Opinion filed April 28 , 20 2 2



### In The 

# Eleventh Court of Appeals

__________ No. 11

- 20

- 000 80

- C V

__________ GLEN D. AARON, II , A ppellant
V. STEPHEN FISHER, JAMES FISHER, KATIE ELAM WARD, JAMES O. “TONY” ELAM, STEPHEN CORY ELAM, DEBBIE

ELAM, AND PIONEER NATURAL RESOURCES USA, INC., Appellee s

On Appeal from the 118 th District Court Glasscock County , Texas Trial Court Cause No. 1865

O P I N I O N
In t his appeal , we must determine whether conveyances in two mineral deeds
bestow ed separate property upon the grantees by gift or convey ed an equal community property interest to the grantees and their spouses by sale for
consideration

. The trial court concluded that each conveyance constituted a sale for2 consideration. W e agree and, for the reasons stated in this opinion, affirm the trial court’s judgment. Appellant , Glen D. Aaron , II, raises eight issues in this appeal

. In his first

seven issues, Appellant challenges the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in
favor of Appellees , Stephen and James Fisher ( the Fisher s ) , Katie Elam Ward, James O. “Tony” Elam , and Deb bie Elam ( the Elam s ) , and Stephen Cory Elam (S.C.)

. In his eighth issue, Appellant challenges the trial court’s order by which it discharg ed Pioneer Natural Resources USA, Inc. (Pioneer ) from the underlying sui t after
Pioneer filed an interpleade r action against Appellees and deposit ed the royalties that were generated from the disputed mineral interests in to the registry of the trial

court

. I. Background Facts In April 1962, Houston Parker ( Houston ) conveyed to his w ife , Lilly , for “ten
and no/100 dollars ($10.00) cash in hand paid and other good and valuable consideration,” an undivided one half (1/2) interest to the oil, gas, and minerals in
and under “ the South 120 acres of the East One

- half (E/2) of Section No. Thirty

eight (38), Block No. Thirty

- five (35), Township 1

- South, T. & P. Ry. Co. Surveys, Glasscock & Midland Counties, Texas.” Houston died in 1971

. In June 1971 , Lilly c onveyed to each of her six children, which includ ed W.T. Aaron (W.T.) and Chester Little (Chester), “[a]n undivided One Twelfth (1/12) [non

participating] interest ” in the mineral s in and under the land as described in the 1962 mineral deed that Lilly had received from Houston

. In addition to the recit ed
consideration of “ t en & no/100 dollars ($10.00) cash in hand paid and other good
and valuable consideration , ” e ach deed specif ied that “[ t ] his sale is made subject to any rights now existing to any lessee or assigns under any valid and su bsisting oil and gas lease

. ” (emphasis added). A series of intestate successions later unfolded that are central to the questions that we must address.3 W.T. was married to Lavon Aaron (Lavon) from 1945 until 2000, when he
died intestate

. W.T. and Lavon never had children. Lavon later died intestate in
2005. She was survived only by her sister , Verda Fisher (Verda) , who also died
intestate in 2016. Verda i s survived by two sons, James and Stephen Fisher ( the
Fisher s )

. Chester married Audra Elam (Aud r a) around the beginning of World War II. They remained married until Chester died intestate in 1998. Chester wa s survived by Audra, his sisters ( Martha Hethcoat and Lillie Clement ) , and his half

- brothers ( W.T. and Glen Aaron I )

. Audra died intestate in 2012. Audra had two siblings , both of whom predeceased her ; however, Audra’s siblings are both survived by eligible intestacy
descendants

. Audra’s brother , Oliver , i s survived by his only son, James O. “Tony”
Elam ( an Elam Appellee )

. Audra’s other brother , Otto, an d his wife, Dora, had four
children

. One of the ir children is Katie Elam Ward ( an Elam Appellee )

. Another
child , Stephen Elam, died intestate, but is survived by his wife , Debbi e ( an Elam Appellee )

. Stephen and Debbie had one child, S.C. Elam. By her 1971 conveyance , Lilly also conveyed a n undivided one
- twelfth non
participating mineral interest to her son Glen Aaron I , Appellant ’s father. Appellant ’s father and mother both died intestate , and Appellant is their only child.
In this case , Appellant sought a declaration from the trial court that he inherited and
is the title owner of the interest that his father received from Lilly in 1971. However, Appellant has also claimed that he is entitled , by inheritance , to portion s of the one

twelfth interests that Lilly conveyed to W.T. and Chester i n 1971

. After Lavon passed , Appellant filed an a ffidavit of d eath and h eirship in
Glasscock Count y in which Appellant mis represented that Lavon’s only heirs were
a deceased niece and four surviving nephews, of which Appellant was one. Appellant also submitted an a mended o il and g as d ivision o rder to Pioneer in which4 Appellant represent ed that Lavon’s royalty interest should be divided and paid to Appellant and the other four purported heirs , in equal amounts

