i

The United States Army War College

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

CENTER for

STRATEGIC

LEADERSHIP

The United States Army War College educates and develops leaders for service 

at the strategic level while advancing knowledge in the global application 

of Landpower.

The purpose of the United States Army War College is to produce graduates 

who are skilled critical thinkers and complex problem solvers. Concurrently, 

it is our duty to the U.S. Army to also act as a “think factory” for commanders 

and civilian leaders at the strategic level worldwide and routinely engage 

in discourse and debate concerning the role of ground forces in achieving 

national security objectives.

The Strategic Studies Institute publishes national 

security and strategic research and analysis to influence 

policy debate and bridge the gap between military 

and academia.

The Center for Strategic Leadership contributes 

to the education of world class senior leaders, 

develops expert knowledge, and provides solutions 

to strategic Army issues affecting the national 

security community.

The Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute 

provides subject matter expertise, technical review, 

and writing expertise to agencies that develop stability 

operations concepts and doctrines.

The School of Strategic Landpower develops strategic 

leaders by providing a strong foundation of wisdom 

grounded in mastery of the profession of arms, and 

by serving as a crucible for educating future leaders in 

the analysis, evaluation, and refinement of professional 

expertise in war, strategy, operations, national security, 

resource management, and responsible command.

The U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center acquires, 

conserves, and exhibits historical materials for use 

to support the U.S. Army, educate an international 

audience, and honor Soldiers—past and present.

STRATEGIC

STUDIES

INSTITUTE

The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) is part of the U.S. Army War 

College and is the strategic-level study agent for issues related 

to national security and military strategy with emphasis on 

geostrategic analysis.

The mission of SSI is to use independent analysis to conduct 

strategic studies that develop policy recommendations on:

• Strategy, planning, and policy for joint and combined 

 employment of military forces;

• Regional strategic appraisals;

• The nature of land warfare;

• Matters affecting the Army’s future;

• The concepts, philosophy, and theory of strategy; and,

• Other issues of importance to the leadership of the Army.

Studies produced by civilian and military analysts concern 

topics having strategic implications for the Army, the Department of 

Defense, and the larger national security community.

In addition to its studies, SSI publishes special reports on topics 

of special or immediate interest. These include edited proceedings 

of conferences and topically oriented roundtables, expanded trip 

reports, and quick-reaction responses to senior Army leaders.

The Institute provides a valuable analytical capability within the 

Army to address strategic and other issues in support of Army 

participation in national security policy formulation.

iii

v

Strategic Studies Institute

and

U.S. Army War College Press

U.S. LANDPOWER IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA

Clarence J. Bouchat

July 2017

The views expressed in this report are those of the author and 

do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the 

Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. 

Government. Authors of Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) and 

U.S. Army War College (USAWC) Press publications enjoy full 

academic freedom, provided they do not disclose classified 

information, jeopardize operations security, or misrepresent 

official U.S. policy. Such academic freedom empowers them to 

offer new and sometimes controversial perspectives in the interest of furthering debate on key issues. This report is cleared for 

public release; distribution is unlimited.

*****

This publication is subject to Title 17, United States Code, 

Sections 101 and 105. It is in the public domain and may not be 

copyrighted.
vi

*****

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should 

be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. 

Army War College Press, U.S. Army War College, 47 Ashburn 

Drive, Carlisle, PA 17013-5010.

*****

This manuscript was funded by the U.S. Army War 

College External Research Associates Program. Information on 

this program is available on our website, ssi.armywarcollege.edu,

at the Opportunities tab.

*****

All Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) and U.S. Army War 

College (USAWC) Press publications may be downloaded 

free of charge from the SSI website. Hard copies of certain 

reports may also be obtained free of charge while supplies last 

by placing an order on the SSI website. Check the website for 

availability. SSI publications may be quoted or reprinted in 

part or in full with permission and appropriate credit given 

to the U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army 

War College Press, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA. Contact SSI by visiting our website at the following address: 

ssi.armywarcollege.edu.

*****

The Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War 

College Press publishes a quarterly email newsletter to update 

the national security community on the research of our analysts,

recent and forthcoming publications, and upcoming conferences sponsored by the Institute. Each newsletter also provides 

a strategic commentary by one of our research analysts. If you 

are interested in receiving this newsletter, please subscribe on 

the SSI website at the following address: ssi.armywarcollege.edu/

newsletter/.

ISBN 1-58487-760-X
vii

FOREWORD

In his third Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) monograph addressing turmoil in the South China Sea region, retired U.S. Air Force officer Clarence J. Bouchat 

counters the misperceptions that U.S. landpower plays 

only a minor or supporting role in what is normally 

considered a predominately maritime- and air-centric 

theater. Conventional wisdom’s misunderstanding 

of how modern and future landpower capabilities 

may influence engagement and operations in semienclosed maritime environments may be the cause for 

landpower being marginalized in these environments, 

as seen in the original Air-Sea Battle concept or the 

2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).

For that reason, I am pleased to present this monograph, which explains the vital role of landpower to 

engage the forces of other countries, deter aggression, 

and fight if necessary in pursuit of broad U.S. national 

interests in the region. In a variety of ways described 

here, the essential direct support of land force capability to the air and sea services, and other government 

organizations, is also critical to their success when 

operating in this theater. As Mr. Bouchat states in his 

Introduction, landpower “offers important options 

which can often be applied with lower risk of exacerbating direct conflict. As the only form of military 

power that covers the full range of military options, 

from humanitarian assistance to full conventional 

combat, landpower’s flexibility and capabilities help 

manage both peace and conflict” in the South China 

Sea.

To show how landpower is necessary in this contested region, this monograph briefly explores the 

concept of landpower and its components—forces 
viii

from the U.S. Army, U.S. Marine Corps, and U.S. 

Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). It then 

examines landpower’s contributions to potential combat operations through wide area defense and maneuver to deterrence through forward presence and 

peacetime operations, and security engagement with 

the region’s landpower-dominant allies, partners, and 

competitors. With this understanding of landpower’s 

capabilities to support national interests in a semi-enclosed maritime environment and recommendations 

to improve its potential in air-sea environments, the 

reader will better understand that landpower’s supporting and stabilizing role is especially important in 

a theater like the South China Sea.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

 Director

 Strategic Studies Institute and

 U.S. Army War College Press
ix

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

CLARENCE J. BOUCHAT is a retired U.S. Air Force 

officer, and an adjunct instructor at the U.S. Army War 

College (USAWC) Department of Distance Education. 

He served in several assignments in East Asia, including the American Embassy in Kuala Lumpur. He has 

taught strategy, geography, and East Asia studies at 

the University of Maryland University College, Harrisburg Area Community College, and his alma mater the U.S. Air Force Academy. He is the author of 

several works on the South China Sea, and developer 

of the political-military board game South China Sea

in support of a course he teaches on this region. He 

is also a Wiki Supervisor and senior analyst for the 

crowd-sourced strategic intelligence consultancy 

Wikistrat Inc.

xi

SUMMARY

U.S. landpower in the South China Sea is an essential component to stabilizing this contested region. 

Together, the U.S. Army, Marine Corps, and Special 

Operations Forces (SOF) offer distinctive capabilities 

whose defensive nature in this semi-enclosed maritime environment tend to be less prone to escalation 

while still sending an unequivocal message of committed support and steady resolve to partners and 

competitors alike. To establish U.S. landpower as 

a critical part of security and stability in the region, 

this monograph presents how its wide-ranging capabilities are important in directly supporting U.S. interests. Even in a sea- and air-dominated environment, 

landpower’s broad operational and diverse support 

capabilities in pursuit of increasingly interdependent 

joint and unified operations make it an indispensable 

element in attaining U.S. interests. Landpower may be 

the most decisive, flexible, and versatile force through 

full spectrum operations, fully covering the range from 

humanitarian assistance to conventional state-on-state 

warfare; landpower is also crucial to understanding, 

engaging, and influencing people and leaders. U.S. 

landpower holds special influence because land forces 

dominate this region’s military structure.

The first of the strategic roles of landpower, to 

compel or fight and win decisively, is more important 

than is normally credited in a maritime environment. 

The U.S. Army provides indispensable support to 

other forces and agencies through its theater opening 

and sustaining abilities. Through its core competency 

of wide area security, U.S. landpower is responsible 

for passive and active means to protect against external and internal threats. The Army’s air and missile 
xii

defense systems are particularly needed in this antiaccess area-denial (A2AD) environment against preemptive strikes. The security role of sea control from 

the land through anti-ship missiles is a historic and influential one in a semi-enclosed sea environment, but 

still needs to be operationally developed by U.S. land 

forces. The counterland mission through surface-tosurface missiles acts as a shield to suppress close-in attack systems located around the region. Another core 

competency is combined arms maneuver. Amphibious operations are a useful option during disasters 

and in the periphery of combat operations around the 

South China Sea. Maneuver by air offers another option, but is also vulnerable in the current threat environment. Landpower’s combat capability is a measure 

of last resort, but does give credibility to landpower’s 

deter and engage strategic roles.

The second of the strategic roles of U.S. landpower, 

to deter and prevent war, is also crucial to stability in 

Southeast Asia. Deterrence needs to exhibit the will 

to back combat capabilities, which is demonstrated 

through the forward presence of troops and prepositioning of equipment and supplies. The advantages 

of forward positioning can be gained through using 

hardened, dispersed, or temporary facilities. U.S. 

landpower’s ability to help mitigate crises and contingencies, whether security related or from natural or 

manmade disasters, is another means to show its resolve and capability in the region. The importance of 

landpower to deterrence and preventing war is due to 

the resolve that land forces represent when committed 

by the U.S. Government. With forward presence and 

the operational interaction with the forces of Southeast Asia, U.S. forces have more opportunity to assure 

partners.
xiii

U.S. landpower’s strategic role to engage states 

and shape conditions may well reduce the need for 

deterrence or combat. Through security cooperation 

and engagement activities, regional states may better understand each other and ensure stability and 

security to address U.S. and regional states’ interests. 

U.S. landpower builds partner capacity through interpersonal and organizational engagements. Security 

cooperation activities also help to develop the capabilities of friendly forces and regional interoperability 

through security assistance from the United States. 

The forward presence of U.S. land forces reinforces the 

strengths and advantages of shaping and engagement 

activities. Although all three U.S. landpower strategic 

roles—combat and compel, deter and prevent, and engage and shape—are mutually dependent upon each 

other, engage and shape may be the most important in 

stabilizing the disputes in the South China Sea.

The use of landpower to address the disputes in 

the South China Sea is not usually considered in what 

is typically labeled a maritime- and air-centric theater, 

but the role of U.S. landpower is profound in this arena, and its influence will be undeniable in preventing 

war; or, should that fail, winning the peace.

1

U.S. LANDPOWER IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA

“Speak softly but carry a big stick.”

—Theodore Roosevelt, U.S. President, 1901.

 

INTRODUCTION1

The use of landpower to help shape the disputes in 

the South China Sea is not usually considered in what 

is typically labeled a maritime- and air-centric theater. 

The conventional wisdom of media, political, academic, and even military participants in the South China 

Sea debate is headlined by the U.S. military concept of 

Air-Sea Battle that was developed to ensure freedom 

of access to the region.2 In part, this wisdom is based 

on the fact that within the 122,648,000 nautical square 

miles encompassing the South China Sea, there are 

less than 5 square miles of naturally occurring land in 

the Spratly and Paracel Islands, with China’s current 

controversial contributions nearly doubling that land 

mass but only adding a tiny fraction overall.3 To further 

emphasize the point, no U.S. Army or Marine Corps 

general officer has ever commanded U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), and the U.S. Army only recently 

upgraded its senior officer in the Pacific region to the 

rank of full General in 2013.4 Even the Department of 

Defense’s (DoD) foundational 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) report only mentions landpower 

in East Asia in terms of its well-established presence 

in Northeast Asia.5 Between vast ocean distances and 

institutional neglect, what is the role of ground forces 

in the South China Sea compared to the seemingly 

better-suited platforms of air and naval forces?
2

U.S. landpower in the South China Sea should not 

be overlooked, because it offers important options that 

can often be applied with a lower risk of exacerbating direct conflict. As the only form of military power 

that covers the full range of military options, from 

humanitarian assistance to full conventional combat, 

landpower’s flexibility and capabilities help manage 

both peace and conflict in this region. Should the situation come to conflict, sea and air power would be the 

primary means of fighting in the South China Sea region. They are what then-Secretary of Defense Ashton 

Carter bluntly called the “big stick,” while transiting 

the South China Sea aboard the aircraft carrier USS 

Theodore Roosevelt.

6

 Landpower is nonetheless important to augment the capabilities found in the other 

domains through essential direct support to diverse 

joint military operations, interagency activities, and in 

its own engagement, deterrence, and strategic combat 

roles. Perhaps even more important is that the defensive nature of landpower, when applied in this region, 

is less prone to escalation, while still sending an unequivocal message of resolve to partners and competitors alike. Landpower represents a strong element of 

“speak softly” engagement to enhance the ability of 

countries to defend themselves, gives pause to states 

with aggressive intentions, creates networks that enhance abilities synergistically, and may also break 

down barriers to misunderstanding—all of which 

should result in a stabilizing role for U.S. landpower 

through its proper application in the South China Sea.

To show how U.S. landpower is necessary in stabilizing this contested region during America’s strategic 

rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region, this monograph 

presents the concept of landpower with its wide-ranging capabilities and its complementary application in 

the newly articulated concept of the human domain 
3

or the human aspects of military operations. The components of landpower are presented, along with how 

it is a required part of joint operations affecting the 

air and maritime domains. How landpower supports 

U.S. interests in the South China Sea sets the stage to 

then explore landpower’s contributions to potential 

combat operations, through wide area defense and 

maneuver, deterrence through forward presence, and 

actual operations. U.S. interests are also complementarily supported through landpower-specific cooperation activities meant to shape beneficial outcomes and 

assure regional allies and partners, and positively engage possible rivals like China. Associated with these 

findings are recommendations to better execute land 

operations in a maritime environment. This monograph will show how landpower is important in a 

supporting and stabilizing role, even—perhaps especially—in the South China Sea.

LANDPOWER AND THE HUMAN DOMAIN

Throughout history, landpower has been the 

dominant force available during conflict. With later 

developments of sea, air, space, and cyberspace power—distinctly articulated by persuasive proponents 

advocating for fast and technically based victory—the 

concept of landpower has been taken for granted or 

simply overlooked. Thus, an overview of landpower, 

its attributes, capabilities, and components are needed, along with an examination of connections with the 

human domain and other institutions to gauge their 

influence on maritime issues.

Landpower is defined by the U.S. Army as “the ability—by threat, force, or occupation—to gain, sustain, 

and exploit control over land, resources, and people.”7

This official definition, however, seems too focused on 
4

landpower’s role in a crisis and diminishes its other 

important contributions to peace and stability. A more 

apt definition is “the ability in peace, crisis, and war 

to exert prompt and sustained influence on or from 

land.”8 This latter definition offers the advantages of 

broadening landpower’s role across the six phases of 

military operations and widening its reach into each 

of the environmental domains of military power to 

enable the synergy of joint operations.9 Using this latter definition, landpower is viewed from the strategic 

level, meaning “the application of landpower toward 

achieving overarching national or multinational . . . 

security objectives.”10 Landpower advances U.S. interests through all phases of operations, in all environmental domains, and in support of ground and 

integrated joint operations using personnel and capabilities associated with land forces, as stressed by 

no one less than USPACOM’s Commander Admiral 

Harry Harris in 2016.11

Landpower inherently offers important enduring 

qualities and attributes that are necessary to any operation in a maritime-dominant environment. For example, landpower can positively control or influence 

targeted terrain and populations, rather than just deny 

control to an adversary (as is the mode for air, sea, 

and cyberspace operations).12 The corollary to positive 

control is that landpower is also “temporally durable” 

in that it can sustain its control far longer than forces 

in the other domains.13 Since war and peace are extensions of politics, and politics is a human endeavor, 

landpower is also a politically decisive force since 

only it can discriminately and directly influence or 

control human populations to achieve enduring political outcomes “operat[ing] among populations, not 

adjacent to them or above them.”14 Landpower is also 

the most adaptable and comprehensive of the forces—
5

encompassing missions from peacekeeping and stability operations to major ground combat.15 With these 

attributes, “there is no more unmistakable or unambiguous display of American resolve than the highly 

visible deployment of landpower,” as declared jointly 

by the U.S. Chief of Staff of the Army, Commandant 

of the Marine Corps, and Commander of U.S. Special 

Operations Command (USSOCOM).16 Although the 

South China Sea region itself lacks land and population, as a semi-enclosed sea fringed by partners, 

competitors, and large population concentrations that 

control this region, it remains prime ground to apply 

the strengths of landpower.

The flexibility and range of roles attributed to 

landpower are best described by “full spectrum operations,” which is an illustrative but older U.S. Army 

term.17 Since the end of the Cold War, the Army and 

Marine Corps have broadened into capability-based 

(as opposed to threat-based) forces; making them 

more versatile across the wide spectrum of military 

operations (see Figure 1).18 Although the Army best 

demonstrates this concept through its array and depth 

of capabilities and more specialized and numerous 

personnel, this notion also applies to the U.S. Marine Corps, which like the Army has recently been 

involved in full spectrum operations from stability 

and special operations to major combat in Iraq and 

Afghanistan. According to its foundational doctrine, 

The Army, Army Doctrinal Publication (ADP) 1, these 

full spectrum capabilities enable landpower to:

• Impose the Nation’s will on an enemy, by force if 

necessary.

• Engage to influence, shape, prevent, and deter in 

any operational environment.

• Establish and maintain a stable environment that 

sets the conditions for political and economic 

development.
6

• Address the consequences of catastrophic events—

both natural and man-made—to restore infrastructure and re-establish basic civil services.

• Secure and support bases from which joint forces 

can influence and dominate the air, land, and maritime domains of an operational environment.19

These listed capabilities are exercised through “winning the clash of wills” inherent in human competition in the recently articulated human domain.20 Each 

of these capabilities will be explored further in this 

monograph, since each is of great importance in applying landpower in maritime environments through 

landpower’s combat, deterrence, and engagement 

operations.

Figure 1. Range of Effectiveness of Military 

Options.21
7

As nearly all people live on land, and landpower is the predominant force in the land domain, it is 

also the dominant force in the human domain—such 

that “the human domain, coupled with the land domain, is the crux for decisive action.”22 This intersection between the land and human domains demonstrates a major role of landpower in a semi-enclosed 

maritime environment. USSOCOM defines the human 

domain as “the totality of the physical, cultural and 

social environments that influence human behavior 

to the extent that success of any military operation 

or campaign depends on the application of unique 

capabilities that are designed to fight and win population-centric conflicts.”23 The British joint doctrine 

definition, “the totality of the human sphere of activity or knowledge,”24 parallels the U.S. definition, but 

is more apt for this analysis because its broader scope 

may include deterrent and engagement activities that 

are major landpower contributors to stability using 

the full spectrum of military operations. Since peace, 

politics, and war are endeavors in the human domain, 

they are best conducted person-to-person rather than 

by technical means, in order to “figur[e] out how other 

people think so we can influence their actions.”25 As 

a “conceptualization of the influence that populations 

have on military operations,” this domain and its human factors have long been a part of the “military 

maneuver space” in terms of culture, religion, history, 

economic and political relationships, use of technology, and other human attributes, with some detractors complaining that “institutionalizing” the term as 

a separate human domain unnecessarily muddies a 

time-tested concept.26 Use of the term human domain 

is controversial, even among landpower advocates, 

and the concept might better be called by its newly 
8

coined U.S. Joint Staff J7 term: “human aspects of military operations.”27 Whether a new full-fledged domain 

or a traditional planning consideration, taking into account that human psychological factors are important 

in modern military operations, this aspect will play a 

significant role in U.S. landpower in maritime environments, especially in military engagement activities 

and preventing “population centric-conflict.”28

After examining landpower, its attributes, and 

its influence within the land and human domains, 

understanding the composition of landpower forces 

are helpful to establish their importance in the South 

China Sea disputes. U.S. landpower is a triad of land 

forces from the Army, Marine Corps, and Special Operations Command (SOCOM), including their reserve 

components, numbering over one million members, 

although that may change under U.S. President Donald Trump’s administration.29 “U.S. ground forces 

provide expeditionary (especially . . . [U.S. Marine 

Corps]) and sustained (especially . . . [U.S. Army]) 

capability needed to deter or defeat aggression,”30

and USSOCOM’s core competency is its high-impact, 

low-footprint combat effectiveness and persuasive 

engagement within the human domain.31 The Army 

claims the core war fighting competencies of combined arms maneuver, wide area security, and special 

operations—each detailed in this monograph—which 

collectively constitute its offensive, defensive, and stability operations. In support of other military services, 

the Army also claims seven enabling competencies 

that serve joint and combined operations, also to be 

covered in detail.32 Like the Army, the Marine Corps 

operates in the land and human domains, differing in 

its reliance on the maritime domain as its operational 

base in order to be “the right force in the right place 
9

at the right time.”33 These rapid response capabilities 

can “shape the environment, and set conditions to deploy the full capabilities of the Joint Force and other 

elements of National Power,” but Marine operations 

lack the sustainability and political decisiveness of the 

U.S. Army.34 Special Operations Forces (SOF) are not a 

separate service, but draw forces from the U.S. Army 

SOCOM, U.S. Marine Corps Forces SOCOM, and specialized elements of the U.S. Air Force and Navy.35

Joint Publication (JP) 3-05, Special Operations, states 

that:

Special operations require unique modes of employment, tactics, techniques, procedures, and equipment. 

They are often conducted in hostile, denied, or politically and/or diplomatically sensitive environments, 

and are characterized by one or more of the following: 

time-sensitivity, clandestine or covert nature, low visibility, work with or through indigenous forces, greater requirements for regional orientation and cultural 

expertise, and a higher degree of risk.36

SOFs are even lighter, faster, and more focused than 

Marines, but also less able to sustain themselves.37 In 

the South China Sea region, SOFs are especially important for “training, advising, and assisting . . . foreign 

forces, enabling them to support their governments’ 

security and stability,”38 and are well suited for operations in the “gray zone” of conflict between full war 

and peace.39 During the fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan, SOF and conventional land forces attained an 

“unprecedented level of interdependence and cooperation” that will continue to serve the United States 

well in its pursuit of national objectives.40

One last aspect of landpower must be emphasized: 

landpower does not stand alone but is fully integrated 

and interdependent with forces of the other domains as 
10

practiced within U.S. joint doctrine.41 Expectations in 

modern joint operations are no longer for the military 

services to be just interoperable, but also interdependent, defined as “the deliberate reliance of one armed 

service on the capabilities of another armed service,”42

meaning that the military services “will depend upon 

each other for the performance of the majority of 

the[ir] roles, missions, and tasks.”43 This results in the 

“seamless application of combat power between domains,” or “cross-domain synergy.”44 Thus, U.S. land 

forces support and operate in synergy with sea, air, 

cyber, and space forces under a joint commander (i.e., 

the commander of USPACOM or a delegated subordinate), and also integrate with the activities of other 

government agencies (the interagency in “unified action”) and in multinational (combined) efforts.45 Under these circumstances, the U.S. Army contributes 

to joint operations to: “(1) shape the security environment; (2) set the theater; and (3) project national 

power . . . [as well as] conduct: (4) combined arms 

maneuver; (5) wide area security . . . and (7) special 

operations.”46 In a predominately maritime region, 

some landpower capabilities that support joint operations, as covered in this monograph, include logistics 

and sustainment support, wide area defense, maneuver from the sea, air and sea control from the land, 

engineering and civil action, and the creation of a secure environment.47 As lighter, more combat-oriented 

forces, special operations and Marine Corps forces 

provide much less enabling support to other forces, 

instead, needing support for their own long-term activities. Landpower’s support to joint operations is especially relevant in the South China Sea, since its other 

core warfighting competencies are clipped by the farflung maritime environment.
11

Even in a sea- and air-dominant environment, 

landpower’s broad operational and strong support 

capabilities in pursuit of increasingly interdependent 

joint and unified operations make it an indispensable element in attaining U.S. interests. Landpower 

may be the most decisive force through persistent 

control of terrain and populations in the land and human domains. Land forces are also the most flexible 

and versatile force through full spectrum operations, 

making it essential at all levels of military operations, 

from peacetime engagement to major combat—especially the ability to understand, engage, and influence 

people through the activities of SOF and, increasingly, 

Army and Marine forces. Landpower’s capabilities 

are crucial for attaining the United States’ national 

security interests of peace and stability in maritime 

environments.

LANDPOWER’S SUPPORT TO U.S. INTERESTS 

IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA

The United States’ national interests are simple, 

broad, and long-standing. They ensure:

• The security of the United States, its citizens, and 

U.S. allies and partners;

• A strong, innovative, and growing U.S. economy 

in an open international economic system that 

promotes opportunity and prosperity;

• Respect for universal values at home and around 

the world; and

• A rules-based international order advanced by 

U.S. leadership that promotes peace, security, and 

opportunity through stronger cooperation to meet 

global challenges.48
12

Each of these interests is directly supported by U.S. 

military forces as outlined in the DoD’s QDR report 

and other supporting documents.49 For example, the 

2012 National Defense Strategy established the “rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region,” emphasizing 

support to existing alliances and expanding cooperation with emerging partners, making the first national 

interest a prime task for U.S. landpower in the South 

China Sea region through its strategic roles of combat, 

deterrence, and engagement.50 Deterrence, through 

U.S. military forces and its allies and partners, also 

supports the economy and an open international system by ensuring free movement through the world’s 

busiest waterway and the well-being of a major region’s economy. Landpower addresses this interest by 

preventing intimidation, promoting internal stability, 

and building relationships in the region.51 Landpower 

is especially adept at reinforcing respect for universal 

values through military-to-military shaping and engagement activities with other forces in Southeast Asia, 

as will also be shown.52 Finally, landpower’s presence 

promotes stability and security by reassuring friends 

through security cooperation activities and engaging 

adversaries beneficially—with additional positive effects from engagement bestowed to the other national 

interests as well.53 American values and interests in 

the region have remained consistent for decades, but 

the importance of landpower in their pursuit has increased in both its harder and softer forms.

These U.S. interests, through the military and 

landpower’s strategic roles, are manifest in 10 primary missions assigned to the U.S. Armed Forces by the 

DoD.54 Around the South China Sea, landpower, with 

forces from the other domains, directly supports the 

combat missions to:
13

• Deter and Defeat Aggression

• Project Power Despite Anti-Access Area Denial 

[A2AD] Challenges55

Under deterrence and contingency operations, landpower: 

• [Performs] Counterterrorism and Irregular 

Warfare

• Provide[s] A Stabilizing Presence

• Conduct[s] Stability and Counterinsurgency 

Operations 

• Conduct[s] Humanitarian, Disaster Relief, 

and Other Operations56

Engagement activities with partners and rivals build 

understanding, cooperation, capabilities, and confidence, useful on their own, but that also strengthens 

deterrence and combat abilities.57 To fulfill these missions, USPACOM’s strategy in essence:

USPACOM protects and defends, in concert with 

other U.S. Government agencies, the territory of the 

United States, its people, and its interests. With allies 

and partners, USPACOM is committed to enhancing stability in the Asia-Pacific region by promoting 

security cooperation, encouraging peaceful development, responding to contingencies, deterring aggression, and, when necessary, fighting to win. This approach is based on partnership, presence, and military 

readiness.58

The subordinate landpower headquarters of U.S. 

Army Pacific Command (USARPAC), Marine Corps 

Forces Pacific (MARFORPAC), and Special Operations 

Command Pacific (SOCPAC) address the USPACOM 
14

commander’s intent by supporting access to common 

domains, strengthening alliances and partnerships 

through security cooperation and engagement, enhancing landpower’s forward presence and posture 

in the region, sustaining force projection into the region, assisting others against terrorism and during 

disasters, and being ready to fight and win.59 Despite 

the apparent environmental limitations the region imposes on land forces, landpower directly supports national objectives in the South China Sea region along 

with the other U.S. Government agencies, services, 

and international partners and allies.

