If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

UNPUBLISHED

In re M. A. GASKIN, Minor. May 18, 2023

No. 363047

Wayne Circuit Court

Family Division

LC No. 2001-400705-NA

Before: RICK, P.J., and SHAPIRO and O’BRIEN, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Respondent-mother appeals as of right the order terminating her parental rights to the 

minor-child MAG under MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)(ii) (desertion of child for 91 or more days and 

custody not sought), (b)(ii) (failure to prevent sexual abuse and reasonable likelihood of future 

abuse if child returned to parent’s home), (g) (failure to provide proper care and custody), (j) 

(reasonable likelihood of harm if returned to parent’s home), and (k)(i) (abandonment of a young 

child and reasonable likelihood of future harm if returned to parent).1 We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

The original petition in this case asked the trial court to take jurisdiction over MAG and to 

terminate respondent’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(ii), (g), and (j). The basis for 

this request was an allegation that MAG had been sexually assaulted by respondent’s cousin, PL. 

According to the petition, respondent and MAG were living with PL and several other adults at 

the time. The petition alleged that PL had a violent criminal history that included numerous 

instances of domestic violence, and that he had previously pled no contest to accosting a minor for 

immoral purposes. According to the petition, respondent should have known about PL’s criminal 

history involving minors, but nevertheless chose to live in PL’s home. The petition also alleged 

that, when MAG told respondent about PL’s sexual abuse, respondent refused to report the abuse 

 

1 The parental rights of MAG’s father were terminated in the same order, but he has not filed a 

claim of appeal and is therefore not a party to this appeal. Some of the grounds for termination 

listed in the trial court’s order seem to apply only to father, but the trial court did not differentiate 

between which grounds applied to father and which applied to respondent.
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to law enforcement, or to take MAG to a doctor for a medical examination, because she did not 

believe MAG.

At the ensuing termination trial, Children’s Protective Services (CPS) worker Mariah 

Taylor testified that MAG had been placed in a safety plan with her brother since the case began, 

while respondent was living in a shelter. Despite MAG’s relative placement, Taylor opined that 

it was in MAG’s best interests to terminate respondent’s parental rights because respondent lacked 

appropriate housing, failed to seek help for MAG after learning about the sexual abuse allegations, 

and there was a reasonable likelihood that MAG would be harmed if returned to respondent’s care. 

Taylor testified that her main concern was that respondent knew about the sexual abuse allegation 

and did not call the police or report the abuse.

MAG, who was 15 years old at the time of trial, testified that she previously lived with 

respondent and four or five other adults, including PL. MAG said that, during this time, respondent 

would often leave for long periods without telling MAG where she was, and if MAG asked, 

respondent would tell MAG to “stay out of grown up’s business.” According to MAG,

respondent’s absenteeism would sometimes last multiple weeks, and she never left any money or 

supplies for MAG. MAG said that she had to sleep on the floor during this time, and that the other 

adults in the house would party with alcohol and marijuana every weekend while she tried to sleep. 

She also said that some of the adults living in the house would have sex in front of her, and that 

they once tried to get her to join, but she left the house instead. According to MAG, she never felt 

safe in that house, but when she told respondent this, respondent said that MAG did not know what 

she was talking about and that MAG was safe.

During the course of her testimony, MAG recounted the night of the sexual assault. She 

testified that, early that night, the mother of PL’s child came over to the house and encouraged 

everyone to get drunk, and everyone (including MAG) did. Respondent was not home at the time. 

According to MAG, after almost everyone was asleep, PL and another adult living in the house—

SR—propositioned MAG for sex. When MAG refused, the two adults pulled MAG’s pants off, 

touched her vagina, and “just kept going.” MAG testified that she tried to talk to respondent about 

the assault, but respondent did not listen. MAG said that she did not want to live with respondent 

in the future because she was scared something would happen again.

Respondent testified that she did not ask MAG many questions about the assault because 

she chose to instead ask the other adults in the house what happened. Respondent also explained 

that she did not contact the police after she found out about the assault because there was a bad 

storm and she could not make it to the police station. Respondent denied that MAG ever said that 

she felt unsafe at the house, and said that MAG wanted to stay in the house when respondent would 

leave. Respondent testified that she was living in a shelter at the time of trial, and her income 

consisted of Social Security payments and food stamps. She also said that she was unable to work 

due to injuries she sustained in a car accident in 2003.

