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e Battle for

Sanh

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HEADQUARTERS, U.S. MARINE CORPS

WASHINGTON, DC
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K.W.White
THE BATTLE FOR KHE SANH

by

Captain Moyers S. Shore II, USMC

Historical Branch, G-3 Division

Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps

Washington, D. C. 20380

1969

•
LIBRARY ^^

ARMEDWRCES STAFF OOLLSCB
/

Oblique aerial photograph of the Khe Sanh Combat Base

(United Press International Photo by Kyoichi Sawada)

111
Library of Congress Card No. 75-603604

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U. S. Government

Printing Office, Washington, D. C. 20402--Price $1.75

IV
PROLOGUE

It is with pleasure that the Marine Corps presents this

account of the Battle for Khe Sanh which stands as one of

the most crucial and bitterly contested struggles in the

Vietnam War. Throughout the existence of our Corps, thousands

of men have been called upon to further the cause of freedom

on scores of battlefields around the globe. At Khe Sanh, a

new generation of Marines, aided by their gallant U. S. Army,

Navy, Air Force, and South Vietnamese counterparts, admirably

upheld this tradition and wrote a thrilling new chapter in

the history of armed conflict.

The two senior U. S. commanders in Vietnam who supervised

the defense--General William C. Westmoreland, USA, and

Lieutenant General Robert E. Cushman, Jr., USMC--have contributed immeasurably to the production of this work and have

also provided their astute summaries of the operation which

appear in the following pages. I heartily endorse their statements as well as the approach and conclusions of this history.

In addition, I am grateful to the individuals and agencies

of all the Services who have provided valuable assistance

through written comments and personal interviews which are reflected in the text. In particular, I wish to extend our

appreciation to Mr. David D. Duncan, a veteran combat photographer who has graciously consented to our use of the brilliant

pictures he took during an eight-day visit to the combat base.

These truly professional shots graphically depict the face of

the siege and enhance the narrative.

The sum total of these contributions, I feel, is an objective, readable account of this important battle which honors

the valiant American and South Vietnamese troops who held Khe

Sanh. I can think of no more fitting tribute to these men--

both living and dead--than to simply relate the events as they

happened. This, then, is their story.

L. F. CHAPMAN,

General, U.S. Marine Corps

Commandant of the Marine Corps

REVIEWED AND APPROVED 28 May 1969
FOREWORD

As the commander of the United States Military Assistance

Command, Vietnam, during the battle of Khe Sanh, I welcome

publication by the U. S. Marine Corps of this historical

study. The Marines' heroic defense of the Khe Sanh area

against numerically superior North Vietnamese forces stands

out among the many battles fought to defend the Republic of

Vietnam against Communist aggression.

The enemy's primary objective of his 1968 TET Offensive

was to seize power in South Vietnam by creating a general uprising and causing the defection of major elements of the Armed

Forces of the Republic of Vietnam. In conjunction with this,

the enemy apparently expected to seize by military action large

portions of the northern two provinces lying just south of the

Demilitarized Zone and there to set up a "liberation government."

The virtually unpopulated Khe Sanh Plateau, which lay astride

the enemy's principal avenue of approach from his large base

areas in Laos, was obviously an initial objective of the North

Vietnamese Army. Its seizure would have created a serious

threat to our forces defending the northern area and would have

cleared the way for the enemy's advance to Quang Tri City and

the heavily populated coastal region. There is also little

doubt that the enemy hoped at Khe Sanh to attain a climactic

victory, such as he had done in 1954 at Dien Bien Phu, in the

expectation that this would produce a psychological shock and

erode American morale.

My subordinate commanders and I were particularly sensitive

to heavy fighting in the populated areas, since this would result in substantial destruction to the towns and villages and

cause unnecessary suffering by the civilian population. We

wanted to avoid this situation to the greatest extent possible

by denying the enemy freedom of movement through the Khe Sanh

area and into the coastal region. At that time we did not have

sufficient troops, helicopters, or logistical support in the

northern provinces to accomplish this entirely through mobile

operations, and competing requirements for troops and resources

did not permit immediate reinforcement from other areas of

South Vietnam. The situation was further complicated by long

periods of fog and low cloud ceilings during January, February,

and March, which made helicopter operations difficult and

hazardous.

VI
To maintain our presence on the Khe Sanh Plateau, our only

choice at the time was to secure the airstrip we had built on

the plateau since this facility was essential as the forward

terminus of our supply line. From here we could maintain our

military presence in the area and, through the use of our firepower, make it costly for large enemy forces to advance while

we awaited the end of the bad weather of the northeast monsoon

and constituted the forces and logistics necessary to strike

out on offensive operations.

Another factor favoring the decision to hold Khe Sanh was

the enemy's determination to take it. Our defense of the area

would tie down large numbers of North Vietnamese troops which

otherwise could move against the vulnerable populated areas

whose security was the heart of the Vietnamese pacification

program. Our decision to defend also held the prospect of

causing the enemy to concentrate his force and thereby provide

us a singular opportunity to bring our firepower to bear on him

with minimum restrictions. Had we withdrawn to fight the

enemy's force of over two divisions in the heavily populated

coastal area, the use of our firepower would have been severely

restricted because of our precautionary measures to avoid

civilian casualties and minimize damage to civilian property.

Based on my decision to hold the Khe Sanh Plateau, Lieutenant General Cushman's and Lieutenant General Lam's first

task was to reinforce the area with sufficient strength to prevent the enemy from overrunning it, but at the same time to

commit no more force than could be supplied by air. While the

battle of Khe Sanh was being fought, emphasis was placed on

the buildup in the northern provinces of the necessary troops,

helicopters, and logistic support for mobile offensive operations to open Highway 9 and move onto the plateau when the

weather cleared at the end of March.

This report provides a detailed and graphic account of

events as they unfolded. It centers about the 26th Marine

Regiment, the main defenders of the Khe Sanh area, who tenaciously

and magnificently held off the enemy during the two-and-onehalf-month siege. Yet the battle of Khe Sanh was an interService and international operation. Consequently, appropriate

coverage is given to the contributions of the U„ S. Army, Navy,

and Air Force, and to South Vietnamese regular and irregular

military units, all of whom contributed to the defense of the

area and to the destruction of the enemy. As Marine artillery

from within the fortified positions pounded the enemy, Army

vii
artillery located to the east provided heavy, long-range fire

support. Fighter aircraft from the Marines, Air Force, and

Navy provided continuous close air support, while B-52 bombers

of the Strategic Air Command dealt decisive blows around-theclock to enemy forces within striking distance of our positions

and against enemy supply areas. Further, Marine and Air Force

airlift together with Army parachute riggers logistically sustained the defenders during the siege despite heavy enemy

antiaircraft fire.

In early April, when the weather cleared and the troop and

logistic buildup was completed, a combined force of U. S. Army

U. S. Marine, and Republic of Vietnam units, coordinated by the

U. S. Army's 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), maneuvered to

link up with the 26th Marines and rout the remaining enemy

elements. Meanwhile, U. S. Marine Corps engineers expeditiously opened Highway 9 to the plateau. The crushing defeat suffered by the North Vietnamese Army during the siege

cost the Communists untold casualties, shattered two of their

best divisions, and frustrated their dream of a second Dien

Bien Phu„

The battle of Khe Sanh is but one facet of the long and

complicated war in South Vietnam. It is one in which the

aggressive nature of North Vietnam, the resolute determination

of our fighting forces, and the local defeat of the armed enemy

can all be clearly seen.

W. C. WESTMORELAND

General, United States Army

Vlll
PREFACE

In the extreme northwestern corner of South Vietnam there

stands a monument to the free world. Unlike those which commemorate the victories of past wars, this one was not built on

marble or bronze but the sacrifies of men who fought and died

at a remote outpost to halt the spread of Communism, This is

the story of those men--the defenders of Khe Sanh--and the epic

77-day struggle which not only denied the North Vietnamese Army

a much needed victory but reaffirmed to the world the intention

of the United States to hold the line in Southeast Asia. In

addition to having been a contest of men and machines, this was

the test of a nation's will0

As a history, this work is not intended to prove any point,

but rather to record objectively the series of events which came

to be called the Battle of Khe Sanh. These events spanned a

period from April 1967 to April 1968. The rationale for the

buildup along the Demilitarized Zone and the commitment to hold

the small garrison is presented as a logical extension of the

three-pronged strategy then employed throughout I Corps

and the rest of South Vietnam; this balanced campaign included

pacification programs, counterguerrilla activity, and large

unit offensive sweeps. Although isolated, the Khe Sanh Combat

Base was a vital link in the northern defenses which screened

the Allied counterinsurgency efforts in the densely populated

coastal plains from invasion by regular divisions from North

Vietnam. By obstructing this attempted invasion, American and

South Vietnamese forces at Khe Sanh provided a shield for their

contemporaries who were waging a war for the hearts and minds

of the people in the cities, villages, and hamlets farther to

the south. In the process, a reinforced regiment--the 26th

Marines--supported by massive firepower provided by the Marine

and Navy air arms, the U0 S„ Air Force and Marine and Army

artillery, defended this base and mangled two crack North Vietnamese Army divisions, further illustrating to Hanoi the

futility of its war of aggression.

Later, after the encirclement was broken and additional

U.S. forces became available, the Allies were able to shift

emphasis from the fixed defense to fast-moving offensive operations to control this vital area astride the enemy's invasion

route. In these operations, our troops thrust out to strike

the enemy whenever he appeared in this critical region. This

IX
shift in tactics in the spring of 1968 was made possible by

favorable weather, the buildup of troops, helicopters, and

logistics that had taken place during the winter of 1967-68.

An additional factor was the construction of a secure forward

base across the mountains to the east of Khe Sanh, from which

these operations could be supported. The Khe Sanh Combat Base

then lost the importance it had earlier and was dismantled

after its supplies were drawn down, since it was no longer

needed. The strategy of containing the North Vietnamese Army

along the border remained the same; but revised tactics were

now possible.

But in 1967 and early 1968, neither troops nor helicopters,

logistics nor the forward base were available to support the

more aggressive tactics. The enemy lunged into the area in

force, and he had to be stopped. The KSCB with its airstrip

was the pivotal point in the area from which Allied firepower

could be directed and which the enemy could not ignore. It

was here that the 26th Marines made their stand.

This study also provides insight into the mechanics of

the battle from the highest echelon of command to the smallest

unit. In addition, appropriate coverage is provided to the

supporting arms and the mammoth logistics effort which spelled

the difference between victory and defeat. While this is

basically a story about Marines, it notes the valiant contributions of U. S. Army, Navy, and Air Force personnel, as well

as the South Vietnamese.

The account is based on records of the U. S. Marine Corps,

selected records of other Services, and appropriate published

works. The comments of and interviews with key participants

have been incorporated into the text. Although this monograph

has been cleared for publication by the Department of Defense,

most of the documents cited retain a security classification.

C^C^d^fVWV^d^M/

R. E. CUSHMAN, JR.

Lieutenant General, U. S. Maibine Corps

Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Prologue v

Foreword vi

Preface ix

Introduction 1

Part I: Background 3

Part II: The Lull Between The Storms 18

Part III: The Buildup and The Opening Round 29

Part IV: The "So-Called" Siege Begins 53

Part V: The Airlift 72

Part VI: Supporting Arms and Intelligence 93

Part VII: The Turning Point 113

Part VIII: The Breakout 132

Part IX: Epilogue 145

Appendices:

A. Bibliographical Notes and Footnotes , . . . ^52

B. Glossary 169

C. Chronology 180

D. Task Organization 187

E. Command and Staff List, 3d Marines 193

F. Command and Staff List, 26th Marines. . . . 196

G. Military Map Symbols 203

xi
The Battle for Khe Sanh

by

Captain Moyers S. Shore II, USMC

INTRODUCTION

"Attention to Colors." The order having been given,

Captain William H. Dabney, a product of the Virginia Military

Institute, snapped to attention, faced the jerry-rigged flagpole, and saluted, as did every other man in Company I, 3d

Battalion, 26th Marines. The ceremony might well have been at

any one of a hundred military installations around the world

except for a few glaring irregularities. The parade ground was

a battle-scarred hilltop to the west of Khe Sanh and the men

in the formation stood half submerged in trenches or foxholes.

Instead of crisply starched utilities, razor sharp creases, and

gleaming brass,these Marines sported scraggly beards, ragged

trousers, and rotted helmet liner straps. The only man in the

company who could play a bugle, Second Lieutenant Owen S.

Matthews, lifted the pock-marked instrument to his lips and

spat out a choppy version of "To the Colors" while two enlisted

men raced to the RC-292 radio antenna which served as the flagpole and gingerly attached the Stars and Stripes. As the mast

with its shredded banner came upright, the Marines could hear

the ominous "thunk," "thunk," "thunk," to the southwest of their

position which meant that North Vietnamese 120mm mortar rounds

had left their tubes. They also knew that in 21 seconds those

"thunks" would be replaced by much louder, closer sounds but no

one budged until Old Glory waved high over the hill.

When Lieutenant Matthews sharply cut off the last note of

his piece, Company I disappeared; men dropped into trenches,

dived headlong into foxholes, or scrambled into bunkers. The

area which moments before had been bristling with humanity was

suddenly a ghost town. Seconds later explosions walked across

the hilltop spewing black smoke, dirt, and debris into the air.

Rocks, splinters, and spent shell fragments rained on the

flattened Marines but, as usual, no one was hurt. As quickly

as the attack came, it was over. While the smoke lazily drifted

away, a much smaller banner rose from the Marines1positions.

A pole adorned with a pair of red, silk panties--Maggie's Drawers
--was waved back and forth above one trenchline to inform the

enemy that he had missed again. A few men stood up and jeered

or cursed at the distant gunners; others simply saluted with

an appropriate obscene gesture. The daily flag-raising ceremony

on Hill 881 South was over.

This episode was just one obscure incident which coupled

with hundreds of others made up the battle for Khe Sanh. The

ceremony carried with it no particular political overtones but

was intended solely as an open show of defiance toward the

Communists as well as a morale booster for the troops. The

jaunty courage, quiet determination, and macabre humor of the

men on Hill 881S exemplified the spirit of the U. S. and South

Vietnamese defenders who not only defied the enemy but, in a

classic 77-day struggle, destroyed him. At the same time, the

fighting around the isolated combat base touched off a passionate

controversy in the United States and the battle, therefore,

warrants close scrutiny. For proper prospective, however, one

first needs to have a basic understanding of the series of

events which thrust Khe Sanh into the limelight. In effect,

the destiny of the combatants was unknowingly determined almost

three years earlier at a place called Red Beach near Da Nang.
PART I

BACKGROUND

When the lead elements of the 9th Marine Expeditionary

Brigade,commanded by Brigadier General Frederick J. Karch,

slogged ashore at Da Nang on 8 March 1965, Communist political

and military aspirations in South Vietnam received a severe

jolt. The buildup of organized American combat units had begun. In May 1965, the 9th MEB was succeeded by the III Marine

Amphibious Force (III MAF) which was comprised of the 3d Marine

Division, the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, and, within a year,

the 1st Marine Division. The Commanding General, III MAF was

given responsibility for U. S. operations in I Corps Tactical

Zone which incorporated the five northern provinces and, on 5

June 1965, Major General Lewis W. Walt assumed that role. (See

Map 1). Major units of the U. S. Army moved into other portions

of South Vietnam and the entire American effort came under the

control of the Commander, U. S. Military Assistance Command,

Vietnam (ComUSMACV), General William C. Westmoreland.(1)

The Marines, in conjunction with the Army of the Republic

of Vietnam (ARVN), set about to wrest control of the populace

in I Corps from the Viet Cong and help reassert the authority

of the central government. The Allies launched an aggressive

campaign designed to root out the enemy's source of strength--

the local guerrilla. Allied battalion- and regimental-sized

units screened this effort by seeking out and engaging Viet Cong

main forces and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) elements. Smaller

Marine and ARVN units went after the isolated guerrilla bands

which preyed on the Vietnamese peasants. Thousands of fire

team-, squad-, and platoon-sized actions took a heavy toll of

the enemy and the Viet Cong were gradually pushed out of the

populated areas. Whenever a village or hamlet was secured,

civic action teams moved in to fill the vacuum and began the

long, tedious process of erasing the effects of prolonged

Communist domination. Progress was slow. Within a year, however, the area under Government security had grown to more than

1,600 square miles and encompassed nearly half a million people.

As government influence extended deeper into the countryside,

the security, health, economic well-being, and educational

prospects of the peasants were constantly improved. There was

an ever increasing number of enemy defectors and intelligence

reports from, heretofore, unsympathetic villagers. By mid-1966,
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K.W.White
Allied military operations and pacification programs were

slowly but seriously eroding the enemy's elaborate infrastructure and his hold over the people.(2)

It soon became apparent to the leaders in the North that,

unless they took some bold action, ten years of preparation and

their master plan for conquest of South Vietnam would go down

the drain. From the Communists' standpoint, the crucial matter

was not the volume of casualties they sustained, but the survival of the guerrilla infrastructure in South Vietnam. In

spite of their disregard for human life, the North Vietnamese

did not wish to counter the American military steamroller in

the populated coastal plain of I Corps. There, the relatively

open terrain favored the overwhelming power of the Marines'

supporting arms. The enemy troops would have extended supply

lines, their movement could be more easily detected, and they

would be further away from sanctuaries in Laos and North Vietnam. In addition, when the propaganda-conscious NVA suffered

a defeat, it would be witnessed by the local populace and thus

shatter the myth of Communist invincibility.

If the Marines could not be smashed, and the Communists

had tried several times, they had to be diverted or thinned out.

The answer to the enemy's dilemma lay along the 17th Parallel.

Gradually, they massed large troop concentrations within the

Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), in Laos, and in the southern panhandle of North Vietnam; in short, they were opening a new

front. Nguyen Van Mai, a high Communist official in Phnom Penh,

Cambodia, predicted: "We will entice the Americans closer to

the North Vietnamese border and...bleed them without mercy."

That remained to be seen.(3)

In response to the enemy buildup along the DMZ throughout

the summer and fall of 1966, General Walt shifted Marine units

further north. The 3d Marine Division Headquarters moved from

Da Nang to Phu Bai, and a Division Forward Command Post (CP)

continued to Dong Ha so that it could respond rapidly to developments along the DMZ. In turn the 1st Marine Division Headquarters

moved from Chu Lai to Da Nang and took control of operations in

central and southern I Corps. For specific, short-term operations,

the division commanders frequently delegated authority to a

task force headquarters. The task force was a semipermanent

organization composed of temporarily assigned units under one

commander, usually a general officer. Because of the fluid,

fast-moving type of warfare peculiar to Vietnam, the individual

battalion became a key element and went where it was needed the
most. It might operate under a task force headquarters or a

regiment other than its own parent unit. For example, it would

not be uncommon for the 2d Battalion, 9th Marines to be attached

to the 3d Marines while the 2d Battalion, 3d Marines was a part

of another command. Commitments were met with units that were

the most readily available at the time.(4)

With the buildup of American troops in Quang Tri province,

there logically followed the buildup of installations. Dong Ha

was the largest since it served as the brain and nervous system

of the entire area. Eight miles to the southwest was Camp J.

J. Carroll, a large artillery base. The Marine units there

were reinforced by several batteries of U. S. Army 175mm guns

which had the capability of firing into North Vietnam. Located

at the base of a jagged mountain ten miles west of Camp Carroll

was another artillery base--the Rockpile. This facility also

had 175mm guns and extended the range of American artillery

support almost to the Laotian border. In addition, the Marines

built a series of strongpoints paralleling and just south of

the DMZ. Gio Linh and Con Thien were the two largest sites.

(See Map 2).

During the remainder of 1966 and in the first quarter of

1967, the intensity of fighting in the eastern DMZ area increased. Each time the enemy troops made a foray across the

DMZ, the Marines met and defeated them. By 31 March 1967, the

NVA had lost 3,492 confirmed killed in action (KIA) in the

northern operations while the Marines had suffered 541 killed.

For the Communists, it appeared that direct assaults across

the DMZ were proving too costly--even by their standards.(5)

The Khe Sanh Plateau, in western Quang Tri Province, provided the NVA with an excellent alternative., The late Doctor

Bernard B. Fall compared the whole of Vietnam to "two rice

baskets on opposite ends of a carrying pole." Such being the

case, Khe Sanh is located at the pole's fulcrum in the heart of

the rugged Annamite Range. Studded with piedmont-type hills,

this area provides a natural infiltration route. Most of the

mountain trails are hidden by tree canopies up to 60 feet in

height, dense elephant grass, and bamboo thickets. Concealment

from reconnaissance aircraft is good, and the heavy jungle undergrowth limits ground observation to five meters in most places.

Dong Tri Mountain (1,015 meters high), the highest peak in the

region, along with Hill 861 and Hills 881 North and South

dominate the two main avenues of approach.(*) One of these,

C*) Tne number indicates the height of the hill in meters.

the western access, runs along Route 9 from the Laotian border,

through the village of Lang Vei to Khe Sanh. The other is a

small valley to the northwest, formed by the Rao Quan River,

which runs between Dong Tri Mountain and Hill 861. (See Map 3).

Another key terrain feature is Hill 558 which is located squarely

in the center of the northwestern approach. The only stumbling

block to the NVA in early 1967 was a handful of Marinas, U. S.

Army Special Forces advisors, and South Vietnamese irregulars.

(6) (See Map 3).

The "Green Berets" were the first American troops in the

area when, in August 1962, they established a Civilian Irregular

Defense Group (CIDG) at the same site which later became the

Khe Sanh Combat Base (KSCB). The first Marine unit of any size

to visit the area was the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines (1/1)

which, in April 1966, was participating in Operation VIRGINIA.

In early October 1966, the 1st Battalion, 3d Marines, which was

taking part in Operation PRAIRIE, moved into the base and the

CIDG camp was relocated near Lang Vei, 9,000 meters to the southwest where it continued surveillance and counterinfiltration

operations. The battalion remained at Khe Sanh with no significant contacts until February 1967 when it was replaced by a

single company, E/2/9.(*) In mid-March 1967, Company E became

engaged in a heavy action near Hill 861 and Company B, 1/9

moved in to reinforce. After a successful conclusion of the

operation, E/2/9 returned to Phu Bai, and B/l/9 remained as the

resident defense company.

The KSCB sat atop a plateau in the shadow of Dong Tri

Mountain and overlooked a tributary of the Ouang Tri River.

The base had a small dirt airstrip, which had been surfaced by

a U. S. Navy Mobile Construction Battalion (Seabees) in the

summer of 1966; the field could accommodate helicopters and

fixed-wing transport aircraft. Organic artillery support was

provided by Battery F, 2/12 (105mm), reinforced by two 155mm

howitzers and two 4.2-inch mortars. The Khe Sanh area of operations was also within range of the 175mm guns of the U. S.

Army's 2d Battalion, 94th Artillery at Camp Carroll and the

Rockpile. In addition to B/l/9 and the CIDG, there was a Marine

Combined Action Company (CAC) and a Regional Forces company

located in the village of Khe Sanh, approximately 3,500 meters

(*) The designation E/2/9 stands for Company E, 2d Battalion,

9th Marines. This type of designation will be used perodically

for other Marine units throughout the text.

8

south of the ,base.(*)

All these units sat astride the northwest-southeast axis

of Route 9 and had the mission of denying the NVA a year-round

route into eastern Quang Tri Province, The garrison at Khe

Sanh and the adjacent outposts commanded the approaches from

the west which led to Dong Ha and Quang Tri City. Had this

strategic plateau not been in the hands of the Americans, the

North Vietnamese would have had an unobstructed invasion route

into the two northern provinces and could have outflanked the

Allied forces holding the line south of the DMZ. At that time,

the Americans did not possess the helicopter resources, troop

strength, or logistical bases in this northern area to adopt a

completely mobile type of defense. Therefore, the troops at

the KSCB maintained a relatively static defense with emphasis

on patrolling, artillery and air interdiction, and occasional

reconnaissance in force operations to stifle infiltration through

the Khe Sanh Plateau. In the event a major enemy threat developed, General Walt could rapidly reinforce the combat base

by air.(7)

On 20 April 1967, the combat assets at KSCB were passed to

the operational control of the 3d Marines which had just commenced Operation PRAIRIE IV. The Khe Sanh area of operations

was not included as a part of PRAIRIE IV but was the responsibility of the 3d Marines since that regiment was in the best

position to oversee the base and reinforce if the need arose.

The need arose very soon.(8)

On 24 April 1967, a patrol from Company B, 1/9 became

heavily engaged with an enemy force of unknown size north of

Hill 861 and in the process prematurely triggered an elaborate

(*) The Combined Action Program was designed to increase the

ability of the local Vietnamese militia units to defend their

own villages. These units, referred to as Popular Forces, were

reinforced by groups of Marines who lived, worked, and conducted

operations with their Vietnamese counterparts. A Combined Action

Company was an organization controlling several Marine squads

which served with different Combined Action Platoons. Combined

Action Company Oscar (CACO) was the unit operating in the Khe

Sanh area. A Regional Forces company was comprised of local

South Vietnamese soldiers along with their American and ARVN advisors who were under the operational control of the Vietnamese

Province Chief.

I

10
North Vietnamese offensive designed to overrun Khe Sanh. What

later became known as the "Hill Fights" had begun. In retrospect, it appears that the drive toward Khe Sanh was but one

prong of the enemy's winter-spring offensive, the ultimate objective of which was the capture of Dong Ha, Quang Tri City,

and eventually, Hue-Phu Bai.(*) That portion of the enemy plan

which pertained to Khe Sanh involved the isolation of the base

by artillery attacks on the Marina fire support bases in the

eastern DMZ area (e.g., Camp Carroll, Con Thien, Gio Linh,

etc.). These were closely coordinated with attacks by fire on

the logistical and helicopter installations at Dong Ha and Phu

Bai. Demolition teams cut Route 9 between Khe Sanh and Cam Lo

to prevent overland reinforcement and, later, a secondary attack

was launched against the camp at Lang Vei, which was manned by

Vietnamese CIDG personnel and U. S. Army Special Forces advisors.

Under cover of heavy fog and low overcast which shrouded Khe

Sanh for several weeks, the North Vietnamese moved a regiment

into the Hill 881/861 complex and constructed a maze of heavily

reinforced bunkers and gun positions from which they intended

to provide direct fire against the KSCB in support of their

assault troops. All of these efforts were ancillary to the

main thrust--a regimental-sized ground attack--from the 325C

NVA Division which would sweep in from the west and seize the

airfield.(**)(9) (See Map 4).

The job of stopping the NVA was given to Colonel John P.

Lanigan and his 3d Marines. Although he probably did not know

it when he arrived at Khe Sanh, this assignment would not be

unlike one which 22 years before had earned him a Silver Star

on Okinawa. Both involved pushing a fanatical enemy force off

a hill.

(*) Hie III MAF and enemy operations during the period of the

NVA/VC winter-spring offensive (1966-1967) will be the subject

of a separate monograph prepared by the Historical Branch.

(**) The diversionary attacks were all launched apparently on

schedule. On 27 and 28 April, the previously mentioned Marine

fire support and supply bases were hit by some 1,200 rocket,

artillery, and mortar rounds. Route 9 was cut in several places,

The Special Forces Camp at Lang Vei was attacked and severely

mauled on 4 May. Only the main effort was detected and subsequently thwarted.

11
12
On 25 April, the lead elements of the 3d Battalion, 3d

Marines, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Gary Wilder, arrived

at Khe Sanh. The following day, 2/3, commanded by Lieutenant

Colonel Earl R. De Long, which was taking part in Operation

BEACON STAR east of Quang Tri City was airlifted to the combat

base. On the 27th, a fresh artillery battery, B/l/12, arrived

and reinforced F/2/12; by the end of the day, the two units had

been reorganized into an artillery group with one battery in

direct support of each battalion.(10)

Late in the afternoon of the 28th, the Marine infantrymen

were ready to drive the enemy from the hill masses. These

hills formed a near-perfect right triangle with Hill 881 North

(N) at the apex and the other two at the base. Hill 861 was

the closest to the combat base,some 5,000 meters northwest of

the airstrip. Hill 881 South (S) was approximately 3,000 meters

west of 861 and 2,000 meters south of 881N.

The concept of operations entailed a two-battalion (2/3

and 3/3) assault for which Hill 861 was designated Objective 1;

Hill 881S was Objective 2 and Hill 881N was Objective 3. From

its position south of Hill 861, 2/3 would assault and seize

Objective 1 on 28 April. The 3d Battalion would follow in

trace of 2/3 and, after the first objective was taken, 3/3 would

wheel to the west, secure the terrain between Hills 861 and

881S, then assault Objective 2 from a northeasterly direction.

Coordinated with the 3/3 attack, 2/3 would consolidate its objective then move out toward Hill 881N to screen the right

flank of the 3d Battalion and reinforce if necessary. When

Objectives 1 and 2 were secured, 3/3 would move to the northwest

and support 2/3 while it assaulted Objective 3. (See Map 5).

After extremely heavy preparatory artillery fires and

massive air strikes, the 3d Marines kicked off the attack. On

the 28th, 2/3 assaulted and seized Hill 861 in the face of

sporadic resistance. Most of the enemy troops had been literally

blown from their positions by heavy close air support strikes

of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing. The operation continued with

a thrust against Hill 881S by 3/3. This area was the scene of

extremely bitter fighting for several days, because, by this

time, the NVA regiment which was originally slated for the

attack on the airfield had been thrown into the hill battles in

a vain effort to stop the Marines. After tons of artillery

shells and aerial bombs had been employed against the hill,

Lieutenant Colonel Wilder1s battalion bulled its way to the

summit and, on 2 May, secured the objective. In the meantime,

13
14
Marines of Company G, 2d Battalion, 3d Marines inch their

way toward the summit of Hill 881N during the Hill fights.

(USMC Photo A189161)

Close air support strikes of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing

and massive artillery fires paved the way for infantry

assaults. (USMC Photo A421953)

15
Lieutenant Colonel De Long's battalion pushed along the ridgeline leading from Hill 861 to 881N. After smashing a determined

NVA counterattack on 3 May, the 2d Battalion battered its way

to the crest of Hill 881N and secured the final objective on

the afternoon of the 5th. The three hills belonged to the

Marines.(11)

The supporting arms had done a good job, for the top of

each hill looked like the surface of the moon. The color of

the summit had changed from a vivid green to a dull, ugly brown.

All of the lush vegetation had been blasted away, leaving in

its place a mass of churned-up dirt and splintered trees. Hundreds of craters dotted the landscape serving as mute witnesses

to the terrible pounding that the enemy had taken. What the NVA

learned during the operation was something the Marine Corps had

espoused for years--that bombs and shells were cheaper than

blood.

Thus, the "Hill Fights" ended and the first major attempt

by the NVA to take Khe Sanh was thwarted. All intelligence reports indicated that the badly mauled 325C NVA Division had

pulled back to lick its wounds, ending the immediate threat in

western Quang Tri Province. With the pressure relieved for the

time being, General Walt began scaling down his forces at Khe

Sanh, because the next phase of the enemy's winter/spring offensive involved a drive through the coastal plain toward Dong Ha.

From 11-13 May, 1/26 moved into the combat base and the

adjacent hills to relieve the 3d Marines. By the evening of

the 12th, 2/3 had been airlifted to Dong Ha and one artillery

battery, B/l/12, was pulled out by convoy. Tne following day,

3/3 also returned to Dong Ha by truck. In the meantime, Company

A, 1/26, was helilifted to Hill 881S while Company C took up

positions on Hill 861. Company B, 1/26, and a skeleton headquarters of the 26th Marines arrived and remained at the base,

as did a fresh artillery battery, A/1/13. At 1500 on 13 May,

Colonel John J. Padley, Commanding Officer of the 26th Marines,

Forward, relieved Colonel Lanigan as the Senior Officer Present

at Khe Sanh.(12)

In his analysis of the operation, Colonel Lanigan reported

that his men had been engaged in a conventional infantry battle

against a well-trained, highly-disciplined, and well-entrenched

enemy force. In the past, the NVA had used phantom tactics when

engaging U. S. forces--not so at Khe Sanh. The maze of bunker

16
complexes served as a grim reminder of their determination to

stay and fight. They openly challenged the Americans to push

them off the hills, and the 3d Marines rose to the occasion.

The fierce resistance was overcome by aggressive infantry

assaults in coordination with artillery and close air support,

which according to Colonel Lanigan was the most accurate and

devastating he had witnessed in three wars.

The Communists had anticipated a blood letting and they

received one. From 24 April through 12 May 1967, the NVA lost

940 confirmed killed.(*) Even for the North Vietnamese, this

was a massive defeat which could not be easily absorbed. But

the leaders in Hanoi were committed to a course of action which

traded human lives for strategic expediency. Just like the

monsoon rains, the enemy would come again.(13)

(*) Marine losses were 155 killed and 425 wounded.

17
PART II

THE LULL BETWEEN THE STORMS

With the departure of the 3d Marines, a relative calm prevailed at Khe Sanh for the remainder of the year. Although

occasional encounters and sightings indicated that the Communists

still had an interest in the area, there was a marked decrease

in large unit contacts and the tempo of operations slackened

to a preinvasion pace0 Such was not the case in other portions

of Quang Tri Province.

During the summer and fall of 1967, the center of activity

shifted to the eastern DMZ area. After being battered and

thrown for a loss on their end sweep, the Communists concentrated on the middle of the line again. With an estimated 37

battalions poised along the border, the NVA constituted a

genuine threat to the northernmost province. At times as many

as eight Marine battalions were shuttled into the area for

short-term operations and three or four were there full time,

but the enemy's intensified campaign created a demand for more

troops. As a result, General Westmoreland was forced to make

major force realignments throughout South Vietnam to satisfy

the troop requirements in I Corps.(14)

General Westmoreland drew the bulk of these reinforcements

from areas in Vietnam which, at the time, were under less

pressure than the five northern provinces. During April and

May 1967, Task Force OREGON, comprised of nine U. S. Army battalions from II and III Corps, moved into the Chu Lai-Due Pho

region and was placed under the operational control of General

Walt. By the end of May, five battalions of the 5th and 7th

Marines at Chu Lai had been released for service further north.

Two of these units moved into the Nui Loc Son Basin northwest

of Tarn Ky to conduct offensive operations and support the

sagging Vietnamese Revolutionary Development efforts. The other

three settled in the Da Nang tactical area of responsibility

(TAOR) and in turn released two Marine battalions, 1/1 and 2/1,

which moved to Thua Thien and Quang Tri provinces.

In addition to his in-country assets, General Westmoreland

also called on Admiral U. S. Grant Sharp, Commander in Chief,

Pacific, for reinforcements. Besides the two Special Landing

Forces afloat with the U. S. Seventh Fleet, the Pacific Command

18
maintained a Marine Battalion Landing Team (BLT 3/4) as an

amphibious reserve on Okinawa.(*)(15) Actually, this unit was

part of the BLT rotation system whereby battalions were periodically shuttled out of Vietnam for retraining and refurbishing

in Okinawa before assignment to the SLF. ComUSMACV needed the

unit and got it. On 15 May, 3/4 began an airlift from Okinawa

to Dong Ha by Air Force and Marine C-130 aircraft and within

31 hours the 1,233-man force was in-country. After the realignment of units in I Corps was complete, there was a net

increase of four USMC battalions in the DMZ area making a total

of seven. Additionally, the SLFs, cruising off the Vietnamese

coast, provided two more battalions which could be landed quickly

and added to the III MAF inventory. SLF'Alpha (BLT 1/3 and

HMM-362) was placed on 24-hour alert to come ashore and SLF

Bravo (BLT 2/3 and HMM-164) was given a 96-hour reaction time.(16)

During the second half of 1967, the enemy offensive south

of the DMZ was a bloody repetition of the previous year's effort.

With more courage than good sense, the NVA streamed across the

DMZ throughout the summer only to be met and systematically

chewed up in one engagement after another. In July, the enemy,

supported by his long-range artillery along the Ben Hai, mounted

a major thrust against the 9th Marines near the strongpoint of

Con Thien. Reinforced by SLFs Alpha and Bravo, the 9th Marines

countered with Operation BUFFALO and, between the 2d and 14th

of July, killed 1,290 NVA. Marine losses were 159 dead and

345 wounded.(17)

After this crushing defeat, the NVA shifted its emphasis

from direct infantry assaults to attacks by fire. Utilizing

(*) The two Special Landing Forces of the Seventh Fleet are

each comprised of a Marine Battalion Landing Team and a Marine

helicopter squadron, and provide ComUSMACV/CG, III MAF with a

highly-flexible, amphibious striking force for operations along

the South Vietnam littoral. During the amphibious operation,

operational control of the SLF remains with the Amphibious Task

Force Commander designated by Commander, Seventh Fleet. This

relationship may persist throughout the operation if coordination with forces ashore does not dictate otherwise. When the

Special Landing Force is firmly established ashore, operational

control may be passed to CG, III MAF who, in turn, may shift

this control to the division in whose area the SLF is operating.

Under such circumstances, operational control of the helicopter

squadron is passed by CG III MAF to the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing.

19
Action near the DMZ was characterized by hard fighting in

rugged terrain. A Marine of 3/4 moves forward during

Operation PRAIRIE. (USMC Photo A187904)

Marine Battalion Landing Teams aboard U. S. Seventh Fleet

shipping augmented III MAF forces. USS Iwo Jima stands

off South Vietnamese coast. (USMC Photo A650016)

20
long-range rockets and artillery pieces tucked away in caves and

treelines along the DMZ, the enemy regularly shelled Marine fire

support and logistical bases from Cam Lo to Cua Viet. One of

the most destructive attacks was against Dong Ha where, on 3

September, 41 enemy artillery rounds hit the base and touched

off a series of spectacular explosions which lasted for over four

hours. Several helicopters were damaged but, more important, a

fuel farm and a huge stockpile of ammunition went up in smoke.

Thousands of gallons of fuel and tons of ammunition were destroyed,

The enormous column of smoke from the exploding dumps rose above

12,000 feet and was visible as far south as Hue-Phu Bai.(18)

The preponderance of enemy fire, however, was directed

against Con Thien. That small strongpoint, never garrisoned by

more than a reinforced battalion, was situated atop Hill 158,

10 miles northwest of Dong Ha and, from their small perch, the

Marines had a commanding view of any activity in the area. In

addition, from one to three battalions were always in the immediate vicinity and deployed so that they could outflank any

major enemy force which tried to attack the strongpoint. Con

Thien also anchored the western end of "the barrier," a 600-meterwide trace which extended eastward some eight miles to Gio Linh.

This strip was part of an anti-infiltration system and had been

bulldozed flat to aid in visual detection.(*)(19)

Because of its strategic importance, Con Thien became the

scene of heavy fighting. The base itself was subjected to

several ground attacks, plus an almost incessant artillery

bombardment which, at its peak, reached 1,233 rounds in one 24-

hour period. Most of the NVA and Marine casualties, however,

were sustained by maneuver elements in the surrounding area.

Operation KINGFISHER, which succeeded BUFFALO, continued around

Con Thien and by 31 October, when it was superseded by two new

operations, had accounted for 1,117 enemy dead. Marine losses

were 340 killed.(**)(20)

(*) The system was an anti-infiltration barrier just south of

the DMZ. Obstacles were used to channelize the enemy. Strongpoints, such as Con Thien, served as patrol bases and fire

support bases.

(**) In addition to the action near the DMZ, there was one other

area in I Corps that was a hub of activity. The Nui Loc Son

Basin, a rice rich coastal plain between Hoi An and Tarn Ky, was

the operating area of the 2d NVA Division. Between April and

21
While heavy fighting raged elsewhere, action around Khe

Sanh continued to be light and sporadic. Immediately after its

arrival on 13 May, Colonel Padley's undermanned 26th Marines

commenced Operation CROCKETT.(*)(21) The mission was to occupy

key terrain, deny the enemy access into vital areas, conduct

reconnaissance-in-force operations to destroy any elements within the TAOR, and provide security for the base and adjacent outposts. Colonel Padley was to support the Vietnamese irregular

forces with his organic artillery as well as coordinate the

efforts of the American advisors to those units. He also had

the responsibility of maintaining small reconnaissance teams

for long-range surveillance.(22)

To accomplish his mission, the colonel had one infantry

battalion, 1/26, a skeleton headquarters, and an artillery

group under the control of 1/13. The 1st Battalion, 26th Marines,

commanded by Lieutenant Colonel James B. Wilkinson, maintained

one rifle company on Hill 881S and one on 861; a security detachment on Hill 950 to protect a communication relay site; a

rifle company and the Headquarters and Service Company (H&S Co)

for base security; and one company in reserve. The units on

the hill outposts patrolled continuously within a 4,000-meter

radius of their positions. Reconnaissance teams were inserted

further out, primarily to the north and northwest, whenever

evidence revealed enemy activity in an area, company-sized

search and destroy sweeps were conducted. Although intelligence

reports indicated that the three regiments of the 325C NVA

Division (i.e. 95C, 10ID, and 29th) were still in the Khe Sanh

TAOR, there were few contacts during the opening weeks of the

operation.(23)

October 1967, Marine, U. S. Army, and ARVN troops conducted 13

major operations (including 3 SLF landings) in this region and

killed 5,395 enemy soldiers. By the end of the year, the 2d

NVA Division was temporarily rendered useless as a fighting unit.

(*) The official designation of the unit at Khe Sanh was Regimental Landing Team 26 (Forward) which consisted of one battalion

and a lightly staffed headquarters. The other two battalions

were in-country but under the operational control of other units.

The rest of the headquarters, RLT-26 (Rear), remained at Camp

Schwab, Okinawa as a pipeline for replacements. RLT-26 (Forward)

was under the operational control of the 3d MarDiv and the administrative control of the 9th MAB. Any further mention of the

26th Marines will refer only to RLT-26 (Forward).

