20- 3909- cv

Fed. Repub l i c of

N igeri a v. V

R Advi sory Servs., Lt d.

UNITE D STATE S COURT OF APPE AL S F O R T H E S E C O N D C I R C U I T August Term, 2021 Argued: December 7, 2021 Deci ded: February 3, 2022

Amended: February 24, 2022 Docket No. 20-3909-cv

T H E F E D E R A L R E P U B L I C O F N I G E R I A , A B U B A K A R M A L A M I, The Attorney General of the Federal Republ i c of Ni geri a, Applicants-Appellants,

— v. — VR A D V I S O RY S E R V I C E S, L T D ., VR A D V I S O R Y S E R V I C E S (USA) LLC , VR C A P I T A L G R O U P , L T D ., VR G L O B A L O N S H O R E F U N D , L.P., VR A R G E N T I N A R E C O V E R Y O N S H O R E F U N D I I, L.P., R I C H A R D D I E T Z , J E F F R E Y J O H N S O N , A S H O K RA J U , Respondents-Appellees

.

B e f o r e: L Y N C H , C A R N E Y, a nd S U L L I V A N , Circuit Judges

.Appl i cants-Appel l ants the Federal Republ i c of Ni geri a and i ts Attorney

General (together, “Ni geri a”), appeal an order of the Uni ted States Di stri ct C ourt for the Southern Di stri ct of New York (Engel mayer, J .) vacati ng i ts earl i er grant of Ni geri a’s appl i cati on for di scovery from Respondents-Appel l ees pursuant to 28 U.S.C

. § 1782

. The di stri ct court consi dered Ni geri a’s use of § 1782 an i mproper attempt to “ci rcumvent” the procedures set out i n the Treaty Between the Government of the Uni ted States of Ameri ca and the Federal Republ i c of Ni geri a on Mutual LegalAssi stance i n C ri minalMatters, U.S.-Ni geri a, Sept. 13, 1989, T.I.A.S. No. 03-114.1 (“the MLAT”), for obtai ni ng assi stance from the Uni ted States Department of Justi c e i n gatheri ng evi dence for use i n cri minal matters. The di stri ct court’s rul i ng was based on an error of l aw. Nothi ng i n the MLAT, § 1782, or any source of Uni ted States pol i cyi denti fi ed by the di stri ct court requi res Ni geri a to uti l i ze the MLAT before or i nstead of § 1782. Accordi ngl y, we VAC ATE the judgment of the di stri c t court and REMAND for further consi derati on of the appl i cati on.

A L E X A N D E R D. P E N C U , Mei ster Seel i g & Fei n LLP, New York, NY (C hri stopher J. Major and Austi n D. Ki m, on the brief ), for Applicants-Appellants. Z A C H A R Y D. R O S E N B A U M , Kobre & Ki mLLP, New York, NY (Mi chael S. Ki m, Josef M. Kl azen, and Darryl G. Stei n, on the brief ), f or Respondents-Appellees.

G E R A R D E. L Y N C H , C ircuit Judge : Appl i cants-Appel l ants the Federal Republ i c of Ni geri a and i ts Attorney General, Abubakar Mal ami(together, “Ni geri a”), appeal from a November 6, 2020 order of the Uni ted States Di stri ct C ourt for the Southern Di stri ct of New

2York (PaulA. Engel mayer, J. ) vacati ng i ts earl i er ex partegrant of Ni geri a’s

appl i cati o n to compel di scovery pursuant to 28 U.S.C . § 1782 from RespondentsAppel l ees VR Advi sory Servi ces, Ltd. and rel ated enti ti es and offi c ers (together, “VR”). Secti o n 1782 permi ts a di stri ct court, “pursuant to a l etter rogatory i ssued, or request made, by a forei gn or i nternati onaltribunalor upon the appl i cati on of any i nterested person,” to compel di scovery from a person wi thi n i ts juri sdi cti on “for use i n a proceedi ng in a forei gn or i nternati onaltribunal, i ncl udi ng cri minal i nvesti gati ons conducted before formal accusati on.” Ni geri a sought di scovery from VR for use i n cri minalproceedi ngs i n Ni geri a rel ated to the al l egedl y fraudul ent procurement of a publ i c-uti l i ty contract. The di stri ct court i ni ti al l y granted the appl i cati on but l a ter vacated that order, pri nci pal l y because i t hel d that Ni geri a’s appl i cati on consti tuted an attempt to “ci rcumvent” procedures l ai d out in the Treaty Between the Government of the Uni ted States of Ameri ca and the Federal Republ i c of Ni geri a on MutualLegalAssi stance i n C ri minalMatters, U.S.-Ni geri a, Sept. 13, 1989, T.I.A.S. No. 03-114.1 (“the Uni t ed States-Ni geri a MLAT” or “the MLAT”), under whi ch Ni g eri a coul d have sought assi stance from the Uni ted States Department of Justi ce.

3We hol d that the di stri ct court’s deci si on was based on an error of l aw, and

thus amounted to an abuse of di screti on, because i teffecti vel y erected an i mpermi ssibl e “extra-statutory barri er[] to di scovery” under § 1782. In re Application of Gianoli Aldunate, 3 F.3d 54, 59 (2d C i r. 1993). The Uni ted StatesNi geri a MLAT by i ts pl ai n terms does not restri ct Ni geri a’s use of other l awful means to access evi dence i n the Uni ted States for use i n cri m i nalmatters. To the contrary, i texpands such access, suppl ementi ng rather than repl aci ng other evi dence-gatheri ng tool s such as § 1782. Ni g eri a therefore does not “ci rcumvent” the MLAT by appl y i ng di rectl y to the di stri c tcourt for di scovery under § 1782. The di stri ct court further erred by concl udi ng that Ni geri a’s potenti al use of the di scovery materi al s sought i n a rel ated proceedi ng chal l engi ng an arbi trati on award before an Engl i sh court woul d be “i mproper” and by consi deri ng such potenti aluse as a negati ve factor i n addressi ng Ni geri a’s § 1782 appl i cati on. We therefore VAC ATE the judgment of the di stri ct court and REMAND for further consi derati on of Ni geri a’s appl i cati on.

4BACKGROUND

I. Factual Background Thi s case grows out of a contract di spute between Ni geri a and Process & Industri alDevel opments, Ltd. (“P&ID”), a company in whi ch VR hol ds a 25- percent ownershi p stake. P&ID was i ncorporated i n the Bri ti sh Vi rgi n Isl ands i n 2006 by Marti n Qui nn, an Iri sh nati o naland former musi c manager engaged i n the Ni g eri a n arms trade, and hi s associ ate Brendan C ahi l l, al so an Iri sh nati onal

. At the ti me of i ts i ncorporati on, P&ID had no assets and a smal lnumber of empl oyees. Neverthel ess, wi thi n a few years, i t convi nced a number of Ni geri an busi nesspersons and government offi ci al s to hel p i t secure a contract to construct a natural -gas processi ng pl ant i n Ni geri a. That contract, the Gas Suppl y and Processi ng Agreement (“GSPA”), was si gned i n January 2010. Under i ts terms, P&ID woul d bui l d a pl ant i n Ni geri a to process unrefi ned “wet gas” suppl i ed by Ni geri a i nto a product sui tabl e for publ i c-uti l i ty use and return much of the refi ned gas to Ni geri a; P&ID woul d be enti tl ed to keep the natural gas l i qui ds stri pped from the wet gas. The GSPA provi ded that l egaldi sputes rel ating to the contract woul d be deci d ed by an

5arbi t rati on panel i n London appl yi ng Ni g eri an l a w. The agreement was to run

for a term of 20 years. For reasons that are i n di spute, the GSPA fel lthrough. Ni geri a al l eges that P&ID procured the GSPA by fraud and bri bery, and never had any i ntenti on or abi l i ty to bui l d a natural -gas pl ant. P&ID has al l eged i n other proceedi ngs, and VR appears to take the posi ti on here, that P&ID secured fundi ng and drew up pl ans for the pl ant, but that Ni geri a breached the GSPA by refusi ng to hel p P&ID secure a source of wet gas. VR, an i nternati onali nvestment fund wi th offi c es i n New York C i ty, acqui red a 25-percent ownershi p i nterest i n P&ID i n 2018. Ni geri a now seeks di scovery pri nci pal l y of documents that VR obtained from P&ID i n the course of that acqui si ti o n. II. Prior Proceedings The di spute over the fai l ed GSPA has spawned a decade of l i ti gati o n spanni ng three conti nents. In addi ti on to proceedi ngs in the Uni ted States, the proceedi ngs most rel evant to the present appeal are an arbi trati on i n Engl and (“the Arbi trati o n”) i n whi ch P&ID secured a mul ti -bi l l i on-dol l ar award agai nst Ni geri a (“the Arbi trati on Award” or “the Award”); P&ID’s attempt to enforce

6that award i n Engl a nd and Ni geri a’s attempt to have the Engl i sh court set the

Award asi de (“the Engl i sh Proceedi ng”); and cri minali nvesti gati ons and prosecuti ons i n Ni geri a rel ated to the GSPA and the Arbi trati on Award (“the Ni geri an Proceedi ngs”). A. The Arbitration P&ID ini ti ated an arbi t rati on i n London i n August 2012, al l egi ng that Ni geri a had repudi ated the GSPA by fai l i ng to make avai l abl e wet gas as requi red by i ts terms, and seeki ng $5,960,226,233 pl us i nterest i n damages for l ost profi ts. The arbi t raltribunalhel d a l i abi l i ty heari ng on June 1, 2015, by whi ch ti m e Qui nn had di ed and was thus unavai l abl e to testi fy i n person. At that heari ng, P&ID rel i ed heavi l y on 34 pages of wri tten testi mony from Quinn, i n whi ch he asserted that P&ID spent years and tens of mi l l i o ns of dol l ars on preparatory work for the pl ant, such as drawi ng up pl ans and securi ng the necessary permi ts, onl yto have Ni geri a cut off communi cati ons and refuse to hel p secure a source of wet gas as req ui red by the GSPA. Ni geri a cal l ed no wi tnesses and presented onl y a si ngl e wi tness statement, whi ch the tribunal determi ned contai ned “no rel evant evi dence”; Ni g eri a woul d l ater al l ege that i ts arbi t rati on counsel, Ol asupo Shasore, had a confl i ct of i nterest and worked to

