent industry 

consolidation of some small business yards on the west coast makes the impact 

there less certain. The extent of set-asides will depend on the capabilities and availabilities of small business qualified yards which will be determined on an individual 

procurement basis. 

In the meantime, prior to approving any acquisition strategy the DON will continue to perform comprehensive market research analysis to determine the availability and capability of small business, the depth of potential competition, the 

77 

present health of the industry and the appropriateness of applying set-asides in accordance with the FAR. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROGER F. WICKER

INDUSTRIAL BASE

5. Senator WICKER. Secretary Stackley, the Navy’s current 30-Year Shipbuilding 

Plan (2011 Plan) indicates that we will be building ships at minimum sustaining 

rates. Many observe that this could pose challenges to fulfilling the amphibious 

force requirement and possibly give rise to a sea-lift capability gap and aviation-lift 

gap in 2015. Let’s set aside the operational implications of those issues for a moment. Many worry that the relatively low orders for new ships proposed in the 2011 

Plan may jeopardize the administration’s plans to support the shipbuilding industrial base over the intermediate- to long-term. The reductions in vendors to provide 

equipment for the shipbuilding industry may also make it difficult to realize desired 

efficiencies. Is the number of ships currently planned for enough to keep the Navy’s 

six major shipyards in business? 

Secretary STACKLEY. The 30-year plan aligns with decisions made by the Secretary of Defense in fiscal year 2012 President’s budget as well as priorities and 

guidance from the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The shipbuilding program invests where necessary to ensure the Navy’s battle force remains equal to the 

challenges of today as well as those it may face in the future. The program represents a balance between the expected demands upon the battle force for presence, 

partnership building, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, deterrence and 

warfighting as well as expected future resources. 

As discussed in the fiscal year 2011 Shipbuilding Report to Congress, the Chief 

of Naval Operations and Commandant of the Marine Corps have agreed that 38 amphibious ships are necessary to ensure full lift capability for a 2.0 Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) assault. Further they have determined that this force can 

be sourced in the Assault Echelon (AE) with 33 ships, with acceptable risk. In keeping with this agreement, the Navy is reviewing options to increase the AE to reflect 

a minimum of 33 amphibious ships in the AE, evenly balanced at 11 aviation-capable ships, 11 LPD–17-class ships, and 11 LSD–41-class ships. The 33 ship force accepts risk in the arrival of combat support and combat service support elements of 

the MEB but has been judged to be adequate in meeting the needs of all parties 

within the limits of today’s fiscal realities. The fiscal year 2012 President’s budget 

achieves the minimum of 33 AE ships beginning in fiscal year 2017. 

The Navy recognizes that level loading of ship procurement to help sustain minimum employment levels and skill retention promotes a healthy U.S. shipbuilding 

industrial base and this was considered in the development of our shipbuilding plan. 

6. Senator WICKER. Secretary Stackley, what is your sense about the shipbuilding 

industry’s support for the proposed plan? 

Secretary STACKLEY. The Navy is the primary customer for all of the first tier 

shipyards. Additionally, fleet maintenance and modernization workload provides 

further workload stabilization. The Navy recognizes that level loading of ship procurement to help sustain minimum employment levels and skill retention promotes 

a healthy U.S. shipbuilding industrial base. The Navy has made a series of key 

shipbuilding investment decisions, each of which have contributed to meeting the 

Department’s requirements while also serving to strengthen the industrial base. 

These adjustments to the shipbuilding plan have been well supported by the shipbuilding industry, including: 

• accelerating increased Virginia-class submarine construction to two boats 

per year, commencing in fiscal year 2011; 

• realigning DDG–1000 construction to a single shipyard (BIW) while restarting DDG–51 construction; 

• accelerating Mobile Landing Platform construction to three ships over 3 

years; 

• accelerating start of the future fleet oiler, T–AO(X), construction from fiscal year 2020 to fiscal year 2014; 

• accelerating construction of the LSD(X) to fiscal year 2017; 

• increasing construction of DDG–51 destroyers with the addition of a second DDG in fiscal year 2014; and 

• dual award of LCS contracts in fiscal year 2010. 

78 

Further, the Navy is supporting the industrial base by leveraging stable designs 

to minimize disruption experienced with first-of-class constructions and providing 

stable production rates within the constraints of requirements and budget. 

7. Senator WICKER. Secretary Stackley, in your view, can industry withstand the 

minimum sustaining rate at which the Navy is building (and intends to continue 

building) many of its ships? 

Secretary STACKLEY. The Navy recognizes that building the required force structure will largely depend on controlling shipbuilding costs (including combat systems) 

within an affordable range. We are committed to maintaining stability in requirements, funding and profiles in an effort to control costs. This will require the combined efforts of the Navy, the shipbuilding industry and combat systems industry. 

Working in conjunction with Congress, the Navy will procure and sustain force 

structure necessary to deliver the naval capabilities needed to support national interests. 

The Navy has and continues initiatives to support the shipbuilding industrial 

base including: 

1. In Title II of Public Law 109–234, section 2203, Congress directed that at least $140 million be made available for infrastructure improvements at Gulf Coast 

shipyards that have existing Navy shipbuilding contracts and that were damaged by Hurricane Katrina in calendar year 2005. In 2010, the Department 

awarded an additional $39.5 million in infrastructure improvement projects to 

Gulf Coast shipyards that support the Navy shipbuilding industrial base. 

These projects focus on expediting recovery of shipbuilding capability, increasing efficiency, and preventing further hurricane damage to Gulf Coast shipyards. 

2. The Department of the Navy’s new ship construction procurement and funding 

plans for fiscal year 2012 and the Future Years Defense Program as reflected 

in the President’s budget 2012 submission, reflects the Navy’s commitment to 

support and add stability to the industrial base by taking into account industrial base implications, as acquisition strategies and contracting strategies are 

developed. Specifically the Navy has: 

a. Accelerated production of the double-hulled fleet oiler T–AO(X) from 2017 

to 2014 in the fiscal year 2012 budget submission. This allows the Navy to 

acquire this important capability 3 years earlier while bringing greater stability and promoting competition in the shipbuilding industry. 

b. Accelerated the procurement schedule for Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) 

to one ship per year in fiscal years 2011–2013 from procurement in fiscal 

year 2011, fiscal year 2013, and fiscal year 2015. 

c. Executed an acquisition strategy for the LCS where Lockheed Martin and 

Austal USA were each awarded a fixed-price incentive contract for the design and construction of a 10-ship block buy from fiscal year 2010–2015. 

This LCS strategy supports the industrial base for shipbuilding by keeping 

workers employed at two shipyards along with workers at their various subcontractors and vendors. 

d. Developed a plan which most affordably meets the requirements for Navy 

surface combatants, commences the transition to improved missile defense 

capability in new construction, and provides significant stability for the industrial base. The plan allocates construction responsibilities for DDGs– 

1000–1002 and DDGs–113–115 (fiscal year 2010–2011 ships) between Bath 

Iron Works (BIW) and Ingalls HII. The workload agreement should ensure 

workload stability at both yards, efficiently restart DDG–51 construction, facilitate performance improvement opportunities at both shipyards, and 

maintain two sources of supply for future Navy surface combatant shipbuilding programs. To further stabilize the combatant industrial base, the 

Navy added a second DDG–51 Flight IIA in fiscal year 2014 and plans to 

request MYP authorization in fiscal years 2013–2017. 

e. Increased procurement of Virginia-class attack submarines to two per year 

starting in fiscal year 2011. The Navy plans to continue procurement of the 

Virginia-class attack submarines at two ships per year when possible. 

3. Of the Big Six shipyards, only General Dynamics NASSCO has recently competed in the commercial shipbuilding industry. However, NASSCO currently 

has only U.S. Navy shipbuilding and repair contract work at the shipyard. In 

2010, the Navy signed an Shipbuilding Capabilities Preservation Act (SCPA) 

agreement with NASSCO and the company is pursuing commercial contracts. 

The Navy is also prepared to provide an agreement, in accordance with the 

SCPA, that would assist in making HII more competitive for commercial shipVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:23 Jan 11, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00084 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\68085.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
79 

building work. The purpose/benefits of an SCPA is to facilitate a shipbuilder’s 

entry into private sector work and reduce that shipbuilder’s reliance on the Department of Defense industrial base. 

The ships brought into service during the 1980s, some procured at a yearly rate 

of four to five ships of a single class, are projected to retire during the next 15– 

20 years. With the need for multi-mission platforms vice single mission platforms, 

and recognizing the significantly increased capabilities of current new construction 

ships, the navy cannot recapitalize legacy ships at the same rate at which they were 

originally procured and maintain an affordable balanced procurement plan. The 

Navy is working to stabilize the shipbuilding plan but industry must move to right 

size and strive for efficiencies to enable an affordable shipbuilding plan. 

8. Senator WICKER. Secretary Stackley, in both the current budget request and 

in terms of a more general policy, what, if anything, is the Navy doing, or will it 

do, to support the shipbuilding industrial base? Are there any plans, for example, 

such as helping to convert existing shipyards into ship-repair yards? 

Secretary STACKLEY. The Department of Defense and Navy face the challenge of 

ensuring that the defense industrial base can meet the current and future requirements for systems and support while maintaining cost effectiveness, competition, 

and the necessary skills and technology base. To help meet this challenge, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development and Acquisition) has engaged 

an outside entity to develop and provide a publicly available, comprehensive, and 

independent assessment of the Navy shipbuilding industrial base. 

The Navy seeks an industrial base analysis that focuses on the essential capabilities and capacities needed to support Navy ship construction. The objective of the 

study is to identify the industrial base challenges facing the Navy and the strategies 

for mitigating the effects of those challenges, across a variety of issue areas such 

as cost, schedule, technical, infrastructure, and workforce capability. This may include recommendations to change/improve policies, standards, contract elements, 

performance benchmarks, government and industry practices, and oversight that define the effective delivery of quality products, platforms, and systems (including 

combat systems). 

Recent examples of what the Navy has done to support the industrial base include: 

1. In Title II of Public Law 109–234, section 2203, Congress directed that at least 

$140 million be made available for infrastructure improvements at Gulf Coast 

shipyards that have existing Navy shipbuilding contracts and that were damaged by Hurricane Katrina in calendar year 2005. In 2010, the Department 

awarded an additional $39.5 million in infrastructure improvement projects to 

Gulf Coast shipyards that support the Navy shipbuilding industrial base. 

These projects focus on expediting recovery of shipbuilding capability, increasing efficiency, and preventing further hurricane damage to Gulf Coast shipyards. 

2. A recent adjustment in the shipbuilding industrial base is the Northrop Grumman Corporation (NGC) decision to spin-off/sell its shipbuilding sector. Navy 

evaluated this complex corporate transaction and negotiated with NGC to ensure that the reorganized entity, Huntington Ingalls Industries (HII), would remain a financially viable company capable of performing current and future 

Navy shipbuilding programs. This reorganization is now complete, after Navy 

completed its evaluation and announced its position supporting this reorganization and finding HII to be a responsible contractor. The Navy is also prepared to provide an agreement, in accordance with the Shipbuilding Capabilities Preservation Act (SCPA), that would assist in making HII more competitive for commercial shipbuilding work. The purpose/benefits of an SCPA is to 

facilitate a shipbuilder’s entry into private sector work and reduce that shipbuilder’s reliance on the DOD industrial base. U.S. commercial shipbuilding accounts for approximately 1 percent of world commercial shipbuilding output; 80 

percent of this comes from the mid-tier sector. 

3. The Department of the Navy’s new ship construction procurement and funding 

plans for fiscal year 2012 and the Future Years Defense Program as reflected 

in the PB2012 submission reflects the Navy’s commitment to support and add 

stability to the industrial base by taking into account industrial base implications as acqusition strategies and contracting strategies are developed. Specifically the Navy has: 

a. Accelerated production of the double-hulled fleet oiler T–AO(X) from 2017 

to 2014 in the fiscal year 2012 budget submission. This allows the Navy to 

80 

acquire this important capability 3 years earlier while bringing greater stability and promoting competition in the shipbuilding industry. 

b. Accelerated the procurement schedule for MLP to one ship per year in fiscal 

year 2011, fiscal year 2012, and fiscal year 2013 from procurement in fiscal 

year 2011, fiscal year 2013, and fiscal year 2015. 

c. Executed an acquisition strategy for the LCS where Lockheed Martin and 

Austal USA were each awarded a fixed-price incentive contract for the design and construction of a 10-ship block buy from fiscal year 2010 through 

2015. This LCS strategy supports the industrial base for shipbuilding by 

keeping workers employed at two shipyards along with workers at their various subcontractors and vendors. 

d. Developed a plan which most affordably meets the requirements for Navy 

surface combatants, commences the transition to improved missile defense 

capability in new construction, and provides significant stability for the industrial base. The plan allocates construction responsibilities for DDG– 

1000–1002 and DDG–113–115 (fiscal year 2010–2011 ships) between BIW 

and Ingalls HII. The workload agreement should ensure workload stability 

at both yards, efficiently restart DDG–51 construction, facilitate performance improvement opportunities at both shipyards, and maintain two 

sources of supply for future Navy surface combatant shipbuilding programs. 

To further stabilize the combatant industrial base, the Navy added a second 

DDG–51 Flight IIA in fiscal year 2014 and plans to request MYP authorization in fiscal year 2013–2017. 

e. Increased procurement of Virginia-class attack submarines to two per year 

starting in fiscal year 2011. The Navy plans to continue procurement of the 

Virginia-class attack submarines at two ships per year when possible. 

4. Of the Big Six shipyards, only General Dynamics NASSCO has recently competed in the commercial shipbuilding industry. However, NASSCO currently 

has only U.S. Navy shipbuilding and repair contract work at the shipyard. In 

2010, the Navy signed an SCPA agreement with NASSCO and the company 

is pursuing commercial contracts. 

5. Government shipbuilding contracts are routinely structured with incentive fees 

on fixed price type contracts. Incentives are tools or mechanisms through 

which the government encourages specific behavior or performance. The Navy 

has implemented a number of different shipbuilding facilities investment incentives. By setting aside ship construction funds to be allocated based on business case justification, these special incentives allow shipbuilders the potential 

to earn additional fees toward capital and process improvements when proven 

to be mutually beneficial to both contract parties. 

6. Both the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR Subpart 32.5) and specific Navy 

regulations address how progress payments are to be distributed for shipbuilding contracts. In general, contractors are paid upon demonstration of 

physical completion and costs incurred, while the Navy retains some remainder 

of funding (i.e., retentions) to ensure completion of contract deliverables and 

expectations. However, in certain circumstances, the Navy has authorized the 

early release of contract retentions. Contract retentions are meant as monetary 

leverage over the shipbuilder to obtain a fully compliant ship delivery, but for 

purposes of providing cash flow to support shipyard investment, early release 

of contract retentions can be a timely, real stimulus from a corporate perspective. Several shipbuilders have benefited from investments supported in part 

or wholly through the early release of contract retentions. This approach was 

used through the DDG–51 Program at General Dynamics’ Bath Iron Works. 

Two projects that have utilized this mechanism are the Land Level Transfer 

Facility and the Ultra Hall Facilities. 

There are no plans to help convert existing shipyards to repair yards as they have 

the capability to perform repair work. There is currently excess capacity in the private ship repair industry. Navy must also balance public/private capacity for ship 

repair. Additional private capacity would put undue pressure on that public/private 

balance. 

9. Senator WICKER. Secretary Stackley, what level of cost risk is created by increasing reliance on sole-source contracts? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Where possible, the Navy is moving away from sole source 

contracting. But where that is unavoidable, the Navy strives to create a strong negotiation posture using in-depth cost analysis of actual costs, component breakouts, 

and incentives to focus industry on reducing costs. 

81 

A sole source contract in itself does not automatically result in an elevated cost 

risk. The degree of contract cost risk is a function of Government and industry joint 

understanding of the contract requirements and an understanding of the business 

and technical factors that drive cost behavior. In September 2010, the Navy implemented an internal management tool coined should-cost management. The goal for 

this initiative is to ensure that program managers articulate only those contract requirements necessary to deliver warfighting capability; understand the factors that 

influence cost behavior; and drive productivity improvements into their programs 

during contract negotiations through effective contract type, terms, and conditions, 

and throughout program execution. This policy applies to all contract types. 

Ultimately, one of the Navy’s biggest negotiation leverages is competition. I have 

challenged the acquisition community to seek every opportunity to compete at all 

levels of a program. 

10. Senator WICKER. Secretary Stackley, are there any unrealized opportunities 

to increase cost controls? 

Secretary STACKLEY. The Department recognizes that building the required force 

structure will largely depend on controlling shipbuilding costs (including combat 

systems). The Navy is addressing this in three ways. 

First, the Navy continues to look for further affordability and efficiency opportunities as we go forward with the shipbuilding plan, such as revising the acquisition 

strategy for the LCS program to maximize the advantage of the competitive pricing 

we received and enable us to gain an additional ship or seeking to employ multiyear contracts for Virginia-class submarines and future DDG–51 destroyers. 

Second, the Navy is continuing to emphasize the use of fixed price contracts as 

a cost control mechanism, when technical risk is low and when a ship’s design is 

mature. The contract for T–AKEs–12–14 was recently converted to Firm Fixed 

Price. 

Third, the Navy is placing increased emphasis on affordable requirements and 

stable designs. Prior to Milestone A approval for the Ohio Replacement submarine, 

the Department evaluated numerous capability trades to reduce costs. As a result, 

the Navy made trades in the number of ballistic missile tubes, the diameter of those 

tubes, the number of torpedoes to be carried, acoustic sensors, and other defensive 

features throughout the design. These trades made the submarine more affordable 

while maintaining the necessary level of capability. Additionally, the Navy worked 

with General Dynamics NASSCO to develop a more affordable design of the Mobile 

Landing Platform (MLP). The alternative solution resulted in approximately $2 billion of cost avoidance. The MLP will improve throughput capabilities for the Maritime Prepositioning Squadron (MPSRON) though float-on/float-off (FLO–FLO) technology from a large reconfigurable mission deck. 

11. Senator WICKER. Secretary Stackley, I understand that an outside study on 

the health of the Navy’s shipbuilding industrial base that was done for you is complete. Please share its preliminary findings and recommendations. 

Secretary STACKLEY. In April 2010, the Navy initiated a Shipbuilding Industrial 

Base Study to review capabilities/capacities of the shipyards including design and 

production, the health of the vendor base, and trends in rates and overhead, productivity, and investment strategies. The information exchange between industry and 

government has been extensive and informative. The study is due to complete shortly and is currently being staffed for review by senior leadership. Findings/recommendations of this study will be made available upon completion of the Navy review. 

AMPHIBIOUS SHIP GAP

12. Senator WICKER. Secretary Stackley, it has been suggested that we are decommissioning amphibious ships too early in their lives and at a rate that cannot be 

sustained by new construction ships without dipping below a level that would negatively impact our amphibious capability requirements. However, ships such as the 

Austin-class amphibious transport docks (LPDs) began reaching the end of their designed service lives more than 20 years ago. A Service Life Extension Program 

(SLEP), which would have modernized the ships for another 10 to 15 years of service, was not authorized by Congress when requested in 1987. As a result, these 

ships which many consider ill-equipped to defend themselves against modern 

threats have remained in service far longer than intended. Of the recently decommissioned amphibious ships, how many—if any—were decommissioned earlier than 

their planned end of service life? 

82 

Secretary STACKLEY. Since 2005, there have been four LHA–1-class Amphibious 

Assault Ships that have been decommissioned earlier than their expected service 

life (ESL). The ESL is the number of years a naval ship is expected to be in service. 

It is used as a planning estimate to facilitate the development of ship recapitalization plans. However, the LHA–1-class ships were built to a design service life (DSL) 

objective of 20 years, which they exceeded. The LHA–1-class did receive mid-life 

modernization availabilities that enabled them to exceed their DSL but were not 

part of a SLEP. 

Ship ESL 

(years) 

DSL 

(years) 

Age at Decom. 

(years) 

Ex-Tarawa (LHA–1) .................................................................................... 35 20 32.8 

Ex-Saipan (LHA–2) ..................................................................................... 35 20 29.5 

Ex-Belleau Wood (LHA–3) .......................................................................... 35 20 27.1 

Ex-Nassau (LHA–4) .................................................................................... 35 20 31.7 

13. Senator WICKER. Secretary Stackley, how many of those ships had their service lives extended beyond what was intended when they were built? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Since 2005, there have been eight Amphibious Warfare ships 

that have been decommissioned whose services lives extended beyond their ESL. 