22
Toward the end of May and throughout June, however,

activity picked up. On 21 May, elements of Company A, 1/26,

clashed sharply with a reinforced enemy company; 25 NVA and 2

Marines were killed. The same day, the Lang Vei CIDG camp was

attacked by an enemy platoon. On 6 June, the radio relay site

on Hill 950 was hit by an NVA force of unknown size and the

combat base was mortared. The following morning a patrol from

Company B, 1/26, engaged another enemy company approximately

2,000 meters northwest of Hill 881S. A platoon from Company A

was helilifted to the scene and the two Marine units killed 66

NVA while losing 18 men. Due to the increasing number of contacts, the 3d Battalion, 26th Marines, commanded by Lieutenant

Colonel Kurt L. Hoch, was transferred to the operational control

of its parent unit and arrived at Khe Sanh on 13 June. Two weeks

later, the newly arrived unit got a crack at the NVA when Companies I and L engaged two enemy companies 5,000 meters southwest

of the base and, along with air and artillery, killed 35.(24)

Operation CROCKETT continued as a two-battalion effort

until 16 July when it terminated. The cumulative casualty

figures were 204 enemy KIA (confirmed), 52 Marines KIA, and

255 Marines wounded. The following day, operations continued

under a new name--ARDM0RE. The name was changed; the mission,

the units, and the TAOR remained basically the same. But again

the fighting tapered off. Except for occasional contacts by

reconnaissance teams and patrols, July and August were quiet.(25)

On 12 August, Colonel David E. Lownds relieved Colonel

Padley as the commanding officer of the 26th Marines. At this

time the 3d Marine Division was deployed from the area north

of Da Nang to the DMZ and from the South China Sea to the Laotian

border. In order to maintain the initiative, Lieutenant General

Robert E. Cushman, Jr., who had relieved General Walt as CG, III

MAF in June, drew down on certain units to provide sufficient

infantry strength for other operations. Except for several

small engagements Khe Sanh had remained relatively quiet; therefore, on the day after Colonel Lownds assumed command, the regiment was whittled down by two companies when K and L, 3/26,

were transferred to the 9th Marines for Operation KINGFISHER.

Three weeks later, the rest of 3/26 was also withdrawn and, as

far as Marine units were concerned, Colonel Lownds found himself "not so much a regimental commander as the supervisor of

a battalion commander." The colonel, however, was still responsible for coordinating the efforts of all the other Allied units

(CACO, CIDG, RF, etc) in the Khe Sanh TAOR.(26)

23
Colonel John J. Padley turns over the colors and

the 26th Marines to Colonel David E. Lownds on 12

August 1967. (Photo courtesy Colonel David E.

Lownds)

24
As Operation ARDMORE dragged on, the Marines at Khe Sanh

concentrated on improving the combat base. The men were kept

busy constructing bunkers and trenches both inside the perimeter and on the hill outposts. On the hills, this proved to

be no small task as was pointed out by the 1/26 battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Wilkinson:

The monsoon rains had little effect on 881, but

when the first torrential rains of the season hit 861

the results were disastrous. The trenchline which encircled the hill washed away completely on one side of

the position and caved in on another side. Some bunkers

collapsed while others were so weakened they had to be

completely rebuilt. Because of the poor soil and the

steepness of the terrain, the new bunkers were built almost completely above ground. To provide drainage,

twenty-seven 55 gallon steel drums, with the tops and

bottoms removed, were installed in the sides of the

trenches around 861 so water would not stand in the

trenches-. (Culvert material was not available.) All

bunker materials, as well as other supplies, were delivered to the hills by helicopter. Attempts were made

to obtain logs for fighting positions and bunkers in the

canopied jungle flanking the hills. This idea was not

successful. The trees close to 881 and 861 were so filled

with shrapnel from the battles the previous spring that

the engineers did not want to ruin their chain saws on

the metal....In spite of the shortages, Marines of 1/26

worked extremely hard until every Marine on 881(S) and

861 had overhead cover.(27)

Another bit of foresight which was to prove a God-send in

the succeeding months was the decision by higher headquarters

to improve the airstrip. The original runway had been a dirt

strip on top of which the U. S. Navy Seabees had laid aluminum

matting. The 3,900-foot strip, however, did not have a rock

base and as a result of the heavy monsoon rains, mud formed

under the matting causing it to buckle in several places. Upon

direction, Colonel Lownds closed the field on 17 August. His

men located a hill 1,500 meters southwest of the perimeter which

served as a quarry. Three 15-ton rock crushers, along with

other heavy equipment, were hauled in and the Marine and Seabee

working parties started the repairs. During September and

October, U. S. Air Force C-130s of the 315th Air Division (under

the operational control of the 834th Air Division) delivered

2,350 tons of matting, asphalt, and other construction material

25
to the base by paradrops and a special low-altitude extraction

system. (See page 76) While the field was shut down, resupply

missions were handled by helicopters and C-7 "Caribou" which

could land on short segments of the strip. Work continued until

27 October when the field was reopened to C-123 aircraft and

later, to C-130s.(28)

On 31 October, Operation ARDMORE came to an uneventful conclusion. The absence of any major engagements was mirrored in

the casualty figures which showed that in three and a half

months, 113 NVA and 10 Marines were killed. The next day, 1

November, the 26th Marines commenced another operation, new in

name only--SCOTLAND I. Again the mission and units remained

the same, and while the area of operations was altered slightly,

SCOTLAND I was basically just an extension of ARDMORE.(29)

One incident in November which was to have a tremendous

effect on the future of the combat base was the arrival of

Major General Rathvon McC. Tompkins at Phu Bai as the new Commanding General, 3d Marine Division. General Tompkins took

over from Brigadier General Louis Metzger who had been serving

as the Acting Division Commander following the death of Major

General Bruno Hochmuth in a helicopter crash on 14 November.

In addition to being an extremely able commander, General Tompkins

possessed a peppery yet gentlemanly quality which, in the gloom

that later shrouded Khe Sanh, often lifted the spirits of his

subordinates. His numerous inspection trips, even to the most

isolated units, provided the division commander with a firsthand knowledge of the tactical situation in northern I Corps

which would never have been gained by simply sitting behind a

desk. When the heavy fighting broke out at Khe Sanh, the general

visited the combat base almost daily. Few people were to influence the coming battle more than General Tompkins or have as

many close calls.(30)

During December, there was another surge of enemy activity.

Reconnaissance teams reported large groups of NVA moving into

the area and, this time, they were not passing through; they

were staying. There was an increased number of contacts between

Marine patrols and enemy units. The companies on Hills 881S

and 861 began receiving more and more sniper fire. Not only

the hill outposts, but the combat base itself, received numerous

probes along the perimeter. In some cases, the defensive wire

was cut and replaced in such a manner that the break was hard

to detect. The situation warranted action, and again General

Cushman directed 3/26 to rejoin the regiment. On 13 December,

26
the 3d Battalion, under its new commander, Lieutenant Colonel

Harry L. Alderman (who assumed command 21 August), was airlifted back to Khe Sanh and the 26th Marines.(31)

On the 21st, the newly-arrived Marines saddled up and took

to the field. This was the first time that Colonel Lownds had

been able to commit a battalion-sized force since 3/26 had left

Khe Sanh in August. Lieutenant Colonel Alderman's unit was

helilifted to 881S where it conducted a sweep toward Hill 918,

some 5,100 meters to the west, and then returned to the combat

base by the way of Hill 689. The 3d Battalion made no contact

with the enemy during the five-day operation but the effort

proved to be extremely valuable. First of all, the men of 3/26

became familiar with the terrain to the west and south of Hill

881S--a position which was later occupied by elements of the 3d

Battalion. The Marines located the best avenues of approach to

the hill, as well as probable sites for the enemy's supporting

weapons. Secondly, and most important, the unit turned up

evidence (fresh foxholes, well-used trails, caches, etc.) which

indicated that the NVA was moving into the area in force. These

signs further strengthened the battalion and regimental commanders' belief that "things were picking up," and the confrontation which many predicted would come was not far off.

Captain Richard D. Camp, the company commander of_L/3/26 put it

a little more bluntly: "I can smell.../the enemy_/."(32)

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28
PART III

THE BUILDUP AND THE OPENING ROUND

With the beginning of the new year, Khe Sanh again became

the focal point of enemy activity in I Corps. All evidence

pointed to a North Vietnamese offensive similar to the one in

1967, only on a much larger scale. From various intelligence

sources, the III MAF, 3d Marine Division, and 26th Marines

Headquarters learned that NVA units, which usually came down

the "Santa Fe Trail" and skirted the combat base outside of

artillery range, were moving into the Khe Sanh area and staying. (*)(33) At first, the reports showed the influx of individual regiments, then a division headquarters; finally a

front headquarters was established indicating that at least

two NVA divisions were in the vicinity. In fact, the 325C NVA

Division had moved back into the region north of Hill 881N while

a newcomer to the area, the 304th NVA Division, had crossed

over from Laos and established positions southwest of the base.

The 304th was an elite home guard division from Hanoi which had

been a participant at Dien Bien Phu.(**)(34) The entire force

included six infantry regiments, two artillery regiments, an

unknown number of tanks, plus miscellaneous support and service

units. Gradually, the enemy shifted his emphasis from reconnaissance and harassment to actual probes and began exerting more

and more pressure on Allied outposts and patrols. One incident

which reinforced the belief that something big was in the wind

occurred on 2 January near a Marine listening post just outside

the main perimeter.(35)

(*) The Santa Fe Trail is a branch of the Ho Chi Minh Trail

which closely parallels the South Vietnam/Laos border.

(**) In addition, one regiment of the 324th Division was located in the central DMZ some 10-15 miles from Khe Sanh and

maintained a resupply role. In the early stages of the siege,

the presence of the 320th Division was confirmed north of the

Rockpile within easy reinforcing distance of Khe Sanh; thus,

General Westmoreland and General Cushman were initially faced

with the possibility that Khe Sanh would be attacked by three

divisions plus a regiment. General Tompkins, however, kept

constant pressure on these additional enemy units and alleviated

their threat.

29
The post was located approximately 400 meters from the

western end of the airstrip and north of where the Company L,

3/26 lines tied in with those of 1/26. At 2030, a sentry dog

was alerted by movement outside the perimeter and a few minutes

later the Marines manning the post reported that six unidentified

persons were approaching the defensive wire. Oddly enough, the

nocturnal visitors were not crawling or attempting to hide their

presence; they were walking around as if they owned the place.

A squad from L/3/26, headed by Second Lieutenant Nile B.

Buffington, was dispatched to investigate. Earlier in the day

the squad had rehearsed the proper procedure for relieving the

listening post and had received a briefing on fire discipline.

The training was shortly put to good use.

Lieutenant Buffington saw that the six men were dressed

like Marines and, while no friendly patrols were reported in

the area, he challenged the strangers in clear English to be

sure. Tnere was no reply. A second challenge was issued and,

this time, the lieutenant saw one of the men make a motion as

if going for a hand grenade. The Marines opened fire and quickly

cut down five of the six intruders. One enemy soldier died with

his finger inserted in the pin of a grenade. The awesome hitting power of the M-16 rifle was quite evident since all five

men were apparently dead by the time they hit the ground. The

lone survivor was wounded but managed to escape after retrieving

some papers from a mapcase which was on one of the bodies. Using

a sentry dog, the Marines followed a trail of blood to the southwest but gave up the hunt in the darkness. The direction the

enemy soldier was heading led the Marines to believe that his

unit was located beyond the rock quarry.

The importance of the contact was not realized until later

when intelligence personnel discovered that all five of the

enemy dead were officers including an NVA regimental commander,

operations officer, and communications officer. The fact that

the North Vietnamese would commit such key men to a highly

dangerous, personal reconnaissance indicated that Khe Sanh was

back at the top of the Communists' priority list.(36)

This series of events did not go unnoticed at higher headquarters. General Cushman saw that Colonel Lownds had more on

his hands than could be handled by two battalions and directed

that 2/26 be transferred to the operational control of its

parent unit. On 16 January, 2/26, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel

Francis J. Heath, Jr., landed at the Khe Sanh Combat Base; its

arrival marked the first time that the three battalions of the

30
26th Marines had operated together in combat since Iwo Jima.

The rapid deployment of Lieutenant Colonel Heath's unit was

another example of the speed with which large number of troops

could be committed to battle. The regimental commander knew

that he would be getting reinforcements but he did not know

exactly when they would arrive; he was informed by telephone

just as the lead transports were entering the landing pattern.

The question that then arose was: "Where could the newcomers

do the most good?"(37)

Outside of the combat base itself, there were several areas

which were vital. The most critical points were the hill outposts, because both General Tompkins and Colonel Lownds were

well aware of what had happened at Dien Bien Phu when the Viet

Minh owned the mountains and the French owned the valley. It

was essential that the hills around Khe Sanh remain in the hands

of the Marines. Shortly after its arrival in mid-December 1967,

3/26 had relieved 1/26 of most of this responsibility. Company

I, 3/26, along with a three-gun detachment of 105mm howitzers

from Battery C, 1/13, was situated atop Hill 881S; Company K,

3/26, with two 4.2-inch mortars, was entrenched on Hill 861; and

the 2d Platoon, A/l/26 defended the radio-relay site on Hill

950. This arrangement still left the NVA with an excellent avenue of approach through the Rao Quan Valley which runs between

Hills 861 and 950. The regimental commander decided to plug

that gap with the newly arrived 2d Battalion.(38)

At 1400 the day it arrived, Company F, 2/26, conducted a

tactical march to Hill 558--a small knob which sat squarely in

the middle of the northwestern approach. The rest of the battalion spent the night in an assembly area approximately 1,300

meters west of the airstrip. The following day, Lieutenant

Colonel Heath moved his three remaining companies and the CP

group overland to join Company F. Once the Marines were dug

in, the perimeter completely encompassed Hill 558 and blocked

enemy movement through the Rao Quan Valley.(39)

Even with 2/26 in position, there was still a flaw in the

northern screen. The line of sight between K/3/26, on Hill 861,

and 2/26 was masked by a ridgeline which extended from the summit

of 861 to the northeast. This stretch of high ground prevented

the two units from supporting each other by fire and created a

corridor through which the North Vietnamese could maneuver to

flank either Marine outpost. About a week after his arrival on

Hill 558, Captain Earle G, Breeding was ordered to take his company,

E/2/26, and occupy the finger at a point approximately 400-500

31
meters northeast of K/3/26. From this new vantage point, dubbed

Hill 861A, Company E blocked the ridgeline and was in a good position to protect the flank of 2/26. Because of its proximity

to K/3/26, Company E, 2/26, was later transferred to the operational control of the 3d Battalion. Although these units did

not form one continuous defensive line, they did occupy the key

terrain which overlooked the valley floor.(40)

With the primary avenue of approach blocked, Colonel Lownds

utilized his remaining assets to provide base security and conduct an occasional search and destroy mission. The 1st Battalion

was given the lion's share of the perimeter to defend with lines

that extended around three sides of the airstrip. Lieutenant

Colonel Wilkinson's Marines occupied positions that paralleled

the runway to the north (Blue Sector), crossed the eastern end

of the strip, and continued back to the west along the southern

boundary of the base (Grey Sector). The southwestern portion

of the compound was manned by Forward Operating Base-3 (FOB-3),

a conglomeration of indigenous personnel and American advisors

under the direct control of a U. S. Army Special Forces commander. FOB-3 tied in with 1/26 on the east and L/3/26 on the

west. Company L, 3/26, was responsible for the northwestern

section (Red Sector) of the base and was thinly spread over

approximately 3,000 meters of perimeter. The remaining company

from the 3d Battalion, M/3/26, was held in reserve until 19

January when two platoons and a command group were helilifted

to 881S. Even though it held a portion of the perimeter, Company

D, 1/26 became the reserve and the remaining platoon from M/3/26

also remained at the base as a reaction force.(*)(41)

In addition to his infantry units, the regimental commander

had an impressive array of artillery and armor. Lieutenant

Colonel John A, Hennelly's 1/13 provided direct support for the

26th Marines with one 4.2-inch mortar battery, three 105mm

howitzer batteries, and one provisional 155mm howitzer battery

(towed). The 175mm guns of the U. S. Army's 2d Battalion, 94th

(*) On the 21st, a platoon from A/1/26 reinforced K/3/26 on

Hill 861 and a second platoon from Company A later followed suit.

Throughout most of the siege the line up on the hill outpost remained as follows: Hill 881S--Company I, 3/26 plus two platoons

and a command group from Company M 3/26; Hill 861--Company K,

3/26 plus two platoons from Company A, 1/26; Hill 861A--Company

E, 2/26; Hill 558--2/26 (minus the one company on 861A); Hill

950--one platoon from 1/26.

32
Artillery at Camp Carroll and the Rockpile were in general

support. Five 90mm tanks from the 3d Tank Battalion, which

had been moved to Khe Sanh before Route 9 was cut, were attached

to the 26th Marines along with two Ontos platoons from the 3d

Antitank Battalion.(*) These highly mobile tracked vehicles

could be rapidly mustered at any threatened point so Colonel

Lownds generally held his armor in the southwestern portion of

the compound as a back-up for L/3/26 and FOB-3. All told, the

Khe Sanh defenders could count on fire support from 46 artillery

pieces of varied calibers, 5 90mm tank guns, and 92 single or

Ontos-mounted 106mm recoilless rifles. With an estimated

15,000 to 20,000 North Vietnamese lurking in the surrounding

hills, the Marines would need it all.(42)

Ironically, the incidents which heralded the beginning of

full-scale hostilities in 1968 occurred in the same general

area as the encounter which touched off tha heavy fighting in

1967. On 19 January 1968, the 3d Platoon, 1/3/26 was patrolling

along a ridgeline 700 meters southwest of Hill 881N where, two

days before, a Marine reconnaissance team had been ambushed.

The team leader and radioman were killed and, while the bodies

had been recovered, the radio and a coded frequency card were

missing. The 3d Platoon was scouring the ambush site for these

items when it was taken under fire by an estimated 25 NVA troops.

The Marines returned fire, then broke contact while friendly

artillery plastered the enemy positions.

The next morning, Company I, commanded by Captain William

H. Dabnay, returned to the scene in force. The captain actually

had two missions: first, to try and make contact with the enemy,

and, second, to insert another reconnaissance team in the vicinity

of the ambush site. Two platoons and a command group from Company

M, 3/26, commanded by Captain John J. Gilece, Jr. were helilifted

to 881S and manned the perimeter while Company I moved out to

the north.(**) The terrain between 881S and its northern twin

dropped off into a deep ravine and then sloped gradually upward

to the crest of 881N. The southern face of 881N had two parallel

(*) The Ontos is a lightly armored tracked vehicle armed with

six 106mm recoilless rifles. Originally designed as a tank

killer, it is primarily used in Vietnam to support the infantry,

(**) Captain Gilece was wounded by sniper fire and on 1 February, First Lieutenant John T. Esslinger, the executive officer,

as sumed command.

LIBRARY

ASMEDWCBS STAFF COLLEGE

33
Five M-48 tanks of the 3d Tank Battalion lent the

weight of their 90mm guns to the defense of the

combat base. (USMC Photo A190384)

Two Ontos platoons of the 3d Antitank Battalion were on

hand at Khe Sanh. The Ontos sports six 106mm recoilless

rifles with coaxially mounted .50 caliber spotting rifles,

(USMC Photo A369169)

34
ridgelines about 500 meters apart which ran up the hill and

provided the company with excellent avenues of approach. These

two fingers were dotted with a series of small knobs which

Captain Dabney had designated as intermediate objectives.

The Marines moved out at 0500 proceeding along two axes

with the 1st and 2d Platoons on the left ridgeline and the 3d

Platoon on the right. The ground fog was so thick that the men

groped along at a snail's pace probing to their front with extended rifles much the same way a blind man uses a walking cane.

For that reason, Captain Dabney had placed Second Lieutenant

Harry F. Fromme's 1st Platoon and Second Lieutenant Thomas D.

Brindley's 3d Platoon in the lead because both units had patrolled

this area frequently and the commanders knew the terrain like

the back of their hands. In spite of this, by 0900 the entire

force had covered only a few hundred meters but then the fog

began to lift enabling the Marines to move out at a brisker pace.

The company swept out of the draw at the northern base of 88IS,

secured its first intermediate objective without incident, and

then advanced toward a stretch of high ground which was punctuated

by four innocent-looking little hills. These formed an eastwest line which ran perpendicular to and bisected the Marines*

intended route of march. As it turned out this area was occupied

by elements of an NVA battalion and each mound was a link in a

heavily-fortified defensive chain.(43)

As the element on the right moved forward after a precautionary 105mm artillery concentration, the enemy opened up

with small arms, .50 caliber machine guns, and grenade launchers

(RPGs). The resistance was so stiff that Captain Dabney ordered

Lieutenant Brindley to hold up his advance and call for more

artillery while the force on the left pushed forward far enough

to place flanking fire on the NVA position. The 1st and 2d

Platoons, however, fared no better; volleys of machine gun fire

from the other enemy-owned hills cut through the Marine ranks

like giant scythes and, in less than 30 seconds, 20 men were out

of action, most with severe leg wounds. Caught in a cross fire,

the captain ordered Fromme to hold up and evacuate his wounded.

Again, Lieutenant Brindley's men on the right surged forward in

the wake of 155mm prep fires. The assault, as_described by one

observer, was like a "page out of /the life of/ Chesty Puller."(*)

(*) Lieutenant General Lewis B. "Chesty" Puller, a legendary

figure in Marine Corps history, is the only Marine to have won

the Navy Cross five times.

35
The ambush of a Marine reconnaissance team near 881N on

17 January 1968 was the prelude to the opening battle

three days later. (USMC Photo A188243)

A view of Hill 881N (1) from its southern twin. Action

on 20 January took place on ridgelines (2) and (3).

(Photo courtesy Major William H. Dabney)

36
Brindley was everywhere; he moved from flank to flank slapping

his men on the back and urging them on. The lieutenant led his

platoon up the slope and was the first man on top of the hill

but, for him, the assault ended there--he was cut down by a

sniper bullet and died within minutes.(*)

During the advance, the recon team, which had volunteered

to join the attack, veered off to the right into a small draw

and became separated from the rest of the platoon. When the

enemy troops were finally driven off the hill, they fled to

the east and inadvertently smashed headlong into the isolated

team. After a brief but savage fight, the North Vietnamese overran the team and made good their escape; most of the recon

Marines were seriously wounded and lay exposed to direct fire

from the enemy on the easternmost hill. Several other men in

the 3d Platoon were hit during the wild charge and by the time

the objective had been taken, the radioman--a corporal--discovered

that he was the senior man in the platoon. He quickly reported

that fact to Captain Dabney.

The company commander saw that the enemy defense hinged

on the center hill which the 3d Platoon had just taken. If he

could consolidate that objective, Dabney would have a vantage

point from which to support, by fire, assaults on the other

three NVA positions. Second Lieutenant Richard M. Foley, the

Company I Executive Officer, had moved up to take command of the

3d Platoon and he reported that while the unit had firm possession of the hill, there were not enough men left to evacuate

the casualties. In addition, he could not locate the recon team

and his ammunition was running low. Dabney, therefore, ordered

Lieutenant Fromme's 1st Platoon to remain in place and support

the left flank of the 3d Platoon by fire. With Second Lieutenant Michael H. Thomas' 2d Platoon which had been in reserve

on the left, the company commander pulled back to the south,

hooked around to the east and joined Foley1s unit on its objective. The officers tried to evacuate the wounded and reorganize

but this attempt was complicated by the fact that one half of

the hastily formed perimeter was being pelted by .50 caliber

machine gun and sniper fire from the enemy's easternmost position.

At this point, there were two acts of extraordinary heroism.

Lieutenant Thomas, who was crouched in a crater alongside the

company commander, was informed of the wounded recon Marines who

(*) Lieutenant Brindley- was posthumously awarded the Navy Cross.

37
lay in the open at the eastern base of the hill. Even though

it was courting certain death to do so, Thomas jumped out of

the hole without hesitation and started down the hill. He had

only gotten a few steps when an enemy sniper shot him through

the head killing him instantly.(*) In spite of what happened

to the lieutenant, Sergeant Daniel G. Jessup quickly followed

his lead. While the NVA hammered away at the exposed slope with

continuous machine gun and sniper fire, the sergeant slithered

over the crest and crawled down the hill to locate the recon

unit. Once at the bottom, he found the team in a small saddle

which was covered with elephant grass; two of the Marines were

dead and five were seriously wounded. Jessup hoisted one of the

wounded men onto his back and made the return trip up the fireswept slope. Gathering up a handful of Marines, the sergeant

returned and supervised the evacuation of the entire team. When

all the dead and wounded had been retrieved, Jessup zig-zagged

down the hill a third time to gather up weapons and insure that

no one had been left behind. For his calm courage and devotion

to his comrades, Sergeant Jessup was later awarded the Silver Star,

The heavy fighting raged throughout the afternoon. Lieutenant Colonel Alderman, his operations officer, Major Matthew

P. Caulfield, and representatives of the Fire Support Coordination Center (FSCC) flew from Khe Sanh to Hill 881S by helicopter

so they could personally oversee the battle. During the action,

Company I drew heavy support from the recoilless rifles, mortars,

and 105mm howitzers on Hill 831S, as well as the batteries at

Khe Sanh. In addition, Marine jets armed with 500-pound bombs

streaked in and literally blew the top off of the easternmost

enemy hill, while other fighter/bombers completely smothered

one NVA counterattack with napalm. A CH-46 helicopter from Marine

Aircraft Group 36 was shot down while attempting to evacuate

casualties hst another Sea Knight swooped in and picked up the

pilot and copilot. The crew chief had jumped from the blazing

chopper while it was still airborne and broke his leg; he was

rescued by Lieutenant Fromme's men. This, however, was the only

highlight for the North Vietnamese because Company I had cracked

the center of their defense and, under the savage air and artillery bombardment, the rest of the line was beginning to

crumble.(46)

Lieutenant Colonal Alderman realized that his men were

gaining the advantage and requested reinforcements with which

(*) For his actions throughout the battle, Lieutenant Thomas

was posthumously awarded the Navy Cross.

38
to exploit the situation. Colonel Lownds, however, denied the

request and directed the 3/26 commander to pull Company I back

to Hill 881S immediately. The order was passed on to Captain

Dabney and it hit him like a thunderbolt. His men had been

fighting hard all day and he hated to tell them to call it off

at that point. Nonetheless, he rapidly disengaged, collected

his casualties, and withdrew. Hie struggle had cost the enemy

dearly: 103 North Vietnamese were killed while friendly losses

were 7 killed, including two platoon commanders, and 35 wounded.

As the weary Marines trudged back to Hill 881S, they were understandably disappointed at not being able to continue the attack.

It wasn't until later that they learned why they had been halted

just when victory was in sight.(*)(47)

Colonel Lownds* decision to break off the battle was not

born out of faintheartedness, but was based on a valuable piece

of intelligence that he received earlier in the afternoon. That

intelligence came in the form of a NVA first lieutenant who was

the commanding officer of the 14th Antiaircraft Company, 95C

Regiment, 325C NVA Division; at 1400, he appeared off the eastern

end of the runway with an AK-47 rifle in one hand and a white

flag in the other. Under the covering guns of two Ontos, a fire

team from the 2d Platoon, Company B, 1/26, took the youag man

in tow and, after Lieutenant Colonel Wilkinson had questioned

him briefly, the lieutenant was hustled off to the regimental

intelligence section for interrogation. The lieutenant had no

compunction about talking and gave the Marines a detailed description of the forthcoming Communist offensive. As it turned

out, the accuracy of the account was surpassed only by its timeliness, because the first series of attacks was scheduled for

that very night--against Hills 861 and 881S. At the time Colonel

Lownds received this news, Company I was heavily engaged 1,000

meters north of its defensive perimeter and he definitely did

not want Captain Dabney and his men to be caught away from their

fortified outpost when the NVA struck. Consequently, Lieutenant

Colonel Alderman's request for reinforcements to press his advantage was denied.(48)

When the first enemy rounds began falling on Hill 861

shortly after midnight, Marines all along the front were in

bunkers and trenches--waiting. The heavy mortar barrage lasted

(*) NVA casualties were obviously much greater than 103 dead

because the Marines counted only those bodies found during the

withdrawal.

39
about 30 minutes and was supplemented by RPG, small arms, and

automatic weapons fire. This was followed by approximately 300

NVA troops who assaulted Hill 861. Trie van of the attacking

force was made up of sapper teams that rushed forward with bangalore torpedoes and satchel charges to breach the defensive wire.

Assault troops then poured through the gaps but were met and, in

most sectors, stopped cold by interlocking bands of grazing

machine gun fire.

In spite of the defensive fire, enemy soldiers penetrated

the K/3/26 lines on the southwestern side of the hill and overran the helo landing zone. The Company K perimeter encompassed

a saddle, thus the crest of 861 was actually two hills; the

landing zone was on the lower one and the company CP was perched

atop a steep rise to the northeast. Before the enemy could exploit the penetration, the Marines counterattacked down the

trenchline and pinched off the salient. After vicious hand-tohand fighting, the men of Company K isolated the pocket and wiped

out the North Vietnamese. Had the enemy been able to flood the

breach with his reserves, the situation might have become extremely

critical. When the fighting subsided, 47 NVA bodies were strewn

over the hilltop while four Marines died holding their ground.(*)(49)

During the attack on 861, the 3d Battalion command group

remained on Hill 881S because bad weather prevented Lieutenant

Colonel Alderman and his operations officer from returning to

the combat base.(**)(50) Major Caulfield contacted the Company K

command post by radio and found out that the fighting was indeed

heavy. The company commander, Captain Norman J. Jasper, Jr.,

had been hit three times and was out of action; the executive

officer, First Lieutenant Jerry N. Saulsbury, was running the

show. The company gunnery sergeant was dead, the first sergeant

was badly wounded, and the radio operator had been blinded by

powder burns. Major Caulfield later recalled that the young

Marine remained at his post for almost two hours before being

(*) Many more North Vietnamese died that night than were found,

The stench from the bodies decaying in the jungle around the

hill became so strong that the men of K/3/26 were forced to wear

their gas masks for several days.

(**) Throughout the night, Lieutenant Colonel Alderman supervised defensive operations from 881S and was assisted by an

alternate battalion command group at the base which was headed

by the 3/26 Executive Officer, .Major Joseph M. Loughran, Jr.

40
relieved and was "as calm, cool, and collected as a telephone

operator in New York City," even though he could not see a

thing.(51)

Some men on the hill had a rather unusual way of keeping

their spirits up during the fight as First Sergeant Stephen L.

Goddard discovered. The first sergeant had been hit in the neck

and was pinching an artery shut with his fingers to keep from

bleeding to death. As he moved around the perimeter, the Top

heard a sound that simply had no place on a battlefield--somebody was singing. After tracing the sound to a mortar pit,

Goddard peered into the emplacement and found the gunners

bellowing out one stanza after another as they dropped rounds

into the tubes. The "ammo humpers" were also singing as they

broke open boxes of ammunition and passed the rounds to the

gunners. Naturally, the name of the song was "The Marines

Hymn."(52)

One decisive factor in this battle was that Hill 881S was

not attacked. Company I did not receive a single mortar round

and the reprieve left the Marines free to lend unhindered support to their comrades on 861. The bulk of this fire came from

the Company I 81mm mortar section. Since Lieutenant Colonel

Alderman and Major Caulfield were concerned about the possibility

of their position being attacked, they were careful not to deplete their ammunition. Major Caulfield personally authorized

the expenditure of every 20-round lot so he knew exactly how

many mortar rounds went out that night--630. The mortar tubes

became so hot that the Marines had to use their precious drinking

water to keep them cool enough to fire; after the water, the men

used fruit juice. When the juice ran out, they urinated on the

tubes. Tne spirited support of Company I and its attached elements played a big part in blunting the attack.(53)

There are two plausible explanations for the enemy's failure to coordinate the attack on Hill 861 with one on 881S. Lieutenant Colonel Alderman and Major Caulfield felt that Captain

Dabney's fight on the afternoon of 20 January had crippled the

NVA battalion which was slated for the attack on Hill 881S and

disrupted the enemy's entire schedule. On the other hand,

Company I had emerged from the engagement with relatively light

casualties and was in fighting trim on the morning of the 21st.

Another possibility was the manner in which Colonel Lownds utilized artillery and aircraft. The regimental commander did not

use his supporting arms to break up the attack directly; he

left that job up to the defenders themselves. Instead, the

41
colonel called in massive air and artillery concentrations on

points where the enemy would more than likely marshal his reserves. Much of the credit belong to Lieutenant Colonel

Hennelly's batteries at the base. One infantry officer on Hill

881S, who observed the fire, described the Marine artillery as

"absolutely and positively superb." Throughout the battle, the

North Vietnamese assault commander was heard frantically screaming for his reserves--he never received an answer. The fact

that the initial attack on 861 was not followed up by another

effort lent credence to the theory that the backup force was

being cut to pieces to the rear while the assault troops were

dying on the wire.(54)

The Marines did not have long to gloat over their victory

because at 0530 on the 21st the KSCB was subjected to an intense barrage. Hundreds of 82mm mortar rounds, artillery shells,

and 122mm rockets slammed into the compound as Marines dived into

bunkers and trenches.(*)(55) Damage at "ground zero" was extensive: several helicopters were destroyed, trucks and tents

were riddled, one messhall was flattened, and fuel storage areas

were set ablaze. Colonel Lownds' quarters were demolished but,

fortunately, the regimental commander was not in his hut at the

time. One of the first incoming rounds found its mark scoring

a direct hit on the largest ammunition dump, which was situated

near the eastern end of the runway. The dump erupted in a series

of blinding explosions which rocked the base and belched thousands

of burning artillery and mortar rounds into the air. Many of

these maverick projectiles exploded on impact and added to the

devastation. Thousands of rounds were destroyed and much of

this ammunition "cooked off" in the flames for the next 48 hours.

In addition, one enemy round hit a cache of tear gas (CS) releasing clouds of the pungent vapor which saturated the entire

base.(56)

The main ammunition dump was just inside the perimeter

manned by Company B, 1/26,and the 2d Platoon, commanded by

(*) On Hill 881S, Captain Dabney watched several hundred 122mm

rockets lift off from the southern slope of 881N--a scant 300

meters beyond the farthest point of his advance the day before.

The enemy defensive positions between the two hills were obviously designed to protect these launching sites. At the combat

base, the barrage did not catch the Marines completely by surprise; the regimental intelligence section had warned that an

enemy attack was imminent and the entire base was on Red Alert.

42
Second Lieutenant John W. Dillon, was in the hotseat throughout

the attack. The unit occupied a trenchline which, at places,

passed as close as 30 meters to the dump. In spite of the

proximity of the "blast furnace," Lieutenant Dillon's men stayed

in their positions, answered with their own mortars, and braced

for the ground attack which never came. Throughout the ordeal,

the 2d Platoon lines became an impact area for all sizes of duds

from the dump which literally filled the trenchline with unexploded ordnance. In addition, the men were pelted by tiny

slivers of steel from the exploding antipersonnel ammunition

which became embedded in their flak jackets, clothing, and bare

flesh.(57)

The fire raging in the main dump also hampered the rest of

the 1st Battalion. The 81mm mortar platoon fired hundreds of

rounds in retaliation but the ammo carriers had to crawl to and

from the pits because of the exploding ammunition. Captain

Kenneth W. Pipes, commanding officer of Company B, had to displace his command post three times when each position became

untenable. Neither was the battalion CP exempt; at about 1000,

a large quantity of C-4 plastic explosives in the blazing dump

was touched off and the resulting shock waves cracked the timbers

holding up the roof of Lieutenant Colonel Wilkinson's command

bunker. As the roof settled, several members of the staff were

knocked to the floor. For a moment it appeared that the entire

overhead would collapse but after sinking about a foot, the

cracked timbers held. With a sigh of relief, the men inside

quickly shored up the roof and went about their duties.(58)

The sudden onslaught produced a number of heroes, most of

whom went unnoticed. Members of Force Logistics Group Bravo,

and other personnel permanently stationed at the ammunition dump,

charged into the inferno with fire extinguishers and shovels to

fight the blaze. Motor transport drivers darted from the safety

of their bunkers to move trucks and other vehicles into revetments. Artillerymen quickly manned their guns and began returning fire. The executive officer of 1/13, Major Ronald W.

Campbell, ignored the heavy barrage and raced from one shell

hole to another analyzing the craters and collecting fragments

so that he could determine the caliber of the enemy weapons as

well as the direction from which they were being fired. Much

of the counterbattery fire was a direct result of his efforts.(59)

Three other artillerymen from Battery C, 1/13, performed

an equally heroic feat in the midst of the intense shelling.

When the dump exploded, the C/l/13 positions, like those of 1/26,

43
were showered with hundreds of hot duds which presented a grave

danger to the battery. The battery commander, Captain William

J. O'Connor, the executive officer, First Lieutenant William L.

Everhart, and the supply sergeant, Sergeant Ronnie D. Whiteknight,

immediately began picking up the burning rounds and carrying

them to a hole approximately 50 meters behind the gun pits. For

three hours, these Marines carried out between 75 and 100 duds

and disposed of them, knowing that any second one might explode.

When the searing clouds of tear gas swept over the battery, many

gunners were cut off from their gas masks. Lieutenant Everhart

and Sergeant Whiteknight quickly gathered up as many masks as

they could carry and distributed them to the men in the gun positions. The "cannon cockers" donned the masks and kept their

howitzers in action throughout the attack.(60)

By this time, most of 1/13 had ceased firing counterbattery

missions and was supporting the defense force at Khe Sanh

Village. An hour after the KSCB came under attack, the Combined

Action Company (CACO) and a South Vietnamese Regional Forces (RF)

company stationed in the village were hit by elements of the

304th NVA Division. The enemy troops breached the defensive

wire, penetrated the compound, and seized the dispensary. Heavy

street fighting ensued and, at 0810, the defenders finally drove

the enemy force from the village. Later that afternoon, two NVA

companies again assaulted the village but, this time, artillery

and strike aircraft broke up the attack. Upon request of the

defenders, Lieutenant Colonel Hennelly's battalion fired over

1,000 artillery rounds with variable time fuzes which resulted

in airbursts over the defensive wire. During the action, a

single Marine A-6A "Intruder" knifed through the ground fire

and killed about 100 of the attackers. Those enemy soldiers who

persisted were taken care of by close-in defensive fires and,

when the fighting subsided, an American advisor counted 123

North Vietnamese bodies on or around the barbed wire.(61)

Following the second attack, Colonel Lownds decided to withdraw these isolated units to the confines of the KSCB0 The

village, which was the seat of the Huong Hoa District Headquarters,

was not an ideal defensive position. The Allies were hampered

by restricted fields of fire and there was a temple just outside

the village which overlooked the perimeter. Most important, a

regiment of the 304th NVA Division was operating in the immediate

vicinity. The colonel decided that he would rather evacuate the

village while he could, instead of waiting until its occupants

were surrounded and fighting for their lives. Helicopters flew

in and picked up the Marines and U. S. Army advisors; the Vietnamese troops and officials of the local government moved overland.

44
Upon arrival, the CACO and RF companies, which totaled about

250 men, took up positions in the southwestern sector of the

base and were absorbed by FOB-3.(*)(62)

There was one other encounter on the 21st. At 1950, the

2d Platoon, L/3/26, reported 25-30 enemy soldiers crawling

toward the wire bordering Red Sector. The Marines opened fire

and, within an hour, killed 14 North Vietnamese. Remnants of

the attacking force were seen dragging dead and wounded comrades

from the battlefield. Cumulative friendly casualties for the

day, including those incurred on Hill 861, were 9 killed, 37

wounded and evacuated (Medevaced), plus 38 wounded but returned

to duty.(63)

When the events of the 21st were flashed to the world via

the news media, many self-appointed experts in the United States

began to speak out concerning the feasibility of maintaining the

garrison at Khe Sanh. Those who opposed the planned defense felt

that the Marines had been able to remain there only at the

pleasure of the NVA. They pointed out that, in the preceding

months, the installation had been of little concern to the North

Vietnamese because it was ineffective as a deterrent to infiltration. The undermanned 26th Marines could not occupy the

perimeter, man the hill outposts, and simultaneously conduct

the constant, large-unit sweeps necessary to control the area.

Therefore, the enemy could simply skirt the base and ignore it.

A build-up, however, would make the prize worthwhile for the

NVA, which badly needed a crushing victory over the Americans

for propaganda purposes. By concentrating forces at Khe Sanh,

the theory went, the Allies would be playing into the enemy's

hands because the base was isolated and, with Route 9 interdicted, had to be completely supplied by air. Fearing that

Khe Sanh would become an American Dien Bien Phu, the critics

favored a pull-out.

In Vietnam, where the decision was being made, there was

little disagreement. The two key figures, General Westmoreland

and General Cushman, "after discussing all aspects of the situation, were in complete agreement from the start."(64) There

were several reasons they decided to hold Khe Sanh at that

time. The base and adjacent outposts commanded the Khe Sanh

Plateau and the main avenue of approach into eastern Quang Tri

(*) The Huong Hoa District Headquarters operated from within

the KSCB throughout the siege.

45
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Province. While the installation was not 100 percent effective

as a deterrent to infiltration, it was a solid block to enemy

invasion and motorized supply from the west. Had the Allies

possessed greater strength in the northern provinces, they might

have achieved the same ends with large and frequent airmobile

assaults--a concept which General Cushman had advocated for some

time. In January 1968, he had neither the helicopter resources,

the troops, nor the logistical bases for such operations. The

weather was another critical factor because the poor visibility

and low overcasts attendant to the monsoon season made helicopter

operations hazardous to say the least. Even if the III MAF

commander had the materiel and manpower for such large airmobile

assaults, the weather precluded any such effort before March or

April. Until that time, the job of sealing off Route 9 would

have to be left up to the 26th Marines.(65)

An additional consideration for holding the base was the

rare and valuable opportunity to engage and destroy an, heretofore, elusive foe. Up to this time, there was hardly a commander

in Vietnam who, at one time or another,had not been frustrated

in his attempts to box in the slippery NVA and VC units. At

Khe Sanh, the enemy showed no desire to hit and run but rather

to stand and fight; it was a good idea to oblige him. In effect,

the 26th Marines would fix the enemy in position around the base

while Allied air and artillery battered him into senselessness.

Furthermore, the defense was envisioned as a classic example of

economy of force. Although there was conjecture that the NVA

was trying to draw American units to the DMZ area, the fact remained that two crack NVA divisions, which otherwise might have

participated in the later attacks on Hue and Quang Tri City, were

tied down far from the vital internal organs of South Vietnam by

one reinforced Marine regiment.(66)

Thus, with only two choices available--withdraw or reinforce

--ComUSMACV chose the latter. In his "Report On The War In

Vietnam," General Westmoreland stated:

The question was whether we could afford the troops

to reinforce, keep them supplied by air, and defeat an

enemy far superior in numbers as we waited for the weather

to clear, build forward bases, and made preparations for

an overland relief expedition. I believed we could do all

of those things. With the concurrence of the III Marine

Amphibious Force Commander, Lieutenant General Robert E.

Cushman, Jr., I made the decision to reinforce and hold the

area while destroying the enemy with our massive firepower

47
and to prepare for offensive operations when the weather

became favorable.

