FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOHN HENRICHS; ANNE HENRICHS, 

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

VALLEY VIEW DEVELOPMENT, a

California corporation; FEDERAL No. 04-56470

DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, a

D.C. No. Federal corporation; TIMCOR  CV-04-04225-CAS EXCHANGE CORPORATION, dba

Timcor Financial Corporation; OPINION

MARC GELMAN, an individual;

MICHAEL BLAHA, an individual;

GRANADA PLAZA ASSOCIATES LTD.,

a California limited partnership,

Defendants-Appellees. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Christina A. Snyder, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

September 12, 2006—Pasadena, California

Filed January 16, 2007

Before: J. Clifford Wallace, M. Margaret McKeown, and

Kim McLane Wardlaw, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge McKeown

597
COUNSEL

Richard Blasco, Hunt, Ortman, Blasco, Palffy & Rossell, Pasadena, California, and F. Glenn Nichols, Law Offices of F.

Glenn Nichols, Pasadena, California, for the appellants. 

Barry R. Edwards, Spiegelman & Edwards, Beverly Hills,

California, for appellees Valley View Development and Marc

Gelman. 

Kathleen V. Gunning and Mary Riche, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Washington, DC, and Michael H. Bierman,

Luce Forward Hamilton & Scripps, LLP, Los Angeles, California, for appellee Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. 

Peter L. Weinberger and A. Douglas Mastroianni, Peter L.

Weinberger & Associates, Los Angeles, California, for appellees Michael Blaha and Granada Plaza Associates, Ltd. 

OPINION

McKEOWN, Circuit Judge: 

This appeal stems from a quiet title action that began in Los

Angeles Superior Court but was resuscitated in federal court

after the California courts ruled against appellants John and

Anne Henrichs (“Henrichs”) on all issues. We consider

whether the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over

Henrichs’ claims arising from a California state court judgment rendered against him. After a series of real estate transactions among Henrichs, Valley View Development (“Valley

View”), Marc Gelman, Michael Blaha, and Granada Plaza

Associates (“GPA”) turned sour, Valley View filed a claim to

quiet title in Los Angeles County Superior Court. Henrichs

cross-claimed, alleging breach of contract and indemnification claims. The Superior Court, the California Court of

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Appeal, and the California Supreme Court all held in favor of

Valley View and denied Henrichs relief on all claims. 

Having extinguished all avenues for relief in the California

courts, Henrichs filed suit in the United States District Court

for the Central District of California. The district court held

that it lacked jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine

to review the state court judgment and Henrichs’ associated

claims and consequently dismissed the action. We now

affirm, albeit on slightly different grounds. At issue is

whether Henrichs’ claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine which, in general terms, prevents “a party losing in

state court . . . from seeking what in substance would be

appellate review of the state judgment in a United States district court.” Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005-06

(1994) (citing District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983), Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.,

263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923)). Looking at each claim individually, as we must do, we conclude that two claims are barred

by Rooker-Feldman, one claim fails on mootness grounds,

and another based upon res judicata.

BACKGROUND

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Although the intricacies of Henrichs’ claims are not before

us, the chronology of events, which includes various convoluted transactions, is helpful to understanding the relationship

between the state and federal court actions. Henrichs’ series

of lawsuits arise from a dispute relating to two plots of land

in Granada Hills, California. In 1990, defendant Valley View

owned property in Granada Hills that included two subdivisions, the Balboa lot and the Chatsworth lot. The GPA entity

was formed to purchase only the Chatsworth lot from Valley

View. John Henrichs, Michael Blaha, and Marc Gelman, Valley View’s president and owner, were the original limited

partners in GPA. 

602 HENRICHS v. VALLEY VIEW DEVELOPMENT
At that time, the final tract map separating the Balboa and

Chatsworth lots had not been recorded. GPA and Valley View

expected this approval would take significant time, and without a final tract map, the Chatsworth lot could not be sold separately from the Balboa lot. As a result, GPA purchased both

lots from Valley View. 

The parties signed an agreement (the “Ground Lease”) in

which Valley View leased the Balboa lot for one dollar per

year for 99 years from GPA and Valley View received an

option to purchase the lot back from GPA for one dollar when

the final tract map was recorded. The Ground Lease provided

that if Valley View exercised the purchase option, GPA

would convey the Balboa lot to Valley View in fee simple,

free of all liens and encumbrances. 

GPA obtained a construction loan of almost $4 million

from Capital Bank of California to finance construction on the

Chatsworth lot. The loan agreement stated that the entire

property — both lots — was collateral for the loan. 

