17-935 

Wu v. Sessions 

BIA 

Christensen, IJ 

A206 690 804

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER

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At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 

for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall 

United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of 

New York, on the 3rd day of May, two thousand eighteen. 

PRESENT: 

RICHARD C. WESLEY,

DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, 

DENNY CHIN,

Circuit Judges. 

_____________________________________ 

ZHENDE WU, AKA WU ZHENDE, 

Petitioner, 

v. 17-935 

 NAC 

JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, 

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

Respondent. 

_____________________________________ 

FOR PETITIONER: Gerald Karikari, Karikari & 

Associates, P.C., New York, NY. 

FOR RESPONDENT: Chad A. Readler, Principal Deputy 
2 

Assistant Attorney General; John S. 

Hogan, Assistant Director; Lindsay 

Corliss, Trial Attorney, Office of 

Immigration Litigation, United 

States Department of Justice, 

Washington, DC. 

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 

Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review 

is DENIED. 

 Petitioner Zhende Wu, a native and citizen of the 

People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a March 9, 2017, 

decision of the BIA affirming a July 20, 2016, decision of an 

Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Wu’s application for asylum, 

withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention 

Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Zhende Wu, No. A206 690 804 

(B.I.A. Mar. 9, 2017), aff’g No. A206 690 804 (Immig. Ct. 

N.Y. City July 20, 2016). We assume the parties’ familiarity 

with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case. 

 Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed 

both the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions “for the sake of 

completeness.” Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Security, 448 

F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006). The applicable standards of 

review are well established. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Xiu 

Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 165-66 (2d Cir. 2008). 
3 

 “Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all 

relevant factors, a trier of fact may base a credibility 

determination on . . . the consistency between the applicant’s 

or witness’s written and oral statements . . . , the internal 

consistency of each such statement, [and] the consistency of 

such statements with other evidence of record . . . without 

regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood 

goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim.” 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 163 & n.2. 

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that 

Wu was not credible as to his claim that he attended church 

in China, that Chinese officials detained and harmed him on 

account of his distribution of religious pamphlets, and that 

he continues to practice Christianity in the United States. 

Certified Administrative Record (“CAR”) at 35–36. 

 The agency reasonably determined that there were 

inconsistencies between Wu’s statements in his asylum 

application, at a credible fear interview, and at his hearing 

before the IJ, regarding how often he attended church in China 

and how he was treated when he was detained in China. See

8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); see Ming Zhang v. Holder, 585 

F.3d 715, 724-25 (2d Cir. 2009) (finding record of credible 
4 

fear interview reliable when interview was conducted with 

interpreter and record is typewritten, demonstrates that 

applicant understood the questions, and includes questions 

about past harm or fear of future harm). Wu did not provide 

compelling explanations for these inconsistencies. See 

Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A 

petitioner must do more than offer a plausible explanation 

for his inconsistent statements to secure relief; he must 

demonstrate that a reasonable fact-finder would be compelled

to credit his testimony.” (internal quotation marks 

omitted)). 

 The agency also reasonably found discrepancies in Wu’s 

accounts of why he began practicing Christianity. In his 

initial statements, he claimed that his friend converted him 

to Christianity at a time when his wife was in hiding from 

family planning officials, family planning officials were 

harassing him, and he had closed his business due to debt. 

However, he later testified that his wife was six or seven 

months pregnant and present at their house when his friend 

converted him to Christianity. When asked why she was no 

longer hiding at that time, Wu testified that they had paid 

a fine to resolve their problems with family planning 
5 

officials. When confronted with his discrepant statements 

regarding why he converted to Christianity, Wu testified that 

he was primarily focused on his Christianity claim and thus 

did not previously mention their payment of the family 

planning fine. The agency was not compelled to credit this 

explanation because Wu claimed that his problems with family 

planning officials led him to practice Christianity. See id.

at 81. 

 The agency also reasonably relied on inconsistencies 

between Wu’s testimony that he was detained in China after 

three police officers approached him when he was distributing 

religious pamphlets with two friends, and his friend’s 

statement that only one officer approached them. See 

8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). When confronted with this 

inconsistency, Wu changed his testimony to conform with his 

friend’s statement, stating that one officer approached them 

but three officers chased them. Wu now argues that his 

friend’s statement was mistranslated, and actually states 

that three police officers approached them. This explanation 

compounds the inconsistency given that Wu initially changed 

his testimony to match his friend’s statement. See Majidi, 

430 F.3d at 80. 
6 

 Finally, although minor, the agency reasonably noted that 

a letter from Wu’s church stated that he was baptized on 

February 7, 2015, but the baptism certificate states that he 

was baptized on the same date in 2016. See Diallo v. INS, 

232 F.3d 279, 287-88 (2d Cir. 2000) (recognizing that minor 

discrepancies in dates need not be fatal to an applicant’s 

credibility); Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167 (“[A]n IJ may rely 

on any inconsistency or omission in making an adverse 

credibility determination as long as the ‘totality of the 

circumstances’ establishes that an asylum applicant is not 

credible.” (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii))). 

Given these inconsistencies, as well as the IJ’s 

consideration of “the totality of circumstances, including 

[Wu’s] demeanor while testifying, his responsiveness to the 

questions that were asked, [and] the inherent plausibility of 

his claim,” CAR at 4, the agency’s adverse credibility 

determination is supported by substantial evidence, 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167. Contrary 

to Wu’s contention, that determination is dispositive of 

asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief because the IJ 

explicitly concluded that Wu was not credible as to all 

aspects of his claim, including his assertion that he is a 
7 

practicing Christian. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 

156-57 (2d Cir. 2006).* 

 For the foregoing reasons, Wu’s petition for review is 

DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal 

that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, 

and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition 

is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument 

in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of 

Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 

34.1(b). 

 FOR THE COURT: 

 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

 

* Although the BIA and Government concluded that Wu waived 

his CAT claim, Wu’s challenge to the adverse credibility 

determination necessarily included a challenge to the IJ’s 

denial of CAT relief because the IJ denied all relief on 

credibility grounds.