Where U.S. interests overlap with the interests of 

other states in the region, landpower may also support and be a welcome addition to the mutual goals 

of stability and security. Even a potential competitor 

like China shares interests with the United States as 

cited in the 2010 U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS),

which directs U.S. Government efforts to “pursue a 

positive, constructive, and comprehensive relationship with China,” a tone that was continued in the 

2015 NSS.60 Former Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta 

noted that both countries have a stake in codependent prosperity and security in the region and thus 

need a productive bilateral relationship, which with 

time will probably be adopted by President Trump’s 

administration, as did initially “tough-on-China” former U.S. Presidents Ronald Reagan, Bill Clinton, and 

George W. Bush within a year or two of taking office.61

A peaceful regional environment allows the Chinese 

Government to focus on its “national goal . . . to build 

a moderately prosperous society and achieve the great 

rejuvenation of the Chinese people by 2050,” which is 

key to maintaining its legitimacy; they have also used 

bilateral, multilateral, and institutional engagements 
15

to achieve some common goals.62 Potential and actual 

military-to-military exchanges of mutual interest with 

China emanating from landpower cover counterterrorism and other transnational threat initiatives, humanitarian and disaster response, peacekeeping, professional education, and building personal contacts 

that are indispensable to preventing misperception 

and building cooperation, especially important during times of tension (as is covered in more detail later 

in this monograph).63 Peaceful development through 

successful engagement, both military and with the 

other elements of national power, over common interests with China benefits all sides, and landpower is 

a robust component in achieving it through security 

cooperation efforts that “help ward off miscalculation 

and war.”64

Although USPACOM is actively building militaryto-military relationships with China, it must also balance a credible military deterrence and fighting ability 

against it because this complex relationship is also one 

of rivalry and diverging interests.65 Secretary of Defense James Mattis identified China as one of the three 

greatest challenges to the United States since World 

War II, remarking that relations with China would 

require special management, especially with respect 

to the South China Sea,66 since many analysts believe 

that China wants to dominate the region and deny influence there to the United States.67 The Chinese military strategy to achieve this:

‘Active Defense,’ states that the PRC [People’s Republic of China] will never take aggressive offensive 

action outside its territory, but is prepared to defend 

its territory [including] . . . territorial waters and airspace . . . [and] safeguarding its maritime rights and 

interests.68
16

Active Defense allows the preemptive use of force but 

avoids involvement in major wars when possible.69

China’s 2009 reaffirmation of the U-Shaped line in the 

South China Sea is part of this strategy to control its 

claimed national space, although it was not recognized 

by the international Permanent Court of Arbitration in 

The Hague in its 2016 ruling and is actively contested 

by its neighbors—China’s aggressive enforcement of 

its claims has led to clashes.70 The U.S. response to 

this has not been a Cold War-like policy of containment, as asserted by the Chinese, but a more nuanced 

channel to funnel China’s rise in power and use of 

influence toward internationally acceptable methods 

and goals.71 American diplomat Zalmay Khalilzad describes the American response as “congagement,” in 

which containment and confrontation are used with 

engagement to affect a range of activities that a peacetime U.S. military may perform to influence China’s 

rise. This results in three possible U.S.-China security 

relationships in the South China Sea: first, they may 

“establish a security partnership designed to protect 

common interests; second, they remain security competitors with an ambiguous relationship; or third, they 

become adversarial.”72 U.S. landpower’s ability to 

project power from the land and sea as well as engage 

peacefully on security issues is part of this “congagement” mix to channel Chinese actions and its ultimate 

rise in power in a way that benefits U.S., Chinese, and 

neighbors’ interests.73

The United States and the region’s powers need 

each other’s support to achieve their shared interests of preventing conflict and developing stability 

and prosperity in the South China Sea region, especially for freedom of navigation and access to the 

resources of this regional commons.74 The Southeast 
17

Asian states have traditionally been wary of China’s 

growing military capability and assertiveness, which 

have put each at an economic, political, and military 

disadvantage, but these states have been unable to 

coalesce or effectively counter China on their own.75

China’s antagonism sometimes pushes these Southeast Asian states to seek more U.S. diplomatic and 

military presence to balance the Chinese hegemon.76

China’s coercion is most recently seen in the “coercive gradualism” or small “gray zone” advances of 

dredging reefs into artificial islands and militarizing 

them along with advanced A2AD capability and belligerent maritime confrontations.77 China also co-opts 

these states through economic dependence as a major 

trading partner, with investments and developments 

through instruments like China’s new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and other interests affecting all, such as energy security and counterterrorism. 

Weak U.S. leadership and presence in the region may 

have led Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte to seek 

rapprochement and more balanced relations with a 

previously antagonistic China.

Even these beneficial actions worry some regional 

leaders for the dependence they foster in an unequal 

hub-and-spoke system with China dominating the 

center.78 For that reason, the expansion of U.S. defense 

and security ties would be welcome. U.S. landpower 

can play a reassuring role for these partners through 

countering transnational security threats, natural 

disaster operations, professionalization of forces, information sharing, building partner military capacity 

and interoperability in missions from peacekeeping 

to combat, and the simple presence of U. S. forces, 

which help partner states to better face internal and 

external threats.79 Committing U.S. landpower to the 
18

region is a strong indication of U.S. determination for 

partners and allies’ security; but regional partners balance their diplomacy between China and the United 

States, as they are not fully convinced of America’s 

commitment to pivot to Asia, or how this may effect 

Chinese behavior in the long-term.80 For instance, how 

far will the United States support Filipino actions on 

Scarborough Shoal after the South China Sea ruling 

by the Permanent Court of Arbitration?81 Common 

interests and a desire for strategic balance led USARPAC’s former commander, General Vincent Brooks, to 

observe, “Many of the countries in the region look to 

the United States as kind of an honest broker and a big 

brother,” to balance the perceived dominating tendencies by China.82

U.S. landpower’s traits and capabilities may be the 

best suited among the military services to perform the 

broad strategic roles of “bolstering defense of allies 

and deterring aggression; promoting regional security and stability through security cooperation; and 

ameliorating the growing United States-China security dilemma” in support of mutually shared goals.83

Landpower plays a prime role because of its inherent 

and influential advantages with the militaries of the 

Southeast Asian littoral. Even in this maritime-rich environment, few states can afford effective air or naval 

forces. The lack of air or naval forces results in regional military structures dominated by land forces which 

can best address these states’ most important security 

requirements, which are often land-based, “giving 

army-army contacts greater weight in military, political, and security affairs.”84 In 2017, the Chiefs of the 

Armed Forces of China, Taiwan, Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Brunei were army officers; and the army was the largest and most influen-
19

tial force in each of these states as well.85 At the much 

lower squad-level, soldiers and marines of the region 

also have more in common with U.S. land forces than 

their counterparts have with the highly sophisticated 

U.S. Air Force or Navy.86 Thus, assistance from the 

world’s most credible army, marine, and SOF are often well-received in the region, and these land-forceto-land-force contacts greatly enhance the other forms 

of U.S. national power.87

The physical environment makes U.S. land forces 

a more influential and welcome stabilizer in the South 

China Sea region, ironically for similar reasons why 

landpower is often overlooked there. In the insular 

and littoral geography of Southeast Asia, the classic 

picture of U.S. land forces massing troops and maneuvering over swaths of land is restrained, forcing 

it instead to employ its supporting missions, which 

present U.S. landpower as a more defensive and less 

threatening presence to a rival since its capabilities 

in the region are distinct from offensive ones, while 

still reassuring partners.88 Forward deploying ground 

troops into a contentious region is the most tangible 

signal possible of U.S. resolve and commitment by 

a casualty-adverse American public.89 Land forces 

working in small units within the human domain may 

be less visible and thus more politically acceptable 

while discreetly operating close to native forces and 

reassuring allies with their ability to hold ground.90

Land forces are well suited to perform manpower intensive activities of mutual interest to partners in nonthreatening areas like disaster response, development 

missions, and transnational crime while supporting a 

U.S. interagency partner through civic action.91 Such 

engagement reassures by strengthening the long-term 

stability and legitimacy of Southeast Asian partners 
20

and by giving an American presence a softer, collaborative hue, while still being able to act as a deterrent 

in the region.

Landpower cooperating with allies and partners in 

this way may help to allay China’s perception of the 

threat of U.S. forces deployed around the South China 

Sea littorals.92 China’s relationship with U.S. air and 

sea power, however, is framed by the Air-Sea Battle 

concept that stresses the second part of their “cooperate-compete” relationship, and although a necessary 

part of a comprehensive American strategy, Air-Sea 

Battle entails danger and risk that needs to be balanced by other approaches.93 Former Secretary of Defense Carter’s earlier reference to the “big stick” is balanced by a “speak softly” engagement of which U.S. 

landpower is the main proponent in a (more, but not 

entirely) cooperative military relationship with China.94 The USARPAC commander once described land 

forces as the “good cop, cooperating with its Chinese 

counterparts on such mutually beneficial missions as 

disaster relief.”95 Such a U.S. landpower presence and 

relationship may benefit all sides by “mitigating some 

of the worst fears . . . over China’s rise . . . [while] China 

might welcome a pacifying role played by the United 

States vis-à-vis aggressive tendencies of American allies.”96 Unlike sea and air power, U.S. landpower does 

not challenge any of China’s current main objectives 

in the region—such as control of the South China Sea 

islands, historic rights to its resources, and protection 

of sea lanes and the homeland—nor does it engage in 

the most immediate source of friction—close proximity surveillance from China’s claimed waters.97 With 

these inherent advantages, U.S. land forces may engage closer with China and the Southeast Asian states 

to continue to reassure, build confidence, and bring 

stability to their overall relationships.
21

Land forces are an important and adaptive contributor in support of mutual U.S., partner, and competitor interests around the South China Sea through 

U.S. landpower’s inherent strengths and capabilities. 

If the United States is to channel tensions in the region 

toward internationally acceptable forms of growth, 

prosperity, stability, and security, U.S. landpower 

holds an outsized influence, because: land-force-toland-force contact is the dominate influence in this 

region’s military structure; the less threatening defensive nature of U.S. landpower in the area; and its 

ability to play the “good cop” through engagement. 

USARPAC, SOCPAC, and MARFORPAC are dualmissioned for peacetime engagement and combat, for 

instance:

Engaging the theater and working alongside partners 

is USARPAC’s first line of effort in a theater campaign 

support plan designed to enable the command—by, 

with, or through allies and partners—to deter aggression, 

build capacity, and assure USPACOM success [italics 

in original].98

This soft role for land forces is summarized succinctly 

as “day-to-day engagement [that] plays a fundamental role in shaping the strategic and operational security environment . . . vital to communicating intent 

and influencing others in the region to address shared 

interests.”99 From this firm grounding of what and 

who landpower is, how it supports American security interests around the South China Sea littoral, and 

its special influence there, how this is accomplished 

through landpower’s capabilities is addressed next.
22

CAPABILITIES OF LANDPOWER IN THE SOUTH 

CHINA SEA

The balance of cooperation and confrontation 

among China, the United States, and Southeast Asian 

countries is a delicate one. The Council of Foreign 

Affairs’ Preventive Priorities Survey 2017 categorizes 

the possibility of conflict in the East and South China 

Seas as potentially high in impact, if low in likelihood, 

while other commentators forecast confrontation between a rising and established world power.100 For this 

possibility, U.S. joint land forces must be prepared for 

their combat role in defending U.S. and allied interests, and supporting air and sea power in their roles, 

“if for no other reason than to deter [war].”101 Prevention or deterrence of conflict is a second major role of 

landpower using its presence and capabilities to reassure partners and to help stabilize against internal 

and external political, developmental, environmental 

disaster, and military challenges.102 Former U.S. President Barack Obama’s administration worked under 

the premise that conflict with China was possible, but 

not inevitable, thus necessitating strong U.S. alliances and military capability. Despite its early hawkish 

announcements, this may develop to be the Trump 

administration’s policy, since Secretary of State Rex 

Tillerson’s core foreign policy belief appears be that 

the United States needs to reassert itself as a means 

of deterrence to reassure Asian allies and to counter 

what Trump advisers Peter Navarro and Alexander 

Gray described as Obama’s policy of speaking loudly 

but “carrying a small stick.”103 The three strategic roles 

of U.S. landpower—shape by assuring friends and restraining adversaries through engagement; prevent or 

deter conflict by denying an aggressor its objectives 
23

through presenting credible combat forces; and win 

by compelling an enemy and dominating decisively 

when committed—are an efficient framework used 

here to analyze landpower’s capabilities.104 Although 

parsed in this analysis, all three strategic roles are 

interdependent upon each other and other services 

and agencies for success. This section presents landpower’s capabilities in terms of its indispensable support to joint operations, its combat roles of wide area 

security and maneuver in a semi-enclosed maritime 

environment, its contributions to deterrence through 

a tangible forward presence and through crisis and 

contingency operations, and landpower’s premier engagement abilities to build military partner capacity, 

reassure allies, and engage adversaries.

One of landpower’s greatest but most overlooked 

contributions to stability and security in the South 

China Sea is its foundational enabling support to joint 

forces. Because these support functions enable activities for all of the forces of air, sea, and land in their 

strategic roles, they will be presented before the specific role analysis of landpower that follows. As the 

largest and most diverse in capabilities, the U.S. Army 

features prominently as the DoD executive agent or 

lead service for a variety of joint combat support and 

sustainment enabling competencies directed by DoD 

and USPACOM.105 One of the Army’s directed responsibilities, as assigned by DoD Directive 5100.01, is to 

“provide logistics to joint operations and campaigns” 

or set the theater for joint use of U.S. military forces 

and other agencies of the U.S. Government and international forces.106 The Army’s 8th Theater Sustainment 

Command provides expertise and depth in these functions that “gives [U.S.] forces extraordinary endurance” in an efficient manner “to campaign for months 
24

and years, often in harsh environments.”107 Even in a 

maritime or air dispute that lasted more than a week, 

U.S. military services’ interdependence would require 

U.S. Army logistical support for sustaining dispersed 

airbases or the opening of ports and airfields.108 This 

operational Army task entails deliberate or forcible 

entry and theater opening to allow the “reception, 

staging, and onward movement” of joint or combined 

forces arriving in theater for engagement, deterrence, 

or combat activities.109 Once open, the Army ensures 

that logistics like food, fuel, ammunition, and medical support are distributed to the military services and 

civilian agencies like the U.S. Agency for International 

Development (USAID) through its port operations, 

helicopter lift, and long-haul trucking.110 Although 

the U.S. Army usually sustains joint forces when deployed, U.S. Marine forces can sustain themselves 

ashore and logistically support other joint forces for 

a limited period.111 Other unsung Army enabling support to the joint forces includes command, control, 

and communications. The U.S. Army is the most experienced and forthcoming of the military services 

in establishing joint task force (JTF) headquarters for 

theater commanders by setting up and integrating 

communication systems for all joint, interagency, and 

combined forces, and providing tailorable and scalable higher echelon division and corps headquarters 

as the command structure for JTFs.112 The U.S. Army 

also has a major medical capability in the Asia-Pacific 

region, including the deployable 18th Medical Command, offering preventive care, pandemic response, 

medical combat care, and intraregional medical transport for the joint forces.113 These and other services, 

like intelligence, are the foundation the U.S. Army 

lays for joint force operations in the South China Sea 
25

region. However, the potential A2AD and coercive 

gradualism threats around the region mean that these 

normally rear-area services are not always safe from 

attack and require other landpower capabilities to 

defend them and U.S. joint forces.

Landpower’s Combat and Compel Capabilities.

This monograph has made the case that, although 

unsought and unlikely, conflict could occur in the 

South China Sea region, and any combat involving 

the United States by necessity would involve U.S. 

landpower. In this semi-enclosed maritime environment, however, some aspects of landpower’s combat 

capabilities are restrained, while other capabilities 

are accentuated. The Army’s foundational doctrine 

ADP-1 categorizes landpower combat as “the ability 

to impose the Nation’s will on an enemy, by force if 

necessary.”114 This is summed up by landpower’s strategic role of “win,” in which it “must be ready to win 

decisively and dominantly when committed.”115 The 

caveat “by force if necessary” recognizes a second option of compelling an adversary with threatening or 

adverse expectations without an actual use of force in 

achieving national interests against an enemy’s will. 

Even if combat in the region is unlikely, the credibility of U.S. land forces in waging it is very important 

to deter conflict, to shape circumstances, and to reassure allies of their safety, security, and own capabilities. On this point, the retired Chief of the Australian 

Army, Lieutenant General David Morrison, observed 

that U.S. landpower’s “ability to shape and prevent is 

a direct reflection of [its] ability to compel . . . if you do 

not have the ability to win as a ground force, people 

are less likely to listen to you.”116 U.S. landpower’s 
26

most important contributions to compel and fight in 

the South China Sea arena are associated mainly with 

the U.S. Army conventional forces’ core competencies 

of wide area security and combined arms maneuver, 

shared with the U.S. Marine Corps.117 This section addresses U.S. landpower’s specific combat contributions germane to the South China Sea by analyzing 

its DoD directed responsibilities to the joint force, including missile forces to “interdict enemy air, sea, and 

space forces . . . from the land”; to “conduct airborne, 

air assault, and amphibious operations”; and to ensure wide area security, which will start this section’s 

analysis.118

Wide area security is one of the most important 

combat capabilities of landpower and a core competency of the U.S. Army. It is the “application of the 

elements of combat power in unified action to protect 

populations, forces, infrastructure, and activities.”119

The effort to protect an area from hostile threats can 

be done cooperatively with host nation forces, in contested areas during counterinsurgency operations, or 

coercively by seizing terrain and defending it (the latter scenarios are explained more in the deterrent and 

maneuver sections respectively).120 In the South China 

Sea region, U.S. Army and Marine forces are particularly adept at enhancing regional security using their 

diverse combat support capabilities against threats 

posed to land-based joint and partner forces.121 The 

most numerous forces in a combatant commander’s 

area of responsibility (AOR) are often land forces. 

Consequently, they are often assigned to wide area 

security through the concurrent use of the branches 

of landpower from infantry to engineers, intelligence, 

civil affairs, and aviation, to name just a few.122 An 

example of these missions includes hardening vul-
27

nerable wireless communications with well-buried 

landlines using communication and engineer troops 

to counter foreign intelligence intercepts and missile 

attacks.123 Military police and intelligence forces work 

together to defend against attacks of sabotage or insurgency on high-value assets like aircraft or headquarters, as was inflicted on U.S. forces during their 

involvement in the American-Vietnam War—a situation easily repeated in the coercive gradualism tactics 

practiced today in lower intensity conflicts.124 Within 

the intricate coasts and rivers of the region, internal 

security and protection may also be enhanced through 

the re-emerging concept of Mobile Riverine Forces that 

integrate a Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) 

with a Navy river assault group and host nation forces 

to patrol and pacify restive areas.125 Although an important capability for shallow water maneuver in this 

region, this requirement remains unfunded.126 As the 

most numerous and specialized troops for such missions and a well-practiced and proffered command 

and control (C2) capability for land control operations, 

a land force commander is often designated the Joint 

Security Coordinator for the Joint Security Area (JSA) 

that protects friendly territory and infrastructure in a 

designated, usually rear, area. U.S. land forces would 

probably be assigned most JSA duties if one were again 

set up in Southeast Asia.127 In addition, joint land forces enabled by U.S. Army civil affairs units often provide essential support during natural or man-made 

disasters, and during routine visits and exchanges 

they often work “to improve conditions over time and 

subsequently increase local and regional stability.”128

These are a sampling of the many necessary, but unglamorous tasks, which usually befall joint land forces 

to protect friendly forces, populations, territories, and 
28

infrastructure when needed by allies and partners. 

Also part of wide area security is the defense of territory and people by ensuring air and sea defense from 

the land capabilities, discussed next.

One proven function of landpower, as assigned by 

DoD to the U.S. Army, is its ability to defend against 

air and missile attacks using land-based radar and 

missile systems integrated under the joint force air 

component commander.129 In the South China Sea region, forward U.S. and friendly bases are vulnerable 

to preemptive air and missile strikes from China’s 

burgeoning A2AD system, meant to disrupt concentrated in-place or reinforcing U.S. and partner logistics 

and combat forces on land and at sea.130 For Southeast 

Asian countries, Chinese A2AD systems also have the 

potential for political coercion and to contest access to 

the South China Sea. Deployed U.S. air and missile defenses, commanded by the 94th Army Air and Missile 

Defense Command, are a partial counter to Chinese 

coercive gradualism.131 American partners and allies 

value these capabilities based on proven engagement 

against aircraft, cruise, and ballistic missiles; high system availability rate; concealment through road mobility; and, a relatively low public profile as defensive 

systems in host countries. Tactical anti-air and antimissile capabilities are delivered by the Patriot missile 

system; while inside and outside the atmosphere, ballistic missile intercepts are conducted at a greater range 

by the Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) 

system.132 While the first operational deployment of a 

THAAD system in 2013 to protect forces in the U.S. 

territory of Guam seems to be permanent, none of the 

Southeast Asian states has a similar capability. Even 

if invited to use Antonio Bautista Air Base (AB), a recently authorized temporary facility for U.S. forces 
29

on the western-most Philippine island of Palawan, 

THAAD’s range of 200 km would cover only a few of 

the most eastern Spratly Island features (and hardly 

any of the disputed oil-rich Reed Bank) and would 

not cover Scarborough Shoal from the nearest Philippine coastline, nor any features from Malaysia’s Borneo coast. The Patriot’s range is even shorter, limiting 

both systems to point defense.133 Improvements are 

in the process for each, with a future Patriot already 

successfully tested against tactical ballistic missiles, 

and a proposed THAAD-Extended Range potentially 

defending an area 9-12 times its current capabilities.134

Besides range, other weaknesses of both systems 

are their expense compared to the threats they counter, 

and a limited number of units to fill the much larger 

worldwide demand for them.135 Only 15 Patriot battalions and 6 THAAD batteries are operational in the 

entire army—eventually growing to 7 THAAD batteries, although a requirement for at least 9 batteries 

exists in the fiscally constrained budget. At the very 

least, U.S. bases on the southern Japanese island of 

Okinawa should also field Patriot and THAAD batteries.136 Additional air defense capability may be available through the Navy’s future Aegis Ashore System 

and those already aboard ships, but ship capability 

is also in short-supply and meant to defend the fleet, 

and which military service would employ a landbased Aegis remains contentious.137 To address these 

and other problems, a U.S. Senate bill intends to fund 

a “comprehensive operational assessment of a potential future role for U.S. ground forces in the island 

chains of the western Pacific in creating anti-access/

area denial (A2/AD) capabilities in cooperation with 

host nations.”138 As witnessed by China’s objections to 

the deployment of THAAD to South Korea to defend 
30

against a North Korean menace, China would likely 

also object to its deployment to defend U.S. partners 

around the South China Sea. As part of landpower’s 

wide area security role of defending defined areas and 

populations to reassure allies and protect forces and 

infrastructure, the limited range and small number 

make U.S. anti-air and anti-missile systems deployed 

to the South China Sea arena truly defensive systems 

against intimidation and for force protection, and not 

one of force projection.139

Another vital wide area security mission that U.S. 

landpower could play in the South China Sea revives 

the role of maritime control from the land. “Coastal 

defense was a core role of the U.S. Army in the 1800s 

and later, in the first half of the 1900s of the Marine 

Corps,” and is well suited as a modern mission in 

semi-enclosed maritime environments.140 The Army 

Operating Concept, 2020-2040 outlines the U.S. Army’s 

role in operating from the land domain in support 

of the air and maritime domains as part of the crossdomain synergy that complements the Air-Sea Battle 

concept.141 Modernized long-range anti-ship missiles 

employed by existing Army missile batteries could 

provide a new role for landpower that offers advantages. These include better hardened and dispersed 

assets than ship-based systems, increased effectiveness through greater available firepower, less cost 

as a deployed force, and when “fielded on a country’s sovereign territory, mak[es] a preemptive strike 

against them a significant escalation.”142 In this role, 

landpower complements air and sea power by maintaining near constant presence and creating options 

for friendly forces through bottlenecks and greater 

freedom of maneuver.143 This capability does not now 

exist, however, with U.S. Army and Marine Corps 
31

commanders reluctant to assume such a positional defense role again, choosing instead to emphasize maneuver capabilities during shrinking budgets.144 Some 

Army officials, however, support use of land-adapted 

RGM-84 Harpoons or the future development of a hypersonic anti-ship missile system for such a mission.145

Both Vietnam and Japan are developing shore-based 

anti-ship capabilities to match China’s A2AD, which 

offer cooperation opportunities to U.S. land forces. To 

increase allied interoperability and decrease acquisition time, the U.S. Army could adopt the Japanese 

or another land-based system. Using an allied system would “also promote partnered A2AD networks 

among friendly nations” to act both as a stronger deterrent and a more effective weapon.146 With a range of 

around 125 km, a land-based Harpoon system would 

remain a defensive weapon. However, should U.S. or 

friendly land forces employ a weapon with a greater 

range, similar to the 400 km Chinese YJ-62 anti-ship 

cruise missile already deployed to the Paracel Islands,147 they could cover much of the Spratly Islands 

from Philippine shores and—in conjunction with a 

deployment to Vietnam—contest sea lanes across 

much of the South China Sea while also covering most 

of the Paracel Islands.148 Former Defense Secretary 

Ashton Carter supported a hypervelocity projectile, 

which is a “precision-guided shell that can be fired 

from traditional artillery and naval cannons to give 

vastly greater range against a wide variety of targets, 

including ships at sea and potentially even incoming 

cruise missiles.”149 Admiral Harris, USPACOM Commander, envisions the use of “ground-based artillery 

to put ‘steel’ into the deep, blue sea—emplacing intelligent sea mines to restrict movement in the maritime 

domain.”150 Such capabilities pose an A2AD dilemma 
32

for China, as the United States is “merely trying to 

defend our allies. It’s the Chinese who have to come 

out.”151 An anti-ship mission still fits within the definition of wide area security, and adopting this concept 

in the South China Sea area has bipartisan support in 

the U.S. Congress, which requested a report “as to the 

feasibility, utility, and options for mobile, land-based 

systems to provide anti-ship fires.”152 China would object to the deployment of land-based coastal defense 

systems to the South China Sea; however, they would 

be reassuring for allies as the formation of a friendly 

A2AD system, a counter to Chinese militarization of 

the sea, and could make air and sea control from the 

land an “immovable anvil to the mobile hammer of 

the Air Force, Navy and Marines.”153

A third method by which U.S. landpower may 

counter Chinese power projection in the South China Sea is through land-based attack missiles, which 

could complicate aggressive Chinese actions by creating a contested no man’s “land,” forcing China to 

deploy defensive systems, not just offensive ones.154

Mobile surface-to-surface missiles can target small, 

militarized land features in a semi-enclosed maritime 

environment. Land attack missiles act not only as a 

“sword” against enemy forces on land, but also as a 

“shield” by suppressing an enemy’s ability to project 

power, which, along with air and sea defenses, enable friendly entry operations into the theater, and air 

and sea power to “form a mobile reserve behind the 

land defenses.”155 U.S. Army forces currently use the 

MGM-140 Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), 

which is a proven precision strike system against stationary or slow moving land targets at ranges up to 

300 km.156 Using ATACMS, an expeditionary force 

(EF) in the Philippines could range the eastern half of 
33

the Spratly Islands and Scarborough Shoals and just 

touch the Paracel Islands or China’s Hainan Dao from 

Vietnam. Like U.S. anti-air and anti-ship missile systems, the range and availability of current land attack 

missiles categorize this as a short-range suppression 

system, and so it remains in the wide area security 

mission. A missile system that increased ranges to 500 

km would cover all of the Spratly Islands from the 

Philippines and all of the Paracels and Hainan Dao 

from Vietnam.157 Former Secretary Carter also used 

the U.S. Navy’s reprogramming of its Tomahawk 

cruise missile to target moving ships at sea as an example for modifying ATACMS in the same way. Further enhancing U.S. capabilities is an in-development 

joint battle network linking sensor, C2, and fires from 

each of the military services so that information may 

be passed across systems and services to assist each 

other against air, sea, and land targets.158 Enhanced 

range and overlapping missile systems would be a direct threat to China’s Hainan Dao, but could counter 

the escalation of missile systems already in place in 

the Paracel and Spratly Islands.159

Another method of projecting power in a maritime 

environment is through the second of landpower’s 

core competencies: movement and maneuver used 

“to achieve a position of relative advantage” over a 

threat.160 The lack of maneuver by land is what some 

people consider when diminishing the influence of 

landpower in the South China Sea, but amphibious 

and air maneuver has had successful historic precedents in the Pacific region.161 The essential purpose 

for Air-Sea Battle is to enable maneuver for air, sea, 

and land operations in the region to effect “what happens on the land area of the littoral environment.”162

Amphibious maneuver is a core capability of the U.S. 
34

Marine Corps, under the key Marine Corps tasks of 

power projection and littoral maneuver, but one also 

assigned by DoD to the U.S. Army and SOF, all with 

support of the U.S. Navy.163 The amphibious role manifests in Air-Sea Battle as “seizing and defending advanced bases, particularly remote islands” to control 

the sea and air space around them in order to conduct 

follow-on operations.164 For this mission, the Marines 

use the combined arms MAGTF, consisting of ground, 

air, and logistical support elements.165 Unlike historic 

amphibious missions, however, the Marines employ 

the modern Seabasing Joint Integrated Concept, by 

which supporting ships are located over the horizon, 

projecting forces with a reduced logistics footprint directly onto or up to 240 miles beyond the beach to create a lodgment or staging area. The advantage of this 

ship-to-objective maneuver concept is: its flexibility in 

employing 3,000 marines and 15-days of supply with 

greater “speed, access, and persistence”; its ability to 

avoid enemy concentrations or nodes; that it requires 

less prepositioned afloat or logistical assets; and that 

it is not necessarily dependent upon use of vulnerable foreign sovereign fixed-facilities.166 Examples of 

combat seabasing and ship-to-objective maneuver are 

the insertion of marines from the Arabian Sea directly 

into combat positions in Afghanistan in 2001 and during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM in 2003.167 Although 

it entails significant force structure changes, the U.S. 

Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) 

is also implementing seabasing to revamp its mostly 

atrophied amphibious capability.168 For instance, the 

Army is currently training its helicopter pilots to operate from U.S. Navy ships at sea, and is making a priority acquisition for about two dozen multipurpose 

landing craft, the Maneuver Support Vessel (Light), 
35

replacing the Vietnam War era Landing Craft Mechanized or “Mike Boat.”169

The second form of landpower maneuver in this 

prevailing maritime realm is from the air, using conventional Army and SOF, which, like amphibious operations, are built upon the Army’s core competency 

of combined arms maneuver to gain access and project 

power.170 Air operations originate from land bases and 

are transported directly to their objectives by the U.S. 