7undermi ne rather than advance Ni geri a’s defense. On Jul y 17, 2015, the tribunal

found Ni geri a l i abl e for breachi ng the GSPA by repudi a ti on. On January 31, 2017, the tribunal awarded P&ID $6.6 bi l l i on i n damages for 20 years of l o st profi ts, pl us seven percent i nterest. B. The E n glish Proceeding On March 16, 2018, P&ID appl i ed to the Hi gh C ourt of Justi ce, Queen’s Bench Di vi si o n, C ommerci alC ourt i n London (“the Engl i sh C ourt”) for l eave to enforce the Arbi trati on Award i n the Uni ted Kingdom. The court granted P&ID l eave to enforce the Award on September 26, 2019. Soon thereafter, Ni geri a sought to chal l enge the Arbi trati on Award. On December 5, 2019, Ni geri a appl i ed to the Engl i sh C ourt for an extensi o n of ti me to chal l enge the Award, al l egi ng that i t had uncovered evi dence of fraud both i n the i nducement of the GSPA and i n the procurement of the Award. On September 4, 2020, the Engl i sh C ourt granted Ni geri a’s appl i cati on for an extensi on of ti me to chal l enge the Award, hol di ng – wi thout making any defi ni ti v e factualfi ndi ngs – that “Ni geri aha[d] establ i shed a strong pri ma faci e case that the GSPA was procured by bri bes pai d to i nsi ders as part of a l a rger scheme to defraud Ni g eri a” and that Qui nn had perjured hi m sel f i n hi s wri tten

8testi mony, on whi ch the arbi traltribunal had heavi l yrel i ed. J. App’x at 366. The

Engl i sh C ourt has schedul ed a tri alon Ni geri a’s fraud cl ai ms for January 2023. C. The Nigerian Proceedings Ni geri an authori ti es began i nvesti gating P&ID and i ts procurement of the GSPA in February 2016. In 2019, after the Engl i sh C ourt granted P&ID’s appl i cati o n to enforce the Arbi trati on Award, Ni geri ai ni ti ated a seri es of cri minalprosecuti ons agai nst P&ID and i ts affi l i ates. P&ID and P&ID Ni geri a pl eaded gui l ty to mul ti pl e counts, i ncl udi ng conspi racy to defraud Ni geri a, money l aunderi ng, tax evasi on, and unauthori z ed tradi ng. It i s uncl ear whether any addi ti onal prosecutions remai n pendi ng in Ni g eri a rel ated to the GSPA or the Arbi trati on Award, but Ni g eri a asserts that i t i s acti vel y investigating cri minal wrongdoi ng i n connecti on wi th the Award. D. Prior Proceedings in the United States 1. P&ID’s enforcement action in the District of Columbia In 2018, roughl y contemporaneousl ywi th i ts enforcement acti on i n Engl and, P&ID brought an acti on i n the Uni t ed States Di stri ct C ourt for the Di stri c t of C ol u mbi a to enforce the Arbi trati on Award agai nst Ni geri a i n the Uni ted States. See Process and Industrial Developments Ltd. v. Fed. Republic of

9Nigeria, No. 18-cv-594, 2018 WL 8997443 (D.D.C . Oct. 1, 2018). Ni geri a moved to

di smi ss the acti on for want of subject matter juri sdi cti on, argui ng that the Forei gn Soverei gn Immuni ti es Act (“FSIA”) i mmuni zed i t from even havi ng to bri ef the meri ts of the case. I

d. at *1. The di stri ct court (C hri stopher R. C ooper, J. ) rejected that argument and set a bri efi ng schedul e. Id. at *2-3. The C ourt of Appeal s for the Di stri ct of C ol umbi a C i rcui t reversed and remanded, however, hol di ng that under the FSIA, the di stri ct court coul d not force a forei gn soverei gn to defend a case on the meri ts before rul i ng on a “col orabl e asserti on[] of i mmuni ty.” Process and Industrial Developments Ltd. v. Fed. Republic of Nigeria, 962 F.3d 576, 586 (D.C

. C i r. 2020). On remand, the di stri ct court agai n deni ed Ni geri a’s moti on to di smi ss, hol di ng that Ni geri a had i mpl i ci tl y wai ved i ts soverei gn i mmuni ty by si gni ng the New York C onventi on on the Recogni ti on and Enforcement of Forei gn Arbi tral Awards. Process and Industrial Developments Ltd. v. Fed. Republic of Nigeria, 506 F. Supp. 3d 1, 6-11 (D.D.C

. 2020). Ni geri a’s i nterl ocutory appeal of that order i s now pendi ng before the Di stri c t of C ol umbi aC i rcui t.

102. Nigeria’s first § 1782 application in New York

On March 25, 2020, i n the Uni ted States Di stri ct C ourt for the Southern Di stri c t of New York, Ni geri a appl i ed under § 1782 to obtai n di scovery for use i n the Ni g eri a n Proceedi ngs from ten di fferent banks that had done busi ness wi th P&ID. P&ID intervened i n the matter, but i t di d not oppose the appl i cati on; rather, i t asked the di stri ct court to grant i t access to any evi dence obtai ned pursuant to the appl i cati on and to l i mi tthe use of such evi dence to the Ni geri an Proceedi ngs, suggesti ng that Ni geri a actual l y sought the requested di scovery for use i n the Engl i sh Proceedi ng. In i ts repl y, Ni geri a argued that P&ID l acked standi ng as an “i nterested party” to seek access to the di scovery materi al s, and characteri zed P&ID’s i nsi nuati on that Ni geri a i ntended to use di scovery materi al s in the Engl i sh Proceedi ng as “rank specul ati on”:

P&ID cl ai ms wi thout support that i t i s an “i nterested party” but fai l s to arti cul ate any cogni zabl e i nterest i t has i n the Appl i cati on, or present any reason why i t shoul d be provi ded wi th access to di scovery materi al s produced by Bank Respondents. P&ID ci t es to i ts September 19, 2019 fraud convi cti on i n Ni geri a, but makes no cl ai m that i t has or wi l lchal l enge thi s convi cti o n, or that i t pl ans to use documents produced by Bank Respondents i n connecti on wi th any ongoi ng i nvesti gati on or proceedi ng. Rather, P&ID bel i eves i t i s enti tl ed to di scovery produced i n these l egal

11proceedi ngs based on rank specul ati on that Appl i cants may seek to ci te to documents produced by Bank Respondents “i n other proceedi ngs.” P&ID’s specul ati o n i s i nsuffi ci ent to transform P&ID into an i nterested party. J. App’x at 275 (ci tati on omi tted). Importantly, Ni g eri a di d not assert that i t woul d not use the di scovery materi al s i n the Engl i sh Proceedi ng; i ndeed, i t argued i n the same fi l i ng that i t had every ri ght to use any di scovery the court mi ght order i n other proceedi ngs i f i t so chose. See id. at 276, qu oti ng In re Accent Delight Int’l Ltd. , 869 F.3d 121, 135 (2d C i r. 2017) (“Secti on 1782 does not prevent an appl i cant who l awful l yhas obtai ned di scovery under the statute wi th respect to one forei gn proceedi ng from using the di scovery el sewhere.”). On May 7, 2020, the di stri ct court (Lorna G. Schofi el d, J

. ) granted Ni geri a’s § 1782 appl i cati on. Judge Schofi el d al so granted P&ID’s request to have “reasonabl e access” to materi al s obtai ned pursuant to any subpoenas i ssued, but di d not restri ct Ni geri a’s use of the evi dence i n the Engl i sh Proceedi ng. Order, In re Ex Parte Application of the Fed. Republic of Nigeria, No. 1:20-mc-00169, EC F No. 18, at 4 (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 2020). As i t turns out, Ni geri a di d, i n fact, use evi dence of al l eged bribery i n connecti on wi th the GSPA that i t obtai ned through that fi rst § 1782 appl i cati on to

12make out i ts prima faciecase of fraud i n the Engl i sh Proceedi ng. P&ID wrote to

Judge Schofi el d objecti ng to that use and to Ni geri a’s havi ng al l egedl yobtai ned materi al s outsi de the scope of the court’s order, and i t requested a protecti ve order (1) requi ri ng Ni g eri a to destroy materi al s i t obtai ned that were outsi de the scope of di scovery and (2) prohi bi ting Ni geri a from usi ng the materi al s i t obtai ned through § 1782 di scovery i n the Engl i sh Proceedi ng. Judge Schofi el d never rul ed on the requested protecti ve order. She di d, however, grant a separate request by JPMorgan C hase (one of the produci ng parti es) for a protecti ve order. That order, to whi ch both JPMorgan C hase and Ni geri a sti pul ated, expressl y permi tted Ni geri a to use materi al s that JPMorgan C hase produced “i n proceedi ngs ari si ng out of or i n connecti on wi th the Ni g eri an Proceedi ngs, the GSPA, the Award, or the attempted enforcement, confi rmati o n, vacatur, or other chal l enge of the Award.” Sti pul ated Protecti ve Order, In re Ex Parte Application of the Fed. Republic of Nigeria, No. 1:20-mc-00169, EC F No. 26, at 3 (S.D.N.Y. Jul y 10, 2020). III. The Present § 1782 Application On May 12, 2020, fi ve days after Judge Schofi el d granted Ni geri a’s fi rst § 1782 appl i cati on, Ni geri a fi l ed the present § 1782 appl i cati on, al so in the

13Southern Di stri c t of New York. Thi s ti me, Ni geri a sought di scovery from VR

Advi sory Servi ces, Ltd.; VR Advi sory Servi ces (USA) LLC ; VR C a pi t alGroup, Ltd.; VR Gl obalOnshore Fund, L.P.; VR Argenti na Recovery Onshore Fund II, L.P.; and VR di rectors and offi cers Ri chard Di etz, Jeffrey Johnson, and Ashok Raju, “for use . . . i n forei gn cri minali nvesti gati o ns and cri minaljudi ci al proceedi ngs that are pendi ng i n the Federal Republ i c of Ni geri a .” J. App’x at 12. Judge Engel mayer, to whom thi s second appl i cati o n was assi gned, i ni ti al l y granted Ni geri a’s ex parteappl i cati on and al l owed i t to subpoena the vari ous VR respondents. Ni g eri a then served subpoenas req uesti ng 56 categori es of documents, i ncl udi ng “[a]l ldocuments concerni ng the terms of VR Advi sory’s acqui si ti o n of Process & Industri alDevel opments, or any of i ts assets,” “[a]l l documents and communi cati o ns concerni ng the enforcement of any award granted i n the Arbi trati o n,” and documents pertai ni ng to transacti ons wi th vari o us persons and enti ti es i nvol ved i n the GSPA affai r. J. App’x at 136-42. After those subpoenas were served, VR moved to q uash them, to vacate the order granti ng the appl i cati on, and to stay di scovery. V R argued pri mari l y that by seeki ng di scovery under § 1782, Ni geri a was attempting to ci rcumvent the procedures of i t s MLAT wi th the Uni ted States, whi ch al l ows Ni geri a to enl i st