. Pioneer , in reliance
on th is affidavit and the amended division order , paid Appellan t $5,521.16 in royalties that Pioneer credited to the mineral interest original ly conveyed from Lilly
to W.T

. In December 2017, Appellant sued Pioneer contend ing that “the interest
ordered to him . . . was less than [what is] actually owned by [Appellant].” Appellant asked the trial court to declare that Appellant was entitled to larg er royalty payments
based on the increase in the amount of his ownership interest that had result ed from
“the intestate succession [s] of

. . . [Chester ]

. . . and [W.T.] .” Pioneer later filed a

“ P etition in I ntervention for I nterpleader ” and joined the Fisher s , the Elam s , and S.C

. as interpleader

- defendants because of their competing claims to the existing unpaid royalties and future royalties that Appellant had s ought to recover from Pioneer

. Pioneer made an unqualified tender of the disputed funds into the registry of the trial

court and , by agreement of the parties, was later dis miss ed from the suit with prejudice

. Prior to Pioneer ’ s exit from the case, the Fishers filed a trespass to try title

cross
- claim against Appellant and assert ed their own claim to ownership over the
interest that Lilly had conveyed to W.T. in 1971. The Fishers also s ought

compensa tory damages from Appellant for “ money had and received ” for the payments he had erroneously received from Pioneer based on the producti on of the
mineral interest that belong ed to W.T

. Appellant nonsuited his original claims but subsequently filed a competing t respass to t ry t itle action against the Fishers in which
he asked the trial court to grant him title to “portion[s] of the W.T. Aaron Estate and
Chester I. Little Estate

. . . under [the] Texas Intestate Succession law.”
The Fishers , Elam s , and S.C. all moved for summary judgment, in which they

assert ed that (1) they we re entitled to their respective claimed portions of the5 disputed mineral interests and (2) Appellant’s claims against them we re barred by
the residual four

- year statute of limitations that is applicable to claims in which the
claimant seek s to reform and correct a deed because of a mistake. In response, Appellant filed a motion for summary judgment only against the Fishers. The trial

court later granted App ellees ’ collective motion and denied Appellant’s motion

. The Fishers separately moved for summary judgment against Appellant on their m oney h ad and r eceived cross

- claim. In support of their motion, t he Fishers
relied primarily on a b usiness r ecords a ffidavit prepared by Carrie Pitts, a Pioneer managerial employee , who attested that Pioneer , in reliance upon the false a ffidavit
of d eath and h eirship and the a mended d ivision o rder submitt ed to it by Appellant , had paid to Appellant $5,521.16 in royalty payments that belong ed to the Fishers

. I I

. M otions for Summary Judgment
In his first, second, fourth, sixth, and seventh issues, Appellant a rgue s that the
trial court err ed when it granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees on their
claims to title because it fail ed to conclude that : (1) the mineral interests that Lilly conveyed to W.T. and Chester constituted gifts , rather than sales for consideration ; and (2) the conveyed mineral interests that W.T. and Chester received from Lilly

w as their respective separate property. In his fifth issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred when it grant ed
the Fishers ’ motion for summary judgment on their claim against Appellant for

m oney h ad and r eceived because the summ ary judgment evidence was insufficient to justify the compensatory damages awarded to them in the amount of $5,521.16

. In his third issue, Appellant a rgues that the trial court erred when it : (1) grant ed S.C.’s motion for summary judgment on the merits ; and (2) consider ed
S.C.’s motion because (a) he did not move for summary judgment until after Appellant had nonsuited his c laims and ( b ) S.C. had no t assert ed any claims for
affirmative relief before the nonsuit was filed

.6 A. Standard of Review
We review a trial court’s grant of summary judgment de novo

. Concho Res.,
Inc. v. Ellison , 627 S.W.3d 226, 233 (Tex. 2021) (citing Valence Operating Co. v.
Dorsett , 164 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005)). To prevail under the traditional summary judgment standard, the m ovant has the burden to establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
T EX

. R. C IV

. P. 166 a (a), (c); ConocoPhillips Co. v. Koopmann , 547 S.W.3d 858, 865 (Tex. 2018) ; Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Knott , 128 S.W.3d 211, 216 (Tex. 2003)

. If the movant establishes its summary judgment burden , the burden shifts to the nonmovant to present evidence ra ising a genuine issue of material f act that would preclud e the grant of summary judgment. Amedisys, Inc. v. Kingwood Home Health Care, LLC , 437 S.W.3d 507 , 510

– 11 (Tex. 2014); M.D. Anderson Hosp. & Tumor Inst. v. Willrich, 28 S.W.3d 22, 23 (Tex. 2000).
To determine if a gen uine issue of material fact exists, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, and we indulge every reasonable
inference and re s olve any doubts in the nonmovant’s favor. KMS Retail Rowlett,
LP v. City of Rowl ett , 593 S.W.3d 175, 181 (Tex. 2019) ; Knott , 128 S.W.3d at 215