General Westmoreland reported his decision to Washington and

more troops began to pour into the combat base.(67)

On 22 January, the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, commanded

by Lieutenant Colonel John F. Mitchell, was transferred to the

operational control of the 26th Marines and arrived at 1900 the

same day. Ever since the three high ranking NVA officers were

killed outside Red Sector, General Tompkins and Colonel Lownds

were concerned over the unhealthy interest that the North Vietnamese were showing in the western perimeter. When 1/9 arrived,

the colonel directed the battalion commander to establish defensive positions at the rock quarry, 1,500 meters southwest of

the strip. Lieutenant Colonel Mitchell moved his unit overland and set up a kidney-shaped perimeter around the quarry with

his CP perched atop a hill. In addition, he dispatched a platoon

from Company A approximately 500 meters further west to set up

a combat outpost on a small knob. The 1/9 lines curved near,

but did not tie in with, those of L/3/26; the small gap, however, could easily be covered by fire. The western approach

was firmly blocked.(68) (See Map 6).

General Tompkins and Colonel Lownds also discussed plans

for the opposite side of the compound. This approach would have

been the most difficult for the North Vietnamese to negotiate

because the terrain east of the runway dropped off sharply to

the river below. This steep grade, however, was heavily wooded

and provided the enemy with excellent concealment. The NVA

troops, masters at the art of camouflage, could have maneuvered

dangerously close to the Marine lines before being detected.

The main reason for concern, however, was the testimony of

the cooperative NVA lieutenant who had surrendered on the 20th.

According to the lieutenant, the eastern avenue of approach was

the key with which the Communists hoped to unlock the Khe Sanh

defenses. First, the NVA intended to attack and seize Hills 861

and 881S, both of which would serve as fire support bases. From

these commanding positions, the enemy would push into the valley

and apply pressure along the northern and western portion of the

Marines' perimeter. These efforts, however, were simply a diversion to conceal the main thrust--a regimental ground attack

from the opposite quarter. An assault regiment from the 304th

Division would skirt the base to the south, hook around to the

east, and attack paralleling the runway through the 1/26 lines.

48
Two key figures in the defense of Khe Sanh: Major General

Rathvon McC. Tompkins (L), CG, 3d MarDiv, and Colonel David

E. Lownds (R), CO, 26th Marines. (Photo courtesy Colonel

David E. Lownds)

General Tompkins (L) made helicopter trips into Khe Sanh

almost daily in spite of heavy enemy fire. (Photo courtesy

David D. Duncan)

49
50
Once the compound was penetrated, the North Vietnamese anticipated that the entire Marine defense system would collapse.(69)

On 27 January, the 37th ARVN Ranger Battalion, the fifth and

final battalion allotted for Khe Sanh, arrived.(*)(70) Understandably, Colonel Lownds moved the ARVN unit into the eastern

portion of the perimeter to reinforce the 1st Battalion. Actually,

the Marines were backing-up the South Vietnamese because the

Ranger Battalion occupied trenches some 200 meters outside the

1/26 lines. Lieutenant Colonel Wilkinson's men had already prepared these defensive positions for the new arrivals. The new

trenchline extended from the northeast corner of Blue Sector,

looped across the runway, paralleled the inner trenchline of

1/26, and tied back in with the Marine lines on the southeastern

corner of Grey Sector. (See Map 7) The only gap was where the

runway extended through the ARVN lines; this section was covered

by two Ontos. At night, the gap was sealed off with strands of

German Tape--a new type of razor-sharp barbed wire which was extremely difficult to breach. The North Vietnamese would now have

to penetrate two lines of defense if they approached from the

east.(71)

As January drew to a close, the situation at Khe Sanh could

be summed up in three words--enemy attack imminent. As a result

of rumblings of a large-scale Communist offensive throughout

South Vietnam, the scheduled Vietnamese Lunar New Year (TET)

ceasefire was cancelled in I Corps and the 26th Marines braced

for the inevitable. While they waited, they filled sandbags, dug

deeper trenches, reinforced bunkers, conducted local security

patrols, and, in general, established a pattern which would remain unbroken for the next two months. The NVA also established

a routine as enemy gunners daily shelled the base and hill outposts while assault units probed for a soft spot. Thus the two

adversaries faced each other like boxers in a championship bout;

one danced around nimbly throwing jabs while the second stood

fast waiting to score the counterpunch that would end the fight.(72)

(*) ARVN battalions were considerably smaller than Marine battalions and the 37th Ranger was no exception. Even by Vietnamese

standards, the unit was undermanned; it had 318 men when it arrived,

51
1/9 J

DROP ZONE

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HELO REVETMENTS

/ BLUE

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37th ARVN RANGER BN

E.L. WILSON

MAP7 KHE SANH COMBAT BASE

52
PART IV

THE "SO-CALLED" SIEGE BEGINS

When the Communists launched their TET Offensive on 30

January, they struck in force almost everywhere in South Vietnam

except Khe Sanh. Their prime targets were not military installations but the major population centers--36 provincial capitals,

64 district capitals, and 5 autonomous cities. The leaders in

Hanoi were apparently becoming dissatisfied with their attempts

to win in the South by a protracted war of attrition and decided

on one massive stroke to tip the scales in their favor. Consequently, the enemy unleashed some 62,000 troops, many of whom

infiltrated the cities disguised as civilians, in hopes that

they could foster a public uprising against the central government and encourage mass defections among the Republic of Vietnam

Armed Forces. Virtually all available VC main and local force

units were thrown into the initial attacks. With the exception

of Hue and Da Nang, NVA units were generally committed a few

days later to reinforce the assault troops.(73)

The sudden onslaught initially achieved surprise but, in the

final analysis, the overall military effort failed miserably.

Allied forces reacted quickly and drove the invaders from the

cities and towns, killing approximately 32,000 (as of 11 February)

hard-core guerrillas and North Vietnamese soldiers in the process.

Many Viet Cong units, with no other orders than to take their

initial objectives and hold until reinforcements arrived, were

wiped out completely. Ironically, these elite cadres were the

backbone of the guerrilla infrastructure in the South which the

Communists, up to that point, had tried so hard to preserve. In

Saigon and Hue, die-hard remnants held out for several weeks but,

for the most part, the attacks were crushed within a few days.

The general uprising and mass desertions never materialized; on

the contrary, the offensive tended to galvanize the South

Vietnamese.(74)

Even though he paid an exorbitant price, the enemy did

achieve certain gains. If the Communists' goal was to create

sensational headlines which would stun the American people--they

succeeded. To the strategists in Hanoi, an important byproduct

of any military operation was the associated political ramifications

in the United States; namely, how much pressure would certain

factions put on their leaders to disengage from the struggle in

53
South Vietnam. To the delight of the Communists, no doubt, the

TET Offensive had a tremendous psychological impact in the

U. S0 and, as usual, the response of the dissidents was vociferous. Much of the reaction was completely out of proportion to

the actual military situation but it had a definite demoralising

effect on the American public--the long-range implications of

which are still undetermined„(75)

Another casualty of these nation-wide attacks was the

pacification program in rural communities. When the Allies

pulled back to clear the cities, they temporarily abandoned

portions of the countryside to the enemy. Upon return, they

found that progress in the so-called "battle for the hearts and

minds of the people" had received a temporary set back.(76)

To achieve these ends, however, the enemy troops brought

senseless destruction to Vietnamese cities and heaped more

suffering upon an already war-weary populace. Thousands of innocent civilians were killed and hundreds of thousands made homeless --mostly in Saigon/Cholon and Hue. Four days after the

initial attacks, the central government formed the Central Recovery Committee which, with U. S. assistance, launched Project

RECOVERY to help alleviate the misery of the people. Had this

program not been implemented, the Communists might have come

much closer to achieving their goal of overthrowing the government. In addition to the destruction in the cities, the enemy

violated a sacred religious holiday and, what's worse, actually

desecrated a national shrine by turning the majestic Hue Citadel

into a bloody battlefield. For these acts, the Viet Cong and

North Vietnamese earned the deep-seated hatred of many South

Vietnamese who in the past had been, at best, neutral.(77)

whether or not Khe Sanh was, in fact, the ultimate enemy

objective or merely a diversion for the TET Offensive has not

yet been established with certainty. The U. S. command in

Saigon believed that the Communists' goal was to create a general

uprising, precipitate mass defections in the RVN armed forces,

and then seize power. The concentration of NVA regular forces

in the northern two provinces was primarily to support this

overall objective but it was also possible that the enemy had

a secondary aspiration of shearing off and seizing the Quang

Tri-Thua Thien area should his primary effort fail. Thus Khe

Sanh was envisioned as an intregal part of the master plan, or

as General Westmoreland called it "an option play."

Subsequent events tended to vindicate that evaluation. Since

54
the initial nation-wide attacks had been conducted primarily by

Viet Cong guerrillas and main force units, the NVA regular

forces remained relatively unscathed and, with two of the four

North Vietnamese divisions known to be in I Corps poised around

the 26th Marines, there was little doubt as to where the next

blow would fall. Furthermore, the enemy's extensive preparations around the base reinforced the belief that this effort was

a major offensive and not just a feint. Before investing the

garrison, the North Vietnamese dug positions for their longrange artillery pieces. Later, they emplaced countless smaller

supporting weapons, established numerous supply depots, and began the ant-like construction of their intricate siege-works.

This intensive build-up continued long after most of the fighting associated with the TET Offensive was over.(78)

The enemy had much to gain by taking Khe Sanh. If they

could seize any portion of Quang Tri Province, the Communists

would have a much stronger bargaining position at any future

conference table. In addition, the spectre of Dien Bien Phu

which was constantly raised in the American press uidoubtedly

led the enemy to believe that the coming battle could not only

prove successful but decisive. If the garrison fell, the defeat might well turn out to be the coup de grace to American

participation in the war. At first, the Marines anticipated a

major pitched battle, similar to the one in 1967, but the enemy

continued to bide his time and the battle at Khe Sanh settled

into one of supporting arms.(79)

At Khe Sanh, the periodic showers of enemy artillery shells

were, quite naturally, a major source of concern to General

Tompkins and Colonel Lownds and they placed a high priority on

the construction of stout fortifications. Understandably, not

every newcomer to Khe Sanh immediately moved into a thick bunker

or a six-foot trench with overhead cover. The colonel had spent

most of his tour with a one-battalion regiment and had prepared

positions for that battalion; than, almost overnight, his command swelled to five battalions. The new units simply had to

build their own bunkers as quickly as they could.(80)

The regimental commander placed a minimum requirement on

his subordinates of providing overhead cover for the troops that

would stop, at least, an 82mm mortar round. The FSCC determined

that one strip of runway matting and two or three layers of sandbags would fill the requirement. The average bunker usually

started as an 8x8 foot dugout with one 6x6 inch timber inserted

in each corner and the center for support. The overhead consisted of planks, a strip of runway matting, sandbags, loose dirt,

55
Marines at the combat base run for cover when warning of

enemy rocket or artillery attack, is sounded. (USMC

Photo A190245)

Machine gunners lie on top of trench cover while they

search for enemy movement. (USMC Photo A190929)

56
and more sandbags. Some enterprising Marines piled on more loose

dirt, then took discarded 105mm casings and drove them into the

top of the bunker like nails. These casings often caused predetonation of the heavier-caliber rounds. The combat engineers

attached to the 26th Marines could build one of these bunkers in

three or four days; the average infantrymen took longer. Overhead cover for the trenchlines consisted of a strip of matting

placed across the top of the trench at intervals and reinforced

with sandbags. The defenders could stand up in the trench during

periods of inactivity and duck under the matting when enemy rounds

started to fall.(81)

Trie Marines were also faced with another question concerning

their defenses: "How large an artillery round could you defend

against and still remain within the realm of practicality?"

Since the 26th Marines was supplied solely by air, building material was a prime consideration. Matting and sandbags were easy

enough to come by but lumber was at a premium. Fortifications

which could withstand a hit from an 82mm mortar were a must because the North Vietnamese had an ample supply of these weapons

but the base was also being pounded, to a lesser degree, by

heavier-caliber guns. With the material available to the 26th

Marines, it was virtually impossible to construct a shelter that

was thick enough or deep enough to stop the heavy stuff.(82)

This fact was borne out when Colonel Lownds decided to build

a new regimental CP bunker. The engineers supplied the specifications for an overhead that would withstand a 122mm rocket;

to be on the safe side, the colonel doubled the thickness of the

roof. Tne day before the CP was to be occupied, a 152mm round

landed squarely on top of the bunker and penetrated both layers.(83)

The massing of enemy artillery made the hill outposts that

much more important. Had they been able to knock the Marines

from those summits, the North Vietnamese would have been able to

fire right down the throats of the base defenders and make their

position untenable. As it was, the companies on Hills 881S, 861,

861A, and 553 not only denied the enemy an unobstructed firing

platform from which to pound the installation, they also served

as the eyes for the rest of the regiment in the valley which was

relatively blind to enemy movement. For observation purposes,

Hill 881S was the most strategically located and a discussion of

the enemy's heavy weaponry will point out why.

While the 60mm and 82mm mortars were scattered around in

proximity of the combat base (roughly within a 2,000-3,000 meter

57
radius), the NVA rocket sites and artillery pieces were located

well to the west, southwest, and northwest, outside of friendly

counterbattery range. One particularly awesome and effective

weapon was the Soviet-built 122mm rocket, the ballistic characteristics of which had a lot to do with the way the North Vietnamese employed it. When fired, the projectile was fairly

accurate in deflection but, because it was powered by a propellent,

the biggest margin of error was in range. Consequently, the

North Vietnamese preferred to position their launching sites so

the gunners could track along the long axis of a given target;

thus, longs and shorts would land "in the ballpark." The KSCB

hugged the airstrip and was roughly in the shape of a rectangle

with the long axis running east and west. This made the optimum

firing positions for the 122mm rocket either to the east or west

of the base on lina with the runway. There was really only one

logical choice because the eastern site would have placed the

rockets within range of the Americans' 175s and extended the

enemy's supply lines from Laos. To the west, Hills 881S or 861

would have been ideal locations because in clear weather those

vantage points provided an excellent view of Khe Sanh and were

almost directly on line with the airstrip. Unfortunately for

the NVA, the Marines had squatters' rights on those pieces of

real estate and were rather hostile to claim jumpers. As an

alternative, the North Vietnamese decided on 881N but this choice

had one drawback since the line of sight between that northern

peak and the combat base was masked by the top of Hill 861.

Nevertheless, the enemy emplaced hundreds of launching sites

along its slopes and throughout the siege approximately 5,000

122mm rockets rained on Khe Sanh from 881N.(84)

Because of their greater range, the enemy's 130mm and 152mm

artillery batteries were located even further to the west. Tnese

guns were cleverly concealed in two main firing positions. One

was on Co Roc Mountain which was southwest of where Route 9

crossed the Laotian border; the other area was 305, so called

because it was on a bearing of 305 degrees (west-northwest) from

Hill 881S at a range of about 10,000 meters. While the heavy

caliber artillery rounds which periodically ripped into the base

were usually referred to as originating from Co Roc, 305 was the

source of about 60-70 percent of this fire, probably because it

was adjacent to a main supply artery. Both sites were vulnerable

only to air attack and were extremely difficult to pinpoint because

of the enemy's masterful job of camouflage, his cautious employment, and the extreme distance from friendly observation posts.

The NVA gunners fired only a few rounds every hour so that continuous muzzle flashes did not betray their positions and, after

each round, quickly scurried out to cover the guns with protective

58
nets and screens. Some pieces, mounted on tracks, were wheeled

out of caves in Co Roc Mountain, fired, and returned immediately.

Though never used in as great a quantity as the rockets and

mortars, these shells wreaked havoc at Khe Sanh because there was

very little that they could not penetrate; even duds went about

four feet into the ground.(85)

The 3/26 elements on Hill 881S were a constant thorn in the

enemy's side because the men on that most isolated of the Marine

outposts could observe all three of the main NVA firing positions

--881N, 305, and Co Roc. When rockets lifted off of 881N or the

guns at Co Roc lashed out, the men of Company I could see the

flashes and provided advance warning to the base, whenever possible they directed retaliatory air strikes on the offenders.(*)

Whenever the enemy artillery at 305 opened up, the muzzle flashes

were hard to see because of the distance and the everpresent

dust from air strikes, but the rounds made a loud rustling noise

as they arched directly over 881S on the way to Khe Sanh. When

the Marines heard the rounds streak overhead, they passed a

warning to the base over the 3d Battalion tactical radio net,

provided the net was not clogged with other traffic. The message

was short and to the point: "Arty, Arty, Co Roc" or "Arty,

Arty, 305."(86)

At the base the Marines had devised a crude but effective

early warning system for such attacks. Motor transport personnel

had mounted a horn from a two-and-a-half ton truck in the top of

a tree and the lead wires were attached to two beer can lids.

When a message was received from 881S, a Marine, who monitored

the radio, pressed the two lids together and the blaring horn

gave advanced warning of the incoming artillery rounds. The

radio operator relayed the message over the regimental net and

then dived into a hole. Men in the open usually had from five

to eighteen seconds to find cover or just hit the deck before

"all hell broke loose." When poor visibility obscured the view

between 881S and the base, the radio operator usually picked

himself up, dusted off, and jokingly passed a three-word message

to Company I which indicated that the rounds had arrived on

schedule--"Roger India...Splash."(87)

(*) One Marine, Corporal Robert J. Arrota, using a PRC-41 UHF

radio which put him in direct contact with the attack pilots,

personally controlled over 200 air strikes without the aid of a

Tactical Air Controller (Airborne); his peers gave him the title

of "The Mightiest Corporal In The World."

59
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61
The fact that Company I on 881S was the fly in the enemy's

ointment was no secret, especially to the enemy. As a result,

North Vietnamese gunners made the Marines' existence there a

veritable nightmare. Although no official tally of incoming

rounds was recorded, Captain Dabney's position took a much more

severe pounding than any of the other hill outposts. Volume,

however, was only part of the story because the incoming was

almost always the heavier stuff. The hill received little 60mm

or 82mm mortar fire but a deluge of 120mm mortar and 100mm

artillery rounds. There was also a smattering of 152mm shells

from Co Roc. The shelling was the heaviest when helicopters

made resupply runs.

The firing position which plagued the Marines the most was

located to the southwest of the hill in a U-shaped draw known

as "the Horseshoe." There were at least two NVA 120mm mortars

in this area which, in spite of an avalanche of American bombs

and artillery shells, were either never knocked out or were frequently replaced. These tubes were registered on the hill and

harassed Company I constantly. Anyone caught above ground when

one of the 120s crashed into the perimeter was almost certain

to become a casualty because the explosion produced an extremely

large fragmentation pattern. Captain Dabney figured that it

took one layer of runway matting, eight of sandbags, and one of

either rocks or 105mm casings to prevent penetration of a 120mm

with a quick fuze--nothing the Marines had on 881S could stop a

round with a delayed fuze. Because of the shape of the hill,

the summit was the only defendable terrain and thus provided the

enemy with a compact target; this often resulted in multiple

casualties when the big rounds landed within the perimeter. The

only thing that the Marines had going for them was that they

could frequently spot a tell-tale flash of an artillery piece or

hear the "thunk" when a mortar round left the tube but the heavy

shells took their toll. On Hill 881S alone, 40 Marines were

killed throughout the siege and over 150 were wounded at least

once.(88)

Considering the sheer weight of the bombardment, enemy

shells caused a relatively small number of fatalities at the

base. Besides the solid fortifications, there were two factors

which kept casualties to a minimum. The first was the flak

jacket--a specially designed nylon vest reinforced with overlapping fiberglass plates. The jacket would not stop a highvelocity bullet but it did protect a man's torso and most vital

organs against shell fragments. The bulky vest was not particularly popular in hot weather when the Marines were on patrol but

62
in a static, defensive position the jacket was ideal. The

second factor was the high quality of leadership at platoon

and company level. Junior officers and staff noncommissioned

officers (NCOs) constantly moved up and down the lines to supervise the younger, inexperienced Marines, many of whom had only

recently arrived in Vietnam. The veteran staff NCOs, long known

as the "backbone of the Corps," knew from experience that troops

had to be kept busy. A man who was left to ponder his problems

often developed a fatalistic attitude that could increase his

reaction time and decrease his life time. The crusty NCOs did

not put much stock in the old cliche: "If a round has your name

on it, there's nothing you can do." Consequently, the Marines

worked; they dug trenches, filled sandbags, ran for cover, and

returned to fill more sandbags. Morale remained high and

casualties, under the circumstances, were surprisingly low.(89)

Although the NVA encircled the KSCB and applied constant

pressure, the defenders were never restricted entirely to the

confines of the perimeter. The term "siege," in the strictest

sense of the word, was somewhat of a misnomer because the Allies

conducted a number of daily patrols, often as far as 500 meters

from their own lines„(*)(90) These excursions were primarily

for security and reconnaissance purposes since General Tompkins

did not want his men engaged in a slugging match with the enemy

outside the defensive wire. If the North Vietnamese were encountered, the Marines broke contact and withdrew, while supporting arms were employed.(91)

One vital area was the drop zone. When the weather turned

bad in February, the KSCB was supplied primarily by parachute

drops. Colonel Lownds set up his original zone inside the

FOB-3 compound but later moved it several hundred meters west

of Red Sector because he was afraid that the falling pallets

might injure someone. Lieutenant Colonel Mitchell's 1/9 was

given responsibility for security of the drop zone and his patrols conducted daily sweeps along the periphery of the drop

area to flush out enemy troops who might try to disrupt the collection of supplies. In addition, combat engineers swept through

the zone each morning and cleared out any mines the enemy set

in during the night. Thus the defenders at Khe Sanh were never

(*) Lieutenant Colonel Mitchell, whose battalion held the rock

quarry perimeter, later commented that his troops patrolled out

to 1,200 meters. The units at the base never went that far

until the siege was lifted.

63
completely hemmed-in, but the regimental commander admitted

that any expedition beyond sight of the base was an invitation

to trouble.(92)

The Allies did more than prepare defenses and conduct patrols because the NVA launched three of its heaviest ground

attacks during the first week in February. In the predawn hours

of 5 February, the North Vietnamese lashed out at the Marine

base and adjacent outposts with nearly 200 artillery rounds while

a battalion from the 325C NVA Division assaulted Hill 861A.

Colonel Lownds immediately placed all units on Red Alert and,

within minutes, 1/13 was returning fire in support of E/2/26.

The fight on Hill 861A was extremely bitter„ At 0305 the

North Vietnamese opened up on Captain Breeding's positions with

a tremendous 82mm mortar barrage. This was followed by continuous volleys of RPG rounds which knocked out several Marine

crew-served weapons and shielded the advance of the NVA sappers

and assault troops. The North Vietnamese blew lanes through

the barbed wire along the northern perimeter and slammed into

the Company E lines. Second Lieutenant Donald E. Shanley's 1st

Platoon bore the brunt of the attack and reeled back to supplementary positions. Quickly the word filtered back to the company

CP that the enemy was inside the wire and Captain Breeding ordered

that all units employ tear gas in defense but the North Vietnamese

were obviously "hopped up" on some type of narcotic and the

searing fumes had very little effect. Following the initial

assault there was a brief lull in the fighting. The NVA soldiers

apparently felt that, having secured the northernmost trenchline,

they owned the entire objective and stopped to sift through the

Marine positions for souvenirs. Magazines and paperbacks were

the most popular. Meanwhile, the temporary reversal only served

to enrage the Marines. Following a shower of grenades, Lieutenant

Shanley and his men charged back into their original positions

and swarmed all over the surprised enemy troops.(93)

The counterattack quickly deteriorated into a melee that resembled a bloody, waterfront barroom brawl--a style of fighting

not completely alien to most Marines„ Because the darkness and

ground fog drastically reduced visibility, hand-to-hand combat

was a necessity. Using their knives, bayonets, rifle butts, and

fists, the men of the 1st Platoon ripped into the hapless North

Vietnamese with a vengeance. Captain Breeding, a veteran of the

Korean conflict who had worked his way up through the ranks,

admitted that, at first, he was concerned over how his younger,

inexperienced Marines would react in their first fight. As it

64
turned out, they were magnificent. The captain saw one of his

men come face to face with a North Vietnamese in the inky darkness; the young American all but decapitated his adversary with

a crushing, round-house right to the face, then leaped on the

flattened soldier and finished the job with a knife. Another

man was jumped from behind by a North Vietnamese who grabbed

him around the neck and was just about to slit his throat, when

one of the Marine's buddies jabbed the muzzle of his M-16 between the two combatants. With his selector on full automatic,

he fired off a full magazine; the burst tore hugh chunks from

the back of the embattled Marine's flak jacket but it also cut

the North Vietnamese in half. Since the fighting was at such

close quarters, both sides used hand grenades at extremely shortrange. The Marines had the advantage because of their armored

vests and they would throw a grenade, then turn away from the

blast, hunch up, and absorb the fragments in their flak jackets

and the backs of their legs. On several occasions, Captain

Breeding's men used this technique and "blew away" enemy soldiers

at less than 10 meters.(94)

No one engaged in the donnybrook was exactly sure just how

long it lasted--all were too busy fighting to check their watches,

More than likely, the enemy was inside the wire less than a half

hour. During the fighting, Captain Breeding fed fire team-sized

elements from the 2d and 3d Platoons into the fray from both

flanks of the penetration. The newcomers appeared to be afraid

that they might miss all the action and tore into the enemy as

if they were making up for lost time. Even though the E/2/26

company commander was no newcomer to blood and gore, he was awed

by the ferocity of the attack. Captain Breeding later said:

"It was like watching a World War II movie. Charlie didn't know

how to cope with it...we walked all over them."(95) Those dazed

NVA soldiers who survived the vicious onslaught retreated into

another meatgrinder; as they ran from the hill, they were blasted

by recoilless rifle fire from 2/26 which was located on Hill 558.

At approximately 0610, the North Vietnamese officers rallied

the battered remnants and tried again, but the second effort was

also stopped cold. By this time, Captain Breeding, who was

busier than the proverbial one-armed paper hanger, was assisting

in the coordination of fire support from five separate sources

(i.e. Hills 361A, 881S, 558, the KSCB, and the 175mm gun bases).

The Marines of Captain Dabney's 1/3/26, located on Hill 881S provided extremely effective and enthusiastic support throughout

the attack. In three hours, Captain Dabney's men pumped out

close to 1,100 rounds from only three 81mm mortars, and the tubes

65
became so hot that they actually glowed in the dark.(*) Again,

the bulk of the heavy artillery fire, along with radar controlled

bombing missions, was placed on the northern avenues leading to

the hill positions. The enemy units, held in reserve, were thus

shredded by the bombardment as they moved up to continue the

attack.(96)

After the second assault fizzled out, the North Vietnamese

withdrew, but enemy gunners shelled the base and outposts throughout the day. At 1430, replacements from 2/26 were helilifted to

Hill 861A. Captain Breeding had lost seven men, most of whom

were killed in the opening barrage, and another 35 were medevaced

so the new arrivals brought E/2/26 back up to normal strength.

On the other hand, the NVA suffered 109 known dead; many still

remained in the 1st Platoon area where they had been shot, slashed,

or bludgeoned to death. As near as Captain Breeding could tell,

he did not lose a single man during the fierce hand-to-hand

struggle; all American deaths were apparently the result of the

enemy's mortar barrage and supporting fire. The Marines never

knew how many other members of the 325C NVA Division had fallen

as a result of the heavy artillery and air strikes but the number

was undoubtedly high. All in all, it had been a bad day for

the Communists.(97)

The North Vietnamese took their revenge in the early morning

hours of 7 February; their victims were the defenders of the

Special Forces camp at Lang Vei. At 0042, an American advisor

reported that the installation was under heavy attack by enemy

tanks. This was the first time that the NVA had employed its

armor in the south and, within 13 minutes, 9 PT-76 Soviet-built

tanks churned through the defensive wire, rumbled over the antipersonnel minefields, and bulled their way into the heart of the

compound.(**)(98) A battalion from the 66th Regiment, 304th NVA

Division, equipped with satchel charges, tear gas, and flamethrowers, followed with an aggressive infantry assault that was

coordinated with heavy attacks by fire on the 26th Marines.

Colonel Lownds placed the base on Red Alert and the FSCC called

in immediate artillery and air in support of the beleaguered

(*) The men of Company I used the same methods to cool the

mortar tubes that they used during the attack against 861 on

21 January.

(**) The defenders later reported knocking out at least one and

probably two tanks with rocket launchers.

66
Lang Vei garrison. Although the Marines responded quickly, the

defensive fires had little effect because, by that time, the

enemy had overrun the camp.(*)(99) The defenders who survived

buttoned themselves up in bunkers and, at 0243, called for

artillery fire to dust off their own positions.(100)

Lieutenant Colonel Hennelly's artillerymen responded with

scores of deadly air bursts which peppered the target area with

thousands of fragments. The 1/13 batteries fired over 300 rounds

that morning and the vast fire superiority was echoed in the

radio transmission of one Lang Vei defender who said: "We don't

know what you're using but for God's sake keep it up." That was

one of the last transmissions to Khe Sanh because, at 0310, the

Marines lost communications with the camp.(101).

Part of Colonel Lownds' mission as coordinator of all friendly

forces in the Khe Sanh area was to provide artillery support for

Lang Vei and, if possible, to reinforce the camp in case of attack.

Under the circumstances, a relief in strength was out of the

question. In early January, when M/3/26 was in reserve, Lieutenant Colonel Alderman and Major Caulfield had conducted a

personal reconnaissance of Route 9 between the K.SCB and Lang Vei

to determine the feasibility of moving a large unit overland.

Their opinion was that any such attempt would be suicidal because

the terrain bordering Route 9 was so well suited for an ambush

it was an "NVA dream." Any column moving down the road, especially

at night, would undoubtedly have been ambushed.(**)(102) If the

Marines went directly over the mountains, they would have to hack

through the dense growth and waste precious hours.(***)(103) A

(*) The 26th Marines F5CC had prepared extensive defensive fire

plans for the Lang Vei Camp. In the early stages of the attack,

the camp commander did not request artillery and later asked for

only a few concentrations. He never asked for the entire schedule

to be put into effect.

(**) Documents taken off a dead NVA officer later in the battle

indicated that the enemy hoped that the attack on Lang Vei would

draw the Marines out of Khe Sanh so he could destroy the relief

column.

(***) In November 1967, Lieutenant Colonel Wilkinson, on direction

of the regimental commander, had sent a rifle company to determine

possible direct routes through the jungle. The company commander,

Captain John N. Raymond, reported that his unit, avoiding wellused trails to preclude ambush, had made the trip in about 19 hours,

67
large-scale heliborne effort was ruled out because the North

Vietnamese apparently anticipated such a move and withdrew

their tanks to the only landing zones near the camp which were

suitable for such an operation. Even with tactical aircraft

providing suppressive fire, a helo assault into the teeth of

enemy armor was ill-advised. The most important factor, however,

was that NVA units in the area greatly outnumbered any force

Colonel Lownds could commit.(104)

Since a relief in force was undesirable, plans for a hit

and run rescue attempt were quickly drawn up at General Cushman's

headquarters. Once General Westmoreland had given the green

light, Major General Norman J0 Anderson, commanding the 1st

MAW and Cclonel Jonathan F„ Ladd of the U. S. Army Special Forces,

worked out the details. Two major points agreed upon were that

the helicopters employed in the operation would be those which

were not essential to the 26th Marines at the moment and that

Marine fixed-wing support would be provided.(105)

As soon as it was light, the survivors of the Lang Vei

garrison managed to break out of their bunkers and work their

way to the site of an older camp some 400-500 meters to the

east. Later that same day, a raiding party composed of 40 CIDG

personnel and 10 U. S. Army Special Forces advisors from FOB-3

boarded Quang Tri-based MAG-36 helicopters and took off for

Lang Vei. A flight of Huey gunships, led by Lieutenant Colonel

William J„ White, Commanding Officer of Marine Observation

Squadron 6, as well as jet aircraft escorted the transport

choppers. While the jets and Hueys covered their approach,

the helicopters swooped into a small strip at the old camp and

took on survivors, including 15 Americans. In spite of the heavy

suppressive fire provided by the escorts, three transport helos

suffered battle damage during the evacuation. One overloaded

chopper, flown by Captain Robert J. Richards of Marine Medium

Helicopter Squadron 262, had to make the return trip to Khe

Sanh at treetop level because the excess weight prevented the

pilot from gaining altitude.(106)

(*) On the return trip to the KSCB, Captain Richards flew

over the outskirts of Khe Sanh Village. A NVA soldier suddenly

stepped out of one hut and sprayed the low-flying chopper with

a burst from his AK-47 assault rifle. The rounds ripped out

part of Richards' instrument panel and one bullet zinged about

two inches in front of his nose before passing through the top

of the cockpit. A Marine gunner on the CH-46 quickly cut down

68
There was a large number of indigenous personnel--both

military and civilian--who could not get out on the helicopters

and had to move overland to Khe Sanh. A portion of these were

members of the Laotian Volunteer 3attalion 33 which on 23 January had been overrun at Ban Houei San, Laos (near the Laotian/

South Vietnam border) by three NVA battalions. The remnants

fled across the border and took refuge at Lang Vei and when the

Special Forces camp fell, the Laotians continued their trek to

the east with a host of other refugees. At 0800 on the 8th,

about 3,000 approached the southern perimeter at Khe Sanh and

requested admittance. Colonel Lownds, fearing that NVA infiltrators were in their midst, denied them entrance until each

was searched and processed. This took place near the FOB-3

compound after which some of the refugees were evacuated. The

Laotians were eventually returned to their own country.(107)

Also on the morning of 8 February, elements of the 101D

Regiment, 325C Division launched the first daylight attack

against the 26th Marines. At 0420, a reinforced battalion hit

the 1st Platoon, A/1/9, which occupied Hill 64 some 500 meters

west of the 1/9 perimeter. Following their usual pattern, the

North Vietnamese tried to disrupt the Marines1artillery support

with simultaneous bombardment of the base. To prevent friendly

reinforcements from reaching the small hill the enemy also

shelled the platoon's parent unit and, during the fight, some

350 mortar and artillery rounds fell on the 1/9 positions. The

NVA assault troops launched a two-pronged attack against the

northwestern and southwestern corners of the A/1/9 outpost and

either blew the barbed wire with bangalore torpedoes or threw

canvas on top of the obstacles and rolled over them. The enemy

soldiers poured into the trenchline and attacked the bunkers

with RPGs and satchel charges. They also emplaced machine guns

at the edge of the penetrations and pinned down those Marines

in the eastern half of the perimeter who were trying to cross

over the hill and reinforce their comrades.(108)

The men in the northeastern sector, led by the platoon commander, Second Lieutenant Terence R. Roach, Jr., counterattacked

the North Vietnamese but the damage had already been done. Even

though he was shaken by the experience, the pilot nursed his

crippled bird back to the base and landed safely. Once on the

ground, he quickly switched helicopters and returned to Lang Vei

for another evacuation mission. For his actions during the day,

Captain Richards was later awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross,

69
down the trenchline and became engaged in savage hand-to-hand

fighting. While rallying his troops and directing fire from

atop an exposed bunker, Lieutenant Roach was mortally wounded.

From sheer weight of numbers, the North Vietnamese gradually

pushed the Marines back until the enemy owned the western half

of the outpost. At that point, neither side was able to press

the advantage. Pre-registered mortar barrages from 1/9 and

artillery fire from the KSCB had isolated the NVA assault units

from any reinforcements but at the same time the depleted 1st

Platoon was not strong enough to dislodge the enemy.(109)

One Marine had an extremely close call during the fight

but lived to tell about it. On the northern side of the perimeter, Private First Class Michael A. Barry of the 1st Squad

was engaged in a furious hand grenade duel with the NVA soldiers

when a ChiCom grenade hit him on top of the helmet and landed

at the young Marine's feet. PFC Barry quickly picked it up and

drew back to throw but the grenade went off in his hand. Had

it been an American M-26 grenade, the private would undoubtedly

have been blown to bits but ChiCom grenades frequently produced an uneven frag pattern. In this case, the bulk of the

blast went down and away from the Marine's body; Barry had the

back of his right arm, his back, and his right leg peppered

with metal fragments but he did not lose any fingers and continued to function for the rest of the battle.(110)

In another section of the trenchline, Lance Corporal Robert

L. Wiley had an equally hair-raising experience. Wiley, a shellshock victim, lay flat on his back in one of the bunkers which

had been overrun by the enemy. His eardrums had burst, he was

temporarily paralyzed and his glazed eyes were fixed in a corpselike stare but the Marine was alive and fully aware of what was

going on around him. Thinking that Wiley was dead, the North

Vietnamese were only interested in rummaging through his personal

effects for souvenirs. One NVA soldier found the Marine's

wallet and took out several pictures including a snapshot of

his family gathered around a Christmas tree. After pocketing

their booty, the North Vietnamese moved on; Lance Corporal Wiley

was later rescued by the relief column.(Ill)

At 0730, Lieutenant Colonel Mitchell committed a second

platoon, headed by the Company A commander, Captain Henry J. M.

Radcliffe, to the action. By 0900, the relief force had made

its way to the eastern slope of the small hill and established

contact with the trapped platoon. During the advance, Companies

B and D, along with one section of tanks, delivered murderous

70
direct fire to the flanks and front of Captain Radcliffe's

column, breaking up any attempt by the enemy to interdict the

linkup. After several flights of strike aircraft had pasted

the reverse slope of the hill, the company commander led his

combined forces in a frontal assault over the crest and, within 15 minutes, drove the North Vietnamese from the outpost.

Automatic weapons chopped down many North Vietnamese as they

fled from the hill. The battered remnants of the enemy force

retreated to the west and, once in the open, were also taken

under fire by the rest of the Marine battalion. In addition,

the artillery batteries at KSCB contributed to the slaughter

and, when the smoke cleared, 150 North Vietnamese were dead.

Although the platoon lines were restored, Colonel Lownds decided to abandon the position and, at 1200, the two units withdrew with their casualties. Marine losses that morning on the

outpost were 21 killed and 26 wounded; at the base, 5 were

killed and 6 wounded.(112)

During the next two weeks, the NVA mounted no major ground

attack but continued to apply pressure on the KSCB. There were

daily clashes along the Marine lines but these were limited to

small fire fights, sniping incidents, and probes against the

wire. A decrease in activity along the various infiltration

routes indicated that the enemy had completed his initial buildup and was busily consolidating positions from which to launch

an all-out effort. The Allies continued to improve their defenses and by mid-February most units occupied positions with

three or four layers of barbed wire, dense minefields, special

detection devices, deep trenches, and mortar-proof bunkers.

The battle reverted to a contest of supporting arms and the

North Vietnamese stepped up their shelling of the base, especially

with direct fire weapons. Attempts to silence the enemy guns

were often frustrated because the Marines were fighting two

battles during February--one with the NVA, the other with the

weather.(113)

71
PART V

THE AIRLIFT

The weather at Khe Sanh throughout February could be

characterized in one word--miserable. General Tompkins remarked

that, for combat purposes, the weather was the worst that he'd

ever seen. The northeast monsoons had long since spilled over

into the Khe Sanh Valley and every morning the base was shrouded

with ground fog and low scud layers which dissipated around

1000 or 1100. When the sun finally managed to burn through,

the cloud ceiling retreated slightly but still hovered low

enough to prevent the unrestricted use of airborne artillery

spotters and strike aircraft. It was during these periods, when

the overcast was between 100 and 500 feet, that enemy artillery,

rocket, and mortar fire was the heaviest. The NVA forward observers, perched along the lower slopes of the surrounding

hills, called in and adjusted barrages with little fear of retaliation against their own gun positions. Later in the afternoon, when the fog rolled in again and obscured the enemy's

view, the incoming tapered off.(*)(114)

The Marines adjusted their schedule accordingly. They

usually worked under the cover of the haze in the morning, went

underground during the midday shelling, and returned to their

duties later in the afternoon. While the extremely low cloud

cover occasionally befriended the men at the base, it constantly

plagued the pilots whose mission was to resupply the 26th Marines.

The job of transporting enough "bullets, beans, and bandages"

to sustain the 6,680 Khe Sanh defenders fell to the C-130s of

Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 152 and the U. S. Air

Force 834th Air Division; the C-123s of the 315th Air Commando

Wing; the UH-34, Ch-46, and UH-1E helicopters of Marine Aircraft

Group 36 (MAG-36); and the CH-53 choppers of MAG-16.(**)(115)

(*) The weather during February was bad for operations but not

particularly uncomfortable. The mean temperature was 71 degrees,

the average humidity was 92 percent, and an average weekly rainfall was .04 inches. The wind was out of the east with an

average velocity of 6 miles per hour.

(**) Organizationally, the USAF C-130s belonged to the 315th

72
Ground fog in the morning and late afternoon shrouded the

base obscuring the view of both the enemy and the Marines.

(Photo courtesy David D. Duncan)

The reduced visibility from fog and haze hampered air

operations. Crews of Marine UH-1E gunships wait for

ceiling to lift. (Photo courtesy David D. Duncan)

73
Even under ideal circumstances, the airlift would have been a

massive undertaking. The difficulties, however, were compounded

by the poor visibility which was below minimum for airfield

operations 40 percent of the time and the heavy volume of antiaircraft and artillery fire directed at the incoming transports.

The NVA had moved several antiaircraft units into the hills

east of the airstrip forcing the C-130 Hercules, the C-123 Providers, and the helicopters to run the gauntlet during their

final approach. Under cover of the heavy fog, some audacious

NVA gun crews positioned their antiaircraft weapons just off

the eastern threshold of the runway and fired in the blind whenever they heard the drone of incoming planes. Several aircraft

were hit while on GCA final and completely in the soup.(*)(116)

Immediately after touchdown, the aircraft were subjected to intense mortar and rocket fire; in fact, the incoming was so

closely synchronized with their arrival, the fixed-wing transports were nicknamed "mortar magnets" by the Marines.(117)

The key to survival for the pilots was a steep approach

through the eastern corridor, a short roll-out,and a speedy

turnaround after landing. A small ramp paralleled the western

end of the strip which the transport crews used as an unloading

point. After roll-out, the pilot turned off the runway onto

the easternmost taxiway, then wheeled onto the ramp while the

loadmasters shoved the pallets of supplies out the back.(**)

All outgoing passengers were loaded on the double because the

Air Division but that unit did not operate in Vietnam. Five

to seven aircraft from each of the 315th1s squadrons were on

temporary duty in Vietnam and were under the operational control

of the 834th Air Division. The 315th Air Commando Wing and its

C-123s were organizationally part of the 834th.