The final tract map was ultimately recorded in January

1992, and Valley View exercised the option in the Ground

Lease to buy back the Balboa lot. Valley View believed that

it had received title free and clear of any liens, including the

pledge of collateral in the loan from Capital Bank. 

In June 1993, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation

(“FDIC”) acquired the loan when it was appointed receiver of

Capital Bank. GPA defaulted on the loan in 1994. 

Following the default, GPA, Gelman, and Blaha agreed that

GPA would pay the FDIC $300,000, and in exchange, the

FDIC would cancel or assign the loan and the accompanying

deed. The agreement (the “FDIC Settlement Agreement”)

contained an indemnification clause and a proviso that bound

all parties to the agreement and their representatives and successors. GPA decided that the FDIC should assign the loan

HENRICHS v. VALLEY VIEW DEVELOPMENT 603
and accompanying deed, which occurred through a separate

agreement (the “Assignment Agreement”) in approximately

the following shares: 22% to Henrichs, 12% to Randy Carpenter, and 66% to Blaha Construction and Development. 

II. PROCEEDINGS IN STATE COURT

In 1996, Gelman obtained a preliminary title report that

reflected a lien on the Balboa lot. Valley View then demanded

that the assignees of the note — Henrichs, Carpenter, and

Blaha Construction and Development — reconvey the deed to

Valley View to eliminate the lien. When the assignees refused

to reconvey, Valley View filed a state court action to quiet

title to the Balboa lot. Henrichs filed a cross-complaint alleging causes of action for indemnification under the FDIC Settlement Agreement and breach of contract by GPA, Gelman,

and Blaha for failing to indemnify Henrichs. 

The Los Angeles County Superior Court held that Valley

View owned the Balboa lot free and clear of any encumbrance

based on the Capital Bank loan and rejected Henrichs’ claims

for breach of contract and indemnification. The California

Court of Appeal affirmed, and the California Supreme Court

denied review. 

During the pendency of the proceedings in the state courts,

Valley View sold the Balboa lot for $550,000. Valley View

placed these funds in a trust account with Timcor Exchange

Corporation (“Timcor”) pending the outcome of the state

court action. 

III. PROCEEDINGS IN THE DISTRICT COURT

Following his loss in state court, Henrichs filed a suit in

federal court. The complaint asserted four claims: 1) a

request for a declaratory judgment voiding the state court

judgment awarding the Balboa lot to Valley View in fee simple and removing the lien on the property; 2) breach of the

604 HENRICHS v. VALLEY VIEW DEVELOPMENT
Assignment Agreement by the FDIC; 3) a claim for indemnification against GPA, Gelman, and Blaha for damages and

legal expenses incurred by the state court litigation; and 4) a

request for an injunction barring Timcor from giving Valley

View the proceeds from the Balboa lot’s sale because, according to Henrichs, Valley View was not entitled to those profits.

The district court held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine

barred all claims and dismissed the action for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction. 

ANALYSIS

We affirm the dismissal of Henrichs’ claims.1 We conclude

that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars the claim for declaratory relief. The claim against the FDIC is moot. The doctrine

of res judicata precludes the claim for indemnity against GPA,

Gelman, and Blaha. Additionally, both Rooker-Feldman and

the Anti-Injunction Act bar the claim for injunctive relief. 

[1] Before delving into a claim-by-claim analysis, we

briefly outline the contours of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine provides that federal district

courts lack jurisdiction to exercise appellate review over final

state court judgments. Rooker, 263 U.S. at 415-16; Feldman,

460 U.S. at 482 86; Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus.

Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 283-84 (2005). Essentially, the doctrine

bars “state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by

state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced” from asking district courts to review

and reject those judgments. Id. at 284. Absent express statutory authorization, only the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to

reverse or modify a state court judgment. The clearest case for

dismissal based on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine occurs when

1Subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law reviewed de novo.

Sahni v. Am. Diversified Partners, 83 F.3d 1054, 1057 (9th Cir. 1996) (as

amended). We may affirm the dismissal on any ground supported by the

record. Preminger v. Principi, 422 F.3d 815, 820 (9th Cir. 2005). 

HENRICHS v. VALLEY VIEW DEVELOPMENT 605
“a federal plaintiff asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly erroneous decision by a state court, and seeks relief from a state

court judgment based on that decision . . . .” Noel v. Hall, 341

F.3d 1148, 1164 (9th Cir. 2003). 

[2] Rooker-Feldman does not override or supplant issue

and claim preclusion doctrines. Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284.

