* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-20925

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

ADONIS ADREANO ABBOTT

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:05-CR-309-1

Before REAVLEY, SMITH, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Adonis Adreano Abbott challenges his bench-trial conviction for bank

robbery and use of a firearm during a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§§ 2, 924(c)(1), and 2113(a), (d). He presents two evidentiary issues.

Abbott challenges the denial of his motion to suppress, asserting: (1) a

roadblock instituted by the Houston Police Department (HPD) was

unconstitutional in the light of City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32

(2000), and Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419 (2004); and (2) the Officers lacked

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

February 13, 2008

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 06-20925

2

reasonable suspicion to stop the SUV Abbott was driving. Factual findings on

a motion to suppress are reviewed for clear error and the district court’s ultimate

conclusions on Fourth Amendment issues de novo, viewing the evidence in the

light mostfavorable to the prevailing party. E.g., United States v. Santiago, 310

F.3d 336, 340 (5th Cir. 2002). 

“The stopping of a vehicle and detention of its occupants constitutes a

‘seizure’ under the Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Brigham, 382 F.3d

500, 506 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc). A limited search and seizure is permissible

under the Fourth Amendment, even in the absence of probable cause, when

“there is a reasonable and articulable suspicion that a person has committed or

is about to commit a crime”. United States v. Jones, 234 F.3d 234, 239 (5th Cir.

2000). To determine whether reasonable suspicion has been developed, courts

must examine the totality of the circumstances, including the collective

knowledge and experience levels of the officers involved. United States v.

Estrada, 459 F.3d 627, 631-32 (5th Cir. 2006).

The Officers were justified in focusing on the SUV because: (1) the vehicle

was located in the dense traffic where electronic tracking devices (ETDs)

embedded in the stolen money suggested it was to be found; (2) the race, gender,

and number ofthe occupants ofthe SUV matched the description ofthe suspects;

and (3) the occupants of the SUV exhibited behavior that experienced Officers

reasonably interpreted as suspicious conduct under the circumstances. This

information was sufficient to justify an investigatory stop. See United States v.

Hall, 557 F.2d 1114, 1116 (5th Cir. 1977).

With respect to the roadblock, the district court likewise did not err.

Roadblocks designed to address specialized law-enforcement purposes may be

permissible without the presence of individualized suspicion, provided the court

finds a favorable balance between “the gravity of the public concerns served by

the seizure,the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest, and the
No. 06-20925

3

severity of the interference with individual liberty”. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S.

47, 50-51 (1979); see also Lidster, 540 U.S. at 424.

The roadblock was a targeted law-enforcement effort designed to address

a specific and dangerous crime – an armed bank robbery – about which the HPD

had particularized knowledge. Utilizing the ETDs, the Officers were able to

narrow their search to a relatively small area in which there was a high

likelihood of apprehending the suspects. Thus, the roadblock was properly

tailored to detect evidence of a particular criminal wrongdoing rather than for

general crime control. See Lidster, 540 U.S. at 424; see also Edmond, 531 U.S.

at 44 (“an appropriately tailored roadblock set up to . . . catch a dangerous

criminal who is likely to flee by way of a particular route” would “almost

certainly” be permissible). Accordingly, it was not unconstitutional per se.

Further, the roadblock was not unreasonable under the circumstances,

and it satisfies the requirements of the Brown balancing test. The public

concern of apprehending armed bank robbers was substantial; the roadblock was

tailored in both time and place, based on evidence extracted from the ETDs; and

any objective intrusion on civil liberties was minimal and brief.

Abbott next maintains the evidence was insufficient to establish that the

Wells Fargo Bank in question was insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance

Corporation (FDIC), an essential elementfor the offense under 18 U.S.C. § 2113.

Our usual standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence in a bench trial is

“whether the finding of guilt is supported by substantial evidence, i.e., evidence

sufficient to justify the trial judge, as the trier of fact, in concluding beyond

reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty”. United States v. Turner, 319

F.3d 716, 720 (5th Cir. 2003) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Contrary to the Government’s assertion, Abbott’s failure to move for a

judgment of acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 does not

mandate application of the more onerous “manifest miscarriage of justice”

standard. When a defendant elects a bench trial, his plea of not guilty serves as
No. 06-20925

4

a motion for acquittal, and his challenge to sufficiency of the evidence is

preserved. See United States v. Cardenas, 9 F.3d 1139, 1159 (5th Cir. 1993). 

The only evidence presented at the trial was Abbott’s stipulation regarding

the testimony the Government’s witnesses would offer, including that they

would testify that the bank was insured by the FDIC. Although Abbott did not

stipulate to the truth of that testimony, the district court was entitled to rely on

the stipulated testimony as evidence in making its determination of guilt. See

United States v. Kleinschmidt, 596 F.2d 133, 136 (5th Cir. 1979).

Abbott’s reliance on United States v. Hellman, 560 F.2d 1235, 1236 (5th

Cir. 1977), is misplaced. Hellman held only that a stipulation as to testimony

did not relieve the district court of the obligation to instruct the jury that it had

to find the essential elements of the offense. (It goes without saying that, for the

bench trial at issue, the district court makes those requisite findings.) Hellman

“should not be read to imply that stipulations cannot themselves provide

sufficient evidence to satisfy those elements”. Kleinschmidt, 596 F.2d at 136.

AFFIRMED.