The ESL is the number of years a naval ship is expected to be in service. It is used 

as a planning estimate to facilitate the development of ship recapitalization plans. 

Ship ESL 

(years) 

Age at Decom. 

(years) 

Ex-Austin (LPD–4) ................................................................................................................... 35 41.6 

Ex-Ogden (LPD–5) ................................................................................................................... 35 41.7 

Ex-Duluth (LPD–6) .................................................................................................................. 35 39.8 

Ex-Dubuque (LPD–8) ............................................................................................................... 35 43.8 

Ex-Juneau (LPD–10) ................................................................................................................ 35 39.3

Ex-Shreveport (LPD–12) .......................................................................................................... 35 36.8 

Ex-Nashville (LPD–13) ............................................................................................................ 35 39.6 

Ex-Trenton (LPD–14) ............................................................................................................... 35 35.9 

The LHA–1-class ships were built to a design service life (DSL) objective of 20 

years. The four LHA–1-class ships that have been decommissioned since 2005 exceeded their DSL. 

Ship DSL 

(years) 

Age at Decom. 

(years) 

Ex-Tarawa (LHA–1) ................................................................................................................. 20 32.8

Ex-Saipan (LHA–2) .................................................................................................................. 20 29.5 

Ex-Belleau Wood (LHA–3) ....................................................................................................... 20 27.1 

Ex-Nassau (LHA–4) ................................................................................................................. 20 31.7

14. Senator WICKER. Secretary Stackley, were those service life extensions 

through planned SLEPs or through an ad-hoc process? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Since 2005, there have been eight LPD–4-class Amphibious 

Transport ships that have been decommissioned whose services lives extended beyond their ESL, and four LHA–1-class Amphibious Assault ships that have been decommissioned whose service lives extended beyond their Designed Service Life 

(DSL). 

SLEPs can be accomplished on a Navy vessel that is approaching its ESL. None 

of the service lives of the aforementioned ships were extended through planned 

SLEPs. 

The LHA–1-class ships did receive mid-life modernization availabilities that enabled them to exceed their DSL. Five of the LPD–4-class ships had an Extended 

Sustainability (ES) availability that enabled them to exceed their ESL. (Note: 

LPDs–7, –8, –9, –13, and –15 received an ES availability.) 

15. Senator WICKER. Secretary Stackley, of our currently serving amphibious 

ships, how many are already beyond their planned service lives? 

Secretary STACKLEY. There are four existing ships from the LPD–4 Austin-class, 

specifically USS Dubuque (LPD–8), USS Cleveland (LPD–7), USS Ponce (LPD–15) 

83 

and the USS Denver (LPD–9) that have exceeded their 35 year ESL. Dubuque and 

Cleveland both are 44 years old and will decommission in fiscal year 2011. Ponce 

will be 41 years old at her planned decommissioning in fiscal year 2012. Denver will 

be 45 years old at her planned decommissioning in fiscal year 2013. 

16. Senator WICKER. Secretary Stackley, if the San Antonio-class of ships had remained on schedule for delivery would we be experiencing this amphibious ship gap 

that raises so many concerns today? 

Secretary STACKLEY. If the San Antonio-class of ships had remained on schedule 

for delivery, it is less likely that we would be experiencing this amphibious ship gap. 

Specifically, it is less likely that the number of active, in-commission LPDs would 

dip below the requirement of eleven. This is because the lead-time required for adjusting the decommission dates of the legacy Austin-class LPDs is longer than the 

advanced warning associated with delivery delays of the San Antonio-class LPDs. 

LITTORAL COMBAT SHIPS

17. Senator WICKER. Secretary Stackley, if last year’s authority to implement the 

dual sole-source award strategy for the LCS program were amended to give the 

Navy the explicit authority to use EOQ purchases as part of the block-buy contracts 

that it awarded to the two LCS builders, would the Navy use this additional EOQ 

authority, and if so, how much might it reduce the cost of the 20 LCSs to be procured under these two contracts? 

Secretary STACKLEY. The Navy plans to use EOQ authority for the LCS program, 

and would support additional statutory language authorizing EOQ for the Program. 

However, the Navy believes that Congress has already authorized the Navy to make 

EOQ purchases under the two Block Buy contracts that were awarded on December 

29, 2010. This statutory authority is granted by section 121 of the NDAA for Fiscal 

Year 2010, Pub. L. 111–84 (section 121); as amended by section 150 of the Continuing Appropriations and Surface Transportation Extensions Act, 2011, Pub. L. 

111–322 (section 150). 

Subsequently, the Navy sought authorization from Congress to award 10-ship construction contracts to both LCS shipbuilders, thereby enabling the Navy to construct 

a total of 20 LCS vessels (acquiring 10 each of both designs) for less than it had 

budgeted to acquire only 15 ships of one design under its original acquisition strategy. 

In response, Congress enacted section 150 providing that ‘‘ . . . the Secretary of the 

Navy may award a contract or contracts for up to 20 LCSs.’’ Section 150 does not 

repeal or amend portions of the prior authorization in section 121, including authorization to acquire ‘‘material and equipment in economic order quantities when cost 

savings are achievable.’’ This position is supported by the fact that Congress subsequently included $190,351,000 of EOQ funding for the LCS Program in the Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011, Pub. L. 112– 

10. 

The Navy had projected more significant EOQ savings of up to 10 percent based 

on a combination of government-furnished equipment and ship component purchases prior to the House Appropriations Committee rescission of those funds. 

18. Senator WICKER. Secretary Stackley, the Navy has announced some changes 

or potential changes to the composition of LCS mission modules. Regarding the surface warfare module, it is not clear from press reports whether the Navy plans to 

replace the canceled non-line-of-sight (NLOS) missile with the Griffin missile. Is the 

Griffin missile the Navy’s replacement for the NLOS, or not? 

Secretary STACKLEY. In April 2010, the Army cancelled the Non-Line-of-Sight 

Launch System (NLOS–LS) program. The Navy had planned to use NLOS–LS in 

the LCS Surface Warfare (SUW) Mission Package to counter the small boat threat. 

The Army planned production quantities accounted for nearly 90 percent of the total 

NLOS production, and the Army program’s cancellation resulted in a significant and 

unacceptable increase to the projected unit cost for the Navy. 

The Navy reviewed over 50 missile systems and gun improvements for their ability to meet the LCS SUW requirements in a cost effective manner. The review led 

to a strategy to address all layers of LCS SUW defense including potential gun ammunition improvements and a phased plan to deploy an anti-small boat missile capability on LCS. 

The Griffin Missile, already in production by Raytheon Missile Systems, is 

planned for integration into the LCS Surface-to-Surface Missile Module to provide 

an initial SUW missile capability. The long-term solution, one that will provide inVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:23 Jan 11, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00089 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\68085.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
84 

creased range and autonomous engagement capability to increase battlespace and 

engage multiple targets simultaneously, will be determined through competition to 

identify the most cost-effective option. 

The initial capability is planned to be in operation on LCS by 2015, matching the 

previously planned introduction of NLOS capability. The long-term missile solution 

is planned to be in operation in 2017. 

19. Senator WICKER. Secretary Stackley, the Navy has also announced a possible 

change to the mine warfare (MCM) module. When will the Navy announce whether 

this change will be implemented? 

Secretary STACKLEY. The Navy is continuing to investigate modifications of the 

Airborne Mine Neutralization System and the Joint Assault Breaching System programs to replace surface/near-surface mine neutralization capability due to the loss 

of the Rapid Airborne Mine Clearance System. The Navy will evaluate the outcome 

of these ongoing assessments upon completion, planned for fiscal year 2012. 

20. Senator WICKER. Secretary Stackley, the Navy has announced a change to the 

antisubmarine warfare (ASW) module. How will this change affect the cost of the 

ASW module? 

Secretary STACKLEY. The announced change to the ASW mission module will result in a decrease of the cost of this module, when compared to the cost of the previous configuration. 

The findings of a periodic warfighting assessment led the Navy to change the 

ASW Mission Package approach to better address operational requirements. The resulting Increment 2 ASW Mission Module is inherently less complex and is technically more mature, resulting in a less expensive ASW Mission Module. 

21. Senator WICKER. Secretary Stackley, concerns have been expressed in some 

quarters about the combat survivability of the LCS. Please give your perspective on 

the combat survivability of this ship. 

Secretary STACKLEY. The LCS Ships meet the Joint Requirements Oversight 

Council-approved survivability requirements and the designs incorporate 

OPNAVINST 9070.1 Level 1 Survivability standards as well as tailored survivability enhancements (‘‘Level 1+’’). LCS survivability depends on a combination of 

ship design, ship quantity, and the Concept of Operations (CONOPS) which says 

LCS will: 

• Operate as part of a networked battle force 

• Independent operations only in low-to medium-threat scenarios • Part of a networked battle force ops in high threat environments 

• Create Battle Space/Avoid being hit 

• Reliance on networked battle force for threat attrition • Reliance on overboard systems 

• Fight and survive if hit 

• Ship design: Accept ship mission kill; keep ship afloat and protect crew 

after hit 

• Battle force design: Maintain battle force fight—through capability, 

through LCS numbers, and mission flexibility 

• Withdraw/reposition if hit 

• Campaign Measure Of Effectiveness (MOE) 

LCS is designed to maintain essential mobility after a hit allowing the ship to exit 

the battle area under its own power. The LCS survivability features enable the ship 

to perform required missions in the littorals with an emphasis on crew survival. 

22. Senator WICKER. Secretary Stackley, the first LCS has experienced hull cracking. Please discuss the Navy’s actions to address this problem, and whether it has 

any implications for follow-on ships in the program. 

Secretary STACKLEY. In order to validate the service life of the LCS–1-class design 

the industry team was required to conduct a Spectral Fatigue Analysis (SFA) in accordance with the Naval Vessel Rules (NVR). This analysis was conducted against 

the LCS operating profiles, to include stressing sea environments, and resulted in 

the identification of several high-stress areas in the design. These analysis findings 

were used to develop a full ship instrumentation plan and a detailed post delivery 

test and trials event schedule to include analysis verification and hull performance 

monitoring. 

NAVSEA, American Bureau of Shipping (ABS), and Industry have conducted a 

detailed analysis and review of the workmanship and design to determine the root 

85 

cause of the hull and superstructure cracks in USS Freedom. Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) indicated that a contributing factor for the single hull crack was likely 

a weld defect. Another contributing factor is undersized backing chocks, which expose that area to higher-than-expected stresses. These chocks will be replaced during a Post Shakedown Availability (PSA) this summer. 

To address these issues in follow-on ships, Navy and Industry identified and implemented design changes in LCS–3 to ease accessibility and production of the spray 

rail (location of the hull crack of USS Freedom). LCS–5 and follow ships incorporate 

additional design changes throughout the spray rail. To confirm that there are not 

widespread weld spray rail quality issues, additional NDT is planned at PSA for 

LCS–1. Navy is also conducting an ongoing assessment to review the consistency of 

design and construction documentation for follow-on ship construction. 

With regard to the superstructure cracks, the investigation found 11 of the 16 

cracks coincide with high stress areas discovered in subsequent detailed structural 

modeling and analysis. Six of the 16 cracks were attributed to some form of workmanship issue. All 16 cracks have been repaired. 

Based on additional analysis, the LCS–3 design was modified to lower the stresses 

in the superstructure via the installation of gussets and increased material thickness. Design modifications from LCS–3 will be incorporated into LCS–1 and no further design related superstructure cracking risk is expected for the LCS–1 design. 

JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER

23. Senator WICKER. Secretary Stackley, the F–35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program has several important test events coming up this year that relate to the shipbuilding portfolio—in particular, shipboard testing on a carrier and an L-class ship 

for the Navy’s F–35C and the Marine Corps’ F–35B, respectively. At this point, 

what challenges do you see to the effective integration of each of those F–35 

variants to the ships from which they are supposed to operate? Please speak to, for 

example, thermal footprint from the main engine exhaust, shipboard noise levels, 

and information technology-related challenges to integration. 

Secretary STACKLEY. 

JSF Short Takeoff and Vertical Landing (STOVL) Variant (F–35B) Integration 

Aboard L-Class Ships (LHA and LHD): 

• Eight modifications required to support F–35B integration on LHA/LHDclass ships that are incorporated into a package of ship change documents 

known as ‘‘cornerstone’’ alterations. These modifications provide necessary 

electrical servicing upgrades, expanded weapons handling and storage, provisioning for the JSF Autonomic Logistics Information System (ALIS), construction of secure access facilities, mission rehearsal training, and relocation of the flight deck tramline for safety concerns. 

• The thermal stresses imparted to the deck steel by the F–35B have been 

characterized by sub-scale modeling and a representative deck coupon tested at Lockheed’s hover pit in January 2010. Initial results show that the 

ship’s structure will handle the thermal footprint for a single landing, but 

further evaluation is required to determine if operationally representative 

scenarios may prompt future ship alterations. F–35B Developmental Testing (DT) on board USS Wasp (LHD–1) will include measurements for thermal footprint, pressure, deflection, and strains caused by F–35B operations 

in the shipboard environment. Shipboard DT is planned to occur in fall 

2011. 

• The ‘‘cornerstone’’ ship alterations have commenced on USS Bonhomme 

Richard (LHD–6) and USS Wasp (LHD–1). Follow-on design changes to install External Environment (EE) modifications will occur once informed by 

shipboard DT. These modifications will be installed on USS Wasp prior to 

the Operational Test (OT) period currently scheduled for the summer/fall 

of 2013. Subsequent ship alterations for the LHD–1-class will occur at a 

rate of one hull per year starting in fiscal year 2015. 

JSF Carrier Variant (F–35C) Integration Aboard CVNs: 

• Eight modifications required for F–35C (JSF Carrier variant) integration 

on CVNs are actively being developed to maturity or being installed. These 

modifications provide for necessary electrical servicing upgrades, expanded 

weapons handling, construction of secure access facilities, mission rehearsal 

training, ALIS, Joint Precision Approach and Landing System, thermal effect mitigation, Lithium Ion battery storage and noise abatement. 

86 

• F–35C thermal impacts on CVNs are currently being studied by modeling 

exhaust impacts on Jet Blast Deflector (JBD) and Flight Deck systems. 

Land-based testing of the F–35C exhaust plume on a JBD started June 29, 

2011. It is necessary to validate the modeling analysis and determine the 

scope of JBD and shipboard modifications. 

• Required CVN modifications will continue to be incorporated into CVN 68 

(Nimitz)-class aircraft carriers during planned maintenance availabilities in 

advance of F–35C arrival. Required modifications that are not part of the 

CVN–78 (Ford)-class design will be incorporated into the ship prior to F– 

35C deployment. 

Common CVN/L-Class Air Ship Integration Topics 

Noise: 

The F–35 program has taken a proactive approach to address noise concerns onboard Naval Ships. Protecting the hearing of maintainers and ship board personnel 

has been a program focus and new Hearing Protection Devices (HPD) were developed to support personnel working in close proximity to F–35 and other jets at high 

power engine settings during launch/recovery operations. The HPD devices will 

allow service personnel to work more effectively and longer at tasks in extreme 

noise environments before reaching their total daily exposure (TDE) limit to high 

noise. 

Many F–35A noise characterization tests have been completed. Tests have shown 

F–35A is in the same noise class as other Department of Defense aircraft (e.g. F– 

22 and F/A–18E/F aircraft). F–35B Ground Test Plans are in development, with 

data collection planned for the third/fourth quarter of calendar year 2011 timeframe. 

The objectives of these tests are to capture near-field personnel noise environments 

with a focus on capturing noise exposure data during Short Take-Off (STO) and 

Vertical Landings (VL). The data from these tests will be used to support noise assessments for flight deck personnel and further assist aircraft integration aboard Lclass Ships. Ground Test Plans for the F–35C have been developed and testing commenced in conjunction with JBD testing on June 29, 2011. Like F–35B, the data 

to be captured from this testing will be used to support maintainer noise exposure 

assessments, personal hearing protection requirements, and flight deck CONOPS. 

The Department of the Navy has also established hazardous noise exposure mitigation working groups that bring together scientists, engineers, and medical professionals to work toward further protecting our sailors and marines from the risks to 

prolonged exposure to noise from all sources (above deck, below deck, and ashore). 

These groups will collaborate on common issues affecting noise sources and exposure 

management and will work with the Department’s System Safety Advisory Board 

for integration of recommendations into the Department’s long-term noise risk mitigation plans. 

Information Technology: 

Issues associated with shipboard special access program space accreditation have 

been resolved. Interoperability with legacy Naval Aviation Enterprise information 

systems remains in-work. Towards resolving this topic, we have identified all affected systems via a joint risk review; identified data exchange requirements with 

DoN legacy systems; and agreed on a plan to build the necessary interfaces between 

the F–35 ALIS system and legacy aviation maintenance systems. 

QUALITY CONTROL PROBLEMS

24. Senator WICKER. Vice Admiral McCoy, from the first ship in its class, the 

LPD–17 San Antonio-class amphibious ship program has displayed chronic problems 

in terms of safety, engineering, design, and oversight. These problems have been so 

significant that they give rise to broader concerns about a widespread readiness 

problem afflicting our surface fleet. As to the LPD–17-class of ships, we have been 

left with an entire class of ships that, according to the Pentagon’s chief independent 

weapons tester, is ‘‘not effective, suitable and not survivable in combat’’. With Northrop Grumman’s sale of its shipyards, what are the Navy’s plans for the construction of the last LPD–17 ship? 

Admiral MCCOY. A new LPD–17-class build plan, which rolls in lessons learned 

from the initial ships of the class and focuses on increased pre-outfitting, increased 

first-time quality, and higher completion levels at launch, has been developed and 

incorporated on the ships currently in construction. The design is mature; and the 

program requirements and schedule are stabilizing as production trends continue to 

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show improvement. The last LPD–17-class ship (LPD–27) is planned to be awarded 

to Huntington Ingalls Industries. 

25. Senator WICKER. Vice Admiral McCoy and Captain Galinis, please address the 

apparent downward trend in funding for maintenance, with the negative impact 

falling more heavily on surface combatants than on carriers and submarines. 

Admiral MCCOY and Captain GALINIS. Even though the percentage of the Ship 

Maintenance requirement funded has fallen, the baseline maintenance budget request has actually increased from $4.3 billion in fiscal year 2010 to $4.9 billion in 

fiscal year 2012. This increase is a reflection of the Navy’s commitment to funding 

the surface ship maintenance requirement. Additionally, investments being made in 

the Surface Maintenance Engineering Planning Program and enhanced assessments 

of our surface ships provides us with more insight on how to best manage risk and 

ensures that deferred work will be properly documented and tracked for completion 

in future availabilities. Navy remains committed to sustaining the force structure 

required to implement the Maritime Strategy. 

The Navy’s total budget submission reflects the best balance of risk and available 

resources across the Navy portfolio. 

SHIP REPAIR ISSUES

26. Senator WICKER. Vice Admiral McCoy, earlier this month, the Navy terminated a large ship-maintenance contract with Earl Industries, citing problems it 

found with Earl’s earlier work and its lack of proper documentation related to repair 

work. The Navy also reported to us recently that its investigation into engine repairs on the amphibious warship USS San Antonio and other ships similarly found 

that key maintenance reports were missing and several other important anomalies 

with documentation. However, 3 weeks before it terminated a $75 million, 5-year 

maintenance contract with Earl Industries, the Navy defended the company’s work 

in a letter to the Government Accountability Office (GAO) in a bid protest. What 

is going on here? 

Admiral MCCOY. The termination of Earl Industries, LLC’s (Earl’s) MSMO contract for the repair of LPD–17-class ships was based on serious documentation and 

recordkeeping problems, and other quality-assurance issues, discovered during 

Earl’s ongoing Continuous Maintenance Availability (CMAV) on USS San Antonio 

(LPD–17). These problems generated significant concerns about the company’s ability to perform successfully on LPD–17-class ships under the 5-year MSMO contract. 

There is no inconsistency between the Navy’s defense of the bid protest and its 

decision to terminate the maintenance contract with Earl Industries. In its submission to GAO on April 18, 2011, concerning the January 2011 award to Earl, the 

Navy emphasized that the deficiencies in Earl’s documentation on the CMAV contract were unknown to the Navy at the time of the MSMO award, and, therefore, 

not relevant to the protest. In that filing, the Navy noted that its investigation of 

Earl’s documentation under the CMAV contract was ongoing. The escalation in performance problems during the course of the CMAV contract, however—including, 

but not limited to, issues related to documentation—raised concerns about the efficacy of Earl’s quality-assurance program in connection with LPD–17-class repair 

work. The Navy terminated the MSMO contract on May 6, 2011, based upon the 

gradual accumulation of information, subsequent to the award of that contract, regarding Earl’s difficulties under the CMAV contract. 

