UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-4643

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

JEROME SAUNDERS, II,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern 

District of West Virginia, at Charleston. Thomas E. Johnston, 

District Judge. (2:08-cr-00049-1)

Submitted: October 14, 2011 Decided: October 20, 2011

Before WILKINSON and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, 

Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Mary Lou Newberger, Federal Public Defender, David R. Bungard, 

Assistant Federal Public Defender, Jonathan D. Byrne, OFFICE OF 

THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Charleston, West Virginia, for 

Appellant. R. Booth Goodwin II, United States Attorney, 

William B. King II, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF 

THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charleston, West Virginia, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Jerome Saunders II appeals the district court’s order 

revoking his supervised release and sentencing him to the 

statutory maximum of twenty-four months’ imprisonment. On 

appeal, Saunders argues that the district court imposed a 

plainly unreasonable sentence. Finding no error, we affirm.

In examining a sentence imposed upon revocation of 

supervised release, this court “takes a more ‘deferential 

appellate posture concerning issues of fact and the exercise of 

discretion’ than reasonableness review for [G]uidelines 

sentences.” United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 656 (4th 

Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 439 

(4th Cir. 2006)). A sentence imposed upon revocation of 

supervised release should be affirmed if it is within the 

statutory maximum and not plainly unreasonable.*

 * To the extent Saunders asks this court to revisit the 

standard of review established in Crudup, we decline to do so. 

See United States v. Bullard, 645 F.3d 237, 246 (4th Cir. 2011)

(stating that one panel of this court cannot overrule precedent 

set by another panel).

 Crudup, 461 

F.3d at 437. In reviewing a revocation sentence, we first 

consider “whether the sentence is unreasonable,” following the 

same general principles we apply to our review of original 

sentences. Id. at 438. Only if we find that a sentence is 
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either procedurally or substantively unreasonable will we

determine whether the sentence is “plainly” so. Id. at 439.

A sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district 

court has considered both the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)

(2006) factors and the policy statements set forth in Chapter 7 

of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (USSG) (2010). Crudup, 

461 F.3d at 439. The district court also must provide an 

explanation of its chosen sentence, although this explanation 

“need not be as detailed or specific” as is required for an 

original sentence. United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 

(4th Cir. 2010). A sentence is substantively reasonable if the 

district court states a proper basis for concluding that the 

defendant should receive the sentence imposed. Crudup, 461 F.3d 

at 440. “[T]he court ultimately has broad discretion to revoke 

its previous sentence and impose a term of imprisonment up to 

the statutory maximum.” Id. at 439 (internal quotation marks 

omitted).

With these standards in mind, we conclude that 

Saunders’ sentence was neither procedurally nor substantively

unreasonable. The district court explicitly stated that it had 

considered the required statutory factors and Guidelines 

provisions and provided a clear rationale for imposing the 

maximum statutory sentence. Given the court’s broad discretion 

to revoke supervised release and impose a term of imprisonment 
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up to the statutory maximum, Saunders’ sentence is reasonable. 

Therefore, we conclude that Saunders’ sentence is not plainly 

unreasonable. 

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED