ARI Research Note 87-28

OTCFILE copYr

(Vi

THE SOCIOLOGY OF THE ARMY RESERVES:

A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT

I

Charles C. Moskos

Northwestern University &,-

DTIO

ELECTEK

JUN 2 2 19873

for D

D

Contracting Officer's Representative

George H. Lawrence

BASIC RESEARCH LABORATORY

Milton R. Katz, Director

U. S. Army

Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

May 1987

Aouroved for Public relee; distribution unlimited.

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FOR THE BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

A Field Operating Agency under the Jurisdiction of the

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WM. DARRYL HENDERSON

EDGAR M. JOHNSON COL, IN

Technical Director Commanding

Research accomplished under contract

for the Department of the Army

Carnegie-Mellon University

Technical review by

Steve Kronheim

I This report. as submitted by the Contractor, has been cleated fc' release to Defense Technical |nformalor Center (OTICI to Conply with regulatory requirements. It has been given no primary distribution other than to DTIC and will be available only through DTIC or other reference services such at the National Technical Information Service (NTIS|. The viw.w1, cPini'nd. and/of findings contained in this report are those of the author(ht and thogld not be contrueu as en offrcis Coepartmenr of the Army position, policy, or decision, unless so designated by other official documentation.
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The Sociology of the Army Reserves: Interim Report

A Preliminary Analysis January - December 1986

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Charles C. Moskos MDA 903-86-K-0011

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George Lawrence, contracting officer's representative

. ,It. EY WORDS (Continue on revere side it nceesary and Identify by block number)

Attitude Survey, ReservesAet+ve-Feree Retevi4om f~ - ' '-i

Job Satisfaction, Manpower0

RecruitmentI

2& ABSTRACT (Cameae a reverse 804 N n-068 md Idently by block nmber)

'This research note outlines the ways that conventional military sociology does

or does not apply to the active duty forces. Statistical data dreived from

social background variables and attitude surveys reveal: that the Guard and the

Reserves are more "top heavy" in grade distribution than the active force, and A

they are older; that the active force and Reserves are better educated than the

Guard, and have more female and minority-group members; that prior-service entrants in the Guard and Reserves are much more likely to score high in mental

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ARI RESEARCH NOTE 87-28

20. Abstract (continued)

,-tests than non-prior service entrants, they are also better educated;

dissatisfaction with service life is much higher in reserve forces than in the active force.

The data show that, rather than viewing the reservist as part of a moonlighting labor force, we must face the truth. Reserve duty conflicts with

family concerns, and causes problems for reservists with their civilian

employers, as they ask for released time to fulfill military requirements.

These factors create major disincentives to joining the reserve forces.

7/

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K
THE SOCIOLOGY OF THE ARMY RESERVES

A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Heretofore the sociology of the military has been, in

effect, the sociology of active-duty forces. This report

outlines the ways in which conventional military sociology

applies or does not apply to the sociology of the reserves. The

referent is the Selected Reserves of the U.S. Army, that is the

National Guard and the Reserves. Two kinds of analyses are

presented: tabular data contrasting reserve components with

active-duty forces, and conceptual development of the sociology

of the reserves.

Statistical data derived from social background variables

and attitude surveys reveal the following. (1) The Guard and

Reserves are more "top heavy" in grade distribution and older

than the active force. (2) The active force and the Reserves

compared to the Guard are higher educated, have higher minority

content, and more females. (3) Prior service entrants in the

Guard and the Reserves are much more likely to score higher in

mental tests and be better educated than non-prior service

entrants. (4) Dissatisfaction with service life is much higher in

reserve forces than in the active force.

From a conceptual standpoint, the prevailing paradigm in

manpower policy for reserve forces has been shaped by econometric

iii

!1 1 1 1 11 1 11 ' lt......11111l
thought, most notably a theory of the reservist as part of a

moonlighting labor market. Yet applications of moonlighting

theory have found only a small relationship between primary-job

characteristics and reserve recruitment and retention. Rather,

data show the major disincentives arise from reserve-duty

conflicts with familial priorities and with released time from

the civilian employer.

Three key concepts are suggested to guide further research.

(1) The prevailing occupational understanding or reserve forces

needs to be counterbalanced by an institutional perspective. (2)

Akin to the "dual market" model developed for active-force

recruitment, the differences in social background of reserve

entrants suggest non-prior service entrants join the reserves

more for occupational reasons while prior service entrants seek

an alternate dimension in their life style. (3) Because of the

differences between part-time and full-time military service,

normative commitment to the military organization requires more

personal inner-direction in reserve forces than in the

active-duty force.

