JSOU Report 06-6 One Valley at a Time Adrian T. Bogart III
Joint Special Operations University

and the Strategic Studies Department

The Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) provides its publications to contribute toward expanding the body of knowledge about 

joint special operations. JSOU publications advance the insights and 

recommendations of national security professionals and the Special 

Operations Forces (SOF) students and leaders for consideration by the 

SOF community and defense leadership. 

JSOU is a subordinate organization of the United States Special 

Operations Command (USSOCOM), MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. 

The JSOU mission is to educate SOF executive, senior, and intermediate leaders and selected other national and international security 

decision makers, both military and civilian, through teaching, outreach, and research in the science and art of joint special operations. 

JSOU provides education to the men and women of SOF and to those 

who enable the SOF mission in a joint environment. 

JSOU conducts research through its Strategic Studies Department 

where effort centers upon the USSOCOM mission and these operational 

priorities: 

• Preempting global terrorist and CBRNE threats

• Enhancing homeland security

• Performing unconventional warfare and serving as a conven-

	 tional force multiplier in conflict against state adversaries

• Conducting proactive stability operations

• Executing small-scale contingencies. 

The Strategic Studies Department also provides teaching and curriculum support to Professional Military Education institutions—the staff colleges and war colleges. It advances SOF strategic influence by its interaction in academic, interagency, and United States military communities.

The JSOU portal is https://jsou.socom.mil. 

Joint Special Operations University

Brigadier General Steven J. Hashem, President

Editorial Advisory Board

John B. Alexander

Ph.D., Education

The Apollinaire Group and 

JSOU Senior Fellow

Joseph D. Celeski

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.

JSOU Senior Fellow

Gilbert E. Doan

Major, U.S. Army, Ret.

JSOU Institutional 

Integration Division Chief

Thomas H. Henriksen

Ph.D., History

Hoover Institution Stanford 

Univ. and JSOU Senior Fellow

Russell D. Howard

Brigadier General, U.S. Army, Ret.

Director of the Jebsen Center for 

Counter-Terrorism Studies, The 

Fletcher School, Tufts University 

and JSOU Senior Fellow

George Emile Irani

Ph.D., International Relations

Toledo International Center for 

Peace and JSOU Senior Fellow

John D. Jogerst

Colonel, U.S. Air Force

USAFSOS Commandant

James Kiras

Ph.D., History

School of Advanced Air and Space 

Studies and JSOU Associate Fellow

Brian A. Maher

Ed.D., Education

JSOU Vice President

Michael C. McMahon

Lt Colonel, U.S. Air Force

JSOU Strategic Studies 

Department Director

William W. Mendel

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.

JSOU Senior Fellow

Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro

Major General, Brazilian Army, Ret.

JSOU Associate Fellow 

Kenneth H. Poole

Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret.

JSOU Senior Fellow 

James F. Powers, Jr.

Director of Homeland Security, 

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 

and JSOU Associate Fellow

Stephen Sloan

Ph.D., Comparative Politics

University of Central Florida

Robert G. Spulak, Jr.

Ph.D., Physics/Nuclear Engineering

Sandia National Laboratories 

and JSOU Associate Fellow

Joseph S. Stringham

Brigadier General, U.S. Army, Ret.

Alutiiq, LLC and JSOU

Associate Fellow

Joseph A. Stuart

Ph.D., Educational Leadership

JSOU Dean of Academics

J. Paul de B. Taillon

Ph.D., International Affairs

Royal Military College of Canada 

and JSOU Associate Fellow

Graham H. Turbiville, Jr.

Ph.D., History

Courage Services, LLC and 

JSOU Senior Fellow

Jessica Glicken Turnley

Ph.D., Cultural Anthropology/

Southeast Asian Studies

Galisteo Consulting Group 

and JSOU Senior Fellow

William S. Wildrick

Captain, U.S. Navy, Ret.

JSOU Senior Fellow
JSOU Report 07-3

The JSOU Press

Hurlburt Field, Florida

2007

The Israeli Approach 

to Irregular Warfare 

and Implications 

for the United States 

Thomas H. Henriksen
Comments about this publication are invited and should be forwarded 

to Director, Strategic Studies Department, Joint Special Operations 

University, 357 Tully Street, Alison Building, Hurlburt Field, Florida 

32544. Copies of this publication may be obtained by calling JSOU at 

850-884-2764; FAX 850-884-4732. 

*******

The Strategic Studies Department, JSOU is currently accepting written works relevant to special operations for potential publication. For 

more information please contact Mr. Jim Anderson, JSOU Director of 

Research, at 850-884-1569, DSN 579-1569, james.d.anderson@hurlburt.af.mil. Thank you for your interest in the JSOU Press. 

*******

This work was cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

ISBN 1-933749-06-7
The views expressed in this publication are entirely those of 

the author and do not necessarily reflect the views, policy

or position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, 

United States Special Operations Command, or the Joint 

Special Operations University.
Publications of the JSOU Press

2004–2005 JSOU/NDIA Essays, April 2005

Special Operations Forces Reference Manual, June 2005

Russian Special Forces, August 2005, Graham H. Turbiville, Jr.

The Evolving Requirements of the Canadian Special 

Operations Forces, September 2005, J. Paul de B. Taillon

Operationalizing COIN, September 2005, Joseph D. Celeski

Theoretical Perspectives of Terrorist Enemies as Networks, 

October 2005, Robert G. Spulak, Jr. and Jessica Glicken Turnley

Logistic Support and Insurgency, October 2005, 

Graham H. Turbiville, Jr.

Dividing Our Enemies, November 2005, Thomas H. Henriksen

The War on Terrorism, December 2005, James A. Bates

Coast Guard SOF, February 2006, Gary R. Bowen

Implications for Network-Centric Warfare, March 2006, 

Jessica Glicken Turnley

Narcoterrorism in Latin America, April 2006, 

Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro

The Changing Nature of Warfare, the Factors Mediating Future 

Conflict, and Implications for SOF, April 2006, John B. Alexander

Civil-Military Operations and Professional Military Education, 

May 2006, James F. Powers, Jr. 

Blogs and Military Information Strategy, June 2006, 

James Kinniburgh and Dorothy Denning

2006 JSOU/NDIA SO/LIC Chapter Essays, June 2006

Executive Report, JSOU First Annual Symposium (2–5 May 2006)

One Valley at a Time, August 2006, Adrian T. Bogart III 

Special Operations Aviation in NATO, September 2006, 

Richard D. Newton

Beyond Draining the Swamp: Urban Development and Counterterrorism in Morocco, October 2006, Stephen R. Dalzell

Filling Special Operations Gaps with Civilian Expertise,

December 2006, James F. Powers, Jr. 

Educating for Strategic Thinking in the SOF Community,

January 2007, Harry R. Yarger


Foreword

I

n this publication, Dr. Henriksen discusses the formation, development, and employment of Israeli Special Operations Forces. An 

informative survey of units and forces underpins Dr. Henriksen’s 

lucid analysis of the strategic and operational conditions and environment in which they are employed. The strategic challenges facing Israel 

require innovative security solutions, and they have shaped the way 

Israel created and nurtured a variety of Special Operations Forces. 

One can argue that the security challenges of Israel are the security concerns of the United States writ small. Terrorist and insurgent 

forces constantly threaten the country and highlight the need for 

effective border security to mitigate cross-border attacks and infiltrations. Israel’s relatively small size exacerbates these threats and 

intuitively leads to understanding the requirement for a proactive 

combating terrorism or counterterrorist program vice a reactive 

policy. The need for a proactive approach emphasizes the need 

for effective and timely intelligence, especially Human Intelligence 

(HUMINT), and the linking of operational missions with the requirement for actionable intelligence. 

For all of the author’s insight into Israeli capabilities and success, he does highlight that Israel has been able to reduce, but not 

eliminate, the terrorist threat to the country. Counterinsurgency, 

combating terrorism, and counterterrorism strategies and operations can ameliorate or moderate terrorist actions, but ultimately 

only a long-term political solution between the warring parties will 

end an insurgency or terror campaign. Sadly, the current situation 

for Israel and its neighbors indicates a viable political settlement is 

not in sight and, consequently, Israeli Special Operations Forces will 

have to continue engaging the country’s enemies. 

Michael C. McMahon, Lt Col, USAF

Director, JSOU Strategic Studies Department

vii

About the Author

Dr. Thomas H. Henriksen is a senior fellow with the JSOU 

Strategic Studies Department and is a senior fellow at 

Stanford University’s Hoover Institution. Until September 2003, he was Hoover Institution associate director for program 

development. Other duties there included executive secretary of the 

National Fellows and National Security Affairs Fellows programs, as 

well as director of the Media Fellows Program. 

His current research focuses on American foreign policy in the 

post-Cold War world, international political affairs, and national 

defense. He specializes in the study of U.S. diplomatic and military 

courses of action toward terrorist havens, such as Afghanistan, and 

the so-called rogue states, including North Korea, Iraq, and Iran. He 

also concentrates on armed and covert interventions abroad. 

Dr. Henriksen has a forthcoming volume entitled The Transformation of American Power After the Berlin Wall. His book, an edited 

volume on competing visions for U.S. foreign policy, is Foreign Policy 

for America in the 21st Century: Alternative Perspectives (Hoover Institution Press, 2001). Other works include Using Power and Diplomacy 

to Deal with Rogue States (Hoover Essays in Public Policy, 1999) and 

the edited collection North Korea After Kim Il Sung (Hoover Institution 

Press, 1999). 

He also authored or edited the following books and monographs: 

One Korea? Challenges and Prospects for Reunification (Hoover Institution Press, 1994); The New World Order: War, Peace, and Military Preparedness (Hoover Institution Press, 1992); Revolution and 

Counterrevolution: Mozambique’s War of Independence (Greenwood 

Press, 1983); The Struggle for Zimbabwe: Battle in the Bush (Praeger, 

1981); Soviet and Chinese Aid to African Nations (Praeger, 1980); and 

Mozambique: A History (Rex Collings, 1978). 

Additionally, he has written numerous journal articles and newspaper essays concerning international politics and security as well 

as U.S. policy toward rogue states in the post-Cold War era. Dr. Henriksen has also received research grants from the American Philosophical Society, State University of New York, National Endowment 

for the Humanities, and National Defense Foreign Language Fellowship Program. His book Mozambique: A History was chosen for the
viii

Outstanding Book Award for African History by Choice. During 1982, 

he traveled to the former Soviet Union as a member of the forum for 

the U.S.-Soviet dialogue.

Dr. Henriksen’s education and public service developed in the 

1960s, specifically earning his B.A. in History from Virginia Military

Institute (1962) and the M.A. and Ph.D. in History from Michigan 

State University (1966 and 1969). He was selected for membership 

in Phi Alpha Theta—the history honorary society—as a graduate student. During 1963-1965, Dr. Henriksen served as an infantry officer

in the U.S. Army. He taught history at the State University of New 

York from 1969, leaving in 1979 as a full professor. During the 1979-

1980 academic year, he was the Susan Louise Dyer Peace Fellow at 

the Hoover Institution. 

Dr. Henriksen’s national public service includes participation as 

a member of the U.S. Army Science Board (1984-1990) and the President’s Commission on White House Fellowships (1987-1993). He 

also received a Certificate of Appreciation for Patriotic Civilian Service

from the U.S. Department of the Army in 1990. He is a member of 

the Board of Trustees for two organizations, the George C. Marshall 

Foundation and the International Conference Group on Portugal. 


Henriksen: The Israeli Approach to IW

The Israeli Approach to Irregular 

Warfare and Implications 

for the United States

Introduction

No political entity since medieval times has been more constant under military siege—whether conventional, terrorist, 

or even existential threat—than Israel.1 Israel’s neighbors 

or its indigenous Arab population have conspired to destroy the 

Jewish state since its founding in 1948. Assaults have varied from 

a phalanx of main battle-line tanks to a lone suicide bomber. The 

sheer ferocity of the attackers, many infused with religious fervor, 

from Israel’s founding has disturbing echoes today as America and 

its Special Operations Forces (SOF) encounter similar assaults in 

Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere. Like the United States, Israel had 

fought large-scale conventional wars, faced existential threats from 

nuclear-arming states, and terrorist attacks for decades. The two 

states share other similarities. Both are democracies with vibrant 

political cultures and first-world technological sectors. And both are

subjected to intense international scrutiny with any perceived use of 

excessive force or humanitarian transgression, while their terrorist 

adversaries often escape with much less censure. 

Differences also exist between the two nations. America’s size, 

vast population, and economic and military strength dwarf tiny 

Israel, a country 300 miles long and nowhere more than 80 miles 

wide, with a population of 6 million. Geostrategically, two oceans and 

friendly bordering states protect the United States. Israel’s borders, 

on the other hand, are actually its frontlines that demand constant 

defensive measures and sometimes offensive operations. America’s 

active frontlines are located faraway in Iraq, Afghanistan, and North 

Korea. To survive, Israel had to become a national security state by 

the mid-1970s and still it preserved its freedoms and Judaic humanitarian traditions.2 The United States has not yet had to face these 

stark realities. 


JSOU Report 07-3

Israel’s versatility and adaptability in successfully combating 

threats not only has protected the embattled nation but also made 

it an intriguing case study. One example is that during the Lebanon 

occupation the Israelis learned to fight guerrillas, but during the

second Palestinian intifada or “uprising” (literally translated as a 

“shaking off”) they coped with suicide bombers. As such the Israel 

Defense Forces (IDF) military actions have been—and are—a crucible 

for methods, procedures, tactics, and techniques for the United States, 

which now faces a similarly 

fanatical foe across the world

in the Global War on Terror. 

In short, Israeli experiences 

offer an historical record and

a laboratory for tactics and

techniques in waging counterinsurgencies or counterterrorist

operations in America’s post-9/11 circumstances. Over the last 

decades the global jihad against the United States, Western Europe, 

and even within many Muslim countries has merged with the conflict against Israel. Before this development, nonparticipants held

that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was merely a nationalistic dispute over the destiny of Palestine. Now Israel’s territorial enemies—

such as Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Hezbollah—share Al 

Qaeda’s grandiose vision of reconstituting a tenth-century caliphate 

stretching from Andalusia to Aceh.3

The recent appearance in Gaza of a new movement—the Army 

of Islam—represents the first Palestinian group to adopt the goals of

Al Qaeda. Unlike other Palestinian resistance movements, the Army 

of Islam argues that it fights not “for a piece of land” but wages war

to restore a religious caliphate throughout the Muslim world.4 Thus, 

the global terrorist campaign is aimed at the United States, the West, 

and non-sharia-ruled Muslim states along with Israel. 