Air Force or Army Aviation. Airborne (parachute) 

and air assault (helicopter) operations are forms of 

forcible-entry to seize key remote, peripheral, or vulnerable rear areas by deploying quickly and stealthily, 

avoiding high threat areas, using scalable forces, and 

maneuvering to achieve surprise that, along with other offensive options, complicates an enemy’s defense 

and gives the joint commander more options to take 

the initiative.171 The U.S. Army’s former chief futurist, 

Lieutenant General H.R. McMaster, observed:

this is not just about fires, it’s about maneuver . . . You 

can’t just stand at a distance and shoot, you have to 

keep moving . . . constantly presenting [the enemy] 

with multiple dilemmas. We’re working very closely 

with the Marine Corps in particular on future maneuver by dispersed yet mutually supporting units.172

Despite the advantages and modern capabilities of 

landpower’s current air and amphibious forcible entry operations, their use is fraught with risk in a dangerous A2AD environment. First, after many years 

of concentrating on counterinsurgency in Iraq and 

Afghanistan, the forcible entry and combined-arms 

skills of marines and soldiers are unexercised, and 

much work is still needed in updating and increasing 

equipment, exercises, and doctrine to survive in the 
36

exposed and threat dense A2AD environment of some 

semi-enclosed maritime environments.173 The capability of partner countries is even weaker, as to limit 

any combined maneuver operations without much 

needed improvement in capabilities.174 China’s imposing air-, sea-, and land-based A2AD systems that 

implement its Area Control Strategy were assembled 

to challenge other countries’ control in the region out 

to the second island chain, making vulnerable U.S. 

entry and partner country operations by threatening 

facilities, transportation systems, and lodgments as 

far as Guam and the Marianas. These systems significantly raise the cost and risk of U.S. and partner political, economic, and military activities.175 Thus, even 

when operationally ready again, land force maneuver 

from the air or sea would by necessity be peripheral 

to avoid the greater risk inherent in it while accountable to a casualty-adverse American public. However, 

peripheral does not mean inconsequential. Combat 

maneuver missions that U.S. landpower can perform 

include the rapid protection of critical infrastructure 

(ports or pipelines) or choke points (against A2AD 

weapons by nonstate actors, for example), retaking 

disputed islands, raids, and halting destabilizing pirate activity (by seizing their havens) especially when 

these missions use surprise and are of limited scope.176

Like maneuver, air and sea movement by land forces 

are important during contingency and humanitarian 

responses in which their mobility, light footprint, and 

logistics capabilities offer relief from natural disasters 

(like the seabasing response to the 2005 Indian Ocean 

tsunami disaster where some local ports were wiped 

out); man-made catastrophes (like the Fukushima 

Daiichi disaster in 2011); or to perform noncombatant 

rescue evacuations.177 The threat environment in the 
37

South China Sea could make combat use of landpower 

maneuver costly, but necessary, to give options to a 

joint force commander and dilemmas to an adversary. 

The difficulty in forcibly inserting and maneuvering 

land forces in the South China Sea dictates their cautious use, and the United States should instead consider substituting concentrated fires into the heart 

of A2AD areas as envisioned in the Air-Sea Battle 

concept.178

The first of the strategic roles of landpower, to 

compel or fight and win, dominantly influences and is 

influenced by the other strategic roles, as will be seen 

in the next sections on deterrence, and shaping and 

engaging. Landpower’s contributions to these roles, 

through its inherent capabilities, are greater than is 

normally credited in a maritime environment. The U.S. 

Army’s major role enabling other forces and agencies 

through its theater opening and sustaining abilities as 

the lead military service in logistics, mass transportation, communications, medical, and other support is 

very important. Through the core competency of wide 

area security, the U.S. Army with the Marine Corps 

is usually responsible for both passively and actively 

protecting forces, populations, and infrastructure 

against external and internal threats. The Army’s air 

and missile defense systems are particularly needed 

in this A2AD environment against preemptive strikes, 

although their relatively short range and limited number currently make them defensive weapon systems. 

Another security role that land forces could play is 

sea-control from the land through anti-ship missiles, 

but no such capability currently exists and would require major acquisitions and force structure changes. 

However, this would be an important landpower 

contribution in a semi-enclosed maritime environ-
38

ment and one for which bipartisan support exists in 

the U.S. Congress. Although more offensive in nature, 

the counterland mission through surface-to-surface 

missiles also acts as a shield to suppress close-in attack systems based around the region and matches the 

escalation of Chinese missile deployments. A second 

core competency shared by the Marine Corps and 

Army is combined arms maneuver to achieve a relative position of advantage over an enemy. Amphibious operations, a mission assigned to all landpower 

forces, use the seabasing concept as a useful option 

during disasters and in the periphery, but are vulnerable in a dense A2AD environment. Maneuver by air 

offers another option, but is also vulnerable in the 

current environment. However, landpower’s combat 

capabilities in the South China Sea may be most important, not in combat, but in its deterrence value and 

contributions to preventing war.

Landpower’s Deter and Prevent Capabilities.

A major component of deterring and preventing 

conflict is the perceived ability to conduct combat operations credibly, such that aggressive outcomes by an 

adversary are stymied. If a state does not see the costbenefit in its efforts, it will avoid conflict as detrimental 

to its interests.179 Thus, U.S. landpower’s capability to 

compel and fight, as presented in the previous section, 

is also critical to deterrence and prevention “by demonstrating the capability and resolve to apply force in 

pursuit of U.S. interests.”180 Plausible U.S. deterrence 

is underpinned by landpower to effectively communicate assurances of strong partnerships, a credible military presence, and an ability to deploy forces despite 

the A2AD threat.181 U.S. deterrence ensures security 
39

through strengthening regional governments’ legitimacy, promoting stability and prosperous economies, 

and encouraging vigorous foreign and military policy 

based on international rules in order to keep partner 

governments from being overwhelmed.182 To make deterrence credible, U.S. land forces need to maintain a 

sufficient forward presence of forces, adequate prepositioning of equipment to support reinforcements, and 

effective crisis and contingency response operations, 

which are the major topics addressed in this section. 

West Point professor Robert Chamberlain believes 

“landpower is the only avenue by which America can 

enhance regional security and stability, deter Chinese 

militarism and encourage Chinese commitment to the 

global status quo” simultaneously.183 In the coercive 

gradualism disputes common in the South China Sea, 

USARPAC strategy states that the ability to prevent 

war is as important as the ability to win a war.184

There is no better way to signal commitment, influence populations, and improve capabilities of other 

military forces than to have U.S. land forces interacting regularly with regional states as a stabilizing presence.185 For example, the forward presence of land 

forces strengthens military deterrence by offering 

more opportunity for direct interaction to improve 

host nation military capabilities and interoperability 

with U.S. forces—significant enabling factors developed through interpersonal relations, security cooperation, and engagement, as shown later in this monograph.186 Access to host nation bases better leverages 

the use of U.S. landpower, while partners and allies 

who cannot match American capabilities contribute 

tangibly to the partnership through sharing their facilities and territory.187 U.S. land-based forces in the 

region also strengthen deterrence by reassuring part-
40

ners and allies through sharing their vulnerability, 

dispersing and entwining forces among more installations to complicate an attack, and acting as a tripwire 

for a U.S. response, the ultimate guarantee of security 

for partners and U.S. interests.188 Hosting U.S. forces 

may also result in improved or upgraded local combined-use infrastructure and better logistical support 

to host forces for equipment and services, especially 

those of U.S. origin.189 Because of long lines of communication to Southeast Asia from the United States, 

forward presence forces negate the deployment time 

and vulnerability-in-transit of forces already in place, 

which can then better receive reinforcements and supplies.190 From such considerations the Joint Operational 

Access Concept (JOAC) concludes, “The more capability and capacity that a military can amass at the forward base, the more it can mitigate the effects of distance.”191 U.S. policy emphasizes that such a presence 

is attained through rotating forces in Southeast Asia, 

where the United States has not had permanent bases 

or standing forces in decades. Thus, the plausibility 

of U.S. military deterrence is premised upon sufficient 

forward forces whose presence results in: capable, selfassured partners with whom trusted relationships are 

developed; collective interests that share defense costs 

and build interoperability; and a more dispersed and 

sustainable response to crises and contingencies.192

As part of the rebalance to Asia strategy, the 2014 

QDR makes clear that the U.S. military presence in 

Southeast Asia needs to increase, and indications 

are that allies and partners would welcome such a 

move—on their terms.193 If U.S. landpower is to exert 

its strengths and capabilities, it needs forward locations in order to protect, project power, and engage 

with regional forces when called upon. Hosting U.S. 
41

forces entails one of three options: a few permanent, 

regularly-manned, hardened installations that can 

withstand attack but may be politically controversial 

and expensive to maintain; disperse rotational forces 

into more, but less-capable intermediate bases, which 

spread vulnerability but are more burdensome to protect and resupply; or temporary use of host-nation 

bases, although these facilities tend to be the most 

challenging for conducting operations and engagement as they are often austere and unfamiliar.194 An 

example of permanent, hardened basing is the U.S. 

island territory of Guam, where foreign sovereignty 

issues are not a hindrance. In addition to having attack submarine and bomber bases, with fighters, 

aerial tankers, and remotely piloted vehicles (PRVs) 

coming in the near future, Marine and SOF numbers 

are building on Guam, which will make it the regional 

hub for amphibious and special operations.195 Protective aircraft shelters, redundant pipelines, shielded 

land communications, and advanced logistics represent some of the hardenings that make Guam a formidable, but also an enticing target. For this reason, a 

U.S. Army THAAD battery is already stationed there, 

and other elements of landpower’s wide area security 

should supplement that.196 Dispersing forces to more 

numerous, but less improved, intermediate locations 

are best represented by the agreement to host 2,500 

U.S. Marines with helicopters and aircraft in Darwin, 

Australia, on a steady rotational basis meant to improve training, interoperability, proximity to the region, and to disperse forces further.197 Although both 

of these force-hosting-options indirectly support U.S. 

policy in Southeast Asia as described above, neither 

option is feasible for directly hosting U.S. forces in the 

region.
42

A third basing option, temporarily deploying 

forces to host-nation bases for limited periods (sometimes referred to as “lily-pads”), allows U.S. troops to 

train other forces, participate in exercises, or quickly 

reinforce a partner. Using more numerous and lessimproved facilities on an occasional basis makes them 

less inviting targets and offers flexibility to commanders. However, unless using regionally aligned units 

recurrently, the force-to-force exchange advantage is 

markedly diminished at temporary facilities, and training, exercising, or operating from such sites is more 

difficult.198 A good example of this option around the 

South China Sea littoral is the 2014 Enhanced Defense 

Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) with the Philippines, 

in which U.S. forces have regular access to five Armed 

Forces of the Philippines (AFP) facilities using rotating forces.199 These facilities offer more advantageous 

proximity to the South China Sea, their number gives 

strategic depth, targeting them becomes riskier, and 

they convey commitment while less adversarial to 

China as temporary-use facilities.200 However, the limited number of missile defense systems means some 

facilities could go unprotected when pressed into 

service or that forces become concentrated onto less 

hardened facilities. Such bases are also more vulnerable to the vagaries of diplomatic relations, as comments by President Duterte have made clear about 

withholding use of Filipino bases to U.S. forces. Of 

the bases offered, only one is a Philippine Army post, 

Fort Magsaysay, a key training area more useful for 

security cooperation activities than direct defense of 

the Philippines. The rest are air bases, which, if levied 

into U.S. use, would need missile and ground security 

provided by U.S. landpower. Other examples of this 

temporary option are deployed land forces for annual 
43

exercises to Vietnam or Malaysia, as explored further 

in the next section. Hardened, dispersed, or temporary 

forward basing by U.S. forces could reassure partners, 

deter aggression in peacetime, and give positional advantages to U.S. forces in an A2AD environment.201

A necessary auxiliary to forward presence is the 

prepositioning of equipment and supplies in forward 

locations where forces arriving by air transport can 

quickly set up operations using locally stored gear.202

Prepositioning includes conventional combat, special operations, and port opening materials to defend allies and partners or engage with them though 

exercises and training.203 Prepositioning is a form 

of forward presence with far fewer personnel, and 

thus may be more domestically acceptable for some 

countries and less likely to alienate host states from 

China.204 Prepositioning reduces the A2AD in-transit 

risk and response time of deploying U.S. forces during 

a crisis, if properly pre-located, and cuts transportation costs for recurring exercises or training.205 In response to Chinese militarization of the South China 

Sea, the U.S. Army may respond by prepositioning 

additional or upgraded unit combat equipment or by 

establishing War Reserve Stocks for Allies to directly 

support a partner in the region.206 However, there are 

fiscal costs under a constricted budget, from purchasing additional needed material to stock the reserves, 

to maintaining and upgrading equipment to keep it 

operationally ready.207

In 2016, the U.S. Army began to preposition material in the region through the Army Prepositioned 

Stocks (APS) Program, starting with activity sets for 

Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response 

(HA/DR) covering tasks such as engineering, medical care, or civil affairs.208 Prepositioning HA/DR 
44

sets, under DoD’s Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, 

and Civic Aid program, should be less controversial 

to all regional states and would likely be used in a 

permissive environment in which stocks may be easily moved around the region with intra-theater lift.209

Under the Philippines EDCA, port opening, HA/DR, 

and engagement activity sets may be prepositioned 

to serve a variety of missions, although President 

Duterte’s suspicions of these sites may hamper their 

use while he remains in power.210 In 2016, Cambodia 

agreed to host U.S. Army prepositioned HA/DR reserves including de-mining, engineering, and port 

opening equipment, as have Vietnam and Malaysia. 

The Army is looking to expand this program throughout the Pacific region.211 China will likely disapprove 

of prepositioned equipment, especially in countries 

that had not closely cooperated before with U.S. land 

forces, and thus could fuel a sense of encirclement by 

China.212 Such a depot may then also become a lucrative preemptive target.213 In addition to its land-stored 

prepositioned equipment, the Army also has two reserves aboard ships to give its stores more flexibility 

and less predictability.214 Through the Maritime Prepositioning Force Operations, prepositioning of gear 

aboard ships is the Marine Corps’ primary reserves 

in the region using the 3rd Maritime Prepositioning 

Ship Squadron, based in Guam, to resupply a Marine 

EF of up to 18,000 marines for 30 days of operations, 

ranging from combat to humanitarian assistance.215

Prepositioning of equipment reduces costs, improves 

response time, opens opportunities for further engagement, and forms the base for other aspects of 

deterrence such as U.S. landpower’s ability to effectively respond to crises and limited contingencies in 

the South China Sea region, which are major missions 

of the U.S. Army and Marine Corps.216
45

However, access agreements, capable forces, and 

prepositioned material are only part of deterrence. 

The demonstrated will to use military force is another 

critical aspect that in part is manifested through support to partner and ally states during a crisis or contingency. According to Marine Corps doctrine:

Crisis response and limited contingency operations encompass a variety of military actions, often in support 

of other government agencies, to contain or mitigate 

the effects of natural disasters or calamitous human 

events . . . requiring a military response regardless of 

ongoing operations elsewhere.”217

The onset of an emergent situation and its importance 

to national interests distinguishes between a crisis 

and contingency, but the commitment to maintaining 

functionality, stability, and legitimacy in cooperating countries is what makes both types of responses 

important for deterrence.218 Countering insurgencies, 

terrorism, or violent criminal trafficking are examples 

of U.S. landpower’s welcomed involvement in internal security and stability responses that enhance 

deterrence.219 U.S. landpower can also oppose opportunistic external aggression through fulfilling security agreements like the Mutual Defense Treaty between 

the Philippines and the United States, and demonstrate 

support for friendly governments when confronting 

coercive gradualism if invoked.220 Land forces, with 

other elements of national power, effectively support 

deterrence and stability to enable domestic forces to 

better support their governments.221 Because of its 

specialized functions, SOF has not played a major 

role in the landpower missions presented so far, but 

during crises and limited contingencies, SOF involvement can be significant.222 For example, Joint Special 
46

Operations Task Force—Philippines (JSOTF-P) was a 

primarily SOF-led mission that worked and collocated 

with AFP forces against dangerous extremists intent 

on disrupting Philippine governance in its southern 

islands. From 2002 to 2014, U.S. SOF helped to counter 

the Abu Sayyaf and Jemaah Islamiyah groups through 

advising during AFP operations, training Philippine 

forces, and rendering humanitarian assistance and 

medical projects to improve conditions for indigenous 

people.223 Concerns are rising that Southeast Asia may 

be in peril by a large number of extremists, who joined 

the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in the Middle 

East, returning to Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines to form a new core for terrorism and insurgency 

that may again require the expertise of U.S. landpower to stem, although the Duterte administration now 

seems antithetical to more U.S. counterinsurgency 

support.224 U.S. landpower’s crucial support to allies 

and partners during security responses, best demonstrated by JSOTF-P, enhance regional states’ legitimacy and stability by stopping internal problems that 

divert attention from international challenges or by 

preventing international aggression from spawning 

internal problems, and thus reinforces internal stability and legitimacy to prevent war.

In addition to countering internal and external 

political challenges, U.S. landpower is a key player 

in mitigating the natural and man-made catastrophes 

that could upset stability within regional states.225

The South China Sea borders the geologically active 

Pacific Ring of Fire and is the main thoroughfare of 

Typhoon Alley, and thus is susceptible to natural disasters “worsened by a lack of disaster mitigation [in] 

city planning . . . [and] social infrastructure, and HA/

DR [humanitarian assistance and disaster response] 
47

capabilities in regional armed forces. Poor disaster 

management has the potential to trigger political and 

economic unrest.”226 Humanitarian and disaster responses often rely on landpower capabilities to supplement relief agencies and host government efforts, 

while under the lead of another U.S. agency.227 The 

key response roles of foreign humanitarian assistance 

(FHA) and consequence management (CM) complement one another in that FHA relieves or reduces “the 

results of natural or man-made disasters . . . [and] is 

generally limited in scope and duration,” while CM 

are “actions taken to maintain or restore essential services and manage and mitigate problems resulting 

from disasters and catastrophes, including natural, 

man-made, or terrorist incidents.”228

U.S. landpower is needed especially in these roles 

with other agencies: for its rapid response, while 

working in non-permissive or austere conditions, 

when access is difficult, and after local agencies are 

overwhelmed or exhausted. Particularly valued in accomplishing these tasks are the SOFs “geographic orientation, cultural knowledge, language capabilities, 

and the ability to work with multiethnic indigenous 

populations and international relief organizations to 

provide initial and ongoing assessments. . . . [SOF civil 

affairs units] are particularly well-suited for stabilization efforts in disaster areas” because they have the 

expertise to best liaison with civil organizations, and 

can integrate and direct essential military functions.229

To mitigate disasters, conventional Army and Marine 

Corps forces enable security, logistics, engineering, 

transport, medical, and command and communications support to restore infrastructure and protect and 

sustain victims.230 An example of landpower acting in 

FHA was in November 2013, when nearly 1,000 U.S. 
48

marines and their aircraft, supported by U.S. Navy 

assets, responded to the devastation of the central 

Philippines by Super Typhoon Haiyan, the strongest 

typhoon ever recorded. With USAID as the lead U.S. 

agency, and while coordinating closely with the AFP, 

JTF 505 cleared roads and opened airports, provided 

vital communications support, conducted search and 

rescue operations, gave medical care, transported aid 

workers, distributed 2,495 tons of relief supplies, and 

evacuated 21,000 people—thereby ameliorating a humanitarian disaster.231 Other recent examples of U.S. 

land forces significantly supporting relief operations 

include the 2011 seismic and nuclear disaster in central 

Japan, the 2015 response to Typhoon Soudelor in the 

Northern Marianas and the earthquakes in Nepal, and 

the 2016 earthquake in southern Japan.232 Elements of 

deterrence, such as regular cooperation and forward 

basing, enhance crisis and contingency responses to 

security and humanitarian issues, but response operations also bolster deterrence and support closer ties 

and mutual interests like respect for human values.233

The second of the strategic roles of U.S. landpower—deter and prevent war—is crucial to stability in 

Southeast Asia and reinforces landpower’s other strategic roles. Credible deterrence that thwarts an adversary’s aggressive intentions requires the operational 

capabilities that U.S. landpower offers, as covered in 

the combat and compel section of this monograph. 

However, deterrence also needs to exhibit the will to 

back those capabilities that are demonstrated through 

the forward presence of troops and prepositioning 

of equipment, thus making plausible U.S. intentions 

in the South China Sea region. The advantage of forward positioned troops can be gained through hardened, dispersed, or temporary facilities that result in 
49

reduced cost and risk with increased speed of deployments, and improved support and engagement of 

allies and partners. U.S. landpower’s ability to help 

mitigate crises and contingencies, whether security 

related or natural or man-made disasters, “employ[s] 

military capabilities alongside partners with very little to no strategic warning, in effect serving as a useful demonstration of latent U.S. contingency response 

capability,” as shown by JSOTF-P and JTF 505 in the 

Philippines.234 U.S. landpower’s presence in the region also has a stabilizing effect by being a committed 

but defensive signal of American interests in support 

of partners, humanitarian values, and international 

norms in much the same way U.S. Forces Korea’s 

landpower has for over 60 years. This is because of 

the resolve that land forces represent when committed by the U.S. Government, and the powerful influence landpower wields in the human domain “largely 

because it puts U.S. forces in direct contact with those 

they seek to influence; whether by deterring or halting 

enemies, or by convincing civilian policymakers and 

populations that they share objectives and priorities 

with the United States.”235 With forward presence and 

operationally interacting with the forces of Southeast 

Asia, U.S. forces have more opportunity to assure 

partners while improving host nation military capabilities and interoperability through the shaping and 

engagement actions of security cooperation, which are 

presented next.

Landpower’s Engage and Shape Capabilities.

The third strategic role of U.S. landpower—to engage states and shape conditions—may be the most 

important because it sets the foundation for U.S. and 
50

regional forces to win or prevent conflict.236 Shaping 

is the establishment of conditions in which U.S. and 

partners’ interests may be met by favorably influencing the operational area and the human domain.237

These conducive future conditions are attained during 

operational planning’s Phase Zero through a variety 

of peacetime security cooperation, engagement, and 

bilateral and multinational activities.238 Shaping operations squarely align with a third of the U.S. Army’s 

missions, to “provide a global stabilizing presence,” 

and more specifically with its proposed core capability to “shape the security environment.”239 Military 

engagement is the art of shaping human activities 

through interactions between U.S. and other countries’ 

forces “designed to build trust and confidence, share 

information, coordinate mutual activities, and maintain influence” in order to better understand and affect the security and human environments.240 “Engage 

and partner” is a critical line of effort for USARPAC’s 

“operations, actions, and activities to assure security 

and stability.” Similarly, U.S. Marine Corps doctrine 

states that military engagement and security cooperation “build partnerships that promote a collective 

approach to mutual security concerns,” and in joint 

doctrine for SOF it serves to reduce daily tensions, 

collect information to forewarn of crisis, and “develop 

and build [host nation] capabilities and capacities that 

can be leveraged in crises and war.”241 A more specific form of engagement with respect to China is also 

used in this monograph as the “means to improve the 

non-status quo elements of a rising major power’s 

behavior . . . [to] induce a rising power to adopt foreign or domestic policies in line with the norms of the 

dominant international order.”242 With the U.S. State 

Department as the lead agency for foreign policy, 
51

these are tasks in which landpower excels because of 

the human-to-human contact with the powerful land 

forces in the region, but which play a mainly protective, non-threatening role around the South China 

Sea.243 The rest of this monograph explains how engagement and shaping address U.S. interests through 

capacity building and security cooperation with allies, 

partners, and other countries in the region.244

Shaping and engagement are important to U.S. and 

partner interests because they create a favorable environment and future in which to operate. U.S. landpower is a major tool in creating that environment 

through building partner capacity (BPC), described 

by former U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates as 

“helping other countries defend themselves or, if necessary, fight alongside U.S. forces by providing them 

with equipment, training, or other forms of security 

assistance.”245 The intent of BPC is to help partners 

meet basic defense needs and build self-confidence 

in their security capabilities in order to contribute to 

regional security with the United States and other 

partners.246 For the United States, BPC offers the advantages of sharing costs and responsibilities for local 

and collective security with other countries, exerting 

positive U.S. leadership in attaining mutual interests, 

and bolstering defense credibility through multilateral and regional ties—and doing so cost-effectively.247

For U.S. landpower in particular, BPC improves military preparedness and interoperability with partners, 

spreads “burden-sharing and harnesses economies 

of scale based on common systems,” may cover regional shortfalls in U.S. capabilities and capacity, and 

“shortens friendly response times and increases uncertainty for an adversary.”248 U.S. landpower’s BPC 

has recently developed counterterrorism, counterin-
52

surgency, and disaster assistance skills with the many 

countries sharing an interest in the South China Sea 

region, but it also develops full spectrum partner capabilities against A2AD threats in areas that U.S. landpower has the expertise to share.249 DoD’s $425 million 

Southeast Asia Reassurance Fund is a BPC initiative 

meant mainly to improve at-sea capabilities for partners, but it could also enhance landpower’s fires and 

maneuver at sea by investing in the maritime domain 

awareness initiative from which air, sea, and land 

forces synergistically benefit, especially if enhancing 

nascent collective security efforts coordinated with 

regional leaders like Australia and Japan.250 BPC is an 

important element of statecraft and security in Southeast Asia, and U.S. landpower plays a major role in its 

effectiveness.

A multiplying factor in BPC (and for combat and 

deterrence missions) is the interpersonal and organizational relations in which U.S. landpower excels. The 

expertise in regional and cultural matters leveraged by 

SOF, regionally aligned conventional land forces, forward presence units, and specialist foreign area officers builds stronger partnerships and engages friends 

and competitors in enduring relationships that make 

other efforts more effective—especially in disaster response and foreign internal defense.251 These contacts 

potentially benefit both partners through improved 

capabilities and assurances of U.S. support, but they 

also enable a “land network of relationships resulting 

in early warning, indigenous solutions . . . informed 

campaigns,” shared intelligence, realistic training, 

and increased cultural awareness that benefit overall 

U.S. interests as well.252 Shaping and influencing other 

populations is a difficult, inexact art that can be counterproductive if done poorly; but fruitful interactions 
53

are invaluable if at least for the better understanding 

of the other’s fundamental objectives that may identify areas of mutual interest.253 If done well, BPC can 

progress to the point where the United States does not 

need to be the regional initiator of such efforts, but 

instead like-minded states train and exercise together, 

reinforcing intra-regional ties and building credible 

collective security.254 U.S. landpower is attractive to 

regional military forces because of its flexible array 

of much-needed combat and combat support capabilities (as detailed in the combat and compel section) 

delivered through BPC by experts in military and 

civilian fields—the latter in the form of reserve component soldiers and marines offering excellent insight 

into civil-military relations.255 These very influential 

land-force-to-land-force ties within Southeast Asia 

also benefit U.S. air and sea forces and other government agencies through greater partner confidence in 

the United States and improved access to partners.256

An example is the improving of U.S. military ties with 

Vietnam to help integrate that country into the current 

international order, which opens doors to address security issues of mutual concern.257 U.S. landpower’s 

abilities to assure and engage in the human domain 

are a boon to the United States, its regional partners, 

and other states.

The formal term for the many security interactions 

described in this monograph is security cooperation, 

defined as DoD:

interactions with foreign defense establishments to 

build defense relationships that promote specific US 

security interests, develop allied and friendly military 

capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation.258
54

Security cooperation, also previously known as military-to-military activities, is a key element of shaping 

and engaging operations at the strategic level and is 

usually conducted under the funding and oversight 

of the State Department as a part of U.S. foreign policy.259 It seeks to improve access to, and the military 

capability of, partner forces and their interoperability with U.S. and other friendly forces. In addition, 

for more advanced allies like Australia and Japan, 

security cooperation strives to assist in their regional 

leadership roles of protecting security and stability.260

With emerging or rival powers like China, security 

cooperation also works to deepen relationships to increase mutual understanding, reduce tensions, and 

to pursue common objectives found in areas like humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping operations.261

USPACOM organizes these shaping and engagement 

activities through its Theater Security Cooperation 

Plan (TSCP), in conjunction with each American embassy’s country plan, delegating activities to its service sub-components like USARPAC, MARFORPAC, 

and SOCPAC as part of their “day-to-day mission 

of . . . ‘fighting phase zero’.”262 U.S. landpower’s role 

in security cooperation is particularly potent because 

all states in the region have a corresponding land force 

that tends to be the senior service in terms of domestic 

influence, and because U.S. land forces like SOF and 

regionally aligned conventional forces have developed 

expertise in training and long-term relations with their 

counterparts, which leverages their influence significantly.263 Throughout the Pacific region, for example, 

USARPAC has conducted over 200 major bilateral 

and multilateral TSCP events annually, including 26 

major exercises, humanitarian responses and training, 

key leader engagements, advise and equip foreign 
55

forces, peace operations training, personnel exchanges, reconstruction, conferences, information and intelligence sharing, military education, and many other 

activities—with examples from the South China Sea 

region presented below.264 Each of these security cooperation activities is meant to improve self-defense, 

interoperability, and access in order to attain U.S. and 

partner goals for regional security and stability.

Security cooperation is a wide-ranging collection 

of U.S. military activities with regional forces. A part 

of it is security assistance, which is the provision of 

“defense articles, military training, and other defenserelated services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales 

in furtherance of national policies and objectives,” as 

overseen by the State Department.265 Although needed 

arms, equipment, defense services, and schoolhouse 

training may be directly purchased commercially by 

other countries, in Southeast Asia defense articles 

are usually obtained through the U.S. Government’s 

foreign military sales (FMS) program. This program reinforces the advantages of engagement cited 

throughout this monograph to include bolstering 

each country’s self-defense and interoperability with 

partners, reducing the cost of common systems, and 

establishing enduring relationships and influence.266

The U.S. Army Security Assistance Command (USASAC), for instance, provides, sustains, and trains on 

Army articles used by other countries, for which the 

Pacific region has been a major customer, especially 

for items such as helicopters and missile systems.267

Formal education and training are also part of FMS, in 

which international students may attend U.S. military 

schools, or U.S. teams train individuals and units at 

their home stations using programs like International 

Military Education and Training (IMET) administered 
56

by the military services’ security assistance agencies. 