The guiding assumption is that the researcher must be alert

to differences as well as similarities between active and reserve

forces. In brief, the sociology of the reserves is a subject

that should be approached on its own terms.

iv
Page 1

r

THE SOCIOLOGY OF THE ARMY RESERVES:

A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT

What is termed the sociology of the military is, in effect,

the sociology of active-duty forces. Reserve forces have rarely

been the object of conceptual analyses and, until very recently,

of not much more empirical research. The underlying assumption

of this report is that the sociology of the reserves is worthy of

attention in its own right for both social scientific and policy

reasons. The goal of this report is to begin defining the

sociology (including social psychology) of the reserves by

distinguishing it from the sociology of the active force. The

first step toward this end is to show in what ways conventional

military sociology applies or, more importantly, does not apply

when looking at reserves. <1> Military manpower concerns often

affect social scientific research. Thus, in the latter part of

the 1970s, worries over recruitment in the all-volunteer force

(AVF), especially in the Army, were evident. Correspondingly,

the improved recruitment and retention of the AVF since 1981

reduced policy concerns with active-duty forces. Yet, the same

period witnessing an upturn in manpower trends within active-duty

forces has been accompanied by an upsurge of concern with reserve

components. <2:> But this has not corresponded with any major

refocusing of military sociology toward reserve issues. Indeed,
Page 2

it would not be too far afield to state that the sociology of

reserve forces is unformed whether talking about conceptual,

methodological, or empirical dimensions. This leads to the

purpose of this report; to set forth forth a preliminary

sociology of the reserves. The problematic is how much of social

science wisdom developed out of research on active-duty forces

applies to an understanding of the reserves.

This report deals with Selected Reserves in the U.S. Army.

That is with the Army Reserves and the Army National Guard. When

referring to these two components collectively, they will be

termed reserve forces or reserve components. Also for convience

of exposition, when distinctions are made made between the

active-duty Army, the Army National Guard, and the Army Reserves,

the three components will be be termed, simply, Actives, Guard,

and Reserves.

This report breaks new ground by offering a conceptual

overview of reserve forces as more than just a variation of

active-duty forces. This is done in two ways. First, I present

tabular data that examines similarities and differences between

active-duty forces and reserve forces. Second, I outline

conceptual issues that distinguish between a sociology of

active-duty forces and a sociology of reserve forces.

TABULAR DATA

The format is to present, based on available manpower
Page 7

statistics, similarities and differences between Actives, the

Guard, and Reserves in the U.S. Army. Nine tables are presented

at the back of this report, each of which is discussed separately

in the text here. For greater detail, the reader is advised to

inspect each table separately. Unless otherwise specified, all

the data deal with 1985 information. With the exception of Table

1, these tabular data have appeared nowhere else in the present

format that directly compares active-duty with reserve forces.

For purposes of clarity, numbers are rounded off to the nearest

whole percent in the text discussion. A summary statement

concludes this section.

Table 1: Active-Duty and Reserve Components by Military

Service. Army personnel constitute a much greater portion (67

percent) of total reserve manpower than of the active force (36

percent). Thus, the sociology of the reserves is much more of an

Army topic than the sociology of the active force.

Table 2: Distribution of Grade Groups by Army QoMgonents.

The grade distribution varies between the three components. The

Guard has the lowest proportion of senior officers and the

highest proportion of junior officers. The Reserves have the

largest proportion of senior officers and the lowest proportion

of junior officers. The Actives fall in between the Reserves and

Guard in the grade distribution of officers. At the enlisted

levels, a somewhat different pattern of grade distribution

appears. The Reserves have the highest proportion of senior NCOs
Page 4

(E-7 and above) and junior enlisted (E-3 and below). The Guard

has the lowest proportion of senior NCOs and the lowest number of

junior enlisted. The Actives fall in between the two reserve

components in the enlisted grade distribution.

The differential in grades between the three Army components

is sometimes significant and sometimes marginal. But, the

general pattern is for the grade distribution of the Guard to

least resemble that of the the Actives while that of the Reserves

most resembles that of the Actives.