(*) One NVA gun crew came in too close for its own good. The

1/26 commander, Lieutenant Colonel Wilkinson, dispatched a platoon from Company D to attack this position which was off the

northeastern end of the airstrip. While the 81mm mortars of

1/26 provided support, the platoon commander, Second Lieutenant

Daniel L. McGravey, and his men aggressively assaulted the position. During a brisk fire fight, they killed several North

Vietnamese, captured the antiaircraft weapon, and took the gunner

prisoner.

(**) If a pilot made his approach from the west, which was not

often the case, he had to taxi all the way back down the runway

to the loading ramp.

74
View of airstrip at Khe Sanh facing east,

(Photo courtesy David D. Duncan)

U. S. Air Force C-130 about to touch down after approaching from the east. (Photo courtesy David D. Duncan)

75
planes rarely stopped rollings The pilot completed the loop

by turning back onto the runway via the western taxiway and

took off in the opposite direction from which he landed. It

was not uncommon for the entire circuit to be completed within

three minutes; even then, the planes were tracked by exploding

mortar rounds.(118)

On 10 February, a tragedy occurred which resulted in a

drastic alteration of the unloading process. A Marine C-130,

heavily laden with bladders of fuel for the 26th Marines, was

making its approach to the field under intense fire. Just before the giant bird touched down, the cockpit and fuel bags

were riddled by enemy bullets. With flames licking at one side,

the stricken craft careened off the runway 3,100 feet from the

approach end, spun around, and was rocked by several muffled

explosions. The C-130 then began to burn furiously. Crash

crews rushed to the plane and started spraying it with foam.

The pilot, Chief Warrant Officer Henry Wildfang, and his copilot

suffered minor burns as they scrambled out the overhead hatch

in the cockpit. Fire fighters in specially designed heat suits

dashed into the flaming debris and pulled several injured crewmen and passengers to safety--rescue attempts came too late for

six otherso One of those killed in the crash, Lieutenant Colonel

Carl E0 Peterson, the 1st MAW Engineer Officer, was a reserve officer who only a few months before had volunteered for active

duty0 As a result of this accident and damage sustained by

other transports while on the ground, C-130 landings at Khe Sanh

were suspended.(119)

With the field closed to C-130s, a U. S. Air Force innovation- -the Low Altitude Parachute Extraction System or LAPES--was

put into effect. This self-contained system, which had been

used extensively during the renovation of the airstrip in the

fall of 1967, enabled the aircraft to unload their cargo without

landing. When making a LAPES run, the Hercules pilot made his

approach from the east during which he opened the tail ramp and

deployed a reefed cargo parachute. Prior to touchdown, he added

just enough power to hold the aircraft about five feet above the

ground. As the plane skimmed over the runway and approached the

intended extraction point, the pilot electrically opened the

streaming chute which was attached to the roller-mounted cargo

pallets. The sudden jolt of the blossoming chute snatched the

cargo from the rear hatch and the pallets came to a skidding

halt on the runway. The pilot then jammed the throttles to the

firewall, eased back on the yoke, and executed a high-angle,

westerly pull-out to avoid ground fire while the Marines moved

76
Death of a Hercules. A C-130 of Marine Aerial Refueler

Transport Squadron 152 burns after crashing at the base.

(Photo courtesy David D. Duncan)

Crash crew at Khe Sanh pours foam on a burning CH-46 heli

copter following an enemy artillery attack. (USMC Photo

A190350)

77
onto the runway with forklifts and quickly gathered in the

supplies. The system was quite ingenious and allowed the aircraft to pass through the V-ring in a matter of seconds.(*)

Even though the airmen could not control the skidding pallets

after release, some pilots perfected their individual technique

and were able to place the cargo on a 25-meter square with consistency. On one occasion, however, an extraction chute malfunctioned and the cargo rocketed off the western end of the

runway; the eight-ton pallet of lumber smashed into a messhall

located near the end of the strip and crushed three Marines

to death.(120)

Another technique--the Ground Proximity Extraction System

or GPES--was also used but to a lesser degree than the LAPES.

(15 GPES deliveries during the siege as compared to 52 LAPES.)

Both utilized the low approach but with GPES tha cargo was extracted by a hook extended from a boom at the rear of the aircraft. As the C-130 swooped low over the runway, the pilot tried

to snag an arresting cable similar to the one used on aircraft

carriers; only his hook was attached to the cargo bundles and

not the plane. Upon engagement, the pallets were jerked from

the rear hatch and came to a dead stop on the runway. With the

GPES, the chance of a pallet skidding out of control or overturning was greatly reduced. The only problem that occurred was

not with the system itself but with faulty installation. The

Marines who initially emplaced the GPES were frequently chased

away from their work by incoming mortar rounds and, as a result

of the periodic interruptions, the cable was not anchored properly.

The first C-130 that snagged the wire ripped the arresting gear

out by the roots. After the initial bugs were remedied, the

system worked so successfully that, on one pass, a load containing 30 dozen eggs was extracted without a single eggshell

being cracked.(121)

Most of the time, however, the low overcast precluded the

use of either extraction system and the preponderance of supplies

was delivered by paradrops. This technique called for close

air/ground coordination and the C-130 pilots relied on the Marine

Air Traffic Control Unit (MATCU) at Khe Sanh to guide them in

to the drop zones. The Marine ground controller lined the aircraft up on the long axis of the runway for a normal instrument

approach and when the Hercules passed a certain point over the

(*) V-ring is a term used on the rifle range to describe the

bull's-eye of a target.

78
eastern threshold of the field, the controller called "Ready,

Ready, Mark." At "Mark," the pilot pushed a stop watch, activated his Doppler navigational system, turned to a predetermined

heading and maintained an altitude of between 500 and 600 feet.

The Doppler device indicated any deviation from the desired

track to the drop zone, which was west of Red Sector, and the

release point was calculated by using the stop watch--20 to 26

seconds from "Mark," depending on the winds. At the computed

release point, the pilot pulled the C-130 into an 8-degree noseup attitude and 16 parachute bundles, containing 15 tons of

supplies, slid from the rear of the aircraft and floated through

the overcast into the 300-meter-square drop zone. Under Visual

Flight Rules (VFR), the average computed error for the drops

was only 95 meters. Even when these missions were executed completely under Instrument Flight Rules (IFR), the average distance

that the bundles landed from the intended impact point was 133

meters--well inside the drop zone. On a few occasions, however,

the parachute bundles missed the zone and drifted far enough

away from the base to preclude a safe recovery. In these rare

instances, friendly artillery and air strikes were brought to

bear on the wayward containers to keep them from falling into

the hands of the enemy. During the siege, Air Force C-130 crews

conducted a total of 496 paradrops at Khe Sanh.(*)(122)

Although the paradrops were sufficient for bulk commodities

such as rations and ammunition, there were certain items which

had to be delivered or picked up personally. Medical supplies,

special ammunition, and other delicate cargo would not withstand

the jolt of a parachute landing. In addition, there were

(*) Disparities in official records make it difficult to determine the exact tonnage delivered to Khe Sanh by air. The

USAF Historical Division Liaison Office states that, of the

14,356 tons delivered during the siege, Air Force planes were

responsible for 12,430 tons (8,120 tons by paradrop, LAPES and

GPES; 4,310 by aircraft landing at the field). On the other

hand, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing records show that Marine helicopters alone carried 4,661 tons of cargo. About three-fourths

of the helicopter tonnage, however, was lifted directly from

Dong Ha to the hill outposts and thus did not pass through the

main base at Khe Sanh. Neither total includes the contributions

made by Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 152; the

records of that unit only indicate the tonnage transported

throughout the whole of I Corps and do not break it down to the

amount delivered to individual bases such as Khe Sanh.

79
replacements to be shuttled into the base and casualties to be

evacuated. With the cancellation of all C-130 landings, this

job was left up to the sturdy C-123 Providers of the 315th Air

Commando Wing as well as MAG-36 and MAG-16 helicopters. The

choppers could maneuver around areas of heavy ground fire, land,

unload, take on medevacs, and depart very quickly but their payloads were limited. On the other hand, the C-123s had a larger

cargo capacity but were restricted to a more rigid approach and

provided better targets both in the pattern and on the ground.

(*)(123) The Providers, however, required much less runway from

which to operate than the C-130s and could land and take off

using only 1,400 of the 3,900 foot strip. This saving feature

enabled the pilots to make a steep approach, short roll-out,

and rapid turnaround. The crews still had to undergo those

frantic moments on the ground when the geysers of dirty-black

smoke bracketed their aircraft. Nevertheless, the dauntless

C-123 crews continued their perilous missions throughout the

siege with great success.(124)

No discussion of the airlift would be complete without

mention of the MAG-36 and MAG-16 helicopter pilots who flew in

and out of Khe Sanh daily delivering supplies, delicate cargo,

reinforcements, and evacuating casualties. The chopper crews

were faced with the same problems that plagued the fixed-wing

transports--low ceilings and enemy ground fire--but to a greater

degree because of their slow speed and vulnerability. MAG-36

operated primarily from Quang Tri and Dong Ha, and was reinforced

from the group's main base at Phu Bai. These valiant pilots

and crewmen in their Huey gunships, CH-46 transports, and

UH-34s flew long hours, day and night, in all kinds of weather

to sustain the Marines in and around Khe Sanh. The CH-53s of

Da Nang-based MAG-16, with their heavier payload, also made a

sizeable contribution to this effort.(125)

The resupply of the hill outposts was a particularly

hazardous aspect of the overall mission. Approximately 20 percent of Colonel Lownds' personnel occupied these redoubts and,

for all practical purposes, were cut off from the rest of the

garrison. The road north of the base was not secure and the

perimeters atop the hills were too small and irregular for parachute drops; the only way that the Isolated posts could be

(*) This resulted in another fiery crash on 6 March when a

C-123 was shot down while on approach to the field and all

aboard (43 USMC, 1 USN, and 4 USAF) were killed.

80
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81
sustained was by helicopter. When the dense monsoon clouds

rolled into the valley, the mountain tops were the first to become submerged and, as the overcast lifted, the last to reappear. During February, several of the outposts were completely

obscured for more than a week and resupply was impossible. Daring

these periods, the North Vietnamese took advantage of the reduced visibility and emplaced heavy automatic weapons along the

neighboring peaks and waited for the ceiling to lift which invariably heralded the arrival of helicopters. As a result,

the UH-lEs, UH-34s, and CH-46s were subjected to a hail of enemy

bullets during each mission.(126)

When the helicopters proceeded to the hills singly or in

small groups, each mission was a hair-raising experience for

both the chopper crews and the men on the ground. A good example

of what often transpired during those frantic moments occurred

early in the siege on Hill 831S when Captain Dabney called for

a chopper to evacuate a badly wounded Marine. One corporal was

assigned as a stretcher bearer because he had a badly impacted

wisdom tooth and, once aboard, he could ride out on the helicopter and have the tooth extracted at the main base.C*) Because of the 120mm mortars located in the Horseshoe and the

antiaircraft guns which ringed the hill, the men on 881S had to

employ a variety of diversions to keep the enemy gunners from

getting the range of the incoming choppers. In this instance,

they threw a smoke grenade a good distance away from the actual

landing zone in hopes that the gunners would register on the

smoke and the helicopter would be in and out before the North

Vietnamese could readjust. This meant that the helo had about

19 seconds to get off the ground.(127)

The ruse did not come off as planned. The stretcher bearers

had barely loaded the wounded man aboard the helicopter, a CH46, when 120mm mortar rounds bracketed the aircraft and spurred

the pilot to action. The helo lurched into the air and the

sudden jolt rolled the corporal with the bad tooth over the

(*) Having the ambulatory cases serve as stretcher bearers

was standard operating procedure on 881S. These men stayed on

the chopper and did not have to make the return trip to their

trenches under fire. When uninjured Marines served in this

capacity there was the added danger that the helicopter would

take off before they could debark and they would end up at Khe

Sanh. In one instance after the siege was lifted, Captain

Dabney spent a day at the combat base because he did not get

off a medevac chopper fast enough.

82
edge of the tail ramp; he held on desperately for a few seconds

but finally let go and fell about 20 feet to the ground. Cursing

to himself, the young man limped back to his trench and waited

for another chance.

Later that day, a UH-34 swooped in to pick up another

casualty and the prospective dental patient quickly scrambled

aboard. This trip also covered about 20 feet--10 feet up and

10 feet down--because the tail rotor of the UH-34 was literally

sawed off by a burst from an enemy machine gun just after the

bird became airborne. After the swirling craft came to rest,

the passengers and the three-man crew quickly clamored out the

hatch and dived into a nearby trench. A heavy mortar barrage

ensued during which several more men were hit.

By the time another CH-46 arrived on the scene, the passenger list had grown to 14, including 10 casualties, the crew of

the downed helo, and the original dental case. Because of the

heavy concentration of enemy fire in the original zone, the

Marines had blasted out another landing site on the opposite

side of the hill. The chopper touched down and 13 of the 14

Marines boarded before the crew chief stated emphatically that

the aircraft was full. As luck would have it, the young Marine

with the swollen jaw was the 14th man. Thoroughly indignant,

the three-time loser returned to his position and mumbled that

he would rather suffer from a toothache than try and get off

the hill by helicopter.(*)(128)

It was the consensus of both the ground commanders and

pilots alike that the problem of getting helicopters to and

from the hills was becoming critical. The technique then

employed was resulting in casualties among both the air crews

(*) During the course of the battle, 881S became a small graveyard for helicopters; at least five were downed on or around

the hill. Consequently, Company I gained a reputation among

chopper crews which lasted long after the siege was over. When

the 3d Battalion later departed Khe Sanh, Company I eventually

moved to Hill 55 near Da Nang. One afternoon, while evacuating

a wounded Marine, a CH-46 developed engine trouble and the pilot

decided to shut down for repairs. Another flight was sent to

pick up the wounded man and as the lead pilot approached ha

came up over the radio and asked his wingman where the landing

zone was. The wingman rep_lied: "Just look for the downed

chopper, India /Company 1/ always marks their zones that way."

83
and the infantry units, as well as a rapid rise in the attrition of MAG-36 helicopters. The Huey gunships, though putting

forth a valiant effort, did not possess the heavy volume of

fire required to keep the approach lanes open. As a result,

the 1st MAW adopted another system which provided more muscle.(129)

The solution was basically a page out of the Fleet Marine

Force Manual for Helicopter Support Operations. All helicopter

flights to the hill outposts were to be escorted by strike aircraft which would provide suppressive fire. The A-4 Skyhawks

of Chu Lai-based MAG-12 were selected as the fixed-wing escorts

and the little jet was perfect for the job. Affectionately

referred to as "Scooters" by their pilots, the A-4 was a highly

maneuverable attack aircraft; its accuracy, dependability, and

varied ordnance load had made it the workhorse of Marine close

air support for many years.

Generals Cushman and Anderson conceived the idea and the

details were worked out by Colonel Joel B. Bonner, Lieutenant

Colonel William J. White, and Lieutenant Colonel Richard E.

Carey at 1st MAW Headquarters. The operation went into effect

on 24 February. Because of the large number of aircraft

utilized in each mission--12 A-4s, 1 TA-4, 12 CH-46s,and 4 UH-1E

gunships--the overall effort was nicknamed the Super Gaggle by

its planners. The difficulty in execution was primarily one of

coordination and control because of the various agencies (i.e.

MAG-36, MAG-12, 3d MarDiv G-4, Dong Ha Logistics Support Area,

and the units on the hill outposts) which were involved. Additional factors that had to be considered were departure

weather, destination weather, and coordination of friendly

artillery and air strikes around Khe Sanh. Lieutenant Colonel

Carey, the 1st MAW Operations Officer and one of the planners,

later described the mechanics of the Super Gaggle:

Success of the effort was predicated on timing, coordination, and often times luck. Luck, as used, refers

to the ability to guess whether the weather would hold

long enough to complete an effort once it got underway.

The effort began with the TA-4 on station determining if

sufficient ceiling existed for the "Scooters" of MAG-12 to

provide sufficient suppressive fires to assure success...

Once the TA-4 called all conditions go, an "H" hour was

set and the Super Gaggle began. Twelve A-4s would launch

from Chu Lai while simultaneously 100 miles to the north

12-16 helos would launch from the Quang Tri helo base and

proceed to the Dong Ha LSA (Logistics Support Area) for

supply pickup. The object was for all aircraft to arrive

84
±M

m

After introduction of the Super Gaggle, CH-46 helicopters

with their 4,000-pound external loads proceeded to the

hill outposts in convoy. (USMC Photo A422061)

A-4 Skyhawks of Marine Aircraft Group-12 provided suppressive fire during resupply missions. (USMC Photo

A421671)

85
in the objective area on a precise schedule. So the operation generally consisted as follows: (1) Softening up

known enemy positions by four A-4s, generally armed with

napalm and bombs; (2) Two A-4s armed with CS (tear gas)

tanks saturate enemy antiaircraft and automatic weapons

positions; (3) 30-40 seconds prior to final run in by the

helos two A-4s lay a smoke screen along selected avenues

of approach....(4) While helos make final run into the

target, four A-4s with bombs,rockets, and 20mm guns provide close-in fire suppression.... Once the helos commenced

their descent the factors of weather, their 4,000-pound

externally carried load, and the terrain would not permit

a second chance. If an enemy gun was not suppressed there

was no alternative for the helos but to continue. They

(the transport pilots) were strengthened with the knowledge

that following close on their heels were their gunships

ready to pick them up if they survived being shot down.

Fortunately, these tactics were so successful that during

the entire period of the Super Gaggle only two CH-46s were

downed enroute to the hill positions. The crews were rescued immediately by escorting Huey gunships.(*)(130)

These missions, however, looked much more orderly on paper

than they did in the air and the operation lived up to its name.

Only those who have experienced the hazards of monsoon flying

can fully appreciate the veritable madhouse that often exists

when large numbers of aircraft are confined to the restricted

space beneath a low-hanging overcast. Coupled with this was the

fact that the fluffy looking clouds around Khe Sanh housed

mountains which ran up to 3,000 feet. No doubt, the aircrews

involved in the Gaggle were mindful of the standard warning

issued to fledgling aviators: "Keep your eyes out of the

cockpit; a mid-air collision could ruin your whole day." Even

though the missions were well-coordinated and executed with a

high degree of professionalism, it often appeared that confusion

reigned because planes were everywhere. A-4s bore in on the

flanks of the approach lanes blasting enemy gun positions and

spewing protective smoke; CH-46s groped through the haze trying

to find the landing zones; the hornet-like UH-1E gunships darted

in from the rear in case someone was shot down; and the lone

(*) For comparison, as many as 16 helicopters were utilized

up to four times in one day during the Super Gaggle without a

loss. Prior to the conception of this technique, as many as

three choppers were shot down in one day around Khe Sanh.

86
TA-4 circled overhead trying to keep his flock from running

amuck. During the missions to 881S, the men of India and

Mike, 3/26, added to the hullabaloo with a little twist of

their own. When the CH-46s settled over the hill, the Marines

on the ground tossed out a few dozen smoke grenades for added

cover and then every man in the perimeter fired a full magazine

at anything on the surrounding slopes which appeared hostile.

With some 350 men hosing down the countryside at the same time,

the din was terrific.

Neither the deluge of lead from 881S nor the suppressive

fire of the jets and gunships kept the NVA completely quiet.

The 120mm mortar crews in the Horseshoe were especially active

during the resupply runs to 881S and always lobbed some rounds

onf:o the hill in hopes of knocking down a helicopter. These

tubes had been previously registered on the LZs and the smoke

screens had little effect on their fire; as a result, the Marines

frequently shifted landing zones.(*) The smoke did block the

view of the North Vietnamese machine gunners and they were forced

to fire blindly through the haze--if they dared fire at all.

The choppers still took hits but nowhere near as many as before

the Gaggle was initiated. The CH-46 pilots, poised precariously

(*) There is an interesting possibility as to why the mortars

in the Horseshoe were never silenced. Fourteen years earlier,

at Dien Bien Phu, the North Vietnamese used an ingenious method

to protect their heavier siege mortars from air attacks and

they may well have repeated it at Khe Sanh. The mortar crews

selected a site on the slope of a hill, figured the elevation

and deflection necessary to hit one specific target, and then

dug a small tunnel at that precise angle into the side of the

hill. The mortar was emplaced at the bottom of the tunnel with

connecting caves which housed the gunners. When fired, the

mortar rounds traveled up the shaft, sometimes as far as 50 feet

before reaching the surface. The foliage was cleared away from

the mouth of the tunnel so that the rounds did not hit the overhanging br-inches and detonate prematurely. Mortars emplaced

in this manner were, of course, limited to only one target and,

as far as the gunners in the Horseshoe were concerned, that

target was 881S. When the siege was later broken and Marine

units began to maneuver in the terrain surrounding the hill mass,

they were never taken under fire by the 120mm mortars even

though they did receive fire from smaller caliber weapons.

Hill 881S, however, continued to be hit periodically by the

120mms.

87
above the LZs during the few agonizing seconds it took to unload their cargo, often heard the sickening smack which meant

that a bullet had torn into the fuselage of their thin-skinned

helos. The members of the two-man Helicopter Support Teams

(HST), 3d Shore Party Battalion who were attached to the rifle

companies were also prime targets. These men had to stand up

while they guided the choppers into the LZs and, every few days,

they had to attach bundles of cargo nets, which accumulated

from previous missions, for the return trip to Dong Ha. This

was dangerous for the aircrews as well as the HST men because,

during the hook-up, the pilots had to hold their aircraft in a

vulnerable position a few feet above the ground with the nose

cocked up and the belly exposed to fire from the front. While

they attached the bundles, the ground support personnel could

hear the machine gun rounds zing a few inches over their heads

and slap into the soft underside of the suspended helicopter.

Not all the bullets and shell fragments passed overhead; on

881S, the defenders were operating with their fourth HST when

the siege ended.

In spite of the seriousness of the situation, the Gaggle

was not without its lighter episodes. In one instance, an HST

man attached to 1/3/26 hooked up an outgoing load and gave the

pilot the "thumbs up" when he discovered that he had become entangled in the pile of nets. The CH-46 surged into the air

with the startled Marine dangling helplessly from the bottom of

the net by one foot. But for the quick reaction of his comrade

on the ground who informed the pilot by radio that the chopper

had taken on more than the prescribed load, the young cargo

handler would have had a rather interesting trip to Dong Ha.

The CH-46 crews also provided a human touch during these missions.

When the Sea Knights swept over the hills, it was not uncommon

to see a machine gunner on board quit his weapon for a second,

nonchalantly pitch a case of soda pop out the hatch, and then

quickly return to blaze away at the enemy positions. At 1st

MAW Headquarters, Lieutenant Colonel Carey, who had been an

infantryman in Korea before he went to flight school and who

sympathized with the men on the outposts, felt that a small

gesture acknowledging their continued outstanding performance

was in order. Special efforts were made to obtain quantities

of dry ice for packing and one day, without notice, hundreds

of Dixie-cups of ice cream were delivered to the men on the hills

as part of the regular resupply. This effort was dubbed Operation COOL IT. The only hitch developed on 881S where the Marines,

unaware of the contents, allowed the cargo to remain in the LZ

until after dark when it was safe to venture out of the trenchline.

88
The ice cream was a little sloppy but edible and greatly

appreciated.

The introduction of the Super Gaggle was a turning point

in the resupply effort. Prior to its conception, the Marines

on the outposts dreaded the thought of leaving their positions

to retrieve cargo--even when it included mail--because of the

heavy shelling. With a dozen Skyhawks pasting the surrounding

hills during each mission, this threat was alleviated to a large

degree and casualties tapered off. Tne Company I, 3/26, commander later stated: "If it weren't for the Gaggle, most of us

probably wouldn't be here today." The helicopter pilots, knowing

that their jet jockey compatriots were close at hand, were also

able to do their job more effectively. In the past, the transport crew chiefs occasionally had to jettison their external

load prematurely when the pilot took evasive action to avoid

ground fire. When this occurred, the cargo nets usually slammed

into the perimeter and splattered containers all over the hilltope (*)(131) With the Super Gaggle, the pilots had less enemy

fire to contend with and did not bomb the hills with the cargo

pallets as much; as a result more supplies arrived intact. In

addition, the system greatly facilitated the picking up of

wounded personnel.(**)

The Marine helicopters continued their flights to and from

Khe Sanh throughout the siege. In spite of the obstacles, the

chopper pilots crammed enough sorties into those days with flyable weather to haul 465 tons of supplies to the base during

February. When the weather later cleared, this amount was increased to approximately 40 tons a day. While supporting

Operation SCOTLAND, MAG-36 and MAG-16 flew 9,109 sorties, transported 14,562 passengers, and delivered 4,661 tons of cargo.(132)

(*) Of all the jettisoned loads, those containing water were

the most spectacular. On one occasion, a CH-46 carrying plastic

containers of water was forced to release the net about 200

feet above the ground. The containers broke open in midair and

the contents cascaded on the hill below. The Company E, 2/26,

commander, Captain Breeding,later recalled that it produced one

of the prettiest waterfalls he'd ever seen.

(**) It is no exaggeration to say that MAG-36 helicopters

played a decisive role in the battle. The maintenance of the

hill outposts was imperative if Khe Sanh was to be held, and

these units depended on the helicopters for survival.

89
Colonel Lownds was more than satisfied with the airborne

pipeline which kept his cupboard full and he had quite a cupboard. The daily requirement for the 26th Marines to maintain

normal operations had jumped from 60 tons in mid-January to

roughly 185 tons when all five battalions were in place. While

the defenders didn't live high off the hog on this amount, at

no time were they desperately lacking the essentials for combat.

There were periods on the hills when the Marines either stretched

their rations and water or went without, but they never ran

short of ammunition. Understandably, ammunition had the highest

priority--even higher than food and water. A man might not be

able to eat a hand grenade but neither could he defend himself

very effectively with a can of fruit cocktail. This did not

mean that the men of the 26th Marines went hungry. On the

average, the troops at the base received two C-Ration meals a

day and this fare was occasionally supplemented with juice,

pastry, hot soup, or fresh fruit. The men on the hills subsisted almost entirely on C-Rations and the time between meals

varied, depending on the weather. Within the compound, water

was rationed only when the pump was out of commission and that

was a rare occurrence. Lieutenant Colonel Heath's position on

Hill 558 was flanked by two streams so 2/26 was well supplied

but the Marines on the other four outposts depended on helilifts

for water; it was used sparingly for drinking and cooking.(*)(133)

Besides the essentials, the 26th Marines also required tons of

other supplies such as fortification material, fuel, tires,

barbed wire, and spare parts--to name a few. PX items were on

the bottom of the bottom of the priority totem pole because,

as Colonel Lownds remarked: "If you have to, you can live without those." On the other hand, mail had a priority second only

to ammunition and rations. The men at Khe Sanh received over

43 tons of mail during the worst month of the siege.(134)

One portion of the airlift which affected morale as much

as the arrival of mail was the swift departure of casualties.

A man's efficiency was greatly improved by the knowledge that,

(*) During one period of extremely bad weather, the platoon

from A/1/26 which held positions on Hill 950 went without resupply for nine days and the water shortage became a major

problem. Lieutenant Colonel Wilkinson authorized the platoon

commander, Second Lieutenant Maxie R. Williams, to send a squad

out to a small stream which was about two hours march from the

perimeter. In addition to finding water, the Marines surprised

a group of North Vietnamese and killed nine of the enemy. One

Marine was also killed.

90
A CH-46 helicopter of Marine Aircraft Group-36 evacuates

wounded from Hill 861A (Photo courtesy David D. Duncan)

U. S. Navy doctors and corpsmen, wearing helmets and flak

jackets, treat wounded at Charlie Med aid station. (Photo

courtesy David D. Duncan)

91
if he were hit, he could expect immediate medical attention

and when necessary, a speedy evacuation.(*) Those with minor

wounds were usually treated at the various battalion aid stations and returned to duty; the more seriously injured were

taken to Company C, 3d Medical Battalion. Charley Med, as this

detachment was called, was located just south of and adjacent

to the aircraft loading ramp. There, U. S. Navy doctors and

corpsmen treated the walking wounded, performed surgery, and

prepared the litter cases for medevac. From Charley Med, it

was a short, but often nerve-racking trip to a waiting aircraft

and a hospital at Phu Bai. During the siege, the courageous

men of Charley Med, often working under heavy enemy fire,

treated and evacuated 852 wounded personnel.(135)

Thus the Marine and U. S. Air Force transport pilots, helicopter crews, loadmasters, and ground personnel kept open the

giant umbilical cord which meant life for the combat base.

Without their efforts, the story of Khe Sanh would undoubtedly

have been an abbreviated edition with a not-too-happy ending.

On the other hand, accounts of the heroism, ingenuity, and

skill demonstrated by these men would fill a book. But there

were other things besides manna falling from the heavens at

Khe Sanh and the vital role of the transports was frequently

eclipsed by the efforts of air crews who carried a much deadlier

cargo.

(*) Bad weather occasionally precluded the immediate evacuation of casualties from the hill outposts.

92
PART VI

SUPPORTING ARMS AND INTELLIGENCE

The amount of air and artillery support that the 26th

Marines received during the defense of Khe Sanh was enormous.

Few regiments ever had such an overwhelming amount of firepower at their disposal. The reason was that General Westmoreland gave SCOTLAND priority over all other operations in Vietnam. The well-publicized struggle had long since become more

than just another battle; it was a symbol of Allied determination to hold the line in Vietnam. The stubborn resistance of

the 26th Marines had generated an emotional impact that was

felt not only in the United States but around the globe. Thanks

to a small army of war correspondents and reporters, millions

of people followed the battle day by day and, in essence, the

military prowess of the United States was exposed to the world.

The agency at the combat base which was responsible for

coordinating the vast array of supporting arms was the 26th

Marines FSCC which was headed by the 1/13 commander, Lieutenant

Colonel Henaelly. The FSCC, with its artillery and air representatives, was an integral part of the regimental staff and it

planned and supervised the execution of all fire missions within the SCOTLAND area of operations. Subordinate to the FSCC,

was the 1/13 Fire Direction Center (FDC), headed by Captain

Lawrence B. Salmon, and the Khe Sanh Direct Air Support Center

(DASC), under Major Charles D. Goddard. The FDC served as the

brain of the artillery battalion where initial fire requests

were received and transformed into numerical data for the gun

crews. To speed up the process, Captain Salmon relied heavily

on the Field Artillery Digital Automatic Computer or FADAC. The

DASC had displaced to the KSCB on 19 January with the sole mission of handling the deluge of incoming aircraft. Requests for

air support from the FSCC were channeled through the DASC to the

Tactical Air Direction Center of the 1st MAW. Whenever the

wing could not completely fill a quota, liaison teams within

the DASC called on the other services for assistance. Once the

schedule was met and the strike aircraft arrived on station, the

Marine DASC, aided by an Airborne Command and Control Center (ABCCC)

from Seventh Air Force, coordinated all air operations within

the Khe Sanh TAOR.(*)(137)

(*) Marine control of air support within the Khe Sanh TAOR

93
This mammoth air umbrella, called Operation NIAGARA, lasted

from 22 January until 31 March and was truly an Allied effort.

At one time or another, the Khe Sanh DASC utilized the assets

of all services: 1st MAW, Seventh Air Force, Strategic Air

Command, U. S. Navy Task Force 77, Vietnamese Air Force, and

various U. S. Army aviation companies. The majority of the

sorties, however, were flown by U. S. Marine, Navy, and Air Force

crews. Their mission was to "destroy enemy forces in the SCOTLAND

...TAOR, interdict enemy supply lines and base areas,...and provide maximum tactical...air support to friendly forces." Generally, the type of strike fell into one of three categories:

close air support, B-52 Arc Light strikes, or radar-controlled

bombing.(*)(138)

Close air support missions were utilized against pinpoint

targets in proximity of friendly troops. Along with radarcontrolled bombing, this type of air strike was the most responsive to the needs of the ground commanders and the most accurate;

the attack pilots, however, required reasonably good weather to

be able to hit their targets. Triere were usually fighter/bombers

overhead at Khe Sanh around the clock; if not,they could be

quickly scrambled from hot pads or diverted from other missions.

When the pilots arrived on station, they checked in with the

DASC and were handed off to a Marine or Air Force Tactical Air

Controller (Airborne) who personally directed the strike. There

resulted from negotiations between CG, III MAF and the Seventh

Air Force. General Cushman was delegated authority for Colonel

Lownds to control, through his FSCC, all supporting fire, including air strikes within a circle which encompassed the range

of the regiment's 155mm howitzers. During the period 22 January13 February, operational difficulties caused ComUSMACV to give

Commander, Seventh Air Force full responsibility for the overall

NIAGARA air effort through the ABCCC.

(*) Close air support in Vietnam includes all air attacks

that are coordinated with the supported force. Radar-controlled

bombing and B-52 strikes, in this context, can be called close

air support but, for the purposes of this study, the three above

mentioned categories will be considered separately. Although

the delivery method is technically not a criteria, close air

support in this text will refer to those missions where fixedwing pilots, under the direction of an airborne or ground controller, visually acquire and attack a target in proximity to

friendly forces.

94
were seven TAC(A)s assigned to the 26th Marines; the Air Force

personnel were members of the 20th Tactical Air Support Squadron

and the Marines were from Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron

36 and Marine Observation Squadron 6. At least five of these

pilots, flying 01-E Birddogs or UH-1E gunships, remained over

the battlefield during the day and maintained direct communications with both the attack aircraft and the troops on the ground.

In this manner, the TAC(A)s could rapidly employ the jets

wherever they were needed the most and the close supervision

reduced the chance of accidentally bombing friendly forces.

During the day, the air around Khe Sanh was filled with

the high-pitched shriek of jet engines: Marine, Navy, and Air

Force F-4 Phantoms; Marine and Navy A-6 Intruders, A-4 Skyhawks,

and F-8 Crusaders; Air Force F-105 Thunderchiefs and F-100 Super

Sabers. In addition to the jets, the South Vietnamese propdriven A-l Skyraider, a rugged attack aircraft of Korean War

vintage, was in evidence. At times, the sky overhead resembled

a giant beehive. When a flight arrived on station, the Khe Sanh

DASC normally directed it into a holding pattern until a TAC(A)

or a Forward Air Controller on the ground was free to handle

the strike. These patterns sometimes extended up to 35,000 feet

with scores of planes gradually augering their way downward as

each preceding flight unloaded its ordnance and scooted for home.

When a TAC(A) picked out a lucrative target or was assigned

one by the FSCC, he cleared the strike aircraft into his area.

The pilots then broke up whatever formation they were in, slipped

into trail, and snaked their way through holes in the overcast--

all the while keeping a sharp eye out for helicopters. Below

the clouds, the TAC(A)s and attack pilots often had difficulty

finding each other because of the ever present haze and dust.

Even on a clear day, the camouflaged Birddogs and Hueys were

hard to spot because they blended in so nicely with the surrounding landscape. To expedite the link-up, the jet pilots

frequently used Automatic Direction Finders to get a fix on the

TAC(A)s radio transmissions. All the while, the airborne spotter

was passing on pertinent information such as target description,

elevation, run-in heading, direction of pull-off, number of

passes, direction and distance of nearest friendly troops, and

whether ground fire was expected.

Wnen the controller and his flight made visual contact,

the real work began. The TAC(A) made a marking run during which

he either fired a smoke rocket or pitched out a colored smoke

grenade on the position he wanted hit. Once the attack pilots

95
^fltf; *>

*z

Marine and Air Force TAC(A)s controlled strike aircraft

from light observation aircraft called Birddogs. (USMC

Photo A402043)

UH-1E Gunships of Marine Observation Squadron-6 were also

used to direct close air support missions. (USMC Photo

A421451)

96
had the smoke, the TAC(A), and the nearest friendlies in sight,

they rolled in on the assigned heading and made dummy passes

until the controller was satisfied that the jets were lined up

on the right target. He then cleared them in for hot passes.

While the jets streaked in, the controller monitored his VHF

tactical net to the ground troops and gave short corrections

to the attack pilots over his UHF radio. An example of an

average commentary follows:

TAC(A): Number One, from my smoke go six o'clock

at 100 meters....PILOT: Roger, Ones in hot.. . TAC(A):

I have you in sight, you're cleared to fire....TAC(A):

PILOT: Ones off target...Switches Safe....TAC(A):

Number Two, from One's hits come three o'clock at 50

meters...PILOT: Roger, Two's in hot....etc., etc.

The aircraft continued their race track pattern until all

ordnance was expended at which time the leader announced that

his flight was pulling off "high and dry."(*)

The TAC(A) would then swoop low over the smoke-shrouded

target and attempt to record the results of the strike. This

Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) was relayed to the departing

pilots for their intelligence debriefing back at homeplate. An

example of one such transmission would be:

Your BDA follows: 5 KBA (killed by air); two bunkers,

1 automatic weapon, and 50 meters of trenchline destroyed;

one secondary explosion. You have been flying in support

of the 26th Marines; your controller has been SOUTHERN

OSCAR. Good shooting and good afternoon, gentlemen.

While the strike pilots checked out with the Khe Sanh DASC and

headed for home, the TAC(A) looked for another target and waited

for another flight.(139)

One of the most unusual incidents involving the use of

strike aircraft occurred near Hill 881S and the key figure in

the episode was a Marine from American Samoa--Lance Corporal

Molimao Niuatoa. The corporal was a bull of a man, who because

of his origin and wedge-shape physique was nicknamed "Pineapple

Chunk." (A second American Samoan in the company of considerably

(*) High and dry meant that all ordnance had been expended.

Another frequently used term was "ammo minus."

97
smaller stature was dubbed "Pineapple Tidbit.") But it was

not the muscles which distinguished Niuatoa, it was his eyes;

the man had absolutely phenomenal vision. During his recruit

training, this gift had enabled him to post a score of 241 out

of a possible 250 on the rifle range. Besides his vision, the

corporal had the patience of Job and a deep power of concentration- -qualities which were essential in his job as an artillery

spotter.

One day, Corporal Niuatoa, using a pair of 20-power naval

binoculars, was scanning in the direction of 305 when he picked

up the muzzle flash of an enemy artillery piece; he then saw

the gunners hurriedly cover the weapon with a screen. As the

round sputtered overhead on its way to Khe Sanh, the corporal

noted the position and reported his discovery to the company

commander. Referring to a map, Captain Dabney could not get

anything other than a general idea of the location because the

site was from 12,000 to 13,000 meters away and the terrain in

that area was so mountainous that he could not pinpoint the

exact contour line. Not so Corporal Niuatoa, he could see

exactly where the gun was and kept his eyes glued to the binoculars. Normally, he would have adjusted on the target with

marking rounds but the site was beyond the range of friendly

artillery. The only way the gun could be taken out was with

aircraft.

While Pineapple Chunk maintained his reference point, an

01-E Birddog aircraft arrived on the scene, and was directed to

the general area of the artillery position. On the heels of

the spotter craft came several flights of Marine A-4 Skyhawks

armed with 500-pound bombs. Although the TAC(A) didn't know

exactly where the target was, he rolled in and cranked off a

smoke rocket. The puff from the 2.75-inch rocket wasn't visible

to the Marines on 881S but the billowing clouds left by the

500-pound bombs of the first A-4 were. Using standard artillery

terminology, Corporal Niuatoa adjusted: "Left 2,000, add 1,000."

The corrections were passed to the TAC(A) who fired another

rocket, on which an A-4 pilot placed another string of bombs.

Gradually, the bracket was closed until a Skyhawk in the fourth

flight scored a direct hit and the gun position erupted in a

series of secondary explosions.(140)

The NVA troops, however, were not always on the receiving

end; they frequently dished it out. In addition to numerous

helicopters shot down around the combat base, several of the

speedier jets were also knocked out of the sky. During one

98
Marine F-4B Phantom delivers Snakeye bombs on enemytrenches. Large tail fins retard the descent of the

bombs. (Photo courtesy David D. Duncan)

Corporal Robert J. Arrotta (center), controlled over 200

airstrikes from Hill 881S. (Photo courtesy Major William

H. Dabney)

99
close air support mission, an A-4 flown by Major William E.

Loftus of Marine Attack Squadron 311 received heavy battle

damage and the pilot realized that he could not make it to

the coast. Not wanting to end up in "Indian Country," he

nursed his crippled Skyhawk toward Khe Sanh and ejected right

over the base. As the smoking A-4 knifed into the lush jungle

growth and erupted in a brilliant orange fireball, Major Loftus

floated down and landed in an outer ring of barbed wire just

outside the Company B, 1/26 perimeter. Lieutenant Dillon, the

2d Platoon commander, took several men out and helped extricate

the major who had become hopelessly entangled in his parachute

shroud lines and the barbed wire. After being freed, Major

Loftus grinned and told the lieutenant: "If you weren't so

damn ugly, I'd kiss you." After a quick medical check-up, the

major climbed aboard a helicopter and returned to his squadron

at Chu Lai for another plane and another day.(141)

One of the closest escapes, however, occurred to the southwest of the base. In late January, Lieutenant Colonel Harry T.

Hagaman, Commanding Officer of Marine Fighter Attack Squadron

323, and his Radar Intercept Officer, Captain Dennis F. Brandon,

were leading a flight of F-4B Phantoms against what the TAC(A)

described as a "suspected" antiaircraft position. The enemy

gunners confirmed their presence during the first pass. As

Lieutenant Colonel Hagaman's F-4B, armed with napalm and 250-

pound Snakeyes, skimmed low over the treetops, the North Vietnamese cut loose and laced the belly of his plane with a stitch

of 50 caliber shells. The aircraft shuddered under the impact

and burst into flames. Captain Brandon, a backseat veteran

with over 300 combat missions, knew instantly when he heard the

series of ominous "thuds" that the Phantom had been mortally

wounded; he quickly pulled his face curtain and ejected. Lieutenant Colonel Hagaman stayed with the bucking Phantom momentarily

in a vain effort to stabilize the aircraft by using his rudders.

The delay almost cost the pilot his life because the F-4B began

to tumble end-over-end barely 100 feet above the ground. Suddenly the world outside became a spinning blur of blue and green.

The second time that he saw green--indicating that the aircraft

was inverted--Lieutenant Colonel Hagaman started to pull his

alternate ejection handle which was located between his knees.

In the second that it took the escape mechanism to function,

the Phantom flipped upright and the ejection cartridges blasted

the pilot from the flaming cockpit. Seconds later, the plane

cartwheeled into the ground and exploded. The pilot was so low

when he "punched out" that the chute had scarcely deployed when

his feet touched the ground. Both crewmen hid in the tall

100
elephant grass within earshot of the North Vietnamese who were

searching for them. Within minutes, rescue helicopters lumbered

on the scene and, while the downed crew's wingman made dummy

passes to discourage the enemy soldiers, the choppers darted in

and plucked the shaken, but otherwise uninjured, Marines to

safety.(*)(142)

If there was anything that could top that performance, it

was the spectacular air shows provided daily by B-52 Stratofortresses of the 4133d Provisional Heavy Bombardment Wing,

based at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam,and the 4258th Strategic

Bombardment Wing in Thailand., The B-52 pilots did not count

on finesse as much as they did on sheer power because each

Stratofortress carried a 27-ton payload of 108 mixed 500- and

750-pound bombs. Since these giants had the means to virtually

move mountains, the Arc Light strikes were used on area targets

such as troop concentrations, marshalling points, supply depots,

and bunker sites. The result of the enemy build-up around the

base was an enormous number of targets located in dispersed but

common areas and such complexes were ideal for heavy bombers.

These targets were programmed into computers aboard the aircraft and the strikes were conducted from altitudes above 30,000

feet. To the bomber crews,it was an impersonal type of warfare

because, from above the overcast, they rarely even saw their

bombs explode. The bombs did not have to be seen to be felt.(143)

When several flights of B-52s worked over a target, the results were awesome. The exploding bombs churned up strips of

the terrain several thousand meters long and the ground for

miles around literally shook from the blasts. Many enemy casualties were sustained from the concussion alone. One entry from

a captured North Vietnamese diary read: "18 February: The

heavy bombing of the jets and B-52 explosions are so strong

that our lungs hurt." In some instances, NVA soldiers were

found after an Arc Light strike wandering around in a daze with

blood streaming from their noses and mouths.(**) Often the

(*) Both crews suffered sore backs from the ejection but no

other injury. Lieutenant Colonel Hagaman became the third CO

in a row from VMFA-323 to leave an F-4B via the ejection route.

Captain Brandon returned to action and eventually compiled 400

combat missions--a first for Marine Radar Intercept Officers.

(**) To catch stunned survivors above ground, the 1/13 batteries frequently put massed artillery fire into the target area

10 to 15 minutes after the bombers departed.

101
internal hemorrhaging induced by the concussion was so severe

that it resulted in death. Quite understandably, such missions

could not be unleashed too close to the Marines.(144)

In the early stages of the conflict, Arc Light strikes

were not authorized within a prescribed distance of friendly

lines. The same rule had applied during the heavy fighting at

Con Thien the year before and the NVA had taken advantage of

the buffer zone by moving troops and supplies in as close to

the Marine base as possible to avoid the bomber raids. They

tried the same thing at Khe Sanh. When American airborne observers noted enemy bunker complexes cropping up near the KSCB,

the no-bomb line was moved in to about half of the original

distance. At first the regimental commander was afraid that

the resulting concussion would collapse his own bunkers and

trenches; as it turned out,the enemy fortifications were the

only ones which suffered. The first few B-52 raids inside the

old line touched off scores of secondary explosions and undoubtedly snapped the North Vietnamese out of their sense of

security. The closer strikes also served as a morale booster

for the defenders who flocked from their bunkers to watch, what

the Marines called, "Number One on the hit parade."(145)

According to the regimental Target Intelligence Officer

(TIO), Captain Mirza M. Baig, the B-52 was an accurate weapons

system which the FSCC employed around Khe Sanh much the same

as the other supporting arms. About 95 percent of the Arc Light

missions were targeted at the 26th Marines headquarters.(*)

Requests were submitted to the 3d Marine Division Air Officer

15 hours prior to the drop at a rate of 8 strikes every 24 hours0

Up to three hours before the strike, the TIO, upon direction,

could divert the bombers to new unscheduled targets, but after

that the Stratofortresses were restricted to their original

target. The response time was later trimmed even more by using

cells of three B-52s which left Guam and Thailand every three

hours; this put the bombers over Khe Sanh every hour and a half.

In spite of this streamlining, the B-52s were never as responsive

(*) General Westmoreland gave his constant personal attention

to the targeting of these strikes and while most of the targets

were generated by the 26th Marines Headquarters, General

Westmoreland personally approved the requests. Based on intelligence he also directed or diverted B-52 raids from Saigon.

TD keep right on top of this aspect of the battle, the general

slept at night in his Combat Operations Center during the siege,

102
or flexible as the droves of fighter/bombers which were overhead constantly. Nevertheless, the devastating power and

psychological effect produced by the Stratofortresses, coupled

with the surprise factor, made them an extremely valuable

adjunct. (*) (146)

The type of strike which most impressed the regimental

commander, however, was the ground-controlled radar bombing.

Although these raids lacked the punch of an Arc Light strike,

they were as accurate and flexible as dive-bombing attacks and

could be conducted in the worst weather. In fact, the technique

was designed especially to cope with the inherent bad weather

which accompanied the monsoons in Southeast Asia when attack

aircraft could not get below an overcast to hit the target.

The controlling agency at Khe Sanh for these strikes was

Air Support Radar Team - Bravo (ASRT-B), Marine Air Support

Squadron 3 which had moved from Chu Lai on 16 January. The

ground controllers operated from a heavily reinforced van which

housed their sensistive computer equipment and used the TPQ-10

radar to guide aircraft to their target; thus, the missions

were called TPQs.(**)(147) The radar emitted a pencil-shaped

beam which detected and locked on to the aircraft. Using target coordinates provided by the FSCC, the controller programmed

the enemy position, ballistic characteristics of the bombs,

current winds, and other pertinent data into a computer which

was connected to the radar. The computer also received inputs

from the radar and, in turn, provided corrections in airspeed,

altitude, and heading which the operator passed on to the pilot.

The controller closely monitored his set and, at a predetermined

release point, called a "Mark" to the pilot who "pickled" his

bombs.(***) In specially-equipped aircraft, such as the A-4

(*) The 26th Marines Command Chronology does not list sorties

but strikes which were made up of several aircraft and 430

strikes were recorded.

(**) xhe van, as well as crew living quarters, was emplaced

underground and was heavily sandbagged. The sturdiness of the

bunker was an important factor because of the heavy shelling.

One enemy round scored a direct hit on top of the blanker with

no damage to the fragile equipment. The computer van remained

operational throughout the siege.

(***) The term "pickled" is slang used by pilots which means

to drop their ordnance.

103
Skyhawk and the A-6 Intruder, the bombs could be released automatically from the ground. One ground controller could handle

a single plane, a section (two planes), or a division (four

planes) on the same pass as long as the pilots flew in a tight

formation and the radar did not break lock. One of the controllers' favorite aircraft was the A-6 because it packed such

a heavy wallop; a single Intruder usually carried 28 500-pounders.

Any fighter/bomber, however, could be used as long as it carried

low-drag ordnance and the pilot could make a smooth run.(148)

Even though most TPQs were conducted from around 14,000

feet, the accuracy of ASRT-B was phenomenal. When new personnel

arrived at Khe Sanh, they were given several check drops on a

nearby hill to test their proficiency before the newcomers were

allowed to conduct strikes near friendly troops. The first

drop was always within 40 meters of the target and, after they

adjusted there was virtually no error. Calibration drops were

also conducted twice weekly to ensure the accuracy of the

equipment. One member of the FSCC stated that, if he were in

a foxhole and under attack, he would have no qualms about calling

an ASRT-B controlled TPQ within 35 meters of his position. The

rule of thumb which the FSCC generally applied when determining

a safe distance for normal operations, however, was one meter

from the friendlies for every pound of conventional ordnance

being delivered. Thus, for TPQs, a 250-pound bomb would not

normally be dropped within 250 meters of Allied troops, a 500-

pounder within 500 meters, and so on, This criteria was not

established because the men on the ground lacked confidence in

the system but because of the large fragmentation pattern produced by the bombs. Besides, anything inside the prescribed

radius could be handled just as effectively by artillery,

mortars, and direct fire weapons. In an emergency, the regimental commander would have undoubtedly lifted the restriction.

Concerning the quality of support he received from ASRT-B,

Colonel Lownds said, "Anything but the highest praise would not

be enough."(149)

In addition to its accuracy, the TPQ system was extremely

flexible. A strike could be programmed and executed within 10

or 12 minutes utilizing any available aircraft. Most of the

missions were at night when it was inefficient and dangerous

to conduct dive-bombing strikes. As a matter of routine, two

Marine and three Air Force flights were scheduled every hour

unless an emergency developed. On 18 February, ASRT-B set a

new squadron record for a single 24-hour period by controlling

aircraft which delivered 486 tons of ordnance on 105 separate

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105
targets. After that, the record was approached frequently but

never broken. During the siege, ASRT-3 controlled 4,989 TPQs

in support of the 26th Marines.(150)

Beginning on 20 February, ASRT-B also assisted with

supply drops whenever the Khe Sanh MATCU was inoperable. Normally, the controllers could have guided the transport pilots

to an exact release point but, at Khe Sanh, the C-130s had to

fly directly over the station and the TPQ-10 would break lock.

(*)(151) Therefore, the ASRT personnel used the same technique

as the MATCU controllers and called a "Mark" when the Hercules

was over the eastern threshold and the pilots completed the

runs with Doppler navigation and stop watches. Tne only problem

was that, when the ASRT conducted supply drops, it was drawn

away from the primary mission of handling TPQs.(152)

While air support was vital to the defense of the base,

Colonel Lownds felt that his artillery played an equally important role. When the fighting first broke out, the colonel

surmised that the side which managed to keep its artillery intact would win the battle. The Marine artillery emerged almost

unscathed. Many incoming rounds landed within the battery positions, however, very few actually hit the gun pits and throughout the operation only three artillery pieces at the base were

destroyed; one was a 155mm howitzer parked alongside the loading

ramp awaiting airlift to Dong Ha.(**) Generally the pieces,

were tucked away inside heavily sandbagged revetments and, while

the crews were often showered with fragments, it would have

taken a direct hit, squarely on top of the weapon, to knock out

a howitzer. Fortunately for the Marine gunners, the North Vietnamese scored only one such a hit which led the regimental

commander to the conclusion: "Either they were amazingly inaccurate or we were amazingly lucky."(153)

The enemy's failure to silence Lieutenant Colonel Hennelly's

batteries was a big point in favor of the Marines. While

American news reporters gave wide coverage to the number of

shells falling on the base, they frequently neglected to mention

that 1/13 answered each enemy round with 10 of its own. Throughout

(*) When a TPQ-10 broke lock, the radar beam strayed from

the aircraft and inputs to the computer were interrupted. Tne

operator also lost visual contact on the radar screen.

(**) One 105mm howitzer on 881S was also destroyed.

106
the battle, 1/13 cranked out 158,891 mixed rounds in direct

support of the 26th Marines. The methods employed by the FSCC

were reminiscent of those used in World War I. Time On Target

(TOT) by massed batteries, Harassment and Interdiction (H&I)

by battery volley instead of a single piece, artillery boxes,

rolling barrages, and battery zones were a few techniques

adopted by the FSCC which more than lived up to its motto:

"Be Generous."(*)

Since the enemy did most of his manuevering under the cover

of darkness, that was when the Marine and Army batteries were

the most active. Captain Baig, who wore one hat--Target Intelligence Officer--in the S-2 section and another--Target Information Officer--in the FSCC later described a good night's work:

An average night's pattern of pre-planned fires was

as follows: Combined TOTs from 9 batteries (4-6); separate

battalion TOTs (Army 4-6, Marine 10-15); battery multiple

volley individual missions (40-50); battery H&Is (20-30).

Normal 1 gun, 1 round H&Is were not used; this type of fire

was of little value. Marine and Army artillery were employed in target areas and at ranges to reduce to a minimum

check fires caused by the arrival of TPQ and reconnaissance

aircraft. Later, as we learned finesse, air was given the

targets south of the base and west of the maximum range

of the 175mm guns; 1/13 was given any targets whose range

required a maximum ordinate of less than 14,000 feet

(altitude of TPQ run); and the 175mm guns were assigned

targets to the north, northwest, and east of the base.

Such were the pre-planned fires.(155)

In addition to volume, reaction time was a key factor. Unless friendly aircraft in the target area necessitated a check

fire, artillery response was immediate--no matter what the

weather. To test the proficiency of the Fire Direction Center

and the gun crews, Colonal Lownds periodically walked into the

(*) Not every artillery round that left Khe Sanh was high explosive. During March, Lieutenant Colonel Hennelly's battalion

had accumulated more ammunition than it could safely store. Since

the ammo would not fit in the berms and presented a hazard above

ground, the decision was made to fire it all. This excess included some 90-odd rounds of green smoke. On 17 March--St.

Patrick's Day--the Marines fired all the green smoke rounds on

known enemy positions to honor the patron saint of the Fighting

Irish.

107
A 105mm howitzer of 1/13 lashes out at NVA troops surrounding Khe Sanh. The artillery battalion was in direct

support of the 26th Marines. (USMC Photo A190832)

The 175mm guns of the 2d Battalion, 94th Artillery, USA

were in general support of the Khe Sanh garrison. This

gun was located at Camp J. J. Carroll. (USMC Photo

A190709)

108
FSCC bunker, pointed to a spot on tha huge map which adorned

the wall and directed Lieutenant Colonel Hennelly to hit it.

The coordinates were quickly sent to the FDC where they were

either fed into the FADAC computer or worked out manually and

the firing data was then passed on to the gun crew. After adjusting the tube, the gunners slammed a round home and sent it

on its way. Hie entire process usually took less than 40 seconds.

This "instant artillery" constantly hampered enemy movement within tha TAOR and helped break up numerous attacks.(156)

The defensive fire plan adopted by the FSCC was separate

from and not to be confused with the final protective fires

employed by the defenders who manned the perimeter. The artillery batteries were used to prevent the enemy assault forces

from reaching the wire and to cut off the lead elements from

reinforcements. The fact that the North Vietnamese usually

attacked with their battalions in column made it somewhat easier

for the FSCC to isolate the assault elements from the reserves.

When the enemy launched his attack, the FSCC placed a three^

sided artillery box around tha lead battalion; three batteries

of 1/13 executed this mission. The fourth battery then closed

the remaining side, which faced the friendly positions, with a

barrage that rolled from one end of the box to the other--much

like a piston within its cylinder. The NVA force in the box

could not escape and could not avoid the rolling barrage. Those

North Vietnamese who spilled out of the open end of the box were

subjected to the final protective fires of the Marines along

the perimeter.

At the same time 1/13 worked over the assault force, the

FSCC put a secondary box into effect for the benefit of the

back-up units. The Army 175mm batteries were responsible for

two sides which were about 500 meters outside the primary box.

On order, the gunners rolled their barrages in toward the sides

of the primary box and back out again. The third side was

sealed by continuous flights of aircraft under the control of

the TPQ-10 radar, whenever B-52s could be diverted in time,

Arc Light strikes were used to saturate the approach routes to

the battle area.(157)

Another key factor in tha defense of Khe Sanh was the

manner in which Lieutenant Colonel Hennelly's FSCC coordinated

their air effort with the artillery so that the two components

were complimentary. One prime example was the Mini-Arc Light

which was devised by the Assistant Fire Support Coordinator,

Captain Kenneth 0. W. Steen and the TIO, Captain Baig. As the

109
name implies, this technique was used against an area target

the same as a B-52 strike, only the former could be organized

and employed much quicker. When intelligence reports indicated

that NVA units were in a certain region, the FSCC plotted a

500 by 1,000-meter block in the center of the suspected area

or across a likely route of march. Two A-6 Intruders, each

armed with 28 500-pound bombs, were called on station for a

TPQ and the batteries at Khe Sanh, Camp Carroll, and the Rockpile

were alerted for a fire mission. Thirty seconds before the two

A-6s dropped, the 175mm batteries, concentrating their fire on

one half of the block, salvoed the first of approximately 60

rounds. At the same time the A-6s rippled their load down the

middle of the block, the 1/13 batteries opened up on the second

half with around 200 155mm, 105mm, and 4.2-inch rounds. The

trajectory and flight time of all ordnance were computed so that

the bombs and initial artillery shells hit at the same instant.

The saturation of the target area was such that any enemy

soldiers caught in the zone during the bombardment simply

ceased to exist.(158)

During the second week in February, a special Mini-Arc

Light was directed against a major NVA headquarters. Two

members of the 26th Marines S-2, Majors Robert B. Coolidge and

Jerry E. Hudson, learned from their various sources that a

force-wide meeting of NVA commanders and their staffs would

occur in an abandoned schoolhouse near the Laotian border. A

beefed-up Mini was prepared to welcome the delegates. For this

strike, the target block was reduced to 500 by 300 meters around

the schoolhouse which would take in, as one of the planners

stated, "the hangers-on and other idlers who usually congregate

around large staffs." Twenty minutes after the meeting was

scheduled to start, the trap was sprung. Two Marine A-6 Intruders and four F-4B Phantoms unloaded 152 500-pound bombs into

the block in concert with the opening volleys of eight artillery

batteries (total of 350 artillery rounds).(159) The target was

obliterated, but whether or not this unusual ambush netted any

NVA brass-hats was never ascertained.

The Micro-Arc Light was executed in the same manner as the

Mini except smaller amounts of ordnance were used and the block

was cut down to 500 by 500 meters. Any aircraft on station

would suffice, preferably ones armed with 12 to 16 500-pounders.

Artillery fire was reduced to 30 rounds from the 175mm guns and

100 mixed rounds from Lieutenant Colonel Hennelly's battalion.

The advantage of the Micro was that it could be put into effect

within 10 minutes while it took roughly 45 minutes to plan and

110
execute the Mini. On an average night, three to four Minis

and six to eight Micros were executed, usually to the south

and southeast of the base; both were extremely effective.(160)

The massive firepower supporting the Marines would have

been almost useless had they not known where and when to employ it. The 26th Marines intelligence section was responsible for this facet of the operation and these people had more

than a passing knowledge of the enemy's past strategy. At

Dien Bien Phu and Con Thien, the Communists had followed a

fairly predictable pattern--not unlike the classic siege of the

18th Century. There were three distinct phases involved in

this type of campaign: arrival on the scene and encirclement

of the garrison, construction of siege works and support facilities, T-ing the sapheads and final assault. After investing

the base, the North Vietnamese first established numerous forward logistic bases within a few thousand meters of the base.

Under the cover of darkness, the enemy soldiers dug a series

of shallow trenches, interlaced with supply bunkers, leading

from these points toward the American positions. The first

trenches began to appear at Khe Sanh around 23 February and the

heaviest concentration was to the south and southeast. Once

in close, the main trenches branched off into ones which

paralleled the Marines lines; these secondary trenches, which

from the air looked like long fingers reaching greedily toward

the base, were the ones from which the NVA assault troops intended to attack.(161)

At first, the defenders tried to prevent the enemy from

moving in too close to the base. The routes into the valley

were saturated; artillery H&I fire and frequent air strikes

were employed but such tactics only tended to slow down the

enemy and force him to bypass certain routes--they did not stop

him. Constant, massed artillery would have effectively blocked

infiltration but that alternative was, from a logistics standpoint, impossible. The 5-2 personnel recommended that the best

way to counter the enemy was to allow the North Vietnamese to

close and pursue their siege tactics and then, to borrow a

phrase used by General "Chesty" Puller (then a colonel) on 28

November 1950 when his regiment was surrounded near the Chosin

Reservoir in Korea, "that simplifies our problem of finding

these people and killing them."(162)

The S-2 section utilized a multitude of sources to develop

an accurate picture of the enemy's activity around the base.

While much of this information was self-generated, the 26th

111
Marines received substantial intelligence support from the MACV,

III MAF, and 3d Marine Division Headquarters. Ground and aerial

observers, photo reconnaissance, infrared imagery, target lists

of higher headquarters, crater analysis, shell/flash reports,

and agent reports were all tools of the intelligence community

at Khe Sanh. By comparing this information with the knowledge

of enemy doctrine as applied in past situations, the S-2 staff

was able to accurately estimate the intentions of the NVA on a

day-to-day basis.

One good example of how this intelligence produced hard

results occurred in late February. From their various inputs,

the two men who were responsible for the earlier attack on the

NVA staff conference, Majors Coolidge and Hudson, pinpointed

the exact location of 12 artillery positions and 2 major ammunition depots. These targets were concentrated in two main areas

to the south of the base. Air strikes were called in on the

enemy positions and, after the planes departed, the whole area

erupted in secondary explosions which lasted for the next 40

minutes. Two weeks later, these officers repeated a similar

performance in another area.(163)

The activities of the intelligence community at Khe Sanh

and higher headquarters were vital to the conduct of the battle.

A3.most every major attack against the 26th Marines was picked

up well in advance by the S-2 section. whenever enemy

activity was detected, the information was passed to the FSCC

and this was the signal for Colonel Lownds to put his defensive

fire plan into effect. The base was placed on Red Alert, the

primary and secondary boxes fired, and saturation air strikes

were employed. This method of cutting off the attack force by

massed fires, once the S-2 section had provided a warning,

proved to be a decisive factor in thwarting the major enemy

thrusts which came late in February.(164)

112
PART VII

THE TURNING POINT

While the supporting arms continued to whittle away at

the enemy's strength, the defensive posture of the 26th Marines

grew more formidable with each passing day. By the end of

February, the Americans and Soath Vietnamese had erected some

510 bunkers, dug miles of trenehline, and laid hundreds of

minefields and trip flares. Each sector was guarded by a maze

of double-apron, tanglefoot, and concertina barbed wire obstacles. (*) The Marines also had sophisticated anti-infiltration

equipment such as the Night Observation Device, the PPS-6

ground-surveillance radar, and the Starlight Scope; all of

which could detect infiltrators along the wire during nighttime and other periods of reduced visibility.(165) Wherever

these apparatus were employed, the number of enemy killed along

the perimeters increased and the number of probes decreased.

In addition to the standard issue, the men improvised

many of their own jerry-rigged gadgets. Drawing from his

childhood experiences on the farm, Colonel Lownds devised a

type of electric fence which was employed along some of the

company fronts in the main perimeter. The plan was simple;

the Marines figured out which strands of barbed wire the enemy

would more than likely cut to penetrate those obstacles and

they attached trip wire in a circuit. Flashlight batteries

were the power source and the network of wires tied into a

central switchboard located in each company CP. When a North

Vietnamese soldier clipped the barbed wire, he short-circuited

the system and one of the warning lights on at the switchboard

went out. A few grenades in the right place or a broadside

from a Claymore mine and the snooper usually became another

grim statistic.

On the hill outposts, the fougasse was used extensively.

The Marines dug holes along the slopes which faced the enemy

(*) Tanglefoot, as the name implies, is a barbed wire entanglement that is stretched low to the ground and is usually used

between larger barriers. Concertina comes in rolls which are

laid side by side or on top of each other. Double-apron obstacles

are simply barbed wire fences in depth.

113
and embedded barrels or cans of mixed gasoline and diesel fuel.

The detonator for this volatile concoction was usually a

grenade, a blasting cap, or a pound of C-4 plastic explosive

taped to the container. The triggering device was a wire

leading back up the hill to the Marine positions. When

attacked, the defender simply jerked the wire and detonated

the lethal munitions.(166)

The Scout Sniper Platoon attached to the 26th Marines

provided another kind of deterrent. At least one team of these

hand-picked, specially-trained sharpshooters was assigned to

each company. Using commercial, bolt-action rifles with highpowered scopes, the snipers preyed on individual NVA soldiers

who carelessly exposed themselves around the fringes of the

perimeter. Patience was a must in this business and the marksmen often waited for days until their quarry appeared. When

the snipers finally got a chance to practice their deadly art,

the results were almost unbelievable. As though they were

firing for record on a rifle range, they calculated the wind,

adjusted their slings, took steady positions, and slowly squeezed

off their shots. Many North Vietnamese who felt safe beyond

1,000 meters of the Marine positions never received a chance to

ponder their mistake. The psychological impact was also a

factor. One can imagine the eerie feeling experienced by an

NVA soldier who had just seen a comrade "zapped" and never

heard the report of the rifle that did the trick.(167)

By no stretch of the imagination did the 26th Marines have

a monopoly on good snipers. The NVA marksmen, armed with rifles

and scopes which were comparable to those of their American

counterparts, lurked around the edges of the perimeters--

especially the hill outposts--and waited for a target. Although

none of this deadly business could be categorized as humorous,

there was one sniper incident on Hill 881S which could not help

but evoke a chuckle. The men of Company I had been cursed with

the presence of a particularly accurate sniper who was located

in the brush to the south of their perimeter. The rifleman

scored frequently and had wounded 10 Marines in the period of

about a week, all of whom were medevaced. In addition to being

a hazard, the sniper was also a general nuisance. A man moving

from one place to another within the perimeter was always hurried

on his way by slugs which kicked up dirt at his heels or buzzed

past his head like angry hornets. Thus, the Marines were constantly waiting for the culprit to expose himself and one day

a glint off the telescopic sight proved to be his undoing. The

Marines marked his position and, on Captain Dabney's order,

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115
lugged a 106mm recoilless rifle from the northern side of the

hill, sighted in, and blew the sniper away--tree and all. The

victory was short lived because his successor proved equally

as effective. More Marines were hit. The second rifleman

lasted about as long as the first before he suffered the same

fate at the hands of the 106mm gunners.

His replacement, however, was a complete wash-out. Expending between 20 and 30 rounds a day, the misfit flailed

away for over a week without hitting anyone. In the process,

he too gave himself away. After the Marines had manhandled the

106 into position for the third time, and were sighting in,

one private, after deep thought, approached the company commander with a proposition: "Skipper, if we get him, they'll

just replace him with someone who might be able to shoot. He

hasn't hit anyone so why not leave him there until he does."

It was so ordered. The sniper's ineptitude had saved his life

and he blasted away for the rest of the battle and never

touched a soul.(*)(168)

The incident with the snipers pointed out the advantage

of having 106mm recoilless rifles on the hills. Unlike the

artillery pieces at Khe Sanh, the 106mms were used in a direct

fire role and because of their extremely flat trajectory,

they could be employed when attack aircraft were in the target

area. Another feature which endeared these weapons to the

Marines was their extraordinary accuracy. The recoilless rifles

were used with great finesse, especially against the wellcamouflaged enemy gun positions which ringed the outposts. In

most cases, it required minute adjustments to put a round

squarely on target and knock out these emplacements. This was

evident in one instance when a 106mm on 881S was used to silence

an NVA 12.7mm machine gun which had been spraying Marine helicopters.

The automatic weapon was situated inside the mouth of a

small tunnel which had been cut deep into the side of a hill

located north of the Company I, 3/26, perimeter. The tiny

aperture, which faced south, restricted the gunner's fields of

fire but that was no drawback because he only concentrated on

(*) To rub salt into the wound, the Marines devised a red

flag--Maggies Drawers--like the ones used on rifle ranges to

signal that the shooter had missed the entire target, and

waved it every time the sniper fired.

116
the resupply choppers as they hovered over the Marine positions.

On the other hand, the small opening prevented the gun from

being knocked out by anything except a direct hit from the

front. Once the men on 881S had pinpointed the heavily camouflaged site, they went to work with their 106mm. Out of necessity, their firing routine was erratic; the gunners cranked off

a round, dived for cover when enemy mortars responded, jumped

up, adjusted the weapon, and fired again. While spotters

guided them with such unorthodox jargon as "Right a tad," or

"Up a hair," the gunners repeated the process and slowly closed

in on the enemy position. Finally, one glowing round disappeared

completely into the side of the hill and a split second later

there was a muffled explosion from deep within. Smoke belched

out the mouth of the tunnel and the NVA machine gun was no more.

This performance was repeated several times during the battle

with the same results.(169)

The three 105mm howitzers on 881S were also used extensively in the direct fire role and were especially useful

against targets of opportunity. The ever-present fog around

the hill reduced the number of such targets but on one occasion

a momentary break in the weather yielded an extremely lucrative

prize. When the fog suddenly lifted, an alert Company I machine gunner spotted a 20-man column of North Vietnamese

slowly climbing Hill 758 which was due south of 881S. They

were carrying what appeared to be several mortar tubes. The

Marine immediately opened fire and even though the range was

1,200 meters he managed to hit several of the enemy soldiers.

Instead of scattering, the remaining NVA troopers clustered

around their fallen comrades and this proved to be a fatal

error. Tha C/l/13 gunners attached to Company I sprang to the

105mm howitzer on the south side of the hill, quickly knocked

aside the parapet, and depressed the tube for a downhill shot.

Using a combination of point detonating and VT fuzes which

were set to explode 50 feet above the ground, the gunners

slammed a dozen rounds of direct fire into the midst of the

tightly packed enemy soldiers. By the time the fog closed in

again, there was no sign of life on the opposite slope. The

action was so brief, that the first report received at the

3/26 CP was a laconic message from Captain Dabney that 20 North

Vietnamese had been sighted, engaged, and killed.

There were also innovations inside the compound. Ever

since 21 January, the NVA gunners had concentrated their fire

on the base ammunition dumps. Originally there were two large

caches but the main one was totally destroyed on the opening

117
day of the battle. After that, Colonel Lownds decentralized

his stores in several widely-scattered berms which were large,

12-foot-deep trenches, gouged out of the ground by bulldozers.

One end of the berm was sloping so that 2% ton trucks could be

driven down a corridor between two flanking stacks of ammunition

which lined the sides of the trench. This arrangement greatly

facilitated loading because the Marines could stand on top of

the stacks and pass rounds onto the bed of the truck which was

at their level. The driver then backed out of the berm and took

the ammunition to the distribution points of the various units.

The ammunition was not only dispersed, it was also segregated

according to type. This way, if a berm of artillery highexplosive shells was hit, fire fighters were not hampered by

tear gas or white phosphorous fumes. On three occasions, ammunition stores were hit but the resulting devastation never

reached the proportion of that on the 21st.(170)

Although the berms were prime targets, the ASRT, MATCU,

FDC, 26th Marines communications center, and other units which

depended on sophisticated and delicate equipment suffered from

the heavy shelling. Consequently, they all had one common

problem--maintenance. The normal difficulties associated with

keeping the various radars, radios, antennae, generators, and

cooling components in an "up" status were complicated by the

constant incoming, the dust, and the limited supply of replacement items. The vans and bunkers were heavily sandbagged but

antennae and some communication lines were exposed and frequently knocked out by enemy rounds.(*)(171) Tne speed with

which the vital installations were returned to operation served

as a tribute to the technicians who maintained the equipment

under the most adverse conditions imaginable. In one instance,

a 122mm rocket exploded a scant seven meters from the ASRT-B

van and sheared off most of the radio antennae. Thanks to

several trouble shooters who braved the intense barrage and

repaired the damage, the station was back on the air within 20

minutes.(**) Such performances were routine. The ASRT normally

(*) To keep the North Vietnamese from zeroing in on his communication bunkers, Colonel Lownds ordered that fake antennae

be placed on every structure at Khe Sanh--including the fourholers o

(**) Tne ASRT-B radar antennae sustained over 200 hits from

shell fragments but continued to function near maximum efficiency

throughout the siege.

118
operated 23 hours a day and shut down one hour for maintenance.

The MATCU, which was essential for ground-controlled approaches

and paradrops, was kept operable 95 percent of the time.(172)

Major John A. Shepherd, Communications Officer of the

26th Marines, was responsible for the vast nework which enabled the ground commanders to keep abreast of the situation

and in touch with their units. The major praised the accomplishments of his men, stating that they "provided support in winning

every battle, firing every round of artillery, controlling

every air strike, and providing the means to receive every

bean and bullet." There were six radio relay teams which kept

open 52 channels between Khe Sanh and the outside world. In

addition, there were five external teletype nets in operation

24-hours a day. Radio relay provided voice and teletype links

to agencies at Dong Ha and Da Nang. For classified information,

there were two secure voice circuits operating full time. One

net linked the Combat Operations Center of the 26th Marines to

that of the 3d Marine Division at Dong Ha. The other, the

Regimental Tactical Net, enabled Colonel Lownds to disseminate

hot information to his battalion commanders.

To protect it against the artillery, mortar, and rocket

attacks, all communication equipment was either underground or

heavily sandbagged. Major Shepherd moved his communications

center into a shelter which was made from 4 conex boxes, 16

feet underground.(*) This nerve center housed the teletype

equipment and switchboards which provided service for 65 onbase subscribers and 40 external radio relay voice circuits.

In spite of the protective measures, the antenna and internal

wire system sustained damage on a daily basis. Following every

barrage, wiremen tracked down cuts and spliced them and repaired

damaged antennae so that the various nets were back in operation within minutes. The maintenance and repair of the electronic devices used for perimeter security placed an additional

burden on the communicators.(173)

While trucks and forklifts were not exactly delicate equipment, the base motor transport personnel had their share of

problems. These vehicles were used constantly. During the

summer and fall of 1967, they were used to haul rock for the

repair of the runway. Throughout the siege, the drivers

(*) A conex box is a large metal container primarily used to

sea-lift cargo.

119
carried ammunition from the berms to the distribution points

and supplies from the drop zone to the combat base. Many of

the trucks were in bad shape and mechanics worked around the

clock to keep them rolling. Hie biggest headache was caused

by flat tires, of which the constant shelling produced an

abundance; the drivers became paste and patch experts of the

highest order. More often than not, these men were caught out

in the open when the enemy decided to pound the base. Since

their cargo usually contained high explosives, the drivers had

good reason to be apprehensive. Some simply bailed out of the

cabs during the attacks and dived for cover; others, performing

a wild imitation of the Grand Prix, raced for revetments.

Needless to say, the base speed limit of five miles per hour

was frequently violated.(174)

When there wasn't any work to do, many Marines created

some and the threat of enemy tunnels provided a powerful motivation. When the word spread that the enemy might try to dig

under the base, the tunnel ferrets went to work. Many of the

defenders became fascinated with the prospects of uncovering a

"mole" and their antics were near comical. It was not uncommon

to see a man crawling around in front of his position, patting

the ground with the flat side of a shovel,and listening for

hollow spots. Others drove metal stakes into the ground and

listened with stethoscopes by the hour for tell-tale signs of

digging. If they heard something, the next step was to dig a

large hole in front of the enemy so that he would tunnel himself

into a trap. Some self-appointed water witches walked around

with divining rods and waited for the downward tug which meant

that they had discovered a subterranean intruder. When the

news media got into the act and publicized the possibility of

tunnels, the regimental commander began receiving scores of

letters from around the world with "If I were you" themes.

One American planter who lived in Sao Paulo, Brazil, wrote and

suggested that the Marines purchase commercial sensors like

the ones he used to detect bugs which fed on the roots of his

trees. Another suggested that the defenders strap hand grenades

onto rats and turn them loose in the tunnels.(175)

Unknown to the Marines at the time, the enemy never tried

to tunnel under the base. The KSCB sat atop a plateau, and

the slopes were wrinkled with deep ravines. Colonel Lownds

later surmised that the enemy would have had to go so deep to

keep from breaking the surface that such excavations were impractical. The men of Company K, 3/26 did, however, discover

one tunnel leading toward Hill 861 and called in air strikes

120
against it; at the base itself, the North Vietnamese limited

their digging to trenches.(176)

Unlike the phantom tunnels, the trenches were very real

and served as a constant reminder of the enemy's intentions.

These networks were quite understandably a source of concern

to the defenders who watched with fascination and no small

apprehension as the trenchlines drew closer and closer each

day. Working at night or under the cover of fog, the North

Vietnamese often moved their lines forward as much as 200-300

meters at a time. There were several methods used to counter

the trenches with artillery and tactical air strikes being the

most prevalent. Lieutenant Colonel Hennelly's batteries provided constant fires during the night especially to the east

and southeast where the heaviest enemy siegeworks were concentrated. The VT-fuzed ammunition with its deadly airbursts

no doubt hampered the enemy efforts considerably. During the

day, attack aircraft hit the trenches with every type of aerial

ordnance from 20mm cannon fire to 2,000-pound bombs. At night,

TPQs were run to within about 250 meters of the wire while Mini

and Micro Arc Lights were targeted from 500 to 1,500 meters.(177)

In addition, the Marines along the perimeters concocted

their own schemes which added to the displeasure of the enemy.

During the day, Lieutenant Colonel Wilkinson's men registered

on the close-in trenches with their M-79 grenade launchers;

these shotgun-like weapons fired a 40mm projectile to a maximum

range of about 375 meters and produced a frag pattern approximately 5 to 10 meters in diameter. At night when the North

Vietnamese were digging, the Marines periodically lobbed these

rounds into the trenches and disrupted the sappers.(178)

In spite of the harassment, the NVA launched several attacks

against the base from the trenchlines during the last 10 days

in February. At 1245, 21 February, the North Vietnamese fired

350 mortar, rocket, recoilless rifle, and artillery rounds into

the eastern sector and followed up with a company-sized probe

against the 37th ARVN Ranger Battalion. The enemy troops, however, did not attempt to close with the South Vietnamese and,

after a distant fire fight, withdrew at about 1500. Although

no body count was ascertained, the Rangers estimated that 1/13

artillery and their own defensive fires had claimed from 20 to

25 of the enemy. Six Marines from 1/26 and 18 Rangers were

wounded during the encounter.(179)

On 23 February, the base received the worse shellacking

121
of the siege. In one eight-hour period, the installation was

rocked by 1,307 rounds--a total which surpassed the daily high

received at Con Thien in 1967. Many of the rounds came from

the 130mm and 152mm artillery pieces in Laos. The runway took

several hits but the Seabee and Marine working parties filled

the craters and quickly replaced the damaged strips of runway

matting. At 1600, the barrage touched off a fire at one of the

supply points and 1,620 rounds of 90mm and 106mm ammunition were

destroyed. Cumulative friendly casualties for the day were 10

killed, 21 medevaced, and 30 wounded but returned to duty.(180)

Two days later the Marines suffered one of their most

serious setbacks. On the morning of the 25th, the 1st and 3d

Squads, 3d Platoon, B/l/26 departed Grey Sector on a patrol to

the south of the base; the patrol leader was a second lieutenant.

The two squads were reinforced by an 81mm mortar FO, an S-2

representative, a Kit Carson Scout, one rocket team, and a

machine gun section (two guns).(*) Each man carried 500 rounds

of ammunition and six grenades; each machine gun team had 1,800

rounds. Their mission was to sweep to the south along a welldefined route and attempt to locate an enemy mortar which had

been harassing the Marines. The patrol leader was assigned

three checkpoints from which he was to radio his position and

progress to the company commander, Captain Pipes. The lieutenant was under strict orders to follow the planned route and

keep within sight of the base as much as possible.(181)

Around 0900, the two squads reached their first checkpoint;

the lieutenant made the required radio report and the Marines

started on the second leg of their trek. Unknown to Captain

Pipes, the patrol had deviated from course and was actually

about 600 meters south of its scheduled route. Shortly after

his first transmission, the lieutenant spotted three NVA

soldiers walking along a road which branched off Route 9 and

ran northwest into the FOB-3 compound. The North Vietnamese

were apparently trying to suck the Americans into a trap--a

trick as old as war itself. In spite of warnings from the Kit

Carson Scout, the young patrol leader took the bait and pursued

the three men; the decision was to cost him his life.(182)

Hie Marines moved south across the road, chased the North

Vietnamese and ran head-on into an ambush. A heavily reinforced

(*) Kit Carson Scouts were enemy ralliers who scouted for

the Allies.

122
NVA company was entrenched just south of the road in a crescentshaped bunker complex, the tips of which curved to the north.

When the trap was sprung, the patrol was caught squarely in the

center and, in essence, was double-enveloped by stationary positions. At first the Marines opened up and gained the advantage

but the enemy fire gradually built to an overwhelming crescendo

and the patrol became pinned down. When the lieutenant realized

the full implications of his predicament, he dispatched the 1st

Squad to flank the NVA emplacements from the west. The maneuver

might have worked but the squad leader did not hook out far

enough to the west before turning back in on the enemy positions.

Instead of hitting the tender flank, the 1st Squad walked into

more blistering, frontal fire. When the lieutenant was unable

to raise the squad leader on the radio, he sent one of his few

unwounded men, Hospitalman 3d Class Frank V. Calzia, a U. S.

Navy corpsman, to find out what had happened. The corpsman returned later and reported that every man in the 1st Squad, except one, was dead.(183)

Captain Pipes immediately realized that his men were in

trouble and, upon direction of higher authority, sent the 2d

Platoon to the aid of the patrol. The cunning North Vietnamese

anticipated such a move, however, and positioned a blocking

force in the path of the relief column. The two separated Marine

units were engaged in heavy fighting for about four hours before

the remnants of the patrol could break contact and withdraw

through the positions of the 2d Platoon. Marine tanks rumbled

into the southern portion of the compound but supporting fires

were restricted by ground fog and the proximity of the combatants.

As he pulled back, the patrol leader was hit in both femoral

arteries and bled to death before reaching the perimeter. His

radioman, Corporal Rolland R. Ball, a full-blooded Sioux Indian,

carried the lieutenant's body back to the base. Friendly

casualties during the day were 1 killed, 25 missing and presumed dead, 13 medevacs, and 8 wounded but returned to duty;

the bodies of the missing men were all recovered. Enemy losses

were undetermined. The action on the 25th sobered the men of

Company B and there was one predominant thought in their minds.