An example would be the Philippine, Malaysian, and 

Vietnamese officers who attend the U.S. Army War 

College (USAWC) annually or others who attend 

technical training in the United States for a specific 

weapon system.268

Outside of security assistance, security cooperation 

takes such forms as exercises and military-to-military 

engagement in the South China Sea region. Combined 

exercises are effective tools for training with single and 

multiple partner states, and for improving interoperability while familiarizing U.S. forces with local conditions and personnel. Within the region, exercises 

leveraging recent U.S. land force experiences “that 

focus on counter-terror, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, pandemic response, transnational crime, 

and peacekeeping operations” are in demand and will 

likely increase.269 One important exercise program 

is USARPAC’s Pacific Pathways, meant to improve 

multilateral interoperability and develop networks of 

trust and understanding through three annual deployments meant to expand the Army’s role in the region 

by projecting tailored and ready forces to participate 

in sequential exercises for 3- to 4-month deployments 

that optimize the cost of training, allow U.S. forces to 

bring more and heavier equipment resulting in more 

robust engagement, and offers flexibility in establishing a forward U.S. presence and improving interoperability. For example, in the 2016 Pacific Pathways, 

the U.S. 2nd Stryker Brigade participated in sequential 

bilateral exercises in Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia with armored vehicles while monitored from a 

forward command post set up at Fort Magsaysay in 

the Philippines.270 Another example is one of the U.S. 

military’s largest exercises, the annual Cobra Gold 
57

held in Thailand, with more than 30 countries participating, including Malaysia and Indonesia (or observing, like Vietnam), in a series of activities ranging 

from live-fire combined arms combat maneuvers, to 

disaster relief or humanitarian mission command post 

exercises.271 The world’s largest multilateral maritime 

exercise, Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) is held in and 

around Hawaii and includes land forces participating in realistic amphibious operations that were led 

by a New Zealand Navy Commodore in 2016. The 

more than 25,000 participants from 27 countries include members from Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, 

the Philippines, and China to a limited degree, and 

the diversity is meant to sustain cooperative relationships.272 Forward deployed marines in Australia will 

extensively train with their counterparts at local training ranges, and from there and from Okinawa, deploy 

on shorter duration training exercises in the region, 

especially amphibious operations and HA/DR missions for which there is increasing demand for Marine 

Corps expertise. Improved interoperability could lead 

to a “regional ‘amphibious architecture’ composed of 

cooperative nations with capabilities that make them 

better able to defend themselves and be more useful 

partners,” both tactically and strategically.273

Shaping and engaging are also performed through 

military-to-military relationships from the individual 

to the unit level. The formal education and exercise 

opportunities already cited are examples of building 

such relationships. Other examples are the senior officer level dialogues, expert exchanges, and staff assistance visits that allow frank discussions on issues 

that cross borders such as infectious diseases and military medicine, transnational crime, and natural disasters.274 USARPAC regularly hosts the Pacific Armies 
58

Chiefs Conference and the Pacific Armies Management Seminar (PAMS) for senior level officers from 

across the Asia-Pacific region to engage one another 

to “foster better understandings of the dynamic and 

complex issues that affect all nations throughout the 

region.”275 Similarly, MARFORPAC initiated the Pacific Command Amphibious Leaders Symposium 

(PALS) in 2015 to include officers from 22 countries 

including Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia, Australia, and Japan “to discuss each nation’s 

goals while working with one another to strengthen 

bilateral and multilateral relationships through future 

engagements and training,” especially in HA/DR and 

collective maritime domain awareness.276 Military exchanges with officers serving temporarily in the service of another country are also useful immersions in 

understanding and interoperability, with Australian 

Major General Richard Burr, for example, seconded 

as the USARPAC Deputy Commanding General for 

Operations from 2013 to 2015.277 U.S. marines serve on 

military staffs in Japan, Australia, and New Zealand 

to improve amphibious capabilities, following the 

model of the successful transformation of South Korea’s marines after years of association with their U.S. 

counterparts.278 The U.S. Army’s Regionally Aligned 

Forces (RAF), from Washington State’s I Corps to Hawaii’s 25th Infantry Division, brigade combat teams, 

and Pacific Rim National Guard units, are assigned to 

engage solely with Asia-Pacific states to:279

not only learn the specifics of a particular locality but 

also gain a broader ability to rapidly develop situational understanding in the event of a contingency operation anywhere. They are expert in their combat skills, 

and when coupled with U.S.-based global response 

forces, these regionally aligned forces [RAF] provide 
59

a powerful blend of local knowledge and large-scale 

capabilities that can execute the full spectrum of activities from security cooperation to support to counterterrorism to large-scale contingency response. . . . 

The U.S. Army, along with special operations forces 

and the U.S. Marine Corps, form the core of a global 

landpower network.280

U.S. landpower’s ability to shape and engage results 

in:

interactions with foreign defense establishments to 

build defense relationships that promote specific US 

security interests, develop allied and friendly military 

capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation.281

This is accomplished through BPC, military-to-military engagements, and security cooperation, at which 

landpower excels. These strengths are best exemplified in the specific activities presented below involving Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, and China.

Conflict with China and subsequent tensions in the 

South China Sea have spurred Vietnam to improve 

relations with the United States since the Vietnam 

War.282 “Vietnam is the most capable and determined 

Southeast Asian state to challenge China’s claims in 

the South China Sea” and the most active in multilateral efforts to counter aggression.283 That provides sufficient mutual national interests for U.S. landpower to 

meaningfully engage with Vietnam. USARPAC categorizes its engagement efforts at one of five levels (see 

Figure 2), and Vietnam might be placed in the middle 

“enhance critical capabilities” class defined as:
countries that have expressed a desire for a closer 

comprehensive security partnership with the United 

States but lack the military resiliency and capacity to 

exert significant military influence beyond their immediate borders. In many cases, these countries acknowledge the stabilizing influence of America’s regional 

presence; however, direct or long-term employment 

of U.S. forces could be objectionable, infeasible, or 

counterproductive. USARPAC seeks opportunities to 

improve relationships by enhancing specific capabilities, such as peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, 

or disaster relief [italics in original].284

The military relationship with Vietnam is based on 

a limited defense cooperation agreement signed in 

September 2011 and enhanced in July 2015 to an “extensive comprehensive partnership” to guide future 

military cooperation between the two.285 Nonetheless, 

Vietnam has even closer strategic ties with India, Japan, and Russia, with the latter supplying nearly all of 

Vietnam’s weapons, in a delicate diplomatic balance 

in which China is prominent.286 To continue to build 

relations, American and Vietnamese land forces have 

engaged in high-level dialogues, humanitarian assistance agreements, combined search and rescue and disaster relief exercises, military training and education, 

sharing of counterterrorism intelligence, and peacekeeping training.287 Such contacts flourish despite 

Vietnam’s sub-standard human rights record because 

these activities enhance the humanitarian nature and 

promise of influence in improving civil-military relations and respect for civil rights.288

60
Figure 2. USARPAC Theater Engagement 

and Partner Design.289

Vietnam has identified illicit trafficking, transnational crimes, and illegal immigration as other areas 

of concern in which U.S. landpower may fruitfully engage.290 For instance, since 2012, the Oregon National 

Guard has been linked with the Vietnamese People’s 

Army (VPA) through the State Partnership Program 

(SPP). The distinctive state-federal and civil-military 

characteristics of the national guard, and its experience in civil emergencies, border protection, natural 

and man-made disaster preparedness, and combat 

skills mutually builds both sides’ capabilities, crosscultural awareness, and international relationship 

through long-term interaction.291 Peacekeeping operations are another area of mutual interest, and the U.S. 

Army’s Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Insti61
tute (PKSOI) assisted Vietnam to establish the Vietnam Peacekeeping Center in 2015 and 2016. The VPA 

is also interested in learning advanced field medical 

skills from its U.S. counterparts based on combat experience from Iraq and Afghanistan.292 Some exercises 

have been conducted too, including an army-to-army 

combined exercise in urban search and rescue with 

more sophisticated exercises possible.293 Another area 

of potential interaction is with Vietnam’s capable but 

under-resourced amphibious forces with which the 

U.S. Marines could be influential through the PALS 

regional amphibious network, yet remain HA/DRoriented and thus less likely to irritate Chinese-Vietnamese relations.294

In addition to exercises, training, and visits by 

American personnel, a forward presence by U.S. land 

forces was negotiated in 2016 with Vietnam hosting 

U.S. Army prepositioned HA/DR reserves, including 

a field hospital.295 The United States would like to expand its presence at Cam Ranh Bay, one of the best 

natural harbors in the region and a major logistical 

and intermodal hub for the United States during its 

war in Vietnam.296 Facilities there currently repair U.S. 

commercial and non-combat military logistics vessels, 

and expanding access could eventually require U.S. 

landpower’s wide area defense and port and logistics 

services to maintain a major entry point into Indochina, and a facility from which to pursue security cooperation further. However, Vietnamese officials prefer 

a non-committed use of its facilities, catering instead 

to all of its strategic partners.297 Another aspect of improving relations is through FMS. In 2014, the United 

States relaxed the ban on selling non-lethal military 

equipment to Vietnam; and, in 2016, during a visit to 

Vietnam, former President Obama opened sales for all 

62
63

military equipment on a case-by-case basis in order to 

counter aggressive Chinese moves in the South China 

Sea.298 Full access to U.S. arms has long been a goal of 

Vietnam to show that relations with the United States 

have been normalized and to improve its A2AD naval 

and coastal defenses.299 U.S. landpower could assist 

with some items needed by Vietnam, including artillery and missile systems; command, control, communications, and intelligence systems; helicopters; amphibious craft; and spare parts for equipment left by 

the United States in 1975.300 U.S. land forces could also 

be instrumental with the PVA-dominated military in 

implementing a regional maritime domain awareness 

initiative as it develops.301 U.S. landpower’s engagement with Vietnam is vital to enhance this military 

partner’s civil and defense capabilities to meet common aspirations through training activities, visits, 

dialogues, and prepositioning and sales of military 

equipment that are part of greater shape and engage 

operations.

Unlike Vietnam, Malaysia has maintained a long 

cordial partnership with the United States. It also 

maintains excellent relationships with its Association 

of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) neighbors and 

tries to balance good relations with China, but aggressive stances against Malaysian claims in the South China Sea and militarization of land features has resulted 

in Malaysia’s Government hedging against Chinese 

actions.302 The U.S. relationship with Malaysia may be 

encapsulated by USARPAC’s engagement effort level 

of “promote regional leadership,” defined as:

These countries have stated aspirations to expand 

their regional influence generally in common with U.S. 

interests and expressed their intentions and willing-
64

ness to use their influence to assume a greater share of 

future regional security responsibilities. Their defense 

establishments demonstrate overall military resiliency 

and increased professionalism . . . the U.S. now seeks 

to promote key aspects of their military capacity to 

achieve their regional security aspirations [italics in 

original].303

Security cooperation between the United States and 

Malaysia is strengthening, as is U.S. cooperation with 

neighbors Indonesia and Brunei. The U.S.-Malaysian 

partnership is manifest in diverse activities such as exercises between each country’s military services and 

multinational maneuvers like Cobra Gold; combined 

training especially in jungle warfare; exchange visits 

and port calls; use of some U.S. military equipment 

and a small amount of FMS funding; IMET with funding; and counter-piracy operations.304 There is no SPP 

between the Malaysian military and U.S. National 

Guard forces yet, but Malaysian and Bruneian officials 

have shown some interest to follow Indonesia, which 

has partnered with the Hawaii National Guard since 

2006.305 The United States strives to sustain its friendly, relatively sophisticated relationship with Malaysia 

through engagement in meeting their common goals 

for security and stability in the region.

Although the Malaysian Army is the senior service 

in the Malaysian Armed Forces, most of Malaysia’s 

external threats (pirates, illegal immigration, Sulu 

insurgents, and Chinese encroachment on Malaysian 

South China Sea claims) are seaborne. The Malaysian 

Army is addressing these by transforming one of its 

paratrooper brigades into a new amphibious unit 

based on the U.S. Marine Corps.306 The resulting interaction since 2014 is a model for landpower engagement. U.S. Marine Corps training assistance started 
65

with the Malaysia-United States Amphibious Exercise 

2015 in North Borneo, consisting of training, planning, 

and execution of combined amphibious air-ground 

operations; a live-fire demonstration; and weapons 

familiarization. In turn, jungle-fighting training was 

led by Malaysian soldiers, and cultural exchanges of 

sports competitions were included.307 The Malaysian 

Defense Minister Hishammuddin Hussein stated such 

exercises could “pave the way for future exercises in 

Malaysia” and proposed that ASEAN “create a ready 

group that focuses on humanitarian assistance and disaster response capabilities.”308 Another exercise, Keris 

Strike, is an annual army-to-army engagement hosted 

in Malaysia since 1996 to improve military readiness 

and tactical interoperability. In 2015, key events were a 

command post exercise; jungle field training; training 

in unmanned aerial surveillance, medical response, 

counter-improvised explosive devices; and an engineer civil action project. Keris Strike was also one of 

the exercises included in the 2014 Pacific Pathways.309

Two other aspects of security cooperation with 

Malaysia are forward presence and sales of military 

equipment. The recurring training visits, exercises, 

aircraft servicing, and an increasing number of naval 

vessel port calls in Malaysia are supported by the 1994 

Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement, which 

also allows U.S. SOF to practice at the Malaysian 

Jungle Warfare Training School.310 Malaysia has also 

agreed to store U.S. Army prepositioned engineering, 

water production, and transportation gear in the near 

future. The Malaysian Government has a policy of 

spreading military acquisitions among many sources, 

so U.S. equipment is only modestly represented in its 

ranks, but each of the Malaysian services uses the U.S. 

M4 carbine rifle. The Malaysian Army also needs heli-
66

copters to defend its South China Sea coastlines and is 

in negotiations for the Bell AH-1Z Super Cobra attack 

helicopter and MD 530G scout attack helicopter, and 

currently operates a few Sikorsky H-60 Blackhawk 

and S-61 Nuri utility helicopters.311 Good long-term 

relations between the United States and Malaysia have 

sustained strong landpower engagement between the 

two in a variety of areas that benefit both countries’ 

strategic interests.

Since becoming treaty allies in 1951, and with colonial ties dating to the 1890s, U.S.-Philippine relations 

have climbed and dipped, but in 2015 were at a zenith 

in large part because of mutual efforts to combat terrorism and Chinese maritime aggression, before reaching 

a nadir with President Duterte’s ambivalence toward 

the United States.312 Nonetheless, this long-standing 

treaty relationship with the Philippines is reflected in 

USARPAC’s closest engagement level of “assure allies 

and partners,” which are:

relatively sophisticated and long-standing defense 

partnerships in which the U.S. seeks to assure partners 

of its mutual defense commitment . . . what sets this 

class of nations apart is a binding and durable commitment to take action together to counter shared 

threats. . . . Exercises and engagements seek to reinforce interoperability. . . . Based on the importance of 

these defense relationships . . . USARPAC Commander focuses the preponderance of resources, time, and 

effort to maintain strong partnerships with them. Significantly, USARPAC often partners with MARFORPAC and SOCPAC in building ground force capacity 

throughout the AOR, but particularly with these partners [italics in original].313
67

Since 1998, the two states have renewed a Status of 

Forces Agreement and, in 2002, established a Mutual 

Logistics Support Agreement, which allowed a robust 

schedule of exercises, military visits, and basing of operational activities such as JSOTF-P. The Philippines 

military benefited from about 400 planned annual activities with U.S. forces, an active IMET program, and 

the Excess Defense Articles Program (EDAP), which 

transfers surplus U.S. military equipment at low or no 

cost in order to modernize partner states.314 After long 

neglect, the Philippine Government is modernizing 

AFP defense capabilities with significantly increased 

spending, and U.S. landpower can support some Philippine requirements for amphibious, wide area protection, and ocean and air surveillance and defense 

capabilities, when relations improve in the future perhaps under or after the Trump administration.315 For 

instance, the new Philippine National Coastal Watch 

Center was built using a $20 million U.S. Government 

grant; intelligence sharing, maritime surveillance, 

and secure communications bolstered with $40 million; the Philippine Army received 100 excess M113 

armored personnel carriers under the EDAP; and a 

new program has been started to improve the Philippine Army’s air assault capabilities.316 Just as important, U.S. land forces can assist in improving the inadequate Philippine supply and logistics, maintenance, 

and procurement processes at which the U.S. Army 

and Marine Corps excel.317 Such continuing assurance 

to a treaty ally, despite recent turmoil in relations, underscores the U.S. defense commitment to the Philippines and gives legitimacy to the U.S. involvement in 

the South China Sea.318

Land forces’ military-to-military relations between 

the United States and the Philippines has traditionally 
68

been strong, based upon working together operationally to counter terrorism, in response to disasters, and 

upon decades of training and exercising together. As 

both homeland defense and disaster relief remain major missions of the Philippine Army, U.S. land forces 

will continue their role in closely supporting them. The 

Philippine Army would also like to build its capacity 

to participate in peacekeeping operations in which the 

U.S. Army has the expertise to share.319 Since 2000, the 

U.S. National Guard units in Hawaii and Guam and 

the Philippine military have also benefited from close 

ties through the SPP, which complements and enhances the many other activities regularly occurring 

between the two countries.320 The Philippine and U.S. 

Marine Corps have long close ties with regular annual 

amphibious landing exercises that improved the skills 

and interoperability of both.321 Major exercises include 

the biannual Balikatan, which, since 1984, focuses on 

humanitarian assistance and disaster relief capabilities and modernization. The 2016 exercise included 

approximately 5,000 U.S., 3,500 Philippine, and 80 

Australian defense personnel engaged in HA/DR scenarios and civic assistance to local communities. It also 

added force integration training directed at maritime 

security and territorial defense, and the possibility of 

Japanese forces participating in the future.322 A second 

long-running bilateral annual exercise, Philippine 

Amphibious Landing Exercise (PHIBLEX), focused 

more on combined arms amphibious training including raids, beach landings, and live fire exercises—

which have recently been conducted near the Spratly 

Islands and Scarborough Shoal—while also improving 

interoperability for HA/DR crises. These 1- to 2-week 

exercises included a civic assistance component such 

as engineering projects to improve local infrastructure 
69

and health engagements.323 The results of such efforts 

have been excellent military-to-military relations and 

effective disaster relief responses, which is why their 

current curtailment by the Duterte administration is a 

definite setback. Despite these efforts, combat capabilities, like amphibious assault operations, still need to 

be improved, because the Philippines was overly dependent upon the United States for its security, even 

while it periodically distances itself from its U.S. ally 

and leaves the United States in a difficult supporting 

position.324

One of the biggest contributions the Philippines 

makes to its U.S. partnership is offering a forward 

presence in close proximity to the South China Sea. 

The United States permanently stationed military forces in the Philippines for nearly a century until 1991, 

when they were removed at the Philippine Government’s request. JSOTF-P reintroduced a U.S. presence 

after the September 11, 2001 attacks, with expanded 

rotational access for other U.S. forces allowed under 

the ECDA after 2014.325 The subsequent Philippine Air 

Force bases approved for U.S. use are Antonio Bautista AB (on Palawan), Basa AB and Fort Magsaysay 

(on Luzon), Lumbia AB (on Mindanao), and MactanBenito Ebuen AB (on Cebu), with U.S. Marines rotating through the Philippine Marines headquarters at 

Camp Aguinaldo, and requests to also use the former U.S. bases at Subic Bay and Clark International 

Airport, both now major civilian commercial hubs.326

These are temporary U.S.-use installations where U.S. 

forces may preposition equipment to enhance training, exercises, contingencies, and combat operations. 

U.S. forces may also upgrade approved existing facilities and military infrastructure for combined use 

at each location.327 Although the use by U.S. forces is 
70

rotational, there were opportunities for longer-term 

forward presence in some cases. For instance, after 

the departure of the 5,000 U.S. service members participating in Balikatan 2016, 275 remained behind with 

some equipment at different locations, to be replaced 

by other personnel later.328 Additional longer-term 

deployments may follow, with more U.S. land forces 

involved as their combat, contingency, and support 

skills grow in demand and the U.S.-Philippine relationship builds, although a more balanced approach 

in 2016 between China and the United States by the 

new administration of President Duterte may moderate this.329 Should relations improve, regular forward 

presence could leverage the effects of all other U.S. 

engagement with the Philippines and other regional 

states, and significantly strengthen U.S. deterrence 

and combat positions by presenting more operating 

locations, faster response to a contingency or crises, 

and complicating an adversary’s targeting plan—all 

to help assure a long-time U.S. ally.330

The most important engagement around the South 

China Sea is between China and the United States, because how these ties develop in large part determines 

the rest of the relationships in the region. Following 

the political oscillations from World War II allies to 

Cold War enemies, more recent military-to-military 

relations between China and the United States are affected by internal events like the Tiananmen Square 

protests, arms sales to and crises over Taiwan, or international freedom of navigation incidents sparked 

by events like the EP-3E Aries II aircraft collision and 

militarization of South China Sea features.331 Based 

upon fluctuating historic ties and the conflicting signals from current events, analysts differ widely on 

whether a U.S. strategy with China should be con-
71

frontational by directly countering Chinese actions 

or indirectly through actions to enhance partners, 

contain Chinese aggression from afar, or engage with 

China to manage an internationally acceptable accommodation of its power. William “Trey” Braun, an Asia 

and landpower expert at the U.S. Army’s Strategic 

Studies Institute (SSI), sees the United States pursuing a “cooperative competitive strategy” with China 

in economic and diplomatic affairs, but a “coercive/

confrontational competitive strategy” on military and 

information lines, which challenges the American 

public and its leaders to understand the “interplay between cooperative and coercive activity to avoid unintended consequences.”332 Despite these seemingly 

conflicting strategy differences, Wikistrat analyst Dr. 

Michael Lumbers sees an American military presence 

in the Asia-Pacific region as necessary to support each 

of these alternatives.333 The complex nature of military 

relations between the United States and China stems 

from concurrently and intermittently pursuing some 

of these contradictory strategies so that military relations are affected by the entire spectrum of options, 

from managing the rise of China into an international 

order that its leaders understand is beneficial to its 

interests, to remedying appeasement through unapologetic hard power, which still requires military 

dialogue to manage “security competition and friction in a way that supports overall stability.”334 As 

Chinese economic growth continues to slow and political, social, demographic, and environmental issues 

need addressing, the present reduction in size and 

professionalization of the People’s Liberation Army 

(PLA) may offer an opportunity “to find face saving 

settlements for the disputes now churning across every domain.”335 Indeed, one way to accomplish this is 
72

through robust and mature military relationships, for 

which then-President Obama and Chinese President 

Xi Jinping had jointly called for in 2014 and 2015.336

How the Trump administration will handle these relations is tenuous and may take time to unfold.

U.S. landpower will play a considerable role in 

managing this military relationship with China’s land 

force-dominated defense leadership—and intra-landforce relations have been steadily improving despite 

recurring naval and air confrontations in the South 

China Sea.337 For its part, USARPAC engages China 

through its open category, in which U.S.:

legislative and policy constraints on defense relationships with these countries limit USARPAC’s ability 

to directly engage them. . . . The countries themselves 

may have a policy to limit engagements with the U.S. 

military as a reflection of the state of the overall bilateral relationship. All of these factors limit USARPAC’s 

engagement activities to senior level counterpart visits, medical, engineer, and HA/DR related exchanges—when allowed and where appropriate . . . USARPAC fosters responsible behavior through a focus on 

common security challenges and expands open lines 

of communication.338

Overcoming these limitations by developing “bilateral trust and transparency, the USARPAC Commander 

actively seeks opportunities to work with China in 

cooperative solutions to international security challenges.”339 Engagement and containment, even while 

at odds with each other, is crucial in order to contain 

crises and extend cooperative endeavors.340 Current 

and previous PACOM Commanders, Admiral Harris 

and Admiral Samuel Locklear, have stressed fostering 

military relations with China even during heightened 
73

tensions to ensure communication and stability.341 In 

the past, however, Chinese officials have used military contacts more as a signal of the state of diplomatic relations than as a tool to manage crises, although 

during a 2015 U.S. freedom of navigation operation 

close to Chinese occupied South China Sea features, 

the PLA used a defense telephone link concerning 

the incident.342 A delicate balance of engagement is 

needed to continue such progress, even while “China

is . . . both a recipient of security cooperation and a potential competitor driving some U.S. regional security 

cooperation efforts.”343

The range of military engagement is circumscribed 

by the U.S. National Defense Authorization Act of 2000, 

which prohibits some activities and discussion of 

certain topics with Chinese forces that could create 

a national security risk; and China bars its members 

from attending any U.S. school, although military-tomilitary contacts are allowed.344 Nonetheless, certain 

themes of engagement are important and drive the 

activities that ensue. For instance, senior leader dialogues are held to “develop common views on the international security environment and related challenges” in order to influence policy, cooperate on shared 

interests like counterterrorism and peacekeeping, and 

reduce tensions between the two states by improving 

operational safety and building institutional interactions.345 Operational safety entails building confidence 

and reducing the perception of threat through such actions as the exchange of information concerning force 

size and composition, deployments and movement, 

exercises, and protocols governing chance meetings 

between forces.346 To accomplish these goals, Defense 

One’s analyst Kedar Pavgi reports that military-tomilitary contacts have climbed since a low point in 
74

2010, consisting of only 7 military-to-military contacts, 

5 of which were senior leader meetings, to about 25 in 

2014, about half of which were exercise or educational 

contacts. Chinese-U.S. military contacts now seem 

less susceptible to being curtailed by adverse events, 

although whether that continues depends on relations established by the new Trump administration. 

Although the types of engagements are still clipped 

by policy and personality, they allow contacts from 

low-level exercises to cabinet secretary dialogues and 

are best categorized as senior leader visits and discussions, non-traditional operations exercises and training, education, and other engagements—examples of 

which are presented below.347

In terms of types and quantity of engagements, 

senior leader engagements are the most numerous, 

perhaps because they are the most reliable to control within legislative and policy restraints imposed 

by both sides. These high-level engagements include 

visits by the U.S. President, as Commander in Chief, 

to China in 2009 and 2014; bilateral discussions at 

international venues as occurred between the U.S. 

Secretary of Defense and PRC Minister of National 

Defense in Kuala Lumpur in 2015; and China’s Chief 

of the General Staff of the PLA’s visit to the United 

States in 2011.348 Because land forces dominate the 

Chinese military structure, discussion between senior 

land force leaders are especially important, as when 

the U.S. Army Chief of Staff visited China in 2014. 

In addition to building personal and organizational 

relationships, these discussions should result in substantive agreements like the 2015 “army-to-army dialogue mechanism to better coordinate humanitarian 

assistance and disaster response practices.”349 Highlevel engagements concerning education are another 
75

permissible topic as witnessed during the Commandant of the USAWC’s visit to the PLA’s Academy of 

Military Science in Beijing in December 2015, or when 

the PLA’s Peacekeeping Center discussed developing 

conceptual materials concerning peacekeeping and 

continuing their exchanges while visiting PKSOI at 

Carlisle Barracks in November 2015.350 Such activities 

should result in more substantive engagement such as 

PLA officers attending the USAWC as international 

fellows, or U.S. Army and PLA forces serving together in United Nations peace operations.351 Despite annual invitations, no PLA officer has ever attended the 

USAWC. In a small step toward closer peace operations, a U.S. Marine officer attended the Peacekeeping 

School in Beijing in 2015.352 Although high-level relationships are essential, more opportunities for lower 

echelon personnel would give depth to engagement 

as ties mature slowly over time and repeated encounters. Former U.S. Ambassador to China and PACOM 

Commander Joseph Prueher related, “These personal relationships are more important than the formal 

agreements . . . [but] we don’t have the amalgam that 

holds it together at the lower level.”353 Steady rotation 

of senior level U.S. officials to duties outside the region also detracts from more effective engagement.354

U.S.-Chinese engagement continues apace especially 

among land forces, despite its detractors and slow 

results, because of its potential to enhance cooperation in areas that concern both countries, and reduce 

the potential for conflict between them—acting as a 

regional stability insurance policy.

One form of engagement where all levels of land 

force personnel can interact is non-traditional military 

operations, once referred to as military operations 

other than war. In order to better manage the com-
76

petitive aspects of the Chinese relationship, the 2014 

QDR recommends practical cooperation in a variety 

of areas including peacekeeping, disaster relief, and 

humanitarian assistance, which are major missions for 

U.S. landpower.355 In order to burnish its image and 

gain practical experience, the PLA is investing heavily in these types of missions, which make a natural 

partnership between both forces, within the limits allowed them, because of the expertise and experience 

each side brings.356 In disaster management, the two 

armies are conducting training and exercises “increasing in number and increasing in quality and scope . . . 

just short of a full-blown exercise.”357 For instance, in 

2012, the PLA and U.S. Army held a tabletop HA/DR 

exercise in Chengdu; 60 PLA soldiers exercised with 

the National Guard in Hawaii in 2013; and, a Disaster Management Exchange was conducted on Hainan 

Dao in 2015, with about 200 soldiers from each side 

participating.358 Also in that year, a trilateral survival 

exercise was held in the Australian Outback for the 

second year.359 Although an observer since 2002, the 

PLA participated in the Cobra Gold exercises for the 

first time in 2014, but characteristically only in the 

humanitarian assistance portions.360

Another area of potential cooperation in which 

both armies have the expertise to share includes nation building, which “is one of the basic missions of 

the PLA . . . [and] a historic mission for the United 

States Army” offering natural venues to exchange 

ideas on civil-military relations, the role of the military in development, and domestic and international 

responsibilities.361 Peace operations are another common interest between the two, and when coupled with 

nation building and HA/DR, could result in intriguing and substantive discussions over combined efforts 
77

to deal with failed or failing states, countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and/or their 

effects, or preventing terrorism.362 In the engineering 

realm, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers oversees major river infrastructure projects that may be a valuable 

exchange with the Chinese who also deal with potential disasters along the Yangtze, Yellow, and other rivers, the peril of earthquakes to major cities, and how 

the destruction from each is mitigated.363 Although 

engagements are now small and limited, with time 

they could prove a boon to both sides for the expertise 

exchanged, improvement in relations, and mitigation 

of the real consequences of disasters.

