F OR P UBLICATION



### UNIT E D ST AT E S CO URT O F APPE AL S FO R T H E NINT H CIRCUIT

H A V E N S I G H T C A P I T A L L L C, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

N I K E , I N C ., Defendant-Appellee. No. 15-56607

D.C. No. 2:14-cv-08985-R-F F M

OPI NI ON

A ppeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Manuel L . Real, District J u dg e, Presiding

Submitted Aug ust 18, 2017 * San F rancisco, California

F iled J une 7, 2018

B efore: J ohnnie B . Rawlinson and J acqueline H. Ng uy en, Circuit J udg es, and Sarah S. Vance, * * District J udg e

.

Opinion by

J udg e Rawlinson

* T h e p an el u n an im o u s ly

co n clu d es th is case is su itab le f o r d ecisio n

w ith o u t o ral arg u

m en t. S ee Fed . R. A pp . P . 3 4 (a)(2 ).

** T h e Ho n o rab l e S arah S. Van ce, Un ited S tates District J u d g e f or th e Eastern District o f

L o u isian a, sittin g b y

d esig n atio n

.H A V E N S I G H T C A

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SUMMARY * * *

Tim ely Appeal / F ed. R. Civ. P

. 11 Sanctions

The pan el dismissed for lack of jurisdiction plaintiff’s appeal of the sanctions imposed under 28 U.S.C. § 1 927, the

vex atious litig a n t o rder, the denial of plaintiff’s motion to strike, the denial o f plaintiff’s application for default, a nd the dismissal of th e a m e n ded c omplaint; and affirmed the district c ourt’s order imposing fees as sanctions under F ed. R. Civ. P. 11.

The panel dismissed plaintiffs’ appeal as to the sanctions imposed under § 1 9 2 7
, the vex atious litig ant order, the denial of plaintiff’s motion to s t rike and the denial of plaintiff’s application for default because t hose
matters were not included in the notice of a ppeal. See F ed. R. App. P. 3(c)(1)(B ).

The district court did not enter a separate judg ment after it dismissed plaintiff’s amended complaint o n F ebruary 18, 2015, and judgm ent was d eemed entered on J uly 15, 2015, pursuant to F ed. R. Civ. P. 58 and F ed. R. App. P. 4(a)(7)( A ) ( i i )

. Plaintiff filed the notice o f appeal on October 1 5
, 2015. One d ay after the district court dismissed the amended complaint, plaintiff f i l ed a motion for reconsideration.

The panel dismissed the amended c o mplaint because the notice of appeal was u ntim e l y

. The panel concluded that

*** T h is su m m ary co n stitu

t es n o p art o f th e o p in io n o f th e co u rt. It h as b een p rep ared b y

co u rt staf

f f o r th e co n v en i en ce o f

th e read er.H A V E N S I G H T C A

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plaintiff’s premature filing of a post-judg ment motion did not

ex tend the otherwise applicable appeal period.

The panel d eferred to the district court’s factual finding s

as to whether p laintiff’s filing s were sufficiently frivolous o r abusive such that Rule 11 s a n c tions were a ppropriate, a

nd affirmed the sanctions order b ecause the finding s were a mply supported by the record.

COUNSEL

B enjamin Wo o d

h o u s e , P ismo B each, California, for PlaintiffAppellant.

Sean S. Twomey
, Gibson Dunn & Crutcher L L P
, I rv i ne, California; Austin Schwing
, Gibson Dunn & Crutcher L L P, San F rancisco, California; for Defendant-Appellee.

OP INION

RAW L I NSON, Circuit J udg e:

This appeal is the latest in an ong oing and biz arre dispute between Havensig ht Capital L L C (Havensig ht) and Nike, I nc. (Nike). Throug hout these p roceedin g s , H avensig ht has portray ed its action as a battle between David a nd G oliath. I n

r e a l i t y , however, it is more a kin to Don Quix ote’s tilting at windmills.

The action from which this appeal was broug ht concerns alleg edly wrong ful conduct by N ike ag a inst Havensig ht (the tortious interference a ction). The tortious interference actionH A V E N S I G H T C A

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was fil ed after Havensig ht’s prior action ag ainst N ike, alleg ing infring e ment u pon a soc cer brand owned b y Havensig ht ( the infring ement action), w as dismissed with prejudice.