Captain Pipes probably understated the feelings of his men

when he said: "We are anxious to repay the loss." Before the

siege ended, Company B did just that.(184)

The flurry of activity to the east and south of the base

led General Tompkins and Colonel Lownds to believe that the

major enemy thrust was imminent. Recalling the accuracy of the

North Vietnamese lieutenant's previous predictions, they felt

123
sure that the attack would come from the east. From various

other reports, they knew that large NVA units were massing

around a deserted plantation to tha south and an old French

fort near the junction of Route 9 and the two roads which tied

in with the KSCB. Although the North Vietnamese had not secured the hill outposts according to the first phase of their

plan, time was running out. Each day, the skies over Khe Sanh

cleared a little more as one of the enemy's greatest allies,

the monsoons, slowly abandoned him. If American airpower, unhindered by the weather, were ever fully brought into play, the

enemy's task would have been next to impossible. The NVA

launched a heavy attack against the base on 29 February; whether

it was in fact the main prong of the Communist offensive, historians may never know for sure.(185)

Largely because of the quick response by the FSCC and the

overwhelming firepower at its disposal, the enemy attack never

got up a full head of steam. Early in the evening of 29 February, current intelligence showed that the enemy was on the

move* Each succeeding report indicated that the North Vietnamese

were heading toward the eastern perimeter. The FSCC sprang

into action and called on all assets to saturate the enemy's

route of march. Massed artillery, TPQs, as well as Mini and

Micro Arc Lights were targeted in blocks to the east, southeast,

and south. Flights of B-52s, diverted from other targets,

arrived overhead in two and a half hours and added to the carnage

before the enemy troops had moved completely through the killing

zone.(186)

At 2130, a battalion from the 304th NVA Division launched

the first attack against the 37th ARVN Ranger Battalion. The

South Vietnamese responded with their final protective fires;

1/13 contributed thousands of conventional and special artillery

rounds while strike aircraft streaked in and raked the attacking

force. The enemy pulled back without even breaching the outer

defenses. The first assault was followed by one at 2330 and

another at 0315 (1 March); both were similarly stifled short

of the wire. The North Vietnamese finally called it quits and

withdrew with those bodies which they could retrieve. When

the Rangers investigated the next morning, they found 78 dead

NVA soldiers huddled in three successive assault trenches a few

hundred meters from the perimeter. Some were in a kneeling

position as if they had been killed just before going over the

top. Many had been peppered by the artillery airbursts and

were covered with small holes. Crude devices made from bamboo

strips and laced with blocks of TNT lay beside many of the

124
bodies. Thase were obviously to be used as bangalore torpedoes

but the sappers never had the chance. The slaughter along the

perimeter, however, was nothing compared to the losses sustained

by the NVA reserves.(187)

While the S-2 personnel could never ascertain the exact

number of enemy killed, they felt reasonably certain that an

entire NVA regiment had been virtually wiped out. The eastern

approach was saturated with tons of high explosives; the road

junction, the plantation, the old French Fort, and all bottlenecks along the enemy's route were heavily hit. Montagnard

tribesmen, who inhabit the surrounding hills, later reported

finding from 200 to 500 North Vietnamese bodies at a time stacked

in rows along the trails and roads leading to the base. It was

obvious that they had been caught while on the march and mangled

by air raids and piston-like artillery concentrations. While

many of the defenders at the KSCB never fired a shot, what was

believed to be the long-awaited enemy onslaught came and passed

with a whimper instead of a roar.(188)

Even though the North Vietnamese continued to probe throughout March, it was obvious that they had shot their bolt on the

night of 29 February/1 March. The NVA never mustered another

large ground attack against the base; the battle had reached a

turning point. Having had their fingers burned too often, the

North Vietnamese settled into a wait-and-see strategy. They

continued to pound the base with artillery but exerted no major

ground effort; instead they lurked in the hills and waited for

patrols which ventured too far from the perimeter.(189)

The waiting game proved to be just as disastrous for the

enemy as had his previous strategy. The month of March was

marked by clear skies over Khe Sanh and there were only five

days during which weather hampered flight operations. While

the overcast had never interfered with Arc Light strikes or

TPQs, the retreat of the monsoons was a blessing for the attack

pilots and fighter/bombers swarmed into the valley like locusts.

The number of close air support sorties in March almost doubled

the amount flown the previous month. Any enemy movement within the TAOR during the day invariably drew a flight of sleek

jets, prop-driven A-l Skyraiders, or helicopter gunships within minutes. The trenches and bunker complexes inside the B-52

line were also worked over daily to insure that the NVA stayed

at arm's length. What's more, the unrestricted visibility enabled the TAC(A)s and airborne observers to ferret out and

call in artillery on the enemy gun positions which had been

125
hammering the base. For the most part, 1/13 had been limited

to intelligence-generated concentrations during February, but

the good weather in March provided Lieutenant Colonel Hennelly's

men with something they could sink their teeth into--observed

targets. Enemy gunners no longer enjoyed a reprieve and each

round they fired was an invitation to instant retaliation. With

Birddogs or Hueys overhead, the enemy seldom even fired and

this was no small consolation to the men at the base. The clear

skies and accurate supporting fires were a potent combination

and the number of confirmed enemy dead recorded in March increased approximately 80 percent over February.(190)

The enemy's plight at Khe Sanh was echoed, albeit in veiled

terms by his propaganda broadcasts. The Radio Hanoi, Englishspeaking announcer, Hanoi Hanna--the Communist's anemic version

of Tokyo Rose--gradually shifted her theme from, "We will crush

Khe Sanh" to "Ho Chi Minh would be unhappy if we wasted our

time on only 6,000 Marines." The Communists also attempted to

sell the line that 20,000 North Vietnamese had "tied down" the

26th Marines. Such rationale smacked of sour grapes. This

illogical reasoning would be similar to a defeated football

coach saying that he didn't really want to win the game, only

keep the other team "tied down" for an hour or so. At the KSCB

itself, there were a few feeble attempts to sway the defenders.

On 10 March, an incoming mortar round released about 200 propaganda leaflets. The following day, an NVA loudspeaker blared

a message to the 37th ARVN Ranger Battalion which invited the

South Vietnamese to "join their brothers from the North in

driving out the Americans." There were no takers. The psychological effort was just one more indication that the enemy was

hurting.(191)

About mid-March, the 26th Marines S-2 began noting an

exodus of major NVA units from the Khe Sanh TAOR. Most of these

reports came from mountain tribesmen who provided valuable information on enemy troop dispositions throughout the siege.

The 325C NVA Division Headquarters was one of the first to pull

out toward Laos, followed by elements of the 95C and 10ID Regiments which also relocated to the west. About the same time,

the 304th NVA Division withdrew several thousand meters to the

southwest. The enemy still retained enough troops around the

base to maintain pressure and thus the shelling and probes

continued.(192)

Closely correlated with the enemy's retrograde movement

was another large influx of refugees into the KSCB. Most were

126
Montagnards who had inhabited the smaller villages surrounding

the base and unfortunately had become the pawns of war. When

the fighting first broke out, the Allies advised them to evacuate

their homes and move overland to Cam Lo or else they would be

exposed to fire from both sides. During the period 23-28 January, 1,050 Vietnamese and tribesmen with their families were

air evacuated to Da Nang and then on to Quang Tri City. About

the" same time, some 1,800 tribesmen completed an overland trek

from Khe Sanh to Cam Lo by way of the the Ba Long Valley. Later

an additional 3,000 or more attempted to reach Cam Lo, but

during the journey, the North Vietnamese intercepted this group

and directed tham back into the Khe Sanh area. Presumably, the

NVA used the Montagnards to screen troop movements and confuse

American intelligence. The next surge of refugees into the

combat base occurred in early February following the attack on

Lang Vei. On 7 March, the tribesmen again started to filter

into the base. They were screened, interrogated, and processed

for evacuation in the FOB-3 compound. As many as 661 were airlifted to eastern Quang Tri Province in a single day and the

total for March was 1,432.(193)

Although the enemy had scaled down his forces, the heavy

incoming continued to plague the Marines. On the average, the

base received about 150 rounds a day during March. During the

course of a normal day, the preponderance of fire was from the

82mm mortars but on peak days the greatest number of rounds was

from the heavier artillery. On 23 March, the KSCB received its

heaviest daily saturation of the month--1,109 rounds. Of these,

over 30 percent were from the enemy's big guns in Laos. In

addition to the indirect fire, the Marines took a sprinkling

of recoilless rifle shells; but these weapons were easy to spot

because of their large back blast and thus were vulnerable to

air attack and counterbattery fire.(194)

During March, the defenders, on order of General Cushman,

began to push out from the perimeter. On 8 March, the ARVN

Rangers conducted a series of sweeps east of the runway. The

first patrol made no contact but the next two became heavily

engaged with an NVA force of unknown size. The Rangers attacked

and poured into the enemy trenches, got eye-ball to eye-ball

with "their brothers from the North" and killed 26. On the

24th, a patrol from Company A, 1/9, made contact with two NVA

platoons which were dug in approximately 1,500 meters northwest

of Lieutenant Colonel Mitchell's main perimeter. The Marines

attacked the enemy emplacements and in a four-hour battle killed

31 North Vietnamese. During the fighting, a UH-1E helicopter

127
of VM0-6 was shot down while supporting the Marines but the

crewmen were rescued.(*) Friendly casualties were five killed,

four medevaced, and two with minor wounds. Tha largest encounter, however, came on 30 March when Company B, 1/26, received a chance to settle an old score. The target area was

the same complex, approximately 850 meters south of the perimeter, where the B/l/26 patrol had been ambushed on 25

February.(195)

The attack had been planned by the battalion commander,

Lieutenant Colonel Frederick J. McEwan (who relieved Lieutenant

Colonel Wilkinson on 1 March) and his operations officer, Major

Charles E. Davis III, with careful attention to every detail.

In fact, the 1/26 staff had been working on this attack for a

month. The sweep was also closely coordinated with the FSCC

to ensure that the maximum supporting arms were available. To

support Company B, Lieutenant Colonel Hennelly's staff worked

out a variation of the defensive fire plan with nine batteries

participating. Marine artillery (1/13) formed the primary box

and rolling barrage while the Army 175mms and TPQ-10 controlled

aircraft were responsible for the sides of the secondary box.

The latter fell on the high ground adjacent to the objective

which might influence the battle. The plan called for Captain

Pipes to move his unit into the primary box and follow approximately 75 meters in trace of the rolling barrage. As the company

advanced, the entire cylinder also advanced. Outside the primary

box, the sides of the secondary would open and close over the

terrain like a giant accordian. One extremely important factor

was that the artillery fire would not necessarily alert the

enemy of the impending attack because the same technique had

been used so frequently in that area. The element of surprise

still belonged to the Marines.

At 0800, Captain Pipes' men swept out of a draw and, under

the cover of heavy fog, crossed the access road which ran from

the Route 9 junction to the F0B-3 compound. This jumping off

point had been secured by one platoon during the night. To

their front and flanks, waves of exploding artillery shells

churned up the terrain. At the same time, four 106mm recoilless

rifles and six .50 caliber and M-60 machine guns provided overhead fire; a type of support "which would have warmed the heart

of 'Manila John1 Basilone."(**) The crescent-shaped defenses,

(*) The pilot was badly burned in the crash and died that night,

(**) Gunnery Sergeant John Basilone was a Medal of Honor winner

128
manned by an NVA battalion, were roughly 100 meters southeast

of the road and extended along a 700 meter front. The enemy

troops occupied heavily fortified bunkers, trenches, and fighting

holes. Although the objective was indeed formidable, Company

B was not to be denied that day.(196)

After about 10 minutes of continuous supporting fire,

Company B moved swiftly into final assault positions and Captain

Pipes directed the FSCC to collapse the two artillery boxes.

The fire was shifted to cut off any enemy reinforcements from

reaching the battle area and to suppress NVA artillery and

mortars. As if on cue, the dense fog suddenly lifted; the last

thing that many enemy soldiers saw that morning was two Marine

assault platoons with fixed bayonets only a few yards in front

of their positions. The surprise was complete. Pipes' men

poured into the trenches and swarmed over the startled defenders

before they could react. While one element laid down a base of

fire with small arms and machine guns, Marines armed with flamethrowers, grenades, and satchel charges rushed through the

trenches to sear and blast enemy emplacements. The men of

Company B carried out their grisly work for over three hours

and, by noon, the trenchworks had become a smoking tomb for 115

North Vietnamese.

The only effective resistance during the battle was enemy

mortar fire. Eventually, the NVA placed about 100 rounds on the

attacking force. One of these scored a direct hit on the company

CP and killed the radio man, the artillery P0, and the 81mm mortar

FO. The company commander was also hit. A mortar fragment

passed through Captain Pipes' arm and lodged in the side of his

chest about two inches from his heart. Pipes not only survived,

he continued to direct the attack.

With the loss of his two forward observers, the captain

had to handle the coordination of supporting arms by himself.

Fortunately, Lieutenant Colonel McEwan and Major Davis had made

allowances for such a possibility. During the planning phase,

they plotted general fire zones in the objective area and assigned

each one a call sign (e.g. Apples, Oranges, Grapes, etc.)

Captain Pipes knew where these zones were located and whenever

in World War II. During an action at Edson's Ridge on Guadalcanal! Basilone's machine gun section fired over 26,000 rounds

in one night and helped break up a fanatical Japanese attack.

Manila John was later killed on Iwo Jima.

129
he wanted to hit a target he simply told the FSCC, "Fire

Apples" or "Fire Oranges." In short order, the designated

zone was saturated with mortar and artillery rounds. Pipes

utilized this technique throughout the rest of the battle.(197)

Once the Marines had consolidated the objective, they

collected their casualties which included nine dead and returned

to the perimeter. As Company B retired, the primary and secondary

boxes closed back in around the Marines and walked them home.

During the battle, the raiding force was shielded by some 2,600

artillery shells and 1,000 mortar rounds. On the return trip,

NVA artillery tracked the column; ironically, one casualty

during the withdrawal was an NVA prisoner who was killed by his

own fire. Lieutenant Colonel McEwan later described the operation as a "classic raid." He attributed the success to the

detailed planning, the coordination with the FSCC, and Captain

Pipes' precise execution which "adhered to the tactical fundamentals and principles of war."(*) For his part, the captain

was later awarded the Silver Star and the entire company received a warm congratulatory message from General Westmoreland.

The debt had been paid in full.(198)

This purge to the south of the base marked the last significant encounter of SCOTLAND and, at 0800 on 31 March, the operation was officially terminated. The operational control of

the 26th Marines was passed to the U. S. Army 1st Air Cavalry

Division (1st ACD), commanded by Major General John J. Tolson,

III, and Operation PEGASUS commenced. The Army division, along

with the 1st Marines and the 3d ARVN Airborne Task Force started

the push from Ca Lu to reopen Route 9, relieve the pressure on

the KSCB, and destroy remnants of the NVA units in the Khe Sanh

TAOR. In effect, the siege was over. Cumulative friendly

casualties for SCOTLAND, which began on 1 November 1967 were

205 friendly KIA, 852 medevaced, and 816 minor wounded. The

extent of NVA losses was never determined and more than likely

(*) Another interesting point was that the attack was largely

carried out by inexperienced troops. During the siege, Company

B suffered considerable casualties and most of the replacements

were fresh from the States. Major Davis later commented that

the conduct of these Marines during the operation spoke highly

of the type of training that they received before arriving in

Vietnam. This ability to adapt quickly plus the high quality

of small unit leadership was, in Davis1 opinion, a key factor

in the Marine victory.

130
never will be. The Marines counted 1,602 enemy bodies along

the perimeters but the total number of North Vietnamese dead

was probably between 10,000 and 15,000. The enemy always

carried off his dead when possible and many others undoubtedly

died in the surrounding hills and were not found by anyone.

There was little doubt that the heart of two crack NVA divisions

had been ripped out at Khe Sanh. The full impact of the suffering endured by the enemy, however, did not become evident until

the Marine, Army, and ARVN troops began mopping up operations

around the base.(*)(199)

(*) The breakdown of fixed-wing tactical sorties under Operation NIAGARA follows: Marine-7,078, Seventh Air Force-9,684, and

U. S. Navy-5,167. These figures were derived from 1st MAW

Command Chronologies and Project CHECO, Southeast Asia Report.

The two sources do not agree on Marine sorties (Project CHECO

credits USMC aircraft with 6,385); 1st MAW records in this case

have been cited. Statistics for B-52 strikes and Marine helicopter operations have been previously incorporated in the text.

131
PART VIII

THE BREAKOUT

The blueprints for a major Allied drive into the Khe Sanh

Plateau had been on the drawing boards at III MAF Headquarters

in the embryo stage since late January. The 1st ACD was slated

for the campaign since that division had displaced from Bong

Son, in II Corps, and arrived at Phu Bai on 22 January. Three

days after he assumed operational control of the new division,

General Cushman directed General Tolson to prepare a contingency

plan for the relief of Khe Sanh. This action eventually resulted in Operation PEGASUS but there was a series of events

which delayed its start until April. The first was the disruptive Communist TET Offensive and the resulting Battle of

Hue City which raged until 25 February. Throughout February

and early March, the 1st ACD was busily engaged in and around

the old imperial capital. Logistics was another consideration.

General Westmoreland had initiated a supply build-up in I Corps

during December 1967 but III MAF did not yet have sufficient

stock levels to support an operation the size of PEGASUS, especially while the heavy fighting still continued in Hue.

Finally, the poor weather prevented large-scale helicopter

operations in the Khe Sanh area.(200)

An alteration of the command structure in I Corps also indirectly affected the proposed operation. Until the early part

of 1968, the three divisions in I Corps (1st MarDiv, 3d MarDiv,

and the U. S. Army Anerical Division) were under the direct

control of General Cushman, CG, III MAF. General Westmoreland,

however, was convinced that a critical, if not the most critical,

phase of the war was taking shape in I Corps and had begun to

pump reinforcements into the two northern provinces. These included the 1st ACD and the 101st Airborne Division. To keep

closer tabs on the action in the north, General Westmoreland

also established a forward echelon of his MACV Headquarters,

under the Deputy, ComUSMACV, General Creighton W. Abrams, at

Camp Hochmuth, Phu Bai on 9 February. There was little formal

change in the command structure; General Abrams simply acted

as an agent for ComUSMACV in an advisor/coordinator role. On

10 March, however, the structure did change; MACV Forward was

converted to Provisional Corps, Vietnam (PCV) and placed under

the operational control of General Cushman, CG, III MAF. PCVs

new commander, Lieutenant General William B. Rosson, U. S. Army,

132
assumed control of all American combat forces operating in the

northern two provinces, less the southern portion of Thua Thien.

At that time the three major U. S. units in the area were the

3d MarDiv, the 1st ACD, and the 101st Airborne Division. In addition, the reinforced ARVN 1st Division was operating in this

region. In essence, PCV was established to provide closer supervision over growing U. S. forces and coordination with the Vietnamese units in the northern area.(201)

As the operations around Hue tapered off, General Cushman,

on 29 February, directed General Tolson to take the plans for

PEGASUS back off the shelf. During the fi?st week in March,

General Tolson met in Da Nang with Generals Cushman and Abrams

for a discussion of the operation.(*) The mission was threefold: relieve the Khe Sanh Combat base, reopen Route 9 from

Ca Lu to Khe Sanh, and eradicate any NVA elements within the

area of operations. In addition to the three brigades of the

1st ACD, General Tolson was to assume operational control of

the 26th Marines, the 1st Marines, and the 3d ARVN Airborne

Task Force. D-day was tentatively set for 1 April--depending

on the weather. With the basic directives, General Tolson returned to Camp Evans, and settled down to detailed planning with his division staff. During the next few weeks, there

were numerous planning and coordination meetings with III MAF,

PCV, the 3d Marine Division, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, Seventh

Air Force, and representatives of the attached units.(202)

The logistics portion of the plan hinged around construction

of a base and airfield near Ca Lu which could accommodate C-7

Caribou transports and later C-123s. Before work could be

initiated, elements of the 3d MarDiv had to secure and repair

the stretch of Route 9 between Ca Lu and the Rockpile so that

supplies, fuel, ammunition, and construction material could be

stockpiled. Once this was accomplished, a joint task force of

engineers--the 11th Engineer Battalion, Fleet Marine Force, the

1st ACD's 8th Engineer Battalion, and Navy Mobile Construction

Battalion 5--began construction of an airfield, parking ramps,

logistical facilities, and defensive positions. By the time the

lead assault elements were ready to jump off in the attack, the

installation was 83 percent completed. The base was dubbed

Landing Zone (LZ) Stud.

(*) It was around this time that PCV was formed and General

Abrams departed I Corps. General Rosson then became a key

figure in the planning of the operation.

133
On 25 March, D-6, the 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry (1/9

CavSqd), operating from LZ Stud, began extensive reconnaissance

in the PEGASUS area of operations to pave the way for the initial

air assaults. The mission of the unit was "to find the enemy,

destroy his antiaircraft capability, acquire hard intelligence

for exploitation, and locate and prepare suitable landing

zones." Since General Tolson had little concrete information

on exact enemy locations, the activities of the 1/9 CavSqd were

essential to the operation. The squadron fanned out from LZ

Stud in ever increasing concentric circles under the cover of

tactical air, B-52 strikes, and the 8-inch and 105mm batteries

which had been moved to Ca Lu. During this phase, the air

cavalrymen called in 632 tactical air strikes, 49 specially

fuzed construction sorties (Daisy Cutters), and 12 Arc Light

strikes on enemy antiaircraft positions, troop concentrations,

and future landing zones.(203)

As a prelude to PEGASUS, the 3d MarDiv launched a regimental-size, diversionary attack in eastern Quang Tri Province.

On 30 March, Task Force KILO, comprised of the 2d Battalion,

4th Marines; the U. S. Army 3d Squadron, 5th Cavalry; and the

3d Battalion, 1st ARVN Regiment pushed northward from Dong Ha

on a search and destroy sweep through the Gio Linh coastal plain

area between the Cua Viet River and the DMZ. In addition, a company

from the 101st Airborne Division was used as a reconnaissance

force and to convey a picture of greater weight and diversity

of attack. Although the foray was primarily designed to confuse

the NVA and draw attention away from the mailed fist which was

poised at Ca Lu, the Allies of Task Force KILO killed 150 North

Vietnamese during the first day.(204)

At 0700 on D-day (1 April), two battalions controlled by

the 1st Marines (2/1 and 2/3), which had moved from Phu Bai to

LZ Stud several days before, spearheaded the attack to the west.

Meeting only light resistance, 2/1 wheeled to the north of Route

9 and secured its objective while 2/3 swept through and consolidated the area to the south of the road. With both flanks

screened by the infantry, the 11th Engineer Battalion began the

mammoth task of renovating Route 9. Later in the day, elements

of the 3d Brigade (Bde) 1st ACD leapfrogged by helicopter to

positions midway between Ca Lu and Khe Sanh. The 1st and 2d

Squadrons, 7th Cavalry swarmed into LZ Mike which encompassed

Hill 248, approximately 7,500 meters east of the KSCB. This

high ground to the south of Route 9 was cradled on three sides

by branches of the Quang Tri River. To the north some 3,000

meters, the 5th Battalion, 7th Cavalry air-assaulted the southern

134
slope of Dong Chio Mountain which was designated LZ Gates. This

stretch was particularly critical because the road was sandwiched between the Quang Tri River on the south and the nearly

perpendicular cliffs which towered menacingly over Route 9 to

the north. Following the initial waves, the 3d Brigade Headquarters displaced to LZ Gates and established a CP. By 1650,

the Flying Horsemen were in place and continued to expand both

zones while 105mm howitzers of the 1st Battalion, 21st Artillery,

were helilifted in for direct support. Throughout the PEGASUS

area of operations, the Americans established defensive perimeters and passed the night with little or no contact.(205)

While the combat engineers continued their steady movement

along Route 9, additional elements of the airmobile armada were

thrown into the action. On D plus two, the 2d Brigade, 1st ACD

which had been staging at Ca Lu conducted a vertical envelopment

into LZ Tom and LZ Wharton which were roughly 6,000 and 8,500

meters southeast of Khe Sanh. The air assault went smoothly

even though the zones were shelled by NVA gunners. By the end

of the day, all 2d Brigade units were in position along with

three batteries of the 1st Battalion, 77th Artillery. In the

meantime, the 3d Brigade and the 1st Marines expanded their

TAORs along Route 9.(206)

On 4 April, General Tolson began to put the squeeze on

enemy elements to the south of the KSCB. Moving northeast from

LZ wharton, the 1/5 CavSqd attacked the old French fort near the

junction of Route 9. At the same time, the 26th Marines, which

had been attached to the 1st AGO since 31 March, began the long

awaited breakout from the base. At 0600, three companies of

Lieutenant Colonel John J. H. Cahill's 1/9 (relieved Lieutenant

Colonel Mitchell on 1 April) moved out of the rock quarry perimeter and advanced on Hill 471 which was 2,500 meters due south

of the airstrip. The hill was a key terrain feature since it

overlooked the road junction and that segment of Route 9 which

snaked to the southwest. The area was also occupied by major

elements of the 304th NVA Division. After heavy prep fires,

the Marines stormed up the slope in the face of light enemy fire

and secured their objective at 1720.(*) Thirty North Vietnamese

(*) Although the rifle companies encountered only slight resistance during the assault, the Company A command group, while

advancing toward the objective, took a direct hit from an enemy

mortar. The Air Officer, Captain Walter C. Jones, III was killed

as was one radio operator; the battalion Operations Officer,

135
bodies were strewn over the hilltop.

The men of 1/9, however, were in for a long night. Later

that night, the enemy lashed out at the hill with 192 mortar

and artillery rounds. The barrage was undoubtedly designed to

soften up the Marines for a counterattack, the next morning.

The North Vietnamese might as well have saved their ammunition

and their counterattack.(207)

At 0515, the 7th Battalion, 66th Regiment, 304th NVA Division, charged up Hill 471 in a vain attempt to knock 1/9 from

the crest0 The 66th Regiment was definitely a hard-luck outfit;

it had been bloodied at Khe Sanh Village on 21 January and again

during the abortive attack against the 37th ARVN Ranger Battalion,

on 29 February/1 March. The enemy's string of bad luck remained

unbroken on the morning of 5 April. Lieutenant Colonel Cahill's

Marines stood their ground, poured withering fire into the onrushing enemy troops, and, with the aid of artillery and tactical

air strikes, smashed the North Vietnamese attack. During the

one-sided exchange, one Marine was killed and 19 wounded; the

66th Regiment left 122 dead on the slopes. This fight was one

of the major highlights of Operation PEGASUS.(*)(208)

The surge of Allied units into the previously uncontested

domain of the 304th NVA Division continued for the next few

days.(**) On the afternoon of the 5th, the last element of the

1st ACD--the 1st Brigade--departed Ca Lu aboard droves of helicopters and swooped into LZ Snapper, 7,500 meters south of the

base. The following morning, the 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry (2d

Brigade) moved northeast from LZ Wharton and relieved Lieutenant

Colonel Cahill's battalion on Hill 471. After relief was effected,

Major Ted R. Henderson, was seriously wounded and evacuated.

The Battalion Commander, Lieutenant Colonel Cahill and his

Artillery Officer, First Lieutenant John K. LeBlond, Jr. were

also wounded at that time but were able to continue.

(*) In addition to the Marine killed during the attack, nine

were killed by enemy shelling the night before. A total of 57

Marines were medevaced.

(**) The 325C NVA Division had long since departed the area

and left the 304th to continue pressure on the 26th Marines.

Some elements of the 304th swung to the north of the base and

replaced units of the 325C.

136
1/9 initiated a drive toward Hill 689 some 4,500 meters to the

northwest. On the opposite side of the KSCB, the 5th Battalion,

7th Cavalry (1st Brigade) conducted a landing just 500 meters

north of the Blue Sector wire. The 2d and 3d Battalions, 26th

Marines fannad out to the north and northwest of their hill outposts. Company G, 2/26 bumped into an NVA company that afternoon and killed 43 of the enemy.

The initial relief of the combat base occurred at 1350 on

6 April when the lead company of the 3d ARVN Airborne Task. Force

was airlifted to Khe Sanh and linked up with the 37th Rangers.

This move was primarily intended as a morale booster for the

37th. Two days later, after 2/7 CavSqd had completed the sweep

along Route 9 and linked up with the 26th Marines, the official

relief took place. At 0800 on 8 April, the 3d Brigade airlifted

its CP to the base and became the new landlord. Relieved of its

duties along the perimeter, Lieutenant Colonel McEwan's 1/26

saddled up and attacked to the west that day but made little

contact.(209)

Traditionally, the lifting of a siege has been the occasion

for great emotional outbursts, bands, and stirring oration; in

this regard, the relief of Khe Sanh was somewhat of a disappointment. General Tolson intended for the link-up to be "as business

like as possible with a minimum of fanfare" so that he could get

the Marines on the offensive again. A few newsmen at the base

snapped pictures of Marines shaking hands with the Cavalrymen

but the men usually shrugged indifferently afterwards and went

about their business. The defenders generally looked on the

proceedings with sort of a "ho-hum" attitude, perhaps they felt

that they had not been rescued from anything. In fact, they

were right; the enemy threat had been squelched weeks before

PEGASUS had gotten off the ground. "I've been at Khe Sanh for

nine months," the regimental commander stated, "and if they keep

me supplied, I could stay here another nine months." No doubt

most men were glad they did not have to remain because the stand

at Khe Sanh had not been "all peaches and cream," but, as far

as the defenders being snatched out of the jaws of destruction

--it just did not happen that way.(210)

With the arrival of the 3d ARVN Airborne Task Force, all

maneuver elements involved in PEGASUS were on the Khe Sanh

Plateau. On the 8th, the three South Vietnamese battalions

(minus one company) leapfrogged from Quang Tri to LZ Stud and

then conducted a helicopter assault into LZ Snake about 2,000

meters southwest of the base. In effect, the encirclement was

137
complete; only, this time, pressure was being applied in the

opposite direction. As the Allied oil slick spread over the

valley, the Americans and South Vietnamese uncovered ghastly

evidence of how badly the NVA had been beaten. The various

units found hundreds of North Vietnamese in shallow graves;

hundreds more lay where they fell. A total of 557 individual

weapons, 207 crew-served weapons,and 2 antiaircraft pieces were

either captured or destroyed. In addition, 17 vehicles, ranging

from PT-76 tanks to motor scooters, and tons of ammunition,

food, radios, and individual equipment were discovered. The

mountains of captured or abandoned enemy stores indicated that

either Operation PEGASUS had caught the NVA completely flatfooted or the remnants of the two enemy divisions were in no

shape to cart off their equipment and supplies.(211)

Even though the rest of the operation centered around completing work on Route 9 and sifting through the debris of battle,

there were several contacts with the retreating enemy. On 8

April, the ARVN forces turned back an NVA counterattack west of

the base and killed 78 in the process. The same day, the 1st

Battalion, 9th Marines, assaulted and seized Hill 689 with no

opposition but discovered 37 NVA killed during a fight the previous night. Air and artillery also hammered away at the NVA;

on one occasion, a U. S. Army airborne observer spotted 100

North Vietnamese in the open and called in artillery fire which

accounted for 30 of the enemy. While the NVA pulled away to

the west, the engineer task force crept toward the base from

the opposite direction, and at 1600 on 11 April, Route 9 was

officially declared open. The engineers had repaired 14 kilometers of road, replaced 9 vital bridges, and constructed 17

bypasses; General Westmoreland applauded their feat as "herculean. "(212)(See Maps 8 and 9).

The day before the road was completed, General Tolson received a visit from the PCV commander, General Rosson, which

resulted in an alteration of Operation PEGASUS. General Rosson

directed his division commander to begin extracting units to

Quang Tri and Camp Evans in preparation for an assault into the

A Shau Valley (Operation DELAWARE). General Tolson anticipated

that the operation would last much longer and had initially

planned to expand his sweeps far to the south, north, and northwest. In addition, the 1st Marines was slated for air assaults

into a valley west of the Rockpile. The A Shau Valley, however,

was a major enemy base area and logistics complex which supported

his operations in Thua Thien and Quang Nam provinces. To launch

a mobile strike into this region and destroy the enemy's base

138
MAPS OPERATION PEGASUS K.WWHITF

139
MAP9

OPERATION PEGASUS

K.W WHITE

140
had been a major MACV objective of long standing. Support of

this operation had been one of the reasons for the troop and

logistical buildup in the northern area which had begun the

previous December. The weather in the A Shau Valley was now

ideal for airmobile operations and General Westmoreland was

anxious to get DELAWARE underway before the end of April. The

following day, the 11th, all air assaults were cancelled and

General Tolson began to withdraw elements from Khe Sanh. The

1st Brigade, less one battalion, was airlifted to Quang Tri

City and the 37th ARVN Ranger Battalion, which had fought so

valiantly, was pulled out and sent to Da Nang. Two days later,

the division command post and elements of the 3d Brigade departed for Camp Evans.(213)

Another noteworthy departure was that of Colonel Lownds.

The colonel, who did his job well enough to earn the nation's

second highest award--the Navy Cross--turned over the reins of

the 26th Marines to Colonel Bruce F. Meyers on 12 April. The

new commander wasted no time; he planned and executed the attack

which in effect, ended the Battle for Khe Sanh. It was scheduled

for 14 April--Easter Sunday.

Ironically, the last engagement took place between Hills

831S and 881N precisely where, on 20 January, the whole affair

had begun. The 3d Battalion, 26th Marines which had started the

fight was also on hand to finish it. Ever since the 4th, Lieutenant Colonel John C. Studt's battalion (relieved Lieutenant

Colonel Alderman on 15 March) had been sweeping to the north and

northwest of Hill 881S and, on several occasions, had taken

fire from 881N. The enemy troops still clung tenaciously to

that piece of real estate from which they had directed rocket

fire against Khe Sanh and antiaircraft fire against the helicopters resupplying the Marines on 881S. Lieutenant Colonel

Studt's mission was to secure the terrain between the two hills,

then attack and seize 881N.(214)

Since the enemy gunners had zeroed in on the slopes of 881S

with their mortars, Lieutenant Colonel Studt moved his attacking

elements into position the night of the 13th. The assault companies of 3/26 slipped out of the defensive wire under the cover

of darkness and moved down the forward slope of the hill along

routes which were protected by security patrols. As he watched

the Marines file by, the battalion's operations officer, Major

Caulfield, could not help but be concerned about them. Most of the

men had spent the past two and a half months in a foxhole or

trench; they had received minimum rations and a maximum of enemy

141
shelling. All were tired and dirty; some suffered from large

body sores because the water received by these men had gone

into their bodies and not on them. Even though they were Marines,

the major wondered how they would perform the next morning. At

0800, he received his answer.(215)

The attack, which the troops referred to as their "Easter

Egg Hunt," was preceded by a deluge of supporting fire. Colonel

Meyers, who flew to 881S by helicopter, observed the attack and

personally ensured that sufficient supporting arms were employed.

In addition to the artillery of 1/13 at Khe Sanh and the 175mm

bases, 155mm and 8-inch batteries of the 1st ACD at LZ Stud were

called on to help cave in the enemy bunkers. Strike aircraft

worked over the hill with bombs, rockets, and napalm. The

Marines who remained on 881S also provided heavy support. Besides the 60mm and 81mm mortars, these men had pooled all eight

of the battalion's 106 recoilless rifles, the two remaining

105mm howitzers, and six .50 caliber machine guns which had

been salvaged from downed helicopters or stripped off of trucks

at the base. As the assault troops advanced, the weapons on

881S provided direct overhead fire which sometimes preceded the

front ranks by no more than 50 meters. As usual, the recoilless

rifles were extremely effective. One observer later remarked

that when the lead elements approached a treeline, no chances

were taken; the 106 gunners fired a broadside and the treeline

was simply blown away.(216)

Because of the weight and speed of the attack, the enemy

was never able to recover. Moving behind a wall of steel, the

battalion clawed its way through the defenses between the two

hills and prepared for the final push. Major Caulfield, who

had worried about the Marines' weakened condition the night

before, soon found the opposite was true--he was having trouble

holding them back. At one point, a group of NVA soldiers who

had been hammered senseless by the prep fires, broke from their

positions and fled into the open. An airborne spotter directed

the companies to hold up while he called in air and artillery.

Scanning the front lines, Major Caulfield noticed that a handful

of Marines with fixed bayonets were in hot pursuit of the enemy.

The major contacted the company commander by radio and told

him to collar his troops. The reply was, "Sir, I can't stop

them...." Neither could the enemy.(217)

The men of 3/26 stormed the hill, swarmed over the crest,

and killed anyone who stood in their way. At 1428, the objective was secured and the men signaled their victory in traditional

142
Marine Corps fashion, as Colonel Meyers later described:

On Sunday, 14 April (Easter), I helicoptered to

88IS and with Captain Bill Dabney, Company Commander of

1/3/26, personally watched the U. S. Colors (which had

been fortuitously carried in a squad leader's pack)

hoisted again over 881N. This was the signal (visual)

that Lieutenant Colonel John Studt's assault had been

completed. I watched the jungle utility-clad Marine

"shinny-up" a shrapnel torn tree whose limbs had been

sheared from the intensive prep fires, and affix the

Stars and Stripes.(218)

With the enemy either dead or gone, the hill again lost its

value. Terrain wasn't so important in the fluid Vietnam war,

but people were and, in that respect, Lieutenant Colonel Studt's

men had completed a very successful operation--106 North Vietnamese were dead. In addition to the enemy dead on the objective, air strikes and artillery fire had completely blanketed

three large groups of NVA fleeing from the hill but because of

the dense vegetation and the approaching darkness, no bodies

were recovered. Two slightly shot-up North Vietnamese, one of

them an officer, were captured and flown back to Khe Sanh in

Colonel Meyers' helicopter. Considering the strength of the

enemy defenses, Marine casualties were surprisingly light--6

killed and 19 medevaced. Lieutenant Colonel Studt stated:

"...stand off plastering with supporting arms...prior to each

assault was the key factor here."(219)

That night the battalion commander and his operations

officer stood at the gate on 881S and slapped the men on the

back as they trooped back into the perimeter. One Marine, a

tall, lanky, slow-talking Kentuckian, held out a captured rifle

for Lieutenant Colonel Studt's inspection--it was filthy. During

the attack, the Marine had come face to face with the owner;

both men raised their rifles simultaneously and pulled the trigger

but only the M-16 barked out--the enemy's rifle jammed. The

survivor's explanation was simply, "I cleaned my weapon last

night, he didn't."(220)

The next morning at 0800, PCV terminated PEGASUS. The

operation was very successful and all objectives were achieved;

Route 9 was open, the enemy had been routed,and the base itself

was relieved. The North Vietnamese had lost another 1,304

killed and 21 captured, while 41 U. S. Army troops, 51 Marines,

and 33 South Vietnamese died. Air support again had played an

143
important role. There were 45 B-52 Arc Light strikes and

1,625 tactical sorties conducted during PEGASUS. Of the latter

nunber, 650 sorties were flown by Marines, 463 by the U. S. Air

Force, 436 by carrier-based Task Force 77, and 77 by the U. S.

Army and VNAF. From 31 March to 8 April, U. S. Air Force C-130

and C-123 aircraft delivered 843 tons of supplies to Khe Sanh

by paradrop and the low altitude extraction system. On 9 April,

the strip was reopened to C-130s and the supply level at the

KSCB began to grow large enough so that the 1st ACD could draw

from the 26th Marines stockpile.(221)

With the termination of PEGASUS, the 3d Marine Division

again assumed responsibility of the Khe Sanh area. Task Force

GLICK, comprised of the 26th Marines, the 1st Marinas, and the

2d Brigade(-), 1st ACD, launched Operation SCOTLAND II at 0801,

15 April. The 26th Marines, however, did not remain in the

operation very long. Three days later, the new commanding

officer and two of his battalions were transferred to Quang Tri

Base and, for the men who had taken 77 days of the best the NVA

could offer, the defense of Khe Sanh was over.(*)(222)

(*) The 2d Battalion, 26th Marines did not return to Quang

Tri with the regiment but was transferred to the operational

control of the 4th Marines at Camp Carroll. General Tompkins

saw to it that each man who returned from Khe Sanh immediately

received a hot shower, a clean uniform, and a big steak dinner.

As an added touch, the 3d Marine Division band was on hand, and

greeted each arrival with a stirring rendition of the "Marines

Hymn."

144
PART IX

EPILOGUE

On 23 May 1968, several members of the 26th Marines who

had fought at Khe Sanh had a reunion of sorts in Washington,

D. C. and the surroundings were a far cry from the dirt and

grime of the combat base. The "CP" belonged to the President

of the United States, Lyndon B. Johnson. In the Cabinet Room

of the White House, the Commander in Chief paused to honor the

men of the 26th Marines and awarded the Presidential Unit

Citation to the regiment. Colonel Lownds, whose large handlebar mustache had been shaved off at the direction of "the

highest possible authority"--his wife, and Sergeant Major

Agrippa W. Smith, senior enlisted man at the KSCB, were on

hand to receive the award. While it was fitting that the 26th

Marines be cited as a unit, the President also praised the

South Vietnamese, U. S. Army, U. S. Navy, U. S. Air Force, and

Marine aviation and support units which contributed so gallantly

to the defense of the installation.(223)

In some quarters, however, there were still grumblings

over the Khe Sanh issue. During the siege, there had been a

virtual storm of protest from critics who opposed the Administration's decision to hold the base. These doomsday prophets

suffered from what some military experts referred to as the

"Dien Bien Phu Syndrome." Many noted intellectuals were in the

van of this group and throughout the battle they could not be

convinced that air and artillery support would provide the margin

of difference; they warned that the tiny base would suffer the

same fate which had been meted out to the French garrison 14

years earlier.(224)

There are several reasons why Khe Sanh did not become

another Dien Bien Phu. The first and most obvious being that

the Americans possessed the overwhelming supporting arms which

were not available to the French. Contrary to the predictions

of many critics, air and artillery were decisive and more than

made up for the numerical superiority of the enemy. Over

100,000 tons of bombs and 150,000 artillery rounds were delivered

--and delivered intelligently--by the Americans during the siege.

Much of the credit goes to the regimental commander and his staff

who knew how to coordinate their different sources of firepower

to achieve maximum results. The NVA learned this during the

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146
five major attacks against the base and hill outposts.

The ability to keep Khe Sanh resupplied was another major

factor. The NVA encirclement did not coincide with the monsoon

season by accident. With Route 9 interdicted, the fate of the

garrison hinged on the success or failure of the airlift and

apparently the North Vietnamese anticipated that it would fail.

The fact that the airlift was successful in the face of heavy

enemy fire and the foulest weather imaginable is indeed a tribute to the aircrews and recovery personnel but the resupply

effort went much deeper than just delivering the goods. The

Force Logistics Command at Da Nang augmented by U. S. Army

sources at Cam Ranh Bay was responsible for the mountain of

supplies and material which sustained the 26th Marinas. An excerpt from the works of Winston Churchill which was selected as

the motto of the Force Logistics Command best describes the

vital role these logistics agencies played: "Victory is the

beautiful colored flower. Supply is the stem without which it

could never have blossomed."(225)

Aiother important facet of the defense was the close supervision and leadership provided by the senior commanders, namely

CG, 3d MarDiv, CG, III MAF, and ComUSMACV. Since much of the

supporting arms and all of the logistical support was handled

by agencies external to the 26th Marines, constant coordination

among these three headquarters was imperative. General Tompkins

was the pivotal figure of the triumvirate. During his daily

trips to the base, the general learned first hand what the

regimental commander needed; he not only saw that Colonel Lownds

received adequate support but he insured that the defenders made

the most of their resources. In so doing he exposed himself to

heavy enemy antiaircraft, artillery, and mortar fire as did

General Cushman during his periodic visits to Khe Sanh. Commenting on the strong role played by the 3d Marine Division

commander, General Cushman later said, "General Tompkins made

or approved every major decision during the battle."(226)

The real hero of Khe Sanh, however, was on the opposite

end of the rank scale--the individual fighting man. For 77

days the defenders waited in the trenchlines while the bulk of

the credit and publicity went to the artillery, fighter/bombers,

and B-52s. On several occasions the supporting arms could not

prevent major enemy assaults from reaching the wire; at this

point, it was the Marines or ARVN Rangers, armed with rifles,

grenades, and bayonets, who stopped the North Vietnamese--often

in bitter hand-to-hand combat. Without exception, the battalion

147
commanders were lavish in their praise of the young Americans

and South Vietnamese who held the perimeter and denied the

enemy a much-needed victory. In spite of the inherent hardships

which accompanied the siege and the incessant shelling, the

defenders were always itching for a fight. The most overused

expression during the battle was, "I wish they (North Vietnamese)

would hurry up and come so we can get this thing over with."