27. Senator WICKER. Vice Admiral McCoy, what should this subcommittee make 

of these developments? 

Admiral MCCOY. The termination of Earl Industries, LLC’s (Earl’s) MSMO contract for the repair of LPD–17-class ships was based on serious documentation and 

recordkeeping problems, and other quality-assurance issues, discovered during 

Earl’s ongoing CMAV on USS San Antonio (LPD–17). These problems generated significant concerns about the company’s ability to perform successfully on LPD–17- 

class ships under the 5-year MSMO contract. 

There is no inconsistency between the Navy’s defense of the bid protest and its 

decision to terminate the maintenance contract with Earl Industries. In its submission to GAO on April 18, 2011, concerning the January 2011 award to Earl, the 

Navy emphasized that the deficiencies in Earl’s documentation on the CMAV contract were unknown to the Navy at the time of the MSMO award, and, therefore, 

not relevant to the protest. In that filing, the Navy noted that its investigation of 

Earl’s documentation under the CMAV contract was ongoing. The escalation in performance problems during the course of the CMAV contract, however—including, 

88 

but not limited to, issues related to documentation—raised concerns about the efficacy of Earl’s quality-assurance program in connection with LPD–17-class repair 

work. The Navy terminated the MSMO contract on May 6, 2011, based upon the 

gradual accumulation of information, subsequent to the award of that contract, regarding Earl’s difficulties under the CMAV contract. 

28. Senator WICKER. Vice Admiral McCoy, like the Earl Industries fiasco, similar 

problems are affecting other shipyards and ship repair facilities outside the Gulf 

Coast. For example, Navy frigates, such as the USS Elrod, USS Klakring, USS Taylor, and USS Nicholas have had shipyard maintenance periods extended because of 

work that was not done correctly the first time and poor Navy oversight. The repair 

problems don’t just end with surface ships; submarines USS Helena, USS Virginia, 

and USS San Juan have extended their shipyard periods because of a lack of materials and a lack of shipyard resources, all which impact ship and submarine sailing 

and deployment schedules. Is there a systemic problem here that needs more direct 

attention by Navy leadership or congressional action? 

Admiral MCCOY. The Navy’s assessment is that there is not a systemic problem 

with how ship maintenance is done. Likewise, while there have been some issues 

with recent ship maintenance efforts, the Navy does not see a common root cause 

that spans the different availabilities. The Navy has rigorous processes for its ships 

to meet their expected service lives and methods to verify that the necessary maintenance and modernization are executed in a formal, deliberate and efficient manner. The Navy assesses the efficacy of the ship repair yards, works with them to 

correct identified problems, and changes contractors when needed, thereby providing 

the necessary oversight to ensure the operational readiness, reliability, safety, and 

effectiveness of the Navy’s ships and submarines. 

Several issues can impact the duration of ship availabilities. Availabilities may be 

extended or delayed as emergent repair work on other ships arises and is given priority. New work identified during an availability may also lead to the availability’s 

extension. Furthermore, availabilities may be adjusted to support revised Fleet 

operational priorities. Adjustments to availabilities are appropriately managed by 

the Fleet Maintenance Officers and the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA). 

Regarding the allocation of shipyard resources, NAVSEA is involved in the management of all ship and submarine availabilities in execution at public and private 

shipyards and those at the regional maintenance centers. Availability workload is 

reviewed monthly by NAVSEA and quarterly with the Fleet customers. The Naval 

Shipyards’ current fiscal year capacity is set to the execution guidance workload. 

These Shipyards, along with the two private-sector nuclear repair yards, use the 

One Shipyard concept to focus on cost, schedule and quality through standardizing 

processes, sharing resources among public shipyards and within Regional Maintenance Centers, and partnering with private shipyards to meet their resource requirements. Workload/workforce forecasting for Naval Shipyards is accomplished 

monthly to allow for the hire of specific skills based on the forecast and attrition 

history. For surface ship repairs executed by private contractors, the workload/workforce forecasting is determined during contract negotiations and monitored by the 

Navy’s Supervisory Authority during execution of the contract. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR KELLY AYOTTE

MARITIME PREPOSITIONING FORCE

29. Senator AYOTTE. Secretary Stackley, you state that the three current Maritime Prepositioning Ship Squadrons will add a Mobile Landing Platform (MLP), an 

Auxiliary Cargo (K) and Ammunition (E) Ship (T–AKE), and Large Medium-Speed, 

Roll-on/Roll-off (LMSR) cargo ship. I also note that the Navy has added three Auxiliary Cargo (K) and Ammunition (E) Ships to the fiscal year program. I interpret 

these Navy decisions as a reaffirmation and a validation of the importance of the 

Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF). Based on the importance of the MPF, I was 

surprised to learn that the Navy plans to place 6 ships of the 3-squadron, 16-ship 

total MPF for the Marine Corps into reduced operating status beginning in fiscal 

year 2013. General Panter of the U.S. Marine Corps has stated in testimony that 

this decision needs additional analysis. When I asked General Panter last week 

about this decision, he said that placing portions of Squadron 1 in the Mediterranean on a reduced-operating-status would ‘‘translate to potentially a slower response time in support of the combatant commands (COCOM).’’ 

During our Readiness and Management Subcommittee hearing last week, I understood Admiral Burke to essentially say that the decision to place Squadron 1 in the 

89 

Mediterranean on reduced operating status was a calculated risk in order to save 

money. Does it make sense to you to reduce the readiness of our MPS in the Mediterranean in light of the turmoil in that region? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes. The MPSRONs were acquired primarily to support 

major combat operations. The timing required to support those major operations has 

changed since the squadrons were formed 25 years ago, permitting the Mediterranean squadron to be placed in Reduced Operating Status (ROS) 5-day status with 

acceptable risk. Response time includes 5 days to activate in addition to the transit 

time from the U.S. East Coast (USEC). For example, USEC to Mediterranean and 

the west coast of Africa is typically 7 to 12 transit days. It should be noted that 

none of the ships have been used to support current operations to date. 

30. Senator AYOTTE. Secretary Stackley, if the MPS is important enough for your 

office to invest additional and finite acquisition funds, why isn’t it important enough 

to maintain them at full operating status? 

Secretary STACKLEY. We have many strategic sealift capabilities maintained in reduced operating status (∼60 ships). Their capacity is required to meet wartime requirements, but wartime requirements do not mandate retention in full operating 

status. This is the same case for the Mediterranean MPS squadron. 

ADVANCED GUN SYSTEM

31. Senator AYOTTE. Secretary Stackley and Vice Admiral McCoy, given the investment in DDG–1000, the Advanced Gun System (AGS), and the Long-Range 

Land Attack Projectile (LRLAP), would it increase efficiency and lower costs by 

leveraging this technology for the DDG–51 Flight III? 

Secretary STACKLEY and Admiral MCCOY. Where practicable, Navy will seek to 

leverage existing technologies for DDG–51 Flight III. However, DDG–51 Flight III’s 

primary mission will be Integrated Air and Missile Defense rather than DDG–1000’s 

emphasis on Naval Surface Fire Support (NSFS). Therefore, DDG–51 Flight III’s 

Naval Gun Fire Support requirements align most closely with current DDG–51 requirements that are filled by the 5’’ gun system. 

32. Senator AYOTTE. Secretary Stackley and Vice Admiral McCoy, if a modified 

AGS was deemed compatible with the planned DDG–51 Flight III general arrangement, would it be technically and programmatically feasible to make the necessary 

modifications and be production ready for the first planned DDG–51 Flight III? 

Secretary STACKLEY and Admiral MCCOY. DDG–51 Flight III’s primary mission 

will be Integrated Air and Missile Defense rather than DDG–1000’s emphasis on 

NSFS. While technically feasible to modify DDG–51 Flight III to support AGS, such 

installations in DDG–51 Flight III ships would result in cost and schedule impacts 

that may not be acceptable. Furthermore, DDG–51 Flight III’s Naval Gun Fire Support requirements align most closely with current DDG–51 requirements that are 

filled by the 5′′ gun system. 

33. Senator AYOTTE. Secretary Stackley and Vice Admiral McCoy, in your opinion, 

would the capabilities of the AGS and the LRLAP developed for DDG–1000 complement current weapons such as the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile? Please explain why or why not. 

Secretary STACKLEY and Admiral MCCOY. The LRLAP fired from the DDG–1000 

AGS is a natural complement to tactical aircraft-delivered precision munitions as 

well as the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile. Together, these weapons provide combatant commanders with persistent, all-weather strike capability including precision 

and volume fires in support of forces ashore. 

[Whereupon, at 3:52 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.] 

(91) 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION 

FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 

2012 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE 

PROGRAM 

WEDNESDAY, JULY 13, 2011 

U.S. SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC. 

THE REQUIRED FORCE LEVEL OF STRATEGIC AIRLIFT 

AIRCRAFT MANDATED BY TITLE 10, UNITED STATES 

CODE, AND THE ADMINISTRATION’S REQUEST TO 

ELIMINATE THAT REQUIREMENT 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:33 p.m., in room 

SR–232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators Reed, Wicker, and Ayotte. 

Committee staff members present: Leah C. Brewer, nominations 

and hearings clerk; and Jennifer L. Stoker, security clerk. 

Majority staff member present: Creighton Greene, professional 

staff member. 

Minority staff member present: Christopher J. Paul, professional 

staff member. 

Staff assistants present: Brian F. Sebold and Breon N. Wells. 

Committee members’ assistants present: Carolyn Chuhta, assistant to Senator Reed; Joseph Lai, assistant to Senator Wicker; and 

Brad Bowman, assistant to Senator Ayotte. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED, CHAIRMAN 

Senator REED. The subcommittee will come to order. 

I want to extend a welcome to our witnesses and thank each of 

you for appearing before the Seapower Subcommittee today. 

The subcommittee will hear from the Honorable Christine Fox, 

Director of the Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation 

(CAPE); General Duncan McNabb, Commander of the U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM); and General Raymond Johns, 

Commander of the Air Force’s Air Mobility Command (AMC). We 

welcome you all and thank you for your service. 

I would note that this hearing is principally the result of the excellent work that Senator Ayotte has done, together with her staff, 

to call to the attention of the subcommittee the issue of the inventory of strategic lift, which is a vital topic to this subcommittee. 

92 

Her work has caused us to, I think, take a very close look at what 

you are proposing, what the administration is proposing, and be 

prepared, we hope, appropriately for the authorization bill when it 

comes to the floor. 

But I would be remiss if I did not very strongly, and with great 

appreciation express my thanks to Senator Ayotte and her staff for 

her excellent work. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator REED. Thank you. 

Today, we would like to hear about the Department of Defense’s 

(DOD) request to eliminate the provisions of section 8062 of title 

10, U.S.C., which require that DOD maintain at least 316 strategic 

airlift aircraft in the inventory. 

For these purposes, the term ‘‘strategic airlift aircraft’’ is defined 

essentially as C–5s and C–17s. Congress established that requirement based on previous assessments of strategic airlift requirements for supporting wartime operations. 

It is appropriate that we consider this change very carefully. We 

need to be sure to get this decision right since we could be incurring large expenses if we get the decision wrong in either direction, 

either maintaining too many aircraft or too few, given the potential 

contingencies going forward. 

If we keep more aircraft than we really need, we have to pay operating and support costs. If, on the other hand, we retire more aircraft than is prudent, we may face the need to reactivate retired 

aircraft—and that is always an iffy proposition, both in terms of 

cost and in terms of the availability and the condition of these aircraft—or, more likely, consider buying new strategic airlift aircraft. 

I suspect that either one of these options would be very expensive to the point that it would quickly wipe out any planned nearterm savings in operating and support costs achieved by retiring 

too many aircraft. So getting the number right is absolutely important. 

I think also it is important—and again, I hope the value of this 

hearing is so that we understand the logic, the analyses, and that 

we also are able to feel comfortable about whatever proposal is 

adopted. 

We are in a situation of retiring aircraft not because the C–5A 

aircraft are worn out—I think there is a lot of serviceable life left 

in these aircraft—but Congress bought essentially 43 more C–17 

aircraft than the Air Force said it needed a few years ago. Had we 

stopped production at 180 C–17 aircraft, we would not be in the position of retiring any C–5A aircraft currently slated for retirement 

under the Air Force’s plans. 

Unlike other parts of our aircraft forces, the C–5A aircraft we retired have not expended all of their useful service lives. The reason 

that it is suggested to retire these aircraft would be to save operating and support costs, not because they are worn out. Frankly, 

there are some classes of aircraft in our inventory that are closer 

to the wear-out situation than the C–5A. 

So I suspect that many other aspects of the Air Force would love 

the luxury of being able to retire aircraft that still have useful life. 

In fact, General Johns, I think in a previous position, you identified 

potential fighter Air Force structure shortfall of some 800 aircraft 

93 

in the next decade because they were wearing out, not because we 

just didn’t need them. 

So over the years since the late 1970s, assessments of our wartime requirements have fluctuated, generally increasing, except in 

the past few years. To my knowledge, previous analyses have never 

explicitly addressed requirements for a strategic airlift to support 

peacetime operations. 

Last year, despite operating fewer aircraft than the current requirement for 316 aircraft, we were told that strategic airlift forces 

were flying harder than ever before. To that specific point, because 

of a lack of availability of strategic airlift aircraft to support peacetime operations, TRANSCOM had to hire former Soviet strategic 

airlift aircraft to carry mine-resistant ambush protected (MRAP) 

vehicles to the theater to support combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

So it raises a host of questions about the Civil Reserve Air Fleet, 

leasing other nationality aircraft, how many C–17s, how many

C–5s? I must say I have looked at the testimony, and I will just 

initially say how thoughtful I believe you have considered this 

issue. So thank you for that thoughtfulness. 

I look forward to the testimony, and I also look forward to a good 

round of questioning because, like any serious issue, you have 

raised many questions with your thoughtful analyses. We would 

like to answer them today. 

With that, let me recognize Senator Wicker. I would certainly 

like to recognize Senator Ayotte, if she would have comments. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROGER F. WICKER 

Senator WICKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for 

holding this important hearing today. 

I want to thank our witnesses for their attendance and for their 

valuable service to our Nation. 

I will be relatively brief, and I appreciate the chair and his willingness to allow Senator Ayotte also to make an opening statement. 

The National Military Strategy (NMS) has continued to evolve 

since 2005, when DOD conducted its last study to determine the 

right mix of aircraft, ships, personnel, and facilities to move cargo 

and passengers for military operations. Although the ability to 

prosecute two nearly simultaneous conventional campaigns remains a cornerstone of U.S. defense policy, the current strategy 

places increased emphasis on irregular warfare, stabilization operations, and support to Homeland defense. 

Furthermore, defense planning recognizes the reality of longterm U.S. involvement in globally dispersed operations, which may 

include commitments to major campaigns. 

In order to provide an updated comprehensive assessment of 

DOD’s mobility system, TRANSCOM last year completed the Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study-2016 (MCRS–16). In its 

fifth comprehensive mobility study—it is the fifth comprehensive 

mobility study conducted by DOD and the second mobility study 

conducted since September 11. 

The objectives of MCRS–16 were to determine the mobility capabilities and requirements needed to deploy, employ, sustain, and 

94 

redeploy joint military forces in support of NMS in the 2016 timeframe. Also, to determine capability gaps and overlaps associated 

with the programmed mobility force structure and to provide insights and recommendations to support the Quadrennial Defense 

Review (QDR). 

MCRS–16 assessed the military’s strategic airlift, large cargo aircraft; intra-theater airlift, small cargo aircraft; sealift; aerial refueling; ashore and afloat prepositioning; surface transportation; and 

infrastructure. This was done by assessing whether the military 

has the right type of equipment against a set of operational metrics 

to determine whether available forces met warfighter objectives 

within desired timelines. 

MCRS–16 found DOD’s planned mobility capabilities are sufficient to support the most demanding projected requirements. Some 

specific findings are, number one, large cargo aircraft airlift capacity exceeds the peak demand in all the scenarios considered, which 

covered a broad spectrum of military operations. Based on the 

study’s findings, the military needs only 264 to 300 large cargo aircraft. 

Number two, lack of foreign infrastructure or access to foreign infrastructure to support major force deployments remains the fundamental constraint when attempting to reduce deployment timeliness in support of U.S. objectives. 

Number three, sealift is the primary means for delivering large 

ground forces. 

Number four, DOD relies on the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF), 

with commercial air carriers as the primary means of delivering 

passengers. Projected passenger airlift capacity greatly exceeds the 

requirement in all scenarios considered. 

Number five, intra-theater airlift using the Air Force’s programmed amount of C–130s exceeds the peak demand, covering a 

broad spectrum of military operations. Those are the findings. 

In his prepared testimony for this subcommittee, one of our witnesses today, General McNabb, says, ‘‘With the MCRS–16 complete, we now have the analytical justification to recommend repeal 

of the 316 strategic airlift floor.’’ 

I agree. Eliminating the 316 large cargo aircraft floor restriction 

would allow the Air Force to retire an additional 15 C–5As and 

provide substantial savings by freeing up billions in taxpayers’ dollars over the next few years. Given the current climate of fiscal 

austerity, which requires that we look to all corners of the defense 

enterprise to determine how DOD can conduct itself more efficiently, this is a move in the right direction. 

Mr. Chairman, I look forward to the testimony of our distinguished witnesses. I can only say one other thing. I have heard a 

wild rumor that General McNabb may be in the process of retiring 

in October. 

Surely this couldn’t possibly be true. But if it is, we will miss his 

services, and he is doubly due the praise and the admiration of this 

committee and this Congress. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator REED. Thank you, Senator Wicker. 

Senator Ayotte. 

95 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I very much appreciate your holding this hearing. 

I also want to thank Ranking Member Wicker for holding this 

hearing today. 

During the markup process for the National Defense Authorization Act, I brought forward an amendment that would have 

changed the strategic airlift requirement, allowing DOD to reduce 

that number from 316 to 299. 

I did that because, in looking at this issue, it came to my attention that DOD and the Air Force had done very careful analyses 

when the proposal was submitted through the President’s budget 

to the Armed Services Committees for consideration. That is why 

I was going to bring forward that in the markup. 

I very much appreciate the chairman and ranking member having this hearing. When this issue was brought up in the markup, 

they realized how important it was and decided to have this hearing today. I am very appreciative of their work on this issue. 

I want to thank all of the witnesses for being here, for your 

thoughtful analyses. Because what has been done by the Air Force 

on this issue, there was an extensive study done in 2010 to identify 

the peak of demand for airlift capacity, which has already been referenced, and that that airlift capacity would be 32.7 million tons 

per day. We would be able to meet that capacity with reducing to 

299 strategic airlift aircraft. 

Why is that important? It is very important, as the chairman 

and the ranking member have already mentioned, because all of us 

want to ensure that our military can meet our strategic airlift requirements. I know the witnesses share that concern, and that is 

why you undertook such careful analyses in coming to this conclusion. 

But we also want to make sure that, in these difficult fiscal times 

for our country, and for DOD, that we aren’t spending money that 

we don’t need to maintain aircraft that we no longer have a capacity or need for. If we were to change the strategic airlift requirements in a way that I hope will happen as we go forward from this 

hearing, we could—in retiring the unneeded C–5A models, save up 

to $1.2 billion in taxpayers’ dollars across the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) over the next 4 years. 

Those, of course, are resources that could be better used, either 

to upgrade our C–17s for other uses within the military, given the 

difficult choices that we are going to have to be making going forward. We, as you all know and appreciate, with $14 trillion in debt 

and with Admiral Mullen, I think, rightfully identifying the national debt as the greatest threat to our national security, all of us, 

when we find that we have too much of something that we need, 

it is very important for us to act on, in my view, your recommendations. That is what prompted me to raise this issue in the committee. 

I am looking forward to hearing each of the witnesses’ testimony 

today. Just to follow up on something that the chairman said, one 

of the reasons that we had too many C–17s is because Members 

of Congress, rather than what you asked us to produce, actually, 

through the earmark process, had more of those aircraft produced 

than the Air Force had requested. 

96 

So we, in part, in Congress have created this situation. So, I am 

hopeful that we will heed your careful analyses and advice going 

forward so that we can right-size and still meet our strategic airlift 

requirements. 

So thank you very much. 

Senator REED. Thank you, Senator Ayotte. 

All of your testimony has been submitted and will be made part 

of the record. You may be free to summarize your testimony. 

We will begin, I believe, with Director Fox and then General 

Johns or General McNabb, whoever wants to go next. 

Director Fox, please. 

STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTINE H. FOX, DIRECTOR, COST ASSESSMENT AND PROGRAM EVALUATION, DEPARTMENT OF 

DEFENSE 

Ms. FOX. Mr. Chairman, Senator Wicker, and distinguished 

members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you to discuss DOD requirements for strategic airlift. 

The Office of CAPE has extensively studied strategic airlift requirements through a series of studies, beginning in the early 

1990s. 

Last year, we completed the MCRS, which assessed peacetime 

and wartime demands on our airlift system. We conducted this 

study in conjunction with TRANSCOM. It serves as the analytic 

underpinning of the Air Force’s current fleet management plan and 

supports retirement of 32 C–5 aircraft. 

Here, I will briefly summarize the results of that study. As you 

said, sir, we have submitted a more detailed written statement. 

The study assessed steady-state and surge requirements for airlift, sealift, and prepositioned assets for various scenarios, providing DOD with a comprehensive understanding of our mobility 

system in time of peace and time of war. 

An understanding of the steady-state demand is important because it quantifies the level of effort needed to support daily operations without mobilization. It also sets the conditions for the location of forces and mobility assets at the commencement of the 

surge events. 

For our analysis of steady-state demand, we evaluated both historical support to global logistics and, through modeling, the deployment, employment, redeployment, and sustainment of forces 

supporting globally dispersed operations. Historical data included 

missions flown in support of combatant commanders, such as cargo 

and passenger missions, exercise missions, and special assignment 

airlift missions conducted over the past 7 years. 

The special assignment airlift missions include movement of nuclear means and related material, presidential support, special operations support, and other time-sensitive, high-priority missions. 

For our analysis of the surge requirements, we developed three 

different cases to evaluate peak airlift demands. Each case included Homeland defense and major campaigns. 

The results of our study showed that it is the surge events that 

drive the size of the strategic airlift fleet. These events are periods 

of finite, but extremely high levels of demand for strategic airlift. 

In comparison, steady-state demands represent prolonged requireVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:23 Jan 11, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00102 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\68085.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
97 

ments, but with significantly lower peaks. While these requirements contribute to the surge demand, they do not drive the size 

of the airlift fleet. 

So based on the study findings, DOD needs a military airlift fleet 

capacity between 29.1 and 32.7 million ton-miles per day (MTM/D), 

which can be met with 264 to 300 aircraft. These results support 

the Air Force desire to retire 32 C–5 aircraft. It is our assessment 

that the retirement of these aircraft will not increase operational 

risk. 

Without this change, DOD would be required to maintain a strategic airlift fleet in excess of what is required, costing DOD billions 

of dollars over the life of the aircraft. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you, and 

I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Fox follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY HON. CHRISTINE H. FOX

Mr. Chairman, Senator Wicker, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, 

thank you for the opportunity to appear before you to discuss the Department of 

Defense requirements for strategic airlift. 

The Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation has extensively studied 

strategic airlift requirements through a series of studies beginning in the early 

1990s. Last year we completed the Mobility Capabilities Requirements Study 

(MCRS), which assessed peacetime and wartime demands on our airlift system. We 

conducted this study in conjunction with U.S. Transportation Command 

(TRANSCOM). It serves as the analytic underpinning of the U.S. Air Force’s current 

fleet management plan and supports retirement of 32 C–5 aircraft. Here I will briefly summarize the results of that study. 

The MCRS was an 18-month, department-level assessment of a broad spectrum 

of mobility capabilities, which included strategic airlift, intra-theater airlift, sealift, 

aerial refueling, ashore and afloat prepositioning, surface transportation, and infrastructure. As with past mobility studies, MCRS assessed the mix of military (organic) and commercial lift capabilities needed to support the National Defense 

Strategy. The analysis was based on illustrative conventional and irregular military 

operations conducted over a notional 7-year timeframe. 

It is important to keep in mind the distinction between the resources the department uses for planned wartime capability and those it uses in steady-state operations. When operating at full wartime capability (surge demand), the department 

mobilizes Guard and Reserve Forces and employs them along with active forces at 

wartime utilization rates. Additionally, the President has the authority to activate 

the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) which can contribute as many as 900 aircraft. 

When not operating at full wartime capability (i.e., steady-state sustainment), 

Guard and Reserve Forces are not mobilized, and CRAF is not activated. This is 

why the department sometimes relies on commercial/foreign source airlift like the 

Russian-built IL–76 and AN–124 to support current operations. Accommodating a 

short-term surge with use of commercial assets is more cost-effective than maintaining additional force structure that is not required full time. 

MCRS assessed steady-state requirements by evaluating historical support to 

global logistics and by modeling the deployment, employment, redeployment, and 

sustainment of forces supporting globally dispersed operations. Steady-state analysis is important for two primary reasons. First, it quantifies the level of effort 

needed from the mobility system to support daily operations without mobilization. 

Second, it sets the initial conditions for the location of forces that need to be relocated by the mobility system to support the commencement of surge events. 

TRANSCOM analysts examined 7 years of mission data from the Global Decision 

Support System database to identify historical support requirements for global logistics. Global logistic missions include routine channel missions, exercise missions, 

and Special Assignment Airlift Missions (SAAMs) that fly daily support for Combatant Commands (COCOMs). Channel missions consist of cargo and passenger missions—organic and commercial—flown in support of COCOMs. The study assumed 

that exercises other than Joint Chiefs of Staff/COCOM exercises would be canceled 

or curtailed when U.S. forces were engaged in one warfight and that all exercises 

would be cancelled when engaged in two overlapping warfights. SAAMs include 

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movement of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons-related material, presidential 

logistics support, special operations support, and other time-sensitive, high priority 

airlift requirements. The study assumed some SAAM requirements would continue 

even during overlapping campaigns. 

As part of the steady-state assessment, the study analyzed two different Department-approved strategic environments consisting of representative vignettes arranged over a 7 year timeline. The ‘‘Global Insurgency’’ strategic environment included 64 distinct operations and reflected an increased level of effort for irregular 

warfare representing an expansion and intensification of global operations. The strategic environment developed during the most recent Quadrennial Defense Review 

included 69 vignettes which had a similar irregular warfare emphasis. 

For our analysis of surge requirements, we developed three different cases to 

evaluate peak airlift demands. Each case included Homeland defense and major 

campaigns. The cases involved demanding operational assumptions. The model used 

in the analysis accounts for the fact that many aircraft are not loaded to their maximum weight capacity due to load size, scheduling constraints, and route structure. 

The MCRS cases were defined as follows: 

Case 1 evaluated two overlapping large-scale land campaigns occurring in different theaters of operation, concurrent with three nearly-simultaneous homeland 

defense consequence management events, plus support to ongoing steady-state operations, to include Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). This case required a military 

strategic airlift fleet with a capacity of 32.7 million ton-miles per day (MTM/D), 

which can be met with a fleet of 300 aircraft (222 C–17s, 52 C–5Ms, and 26 C–5As). 

Case 2 evaluated a large scale air/naval campaign immediately followed by a 

major campaign in a different theater of operation, plus one large-scale homeland 

defense consequence management event, plus support to ongoing steady-state operations, to include OEF. This case required a military strategic airlift fleet with a 

capacity of 30.7 MTM/D, which can be met with a fleet of 277 aircraft (222 C–17s, 

52 C–5Ms, and 3 C–5As). 

Case 3 evaluated U.S. forces surging to conduct a large-scale land campaign 

against the backdrop of an ongoing long-term irregular warfare campaign of a size 

and scale similar to the 2007 Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) surge force. Case 3 

also included three near-simultaneous homeland defense consequence management 

events, plus support to ongoing steady-state operations, to include OEF. This case 

required a military strategic airlift fleet with a capacity of 29.1 MTM/D, which can 

be met with a fleet of 264 aircraft (222 C–17s, 42 C–5Ms, 0 C–5As). 

The results of our study showed that it is the surge events that drive the size 

of the strategic airlift fleet. These events are periods of finite, but extremely high 

levels of demand for strategic airlift. In comparison, steady-state demands represent 

prolonged requirements, but with significantly lower peaks. While these requirements contribute to the surge demand, they do not drive the size of the organic airlift fleet. Based on the MCRS findings, the department needs a military fleet capacity between 29.1 and 32.7 MTM/D which can be met with 264 to 300 aircraft. 

These results support the Air Force desire to retire 32 C–5A aircraft. It is our 

assessment that the retirement of these aircraft will not increase operational risk. 

Without this change, the department would be required to maintain a strategic airlift fleet in excess of what is required, costing the department billions of dollars over 

the life of the aircraft. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you, and I look forward to 

your questions. 

Senator REED. Thank you, Director Fox. Once again, thank you 

for your very thoughtful written testimony. 

Since I don’t know date of ranks—okay, General Johns. General 

McNabb, you are recognized because General Johns does know date 

of ranks. [Laughter.] 

STATEMENT OF GEN. DUNCAN J. MCNABB, USAF, 

COMMANDER, U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND 

General MCNABB. Chairman Reed, Senator Wicker, and distinguished members of this subcommittee, I would like to express my 

gratitude to this committee for your support to TRANSCOM and to 

the men and women who strive every day to protect our Nation 

and its freedom. 

99 

It is my distinct honor to be with you today, representing the 

more than 145,000 soldiers, sailors, marines, airmen, coast guardsmen, and civilians that are TRANSCOM. Daily, our total force 

team provides the warfighters the force and sustainment they need 

to win. 

I am also privileged today to be joined by two of my good friends 

and colleagues, General Ray Johns and Ms. Christine Fox. Great 

to be up here with you all. 

Rapid global mobility is among our Nation’s greatest asymmetric 

advantages. And the ability to mobilize forces and materials within 

hours, rather than days or weeks, depends on the right-sized fleet 

of versatile, ready, and effective air mobility forces. 

I fully support the administration’s proposal to repeal the statutory requirement for the Air Force to maintain a strategic cargo 

fleet of 316 aircraft. The congressionally-directed floor of 316 strategic airlifters was established before the MCRS–16 determined the 

strategic airlift requirement to be 32.7 MTM per day. Our analysis 

confirms this capacity can be met with approximately 300 strategic 

airlift aircraft. 

Additionally, a strategic airlift aircraft reduction allows the Air 

Force to retire an additional 15 C–5As and, as the Senator mentioned, with a substantial saving of over $1.2 billion in taxpayers’ 

dollars across the FYDP and, most importantly, focus our critical 

infrastructure, aerial port, and aircrew personnel and resources on 

a right-sized fleet. 

The current program fleet of 222 C–17s, 52 C–5Ms, and 27 C– 

5As satisfies this requirement and is far more modern and capable 

than any strategic airlift fleet in our history. To underscore this 

point, our strategic airlift fleet of approximately 350 aircraft in 

1999 provided about 26 MTM per day capacity. Yet today, a fleet 

of only 300 aircraft will provide over 32 MTM per day. 

This also allows us to meet our peacetime requirements. Indeed, 

in 2010, while supporting both the troop withdrawal from Iraq and 

the surge into Afghanistan, our busiest day in AMC was on March 

23, when we performed 16.6 MTM per day of lift. For comparison, 

prior to September 11, the busiest day in 2001 for AMC was 5.5 

MTM per day. 

When these numbers are compared with our projected capacity, 

the Air Force program fleet can meet all readiness and peacetime 

requirements, as well as be surged to meet wartime needs. 

In addition to a more modern and capable fleet, we also continuously improve the efficiency of air mobility operations. For example, with the use of multimodal operations, we move large volumes 

of cargo by sea to locations in close proximity to the area of operations, then by truck from the seaports to the nearby airfields, and 

finally by air to its destination. 

This concept has been used with great success throughout 2010 

and 2011 as we moved almost 7,000 mine-resistant attack platforms and M–ATVs to Afghanistan. Utilizing the combination of 

air, land, and sea modes of transportation, we increased velocity, 

employed aircraft more efficiently, and ultimately reduced transportation costs by almost $400 million in 2010 alone. 

Multipurpose aircraft will also improve the efficiency and capacity of our airlift fleet. The KC–46 fleet, the new tanker—and thank 

100 

you for your support of that—will be sized based on war plan tanker requirements. In those plans, when not at aerial refueling peak 

demand periods, the KC–46 can supplement the heavy airlift fleet 

by conducting a variety of airlift and air medical evacuation missions. 

Not only will it dramatically change our air refueling concept of 

operations, but it will also allow us to make the whole air mobility 

system that much more efficient. 

Our commercial partners also provide superb modernized and 

cost-effective airlift support in peace and in war. Their ability to 

move bulk cargo and passengers around the world complements 

our organic capabilities. I depend on them in wartime. 

The CRAF program’s ability to augment our organic airlift fleet 

helps to reduce the operational burden on our military assets and 

allows us to deal with short-term surges without having to mobilize 

total force assets. Based on all these factors, I reiterate my full 

support to repeal the 316 statutory floor. 

At TRANSCOM, we view our success through the eyes of the 

warfighter. We know that combatant commanders around the 

world absolutely depend on us to deliver the forces and their 

sustainment day in and day out. 

We are committed to deliver to the warfighter, while also being 

responsible stewards of the taxpayers’ trust and dollars. The men 

and women of TRANSCOM, our components, and industry partners 

are proud to provide world-class support to those who put themselves on the line every day. We want them to absolutely know 

that we will always, always deliver. 

Chairman Reed, Senator Wicker, and all members of this subcommittee, thank you for your continued superb support of 

TRANSCOM and of all of our men and women in uniform. 

Thank you for including my written statement for the record, 

and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General McNabb follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY GEN. DUNCAN J. MCNABB, USAF 

Chairman Reed, Senator Wicker, and distinguished members of this subcommittee, I would like to begin by expressing my appreciation to this committee 

for your support to the U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) and to the 

men and women who strive every day to protect our Nation and its interests. 

Rapid global mobility is among our Nation’s greatest asymmetric advantages, and 

the ability to mobilize forces and materiel within hours, rather than days or weeks, 

depends on the right-sized fleet of versatile, ready and effective air mobility forces. 

This year, the administration proposed a repeal of the statutory requirement for 

the Air Force to maintain a strategic cargo fleet of 316 aircraft. I fully agree with 

the administration’s proposal. The congressionally-directed 316 strategic airlift requirement was established before the Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study 

2016 determined the strategic airlift requirement to be 32.7 million ton-miles per 

day (MTM/D), based on the most challenging wartime airlift scenario. Our analysis 

confirms 32.7 MTM/D capacity exceeds the peacetime requirement and can be met 

with approximately 300 strategic airlift aircraft. 

With the Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study 2016 complete, we now 

have the analytical justification to recommend repeal of the 316 strategic airlift 

floor. As I and others have previously stated or testified, it was necessary to wait 

for the results of the study before making any recommendation to change the size 

of the strategic airlift fleet. I do so confidently today. The strategic airlift aircraft 

reduction will allow the Air Force to retire an additional 15 C–5As and provides a 

substantial savings by freeing up over $1.2 billion in taxpayer dollars across the 

FYDP. 

101 

The current programmed fleet of 222 C–17s, 52 C–5Ms and 27 C–5As is far more 

modern and capable than any strategic airlift fleet in our history. To underscore this 

point, our strategic airlift fleet of approximately 350 aircraft in 1999 provided about 

26 MTM/D capacity, yet, today, a fleet of only 300 aircraft provides 32.7 MTM/D. 

The dramatic improvement in strategic airlift capability provided by C–17s and 

modernized C–5s has enabled a reduced fleet size to meet our warfighter requirements. 

C–17s will continue to meet TRANSCOM’s future requirements through currently 

funded purchases, upgrade programs and fleet rotation. New C–17s arrive with improvements that increase the reliability of the weapon system. Older aircraft enter 

into the Global Reach Improvement Program to increase their sustainability and reliability. Furthermore, aircraft located in corrosive and training environments are 

monitored and analyzed for stress and rotated to maintain structural integrity of 

the fleet. 

The C–5 is critical to our oversized and outsized air cargo capability. C–5 fleet 

management has two main focus areas: C–5 reliability and C–5A retirements. The 

Reliability Enhancement and Re-Engining Program (RERP) is on track to increase 

the mission capable rate (MCR) of the C–5 fleet by at least 25 percent over the current C–5A and at least 15 percent over the current C–5B . . . increasing the utilization rate for these aircraft and allowing us to operate into more austere locations. 

All C–5 B and C models and one C–5A model aircraft will undergo RERP resulting 

in a total of 52 C–5Ms in the inventory. Additionally, the new maintenance processes changed our focus from ‘‘fly to fail’’ on major components to preventative replacement. This has reduced the number of C–5s stranded off-station awaiting parts 

and will result in a 7-percent increase in MCR. Finally, C–5A retirements will improve aircraft availability by removing maintenance intensive jets from the fleet and 

will allow us to focus our critical maintenance, aerial port, and aircrew personnel 

and resources on a right-sized fleet. 

In addition to a more modern and capable fleet, we also continuously improve the 

efficiency of air mobility operations. This efficiency allows a smaller strategic airlift 

fleet to handle wartime and peacetime mobility requirements. For example, with the 

use of multi-modal operations, we move large volumes of cargo by sea to locations 

in closer proximity to the area of operations, then by truck from the seaports to the 

nearby airfields and finally by air to its destination. This concept has been used 

with great success throughout 2010 and 2011 as we moved almost 7,000 MRAP and 

MRAP all-terrain vehicles to Afghanistan. Utilizing the combination of air, land and 

sea modes of transportation, we increased velocity, employed aircraft more efficiently and ultimately reduced costs by almost $400 million in 2010. 

Multi-purpose aircraft will also improve the efficiency and capacity of our airlift 

fleet. The KC–46 fleet, for example, will be sized based on war plan tanker requirements. In those plans, as the need for aerial refueling diminishes, the KC–46 can 

supplement the heavy airlift fleet by conducting a variety of airlift and aeromedical 

evacuation missions. Not only will it dramatically change our air refueling concept 

of operations, it will also allow us to make the whole air mobility system much more 

efficient. 

Our commercial partners provide superb, cost-effective airlift support in peace and 

in war. Their ability to move bulk cargo around the world complements our organic 

capabilities. The Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) program’s ability to augment our 

organic airlift fleet helps to reduce the operational burden on those assets. Because 

of the importance of the CRAF, we continue to seek out incentives, especially those 

that provide additional peacetime business opportunities, to strengthen participation in the program with modernized aircraft by our commercial airline partners. 

At TRANSCOM, we view our success through the eyes of the warfighter. We know 

the combatant commanders around the world absolutely depend on us to deliver the 

forces and their sustainment day in and day out. We are committed to deliver what 

the warfighter needs, where they need it, when they need it . . . while also being 

responsible stewards of the taxpayers’ trust and dollars. The men and women of 

TRANSCOM, our components and industry partners are proud to provide worldclass support to those who put themselves on the line every day, and ensure we always, always deliver. 

Senator REED. Thank you, General. 

General Johns? 

102 

STATEMENT OF GEN. RAYMOND E. JOHNS, JR., USAF, 

COMMANDER, AIR MOBILITY COMMAND 

General JOHNS. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Wicker, and 

distinguished members of the subcommittee, on behalf of the 

135,000 active duty, Air National Guard, and Air Force Reserve 

airmen of AMC, we thank you for the opportunity to speak with 

you about our strategic airlift fleet. 

AMC airmen are employed every day around the world, providing global mobility for the Nation. We answer the call of others 

so that they may prevail. We thank you for your steadfast support 

for our efforts over the past many years. 

As a force provider, AMC is charged with maintaining our strategic airlift fleet and ensuring it has the capability and capacity required by TRANSCOM and the geographic combatant commanders. 

The strategic airlift fleet is a national asset, allowing America to 

deliver hope, to fuel the fight, and to save lives anywhere in the 

world within hours of getting the call. 

We are also keenly aware of the fiscal challenges our Nation is 

facing and take very seriously our role in fulfilling our requirement 

not only today, but as we look out into the future. It is incumbent 

on us to maintain effectiveness across the spectrum of operations 

in the most efficient manner possible. 

We are devoted to managing the strategic airlift fleet responsibly. As part of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 2010, several restrictions were placed on the Air Force regarding strategic airlift, including a floor of 316 aircraft and several reporting requirements prior to any C–5 retirements. 

The Secretary of the Air Force met the C–5A retirement restrictions earlier this year, and we greatly appreciate the committee allowing us to begin retiring our oldest and least capable C–5s. We 

are still constrained by the 316 floor and currently are only able 

to retire one C–5A for every C–17 delivered. 

AMC fully supports the President’s request to repeal the 316 

strategic airlift floor and allow the Air Force to manage its fleet. 