I. BACK G R OUND

Althoug h the prior action i s n o t b e f ore us on appeal, the
two cases are somewhat intertw i n e d. Havensig ht’s infring e m en t action was dismissed with prejudice on November 19, 2014. The following day
, Havensig ht f iled the tortious interference action, and six day s lat e r f iled its Amended Complaint. 1 Attached to the Amended Complaint

was an affidavit purportedly refl e c ting an interview of a sporting g oods retailer who reported that Nike used its market streng th to f

orce retailers to purchase it s go o ds, thereby

ex c luding competitors like Havensig ht. A fter the tortious interference action was reassig n ed t o t he same judg e w ho presided over the infring ement action, Nike filed a motion to dismiss under F ederal Rule of Civil Procedure (F RCP) 12(b)(6). 2

1 Hav en sig h t alleg ed six cau ses o f actio n : (1 ) in ten tio n al in t erf eren ce

w ith co n tractu al relatio n s; (2 ) in ten tio n al in terf eren ce w i t h p ro sp ectiv e

ec o n o m i c r elatio n s; (3 ) n eg lig en ce; (4 ) v ertical an d h o rizo n tal p rice f ix in g ; (5 ) civ il RICO (Rack eteer In f lu en ced an d C o rru p t Org an izatio n s) u n d e r Calif o rn ia law ; an d (6 ) u n f

air co m p etitio n an d trad e p ractices.

2 R u l e 1 2(b )(6 ) p ro v id es: “ Ev ery d ef en se to a claim f

o r relief in an y p lead in g m

u st be asserted in th e resp o n siv e p l ead in g if o n e is req u ired

. B u t a p a r t y m a y a ssert th e f o llo w in g d ef

en ses b y m o tio n :

. . . f

ailu re to state a claim u

p on w hi ch relief can b e g ran ted

. . .” F ed

. R. Civ

. P

. 1 2 (b )(6 ).H A V E N S I G H T C A

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At this juncture, H a v ensig ht departed sharply from ordinary procedure, filing multiple motions for default on the basis that Nike’s motion to dismiss was untimely

. B e fore the di strict court could r

ule on the motions, Havensig h t filed a writ of ex ecution with t h e Clerk of the Court, claiming a default judg ment in ex cess o f $6 0 0 m illion. Of course, because Nike had timely filed its motion in lieu of a n answer,

no d e fault judg ment was w ar ra n t e d
, and the district court ordered the writ of ex e cution stricken.

Ni k e subsequently filed a Motion for Relief Reg arding [ Havensig h t’s counsel’s] Ethical V iolation s

. Undeterred, Havensig ht moved to recuse the a ssi gned judg e f r o m the tortious interference action and from the (dismissed) infring emen t a ct ion. The judg e assig n ed
t o H a v e n s i g h t ’ s r e c u s a l m o t i o n s d e n i e d b o t h

. Nike subsequently soug h t sanctions u nder Rule 1 1 of the F e d e r a l R u l e s o f C i v i l P r o c e d u r e ( R u l e 1 1 ) 3

3 Ru l e 1 1 p ro v id es in

p ertin en t p art:

. . . (b ) Rep resen tatio n s to t h e C o u rt. B y p resen tin g to th e

c o u r t a p l e a d i ng , w r i t t e n m o t i o n , o r o t h e r p ap er– w h eth er by sig n in g , f

il i n g , su b m ittin g , o r l ater ad v ocatin g i t– an atto rn ey or u n rep resen ted p arty certif ies th at to th e b est o f t

h e p erso n ’s k

n o w led g e, in f o rm ati o n , an d b elief

, f o rm ed af

ter an in q u iry

reaso n ab le u n d er th e circu m stan ces:
(1 ) it is n o t be i n g p resen t ed f o r an y im

p ro per p u rp o se, su ch as to h arass, cau s e u n n ecessary d elay
, o r n eed lessly in crease t h e co st o f litig atio n ;H A V E N S I G H T C A

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due to Havensig ht’s false and frivolous filing s.

On F ebruary 18, 2 0 1 5
, the district c ourt g ranted Nike’s motion to d ismiss the A mended Complaint without le a ve to amend, and imposed sanction s u nder Rule 11 ag ainst Havensig ht’s counsel in the form of attorney s’ fees a nd

ex p enses. No separ a te judg ment was entered for this order. The following day
, Havensig ht f iled a motion to va c ate the