The doctrine applies when the federal plaintiff’s claim arises

from the state court judgment, not simply when a party fails

to obtain relief in state court. Noel, 341 F.3d at 1164-65 (citing GASH Assocs. v. Village of Rosemont, 995 F.2d 726, 729

(7th Cir. 1993)). Preclusion, not Rooker-Feldman, applies

when “ ‘a federal plaintiff complains of an injury that was not

caused by the state court, but which the state court has previously failed to rectify.’ ” Noel, 341 F.3d at 1165 (quoting Jensen v. Foley, 295 F.3d 745, 747-78 (7th Cir. 2002)). 

I. DECLARATORY RELIEF CLAIM

[3] Henrichs argues that the state court exceeded its jurisdiction when it entered judgment against him. The request for

relief is unambiguous. Henrichs asked the district court to

“declare the State Court Judgment void, and enter judgment

in favor of the Henrichs.” Such a claim is squarely barred by

Rooker-Feldman; a request to declare the state court judgment

void seeks redress from an injury caused by the state court

itself. See Noel, 341 F.3d at 1164-65. 

Henrichs attempts to circumvent the jurisdictional bar by

arguing that there was exclusive federal jurisdiction over all

of his claims and thus the state court litigation was improper.

To be sure, a state court judgment entered in a case that falls

within the federal courts’ exclusive jurisdiction may be collaterally attacked in a district court. In re Gruntz, 202 F.3d 1074,

1079 (9th Cir. 2000). The difficulty with Henrichs’ argument

is that there was no exclusive federal jurisdiction over the

claims. 

606 HENRICHS v. VALLEY VIEW DEVELOPMENT
[4] Henrichs grounds the exclusive jurisdiction argument

on the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (“FIRREA”), Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat.

183 (1989) (codified at various sections of Title 12). He relies

on two provisions of the Act, which establishes the powers

and responsibilities of the FDIC. Id. The first provision states

that no court may grant equitable relief against the FDIC

except as provided by FIRREA. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(j). The second provision states that individuals seeking to make claims

that affect assets acquired by the FDIC in its capacity as a

conservator or receiver must exhaust the FDIC’s administrative claims process before seeking judicial review. 12 U.S.C.

§ 1821(d)(13)(D). See Henderson v. Bank of New England,

986 F.2d 319, 320-21 (9th Cir. 1993). Henrichs posits that the

claims affect FDIC interests because the FDIC was the

receiver of the assets of Capital Bank, and the FDIC in turn

assigned the note to Henrichs. 

[5] The jurisdictional bars to state court litigation set out in

FIRREA are not applicable here. Section 1821(j) does not

apply because the FDIC was not a party to the state court litigation. It was Henrichs, not the FDIC, who was ordered to

reconvey the note and deed referencing the Balboa lot. 

[6] Nor does § 1821(d)(13)(D) confer exclusive federal

jurisdiction in this case. If, by citing this provision, Henrichs

means to imply that the statute bars the state court’s adjudication of the dispute with Valley View, he is mistaken — the

requirement to exhaust administrative remedies applies only

in an action against the FDIC as receiver. 18 U.S.C.

§ 1821(d)(13)(D); see also McCarthy v. FDIC, 348 F.3d

1075, 1080-81 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that the exhaustion

requirement applies to those who “challenge conduct by the

FDIC as receiver”). At the time of the state court litigation,

the FDIC had no interest in the note because it had already

assigned the note. Although Henrichs attempts to paper over

this fact by claiming that he stepped into the shoes of the

FDIC for the purposes of the state court litigation, the statute

HENRICHS v. VALLEY VIEW DEVELOPMENT 607
does not reach assignees of assets once owned by the FDIC.

Therefore, because the FDIC was neither a party to the state

court lawsuit nor did it retain an interest in the previouslyassigned note, FIRREA does not confer exclusive federal

jurisdiction over Henrichs’ claims. 

II. BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIM

Henrichs next asserts a claim for damages against the FDIC

stemming from the FDIC’s alleged breach of the FDIC Settlement Agreement. Although this claim is not necessarily

barred by Rooker-Feldman, it is moot. We — and the district

court — have no jurisdiction over moot claims. United States

v. Geophysical Corp. of Alaska, 732 F.2d 693, 698 (9th Cir.

1984) (as amended). 