In its order terminating respondent’s parental rights, the trial court found that MAG and 

respondent had been living in a house with numerous other adults who frequently used marijuana 

and alcohol. The trial court credited MAG’s testimony that she had told respondent that she felt 

uncomfortable where they were living, but respondent ignored her and, in fact, would frequently 

leave MAG alone in the house for weeks at a time with no money, food, or any way to contact 
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respondent. The trial court found that this left MAG vulnerable, and that PL and SR took 

advantage of the situation and coerced MAG to have sex with them. The trial court also found 

that, when respondent learned about the sexual abuse, respondent “did not want to hear about it,” 

refused to move out of the home, never contacted law enforcement to report the abuse, and declined 

to take MAG “for a physical exam for sexual abuse.” The trial court also noted that MAG was 

currently placed with her older brother, and that MAG said she “did not ever want to live with 

[respondent] again.” On the basis of these findings, the trial court held that termination of 

respondent’s parental rights was proper under MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)(ii), (b)(ii), (g), (j), and (k)(i). 

Turning to best interests, the court reasoned that termination was in MAG’s best interests because 

respondent had no plan to care for MAG, MAG needed safety and stability, and respondent “had 

abandoned her responsibility as a mother to make certain her child was safe and had a stable living 

environment.” The court also found that respondent would not be able to provide “long-term safe 

care” for MAG in the foreseeable future. Accordingly, the trial court terminated respondent’s 

parental rights. This appeal followed.

II. STATUTORY GROUNDS

On appeal, respondent first argues that the trial court clearly erred by finding a statutory 

ground to terminate her parental rights. We disagree.

“To terminate parental rights, the trial court must find that at least one of the statutory 

grounds for termination in MCL 712A.19b(3) has been proved by clear and convincing evidence.” 

In re Ellis, 294 Mich App 30, 32; 817 NW2d 111 (2011). “We review for clear error a trial court’s 

finding of whether a statutory ground for termination has been proven by clear and convincing 

evidence.” In re Moss, 301 Mich App 76, 80; 836 NW2d 182 (2013). “A finding is only clearly 

erroneous if an appellate court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 

made.” In re Benavides, 334 Mich App 162, 167; 964 NW2d 108 (2020) (quotation marks and 

citation omitted).

The trial court terminated respondent’s parental rights on numerous grounds, including 

MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(ii). That subsection provides that a court may terminate parental rights if it 

finds clear and convincing evidence that the child suffered sexual abuse and “[t]he parent who had 

the opportunity to prevent the physical injury or physical or sexual abuse failed to do so and the 

court finds that there is a reasonable likelihood that the child will suffer injury or abuse in the 

foreseeable future if placed in the parent’s home.” MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(ii). The harm 

contemplated by MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(ii) must be caused by a parent’s act “and not merely 

contributed to by an unintentional omission.” In re LaFrance, 306 Mich App 713, 725; 858 NW2d 

143 (2014).

The trial court did not clearly err when it found that termination was proper on this ground. 

Respondent placed MAG in an environment where she knew grown men drank alcohol, partied, 

and consumed marijuana. One of the couples living in the house also frequently had sex in front 

of MAG. Not only was this environment inappropriate for a child, but respondent frequently left 

MAG there alone, often overnight, and sometimes for multiple weeks at a time. During 

respondent’s absences, she refused to tell MAG where she was, often did not leave MAG with a 

way to contact her, and never left MAG any supplies or money for food or other necessaries. Even 

more troubling, when MAG told respondent that she did not feel safe in that environment, 
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respondent assured MAG that she was safe. Respondent’s refusal to listen to MAG’s fears, and 

her choice to continue leaving MAG alone and vulnerable at this house, resulted in PL and SR

sexually abusing MAG—on one of the many nights respondent left MAG at the house alone, the 

other adults in the house gave MAG alcohol despite her being underage, and, once everyone was 

asleep, PL and SR coerced MAG to have sex with them. This was wholly avoidable if respondent 

had merely used better judgment to see that this living environment placed MAG at risk, or listened 

to MAG when she told respondent that she did not feel safe living in that house. Instead of 

protecting MAG, respondent chose to leave MAG vulnerable and alone.

On appeal, respondent asserts that she “did not cause the assault . . . or have an ability to 

prevent it before it happened,” but that is only half true. While respondent may not have caused 

the assault—only PL and SR bear responsibility for that—respondent could have prevented it by 

listening to MAG when she voiced her fears about living in the house, or using her judgment to 

see that the house was not safe for a child. Respondent stresses how difficult it was to find 

alternative housing for her and MAG given respondent’s limited income, but finding alternative 

housing was not the only way respondent could have kept MAG safe. As respondent emphasizes

on appeal, “[n]othing occurred in [respondent’s] presence.” It follows that respondent could have 

ensured MAG’s safety by staying with MAG overnight, rather than leaving MAG alone and 

vulnerable in a house in which she already felt unsafe. Respondent’s decision to constantly leave 

MAG alone at the house, often overnight and sometimes for weeks at a time, demonstrated 

respondent’s unwillingness (or inability) to place MAG’s need for safety over respondent’s own 

wants and desires.