(2 ) th e claim s, d ef

en ses, an d o th er leg al

co n t en tio n s ar e w arran ted b y ex istin g law o r b y a

n o n f riv o lo u s arg u m en t f

o r ex t en d i n g , m o d ify in g , o r rev ers i n g e x istin g law o r f o r estab lish in g n ew law ;
(3 ) th e f actu al co n t e n t io n s h av e ev id en tiary su

p p o rt

o r, if sp ecif

ically so id en tif

i ed
, w ill lik ely h av e

ev id en tiary su

p p o rt af ter a reaso n ab le o p p o rtu n ity f o r f u rth er in v estig atio n

o r d isco v ery ; an d

(4 ) t h e d en ials o f f

actu al co n ten tio n s are w arran ted

o n th e ev id en ce o r, if sp ecif ically so id en tif

ied
, are

reaso n a b ly b ased o n b elief o r a lack of in f o rm atio n

. (c) San ctio n s.
(1 ) In Gen er a l

. I f, af

ter n otice an d a reaso n ab le

o p p o rtu n i ty to res p o n d
, th e co u rt d eterm in es th at Ru le 1 1 (b ) h as b een v io lated
, th e co u rt m ay im p o se an ap p ro p riate s a n ctio n o n an y atto rn ey , law f irm
, or p arty th at v i o l a ted th e ru l e o r is resp o n sib le f

or th e v io latio n

. A

b sen t ex cep tio n al

c i rcu m stan ces, a l aw f

irm m u st b e h eld j o in t l y resp o n sib l e fo r a v io latio n co m m itted b y its
p artn er, asso ciate, o r em

p lo y ee.

Fed . R. Civ . P . 1 1

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dismissal and the Rule 1 1 sanctions (motio n for reconsideration). I ncluded in Havensig ht’s motion was y et

a n other motion to recuse the judg e who decided the e arl i e r recusal motions. Althoug h the j u d ge h ad previously requested that Havensig ht refr ai n from filing further recusal motions, H avensig ht decided to J ust Do I t. Understandably
, the court did not look favorably upon Havensig h t’s audacity
, and d enied the motion on Ap r i l 22, 2015, while issuing an order to show cause w hy additional sanctions shou l d n o t be imposed under Rule 11 and 2 8 U

. S

. C. § 1927. 4 These sanctions were imposed on March 31, 2015.

T h e district court entered a separate order declaring Havensig ht to be a vex atious liti ga n t , and Nike moved for

a t torney s’ fees and costs pursuant to the Rule 11 sanc t i o n s imposed in the F ebruary 18 order. The d istrict court g ranted Nike’s motion in full in an o rder entered o n S eptember 22, 2015.

Havensig ht filed its N o t i c e of Appeal on October 15, 2015. I n its notice, Havensig ht referenced only the d ismissal of the A mended Complaint and the g ranting of the R ule 11 sanctio n s. Havensig ht now seeks to e x pand the scope o f ruling s of its appeal to include the additi o n a l sanctions imposed under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, the vex atious litig ant order, the denial of Havensi gh t ’s motion to strike “Nike’s alleg ed illeg al d e p o sition and f elonious entry of a confidential

4 2 8 U .S.C. § 1 9 2 7 p ro v id es: “ A n y atto rn ey o r o th er p erso n ad m i tted
to co n d u ct cases in an y co u rt o f th e Un ited States o r an y T errito ry th ereo f

w h o so m u ltip lies th e p r o c e e d in g s in an y case u n reaso n ab ly an d

v ex atio u sly

m ay b e req u ired b y

th e co u rt to satisf

y p erso n ally th e ex cess

co sts, ex p en s es, an d atto rn ey s’ f ees reaso n ab ly

in cu rred b ecau se o f

su ch

co n d u ct.” 2 8 U.S.C. § 1 9 2 7

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customer communication into the public record,” and denial of Havensig ht’s Application for Default.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standards of

Review

W e r eview de novo a district cour t ’ s d ismissal of a complaint under F ederal Rule o f Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Friedman v. AARP, Inc.
, 8 5 5 F .3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2017). A district court’s d e n ial of a motion f o r l eave to amend, denial of a motion for r econsideration, imposition o f

s a nctions under Rule 11 and 28 U.S.C. § 1 927, a nd

c h a racteriz ation of a party as a vex atious litig ant are a l l reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Kerr v. Jewell
, 836 F .3d 1048, 1053 (9th Cir. 2016) ( d e n i a l of motion for reconsideration); De Dios v. Int’l Realty & I nvestments , 641 F .3d 1071, 1076 (9 th Cir. 2 011) (imposition o f sanctions); Ringgold-Lockhart v. Count y o f Los Angeles
, 761 F .3d 1057, 1062 ( 9th Cir. 2 0 14) ( characteriz ation of party

as a vex atious litig ant).