Another type of engagement, forward presence, 

may seem more difficult to derive benefits from with 

the PLA, but here too gains may be found. As with 

other states, high-level discussions, exercises, and 

training are each a part of forward presence engagement with China. However, compared to other South 

China Sea countries, these are sparse and lack any advantages of enduring interaction through personnel 

basing or prepositioning of equipment. Indeed, U.S. 

military forces’ simultaneous engaging and deterring 

activities—congagement—makes forward positioning 

of U.S. personnel and equipment with partner countries an irritation to relations with China and a perceived security dilemma that the Chinese vigorously 

resist.364 From a combat and deter perspective, U.S. 

forces in the region restrain Chinese options, as they 

are intended to do. However, if Chinese intentions are 

as cooperative as they claim, then current forward positioning of U.S. forces makes engagement stronger. 

U.S. forces in close proximity to China means that opportunities and duration to engage in exercises and 

training can increase, and it opens the door for mul-
78

tilateral interaction with the forces of countries not 

regularly encountered, as occurs during Cobra Gold. 

Some analysts claim that the U.S. forces presence in 

partner countries may also act “as a pacifier for the 

more aggressive impulses of American allies and partners in the region,”365 much the same way that was 

an unofficial role of American land forces with their 

South Korean counterparts in the 1960s and 1970s. A 

detached view of the American presence in the region 

may see it as having a region-wide stabilizing effect 

of restraining aggression on both sides while offering 

venues to build confidence in one another and pursue 

common interests with the United States as a facilitator, and “over time can improve cooperation when 

policymakers are feeling friendly and reduce the 

chance of accidental clashes when policymakers are 

feeling prickly.”366 To date, the Chinese Government 

has been wary of such an approach, but if there were a 

breakthrough in such engagement, it would probably 

be led by the land forces.367

U.S. landpower’s strategic role to engage states 

and shape conditions should limit the need for deterrence or combat if properly performed. Through security cooperation and engagement activities, regional 

states may better understand each other and ensure 

stability and security to address U.S. and other states’ 

interests. U.S. landpower’s contribution to this is to 

build partner capacity especially through interpersonal and organizational engagements with militaries dominated by their land forces, and engaged by 

regionally specialized U.S. land forces. Security cooperation activities help to develop friendly forces and 

interoperability through security assistance, the transfer of equipment and munitions, defense services, and 

education and training. Security cooperation through 
79

military-to-military engagement also takes the form 

of exercises and field training through programs like 

Pacific Pathways and exercises like Cobra Gold, nontraditional military and combat missions, and senior 

level and staff engagements through conferences and 

visits like PAMS and PALS. The forward presence of 

U.S. land forces through basing or prepositioning of 

equipment reinforces the strengths and advantages 

of shape and engage activities through enduring and 

recurring ties, and reassuring partners and warning 

adversaries of American commitment and resolve. 

USARPAC’s levels of engagement are examples of 

the different intensities of interaction with other land 

forces including Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, 

and even rival China. HA/DR and peace operations 

tend to be universally accepted cooperation activities, 

while combat maneuvers or actual operations, as with 

JSOTF-P, are reserved for close partners and allies. Engagement activities especially benefit ties with China, 

which is the most difficult and consequential of the 

relations, in order to build upon cooperation or mitigate crises. Thus of the three strategic U.S. landpower 

roles—combat and compel, deter and prevent, and 

engage and shape—the latter may be the most consequential in the disputes over the South China Sea.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Chinese word for crisis is sometimes misperceived as composed of the characters for danger and 

opportunity based on common references ranging 

from former U.S. President John F. Kennedy’s campaign speeches to the Nobel Peace Prize acceptance 

lecture by former U.S. Vice President Al Gore.368

Despite being only partially accurate, this concept 
80

endures in the public mind as a useful touchstone for 

making necessary, if difficult, changes during chaotic 

times. The United States and East Asian countries are 

in a turbulent period where such opportunities exist, 

for good or ill. There is certainly much opportunity 

here for U.S. land forces to better support U.S. interests in the region, as described in this monograph. 

This section draws out, emphasizes, and elaborates 

on some of the findings and recommendations already presented as relevant for land forces in a semienclosed maritime environment concerning aspects of 

doctrine, operations, and engagement; organization; 

training and exercises, and material. Although examined in select categories, many of these recommendations are interdependent, so that some solutions are 

covered in other categories.

While significant opportunities may be grasped 

during uncertain times, there are risks to these proposed changes including long-time U.S. fiscal constraints on some of the material and operational 

recommendations, constraints that will probably 

endure despite recent American campaign rhetoric. 

Depending on how strict budgets become in addressing spending, the continuing low funding of U.S. 

land force personnel, units, and equipment will make 

their rebalance to Asia challenging and leave some of 

the recommendations here simply never-resourced 

requirements.369 A bigger problem for these recommendations, and in the forming and managing of 

military and government policy of the future, is that 

no real American grand strategy has been articulated 

for a long time, which leaves military forces without 

an adequate foundation to organize, train, and equip 

forces, and vulnerable to competing priorities or halfmeasures if changes are started. Without the founda-
81

tion of strategy and end states, the difficult trade-offs 

envisioned in this monograph between strengthening 

the security relationship with Vietnam, for example, 

with building trust and cooperation with China may 

come to naught as inconclusively debated or summarily reversed.370 The first recommendations of this 

monograph then are to stabilize the policy environment through crafting a strategy to guide efforts and 

then establishing actionable budgets and guidance to 

attain strategic goals. Although these are obvious elements that have been long ignored, they are worth 

stating again. Even should these necessary tasks be 

completed, the implementation of changes in land 

force posture, methods of fighting and engaging, new 

and improving weapon systems, interoperability and 

interdependence, and personnel and training will not 

be easy in terms of foreign or domestic politics, but 

are necessary.371 With all of these risks acknowledged, 

what follows are some recommendations to advance 

the role of U.S. land forces to fight, deter, or engage in 

support of national objectives and military operations 

in a semi-enclosed maritime environment, in general, 

and in the South China Sea in particular.

Within land force operations, several advances attained during nearly 2 decades of combat in dry landlocked battlefields need to be sustained because they 

are relatively inexpensive, powerful contributions to 

joint and interagency operations. First, maintain and 

strengthen the hard-won cooperation and interdependence between conventional Army and Marine forces 

with each other and with SOF in their complementary 

roles. As the demands of combat operations reduce, 

too often so does trust and cooperation among the 

land forces, as each seeks to protect service interests 

and budgets, while separating into garrison routines. 
82

These stronger operational bonds may be taken for 

granted, which can happen without strong leadership 

and dedicated nurturing.

Also is the need to sustain and improve landpower’s foundational role in enabling support to joint forces, to open and set the theater, provide logistics, establish wide area security, and other critical supporting 

contributions of landpower to air, sea, interagency, 

and partner organizations, which are often overlooked 

and thereby neglected in the interims between crises. 

Sustaining the knowledge, expertise, and capabilities 

that have been hard learned may require those skills 

and tasks to be streamlined and balanced for greater 

effectiveness. Lessons are expected from past and ongoing operations and should be applied to improve 

these critical capabilities especially since short notice 

operations and austere conditions are often encountered when U.S. forces deploy. These may be the most 

important landpower contributions to semi-enclosed 

maritime operations and should be reinforced.

One change to land force operations that will require organizational change and a doctrinal shift is 

fully integrating and controlling improved or to-bedeveloped landpower projection capabilities into the 

air and maritime domains. Overlapping weapon system threats and confined maneuvering areas fraught 

with physical hazards make semi-enclosed maritime 

environments particularly dangerous places for modern air and naval combat. This monograph proposed 

that land forces stationed in the littorals should project air, sea, and land fires into this environment to 

supplement air and naval power, or even provide the 

shield behind which air and sea power become a mobile reserve, counter strike force, or act as a deterrent. 

The specifics of these systems are discussed below, 
83

but to properly implement this concept, organizational and doctrinal changes are needed to fully integrate 

joint and combined systems through a cross-domain 

command and intelligence capability for collective regional defense. A mobile land-based C2 fires system 

for semi-enclosed maritime regions would fill a U.S. 

and partner capability gap that is especially apparent 

around the South China Sea.

A mobile land-based cross-domain C2 system 

would be less expensive, less vulnerable, larger and 

more capable, more available, and less provocative 

than similar air- or sea-based systems, and should include and sometimes depend upon partner country 

capabilities. Such an integrated system would defend 

air, sea, and land forces deploying to and operating in 

the theater, and enable joint force entry operations.372

Adding maritime domain awareness capabilities as 

an early warning of changing events in the maritime 

domain would be a useful intelligence layer to build a 

common operating picture so that participating states 

could better coordinate responses. The current SEA 

Reassurance Fund could be used to integrate and develop the capabilities needed to build and employ this 

capability.373 The U.S. Army would be responsible for 

providing many of the air-defense, surface-to-surface 

fires, and potentially land-based anti-ship and surveillance systems needed for the endeavor that may 

require adding and restructuring these elements and 

developing a scheme to deploy these units.374 Operating the system in theater is a sign of resolve and 

ensures that hosting states are fully committed to the 

defense of the commons, including surveillance of piracy, terrorism, and other threats that would link the 

interests of regional states along with their systems. 

Doctrine, systems, and organization changes to real-
84

ize this recommendation are needed, with research 

and acquisition necessary through U.S. and partner 

efforts. A fully integrated cross-domain C2 system is a 

much-needed capability to monitor and defend semienclosed maritime regions around the world, and a 

land-based system fully integrating partners is a practical choice.

The second change to land force operations that 

will require organizational and doctrinal change is 

developing a small-unit boat-based land force capable of patrolling and controlling littorals and intraarchipelagic waters. To counter gray zone tensions 

and nonstate actors’ disruptive actions, growing more 

common in the South China Sea littoral, land forces 

require an “assured shallow-water maneuver capability [that] fills a tactical and operational need” to support defensive, offensive, stability, and humanitarian 

actions by land forces. Such a force properly trained 

and equipped could, for example, conduct raids or 

reconnaissance in the brown waters of a coastline or 

within the Spratly archipelago, as an example; provide counter-terrorism and other security services 

around friendly forces; interdict trafficking or pirates; 

and provide humanitarian services and disaster relief 

in shallow but navigable waterways or remote areas 

only accessible by such vessels. Since many of Southeast Asia’s countries’ problems are water-related, but 

its forces are land-centric, such a small-unit boat force 

is a natural engagement match with regional powers 

and thus satisfies the combat, deterrence, and engagement missions of U.S. land forces.375 The Marine Corps 

is the best fit to perform this mission, but soldiers have 

conducted this task in the past and may have more 

personnel and capability to expand in this direction. 

Although this is a mission not conducted by U.S. forces 
85

since the Vietnam War, the obvious requirement and 

current uncertainty and changes in the political environment, both foreign and domestic, may now make 

this the time to consider instituting such capability.

Daily engagement and support to regional partners and allies is a powerful but relatively inexpensive 

way to achieve U.S. and regional partners’ goals—a 

tool that needs to be strengthened. If, as Dr. David 

Lai of SSI contends, China’s strategy mirrors the ancient Chinese game of go, then its recent moves of 

seizing the center of the board in the South China Sea 

through building up and militarizing the Spratly and 

Paracel Islands may be countered by the United States 

working the game board’s edges, remaining fully engaged with Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, and 

other involved regional powers.376 In his inaugural address, however, President Trump may have signaled 

a weakening of support and engagement with likeminded partners when he proclaimed, “For many decades, we’ve enriched foreign industry at the expense 

of American industry, subsidized the armies of other 

countries while allowing for the very sad depletion of 

our military.”377 This monograph and other authorities believe that reducing engagement activities with 

key regional countries would ultimately be an expensive and debilitating mistake.378 Instead, engagement 

should be increased and strengthened, with land forces 

in the lead, because of their stabilizing and defensive 

nature in a land forces-dominant region, as already 

presented. For reasons of its own new administration’s 

policies, this may be particularly difficult to continue 

with the Philippines. However, even here, continuing 

influential ties and activities at lower echelons and in 

much-needed activities, below the headline levels of 

more fraught large exercises and equipment sales, are 
86

desirable to maintain personal relationships and force 

capabilities until official relationships allow more 

broad engagements again. While official relationships 

between the United States and the Philippines remain 

muted, landpower ties with the forces of Vietnam, 

Malaysia, Brunei, and Indonesia should be deepened. 

The Trump administration is already actively engaged 

in strengthening ties with Taiwan, perhaps playing an 

unexpected edge of the go game board.

Despite recent downgrading by the Philippines, 

training and exercising with Southeast Asian powers 

has been mutually beneficial, and should be maintained and diversified. International exercises like 

Cobra Gold allow states that might not otherwise 

engage with the United States or the Philippines, like 

China, to participate together in a variety of operating 

environments.379 U.S. Army, Marine, and SOF each 

conduct their own bilateral exercises with regional 

states, often emphasizing particular missions or tasks 

of which USARPAC’s Pacific Pathways program is 

an effective example of wisely engaging in various 

bilateral exercises, and should be continued. These 

bilateral exercises should concentrate on training activities sought after by partners. For instance, the U.S. 

Army could advance its cooperation in establishing a 

peacekeeping center with the VPA to the next level of 

running peacekeeping field and command post exercises or planning actual operations. The VPA is also 

interested in acquiring advanced field medical skills—

with which U.S. land forces have much combat experience—and continuing urban search and rescue drills, 

all of which are examples of non-controversial ways 

to continue engagement despite Chinese protests. A 

more substantial step would be bolstering Vietnam’s 

already capable amphibious forces through exercises 
87

and training with the U.S. Marine Corps. The Malaysian Army’s nascent amphibious force would benefit 

too from increased training and exercise with the Marine Corps that the Malaysian Defense Minister appears to support.380 For reasons such as these, the DoD 

needs to make sure that security cooperation remains 

an important tool for engagement despite possible 

political sentiment otherwise.

Engagement with more wary countries is both possible and necessary. The Philippine Army would also 

like to increase its abilities in peacekeeping, which 

is an entrée to which even the Duterte administration might not object, and could have the benefit of 

becoming a trilateral effort with Vietnam or perhaps 

even China. A more substantial but difficult activity 

would be to continue building the Philippine’s air assault capability, which is much needed in its jungle 

and insular environment. Maintaining continuity in 

this and other U.S.-Philippines training and exercise 

efforts would be advantageous for Philippine forces 

but are uncertain in the current political environment. 

Relations with China have made military engagements, at the level described here, tenuous activities. 

Recent moves by the Trump administration have 

probably hampered any form of engagement for some 

time to come. Nonetheless, contact between U.S. and 

Chinese forces would at least reduce tensions, and the 

possibility for misunderstanding and miscalculations. 

U.S. land forces are the most likely to spearhead any 

future cooperation. Senior level military dialogues 

would air out challenges between the two sides and 

perhaps find some common views. As noted earlier 

by former U.S. Ambassador and USPACOM Commander Joseph Prueher, such personal relationships 

with Chinese officials “are more important than the 
88

formal agreements” and should be fostered.381 The 

usual less contentious activities for relationships like 

this could re-establish ties including student exchanges, and practical cooperation in areas such as peacekeeping, HA/DR, and natural disaster mitigation and 

infrastructure projects in which both sides’ land forces 

have much expertise.

Improvements to training and exercising are always necessary, but two main ideas are suggested 

here. Although joint and combined exercises like Cobra Gold are very useful, and single-service bilateral 

exercise can focus training for better results, more USARPAC exercises should include U.S. Marine and SOF 

elements in their exercises to maintain joint interoperability and increase access for the other services—and 

their exercises should do the same. A second suggestion comes from a 2016 USAWC study that recommends strengthening regional partner capacity with 

regional leaders like Australia and Japan, where the 

United States should assist in helping them develop 

regional defense operations through organizing and 

executing their own “Pathways” exercises. The report 

stated that:

this initiative offers a unique opportunity for the participating nations to deepen cooperation and relationships among themselves . . . to increase regional military involvement and leadership among Asia-Pacific 

partners, providing regionally led security, stability, 

and cooperative defense.382

These proposed “Reverse Pathways” would not only 

increase and strengthen regional powers’ capacities, 

but would also share some of the burdens of cooperation activities, and multiply the strands in the defense 

network of like-minded states as insurance against 
89

one relationship souring. For instance, recently difficult relations between the United States and the Philippines allow Japan to continue anchoring relations 

with the Philippines. Malaysian Defense Minister 

Hishammuddin Hussein has proposed that ASEAN 

“create a ready group that focuses on humanitarian 

assistance and disaster response capabilities,” which 

is one form such an idea might take.383

Unit-to-unit engagement with regional states is 

a relatively inexpensive, rapid, and effective way to 

enhance access and operations in maritime environments, so expanding existing RAF and SPPs makes 

sense. Because of their importance as individual states 

and even more so as a bloc, the SPP should expand to 

cover all 10 ASEAN states to tighten their cooperation 

and collective actions.384 Partnering with Malaysia and 

Brunei is especially important since both are directly 

impacted by the South China Sea disputes, and their 

officials have shown some interest in the program.385

To increase stability and security in Southeast Asia, 

the SPP should focus on threats to stability and legitimacy including “disaster response, consequence management [CM], border and fixed site security, cyber 

defense, counter terrorism and counter trafficking,” as 

well as improve partner resiliency in light of ongoing 

gray zone operations.386 These focus areas are particularly well suited to the civil-military expertise that National Guard units bring to cooperative engagements, 

especially when interacting with civilian authorities.387 A limited number of training days available to 

Guardsmen, however, has constrained this program 

and should be corrected through more resources, as 

intended by the Army Chief of Staff, or more innovative methods employed for engaging.388
90

Both the U.S. Army National Guard, through the 

SPP, and SOF have aligned their units to better understand a region—gaining practical expertise and 

insight. As former TRADOC Commander General 

Robert Cone emphasized, “if we can just get the first 

four brigades on the ground, anywhere we go, to be 

conversant in language, culture, and networks, then 

we will be far ahead of where we were in Iraq and Afghanistan.”389 To achieve such regional awareness, the 

U.S. Army and Marine Corps active forces and their 

reserves should be regionally aligned as well, to enhance combat and engagement actions, especially in 

HA/DR and foreign internal defense. Such customizing of RAF, initiated in the U.S. Army in 2012, is a challenge because many rival tasks compete for manpower, especially in a force as small as the Marine Corps. 

Assigning a continuum of scalable or smaller units to 

specialize and engage in a region would be one way 

to address this concern.390 Although well intentioned, 

however, such alignments are prone to breaking down 

during the periods between crises, so an institutional 

change to keep personnel in units longer and to reassign them back to maintain regional focus should be 

considered, perhaps through a regimental system.391

The U.S. Marine Corps, already notorious for splitting into East Coast and West Coast “tribes,” may 

be further along such regional forces alignment than 

they think, especially with a large contingent of personnel permanently in Okinawa and Guam. Aligned 

forces must also be funded to exercise in their region 

and given the training needed to properly prepare for 

regular deployments and maintain their readiness.392

Individual training to create specialists is also necessary to maintain regional expertise, ranging from the 

well-regarded Army Foreign Area Officer to the Strategic Broadening Seminar for non-commissioned and 
91

warrant officers.393 Within the human domain, more 

culturally aware personnel, policies, and activities are 

crucial for landpower’s effectiveness in combat and 

peacetime engagement, because, as respected SSI author Steven Metz concludes, “Most, if not all, U.S. military operations will continue to be cross-cultural.”394

For deterrence and combat capabilities, a landbased cross-domain C2 system has already been 

proposed, but improvements to the joint and allied 

systems that are part of such an integrated network 

are needed. For instance, competent anti-air systems 

like Patriot and THAAD exist, but, as presented earlier, their capabilities need to be extended to cover 

the wider spaces of a maritime environment, and 

their capabilities need to be upgraded to counter the 

sophisticated A2AD systems fielded by the Chinese. 

Enough of these systems are not available for worldwide commitments, so more Patriot and THAAD air 

defense units are needed to protect vital U.S. bases 

in Okinawa, mainland Japan, and forward deployed 

bases that U.S. military forces might need in order to 

counter aggressive moves in the South China Sea.395

Anti-ship capabilities for U.S. land forces do not 

exist yet, but if pursued, as advocated by this monograph, making existing systems dual purpose for covering this mission is a good initial first step. The U.S. 

Army should fully pursue its programs of using the 

existing M777 155 mm howitzers to fire hypervelocity 

projectiles and the Excalibur precision guided munition for initial land-based mobile, short-range antiship weapons. In the longer term, the United States 

should work with partners like Japan and Vietnam, 

who are already developing anti-ship systems, to ensure interoperability in hardware, doctrine, and tactics, and C2 to attain an effective long-range anti-ship 

capability, which has U.S. Senate backing.396
92

ATACMS upgrade in range and ability to track 

slow-moving targets could cover much of the region’s 

sea- and land-based threats out to 500 km when better 

integrated into a cross-domain C2 system. Such a system further complicates an aggressors plan and contributes to deterrence. However, such systems when 

fully fielded also increase offensive capability for land 

forces, which could be controversial internationally, 

and are significant expansions to roles, missions, and 

costs for land forces during fiscally constrained times, 

which could be controversial domestically.397 Nonetheless, if the United States is serious about supporting its partners and allies around the world’s littorals, 

and deterring aggression in the marginal seas, more 

funding, research, development, and acquisition are 

necessary.398

There are other recommendations suggested in 

this monograph that may be more practical in the 

long term than in the present political environment, 

so those are only covered briefly. Forward presence 

forces, temporary host-nation facilities, and prepositioned logistics sites are important tools for combat, 

deterrence, and engagement in order to reduce deployment time, costs, and vulnerability; show commitment in the region; and enhance interoperability, 

understanding, and networks with partners.399 The 

Trump administration and some U.S. partners seem 

less interested in employing these force-enhancing 

tools; however, pursuing them should be done selectively with the hope for better prospects in the 

future. To compensate, forward-postured, sea-based 

land forces, such as the U.S. Marine Corps’ Amphibious Readiness Groups’ Marine Expeditionary Unit, 

should substitute when and where land-based forces 

lack access, as well as be properly funded to ensure 
93

availability and readiness for when such forces are 

needed.400 Another postponed opportunity is greater 

engagement with Chinese forces. Without enhancing 

China’s fighting capabilities, engagement on a variety 

of levels is needed to build relationships, understanding, and trust during crises and opportunities when 

these are needed. Despite political circumstances, engagement should continue as a fundamental aspect of 

the relationship, but the Chinese have used engagement as a carrot for their diplomatic purposes, and the 

Trump administration seems little inclined to use its 

soft power instruments with China. Nonetheless, as 

much engagement as may be salvaged should continue, in order to have some framework ready when political winds shift and engagement is needed again.401

CONCLUSION

U.S. landpower in the South China Sea is an essential component to stabilizing this contested region 

during America’s strategic rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region. Together, the U.S. Army, Marine Corps, 

and SOF offer distinctive capabilities whose defensive 

nature in this semi-enclosed maritime environment 

tend to escalate less while still sending an unequivocal message of committed support and steady resolve 

to partners and competitors alike. The capabilities of 

U.S. landpower are also essential to augment other 

activities in the air, sea, and human domains in the 

South China Sea through direct support to diverse 

joint military operations, intergovernmental activities 

in pursuit of U.S. strategic interests, and in landpower’s own engagement, deterrence, and strategic combat roles. U.S. landpower gives pause to states with 

aggressive intentions, creates networks that enhance 
94

abilities synergistically, and may also break down barriers to misunderstanding—all of which should result 

in a stabilizing role for U.S. landpower through its 

proper application in the South China Sea region.

To establish U.S. landpower as a critical part of 

security and stability in the region, this monograph 

presented how its wide-ranging capabilities have an 

important influence on the land and human domains 

rimming the South China Sea, and that directly support U.S. interests pursued by all of its government 

agencies. Even in a sea- and air-dominated environment, landpower’s broad operational and strong 

support capabilities in pursuit of increasingly interdependent joint and unified operations make it an indispensable element in attaining U.S. interests. Landpower may be the most decisive, flexible, and versatile 

force through full spectrum operations, fully covering 

the range of military operations from humanitarian 

assistance to conventional state-on-state warfare, and 

is also crucial to understand, engage, and influence 

people and leaders. If the United States is to channel 

tensions in the region toward internationally acceptable forms of growth, prosperity, stability, and security, U.S. landpower holds special influence because 

land forces dominate this region’s military structure. 

Landpower’s capabilities are crucial for attaining the 

United States’ national security interests of peace and 

stability in the South China Sea region.

The first of the strategic roles of landpower, to 

compel or fight and win decisively, is more important 

than is normally credited in a maritime environment. 

The U.S. Army provides indispensable support to 

other forces and agencies through its theater opening and sustaining abilities as lead military service in 

logistics, land transportation, communications, medi-
95

cal, and other support. Through its core competency 

of wide area security, the U.S. Army, often with the 

Marine Corps, is usually responsible for passive and 

active means to protect forces, populations, and infrastructure against external and internal threats. The 

Army’s air and missile defense systems are particularly needed in this A2AD environment against preemptive strikes. The security role of sea control from 

the land through anti-ship missiles is a historic and influential one in a semi-enclosed sea environment, but 

still needs to be operationally developed by U.S. land 

forces. The counterland mission through surface-tosurface missiles acts as a shield to suppress close-in attack systems located around the region. Another core 

competency is combined arms maneuver. Amphibious operations, a mission assigned to all landpower 

forces, are a useful option during disasters and in the 

periphery of combat operations around the South 

China Sea. Maneuver by air offers another option but 

is also vulnerable in the current threat environment. 

Landpower’s combat capability is a measure of last 

resort, but does give credibility to landpower’s deter 

and engage strategic roles.

The second of the strategic roles of U.S. landpower, to deter and prevent war, is also crucial to stability in Southeast Asia. Credible U.S. deterrence in the 

region depends on the combat capabilities of U.S. 

landpower covered in this monograph. However, deterrence also needs to exhibit the will to back those capabilities, which is demonstrated through the forward 

presence of troops and prepositioning of equipment 

and supplies. The advantages of forward positioning 

can be gained through using hardened, dispersed, or 

temporary facilities. U.S. landpower’s ability to help 

mitigate crises and contingencies, whether security 
96

related or natural or manmade disasters, is another 

means to show resolve and capability in the region, 

as demonstrated by JSOTF-P and JTF 505 operations 

in the Philippines. The importance of landpower to 

deterrence and preventing war is due to the resolve 

that land forces represent when committed by the U.S. 

Government, and the powerful influence landpower 

wields in the human aspects of military operations. 

With forward presence and operational interaction 

with the forces of Southeast Asia, U.S. forces have 

more opportunity to assure partners while improving 

host nation military capabilities and interoperability 

through the shaping and engagement actions of security cooperation.

U.S. landpower’s strategic role to engage states 

and shape conditions may well reduce the need for 

deterrence or combat. Through security cooperation 

and engagement activities, regional states may better 

understand each other and ensure stability and security to address U.S. and regional states’ interests. U.S. 

landpower builds partner capacity through interpersonal and organizational engagements with militaries dominated by their land forces. Security cooperation activities also help to develop the capabilities of 

friendly forces and regional interoperability through 

security assistance, equipment, defense services, and 

education to partners from the United States. Security cooperation also takes the form of exercises and 

field training, military-to-military engagement exercises, non-traditional military and combat missions, 

and senior level and staff engagements. The forward 

presence of U.S. land forces reinforces the strengths 

and advantages of shaping and engagement activities 

for which multiple examples were given for Vietnam, 

Malaysia, the Philippines, and even rival China in a 
97

manner in which ties become more enduring and recurring. Although all three of the U.S. landpower strategic roles—combat and compel, deter and prevent, 

and engage and shape—are mutually dependent upon 

each other, engage and shape may be the most important in stabilizing the disputes in the South China Sea.

The use of landpower to address the disputes in 

the South China Sea is not usually considered in what 

is typically labeled a maritime- and air-centric theater, 

but the role of U.S. landpower is profound in this arena. Should the situation come to conflict, sea and air 

power may be the “big stick” of fighting in the South 

China Sea region with U.S. landpower support, but it 

is landpower that will speak softly, and its influence 

will be undeniable in deterring war or, should that 

fail, winning the peace.

ENDNOTES

1. The author gratefully acknowledges the support and help 

he received for this monograph from his colleagues: Commander 

(Ret.) David M. Birdwell, Colonel (Ret.) John A. Bonin, Colonel 

(Ret.) Donald Boose, Colonel (Ret.) William G. Braun, Colonel Stephen C. Ma, Colonel (Ret.) Michael A. Marra, and Colonel (Ret.) 