The tiny Levantine country’s contribution to the technology of 

warfare is well known. Israel’s defense industry, for example, developed innovative techniques such as reactive tank armor to protect 

these hulking vehicles from high explosive rounds and remotely 

piloted aircraft, known as unmanned air vehicles (UAVs) by Americans forces. The Israelis deployed these pilotless planes during the 

1982 invasion of Lebanon. The Israeli drones buzzed above guerrilla 

... Israeli experiences offer an

historical record and a laboratory 

for tactics and techniques in waging 

counterinsurgencies or counterterrorist operations in America’s 

post-9/11 circumstances.


Henriksen: The Israeli Approach to IW

positions and beamed back real-time video images from the on-board 

cameras, allowing battlefield intelligence to occur without endangering piloted planes or land-bound reconnoitering teams. These UAVs 

became a feature of United States (U.S.) conflicts first in Afghanistan and then Iraq. If Israel did not actually first initiate some of the

modern-day techniques or practices now widely used by American 

forces, it gave many prominences in the antiterrorist arsenal. They 

are worthy of consideration by U.S. forces. 

Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency 

The purview of this study is not large-scale conventional wars such 

as Israel’s 1948, 1956, 1967, or 1973 conflicts or America’s Persian Gulf War or its Kosovo bombing campaign. The emphasis is 

on Israel’s practice of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, and 

the IDF generally and its SOF in particular are rich in experience in 

these most difficult forms of conflict. Even before Israel’s declaration of independence, there have been specialized Jewish forces that 

date back to the 1930s. With World War II, Great Britain (who ruled 

Palestine under a League of Nations mandate) trained and equipped 

unconventional forces from among the Jewish population to combat 

Nazi armies and their Arab sympathizers in the Middle East. Disbanded after the war, these units’ specialized warriors went underground to fight for independence from Britain. In the early 1950s, the

now-independent State of Israel reconstituted small counterguerrilla 

parties to halt Arab infiltrators attacks on Jewish farmers and rural

dwellers. 

In time, Israel formed numerous specialized units, many of which 

are shrouded in secrecy. In this overview, it is impossible to mention 

all these entities, let alone give them proper consideration. For a 

more detailed picture, see the books and articles referenced in the 

endnotes as well as the Internet site isayeret.com (The Israeli Special 

Forces DatabaseTM); included are units within the country’s prison 

services, public transportation, and border security forces. 

Unlike the United States, Israel has a plethora of elite teams 

specializing in specific missions. The IDF established many small

units because Israel’s mandatory service requirements include all 

its men and women over 18 years of age. Because the required 

3-year period is insufficient for individuals to master all SOF skills,


JSOU Report 07-3

the units master techniques for a specific mission such as hostage

rescue, underwater demolition, or canine capabilities. Most special 

units, however, also have LOTAR (Israeli acronym for Counter Terror 

from the Hebrew “Lohama Baterror”) capacities. The Tier 1 units have 

multiple mission capabilities, similar to those in the United States or 

United Kingdom. Unlike the United States, though, Israeli youth pass 

directly from civilian life into special units, after the Gibush (selection process of arduous physical and psychological testing), rather 

than proceeding from regular military units. Exceptions to this path 

include Israel’s National Counterterrorism Unit, which requires a 

minimum 3 years of service in an IDF combat unit. 

Some of these groups were originally formed from paratrooper 

detachments or infantry brigades, as sayeret (reconnaissance) commando elements that function along the lines of SOF by gathering intelligence. They undertook Long-Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP)

missions, then conducted defined attacks on key strongholds. Examples are the Sayeret Golani from the Golani Brigade and the Sayeret 

Giva’ati from the Giva’ati Brigade. The practice of having Special 

Forces as a part of regular line units differs from the American 

method; U.S. Special Forces are distinct and separate units. These 

brigade sayeret units do not have any real special operations capabilities. Rather, they are similar to the reconnaissance platoons of 

the 82nd and 101st divisions in the U.S. Army. Israel’s Special Operations/Special Mission units fall under the IDF General Staff. Until 

after the U.S. invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, America’s SOF were 

most often employed in missions distinct from regular line units. 

In the Israeli case, however, the integration among SOF, regular 

units, and intelligence officials is much tighter with fewer firewalls

separating the exchange of information and plans than in many U.S. 

operations. Israel’s Shin Bet (the domestic security service, officially

known as Israel Security Agency) is also closely integrated into the 

military’s counterterrorism effort by interrogating a captured terrorist as close to the time of apprehension as possible in order to head 

off subsequent attacks.5 The free exchange of intelligence among 

gatherers and actors is enhanced because Israel is a small country 

where many of the soldiers and agents know each other before their 

service years. The ever-present perils the country faces, its political and military authorities’ consciousness, and enforced decisions 

expands the flow of intelligence.


Henriksen: The Israeli Approach to IW

The ongoing cross-pollination between special operations and 

regular units has led to a greater appreciation of each force’s capabilities. Unlike their U.S. counterparts, 

many IDF commanders have served 

at least one tour in a SOF unit. IDF 

commanders are therefore familiar 

with special capability forces and 

how to integrate them into missions.6

Innovations springing from Israeli 

Special Forces have spread to conventional military units. Perfecting 

the long-term ambush (requiring sometimes 36 hours), these specialized troops taught the technique to conventional forces.7 As one 

commentator said, the SOF have contributed to the specialization of 

regular line troops and, in turn, the conventionalization of Special 

Forces.8 This blending has enhanced understanding and success. 

Israel also has other arrangements with distinct special units. 

For example, the IDF’s General Staff (abbreviated as Mat’Kal) has 

its own Special Forces unit, the Sayeret Mat’kal. Along with specialist groups within the police and border guards, Mista’aravim are 

the deeply secret Arabist units that masquerade as Arabs among 

the indigenous populations in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and

Shayetet 13 (also known as Flotilla 13 or Ha’Kommando Ha’Yami)

are naval crack commandos. In addition, the IDF even has an extreme 

cold weather force, Unit Alpinistim, which is dedicated to the defense 

of Mount Hermon, located on the Golan Heights and the country’s 

only snow-covered mountain. Again, it is a reconnaissance unit with 

no special operations capabilities. Because Mount Hermon overlooks 

the Syrian capital of Damascus, only 35 kilometers distant, it commands a strategic vantage point. As such, the Israelis have erected 

state-of-the art electronic surveillance equipment aimed at one of the 

Jewish state’s implacable enemies. Hence its year-round defense is 

crucial. 

The IDF does not operate a Green Beret (U.S. Army Special 

Forces) type force for overseeing unconventional warfare “predominately conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces.” 9 The IDF did 

institute separate units, however, comprised of non-Jewish peoples 

such as the Druze Muslims or the Bedouin, whose uncanny deserttracking skills draw much acclaim. The protractedness and variety of the IDF’s experiences with unconventional warfare make it a 

The ongoing cross-pollination 

between special operations 

and regular units has led to 

a greater appreciation of 

each force’s capabilities. 


JSOU Report 07-3

compelling story for students of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency that has been underutilized. 

American practitioners of counterinsurgency often study the lessons of the U.S. forces in the Vietnam War or the British in Malaya, 

while neglecting the very relevant experiences of the IDF over

the past several decades in combating terrorism and insurgency.10

Located in the heart of the Middle East, Israel’s combat theater 

much more closely resembles America’s challenges 

in Iraq, Afghanistan, and 

the Horn of Africa in terms 

of cultural, historical, and 

political/religious persuasion than that of communist-inspired insurgents in 

Asia several decades ago. 

Moreover, America’s Armed Forces use of special operations has had 

a problematic past dating from the Vietnam War, when the Pentagon 

and U.S. Army generals in the field did their utmost to freeze out or

circumscribe special operations’ clandestine methods.11

Not unlike the United States, Israel has had to transform parts of 

its regular forces after major conventional warfare victories to address 

unconventional attacks. America won its major conventional engagements in World War II, the Persian the Gulf War, and the first 3 weeks

of the Iraq War, only to be confronted by insurgencies in Vietnam and 

more recently in Iraq and Afghanistan. While Israel also underwent 

a similar changeover after the conventional tank and troop battles 

during its 1973 war against Egyptian and Syrian massed attacks, 

it has also experienced earlier insurgent infiltrations dating almost

from its founding. A small but typical conversion took place with a 

hostage rescue mission. Well before the United States created special mission units, for rescuing hostages among its other operations, 

troopers from the elite Sayeret Mat’kal disguised themselves in white 

mechanics coveralls to spring the abducted passengers on Belgium’s 

Sabena Airlines jet bound from Brussels to Tel Aviv in early May 

1972. Upon boarding the Boeing 707, the commandos killed two terrorists and freed the hostages in an early case study of foiling what 

became the skyjack phenomenon. The famed 1976 Entebbe hostage 

... Israel’s combat theater much more 

closely resembles America’s challenges 

in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Horn of 

Africa in terms of cultural, historical, 

and political/religious persuasion than 

that of communist-inspired insurgents 

in Asia several decades ago.


Henriksen: The Israeli Approach to IW

rescue operation was another first and good preparation for counterterrorism operations. 

Not all hostage-rescue missions went well, however. An example 

is the 1974 hostage-standoff in the northern town of Ma’alot that 

ended with the death of 25 students and teachers when three Palestinian terrorists opened fire with automatic weapons as Israeli forces

stormed the school. The incident spawned the establishment of the 

National Counterterrorism Unit for hostage-rescue situations. The 

Israeli government also established a counterterrorism school, which 

offers instruction in urban operations, military skills, and the use of 

dogs for some missions. Regular IDF units also undergo training for 

implementing assignments in urban environments.12

IDF defensive operations led to their subdividing Israel into three 

main territorial zones—the Northern, Central, and Southern Commands—to facilitate protection of the country. While commanders 

within these theaters have much latitude in conducting operations, 

they generally lack same operational freedom of the American combatant commands in the Pacific, Europe, or the Central Command.

Unlike the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, the IDF’s General Staff commands forces in action. At various times, each of the three Israel 

territorial commands possessed their own specialized units for 

reconnaissance missions. These included Sayeret Shaked, Sayeret 

Egoz, and Sayeret Haruv, all of which were disbanded in the 1970s, 

although their names lived on in infantry battalions. 

Years before the United States launched its 1986 retaliatory airstrikes on Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi’s Libya for its terrorism, Al

Qaeda camps in Afghanistan, or the al-Shifa pharmaceutical plant 

in the Sudan, Israel had staged commando raids and counterstrikes 

against terrorist networks and states that facilitated their assaults. 

For example, Israeli helicopter gunships destroyed 14 commercial 

aircraft at the Beirut Airport in December 1968 that belonged to 

Lebanese Middle East Airways. The objective was to halt international terrorist acts planned in the Lebanese capital and to pressure Lebanon to halt the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) 

cross-border terrorism. Special Israeli units boarded each aircraft to 

ensure no passengers were on board before placing demo charges on 

the planes. 

Elsewhere, Israel conducted a contemporary version of the international preemptive strike when its air force famously destroyed Iraq’s 


JSOU Report 07-3

Osirak nuclear reactor in 1981 after a failed Iranian effort to accomplish the same goal the previous year. Although Operation Babylon 

initially elicited international opprobrium, it was later judged beneficial to halting Iraq’s nuclear ambitions. In 1985, the Israel Air

Force mounted another less well-known long-distance airstrike that 

necessitated midair refueling against the PLO headquarters south of 

Tunis, the Tunisian capital. This attack eliminated several key PLO 

figures, but narrowly missed its chieftain, Yasir Arafat.

These long-distance Israeli strikes serve as a lesson for American forces. The long-range hostage rescue by the IDF at Entebbe 

Airport in July 1976 preceded a similar but unsuccessful American 

effort into Iran just 4 years later. In the Israeli case, four terrorists 

hijacked an Air France commercial jet bound for Paris from Tel Aviv, 

after a stopover in Athens, on 27 June 1976. After flying to Benghazi,

Libya, the Air France flight was diverted to Entebbe, Uganda, where

President Idi Amin collaborated with the terrorist hijackers (two from 

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and two from West Germany’s Baader-Meinhoff gang) in holding the hostages. 

With intelligence from the IDF’s Aman, its intelligence branch, 

the Sayeret Mat’kal mobilized, rehearsed its plans, flew nearly 2,500

miles, and struck at the Entebbe Airport, rescuing more than 100 

passengers and crew with a minimum loss of life. The Entebbe Airport raid—later renamed Operation Yonatan (after Colonel Jonathan 

Netanyahu, the only Israeli soldier to die in the assault)—entered 

the hall of fame of counterterrorist operations.13 Despite the success of Israel’s dramatic rescue raid, it did not serve as a model for 

the United States. In some sense, America’s well-executed but fruitless 1970 Son Tay raid into North Vietnam to rescue captured U.S. 

airmen served as a model for Israel’s Entebbe mission. Although the 

American operation did not free the prisoners who had been moved, 

it prompted U.S. attention to these types of activities. 

In April 1980, the United States launched its own deep-penetration raid to rescue 52 American hostages seized in the U.S. Embassy 

takeover in Tehran 5 months earlier. The spearpoint of the effort 

called for a mix of Special Forces and U.S. Army Rangers. Despite 

lengthy preparation time, the 600-mile flight ended in failure at its

Desert One rendezvous, when three of the Sea Stallion helicopters 

mechanically broke down and a fourth was destroyed in an acciden-


Henriksen: The Israeli Approach to IW

tal crash at the site. The costs also included eight U.S. lives, captured 

documents revealing the names of Iranians willing to help the rescue 

team, and an American humiliation.14 Plagued by compartmentalization that prohibited the flow of information, unqualified pilots, and

inattention to weather forecasts, the Iranian hostage rescue attempt 

became emblematic of the ill-starred American operations of the 

post-Vietnam era; examples follow:

a. Costly effort to free the crew of the merchant ship Mayaguez, 

taken prisoner by Cambodian communists in the Gulf of 

Thailand

b. Failed effort to protect the U.S. Marine Corps barracks in 

Beirut, killing 241 troops

c. Blighted Grenada invasion marked by tangled command and 

coordination snafus. 