[7] To satisfy Article III’s case or controversy requirement,

Henrichs “must have suffered some actual injury that can be

redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” See FDIC v. Kooyomjian, 220 F.3d 10, 15 (1st Cir. 2000) (holding that a claim

against a failed bank was moot when the FDIC had determined there were no assets with which to satisfy the claim)

(emphasis omitted). Henrichs may look only to the assets of

the Capital Bank receivership to satisfy any breach of contract

claim. See First Ind. Fed. Sav. Bank v. FDIC, 964 F.2d 503,

507 (5th Cir. 1992). The receivership distributed all of the

failed bank’s assets and was terminated in January 2001, fully

three years before Henrichs raised the claim. No assets remain

in the receivership to satisfy a late-filed claim, thus rendering

the claim moot. See Maher v. FDIC, 441 F.3d 522, 525-26

(7th Cir. 2006); Kooyomjian, 220 F.3d at 15; Adams v. Resolution Tr. Corp., 927 F.2d 348, 354 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding

that where the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation would never possess any assets to satisfy the plaintiff’s

claim, the claim was moot). 

III. INDEMNITY CLAIM

In the third claim, Henrichs asserts that GPA, Gelman, and

Blaha must indemnify him for his legal expenses because he

608 HENRICHS v. VALLEY VIEW DEVELOPMENT
is a successor to the FDIC Settlement Agreement. In state

court proceedings, Henrichs asserted an identical cause of

action for indemnification based on the same FDIC Settlement Agreement and against the same three defendants. The

Los Angeles County Superior Court denied relief, the California Court of Appeal affirmed, and the California Supreme

Court denied review. 

[8] Res judicata prevents the district court from addressing

Henrichs’ indemnity claim. To determine the preclusive effect

of a state court judgment, we look to state law. Sosa v.

DIRECTV, Inc., 437 F.3d 923, 927 (9th Cir. 2006). In California, “[r]es judicata, or claim preclusion, prevents relitigation

of the same cause of action in a second suit between the same

parties or parties in privity with them.” Mycogen Corp. v.

Monsanto Co., 28 Cal. 4th 888, 896 (2002). For purposes of

res judicata, Henrichs’ claim for indemnity has been finally

determined by a court of competent jurisdiction and we may

not revisit it now.2See Rice v. Crow, 81 Cal. App. 4th 725,

736 (2000). 

IV. INJUNCTION CLAIM

In the final claim in district court, Henrichs seeks to enjoin

Timcor from giving Valley View the proceeds from the sale

of the Balboa lot. According to Henrichs, the state court judgment giving Valley View the lot in fee simple was void, so

Valley View should not be able to appropriate profits from the

lot’s sale. 

[9] Both the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and the AntiInjunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, bar this claim. Rooker2This claim is not barred by Rooker-Feldman because GPA, Gelman,

and Blaha allegedly caused Henrichs’ injury when they failed to indemnify Henrichs. Thus, the injury alleged in this claim does not arise from

a state court judgment, but rather from the actions of an adverse party;

hence, Rooker-Feldman does not apply. 

HENRICHS v. VALLEY VIEW DEVELOPMENT 609
Feldman applies because the legal injuries Henrichs alleges

arise from the state court’s purportedly erroneous judgment.

As framed by Henrichs, Valley View and Timcor possess

funds from the sale of the Balboa lot only because the state

court erred in awarding Valley View and Timcor that lot in

the first place. Without the state court judgment, Valley View

and Timcor would not have caused injury to Henrichs at all.

Granting the injunction would require the district court to

determine that the state court’s decision was wrong and thus

void. Cf. Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 283-84 (holding that

district courts do not have jurisdiction over cases in which

plaintiffs complain of injuries caused by state court judgments). 

[10] The requested relief also is barred by the AntiInjunction Act, which precludes a federal court from granting

“an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as

expressly authorized by Act of Congress . . . .” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2283. The Act’s mandate extends not only to injunctions

affecting pending proceedings, but also to injunctions against

the execution or enforcement of state judgments. See Atl.

Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Bd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 398 U.S.

281, 287-88 (1970). An injunction may not be used to evade

the dictates of the Act if the injunction effectively blocks a

state court judgment. Id. 

[11] The practical effect of the requested injunction would

be to prevent Valley View from alienating the land in fee simple, which was the purpose of the quiet title action at the outset. To grant the relief would undo the effect of three

California courts’ unbroken agreement on the resolution of

the issues Valley View presented and would disregard the

principle of abstention the statute seeks to uphold. Id. at 284-

88. 

CONCLUSION

Because the district court lacked jurisdiction over three of

the claims and a fourth claim is barred by res judicata, we

610 HENRICHS v. VALLEY VIEW DEVELOPMENT
affirm the district court’s dismissal of the action. 

AFFIRMED. 

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