MCRS–16, the most recent study completed on the strategic airlift 

requirement, was wholly informed by the National Security Strategy and the NMS. The foundation of MCRS–16 analyses is directly 

tied to the QDR, and its conclusions reflect our Nation’s strategic 

priorities. 

Based on MCRS–16 requirements of 32.7 MTM per day, we believe the program fleet size of 301 C–5s, C–5Ms, and C–17s is sufficient. By allowing the Air Force to retire the additional C–5As as 

requested, $1.2 billion, ma’am, as you stated, of unprogrammed 

cost will be avoided across the FYDP. 

Again, we thank you for the opportunity to come before you. 

Today is an important issue, and we sincerely thank you for your 

strong continued support. I look forward to your questions. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of General Johns follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY GEN. RAYMOND E. JOHNS, JR., USAF 

INTRODUCTION

Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Wicker, distinguished members of the subcommittee, on behalf of the nearly 135,000 active duty, Air National Guard, and Air 

103 

Force Reserve airmen that provide rapid Global Reach for the Nation as part of the 

Mobility Air Forces, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. Our 

strategic airlift capability is a national treasure which allows us to deliver hope, fuel 

the fight and save lives anywhere in the world within a matter of hours as evidenced by our continuing efforts in Afghanistan and our response to both the devastation in Haiti in 2010 and Japan earlier this year. The Mobility Air Forces are 

proud stewards of this capability. We constantly strive to ensure we have the right 

mix of aircraft and personnel to always be effective while at the same time remain 

fiscally responsible to the American taxpayer. This is the responsibility that brings 

us before you today. 

SUPPORTING FORCES

As the air component of U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), we are 

charged with providing the required airlift to support geographic combatant commands (COCOM) around the globe. We do not determine the requirement, but we 

develop the most effective and efficient airlift fleet possible to support the National 

Security Strategy, National Military Strategy, and COCOM plans. To that end, we 

completely support the President’s authorization request that would: (1) strike subsection (g) of section 8062 of title 10, U.S.C.; and (2) change the certification requirement in section 137 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 

(Public Law 111–84), eliminating the 316 strategic airlift aircraft restriction. 

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

The strategic airlift fleet we manage today traces its roots to the Mobility Requirements Study (MRS–05) completed in January 2001, prior to the attacks of September 11. That study addressed the best mix of strategic airlift required to deploy 

forces from a posture of global engagement. MRS–05 determined 54.5 million tonmiles per day (MTM/D), provided by a combination of organic strategic airlift and 

Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) airlift met requirements with acceptable risk. The 

organic strategic airlift accounted for 34.0 MTM/D of the 54.5 MTM/D total requirement and could be met with a range of fleet sizes, dependent on the mix of strategic 

aircraft. Based on the operations tempo around the world post September 11, the 

Mobility Capability Study delivered in December 2005 confirmed the findings of 

MRS–05 for acceptable levels of risk. Both studies were led by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Joint Staff. 

The most recent study, the Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study 2016 

(MCRS–16), was completed in February 2010 by OSD and TRANSCOM. This study 

investigated scenarios that generated an organic strategic airlift requirement of between 29.1 and 32.7 MTM/D. The higher number (32.7 MTM/D) is the benchmark 

that the Air Force and AMC currently uses to right size the strategic airlift fleet. 

Between the initial MRS–05 study and the most recent MCRS–16 study, the number of strategic airlifters required has remained relatively steady over the last decade (between 292 and 304 depending on fleet mix). 

Notwithstanding the COCOM requirements, the strategic airlift fleet we maintain 

today is not the one envisioned just a decade ago. When the final C–17 is delivered 

to the Air Force, we will have over 40 more in the inventory than anticipated during 

MRS–05. As the force provider, the exact fleet mix is less critical than the ability 

to provide the required MTM/D. 

MANAGING THE FLEET

We greatly appreciate the committee allowing the retirement of C–5As in accordance with the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 language. 

Every new C–17 delivered now allows retirement of a C–5A resulting in considerable savings. As more capable aircraft like the C–17 and C–5M enter the inventory, 

the 32.7 MTM/D requirement can be maintained with fewer aircraft. However, the 

316 strategic airlift floor requires us to keep unneeded, less capable C–5As in the 

inventory. Each of these unneeded aircraft comes with a cost to maintain in flyable 

status, a cost not programmed in the Air Force budget. Over the Future Years Defense Program, the unprogrammed cost to the Air Force to maintain these aircraft 

could be as much as $1.23 billion. For this considerable investment, the Nation will 

maintain 1.5 MTM/D of excess capacity; approximately 5 percent above the requirement of 32.7 MTM/D. 

CONCLUSION

Our ability to manage the strategic airlift fleet over the coming years will enable 

us to be more fiscally responsible to the Nation. The fiscal year 2012 President’s 

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budget includes a strategic airlift fleet of 301. This reflects the highest MCRS–16 

requirement of 32.7 MTM/D which can be met with the programmed fleet of 222 

C–17s, 52 C–5Ms and 27 C–5As, or 301 total strategic airlifters. With over a decade 

of study by multiple organizations, we firmly believe the programmed fleet of 301 

aircraft meets our current national strategic objectives. We humbly ask the committee and Congress to support the President’s vision by repealing the 316 strategic 

airlift floor and enabling us to manage the fleet to ensure we continue to meet 

COCOM requirements. We thank you for the subcommittee’s continued support of 

America’s Air Force and particularly to its airmen and their contributions to Global 

Mobility. 

Senator REED. Thank you very much, General Johns. 

We will do an 8-minute first round, and I think this is a topic 

that is of significant technical complexity and also interest that we 

will do a second round. We might have other members join us, too. 

But let me just preface my remarks by saying—and this might 

be more folklore than fact—but I think one of the reasons there 

was a floor placed with respect to strategic lift is that there are 

strong intramural and extramural pressures sometimes to avoid 

buying airlift and buying other platforms. I hope that is not the 

case going forward. 

Because, frankly, I think, as you have demonstrated and continue to demonstrate every day, strategic and tactical airlift is central to everything we do, everywhere we do it, and it deserves premier attention, not secondary attention. So that is just a preface 

to my questions. 

First, in terms of the analysis, there are several terms that are 

running around. Director Fox, you talk in two categories, steady 

state and surge. Other people talk about peacetime and wartime. 

Do you equate steady state as equals peacetime and surge equals 

wartime? Just for clarification. 

Ms. FOX. Yes, sir. Essentially, that is correct. In the wartime, it 

includes Homeland defense operations concurrent with the 

warfight. Perhaps that is part of the confusion. But, yes, what you 

said is correct. 

Senator REED. The surge is not only Homeland security. It is also 

a major campaign, which would be a conventional fight, unlike the 

irregular warfare we are seeing now? 

Ms. FOX. Absolutely, sir. The most stringent cases, two overlapping, large land warfare campaigns, plus three simultaneously 

Homeland defense—— 

Senator REED. That leads to a 32.7 million tons per day figure 

to meet that? 

Ms. FOX. Yes, sir. The max. 

Senator REED. The max, and that is what you feel you can obtain, even with these reductions down to 301 aircraft, basically? 

Ms. FOX. Yes, sir. A point of clarification, if I could? 

Senator REED. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. FOX. The maximum needed is not that. It is 20 MTM/D. But 

when you look at how you schedule, how you load, the size, so it 

is really quite conservative. The model tries to go through that so 

we don’t get caught short in our inability to provide it. 

Senator REED. Just in terms of modeling, so the range of error— 

can you quantify that in terms of—were you told to get this within 

a 2 percent error, or was that not a modeling factor? 

Ms. FOX. Sir, the model—I ought to be able to answer your question, but I will have to get back to you. We were not told to get 

105 

to something. What we have tried to do is model it as accurately 

as we can. 

Of course, you are right. There are errors in any model. I should 

know that, but I am afraid I don’t. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

The difference between the 20 million ton-miles per day (MTM/D) that I mentioned in my comment and the 32.7 MTM/D is the difference between the cargomiles actually moved (20 MTM/D) in the simulation and the capacity of the fleet 

(32.7 MTM/D) required to achieve that level of activity. When loading aircraft we 

often run out of space before reaching weight limits resulting in a difference between the capacity of an aircraft and the capability realized. It is also true that due 

to the location of the airfields, not every aircraft flies the maximum hours/day authorized. The actual hours flown is dependent on weather and the departure and 

arrival locations. Thus the actual miles flown in a given scenario is always less than 

the theoretical miles possible. Our models take these factors and many others into 

consideration to ensure the most realistic simulation possible. In addition we update 

the model algorithms based on the latest information from current operations. For 

these reasons and because the model is based on time-distance-payload computations which are very accurate, we are quite confident that the results reflect what 

we would actually achieve given the scenarios assessed. The results of the Mobility 

Capabilities and Requirements Study 2016 which range from 29.1 MTM/D–32.7 

MTM/D reflect different strategic assumptions and are not reflections or statements 

of model error. 

Senator REED. No, that is quite all right. 

The other issue, just a clarification, of steady state. Steady state 

is essentially what we are in right now. 

We have a major operation in Afghanistan. You are doing major 

operations out of Iraq, particularly airlifting equipment out of Iraq. 

You have ongoing support requirements globally. So this is steady 

state? 

Ms. FOX. That is correct. Steady state is intense. 

Senator REED. Okay. General McNabb, let me—and General 

Johns or Director Fox, if you feel that you want to comment, 

please. One of the realities that is facing us right now is in this 

steady-state process, we are relying upon one of our allies, Pakistan, for terrestrial transit, their roads, et cetera. But given the political dynamics there, I will just ask the question. 

The loss of Pakistan as a land transit point would not in any way 

affect your plans to retire the C–5As you currently have on duty 

or in any way change your request to—at least in the short run— 

to go down to as low as 301 aircraft? 

General MCNABB. No, sir, it wouldn’t at all. We were really constrained going into Afghanistan by the throughput of the airfields 

in Afghanistan. It is not a matter of number of airplanes that we 

have. It is how many you can get in through and have and flow 

through there. 

So one thing that we have done is by using those multimodal operations, where we bring stuff by surface as far forward as possible 

and then maximizing C–17s going back and forth, or C–5s, that 

has really allowed us to optimize those slot times that we have in 

Afghanistan. So, we will continue to work very hard at that. 

But, no, this would in no way restrict—— 

Senator REED. Right. But the commander on the—one of the reasons you have been able to do this successfully is most of what you 

are moving is into the ports in Pakistan and then up through Pakistan. If that option is gone and you have to deliver by air, now you 

106 

either shift to K2, I guess, in Uzbekistan or you just have to be 

much more efficient in those airfields. 

General MCNABB. Sir, two things that we are doing there. One, 

we opened up the operations in the north. We call it the northern 

distribution network. So we are bringing a lot of the resupply up 

through the north. 

In fact, to the tune of about 35 percent comes from the north, 

about 30 percent comes through the Pakistan ground, and about 35 

percent by air. Everything that is high value, everything that is lethal, everything that is special, we bring in by air now. 

What we would have to do is absorb that and bring more of that 

stuff either through the north, or we would have to bring in by air. 

Air is our ultimate ace-in-the-hole. Ideally, we will have other ways 

of getting that in, and right now, we have worked very hard to 

make sure we have good options. 

Senator REED. Right. Let me ask another question. I will direct 

it to you, Director Fox, but it might be General Johns’s area. 

So who gets the savings if we go ahead and retire these aircraft? 

Ms. FOX. That would probably be a point of issue between the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Air Force. But I 

am sure the Air Force thinks the Air Force gets the savings. We 

have to see how all of the budgets and the requirements come out 

this year. He won’t like my answer. 

Senator REED. Okay, General Johns? I think your answer is fine. 

General JOHNS. What we have done by assuming the savings and 

the retirements, as we submitted our fiscal request through OSD, 

was to actually use those resources to support other air forces in 

the effort. So they have already been spread, and then we will have 

that discussion with—— 

Senator REED. So put it another way, you have already spent the 

savings, conceptually, on Air Force programs? 

General JOHNS. Yes, sir. I wouldn’t say we spent the savings. We 

basically—yes, sir, the simple term is, we said if we don’t have to 

preserve these aircraft, we would use them against other obligations. 

Senator REED. Okay. I think—and again, probably best to follow 

up with a question to give us an idea of how you are distributing 

the savings, and we will follow up with a question. 

General JOHNS. Yes, sir. It wasn’t like there was the savings 

there. It was more as we built the POM, we reduced the requirement. So it was used across the Air Force. 

Senator REED. So you lowered the amount of request going forward? 

General JOHNS. Yes, sir. Yes, sir. 

Senator REED. But we will, I think, follow up with a question, 

try to get an idea of what you are doing with those. 

General JOHNS. Yes, sir. But again, it was pretty much spread 

across. So it is hard to track and say, ‘‘This dollar went here, and 

this dollar went there.’’ 

Senator REED. Okay. Thank you. 

Let me ask another—General McNabb or General Johns, et 

cetera, particularly in your testimony, General McNabb, you said 

the C–17s will continue to meet TRANSCOM future requirements 

107 

through currently funded purchases, upgrade programs, and fleet 

rotation. 

All of you in this study assumed no additional acquisition of C– 

17 aircraft. Is that correct? 

General MCNABB. Sir, that is true. 

Senator REED. That is true. 

General MCNABB. Just make sure that we upgrade—continue to 

upgrade the older models so that we have a common model of C– 

17s across the board with common capabilities. 

Senator REED. Now just another question, and I will—as I said, 

we will have a second round. So let me at this point recognize Senator Wicker, and then I will see you again. 

Senator Wicker? 

Senator WICKER. I have been absent from the room, and I 

haven’t heard all of the questions. If it is all right, I think I will 

let Senator Ayotte go before me, if that is all right, Mr. Chairman? 

Senator REED. Senator Ayotte? 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you so much, Senator Wicker. 

I just want to make sure that we are clear on the results of the 

2010 study. As I understand it, according to Director Fox’s written 

testimony—and I would like to make sure that we have the concurrence of the two generals that are here—that if we have reduced 

the airlift capacity to 32.7 million tons per day, as the conclusion 

was of the study, that would still allow us the capacity, based on 

the results of the study, to do two overlapping large-scale land 

campaigns occurring in different theaters, three nearly simultaneous Homeland defense consequence management events, and ongoing, as we have right now, steady-state operations, including Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan. 

General McNabb and General Johns, do you concur with that 

analysis in terms of what capacity we would be left with if we reduce the number to, say, a 301 or in that range, whatever your recommendation would be? 

General MCNABB. Yes, ma’am. We can do that. Basically, that 

32.7 was that two major land campaigns, separate theaters, just as 

you mentioned, and our ability to still handle the steady-state requirement. 

Now, if you talk about an Afghanistan and Iraq along with that, 

then now you are starting to go a little bit beyond what they were 

talking about. We are talking in the neighborhood—we actually did 

a scenario where we did a steady state that was very similar to Afghanistan, along with one land campaign, and that was one of the 

other scenarios that we ran to make sure that we could do a much 

larger steady state, like we have today, along with another scenario. 

So based on how you just said that, if you, depending on how you 

would define Iraq and Afghanistan, what level we are at when you 

brought that up, that is the one where I would go it would depend 

how large we are still in Iraq and Afghanistan and then to be able 

to go do two theater wars. 

Senator AYOTTE. General, I just wanted to follow up. The situation right now, for example, let us assume we stay where we are, 

current operation in Afghanistan, which would be peak right now, 

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given the number of troops we have there with the surge before 

any of them are withdrawn, and we also were to be in a situation 

where we decided to leave additional troops, because the Iraqis 

have asked us to, in Iraq because we have obviously seen some 

flare-ups there because of the influence of others that want to undermine our success. 

If we change the capacity, would we be able to handle that type 

of situation? Because I think that is, obviously, a very real scenario 

we could face in the coming year. 

General MCNABB. Yes. I think what we would do is we would be 

taking a very hard look at—because a lot of it is the number of 

forces you have engaged there. So it wouldn’t be—lift probably 

wouldn’t be the thing that you would start looking it. It would be 

all the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets, all the 

other assets that you would have to bring all that to bear. 

Senator AYOTTE. Right. 

General MCNABB. So lift, I would say that from the standpoint 

we will move what needs to be moved where it needs to be moved. 

It is just that overall capacity, if you mirror that with two very 

large land campaigns along with that, I would say we would have 

to prioritize within that. 

Senator AYOTTE. Okay. 

General MCNABB. That is beyond, I think, what the MCRS 

looked at. I don’t know, Ms. Fox, how you see that. I saw that as 

the one option that we looked at for the scenario in Africa. Go 

ahead. 

Ms. FOX. So the least stressful case that we looked at was an Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), Iraq-like sustained campaign, plus a 

major ground war, land war campaign concurrently. So, yes, I 

agree with General McNabb. 

But the most stressing case was two large land campaigns, separate theaters. The steady state was more—was not the OIF peak, 

but it was consistent with OEF at a lower level, the Afghanistan. 

Senator AYOTTE. Really, the point would be that this is a very 

conservative estimate. If we are in a position where we are engaged 

in two major, large-scale land campaigns and obviously a situation 

like we are sustaining right now in OEF in Afghanistan, that is a 

very significant engagement level for our country. I am not saying 

that we shouldn’t be prepared to be there. I think our readiness 

should always be well beyond where we are. 

But as I understand your analyses, it is very conservative in 

terms of what you have provided for testimony if we were to reduce 

our capacity to 301. Is that right? 

Ms. FOX. If I could add, don’t forget three additional concurrent 

Homeland events at the same time. So, yes, I would say it is very 

conservative. 

Senator AYOTTE. So anyone that would be concerned about our 

readiness posture should be satisfied if we were to reduce the fleet 

to 301? 

General JOHNS. Yes, ma’am. Again, from Air Mobility and the 

Air Force perspective, we want to deliver on the requirements that 

come from TRANSCOM through the analyses of CAPE. So, we will 

look at that to ensure across the spectrum to do the two MCOs, as 

you talk about. 

109 

But as we look at Iraq and Afghanistan today, they are at a 

surge period, per se, and probably a little bit above what we consider steady state. 

Senator AYOTTE. Okay. Thank you. 

General MCNABB. Senator, could I mention one other thing, is 

the other part to that is when we think about doing two major theater land campaigns, you really are going to mobilize the complete 

force, mobilize all our total force, and activate our CRAF. So this 

is you are bringing everything to the game. 

As I mentioned last year, during the very peak of the surge, our 

highest requirement was in the 16 MTM, about half of what we 

would surge to. But it gives you an idea of what all we would then 

bring to bear, and that is how—every once in a while that gets lost 

in it, is that you are taking everything and everything we have in 

reserve all goes. 

Senator AYOTTE. So, General, just to use your example, you said 

March 23 was the peak, and that is only half, in terms of Afghanistan and the surge, of what you have been doing. So that was really only half the capacity of what we would still have as a capacity 

if we reduce to 301? 

General MCNABB. That is right. Now we did not fully mobilize, 

but we did mobilize, do a partial mobilization of C–17 and C–5 

crews to be able to handle that increase. 

Senator AYOTTE. Okay. General Johns? 

General JOHNS. Yes, ma’am. Yes, Senator. 

We called March 2011 ‘‘March Madness’’ as we looked at it from 

the mobility force. We had Japan going on. We had the support of 

Libya. We had a presidential banner mission. We had Afghanistan 

and Iraq working. 

In my history, that was the busiest period. So, again, March 

Madness of a different silk. 

In looking at that, around the 23rd of March to about the 29th 

is where we had our heaviest commitment of our gray tails, of our 

mobility fleet. It was 127 C–17s, 33 C–5s, and 208 tankers across 

the globe. So I have never seen such a heavy demand, but still that 

is less than half of what we could deliver. 

Senator AYOTTE. Great. I really appreciate your putting it in that 

perspective. When you think about that much activity, and that is 

only half of the capacity that we would still be leaving here if we 

reduce the fleet to 301 or near that level. 

I also wanted to follow up, some who have been critical in the 

past of reducing the strategic Air Force airlift capacity to the requirements that you are recommending have cited the fact that we 

lease commercial aircraft as an argument against reducing or 

eliminating the aircraft floor. Yet I am also told by the Air Force 

that we sometimes lease aircraft for two reasons. 

First, in order to meet short-term surges in airlift demand, and 

second, sometimes it is more cost effective to lease commercial assets for a brief period rather than purchasing and having to continually maintain an asset. 

General McNabb, can you address this issue to those that might 

raise this issue in terms of concerns about leasing and our capacity? 

General MCNABB. Certainly, Senator. 