14the hel p of the Uni ted States Department of Justi ce to gather evi dence for use i n

cri minalproceedi ngs. Ni geri a argued i n response that i t di d not have to use the procedures provi ded by the MLAT before seeki ng di scovery for use i n cri minal matters under § 1782, and that i n any event, “the arbi tral enforcement proceedi ng i n London i s a rel ated and i ndependentl yqual i fyi ng forei gn proceedi ng.” Appl i cant’s Opp’n Mot. Vac., Fed. Republic of Nigeria v. VR Advisory Servs., Ltd. , No. 1:20-mc-00209, EC F No. 25, at 4 (S.D.N.Y. Jul y 10, 2020). Ni g eri a al so argued that VR, as a pri v a te party, l acked standi ng to invoke a treaty between two soverei gns as a basi s for vacati ng the grant of the appl i cati on. On November 6, 2020, the di stri ct court granted VR’s moti o n to quash the subpoenas and vacate the earl i er order granti ng the appl i cati on. The court fol l owed the prescri bed two-step process for eval u ating § 1782 appl i cati o ns: Fi rst, i t consi dered the statutory requi rements for di scovery under § 1782, and second, i t exerci sed i ts di screti on to grant or deny the appl i c a ti on, consi deri ng the four factors that the Supreme C ourt set out i n Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. , 542 U.S. 241 (2004). Begi nning wi th the statutory requ i rements, the di stri c tcourt determi ned that i f Ni geri a had sought di scovery for use i n the Engl i sh Proceedi ng, the

15appl i cati o n “woul d fai l § 1782‘s second statutory requi rement” – that di scovery i s

sought for use i n a proceedi ng before a forei gn or i nternati onal t ribunal– because “[t]he pendi ng Engl i sh arbi tral -enforcement proceedi ng” was of a ”post-judgment character” aki n to proceedi ngs that thi s C ourt has hel d di d not qual i fy under § 1782. Fed. Republic of Nigeria v. VR Advisory Servs., Ltd. , 499 F. Supp. 3d 3, 10 (S.D.N.Y. 2020), ci ting Euromepa, S.A. v. R. Esmerian, Inc. , 154 F.3d 24, 28 (2d C i r. 1998). Neverthel ess, the di stri ct court “assume[d] arguendo” that the appl i cati on sought documents for use i n the Ni geri an Proceedi ngs, whi ch i t determi ned were qual i fyi ng proceedi ngs under § 1782, and hel d that the other statutory requi rements were sati sfi ed. Id. at 11. Proceedi ng to i ts di screti onary bal anci ng of the Intel factors, the court hel d that the fi rst factor, whether “the person from whom di scovery i s sought i s a parti ci pant i n the forei gn proceedi ng,” Intel, 542 U.S. at 264, favored granti ng the appl i cati o n, but “onl y nominal l y . . . because P&ID – whi ch i s i nvol ved i n the Ni geri an cri minalproceedi ng – i s the l i kel y source of documents hel d by [VR] rel evant to that proceedi ng.” Fed. Republic of Nigeria, 499 F. Supp. 3d at 13. It hel d that the second factor, “the nature of the forei gn tribunal, the character of the proceedi ngs underway abroad, and the recepti vi ty of the forei gn government or

16the court or agency abroad to U.S. federal -court judi ci a lassi stance,” Intel, 542

U.S. at 264, favored granti ng the appl i cati o n, because the Ni geri a n government was cl earl y recepti v e to, and i n fact sought, the assi stance i n questi o n, Fed. Republic of Nigeria, 499 F. Supp. 3d at 13. The di stri ct court hel d, however, that the thi rd Intel factor, “whether the § 1782(a) request conceal s an attempt to ci rcumvent forei gn proof-gatheri ng restri cti ons or other pol i ci es of a forei gn country or the Uni ted States,” Intel, 542 U.S. at 265, “meri t[ed] the greatest wei ght” and “strongl y counsel [ed] agai nst authori zi ng” the requ ested di scovery. Fed. Republic of Nigeria, 499 F. Supp. 3d at 14. The court rejected Ni geri a’s argument that VR l acked standi ng to object to Ni geri a’s use of § 1782 i nstead of the MLAT. Id. at 15. On the meri ts, al though i t acknowl edged that “there i s no pri nci pl e of l a w compel l i ng a forei gn nati on seeki ng evi dence i n thi s country for use i n a cri minalcase to proceed fi rst vi a an MLAT,” the di stri ct court determi ned that “there are sound reasons for general l y channel i ng such di scovery appl i c ati ons through the MLAT process,” i ncl udi ng the promoti on of “comi ty and consi stent outcomes,” the protecti on of “domesti c enti ti es” from “forei gn prosecutors and cri m i nali nvesti gators,” and the assurance that “the U.S. government’s experti se and anal yti c ri gor i s appl i ed to

17the appl i cati on, i ncl u di ng to assure that the di scovery i s not sought for ul teri or

(non-prosecuti ve) ends.” Id. at 14. It expl ai ned that “[t]he U.S.-Ni geri a MLAT [] puts i n pl ace a regul ar procedure for Ni geri a to request assi stance from the Uni ted States for di scovery i n Ni geri an cri minalcases” and mai ntai ned that Ni geri a had not “provi ded a good reason for bypassi ng the MLAT process.” Id. at 15. The court cal l ed i t “pl a usibl e” that Ni geri awas attempting “to avoi d scruti ny by U.S. authori ti es i nto the i ntegri ty of thei r cri minalproceedi ngs, and to avoi d scruti ny i nto whether Ni geri a i s seeki ng di scovery from the VR enti ti es for the i mproper purpose of attempti ng to undermi ne the arbi tralAward i ssued agai nst i t ,” because Ni geri a had “mi sl ed Judge Schofi el d ” about i ts i ntenti ons wi th the di scovery materi al s. Id. at 16. Fi nal l y, the di stri ct court hel d that the fourth factor, whether the req uest was “undul y i ntrusi ve or burdensome,” Intel, 542 U.S. at 265, wei ghed agai nst the appl i cati on because “vari ous document requests i n the subpoena appear to sweep wel lbeyond [the] subject” of bri bery, whi ch Ni g eri a was ostensibl y i nvesti gating, possibl y evi nci ng an i ntent to use di scovery materi al s “for purposes outsi de the contempl ati on of § 1782,” Fed. Republic of Nigeria, 499 F. Supp. 3d at 17.

18C onsi deri ng the four factors together, the di stri c tcourt vacated i ts earl i er

grant of Ni geri a’s appl i c ati on and quashed the subpoenas that Ni geri a had al ready served pursuant to that grant. Ni geri a fi l ed a noti ce of appeal on November 17, 2020. DISCUSSION I. Applicable L aw A. Section 1782 “We revi ew de novo the di stri ct court’s i nterpretati on of the statutory requi rements of § 1782.” Mees v. Buiter , 793 F.3d 291, 297 (2d C i r. 2015)

. “We revi ew the Di stri ct C o urt’s appl i cati on of the so-cal l ed Intel f actors and i ts deci si on to order di scovery for abuse of di screti on.” Fund for Protection of Investor Rights in Foreign States v. AlixPartners, LLP, 5 F.4th 216, 224 (2d C i r. 2021).

A di stri ct court abuses i ts di screti o n i f i t (1) bases i ts deci si on on an error of l aw or uses the wrong l egal standard; (2) bases i ts deci si on on a cl earl y erroneous factualfi ndi ng; or (3) reaches a concl usi on that, though not necessari l y the product of a l egalerror or a cl earl y erroneous factual fi ndi ng, “cannot be l ocated wi thi n the range of permi ssibl e deci si ons.” Millea v. Metro-North R. Co. , 658 F.3d 154, 166 (2d C i r. 2011), quoting McDaniel v. County of Schenectady, 595 F.3d 411, 416 (2d C i r. 2010).

19“Secti o n 1782 i s the product of congressi o nalefforts, over the span of

nearl y 150 years, to provi d e federal -court assi stance i n gatheri ng evi d ence for use i n forei gn tribunal s.” Intel, 542 U.S. at 247. The present versi on of the statute, as enacted i n 1964 and amended i n 1996, provi des i n rel evant part:

The di stri ct court of the di stri ct i n whi ch a person resi des or i s found may order hi m to gi ve hi s testi mony or statement or to produce a document or other thi ng for use i n a proceedi ng i n a forei gn or i nternati onal tribunal, i ncl udi ng cri m i nali nvesti gati o ns conducted before formal accusati o n. The order may be made pursuant to a l etter rogatory i ssued, or request made, by a forei gn or i nternati onaltribunal or upon the appl i cati on of any i nterested person and may di rect that the testi m ony or statement be gi ven, or the document or other thi ng be produced, before a person appoi nted by the court. 28 U.S.C

. § 1782(a). The 1996 amendment added the phrase “i ncl udi ng cri minal i nvesti gati ons conducted before formal accusati on,” thus expandi ng access to di scovery under § 1782 i n cri minalmatters. SeeNati onalDefense Authori zati on Act for Fi scalYear 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-106, § 1342(b), 110 Stat. 186, 486. “To the extent that the [di stri ct court’s] order does not prescri be otherwi se,” di scovery pursuant to § 1782 i s taken “i n accordance wi th the Federal Rul es of C i vi l Procedure.” 28 U.S.C . § 1782(a). The anal ysi s of a di stri ct court heari ng an appl i cati on for di scovery 20pursuant to § 1782 proceeds i n two steps.