When asked by a reporter if the NVA troops could take Khe Sanh,

one officer answered, "Hell no, those 19-year-old Marines won't

let them."(*)(227)

Finally, much of the credit for the American success at

Khe Sanh belongs to the NVA. The North Vietnamese obliged the

26th Marines by standing toe to toe in a slugging contest during

which they were outgunned and outfought; in effect, the enemy

destroyed himself. If there was one salient feature which resulted in the enemy's defeat it might well be his rigid adherence

to a siege strategy in the face of certain failure. Even when

it became obvious that the Americans were aware of their master

plan, the North Vietnamese doggedly pursued their siege tactics

without alteration. The extremely lucrative target presented

by the massed NVA forces which ringed the base was one of the

main reasons the garrison was maintained. Thus, the question

may be legitimately asked, "Who besieged whom?"(228)

To a lesser degree, there was a controversy over who or

what had won the battle. Proponents of air power and strategic

bombing were the most vocal; they felt that the B-52 had been

the most decisive instrument of defense. While the Stratofortress was a valuable asset and, without doubt played a major

role, any attempt to single out one supporting arm as the ultimate weapon in the battle would be futile. The B-52 was but

one part of an intricate defensive fire plan. The bombers struck

targets beyond 1,100 meters of the base; tactical air and

artillery took up the slack to within about 250 meters and the

organic weaponry of the defenders provided close-in fires. The

system was balanced and effective but, if any part were eliminated,

the defenders would have paid a much higher price in casualties.

Both General Tompkins and Colonel Lownds were unstinting in

(*) Many of these young men exhibited a maturity beyond their

years. One message, scrawled on the back of a C-ration carton

by an anonymous Marine, was found after the siege. It read:

"Life has a special flavor to those who fight for it that the

sheltered never know."

148
their praise of all supporting arms, as well as the logistical

effort; they stressed, and stressed heavily, that the defense

of Khe Sanh was a joint endeavor. The highly successful results

were achieved through the contributions of all U. S. Services

and the South Vietnamese. While the Marines had been unable to

find an infantryman who could carry a 27-ton payload, neither

had the U. S. Air Force come up with a B-52 which could man a

foxhole. Both, in their own way, were essential.(229)

The Khe Sanh story again became news in late June 1968

and the old controversy over strategy was rekindled. Prior to

leaving his post as ComUSMACV on 11 June, General Westmoreland

visited PCV Headquarters in I Corps and approved the recommendations of Generals Cushman and Rosson to raze the KSC3 and withdraw all Allied forces to the Ca Lu area. While General

Westmoreland made the decision prior to his departure, he did

not close the base at that time, because mopping-up operations

were being conducted around Khe Sanh. In addition, large

amounts of supplies had been stockpiled there and the general

deemed it more economical to maintain the base while these

stocks were consumed in support of the operations rather than

backhaul them to Ca Lu. For these reasons, he left the choice

concerning the optimum time to dismantle the installation up to

his successor, General Abrams. When bulldozers finally began

to level the bunkers and structures which had housed the 26th

Marines throughout the siege, the American people wondered why

the base had been so tenaciously defended if it was to be

eventually abandoned. Had American blood been shed in vain?

Critics of the hold-out policy argued that,in the final analysis,

they had been right and those who decided to defend the base

had been wrong. Such rationale pinpointed the inability of

many Americans to break away from the techniques employed in

past wars and recognize the pecularities of the conflict in

Vietnam.

There were several reasons for the deactivation of the KSCB

since, for all practical purposes, the base had outlived its

usefulness. The rationale endorsed by General Cushman and

General Rosson was threefold. First, the enemy had reduced his

forces and changed his modus operandi in the Khe Sanh area.

Secondly, the NVA artillery in Laos had accurately targeted the

base and access road which compounded the casualty and resupply

problems. Finally and most important, General Cushman had sufficient assets in June to pursue the mobile offensive strategy

which he had advocated strongly for such a long time. Two U. S.

Army divisions (i.e. 1st ACD and the 101st Airborne) with their

149
inherent helicopter resources had been shifted to III MAF and,

during March and April,the tremendous logistics burden associated

with the introduction of these 50,000 men into northern I Corps

had been alleviated. Since he had sufficient maneuver elements

to go on the offense in western Quang Tri Province, General

Cushman no longer needed five battalions buttoned up in Khe

Sanh.(230)

An additional consideration for the abandonment of the base

was President Johnson's announcement on 31 March that the U. S.

would end air strikes in North Vietnam.(*) While the decision

was a major step toward peace, it also enabled thousands of NVA

support personnel who were responsible for road repair in North

Vietnam to move further south. These workers constructed a network of infiltration arteries which bypassed the combat base and

the continued policy of positioning static Allied defense installations in the path of these routes would have been inefficient

and undesirable. In this regard, the best defense was a highly

mobile offense and while a forward operating base for such operations was essential, the LZ Stud/Ca Lu area was much better

suited than Khe Sanh.(231)

By the time PEGASUS was over, LZ Stud was in full operation. The airstrip was extended to accommodate C-123s, a

Force Logistics Area was established, and local defenses were

strengthened. The base was outside the range of the North

Vietnamese 130mm and 152mm guns in Laos and the stretch of

Route 9 from Ca Lu to the Rockpile and eventually Dong Ha was

easier to keep open. Thus, two factors--enemy shelling and

resupply problems--which had negated the effectiveness of Khe

Sanh as a base of operations were absent at LZ Stud.

While not physically located on the Khe Sanh Plateau, the

forces at LZ Stud controlled it. Two forward fire bases were

established in the vicinity of the old combat base from which

extensive patrolling was conducted. Ground patrols were supplemented by air surveillance, whenever contact with the enemy

was made, lighting-fast helicopter assaults were launched from

LZ Stud and were supported by the artillery of the forward fire

bases, tactical aircraft, and Huey gunships. The enemy was

attacked by these mobile forces whenever and wherever he appeared.

(*) The attacks were halted except in the area north of the

demilitarized zone where the contimiing enemy buildup directly

threatened Allied forward positions and where the movements of

their troops and supplies clearly related to that threat.

150
When a major NVA unit was encountered, sufficient reinforcements

were also injected by helicopter. So, the only thing that

changed on the Khe Sanh Plateau, besides the face of the combat

base, was the style and tempo of operations.(232)

The new strategy by no means diminished the accomplishments

of the men who had held Khe Sanh; it was simply a continuation

of the battle in another form. When the leaders in Hanoi finally

accepted President Johnson's peace overtures and consented to

meet with U. S. representatives in Paris, there was one thing

that the North Vietnamese negotiators did not possess--the battle

standard of the 26th Marines. An editorial in the Washington

Star provided an appropriate tribute to the men of Khe Sanh:

To be sure, Khe Sanh will be a subject of controversy for a long time, but this much about it is

indisputable: It has won a large place in the history

of the Vietnam war as an inspiring example of American

and Allied valor. One day, in fact, the victory over

the siege may be judged a decisive turning point that

finally convinced the enemy he could not win.(233)

151
APPENDIX A

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES AND FOOTNOTES

Explanatory Note: Unless otherwise noted the material in this

monograph is derived from Admiral Ulysses S. G. Sharp, USN, and

General William C. Westmoreland, USA, Report On The War In

Vietnam, hereafter Sharp and Westmoreland, Report On The War;

Maj John J. Cahill, USMC, and Jack Shulimson, "History of U. S.

Marine Corps Operations in Vietnam, Jan-Jun65"; FMFPac, Operations of U. S. Marine Forces Vietnam, Mar67-Apr68, hereafter

FMFPac Marine Opns in Vietnam; FMFPac, U. S. Marine Corps Forces

in Vietnam Mar65-Sep67 Historical Summary, Volume I: Narrative,

hereafter FMFPac HistSum; III MAF Command Chronologies Apr67-

Apr68, hereafter III MAF CmdChron; 3d Marine Division Command

Chronologies, Apr67-Apr68, hereafter 3d MarPiv CmdChron; 1st

Marine Aircraft Wing Command Chronologies, Apr67-Apr68, hereafter 1st MAW CmdChron; 26th Marines Command Chronologies,

Apr67-Apr68, hereafter 26th Marines CmdChron; 1/26 Command

Chronologies, Apr67-Apr68, hereafter 1/26 CmdChron; 2/26 Command

Chronologies, Jan68-Apr68, hereafter 2/26 CmdChron; 3/26 Command

Chronologies, Jun67-Apr68, hereafter 3/26 CmdChron; 3d Marines

Khe Sanh Operations After Action Report, 9Jun67, hereafter 3d

Marines Khe Sanh AAR; VMGR-152 Command Chronologies Jan68-Apr68,

hereafter VMGR-152 CmdChron; Marine Corps Command Center, Status

of Forces, Apr68, hereafter MCCC Status of Forces; Defense Intelligence Bulletins Dec67-Apr68, hereafter DIA IntBul; Six

Month Evaluation Report, prepared by HQ, MACV 31May68; Presentation of LtGen Robert E. Cushman, Jr., USMC, in 1968 General

Officers Symposium Book, HQMC, dtd 15Jul68; CG, FMFPac msg to

CMC dtd 200327Z Mar68; Combat Operations After Action Report,

Operation PEGASUS (C), hereafter PEGASUS AAR; Gen William C.

Westmoreland ltr to CMC dtd 14Dec68, Subj: "Review of the draft

manuscript "The Battle of Khe Sanh Apr67-Apr68," hereafter

Westmoreland Comments; LtGen Lewis W. Walt Interviews with HistBr

dtd 17Dec67 and 14Jan69; LtGen Robert E. Cushman, Jr., USMC, ltr

to Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, HQMC, dtd 26Dec68,

Subj: "The Battle of Khe Sanh, Apr67-Apr68," hereafter Cushman

Comments; LtGen Herman Nickerson, USMC, memo to Assistant Chief

of Staff, G-3, HQMC, dtd Dec68, Subj: Review of draft manuscript, "The Battle of Khe Sanh Apr67-Apr68," hereafter Nickerson

Comments; LtGen William B. Rosson, USA, ltr to CMC dtd 18Dec68,

Subj: "'The Battle of Khe Sanh, Apr67-Apr68," hereafter Rosson

Comments; LtGen John J. Tolson, III, USA, ltr to CMC dtd 21Jan69,

152
Subj: "The Battle of Khe Sanh," hereafter To1son Comments;

MajGen Norman J. Anderson, USMC, ltr to HistBr, G-3 Division,

HQMC, dtd 2Jan69, Subj: Khe Sanh Historical Monograph, hereafter Anderson Comments; MajGen Louis Metzger, USMC, memo to

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, HQMC, dtd 23Dec68, Subj: "The

Battle of Khe Sanh, Apr67-Apr68," hereafter Metzger Comments;

MajGen John R. Chaisson comments on draft manuscript, "The

Battle of Khe Sanh, Apr67-Apr68," hereafter Chaisson Comments;

Interview with MajGen Rathvon McC. Tompkins, USMC, dtd 26Aug68

No. 3088 (Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC), hereafter

Tompkins Interview; Deputy Chief of Staff (Air) comments on

draft manuscript, "The Battle of Khe Sanh," dtd 9Dec68, hereafter DCS/Air Comments; BGen Robert P. Keller, USMC, ltr to

Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 Division, HQMC, dtd 17Dec68,

Subj: "The Battle of Khe Sanh," hereafter Keller Comments;

BGen Harry C. Olson, USMC, ltr to HistBr, G-3 Division, HQMC,

dtd 13Jan69, Subj: "The Battle of Khe Sanh," hereafter Olson

Comments; BGen Carl W. Hoffman, USMC, ltr to CMC (Code A03D)

dtd 22Dec68, Subj: "The Battle of Khe Sanh," hereafter Hoffman

Comments; Chief, USAF Historical Division Liaison Office ltr to

HistBr, G-3 Division, HQMC, dtd 18Dec68, Subj: Review of

Historical Study, "The Battle of Khe Sanh"; Chief, Historical

Studies Branch, USAF Historical Division ltr to HistBr, G-3

Division, HQMC, dtd 22Jan69, Subj: Review of Historical Study,

"The Battle of Khe Sanh"; Chief, Project CORONA HARVEST ltr to

HistBr, G-3 Division, HQMC, dtd 15Jan69, Subj: Review of Draft

Manuscript, "The Battle of Khe Sanh," hereafter Air Force

Historical Comments; Interview with Col David E. Lownds, USMC,

dtd Jul68, No. 801 674/4 (Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC),

hereafter Lownds Jul Interview; Col David E. Lownds, USMC, Interview with HistBr dtd 13Sep68, hereafter Lownds Sep Interview;

Col Frank E. Wilson, USMC, ltr to HistBr, G-3 Division, HQMC,

dtd 6Jan69, Subj: Review of "The Battle of Khe Sanh," hereafter Wilson Comments; Col Bruce F. Meyers, USMC, ltr to HistBr,

G-3 Division, HQMC, dtd 16Dec68, Subj: "The Battle of Khe Sanh"

hereafter Meyers Comments; Interview with Col Franklin N. Pippin,

USMC, dtd 24Jun68, No. 2907 (Oral History Collection, HistBr,

HQMC); Interview with Col Johnnie C. Vance, Jr., USMC, dtd

20Jun68, No. 2909 (Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC); Col

Robert D. Brown, USAF, ltr to HQMC (A03D) dtd 8Jan69, Subj:

"The Battle of Khe Sanh" hereafter Brown Comments; Col Robert

E. Brofft, USAF, ltr to HQMC (A03D) dtd 8Jan69, Subj: Monograph,

"The Battle of Khe Sanh," hereafter Brofft Comments; LtCol John

F. Mitchell, USMC, ltr to HistBr, G-3 Division, HQMC, dtd 31Jan69,

Subj: Comments on "The Battle of Khe Sanh," hereafter Mitchell

Comments; LtCol Harry L. Alderman, USMC, ltr to HistBr, G-3

153
Division, HQMC, Subj: "The Battle of Khe Sanh" hereafter

Alderman Comments; LtCol James B. Wilkinson, USMC, Itr to

HistBr, G-3 Division, HQMG, dtd Dec68, Subj: Response to HQMC

ltr A03D-rem S807 373 of 6Dec68, "The Battle of Khe Sanh,"

hereafter Wilkinson Comments; LtCol John A. Hennelly, USMC,

comments on draft manuscript, "The Battle of Khe Sanh" of

15Feb69, hereafter Hennelly Comments; Interview with LtCol

Edward J. A. Castagna, USMC, dtd Mar68, No. 2621 (Oral History

Collection, HistBr, HQMC); LtCol Francis J. Heath, Jr., USMC,

comments on draft manuscript, "The Battle of Khe Sanh, Apr67-

Apr68," hereafter Heath Comments; LtCol Frederick J. McEwan,

USMC, ltr to HistBr, G-3 Division, HQMC, dtd 30Dec68, Subj:

Comments on "The Battle of Khe Sanh Apr67-Apr68," hereafter

McEwan Comments; LtCol Johnny 0. Gregerson, USMC, ltr to HistBr,

G-3, HQMC dtd 3Jan69, Subj: Review of a draft copy of the

historical monograph: "The Battle of Khe Sanh, Apr67-Apr68,"

hereafter Gregerson Comments; LtCol John C. Studt, USMC, ltr to

HistBr, G-3, HQMC dtd 24Dec68, Subj: "The Battle of Khe Sanh"

manuscript, hereafter Studt Comments; Interview with LtCol Harry

T. Hagaman, USMC, dtd 2Mar68, No. 2548 (Oral History Collection,

HistBr, HQMC); LtCol William J. White, USMC, comments on draft

manuscript, "The Battle of Khe Sanh, Apr67-Apr68" n.d., hereafter White Comments: Interview wittTMaj William J. Sullivan,

USMC, dtd 26Apr68, No. 2621 (Oral History Collection, HistBr,

HQMC); Maj John A. Shepherd,USMC, ltr to HistBr, G-3 Division,

HQMC, dtd 2Jan69, Subj: "The Battle of Khe Sanh, Apr67-Apr68"

hereafter Shepherd Comments; Taped comments of Maj Matthew P.

Caulfield, USMC, on the draft manuscript, "The Battle of Khe

Sanh, Apr67-Apr68" dtd 2Jan69, hereafter Caulfield Comments;

Interview with Maj Matthew P. Caulfield, USMC, dtd 10Feb68,

No. 2535 (Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC); Maj Wayne M.

Wills, USMC, ltr to HistBr, G-3, HQMC, dtd 2Jan69, Subj:

Historical Monograph, "The Battle of Khe Sanh, Apr67-Apr68,"

hereafter Wills Comments; Maj Harper L. Bohr, USMC, ltr to

HistBr, G-3, HQMC, dtd 18Dec68, Subj: Comments concerning

"The Battle of Khe Sanh" hereafter Bohr Comments; Maj Jerry E.

Hudson, USMC, ltr to HistBr, G-3, HQMC, dtd 2Jan69, Subj: Review of Historical Monograph of Khe Sanh, hereafter Hudson

Comments; Maj Mirza M. Baig, USMC, ltr to HistBr, G-3 Division,

HQMC dtd 23Dec68, Subj: Comments on draft manuscript, "The

Battle of Khe Sanh, Apr67-Apr68" hereafter Baig Comments; Maj

William H. Dabney, USMC, comments on draft manuscript nd, "The

Battle of Khe Sanh, Apr67-Apr68" hereafter Dabney Comments; Maj

William H. Dabney, USMC, Interview with HistBr dtd 10Jan69;

Maj Earl G. Breeding, USMC, comments on draft manuscript dtd

22Dec68, "The Battle of Khe Sanh, Apr67-Apr68," hereafter

154
Breeding Comments; Interview with Capt Earl G. Breeding, dtd

Jul68, No. 2121 (Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC); Maj

Kenneth W. Pipes, USMC ltr to HistBr, G-3 Division, HQMC, n.d.,

Subj: Khe Sanh Manuscript, hereafter Pipes Comments; Interview

with Capt Kenneth W. Pipes, USMC, dtd Mar68,~No. 2621 (Oral

History Collection, HistBr, HQMC); IstLt James M. Alexander,

USMC, ltr to HistBr, G-3 Division, HQMC, n.d., Subj: "The Battle

of Khe Sanh, Apr67-Apr68" hereafter Alexander Comments; Interview with IstLt James M. Alexander, USMC, dtd 26Apr68, No. 2621

(Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC); Interview with IstLt

William L. Everhart, USMC, dtd 10Feb68, No. 2535 (Oral History

Collection, HistBr, HQMC); Interview with Sgt Timothy B. Keady,

USMC, dtd Mar68, No. 2621 (Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC);

Interview with HM3 Frank V. Calzia, USN, dtd Mar68, No. 2621

(Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC); LCpl Michael A. Barry,

USMC, Interview with HistBr dtd 17Feb69; Cornelius D. Sullivan,

et al., The Vietnam War: Its Conduct and Higher Direction

(Washington, D. C: The Center For Strategic Studies, Georgetown

University, 1968) (U), hereafter Sullivan, et al., The Vietnam

War; Bernard B. Fall, The Two Viet-Nams (New York: Frederick

A.~Praeger, 1965 ed.) (U); Colonel Robert D. Heinl, Jr., USMC,

Soldiers of the Sea (Annapolis: United States Naval Institute

1962 ed.) (U); Capt Ken Kashiwahara, USAF, "Lifeline to Khe

Sanh," The Airman, v. XII, no. 7 (Jul68) (U), hereafter

Kashiwahara, "Lifeline to Khe Sanh"; Washington Star, 25May68,

p. 13 (Early Bird) (U); Washington Star, 9Jun68, p. 1-E (Early

Bird); Baltimore Sun, 25May68, p. 2 (Early Bird) (U). All

documentary material cited is located in the HistBr, G-3 Division,

HQMC and, unless otherwise noted, carries an overall classification of Secret.

155
(1) Major John J. Cahill, USMC and Jack Shulimson, "History

of U. S. Marine Corps Operations in Vietnam, Jan-Jun65,"

pp. 67, 68, 126 (S).

(2) FMFPac, Marine Opns in Vietnam, Jun67, pp. 5-12 (S).

(3) Ibid.

(4) 3d MarDiv CmdChron, Oct68, p. 11 (S).

(5) FMFPac, Marine Opns in Vietnam, Mar67, p. 15 (S).

(6) 3d Marines Khe Sanh AAR, p. 7 (S); Bernard B. Fall,

The Two Viet-Nams (New York: Frederick A. Praeger

1965 ed.), p. 3.

(7) Westmoreland Comments.

(8) 3d Marines, Khe Sanh AAR, p. 12 (S).

(9) Lieutenant General Lewis W. Walt Interview with Historical Branch dtd 17Dec68 and 14Jan69 (S).

(10) 3d Marines Khe Sanh AAR, pp. 7-30 (S).

(11) Ibid

(12) Ibid., pp. 32-33 (S).

(13) FMFPac Marina Opns in Vietnam, May67, p. 11 (S).

(14) Ibid., pp. 7-10, 19 (S).

(15) FMFPac HistSum, pp. 7-17 (S).

(16) FMFPac Marine 0_£ns in Vietnam, Jul67, pp. 9-13 (S) .

(17) Ibid.

(18) FMFPac Marine Opns in Vietnam Sep67, pp. 52-73 (S); 3d

MarDiv ComdChron, Sep67, p. 25 (S); Chaisson Comments;

Personal observations of the author.

(19) Westmoreland Comments; Metzger Comments.

(20) FMFPac, Marine Opns in Vietnam, Oct67, pp. 24-36 (S).

156
(21) Metzger Comments.

(22) 26th Marinas CmdChron, May67, p. 4 (S).

(23) Ibid.

(24) 26th Marines CmdChron, Jun67, p. 4 (S).

(25) Ibid., Jul67, p. 4 (S).

(26) Col Lownds tape No. 801 674/4 (S); 26th Marines CmdChron,

Aug67, p. 4 (S); Metzger Comments.

(27) Wilkinson Comments.

(28) Col Lownds Tape No. 801 674/4 (S); 26th Marines CmdChron,

Aug67, p. 4 (S); Brown Comments.

(29) 26th Marines CmdChron, Nov67, p. 4 (S).

(30) Cushman Comments; Hoffman Comments.

(31) 26th Marines CmdChron, Dec67, p. 4 (S).

(32) Alderman Comments.

(33) Bohr Comments.

(34) Hudson Comments.

(35) FMFPac Marine Opns in Vietnam, Jan 68, pp. 8, 9; III

MAF CmdChron, Jan and Feb68 (S); 26th Marines CmdChron,

Feb58, p. 60 (S); Lownds Sep Interview (S).

(36) Lownds Sep Interview (S); 3/26 CmdChron, Jan68, p. 10

(S); Caulfield Comments.

(37) Lownds Sep Interview (S); 26th Marines CmdChron, Jan68,

p. 4 (S).

(38) 3/26 CmdChron, Jan68, p. 3 (S).

(39) 2/26 CmdChron, Jan68, p. 2 (S).

(40) Ibid.; Breeding Comments; Caulfield Comments.

157
(41) 26th Marines CmdChron, Jan68, pp. 3, 4 (S); Lownds Sep

Interview (S).

(42) FMFPac Marine Opns in Vietnam, Jan68, p. 10 (S).

(43) 26th Marines CmdChron, Jan68, pp. 3, 4 (S); 3/26 CmdChron,

Jan68, p. 3 (S); Alderman Comments; Dabney Comments;

CaulfieId. Comments.

(44) Ibid.

(45) Dabney Comments.

(46) Ibid.; 26th CmdChron, Jan68, pp. 3, 4 (S); 3/26 CmdChron,

Jan68, p. 3 (S); Alderman Comments; Dabney Comments.

(47) Ibid.

(48) Cushman Comments; Tompkins Interview (S); Lownds Sep

Interview (S); Wilkinson Comments; Pipes Comments; 26th

Marines CmdChron, Jan68, p. 5 (S).

(49) Caulfield Comments.

(50) Alderman Comments.

(51) Caulfield Comments.

(52) Ibid.

(53) 3/26 CmdChron, Jan 68, p. 3 (S); Caulfield Comments.

(54) Lownds Sep Interview (S); Interview with Major Matthew

P. Caulfield, USMC dtd 10Feb68, No. 2535 (Oral History

Collection, HistBr, HQMC) (S); Caulfield Comments.

(55) Dabney Comments; Caulfield Comments.

(56) Ibid.; 26th Marines CmdChron, Jan68, p. 4 (S); Lownds

Sep Interview; White Comments.

(57) Pipes Comments.

(53) Wilkinson Comments.

(59) 26th Marines CmdChron, Jan68, p. 4 (S); Hudson Comment s.

158
(60) Interview with First Lieutenant William L. Everhart,

dtd 10Feb68 No. 2535 (Oral History Collection, HistBr,

HQMC) (S); Hennelly Comments.

(61) 26th Marines CmdChron, Jan68, p. 9 (S); FMFPac Marine

Opns in Vietnam, Jan68, p. 11 (S); Tompkins Interview

(S); Hudson Comments.

(62) Lownds Sep Interview (S).

(63) 26th Marines CmdChron, Jan68, p. 9 (S).

(64) Cushman Comments.

(65) Ibid.; Westmoreland Comments.

(66) Westmoreland Comments.

(67) Ibid.; Sharp and Westmoreland, Report on The War, p. 163,

(68) 26th Marines CmdChron, Jan68, pp. 4, 11 (S); Lownds

Sep Interview (S).

(69) Lownds Sep Interview (S); Baig Comments.

(70) Wilkinson Comments.

(71) 26th Marines CmdChron, Jan68, p. 4 (S); Lownds Sep

Interview; Wilkinson Comments.

(72) 26th Marines CmdChron, Jan68, pp. 3, 4 (S); III MAF

CmdChron, Jan68, pp. 3-10 (S).

(73) Sharp and Westmoreland, Report on The War, p. 158.

(74) Presentation of Lieutenant General Robert E. Cushman,

Jr., USMC, in 1968 General Officers Symposium Book,

dtd 15Jul68 (S).

(75) Sullivan, et al., The Vietnam War, pp. 101-104.

(76) Ibid., Sharp and Westmoreland, Report on The War, p. 235,

(77) Ibid.

(78) Sullivan, et al., The Vietnam War, p. 99.

159
(79) Ibid.

(80) Lownds Jul Interview (S).

(81) Ibid.

(82) Ibid.; CG FMFPac msg to CMC, dtd 200327Z Mar68 (S) .

(83) Lownds Jul and Sep Interviews (S).

(84) Dabney Comments.

(85) Ibid.

(86) Ibid.

(87) Ibid.; Caulfield Comments.

(88) Dabney Comments.

(89) Lownds Jul Interview (S).

(90) Mitchell Comments.

(91) Lownds Jul and Sep Interviews (S); Tompkins Interview (S)

(92) Ibid.; Mitchell Comments.

(93) 26th Marines CmdChron, Feb68, p. 8 (S); Interview with

Captain Earl G. Breeding, USMC, dtd Jul68, No. 2121

(Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC) (S): Breeding

Comments.

(94) Ibid.

(95) Ibid.

(96) Ibid.; Dabney Comments.

(97) Ibid.

(98) White Comments.

(99) 26th Marines CmdChron, Feb68, pp. 8-10 (S); Tompkins

Interview (S).

160
(100) Ibid.; Lownds Jul Interview (S); Hennelly Comments.

(101) Hennelly Comments.

(102) Hudson Comment s.

(103) Wilkinson Comments.

(104) Lownds Sep Interview; Caulfield Comments.

(105) Anderson Comments.

(106) Westmoreland Comments; White Comments; 26th Marines

CmdChron, ~Feb68, pp. 4-8 (S).

(107) DIA IntBul.

(108) 26th Marines CmdChron, Feb68, pp. 8, 48 (S); Mitchell

Comments.

(109) Ibid.

(110) Lance Corporal Michael A. Barry Interview with HistBr,

dtd 17Feb69.

(111) Ibid.

(112) 26th Marines CmdChron, Feb68, pp. 8, 48, 49 (S);

Mitchell Comments.

(113) 26th Marines CmdChron, Feb68, p. 49 (S).

(114) Ibid., p. 51 (S).

(115) Air Force Historical Comments; 1st MAW CmdChron, Feb68,

p. 8 (S).

(116) Wilkinson Comments; White Comments.

(117) 26th Marines CmdChron, Feb68, p. 51 (S); Kashiwahara,

"Lifeline to Khe Sanh".

(113) Ibid.; Lownds Sep Interview (S).

(119) VMGR-152 CmdChron, Feb68, p. 4 (S); Gregerson Comments.

161
(120) Kashiwahara, "Lifeline to Khe Sanh"; Meyers Comments;

Brown Comments; Air Force Historical Comments.

(121) Ibid.; Lownds Jul Interview (S).

(122) Ibid.

(123) Information provided by the Marine Corps Command Center

on 19Feb68.

(124) Ibid.

(125) 1st MAW CmdChron, Jan, Feb, Mar68 (S); Wilson Comments.

(126) Ibid.

(127) Dabney Comments.

(128) Ibid.

(129) Wilson Comments.

(130) DCS/Air Comments.

(131) Breeding Comments.

(132) See 1st MAW CmdChron, Jan, Feb, Mar68 (S); CG FMFPac

msg to CMC dtd 200327Z Mar68 (S).

(133) Wilkinson Comments.

(134) CG FMFPac Msg to CMC dtd 200327Z Mar68 (S); Lownds Jul

Interview (S).

(135) See 26th Marines CmdChron, Jan, Feb, and Mar68 (S).

(136) Lownds Sep Interview (S).

(137) 26th Marines CmdChron, Jan, Feb, and Mar68 (S); Lownds

Sep Interview; Interview with Major William J. Sullivan,

USMC, dtd 26Apr68, No. 2621 (Oral History Collection,

HistBr, HQMC) (S); Hennelly Comments; Gregerson Comments;

Air Force Historical Comments.

(138) 1st MAW CmdChron, Jan and Feb68 (S).

162
(139) Ibid., Debrief Sheets (S).

(140) Dabney Comments.

(141) 1st MAW CmdChron, Feb 68, p. 2-2 (S); Pipes Comments.

(142) Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Harry T. Hagaman,

USMC, dtd 2Mar68, No. 2548 (Oral History Collection,

HistBr, HQMC) (C).

(143) Information supplied by U. S. Air Force Public Information Office, 160ct68 (U); Chaisson Comments; Air Force

Historical Comments; Brofft Comments.

(144) Tompkins Interview (S).

(145) Ibid.; Lownds Sep Interview (S); Kashiwahara, "Lifeline

to Khe Sanh."

(146) Air Force Historical Comments; 26th Marines CmdChron,

Jan, Feb and Mar68 (S); Tompkins Interview, Baig Comments,

(147) Gregerson Comments.

(148) Lownds Jul Interview (S); Interview with Major William

J. Sullivan, USMC, dtd 26Apr68, No. 2621 (Oral History

Collection, HistBr, HQMC) (S); Gregerson Comments,

(149) Lownds Sep Interview (S); Interview with First Lieutenant James M. Alexander, USMC, dtd 26Apr68, No. 2621

(Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC) (S). Hennelly

Comments.

(150) Interview with Major William J. Sullivan, USMC, dtd

26Apr68, No. 2621 (Oral History Collection, HistBr,

HQMC) (S); Interview with First Lieutenant James M.

Alexander, USMC, dtd 26Apr68, No. 2621 (Oral History

Collection, HistBr, HQMC) (S); 26th Marines CmdChron,

Jan, Feb and Mar 68 (S); Gregerson Comments.

(151) Ibid.

(152) Ibid.

(153) Lownds Interview; Hennelly Comments

163
(154) Hennelly Comments.

(155) Baig Comments.

(156) Hennelly Comments.

(157) Ibid.; 26th Marines CmdChron, Jan, Feb and Mar68 (S);

Baig Comments.

(158) Ibid.

(159) Baig Comments.

(160) Ibid.

(161) Ibid.

(162) Ibid.; Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Edward J. A.

Castagna, USMC, dtd Mar68, No. 2621 (Oral History

Collection, HistBr, HQMC) (S); Colonel Robert D. Heinl,

Jr., USMC, Soldiers of the Sea (Annapolis: United States

Naval Institute 1962 ed.) p. 563.

(163) Baig Comments.

(164) Six Month Evaluation Report, HQ USMACV, 31May68 (S);

Interview with Colonel Franklin N. Pippin, USMC, dtd

24Jun68, No. 2907 (Oral History Collection, HistBr,

HQMC) (S).

(165) 1/26 CmdChron, Jan and Feb68 (S); CG FMFPac msg to CMC

dtd 200327Z Mar68 (S); Information provided by Research,

Development, and Study Division, HQMC, 8Nov68 (U);

Lownds Jul Interview (S).

(166) 26th Marines CmdChron, Jan and Feb68 (S); Lownds Jul

and Sep Interviews (S).

(167) 26th Marines CmdChron, Jan, Feb and Mar68 (S).

(168) Dabney Comments.

(169) Ibid.

(170) Lownds Sep Interview (S); Interview with Sergeant Timothy

B. Keady, USMC, dtd Mar68, No. 2621 (Oral History

Collection, HistBr, HQMC) (S).

164
(171) Baltimore Sun, 25 May, p. 2 (Early Bird) (U).

(172) Interview with First Lieutenant James M. Alexander, USMC,

dtd 26Apr63, No. 2621 (Oral History Collection, HistBr,

HQMC) (S); Interview with Major William J. Sullivan,

USMC, dtd 26Apr68, No. 2621 (Oral History Collection,

HistBr, HQMC) (S); Interview with Colonel Johnnie C.

Vance, Jr., USMC, dtd 20Jun68, No. 2909 (Oral History

Collection, HistBr, HQMC) (S); Interview with Major John

A. Shepherd, USMC, dtd 26Apr68, No. 2621 (Oral History

Collection, HistBr, HQMC) (S).

(173) Shepherd Comments.

(174) Lownds Sep Interview (S).

(175) Lownds Jul Interview (S).

(176) Ibid.; Tompkins Interview (S).

(177) Keller Comments.

(178) Wilkinson Comment s.

(179) 26th Marines CmdChron, Feb68, Encl 1 (S).

(180) Ibid.

(181) Lownds Sep Interview (S); Interview with HM3 Class

Frank V. Calzia, dtd Mar68, No. 2621 (Oral History

Collection, HistBr, HQMC) (S).

(182) Ibid.; Interview with Captain Kenneth W. Pipes, USMC,

dtd Mar68, No. 2621 (Oral History Collection, HistBr,

HQMC) (S).

(183) Ibid.

(184) Ibid.; 26th Marines CmdChron, Feb68, Encl 1 (S).

(185) Lownds Jul and Sep Interviews (S).

(186) Ibid.; 26th Marines CmdChron, Mar68, p. 4 (S); Baig

Comments.

(187) 26th Marines CmdChron, Mar68, pp. 3, 4 (S); Wilkinson

Comments.

165
(188) Ibid.; Lownds Sep Interview,

(189) 26th Marines CmdChron, Mar68, p. 8 (S).

(190) Ibid., pp. 11, 12.

(191) Ibid., p. 7.

(192) Ibid., pp. 7, 8.

(193) Ibid., p. 6.

(194) Ibid., p. 10 (S)

(195) Ibid.; White Comments.

(196) Ibid.; McEwan Comments; Pipes Comments.

(197) 26th Marines CmdChron, Mar68, pp. 9, 10, and Encl 1.

(198) Ibid.; Baig Comments.

(199) MCCC, Status of Forces, Apr 68 (S); Lownds Sep Interview (S); PEGASUS AAR, pp. 1-4.

(200) PEGASUS AAR, Encl 1 (C); Westmoreland Comments; Cushman

Comments.

(201) Ibid.

(202) Tolson Comments.

(203) Ibid.

(204) PEGASUS AAR, Encl 1 (C); Rosson Comments.

(205) Ibid.

(206) Ibid.

(207) Ibid.; Lownds Jul and Sep Interviews (S).

(208) PEGASUS AAR, Encl 1 (C) .

(209) Ibid.

166
(210) Ibid.; Lownds Jul and Sep_ Interviews (S); Tolson

Comments.

(211) PEGASUS AAR, pp. 13, 14 (C).

(212) Ibid., Encl 1.

(213) Ibid.

(214) 3/26 CmdChron, Apr68, p. 4 (S); Studt Comments; Meiers

Comments.

(215) Ibid.; CaulfieId Comments.

(216) Ibid.; Dabney Comments.

(217) Caulfield Comments.

(218) Meyers Comments.

(219) 3/26 CmdChron, Apr68, p. 4 (S); Meyers Comments; Studt

Comments.

(220) Caulfield Comments

(221) PEGASUS AAR.

(222) Ibid.; 26th Marines CmdChron, Apr68, p. 4 (S); Caulfield

Comments.

(223) Baltimore Sun, 25May68, p. 2 (Early Bird) (U);

Washington Star, 25May68, p. 13 (Early Bird) (U).

(224) Ibid.

(225) Olson Comments.

(226) Cushman Comments.

(227) Alderman Comments; Caulfield Comments.

(228) Baig Comments.

(229) Tompkins Interview; Lownds Jul and Sep Interviews (S).

167
(230) Westmoreland Comments; Cushman Comments; Rosson

Comments.

(231) Ibid.

(232) Ibid.

(233) Washington Star, 9Jun68, p. 1-E (Early Bird) (U)

168
AAR

ABCCC

A-4 Skyhawk

AN/PRC-25

AN/IP Q-10

A-l Skyraider

Arc Light

ARVN

A-6A Intruder

ASRT

BDA

Bde

B-52 Stratofortress

BLT

APPENDIX B

GLOSSARY

After Action Report

Airborne Command and Control Center

A single-seat, lightweight, jet attack

bomber in service with Navy and Marine

Corps squadrons. Built by Douglas.

U. S.-built, short-range, portable, frequency-modulated radio set used to provide two-way communication in the 30 megacycle to 75.95 megacycle band.

U. S.-built, ground-based radar system

used to guide aircraft on bombing missions,

U. S.-built, prop-driven, attack aircraft

built by Douglas.

Operational name for B-52 strikes in South

Vietnam.

Army of The Republic of Vietnam.

U. S. Navy and Marine Corps twin-engine,

low-altitude, jet attack bomber specifically designed to deliver ordnance on

targets completely obscured by weather or

darkness. Carries a heavier and more

varied load than any other U. S. naval

attack aircraft. Built by Grumman.

Air Support Radar Team

Battle Damage Assessment

Brigade

USAF eight-engine, swept-wing heavy jet

bomber. Built by Boeing.

Battalion Landing Team

169
CAC

CACO

CavSqd (e.g. 1/9)

C-4

CG, 1st MarDiv

CG, FMFPac

CG, 3d MarDiv

CG, III MAF

ChiCom

CH-53A Sea Stallion

CH-46D Sea Knight

CIDG

Claymore

CMC

Combined Action Company

Combined Action Company Oscar

1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry

Plastic explosives

Commanding General, 1st Marine Division

Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force,

Pacific

Commanding General, 3d Marine Division

Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious

Force

Chinese Communist

U. S.-built, single-rotor, heavy assault

transport helicopter powered by two shaftturbine engines with an average payload

of 12,800 pounds. Full-sized rear opening

with built-in ramp permits loading of

105mm howitzer and carriage. External

sling will accommodate a 155mm howitzer

(towed). Carries crew of 3 plus 38 combat

troops or 24 litters. Built by Sikorsky.

U. S.-built, medium transport, twinturbine, tandem rotor helicopter with

an average payload of 4,800 pounds. Has

rear loading ramp and external sling

mount. Carries crew of 3 plus 25 combat

troops or 15 litters and 2 attendants.

Built by Boeing.

Civilian Irregular Defense Group

U. S.-built, directional antipersonnel

land mine employed above ground and

normally in an upright position.

Commandant of the Marine Corps

170
CmdChron

CO

ComUSMACV

CP

CS

DASC

D-Day

DIA IntBul

DMZ

EC-121 Super

Constellation

FADAC

FDC

F-8 Crusader

F-4B Phantom II

F-4C

Command Chronology

Commanding Officer

Commander, U. S. Military Assistance

Command, Vietnam

Command Post

Designation for tear gas

Direct Air Support Center

Day scheduled for the commencement of an

operation.

Defense Intelligence Agency Intelligence

Bulletin

Demilitarized Zone

USAF and USN four-engine, prop-driven,

long-range, heavy transport modified with

special equipment for radar early warning

patrols and electronic warfare duty.

Built by Lockheed.

Field Artillery Digital Automatic Computer

Fire Direction Center

U. S. Navy and Marine Corps supersonic,

single-seat, single-engine, jet fighter

with afterburner. Primarily used in South

Vietnam in an attack role. Carries airto-air and air-to-ground ordnance. Built

by LTV Vought Aeronautics.

U. S. Navy and Marine Corps twin-engine,

two-seat, supersonic fighter/attack jet

with afterburners; has dual role of interceptor and bomber. Of all U. S. naval

attack aircraft, F-4B carries second

largest payload. Built by McDonnell.

U. S. Air Force model of the Phantom II.

171
1st ACD

1st MarDiv

1st MAW

FOB-3

F-100 Super Sabre

F-105 Thunderchief

FMFPac

FO

FSCC

GCA

GPES

Grenade Launcher,

M-79

Gun, 100mm M1944

1st Air Cavalry Division

1st Marine Division

1st Marine Aircraft Wing

Forward Operating Base 3

Single-engine, jet (with afterburner)

sweptwing, supersonic fighter-bomber; in

production since 1953, the F-100 was the

first supersonic operational fighter developed for the U. S. Air Force. Carries

air-to-air and air-to-ground ordnance.

Built by North American.

U. S. Air Force supersonic, single-seat,

single-engine, jet fighter/bomber with

afterburner. Built by Republic.

Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Forward Observer

Fire Support Coordination Center

Ground Controlled Approach

Ground Proximity Extraction System

U. S.-built, single-shot, break-open,

breech-loaded shoulder weapon which fires

40mm projectiles and weighs approximately

6.5 pounds when loaded; it has a sustained rate of aimed fire of 5-7 rounds

per minute and an effective range of 375

meters.