110 

I basically run an enterprise, and I have three parts to that enterprise. I have the active duty fleet. I have the Guard and Reserve 

total force augmentation of that as well. So I have the total force 

to augment that, and third, I have our commercial partners. 

All three of them are integral parts, and my job is to match the 

capability against the requirement. What goes into that is, is it a 

military-type mission like air drop or going into some high-threat 

fields where I have to use a military airplane? Second, it goes into 

cost. How much will it cost me if I end up taking MRAPs or M– 

ATVs? 

In fact, in general, if I can use our commercial partners, if I can 

use them, it is normally cheaper than if I use military airplanes. 

That does the two things you mentioned. It preserves their longevity. It preserves those airframes for when I need them later. 

Saves you in the long term. 

But more importantly, if I have an immediate requirement, then 

I have that extra capacity to go. We are always mixing and matching. As General Johns mentioned, March Madness, we were pivoting the enterprise to take care of Iraq and Afghanistan, pivoting 

it to Libya, pivoting it to Japan, pivoting it to South America for 

the movement of the President. All of those things are going, and 

our ability is to swing that very rapidly. 

A lot of questions came up, and Mr. Chairman, you brought up 

the AN–124s. The 124s actually are a subcontractor to one of our 

CRAF members, in this case Atlas Air. They actually could move 

MRAPs cheaper on that than we could on any other airplane, 

cheaper than C–17s, cheaper than C–5s. It also then freed up C– 

17s to be able to go do the additional air drop that we do in theater. 

Those are the kinds of things that I will be looking at. Again, if 

I am helping our commercial partners, our CRAF, they obligate 

their fleet to us in wartime for peacetime business. So when I give 

them business, it is good for everybody. It is good for them to operate in our system. It brings jobs, and it is also cheaper for the taxpayers to do it that way. 

Again, it preserves my military capability for where I need it, 

and it normally has to do with threat and then also availability. 

If I were running short of airplanes, then, in fact, I would say, 

‘‘well, okay, I am out of C–17s. I am going to have to use one of 

these others.’’ 

I haven’t had to do that in the last couple of years. It has been 

because of cost where I have used them. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you, General. 

My time is expired. Appreciate it. Thank you. 

Senator REED. Senator Wicker, please? 

Senator WICKER. Thank you very much. 

This has been a very informative hearing. Let me just see if I 

can nail a few things down. 

General McNabb, would a programmed fleet of 301 strategic 

airlifters provide enough capacity to meet wartime and peacetime 

requirements? 

General MCNABB. Yes, sir. 

Senator WICKER. General Johns, do you agree? 

General JOHNS. Yes, Senator. 

111 

Senator WICKER. Gentlemen, would there be any increased risk 

at all in getting your jobs done by moving to this reduced number? 

General MCNABB. Senator, it would not. In fact, from my standpoint, those facilities, those air crews, the maintainers, the aerial 

porters, making sure that I have them targeted on our best assets 

is smart business and actually helps me because I better manage 

a right-sized fleet. 

Senator WICKER. The risk would be reduced, in your view? 

General MCNABB. Sir, I hate to have folks working on stuff that 

I don’t need. Manpower is absolutely critical. 

Again, as I think about this, running it like a business, those facilities and the people are the most critical factor in all of this. The 

$1.2 billion is a savings, but it is really taking full advantage of 

our great people. 

Senator WICKER. General Johns, do you concur? 

General JOHNS. Senator, I do concur. I think the excess above 

301 is over capacity. I may not use the term ‘‘risk.’’ I may say it 

is extra workload on our airmen to keep that capability when we 

don’t need to utilize it. 

Senator WICKER. So it is more than getting rid of a luxury. It is 

actually getting rid of something that stands in the way of doing 

our best job? 

General JOHNS. Yes, Senator. 

Senator WICKER. General Johns, why does the number change? 

During previous testimony, we have been told 316 was the right 

number. Why does that change? 

General JOHNS. Sir, I think when we were here last time—or before me. In fact, when General McNabb was the AMC commander, 

we didn’t have the results of MCRS–16. So, that number really was 

not definitized until we saw the results of MCRS–16. Once we had 

that, we now had the analyses to articulate a position based on 

facts. 

Senator WICKER. General McNabb, how long have you seen this 

coming? I have been meeting with you for a long time. 

General MCNABB. For the 300? 

Senator WICKER. Yes. 

General MCNABB. The fact that about 300 was what we were 

going to need, and as we went above that—— 

Senator WICKER. Indeed. Moving from the larger number to the 

300, how long have you really honestly seen this coming? 

General MCNABB. I think ever since MCRS–16 was complete. Because what changed really was we, from MCRS—— 

Senator WICKER. That was when? 

General MCNABB. I am sorry? Oh, 2010. It was 2010. 

Senator WICKER. So that was just last year, okay. 

General MCNABB. So, but where we, at MCRS–05, we had a 

range, 292 to 383. The administration came in, and we said that 

we needed 292 fully modernized aircraft. That is C–17 and C–5M. 

What changed was the Nunn-McCurdy breach on the C–5 Reliability Enhancement and Re-engining Program. Basically, we 

looked at that, and DOD got together and said, ‘‘Okay, what is the 

best way to address this?’’ 

When we did this, they said, ‘‘well, if we don’t do all of the

C–5s because of cost, if it is not cost effective to do all of them, let 

112 

us use—the JROC came up with a requirement, 33.9, and said here 

is how much we want to take all the alternatives and then cost the 

different ways of getting at that.’’ That is where the 316 came 

from. 

But we always acknowledged that MCRS–16 was going to relook 

at all of the things that you mentioned, like steady-state requirements, how would we do intra-theater, all the things that you mentioned earlier in your opening statement, sir. We did that. 

We always knew that once we had the results of MCRS–16, we 

would come back and take a look at that and see is 316 the right 

number, or would it be less? It ended up being less, 301. 

Senator WICKER. We are looking at very serious budget constraints. General McNabb, based on your illustrious career and 

your vast experience, is this more or less an isolated savings, or do 

you think if we dig deeply we can find this Air Force-wide? 

Would you—and I ask that question in the context of the desire 

of many people in the public arena saying that there is a real savings that can be made in the defense budget. 

General MCNABB. Yes, sir. I think that is what Secretary Gates, 

now Secretary Panetta, are really after on efficiencies. ‘‘Go take a 

look at every part of what you do.’’ 

We happen to have the opportunity to look at this as an enterprise because it is all parts. It also includes our ability to use land 

and air, use commercial versus military, all of those things. Go 

back and say ‘‘every nickel we can save, we need to save,’’ and look 

at every part that you do. 

I think that that is what—Ms. Fox can actually talk to this for 

the whole DOD. But from my standpoint, that is what I was tasked 

to do by the Secretary. I think all the COCOMs and the Services 

were asked to do the same thing. Go take a look at every part of 

your operation and say ‘‘are there places where we can save money 

prudently, smartly?’’ Still get the capability that we need but make 

sure that we are not wasting any money. 

Given the demands, as you mentioned and the chairman mentioned, there are a lot of things out there that are really wearing 

out that you need to spend dollars on. We want to make sure we 

are putting the dollars against the right thing. 

We have had great support because of what we have done the 

last 10 years in the mobility world. Congress has been tremendously supportive, as has the administration. We have been able to 

do lessons learned. We have been able to try to figure out how to 

use C–17s and C–5s in commercial and different ways. 

What that has done is allowed us to look into some of these 

things and come up with alternative ways of using airplanes, different concept of operations that would allow us to maybe say, hey, 

we can actually do this better, save some money, and actually reduce risk. 

This is one of those departments where I think when the 316 

number came, we always said we will use MCRS–16 to make sure 

that we refine that number, take full advantage of the C–17, the 

full 222—at that time 223 C–17s being in the inventory. Let us see 

how that plays out. Let us see how the C–5M does. Let us make 

sure that we model that. 

113 

Let us see how this whole thing comes together with how we do 

the lessons learned from doing 10 years of surge, and let us put 

that together. That is the results that you have. 

I am very comfortable with the results. TRANSCOM and CAPE 

co-led that and did that together, and I am very comfortable with 

the results on that. I think that it captured Services, COCOMs, all 

the agencies, and made sure that we had all the parts to the puzzle 

and everybody had a voice. I think, in general, I have not had a 

lot of pushback on the MCRS results within DOD at all, at least 

from my standpoint. 

So we are basically saying we have done that. Now we come back 

and tell you here is what the answer that we get, this is what the 

analysis shows, and I am very comfortable with saying that you 

can come down to the 300 strategic airlifters. 

Senator WICKER. Finally, who can tell me what will become of 

the 32 C–5A aircraft? 

General JOHNS. Sir, the C–5As will go down to AMARC and put 

into our storage there. 

Senator WICKER. Is that the most efficient thing we can do with 

them? 

General JOHNS. Senator, as opposed to selling them or doing 

something else, sir, I think that preserves us the capability of putting them into storage there down at Arizona. 

Senator WICKER. All right. 

General JOHNS. Then potentially using some of those to sustain 

the other aircraft down the road. We will have to look at the discussion about do you take some of the parts from those to sustain 

the fleet to reduce operating costs in the future? So there is the 

tradeoff there we look. 

Senator WICKER. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator REED. Thanks, Senator Wicker. 

Let me initiate a second round. I have a few questions. 

One, just for the record to clarify Senator Wicker’s question, Director Fox, this is the opinion not just of the Department of the Air 

Force and TRANSCOM. This is DOD, the Secretary, presumably as 

General McNabb said, all the CINCs, commanders, have been able 

to weigh in. So, this is the conclusion of DOD, all the way up to 

the Secretary, about the right number? 

Ms. FOX. That is correct, sir. This has been vetted by everyone 

in DOD, and it does have the support of the Secretary. 

Senator REED. Thank you very much. 

General McNabb, particularly in a surge, you have to call on the 

civilian fleet. What number of millions of tons per day or miles per 

tons per day would they have to contribute in a surge? 

Because, i.e., that 32.7 million of tons per day is just what your 

organic aircraft are delivering. There is another number, and that 

number is what? Do you know? 

General MCNABB. Yes, sir. I will get that for the record for you, 

but it is about 20 MTM per day. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

Mobility Capabilities Requirements Study 2016 (MCRS–16) reported a peak demand for 149 wide-bodied cargo aircraft and 157 wide-bodied passenger aircraft. 

MCRS–16 used these commercial aircraft in the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) to 

114 

deliver approximately 43 percent of the cargo (bulk, containerized, and palletized 

cargo) and approximately 93 percent of our passengers/troops. The 149 wide-bodied 

cargo aircraft in CRAF can generate about 25.4 million ton-miles per day (MTM/ 

D) in addition to the 32.7 MTM/D provided by military organic lift to move oversize 

and outsize cargo. 

Senator REED. Right. 

General MCNABB. We plan on doing 37 percent of our cargo 

movement done by our CRAF in those two theaters that we were 

talking about. So 37 percent. So over a third will be done on the 

commercial, and 93 percent of our passengers. 

So when you say how have you sized your fleet, the gray tails— 

the C–17s, C–5s—are tailored toward rolling vehicles and militarytype cargo because that is what they are optimized for. Where all 

your bulk cargo, your pallets and all that, would be carried on commercial. 

The one thing that makes it a little different that you have to 

throw in there is that sometimes the commercial can’t go all the 

way forward because of the threat and then we have to transload. 

We have that built in there. But that is also where the one tanker, 

if it is not being used for tanking, would make a very big difference 

because it has the defensive systems to be able to do that. 

Senator REED. You obviously have less control over the composition in terms of airframes of the civilian fleet. Are there any concerns you have about commercial companies buying different aircraft that might support passengers, but not any kind of bulk or 

pallets or, i.e., has that been factored in? 

General MCNABB. Yes, sir. We work very closely with the commercial industry, and we have a mix of passenger and cargo. We 

make sure that we meet both of those. 

Just for clarification, you brought up the AN–124s, we don’t plan 

on using any of that during those surges. This will be totally our 

U.S. commercial fleet, and they do a great job. The good part there 

is that they already are incentivized to modernize. They are already incentivized to take care of all the other things to get better, 

more efficient, fuel efficient, all of those things, because they can’t 

survive in the commercial market if they don’t do those things already. 

Senator REED. Let me ask you another question, which is this— 

I think it is looking at the worst possible case, but that, in some 

cases, is what we get paid for. What about attrition of aircraft, either through normal wear and tear or through combat action? Has 

that been built into the model? 

General MCNABB. Yes, sir. What I would say is that for the big 

airplanes, we have lost one C–17 and one C–5 in the last 8 to 10 

years. 

I would say that one of the things that General Johns—and I will 

ask General Johns to jump in here. Because primarily the Air 

Force, then—one of the reasons they talk about 301—and I think 

it comes up was at 299 or 301—a lot of that is to make sure that 

he has the right-sized backup aircraft inventory (BAI), and he has 

that factored in. 

But again, for the large airplanes, because we don’t lose very 

many, it is not the same as what we do in fighters and others, 

where that you are going to lose some airplanes. 

115 

So, I would say we do it a little differently. I think we capture 

it. The BAI helps us do that. By the time that we really have to 

get at, usually we are into another platform, and we can adjust at 

that time. 

Senator REED. Let me just—a follow-up question before I recognize General Johns. Is that the point you raise about—right now, 

in the steady-state environment, the ability, the willingness of commercial entities to fly is a lot more—is a lot, I guess, better than 

the situation where they are afraid or the insurance companies are 

afraid they might get shot at. 

General MCNABB. Right. 

Senator REED. So, have you effectively factored in a situation, 

and particularly in the surge, where, for many reasons, just the insurance companies simply saying, ‘‘you ain’t flying,’’ that you would 

not be able to meet your—— 

General MCNABB. Yes, sir. A couple things that you do there. 

One, we work with the Federal Aviation Administration to guarantee insurability, wartime insurance. So we already do that. So, 

whenever you have operations into Afghanistan or Iraq, that is one 

of the things that I will sign off and say, we recommend that we 

allow that. 

But to your point, we also are not going to put any of our airplanes into harm’s way unless they have the defensive systems and 

the training and all the things that go with that. So what we will 

do then is we will transload. We will take it as far forward as possible, and then we will transload. 

That is where these multi-modal ops, sometimes it is surface-toair, sometimes it is commercial air-to-military air. We do that in 

Manas now. All of our passengers going into Afghanistan will go 

in on a C–17 and C–130. But we take them commercially to Manas 

and then transload them onto an airplane where they have the defensive systems. They have night-vision goggles. They have the tactics, techniques, and procedures to get our folks in and out in the 

safest possible way. 

Senator REED. General Johns, your comments on that? I have a 

few other questions for you. 

General JOHNS. Yes, Mr. Chairman. 

With the large aircraft, because we haven’t experienced the 

losses, we don’t build in attrition reserve, as we do with the tactical 

aircraft. So our model basically is how many aircraft do you need 

to accomplish your mission? Then we have a backup inventory to 

allow us to have enough aircraft available and still have aircraft 

in the depot. 

So we have the two modeled. We don’t add the third element, 

which is attrition reserve. It hasn’t been warranted, and that would 

cause us to have more capacity than we need. 

Senator REED. Let me ask you a follow-up again on Senator 

Wicker’s very good question about what happens with the C–5As. 

Have you done—and this is, again, the worst-case, and again, we 

have to ask these questions—an analysis of how much it would cost 

you to take a C–5A out of the desert and put it back in the air, 

if all this very thoughtful analysis proves to be wrong? Because 

that happens sometimes. 

116 

Is that part of the—would all the savings evaporate in two or 

three retrofits and recommitments? 

General JOHNS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to take the specific 

numbers for the record, if I may? 

Senator REED. Absolutely, sir. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

The cost to return a C–5A to flying status after it has been inducted into the 

Aerospace Maintenance and Regeneration Group would depend on the type of storage the aircraft is placed into and the length of time it has been in storage. Type 

1000 storage, which is the most costly, would maintain the retired aircraft in anticipation of future requirements and ensure parts were maintained in a serviceable 

manner. Type 1000 storage would generate a reoccurring cost of approximately 

$50,000 every 4 years per aircraft with an actual regeneration cost, the cost to return an aircraft to the fleet, estimated at $300,000. Based on the length of time the 

aircraft are in storage, there could be additional costs such as implementing time 

compliant technical orders for safety and periodic depot maintenance. Should all of 

these additional actions be required we estimate the cost would be $35 million per 

aircraft. 

General JOHNS. But we look at putting them in storage and 

keeping at different levels of readiness and then having to take 

them out and make sure they are current for the wartime employment or the safety employment. So let me take the specific numbers. 

But it is still very low in comparison to keeping that many aircraft, and the likelihood of needing them also is considered. 

Senator REED. One other follow-up, and that is part of the savings going forward that you are projecting are a function of Congress changing the law. Just as bookkeeping or policy-wise, how 

often do you do that, Director Fox, in terms of the defense budget? 

Like, these guys will get it. We have a lot of confidence in them. 

Ms. FOX. Sir, I would like to tell you that we only do that when 

we have the best analyses available to support the decision. 

Senator REED. That is a very good answer, but just it raises some 

policy issues with us. 

Ms. FOX. Yes, sir, I understand. 

Senator REED. But I just wanted to flag it. 

Ms. FOX. Yes, sir. 

Senator REED. I don’t think it is a major issue at the moment. 

Ms. FOX. It is a very fair question, sir. 

Senator REED. My time expired. I just must say I think this has 

been a very useful hearing. I am going to recognize Senator Wicker 

for any questions, and Senator Ayotte? 

Senator WICKER. I will pass, and I understand that Senate 

Ayotte has some. 

Senator REED. Senator Ayotte. 

Senator AYOTTE. I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I have one brief follow-up. Director Fox, is it fair to say that Congress has added, by earmarks, C–17s over and above what DOD 

has requested, particularly in 2007 and 2008? 

Ms. FOX. Yes, Senator, it is. 

Senator AYOTTE. Is that one of the reasons why, in part, we find 

ourselves here and examining this important issue of what is the 

right size that we have? 

Ms. FOX. I do believe that the number of C–17s that we are ending up with, above what we had planned, is a factor. As we look 

117 

at what we would do to get to the number that the study says we 

need, it obviously points you in a particular place. So, yes. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you. Obviously, I hope going forward 

that we rely on your recommendations, as opposed to—it is one of 

the reasons that when I ran this past fall, I decided to swear off 

earmarks. So, I appreciate what can be the unintended consequences of some of our perhaps well-intentioned actions on behalf 

of our constituents. 

So, thank you all. 

Senator REED. Senator Wicker has a second round. 

Senator WICKER. Let me just follow up on that. If there were earmarks that increased the number of these aircraft, they were based 

on the Air Force’s studied opinion at the time, that those were appropriate numbers. Is that not correct? 

Because we have testimony that the requirement changed last 

year after MCRS–16. 

Ms. FOX. Sir, let me get back to you with the record of exactly 

what we asked for. But it is my understanding the total number 

of aircraft that you need, yes, sir, that has changed. It has come 

down. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

Over the last decade, the Department of Defense (DOD) has consistently maintained that an organic strategic airlift fleet of about 300 aircraft is required to support the strategy with acceptable risk. Changes to the strategic environment, as well 

as adjustments in the fleet mix, which include changes to the number of modernized 

C–5s, have contributed to variations in the total number of aircraft required. Prior 

to September 11, the Mobility Requirements Study concluded that DOD needed between 252 to 302 aircraft depending on the strategic assumptions and the mix of 

C–17s, C–5s, and modernized C–5s. In 2005, the Mobility Capability Study concluded that a fleet of 292 aircraft, comprised of 180 C–17s and 112 fully modernized 

C–5s, would meet DOD’s requirements. In 2008, when DOD reduced the C–5 Reliability Enhancement and Re-engining Program from 112 to 52 aircraft, the required 

number of aircraft increased slightly. During this timeframe, DOD briefed Congress 

that a new mobility study was underway to update earlier findings based on lessons 

learned from ongoing operations and the evolving strategic environment. Subsequently Mobility Capabilities Requirements Study assessed 3 different strategic 

cases and determined that the airlift capacity needed to support the strategy ranged 

from 29.1 to 32.7 million ton-miles per day which can be met with a fleet of 264– 

300 aircraft. 

Senator WICKER. It just changed last year? 

Ms. FOX. It is a small change, frankly, but it is a change. You 

are right. It went up, actually, a little bit from what we had 

thought before. But Congress wanted it to be 316 for a safety margin, as General McNabb has explained, until we finished the MCRS 

study. 

The mix within that total number is, I think, perhaps the question with regard to C–17s, and Congress has given us more C–17s 

than we have requested in the past. But I don’t have with me the 

exact numbers we requested and what we received. But that is the 

history. 

