Filed 5/19/16 P. v. Hargrove CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE,

 Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

SHYLA HARGROVE,

 Defendant and Appellant.

2d Crim. No. B267707

(Super. Ct. No. 2010012698)

(Ventura County)

Shyla Hargrove appeals from judgment after an order revoking her 

postrelease community supervision (PRCS) following her admission that she violated the 

conditions of her release. (Pen. Code, § 3450 et seq.)1 We affirm.

BACKGROUND

In 2013, Hargrove was convicted after plea of guilty to corporal injury to a 

spouse or cohabitant. (§ 273.5.) The trial court sentenced her to two years in prison.

Hargrove was released under PRCS in November 2013. The Ventura 

County Probation Agency is her supervising agency. As a condition of release, she 

agreed to report to her probation officer as ordered, report any change of address to her 

probation officer, use no narcotics or dangerous drugs, submit to drug testing, and 

actively participate in substance abuse treatment. She also agreed the probation agency 

 

1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.
2

could, without a court hearing, order “flash incarceration” in a county jail for up to 10 

days if she violated a condition of her release. (§ 3453, subd. (q).) 

In July 2015, Hargrove relocated and did not report her new address, did 

not participate in substance abuse treatment, and did not report to her probation officer or 

submit to drug testing. On August 4, 2015, she was arrested. She said she used 

methamphetamine four days earlier. 

One day after her arrest, Senior Deputy Probation Officer Michelle Larson

met with Hargrove. Larson advised Hargrove in writing that she had the right to written 

notice of the alleged violations, the right to an administrative hearing within two days, 

and the right at that hearing to speak on her own behalf and present letters and 

documents. Larson gave Hargrove a “PROS Hold” form that identified the alleged 

violations. Larson advised Hargrove in writing of her right to a formal revocation 

hearing at which she would have the right to be represented by an attorney, the right to 

call and confront witnesses, and the right to testify or remain silent. Hargrove 

acknowledged and waived all of these rights on a “Postrelease Community Supervision 

Waivers of Rights and Admission Form.” 

Based on Hargrove’s admission, the probation agency filed a revocation 

petition. Hargrove did not move to dismiss it. She appeared in court with counsel 16

days after arrest. The trial court found that her admission and waiver were valid. It 

granted the petition. 

DISCUSSION

Hargrove contends she was entitled to an arraignment within 10 days and a 

judicial determination of probable cause within 15 days of her arrest, citing Morrissey v. 

Brewer (1972) 408 U.S. 471 (Morrissey) (minimum due process safeguards for parole 

revocation); People v. Vickers (1972) 8 Cal.3d 451 (Vickers) (minimum due process 

safeguards for probation revocation); and Williams v. Superior Court (2014) 230 

Cal.App.4th 636 (minimum due process safeguards for parole revocation after 

realignment). Hargrove forfeited this claim because she did not raise it in the trial court. 

(People v. Romero (2008) 44 Cal.4th 386, 411 [constitutional claim forfeited by failure to 
3

raise it in the trial court].) She did not cite these authorities in the trial court or argue at 

the revocation hearing that she was denied due process. She is not permitted to change 

her trial court theory on appeal. (People v. Borland (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 124, 129.) 

At the revocation hearing, Hargrove’s attorney did argue that her waiver 

was premature and she did not have the benefit of counsel: “She unfortunately signed a 

waiver, it seems, on August 4th, even though the petition was not filed until August 10th. 

She didn’t have the benefit of counsel.” 

The record supports the trial court’s determination that the waiver was 

valid. The PROS Hold form gave Hargrove notice of the alleged violations before she 

waived her right to a revocation hearing and admitted the violations. (Morrissey, supra, 

408 U.S. at pp. 486-487; Vickers, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 456.) And Hargrove 

acknowledged in writing that she understood she had a right to counsel and that she 

waived it “freely, voluntarily, and without any coercion or promise of immunity.” The 

trial court was entitled to rely on her waiver. 

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

TANGEMAN, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P. J.

PERREN, J.
Donald D. Coleman, Judge

Superior Court County of Ventura

______________________________

Jolene Larimore, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant 

and Appellant. 

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant 

Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Paul M. 

Roadarmel, Jr., Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Stephanie A. Miyoshi, Deputy 

Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.