Not all Israeli counter-operations ended so happily or mythically as the Entebbe venture. Palestinian insurgents ambushed IDF 

patrols, rained rockets down on Israeli civilians, and killed bus riders 

or café customers with suicide bombs. The failed Israeli rescue effort 

at Ma’alot (described on page 7) falls into this category. Even with its 

grinding counterinsurgency operations or counterterrorist sweeps, 

however, Israel’s missions furnished abundant lessons and warnings for American strategists willing to observe and perhaps thereby 

also benefit.

Countering Terrorist Attacks 

A bit of historical reflection on Israeli experiences is instructive. Not

long after Israel’s Independence War, the new country underwent 

the first attacks by irregular fighters that endure to this day. These

intruders came from across Israel’s borders. From guerrilla training 

camps in the Sinai Desert or the Gaza Strip, Egyptian intelligence 

officers trained Palestinians who they recruited from refugee camps.

The raids soon caused hundreds of Israeli deaths.15

Forays from Egypt or Jordan dating from the 1950s resembled 

jihadi crossings into Iraq or Afghanistan decades later. The fedayeen 

(irregular forces) attackers were trained and armed by Egyptian and 

Jordanian military officers. To seal its borders from attackers, the

IDF mounted defenses and counter-raids into adjoining territories, 

including Lebanon that in the words of one tough-minded critic 
10

JSOU Report 07-3

displayed “a brilliance that was san pareil.” 16 Starting in 1964, when 

the PLO formed, terrorist infiltrations also increased from Jordan.

Often Jordanian troops protectively ringed the PLO bases. On occasion the IDF unleashed counterattacks with tanks, troops, and 

supporting air cover into Jordan and Syria, which amounted to miniinvasions. Following a day or two of fighting and destruction of military bases, the IDF withdrew back onto Israeli soil. 

After the large-scale 1967 conventional war and the occupation 

of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, the number of cross-border 

infiltrations from Jordan intensified. Within both entities, large hostile Palestinian populations existed, with most on the West Bank of 

the Jordan River. The PLO strove to foment an insurgency within the 

Israeli-occupied West Bank. It resorted to classic guerrilla warfare 

tactic as exported by communist regimes in the People’s Republic of 

China, North Korea, North Vietnam, and the Soviet Union during the 

Cold War. 

At first, IDF units engaged Palestinian infiltrators and Jordanian troops in firefights alone. Israel later employed defensive measures such as clearing vegetation that masked terrorist movements, 

implanted mines, erected electronic fences monitored by closed-circuit TV cameras, and profiled suspected individuals and groups.

The Israelis also inserted Arabic-speaking intelligence and uncover 

operatives within the Palestinian population to expose and break up 

guerrilla cells. 

The combination of active and passive measures complicated 

the PLO intrusions but did not completely halt them. Because more 

than enough interceptions occurred, however, a genuine people’s 

war never took root among the occupied Palestinians living in the 

West Bank. This noteworthy victory of essentially closing a porous 

border to the flow of men and arms necessary to sustain an insurgent uprising warrants careful study by other military forces facing 

a similar challenge. 

In Jordan, the coup de grace for the PLO came from the kingdom’s 

monarch. Increasingly alarmed by the Palestinian terrorist antics 

against not only Israel but also hijacked international aircraft, King 

Hussein decided to act. The restive Palestinian population promised 

to destabilize the throne. King Hussein expelled the PLO through a 

bloody military assault and implemented a clampdown that pacified

the Israeli-Jordanian border. 
11

Henriksen: The Israeli Approach to IW

Counterinsurgency Successes 

Lessons can also be gleaned from Israeli counterterrorist operations 

in the Gaza Strip. Here, squads of soldiers functioned more as policemen and detectives than combat infantrymen. Formally under Egyptian control, Gaza, along with the West Bank, fell to Israel during 

the 1967 war. Like the West Bank territory, tiny Gaza was densely 

populated; some 400,000 Arabs at the time lived in a pocket-sized 

territory of 360 square kilometers, which bordered the Mediterranean Sea. Under the new mandate, Israel ruled directly but permitted Gazans to live normal lives, engage in commerce, work within 

Israel, and receive public services. It hoped that a gradually improving standard of living would ease tension with Jewish governance. 

Although they resented Israeli rule, the Gazans experienced economic improvements in their daily lives, something that the antiIsrael guerrillas determined to disrupt in a preview of what happened 

in post-Hussein Iraq. 

Among this population operated some 800 terrorists within Yasir 

Arafat’s PLO and George Habash’s Popular Front for the Liberation of 

Palestine (PFLP), which funneled in money, arms, and trained cadre 

from Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. The two organizations cooperated 

tactically and modeled themselves on Vietcong operations in South 

Vietnam. The PLO and PFLP established underground cells, recruited 

young men, staged attacks on the IDF, killed suspected Israeli collaborators, and generally destabilized Gazan society through torture, 

murder, and intimidation. As is typical in most guerrilla wars, violence hit the civilian population the hardest to uproot cooperation 

between it and the government. The terrorist fronts also tried to prevent Gazans from crossing into Israel to work. Operating in the teeming refugee camps or thick orange groves, the PLO and PFLP enjoyed 

classic advantages of elusive guerrillas in cover and evasion from 

easy detection by Israeli counterinsurgency forces. 

In 1971 Major General Ariel Sharon, commander of Israel’s 

southern zone, turned his attention to Gaza’s mushrooming insurgency. Perplexed about how to regain control of the enclave, Sharon 

walked much of the territory over a 2-month period, trying to devise 

a policy of eliminating guerrillas while not unduly inflicting harm on

the population. General Sharon hit upon a unique method of subdividing Gaza and crippling movement and communication amongst 
12

JSOU Report 07-3

terrorist units. On maps, he dissected the province into squares of 

a mile or two in area. General Sharon then trained “first-rate infantry units” for what he called “antiterrorist guerrilla warfare” whose 

tactics would create “a new 

situation for every terrorist 

every day.” According to one 

source, the IDF deployed 

its Special Forces to Gaza, 

including the Southern 

Command’s reconnaissance 

force, Sayeret Shaked; Central Command’s reconnaissance troops, 

Sayeret Haruv; and Sayeret Tzanhanim, Sayeret Golani, and possibly Sayeret Mat’Kal.

17 Israeli special units played a large role in a 

highly successful counterinsurgency campaign along with Shin Bet 

and Aman. 

General Sharon assigned squads of elite soldiers to each zone, 

in which they were to learn intimately the paths, orchards, houses, 

and other features as well as the routine comings and goings of the 

inhabitants. Anything out of the ordinary aroused their interest and 

their deadly response. In the buildup camps, the troops compared the 

outside and inside measurements of houses to detect crawl spaces or 

false walls behind which terrorist hid. In rural areas, they looked for 

ventilation pipes from underground bunkers. Dressing soldiers as 

Arabs, planting undercover squads, turning captured terrorists into 

agents (called shtinkerim or stinkers), the IDF generated intelligence 

that led to dead or captured guerrillas. Sharon later recorded these 

and other techniques in his autobiography, the reading of which 

would benefit any counterinsurgency practitioner.18

Sharon also focused on making terrorists operate in the open, 

where their stealth was exposed to Israel attack. For this task, he 

employed bulldozers to widen roadways in the refugee camps, which 

facilitated patrolling and reduced unobserved movement. Bulldozers 

also dug up bunkers often located next to thick cactus hedges. IDF 

patrols of orchards often trailed bulldozers behind other vehicles for 

quick employment. The purpose was to force underground cells into 

the open where they stood in Israeli crosshairs. These and other 

techniques substantially cranked down, although did not eliminate 

terrorist incidences. 

General Sharon then trained “first-rate 

infantry units” for what he called 

“antiterrorist guerrilla warfare” whose 

tactics would create “a new situation 

for every terrorist every day.” 
13

Henriksen: The Israeli Approach to IW

In the West Bank after the 1967 war, Israeli security forces—

including the IDF, Border Guard, and the Shin Bet—used stern

measures to keep a lid on terrorist activities. They clamped down on 

demonstrations, set up checkpoints, conducted frequent searches, 

and initiated curfews. Israeli bulldozers razed homes of suspected 

terrorists as an object lesson. Because the Israelis rigorously sealed 

the border with Jordan, the West Bank population lacked the easy 

access to arms and explosives that later prevailed in southern Lebanon. Therefore, young men and sometime women in West Bank 

towns might stone Israeli security forces, as in the first intifada, and 

thereby did not pose the same danger of launching rockets or mortars as Lebanon or, as more recently, Gaza to Israeli life. Containing 

the intifada with its burning tires and Molotov cocktails required the 

IDF to react more as riot police than an army of massive firepower

and maneuver. 

The spontaneity, decentralization, and endurance of the Palestinian protests, however, presented other problems, as the street 

violence persisted from 1988 to 1995, some of which the U.S.-led 

coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan felt. Whenever a lighter 

armed, or even unarmed, opponent engages a superior force, especially before whirring television cameras, it enjoys a revered underdog status that places moral dilemmas on those trying to preserve 

civilian lives. Excessive force invites international censure. Limited 

applications of military power, on the other hand, risk an escalation 

of violence and casualties. Not just in the first intifada but also in 

the earlier low-intensity conflicts in Gaza and the West Bank, Israeli

forces encountered the same type media glare and international 

criticism that now bedevils the U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

The double standard that excuses or at least ignores the savagery of 

the terrorists does not let the counterinsurgents off the political and 

legal hook. 

Operations for Intelligence 

Being subject to incessant cross-border murder and mayhem necessitated aggressive intelligence gathering to offset the attacker’s element of surprise. Paid Arab informants, while sometimes useful, 

constituted a form of waiting for intelligence to arrive, which required 

time and effort to verify its validity. The Israelis decided to use spe-
14

JSOU Report 07-3

cial military units not just for executing deterrence raids based on 

intelligence gained from other sources but also for initiating LongRange Reconnaissance Patrol operations to obtain intelligence. They 

operated on the principle that he who waits in counterterrorism is 

lost. Thus by the mid-1950s, Israeli authorities lifted a page from one 

particular World War II-era platoon of the pal’mach (meaning “strike 

platoons” manned by Jews and sanctioned by the British to wage 

guerrilla war against German forces). Comprised of Middle Eastern 

Jews who could speak and pass as Arabs, the Arab Platoon insinuated agents in Transjordan, Lebanon, and Syria to conduct irregular 

warfare and gather intelligence. Disbanded by the British near the 

end of the war, the Arab Platoon operatives went underground. The 

concept resurfaced later with Israeli special units and undercover 

agents that function within the hyper-tense environments of the 

West Bank and Gaza territories. 

Commando raids against terrorist infrastructure often encompassed intelligence gathering along with retaliatory or deterrence 

ends. After a string of Black September19 attacks culminating in 

the infamous Munich massacre of Israeli Olympic athletes, the IDF 

staged a small-scale invasion, Operation Turmoil 4, into southern 

Lebanon to extirpate the widening Palestinian terror apparatus in 

September 1972. To forestall Black September terrorism, the Israeli 

forces deliberately sought out documents.20 Military actions to flush

out intelligence formed the basis of many IDF operations. 

Unlike the modus operandi of pre-9/11 U.S. SOF, which had 

a “Intel-drives-operations” approach, the Israelis utilized a cyclical 

posture of operations feeding intelligence that, in turn, contributed to 

more operations. Intelligence-seeking operations are now more standard in the American special operations community. As one practitioner commented in 2006, “The idea of conducting an operation in 

order to satisfy intelligence requirements is a much more common 

and accepted concept for us than it was 5 years ago.” 21

The firewalls that have often blocked the rapid flow of information between SOF and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) are much 

less a hindrance within the Israeli intelligence-defense community. 

Many Israeli company-sized regular units include an Arabic-speaking interrogator to access information quickly so as to preempt terrorist attacks.22
15

Henriksen: The Israeli Approach to IW

The Intertwining of Combat Action and Intelligence 

More striking than any other feature is the IDF’s tight blending of 

intelligence, particularly human intelligence (HUMINT), and combat 

action. Civilian and military officials frequently make a point of

emphasizing the centrality of HUMINT to Israel’s defense.23

Israel’s crack SOF units have direct contact with the Israeli military intelligence headquarters, Aman. In the Israeli construct, Aman 

controls signal intelligence and even satellite transmissions. The 

Aman plays a predominate role in setting missions of small special 

forces. A tendency within the Israeli SOF community that has been 

less pronounced in its American counterpart is devolution of mission-setting goals downward to the actual elite units. Rather than 

a top-down approach, Israeli SOF generally (but not always) are 

tasked to look for missions instead of waiting for orders on high.24

In mature battle theaters such as Iraq and Afghanistan, SOF are 

also in “bottom-up” approaches at the tactical level. But the Israelis 

often cross international borders in pursuit of intelligence as well as 

kinetic actions, something U.S. SOF do not undertake with strategic 

level authority. 

Unlike the U.S. military branch, the head of the Aman is always 

an officer with military operational experience, not one groomed from

within the military intelligence branch itself. Also the coordination 

between civilian and military intelligence officers is much closer

and cooperative than the often rivalrous and rancorous CIA-military 

relationship. Overall the linkage between operational units and the 

intelligence branch is close. Aman, in some respects, functions like 

another service branch such as the Army, Navy, or Air Force. Unique 

to Israel, however, is that its commander is a full general officer,

not a brigadier general like the Tank Corps, Infantry Corps, or the 

Artillery Corps. With the rise of suicide bombers during the second 

intifada starting in 2000, the operational-intelligence loop became 

even tighter in order to prevent explosive blasts killing innocent civilians.25 For the Israeli army, containing the terrorist attacks associated with the second intifada required a reorientation in tactics. 

Special units from within the Israeli civilian police forces complemented their role. 
16

JSOU Report 07-3

Defense Through Targeted Killings 

In self-defense, the State of Israel also reintroduced in contemporary times the technique of targeted killings against terrorists, 

although its governments have often disclaimed responsibility for 

specific attacks and provided no official statistics on the number of

deaths.26 Although eliminating bombers, assassins, or their facilitators generated controversy and criticism from anti-Israeli quarters, 

it proved to be a discriminating application of lethal force against 

direct threats. The practice of targeted killings has ebbed and flowed

with the intensity of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The methods involved

have also varied with the circumstances and include booby-trapped 

packages, helicopter gunships, F-16 fighters, car bombs, and commando operations. Helicopter fire, for instance, eliminated Sayyed

Abbas Musawi, the Hezbollah secretary-general, in 1992. 