Senator WICKER. Thank you. 

Senator REED. My only comment is, and I think it is trying to 

encapsulate what Senator Ayotte said, had we not added additional 

C–17s, either at the request of the Air Force or the request of Congress, then we would not be able to retire these C–5As. So any way 

you look at it, the debate today about retiring C–5As is a function, 

at least in some respect, of the additional C–17s. 

118 

Now one of the issues, and I think this goes to one of the points 

that Senator Ayotte made and one that I suggest, is that your analysis assumes that we will not add any additional C–17s, that the 

Air Force is not going to come up and recommend that we build 

more C–17s because, unfortunately, this study has reduced the 

number of aircraft and we need more aircraft. Is that fair to say, 

General Johns? 

General JOHNS. Mr. Chairman, the Air Force is very content with 

the 222 C–17s. It will not be asking for additional ones. 

Senator REED. The swing, if you will, if—again, I think this analysis is very thoughtful. But if there are conditions, unpredictable 

at the moment, the swing comes out of civilian fleet. It comes out 

of, as you have suggested, you will have at least the capacity of reactivating C–5As which have not flown their full life of service. 

Those options, I presume, would be advanced to us prior to any 

other options? 

Ms. FOX. Yes, sir, absolutely. We have done a lot of cost analyses 

of those various options. So, again, my testimony today is about the 

total number. 

Senator REED. Right. 

Ms. FOX. Then the mix within is something that you also look 

at for cost. 

Senator REED. General Johns? 

General JOHNS. Mr. Chairman, as we talked about how do you 

take them out of the depot if they are there? What you have to do 

is you have to unwrap them, and you may have to put them 

through a depot itself. You may have to do some modernization. 

But what you are hugely saving is the annual flying hour program of not having to fly them. So, we have to look at then do we 

put them all in that type of storage, or do we allow some to be used 

to part out and support the other aircraft? 

Senator REED. Sure. 

General JOHNS. So there is a mix there between the type of storage we use. That is the biggest difference. 

Senator REED. If there are no additional questions, again, I 

think, as we reflect upon these issues, we might have written questions, which we will submit to you. I think there has been some indications that you would like to provide some written information. 

We would accept that, and we would like to let us give ourselves 

a week, until next Wednesday, for written questions submitted to 

the panel. We would ask you to respond as quickly as you could 

to any written request made by the committee. 

Again, I have to thank Senator Ayotte because she has raised 

this issue, and she has done it with great insight into an important 

program. I think this hearing has been very useful to me, and I 

thank her for urging us to do it. 

Senator AYOTTE. I want to thank the chairman and the ranking 

member, Senator Wicker, again because I raised the issue, but this 

has provided much more helpful information to be able to bring 

this to the floor of what the right number is and also really support 

for such an important issue. 

So I think this hearing was very helpful. I want to thank both 

of you for accommodating my having it. Rather than having that 

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vote in committee, I think this is really a better place to be in 

terms of how much information we have. 

Thank you. 

Senator REED. Thank you. 

If there are no further questions, the hearing is adjourned. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JACK REED

AIRCRAFT SERVICE LIVES

1. Senator REED. General Johns, what is the average number of flight hours on 

the C–5A aircraft that you intend to retire? 

General JOHNS. The 22 C–5As projected for retirements have an average of 21,237 

flight hours 

2. Senator REED. General Johns, how does this average compare to what we believe is the total service life of the C–5A aircraft? 

General JOHNS. The expected service life of the C–5A is 47,270 flight hours. At 

the current flying hour rate, the fleet is not projected to reach or exceed the total 

service life before 2040. 

3. Senator REED. General Johns, how about comparable numbers for the C–5B 

fleet? 

General JOHNS. The C–5B fleet has an average of 19,157 flight hours per aircraft 

with a service life expectancy of 52,500 hours. 

4. Senator REED. General Johns, what is the average number of hours of service 

life expended by the C–17 fleet? 

General JOHNS. Average actual airframe hours for the entire C–17 fleet are 9,650. 

5. Senator REED. General Johns, how does this average compare to the total expected service life of the C–17 aircraft? 

General JOHNS. Designed service life of the C–17 is 30,000 hours before we examine any service life extensions. 

6. Senator REED. General Johns, if we keep burning hours on the C–17 at the current rate, when would we need to begin a C–17 replacement program? 

General JOHNS. The C–17 fleet averages more than the planned 1,000 actual 

flight hours per year, but the life-limiting effects ‘‘felt’’ by the fleet are within limits. 

The C–17 fleet will meet its service life of 30 years, and based on historic usage 

severity, should be available much longer. Targeted fleet service life extension programs (SLEP) can be utilized to refresh aging aircraft drivers (wing upper cover, 

landing gear) as appropriate to enable continued safe/reliable/economic C–17 operations. 

Supporting Information: 

The C–17 was delivered with an engineered service life of 30,000 actual flight 

hours (AFH), programmed to fly 1,000 AFH per year for 30 years. Recent history 

shows higher usage. 

The true measure of an airframe’s ‘‘remaining life’’ is total Equivalent Flight 

Hours (EFH), based on aircraft usage severity; in effect, what the aircraft ‘‘feels’’ 

it is flying. Usage severity is specific to each tail number by mission (e.g., low-level 

airdrop is more ‘‘severe’’ than high-altitude, straight/level). 

While the entire aircraft accumulates AFH at the same rate, individual ‘‘regions’’ 

of an aircraft accumulate EFH at different rates, depending on each region’s loading 

environment. For all but one aircraft region, the average accumulated annual EFH 

is under the designed 1,000 EFH annual standard. Wing Upper Cover (Control 

Point W2) is the exception; and it is only the exception at Altus Air Force Base 

(AFB), due to the harsh training environment which, in effect, ‘‘ages’’ the upper 

cover faster. 

HQ Air Mobility Command (AMC) and the C–17 SPO coordinate to monitor these 

operational effects at Altus, and rotate aircraft on a schedule through Altus. The 

System Program Manager and Boeing confirmed that W2 EFH accumulation slows 

down and starts to recover after aircraft leave Altus, as AFH begins to outpace EFH 

again. 

120 

As C–17 aircraft sections approach life limits, SLEP can be utilized to refresh 

these sections in order to breathe new life into the fleet. For instance, a W2 SLEP, 

when applicable, could be applied to essentially reduce the aircraft ‘‘age’’ by reducing the leading aircraft service life driver. Currently, the only proposed C–17 SLEP 

relates to landing gear, which has a life limit of 19,000 landings (although it was 

tested to 4 lifetimes); the fleet’s high time aircraft currently has over 17,000 landings (∼3 years of service life left at current rate); SLEP will provide a solution for 

these ‘‘high landings’’ fleet drivers, enabling continued aircraft availability. The proposed SLEP will analyze landing gear available life, determine components requiring modification to attain 38,000 landings, and implement required modifications or 

impose life limits on components. 

AIRCRAFT AVAILABILITY

7. Senator REED. General Johns, normal Air Force planning for force structure includes additional aircraft for attrition reserve, so-called back-up inventory aircraft 

that protect against aircraft being unavailable during periods of depot maintenance, 

et cetera, and aircraft for training purposes. To what extent have your assessment 

of the adequacy of a force of 301 aircraft taken these factors into account? 

General JOHNS. AMC plans for Backup Aircraft Inventory (BAI) to account for aircraft that are in depot for maintenance, modifications, etc. Formal training requirements for mobility aircraft are also taken into account when considering the proper 

fleet size. The assessment that 301 inter-theater airlift aircraft will meet MCRS– 

16 peak demand takes both BAI and formal training aircraft into account. Unlike 

tactical aircraft fleets, AMC does not program for attrition reserve aircraft because 

the historic and forecasted loss rates for mobility aircraft does not justify the additional investment. 

8. Senator REED. General Johns, is there any attrition reserve in the 301 number, 

or back-up aircraft inventory, or provisions for training aircraft? If not, what would 

you propose to do if we should lose another C–17 or C–5 aircraft in a major mishap? 

General JOHNS. AMC plans for BAI to account for aircraft that are in depot for 

maintenance, modifications, et cetera. Formal training requirements are for mobility 

aircraft are also taken into account when considering the proper fleet size. The assessment that 301 inter-theater airlift aircraft will meet MCRS–16 peak demand 

takes both BAI and formal training aircraft into account. Unlike tactical aircraft 

fleets, AMC does not program for attrition reserve aircraft because the historic and 

forecasted loss rates for mobility aircraft does not justify the additional investment. 

Any loss in the C–17 or C–5 fleets would be filled by BAI aircraft. 

9. Senator REED. General Johns, C–5B aircraft will be unavailable for nearly a 

year in the Reliability Enhancement and Re-engining Program (RERP) modification, 

which continues through 2015. In fiscal year 2013 and fiscal year 2014, you will 

have 11 C–5B aircraft offline undergoing the modification. If Congress removes the 

316 floor, the Air Force plans to complete the action of getting down to 301 aircraft 

by 2014. What assumptions have you made about the availability of C–5B aircraft 

that are undergoing the extensive RERP modification, where these aircraft will be 

unavailable for almost a year at a time? 

General JOHNS. AMC has taken into account depot possession of C–5Bs as they 

continue through the RERP modification. If a fully-mobilized scenario requiring all 

inter-theater aircraft were to arise in the near-term, steps would be taken to defer 

aircraft inputs into depot and/or accelerate aircraft through depot lines. The increased depot load for the C–5 RERP modification will not adversely impact current 

day-to-day operations. 

10. Senator REED. General Johns wouldn‘t the Air Force plans for retirement actually allow capabilities for million ton-miles per day (MTM/D) to fall below the revised requirement for several years in the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP)? 

General JOHNS. AMC’s plan for 301 inter-theater airlift aircraft steadily improves 

our MTM/D capability between fiscal year 2012 and fiscal year 2015. As we begin 

fiscal year 2012, our current inventory of 212 delivered C–17s and 104 C–5s (5 C– 

5Ms, 45 C–5Bs, 2 C–5Cs, and 52 C–5As) provides approximately 31.0 MTM/D. Continued delivery of C–17s to a total of 222 and the progress of the C–5 RERP modification for 52 aircraft will steadily improve MTM/D capability to 32.1 by end of fiscal year 2012 and above 32.7 by end of fiscal year 2015. This steady improvement 

in capability is balanced with realistic unit conversion schedules from the C–5A to 

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the C–17 and avoids expenditures on modifications and depot maintenance on retiring aircraft. 

IMPLEMENTATION OF REDUCTIONS

11. Senator REED. General Johns, have you decided which C–5A aircraft you want 

to retire, and which units will be losing aircraft without replacement by C–17s if 

you have to maintain 316 aircraft? 

General JOHNS. The main driver in selecting specific C–5A aircraft for retirement 

is the programmed depot maintenance (PDM) schedule. We typically choose aircraft 

coming due a PDM, and we are formulating that list. The remaining aircraft will 

be redistributed across the remaining C–5A units after the remaining ARC unit for 

conversion to the C–17 is selected through the Air Force’s strategic basing process. 

All existing inter-theater units will be covered with aircraft. 

12. Senator REED. General Johns, which aircraft and which units would be affected if we either eliminate the floor or lower the floor to 301 aircraft? 

General JOHNS. The fiscal year 2012 request reduces the C–5A fleet to 27 as the 

overall inter-theater fleet is reduced to 301 (222 C–17s, 52 C–5Ms, and 27 C–5As). 

A remaining ARC C–5A to C–17 unit conversion will be announced as we complete 

the Air Force’s strategic basing process. No units will go uncovered as we reduce 

the inter-theater fleet to 301 aircraft. 

13. Senator REED. General Johns, if we eliminate the 316 floor, would the Air 

Force retire more than the number it takes to get to a total of 301? 

General JOHNS. Based on the most stressful MCRS–16 requirement of 32.7 MTM/ 

D, our fiscal year 2012 request is to retire C–5As to achieve an inter-theater fleet 

of 301 aircraft (222 C–17s, 52 C–5Ms, and 27 C–5As). We will maintain the strategic fleet of 301 aircraft until such time that a new requirement is established and/ 

or a follow-on study is accomplished that points to a reduced inter-theater airlift requirement in the future. 

14. Senator REED. General Johns, what would be the effect of immediately implementing these reductions, rather than spacing them out over the FYDP? 

General JOHNS. Attempting to immediately implement all proposed C–5A reductions in 1 year would initially exceed the Aerospace Maintenance and Regeneration 

Group ability to accept the aircraft and would exceed the converting unit’s ability 

to initially train operations and maintenance personnel in the C–17. The proposed 

C–5A retirement schedule attempts to balance fiscal savings with achievable aircraft acceptance and unit conversion schedules. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROGER F. WICKER

HEAVY-LIFTING CAPABILITY

15. Senator WICKER. General McNabb, how does U.S. Transportation Command 

(TRANSCOM) engage the private sector to support the lift mission from big and 

heavy equipment like a mine-resistant ambush protected (MRAP) vehicle to other 

essentials that are large and bulky? 

General MCNABB. TRANSCOM starts with the lift requirement as identified by 

the Geographic Combatant Commander. We examine restrictions such as size, 

weight and delivery timeline. For heavy equipment such as MRAPs, joint priorities, 

delivery timelines, and cost effectiveness are all factors in vessel and mode selection. 

Rapid delivery often requires military organic solutions, deliveries over time may 

allow engagement of commercial partners, and more cost effective multi-modal solutions. To ensure the best value and meet mission parameters, TRANSCOM acquisitions uses departmental contracting guidelines to engage commercial industry. 

16. Senator WICKER. General McNabb, how important is cargo preference to sustaining an adequate sealift capability? 

General MCNABB. Maintaining U.S.-Flag sealift readiness is a top priority for 

TRANSCOM. Sealift is the primary means for delivering combat forces and 

sustainment during major and contingency operations. TRANSCOM’s partnership 

with U.S. commercial sealift industry is a vital component in meeting the Nation’s 

strategic sealift requirements. To date, over 90 percent of all cargo to Afghanistan 

and Iraq has been moved by sea in U.S.-Flag vessels. 

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Under cargo preference laws, the Department of Defense (DOD) gains critical access to U.S.-Flag commercial sealift and transportation networks in exchange for 

our U.S.-Flag maritime industry to have first opportunity to move U.S. Government 

cargo. This allows the continued viability of the U.S.-Flag fleet and the pool of citizen mariners who man them. U.S. commercial sealift industry depends on preference cargo. Any reductions in available U.S.-Flag sealift will have to be offset in 

other ways to maintain DOD sealift readiness. 

17. Senator WICKER. General McNabb, the Defense Advanced Research Products 

Agency hopes that its Pelican program will provide heavy-lifting capability from 

lighter-than-air vehicles for the U.S. military. What role do you see for such aircraft 

in the future? 

General MCNABB. Initial research observations lead me to believe that airships 

could provide a balance of cargo throughput at lower operating cost and fuel savings. Such operations can potentially blend efficiency and cargo velocity independent 

of infrastructure. Beyond creating alternative approaches to operations, it also has 

the potential to improve the effectiveness of the existing transportation system. 

We are presently developing understanding of competing technical viewpoints 

through our participation in multiple Cooperative Research and Development Agreements with industry to analyze different aspects of this technology. To date, our 

analyses have reinforced the importance of flexible cargo delivery options. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CLAIRE MCCASKILL

AIR FORCE AIR FLEET

18. Senator MCCASKILL. Director Fox, with the high costs of keeping the C–5As 

($30,167/hour for the C–5A vs. $13,767/hour for the C–17), how much of an impact 

would retiring C–5As have on the operation and maintenance budget? 

Director FOX. DOD currently has more airlift than it needs, and thus there would 

be no reason to replace C–5As with C–17s. Furthermore, the 2009 congressionally 

mandated fleet mix study conducted by the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) 

concluded that it is not cost effective to replace C–5As with C–17s. Their analyses 

accounted for the full life-cycle costs, and the operational readiness and cargo capacity of both aircraft. That said, retiring C–5As would save DOD approximately $9 

million per aircraft per year in annual flying hour cost. 

19. Senator MCCASKILL. Director Fox, if the full fleet of C–5As were retired and 

the Air Force wished to maintain the same total lift capability as it has now, how 

many additional C–17s would be required taking into account operational readiness 

and cargo capacity of both aircraft? 

Director FOX. DOD currently has more airlift than it needs, and thus there is no 

reason to replace the 32 aircraft the Air Force currently plans to retire. Retiring 

32 of the 59 C–5As leaves DOD with enough airlift capacity to meet the peak demand of the most stressing set of scenarios examined in the Mobility Capabilities 

and Requirements Study (MCRS–16). That said, when considering operational readiness and cargo capacity, it would take 22 C–17s to replace the remaining 27

C–5As. 

20. Senator MCCASKILL. Director Fox, what would it cost to secure this capability 

taking into account the lower cost per flight hour rates for the C–17, reduced maintenance costs for the C–17, and reduced manpower costs for the C–17? 

Director FOX. Taking into account operational readiness and cargo capacity, it 

takes 22 C–17s to replace the capability of 27 C–5As at an upfront cost of about 

$6 billion in procurement. This could save approximately $160 million per year in 

operations. It is worth noting that the 2009 congressionally mandated fleet mix 

study conducted by the IDA concluded that it is not cost effective to replace C–5As 

with C–17s. They based their conclusion on analyses of full life-cycle costs, and they 

accounted for the operational readiness and cargo capacity of both aircraft. Their 

conclusion was that if DOD needs the capacity, it is more cost effective to maintain 

some C–5As versus buying additional C–17s. 

21. Senator MCCASKILL. Director Fox, can you retire all C–5As and still meet your 

war-time mobility requirements? 

Director FOX. Retiring all the C–5As would result in a fleet capacity capable of 

meeting the demands of two of the three strategic cases assessed in the MCRS. The 

demands of the most stressing and least likely strategic case involving two large 

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overlapping land campaigns would not be met at 100 percent and the associated risk 

would have to be assessed. 

22. Senator MCCASKILL. Director Fox, would the purchase of C–17 to replace the 

C–5As reduce the requirement to recapitalize the C–130 fleet? 

Director FOX. No. While C–17s can support many intra-theater missions, the C– 

130Js are far more efficient in that role. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SAXBY CHAMBLISS

CIVIL RESERVE AIR FLEET

23. Senator CHAMBLISS. Director Fox, in your statement you comment: ‘‘When not 

operating at full war-time capability, Guard and Reserve Forces are not mobilized, 

and Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) aircraft are not activated. This is why DOD 

sometimes relies on commercial/foreign source airlift like the Russian-built IL–76 

and AN–124 to support current operations. Accommodating a short-term surge with 

use of commercial assets is more cost-effective than maintaining additional force 

structure that is not required full time.’’ If that is true, could a limited activation 

of the CRAF accomplish the same objective? 

Director FOX. Generally speaking a limited activation of CRAF would not be able 

to accomplish the same objective. The IL–76 and AN–124 are typically used to move 

large cargo, like MRAP vehicles. This type of cargo is ill-suited for most CRAF aircraft, which are normally used to move personnel and bulk cargo. It’s important to 

keep in mind that DOD accesses the Russian-built aircraft by providing peacetime 

cargo business to DOD’s CRAF partners. They in turn determine how best to support the requirement. In the past, the AN–124s were provided via a subcontract to 

one of our CRAF members. 

24. Senator CHAMBLISS. General McNabb and General Johns, section 137 of the 

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 requires the Air Force, before retiring any C–5 aircraft from the active inventory, to provide a report to Congress several items including ‘‘an assessment of the costs, benefits, and implications 

of transferring C–5 aircraft to U.S. flag carriers operating in the CRAF program or 

to coalition partners in lieu of the retirement of such aircraft.’’ Please explain what, 

if any, actions the Air Force has taken regarding this assessment. 

General MCNABB. TRANSCOM does not oppose the transfer of C–5A aircraft to 

CRAF program carriers or to our coalition partners. Based on current policy however, the C–5A is catalogued on the U.S. Munitions List as a ‘‘category C’’ aircraft. 

That policy requires the removal or destruction of certain components before transferring ownership. In this case the list of components includes the wing spars, fuselage, and tail assembly making the aircraft inoperable. If the policy were altered 

to allow the transfer, commercial carriers would then have to determine if refurbishment required to meet Federal Aviation Administration standards were fiscally viable for operations. 

The transfer of the C–5A to coalition partners would not fall under the same policy. As with the acquisition of C–17s and other military aircraft, it would be possible 

for our coalition partners to acquire and operate the C–5A. 