Table 3: Age Distribution of Officers and Enlisted by 8nMy

Components. The age distribution between the Actives, Guard, and

Reserves varies greatly. Thus, for example, 14 percent of Guard

oFficers and 15 percent of Reserve officers are forty-seven years

or older. This compares with with 6 percent of active-duty

officers in the same age bracket. Whereas both reserve

components have older officers than the active force, the pattern

changes among younger officers. There are more young officers,

twenty-six and under, in the Reserves (33 percent) than in either

the Guard (14 percent) or Actives (15 percent).

At the enlisted level, the reserve forces are much older

than the active force. Nine percent of the Guard and 8 percent

of the Reserves are over forty-two years old compared with less

than one percent of the Actives in the same age bracket.

Correspondingly fewer younger enlisted men are found in the

reserve forces compared to the active force.

,M
Page 5

Table 4: Years of Service of Major and Staff Sergeant by

Army gqMRqUEUkt Two representative grades, major (0-4) and

staff sergeant (E-6), are used to illustrate differences in years

in service between the the three Army components. Seniority in

years is most typical of the Guard, followed by the Reserves.

Time in grade is least characteristic of the active force. Thus,

the proportion of majors with at least 21 years of service is 91

percent for the Guard, 85 percent for the Reserves and 34 percent

for the Actives. For staff sergeant, the corresponding figures

are 12 percent for the Guard, 4 percent for the Reserves, and

less than one percent for the Actives.

Table 5: Social Composition by Race and Sex of Army

Components. Two major social background variables are presented

in this table -- race and sex. The overall finding is that

Actives and Reserves are more like each other with the Guard

being the odd component. At the officer level, white males

constitute 82 percent of the Actives and 81 percent of the

Reserves, but 87 percent of the Guard. The demographic

differences are sharpest at the enlisted levels. Thus, white

males make up 57 percent of the Actives, 59 percent of the

Reserves, but 81 percent of the Guard.

By sex, the important finding is that females make up a

larger proportion in the Reserves (17 percent) than in either the

Actives (10 percent) or Guard (8 percent).

Table 6: Percent of Accessions Female by Army e

!1
Page 6

Tables 6 through 9 present accession data that allow for a

breakdown of Guard and Reserve statistics are into prior service

(PS) and non-prior service (NPS) entrants.

The sex ratio information given in Table 5 is reinforced by

an examination of 1985 accessions. The proportion of female

entrants is highest in the Reserves (16 percent), closely

followed by the Actives (13 percent), and lowest in the Guard (b

percent). Indeed, the female accession rate varies by a factor

greater than three if we compare NPS entrants in the Reserves (18

percent) compared with PS entrants in the Guard (5 percent). Foboth reserve components, however, the proportion of NPS entrants

who are female is somewhat greater than for PS entrants.

Table 7: Percent of Accessions by Educational Level of Army

Components. When examining accession data by educational levels,

a surrogate measure of socio-economic class, we observe major

differences between and within the various Army components.

About one third of all NPS entrants into reserve components

are recorded as still attending high school' This in turn

confounds our comparison of accessions with a high school diploma

because we do not know how many of the present high school

attenders in the Guard or Reserves will become high school

graduates.

At the other end of the educational scale, we can look at

accessions with two or more years of college (reserve entry data

does not categorize a higher educational level). Those with some

, '.2
Page 7

college make up a higher proportion of entrants for the Guard (11

percent) than for the Reserves or Actives (both 7 percent). But

the difference between NPS and PS within the Guard and the

Reserves is much greater than the difference between the Guard

and Reserves or between either of the two reserve components and

the active force. In broad terms, and perhaps somewhat counter

intuitive, PS Guard and PS Reserve entrants are twice more likely

to have some college than NPS Guard and NPS Reserve entrants.

Table 8: Percent of Male Accessions in Mental Test

Categories I and II By Army Again, differences

between PS and NPS entrants within reserve components are more

significant than those between the Actives, Guard, and Reserves.

In general terms, there are no significant differences between

Army components in the proportion of entrants falling in the top

two mental test categories. But within reserve components, PS

versus NIPS differences are substantial. Thirty-eight percent of

Guard PS entrants fall within categories I and II compared to 28

percent of NPS entrants. An almost identical pattern is found in

the Reserves. Thus, as in the previous pattern noted for

educational levels, we again find that PS Guard and PS Reserve

entrants are more likely to represent higher quality youth than

NPS Guard and NPS Reserve entrants.