One ingenious method was the use of a booby-trapped cell phone 

in 1996. Its explosion killed Yahya Ayyash, known among Palestinians as “the engineer” for his bomb-making expertise within the 

Hamas movement, formally known as the Islamic Resistance Movement. Unlike a missile or bomb strike, the deadly phone device 

spared bystanders’ lives. If such methods are unsuccessful, however, 

the result can be adverse. An example is when two Mossad agents 

in 1999 tried to kill Khaled Mashaal via lethal injection in Amman, 

Jordan; the botched attempt on this political chief of Hamas was a 

celebrated bungle.27

After the internecine fights among Jewish independence movements, targeted attacks fell predominately against fedayeen infiltrators from Egypt and Jordan of the early 1950s. Organized by 

Egyptian military officers, Palestinian guerrillas slipped across the

Sinai or Gaza borders to attack Israel kibbutzim (collectivized settlements) and kill their residents. One authority on Israeli responses 

to terrorism credited two key Egyptian assassinations with the suspension of fedayeen raids for 10 years, thereby demonstrating their 

early effectiveness against cross-border assaults.28

Later attacks were almost exclusively directed at Palestinians 

engaged in planning or participating in terrorist attacks on Israeli 

civilians or troops. Possibly the most well-know counterattacks took 

place against perpetrators of those who slaughtered 11 Israeli athletes at the 1972 Munich Olympics. In a series of preventive strikes 
17

Henriksen: The Israeli Approach to IW

to block further massacres, Mossad agents undertook 13 killings 

against the Black September movement, one of which resulted in a 

wrongful death of a Moroccan waiter in Lillehammer, Norway.29

Israeli authorities increased the incidence of targeted killings in 

response to the number of attacks on the country’s civilian population with the outbreak of the second intifada in fall 2000. When 

the Camp David negotiations collapsed that summer, Palestinian 

militants intensified their suicide attacks against Israeli civilians.

The Oslo Accords, which established the Palestinian Authority and 

obtained weapons for its own police force, meant that Arab residents 

were better armed than in the previous intifada. The Palestinians’ 

increased use of suicide bombers also changed the calculus of the 

uprising. Hence, the second intifada witnessed a drastic change in 

the ratio of Jews killed to Palestinians—1 to 3; the first intifada had 

been 1 to 25.30

The frequency and mode of the Israeli counterattack also 

changed substantially during the second intifada. The Israelis eliminated many mid-level leaders of Palestinian terrorist organizations. 

In 2001, more than 20 were reported killed by snipers or helicopter 

gunships in what the Israeli government termed “targeted thwarting” 

in its Hebrew phrasing. Most of those eliminated were second-level 

terrorists; a few exceptions follow:

a. Mustafa Zibri, the secretary general of the Popular Front for 

the Liberation of Palestine, met his fate from two IDF helicopter missiles while in his Ramallah office.

b.	 In March 2004, helicopter-fired rockets found Sheikh Ahmed

Yassin, the main leader of Hamas who ordered most of the 

suicide bombers that killed over 1,000 Israelis during the 

second intifada. 

The use of the aircraft-borne missiles on cars or buildings with 

intifada organizers meant that Tel Aviv dropped its veil of secrecy on 

the tactic because to deny government involvement was pointless. 

More importantly, the counteroffensive reduced the organizing and 

execution of terrorist bombings on Israeli civilians. Given the near 

impossibility of defending countless terrorist targets in public sites 

(e.g., streets, restaurants, airports, and bus stations), preemption of 

attacks is the only reasonable deterrent measure.31
18

JSOU Report 07-3

Frequently,the Israeli government notified the Palestinian Authority of those on its list for terrorist activities. If the Palestinian Authority 

failed to arrest the terrorist organizers, who it often alerted, the IDF 

put them in its gun sights. These pinpoint attacks have produced far 

less collateral damage than artillery-type bombardments that often 

kill many innocent bystanders. Precise intelligence drawn from many 

Israeli agencies and Palestinian collaborators has enabled the IDF to 

zero in on bomb makers or recruiters of homicide bombers.32 

The U.S. Targeted Killing Effort 

Faced with terrorist attacks, the United States also adopted over time 

the practice of targeted assassinations for the same reasons that the 

Israelis had, to wit: the reduction or elimination of terrorist attacks. 

America’s use of targeted killings has lagged behind that of the Israelis. Two broad explanations for America’s hesitancy to act follow:

a.	 Despite a spate of terrorist attacks on American officials, citizens, and military forces stretching back over three decades, 

the United States claimed it could not strike back due to an 

absence of precise intelligence on those responsible. 

b. The United States remained wedded to conventional diplomacy and security arrangements rather than utilizing unconventional means to combat terrorism. Britain, for instance, 

also adopted targeted killings against terrorists. Its SAS hit 

team shot three unarmed IRA terrorists on a Gibraltar street 

in 1988 in an incident that grabbed much negative European 

attention.33

A detailed account of America’s aversion to striking back would 

take us too far afield for this study; yet a couple overview examples

of justifiable provocation are appropriate:

a. Seven months after the Palestinian massacre of Israeli athletes at the 1972 Munich Olympics, the same Palestinian 

terrorist organization, Black September, struck again at the 

U.S. Embassy staff in the Sudanese capital of Khartoum, 

killing the ambassador, Cleo Allen Noel, Jr., and the chargé 

d’affaires, George Curtis Moore (and one Belgian diplomat). Yasir Arafat, the deceased Palestinian leader, formed 

Black September from his al-Fatah (Islamic Holy War) movement that had been launching guerrilla and terrorist raids 
19

Henriksen: The Israeli Approach to IW

into Israel from Jordan, Lebanon, and the Gaza Strip since 

1965. Black September’s nominal separation from al-Fatah 

was intended to provide Arafat plausible deniability for the 

Munich killings and the March 1973 murders in Khartoum. 

The result was that Washington did not directly respond with 

force against the organizations that perpetrated terrorism for 

years. 

b. During Ronald Reagan’s presidency, assaults directed at 

Americans intensified. They took many forms, ranging from

the kidnapping of Americans in Lebanon, bombings of U.S. 

embassies in Kuwait and Beirut, murder of Leon Klinghoffer (an American tourist on the Italian cruise ship Achille 

Lauro), and air hijackings of American planes to the massive 

truck bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut on 23 

October 1983 that killed 241 troops. None of these deadly 

occurrences was suitably dealt with either by retaliating decisively or bringing culprits to justice. Despite evidence that 

the attack on the Marines had been carried out by the radical 

Islamic group Hezbollah backed by Iran, the United States 

never acted on a planned bombing mission against one of 

the group’s training camps in Lebanon. Instead, Washington 

withdrew American forces from Lebanon early the next year. 

About the second example, Secretary of State George Shultz and 

others in the administration did worry about the message sent by a 

cut-and-run tack. He called for action beyond “passive defense” to 

include “preemption and retaliation” in an October 1984 speech at 

the Park Avenue Synagogue in Manhattan.34 The advice helped precipitate a limited counteraction in President Reagan’s famed reprisals against Libya 2 years later. 

Aerial Bombardments. Ronald Reagan lashed back at the Libyan dictator, Qaddafi, in response to a string of state-sponsored terrorist

incidents occurring over several years, culminating in the bombing of a West German discotheque that killed two U.S. servicemen. 

Frustrated by being unable to assemble a coalition among European 

allies that would impose effective sanctions against Libya, the United 

States retaliated unilaterally with air strikes in 1986. In anticipating post-9/11 transatlantic relations, European capitals argued 

that the United States was overreaching. France predictably banned 
20

JSOU Report 07-3

the aircraft from its airspace. Perhaps ironically, one of the F-111

“Aardvark” warplane guided bombs did collateral damage to the 

French embassy at Tripoli in the El Dorado Canyon operation. The 

combined U.S. Navy and Air Force nighttime precision attack served 

as a model for similar missions in the next decade and even the next 

century.35

U.S. bombs that hit Qaddafi’s residence and military installations almost eliminated the Libyan strongman. After the bombardment, he appeared subdued, contributing to the judgment that he 

had been deterred from further killing sprees. Appearances can be 

deceiving, however, and were in the case of Qaddafi. The Libyan dictator disguised his hand in over a score of state-sponsored terrorist 

activities in the late 1980s.36 For its part, the United States incurred 

world censure when the United Nations General Assembly passed a 

resolution condemning the American raid on Libya. 

The most infamous of Qaddafi’s masterminded attacks downed

Pan American flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland in December 1988,

which killed all 259 passengers (three fourths being Americans) and 

11 others on the ground. Prima facie evidence pointed toward Libya’s 

involvement in the destruction of the U.S.-bound airline. American 

and British authorities filed indictments against a Libyan intelligence officer and an employee of Libya’s national airline for secreting a pressure-fused bomb among the baggage of the doomed flight.

Qaddafi refused to hand over the two men for trial in either United

States or Scotland. 

The incoming George H. W. Bush administration resorted to 

diplomacy with allied governments and sought United Nations sanctions against Libya. London and Paris backed Washington in the 

Security Council, which voted to impose sanctions blocking international sales of petroleum equipment and arms along with banning 

incoming and outgoing flights. The United Nations demanded Libya

turn over the suspects for trial in order to suspend the restrictions. 

A total lifting of the sanctions required the Libyan government to 

accept responsibility for the crime, pay compensation to the victims’ 

families, and renounce terrorism. Qaddafi refused and the sanctions

bit sharply into Libya’s economy and Libyans’ travel abroad for a 

decade and half. Ultimately in 1999 the Libyan despot offered up the 

two suspects and in 2004 (during the George W. Bush presidency) 

opened his country to inspection for unconventional weapons. 
21

Henriksen: The Israeli Approach to IW

Libya was not alone in abetting international terrorism. Statesponsored terrorism also emanated from North Korea, Iran, and 

Syria during the 1980s as a precursor to the “rogue” state phenomenon that emerged on the international scene in the following decade. 

By that time, another species of this form of violence was visible on 

the horizon, one that spoke in the name of Islam. 

Missile Strikes. After the Qaddafi-near miss, the United States second

attempt at a targeted killing took place in 1998 against Osama bin 

Laden, the scion of a wealthy Saudi family 

whose spiritual and political aspirations 

were fired by his experiences in Afghanistan during the Soviet invasion. Before bin 

Laden’s Al Qaeda carried out the deadly 

9/11 attacks, it struck U.S. embassies in 

Tanzania and Kenya, killing 12 Americans 

and hundreds of Africans. The United States resolved to strike back 

to preempt further Al Qaeda terrorism. 

Acting on intelligence that placed bin Laden and his inner-circle 

at a camp near the city of Khost on 20 August, U.S. naval vessels in 

the Arabian Sea launched 79 Tomahawk missiles that slammed into 

the Afghan terrorist installations and the al-Shifa plant near Khartoum. Operation Infinite Reach killed an estimated 20-30 people in

the training camps and demolished the Sudanese chemical plant, 

which was linked to Al Qaeda. The exhilaration, experienced within 

government circles, of retaliating against terrorism quickly dissipated as disappointing reports streamed in about the errant attacks. 

Osama bin Laden and his top lieutenants escaped the strike, perhaps being tipped off from Pakistani sources.37 Unlike various Tel 

Aviv governments, the Clinton administration never dispatched its 

secret elite troops to capture or kill bin Laden.38

A first successful, acknowledged application of post-9/11 targeted killing tactic turned out to be in Yemen, not Iraq. A fired missile

killed an alleged associate of bin Laden and five suspected Al Qaeda

operatives in the first days of November 2002. An unmanned Predator drone unloaded its deadly 5-foot-long Hellfire rocket straight into

a four-wheel-drive vehicle carrying Qaed Salem Sinan al-Harithi—a 

suspected Al Qaeda leader and an accessory in the U.S.S. Cole bombing—as he and his riding companions drove 100 miles east of Sanaa, 

the Yemeni capital. 

Before bin Laden’s Al 

Qaeda carried out the 

deadly 9/11 attacks, it 

struck U.S. embassies in 

Tanzania and Kenya ...
22

JSOU Report 07-3

Washington justified the threshold-crossing assassinations

because the traveling party was considered a military target—combatants—under international law. Although the attack did not rank 

even remotely near the preemptive war doctrine, it did signal a resort 

to deadly force in a different kind of warfare. As a combatant on a 

broader battlefield, Harithi fell victim to the campaign against Islamic

terrorism. According to administration officials, President Bush delegated operational authority over Predator strikes to intelligence and 

military personnel, thereby improving the response time to sensitive 

information about the whereabouts of terrorists.39

Nineteen months later in the tribal agency of Pakistan’s South 

Waziristan, another Al Qaeda-linked leader, Nek Mohammad, met 

a similar fate by a laser-guided Hellfire from a UAV Predator. This

sanctuary in the lawless lands afforded the pro-Taliban Mohammad 

no protection from “secret” cooperation of the U.S. forces in Afghanistan, who fired the missile, and Pakistani officials. It was further

evidence that hitting terrorists anywhere had become accepted practice, an application long used by the Israeli government. 

On 13 January 2006, missiles fired from a remotely controlled

Predator drone (and possibly piloted jets) on a mud-brick compound 

in Damadola, Pakistan targeted Al Qaeda facilitators. The airstrike 

reportedly killed some operatives, including two leaders:

a. Abu Khabab al-Masri (otherwise known as Midhat Mursi alSayid Umar), who trained Al Qaeda fighters in chemical and

biological explosives

b. Abu Ubayda al-Misri, who directed insurgent operations in 

the southern Afghanistan province of Kunar. 

The air attack was part of a series of assaults to cripple Al Qaeda 

and was aimed at the terrorist network’s principle deputy Ayman alZawhiri, whose son-in-law, Abd al-Rahman al-Maghrebi, may have 

fallen victim to the bombing.40 The frequency of these U.S. target 

killings of terrorists suggests that American forces are beginning to 

emulate Israeli practices, although Washington implementation lies 

well beyond America’s landmass. 

