[Cite as State v. Wagner , 2012-Ohio-2791.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR CLARK COUNTY, OHIO STATE OF OHIO : Plaintiff-Appellee : C.A. CASE NO. 2011 CA 27

v. : T.C. NO. 11 CR 34 STEPHEN WAGNER : (Criminal appeal from Common Pleas Court) Defendant-Appellant :

:

. . . . . . . . . . O P I N I O N Rendered on the 22nd day of June , 2012.

. . . . . . . . . . LISA M. FANNIN, Atty. Reg. No. 0082337, Assistant Clark County Prosecutor, 50 E. Columbia Street, 4th Floor, P. O. Box 1608, Springfield, Ohio 45501 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee TYLER D. STARLINE, Atty. Reg. No. 0078552, 260 North Detroit Street, Xenia, Ohio 45385 Attorney for Defendant-Appellant STEPHEN WAGNER, #648663, London Correctional Institute, P. O. Box 69, London, Ohio 43140 Defendant-Appellant

. . . . . . . . . .2 FROELICH, J. {¶ 1} Stephen Wagner pled guilty to r obbery, a third degree felony, and was sentenced to the maximum term of five y ears in prison. Wagner appealed from his conviction, and his appe llate counsel raised potential a ssignments of error pursuant to Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct.1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). For the following reasons, the trial court’s judgment will be affirmed.
I. {¶ 2} In January 2011, Wagner was indicted for two counts of aggravated robbery, each with a firearm specification. His tria l was scheduled for March 29, 2011. On the morning of the scheduled trial date, the court informed the parties that it was currently conducting another trial, which had started the day before . The court, on its own motion, rescheduled Wagner’s trial for March 30, one day later. With in hours, the parties reached an agreement on the charges. {¶ 3} During the afternoon of March 29, Wagner pled guilty to an amended charge of robbery. As part of the plea, the State agreed to dismiss the second charge of aggravated robbery and the firearm specificati ons and to have a pre- sentence investigation conducted. The parties pr esented the court with a guilty plea form, with those terms, which Wagner had signed prior to the plea hearing. {¶ 4} A pre-sentence investigation wa s conducted. After reviewing the pre-sentence investigation report, hearing fro m defense counsel and the prosecutor, and providing Wagner an opportunity to address the court, the trial court sentenced Wagner to the maximum five years in prison. Wagner appealed from his conviction.3 {¶ 5} Wagner’s counsel has filed an Anders brief, stating that after a thorough review of the record, no non-frivolous issues for appellate review were found. Wagner’s counsel identified three possible assignments of error that we should review. Wagner was informed of his counsel’s brief, and he was gran ted time to file a pro se brief. No pro se brief has been filed. {¶ 6} We have conducted an indepe ndent review of the record. Penson v. Ohio , 488 U.S. 75, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988).
II. {¶ 7} The first and second potential assignment s of error both relate to Wagner’s sentencing. They state: The Trial Court prejudicially erred in its analysis of the statutory sentencing purposes and factors when it sentenced Appellant Wagner to a maximum prison sentence. The Trial Court prejudicially erre d by imposing a cruel and unusual punishment. {¶ 8} Wagner’s counsel raises that the tria l court’s sentence is contrary to law, because the court did not follow statutory procedures in imposing sentence and the imposition of a maximum sentence cons titutes cruel and unusual punishment. {¶ 9} We review a felony sentence using a two-step procedure. State v. Kalish , 120 Ohio St.3d 23, 2008-Ohio-4912, 896 N.E.2d 124, ¶ 4. “The first step is to ‘examine the sentencing court’s compliance with all applicable rules and statutes in imposing the sentence to determine whether the sentence is clearly and convincingly contrary to law.’” State v.4 Stevens , 179 Ohio App.3d 97, 2008-Ohio-5775, 900 N.E.2d 1037, ¶ 4 (2d Dist.), quoting Kalish at ¶ 4. “If this step is satisfied, the sec ond step requires that th e trial court’s decision be ‘reviewed under an abuse- of-discretion standard.’” Id. {¶ 10} At the time of Wagner’s sentencing, the trial court was not required to make any findings or give its reasons before im posing a maximum, consecutive, or non-minimum sentence within the statutory range. 1 State v. Foster , 109 Ohio St.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-856, 845 N.E.2d 470, paragraph seven of th e syllabus. Nevertheless, the trial court must still comply with the sentencing laws unaffected by Foster , such as R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12, which require consideration of the pur poses and principles of felony sentencing and the seriousness and recidivism factors. State v. Mathis, 109 Ohio St.3d 54, 2006-Ohio-855, 846 N.E.2d 1. The court does not have to make any specific findings to demonstrate its consideration of those statutes. State v. Ramey , 2d Dist. Clark No. 2010 CA 19, 2011-Ohio-1288, ¶ 47;
Foster at ¶ 42. “Where the record is silent, a presumption exits that the trial court has considered the factors. Further, where a criminal sentence is within statutory limits, an appellate court should accord the trial court the presumption that it considered the statutory mitigating factors. Consequently, the appellant has an affirmative duty to show otherwise.” (Citations omitted.) Ramey at ¶ 47. {¶ 11} Wagner pled guilty to robbery, a th ird degree felony. At the time of his sentencing, a felony of the third degree warranted a definite prison term of one to five years.