Table 9: Reported Satisfaction with Active-Duty A8Emy

Service versus Service in Reserve Comeonents. First-erm

Se atees. This table reports one of the few attitudinal data
Page 8

sets which allows for comparison between active and reserve

forces. Based on the 1985 Army Experience Survey, recent

separtees were much more likely to report greater satisfaction

with their active-duty experience than with their reserve

experience. <3 (No distinction was made in the survey item

between Guard and Reserve membership.) Indeed, the number

expressing "great dissatisfaction" with reserve duty is three

times larger (22 percent) than that reported for the active-duty

experience (7 percent.) We should keep in mind that this survey

deals only with PS entrants into reserve forces, the populaton

that generally displays higher quality than NPS entrants.

Summnary. The working assumption that the sociology of the

reserves differs from the sociology of the active force is a mite

too simplistic. Even a cursory examination of available

statistical data shows not only are there major empirical

differences between the active and reserve forces, but also that

equally important differences exist between the Guard and the

Reserves. With regard to accessions, the even more striking

finding is the differences between prior service and non-prior

service entrants occurring within reserve components.

We can summarize the findings on the differences between the

active force and reserve components and internal differences with

reserve forces as follows:

(1) The Guard and Reserves are more like each other

compared to the Actives with regard to grade distribution and
Page 9

years of service. (Guard and Reserves more "top heavy" and

older.)

(2) The Actives and Reserves are more like each other

compared to the Guard with regard to minority composition,

educational level, and female accessions. (Actives and Reserves

more black, higher educated, and more female.)

(3) PS Guard and PS Reserve entrants are more like

each other compared with NPS entrants in the same Army component.

(PS higher mental level and higher educated).

(4) Dissatisfaction with service life is much higher

in reserve forces than in the active forces. (Data do not allow

for differentiation of Guard versus Reserves.)

CONCEPTUAL ISSUES

Although the body of empirical data on reserve components is

beginning to build up, conceptualization of the sociology of the

reserves remains fragmentary and unfocused. <4.> As with the

active force, the prevailing paradigm in military manpower policy

in the reserve forces has been shaped by econometric thought.

Indeed, because of the near absence of countervailing approaches,

the econometric model dominates reserve-force research even more

than analyses of the active force.

In the early 1970s, the Air Force initiated a series of

studies of reserve personnel which developed a theory of the

reservist as part of a moonlighting labor market. <5> The

nU
Page 10

moonlighting theory holds that characteristics of the primary job

-- essentially, wages and hours worked -- affect moonlighting

decisions. The greater the earning and hours of the primary job,

the less the likelihood of moonlighting (i.e. joining and staying

in the reserves), and vice versa. Moonlighting theory, or, more

formally, secondary labor market participation, has not only been

the dominant paradigm in the study of manpower issues in the

reserves, but has been the starting point for nearly all of

sponsored research on reserve forces.

Yet all straight-forward applications of the moonlighting

theory of occupational choice have found only a small

relationship between primary-job characteristics and reserve

recruitment and retention. <6> The general consensus in the

econometric literature is that that the "reserve reenlistment

decision is more complex than the simple decision suggested by

moonlighting labor theory and that certain summptions inhehrent

in moonlighting labor theory may hold only weakly for

reservists." <7> Moreover, "reserve pay elasticity is much lower

than similar elasticities measured for civilian moonlighting."

Membership in a reserve units ought be distinguished from

civilian moonlighting in several important ways. First, duty

hours of reservists are quite different that of the typical

moonlighting job. Second, reservists can be called into active

duty in a national (or sometime local) emergency. Third, career
Page 11

reservists receive important retirement benefits rarely found in

civilian moonlighting employment. Fourth, reserve summer

training conflicts with normal vacation time. <9> These factors

bring into question the whole moonlighting concept of reserve

forces. Studies are quite clear that the key variables, by far

and away, in reserve retention are not directly related to

financial costs and benefits of reserve duty. Survey data show

that the major disincentives arise from reserve-duty conflicts

with familial priorities and with released time from the civilian

employer. <I'0'

That no systematic research exists on the interaction of

reserve duty with family obligations points to major lacuna in

the sociology of the reserves. This contasts with major research

enterprises focusing on the conflict between family needs and

military demands in the active-duty force. Examination of

conflict and accomodation within the family/reserve nexus will be

undertaken by the present writer as one facet of the next stage

in the research project. But as a preliminary statement, it may

be more useful to think of reserve membership as closer to a

voluntary association model than a moonlghting model.