An even more spectacular application of taking down a jihad terrorist came with the death of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in a safe house 

north of Baghdad on 8 June 2006 by two F-16 jets dropping precision 500-pound bombs. U.S. SOF played a role in pinpointing the 
23

Henriksen: The Israeli Approach to IW

whereabouts of this mastermind of Al Qaeda in Iraq, according to 

George W. Bush’s remarks in a Rose Garden press conference. They 

acted “on tips and intelligence from Iraqis, confirmed Mr. Zarqawi’s

location, and delivered justice to the most wanted terrorist in Iraq,” 

stated the president.41

Commando Raids. Despite the apparent adoption of Israeli defense 

tactics, the United States has only resorted to missile strikes or 

aerial bombardments in its targeted killings. It has not reported success with commando raids, where the specific mission is shoot to 

kill a known terrorist residing within a country that enjoys de jure

peace with the United States. Israel, on the other hand, has undertaken several such operations. In addition to the counterattacks 

against the perpetrators of the 1984 Munich Olympic massacre of its 

athletes in Western Europe and the Middle East, Tel Aviv mounted 

others. Among the most notable was long-distance special operations 

removal of Abu Jihad (Khalil al-Wazir), a Yasir Arafat loyalist and 

deputy PLO commander who oversaw numerous terrorist assaults 

with many victims. Operating from Tunisia, Abu Jihad made for an 

elusive target. Sayeret Mat’Kal commandos carried out an elaborately planned assassination operation involving the Mossad, naval 

SOF, and the IAF infiltrating a posh suburb of Tunis on 16 April

1988. Along with eliminating Abu Jihad, the Israeli team netted an 

abundance of PLO documents, a sine qua non of every foray.42

The Clinton administration discussed at length SOF either capturing or killing bin Laden in Afghanistan in the late 1990s, but nothing 

came of the deliberations. Clinton officials lived in the shadow of history. During the 1970s, the CIA had been embroiled in controversy. 

Senator Frank Church, a Democrat from Idaho, headed a U.S. Senate 

committee investigation of the CIA that revealed a series of bizarre 

plots to assassinate foreign leaders such as Fidel Castro of Cuba via 

exploding cigars. In 1975 the committee concluded that assassination was incompatible with American principles and thereby should 

be rejected as a foreign policy instrument. As one consequence, presidential Executive Order 12333—issued by Gerald Ford and re-signed 

by subsequent presidents—outlawed political assassinations. Legal 

experts judged that the ban did not apply to military targets or persons posing imminent threat to the United States in times of armed 

conflict. But executive branch officials still agonized over the precise
24

JSOU Report 07-3

language in Bill Clinton’s secret legal authorizations, or Memorandum of Notifications, to go after the chief terror suspect.

The quandary was that the inherent risks of apprehending bin 

Laden virtually necessitated the use of lethal force. The CIA did not 

want its hands tied, yet sought political cover. Similarly, the White 

House did not want to be held responsible if a subsequent investigation construed an authorizing memo as a shoot-to-kill order from 

President Clinton. Executive branch aides worried that their authority conveyed to Afghan agents a license to kill the terrorist planner. It was a bureaucratic hall of mirrors, and consensus eluded 

the president’s senior aides. National Security Advisor Sandy Berger 

struggled to forge an agreement. Attorney General Jane Reno and 

her Justice Department adhered to a law-enforcement formula for 

dealing with terrorism. They mulled over the language of authorizing 

memos that the CIA deemed ambiguous on the use of lethal force. 

The agency concluded that the only legally acceptable pretext for killing the Saudi terrorist chief lay in a credible capture operation that 

went awry in its execution.43

In the course of the 9/11 testimonies, the conflicting understandings among the participants revealed that the Clinton White House 

and the CIA held polar opposite interpretations of Memorandum of 

Notifications. The administration policy makers, including Bill Clinton, shared the opinion that their intent was to kill bin Laden. “This 

intent was never well communicated or understood with the CIA,” 

according to the 9/11 Commission.44 George Tenet took away the 

impression that his agency possessed authority to capture the Saudi 

terrorists, not kill him. In essence, the decision makers tied themselves in knots. The Israeli elite secret units were far bolder because, 

in part, they enjoyed the backing of their political leaders. 

Invasion, Counterinsurgency, and Withdrawal from Lebanon 

Just as IDF actions anticipated American use of targeted killings to 

combat terrorism, so also did Israel’s intractable insurgency in Lebanon eerily foretell U.S. experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan. Rather 

than fixating on the lessons of the Vietnam War, American students

of counterinsurgency would have benefited from looking at Israel’s

experiences in combating terrorism emanating from Lebanon and 

later from its 18-year occupation into its northern neighbor. They 
25

Henriksen: The Israeli Approach to IW

might also have gained insights and warnings of unanticipated resistance in the post-invasion phrase following “shock and awe” offensive 

in the Iraq War. An ounce of anticipation would have gone a long way 

toward adequate preparation for America’s greatest counterinsurgent 

enterprise since the Vietnam War. 

For the first 20 years of Israel’s history, its Lebanon border had

been the most peaceful over its other three frontiers. Invading armies 

or guerrilla raids had come with grim frequency from Egypt, Jordan, 

and Syria. What changed the pacific Israel-Lebanon boundary into

a war zone is like all politics in the Middle East—both a simple and 

complex story. The simple explanation lies in the fact that the PLO 

and then other terrorists groups, such as Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), used the Lebanese southern quadrant 

for attacks on northern Israel. The openness of Lebanese society 

enabled the PLO and PFLP to recruit fighters in the Palestinian refugee camps. When the Kingdom of Jordan violently expelled Palestinian guerrillas from its territory in “Black September” 1970, most fled

to Lebanon to continue their attacks and killings from its southern 

belt. In time the Palestinians turned Beirut into the world’s terrorist 

capital to carry on violent attacks on Israel and its citizens as well as 

hijackings of international civilian jets.45

The complex explanation, which takes us well beyond the thrust 

of this study, can be summarized by stating that contending factions propelled Lebanon’s descent into anarchy in the early 1970s. 

Pushed into a multipronged civil war by the convoluted nature of 

the Lebanese political configuration, the Mediterranean country

spawned some 50 different factions and militias among the Sunni, 

Shiite, Christian, and Druze religious communities. Into this tangled 

conflict stepped the Syrian army and intelligence services, ostensibly to restore order and later to assist the Palestinian guerrillas who 

fired rockets or infiltrated terrorists into northern Israel. Additionally, Damascus wadded into its eastern neighbor in 1976 to reestablish its hold over Lebanon as part of an historic Greater Syria. From 

this base, it also hoped to exert pressure on the Israelis to relinquish 

the Golan Heights. 

Rather than detailing the intricacies of Lebanese politics, it is 

more pertinent for this study to record the IDF’s handling of the 

Palestinian attacks themselves. By the late 1970s, southern Lebanon erupted as the primary Arab-Israeli battlefield. Before actually
26

JSOU Report 07-3

occupying southern Lebanon, Israel made repeated forays into the 

adjoining borderlands as retribution and deterrence for Palestinian assaults. The IDF fired artillery, marched patrols, and dropped

bombs on suspected Palestinian headquarters, training camps, and 

arms depots. It also deployed armored columns and several thousands of troops northward that cleared and held territory for brief 

periods. As part of its offenses, the IDF recruited, trained, and armed 

Arabic-speaking soldiers for its Unit 300—a group of volunteers from 

the minority Druze, Bedouin, and Circassian communities. The Special Forces unit, Sayeret Ha’Druzim, consisted of Druze Muslims, 

who formed an especially effective reconnaissance force within the 

Lebanese contingent.46

After a medium-scale invasion of Lebanon—about 7,000 troops in 

Operation Litani (1978)—to curtail the cross-border raids into Israel, 

the IDF turned to setting up a security zone. Specifically, it tried to

create a buffer area in southern Lebanon by backing the grievances 

of local allies; the grievances were toward the interloping Palestinians, who were causing them trouble with Israel. The IDF approach 

was to aid a combined Christian and 

Shiite militia under the leadership of Sa’d 

Haddad, whose forces fought the PLO in 

southern Lebanon because they resented 

Palestinian domination. Tel Aviv trained 

and armed this Free Lebanon Military, which comprised about 2,000 

fighters against PLO guerrillas.47 

Out of these efforts eventually developed the South Lebanese 

Army, which played a role in Israel’s occupation of Lebanon; its 

analysis begins on page 31. In the 1970s, the IDF as well as the 

Mossad also made contact with Lebanese Christians, many of whom 

resided in the Levantine country’s north. These Maronite Christians, 

known to many as Phalangists, provided little real benefit to the IDF

in the late 1970s. What is pertinent to this study is that the intricate wheels-within-wheels politics of managing ruthless, deceitful, 

and untrustworthy allies proved daunting even for the Israelis, long 

accustomed to the intrigue and intricacies of Middle East politics. 

The warning flags to American practitioners of counterinsurgency

campaigns were unmistakable before the United States ventured 

into Iraq and Afghanistan. 

The IDF approach was to 

aid a combined Christian 

and Shiite militia ...
27

Henriksen: The Israeli Approach to IW

Another part of the Israeli strategy embraced the so-called “Good 

Fence” policy (taken from the stoutly defended barrier between the 

two countries) that enabled Lebanese civilians to cross over into 

Israel for sanctuary, food, employment, and medical treatment. As 

such, it represented a quasi “hearts and minds” campaign to win over 

anti-PLO elements and to stabilize the southern reaches of Lebanon. 

This policy formed a major nonmilitary effort to bolster a population 

friendly to Israel. 

Despite the efforts of the IDF and its Christian-Shiite allies, the 

PLO persisted in firing Katyusha rockets, lobbing mortar rounds, and

launching terrorist attacks from Lebanon as well as the West Bank 

that killed Israeli civilians and military personnel. Some Palestinian assaults were staged by suicide teams, who killed or kidnapped 

residents of lightly defended settlements. The Israeli Special Forces 

improved in their hostage rescue techniques. The Sayeret Mat’Kal, 

for example, saved all but one child on a terrorist-infested kibbutz 

in 1981.48 The Lebanese border, however, remained largely porous to 

PLO infiltration.

The deadly incursions made Lebanon a virtual national obsession 

among the Israeli public and led to large-scale conventional invasion 

of the coastal country on 6 June 1982 in Operation Peace for Galilee. 

Six and a half Israeli army divisions pushed deep into Lebanon, seizing more than a third of the country—almost to the Beirut-Damascus 

Highway that bisects the nation—by the time the first cease-fire went

into effect. The IDF employed its commando forces, for instance, in 

the capture of the Beaufort Crusader Castle with a special unit from 

the Golani Infantry Brigade. The air war against the Syrian pilots 

went lopsidedly in the Israeli Air Force’s favor but the IDF’s ground 

advance encountered stiffer resistance than anticipated, especially 

from small parties of PLO guerrillas and Syrian tanks. Still, the conventional phase of this blitzkrieg intervention largely succeeded in 

sweeping the most PLO guerrillas back from the southern border. 

The Lebanon incursion attained one of Israel’s goals at the end 

of August, when the PLO agreed to evacuate Beirut under a U.S.-

brokered agreement to spare the seaside capital from further destruction by the Israeli siege. Nearly 15,000 PLO fighters and their dependents departed for Tunisia, and others went to Syria. Later, however, 

some PLO fighters drifted back to operate in southern Lebanon. In

addition, the other main invasion goal—installation of a friendly 
28

JSOU Report 07-3

government—eluded Tel Aviv with the assassination of President 

Bashir Gemayel, newly elected by the Lebanese parliament. Because 

Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin viewed the Phalangist leader 

as favorable to the Jewish state, the Syrians had him killed.49 The 

resulting instability led Israel to reevaluate its earlier plan—a shortduration occupation of Lebanon—for a more lengthy stay so as protect its northern border. As one counterinsurgency expert has said, 

this decision and Israel’s management of Shiite conflict became “one

of the most disastrous chapters in Israeli military history.” 50

The Israeli incursion yielded a little recognized benefit for other

countries engaged in antiterrorist campaigns. It destroyed the PLO 

terrorist training camps in southern Lebanon, which functioned as 

precursors to similar Al Qaeda bases in Afghanistan two decades 

later. Funded by oil revenues from Qaddafi’s regime in Libya, the

camps instructed assassins, bomb makers, document forgers, and 

terrorist facilitators. Within their encampments, the PLO along with 

instructors from Cuba and East Germany trained members of the 

Irish Provisional Republican Army, Japanese Red Army, Nicaraguan 

Sandinistas, and the Spanish Basque ETA (Evzkadi Ta Askatasuna).51

But Tel Aviv also reaped a whirlwind of unintended consequences 

from the intervention, which could have served notice to the United 

States before its Operation Iraqi Freedom. 

The invasion and subsequent occupation also sparked a major 

political realignment. Whereas the southern Shiite minority had 

originally looked to Israel for assistance against the Sunni-dominated PLO, this community now turned against the foreign occupiers in the 1980s. The guerrilla warfare that soon greeted the IDF 

foretold a familiar pattern that U.S. and coalition forces encountered 

in Iraq and Afghanistan. The terrain favored irregular warfare, as it 

was either wooded mountain areas or small urban centers, ideal for 

guerrillas to shoot, run, and hide. A long porous border with a hostile 

Syria also foretold what befell U.S. forces in Iraq after the 2003 invasion when the American-led coalition faced an adversarial Iran and 

Syria in post-Hussein Iraq. 

The Lebanese political terrain was even more treacherous. Unlike 

the unpopulated Sinai desert where Israeli armored forces prevailed in 

the 1973 war, Lebanon was sprinkled with villages and honeycombed 

with lawlessness since the writ of a central government had not run 

for years much beyond the capital. Lebanon’s multi-sided civil war 
29

Henriksen: The Israeli Approach to IW

resumed with factions from the Christian, Druze, Palestinian, Shiite, 

and Sunni communities fighting each other and sometimes the IDF

in a kaleidoscopic intricacy. Keeping the players straight demanded 

more than a game program; it called for forbearance, flexibility, and

restraint as the combatants shifted. As an occupying force, the IDF 

sometimes found itself in the midst of crossfire as it strove to protect

one group from another that foreshadowed U.S. role in Iraq. 

Initially, the Shiite villagers warmly greeted the IDF because the 

southern Lebanese communities had long been burdened by PLO 

activities and Israeli counter-responses. They resented the Sunnidominated PLO out of sectarian difference, its cadres’ arrogance, and 

its disruption of daily life. Numbering about three-quarters of a million people, the Shiite Muslims made up 80 percent of the southern 

Lebanese population. Shiite extremism was not yet increasing, and 

tensions between Shiite people and Israelis were not a significant

factor. Thus, most Shiites refrained from helping the retreating PLO 

fight the incoming IDF.

A metamorphosis took place 

among the Shia, many of whom 

had welcomed Israeli support 

against the Sunni-dominated PLO 

in the late 1970s. After the IDF’s 

1982 incursion, however, the 

Shiite community turned against 

their onetime benefactors in southern Lebanon, who they had initially greeted with showers of rice. The Shia soon came to see the IDF 

less as a liberator than an occupier, foreshadowing a similar turn 

of events after the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq that toppled Saddam 

Hussein. In the latter case, the United States was initially considered 

liberators in Iraq, but its lengthening occupation soon eroded the 

locals’ gratitude. In Lebanon, the Shiite, backed by their coreligionist in Iran, likewise turned against the IDF. From this opposition 

emerged Hezbollah (the Party of God). The Iran-Syria alliance that 

formed during the Iran-Iraq War (1980s) facilitated Tehran’s support 

of Hezbollah; Damascus opened its territory for use—that is, as conduit for Iranian arms, funds, and instructors to reach Lebanon. 

Suicide bombings—later the bane of coalition forces in Afghanistan and Iraq—loomed large, which was early in the Israeli incursion 

into Lebanon. In November 1982, a suicide bomber from Hezbollah, 

A metamorphosis took place 

among the Shia, many of whom 

had welcomed Israeli support 

against the Sunni-dominated 

PLO in the late 1970s. 
30

JSOU Report 07-3

born amid the Lebanese Shiite community, struck an IDF headquarters building in Tyre, killing 75 Israeli soldiers. Almost exactly a 

year later, another Shiite suicide bomber repeated the feat; 28 Israel 

security officials were killed in a truck explosion at the IDF/Shin

Bet headquarters also near Tyre. In between the two attacks, the 

U.S. Embassy in West Beirut was bombed. Even more devastatingly, 

the American military felt first hand the Shiite resistance and their

suicide tactics in 1982 when a truck bomber detonated a massive 

explosion against the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut, killing 241 

troops who had been deployed as a multinational peace force. This 

attack should have served as a red flag to the top civilian war plans

in the Pentagon ahead of the U.S. occupation of Iraq prior to the 

invasion. If the single incident failed to alert American officials, the

IDF’s nearly two-decade tribulations in Lebanon would have served 

that purpose. 

Over the 18-year occupation, the IDF confronted scores of suicide 

bombers that killed and maimed many of its soldiers as the insurgency spread. Adoption of this tactic by the newly founded Hezbollah and its military wing, Islamic Resistance, was facilitated by the 

presence of a 1,500 strong contingent of the Iranian Revolutionary 

Guards, who used it against Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War.52 Under 

these circumstances, the Israeli role metamorphosed from a liberating warrior to an embattled occupier or peacekeeper. Along with 

Lebanese civilians, its patrols fell victim to car explosions, roadside 

bombs, and suicide attacks as well as ambushes. To counter wireless explosive devices, the IDF deployed dogs in its units of Oket’z 

Explosive Palgra (Sting Explosive Force), which limited the casualty 

rate despite the increased use of roadside bombs.53

The complex internecine conflict and the political failure to secure

a peace settlement with a friendly government in Beirut led Tel Aviv 

to withdraw from central Lebanon in late 1982. The IDF settled on a 

line south from the mouth of the Awali River on the Mediterranean 

to Mount Dov near the Syrian border. It also reduced its troop presence by more than half, to about 33,000 soldiers. This downsized 

arena still left Israel with about 12,000 square miles and half a million people to oversee. The smaller area yielded no security for the 

IDF, which still suffered bombings and ambushes. Although Israeli 

SOF had fought terrorist incursions from contiguous states since the 

1950s or after 1967 within the West Bank, they had not encountered 
31

Henriksen: The Israeli Approach to IW

genuine guerrilla warfare, in which a population had a ready access 

to arms and munitions. The insurgents in the West Bank at this 

time lacked the plentiful supply of firearms that the Shiites bands

possessed. Moreover, West Bank inhabitants shared in the Israelis 

general economic improvements, which at times took the edge off 

their grievances. 

Afterwards, the IDF settled into a near classic guerrilla conflict

on Lebanese soil. The struggle reported familiar charges of any such 

campaign as Israeli involvement in inadvertent massacres of civilians and a “war of choice” that eroded popular support for the occupation. Then in 1985, Tel Aviv staged another, deeper pullback to 

a narrow belt along the Lebanese border, some 6 to 10 miles wide 

spanning the length of the Israel-Lebanon boundary. 

Like what preceded its 1982 invasion, the IDF turned to local 

forces. It reconstituted the former Free Lebanese Movement (FLM) 

as the South Lebanese Army (SLA), now under General Antoine 

Lahad (the former head, Haddad, died in 1984), to police the “security zone.” As in the 1970s, Christian and Druze villagers formed the 

bulk of the SLA, along with smaller Shiite representation. Within the 

security zone, the SLA administered the civil functions as a quasigovernment. They operated militarily from village strongholds in the 

southernmost strip with backing from the IDF’s Northern Command. 

Israeli artillery, aircraft, and ground troops supported the SLA. The 

Israeli army financed, trained, and equipped about 2,000 SLA soldiers to fight Shiite militias. Two Shiite militia groups—Amal (a

northern-based movement) and Hezbollah—stepped into the breach 

left by the PLO, although some PLO guerrillas filtered back to southern Lebanon. These rival parties did engage in deadly battles from 

time to time. Before being vanquished by Hezbollah in street fights,

Amal was generally absent from southern Lebanon, where Hezbollah 

and its military wing, the Islamic Resistance Movement, operated 

extensively. 

To stem the rockets and raids launched by the Shiite militants, 

Tel Aviv executed two medium-sized conventional counter operations. Both of these military sweeps (1993 Operation Accountability and 1996 Operation Grapes of Wrath) made a strenuous stab at

disrupting the insurgent infrastructure of training facilities and 

supply depots. They temporarily succeeded but like water, the Hezbollah fighters flowed back into the crevices that tank columns
32

JSOU Report 07-3

and frontal assaults inevitably leave in place. Because small guerrilla bodies tend to harass upon their return, they frustrated much 

heavier forces. Katyusha rockets thus kept falling inside Israel. 

Within Lebanon, roadside bombs remotely detonated; in addition, 

rocket propelled grenades and ambushes plagued the IDF and its 

SLA, which performed poorly. Like other such large fire and maneuver engagements, the IDF ventures also upset civilians, thereby 

generating intelligence, assistance, and even recruits for the elusive 

guerrillas. Booby trap explosions or gunfire consistently took a toll

of three or four IDF casualties every month. For their part, Hezbollah death squads eliminated Israeli sympathizers and collaborators 

or peeled them away by threat or enticement. In short, by the mid1990s Southern Lebanon resembled the Mekong Delta. 

To reduce, if not totally eliminate, civilian casualties that generated anger and hence fresh Hezbollah recruits, the IDF implemented 

guidelines such as not always returning fire to the source of guerrilla

fusillades. In most cases, the Hezbollah fighters deliberately took up

positions within or near villagers for protection against Israel counterfire. This tactic naturally reduced the advantage of massive firepower enjoyed by the IDF. Likewise, the IDF also adopted elaborate 

procedures at checkpoints or in searches to minimize their own casualties, which sparked political outcry and commissions charged with 

looking into soldiers’ deaths. Furthermore, the IDF relied on technology—such as airstrikes, fire-detection finders, spotter drones, and

artillery bombards—to reduce casualties. Such policies foreshadowed similar actions by U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, as they 

fought the most politically fraught of all modes of warfare. 

The ambushing of thin-skinned vehicles in southern Lebanon also 

heralded trouble for U.S. convoys and patrols in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

The American-built M113 armored personnel carrier was particularly 

vulnerable to rocket-propelled grenades and roadside bombs that 

were stock-in-trade of the fierce Shiite attacks. Nearly two decades

later U.S. Army and Marine infantrymen suffered heavy casualties while riding in the unarmored Humvees on roadways around 

Baghdad, Ramadi, or Fallouja until the vehicles were “up-armored” 

to afford a modicum of protection from small bomb blasts. 

The IDF also struck back with helicopter-fired missiles or daring

SOF raids to kill or capture guerrilla leaders. To counter the growing 

battlefield skills of the Islamic Resistance, the IDF turned to unique
33

Henriksen: The Israeli Approach to IW

units such as Sayeret Egoz (“walnut” in Hebrew) that conducted 

aggressive patrolling and ambushing of insurgents. These units were 

effective but not on a decisive scale. Despite the pullback to reduce 

the size of its occupied sector, the IDF still endured the steady attrition associated with a traditional insurgency where a conventional 

army, even one with many skilled special operations units, confronts 

guerrilla forces that fire and run.

Israeli popular opinion, like that 

of other Western societies in similar wars, gradually turned against 

the protracted Lebanese intervention, with its trickle of casualties, 

well-publicized charges of mistakes 

resulting in the death of innocents, 

mounting costs in treasure, and inclusive nature. While Israel suffered fewer casualties than their Shiite opponents, the death of IDF 

troops had a corrosive political impact in Jewish society. The Lebanon conflict also drained defense resources and demoralized some

IDF units. Although Israeli governments wanted a settlement with 

Syria before departing, they were unable to reach an accord with 

Damascus. Finally, after 18 years on Lebanese soil, Tel Aviv moved 

the last of its IDF units out in a disorderly withdrawal in 2000. Some 

1,000 SLA militiamen and their families streamed across the border 

into settlements on the shores of the Sea of Galilee. Some units 

abandoned tanks, artillery, and armored personnel carriers, which 

the IAF bombed so they would not fall to Hezbollah. 

A decade and half before the U.S. invasion of Iraq, one American 

analyst perceptively wrote about the IDF’s encounter with Hezbollah: 

the “vicious circle of resistance and reaction provides a warning to 

other states that may become involved in especially sensitive occupations.” 54

Although Israel could not impose its political will on Lebanon 

through invasion and occupation, it did emerge from the quagmire 

with its northern border less violated than before the 1982 invasion, until the Hezbollah attacks in mid-2006. Occasional Katyusha rockets rained down from time to time, although cross-border 

attacks nowhere near approached the frequency of the pre-1982 

invasion period. The effectiveness of the Israeli fence—spotlighted, 

electronically monitored, and heavily patrolled—partially explains 

Israeli popular opinion, like 

that of other Western societies 

in similar wars, gradually turned 

against the protracted Lebanese 

intervention ...
34

JSOU Report 07-3

the reduction in ground-based raids before Hezbollah provoked fierce

IDF counterattack in July 2006. The other part of the explanation 

lies in the fact that Hezbollah was biding its time. Before Hezbollah crossed over the Israeli border to capture two IDF soldiers that 

spared 12 July 2006 war, it became a virtual “state within a state” 

in southern Lebanon. It elected 14 representatives to the 128-seat 

Lebanese parliament, assumed two Cabinet posts, ran schools and 

hospitals, and secretly amassed arms and 14,000 rockets to rain 

down on Israel. 

During its Lebanese occupation, the IDF’s counterinsurgency 

strategies diverged from the U.S. practices in Vietnam and later in 

Afghanistan and Iraq. In each of these conflicts, America pursued

a robust “hearts and minds” campaign of digging wells, constructing roads, and providing medical clinics to win over the indigenous 

population. It also tried to stand up local forces for confronting the 

insurgents. Especially in the Afghanistan and Iraq cases, the United 

States also tried to implant democracy through running referenda, 

holding elections, coaching politicians, and aiding political movements. In the American way of counterinsurgency, a hearts-andminds strategy is central for moving the local population away from 

the insurgents. The Israeli approach differed from these American 

efforts. The occupation itself also brought much criticism. One commentator labeled IDF measures as “heavy-handed steps” and cited 

its “posting of road signs in Hebrew, commandeering facilities, and 

establishing bases, headquarters, and detention camps.” 55

Although Israel looked after its own one million Arab citizens 

within its own territory as a reflection of Jewish values and as a

modern-day state’s responsibility, it showed less interest in instituting civic-action type programs on Lebanese soil. Its action-orientated military doctrine has been cited as an explanation for a missed 

opportunity to undercut insurgent efforts and thereby serve as protectors of the local communities. Rather than seeing counterinsurgency in political terms, the IDF narrowly focused almost exclusively 

on the military dimension, according to critics. In this interpretation, 

the IDF “let slip a golden opportunity to forge a closer link” with the 

Shiite community. Thus, one argument is that by failing to implement a genuine counterinsurgency strategy, the IDF ignored “the 

crucial element in securing wider political objectives.” 56 The realities 
35

Henriksen: The Israeli Approach to IW

of Middle East politics and religion, however, render this assessment 

less than valid. 

Given the level of distrust and actual hatred flowing from Shiite

communities as the occupation lengthened, no hearts-and-minds 

program would have worked. Under radicalizing influence of their

coreligionist from Iran, the Lebanese Shia changed their stripes to 

view the Israelis as their new enemies. Such a policy also permitted the Shiite community of Lebanon to advance their political goals 

within Lebanese politics by presenting themselves as protectors of 

Lebanon’s sovereignty.57 As a counter to their critics, Israeli active 

and retired military officers expressed skepticism, believing that

the Arab populations would have taken the assistance rendered by 

Israeli hearts-and-minds endeavors without transferring their longterm loyalties toward their benefactors. 

The IDF approach differed from the current U.S. campaigns 

within Iraq and Afghanistan, on which the judgment of history is still 

awaited. The American-led coalition has sought not only to foster 

social services but also establish Iraqi security forces and promote 

democracy. The United States restored electricity, water treatment 

facilities, oil pumping wells and pipelines, schools, and hospitals with 

the expenditure of billions of dollars. While not all these ventures 

worked according to plans, America undertook substantial rehabilitation of Iraq’s infrastructure. In short, the United States launched a 

gigantic nation-preserving and nation-building enterprise in a fragmented, traumatized, and deeply antagonistic state. 

It was Hezbollah that filled the social-service vacuum within the

southern Lebanese society, making the Israeli effort more difficult to

implement. Like the 1930s Chinese Communists or Mozambique’s 

Frelimo party, Hezbollah set up an insurgent state in the shadow of 

Israel’s occupation that swayed or intimidated southern Lebanese 

residents.58 Additionally, the Islamic Resistance assassinated the 

distributors of food that the Israeli government disbursed mainly to 

the Lebanese Christian community. 