1 Pursuant to State v. Hodge , 128 Ohio St.3d 1, 2010-Ohio-6320, 941 N.E.2d 768, in H.B. 86, the Ohio legislature re-enacted statutes requiring certain judicial fact-finding befo re imposing consecutive sentencing, which had previously been found unconstitutional in Foster and were not “revived” following Oregon v. Ice , 555 U.S. 160, 129 S.Ct. 711, 172 L.Ed.2d 517 (2009). See R.C. 2929.14(C)(4).5 Former R.C. 2929.14(A). Wagner was sentenced to five years, which was within the sentencing range. {¶ 12} In imposing sentence, the trial court discussed Wagner’s juvenile and adult record, as detailed in the pre-sentence inves tigation report. The court did not, during the sentencing hearing, expressly state that it had considered the principles and purposes of felony sentencing and the seriousness and reci divism factors as set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12. However, the court commented on th e severity of Wagner’s robbery offense and the fact that his convicti on record reflected escalating vi olence, including the use of a firearm. The court stated, “Defendant’s reco rd would indicate most likely to re-offend and, as indicated, seems to be getting more serious offenses.” The court’s subsequent judgment entry indicated that “[t]he Court has considered the record, oral statements, any victim impact statement and presentence report prepare d, as well as the principles and purposes of sentencing under Ohio Revise d Code Section 2929.11, and has ba lanced the seriousness of recidivism factors [in] Ohio Revised Code 2929.12.” There is nothing in the record to suggest that the trial court did not do so. Wagn er’s first potential assi gnment of error has no arguable merit. {¶ 13} Wagner’s counsel further raises th at his maximum five-year sentence for robbery constitutes crue l and unusual punishment. “As a gene ral rule, a sentence that falls within the terms of a valid statute cannot amount to a cruel and unusual punishment.” (Citations omitted.) McDougle v. Maxwell , 1 Ohio St.2d 68, 69, 203 N.E.2d 334 (1964), quoted by State v. Coffman , 2d Dist. Champaign No. 2010-CA-20, 2010-Ohio-4284, ¶ 9. Wagner’s sentence was within the statutory range for a third degree felony. Accordingly,6 his argument that his five -year sentence constituted crue l and unusual punishment is frivolous. {¶ 14} We further find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s imposition of the maximum five-year sentence. The record reflect s that Wagner and another man broke into a residence, pointed guns at the three occupants, and demanded m oney; one resident was hit in the head with a gun. The trial court reasona bly concluded that thes e actions amounted to “one of the most serious” forms of the offens e of robbery. Moreover, Wagner’s extensive juvenile record over severa l years and his use of violence in committing the robbery supported the trial court’s c onclusion that Wagner was likely to re-offend and that a maximum sentence was a ppropriate. Wagner’s second poten tial assignment of error has no arguable merit.
III. {¶ 15} In his third potential assign ment of error, Wagner’s c ounsel raises that “[t]he trial court prejudici ally erred by granting a sua sponte con tinuance of the scheduled jury trial when no journal entry reflecting the sua spont e continuance was filed with the Clerk of
Courts.” {¶ 16} A plea of guilty is a complete admission of guilt. E.g ., State v. Wheeler , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24112, 2011-Ohio-3423, ¶ 3; State v. Barrett , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24150, 2011-Ohio-2303, ¶ 3; Crim.R. 11(B)(1). Consequently, a guilty plea waives all appealable errors that may have occurred in th e trial court, unless su ch errors precluded the defendant from knowingly, in telligently, and voluntarily entering his guilty plea. See , e.g ., State v. Kelley , 57 Ohio St.3d 127, 566 N.E.2d 658 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus;7 Wheeler at ¶ 3; State v. Smith , 2d Dist. Clark No. 08 CA 60, 2009-Ohio-5048, ¶ 13. By pleading guilty, Wagner has waived any cha llenge based on the tria l court’s sua sponte one-day continuance of his trial date. Even if Wagner’s argu ment were not waived, he has failed to articulate how he was prej udiced by the trial court’s action. {¶ 17} Wagner’s third potential assi gnment of error is frivolous.
IV. {¶ 18} We agree with Wagner’s appellate counsel that there are no potential assignments of error having ar guable merit and that this appeal is wholly frivolous. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court will be affirmed.

. . . . . . . . . . GRADY, P.J. and DONOVAN, J., concur. Copies mailed to: Lisa M. Fannin Tyler D. Starline Stephen Wagner Hon. Richard J. O’Neill