UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-4944

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

ANTHONY BYRON PRIDGEN, a/k/a Big Ant,

Defendant – Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Florence. C. Weston Houck, Senior District 

Judge. (4:01-cr-00627-CWH-6; 4:06-cv-00166-CWH)

Submitted: March 10, 2010 Decided: May 6, 2010

Before KING, GREGORY, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed in part; affirmed in part by unpublished per curiam 

opinion.

D. Craig Brown, Florence, South Carolina, for Appellant. Marvin 

Jennings Caughman, Assistant United States Attorney, Columbia, 

South Carolina, Rose Mary Sheppard Parham, Assistant United 

States Attorney, Florence, South Carolina, for Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Anthony Byron Pridgen appeals the district court’s 

amended judgment reducing his prison sentence from 292 months to 

240 months after ordering that he be resentenced in his 28 

U.S.C. § 2255 (2006) proceeding. Pridgen’s attorney has filed a 

brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), 

asserting, in his opinion, there are no meritorious grounds for 

appeal but raising the issue of whether the district court 

complied with 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) when it resentenced 

Pridgen to 240 months. Pridgen has filed a pro se supplemental 

brief raising the issue of whether the district court erred or 

abused its discretion when it refused to entertain his motion 

under § 2255 and instead granted him a resentencing under United 

States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). We dismiss this appeal 

in part, and we affirm the district court’s judgment.

We review Pridgen’s sentence under a deferential 

abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 

38, 51 (2007). The first step in this review requires us to 

ensure that the district court committed no significant 

procedural error. United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328 

(4th Cir. 2009). We then consider the substantive 

reasonableness of the sentence, taking into account the totality 

of the circumstances. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.
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At Pridgen’s original sentencing, the district court 

sentenced him at the low end of his guideline range to 292 

months in prison. At resentencing, the district court reduced 

his sentence to the statutory mandatory minimum term of 240 

months. In explaining its sentence, the district court reviewed 

the § 3553(a) factors and noted that the court considered the 

guideline range as advisory and looked to the § 3553(a) factors 

in imposing the sentence. The court further explained that 

Booker did not remove the statutory mandatory minimum, and that 

the court had no discretion to sentence him below that minimum. 

Pridgen’s attorney contends that if the district court 

had given greater deference to the § 3553(a) factors, Pridgen 

would have received a lower sentence. We find this argument 

without merit. The district court had no discretion to sentence 

Pridgen below the statutory mandatory minimum, see United States 

v. Robinson, 404 F.3d 850, 862 (4th Cir. 2005), and his sentence 

to the statutory mandatory minimum is per se reasonable. See

United States v. Farrior, 535 F.3d 210, 224 (4th Cir.), cert. 

denied, 129 S. Ct. 743 (2008).

In his pro se supplemental brief, Pridgen questions 

whether the district court erred or abused its discretion when 

it refused to entertain his § 2255 motion and instead granted 

him a Booker resentencing. The district court ordered the

resentencing based on Pridgen’s allegation and the Government’s 
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concession that his appellate attorney may have been ineffective 

in not filing a timely petition for certiorari, and he was 

prejudiced as a result. The district court dismissed Pridgen’s 

remaining claims without prejudice to him raising them in 

another § 2255 motion after his sentence was final following 

direct review on his resentencing. 

To the extent that Pridgen challenges the propriety of 

the district court’s § 2255 relief on his ineffective assistance 

claim pertaining to the untimely petition for certiorari, we 

find no abuse of discretion by the district court. See United 

States v. Hadden, 475 F.3d 652, 666 (4th Cir. 2007). To the 

extent that he seeks to appeal the district court’s decision to 

dismiss his remaining claims without prejudice, we have reviewed 

the record and conclude that he has failed to make a substantial 

showing of the denial of a constitutional right pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2253(c) (2006). Accordingly, we deny a certificate of 

appealability and dismiss this part of Pridgen’s appeal. 

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire 

record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for 

appeal. We therefore dismiss this appeal in part and affirm the 

district court’s judgment. This court requires that counsel 

inform his client, in writing, of his right to petition the 

Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If the 

client requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes 
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that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move 

in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. 

Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on 

the client.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

DISMISSED IN PART;

AFFIRMED IN PART