B. Jurisdiction

“W e have jurisdiction to determine our own jurisdiction.” Agonafer v. Sessions
, 8 59 F .3d 1198, 1 202 (9t h C i r. 2 017) (citation omitted). However, we lack jurisdiction to d ecide an appeal if the notice of a

ppeal is not timely filed under Rule 4 of the F e deral Rules of Appellate Procedure (Rule 4) and the appellee raises the u ntimeliness as a basis for dismissal. See Hamer v

. Neighborhood Hous. Serv. Of Chicago
, 1 3 8 S

. C t. 13, 1 6

– 1 7 (2017); see also Classic Concepts, Inc. v. Linen Source, Inc.
, 716 F

. 3d 1282, 1 284 (9t h C i r. 2013). W e similarly lack jurisdiction over matters not included in theH A V E N S I G H T C A

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Notice of Appeal. S

ee Smith v. Barry
, 50 2 U

. S

. 244, 248 (1992).

Rule 4 requires the notice of a ppeal to be filed “ wi t h i n thirty day s after the entry ” of the judg ment or order being appealed. Orr v. Plum b
, 884 F .3d 923, 927 (9th Cir. 2018). I f the d istrict court did not enter a separate judg ment, judg ment is deemed entered 150 day s after “entry of the

judg ment or order in the civil docket.” F RAP 4(a)(7)(A)(ii).

1. Matters Not Included in the Notice of Appeal

Rule 3 of the F ed er a l Rule of Appellate Procedure provides that “[ t] he notice of appeal m u s t

. . . desig nate the ju d gm e n t, order, o r part thereof being appealed.” F RAP 3 ( c)(1)(B ). “W h en a party seeks to arg ue the merits o f

an order that does not appear o n the fac e o f t he notice o f appeal, we consider: (1) whether the inten t t o appeal a specific judg ment can be f airly inferred a n d ( 2 ) whether the appellee w as prejudiced by the mistake.” W e st v. United St a t e s , 853 F .3d 5 20, 5 23 (9th Cir. 2 017) (citation a nd internal quotation marks omitted).

H av ensig h t’s notice o f appeal named “the order, a n d sanctions imposed ag ainst the Plaintiff by the Court,” referenced “ document[ s] 1 2 3 [ order g ranting Rule 11 sanctions] a n d 124 [ order g r anting d efendant’s motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint] ,” and attached the orders a s

ex h ibits. No intent to appeal any other ruling s can reasonably be inferred from Ha v e n sig h t’s notice of appeal. See id

. A c c ording ly
, Havensig ht’s appeal is dismissed as to t h e sanctions imposed u nder § 1927, the vex atious litig ant order, the denial of H avensig ht’s motion to strike and the denial ofH A V E N S I G H T C A

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Havensig ht’s Application f or Default. See Valadez-Lopez v

. Chertoff , 656 F .3d 851, 859 n.2 (9th Cir. 2011).

2. Dism issal of the Am ended Com plaint

The district court did not enter a separate judg ment after it dismissed Havensigh t ’ s Am e n d e d Complaint on F ebruary 1 8, 2015. J udg ment was therefore deemed entered

on J uly 18, 2015, pursuant to Rule 58 of the F ederal Rules o f Civil Procedure (Rul e 5 8). 5 Ordinarily
, this analy sis would resolve t h e m a tter—if Havensig ht filed its notice of appeal after J uly 18, we would lack jurisdiction t o hear the appeal.

5 R u le 5 8 of th e Fed eral R

u les o f Civ il P ro ced u re p ro v id es in pertin en t p art:

(a) Sep arate Do cu m en t. Ev ery j u d g m en t an d am en ded j u d g m en t m

u st b e set o u t

in a sep arate d o cu m en t . . .

. . . (c) T i m e o f En try

. Fo r p u rp o ses o f th ese ru les, j u d g m en t is en tered at th e f o llo w in g tim es:
(1 ) if a sep arate do cu m en t is n o t req u ired
, w h en th e j u d g m en t is en tered i n th e civ il d o ck et u n der Ru le 7 9 (a); o r
( 2 ) if a sep arate d o cu

m en t is req u ired
, w

h en th e j u d g m en t is en tered i n th e civ il d o ck et u n der Ru le 7 9 (a) an d th e earlier o f

th ese ev en ts o ccu rs:
(A ) it is set o u

t in a sep arate d o cu m en t; o r
(B ) 1 5 0 d ay s h av e ru n fr o m t h e en try in th e civ il d o ck et.

Fed . R. Civ . P . 5 8 (a), (c).H A V E N S I G H T C A

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See Classic Concepts
, 7 16 F .3d at 1284. I ndeed, Havensig ht filed its notice of appeal on October 15, well after judg ment was deemed entered.

This case, however, presents an unusual wrinkle. One day after the district c o urt dismissed the Amended Complaint, Havensig ht filed a motion f or r econsideration. W hen a party files a m o t i o n f

or reconsideration, the time period to appeal is tolled pending resolution of that motion. See United States

ex rel. Hoggett v. Univ. of P hoenix
, 8 63 F .3d 1105, 1107–08 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[ I ] f a party files one o f the motions listed in [ Rule] 4(a)(4)(A), the time to file a notice of appeal is tolled during the motion ’ s p endency

. . . .”). I ncluded w ithin this categ ory o f motions is a motion to alter or amend the judg ment. Id. at 1107; see a lso F RAP 4(a)(4)(A)(iv). The title of the pleading does not control thi s determination. Rather, we “look to the substance ” of the pleading “to determine w hether it is in substance a m o tion to alter o r amend the judg ment.” H oggett, 863 F .3d a t 1 1 0 8

. I f the motion “involves recon sideration of matters properly encompassed in a decision on the merits,” it is properly characteriz ed a s a motion to a lter or amend the j u d g ment under Rule 4 (a). I

d. (cit at i o ns and internal quotation marks omitted).

Althoug h Havensig ht sty led its p leading as a motion to vacate the judg ment a

nd r e-open the case, the motion actually soug h t reconsideration of the d istrict court’s decision on the merits as co n t e m plated in Rule 4(a). See id. However, the difficulty in apply ing Rule 4(a) in this case stems from the fact that the motion that would o r dinarily toll t h e time for filing t h e n o tice of appeal was resolved prior to entry of the

un d erlying judg ment. The proceeding s evolved along the following timeline:H A V E N S I G H T C A

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• Dismissal of Amended Complaint – F ebruary 18, 2015

• F iling of Motion for Reconsideration – F ebruary 19, 2015

• Denial of Motion for Reconsideration – April 22, 2015

• J udg ment d eemed entered pursuant to Rule 4(a)(7)(A)(ii) – J uly 18, 2015

W e have not previously addressed this p recise scenar i o

. More ty pically
, we are call ed upon to address the timeliness of an appeal when a pending mot i o n for reconsideration is being relied u

pon to ex tend the appeal p eriod. See, e.g. , Lolli

v. County of O range , 351 F .3d 410, 414 (9th Cir. 2003). I n t his case, however, there was no motion for reconsider a t i o n pending when the judg ment w as deemed entered p ursuant to Rule 4(a)(7)(A)(ii). B ut, if Rule 4 is interpreted as tolling the appeal period for the six ty

- two day s during which the motion for reconsideration was pending
, the ap peal period would

ex p ire on October 18, 2 015, after adding t h e t h irty day s provided for in Rule 4(a)(1)(A) (providing that the notice o f
ap p e a l m u s t be filed “within 30 day s after entry of the judg ment or o rder appealed from”), renderi n g H avensig ht’s October 15 n o tice of a

ppeal timely

. S

e e Menken v. Emm
, 503 F

. 3d 1050, 1056 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting that the appellant had “180 day s (150 day s p l u s 3 0 day s) from entry of the order” within w hich to a

ppeal when appealing “a judg ment entered by

operation of [ Rule] 4(a)(7)”).

Althoug h not directly o n point, our decision in ABF Capital Corp. v. Osley
, 414 F .3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2 0 0 5 )
, i s instructive o n the interplay between Rule 5 8 a n d Rule 4. I n ABF Capital
, orders of d i s m issal were entered o n April 10, 2 0 0 3
, and April 11, 2 003, respectively

. See id

. at 1 0 6 4

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W h en AB F Capital ( ABF) m oved to alter or a mend the judg ments, the district court construed the motions a s ones to

r econsider because no judg ments had y et been entered. S e e id

. The district court deni e d the motions in minute orders entered on May 15, 2003, and on J uly 30, 2003, AB F fi led notices of appeal for both cases. See id.