In a related manner, the conflict between vacation time ano

summer training speaks directly to the reservist's relationship

with his primary civilian employer. That federal government is

one of the few emploers allowing military reservists to take time

off for both summer-duty reserve training and regular vacation
Page 12

time allows for a kind of natural experiment. It is highly

significant that federal employees make up 11.5 percent of the

Selected Reserves and only 2.6 percent of the total labor force.

<11> That this correlation has not been previously noted in the

research literature speaks to the low level of development of the

sociology of the reserves.

Sociological perspectives derived from the research on

active-duty forces, nevertheless, may, with proper modification,

advance our understanding of reserve forces. Three master

hypotheses are suggested for further research: the first deals

with conceptions of the military as an institution or an

occupation, the second with the "dual-market" recruitment pool,

and third with maintenance of normative commitment in a part-time

organization. Each of these deserves separate attention.

An overarching hypothesis, largely inspired by my earlier

research writings, proposes that with the advent of the

all-volunteer force (AVF) the military began to adopt

organizational patterns more and more resembling that of a

civilian occupation while moving away from the traditional format

associated with a military institution. <12> This is not the

place to elaborate on that hypothesis nor on the debate it has

caused in the research community. Suffice it to say, that an

institution attains its basic legitimacy from normative values,

while that of an occupation is shaped by the marketplace.

Moonlighting theory would describe the reserves almost
Page 13

exclusively in occupational terms. Yet, two studies of the

reserves have explicitly stated that compared to active force,

the reserves, if anything, are more institutional than

occupational and a third has proposed that the reserves are even

more institutional than the active force. <13 Evidence is not

presently at hand to come to an definitive conclusion on this

question, but, at the least, it suggests that the prevailing

occupational understanding of reserve forces needs to be

counterbalanced by an institutional perspective.

A second hypothesis, again in part derived from my earlier

work, suggests that when recruiting an active-duty force, there

are two basic markets. This "dual-market" model has become the

operative scheme of the U.S. Army Recruiting Command. On the one

hand, there is the occupationally oriented recruit largely

motivated by pay and security considerations, and prone to be

interested in long enlistments and skill training. On the other

hand, there is the young person looking for a hiatus in life

before resuming formal education, a recruit attracted by short

enlistments and post-service educational benefits. Patriotic

motivations for entering military service cut across both groups.

There can be no mechanical application of the dual-market

theory to reserve recruitment, but the following is proposed in

light of the tabular findings that contrasted prior-service (PS)

with non-prior service (NPS) reserve accessions. NPS accessions

seem to fall closer to the economic man model while non-economic
Page 14

motives are more likelyt to animate PS accessions. We find the

social background of NPS reserve entrants resembles that of the

occupational active-duty entrants while the PS reserve entrants

come closer to those entrants seeking a new dimension in their

life progression. One policy implication would be that

educational benefits may be much more salient for PS than NFS

entrants into the reserves.

The third hypothesis is that normative commitment varies in

form, and perhaps in content, between a part-time military force

and a full-time military service. Some work has been done on

political values and socialization within the active force, but

none on reserve components. \14.. I offer the argument that

normative commitment in reserve forces requires more personal

inner-direction. Put in another way, cohesion in a reserve unit

is more a function of social background factors and individual

attributes than is the case in active-duty units where cohesion

is more determined by organizational structure.

From this perspective, we can look again at the observed

high levels of dissatisfaction in reserve units. Rather than

limiting ourselves to explaining the dissatisfaction as simply

reflecting objective organizational differences between active

and reserve components, we can now additionally examine to what

degree dissatisfaction is caused by lack of reinforcement from

other serving members. This perspective also allows us to

conjecture that if circumstances result in high dissatisfaction
Page 15

in active-duty units (say, as has been described during the

Vietnam War or early AVF eras), the lack of negative attitudinal

reinforcement could lead to (relaitvely) higher satisfaction in

reserve units (which was probably the case during the late 1960s

and much of the 1970s). Put in another way, the active force,

because of the full-time nature of membership, has more of an

echo chamber effect on attitude formation, whether favorable or

unfavorable, toward military life.

CONCLUSION

This first report on the sociology of reserve forces has

sought to demonstrate the sociology of the military has been, in

effect, the sociology of the active-duty force. This is to say

that the sociology of the military as generally understood can

mislead as well as inform an understanding of reserve forces.

The guiding assumption is that the researcher must be alert to

differences as well as similarities between active and reserve

forces. In brief, the sociology of the reserves is a subject

that should be be approached on its own terms.