Fi rst, the court must determi ne whether the appl i c ati on sati sfi es § 1782‘s three statutory requi rements: that

(1) the person from whom di scovery i s sought resi des (or i s found) i n the di stri ct of the di stri ct court to whi ch the appl i cati on i s made, (2) the di scovery i s for use i n a forei gn proceedi ng before a forei gn [or i nternati onal ] tribunal, and (3) the appl i cati on i s made by a forei gn or i nternati onaltribunalor any i nterested person. Mees , 793 F.3d at 297, quotingBrandi-Dohrn v. IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG, 673 F.3d 76, 80 (2d C i r. 2012) (al terati on i n ori gi nal ). We have hel d that in order to sati sfy the second statutory requi rement, the appl i cant must seek di scovery for use i n an “adjudi cati ve” proceedi ng. See In re Letters Rogatory Issued by Dir. of Inspection of Gov’t of India (“ India ”), 385 F.2d 1017, 1020-22 (2d C i r. 1967) (Fri endl y, J. ) (hol di ng that assessment by an Indi an tax offi c i al was not a “proceedi ng i n a forei gn or i nternati onal tribunal ” because of the offi ci al ’s essenti al l y executi ve, rather than adjudi cati v e, functi on). Second, i f the di stri ct court has determi ned that the statutory requi rements are met, i t “may grant di scovery under § 1782 i n i ts di screti on . . . ‘i n l i ght of the twin ai ms of the statute: provi d i ng effi ci ent means of assi stance to parti ci pants in i nternati o nall i ti gati on i n our federal courts and encouragi ng forei gn countri es by 21exampl e to provi de si m i l ar means of assi stance to our courts.’” Mees , 793 F.3d at

297-98, qu oti ng Schmitz v. Bernstein Liebhard & Lifshitz, LLP, 376 F.3d 79, 84 (2d C i r. 2004). To eval uate whether granti ng an appl i cati on woul d further those ai ms, courts are to consi der four factors that the Supreme C ourt l ai d out in Intel :

(1) whether “the person from whom di scovery i s sought i s a parti ci pant i n the forei gn proceedi ng,” i n whi ch case “the need for § 1782(a) ai d general l y i s not as apparent”; (2) “the nature of the forei gn tribunal, the character of the proceedi ngs underway abroad, and the recepti vi ty of the forei gn government or the court or agency abroad to U.S. federal -court judi ci alassi stance”; (3) “whether the § 1782(a) request conceal s an attempt to ci rcumvent forei gn proof-gatheri ng restri cti ons or other pol i ci es of a forei gn country or the Uni ted States”; and (4) whether the request i s “undul y i ntrusi ve or burdensome.” Mees , 793 F.3d at 298, quoting Intel, 542 U.S. at 264-65. Whi l e the ul ti mate deci si on to grant or deny an appl i cati on i s di screti onary, we have cauti o ned that courts are “not free to read extra-statutory barri ers to di scovery i nto secti o n 1782” under the gui se of exerci si ng thei r di screti on. Gianoli Aldunate, 3 F.3d at 59; see also In re Malev Hungarian Airlines , 964 F.2d 97, 100 (2d C i r. 1992) (“[D]i stri ct courts i ssui ng di scovery orders pursuant to 28 U.S.C . § 1782 may i mpose condi ti o ns to mi ni mi ze the compl i ance burdens, so l ong as those condi ti ons do not i mpose extra-statutory barri ers to

22obtai ni ng di scovery such as an exhausti on requi rement.”).

B. The United States-Nigeria ML AT “We revi ew de novo a di stri ct court’s i nterpretati on of a treaty.” Swarna v. Al-Awadi, 622 F.3d 123, 132 (2d C i r. 2010). An MLAT i s an agreement between two soverei gns to provi de assi stance i n cri minalmatters where evi d ence, persons, or property potenti al l y usefulto one soverei gn’s prosecutors may be found wi thi n the other’s juri sdi cti o n. Ni geri a i s one of many countri es that have an MLAT wi th the Uni ted States. The Uni ted States and Ni geri a si gned thei r MLAT on September 13, 1989. The Senate approved the treaty on October 18, 2000, the presi dent si gned i t into l a w on January 5, 2001, and i t took effect on January 14, 2003. The preambl e to the Uni ted States-Ni geri a MLAT states that i t s purposes are “to i mprove the effecti veness of the l a w enforcement authori ti es of both countri es i n the i nvesti gati on, prosecuti on, and preventi on of cri m e through cooperati on and mutuall egalassi stance i n cri m i nalmatters,” “[c]onsi deri ng i n parti cul a r the need to fi ght agai nst i l l i ci t producti on of and traffi cki ng i n narcoti c drugs and other control l ed substances,” and “to enhance assi stance i n the fi ght agai nst cri me.”

23Arti cl e I l ays out the treaty’s basi c functi ons. The two soverei gns “shal l,

upon request and i n accordance wi th the provi si ons of th[e] Treaty, provi de mutual a ssi stance i n connecti on wi th the i nvesti gati on, prosecuti on, and preventi on of cri mes, and i n proceedi ngs rel ated to cri minalmatters.” Uni ted States-Ni geri a MLAT, art. I, ¶ 1. The types of assi stance avai l abl e i ncl ude:

(a) taki ng the testi mony or statements of persons; (b) provi di ng documents, records, and arti cl es of evi d ence; (c) servi ng documents; (d) l ocati ng and i d enti fyi ng persons; (e) transferri ng persons i n custody for testi mony or other purposes; (f) executi ng requests for searches and sei zures; (g) traci ng, i denti fyi ng, and i mmobi l i zi ng cri m i nal l y obtai ned assets; (h) assi sti ng in proceedi ngs rel ated to forfei ture, resti tuti on, and col l ecti on of fi nes; and (i ) any other form of assi stance not prohibi ted by the l aws of the Requested State. Id. art. I, ¶ 2. The conduct bei ng i nvesti gated i n the Requ esti ng State need not be a cri me under the l a ws of the Requested State, and the treaty states that i t “i s i ntended sol el y for mutual l egalassi stance” between the two soverei gns, expressl y di scl ai ming the creati on of any “ri ght on the part of any pri vate party to obtai n, suppress, or excl ude any evi dence, or to i mpede the executi on of a request.” Id. art. I, ¶¶ 3-4. 24Arti cl es II and IV-VII l ay out the procedures by whi ch the Requ esting State

requests, and the Requested State grants or deni es, assi stance. Under Arti cl e II, each country has a “C entralAuthori ty” that handl es MLAT requests: “the Attorney General or a person desi gnated by hi m” for the Uni ted States, and “the Attorney General of the Federati on or a person desi gnated by hi m” for Ni geri a . Id. art. II, ¶¶ 1-2. Thus, in thi s country, the Department of Justi c e processes MLAT requests. Arti cl es IV-VII concern vari ous techni c alaspects of the procedures for req uesti ng assi stance and processi ng such requests. Arti cl es III and VIII pl a ce substanti ve l i mi tati ons on the content of requests and the use of materi al s obtai ned, respecti v el y. “The C entral Authori ty of the Requested State may deny assi stance” i f

(a) a request i s not i n compl i a nce wi th the provi si o ns of th[e] Treaty; (b) the request rel ates to a pol i ti caloffense; (c) the request rel ates to an offense under mi l i tary l aw whi ch woul d not be an offense under ordi nary cri minal l aw; or (d) the executi on of the request woul d be contrary to the C onsti tuti on of the Requested State or woul d prejudi ce the securi ty or other essenti alnati onali nterests of that State. Id. art. III, ¶ 1. “The Requesti ng State shal lnot use any i nformati on or evi d ence obtai ned under th[e] Treaty i n any i nvesti g ati on, prosecuti on, or proceedi ng 25other than that described i n the requ est wi thout the pri or consent of the

Requested State,” unl ess the i nformati on or evi dence has al ready become publ i c. Id. art. VIII, ¶¶ 1-2. Arti cl e XIX provi des a rul e of constructi on that i s di rectl y rel evant to the present case:

Assi stance and procedures provi d ed by thi s Treaty shal l not prevent or restri ct ei ther of the C ontracti ng Parti es from granti ng any assi stance under other appl i cabl e i nternati onalconventi ons, arrangements, agreements, practi ces, or under the l aws of the C ontracti ng Parti es. Id. art. XIX. In i ts report recommendi ng approval of the treaty, the Senate Forei gn Affai rs C ommi ttee expl a i ned that Arti cl e XIX “provi des that the Treaty shal lnot be deemed to prevent recourse to any assi stance avai l abl e under the i nternal l aws of ei ther country,” “l eaves the provi si ons of Uni ted States and Ni geri an l aw on l etters rogatory compl etel y undi sturbed, and does not al ter any pre-exi sti ng agreements concerni ng i nvesti gati ve assi stance.” S. Exec. Rep. No. 106-24, at 102 (Oct. 4, 2000). Pri or to 2009, the Department of Justi ce uti l i zed the procedures made avai l abl e by § 1782 when a forei gn soverei gn submi tted an MLAT request that requi red court authori zati o n i n the Uni ted States. S ee, e.g., In re Erato , 2 F.3d 11

26(2d C i r. 1993) (di scussi ng vari o us i ssues ari si ng from a di stri c tcourt appoi ntment

of an Assi stant U.S. Attorney as a commi ssi oner under § 1782 to execute an MLAT request from the Netherl ands). In 2009, C ongress codi fi ed and streaml i ned that practi ce, whi ch had devel oped through decades of case l aw, “mak[ing] i t easi er for the Uni ted States to respond to these req uests by al l owi ng them to be central i z ed and by putti ng the process for handl i ng them wi thi n a cl ear statutory system.” 155 C ong. Rec. S6810 (dai l yed. June 18, 2009) (statement of Sen. Whi tehouse). The new statute made expl i c i t what courts had l ong hel d was authori zed under § 1782 – for exampl e, that a federal judge may order “the appearance of a person for the purpose of provi d i ng testi mony or a statement, or requi ri ng the producti on of documents or other thi ngs,” 18 U.S.C . § 3512(a)(2)(D), or appoi nt a person to di rect the taki ng of testi mony or the producti on of documents, id. § 3512(b)(1). Notabl y, that statute does not “precl u d e any forei gn authori ty or an i nterested person from obtai ni ng assi stance i n a cri minal i nvesti gati on or prosecuti on pursuant to secti on 1782 of ti tl e 28, Uni t ed States C ode.” Id. § 3512(g). II. The Present Application In thi s case, the di stri ct court hel d or assumed arguendo that al lthree

27statutory requi rements of § 1782 were sati sfi ed, and i t based i ts deci si o n to vacate

i ts earl i er grant of di scovery pri mari l y on the thi rd Intel factor and, to a l esser extent, the fourth. Speci fi cal ly, the di stri ct court hel d that Ni geri a ’s § 1782 request conceal ed an attempt to “ci rcumvent” the Uni ted States-Ni geri a MLAT, and that the requ est was undul y burdensome, at l east i n part because some of the materi al s were l i kel y rel evant onl y to the Engl i sh Proceedi ng. Sp. App’x at 25. We address the di stri ct court’s wei ghi ng of the thi rd and fourth Intel factors i n turn, i nterpreti ng the Uni t ed States-Ni geri aMLAT as necessary. A. The Third IntelFactor The di stri ct court gave the greatest wei ght, and Ni geri a devotes the bul k of i ts argument, to the thi rd Intel factor – “whether the § 1782(a) request conceal s an attempt to ci rcumvent forei gn proof-gatheri ng restri cti ons or other pol i ci es of a forei gn country or the Uni ted States.” Intel, 542 U.S. at 265

. Ni geri a argues that the di stri ct court erred (1) by al l owi ng VR to rai se the MLAT i ssue, (2) by effecti vel y erecti ng an extra-statutory requ i rement that a country wi th an MLAT pursue an MLAT request before (or i nstead of) seeki ng di scovery under § 1782 for use i n a cri minalmatter, and (3) by treati ng Ni geri a’s potenti aluse of di scovery materi al s i n the Engl i sh Proceedi ng as rel evant to the anal ysi s of the

28thi rd Intel factor. We concl ude that Ni g eri a’s fi rst argument l acks meri t but that

i ts second and thi rd are correct.