Hezbollah practiced traditional guerrilla political techniques as 

an “effective provider to local south Lebanese residents.” In deed, it 

helped rebuild damaged villages and provided humanitarian relief. It 

dispensed its own funds as well as monies from Iran in an insurgent 

version of the hearts-and-minds campaign across sectarian lines as 
36

JSOU Report 07-3

well as within the Lebanese Shiite community by operating clinics 

and schools. It also extended aid to the families of fallen fighters and

other civilians wounded in the conflict. It behaved like an autonomous governing structure within the greater Lebanese state.59 Additionally, the Party of God functioned as a political entity by getting 

members elected to the Lebanese parliament starting in the 1992 

elections. Later, Hezbollah members held Lebanese cabinet posts in 

national governments, while its military arm carried out attacks on 

the IDF. 

Hezbollah ascended as the champion of Lebanon sovereignty in a 

way that the PLO never did. In addition to being fiercely anti-Israel,

Hezbollah was a nationalistic movement that strove to insinuate 

itself into the Lebanese body politic by legitimizing its nationalist 

credential. It received funding, training, and ideological inspiration 

from the Iranian mullahs. Locally, however, it behaved more like a 

national liberation front than had the PLO. In irony so typical of the 

Middle East, the Israeli governments of the 1990s turned to making 

peace with the PLO, the very target of its Lebanon invasion. And in a 

further twist, Israel’s former Shiite surrogates became its new foes. 

While both Israel and the United States adapted conventional 

forces to wage counterinsurgency campaigns, raised local armies, 

and deployed their special operations troops to engage irregular 

forces, they diverged on hearts-and-minds efforts and state-building issues. American soldiers and their elected politicians embraced 

a political as well as military approach to insurgents. In this effort, 

they adhered to the Western way of counterinsurgency that had been 

practiced in varying forms by France in Algeria, Britain in Northern 

Ireland, and Portugal in Angola and Mozambique. America, however, 

implemented its civic-action programs and political integration on 

a far grander scale. Its enormous wealth partly explains a reliance 

on this approach. The other part is that its social-action programs 

reflected its values, which were reinforced during the 1960s—the

Great Society welfare-system era and the integration into the American mainstream of the largely disenfranchised and impoverished 

African-American population.

One difference in the counterinsurgency measures stemmed from 

the fact that the insurgent movements in southern Lebanon retaliated against Israeli civilians or held Tel Aviv hostage by threatening 

to attack the Israeli population living in the northern part of the 
37

Henriksen: The Israeli Approach to IW

Jewish state. Therefore, a failure to prevent or quickly halt a Katyusha rocket fusillade from the Lebanese side of the border resulted 

in political controversy within Israeli society. This proximity to conflict is without parallel in the American case in Iraq or Afghanistan,

where U.S. troops suffered but not America’s homeland population. 

The Israeli experiences, in fact, made them adept at urban conflict.

Urban Warfare and Counterterrorism 

A year before the United States unleashed Operation Iraqi Freedom, 

the IDF undertook large-scale urban combat operations in several 

West Bank cities, including Jenin and Nablus, as part of its Operation Defensive Shield. This operation was a counterterrorism offensive that was triggered by a terrorist bombing in Netanya, which 

killed 23 people. As specific case studies, Jenin and Nablus can provide lessons. Specifically, the fighting in Nablus’s Kasbah (old city)

district and Jenin’s Palestinian refugee camp displayed unique features in April 2002 and constituted the biggest military engagement 

in the West Bank since the 1967 Six-Day War. 

Jenin’s Palestinian refugee camp was the second largest in the 

West Bank. As a consequence of the Oslo Accords, the Jenin camp 

had come under the Palestinian Authority, which provided civil and 

security administration in 1995. Cadres from the Palestinian Islamic 

Jihad, Al-Asqa Martyrs Brigade, and Hamas entered the camps and 

orchestrated some 100-suicide bombers since the start of the second 

intifada in September 2000. These orchestrated attacks killed hundreds of Israeli bus riders and café goers. The Tel Aviv government 

decided to deploy the IDF to disrupt the terrorist infrastructure. 

Wanting to minimize civilian casualties in the maze of houses and 

buildings that made up the crowded refugee center, the IDF opted not 

to use fixed-wing aircraft in airstrikes against bands of Palestinian

insurgents. The Israelis also worried about giving Palestinians “the 

public relations coup of mass civilian casualties” if aircraft bombing 

formed part of the operation.60 Cobra attack helicopters were episodically used but no precision bombs from the Israeli Air Force. 

Without an IAF air bombardment, the insurgent defenders 

enjoyed two advantages: first, they were spared a devastating aerial

bombardment; and second, they knew the intricacies of their urban 

environment that would remain largely intact without being flattened
38

JSOU Report 07-3

by Israeli aircraft. Flushing them out meant going in after the Palestinian fighters in close quarters rather than blowing them to smithereens with bombs. By foregoing bombing, the IDF opened itself to 

the bag of dirty tricks that insurgent fighters the world over rely on

to produce casualties. Thus the Palestinians prepared for the IDF 

offensive by laying mines in the roads and booby traps inside buildings. The no-bombs decision also prolonged the siege from an estimated 72 hours to 12 days, as Israeli troops fought painstakingly 

house-by-house through the 13,000-person camp. 

This no-airpower decision also contributed to 23 Israeli fatalities of which 13 less-than-prepared reservists fell in one incident 

when the Palestinians sprang an ambush against their attackers. A 

heavy preparatory aerial shelling by the Israeli Air Force would have 

undoubtedly pulverized pockets of 

resistance. After initial setbacks, 

the IDF threw in giant Caterpillar 

bulldozers that cleared routes for 

armored vehicles, pushed aside 

booby traps, opened fields of fire for

advancing IDF forces, and demolished houses suspected of harboring terrorists. The Caterpillar D-9, 

weighing 50 tons and rising 20-feet high, proved particularly effective in safely detonating explosive devices hidden within structures. 

Although the charges of widespread Israeli massacres turned 

out to be bogus under United Nations and Amnesty International 

investigations, the use of the armor-protected bulldozers became a 

lightning rod of international criticism for the IDF tactics. Part of the 

explanation for this quick censure lies in the previous application of 

bulldozers to raze homes of terrorists as a form of collectivized punishment and community deterrence. Even though bulldozers worked 

well in close urban combat, U.S. forces in Iraq did not resort to 

using them in the attack on Falluja (November 2004) or other urban 

assaults.61 In the course of the Falluja assault, U.S. forces instead 

relied on artillery and heavy airstrikes on militant positions thereby 

leveling whole neighborhoods. This bombing-induced tabula-rasa 

strategy later resulted in recriminations and reevaluation. In Tall 

Afar and Ramadi, U.S. forces implemented tactics to secure and gain 

the confidence of the inhabitants. In Jenin, as in Falluja, ground

After initial setbacks, the IDF 

threw in giant Caterpillar bulldozers that cleared routes for 

armored vehicles, pushed aside 

booby traps, opened fields of 

fire for advancing IDF forces, 

and demolished houses ...
39

Henriksen: The Israeli Approach to IW

troops went into action against well-dug-in insurgents who decided 

to stay and fight.

Fighting in nearby Nablus also witnessed the novel use of a familiar

tactic. Again wanting to minimize casualties inside the teeming city, 

the IDF avoided undo exposure in streets, alleys, or courtyards during 

its infestation. It refrained from passing through external building 

doors or transcending internal stairwells. These usual access points 

were circumvented by the Israeli adoption of blasting through walls 

to move horizontally and exploding holes in floors or ceilings to pass

vertically within structures. Sometimes troops swung a sledgehammer 

against a concrete barrier to open it in so-called “cold breaching.” 

Rather than conforming to old-style frontal assault from blockto-block takeovers, the elite Israeli Paratroops Brigade penetrated the 

Kasbah district where some 1,000 insurgents awaited them behind 

elaborate barricades, improvised explosives, and mines buried 

in streets and alleys. Better prepared than the IDF reservists who 

fought in Jenin, the paratroopers waged a cagey fight in the sprawling labyrinth. Undoubtedly, the inside-out penetration spared Israeli 

lives and forced the insurgents out into the streets and open areas, 

where they faced the IDF’s greater firepower. Brigadier General Aviv

Kokhavi wrote in his battle plan that the defenders faced Israeli troops 

“swarming simultaneously from every direction.” The IDF practice of 

“walking through walls” rested on extensive research and training. 

One authority described the method as movement “within the city 

across hundred-meter-long ‘over-ground-tunnels’ carved through a 

dense and contiguous urban fabric.” 62

In breaching walls, the IDF did not invent the technique; it had 

been employed since at least World War II (and before then, sappers 

had demolished defenses since the invention of gunpowder). The IDF 

systematized and employed the technique in a large-scale manner. 

Exterior damage was less than in the Jenin- or Falluja-style destruction, and the structures were still habitable, although many had 

holes punched through outside walls. 

These two urban conflicts and other sweeps in Operation Defensive Shield shared the same goal. This counterterrorist operation did 

not totally eliminate suicide bombs. 

The IDF reasserted control over the West Bank, however, which 

limited the Palestinians from conducting an effective terror campaign. 

By squeezing the terrorist underground (with police work, informants, 
40

JSOU Report 07-3

and patrols), the campaign largely worked. For combating terrorism 

operations in the West Bank, the IDF deployed its Sayeret Duvdevan, 

which differed from other special operations units by being exclusively counterterrorist in orientation rather than having a hard-core 

Long-Range Reconnaissance Patrol focus with some counterterrorism capabilities. Their low visibility among West Bank residents and 

language capabilities make them especially effective. 

During the combat phase of the operation, the IDF aimed to 

reduce Palestinian terrorists through death or capture. Since the 

Palestinians had no genuine industrial or strategic targets, they 

relied on trained political leaders or terrorists to continue their fight.

Thus, IDF attacks conformed to the Israeli basic plan of targeted killings whether from the air or the ground. 

The U.S. offensive operations in urban areas, on the other hand, 

have sometimes resulted in flattened neighborhoods through devastating airstrikes. The November 2006 offensive against Falluja stands 

as a negative example. These blunt tactics have not proved any more 

effective in curbing Iraqi car or suicide bombings. More recently, 

some units have undertaken aggressive foot patrols to establish security and softer approaches toward Iraqi civilians in hopes of winning 

public trust among the populace. Under the command of Colonel H. 

R. McMaster, for instance, the 3rd Armored Calvary Regiment undertook a vigorous campaign of intelligence gathering and security steps 

targeted much more at insurgents than blunderbuss assaults that 

would have made a wasteland of Tall Afar in 2004. More recently 

other commanders have adopted these types of methods in Baghdad 

and Ramadi.63

Combating terrorism in the urbanized West Bank also beheld the 

introduction of Israeli undercover units, which disguise themselves 

as Palestinian civilians. These units foil terrorist plots, unearth intelligence, and seize Hamas or the Palestinian Islamic Jihad figures

or other terrorists on Israel’s most-wanted list in raids. After the 

2002 crackdown on suicide bombers, Israeli military units have conducted frequent nightly raids as well as occasional daytime arrests.64

In addition, the IDF set up roadblocks that have intercepted many 

suicide bombers bound for Israeli cities. Checkpoints, both routine 

and impromptu, have proven effective as well as road patrols in limiting terrorism. Thus a near-saturation of territory seems effective, 
41

Henriksen: The Israeli Approach to IW

although difficult to execute in large cities and to sustain over long

periods. 

One former special operations officer held that the IDF enjoyed

greater political scope in combating attacks in the second intifada

than during the Lebanon intervention that witnessed setbacks in 

controlling assaults.65 With the threat of failing to halt suicide bombings, cooperation improved between brigades that operated regionally in Israel and Special Forces. While the brigades had a great deal 

of detailed knowledge, the SOF still wanted maximum flexibility in

deciding the specifics of a mission. The exigencies of the suicide

threat reduced the inter-unit tension and enhanced cooperation.66

The sheer volume of operations—up to 700 annually and mounted 

by squad-sized units—required downward delegation of planning, 

execution, and command and control to lower levels. The operation tempo dictated “short-cycles” between decision-makers and the 

actual operators of countermeasures against terrorism.67 Because of 

the possibility of untoward circumstances impacting plans, Special 

Forces must anticipate and practice contingency plans. One former 

officer depicted this as the “jazz band” model whereby musicians

fully know the main tune before they improvise on it from execution 

to execution.68 The antiterrorist effort is concentrated on keeping the 

terrorists on the run, scared, and moving; and as General Yossi Heymann commented, to “keep the grass low,” which in American parlance translates to “keeping their heads down.” 69

Like their American counterparts, Israeli SOF are well-grounded 

in the political dimensions of assaults. Unnecessary violence or the 

death of the wrong suspect ricochets back on them and on the overall mission. For IDF SOF operating among Israeli citizens, the risks 

also entail serious political repercussions if Israeli civilians are inadvertently killed or wounded in an antiterrorist incident. As a consequence, their rules of engagement are extremely restricted. 

Future Glimpses 

As the United States contemplates reductions of its ground forces in 

Iraq and Afghanistan, American strategists must envision the next 

phase in the Global War on Terror. In anticipating what methods and 

operations might become useful, SOF would do well to scrutinize the 

operations and tactics employed by their counterparts in the IDF, as 
42

JSOU Report 07-3

terrorist tactics adapt and evolve. It seems improbable the United 

States will replicate the 2003 invasion and occupation of Iraq in the 

near term. 

Operation Iraqi Freedom and America’s subsequent nation-building endeavors proved enormously expensive in blood and treasure. 

As of now, over 3,000 U.S. troops have died in the Iraq conflict, and

25,000 wounded, many of them severely. In addition over $450 billion has been expended in direct military and rebuilding efforts. Over 

150,000 Iraqi fatalities resulted from U.S.-led intervention and the 

Iraqi insurgency. Although these Iraqi casualty figures pale in comparison with Saddam Hussein’s atrocities and mass killings especially among the Kurdish and Shiite populations, they suggest the 

American government will unlikely engage in another large-scale 

occupation along the lines of the Iraq War. 

The costs of the Iraq War and the international uproar, moreover, 

have limited American options against other threats from Iran to 

North Korea and elsewhere. These factors make it improbable that 

the United States will soon again embark on another Iraq conflict.