Future reports in this project on the sociology of the

reserves will focus on core issues in military effectiveness,

organizational context, civil-military relations, and attitudes

of serving members. The second report will present findings

based upon participant observation in reserve units and in-depth

interviews with reservists. The role of civilian technicians and
Page 16

full-time Army personnel in reserve units will be given special

attention. The third report will highlight organizational

features in the American reserve system by making international

comparisons with reserve forces of other Western nations. The

final technical report will be based on the three earlier reports

and specify the implications of the sociology of reserve forces

for policy.
Page 17

NOTES

1. Most of the writings on the military reserves have been

historical accounts. For recent works and current

bibliographies, see Bennie J. Wilson III, ed., The Guard and

Reserve in the Total Force (Washington, D.C.: National Defense

University Press, 1985; John K. Mahon, History gf the Militia and

the National Guard, (N.Y.: Macmillan, 1983; and Richard S.

Crossland and James T. Currie, Twice the Citizen: A History of

the U.S. Army Reserves 1908-1983, (Washington, D.C.: Office of

the Chief, Army Reserve, 1984). A comprehsnive but now dated

bibliography is Thomas C. Wyatt, "Sociology of the Military

Reserves," unpublished paper, November, 1978.

For general works using a social science approach other than

economic, see Louis a Zurcher, Milton L. Boykin, and Hardy L.

Merritt, Citizen-Sailors in a Changing Society, (Westport, Conn.,

1986; Louis A Zurcher and Gwyn Harries-Jenkins, eds.,

Military Forces (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage,

1978); H. Wallace Sinaiko, "Part-Time Soldiers, Sailors, and

Airmen", report prepared for the Subcommittee on Non-Atomic

Military Research and Development, Technical Cooperation Program,

May, 1985; H. Wallace Sinaiko and Kenneth J. Coffey, "Reserve

Manpower, Personnel and Training Research," proceedings of a

workshop held at Monterey, Calif., June, 1986, issued by Manpower

Research and Advisory Services, Sept., 1986.

Also relevant for the social scientist are Associates for
Page 18

Research in Behavior, "A Study of Issues Related to Accessions

and Retention of Enlisted Personnel in the Reserve Components,"

Nov., 1977; System Planning Coporation, "Condition of the Army

Reserves -- 1980: Stability, Voluntarism, Effectiveness,"

December, 1980; Jeffrey K. Hadden, "Understanding the Reserves,"

unpublished paper, 1979; Lowndes F. Stephens, "Recruiting and

Retaining the Citizen Soldier," Armed Forces and Society, 4, no.

1 (fall, 1977), pp. 29-39; and Zahava D. Doering and David W.

Grissmer, "What We Know and How We Know It: A Selected Review of

Research and Methods for Studying Active and Reserve

Attrition/Retention in the U.S. Armed Forces, unpublished paper,

1986.

2. Letter to Secretary of Army, John Marsh, dated 9 March

1984 from Adjutants General Association of the United States;

General Accounting Office, Personnel Problems May HamflE Army s

Ready Reserve in Wartime (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing

Office, Jan. 31, 1983); General Accounting Office, DoD 'Total

Force Management' -- Fact or Rhetoric? (Washington, D.C.:

Government Printing Office, Jan. 24, 1979); Congressional Budget

Office, Irnroving the Army Beserves (Washington, D.C.: Government

Printing Office, November, 1985); Arthur L. Moxon, "U.S. Reserve

Forces: The Achilles' Heel of the All-Volunteer Force?" in

Wilson, ed., gp, cit., pp. 91-113.

3. Westat, Inc., "The 1985 Army Experience Survey: Tabular

Descriptions of First-Term Separatees, Volumes I and II," Report
Page 19

prepared for U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and

Social Sciences, January, 1986.

4. Among siginficant ongoing research on reserves is a

large-scale survey of reserve members being conducted under the

auspices of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for

Reserve Affairs and the direction of Zahava D. Doering. These

data will allow for direct comparisons with other survey data

collected from active-duty service members. The results of this

survey are expected to be ready for analysis in 1988.

5. Bernard Rostker, The Personnel Structure and Posture of

the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve, R-1049-PR; Bernard

Rostker and Robert Shisko, The Air Reserve Forces and the

Economics of Secondary Labor Market Participation, R-1254-PR,

August, 1973; and Bernard Rostker, Total Force, R-1430-PR,

October, 1974 (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation).