1. VR did not lack standing to raise the MLAT issue. Ni geri a fi rst argues that the di stri ct court erred i n rejecti ng i ts standi ng argument and al l owi ng VR to rai se the MLAT i ssue as a reason to vacate the earl i er grant of di scovery. We di sagree. Ordi nari l y, “absent protest or objecti on by the offended soverei gn, an i ndi vi dualhas no standi ng to rai se the vi ol ati o n of i nternati onall aw,” i ncl udi ng treati es, “as an i ssue,” unl ess the treaty creates “pri vatel y enforceabl e ri ghts” or gi ves “some other i ndi cati on that the i ntent of the treaty drafters was to confer ri ghts that coul d be vi ndi cated i n the manner sought by affected i ndi vi dual s.” Georges v. United Nations , 834 F.3d 88, 97 (2d C i r. 2016) (al terati ons, ci tati ons, and i nternal quotati on marks omi tted). That rul e, however, concerns attempts by pri v a te parti es to assert pri vate rights under treati es. In United States v. Davis , 767 F.2d 1025 (2d C i r. 1985), for exampl e, we hel d that a cri minaldefendant was not enti tl ed to have evi d ence agai nst hi m excl uded si m pl y because i twas gathered pursuant to an MLAT request to Swi tzerl a nd that di d not compl y wi th the procedures contempl ated by

29the Uni ted States-Swi tzerl and MLAT, whi ch expressl ydi scl ai med the creati on of

pri vate ri ghts. Id. at 1029-31; see also Georges , 834 F.3d at 97-98 (hol di ng that treaty created no pri vate ri ght to pi erce Uni ted Nati ons’ i m muni ty where Uni ted Nati ons commi tted “materi albreach” of treaty); In re United Kingdom , 685 F.3d 1, 13-15 (1st C i r. 2012) (hol di ng that Uni ted States-Uni ted Kingdom MLAT di d not create pri vate ri ght for targets of MLAT requests to move to quash subpoenas on grounds that requests di d not compl y wi th procedures outl i ned i n treaty). Here, Ni geri a makes a di fferent ki nd of argument: that VR l acked standi ng even to poi nt to the Uni ted States-Ni geri a MLAT as a factor that mi ght be rel evant to the di stri ct court’s di screti onary eval uati on of the thi rd Intel factor. It i s true that Arti cl e I, ¶ 4 of the Uni ted States-Ni geri a MLAT expressl y di scl ai ms the creati on of ri ghts i n “any pri vate party to obtai n, suppress, or excl ude any evi dence, or to i mpede the executi on of a request.” Ni geri a’s standi ng argument, however, mi sapprehends the rul e against pri vate i nvocati on of treaty ri ghts. In rai si ng the MLAT i ssue, VR was nei ther argui ng that the MLAT conferred any ri ghts on i tnor seeki ng to assert such ri ghts. Rather, i t was appeal i ng to the di stri ct court’s di screti on to deny di scovery on grounds that Ni geri a was attempting to “ci rcumvent” proof-gatheri ng

30restri cti ons or pol i ci es of the Uni ted States or Ni geri a, a factor that the Supreme

C ourt has i nstructed di stri c t courts to consi der. The text of the MLAT i t sel f supports that di sti ncti o n. By poi nti ng to the MLAT as a factor to be consi dered, VR i s not asserti ng any ri ght to “obtai n, suppress or excl ude” evi dence by i nvoki ng the MLAT, nor to i mpede the executi on of an MLAT request. Uni ted States-Ni geri a MLAT, art. I, ¶ 4. The thi rd Intel factor concerns efforts to evade “forei gn proof-gatheri ng restri cti ons or other pol i c i es of a forei gn country or of the Uni ted States.” Intel, 542 U.S. at 265. If indeed the Uni ted States-Ni geri a MLAT embodi ed a rel evant proof-gatheri ng restri c ti on or pol i cy of the Uni ted States or Ni geri a, the di stri ct court woul d be enti tl ed to consi d er that restri cti on or pol i cy, regardl ess of whether the MLAT conferred any “rights” on VR. The di stri ct court thus di d not err i n al l owi ng VR to rai se the MLAT i ssue. We turn, therefore, to the meri ts of the di stri c t court’s eval uati on of the thi rd Intel factor. 2. As a matter of law, Nigeria’s request does not “circumvent” the MLAT. Ni geri a next argues that i n hol d i ng that i ts appl i cati on conceal ed an attempt to “ci rcumvent” the Uni ted States-Ni geri a MLAT, the di stri ct court commi tted a l egalerror and effecti vel y erected an i mpermi ssibl e “extra-statutory barri er[]” to di scovery. Gianoli Aldunate, 3 F.3d at 59. We agree.

31As an i ni ti al matter, we are not persuaded by VR’s argument that what the

MLAT requi res by i ts terms i s not di sposi ti ve of thi s appeal because the di stri ct court was exerci si ng i t s di screti on rather than purporti ng to defi ni ti vel y i nterpret the treaty. To be sure, the di stri ct court acknowl edged that “there i s no pri nci pl e of l aw compel l i ng a forei gn nati on seeki ng evi d ence i n thi s country for use i n a cri minalcase to proceed fi rst vi a an MLAT,” and i t buttressed i t s anal ysi s wi th pol i cy reasons for preferri ng MLAT requ ests to § 1782 requests by forei gn soverei gns for use i n cri minalmatters. Fed. Republic of Nigeria, 499 F. Supp. 3d at 14. But whether the Uni ted States-Ni geri a MLAT embodi es a “proof-gatheri ng restri cti on[] or other pol i c[y] of [Ni geri a] or the Uni ted States” that one can “ci rcumvent” wi thi n the meani ng of Intel, 542 U.S. at 265, i s a qu esti on of l aw, not di screti on, and a di stri ct court abuses i t s di screti on where i t “bases i ts deci si on on an error of l aw,” Millea, 658 F.3d at 166. To answer that questi on, we must consi der the terms of the MLAT, parti cul arl y where, as here, VR poi nts to no other sources of Uni ted States pol i cy asi de from the treaty i tsel f. To date, nei ther the Supreme C ourt nor any C o urt of Appeal s has consi dered whether a forei gn soverei gn that has an MLAT wi th the Uni t ed States “ci rcumvents” that MLAT by fi l i ng a § 1782 appl i cati on i n the di stri ct court.

32Besi d es the di stri ct court i n the i nstant case, three di stri ct courts have consi dered

that questi o n, al lof them i n di fferent C i rcui ts – one i n rel ati on to the Uni t ed States-Ni geri a MLAT and two in rel ati on to a si mi l ar MLAT between the Uni ted States and Turkey – and al lhave deni ed the appl i cati o ns before them pri nci pal l y on the same basi s as the di stri ct court i n thi s case. See generally In re Ekpenyong Ntekim , No. 1:13-mc-38, Sp. App’x at 24-26 (E.D. Va. Dec. 18, 2013) (unpubl i shed opi ni on); In re Republic of Turkey, No. 2:20-mc-36, 2021 WL 671518 (S.D. Ohi o Feb. 22, 2021) (“ Republic of Turkey I”); In re Republic of Turkey, No. 20-C -5012, 2021 WL 3022318 (N.D. Il l . Jul y 16, 2021) (“ Republic of Turkey II”). The fi rst di stri ct court, however, devoted a mere three sentences of anal ysi s to the ci rcumventi on questi on, see Ekpenyong Ntekim , Sp. App’x at 25-26, 1 and the other two rel i ed on

1 The enti rety of that di stri ct court’s reasoni ng regardi ng the MLAT was as fol l ows: Thi s request, from the Attorney General of Akwa Ibom

State to the U.S. Di stri ct C ourt for the Eastern Di stri ct of Vi rgi ni a, woul d ci rcumvent the procedure that the Government of the Uni ted States and the Government of the Federal Republ i c of Ni geri a have establ i shed to faci l i tate preci sel ythi s type of request. Thus, the facts of thi s case poi nt persuasi vel y to [ sic ] concl usi on that appl i cant’s request shoul d properl y be handl ed by the Uni ted States executi ve branch through di pl omati c means. As such, i ti s appropri ate for appl i cant to di rect 33the reasoni ng of the di stri ct court i n thi s case, see Republic of Turkey I , 2021 WL 671518, at *8-12; Republic of Turkey II , 2021 WL 3022318, at *6-7. Wi th no bi ndi ng authori ty on poi nt and l i ttl e ori gi nalanal ysi s i n the scant persuasi ve authori ty that exi sts, we must consi der for oursel v es the i mport of the Supreme C ourt’s gui dance i n Intel and the meani ng of the Uni ted States-Ni g eri a MLAT. We begi n wi th the word “ci rcumvent,” the focus of the thi rd Intel factor. Somethi ng that i s “ci rcumvented” must be an obstacl e that one ordi nari l y woul d expect to encounter. S ee C i rcumvent, Oxford Engl i sh Di cti onary (2021) (“To get the better of by craft or fraud; to overreach, outwi t, cheat, ‘get round’, ‘take i n’. Al so, to evade or fi nd a way around (a di ffi cul ty, obstacl e, etc.).”); C i rcumvent, Bl ack’s Law Di cti o nary (11th ed. 2019) (“To avoi d (a restri cti ve probl em, rul e, etc.), esp. by cl ever and someti mes di shonest means . . . . To avoi d (an obstacl e, etc.) by changi ng route.”). If there are two equal l yval i d means to the same end and nei ther i s meant to restri ct use of the other, the choi ce of one over the other i s not “ci rcumventi on.” For exampl e, i f two trai ns run from Lagos to Abuja but one makes fewer stops al ong the way and therefore compl etes the journey i n l ess

hi s request to the rel evant U.S. authori ti es desi gnated under the Treaty. 34ti m e, a passenger who chooses the faster express trai n has not “ci rcumvented”

the sl ower l ocal

. In the context of § 1782 and the thi rd Intel factor, ci rcumventi on occurs where the appl i cant uses a § 1782 appl i cati on to avoi d measures that are intended to restri ct certai n means of gatheri ng or usi ng evi dence. In Kiobel by Samkalden v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP, 895 F.3d 238 (2d C i r. 2018), for exampl e, we hel d that the di stri ct court abused i ts di screti o n i n granti ng a § 1782 appl i cati on, i n part because the appl i c ant, who was engaged i n l i ti gati on i n the Netherl ands, was attempting to gather evi dence i n the Uni ted States that i t woul d not be abl e to obtai n under the more restri cti ve Dutch di scovery rul es. Id. at 245. Indeed, we have cauti o ned that courts shoul d not gi ve undue wei ght to the mere absence i n forei gn juri sdi c ti ons of proof-gatheri ng mechanisms avai l abl e in the Uni ted States, for “‘[p]roof-gatheri ng restri cti ons’ are best understood as rul es aki n to pri vi l eges that prohibit the acqui si ti on or use of certai n materi a l s, rather than as rul es that fai lto facilitate i nvesti gati on of cl ai ms by empoweri ng parti es to requi re thei r adversari aland non-party wi tnesses to provi de i nformati on.” Mees , 793 F.3d at 303 n.20 (emphasi s i n ori gi nal ). In order to tel lwhether an appl i cati on l i ke Ni geri a’s can, as a matter of l aw, be sai d to “ci rcumvent” the Uni ted

35States-Ni geri a MLAT wi thi n the meani ng of Intel, we must determi ne whether

the MLAT i s properl y understood as embodyi ng a proof-gatheri ng restri cti on, or at l east a pol i cy preference for use of i ts processes over other means by whi ch Ni geri a can gather evi d ence i n the Uni ted States for use i n cri minalmatters. “When i nterpreti ng a treaty, we begi n wi th the text of the treaty and the context i n whi ch the wri tten words are used.” Cohen v. American Airlines, Inc. , 13 F.4th 240, 245 (2d C i r. 2021), quoting Ehrlich v. American Airlines, Inc. , 360 F.3d 366, 375 (2d C i r. 2004) (i nternal quotati on marks omi t ted). The text of the MLAT makes cl ear that i t was i ntended to expand, not contract, each si gnatory’s access to cri minalevi dence i n the other’s juri sdi c ti on. Arti c l e XIX of the treaty provi des that “[a]ssi stance and procedures provi d ed by thi s Treaty shal lnot prevent or restri ct ei ther of the C o ntracti ng Parti es from granti ng any assi stance under other appl i cabl e i nternati onalconventi ons, arrangements, agreements, practi ces, or under the l aws of the C ontracti ng Parti es.” That provi si on al one shoul d end the matter. Secti on 1782 i s, of course, a l aw of the Uni ted States, one of the C ontracti ng Parti es, and i t was i n pl a ce at the ti m e the treaty was si gned and entered i nto force. The text of the MLAT makes pl ai n that i t does not operate as a restri cti on on evi dence-gatheri ng by means of

36such an exi sti ng l aw. 2The preambl e to the treaty further supports that

constructi on: It expl ai ns that the treaty’s purposes are “to improve the effecti veness of the l aw enforcement authori ti es of both countri es i n the i nvesti gati on, prosecuti o n, and preventi on of cri me through cooperati on and mutual l egalassi stance i n cri minalmatters” and “to enhanceassi stance i n the fi ght agai nst cri m e.” (Emphasi s added.) A treaty coul d hardl y be sai d to “i mprove” or “enhance” the capabi l i ti es of l aw enforcement authori ti es i f i t depri v ed them of tool s previ ousl y at thei r di sposal

. 3 To be sure, parts of the Uni ted States-Ni g eri a MLAT do i mpose l i mi ts on the assi stance that the Department of Justi ce or Ni geri an Attorney General wi l l

2At oralargument, VR argued for the fi rst ti me that in the phrase “[a]ssi stance and procedures provi ded by thi s Treaty,” Uni t ed States-Ni geri a MLAT, art. XIX, the word “and” shoul d be read conjuncti v el y and “provi ded” i n the past tense, and therefore Arti c l e XIX onl y appl i es where the Requesti ng State has al ready sought and obtai ned the assi stance of the Requested State under the procedures outl i ned i n the treaty. That bel ated argument mangl es the pl ai n l anguage of the treaty. The phrase “provi ded by thi s Treaty” makes cl ear that “thi s Treaty” – not the Requested State’s C entral Authori ty – i s doi ng the “provi d[i ng].”

3The text of the treaty i s cl ear enough, standi ng al one, to resol ve the i ssue before us. We note, neverthel ess, that the l egi sl ati v e hi story i s ful ly consi stent wi th our readi ng of the text. Mi rrori ng the text, the Senate Forei gn Affai rs C ommi ttee noted i ts understandi ng that Arti cl e XIX i s i ntended to make cl ear that the MLAT “shal lnot be deemed to prevent recourse to any assi stance avai l abl e under the i nternal l aws of ei ther country.” S. Exec. Rep. No. 106-24, at 102. 37provi de i n response to an MLAT request. Arti cl e III, ¶ 1, for instance, authori zes

the rel evant authori ti es to deny requests that are noncompl i a nt wi th the provi si ons of the treaty, rel ate to pol i ti c aloffenses, rel ate to conduct that i s onl y cri minalunder mi l i tary l a w, or woul d vi ol ate the Requested State’s consti tuti on or endanger i t s essenti alnati onali nterests. In addi ti on, Arti cl e VIII i mposes restri cti ons on the use of assi stance obtai ned through MLAT requests. But readi ng those l i mi ting provi si ons together wi th Arti cl e XIX’s rul e of constructi on, i t i s cl ear that they are i ntended onl y as i nternal l i mi ts appl i c abl e to MLAT requests, not as restri cti o ns on proof-gatheri ng means external to the treaty. Readi ng the treaty’s procedures and substanti ve l i mi tati o ns as purel y i nternal not onl y comports wi th the cl ear commands of the text – i t al so makes emi nent sense. An MLAT i s not merel y a means by whi ch a forei gn soverei gn may gather evi dence i n another juri sdi cti on. It i s a cooperati ve arrangement pursuant to whi ch the Requested State’s executi ve authori ti es affi rmati v el y provi de assistanceto the Requesti ng State’s executi ve authori ti es. Under the Uni ted States-Ni geri a MLAT, the Department of Justi ce i s obl i gated to assi st the Ni geri an authori ti es by means that woul d be unavai l abl e i n the Uni ted States to pri vate persons or to the Ni geri an authori ti es acti ng al one, even wi th access to

38§ 1782. These i ncl ude, among other means of assi stance: “transferri ng persons i n

custody for testi mony or other purposes; [] executi ng requests for searches and sei zures; [] traci ng, i denti f yi ng, and i mmobi l i zi ng cri minal l y obtai ned assets; [and] assi sti ng in proceedi ngs rel a ted to forfei ture, resti tuti o n, and col l ecti on of fi nes.” Uni ted States-Ni geri a MLAT, art. I, ¶ 2. It i s hardl y surpri si ng that there shoul d be sharper l i mi ts on borrowi ng the power of the Department of Justi ce and i ts l aw enforcement partners than on maki ng the sorts of ordi nary di scovery requests avai l abl e to every ci vi ll i ti gant i n a Uni ted States Di stri c tC ourt. It si mi l arl y makes sense that those sharper l i mi ts woul d appl y to requests by Ameri can prosecutors for assi stance by the Ni geri an authori ti es. For si mi l ar reasons, we are unpersuaded by VR’s pol i cy argument that openi ng the § 1782 process to forei gn soverei gns i nvesti gating cri minaloffenses woul d deter other countri es from enteri ng MLATs wi th the Uni t ed States. An MLAT offers a forei gn soverei gn many forms of assi stance that are not avai l abl e vi a the ordi nary ci vi ldi scovery procedures avai l abl e under § 1782, such as the abi l i ty to execute (through the Department of Justi c e) searches and sei zures i n thi s country. That al o ne, not to menti o n the other tool s that an MLAT provi des, i s a si gni fi c ant i ncenti ve for other countri es to negoti ate MLATs wi th the Uni ted

39States. Moreover, regardl ess of the possibl e soundness of i t s pol i cy arguments,

VR does not poi nt to any pri nci pl e of l aw that woul d prevent a soverei gn, wi th or wi thout an MLAT wi th the Uni ted States, from obtai ni ng di scovery i n a cri minal matter by means of a di rect § 1782 appl i cati o n. If anythi ng, i t i s VR’s posi ti on – that an MLAT shoul d be consi dered an obstacl e to a forei gn soverei gn seeki ng di scovery pursuant to § 1782 for use i n cri minalmatters – that woul d di si ncenti vi ze the further prol i ferati on of MLATs. Nor do the pol i cy reasons that the di stri ct court i denti fi ed justi fy an i nsi stence on fi rst resort to the MLAT process. Whi l e di stri ct courts have broad di screti on to grant or deny § 1782 appl i cati ons, that di screti on i s not a l i cense to engage i n a free-rangi ng pol i cy anal ysi s of any gi ven appl i cati on wi thout a basi s i n the Intel factors or the broader “twi n ai ms” of the statute. See Malev Hungarian Airlines , 964 F.2d at 100-01, quoting Indep. Oil & Chem. Workers v. Procter & Gamble, 864 F.2d 927, 929 (1st C i r. 1988) (“Judi ci aldi screti on i s necessari l y broad – but i t i s not absol ute. Abuse occurs . . . where an i mproper factor i s rel i ed upon . . . .”). Thus, i n Malev Hungarian Airlines , we hel d that a di stri c t court abused i ts di screti on by denyi ng an appl i cati on on the basi s that the appl i cant had not exhausted i ts opportuni ti es for di scovery before the forei gn tribunal– a

40requi rement that, whi l e perhaps supported by sound pol i cy consi derati ons, has

no basi s i n the text or purpose of § 1782. Id. at 101. The di stri ct court may wel lbe correct that the MLAT process promotes comi ty and consi stent outcomes . . . , adds protecti on for the domesti c enti ti es from whom di scovery i s sought by forei gn prosecutors and cri minal i nvesti gators, and assures that the U.S. government’s experti se and anal yti c ri gor i s appl i ed to the appl i cati o n, i ncl udi ng to assure that the di scovery i s not sought for ul teri or (non-prosecuti ve) ends. Fed. Republic of Nigeria, 499 F. Supp. 3d at 15. It may al so be that forei gn soverei gns and prosecutors – both those wi th an MLAT and those wi thout – often send thei r evi dence-gatheri ng requ ests to the Department of Justi ce i nstead of making appl i c ati ons under § 1782. 4But consi stency, protecti on of domesti c enti ti es, and rel i ance on executi ve experti se are not rel evant consi derati ons when

4The di stri ct court suggested that channel i ng requests through the Department of Justi ce i s the most common procedure – at l east where an MLAT exi sts – but i t di d not ci te any empi ri caldata compari ng the respecti ve frequency of use of these al ternate procedures. See Fed. Republic of Nigeria, 499 F. Supp. 3d at 15 (“[B]ased on the authori ti es the parti es have mustered, other forei gn prosecutors appear to have consi stentl y pursued di scovery vi a the governi ng MLAT rather than proceedi ng i n the fi rst i nstance to a di stri ct court under § 1782.”). In any event, the exi stence of a general practice among forei gn soverei gns, standi ng al one, nei ther establ i shes a Uni ted States or forei gn p olicy preferri ng the use of MLATs nor provi des an i ndependent reason to deny an MLAT si gnatory’s § 1782 appl i cati o n. 41eval uating the thi rd or any other Intel factor. And whi l e the promoti on of comi ty

may be rel evant to the overarchi ng i nqui ry of whether granti ng the appl i cati on woul d serve the second of the “twi n ai ms” of § 1782 – “encouragi ng forei gn countri es by exampl e to provi d e si mi l ar means of assi stance to our courts,” Mees , 793 F.3d at 297-98, qu oti ng Schmitz, 376 F.3d at 84 – the di stri c tcourt di d not expl ai n why al l owi ng forei gn soverei gns to make di rect § 1782 requ ests for di scovery i n cri minalmatters woul d undermi ne that ai m. To the extent that § 1782 forces di stri ct courts to make determi nati ons that they mi ght consi der other actors better equi pped to make, “we are not at l iberty to second-guess the pol i cy choi ces of our C ongress.” Malev Hungarian Airlines , 964 F.2d at 100. Moreover, i nsofar as C ongress has set any pol i cy regardi ng forei gn requests for assi stance i n cri minalmatters – wi th or wi thout an MLAT 5 – that

5At oralargument, VR’s counsel asserted that i t i s standard procedure for countri es wi thout an MLAT seeki ng assi stance i n cri minalmatters to send l etters rogatory to the Department of Justi ce. When pressed, however, VR’s counsel coul d not provi d e any empi ri calbasi s for that asserti on besi des the fact that the Department has procedures for processi ng l etters rogatory from such countri es – an apparent reference to outdated Department gui dance ci ted i n VR’s bri ef. Whatever the Department’s procedures for processi ng l etters rogatory may be after the enactment of 18 U.S.C . § 3512 i n 2009, the exi stence of such an opti on does not i mpl y a rel evant pol i cy preference on behal f of the Uni ted States. There i s no requi rement i n the text of § 1782 that forei gn soverei gns and prosecutors proceed by l etters rogatory di rected to the Executi ve Branch rather than by di rect 42pol i cy i s that § 1782 appl i cati ons shoul d remai n an opti on for the forei gn

soverei gn. When C ongress codi fi ed the process for granti ng orders authori zi ng the Justi ce Department to provi de assi stance to a forei gn soverei gn, see18 U.S.C

. § 3512, i t expressl y provi ded that “[n]othi ng i n [that] secti on shal lbe construed to precl ude any forei gn authori ty or an i nterested person from obtai ni ng assi stance i n a cri minali nvesti gati on or prosecuti on pursuant to secti o n 1782 of ti tl e 28, Uni ted States C ode.” Id . § 3512(g). It i s of course possi bl e that a speci fi c treaty coul d enact a pol i cy that woul d trump that more general provi si o n, but nei ther VR nor the di stri ct court i denti fi es any reason why the Uni ted States-Ni g eri a MLAT shoul d be read to do so. In sum, the Uni ted States-Ni geri aMLAT does not, as a matter of l aw, embody a “proof-gatheri ng restri cti on[] or [] pol i c[y]” that prefers i ts own procedures above other means of gatheri ng evi dence for use i n cri m i nalmatters. Intel, 542 U.S. at 265. Ni geri a does not “ci rcumvent” any rel evant restri cti on or pol i cy wi thi n the meani ng of Intel by fi l ing an appl i cati on under § 1782 when i t appl i cati o ns to courts under § 1782. To the contrary, the statute menti ons l etters rogatory as an opti o n onl ywhere a forei gn or i nternati onal tribunal seeks assi stance. See28 U.S.C

. § 1782(a) (“The order may be made pursuant to [1] a l etter rogatory i ssued, or request made, by a forei gn or i nternati onaltribunalor [2] upon the appl i cati on of any i nterested person . . . .”). 43coul d otherwi se fi l e an MLAT request. We therefore hol d that the di stri c t court

based i ts deci si on on l egalerror, and thereby exceeded the bounds of i ts di screti on, by requi ri ng Ni g eri a to justi fy i ts use of a § 1782 appl i cati o n rather than an MLAT request for di scovery i n connecti o n wi th cri minal proceedi ngs.

3. It would not be “improper” for Nigeria to use the materials sought in the English Proceeding. Ni geri a further argues that the di stri ct court erred i n consi d eri ng i ts potenti aluse of evi d ence gathered pursuant to i ts § 1782 appl i cati on i n the Engl i sh Proceedi ng, and i ts representati ons to Judge Schofi el d on that subject, when deci di ng the qu esti on of “ci rcumventi o n” wi thi n the meani ng of the thi rd Intel factor. Agai n, we agree. In eval uating the statutory requi rements of § 1782, the di stri ct court stated that the Engl i sh Proceedi ng was not a “proceedi ng before a forei gn or i nternati o naltribunal ” wi thi n the meani ng of the statute. See Fed. Republic of Nigeria, 499 F. Supp. 3d at 10-11. The present appl i cati on names the Ni geri an Proceedi ngs – whi ch the di stri ct court was wi l l i ng to assume were qual i fyi ng proceedi ngs – as the matter for whi ch Ni geri a seeks di scovery. Thus the di stri ct court’s di scussi o n of the Engl i sh Proceedi ng i n the context of the second statutory

44requi rement i s arguabl y di ctum. However, the di stri ct court al so rel i ed on i ts

characteri zati on of the Engl i sh Proceedi ng as beyond the scope of the statute i n i ts eval uati on of the thi rd Intel factor, vi ewi ng Ni g eri a’s potenti aluse of evi dence gathered pursuant to i ts § 1782 appl i cati on i n that proceedi ng as evi dence of Ni geri a’s i ntent to “ci rcumvent” proof-gatheri ng restri c ti ons or pol i c i es. See id. at 17 (“[T]he C ourt fi nds that the DOJ revi ew contempl ated by the MLAT woul d serve sal utary purposes here, i ncl udi ng hel pi ng determi ne whether, i n whol e or i n part, the materi al s sought are genui nel y i ntended for use i n a cri minal prosecuti on or i nvesti gati on, or whether they are sought for the improper purpose of forti f yi ng Ni geri a’s attempt in the Engl i sh courts to voi d the mul ti -bi l l i ondol l ar arbi tralAward agai nst i t.” (emphasi s added)). We therefore have occasi on to note that there woul d be nothi ng “i m proper” about Ni g eri a’s use of di scovery gathered pursuant to the i nstant appl i cati on i n the Engl i sh Proceedi ng. From the record before us, i t appears that the Engl i sh Proceedi ng woul d i ndependentl y qual i fy as a “proceedi ng in a forei gn or i nternati onaltribunal ” wi thi n the meani ng of the statute. In concl udi ng that i t di d not, the di stri ct court rel i ed pri nci pal l y upon Euromepa, S.A. v. R. Esmerian, Inc ., 154 F.3d 24 (2d C i r. 1998). In that case, the appl i cant i ni ti al l y sought di scovery for use i n a ci v i lfraud

45acti on i n France. Euromepa, 154 F.3d at 25. Whi l e the appl i cati on was pendi ng,

however, the French tri al court entered judgment for the pl ai nti ff (the respondent i n thi s country), and France’s court of l ast resort for the matter affi rmed that judgment. Id. at 25-26. The defendant (the appl i cant i n thi s country) then decl a red bankruptcy i n France. Id. at 26. The respondent moved i n the di stri ct court to di smi ss the § 1782 appl i cati on as moot, asserti ng that the matter for whi ch di scovery was sought had run i ts course; the appl i c ant argued i n response that the sti l l -ongoi ng bankruptcy proceedi ng was a qu a l i fyi ng “proceedi ng” wi thi n the meani ng of § 1782. Id. at 28. The di stri ct court di smi ssed the appl i cati on as moot, and we affi rmed. Al though we acknowl edged that “a bankruptcy proceedi ng may, in some i nstances, be an adjudi cati ve proceedi ng wi thi n the meani ng of the statute,” we noted that “[a]s a matter of French l a w, the judgment of the French Supreme C ourt acts as res judicata wi th respect to the meri ts of the di spute i n the French Bankruptcy Proceedi ng.” Id. Therefore, “i n the French Bankruptcy Proceedi ng, nothi ng [was] bei ng adjudi cated; the al ready extant judgment [was] merel y bei ng enforced.” Id. C ontrary to the di stri ct court’s reasoni ng i n the present case, the Engl i sh Proceedi ng i s not “of a si mi l ar post-judgment character” to the French

46bankruptcy proceedi ng i n Euromepa

. Fed. Republic of Nigeria, 499 F. Supp. 3d at 10.

True, there i s somethi ng resembl i ng an “al ready extant judgment” here – the Arbi trati on Award – and Ni geri a i s attempting to keep that Award from bei ng “enforced” i n the Engl i sh Proceedi ng. Euromepa, 154 F.3d at 28. But the di stri ct court mi sread Euromepa to the extent that i t understood that case to hol d that the mere compl eti on of an i ni ti aladjudi cati on of a di spute categori cal l y di squal i fi es a forei gn proceedi ng under § 1782‘s statutory “proceedi ng” requ i rement. Euromepa was fundamental l y a case about mootness, at l east i n the practi calsense. We hel d that there was no l onger a qual i fyi ng “proceedi ng” under the statute because the French equi val ent of our res judicata doctri ne prevented the French bankruptcy court from reconsi deri ng the underl y i ng meri t s of the di spute, and thus the di scovery sought i n the Uni ted States was no l onger of any use i n the matter for whi ch i t was ori g i nal l y sought. Here, i n contrast, Ni geri a i s expressl y aski ng the Engl i sh C ourt to probe the meri ts of, and set asi de, the Arbi trati on Award, and VR has never di sputed that the Engl i sh C ourt has the authori ty to do so. The Engl i sh C ourt, unqu esti onabl y a forei gn tribunal, has schedul ed a tri a l, a qui ntessenti al adjudi cati ve proceedi ng, to determi ne the meri ts of a contenti on that an arbi tral

47award shoul d be vacated as fraudul entl y obtai ned, a recogni z ed judi ci alfuncti on

i n thi s country as wel las i n the Uni ted Kingdom. Cf. India, 385 F.2d at 1020-22 (expl ai ni ng that “an Indi a n Income-Tax Offi ce i s not a ‘tribunal ’” and i ts taxcol l ecti on efforts are not adjudi cati ve proceedi ngs). We have no doubt, therefore, that i f Ni geri a had sought to obtai n di scovery under § 1782 i n the fi rst i nstance for use i n the Engl i sh Proceedi ng, such a request woul d sati sfy the statutory requi rements. Of course, Ni geri a di d not state i n the present appl i c ati on that i t sought di scovery for use i n the Engl i sh Proceedi ng – i t stated that i t sought di scovery for use i n the Ni geri an Proceedi ngs. But we have hel d that “Secti o n 1782 does not prevent an appl i cant who l awful l yhas obtai ned di scovery under the statute wi th respect to one forei gn proceedi ng from usi ng the di scovery el sewhere.” A ccent Delight, 869 F.3d at 135. Whi l e that hol di ng concerned the statutory “for use” requi rement, i tnecessari l y fol l ows that the possibi l i ty of use i n a di fferent but i ndependentl y qual i fyi ng proceedi ng does not consti tute an attempt to “ci rcumvent” a proof-gatheri ng restri c ti on or pol i cy of the Uni ted States or a forei gn state. The di stri c t court thus erred to the extent that i ts eval uati o n of the thi rd Intel factor rel i ed on i ts characteri zati on of the Engl i sh Proceedi ng as an

48“i mproper” use for di scovery obtai ned pursuant to the present appl i cati on.