2

 This in turn supported termination of respondent’s parental rights under MCL 

712A.19b(3)(b)(ii). See In re Gonzales/Martinez, 310 Mich App 426, 432; 871 NW2d 868 (2015). 

(explaining that “MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(ii) addresses the harm occasioned by a parent who is 

unwilling or unable to protect his or her children from abuse”). For the same reasons, we are 

unpersuaded by respondent’s argument that she only contributed to the harm suffered by MAG 

through unintentional omissions—respondent had the opportunity to prevent the sexual abuse by, 

at the very least, staying with MAG while MAG was at the house, but respondent instead left MAG 

alone in an unsafe environment.

Turning to the other required finding for termination under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(ii)—the 

likelihood of future abuse—we conclude that the trial court did not clearly err when it found by 

clear and convincing evidence that there was a reasonable likelihood MAG would be harmed if 

returned to respondent’s care. Evidence established that respondent has an extensive history with 

CPS dating back to 2000, and many of the substantiated allegations concerned neglecting and 

failing to protect her children. That patterned continued in this case—respondent failed to provide 

a safe living environment for MAG, which resulted in MAG being sexually abused. Most 

troubling, after being told about the assault, respondent still failed to protect MAG—she did not 

call the police to report the abuse, nor did she take MAG to get medical care, despite being asked

to do so by CPS worker Taylor. Based on this evidence, it is reasonable to conclude that 

respondent is either unable or unwilling to protect MAG, such that MAG would continue to be 

 

2 Respondent claims on appeal that she only left MAG alone while she was trying “to get back on 

her feet financially,” but this claim is unsupported by any testimony or other evidence presented 

at trial.
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exposed to dangerous situations if returned to respondent’s care. Accordingly, the trial court did 

not clearly err when it found that there was a reasonable likelihood MAG would be harmed if 

returned to respondent’s care, and termination of respondent’s parental rights under MCL 

712A.19b(3)(b)(ii) was appropriate.

“Having concluded that at least one ground for termination existed, we need not consider 

the additional grounds upon which the trial court based its decision.” In re HRC, 286 Mich App 

444, 461; 781 NW2d 105 (2009).

III. BEST INTERESTS

Respondent also argues on appeal that the trial court erred when it found that termination 

of respondent’s parental rights was in MAG’s best interests. We disagree.

“[W]hether termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child must be proved 

by a preponderance of the evidence.” In re Moss, 301 Mich App at 90. We review a “trial court’s 

determination regarding the children’s best interests” for clear error. In re White, 303 Mich App 

701, 713; 846 NW2d 61 (2014). Clear error exists when the reviewing court has a firm and definite 

conviction that a mistake was made. In re Benavides, 334 Mich App at 167.

The primary focus at the best-interest stage is the child. In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 356; 

612 NW2d 407 (2000). When determining whether termination is in a child’s best interest, the 

trial court should consider all of the evidence, including the child’s bond to the parent, the parent’s 

parenting ability, the child’s need for permanency, stability, and finality, and the possibility of 

adoption. White, 303 Mich App at 713-714. The trial court may also consider the child’s wellbeing while in the respondent’s care, id. at 714, and, relatedly, whether the child’s safety and wellbeing could be reasonably assured if returned to the respondent’s care, In re VanDalen, 293 Mich 

App 120, 142; 809 NW2d 412 (2011).

Respondent asserts that it was contrary to MAG’s best interests to terminate respondent’s 

parental rights because doing so removed a loving parent from MAG’s life, which MAG was 

unlikely to replace by adoption in light of her age. Respondent also points out that MAG was in a 

relative placement at the time of termination, and that this, too, weighed against termination.3 

While MAG’s placement with a relative and respondent’s bond with MAG both weighed against 

termination, these were only two factors among many for the trial court to consider. The trial court 

also considered MAG’s well-being while in respondent’s care, particularly the fact that MAG was 

sexually abused, and the court reasonably found that MAG’s safety and well-being could not be 

assured if returned to respondent’s care. MAG seemingly shared the trial court’s concerns because 

she testified that she did not want to live with respondent in the future because she was scared

something would happen. The trial court further reasoned that termination was in MAG’s best 

interests because respondent had no plan to provide for MAG, and MAG needed stability, which 

respondent had not shown she could provide. The trial court properly considered all these factors, 

 

3 The trial court was required to explicitly address MAG’s placement with relatives, see In re 

Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App 35, 44; 823 NW2d 144 (2012), and there is no dispute that the 

trial court did so.
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and its finding that termination of respondent’s parental rights was in MAG’s best interests was 

not clearly erroneous.

Affirmed.

/s/ Michelle M. Rick

/s/ Douglas B. Shapiro

/s/ Colleen A. O’Brien