Brett D. Weigle.

2. The Air-Sea Battle concept has been subsumed into the Joint 

Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons (JAM-GC) 

in recognition of the joint and integrated nature of modern U.S. 

military operations, as explained later in this monograph, and 

gradual acknowledgement of the influence of landpower in semienclosed maritime environments like the South China Sea. Harry 

J. Kazianis, “Air-Sea Battle’s Next Step: JAM-GC on Deck,” The 

National Interest, November 25, 2015, available from nationalinterest.org/feature/air-sea-battles-next-step-jam-gc-deck-14440, accessed 

February 7, 2015; and Lieutenant Colonel Jason B. Nicholson and 

Joseph Trevithick, “The Army’s New Role in the Pacific Pivot,”

Proceedings: U.S. Naval Institute, Vol. 141, No. 10, October 2015, pp. 
98

60-65, available from www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2015-10/

armys-new-role-pacific-pivot, accessed January 20, 2016.

3. China added approximately 4.69 square miles to the Spratly Islands in 2014 and 2015 through its impressive but destructive 

land reclamation efforts, while Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Taiwan together added only about 0.34 square miles 

in the past 40 years. Clarence J. Bouchat, Dangerous Ground: The 

Spratly Islands and U.S. Interests and Approaches, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2013, p. 3, available from ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1187, 

accessed March 4, 2016; Christopher P. Cavas, “US Pacific Chief 

Talks China, Regional Partnerships,” DefenseNews.com, January 

27, 2016, available from www.defensenews.com/story/defense/naval/

navy/2016/01/27/harris-pacific-command-south-china-sea-naval-artificial-islands-reefs-india-thailand-japan-korea-philippines/79423764/, 

accessed February 19, 2016; and Clarence J. Bouchat; The Paracel Islands and U.S. Interests and Approaches in the South China Sea, 

Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 

2014, p. 3, available from ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/display.

cfm?pubID=1207, accessed March 4, 2016.

4. John R. Deni, The Future of American Landpower: Does Forward Presence Still Matter? The Case of the Army in the Pacific, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 

June 2014, p. 2, available from ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/display.

cfm?pubID=1202, accessed February 13, 2016; and Michael Green, 

Kathleen Hicks, and Mark Cancian, dirs., Asia-Pacific Rebalance 

2025: Capabilities, Presence, and Partnerships: An Independent Review 

of U.S. Defense Strategy in the Asia-Pacific, Washington, DC: Center 

for Strategic and International Studies, January 2016, p. 131, available from csis.org/files/publication/160119_Green_AsiaPacificRebalance2025_Web_0.pdf, accessed January 29, 2016. Disregarding the 

sub-unified command in Korea that has long been held by a U.S. 

Army General (four-star), this is an important adjustment in rank 

conscious Asian societies.

5. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review 2014, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, March 4, 

2014, p. 34, available from archive.defense.gov/pubs/2014_Quadrennial_Defense_Review.pdf, accessed January 25, 2016.
99

6. Gordon Lubold and Trefor Moss, “Aboard U.S. Ship in 

South China Sea, Defense Secretary Invokes ‘Big Stick’,” The Wall 

Street Journal, November 5, 2015, available from www.wsj.com/

articles/aboard-u-s-ship-in-south-china-sea-defense-secretary-invokesbig-stick-1446720866, accessed February 1, 2016.

7. Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), The 

Army, Army Doctrinal Publication (ADP) 1, Chg. No. 1, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 17, 2012, 

p. 1-4, available from https://www.army.mil/e2/c/downloads/303969.

pdf, accessed January 16, 2016.

8. There is no joint forces definition of “landpower,” see Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 

Joint Reference Publication, Washington, DC: U.S. Department 

of Defense, March 2017, available from www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_

dictionary, accessed April 13, 2017; Glenn K. Cunningham, “Landpower in Traditional Theory and Contemporary Application,” 

in J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr., ed., U.S. Army War College Guide to 

National Security Policy and Strategy, 2nd ed., Carlisle, PA: Strategic 

Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2006, p. 163, available 

from ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=708, accessed 

January 17, 2016.

9. Cunningham, p. 163; Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operations, 

Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of 

Defense, January 17, 2017, p. V-13, available from www.dtic.mil/

doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_0_20170117.pdf, accessed April 13, 2017, 

lists the six operational planning phases as: Phase 0 Shape, Phase 

I Deter, Phase II Seize the Initiative, Phase III Dominate, Phase IV 

Stabilize, Phase V Enable Civil Authority. The environmental domains of military power include land, sea, air, space, cyberspace, 

and a more recently debated human domain. Joint operations are 

the interoperable and interdependent use of the U.S. Army, Navy, 

Air Force, and Marine Corps toward common national goals.

10. Raymond T. Odierno, James F. Amos, and William H. 

McRaven, Strategic Landpower: Winning the Clash of Wills, Washington, DC: The Pentagon, 2013, p. 5, available from www.

tradoc.army.mil/FrontPageContent/Docs/Strategic%20Landpower%20

White%20Paper.pdf, accessed January 12, 2016.
100

11. U.S. Army Special Operations Command (SOCOM), ARSOF Operating Concept 2022, Fort Bragg, NC: U.S. Special Operations Command, September 26, 2014, p. 5, available from www.

soc.mil/Assorted%20Pages/ARSOF%20Operating%20Concept%20

2014.pdf, accessed January 19, 2016; and Harry B. Harris, Jr., “Role 

of Land Forces In Ensuring Access To Shared Domains,” public 

speech to Land Power in the Pacific (LANPAC) Symposium 2016, 

Sheraton, Waikiki, Hawaii, May 25, 2016, available from www.

pacom.mil/Media/SpeechesTestimony/tabid/6706/Article/781889/lanpac-symposium-2016-role-of-land-forces-in-ensuring-access-to-shareddomains.aspx, accessed June 9, 2016.

12. David Knych, “Preserving the U.S. Army’s Land Combat 

Power,” in Samuel R. White, Jr., ed., Futures Seminar: the United 

States Army in 2025 and Beyond, Vol. 2, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Center for Strategic Leadership, U.S. Army War College, December 

2015, p. 37, available from http://publications.armywarcollege.edu/

pubs/2972.pdf, accessed January 15, 2016.

13. Lukas Milevski, “Fortissimus Inter Pares: The Utility of 

Landpower in Grand Strategy,” Parameters, Vol. 42, No. 2, July 

2012, p. 6, available from ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/parameters/

Articles/2012summer/Milevski.pdf, accessed January 21, 2016.

14. U.S. Army SOCOM, pp. 1, 5; John M. McHugh and Raymond T. Odierno, 2012 Army Posture: The Nation’s Force of Decisive 

Action, posture statement to the Committees and Subcommittees 

of the United States Senate and the House of Representatives, 

2nd Sess., 112th Cong., Washington, D.C., February 2012, p. 22, 

available from www.army.mil/e2/rv5_downloads/aps/aps_2012.pdf, 

accessed February 29, 2016; and HQDA, The Army, p. 1-1.

15. Douglas Ollivant, “Go Army, Beat Navy,” Foreign Policy, 

September 28, 2012, available from foreignpolicy.com/2012/09/28/

go-army-beat-navy/, accessed February 14, 2015.

16. Odierno, Amos, and McRaven, p. 7.

17. The term “decisive action” replaced the term “full spectrum operations” as the concept of continuous, simultaneous offense, defense, stability, or defense support of civil authorities. 

The term “full spectrum operations” continues to be used in this 
101

monograph, however, as it is more illustrative for its audience. 

HQDA, Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), Unified 

Land Operations, ADP 3-0, Washington, DC: U.S. Government 

Printing Office, October 10, 2011, p. 5, available from https://

www.army.mil/e2/rv5_downloads/info/references/ADP_3-0_ULO_

Oct_2011_APD.pdf.

18. Robert B. Brown and Ronald W. Sprang, Human Domain: 

Essential to Victory in Future Operations, White Paper, Fort Benning, GA: U.S. Army Maneuver Center of Excellence, n.d., p. 5; 

and Cunningham, p. 165.

19. HQDA, The Army, p. 1-4.

20. Francis G Hoffman, “What the QDR Ought to Say about 

Landpower,” Parameters, Vol. 43, No. 4, Winter 2013-14, p. 7, 

available from ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/Parameters/Issues/Winter_2013/TheQuarterly_Winter2013-14_v43n4.pdf, accessed January 11, 2016; and U.S. Department of the Navy (USDN), Marine 

Corps Operations, Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 

1-0, Washington, DC: Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, August 9, 2011, p. 1-3, available from www.marines.mil/Portals/59/

Publications/MCDP%201-0%20Marine%20Corps%20Operations.

pdf, accessed January 18, 2016.

21. Figure sourced from Cunningham, p. 166.

22. Odierno, Amos, and McRaven, p. 3; HQDA, The Army, p. 

1-1; and Brown and Sprang, pp. 2, 5-6. Note: that as a human contrived environment one could also argue that cyberspace should 

be included in this discussion. While probably true, including cyberspace into the discussion goes beyond the scope of this monograph.

23. Charles T. Cleveland, Shaw S. Pick, and Stuart L. Farris, 

“Shedding Light on the Gray Zone: A New Approach to HumanCentric Warfare,” Army, Vol. 65, No. 9, September 2015, p. 21, 

available from https://www.ausa.org/articles/shedding-light-grayzone-new-approach-human-centric-warfare, accessed January 16, 

2015.
102

24. Frank Hoffman and Michael C. Davies, “Joint Force 2020 

and the Human Domain: Time for a New Conceptual Framework?” Small Wars Journal, Vol. 9, No. 6, June 10, 2013, available 

from smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/joint-force-2020-and-the-humandomain-time-for-a-new-conceptual-framework, accessed January 16, 

2016.

25. Charles T. Cleveland and Stuart L. Farris, “Toward Strategic Landpower,” Army, July 2013, pp. 21-22, available from www.

ausa.org/publications/armymagazine/archive/2013/07/Documents/

Cleveland_July2013ARMY.pdf, accessed January 11, 2016; Steven 

Metz, “Strategic Landpower Task Force Research Report,” Newsletter, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, October 2013, available from ssi.armywarcollege.edu/index.cfm/articles//

STRATEGIC-LANDPOWER-TASK-FORCE/2013/10/3, accessed 

January 11, 2016; and quote from Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., “After ‘10 Years of Abject Failure,’ Army, SOCOM, Marine Leaders 

Focus on ‘Strategic Landpower’,” Breaking Defense, August 27, 

2013, available from breakingdefense.com/2013/08/10-years-of-abjectfailure-army-socom-marine-leaders-focus-on-strategic-landpower/, accessed January 18, 2016.

26. Grant M. Martin, “The Sublime: The Paradox of the 7th 

Warfighting Function,” Small Wars Journal, Vol. 9, No. 11, November 25, 2013, available from smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/thesublime-the-paradox-of-the-7th-warfighting-function, accessed January 16, 2016; Hoffman and Davies; William T. Johnsen, Toward 

a Theory of Landpower for the 21st Century, Carlisle Baracks, PA: 

U.S. Army War College, 2015, p. 14; and Freedberg, Jr., “After 

‘10 Years of Abject Failure’”; Steven Metz in his report covers the 

pros and cons of formally institutionalizing the human domain as 

a concept, see Metz.

27. At the time of publication, the term “human domain,” 

while controversial, is better known and understood and will 

be used for this concept in this monograph. William G. Braun, 

Professor of Practice at the U.S. Army War College’s (USAWC) 

Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), written comments to the present 

author, July 15, 2016.

28. Hoffman and Davies; Metz; Bennet S. Sacolick and 

Wayne W. Grigsby, Jr., “Special Operations/Conventional Forc-
103

es Interdependence: A Critical Role in ‘Prevent, Shape, Win’,” 

Army, June 2012, p. 40, available from www.ausa.org/publications/

armymagazine/archive/2012/06/Documents/Sacolick_0612.pdf,

accessed February 11, 2016; and U.S. Army Pacific Command 

(USARPAC), Partnering in the Pacific Theater: Assuring Security and 

Stability through Strong Army Partnerships, Fort Shafter, HI: U.S. 

Army Pacific Command, September 26, 2014, p. 11, available from 

www.usarpac.army.mil/pdfs/Partnering%20in%20the%20Pacific

%20Theater.pdf, accessed January 26, 2016.

29. Hoffman, p. 10.

30. Green et al., pp. 132-133.

31. Odierno, Amos, and McRaven, pp. 5-6; and U.S. Army SOCOM, p. 7.

32. HQDA, TRADOC, Unified Land Operations, p. 5; and John 

A. Bonin, “Roles and Responsibilities of an Army Service Command Component,” presentation slides, Center for Strategic 

Leadership (CSL), U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 

August 19, 2015, slide 3.

33. Michael Orzetti, “Extinct Force 21: EF 21’s Existential 

Threat to the Marine Corps,” Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 99, No. 12, 

December 2015, p. 27.

34. Matthew Shenberger, Strategic Decision Space: the Marine 

Corps in the 21st Century, Strategy Research Project, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2013, pp. 13-14, available from 

www.hsdl.org/?view&did=720097, accessed January 18, 2016.

35. U.S. Army Special Operations Forces (SOF) includes Special Forces (Green Berets), Rangers, and Civil Affairs with aviation, logistics, and information support elements; and U.S. Marine 

Corps SOF include Raiders and their support elements.

36. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Special Operations, JP 3-05, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, July 16, 2014, p. ix, available 

from www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_05.pdf, accessed April 13, 

2017.
104

37. Ibid., I-7.

38. USDN, p. 2-16.

39. Green et al., pp. 135-136.

40. Metz.

41. Brown and Sprang, p. 2.

42. HQDA, The Army, p. 3-2.

43. William T. Johnsen, Re-Examining the Roles of Landpower in 

the 21st Century and Their Implications, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, November 2014, p. 17, available from ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1237, accessed January 16, 2016.

44. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operational Access Concept

(JOAC), Joint Concepts, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, January 2012, pp. i, 16-17, available from www.dtic.mil/doctrine/concepts/joint_concepts/joac_2012.pdf, accessed April 13, 2017.

45. HQDA, TRADOC, Unified Land Operations, p. 7.

46. Scott Katrosh, “A General Purpose Fighting Force: The 

Foundation to Win in the Complex World of the 21st Century,” in 

Samuel R. White, Jr., ed., Futures Seminar: the United States Army 

in 2025 and Beyond, Vol. 2, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Center for Strategic Leadership, U.S. Army War College, December 2015, p. 26, 

available from https://csl.armywarcollege.edu/usacsl/publications/

FuturesElectiveCompendium(Vol%202%20-%202015).pdf, accessed 

January 15, 2016.

47. Knych, p. 35; and HQDA, TRADOC, The U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World, 2020-2040, Pamphlet 525-3-

1, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, October 31, 

2014, p. 10, available from https://www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/pams/

tp525-3-1.pdf, accessed January 12, 2016.

48. Barack Obama, The National Security Strategy of the United 

States of America, Washington, DC: The White House, February 
105

2015, p. 2, available from https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/

default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy.pdf, accessed April 

17, 2017. The 2010 national interests were the same as these interests stated in 2015.

49. Office of the Secretary of Defense, p. v.

50. Leon Panetta, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities 

for 21st Century Defense, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, January 2012, available from www.defense.gov/news/Defense_

Strategic_Guidance.pdf, accessed January 8, 2016.

51. Panetta, p. 3; Michael W. King, United States and the Spratly 

Islands: Six Actors, Which Stage? Strategy Research Project, Carlisle 

Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2002, p. 20, available from 

oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=

ADA401876, accessed January 20, 2016; and Thomas J. Bickford, 

Lisa Hannett, Edward Skolnick, and Albert S. Willner, The Role 

of the U.S. Army in Asia, Arlington, VA: Center for Naval Analysis, May 2015, p. 17, available from https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/

PDF/CRM-2015-U-010431-Final.pdf, accessed March 10, 2016.

52. Bickford et al., p. 17; and Michael McDevitt, “U.S. Policy 

in East Asia: East Asian Maritime Disputes,” briefing slides and 

lecture, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, January 7, 

2016, slide 2.

53. Joint Chiefs of Staff, The National Military Strategy of the 

United States of America: 2011 Redefining America’s Military Leadership, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, February 

2011, p. 7, available from www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/

pubs/2011-National-Military-Strategy.pdf, accessed March 10, 2016.

54. Guy Brynt Parmeter, The Strategic Shift to the Asia-Pacific 

and the U.S. Army, Strategy Research Project, Carlisle Barracks, 

PA: U.S. Army War College, 2012, pp. 11, 17, available from handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA561837, accessed April 17, 2017.

55. Odierno, Amos, and McRaven, p. 4.

56. Ibid.
106

57. Ibid.; and Brian J. Stokes, Prevent, Promote, and Hedge: US 

Military Power in the South China Sea, Civilian Research Project, 

Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2012, pp. 18-19, 

available from www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a592509.pdf, accessed February 12, 2016.

58. Headquarters, United States Pacific Command (USPACOM), “About USPACOM,” n.d., available from www.pacom.mil/

About-USPACOM/, accessed April 17, 2017.

59. Ibid.

60. Stokes, p. 6; and Kimberly Field and Stephan Pikner, “The 

Role of U.S. Land Forces in the Asia-Pacific,” Joint Force Quarterly, Vol. 74, 3rd Qtr., 2014, available from ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/

News/News-Article-View/Article/577525/jfq-74-the-role-of-us-landforces-in-the-asia-pacific/, accessed February 14, 2016; Ollivant; and 

Chen Jimin, “Messages from the U.S. 2015 National Security Strategy Report,” China-U.S. Focus, April 5, 2015, available from www.

chinausfocus.com/peace-security/messages-from-the-u-s-2015-nationalsecurity-strategy-report, accessed April 21, 2017.

61. Parmeter, pp. 7-9; and Nishant Dahiya, “Trump and China: Intentionally Provocative or Unprepared?” National Public 

Radio, Morning Edition, January 17, 2017, available from www.

npr.org/sections/parallels/2017/01/17/510116169/trump-and-chinaintentionally-provocative-or-unprepared?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_

medium=email&utm_campaign=Early%20Bid%20Brief:%20

01.18.2017&utm_term=Editorial%20-%20Military%20-%20

Early%20Bird%20Brief, accessed January 18, 2016.

62. Li Mingjiang, “Cooperation for Competition: China’s Approach to Regional Security in East Asia,” in Wilhelm Hofmeister, ed., Security Politics in Asia and Europe, Panorama: Insights 

Into Asian and European Affairs Occasional Papers Series, No. 

2, Singapore: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2010, pp. 121-123, 126-

127, available from www.kas.de/upload/dokumente/2010/06/PolDiAsien_Panorama_02-2010/Panorama_2-2010_SecurityPolitics_Li.pdf,

accessed January 16, 2016; Shashank T. Upasani, Exploring Options to Address China’s Strategy in South Asia, Strategy Research 

Project, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2013, p. 

36, available from oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataP

refix=html&identifier=ADA590266, accessed March 1, 2016; and 
107

Ben Lowsen, “How China Fights: The PLA’s Strategic Doctrine,” 

Asia Defense, blog of The Diplomat, April 6, 2016, available from 

thediplomat.com/2016/04/how-china-fights-the-plas-strategic-doctrine/, 

accessed April 6, 2016.

63. Parmeter, pp. 14-15; Kedar Pavgi, “Here’s One Way the 

US-China Relationship Is Improving,” Defense One, August 4, 

2015, available from www.defenseone.com/politics/2015/08/heres-oneway-us-china-relationship-improving/118865/, accessed February 19, 

2016; Bickford et al., p. 17; and Lowsen.

64. Green et al., pp. 12-13; and Pavgi.

65. Peter Gadd, Rebalance to the Pacific: Resourcing the Strategy, 

Strategy Research Project, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War 

College, 2013, p. 17, available from oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRe

cord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA589241, accessed February 1, 2016; Field and Pikner; and Robert Chamberlain, “Back to 

reality: Why land power trumps in the national rebalance toward 

Asia,” Armed Forces Journal, May 1, 2013, available from www.

armedforcesjournal.com/back-to-reality/, accessed April 25, 2016.

66. Phil Stewart and Patricia Zengerle, “Trump’s Pentagon 

choice says U.S. needs to be ready to confront Russia,” Reuters, 

January 12, 2017, available from www.reuters.com/article/us-usacongress-mattis-idUSKBN14W1KK, accessed January 14, 2017.

67. Upasani, pp. 1-3; and Stokes, p. 7.

68. Mark A. Olsen, Landpower in Asia—Historical Insights 

for the Pivot to the Pacific, Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General 

Staff College, 2013, p. 24, available from www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/

GetTRDoc?AD=ADA589096, accessed February 14, 2016.

69. Lowsen.

70. Joseph Bosco, “How Obama Can Deter China,” Real Clear 

World, September 23, 2015, available from www.realclearworld.

com/articles/2015/09/23/obama_taiwan_deter_china_111455.html, accessed January 26, 2016; and Tanguy Struye De Swielande, “The 

Reassertion of the United States in the Asia-Pacific Region,” 
108

Parameters, Vol. 42, No. 1, Spring 2012, pp. 77-78, available from 

ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/parameters/Articles/2012spring/Struye_

de_Swielande.pdf, accessed March 9, 2016.

71. Shannon Tiezzi, “Yes, the US Does Want to Contain China 

(Sort of),” China Power, blog of The Diplomat, August 8, 2015,

available from thediplomat.com/2015/08/yes-the-us-does-want-tocontain-china-sort-of/, accessed February 4, 2015.

72. Stokes, pp. 1, 9.

73. HQDA, TRADOC, The U.S. Army Operating Concept,

pp. 12-13.

74. Mira Rapp-Hooper, “Six Summertime Steps in the South 

China Sea,” War on the Rocks, August 6, 2015, available from 

https://warontherocks.com/2015/08/six-summertime-steps-in-thesouth-china-sea-2/, accessed February 4, 2016; Chamberlain; June 

Teufel Dreyer, “The Rise of China and the Geopolitics of East 

Asia,” Orbis, Vol. 59, Iss. 4, Fall 2015, p. 529; Kurt Campbell and 

Brian Andrews, Explaining the U.S. ‘Pivot’ to Asia, London: Chatham House, August 1, 2013, p. 3; and Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., 

“Reshape US Army, Asian Alliances to Deter China: CSBA,” 

Breaking Defense, February 3, 2016, available from breakingdefense.com/2016/02/reshape-us-army-asian-alliances-to-deter-china-csba/, accessed February 6, 2016.

75. Nathan P. Freier, auth., Daniel Bilko, Matthew Driscoll, 

Akhil Iyer, Walter Rugen, Terrence Smith, Matthew Trollinger, 

contrib. auth., Maren Leed, dir., U.S. Ground Force Capabilities 

through 2020, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2011, p. 42, available from csis.org/files/publication/111116%20-%20Freier_USGroundForces_Web.pdf, accessed 

February 2, 2016; and Dreyer, pp. 518, 524.

76. Deni, The Future of American Landpower, pp. 20-21; David 

W. Barno, Nora Bensahel, and Travis Sharp, “Pivot but Hedge: A 

Strategy for Pivoting to Asia While Hedging in the Middle East,” 

Orbis, Vol. 56, Iss. 2, Spring 2012, p. 161; and Green et al., p. 3.

77. Bickford et al., p. 29; Li, p. 126; Lubold and Moss; and 

Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., “What Lessons Do China’s Island Bases 

Offer the US Army,” Breaking Defense, May 5, 2016, available 
109

from breakingdefense.com/2016/05/chinese-island-bases-show-the-way

-for-us-army/, accessed May 10, 2016. For a complete discussion 

of the concept of coercive gradualism, see William G. Pierce, 

Douglas G. Douds, and Michael A. Marra, “Understanding 

Coercive Gradualism,” Parameters, Vol. 45, No. 3, Autumn 

2015, pp. 51-61, available from ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/

Parameters/issues/Autumn_2015/Parameters%20Autumn%20

2015%20Vol45%20No3_ONLINE.pdf, accessed February 19, 2016.

78. Dreyer, p. 525; and Lee Jaehyon, “China is Recreating the 

American ‘Hub-and-Spoke’ System in Asia,” Flashpoints, blog 

of The Diplomat, September 11, 2015, available from thediplomat.

com/2015/09/china-is-recreating-the-american-hub-and-spoke-systemin-asia/, accessed February 5, 2016.

79. USARPAC, Partnering in the Pacific, p. 7; Bickford et al., 

pp. 17, 41-42; Field and Pikner; and Deni, The Future of American 

Landpower, p. 2.

80. Odierno, Amos, and McRaven, p. 9.

81. Braun, written comments to the present author, July 15, 

2016.

82. Freedberg, Jr., “Reshape US Army, Asian Alliances to 

Deter China”; and Bickford et al., p. 44.

83. John R. Deni, “Strategic Landpower in the Indo-Asia-Pacific,” Parameters, Vol. 43, No. 3, Autumn 2013, pp. 77, 82, available 

from ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/Parameters/Issues/Autumn_2013/

Parameters_Autumn2013_v43n3.pdf, accessed February 13, 2016; 

and Chamberlain.

84. HQDA, The Army, pp. 1-2, 1-6; and quote from Field and 

Pikner.

85. This was also true in 2012, but Taiwan’s Chief was an Air 

Force officer, and Indonesia’s Chief a navy officer—only the third 

non-Army appointment in 70 years. USARPAC, Partnering in the 

Pacific, pp. 2, 23; and IHS Markit, “Jane’s Military and Security 

Assessments Intelligence Centre,” available from https://www.

ihs.com/products/janes-military-security-assessments.html, accessed 

April 18, 2017.
110

86. Field and Pikner.

87. Barno, Bensahel, and Sharp, pp. 174-175.

88. Parmeter, p. 12; and Chamberlain.

89. Freier et al., U.S. Ground Force Capabilities, p. vii.

90. Ibid.; U.S. Army SOCOM, p. 20; and Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

Special Operations, p. I-2.

91. USDN, p. 1-2; Parmeter, pp. 12-13; Bickford et al., pp. 41-

42, 56-57; and Green et al., p. 29.

92. Olsen, p. 19.

93. Green et al., p. 16; and Field and Pikner. Although Air-Sea 

Battle may no longer be the official name, it is a valid term and 

more expressive than the official term JAM-GC, so it is purposefully used here.

94. Lubold and Moss.

95. Freedberg, Jr., “Reshape US Army, Asian Alliances to 

Deter China.”

96. Deni, The Future of American Landpower, pp. 25-27.

97. McDevitt, “U.S. Policy in East Asia,” slide 30.

98. USARPAC, Partnering in the Pacific, p. 1; and John A. Bonin, Professor of Concepts and Doctrine, Center for Strategic 

Leadership (CSL), U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 

April 8, 2016, e-mail discussion with the present author.

99. Bickford et al., p. iii.

100. The 2016 report rated the South China Sea’s conflict potential as both high impact and high likelihood, but lowered its 

likelihood in its 2017 report. Paul Stares, Preventive Priorities Survey, 2017, Washington, DC: Council on Foreign Relations, 2017, 

p. 7, available from www.cfr.org/conflict-assessment/preventive-
111

priorities-survey-2017/p38562, accessed January 14, 2017; Council 

on Foreign Affairs, Global Conflict Tracker, Washington, DC: Council on Foreign Relations, 2016, available from www.cfr.org/global/

global-conflict-tracker/p32137#!/, accessed February 29, 2016; and 

Michael Lumbers, “Whither the Pivot? Alternative U.S. Strategies 

for Responding to China’s Rise,” Comparative Strategy, Vol. 34, 

No. 4, September-October 2015, p. 313, available from dx.doi.org/1

0.1080/01495933.2015.1069510, accessed January 23, 2016.

101. Olsen, p. 2.

102. Bickford et al., p. 21.

103. Metz; and Pavgi.

104. Bonin, “Roles and Responsibilities of an Army Service 

Command Component,” slide 2.

105. Enabling competencies are “several vital capabilities 

. . . [that] are fundamental to the Army’s ability to maneuver and 

secure land areas for the joint force.” See HQDA, The Army, p. 3-3; 

and John A. Bonin, Professor of Concepts and Doctrine, Center 

for Strategic Leadership (CSL), U.S. Army War College, Carlisle 

Barracks, PA, February 25, 2016, e-mail discussion with the present author; U.S. Naval War College (USNWC), Joint Military Operations Reference Guide: Forces/Capabilities Handbook, NWC 3153L, 

Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, July 2011, p. 69, available 

from keystone.ndu.edu/Portals/86/Documents/JointMilitaryOperationsReferenceGuide.pdf, accessed January 13, 2016; and Deni, 

“Strategic Landpower in the Indo-Asia-Pacific,” p. 78.

106. Cunningham, p. 168; Bickford et al., p. 61; HQDA, TRADOC, The U.S. Army Operating Concept, p. i.; USNWC, pp. 30, 35; 

and Department of Defense (DoD), Functions of the Department of 

Defense and Its Major Components, DoD Directive 5100.01, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, December 21, 2010, 

p. 30, available from www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/510

001p.pdf, accessed April 10, 2016.

107. HQDA, The Army, p. 3-7; and Bonin, e-mail, April 8, 2016.
112

108. Bickford et al., pp. 65-66; and Deni, The Future of American 

Landpower, p. 10.

109. Freier et al., U.S. Ground Force Capabilities, pp. 7, 64; and 

HQDA, TRADOC, The U.S. Army Operating Concept, p. 23.

110. HQDA, The Army, p. 1-8; Ray Odierno, “The Force of 

Tomorrow,” Foreign Policy, February 4, 2013, available from foreignpolicy.com/2013/02/04/the-force-of-tomorrow/, accessed February 

2, 2016; Green et al., p. 167; Bickford et al., p. 68; and HQDA, TRADOC, The U.S. Army Operating Concept, p. 17.

111. USNWC, pp. 68-69; and USDN, p. 2-31.

112. Bickford et al., pp. 53, 68; HQDA, Executive Agent Responsibilities Assigned to the Secretary of the Army, DA Memo 10-1, 

Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 15, 

1997, p. 17; Odierno; Green et al., p. 132; and Bonin, e-mail, February 25, 2016.

113. Bickford et al., pp. 68-69; John A. Bonin, “Doctrine for 

Joint Land Operations,” presentation slides, Center for Strategic 

Leadership (CSL), U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 

November 2015, slide 8; John A. Bonin, “The Army,” presentation 

slides, Center for Strategic Leadership (CSL), U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, February 28, 2016, slide 5; and Bonin, 

e-mail, April 8, 2016.

114. Bonin, “The Army,” slide 15.

115. Bonin, “Roles and Responsibilities of an Army Service 

Command Component,” slide 2.

116. Robert W. Cone, Operationalizing Strategic Landpower,

Fort Eustis, VA: U.S. Commanders Planning Group, Headquarters, Army Training and Doctrine Command, June 27, 2013, 

p. 8, available from https://csis.org/files/RUSI%20TRANSCRIPT

%20v6%20with%20embedded%20slides.pdf, accessed January 31, 

2016.

117. Core competencies are defined as “indispensable contributions to the joint force.” Bonin, “Roles and Responsibilities of 

an Army Service Command Component,” slide 3.
113

118. Panetta, pp. 4-6.

119. HQDA, TRADOC, Unified Land Operations, p. 6.

120. HQDA, The Army, p. 3-4.

121. Nathan P. Freier, proj. dir., David Berteau, prog. dir., 

Stephanie Sanok, Jaquelyn Guy, Curtis Buzzard, Errol Laumann, 

Steven Nicolucci, J.P. Pellegrino, Sam Eaton, Megan Loney, contrib. auth., Beyond the Last War: Balancing Ground Forces and Future 

Challenges Risk in USCENTCOM and USPACOM, Washington, 

DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 2013, p. 

72, available from csis.org/files/publication/130424_Freier_BeyondLastWar_Web.pdf, accessed February 2, 2016; and Hoffman, p. 9.

122. Freier et al., U.S. Ground Force Capabilities, p. vii.

123. Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., “SASC Pushes Bigger Army 

Role in Pacific Vs. China,” Breaking Defense, May 27, 2015, available from breakingdefense.com/2015/05/sasc-pushes-bigger-army-rolein-pacific-vs-china/, accessed February 20, 2016.

124. Joint Chiefs of Staff, JOAC, pp. 31-32.

125. Robert P. Kozloski, “Marching Toward the Sweet Spot: 

Options for the U.S. Marine Corps in a Time of Austerity,” Naval War College Review, Vol. 66, No. 3, June 2013, p. 22, available 

from https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/3e4a9be3-74fe-4bfd-ad8f7c34b76242fd/Marching-toward-the-Sweet-Spot--Options-for-the-U-.

aspx, accessed January 19, 2016; and USNWC, p. 69.

126. Braun, written comments to the present author, July 15, 

2016.

127. USNWC, p. 69; and Parmeter, p. 13.

128. Bonin, e-mail, April 8, 2016.

129. DoD, Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major 

Components, p. 30.
114

130. Green et al., pp. 16, 64, 167; Freedberg, Jr., “SASC Pushes 

Bigger Army Role in Pacific Vs. China”; Freedberg, Jr., “Reshape 

US Army, Asian Alliances to Deter China”; E. John Teichert, 

“What Should We Do If the Bomber Can’t Get Through?” War 

on the Rocks, September 16, 2015, available from warontherocks.

com/2015/09/what-should-we-do-if-the-bomber-cant-get-through/, 

accessed February 11, 2016; and Lowsen.

131. Jim Thomas, “Why the U.S. Army Needs Missiles: A New 

Mission to Save the Service,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 92, No. 3, May/

June 2013, pp. 137-138; Devan Joseph and Amanda Macias, “Meet 

America’s THAAD: One of the world’s most advanced missiledefense systems that has China spooked,” Business Insider, October 18, 2015, available from www.businessinsider.com/thaad-missiledefense-systems-south-korea-usa-2015-10, accessed February 9, 2016; 

Field and Pikner; and Bonin, e-mail, April 8, 2016.

132. Deni, “Strategic Landpower in the Indo-Asia-Pacific,” 

pp. 79-80; HQDA, The Army, pp. 3-3; Green et al., pp. 138-139; Joseph and Macias.

133. Deni, “Strategic Landpower in the Indo-Asia-Pacific,” p. 

80; Armando J. Heredia, “Analysis: New U.S.-Philippine Basing 

Deal Heavy on Air Power, Light on Naval Support,” USNI News, 

March 22, 2016, available from https://news.usni.org/2016/03/22/

analysis-new-u-s-philippine-basing-deal-heavy-on-air-power-light-onnaval-support, accessed March 29, 2016; and Center for Strategic 

and International Studies (CSIS), “Terminal High Altitude Air 

Defense (THAAD),” Missile Threat, CSIS Missile Defense Project, 

n.d., available from https://missilethreat.csis.org/system/thaad/, accessed April 18, 2017.

134. Geoff Fein, “US Army’s Patriot missile defence system 

successfully downs a ballistic missile target,” IHS Jane’s Defence 

Weekly, March 22, 2016, available from janes.ihs.com/DefenceWeekly/Display/1765526, accessed March 28, 2016; and Green et al., 

pp. 138-139.

135. S. Edward Boxx, and Jason Schuyler, “The Case for the 

Joint Theater Air Missile Defense Board,” Joint Force Quarterly, 

Vol. 79, 4th Qtr., October 2015, p. 84; Teichert; and Deni, “Strategic Landpower in the Indo-Asia-Pacific,” p. 80.
115

136. John A. Bonin, “Landpower ASAP TSC-07,” presentation 

slides, Center for Strategic Leadership (CSL), U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, March 4, 2016, slide 10; Office of the 

Secretary of Defense, p. 39; and Green et al., pp. 140, 218.

137. Deni, “Strategic Landpower in the Indo-Asia-Pacific,” p. 

80; and Freedberg, Jr., “SASC Pushes Bigger Army Role in Pacific 

Vs. China.”

138. Freedberg, Jr., “SASC Pushes Bigger Army Role in Pacific 

Vs. China.”

139. Chamberlain.

140. Peter W. Singer, “From fuzzy to focus: Questions to ask 

about strategic land power,” Armed Forces Journal, December 18, 

2013, available from www.armedforcesjournal.com/from-fuzzy-tofocus-questions-to-ask-about-strategic-land-power/, accessed January 

13, 2016; and Harris, Jr.

141. HQDA, TRADOC, The U.S. Army Operating Concept,

p. 3; Martin E. Dempsey, “Foreword,” in Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

JOAC, Joint Concepts, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, January 2012, available from www.dtic.mil/doctrine/concepts/

joint_concepts/joac_2012.pdf, accessed April 13, 2017; Freedberg, 

Jr., “SASC Pushes Bigger Army Role in Pacific Vs. China”; and 

Olsen, pp. 6, 44-45.

142. Field and Pikner; and J. Thomas.

143. Olsen, p. 6; and Field and Pikner.

144. J. Thomas; Freedberg, Jr., “Reshape US Army, Asian Alliances to Deter China”; and Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., “Japan Blazes 

Trail for US Army: Coastal Defense Vs. China,” Breaking Defense, 

July 15, 2015, available from breakingdefense.com/2015/07/japanblazes-trail-for-us-army-coastal-defense-vs-china/, accessed February 

20, 2016.

145. Kris Osborn, “U.S. May Put Weapons in South China Sea,” The National Interest, January 1, 2017, available from

nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/us-may-put-weapons-southchina-sea-18914, accessed May 26, 2017.
116

146. Bickford et al., p. 42; Freedberg, Jr., “Japan Blazes Trail for 

US Army”; and Teichert.

147. Richard D. Fisher, Jr., “Imagery Suggests China has Deployed YJ-62 Anti-ship Missiles to Woody Island,” IHS Jane’s Defence Weekly, March 23, 2016, available from janes.ihs.com/DefenceWeekly/Display/1765554, accessed March 31, 2016.

148. The People’s Navy of Vietnam already employs the Russian coastal defense missile system, K-300P Bastion, with a range 

of 300 km to defend its shores. This system lacks the range to reach 

much of the Paracels or any of the Spratly Islands, but is estimated 

to be able to reach China’s Shanya Naval Base on Hainan Dao. 

“Vietnam’s K-330P system can attack Chinese targets in Hainan,” 

Defense Blog, available from http://defence-blog.com/news/vietnamsk-300p-system-can-attack-chinese-targets-in-hainan.html, accessed 

April 28, 2017; and Green et al., p. 106.

149. Freedberg, Jr., “What Lessons Do China’s Island Bases 

Offer the US Army.”

150. Harris, Jr.

151. Deni, “Strategic Landpower in the Indo-Asia-Pacific,” 

p. 79; and Freedberg, Jr., “Japan Blazes Trail for US Army.”

152. HQDA, The Army, p. 3-4; and Freedberg, Jr., “SASC 

Pushes Bigger Army Role in Pacific Vs. China.”

153. Freedberg, Jr., “Reshape US Army, Asian Alliances to 

Deter China”; J. Thomas; and Chamberlain.

154. Freedberg, Jr., “Reshape US Army, Asian Alliances to 

Deter China”; Jakub Grygiel, “Arming Our Allies: The Case for 

Offensive Capabilities,” Parameters, Vol. 45, No. 3, Autumn 2015, 

p. 48, available from ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/Parameters/issues/

Autumn_2015/Parameters%20Autumn%202015%20Vol45%20No3_

ONLINE.pdf, accessed February 10, 2015; and J. Thomas.

155. J. Thomas; Grygiel; and Freedberg, Jr., “Japan Blazes 

Trail for US Army.”

156. J. Thomas; and Osborn.
117

157. A 500 km surface-to-surface missile does not exist in the 

U.S. inventory, so it would need to be acquired for a fully effective counterland mission in the South China Sea. However, 500 

km would be the limit set in 1987 by the U.S.-Soviet Intermediate 

Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which required the United 

States to scrap the Pershing II missile, and which Russia arguably 

violates today; J. Thomas.

158. Harris, Jr.; and Freedberg, Jr., “What Lessons Do China’s 

Island Bases Offer the US Army.”

159. Antulio J. Echevarria, “How Should We Think about 

‘Gray-Zone’ Wars?” Infinity Journal, Vol. 5, Iss. 1, Fall 2015, p. 19, 

available from https://www.infinityjournal.com/article/158/How_

Should_We_Think_about_GrayZone_Wars/, accessed January 29, 

2016.

160. HQDA, TRADOC, Unified Land Operations, Foreword 

and p. 14.

161. Nicholson and Trevithick.

162. Andrew D. Preston, The Asia Pacific Rebalance: Tipping the 

Scale with Landpower, Civilian Research Project, Carlisle Barracks, 

PA: U.S. Army War College, April 2013, available from www.dtic.

mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA592975, accessed June 13, 2016.

163. Both the Marine Corps and Army are assigned the functions of amphibious warfare, and the Army is also assigned the 

functions of airborne and air assault. DoD, Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components, pp. 30, 32; USDN, p. 1-16; 

and HQDA, TRADOC, The U.S. Army Operating Concept, p. 23.

164. Kozloski, p. 19; and Olsen, p. 51.

165. Shenberger, pp. 16-17.

166. Michael F. Perry, Importance of Seabasing to Land Power 

Generation, Program Research Project, Carlisle Barracks: U.S. 

Army War College, May 2009, pp. 2, 15, available from www.dtic.

mil/docs/citations/ADA508337, accessed February 8, 2016; Shenberger, pp. 14-15; and Joseph R. Corleto, Future Joint Seabasing in 
118

the Asia-Pacific Region, Strategy Research Project, Carlisle Barracks, 

PA: U.S. Army War College, 2013, pp. 7-8, available from www.

dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA553114, accessed Februrary 8, 2016.

167. USDN, pp. 2-22-2-24; Perry, p. 16; Shenberger, p. 21; and 

Corleto, p. 25.

168. Perry, pp. 13-14; Green et al., p. 134; and Corleto, pp. 8, 25.

169. Joe Gould, “US Army To Choose New Landing Craft 

Next Year,” DefenseNews.com, August 26, 2015, available from 

www.defensenews.com/story/defense/2015/08/26/us-army-choose-newlanding-craft-next-year/32424371/, accessed February 10, 2015; and 

Grace Jean, “US Army helicopters to continue training with US 

Navy ships,” IHS Jane’s Defence Weekly, December 8, 2015, available from janes.ihs.com/DefenceWeekly/Display/1758226, accessed 

February 7, 2015.

170. HQDA, TRADOC, The U.S. Army Operating Concept,

p. 23; and Office of the Secretary of Defense, pp. 36-37.

171. HQDA, The Army, pp. 3-2, 3-5; Nicholson and Trevithick; Bickford et al., pp. 26-27; and Joint Chiefs of Staff, JOAC,

pp. 22, 30.

172. Freedberg, Jr., “What Lessons Do China’s Island Bases 

Offer the US Army.”

173. USNWC, pp. 82-83; and Nicholson and Trevithick.

174. Grygiel, pp. 39-40.

175. The first island chain that China considers hemming it in 

stretches from Japan to Taiwan, the Philippines and Borneo, and 

the second island chain, in the mid-Pacific Ocean, goes from the 

Ogasawara and Volcano Islands to the U.S. Marianas and Guam. 

Gadd, p. 9; Green et al., p. 4; and Gregory B. Poling, “Rationalizing 

U.S. Goals in the South China Sea,” Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 3, 

No. 9, September 2015, available from www.jpolrisk.com/rationalizing-u-s-goals-in-the-south-china-sea/, accessed January 26, 2016.
119

176. Freier et al., U.S. Ground Force Capabilities, p. 52; Bickford 

et al., p. 53; Olsen, pp. 51-52; and Shenberger, p. 22.

177. Shenberger, pp. 2-3, 22; Green et al., p. 132; Corleto, p. 

2; Ryan Faith, “Can the US Army Still Fight as a Heavyweight?” 

Vice News, August 4, 2015, available from https://news.vice.com/article/can-the-us-army-still-fight-as-a-heavyweight, accessed February 

5, 2016; and Perry, p. 16.

178. Shenberger, p. 17; and Freedberg, Jr., “Japan Blazes Trail 

for US Army.”

179. Echevarria, p. 18; and USDN, pp. 4-2-4-3.

180. USDN, p. 1-11.

181. HQDA, The Army, p. 1-5; Katrosh, p. 28; Panetta, p. 8; 

Nicholas R. Krueger, “The Rationale for a Robust U.S. Army 

Presence in the Pacific Basin,” National Security Watch, Vol. 12-2, 

March 8, 2012, p. 4, available from https://www.ausa.org/file/1586/

download?token=O-95HCQu, accessed April 18, 2017; and Knych.

182. Odierno; Joint Chiefs of Staff, JOAC, p. 3; and USARPAC, 

Partnering in the Pacific, p. 5.

183. Chamberlain.

184. USARPAC, Partnering in the Pacific, p. 11; and Echevarria, 

p. 17.

185. Green et al., p. 13; Barno, Bensahel, and Sharp, p. 165; and 

Robert H. Scales and Larry M. Wortzel, The Future U.S. Military 

Presence in Asia: Landpower and the Geostrategy of American Commitment, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War 

College, April 1, 1999, p. 1, available from ssi.armywarcollege.edu/

pubs/display.cfm?pubID=75, accessed April 18, 2017.

186. Leonard A. Housley, Multinational Training Opportunities in the Asia-Pacific, Strategy Research Project, Carlisle Barracks, 

PA: U.S. Army War College, 2013, p. 11, available from handle.dtic.

mil/100.2/ADA589344, accessed March 15, 2016; Green et al., p. 34; 

and Deni, The Future of American Landpower, pp. 34-35, 38-39.
120

187. Olsen, p. 50; Trefor Moss, “U.S., Philippines Forge Closer 

Military Ties Amid China Tensions,” The Wall Street Journal, October 8, 2015, available from www.wsj.com/article_email/u-s-philippines-forge-closer-military-ties-amid-china-tensions-1444304011-lMyQjAxMTA1OTA1OTQwNTk0Wj, accessed February 17, 2016.

188. Teichert; Field and Pikner; Office of the Secretary of Defense, p. 16; and Seth Robson, “US Buildup in Philippines Raises 

Stakes in Region,” Stars and Stripes, February 3, 2016, available 

from https://www.stripes.com/news/us-buildup-in-philippines-raisesstakes-in-region-1.391912#.WPdT4EdMRpg, accessed February 6, 

2016.

189. Deni, The Future of American Landpower, pp. 27-28; Green 

et al., p. 77; Poling; and Stokes, p. 17.

190. Scales and Wortzel, p. 5; and Green et al., p. 32.

191. Joint Chiefs of Staff, JOAC, p. 7.

192. Panetta, pp. 4-6; Fernando M. Luján, Light Footprints: The 

Future of American Military Intervention, Washington, DC: Center 

for a New American Security, March 2013, p. 5, available from 

https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/light-footprints-the-futureof-american-military-intervention, accessed February 15, 2016; 

Freedberg, Jr., “Reshape US Army, Asian Alliances to Deter China”; and Teichert.

193. Office of the Secretary of Defense, p. viii; Scales and 

Wortzel, p. 4; Deni, “Strategic Landpower in the Indo-Asia-Pacific,” p. 83; Derek Chollet and Julianne Smith, “America’s Allies 

Want More from the US,” Defense One, August 3, 2015, available 

from www.defenseone.com/ideas/2015/08/americas-allies-want-moreus/118811/, accessed February 14, 2016; and Green et al., p. 50.

194. Joint Chiefs of Staff, JOAC, p. 20; and Chamberlain.

195. De Swielande, p. 80; and Green et al., pp. 40-41; DoD, 

U.S. Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy, Washington, DC: U.S. 

Department of Defense, 2015, p. 23, available from https://admin.

govexec.com/media/gbc/docs/pdfs_edit/dod-asia-pacific-maritime-security-strategy.pdf, accessed January 26, 2016.
121

196. Thomas G. Mahnken, Dan Blumenthal, Thomas Donnelly, Michael Mazza, Gary J. Schmitt, and Andrew Shearer, Asia in 

the Balance: Transforming US Military Strategy in Asia, Washington, 

DC: American Enterprise Institute, June 2012, p. 15; Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, JOAC, p. 8; and Bickford et al., pp. 70-71.

197. U.S. Army forces were stationed in Darwin during 

World War II. Barno, Bensahel, and Sharp, pp. 158-159; Deni, 

The Future of American Landpower, pp. x, 16; and Riccoh Player, 

Strategic Pivot Toward the Asia-Pacific: Implications for the USMC, 

Strategy Research Project, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War 

College, March 2013, p. 10, available from www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/

GetTRDoc?AD=ADA589881, accessed January 19, 2016.

198. Scales and Wortzel, p. iii; and Bickford et al., p. v.

199. Parts of the five military installations to house American 

forces are: Antonio Bautista Air Base (AB), Basa AB, Fort Magsaysay, Lumbia AB, and Mactan-Benito Ebuen AB, along with further requests for access to Clark International Airport and Camp 

Aguinaldo, the Philippine Marine Corps’ headquarters. Dan 

Lamonthe, “These are the bases the U.S. will use near the South 

China Sea. China isn’t impressed,” The Washington Post, March 

21, 2016, available from https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/

checkpoint/wp/2016/03/21/these-are-the-new-u-s-military-bases-nearthe-south-china-sea-china-isnt-impressed/?utm_term=.3ea5ff8e0833, 

accessed April 17, 2016; Lolita C. Baldor, Associated Press, “U.S. 

sending commandos, combat aircraft to Philippines,” Navy Times, 

April 14, 2016, available from https://www.navytimes.com/story/

military/2016/04/14/us-reveals-joint-patrols-south-china-sea-philippines/83020786/, accessed April 17, 2016; and Tara Copp, “US to 

rotate more aircraft, troops through Philippines,” Stars and Stripes, 

April 14, 2016, available from www.stripes.com/news/pacific/us-torotate-more-aircraft-troops-through-philippines-1.404418, accessed 

April 17, 2016.

200. Green et al., p. 17; and Mark S. Miller, Maintaining Peace 

in the South China Sea and the Spratly Islands: Are There Acceptable 

Alternatives to the U.S. Naval Forces Forward Deployed in the Asia 

Pacific Region? Strategy Research Project, Carlisle Barracks, PA: 

U.S. Army War College, 2002, p. 13, available from www.dtic.mil/

get-tr-doc/pdf?AD=ADA401689, accessed February 11, 2016.
122

201. Mahnken et al., pp. 1, 5; and Shenberger, p. 11.

202. Joint Chiefs of Staff, JOAC, pp. 18-19; and Green et al., 

p. 164.

203. Bickford et al., p. vi; Housley, pp. 21-22; and Joe Gould, 

“US Army to Expand Prepositioned Stocks,” DefenseNews.com, 

June 3, 2015, available from www.defensenews.com/story/defense/

land/army/2015/06/03/us-army-aims-to-expand-prepositioned-stocksafrica-asia-pacific-latin-america/28423437/, accessed February 12, 

2016.

204. Bickford et al., pp. 28-29.

205. For example, a light infantry brigade of 3,800 soldiers 

and 7,300 tons of gear requires 150 C-17 cargo planes and about 5 

days to deploy, see Faith; Franz-Stefan Gady, “Deterring China: 

US Army to Stockpile Equipment in Cambodia and Vietnam,” 

Asia Defense, blog of The Diplomat, March 18, 2016, available 

from thediplomat.com/2016/03/deterring-china-us-army-to-stockpileequipment-in-cambodia-and-vietnam/, accessed April 19, 2016; 

Gould, “US Army to Expand Prepositioned Stocks”; Green et al., 

p. 164; and Bickford et al., p. 29.

206. USNWC, pp. 59-60.

207. Excess material could instead be used to fill some prepositioned stocks to reduce the cost involved. Aaron Mehta, “Pentagon Eyeing More Prepositioning of Gear,” DefenseNews.com, 

December 21, 2015, available from www.defensenews.com/story/

defense/policy-budget/policy/2015/12/21/pentagon-expects-more-prepositioning-gear-europe-russia/77700432/, accessed February 12, 2016.

208. USARPAC, Partnering in the Pacific, p. 23; Mehta; and 

USNWC, p. 59.

209. Green et al., pp. 50, 170; and Mehta.

210. Philippine President Duterte has accused the United 

States of storing weapons at some of these sites contravening the 

Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA)—a charge the 

American Ambassador has refuted and Philippine military officials have subsequently found baseless. Neil Jerome Morales, rpt., 
123

Manuel Mogato, auth., and Martin Petty, ed., “U.S. envoy says 

no American weapons buildup in Philippines,” Reuters, January 

31, 2017, available from www.reuters.com/article/us-philippines-usaidUSKBN15F0MI, accessed April 19, 2017; Green et al., p. 77; and 

Agence France-Presse, “Official: Philippines to Offer the Use of 

Eight Bases to US Forces,” DefenseNews.com, January 13, 2016, 

available from www.defensenews.com/story/defense/2016/01/13/official-philippines-offer-use-eight-bases-us-forces/78736552/, accessed 

February 17, 2017.

211. Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., “US Army Plans Stockpiles in 

Vietnam, Cambodia: Hello China,” Breaking Defense, March 15, 

2016, available from breakingdefense.com/2016/03/us-army-plansstockpiles-in-vietnam-cambodia-hello-china/, accessed April 18, 2017; 

Gady, “Deterring China”; Gould, “US Army to Expand Prepositioned Stocks”; and Bickford et al., p. 29.

212. Gady, “Deterring China.”

213. Mehta.

214. Freedberg, Jr., “US Army Plans Stockpiles in Vietnam, 

Cambodia.”

215. Green et al., p. 164; and USDN, p. 2-30.

216. Bonin, “Landpower ASAP TSC-07,” slide 49; and USDN, 

p. 5-4.

217. USDN, p. 5-2.

218. Ann E. Stafford, former Associate Dean, Joint Forces Staff 

College, Norfolk, VA, e-mail discussion with the present author, 

April 23, 2016.

219. Panetta, pp. 4-6; De Swielande, p. 86; Bickford et al., 

pp. iv, 23, 54; and Jeong Lee, “On ‘Strategic Landpower in the 

Indo-Asia-Pacific’,” Parameters, Vol. 43, No. 4, Winter 2013-14, pp. 

128-130, available from http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/Parameters/Issues/Winter_2013/TheQuarterly_Winter2013-14_v43n4.pdf, 

accessed April 28, 2017.
124

220. Pierce, Douds, and Marra, pp. 58-59.

221. De Swielande, p. 86; USDN, pp. 2-16, 4-4-4-6; Nicholson 

and Trevithick; Player, p. 17; and Joint Chiefs of Staff, Special Operations, p. II-11.

222. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Special Operations, pp. x-xii, I-9; and 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, p. 37.

223. “Joint Special Operations Task Force—Philippines 

(JSOTF-P),” GlobalSecurity.org, last modified October 8, 2013, 

available from www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/dod/jsotf-p.

htm, accessed April 21, 2016; and Bickford et al., p. 54.

224. Per Liljas, “ISIS Is Making Inroads in the Southern Philippines and the Implications for Asia Are Alarming,” Time, April 

14, 2016, available from time.com/4293395/isis-zamboanga-mindanao-moro-islamist-terrorist-asia-philippines-abu-sayyaf/, accessed 

April 23, 2016.

225. Freier et al., Beyond the Last War, p. 41.

226. Takashi Kawamoto and Yizhe Daniel Xie, “An HA/DR 

Solution to South China Sea Tensions,” Flashpoints, blog of The 

Diplomat, July 18, 2015, available from thediplomat.com/2015/07/anhadr-solution-to-south-china-sea-tensions/, accessed December 30, 

2015.

227. Panetta, pp. 4-6; Freier et al., U.S. Ground Force Capabilities, p. 26; Parmeter, pp. 12-13; and HQDA, The Army, pp. 3-2-3-3.

228. USDN, p. 5-4; and Joint Chiefs of Staff, Special Operations, 

p. I-14.

229. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Civil-Military Operations, JP 3-57, 

Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, September 11, 

2013, p. II-5, available from www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_57.

pdf, accessed April 24, 2016; Bickford et al., pp. 68-69; and Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, Special Operations, p. I-14.

230. USDN, p. 5-4; Bickford et al., pp. 21-22; Mike Ellicott, 

“The Army Engineer Regiment and the Future,” in Samuel R. 
125

White, Jr., ed., Futures Seminar: the United States Army in 2025 

and Beyond, Vol. 2, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Center for Strategic 

Leadership, U.S. Army War College, December 2015, pp. 78-79, 

available from https://csl.armywarcollege.edu/usacsl/publications/

FuturesElectiveCompendium(Vol%202%20-%202015).pdf, accessed 

January 15, 2016; and Deni, “Strategic Landpower in the IndoAsia-Pacific,” p. 79.

231. Thomas Lum and Rhoda Margesson, Typhoon Haiyan 

(Yolanda): U.S. and International Response to Philippines Disaster, 

Report No. R43309, Washington, DC: U.S. Library of Congress, 

Congressional Research Service, February 10, 2014, Summary, 

available from https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43309.pdf, accessed 

April 25, 2016; and Office of the Press Secretary, “Fact Sheet: U.S. 

Response to Typhoon Haiyan,” Washington, DC: The White 

House, November 19, 2013, available from https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/11/19/fact-sheet-us-responsetyphoon-haiyan, accessed April 25, 2016.

232. Andrew Feickert and Emma Chanlett-Avery, Japan 2011 

Earthquake: U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) Response, Report No. 

R41690, Washington, DC: U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, June 2, 2011, Summary, available from 

https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=4139, accessed April 26, 2017; Jeff 

Schogol, “U.S. military steps up Japan earthquake relief mission,” 

Marine Corps Times, April 18, 2016, available from https://www.

marinecorpstimes.com/story/military/2016/04/18/us-steps-up-japanearthquake-relief-mission/83187580/, accessed April 25, 2016; Green 

et al., p. 42; and USARPAC, Partnering in the Pacific, p. 3.

233. Office of the Press Secretary; Freier et al., Beyond the Last 

War, pp. 48-49; and Green et al., p. 170.

234. Freier et al., Beyond the Last War, p. 49.

235. Metz.

236. “Influence, Engagement, and Shape” helps to “maximize 

combat power “ as the U.S. Army’s seventh Warfighting Function, 

listed with other critical functions such as movement and maneuver, fires, intelligence, protection, sustainment, and mission command. Martin; Odierno, Amos, and McRaven, p. 8; Freier et al., 

Beyond the Last War, pp. 72-73; and HQDA, The Army, pp. 1-1-1-2.
126

237. Harris, Jr.; Odierno, Amos, and McRaven, p. 5; and Bickford et al., p. 70.

238. Joint Chiefs of Staff, JOAC, pp. i, 18; and Michelle Tan, 

“Army seeks partnerships, new technology in the Pacific,” Army 

Times, October 19, 2015, available from www.armytimes.com/story/

military/careers/army/2015/10/19/army-seeks-partnerships-new-technology-pacific/73299074/, accessed January 27, 2016.