For the same reason, the di stri ct court’s concern about Ni geri a ’s representati o ns to Judge Schofi el d was mi spl aced. Ni geri aasserts that the di stri ct court’s characteri zati on of those representati ons as “di shonest” was cl earl y erroneous. We need not deci de that questi on, because the di stri ct court consi dered Ni geri a’s putati ve di shonesty to Judge Schofi el d rel evant onl y i nsofar as i t evi nced an i ntent “to avoi d [Department of Justi ce] scruti ny i nto whether Ni geri a i s seeki ng di scovery from the VR enti ti es for the i mproper purpose of attempting to undermi ne the arbi tralAward agai nst i t,” Fed. Republic of Nigeria, 499 F. Supp. 3d at 16, whi ch, as just di scussed, woul d not be an i mproper purpose. Regardl ess of whether Ni geri a “mi sl ed” Judge Schofi el d regardi ng i ts i ntenti ons, the di stri ct court’s reasoni ng as to why any putati ve di shonesty woul d be rel evant to i ts anal ysi s of the thi rd In tel factor rel i ed on l egal error, strengtheni ng our concl usi o n that the di stri ct court abused i ts di screti on i n eval uating the thi rd Intel factor. 6

6That i s not to say that i f a di stri ct court determi nes that the stated reasons underl y i ng a § 1782 appl i cati on were purel y pretextual, that fact shoul d be i rrel evant to the court’s consi d erati on of the appl i cati on. At the same ti me, we note that VR’s descri pti on of the di stri ct court’s concern i n thi s case appears somewhat exaggerated. Ni geri a’s di smi ssalof VR’s suggesti o n that i t was 49B. The Fourth IntelFactor

Fi nal l y, Ni geri a argues that the di stri ct court abused i ts di screti on i n determi ni ng that the fourth Intel factor – whether the di scovery request i s “undul y i ntrusi ve or burdensome,” Intel, 542 U.S. at 265 – wei ghed agai nst the appl i cati o n. We agree to the extent that the di stri ct court’s eval uati on of the fourth factor rel i ed on the possibi l i ty that Ni geri a woul d use the materi al s i t obtai ned i n the Engl i sh Proceedi ng. The di stri ct court concl uded that the fourth factor wei ghed agai nst the appl i cati o n for two reasons: (1) because “vari ous document requests i n the subpoena appear to sweep wel lbeyond [the] subject” of “bri bery i n connecti on wi th procuri ng the [Arbi trati on] Award;” and (2) because “the breadth of the requests for materi a l s rel ating to the arbi trati o n and i ts enforcement may refl ect

i nterested i n usi ng the documents i tsought i n the Engl i sh proceedi ng as “rank specul ati on,” J. App’x at 275, may have been di si ngenuous, gi ven that i t promptl y used them i n that very proceedi ng as soon as i t obtai ned them. But in the same submi ssi on to the court Ni geri a expl i c i tl y reserved i ts ri ght – whi ch i t i ndeed had under our deci si o n i n Accent Delight– to use the documents i n any proceedi ng. Moreover, Judge Schofi el d never suggested that she had been mi sl ed, di d not grant P&ID’s request to prohibi tsuch use of the di scovered documents, and even expressl y permi tted such use i n her rul i ng on JPMorgan C hase’s appl i cati o n for a protecti ve order. There i s l i ttl e i n that seri es of events to suggest that Ni geri a’s statements mi sl ed Judge Schofi el d i n any materi alway. 50an i ntenti on to use U.S. di scovery for purposes outsi de the contempl a ti on of

§ 1782.” Fed. Republic of Nigeria, 499 F. Supp. 3d at 17. We detect no reversi bl e error i n the fi rst reason. Al though Ni geri a’s di scovery requ ests seem l argel y consi stent wi th a purpose of cri minal l y i nvesti gating the procurement of the Arbi trati on Award, the ul ti mate qu esti on of burdensomeness i s wi thi n the di stri ct court’s di screti on to deci de, and not ours. The second reason i s somewhat opaque, but appears to refer to the possi bi l i ty that Ni geri a woul d use the materi al s i t obtai ned pursuant to thi s appl i cati on i n the Engl i sh Proceedi ng. As expl ai ned above, use i n the Engl i sh Proceedi ng i s not a “purpose[] outsi de the contempl ati on of § 1782.” Id. If that was the purpose to whi ch the di stri ct court referred, i t based i ts reasoni ng regardi ng the fourth factor at l east i n part on l egal

error. We therefore concl ude that the di stri ct court erred i n eval uating the fourth Intel factor i nsofar as i ts reasoni ng depended on i ts vi ew that the use of evi dence i n the Engl i sh Proceedi ng was a “purpose[] outsi de the contempl ati on of § 1782.” Id.

51III. The Appropriate Remedy

Havi ng concl uded that the di stri ct court rel i ed on erroneous l egalpremi ses i n eval uating the thi rd Intel factor, and to some extent i n eval uating the fourth, we turn to the appropri ate appel l ate remedy. The thi rd Intel factor cl earl y was the dri vi ng force behi nd the di stri ct court’s deci si on to vacate i ts earl i er ex partegrant of the appl i cati on. S ee id. at 14 (“[T]he C ourt agrees both that [the thi rd] factor meri ts the greatest wei ght i n the di screti o nary anal ysi s here, and that i t strongl y counsel s agai nst authori zi ng U.S. di scovery under § 1782.”). Moreover, we see no al ternati ve grounds upon whi ch we coul d affi rm the di stri ct court’s judgment. 7

7VR i nvi tes us to affi rm the judgment on the al ternati ve ground that the fi rst Intel factor – whether “the person from whom di scovery i s sought i s a parti c i pant i n the forei gn proceedi ng,” Intel, 542 U.S. at 264 – wei ghs agai nst the appl i cati on. But the di stri ct court concl uded that the fi rst factor at l east “nomi nal l y [] favor[ed] al l owi ng U.S. di scovery under § 1782,” Fed. Republic of Nigeria, 499 F. Supp. 3d at 13, and VR offers no reason why we shoul d vi ew that concl usi on as an abuse of di screti on. Moreover, whi l e Ni geri a does not chal l enge the concl usi on that the fi rst factor onl y nominallyfavors the appl i cati on, we have some reservati on about even that concl u si on. The purpose of the fi rst factor i s to root out si tuati ons i n whi ch “the need for § 1782(a) ai d [] i s not as apparent” because “[a] forei gn tribunalhas juri sdi cti on over” the party from whom di scovery i s sought “and can i tsel f order [that party] to produce evi dence.” Intel, 542 U.S. at 264. It i s true, as the di stri ct court noted, that P&ID i s a party i nvol ved i n the Ni geri an Proceedi ngs and i s l i kel yto possess many of the same documents as VR concerni ng VR’s acqu i si ti on of an ownershi p stake i n P&ID. But VR i s a di sti nct l egalpersonal i ty, and i t woul d be far from surpri si ng i f a minori ty sharehol der of an enti ty under cri m i nal i nvesti gati o n were more responsi ve to 52At the same ti me, the di stri ct court’s eval uati o n of the fourth Intel factor –

whi ch was, at most, onl y erroneous i n part – counsel s agai nst outri ght reversal

. As expl ai ned above, the di stri ct court evi dentl y had some concern about the sheer breadth of Ni geri a’s di scovery requests and thei r proporti onal i ty to the al l egati ons of fraud and bribery under i nvesti g ati on. It i s concei vabl e that, i f the di stri ct court conducted a ful l er anal ysi s of the fourth factor, i t woul d sti l l concl ude that Ni geri a’s di scovery requests were suffi ci entl y burdensome to warrant a deni al, or more l i kel y a l i m i tati on, of the appl i cati on. See Fed. Republic of Nigeria, 499 F. Supp. 3d at 17 (“At a mini mum, [] were the § 1782 subpoenas otherwi se to be uphel d, they woul d need to be careful l y pruned.”). We therefore concl ude that i t i s not appropri ate for us to reverse the di stri ct court’s judgment outri ght and order the di scovery that Ni geri a has sought. Cf. Intel, 542 U.S. at 266 (“Several facets of thi s case remai n l argel yunexpl ored . . . . On the meri ts, thi s case bears cl oser scruti ny than i t has recei ved to date . . . . [W]e l eave i t to the courts bel ow to ensure an ai ri ng adequate to determi ne what, i f any, assi stance i s appropri ate.”). Rather, we bel i eve that the appropri ate remedy for the di stri ct court’s

di scovery requests than the enti ty i tsel f. 53abuse of di screti on i n thi s case i s to vacate the di stri ct court’s order and remand

for further consi derati on. On remand, the di stri ct court shoul d reconsi der Ni geri a’s § 1782 appl i c ati on, consi stent wi th our rul i ng that the appl i cati on may not be consi dered an attempt to “ci rcumvent” the MLAT and that Ni geri a i s wi thi n i ts ri ghts to use any evi dence i t mi ght uncover pursuant to thi s appl i cati on i n the Engl i sh Proceedi ng. CONCL USION For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the di stri c t court i s VAC ATED and the case i s REMANDED for further consi derati o n of Ni geri a’s appl i cati o n consi stent wi th thi s Opi ni on.

54