B e cause the court never set forth judg ments in a separate docum ent as p rovided in Rule 5 8
, AB F had 1 8 0 day s to appeal. See id. Althoug h A B F filed its notices o f appeal within that 180-day period, t h e Appellees urg ed the court to declare AB F ’s appeal untimely due to AB F ’s premature filing of a motion t o alter or amend the judg ments. Appellees contended that “the 180-day timetable was shortened” by the filing o f the premature motion. See id. I n rejecting this arg ument, we noted that the separat e d o cument r equirement

serves to inform the parties with p recision “when judg ment has been entered and when they must b e gi n p r eparing postverdict motions or an appeal.” Id. (citation omitted). W e noted that accelerating the appeal period due to the f i l i n g o f

a premature motion to alter or amend the judgm en t s would

no t b e consistent with the c onsidered interplay b etween Rule 58 and Rule 4, and would lessen the deg ree of c ertainty that was the g oal of the Advisory Committee when amending the rules. See id. at 1064–65.

B e cause the district court decided Havensig ht’ s m o t i o n o n April 22, 2015, we are present e d w i th a question not often encountered: when an appellant files a post-judg ment motion that is resolved before entry of the u nderlying judgm e n t , is the time period to file a notice of appeal ex tended? I n ABF
, we held that a “premature post-judg ment motion may not accelerate the deadline for appeal before a separate judg ment has been entered.” Id. at 1065. W e see no principled basisH A V E N S I G H T C A

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for reaching a different outcome in the converse scenario : when an Appellant seeks to leng then the period for appeal due to the filing of a premature post-judg ment motion.

Althoug h a litig ant is not to be penaliz ed for prematurely filing a p ost-judg ment motion, neither should it g ain a tactical adv antag e by doing so. Nor does any thing in the tex t o f Rule 4 sug g est otherwise. A c c o r d ing ly
, we apply the same rationale w e articulated in A BF to conclude that Havensig ht’s premature filing of the post-judg ment motion d id not ex tend the otherwise applicable appeal period.

The district court’s judg ment w as deemed entere d o n J uly 18, 150 d a y s after its F ebruary 18 order dismissing the Amended Complaint. A l t houg h Havensig h t filed a motion for reconsideration on F ebruary 1 9, the motion was resolved

on April 22, well before judg ment wa s deemed entered. Thus, H avensig ht had thirty day s from the entry of judg ment,

or until Aug ust 17, to f ile its notice of appea l

. See F RAP 4(a)(1)(A). N evertheless, Havensig ht failed to file its notice of appeal until October 1 5, n e arly two months later. Havensig ht’s appeal is therefore u ntimely
, and we dismiss for lack of jurisdiction its ap p eal challeng ing dismissal of the Amended Complaint. S ee Classic Concepts
, 716 F. 3 d at 1284; see also Hamer , 138 S.Ct. at 16–17.

C. Im position of

Rule 11 Sanctions

The district court issued its order g r anting N ike attorney s’ fees as a sanction under Rule 1 1 o n Septem b er 2 2
, 2015. This is the only issue for which Havensig ht’s October 15 appeal was timely

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. N I K

E 15

“Distri c t courts can use Rule 11 to impose sanctions on any party that files a motion f or an improper purpose or w ho does so without a leg al or f act u a l b a s i s .” Center for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp., LLC , 809 F .3d 1092, 1102 (9th Cir. 2016) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

W e defer to the trial court’s factual finding s a s to whether

a liti g ant’s filing s are sufficiently frivolous or abusive such that Rule 11 sanctions would appropriately dete r future malfeasance. See Primus Auto. F i n

. Servs., Inc. v. B atarse , 115 F .3d 644, 649 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting that “[ t] h e district
court h as b road fact-finding powers with respect to sanctions, and its finding s w arrant g reat deference”) (citation a nd internal quotation marks o m i t t e d). Here, use of Rule 11 sanctions was properly w ithin the dis t r i ct court’s discretion. See Blixseth v. Y

ellowstone Mo u n tain Club, LLC
, 854 F .3d 626, 630, n.4 (9th Cir. 2017) (noting that a court may award

a t t orney s’ fees and costs “associated with sanctions proceeding s” under Rule 11). A s discussed, Havensig ht filed

numerous and voluminous motions despite specific warning s to desist filing these needless pleading s. The district court’s finding s were amply supported b y the record, a n d its sanctions order is affirmed. See id

.

III. CONCLUSION

Havensi gh t’s appeal of the sanctions imposed under 28 U.S.C. § 1297, the vex atious litig ant order, the d enial o f Havensig ht’s motion to strike, the denial of Hav e n sig ht’s Application for D efault, and the dismissal of the Amended Complaint, is DI SMI SSED f or lack of jurisdiction. The order imposing fees as sanctions under Rule 11 is AF F I RMED.

DISMISSED in part and AF F IRMED in part.