General JOHNS. The Air Force delivered the requested report, ‘‘Report on Retirements of C–5A Aircraft’’ to the four congressional defense committees in October, 

2010. That report concluded that the benefits of transferring C–5A aircraft to CRAF 

are limited, primarily because a transfer of these aircraft to the commercial fleet 

would create an increase in capacity that isn’t required, i.e. the excess capacity 

would merely be traded from one fleet to another. There is also a high cost to transfer the aircraft to commercial carriers due to required demilitarization. 

RUSSIAN AND UKRAINIAN AIRCRAFT

25. Senator CHAMBLISS. Director Fox, it has been estimated that between 2005 

and 2009, DOD spent $1.7 billion contracting airlift from the Russians and Ukrainians. Are Russian and Ukrainian aircraft available world-wide or just in limited locations? 

Director FOX. DOD provides peacetime cargo business to our CRAF members as 

an incentive for their voluntary participation in the CRAF program. They in turn 

leverage the capability of foreign carriers (i.e. Russian and Ukrainian aircraft) to 

move our peacetime cargo at less cost to the taxpayer than using our organic fleet. 

Additionally, this helps preserve our fleet for its wartime mission. Finally, DOD 

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only uses these foreign aircraft where they are accepted, and we do not rely on their 

capability to meet our wartime surge demand. 

26. Senator CHAMBLISS. Director Fox, General McNabb, and General Johns, how 

does the United States account for the fact that, based on the specific requirement 

the Russians and Ukrainians are asked to support, they might decline to do so, 

similar to how some countries where we have troops or assets stationed have denied 

over-flight rights or denied our request to use those troops or assets for certain purposes? 

Director FOX. DOD leverages the capability of Russian and Ukrainian aircraft because it is often less expensive than using our organic fleet and it helps preserve 

our fleet so that we can meet wartime demands when called upon to do so. We do 

not rely on the capability of the Russian and Ukrainian aircraft to meet our wartime surge demand. 

General MCNABB. Russia continues to be a strong partner in support of Operation 

Enduring Freedom (OEF), including the recent approval of Polar Overflight. Our 

transit agreement with the Russians has been instrumental moving passengers into 

Afghanistan. Approximately 60 percent of troops deploying and redeploying in support of OEF transit over Russia’s airspace. Over 1,300 flights have transited Russia 

ferrying 211,000 soldiers. In the unlikely event Russia or Ukraine change their 

stance, TRANSCOM would seek to maximize routing through Georgia, Azerbaijan, 

and Pakistan. The flexibility of the Northern Air Lines of Communication provides 

TRANSCOM with several options. 

The Northern Distribution Network provides strategic surface flexibility, metering 

cargo between the Pakistan ground routes and European/Russian/Caucasus routes. 

Loss of Russian access would have a large impact on this northern route system, 

with 79 percent of northern cargo passing through Russia in July 2011. Additionally, losing Russian access would essentially cut off supply lines from ports in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. The load would be carried by ground lines in Pakistan, 

Georgia, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Turkey, and Kyrgyzstan, but with 

slightly less volume due to host nation infrastructure limitations. We could also increase the amount we bring in by air, especially through multimodal operations. 

General JOHNS. We are fully capable of meeting our national objectives without 

relying on Russian and Ukrainian assets air mobility assets to meet our national 

objectives. Studies like the MCRS–16 define requirements we will meet with U.S. 

military organic lift (like C5s, C–17s, and C–130s) combined with partnerships from 

carriers in the CRAF. A prerequisite of membership in the CRAF is being a U.S. 

flagged carrier; no foreign flagged carriers are CRAF partners. Beyond our combatant commander requirements and where contractual law permits, DOD can and 

does contract for commercial business with foreign flagged carriers. In some cases, 

such an arrangement results in lower costs to the taxpayer. In other cases, we use 

foreign contracts to access locations where a U.S.-Flag presence may be politically 

unwise or diplomatically difficult. U.S. troops or assets stationed in harm’s way can 

always depend on support from U.S-Flag carriers whether they be military or commercial when needed. 

MOBILITY CAPABILITIES AND REQUIREMENTS STUDY

27. Senator CHAMBLISS. Director Fox, General McNabb, and General Johns, in 

2008, the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) conducted a Strategic Airlift Review 

and concluded that the then current program of record was the most cost-effective 

and there was no need for additional C–17s. The Joint Requirements Oversight 

Council (JROC) also established a requirement for 33.95 million ton-miles (MTM) 

organic capability and stated that any reduction in strategic airlift capability would 

increase risk to unacceptable levels and jeopardize DOD’s ability to adequately support the combatant commands (COCOM). 

In 2008, OSD also certified the need for 316 strategic airlifters. In 2009, a congressionally directed airlift review conducted by the Institute for Defense Analyses 

concluded that the current program of record (316 aircraft) met all requirements 

and that retiring C–5As to buy/operate additional C–17s was not cost effective. Air 

Force leadership also testified to Congress that 316 strategic airlift aircraft was ‘‘the 

sweet spot.’’ 

In 2009, the MCRS established a new 32.7 MTM worst case requirement which 

was lower than previous studies in recent years. The Air Force’s desire to retire 30+ 

C–5As which could drive the strategic airlift fleet below 300 aircraft is based on this 

most recent study. 

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Over the last 3 to 4 years, DOD and the Air Force have changed their positions 

several times on what the strategic airlift requirement is. How do you compare the 

results of these studies and which study is most correct? 

Director FOX. Over the last decade, DOD has consistently maintained that an organic strategic airlift fleet of about 300 aircraft is required to support the strategy 

with acceptable risk. The small changes in the numbers of aircraft (i.e., 292 vs. 316 

vs. 301), and the required fleet capacity, expressed in MTM/D (i.e., 33.95 vs. 32.7 

MTM/D) result from changes in the National Military Strategy (NMS), changes in 

force structure, and changes in the capabilities of the airlift fleet. The most recent 

mobility study, MCRS–16 assessed three different strategic cases and determined 

that the airlift capacity needed to support the strategy ranged from 29.1 to 32.7 

MTM/D. This can be met with a fleet of 264 to 300 aircraft. One of the reasons we 

no longer view 316 aircraft as ‘‘the sweet spot’’ is because that number was based 

on a greater proportion of the fleet consisting of C–5As. Because the C–17 is more 

capable than the C–5A and because Congress added 43 C–17s over DOD’s program, 

DOD doesn’t need to retain as many C–5As to meet its fleet capacity requirements. 

General MCNABB. The Mobility Capability Study (MCS) of 2005 determined that 

the 2005 programmed force mix of 180 C–17s and 112 C–5s (all intended to be reliability enhanced and reengined; RERP-ed) was sufficient to meet organic strategic 

airlift requirements. The MCS did not establish a specific MTM/D requirement. Subsequent to MCS, as a result of the Nunn-McCurdy breach in the C–5 RERP, the 

Air Force limited the C–5 RERP program to 52 C–5Bs and continued with plans 

to acquire 205 C–17s to meet requirements. As part of the Nunn-McCurdy process, 

the JROC validated an organic strategic airlift requirement of 33.95 MTM/D. The 

JROC validated this requirement based on the fleet mix used in MCS and pending 

the results of the MCRS–16. DOD subsequently determined that 316 tails (111 C– 

5s and 205 C–17s) best met the interim requirement of 33.95 MTM/D of organic capacity. 

The MCRS–16, released in 2010, determined a specific organic airlift requirement 

of 32.7 MTM/D based on updated scenarios approved by the Deputy Secretary of Defense (DEPSECDEF). MCRS–16 examined various C–17/C–5 force mixes able to 

meet the new 32.7 MTM/D requirement, and determined that a mix totaling about 

300 tails fulfills the requirement. Although the MCS fleet mix in the 2005 study 

was sufficient to meet organic strategic lift requirements, MCRS–16 provided a 

much more specific and reliable airlift requirement, based on high-fidelity, 

DEPSECDEF-approved scenarios. Bottom line: I don’t see anything on the horizon 

that will substantially alter MCRS–16 results. 

General JOHNS. Your recount of history is accurate and we know that the current 

demand signal for 32.7 MTM/D of strategic organic airlift capacity from MCRS–16 

can be met with approximately 300 aircraft. Our program of record for 222 C–17s, 

52 C–5Ms, and 27 C–5As assures we can address the most demanding validated 

needs of the Nation with this force structure. All previous DOD-level studies you 

reference were ‘‘correct’’; the MCRS–16 is the most ‘‘current’’ and serves as the foundation for a requirements demand signal extending to fiscal year 2016. History has 

shown a need to update such studies every quadrennial review cycle and we respond 

to those validated and reviewed changes each time we submit a new Program Objective Memorandum. 

28. Senator CHAMBLISS. Director Fox, General McNabb, and General Johns, how 

do we know that you have it right this time and that we are not incurring unacceptable or unnecessary risks? 

Director FOX. Over the last decade, DOD has consistently maintained that an organic strategic airlift fleet of about 300 aircraft is required to support the strategy 

with acceptable risk. The minor variations in the numbers of aircraft (i.e., 292 vs. 

316 vs. 301), and the required fleet capacity, expressed in MTM/D (i.e., 33.95 vs. 

32.7 MTM/D) result from changes in the NMS, changes in force structure, and 

changes in the capabilities of the airlift fleet. The most recent mobility study, 

MCRS–16, assessed three possible strategic cases and determined that the airlift capacity needed to support the strategy ranged from 29.1 to 32.7 MTM/D. This can 

be met with a fleet of 264 to 300 aircraft. The high end number of 300 aircraft is 

very conservative as it represents the fleet required to support two overlapping 

major campaigns concurrent with three nearly simultaneous Homeland defense consequence management events, plus support to ongoing steady-state operations, to include OEF. 

General MCNABB. The MCRS–16 is the most comprehensive study done to date. 

TRANSCOM and OSD led the effort and the study enjoyed the contributions of all 

the Services, COCOMs, and the Joint Staff. MCRS–16 addressed three demanding 

cases to integrate overlapping campaign-level warfights with concurrent protection 

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of the Homeland, support to small scale security postures around the globe, and 

maintain a preparedness to respond to critical alert requirements. The completeness 

of the study and the collaboration among all key participants gives us great confidence that we are not incurring unacceptable or unnecessary risks. 

General JOHNS. The MCRS–16 is the most current assessment of the need for mobility assets based on 2 years of studying three demanding cases involving the integration of scenarios to simultaneously protect the Homeland, posture our Nation to 

respond to events around the globe, and be prepared to address significant overlapping combatant campaigns in response to threats to our national interests. These 

DOD validated scenario sets are continuously being reviewed and updated to assure 

we can respond to world events and address conflicts with acceptable levels of risk. 

Each year we submit our programming actions based upon the most current family 

of scenario sets and demands approved by DOD. 

29. Senator CHAMBLISS. Director Fox, did the MCRS–16 account for the possibility 

of future losses—combat or otherwise—in the strategic airlift fleet? If not, why not? 

Director FOX. Unlike combat aircraft and bombers, DOD does not program an attrition reserve for mobility aircraft. DOD does program (and the MCRS accounted 

for) BAI at approximately 10 percent of the fleet size. 

30. Senator CHAMBLISS. Director Fox, did the MCRS account for already planned 

heavy depot modifications and upgrades to both C–17s and C–5s that will continue 

through 2016, and how these modifications and upgrades will affect the aircraft’s 

availability? If not, why not? 

Director FOX. The study accounted for depot rates consistent with all programmed 

modifications. 

31. Senator CHAMBLISS. Director Fox, did the MCRS analysis include or exclude 

training assets? 

Director FOX. MCRS included training assets. During the steady state portion of 

the analysis, the demand included full training operations consistent with the training demands witnessed over the past 7 years. When operating under surge conditions, as would be the case if engaged in two overlapping warfights, DOD plans to 

curtail routine training while sustaining the primary training pipeline. The fleet capacity of 32.7 MTM/D required to meet peak demands of overlapping warfights includes a 50 percent reduction in training aircraft for the 45-day surge period. 

AIR FORCE C–5Ms 

32. Senator CHAMBLISS. General McNabb and General Johns, as I understand, the 

Air Force currently has five C–5Ms in operational service. Please provide a summary of how well the C–5Ms are performing operationally. 

General MCNABB and General JOHNS. The C–5M has demonstrated its superior 

capability as early as Operational Test and Evaluation where a small fleet of aircraft were employed to provide direct delivery of heavy outsized cargo to U.S. Central Command’s (CENTCOM) front door. The C–5M was able to overfly the en route 

gas stops where any other AMC airlifter would have to land for fuel. These 23 hour 

roundtrip missions delivered approximately 120,000 pounds of cargo on each mission from Dover AFB, DE, to Turkey and Iraq, dramatically increasing mission velocity and reliability. Approximately 36 missions were completed by 3 aircraft and 

6 crews in only 35 days. 

In February, Dover AFB, DE, brought together an all-star team of 8 aircrews and 

28 maintainers, composed of Active and Reserve airmen, and deployed 2 C–5Ms and 

2 C–5Bs in support of an intermodal movement of 2 Combat Aviation Brigades 

(CAB) of the 101st Airborne Division. In only 31 days, Team Dover successfully delivered 172 helicopters plus personnel and support equipment totaling over 6 million 

pounds. The C–5M outpaced the C–5B by consuming approximately 20 percent less 

fuel, moving 59 percent of the cargo, and increased mission effectiveness and velocity by overflying intermediate gas stops required by the C–5B (while carrying heavier cargo loads in and out of the theater). The C–5M maintained a phenomenal 87 

percent logistics departure reliability rate. 

In June, a C–5M from Dover AFB was tasked to complete the first direct, nonstop mission from Dover AFB, DE, to Bagram, Afghanistan. This was the first flight 

of its kind which involved flying over Canada towards the Arctic Circle, then down 

through Russia and into Afghanistan. This history-making flight was made possible 

by the improved reliability and capability of the C–5M. The flight took over 15 

hours to complete. The success of this mission laid the ground-work for future polar 

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over-flight operations from the United States directly delivering high priority outsized cargo into the area of responsibility (AOR). 

33. Senator CHAMBLISS. General McNabb and General Johns, is the Air Force satisfied with the C–5M? 

General MCNABB and General JOHNS. Yes, the C–5M’s performance is exceeding 

our expectations. Five C–5Ms have been delivered to the Air Force; however, over 

the past 18 months we have had three or less C–5Ms which are available to fly missions in support of our customers. The other C–5Ms have been receiving modifications such as large aircraft infrared countermeasures (LAIRCM), programmed depot 

maintenance, or have been supporting follow-on reliability enhancement reengining 

program (RERP) development testing. With a possessed fleet size of three or less, 

a peacetime Mission Capable Rate does not provide a meaningful measure of the 

current and future performance of the C–5M. To date we assess the performance 

of the C–5M as exceeding our expectations. The propulsion system which is over 70 

percent of the modification is proving very reliable and provides the C–5M much 

higher climb, payload, range, and exceptional noise abatement performance over the 

legacy C–5. Consequently, a C–5M uses less mobility assets and 10 to 20 percent 

less fuel to accomplish the same mission than a legacy C–5. On several occasions, 

we have tasked C–5Ms to perform their wartime representative surges and their 

wartime mission capable rate has exceeded 75 percent with maintenance departure 

reliability rates exceeding 85 percent. The C–5M is lauded by both aircrew and 

maintainers as being an outstanding platform. Aircrews praise the climb, payload, 

range, diagnostics system, and upgraded flight station equipment and displays. 

Maintainers now deal less with the legacy issues that were upgraded by the RERP 

conversion and maintainability has become much more user friendly thanks to improvements in diagnostics system and maintenance manuals. The C–5M maintenance repair time and mission essential equipment fix rates are much better than 

the standards established by the C–5 RERP Capabilities Requirement Document. 

34. Senator CHAMBLISS. General McNabb and General Johns, one of those C–5Ms 

was previously a C–5A. How is that aircraft performing relative the other C–5Ms? 

General MCNABB and General JOHNS. There is minimal difference between A and 

B model C–5s. The C–5Ms are still a relatively small fleet and we do not have 

enough data to determine how the ‘‘A-model’’ conversion is performing relative to 

the other C–5Ms. 

C–5 RELIABILITY ENHANCEMENT AND RE-ENGINING PROGRAM

35. Senator CHAMBLISS. General McNabb and General Johns, as reported in the 

2008 C–5 Capabilities Production Document signed by then Chief of Staff of the Air 

Force General Moseley, the Air Force conducted a cost/benefit analyses of the C– 

5 RERP effort and concluded that modernizing 52 C–5s to the C–5 RERP configuration results in an $8.9 billion reduction in total ownership costs after paying for all 

development and production through 2040. This suggests that the current 52 aircraft C–5 RERP not only pays for itself, but generates sufficient net savings that 

would also pay to RERP the entire C–5A fleet if the Air Force chose to modernize 

them as well. Is this your understanding as well and are these estimates still accurate? 

General MCNABB and General JOHNS. The reduced total ownership cost (RTOC) 

estimate will be at least $8.9 billion (BY00). However, the RTOC for the RERP 

modification of 52 C–5s will not be realized until after 2025 which is late to funding 

modification of C–5As, i.e., fiscal years 2014 to 2019. The estimated cost to RERP 

27 C–5As is in excess of $3 billion. The Air Force does not need to RERP additional 

C–5As to meet known strategic airlift requirements. Currently the Air Force plans 

to use savings from RERP to pay for future budget reductions. 

36. Senator CHAMBLISS. General McNabb and General Johns, the MCRS assumes 

full Guard/Reserve mobilization to meet national requirements. Once that happens, 

all assets are brought to bear to meet strategic airlift requirements. However, in 

peacetime that is not the situation. I have heard that AMC has challenges day-today meeting peacetime requirements. Please comment on what effect your desire to 

retire up to 32 C–5s will have on your ability to perform your peacetime mission? 

General MCNABB. Bottom Line—there is sufficient capacity for peacetime operations. While supporting both the troop withdrawal from Iraq and the surge in Afghanistan, the busiest day for TRANSCOM’s component, AMC, was 16.6 MTM/D. 

So far in 2011, it has been 15.9 MTM/D, highlighted by our ability to support operVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:23 Jan 11, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00133 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\68085.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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ations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya, while responding to the disasters in Japan, 

where we were able to deliver over 3,600 tons of supplies and evacuate over 7,500 

dependents. I am confident we have enough organic surge capacity and commercial 

partner augmentation to satisfy the anticipated workload based upon our recent 

years’ experience. 

General JOHNS. The Air Force’s need to retire 32 C–5s, excess to the maximum 

demand of 32.7 MTM/D, will not result in an adverse impact to our day-to-day 

peacetime operation. Today, in the midst of the lower access to C–5 aircraft because 

of the avionic modernization program (AMP) and RERP modification lines, we have 

still been able to balance our C–17 and C–5 fleets to meet current airlift requirements. Our challenge has been to keep the C–5s moving in the system. The reliability rates we’ve been experiencing have reduced our capacity to move as much 

airlift as we might like with the C–5. With the 52 C–5M tails presently programmed, we forecast an increase to C–5 airlift capacity. This increase comes from 

an increased aircraft reliability or mission capable rate of 54 percent with our legacy 

fleet to 75 percent for our RERP’d fleet and increased C–5M range and tonnage capability over the C–5A/B. 

AN–124 AUGMENTATION

37. Senator CHAMBLISS. General McNabb and General Johns, will we see 

TRANSCOM continuing or increasing reliance on foreign AN–124 augmentation to 

get their job done? 

General MCNABB. We will continue to take advantage of AN–124 aircraft’s ability 

to carry outsize cargo when they are the lowest cost option, thus allowing us to fly 

our C–5 and C–17 fleets at lower utilization (UTE) rates and preserve their service 

life. AN–124 augmentation will not be at the expense of CRAF carriers and the AN– 

124 capability will be arranged as a subcontract through CRAF carriers. 

General JOHNS. The ability to meet the requirements of U.S. combatant commanders around the globe does not rely upon the use of foreign flagged aircraft like 

the AN–124. Studies like the MCRS–16 come with solutions that rely wholly on U.S. 

flagged capabilities. We will continue to augment our organic capability and our 

partnerships with U.S. flagged carriers in the CRAF with foreign flagged carriers 

to reduce operational/personnel tempo on our troops, to save wear-and-tear on our 

military assets, to reduce costs to American taxpayers, and to facilitate diplomatic 

access to destinations that may be restricted or denied to U.S. carriers. We do not 

rely on foreign augmentation, but we do seek to build partnerships and trust 

throughout the international community where foreign contractual relationships 

make sense to save time, save money, and/or free our people and assets for other 

activities. 

[Whereupon, at 3:46 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.] 

Æ