239. Bonin, “Landpower ASAP TSC-07,” slides 48-49.

240. Odierno, Amos, and McRaven, pp. 3-4; USDN, p. 4-2; 

Bickford et al., p. 18; USARPAC, Partnering in the Pacific, p. 3; and 

H.R. McMaster, “Continuity and Change: The Army Operating 

Concept and Clear Thinking About Future War,” Military Review, 

Vol. 95, No. 2, March-April 2015, p. 14, available from www.ncfa.

ncr.gov/sites/default/files/2%20McMaster_Continuity%20and%20

Change_The%20Army%20Operating%20Concept%20and%20

Clear%20Thinking%20About%20Future%20War.pdf, accessed January 12, 2015.

241. USARPAC, Partnering in the Pacific, p. 6; USDN, p. 4-1; 

and Joint Chiefs of Staff, Special Operations, p. I-8.

242. Bickford et al., p. 18; and Arthur Chi Wing Fong, 

Dancing with the Dragon: U.S.-China Engagement Policy, Strategy Research Project, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War 

College, 2013, pp. 11-12, available from www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/

GetTRDoc?AD=ADA589225, accessed February 19, 2016.

243. Joint Chiefs of Staff, JOAC, p. 18; HQDA, The Army, p. 

1-5; and Freier et al., Beyond the Last War, p. 44.

244. Bickford et al., p. 17; and USARPAC, Partnering in the Pacific, p. 4.

245. Robert M. Gates, “Helping Others Defend Themselves: 

The Future of U.S. Security Assistance,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 89, 

No. 3, May/June 2010, p. 2; Singer; and Green et al., p. 9.

246. Grant Newsham, “‘Amphibiosity’ in the Asia-Pacific,” 

Proceedings: United States Naval Institute, Vol. 141, No. 11, Novem-
127

ber 2015; Peter Lichtenbaum, John G. McGinn, Matt Breen, and 

Adam Cushing, “Improving Security Cooperation: A Win-Win,” 

War on the Rocks, July 7, 2015, available from warontherocks.

com/2015/07/improving-security-cooperation-a-win-win/, accessed 

February 15, 2016; Bickford et al., p. 36; and USARPAC, Partnering 

in the Pacific, p. 3.

247. Bickford et al., p. vii; Odierno, Amos, and McRaven, p. 6; 

Olsen, p. 53; and USARPAC, Partnering in the Pacific, p. 1.

248. Amber Corrin, “Interoperability: The key to Army 

readiness,” C4ISRNET, March 17, 2016, available from www.

c4isrnet.com/story/military-tech/show-reporter/global-force-symposium/2016/03/17/interoperability-key-army-readiness/81908934/, accessed April 30, 2016; Housley, p. 8; Green et al., p. 10; Newsham; 

Freier et al., Beyond the Last War, p. 44; and Teichert.

249. Housley, p. 8; and Teichert.

250. Rapp-Hooper; and Desmond Walton, “A Reinvigorated 

Strategic Alliance,” The Cipher Brief, April 15, 2016, available from 

thecipherbrief.com/article/asia/reinvigorated-strategic-alliance-1093, 

accessed April 17, 2016.

251. Bickford et al., pp. 68-69; Deni, “Strategic Landpower in 

the Indo-Asia-Pacific,” p. 82; Odierno, Amos, and McRaven, p. 6; 

Olsen, p. 50; and Green et al., p. 29.

252. Odierno, Amos, and McRaven, pp. 17-18; USARPAC, 

Partnering in the Pacific, pp. 5-6; and HQDA, TRADOC, The U.S. 

Army Operating Concept, p. 22.

253. Freedberg, Jr., “After ‘10 Years of Abject Failure’”; and 

Luján, p. 16.

254. Newsham.

255. Jack Midgley, “Building Partner Capability: Defining 

an Army Role in Future Small Wars,” Small Wars Journal, Vol. 8, 

No. 2, February 20, 2012, available from www.smallwarsjournal.

com/jrnl/art/building-partner-capability, accessed February 2, 2016; 

HQDA, TRADOC, The U.S. Army Operating Concept, pp. 17, 22;

and Green et al., p. 135.
128

256. Olsen, pp. 50-51; USARPAC, Partnering in the Pacific, p. 3; 

USDN, p. 1-16; U.S. Army SOCOM, p. 22; HQDA, TRADOC, The 

U.S. Army Operating Concept, p. 22; Bickford et al., The Role of the 

U.S. Army in Asia, p. 43.

257. Bickford et al., pp. 18-19.

258. Joint Chiefs of Staff, DOD Dictionary of Military and 

Associated Terms, p. 210.

259. USDN, p. 4-2; Green et al., p. 173; and Deni, “Strategic 

Landpower in the Indo-Asia-Pacific,” p. 81.

260. Deni, “Strategic Landpower in the Indo-Asia-Pacific,” 

pp. 81-82; and Housley, p. 9.

261. Green et al., p. 171.

262. Freier et al., Beyond the Last War, p. 43; Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

JOAC, p. 19; and HQDA, The Army, p. 3-4.

263. HQDA, The Army, p. 3-5.

264. Deni, The Future of American Landpower, p. 3; Housley, 

p. 13; Joint Chiefs of Staff, JOAC, pp. 18-19; Stokes, p. 15; and 

USARPAC, Partnering in the Pacific, p. 23.

265. Joint Chiefs of Staff, DOD Dictionary of Military and 

Associated Terms, p. 210.

266. Jen Judson, “Brooks: Pacific Pathways Generating Savings, Highlighting Challenges,” DefenseNews.com, December 

8, 2015, available from www.defensenews.com/story/defense/land/

army/2015/12/08/brooks-pacific-pathways-generating-savings-highlighting-challenges/76982200/, accessed January 31, 2016; and Daniel Gouré, “Foreign Military Sales Remain an Important Tool of 

U.S. National Security,” Lexington Institute, February 26, 2016, 

available from lexingtoninstitute.org/foreign-military-sales-remainan-important-tool-of-u-s-national-security/, accessed May 5, 2016.

267. Jen Judson, “Army’s Annual Foreign Military Sales Top 

$20 Billion,” DefenseNews.com, October 13, 2015, available from 
129

www.defensenews.com/story/defense/show-daily/ausa/2015/10/13/army-conducts-thriving-business-abroad/73874016/, accessed February 

16, 2016.

268. Stokes, p. 17; Bickford et al., p. 73.

269. Bickford et al., pp. v, vii; and Stokes, p. 17.

270. Michelle Tan, “Here’s how the Army’s pacific mission 

is expanding now,” Army Times, May 14, 2016, available from 

www.armytimes.com/story/military/2016/05/14/heres-how-armyspacific-mission-expanding-now/84241910/, accessed May 16, 2016; 

Tan, “Army seeks partnerships, new technology in the Pacific”; 

Judson, “Brooks”; William G. Braun III and David Lai, eds., U.S.-

China Competition: Asia-Pacific Land Force Implications, A U.S. Army 

War College Integrated Research Project in Support of U.S. Army Pacific Command and Headquarters, Department of the Army, Directorate 

of Strategy and Policy (HQDA G-35), Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies 

Institute, U.S. Army War College, November 2016, p. 47, available 

from ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1333, accessed 

January 22, 2017; and Richard Sisk, “US Army Wants Permanent 

Missile Defense System on Guam,” Military.com, December 8, 

2015, available from www.military.com/daily-news/2015/12/08/

us-army-wants-permanent-missile-defense-system-on-guam.html, 

accessed February 15, 2016.

271. Wikipedia contributors, “Cobra Gold,” Wikipedia, 

the free encyclopedia, February 17, 2016, available from https://

en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Cobra_Gold&oldid=705463829,

accessed May 9, 2016; and Stephen C. Myers, Military Cooperation 

Frameworks: Effective Models to Address Transnational Security Challenges of the Asia-Pacific Region, Civilian Research Project, Carlisle 

Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2011, p. 20, available from 

www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a565132.pdf, accessed February 16, 

2016.

272. U.S. Third Fleet Public Affairs, “27 Nations to Participate 

in World’s Largest Maritime Exercise,” U.S. Pacific Command, 

June 1, 2016, available from www.pacom.mil/Media/News/NewsArticleView/tabid/11348/Article/788436/27-nations-to-participate-inworlds-largest-maritime-exercise.aspx, accessed June 10, 2016; June 

Teufel Dreyer, “Washington Contemplates the Chinese Military,” 
130

E-Notes, Foreign Policy Research Institute, September 1, 2015, 

available from www.fpri.org/article/2015/09/washington-contemplates-the-chinese-military/, accessed on April 19, 2017.

273. Deni, The Future of American Landpower, p. 40; Green et al., 

pp. 12, 132; and Newsham.

274. USARPAC, Partnering in the Pacific, p. 3; Parmeter, p. 14; 

and Bickford et al., pp. 71-72.

275. Miller, pp. 13-14.

276. USPACOM Public Affairs Office, “Foreign Military Leaders Observe U.S. Marine Corps Amphibious Landing during U.S. 

Pacific Command Amphibious Leaders Symposium,” U.S. Pacific 

Command, May 20, 2015, available from www.pacom.mil/Media/

News/tabid/5693/Article/589347/foreign-military-leaders-observe-usmarine-corps-amphibious-landing-during-us-p.aspx, accessed May 

16, 2016; Newsham; Green et al., p. 132; and Harley Thomas, 

“PALS-15 Unites Pacific,” Official U.S. Marine Corps Website, 

May 22, 2015, available from www.marines.mil/News/NewsDisplay/

tabid/3258/Article/589525/pals-15-unites-pacific.aspx, accessed May 

10, 2016.

277. Stokes, p. 17; and Robert Johnson, “Why the US Appointing an Aussie General to Command Its Pacific Troops is a Big 

Deal,” Business Insider, February 2, 2013, available from www.businessinsider.com/usarpac-post-australian-major-general-richard-burraustralian-defence-force-2013-2, accessed May 9, 2016.

278. Newsham.

279. The Marine Corps does not regionally align its forces, 

while SOF forces do. Deni, The Future of American Landpower, p. 14; 

Deni, “Strategic Landpower in the Indo-Asia-Pacific,” pp. 82-83; 

Green et al., pp. 132, 135; and Bickford et al., pp. 72-73.

280. Field and Pikner.

281. Joint Chiefs of Staff, DOD Dictionary of Military and 

Associated Terms, p. 210.
131

282. Green et al., p. 105; and Bickford et al., p. 40.

283. Yevgen Sautin, “This Vietnamese Base Will Decide the 

South China Sea’s Fate,” The National Interest, May 8, 2016, available from nationalinterest.org/feature/vietnamese-base-will-decide-thesouth-china-seas-fate-16093?page=2, accessed May 10, 2016.

284. USARPAC, Partnering in the Pacific, p. 8.

285. Alexander L. Vuving, “A Tipping Point in the US-ChinaVietnam Triangle,” Features, online news articles of The Diplomat, 

July 6, 2015, available from thediplomat.com/2015/07/a-tippingpoint-in-the-u-s-china-vietnam-triangle/, accessed February 17, 2016; 

Abraham Muñoz, Revisiting U.S.-Vietnam Relations Amid the Rebalance to the Pacific, Strategy Research Project, Carlisle Barracks, 

PA: U.S. Army War College, 2013, p. 6, available from www.dtic.

mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a589271.pdf, accessed February 17, 2016; and 

Green et al., p. 107.

286. Eric Tegler, “The Practicalities of US Military Sales to 

Vietnam,” Features, online news articles of The Diplomat, August 

5, 2015, available from thediplomat.com/2015/08/the-practicalitiesof-us-military-sales-to-vietnam/, accessed February 17, 2016; Muñoz, p. 10; and Richard Weitz, “Vietnam: America’s Big Strategic 

Opportunity in Asia (Think China),” The National Interest, May 

29, 2016, available from nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/vietnamamericas-strategic-opportunity-asia-16373?page=2, accessed June 12, 

2016.

287. Freier et al., Beyond the Last War, p. 44; De Swielande, 

p. 82; and Green et al., p. 173.

288. Muñoz, pp. 7-8.

289. Figure sourced from USARPAC, Partnering in the 

Pacific, p. 6.

290. Bickford et al., pp. 41-42.

291. “State Partnership program expands to include Vietnam,” Oregon Sentinel, Vol. 10, No. 5, Winter 2012, pp. 1, 4, available from www.oregon.gov/OMD/AGPA/Documents/Winter%20

2012-WEB.pdf, accessed May 11, 2016; and Nick Choy, “Vietnam 
132

delegation visits Oregon National Guard for State Partnership 

Program workshop,” Salem, OR: Oregon National Guard Public 

Affairs Office, April 2014, available from https://www.dvidshub.net/

news/105326/vietnam-delegation-visits-oregon-national-guard-statepartnership-program-workshop#.VzNZwiFKYYA, accessed May 11, 

2016.

292. Muñoz, pp. 6-7; Green et al., p. 107; and David Larter, 

“Changing times in Vietnam: 5 things troops need to know,” Navy 

Times, May 28, 2016, available from www.navytimes.com/story/military/2016/05/28/vietnam-pacom-port-visits-obama-harris/84848028/, 

accessed May 31, 2016.

293. Green et al., pp. 107-108; and Richard Sisk, “US Army 

Seeks to Expand Role in Asia-Pacific Region, General Says,” DOD 

Buzz, May 25, 2016, available from www.dodbuzz.com/2016/05/25/

us-vietnam-joint-military-exercises-possible-army-general-says/, 

accessed May 30, 2016.

294. Newsham.

295. Freedberg, Jr., “US Army Plans Stockpiles in Vietnam, 

Cambodia.”

296. De Swielande, p. 82; Sautin; and Muñoz, p. 7.

297. Muñoz, p. 7; and Sautin.

298. Sautin; Green et al., p. 107; Harsh V. Pant, “New Equations in the Asia-Pacific as China Arrives as Military Power,” China Power, blog of The Diplomat, September 21, 2015, available from 

thediplomat.com/2015/09/new-equations-in-the-asia-pacific-as-chinaarrives-as-military-power/, accessed February 15, 2016; and “Obama 

lifts US embargo on lethal arms sales to Vietnam,” BBC News, May 

23, 2016, available from www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-36356695, 

accessed May 23, 2016.

299. Weitz.

300. David Brunnstrom, Lesley Wroughton, and Matt Spetalnick, “Obama weighs historic decision on whether to lift Vietnam 

arms ban,” Reuters, May 10, 2016 available from in.reuters.com/
133

article/usa-vietnam-embargo-idINKCN0Y02ES, accessed April 19, 

2017; Muñoz, p. 9; Green et al., p. 106; and Tegler.

301. Poling.

302. “Malaysia faces tricky Sino-US balancing act,” The Straits 

Times, November 6, 2015, available from www.straitstimes.com/

asia/se-asia/malaysia-faces-tricky-sino-us-balancing-act, accessed February 17, 2016; Green et al., p. 96; and Zachary Keck, “Malaysia to 

Establish Marine Corps and South China Sea Naval Base,” Flashpoints, blog of The Diplomat, October 19, 2013, available from thediplomat.com/2013/10/malaysia-to-establish-marine-corps-and-southchina-sea-naval-base/, accessed May 14, 2016.

303. USARPAC, Partnering in the Pacific, p. 7.

304. Green et al., pp. 96, 172-173.

305. Prashanth Parameswaran, “US, Brunei Mull New 

Military Partnership,” Rebalance (renamed Trans-Pacific 

View), blog of The Diplomat, March 15, 2016, available from 

thediplomat.com/2016/03/us-brunei-mull-new-military-partner

ship/, accessed May 14, 2016. Although receiving briefings on the 

State Partnership Program (SPP), neither Malaysia nor Brunei has 

advanced far in joining.

306. Green et al., p. 95; Keck; and Wikipedia contributors, “Malaysian Army,” Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, March 4, 2016, 

available from https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Malaysian_

Army&oldid=708230049, accessed May 15, 2016.

307. Newsham; Joshua Stewart, “Marine Corps Works to 

Build New Ties in Southeast Asia,” Marine Corps Times, April 1, 

2015; and Emmanuel Ramos, “U.S. Marines, Malaysian Soldiers 

Complete MALUS AMPHEX 15,” Official U.S. Marine Corps 

Website, November 23, 2015, available from www.marines.mil/

News/NewsDisplay/tabid/3258/Article/630890/us-marines-malaysiansoldiers-complete-malus-amphex-15.aspx, accessed May 14, 2015.

308. Stewart, “Marine Corps Works to Build New Ties in 

Southeast Asia.”
134

309. Brian Erickson, “Opening Ceremony Marks Beginning of Keris Strike 2015,” U.S. Pacific Command, September 16, 

2015, available from www.pacom.mil/Media/News/tabid/5693/Article/617463/opening-ceremony-marks-beginning-of-keris-strike-2015.

aspx, accessed May 15, 2016; and Michael McMillan and Brian W. 

Tuttle, “Logistics for Pacific Pathways: Malaysia,” Army Sustainment, March-April 2015, p. 42, available from www.alu.army.mil/

alog/2015/MarApr15/PDF/143253.pdf, accessed June 10, 2016.

310. De Swielande, p. 82; and Reuters, Agence France-Presse, 

“Malaysia faces tricky Sino-US balancing act.”

311. Jon Grevatt, “Malaysian Army Orders MD 530G Helicopters,” IHS Jane’s 360, February 2, 2016; Franz-Stefan Gady, 

“Biggest US-Malaysia Arms Deal in 20 Years: Kuala Lumpur to 

Receive New Attack Helicopters,” Asia Defense, blog of The Diplomat, February 2, 2016, available from thediplomat.com/2016/02/

biggest-us-malaysia-arms-deal-in-20-years-kuala-lumpur-to-receivenew-attack-helicopters/, accessed February 7, 2016; and Keck.

312. Lamonthe; Walton; Erik Estrada, “Philippines, U.S. begin Balikatan 2016 with Opening Ceremony,” Official U.S. Marine 

Corps Website, April 4, 2016; USARPAC, Partnering in the Pacific, 

p. 23; Campbell and Andrews, p. 4; and Deni, The Future of American Landpower, p. 19.

313. USARPAC, Partnering in the Pacific, pp. 6-7; and 

Preston, p. 9.

314. De Swielande, pp. 80-81; and DoD, U.S. Asia-Pacific 

Maritime Security Strategy, p. 24.

315. Mahnken et al., p. 19; Office of the Secretary of 

Defense, pp. 16-17; Agence France-Presse, “President Says 

Philippines to Spend $1.8B on Military Modernization,” 

DefenseNews.com, December 21, 2015, available from www.

defensenews.com/story/defense/2015/12/21/president-says-philippinesspend-military-modernization/77726792/, accessed February 17, 

2016; and Green et al., p. 76.

316. Associated Press, “US Donates Vehicles to Boost Poorly-armed Philippine Forces,” Military.com, December 10, 2015, 
135

available from www.military.com/daily-news/2015/12/10/us-donatesvehicles-boost-poorly-armed-philippine-forces.html, accessed February 17, 2016; Moss; Baldor.

317. Green et al., p. 78.

318. Walton; Green et al., pp. 73-74; and Bickford et al., 

pp. 39-40.

319. Bickford et al., pp. 42-43.

320. “Hawaii National Guard Adjutant General Welcomes 

PHL Officials,” Honolulu, HI: Philippine Consulate General, June 24, 2015, available from www.philippineshonolulu.org/

news/4597/573/HAWAII-NATIONAL-GUARD-ADJUTANT-GENERAL-WELCOMES-PHL-OFFICIALS/d,phildet/, accessed May 17, 

2017.

321. Stewart, “Marine Corps Works to Build New Ties in 

Southeast Asia”; and Moss.

322. Estrada; and Renato Cruz de Castro, “Balikatan Exercise 

Highlights Territorial Defense and Multilateral Approach,” Asia 

Maritime Transparency Initiative, April 20, 2016, available from 

amti.csis.org/balikatan-exercise-highlights-territorial-defense-multilateral-approach/, accessed May 17, 2016.

323. Prashanth Parameswaran, “US, Philippines to Hold 

Amphibious Landing Exercise: PHIBLEX 2016 will be held from 

September 21 to October 9,” Asia Defense, blog of The Diplomat,

September 19, 2015, available from thediplomat.com/2015/09/usphilippines-to-hold-amphibious-landing-exercise/, accessed May 16, 

2016; and “Philippine Bilateral Exercises, or ‘Phiblex’,” GlobalSecurity.org, last modified September 29, 2014, available from www.

globalsecurity.org/military/ops/phiblex.htm, accessed May 16, 2016.

324. Office of the Press Secretary; and Newsham.

325. Lamonthe; Green et al., p. 28; and Agence France-Presse, 

“Official.”

326. Moss; Robson; and Lamonthe.
136

327. Green et al., p. 77; Robson; Poling.

328. Copp; and Baldor.

329. Deni, The Future of American Landpower, p. 42; and Richard 

Javad Heydarian, “What Will a Duterte Administration Mean?” 

Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, May 13, 2016, available 

from amti.csis.org/will-duterte-administration-mean/, accessed May 

27, 2016.

330. Green et al., pp. 32-33, 77; and Deni, The Future of American Landpower, p. 42.

331. Roy D. Kamphausen and Jessica Drun, “What Are MilMil Ties Between the U.S. and China Good For?” War on the 

Rocks, April 22, 2016, available from warontherocks.com/2016/04/

what-are-mil-mil-ties-between-the-u-s-and-china-good-for/, accessed 

May 22, 2016.

332. Braun, written comments to the present author, July 

15, 2016.

333. Lumbers, p. 312.

334. Deni, “Strategic Landpower in the Indo-Asia-Pacific,” 

p. 83; Fong, p. 10; Parmeter, pp. 7-8; DoD, U.S. Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy, pp. 29-30; and Kamphausen and Drun.

335. Lowsen.

336. Kamphausen and Drun.

337. Bickford et al., p. 22; and Freedberg, Jr., “Reshape US 

Army, Asian Alliances to Deter China.”

338. USARPAC, Partnering in the Pacific, p. 9.

339. Ibid., p. 5.

340. Stokes, pp. 12-13; and Fong, p. 12.

341. Pavgi; and Kamphausen and Drun.
137

342. Prashanth Parameswaran, “Underestimating US in Asia 

a ‘Severe Miscalculation’: Senior Defense Official,” Rebalance (renamed Trans-Pacific View) , blog of The Diplomat, December 11, 

2015, available from thediplomat.com/2015/12/underestimating-usin-asia-a-severe-miscalculation-senior-defense-official/, accessed April 

20, 2017; and Pavgi.

343. Green et al., p. 173.

344. Pavgi; Freedberg, Jr., “Reshape US Army, Asian Alliances to Deter China”; and Michael A. Marra, Professor of Building 

Partner Capacity (BPC) Studies, School of Strategic Landpower 

(SSL), U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, June 6, 2016, 

e-mail discussion with the present author.

345. DoD, U.S. Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy, p. 29.

346. Deni, “Strategic Landpower in the Indo-Asia-Pacific,” 

pp. 84-85; and Kamphausen and Drun.

347. Pavgi.

348. Peter Cook, “Readout of Secretary of Defense Ash Carter’s 

Meeting With People’s Republic of China’s Minister of National 

Defense, General Chang Wanquan in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia,” 

Release No: NR-424-15, Washington, DC: Press Operations, U.S. 

Department of Defense, November 3, 2015, available from www.

defense.gov/News/News-Releases/News-Release-View/Article/627162/

readout-of-secretary-of-defense-ash-carters-meeting-with-peoples-republic-of-ch, accessed May 24, 2016; and “Senior Chinese PLA Officer Embarks on Week-Long Official Visit of the United States,” 

The U.S.-China Policy Foundation, May 16, 2011, available from 

uscpf.org/v3/2011/05/17/senior-chinese-pla-officer-visits-united-states, 

accessed May 24, 2016.

349. Agence France-Presse, “Top Chinese officer pays visit 

to US: Pentagon,” Yahoo News, June 8, 2015, available from 

https://www.yahoo.com/news/top-chinese-officer-pays-visit-uspentagon-202415362.html?ref=gs, accessed May 24, 2016; and Li 

Bao, “US, China to Establish Military Dialogue,” VOA News, 

June 13, 2015, 9:13 AM, available from www.voanews.com/

content/united-states-china-sign-deal-on-military-dialogue/2820468.

html, accessed May 24, 2016.
138

350. Pavgi; and “USAWC Military Engagement with PLA 

Academy of Military Science Back-Brief,” presentation slides, U.S. 

Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, December 16, 2015.

351. Fong, pp. 30-31.

352. Marra, e-mail, June 6, 2016.

353. Pavgi.

354. Ibid.

355. Office of the Secretary of Defense, p. 17.

356. Lowsen; and Bickford et al., p. 36.

357. Tan, “Army seeks partnerships, new technology in the 

Pacific.”

358. Bickford et al., pp. 22, 71; and Freedberg, Jr., “Reshape US 

Army, Asian Alliances to Deter China.”

359. Tan, “Army seeks partnerships, new technology in the 

Pacific.”

360. Nicole Yeo, “China’s Participation in Cobra Gold 2014: 

A Golden Opportunity for the United States?” China-US Focus, 

March 11, 2014, available from www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/chinas-participation-in-cobra-gold-2014-a-golden-opportunity-forthe-united-states/, accessed May 25, 2016; and Deni, “Strategic 

Landpower in the Indo-Asia-Pacific,” pp. 84-85.

361. Henry C. O’Brien, Peacetime Engagement of the Chinese 

People’s Liberation Army Ground Forces by the United States Army, 

Strategy Research Project, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War 

College, April 26, 2000, pp. 5-6, available from oai.dtic.mil/oai/oa

i?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA380135, 

accessed February 19, 2016.

362. Field and Pikner.

363. O’Brien, pp. 7-8.
139

364. Lumbers, p. 315; and Ankit Panda, “Top US Commander: US Won’t Pursue New Bases in Australia,” Asia Defense, 

blog of The Diplomat, August 9, 2015, available from http://the

diplomat.com/2015/08/top-us-commander-us-wont-pursue-newbases-in-australia/, accessed on April 28, 2017.

365. Deni, The Future of American Landpower, pp. x, 15.

366. Freedberg, Jr., “Reshape US Army, Asian Alliances to 

Deter China”; Stokes, p. 10; and Kamphausen and Drun.

367. Pavgi.

368. Although the word “danger” is part of the Chinese word 

for crisis (weiji), the other half is better translated as a more neutral 

“incipient moment.” Benjamin Zimmer, “Crisis = Danger + Opportunity: The Plot Thickens,” Language Log, March 27, 2007, available from itre.cis.upenn.edu/myl/languagelog/archives/004343.html, 

accessed January 21, 2016.

369. Parmeter, pp. 15-16.

370. Stokes, p. 19.

371. Teichert.

372. Braun and Lai, pp. xiii-xiv, 68-69.

373. Rapp-Hooper; and Walton.

374. J. Thomas.

375. Braun and Lai, pp. xiv-xv, 87-89.

376. David Lai, Learning from the Stones: A Go Approach to Mastering China’s Strategic Concept, Shi, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies 

Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2004, p. v, available from ssi.

armywarcollege.edu/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=378, accessed January 

24, 2017.

377. Donald Trump, “President Trump’s Inaugural Address, 

Annotated,” National Public Radio, January 20, 2017, available
140

from www.npr.org/2017/01/20/510629447/watch-live-presidenttrumps-inauguration-ceremony, accessed January 24, 2017.

378. Midgley; and Preston, p. 11.

379. Parmeter, pp. 11-12.

380. Green et al., p. 97.

381. Pavgi.

382. Braun and Lai, pp. 47-48, 103-104.

383. Stewart, “Marine Corps Works to Build New Ties in 

Southeast Asia”; and Newsham.

384. Michael Green, Kathleen Hicks, Mark Cancian, dirs., 

Zach Cooper and John Schaus, leads., Asia-Pacific Rebalance 2025: 

Capabilities, Presence, and Partnerships: An Independent Review of 

U.S. Defense Strategy in the Asia-Pacific, Washington, DC: Center 

for Strategic and International Studies, January 2016, pp. 18, 205.

385. Parameswaran, “US, Brunei Mull New Military 

Partnership.”

386. Braun and Lai, study deliberations.

387. Bickford et al., p. vii.

388. Braun and Lai, p. 53.

389. Cone, p. 10; and Cleveland, Pick, and Farris.

390. Green et al., pp. 18, 132-133; and Luján, p. 5.

391. Preston, p. 17.

392. Parmeter, pp. 17-18; and Katrosh, p. 27.

393. Bickford et al.; and Jim Tice, “NCO, officer broadening 

seminars available for this summer,” Army Times, February 23, 

2015, available from https://www.armytimes.com/story/military/
141

careers/army/2015/02/23/strategic-broadening-seminars/23548367/, 

accessed February 2, 2017.

394. Metz; and Cleveland and Farris, p. 23.

395. Braun and Lai, pp. 69-70; and Green et al., p. 113.

396. Freedberg, Jr., “SASC Pushes Bigger Army Role in Pacific 

Vs. China”; and Braun and Lai, pp. 70-71.

397. Braun and Lai, pp. 70-73.

398. Barno, Bensahel, and Sharp, p. 174.

399. Deni, The Future of American Landpower, pp. 3-4.

400. USDN, Foreword and pp. 5-2-5-3.

401. Braun and Lai, p. 45.

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General William E. Rapp

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

and

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE PRESS

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Steven K. Metz

Author

Lieutenant Colonel Clarence J. Bouchat, 

U.S. Air Force (Retired)

Editor for Production

Dr. James G. Pierce

Publications Assistant

Ms. Denise J. Kersting

*****

Composition

Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil

This Publication SSI Website USAWC Website