Soviet-built, dual purpose field and antitank, gun introduced toward the close of

World War II; it weighs 7,628 pounds, is

30.9 feet in length and has a muzzle velocity of 900 meters per second. Maximum

range is 21,000 meters and maximum rate

of fire is 8-10 rounds per minute. Is

recognizable by long tube, double-barrel

muzzle brake, dual wheels, and sloping shield,

172
Gun, 130mm Soviet-built fieldpiece which utilizes

either a limber for transport or is selfpropelled. Towed weapon weighs 19,000

pounds, is 38 feet in length, and has a

muzzle velocity of 930 meters per second.

Maximum range is 27,000 meters and maximum rate of fire is 6-7 rounds per minute,

Tube has a multi-perforated muzzle brake.

Gun, 175mm

Hand Grenade,

Fragmentation

M-26

H&T

H&S Co

HistBr

HMM

Howitzer, 105mm

M2A1

Howitzer, 155mm

Ml

U. S.-built, self-propelled gun which

weighs 62,100 pounds and fires a 147-pouid

projectile to a maximum range of 32,800

meters. Maximum rate of fire is 1/2 round

per minute.

U. S.-manufactured, hand-thrown bomb,

which weighs approximately one pound,

and contains an explosive charge in a

body that shatters into small fragments;

it has an effective range of 40 meters.

Harassment and Interdiction

Headquarters and Service Company

Historical Branch

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron

U. S.-built, towed, general purpose light

artillery piece; the weapon is mounted

on a carriage equipped with split box

trails and pneumatic tires. On-carriage

sighting and fire control equipment are

used both for direct and indirect fire.

The piece weighs 4,980 pounds, is 19.75

feet in length, has a muzzle velocity of

470 meters per second, and a maximum range

of 11,155 meters. Maximum rate of fire

is 4 rounds per minute.

U. S.-built, towed, medium artillery piece

mounted on a two-whael, split-trail carriage

with detachable spades. The howitzer is

fired from a three-point suspension, with

the trails spread and the carriage resting

173
Howitzer, 8-inch

M-110

HQMC

IFR

KBA

KIA

upon an integral firing jack, the wheels

being clear of the ground. The piece

weighs 12,700 pounds, is 24 feet long,

has a muzzle velocity of 560 meters per

second and a maximum range of 15,080

meters. Maximum rate of fire is 3 rounds

per minute.

U. S.-built, self-propelled heavy artillery

piece; 37 feet long tracked carriage is

identical to that of 175mm gun. M-110 has

a maximum range of 16,930 meters and a

rate of fire of 1/2 round per minute.

Headquarters, United States Marine Corps

Instrument Flight Rules

Killed By Air

Killed In Action

KSCB

LAPES

LSA

LZ

MACV

MAG

Machine Gun,

.50 Caliber

Machine Gun, M-60

Khe Sanh Combat Base

Low Altitude Proximity Extraction System

Logistics Support Area

Landing Zone

Military Assistance Command, Vietnam

Marine Aircraft Group

U. S.-built, belt-fed, recoil-operated,

air-cooled automatic weapon, which weighs

approximately 80 pounds without mount or

ammunition; it has a sustained rate of

fire of 100 rounds per minute and an

effective range of 1,450 meters.

U. S.-built, belt-fed, gas-operated, aircooled, 7.62mm automatic weapon, which

weighs approximately 23 pounds without

mount or ammunition; it has a sustained

rate of fire of 100 rounds per minute and

an effective range of 1,100 meters.

174
Marines

MATCU

Medevac

Mortar, 60iran

Mortar, 81mm

Mortar, 82mm

Mortar, 120mm

Mortar, 4.2 inch

M2

Designation of Marine regiment

Marine Air Traffic Control Unit

Medical evacuation

U. S.-built, smooth-bore, muzzle-loaded,

single-shot, high-angle of fire weapon,

which weighs 45.2 pounds when assembled

and fires an assortment of high explosive

and pyrotechnic rounds; it has a maximum

rate of fire of 30 rounds per minute and

sustained rate of fire of 18 rounds per

minute; the effective range is 2,000 meters.

U. S.-built, smooth-bore, muzzle-loaded,

single-shot, high angle of fire weapon,

which weighs approximately 115 pounds

when assembled and fires an assortment of

high explosive and pyrotechnic rounds;

it has a sustained rate of fire of 2 rounds

per minute and an effective range of

2,200-3,650 meters, depending upon the

ammunition used.

Soviet-built, smooth-bore, muzzle-loaded,

single-shot, high-angle of fire weapon

which weighs approximately 123 pounds

when assembled and fires high explosive

and pyrotechnic rounds; it has a maximum

rate of fire of 25 rounds per minute and

a maximum range of 3,040 meters.

Soviet-or Chinese Communist-built, smoothbore, drop or trigger fired, single-shot,

high-angle of fire weapon, which weighs

approximately 606 pounds when assembled

and fires high explosive and pyrotechnic

rounds; it has a maximum rate of fire of

15 rounds per minute and a maximum range

of 5,700 meters.

U. S.-built, 107mm, rifled, muzzle-loaded,

drop-fired weapon consisting of tube, baseplate and standard; weapon weighs 330

pounds, is 4 feet in length, and has a

175
Mortar, 4.2-inch

M98 Howtar

M-16

9th MAB

9th MEB

NVA

01-E

Ontos

PCV

PF

PMDL

RC-292

maximum range of 4,020 meters. Rate of

fire is 20 rounds per minute and utilizes

both high explosive and pyrotechnic

ammunition. (Five M2s were employed at

KSCB)

U. S.-built, 107mm, rifled, muzzle-loaded,

mortar; a towed weapon, the howtar is

mounted on a carriage with two pneumatic

tires. Tube and carriage weigh 1,289

pounds; maximum range is 5,500 meters.

(Two Howtars were employed at KSCB)

U. S.-built, magazine-fed, 5,62mm gasoperated, air-cooled shoulder weapon

designed for either semiautomatic or full

automatic fire; fully loaded weighs 7.6

pounds, fires a maximum rate of 150-200

rounds per minute, and has a maximum

effective range of 460 meters.

9th Marine Amphibious Brigade

9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade

North Vietnamese Army

U. S.-built, single engine, two-seat,

prop-driven light observation aircraft

built by Cessna.

U. S.-built, lightly-armored tracked

vehicle armed with six coaxially mounted

106mm recoilless rifles. Originally designed as a tank killer, the Ontos is

primarily used in Vietnam to support the

infantry.

Provisional Corps, Vietnam

Popular Forces

Provisional Military Demarcation Line

U. S.-built, elevated, wide-band, modified

ground-plane antenna designed to operate

176
Recoilless Rifle,

106mm, M40A1

RF

RLT

Rocket, 122mm

RPG-2

SLF

S-2

TA-4

TAC(A)

TAFDS

Tank, PT-76

with and increase the distance range of

various radio sets.

U. S.-built, single-shot, recoilless,

breech-loaded weapon which weighs 438

pounds when assembled and mounted for

firing; it has a sustained rate of fire

of 6 rounds per minute and an effective

range of 1,365 meters. The weapon can

be singly or Ontos mounted.

Regional Forces

Regimental Landing Team

A Soviet-built, four-piece, fin-stabilized,

9-foot long rocket weighing 125 pounds;

maximum range is approximately 17,000

meters. Launcher tube and mount weigh

121 pounds and are 8.1 feet in length.

A Soviet- and Chinese Communist-built

antitank grenade launcher; a smooth-bore,

muzzle-loaded, shoulder-fired, recoilless

weapon which fires a 40mm spin-stabilized

round. The weapon weighs 6.3 pounds, is

3.2 feet in length, has a muzzle velocity

of 84 meters per second, and an effective

range of 100 meters. Maximum rate of fire

is 4-6 rounds per minute utilizing High

Explosive Antitank ammunition.

Special Landing Force

Intelligence section or officer

Two-seat trainer model of the A-4 Skyhawk

Tactical Air Controller (Airborne)

Tactical Airfield Fuel Dispensing System

Soviet-built, 15.4-ton, amphibious tank

with a crew of 3; primary armament is

turret mounted 76mm gun and maximum thickness of armor is 0.6 inches.

177
Tank, M-48

TAOR

TET

3d MarDiv

III MAF

TIO

TOT

UHF

UH-1E

Huey Gunship

UH-34D

Sea Horse

USAF

USA

USMC

USN

vc

U. S.-built 50.7-ton tank with a crew

of 4; primary armament is turret-mounted

90mm gun with one .30 caliber and one

.50 caliber machine gun. Can be configured with water fording equipment.

Maximum road speed of 32 miles per hour

and an average range of 195 miles.

Tactical Area Of Responsibility

Vietnamese Lunar New Year

3d Marine Division

III Marine Amphibious Force

Target Intelligence/Information Officer

Time On Target

Ultra High Frequency

A single-engine, Marine, light attack/

transport helicopter noted for its

maneuverability and firepower; carries a

crew of three with seven combat troops or

three litters, two sitting casualties and

a medical attendant, or 3,000 pounds of

cargo. It is armed with air to ground

rocket packs and fuselage mounted, electri'

cally fired machine guns.

A single-engine, Marine, medium transport

helicopter with a crew of three; carries

16-18 combat troops or 8 litters or a

normal 5,000 pound payload.

United States Air Force

United States Army

United States Marine Corps

United States Navy

Viet Cong

178
VFR

VHF

Viet Minh

VMA

VMFA

VMGR

VMO

VNAF

VT

Visual Flight Rules

Very High Frequency

The Vietnamese contraction for Viet Nam,

Doc Lap Nong Minh Hoi, a Communist-led

coalition of nationalist groups which

actively opposed the Japanese in World

War II and the French in the early years

of the Indo-China War.

Marine Attack Squadron

Marine Fighter/Attack Squadron

Marine Aerial Refueler Transport

Squadron

Marine Observation Squadron

Vietnamese Air Force

Variable Timed fuze for artillery shell

which causes airburst over target area.

179
APPENDIX C

CHRONOLOGY

1962

Aug U. S. Army Special Forces establish CIDG camp at

Khe Sanh.

1966

Apr 1/1 sweeps Khe Sanh plateau during Operation

VIRGINIA.

Oct 1/3 occupies KSCB; CIDG displaces to Lang Vei

1967

Feb 1/3 replaced by single company, E/2/9.

15 Mar Company B, 1/9, replaces E/2/9 as resident defense

company.

20 Apr Combat assets at KSCB pass to operational control

of Col Lanigan's 3d Marines which commences Operation PRAIRIE IV.

24 Apr B/l/9 patrol engages large enemy force north of

Hill 861 and prematurely triggers attack on Khe

Sanh; "Hill Fights" begin.

2/3 and 3/3 airlifted to KSCB to counter enemy drive,

After heavy prep fires, LtCol DeLong's 2/3 assaults

and seizes first objective--Hill 861.

LtCol Wilder's 3/3 seizes Hill 881S after four days

of heavy fighting.

2/3 repulses strong enemy counterattack south of

881N.

2/3 secures final objective--Hill 881N.

25 Apr

28 Apr

2 May

3 May

5 May

180
11-13 "Hill Fights" terminate with 940 NVA and 155 Marine

May KIA. 3d Marines shuttled to Dong Ha as 26th Marines

(FWD) and 1/26 move into Khe Sanh.

13 May Col Padley, CO 26th Marines (FWD), relieves Col

Lanigan as Senior Officer Present at Khe Sanh.

Elements of 1/26 occupy combat base, Hills 881S,

861, and 950. Operation CROCKETT commences.

13 Jun Due to increasing enemy contacts, LtCol Hoch's

3/26 airlifted to KSCB.

16 Jul Operation CROCKETT terminates with 204 NVA and 52

Marines KIA.

17 Jul Operation ARDMORE begins.

12 Aug Col Lownds relieves Col Padley as CO, 26th Marines.

13 Aug Due to lack of significant contact around Khe Sanh,

Company K and L, 3/26, transferred to 9th Marines

and Operation KINGFISHER.

Khe Sanh airfield closed to normal traffic for

repair of runway.

Remainder of 3/26 withdrawn to eastern Quang Tri

Province.

Air strip reopened to C-123 aircraft.

Operation ARDMORE terminated with 113 NVA and 10

Marines KIA.

Operation SCOTLAND I begins.

MajGen Tompkins assumes command of 3d MarDiv.

LtCol Alderman's 3/26 returns to Khe Sanh because

of increased enemy activity in Khe Sanh TAOR.

21 Dec 3/26 conducts five-day sweep west of base and uncovers

evidence of enemy buildup around KSCB.

181

17 Aug

3 Sep

27 Oct

31 Oct

1 Nov

28 Nov

13 Dec
1968

2 Jan Five NVA officers killed near western edge of main

perimeter.

Intelligence reports indicate influx of two NVA

divisions, and possibly a third, into Khe Sanh TAOR.

16-17 LtCol Heath's 2/26 transferred to operational control

Jan of 26th Marines and arrive KSCB; 2/26 occupies Hill

558 north of base.

ASRT-B of MASS-3 displaces from Chu Lai to Khe Sanh

to handle ground controlled radar bombing missions.

17 Jan Team from Company B, 3d Reconnaissance Battalion

ambushed near Hill 881N.

19 Jan While searching ambush site, patrol from 1/3/26 comes

under fire from estimated 25 NVA troops and withdraws under cover of supporting arms. Two platoons

from M/3/26 helilifted to Hill 881S as reinforcements for 1/3/26 which prepares for sweep toward

881N the next day.

20 Jan Capt Dabney's 1/3/26 attacks and, with the aid of

air and artillery, badly mauls NVA battalion entrenched on southern slopes of 881N; 7 Marines and

103 North Vietnamese KIA.

On strength of testimony of captured NVA lieutenant

that enemy attack is imminent,1/3/26 is withdrawn

to 881S and base placed on Red Alert.

DASC of MASS-3 displaces to Khe Sanh.

20-21 Estimated NVA battalion attacks K/3/26 on Hill 861.

Jan After penetrating southwestern portion of Marines'

perimeter, the enemy is repulsed leaving 47 dead; NVA

reserves are hit by heavy air strikes and artillery

fire.

182
21 Jan KSCB comes under heavy mortar, artillery, and rocket

attack which destroys main ammunition dump. NVA

battalion attacks and partially overruns Khe Sanh

village before CAC and RF companies drive off enemy.

After second attack, Col Lownds withdraws defenders

to confines of combat base.

22 Jan ComUSMACV initiates Operation NIAGARA to provide

massive air support for Khe Sanh.

LtCol Mitchell's 1/9 arrives KSCB and takes up positions which encompass rock quarry southwest of

combat base.

E/2/26 is relocated from Hill 558 to prominent ridgeline northeast of 861 as covering force for flank of

2/26; E/2/26 passes to operational control of 3d

Battalion. New position is called 861A.

23-28 Large number of tribesmen and families are evacuated

Jan from Khe Sanh area to avoid hostile fire.

27 Jan 37th ARVN Ranger Battalion arrives KSCB and takes up

positions in eastern sector of combat base.

30 Jan Communists launch nation-wide TET Offensive.

5 Feb NVA battalion attacks E/2/26 on Hill 861A in concert

with heavy shelling of KSCB. Enemy gains foothold

in northern sector of Company E perimeter but is

driven out by savage counterattack; 109 NVA and 7

Marines KIA.

7 Feb Special Forces camp at Lang Vei overrun by enemy

battalion supported by PT-76 Soviet-built tanks;

first use of NVA tanks in South Vietnam.

8 Feb Some 3,000 indigenous personnel, both military and

civilian, from Lang Vei move overland to Khe Sanh.

After being searched and processed, several hundred

refugees are air evacuated.

183
8 Feb A/1/9 combat outpost 500 meters west of 1/9 perimeter

hit and partially overrun by reinforced NVA battalion.

During three-hour battle, reinforcements drive NVA

from Marine position and with aid of supporting arms

kill 150 North Vietnamese; Col Lownds decides to

abandon outpost and units withdraw to 1/9 perimeter.

10 Feb Marine C-130 of VMGR-152, hit by enemy fire during

approach, crashes after landing at Khe Sanh and six

are killed.

Feb- Paradrops, low-altitude extraction systems, and

Apr helicopters are primary means of resupplying 26th

Marines due to bad weather and heavy enemy fire.

21 Feb After heavy mortar and artillery barrage, NVA company

probes 37th ARVN Ranger lines but withdraws after

distant fire fight. It is estimated that 25-30 NVA

were killed.

23 Feb KSCB receives record number of incoming rounds for

a single day--1,307.

First appearance of enemy trench system around KSCB.

25 Feb B/l/26 patrol ambushed south of KSCB; 23 Marines KIA.

29 Feb- Estimated NVA regiment maneuvers to attack 37th ARVN

1 Mar Ranger positions but fail to reach defensive wire.

6 Mar USAF C-123 shot down east of runway; 43 USMC, 4 USAF,

and 1 USN personnel killed.

7 Mar Large groups of refugees begin to filter into

the combat base and are evacuated.

8 Mar ARVN patrols attack enemy trenchline east of runway

and kill 26 North Vietnamese.

15 Mar American intelligence notes withdrawal of major NVA

units from Khe Sanh area.

23 Mar KSCB receives heaviest saturation of enemy rounds for

the month of March--1,109.

184
24 Mar A/1/9 patrol kills 31 NVA west of 1/9 perimeter.

25 Mar 1/9 CavSqd, 1st ACD begins reconnaissance in force

operations east of Khe Sanh in preparation for

Operation PEGASUS.

30 Mar B/l/26 attacks enemy fortified position south of combat

base and kills 115 North Vietnamese; 9 Marines are KIA.

Operation SCOTLAND I terminates with 1,602 confirmed

NVA and 205 Marines KIA; estimates place probable

enemy dead between 10,000 and 15,000.

Task Force KILO launches diversionary attack along

Gio Linh coastal plain to divert attention away from

Ca Lu where 1st ACD, and 1st Marines are staging for

Operation PEGASUS.

1 Apr Operation PEGASUS begins; 2/1 and 2/3 (1st Marines)

attack west from Ca Lu along Route 9. Elements of

3d Bde, 1st ACD conduct helo assaults into LZ Mike

and Cates. Joint engineer task force begins repair

of Route 9 from Ca Lu to Khe Sanh.

3 Apr 2d Bde, 1st ACD assaults LZs Tom and Wharton.

4 Apr 1/5 CavSqd moves northwest from LZ wharton and attacks

enemy units near old French fort; 1st Battalion, 9th

Marines moves southeast from rock quarry and assaults

Hill 471.

5 Apr 1/9 repulses enemy counterattack on Hill 471 and

kills 122 North Vietnamese.

1st Bde, 1st ACD departs Ca Lu and assaults LZ Snapper.

6 Apr One company of 3d ARVN Airborne Task Force airlifted

to KSCB for the initial link up with defenders.

Elements of 2d Bde, 1st ACD relieve 1st Battalion, 9th

Marines on Hill 471; 1/9 commences sweep to northwest

toward Hill 689.

185
6 Apr 1st Bde, 1st ACD helilifted north of KSCB. 2/26 and

3/26 push north of combat base; Company G, 2/26 engages enemy force and kills 48 NVA.

8 Apr 2/7 CavSqd links up with 26th Marines and conducts

official relief of combat base. 1/26 attacks to

the west.

3d ARVN Airborne Task Force air assaults into LZ Snake

west of Khe Sanh and kills 78 North Vietnamese.

10 Apr LtGen Rosson arrives Khe Sanh and directs LtGen Tolson

to disengage and prepare for Operation DELAWARE in

A Shau Valley.

11 Apr Engineers complete renovation of Route 9 and road is

officially opened.

Elements of 1st ACD begin withdrawal to Quang Tri City

in preparation for Operation DELAWARE; 37th ARVN

Ranger Battalion airlifted to Da Nang.

12 Apr Col Meyers relieves Col Lownds as CO, 26th Marines.

14 Apr 3/26 attacks Hill 881N and kills 106 NVA; 6 Marines

are KIA.

15 Apr Operation PEGASUS terminated; Operation SCOTLAND II

begins.

18 Apr 26th Marines withdrawn to Dong Ha and Camp Carroll.

23 May President Johnson presents the Presidential Unit

Citation to 26th Marines and supporting units during

White House ceremony.

23 Jun Although forward fire support bases are maintained in

Khe Sanh area, the KSCB is dismantled and abandoned.

LZ Stud at Ca Lu is selected as base for air mobile

operations in western DMZ area.

186
APPENDIX D

TASK ORGANIZATION AT KHE SANH, 24 APRIL - 13 MAY 1967

A. 3D MARINES (-) (REIN) 24APR-13MAY67

HEADQUARTERS COMPANY 24APR-13MAY67

2D BATTALION (REIN) 26APR-13MAY67

HEADQUARTERS AND SERVICE COMPANY(-)(REIN)

DET, HQBN, 3D MARDIV

DET, HQCO, 3D MAR

DET, B BTRY (REIN), 1ST BN, 12TH MAR

DET, 15TH DENTAL CO

2D CLEARING PLT (REIN), CO B, 3D MED BN

1ST PLT (-) (REIN), CO A, 3D ENGR BN

1ST PLT (REIN), CO C, 3D MT BN

1ST PLT (-) (REIN), CO C, 3D SP BN

DET, LSU, FLC

COMPANY E (REIN)

1ST SEC, 81MM MORTAR PLT

FAC TEAM

DET, MED PLT

DET, INTELLIGENCE SEC

DET, B BTRY (REIN), 1/12

1ST SQD, 1ST PLT (REIN), CO A, 3D ENGR BN

DET, 1ST PLT (REIN), CO C, 3D SP BN

COMPANY F (REIN)

DET, H&S CO

2D SEC, 81MM MORTAR PLT

FAC TEAM

DET, MED PLT

DET, INTELLIGENCE SEC

DET, B BTRY (REIN), 1/12

2D SQD, 1ST PLT (REIN), CO A, 3D ENGR BN

DET, 1ST PLT (REIN), CO C, 3D SP BN

COMPANY G (REIN)

DET, H&S CO

3D SEC, 81MM MORTAR PLT

DET, MED PLT

DET, INTELLIGENCE SEC

DET, B BTRY (REIN), 1/12

COMPANY H (REIN)

DET, H&S CO

4TH SEC, 81MM MORTAR PLT

FAC TEAM

DET, MED PLT

DET, INTELLIGENCE SEC

187
DET, B BTRY (REIN), 1/12

3D SOD, 1ST PLT (REIN), CO A, 3D ENGR BN

DET, 1ST PLT (REIN), CO C, 3D SP BN

COMPANY A, 1ST BATTALION, 26TH MARINES

COMPANY B, 1ST BATTALION, 26TH MARINES

COMPANY C, 1ST BATTALION, 26TH MARINES

COMPANY D, 1ST BATTALION, 26TH MARINES

COMPANY E, 2D BATTALION, 9TH MARINES

3D PLT (REIN), CO B, 1ST AMTRAC BN

2D PLT (REIN), CO A, AT BN

3D PLT, CO B, 3D RECON BN

2D PLT (REIN) , CO A, 3D TANK BN

106MM RR PLT

3D BATTALION (-) (REIN)

COMMAND GROUP "A"

COMPANY K

FO TEAM, BTRY C, 1/12

DET, H&S CO

FO TEAM, 81MM MORTAR PLT

FAC TEAM (-)

DET, MED PLT

COMPANY M

FO TEAM, BRTY C, 1/12

FO TEAM, 81MM MORTAR PLT

SCOUT/DOG TEAM

SCOUT TEAM, 3/3

COMPANY B, 1ST BATTALION, 9TH MARINES

COMPANY K, 3D BATTALION, 9TH MARINES

COMPANY M, 3D BATTALION, 9TH MARINES

COMPANY F, 2D BATTALION, 3D MARINES

COMPANY C, 1ST BATTALION, 26TH MARINES

COMPANY A, 1ST BATTALION, 26TH MARINES

11-13MAY67

11-13MAY67

13 MAY 67

11-13MAY67

12-13MAY67

25-27APR67

27APR-1MAY67

25-27APR67

25APR-13MAY67

29APR-13MAY67

1MAY-3MAY67

5-13MAY67

12-13MAY67

188
BASE DEFENSE/RESERVE

COMPANY B, 1ST BATTALION, 9TH MARINES

COMPANY F, 2D BATTALION, 3D MARINES

COMPANY E, 2D BATTALION, 9TH MARINES

COMPANY C, 1ST BATTALION, 26TH MARINES

1ST BATTALION, 26TH MARINES

SUPPORTING UNITS

DIRECT SUPPORT

BATTERY F (REIN), 2/12

BATTERY B, 1/12

BATTERY A, 1/12

24-27APR67

27APR-1MAY67

1-12MAY67

4-5MAY67

12-13MAY67

24APR-13MAY67

27APR-11MAY67

13MAY

189
TASK ORGANIZATION AT KHE SANH, 20 JANUARY - 1 APRIL 1968

A. 26TH MARINES

HEADQUARTERS COMPANY

1ST BATTALION

2D BATTALION

3D BATTALION

B. ATTACHED AND SUPPORTING UNITS

(1) U. S. MARINE CORPS

1ST BATTALION, 9TH MARINES (LESS CO "C")

CO "C", 1ST BATTALION, 9TH MARINES

1ST BATTALION, 13TH MARINES

1ST PROV, 155MM HOWITZER BTRY

20JAN-31MAR68

20JAN-31MAR68

20JAN-31MAR68

20JAN-31MAR68

22JAN-31MAR68

23JAN-31MAR68

20JAN-31MAR68

20JAN-31MAR68

DET, 1ST SEARCHLIGHT BTRY 12TH MARINES

DET, 3D ENGINEER BATTALION

COMPANY "B", 3D RECON BATTALION

3D PLATOON, COMPANY "D", 3D RECON

BATTALION

1ST PLATOON, COMPANY "A", 5TH RECON

BATTALION

COMPANY "A" (-) 3D ANTITANK

BATTALION (REDESIGNATED ANTITANK

COMPANY (-), 3D TANK BATTALION)

COMPANY "A", 3D SHORE PARTY BATTALION

DET, H&S COMPANY, 3D SHORE PARTY

BATTALION

2D CLEARING PLATOON, COMPANY "C"

3D MED BATTALION

20JAN-31MAR68

20JAN-31MAR68

20JAN-31MAR68

20JAN-31MAR68

20JAN-31MAR68

20JAN-31MAR68

24JAN-31MAR68

24JAN-31MAR68

24JAN-31MAR68

190
OTTER PLATOON, H&S COMPANY

3D MOTOR TRANSPORT BATTALION

DET, COMPANY "B", 9TH MOTOR

TRANSPORT BATTALION

DET, COMPANY "A", 9TH MOTOR TRANSPORT

BATTALION

DET, SU#1, 1ST RADIO BATTALION

DET, 3D DENTAL COMPANY

DET, HEADQUARTERS COMPANY, HEADQUARTERS BATTALION, 3D MARINE

DIVISION (POSTAL, PHOTO, EXCHANGE,

ISO, AO'S, STAFF AUGMENT)

COMBINED ACTION COMPANY "0"

3D COMBINED ACTION GROUP, III MAF

DET, COMM CO, HEADQUARTERS BATTALION,

3D MARINE DIVISION

DET, 5TH COMM BATTALION

DET, 7TH COMM BATTALION

DET, FORCE LOGISTICS COMMAND

SUB-TEAM #1, 17TH INTERROGATORTRANSLATOR TEAM

COMPANY "B", 3D TANK BATTALION, 3D

MARINE DIVISION

DET "01", HEADQUARTERS & MAINTENANCE

SQUADRON, MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP-16

DET "01", MARINE OBSERVATION SQUADRON,

MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP-16

DET "2" MARINE AIR SUPPORT SQUADRON

3, MARINE AIR CONTROL GROUP-18

DET, HEADQUARTERS & MAINTENANCE

SQUADRON-36, MARINE AIRCRAFT

GROUP-36

20JAN-31MAR68

20JAN-31MAR68

20JAN-31MAR68

20JAN-31MAR68

20JAN-31MAR68

20JAN-31MAR68

20JAN-31MAR68

20JAN20JAN20JAN20JAN20JAN20JAN20JAN15MAR16JAN31MAR68

31MAR68

31MAR68

31MAR68

31MAR68

31MAR68

31MAR68

31MAR68

31MAR68

20JAN-31MAR68

191
DET, MARINE AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL UNIT-62,

MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP-36

(2) U. S. NAVY

DET "B", CONSTRUCTION BATTALION,

MOBILE UNIT-301

DET, MOBILE CONSTRUCTION BATTALION-10

DET, MOBILE CONSTRUCTION BATTALION-53

DET, MOBILE CONSTRUCTION BATTALION-5

(3) U. S. ARMY

DET. A-101, 5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP

DET, 44TH ARTILLERY

DET, 65TH ARTILLERY

DET, 238TH COUNTER-MORTAR RADAR

UNIT, 108TH FIELD ARTILLERY GROUP

DET, 1ST PLATOON (SMOKE), 25TH

CHEMICAL COMPANY

544TH SIGNAL DET, 37TH SIGNAL

BATTALION

(4) U. S. AIR FORCE

DET, (OPERATING LOCATION AJ), 15TH

AERIAL PORT SQUADRON

DET, 366TH TRANSPORT SQUADRON, 366TH

COMBAT SUPPORT GROUP

DET, 903D AERO MED EVAC SQDN

DET "A", 834TH AIR DIVISION

ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH VIETNAM

37TH ARVN RANGER BATTALION

20JAN-31MAR68

20JAN-11FEB68

20JAN-19FEB68

20JAN-13FEB68

20JAN-24JAN68

20JAN-31MAR68

20JAN-31MAR68

20JAN-31MAR68

22JAN-31MAR68

9FEB-31MAR68

20JAN-31MAR68

20JAN-31MAR68

20JAN-31MAR68

20JAN-31MAR68

20JAN-31MAR68

27JAN- 1APR68

192
APPENDIX E

COMMAND AND STAFF LIST 3D MARINES, 24 APR - 13 MAY 1967

(Period covered during "The Hill Fights")

3D MARINES

Commanding Officer

Executive Officer

S-l

S-2

S-3

S-4

Communications Officer

2D BATTALION, 3D MARINES

Commanding Officer

Executive Officer

S-l

S-2

S-3

S-4

Col John P. Lanigan

(24Apr67-13May67)

LtCol Jack Westerman

(24Apr67-13May67)

WO Charles M. Christensen

(24Apr67-13May67)

Capt Adolfo Sgambelluri

(24Apr67-7May67)

Capt James D. McGowan

(8May67-13May67)

Maj Floyd A. Karker

(24Apr67-13May67)

Maj Howard L. Long

(24Apr67-13May67)

Capt Curtis G. Arnold

(24Apr67-lMay67)

Capt George W. Brooks

(2May67-13May67)

LtCol Earl R. DeLong

(24Apr67-13May67)

Maj Wendell 0. Beard

(24Apr67-13May67)

2dLt Billy L. Heaton

(24Apr67-13May67)

Capt Robert N. Bogard

(24Apr67-13May67)

Capt Douglas W. Lemon

(24Apr67-13May67)

Capt Robert R. Green

(24Apr67-13May67)

193
Commanding Otficer

Headquarters and Service

Commanding Officer

Company "E"

Company Capt Stuart R. Vaughan

(24Apr67-13May67)

Capt Alfred E. Lyon

(24Apr67-3May67)

IstLt John F. Adinolfi

(4May67-12May67)

Capt Alfred E. Lyon

(13May67)

Commanding Officer

Company "F"

Commanding Officer

Company "G"

Commanding Officer

Company "H"

3D BATTALION, 3D MARINES

Commanding Officer

Executive Officer

S-l

Capt Martin Sorensen

(24Apr67-9May67)

Capt James P. Sheehan

(24Apr67-13May67)

Capt Raymond C. Madonna

(24Apr67-13May67)

LtCol Gary Wilder

(24Apr67-13May67)

Maj Rudolph S. Sutter

(24Apr67-13May67)

2dLt John C. Ralph

(24Apr67-llMay67

S-2

S-3

S-4

2dLt Evander R. Mclver III

(24Apr67-llMay67)

2dLt Michael T. Montgomery

(12May67-13May67)

Capt Thomas A. Stumpf

(24Apr67-13May67)

SSgt William T. Pope

(24Apr67-30Apr67)

IstLt John H. Admire

(!May67-13May67)

194
Commanding Officer

Headquarters and Service Company

Commanding Officer

Company "I"

Capt Robert W. Poolaw

(24Apr67-13May67)

Capt Christian L. Harkness

(24Apr67-13May67)

Commanding Officer

Company "K" Capt Bayliss L. Spivey, Jr.

(24Apr67-13May67)

Commanding Officer

Company "L"

Commanding Officer

Company "M"

Capt John W. Ripley

(24Apr67-13May67)

Capt William R. Griggs

(24Apr67-13May67)

195
APPENDIX F

COMMAND AND STAFF LIST 26TH MARINES, 20 JAN - 1 APR 1968

(Period covered in Presidential Unit Citation)

26TH MARINES

Commanding Officer

Executive Officer

S-l

S-2

S-3

Col David E. Lownds

(12Aug67-lApr68)

LtCol Louis A. Rann

(28Sep67-lApr68)

IstLt Robert J. Mariz

(29Jan68-29Jan68)(KIA)

Capt Arnold R. Nelson

(30Jan68-8Feb68)

Capt Anthony V. Latorre, Jr.

(9Feb68-lApr68)

Capt Harper L. Bohr, Jr.

(lAug67-7Feb68)

Maj Jerry E. Hudson

(8Feb68-17Mar68)

Capt Thorvald P. E. Holm

(18Mar68-lApr68)

Maj Wayne M. Wills

(lAug67-22Jan68)

LtCol Edward J. A. Castagna

(23Jan68- lApr68)

S-4 Maj Aubrey L. Lumpkin

(!7Mar68-lApr68)

Communications Officer

1ST BATTALION, 26TH MARINES

Commanding Officer

Executive Officer

Maj John A. Shepherd

(16Nov67-lApr68)

LtCol James B. Wilkinson

<5jul67-29Feb68)

LtCol Frederick J. McEwan

(lMar68-lApr68)

Maj Charles E. Davis III

(23Decft7-31Jan68)

Maj Howard J. McCarty

(!Feb68-lApr68)

196
S-l

S-2

S-3

IstLt Stephen A. Fitzgerald

(13Dec67-31Jan68)

IstLt William J. Ferral

(lFeb68-lApr68)

IstLt Anthony E. Sibley

(6Dec67-13Feb68)

IstLt Ernest E. Spencer

(14Feb68-lApr68)

Maj Bruce A. Greene

(23Dec67-29Jan68)

Maj Charles E. Davis III

(30Jan68-lApr68)

S-4 Capt Robert C. Onslow

(6Nov67-lApr68)

Commanding Officer

Headquarters and Service Company IstLt Robert A. Brown

(20Dec67-16Feb68)

IstLt Paul G. Lojkovic

(17Feb68-20Mar68)

Capt Lajon R. Hutton

(21Mar68-lApr68)

Commanding Officer

Company "A" Capt Ray G. Snyder

(15Dec67-lApr68)

Commanding Officer

Company "B" Capt Kenneth W. Pipes

(20Dec67-lApr68)

Commanding Officer

Company "C" Capt David L. Ernst

(15Jan68-15Feb68)

2dLt Paul W. Bush

(16Feb68-2Mar68)

Capt Walter J. Egger

(3Mar68-22Mar68

Capt Lawrence E. Seaman, Jr.

(23Mar68-lApr68)

Commanding Officer

Company "D" IstLt Ernest E. Spencer

UAug67-13Feb68)

Capt Edward J. Hughes, Jr.

(14Feb68-lApr68)

197
2D BATTALION, 26TH MARINES

Commanding Officer

Executive Officer

S-l

S-2

S-3

S-4

Commanding Officer

Headquarters and Service Company

Commanding Officer

Company "E"

Commanding Officer

Company "F"

Commanding Officer

Company "G"

Commanding Officer

Company "H"

3D BATTALION, 26TH MARINES

Commanding Officer

LtCol Francis J. Heath, Jr.

(Jan68-lApr68)

Maj Royce L. Bond

(Jan68-lApr68)

IstLt Richard J. Gustafson

(16Jan-lApr68)

IstLt Edwin R. Matthews

(Jan68-llFeb68)

SSgt Horace E. Roland

U2Feb68-9Mar68)

IstLt John C. Wainio

(10Mar68-lApr68)

Maj Gerald F. Kurth

(Jan68-lApr68)

Capt Erwin J. Martikke, Jr.

(Jan68-18Mar68)

Capt Earle G. Breeding, Jr.

(19Mar68-lApr68)

Capt Stanley M. Hartman

(Jan68-lApr68)

Capt Earle G. Breeding Jr.

(Jan68-8Mar68)

IstLt Joseph R. Meeks

(9Mar68-lApr68)

Capt Charles F. Divelbiss

(Jan68-lApr68)

Capt Lee R. Overstreet

(Jan68-lApr68)

Capt Charles O. Broughton

(Jan68-lApr68)

LtCol Harry L. Alderman

(2lAug6 7-14Mar68)

198
Executive Officer

S-l

S-2

S-3

S-4

LtCol John C. Studt

(15Mar68-lApr68)

Maj Joseph M. Loughran, Jr.

(9Sep67-lApr68)

IstLt Edward J. Paurazas Jr,

(2lDec67-lApr68)

2dLt Jay G. Marks, Jr.

(14Jan68-lApr68)

Maj Matthew P. Caul field

(24Nov67-lApr68)

IstLt Jack A. Brage

(16Nov67-lApr68)

Commanding Officer

Headquarters and Service Company Capt Alfred Lardizabal, Jr,

(29Nov67-lApr68)

Commanding Officer

Company "I" Capt William H. Dabney

(24Nov67-lApr68)

Commanding Officer

Company "K" Capt Norman J. Jasper, Jr,

(23Nov67-22Jan68)

IstLt Jerry Saulsbury

(23Jan68-27Jan68)

Capt Paul L. Snead

(28Jan68-lApr68)

Commanding Officer

Company "L" Capt Richard D. Camp, Jr.

(30Jun67-29Jan68)

Capt William F. Hurley

(30Jan68-lApr68)

Commanding Officer

Company "M" Capt John J. Gilece, Jr.

(29Nov67-31Jan68)

IstLt John T. Esslinger

(lFeb68-23Mar68)

Capt Walter R. Jenkins

(24Mar68-lApr68)

199
1ST BATTALION, 9TH MARINES

Commanding Officer

Executive Officer

S-l

S-2

S-3

S-4

Commanding Officer

Headquarters and Service Company

Commanding Officer

Company "A"

Commanding Officer

Company "B"

Commanding Officer

Company "C"

LtCol John F. Mitchell

(Uan68-31Mar68)

LtCol John J. H. Cahill

(lApr68)

Maj Joseph A. Donnelly

(Uan68-lApr68)

IstLt Peter A. Woog

(Uan68-lApr68)

IstLt Robert J. Arboleda

(Uan68-lApr68)

Maj Edward M. Ringley

(Uan68-16Feb68)

Capt Charles B. Hartzell

(17 Feb68-10Mar68)

Maj Ted R. Henderson

(HMar68-lApr68)

IstLt John M. Georgi

(Uan68-lApr68)

IstLt Michael J. Walker

(9Jan68-13Feb68)

Capt John W. Cargile

(14Feb68-31Mar68)

Capt Edward R. Miller, Jr.

(1Apr68)

Capt Henry J. M. Radcliffe

(Uan68-31Mar68)

Capt Henry D. Banks

(lApr68)

Capt Robert T. Bruner

(Uan68-26Jan68)

IstLt Arthur N. Mangham, Jr,

(27Jan68-2Feb68)

Capt John R. Williams, Jr.

(3Feb68-lApr68)

Capt John W. Cargile

(9Jan68-13Feb68)

Capt Ralph H. Flagler

(14Feb68-lApr68)

200
Commanding Officer

Company "D"

1ST BATTALION, 13TH MARINES

Commanding Officer

Executive Officer

S-l

S-2

S-3

S-4

Commanding Officer

Headquarters Battery

Commanding Officer

Battery "A"

Commanding Officer

Battery "B"

Capt Don F. Schafer

(Uan68-31Mar68)

Capt John W. Cargile

(!Apr68)

LtCol John A. Hennelly

(10Dec67-lApr68)

Maj Ronald W. Campbell

(13Jul67-lApr68)

2dLt Daniel W. Kelly

(19Nov67-lApr68)

IstLt Walter K. Jones

(2lDec67-4Mar68)

IstLt Leslie M. Palm

(5Mar68-lApr68)

Capt Lawrence R. Salmon

(13Jul67-8Mar68)

Maj Gerald R. Houchin

(9Mar68-lApr68)

IstLt Harold P. Klunk

(lDec67-20Feb68)

Capt Tommy J. Hicks

(21Feb68-lApr68)

IstLt Ralph W. Dunn, Jr.

(2Aug67-20Feb68)

IstLt Walter K. Jones

(2lFeb68-15Mar68)

Capt Jerome P. Rogers

(16Mar68-2lMar68)

IstLt Jacob W. Hughes, Jr

(22Mar68-lApr68)

Capt Dennis L. Pardee

(Aug67-29Feb68)

Capt Victor B. Snider

(!Mar68-lApr68)

IstLt George G. Wood

(2lJan68-29Feb68)

Capt James C. Uecker

(!Mar68-lApr68)

201
Commanding Officer

Battery "C"

Commanding Officer

Mortar Battery

Commanding Officer

1st Provisional 155

Howitzer Battery, 3/12

Capt William J. O'Connor

(28Nov6 7-lApr68)

Capt Michael T. Pierson

(5Jan68-lApr68)

Capt Joseph Taylor

(5Jan68-29Feb68)

Capt Stephen J. Hayes

(!Mar68-lApr68)

ATTACHED UNITS

Commanding Officer

Company "A", 3d AT Battalion

Commanding Officer

Company "B", 3d Tank Battalion

Commanding Officer

Company "A", 3d Shore Party

Battalion

Capt James 0. Lea

(20Jan68-lApr68)

Capt Daniel W. Kent

( -24Jan68)

Capt Claude W. Reinke

(25Jan68-lApr68)

IstLt Robert L. Singleton

(28Jan68-4Mar68)

Maj Howard W. Wahlfeld

(5Mar68-lApr68)

202
APPENDIX G

203 OU. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1969 O - 366-541
*ttMTT> FORCES STAFT COLLffGi
DS 557 .A62 K5 1968 A42

Shore, Moyers S., 1941-

The battle for Khe Sanh

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