6. See, especially, William McNaught, E ro ing Future

Accssions to the Selected Reserve Components, N-1563-MRAL,

August, 1980; William McNaught, The SuDppy gf Enlistees to the

Selected Reserve Forces N-1562-MRAL, July, 1981; David W.

Grissmer, Zahava D. Doering, and Jane Sachar, The Desigo±

Administration, and Evaluation of the 1978 Selected Reserve

Reenlistment Bonus Test, R-2865-MRAL, July, 1982; David W.

Grissmer and S.N. Kirby, Attrition During Training in the Army

Reserve and National Guard N-2866-RA, August, 1984; David W.

Grissmer and Sheila Nataraj Kirby, Attrition of Nonprior-Service
Page 20

Grissmer and Sheila Nataraj Kirby, Attrition of Nonprior-Service

Reservists in the Army National Guard and Army Reserve R-3627-RA,

October, 1985 (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation).

7. Burke K. Burright, David W. Grissmer, and Zahava D.

Doering, A Model of Reenlistment Decisions of Army National

Guardsmen R-2866-MRAL (Santa Monica, Calif.: October, 1982), p.

vii .

8. John W. Brinkerhoff and David Grismmer, "The Reserve

Forces in the All Volunteer Enviornment," in William Bowman, et

al., eds., THe All-Volunteer Force After a Decade (McLean, Va.:

Pergamon-Brassey's, 1986), p. 213.

9. Ibid., pp. 213-14.

10. David W. Grissmer and Sheila Nataraj Kirby, "Attrition

and Retetion in the Army Reserve and National Guard: An Empirical

Analysis," in Curtis L. Golroy, ed., Amy Mj@anpower Economics

Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1986, p. 183.

11. Ready Reservists in the Federal Governmenta annual

report to the House Appropriations Committee concerning the

Mobilization Availability of Ready Reservists Employed in the

Federal Government, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve

Affairs), June, 1986.

12. For a synopsis of the thesis of military organization,

see Charles C. Moskos, "Institutional and Occupational Trends in

Armed Forces: An Update," Armed Forces and Society 12, no. 3

(Spring, 1986), pp. 377-382.

.... '~~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ '; I 1 10"...... 
Page 21

13. On the reserves as institution, see Gregory Candell,

Charles L. Hulin, and Mary Roznowski, "Economic and Technological

Influences on Reenlistment Intention," p. 159, and Louis A.

Zurcher, Milton L. Boykin and HardyL. Merritt, "Conclusion,"

p.256 in Zurcher, Citizen Sailors, oE . cit. For the argument

that the reserves are more institutional than the active force,

see Thomas C. Wyatt "The Reserves" paper presented at the

International Conference on Institutional and Occupational Trends

in Armed Forces, Colorado Springs, June, 1984.

14. See Morris Janowitz and Stephen D. Wesbrook, eds., The

Political Education of Soldiers (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage,

198:.
Page 22

Table 1. ACTIVE DUTY AND RESERVE COMPONENTS BY MILITARY SERVICE (FY1985)

Active Duty Reserve Components

Army 36.4% Army National Guard 40.6%

Army Reserves 26.8

Total Army 67.4%

Navy 26.3 Navy Reserves 11.8

Air Force 28.1 Air National Guard 10.2

Air Reserves 6.8

Total Air Force 170

Marine Corps 9.2 Marine Corps Reserves 3.8

Total 100.0% 100.0%

,N (i,147,845t (1 ,058,337)

so; rce: DoD statistics
Page 23

Table 2. DISTRIBUTION OF GRADE GROUPS BY ARMY COMPONENTS (FY1985)

Grade Groups Active National Reserves

Army Guard

Officers:

06 and above 5.3% 4.3% 5.8%

04-05 34.2 26.6 40.7

01 - 03 60.5 69.1 53.5

Total100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

(N) (96,852) (32,434) (48,332)

Enlisted:

E7-E9 10.5% 7.8% 11.6%

E5-E6 30.5 36.5 29.4

E4 28.6 28.0 24.9

El-E3 30.4 27.7 34.1

Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

(N) (671,285) (388,287) (230,708)

source: DoD statistics
Page 24

Table 3. AGE DISTRIBUTION OF OFFICERS AND ENLISTED BY ARMY COMPONENTS

(FY1985)

Age Distribution Active National Reserves

Army Guard

Officers:

47 or older 5.6% 14.0% 14.6%

37-46 32.3 36.1 34.4

32-36 23.6 22.2 28.2

27-31 23.7 13.0 13.4

26 or under 14.8 14.3 33.0

Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

(N) (109,901) (41,502) (52,966)

Enlisted:

47 or older .7% 8.7% 7.8%

37-46 9.4 17.3 15.3

32-36 12.0 13.5 10.1

27-31 18.7 14.8 14.7

26 or under 59.1 48.2 49.9

Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

(N) (671,285) (388,287) (230,710)

source: DoD statistics
Page 25

Table 4. YEARS OF SERVICE OF MAJOR AND STAFF SERGEANT BY ARMY COMPONENTS

(FYI 985)

Years of Service Active National Reserves

Army Guard

Maior (0-5):

21 or more 33.8% 90.5% 84.8%

15-20 60.6 6.6 9.0

11-14 2.7 1.9 2.4

7-10 2.0 .4 1.4

4-6 .3 .3 1.2

0-3 .5 .2 1.2

Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

(N) (17,003) (5,887) (13,348)

Staff Sergeant (E-6)

21 or more .5% 11.6% 4.0%

15-20 18.2 39.8 32.0

11-14 39.3 28.3 32.1

7-10 38.6 16.4 25.4

4-6 1.7 3.7 4.9

0-3 1.6 2.2 1.6

Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

(N) (87,381) (54,004) (27,584)

source: DoD statistics
Page 26

Table 5. SOCIAL COMPOSITION BY RACE AND SEX OF ARMY COMPONENTS (FY1985)

Social Category Active National Reserves

Army Guard

Officers:

White Male 81.6% 86.7% 80.6%

Black Male 8.1 2.1 5.7

Other Male .5 3.0 1.8

White Female 8.1 6.9 9.6

Black Female 1.7 1.0 1.8

Other Female -- .3 .5

Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

(N) (109,901) (41 ,502) (52,966)

Enlisted:

White Male 57.2% 80.6% 58.6%

Black Male 25.5 7.0 19.5

Other Male 7.1 4.1 6.2

White Female 5.2 6.4 10.0

Black Female 4.4 1.4 4.7

Other Female .6 .5 1.0

Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

(N) (666,149) (388,287) (230,657)

Source: DoD statistics
Page 27

Table 6. PERCENT OF ACCESSIONS FEMALE BY ARMY COMPONENTS (FY1985)

Active Army 12.9

Army National Guard Total 5.6

ANG Non-Prior Service 6.3

ANG Prior Service 5.0

U.S. Army Reserves Total 16.3

USAR Non-Prior Service 18.0

USAR Prior Service 15.0

source: DOD statatistics
Page 28

Table 7. PERCENT OF ACCESSIONS BY EDUCATIONAL LEVEL OF ARMY COMPONENTS

(FY1985)

Component Attending High School Diploma Two Or More

High School Graduate Years College

Active Army -- 90.7 6.5

Army National Guard

Total 16.2 58.6 10.6

ANG Non-Prior Service 33.3 40.9 7.2

ANG Prior Service .5 74.8 13.6

US Army Reserves

Total 18.7 48.8 7.2

USAR Non-Prior Service 35.7 43.8 4.6

USAR Prior Service 1.8 67.9 9.8

source: DOD statistics
Page 29

Table 8. PERCENT OF MALE ACCESSIONS IN MENTAL TEST CATEGORIES I AND II BY

ARMY COMPONENTS (FY1985)

Active Army 35.1

Army National Guard Total 33.1

ANG Non-Prior Service 27.8

ANG Prior Service 38.1

US Army Reserves Total 32.9

USAR Non-Prior Service 29.6

USAR Prior Service 37.6

source: DoD statistics
Page 30

Table 9. REPORTED SATISFACTION WITH ACTIVE-DUTY ARMY SERVICE VERSUS

SERVICE IN RESERVE COMPONENTS, FIRST-TERM SEPARATEES (1985)

Active Duty Reserve Components

Very Satisfied 25.4% 19.4%

Satisfied 51.2 39.1

Dissatisfied 16.5 19.5

Very Dissatisfied 6.9 22.0

Total 100.0% 100.0%

(N) (2,543) (1,008)

Source: U.S. Army Research Institute, The 1985 Army Experience Survey:

Tabular Descriptions of First-Term Separatees.

II l [ " ' ]" °''" " ' ' '' 117 -- ' ' '