The takeover of Somalia by Taliban-like militants in mid-2006 despite 

very slender U.S.-financed proxy opposition demonstrates the fact

that Washington is reluctant to engage in another conflict with a full

plate in Iraq and Afghanistan.70

Despite setbacks, the Global War on Terror shows no sign of 

winding down. Indeed, the rash of terrorist incidents since 9/11 in 

Bali, Turkey, Morocco, Israel, Madrid, London, and Mumbai indicate a protracted struggle. The need for SOF is assured. In the new 

American way of war, specific units of the SOF along with regular

Army and Marine forces will continue to concentrate on preventative 

civic-action programs to alleviate the grievances that Al Qaeda and 

its clones tap into for recruits and assistance as in the Horn of Africa 

and the Philippines. In other cases, however, state-building enterprises and social-service networks may not be feasible because terrorists may be tucked deep in inhospitable terrain. Thus, American 

counterinsurgency strategies of nation-building, civic reconstruction, 

and democracy promotion cannot be utilized. These “denied areas” 

or “ungovernable spaces” lend themselves to the Israeli way of war. 

This Israeli approach to combating terrorism over a long haul 

affords an example of a counterterrorism strategy. Israel’s 18-year 

intervention and occupation of southern Lebanon sobered the 
43

Henriksen: The Israeli Approach to IW

Jewish state on the intractableness of Arab politics and resistance. 

As consequence of occupying Arab lands, it has withdrawn from its 

18-year toehold in Lebanon and from the Gaza Strip. It also resumed 

and expanded its utilization of raids, whether by air power or commando teams, to deter and retaliate against terrorism from Hezbollah in Lebanon or the Palestinian Islamic Jihad Hamas in Gaza and 

the West Bank, as demonstrated by its extended foray into Lebanon 

against Hezbollah (summer 2006). 

Given Israel’s limited resources and strategic defensive crouch, 

the Jewish state has over the years relied on raids—sometimes fairly 

long-distance strikes—as preemption, deterrence, or punishment for 

terrorism perpetrated on its soil or against its citizens abroad. The 

United States might find that it also must dispatch commando raids,

capture terrorists for intelligence, assassinate diabolical masterminds, and target insurgent strongholds with airpower, missiles, or 

with SOF from bases around the globe rather than trying pacification

programs and nation-building endeavors in inhospitable lands. 

After the 9/11 attacks, the United States started off on a counterterrorism campaign but ended up in counterinsurgencies in 

Afghanistan and Iraq. The enormous expense in blood, treasure, and 

political capital around the world make future invasions, occupations 

and nation-building schemes prohibitive. The failure of backing proxy 

forces with money and nonlethal equipment, as in the case of antiIslamic extremist forces in Somalia, makes these types of ventures 

virtual nonstarters. Thus the United States might have to resort to 

counterterrorist strikes as Israel has done. 

The purpose of commando-type raids is not merely punitive. Air 

attacks can often accomplish the same thing, although the “surgical 

strike” often results in civilian casualties. Deep-penetration assaults 

demonstrate not only military muscle but also superior military 

intelligence and political confidence that sends a powerful message

to state leaders and terrorist networks—that is, they are vulnerable 

to up-close and personal attacks that, in short, they can run from 

but cannot hide. 

One larger, societal lesson to be gleaned from Israel’s long war 

against terrorism from Jordan, Gaza, Lebanon, or the West Bank 

boils down to endurance and fortitude in the face of unrelenting 

attacks. In addition, the Israeli and American societies are better at 

sustaining low-profile counterattacks that are launched in the name
44

JSOU Report 07-3

of prevention, deterrence, and retribution than full-blown offensive 

wars such as Israel’s 1982 Lebanon intervention or America’s Iraq 

and Afghanistan invasions. Democracies are not good at sustained, 

high-cost wars. 

While pursuing diplomacy and nonlethal measures are steps to 

counter terrorist threats, more aggressive measures may be more 

effective. The United States might find that it must also, like the

Israelis, dispatch commando raids across international boundaries, 

stage operations solely to gain intelligence, assassinate diabolical 

masterminds within allied nations, and target insurgent strongholds 

in noncombatant countries with bombs, missiles, or SOF from bases 

around the world rather than undertake enormous pacification

programs and expensive nation-building endeavors in inhospitable 

lands. By eliminating terrorists and destroying militant networks, 

you deny bombers and beheaders victories—the only sure way to 

defeat terrorism. Limited military offensives sustained in a manner 

that enables the United States to husband its resources for a

protracted conflict against violent extremism may provide the next

long-term SOF mission.
45

Henriksen: The Israeli Approach to IW

Endnotes

1. An earlier version of this paper was delivered at the Sixth Annual 

International Conference on Global Terrorism, Institute for Counterterrorism, Herzliya, Israel, 12 September 2006. The author would like 

to thank a number of people who contributed their time or insight, 

while he alone is responsible for mistakes or misinterpretations. A 

special note of thanks goes to Golan Benavi in Israel; CAPT Roger 

Herbert, U.S. Navy; and COL William Hix, U.S. Army. Others in alphabetical order are as follows: Tristan Abbey; Col David F. Aumuller, U.S. 

Marine Corps; Shmuel Bar; David Fishbein; LTC Wade Foote, U.S. 

Army; LTC Christopher Gibson, U.S. Army; Charles Kirschner; COL 

H. R. MacMaster, U.S. Army; Ken Poole; Linda Robinson; and Bob 

Zeidman. 

2. Paul Johnson. A History of the Jews (New York: Harper Perennial, 

1998), page 537.

3. See Shmuel Bar, Warrant for Terror: Fatwas of Radical Islam and the 

Duty of Jihad (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution, 2006), pages 

85-96. Gives lucid analysis of Muslim identifications and nationalism.

4. Michael Slackman and Souad Mekhennet, “A New Group That Seems 

to Share Al Qaeda’s Agenda,” New York Times, 8 July 2006, page A3.

5.	 Interview with Ehud Ilan, former senior Shin Bet official, Israel, 23

March 2006.

6. Interview with Colonel Barak Bitnoun, Deputy of Special Operations 

for the Israeli Air Force, Israel, 23 March 2006.

7. Interview with Hegai Peleg, Israel, 23 March 2006.

8. Interview with Brigadier General Yossi Heymann, Chief of Infantry and 

Paratroops, Israel, 21 March 2006.

9. Special Operations Forces Reference Manual (Hurlburt Field, Florida: 

JSOU Press, 2005), page 3-8 (chapter 3, page 8).

10. See, for example, one of the most recent in this genre, John A. Nagl, 

Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from 

Malaya and Vietnam (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002).

11. Richard H. Shultz, Jr., The Secret War Against Hanoi: Kennedy’s and 

Johnson’s Use of Spies, Saboteurs, and Covert Warriors in North Vietnam (New York: Harper Collins, 1999), pages 285, 301, and 329.

12. Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Haim Ben-Noon, Head of the Counterterrorism School, Israel, 23 March 2006.

13. Yeshayahu Ben-Porat, Eitan Haber, and Zeev Schiff, Entebbe Rescue

(New York: Delacorte Press, 1977), pages 321-36.

14. Paul B. Ryan, The Iranian Rescue Mission: Why It Failed (Stanford, 

California: Hoover Institution Press, 1985), pages 107-37.
46

JSOU Report 07-3

15. Edgar O’Ballance, Arab Guerrilla Power, 1967-1972 (London: Faber 

and Faber, 1974), pages 18-19.

16. Martin van Creveld, The Sword and the Olive: A Critical History of the 

Israeli Defense Force (New York Public Affairs, 2002), page 209.

17. Samuel M. Katz, Soldier Spies: Israeli Military Intelligence (Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1992), page 221.

18. Ariel Sharon, Warrior (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989), pages 

251-262.

19. The name “Black September” refers to 17 September 1971, when the 

Jordanians used military force to expel the Palestinian fedayeen from 

their soil. King Hussein had grown alarmed by the al-Fatah and other 

groups’ cross-border attacks on Israel and the Tel Aviv’s reprisals.

20. Katz, Soldier Spies, page 228.

21.	 CAPT Roger Herbert, commanding officer, Naval Special Warfare Unit

THREE, San Diego, e-mail 14 June 2006. CAPT Herbert clarified this

and other matters in a subsequent e-mail, 22 September 2006.

22. Interview with Heymann, 21 March 2006.

23. Interview with Dore Gold, former Israeli ambassador to the United 

Nations, Israel, 19 March 2006. In addition to active and retired military officials, Gold underlined the importance of blending HUMINT

and combat action. He noted that translators had to be able to understand conversations on even static-ridden phone connections.

24. Interview with Peleg, Israel, 23 March 2006.

25. Interview with Golan Benavi, SOF operator, Israel, 23 March 2006 and 

subsequent e-mail.

26. See Steven R. David, “Fatal Choices: Israel’s Policy of Targeted Killing,” in Democracies and Small Wars, ed. Efraim Inbar (London: Frank 

Cass, 2003), pages 138-58. Gives brief but relatively comprehensive 

review of Israeli targeted killings.

27. See Boaz Ganor, The Counterterrorism Puzzle: A Guide for Decision 

Makers (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2005), 

pages 122-126. Gives clear explanation of the operation and its rationale.

28. Katz, Soldier Spies, page 128.

29. See Aaron J. Klein, Striking Back: the 1972 Munich Olympics Massacre 

and Israel’s Deadly Response (New York: Random House, 2005).

30. David, “Israel’s Policy of Targeted Killings,” page 141.

31. See Ganor, The Counteterrorism Puzzle, pages 128-40. Gives penetrating analysis of the dilemmas posed by targeting killings.

32. Samantha M. Shapiro, “Announced Assassinations,” New York Times 

Magazine, 9 December 2001, page 54.
47

Henriksen: The Israeli Approach to IW

33. See Tony Geraghty, The Irish War: The Hidden Conflict Between the 

IRA and British Intelligence (London: Harper Collins, 1998), pages 75, 

129-30, and 147-149.

34. George P. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State

(New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1993), page 648.

35. Joseph T. Stanik, El Dorado Canyon: Reagan’s Undeclared War with 

Qaddafi (Annapolis, Maryland: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2002), 

pages 155-165.

36. Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University 

Press, 1998), page 192.

37. Yossef Bodansky, Bin Laden: The Man Who Declared War on America 

(Roseville, California: Prima Publishing, 2001), page 287; also Dan 

Eggen and John Mintz, “9/11 Panel Critical of Clinton, Bush,” Washington Post, 24 March 2004, page A1.

38. Richard H. Shultz , Jr., “Showstoppers: Nine Reasons Why We Never 

Sent Our Special Operations Forces After Al Qaeda Before 9/11,” 

Weekly Standard, 26 January 2004, pages 25-33.

39. David Johnston and David E. Sanger, “Yemen Killing Based on Rules 

Set Out by Bush,” New York Times, 6 November 2002, page A1.

40. Carlotta Gall and Douglas Jehl, “U.S. Raid Killed Al Qaeda Leaders, 

Pakistanis Say,” New York Times, 19 January 2006, page A1.

41. John F. Burns, “U.S. Strike Hits Insurgent at Safehouse,” New York 

Times, 8 June 2006.

42. See Katz, Soldier Spies, pages 337-343. Brief account of the Abu Jihad 

death.

43. Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and 

bin Laden from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (New York: 

Penguin, 2004), pages 372-396.

44. The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission 

Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (New York: W.W. Norton & 

Company, 2004), page 133.

45. Ze’ev Schiff, A History of the Israeli Army: 1874 to the Present (New 

York: Macmillan Company, 1985), pages 239-244.

46. Katz, Soldier Spies, pages 271 and 312.

47. Laura Zittrain Eisenberg, “Israel’s South Lebanon Imbroglio,” Middle 

East Quarterly, June 1997, page 2, available from www.meforum.org/

article/352.

48. Katz, Soldier Spies, page 265.

49. Schiff, A History of the Israeli Army, pages 256-257.

50.	 W. Andrew Terrill, “Low Intensity Conflict in Southern Lebanon: Lessons and Dynamics of the Israeli-Shi’ite War,” Conflict Quarterly, Vol. 

VII, No.3 (Summer 1987), page 22.

51. Katz, Soldier Spies, page 302.
48

JSOU Report 07-3

52. Judith Palmer Harik, Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism 

(London: I.B. Tauris, 2005), page 40.

53. See www.isayeret.com/content/units/land/special/oketz/explo.htm 

for more on this unit.

54.	 Terrill, “Low Intensity Conflict in Southern Lebanon,” page 31.

55. Eisenberg, “Israel’s South Lebanon Imbroglio,” pages 2-3.

56. Clive Jones, “Israeli Counter-Insurgency Strategy and the War in 

South Lebanon 1982-1997,” Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 8, No. 

3 (Winter 1997), pages 83, 86, and 87; also Eisenberg, “Israel’s South 

Lebanon Imbroglio,” page 15.

57. Harik, Hezbollah, pages 39, 40, and 47.

58. See Thomas H. Henriksen, Revolution and Counterrevolution: Mozambique’s War of Independence, 1964-1974 (Westport, Connecticut: 

Greenwood Press, 1983), pages 143-170. Gives study of the Frelimo 

liberated zones.

59. Harik, Hezbollah, pages 86-93.

60. Matt Reese, “The Battle of Jenin,” Time, 13 May 2002, available from 

www.time.com/time/2002/jenin/story.html.

61. Interview with COL Bill Hix, 9 June 2006. COL Hix was the U.S. Army 

Chief of Strategy for Multi-National Force-Iraq from mid-2004 to late 

2005.

62. Eyal Weizman, “Lethal Theory,” Roundtable: Research Architecture, 

available from http://roundtable.kein.org/files/roundtable/Weizman_lethal%20theory.pdf.

63. Antonio Castaneda, “In Ramadi, Troops Swap Aggression for Courtesy,” Washington Times, 5 July 2006, page 12.

64. Greg Myre, “Israeli Raid in West Bank Kills 4 Palestinians,” New York 

Times, 25 May 2006, page 10.

65. Interview with Colonel (Reserve) Lior Lotan, Israel, 23 March 2006.

66. Interview with Peleg, Israel, 23 March 2006.

67. Interview with Golan Benavi, Israel, 23 March 2006.

68. Interview with Lotan, Israel, 23 March 2006.

69. Interview with Heymann, Israel, 21 March 2006.

	 70.	 Mark Mazzetti, “Efforts by CIA Fail in Somalia, Officials Charge,” New 

York Times, 8 June 2006, page A1; also Craig Timberg, “Somalia’s 

Islamic Militias Reaching Out to the West, Washington Post, 14 June 

2006, page A17.