. We credit evidence that is favorable to the nonmovant if reasonable jurors could do so, and we disregard contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could not. Samson Expl., LLC v. T.S. Reed Props., Inc. , 521 S.W.3d 766, 774 (Tex. 2017); Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding , 289 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Te x. 2009).
The evidence raises a genuine issue of material fac t if “ reasonable and fair

- minded jurors could differ in their conclusions in light of all the evidence presented. ” Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Mayes , 236 S.W.3d 754, 755 (Tex. 2007).
When , as in this case, both parties move for summary judgment and the trial court grants one motion but denies the other , we review all of the summary judgment evidence presented , determine all questions presented , and render the judgment that7 the trial court should have rendered. Lightning Oil Co. v. Anadarko E&P Onshore,
LLC , 520 S.W.3d 39, 45 (Tex. 2017) (citing Merriman v. XTO Energy, Inc. , 407 S.W.3d 244, 248 (Tex. 2013)) ; Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. , 289
S.W.3d at 848

. W hen the trial court does not specify the grounds for its ruling , a summary judgment must be affirmed if any of the grounds on which the judgment is sought are meritorious. Merriman , 407 S.W.3d at 248 ; Knott , 128 S.W.3d at 216 (citing Cincinnati Life Ins. Co. v. Cates , 927 S.W.2d 623, 626 (Tex. 1996) )

. B

. T he 1971 d eed s conveyed the disputed mineral interests by sale for consideration , rather than by gift.
1

. Applicable Law We review unambig uous mineral deeds de novo , and we limi t our scope of
review to the four corners of the document ; we also exclud e any extrinsic evidence
from consideration. See Luckel v. White , 819 S.W.2d 459, 461

– 62 (Tex. 1991). In this case, w e conclude that the 1971 deeds are unambiguous

. Therefore, our p rimary

concern is to constru e the se deeds to ascertain the true intention of the parties. Stewman Ranch, Inc. v. Double M. Ranch, Ltd. , 192 S.W.3d 808, 810 (Tex. App.

— Eastland 2006, pet. denied). What control s is the intent that was actually expressed in the language of the deed , not what the parties privately intended but failed to
express

. Moon Royalty, LLC v. Boldrick Partners , 244 S.W.3d 391, 394 (Tex. App.

— Eastland 2007, no pet.). If a court can ascertain the parties’ intent from the language of the deed, “ that should [generally]

. . . be the end of our analysis.” Wenske v. Ealy , 521 S.W.3d 791, 794 (Tex. 2017). Further, p arol evidence is not
admissible to contradict the recital o f consideration in a deed if a party seek s to prove that the deed is actually a “ gift ” deed. Johnson v. Driver , 198 S.W.3d 359, 363

– 64 (Tex. App.

— Tyler 2006, no pet.); Massey v. Massey , 807 S.W.2d 391, 405 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied)

.8 2

. Analysis With regard to Appellant’s first, second, fourth, sixth, and seventh issues , we must determine whether the one
- twelfth mineral interests that Lilly separately conveyed by deed to W.T. and Chester in 1971 are characterized as gift s or sale s for
consi deration

. Because these issues are interrelated, we will consider them together. It is Appellant’s primary contention that Lilly’s 1971 conveyances were gifts. If this is true, the mineral in terests conveyed to W.T. and Chester by the se deeds
would be the ir separate property. However, i f Lilly ’s conveyances a re deemed to be sales for consideration, then the interest s that W.T. and Chester received from her
would be their community property that belonged equally to their respective spouses

. As such , title to the disputed mineral interests would rest with Appellees

. As we have said , the language in the 1971 deeds is not ambiguous ; therefore,

we will construe and harmoniz e the deed’s provisions

. 1 Both deeds recit e that Lilly “grant[s], bargain[s], sell[s] , convey[s], transfer[s], assign[s], and deliver[s the disputed mineral interests ] unto [ W.T. and Chester , respectively ]” (emphasis added).
The deeds further contain a provision that Lilly does so “for and in consideration of
the sum of Ten & no/100 DOLLARS ($10.00) cash in hand paid and [for] other good
and valuable considerations .” 2 No other deed language or recital indicate s or suggest s t hat Lilly intended to gift the disputed interests to W.T. and Chester

. I n fact, in b oth deeds Lilly clearly provided that “[ t ] his sale is made subject to any

1 We may determine an ambiguity as a matter of law for the first time on appeal . Royal Maccabees Life Ins. Co. v. James , 146 S.W. 3 d 340, 347 (Tex. App.

— Dallas 2004, pet. denied ) (citing Sage St

. Assocs. v. Northdale Constr. Co

. , 863 S.W.2d 438, 444

– 46 (Tex. 1993) )

. To determine whether a mineral deed is ambiguous, we look onl y to its text and do not consult parol evidence

. See J.M. Davidson, Inc. v. Webster , 128 S.W.3d 223, 230 (Tex. 2003).

2 Deeds ordinarily embody such recitals of nominal consideration and “other good and valuable consideration.” See, e.g. , Troxel v. Bishop , 201 S.W.3d 290, 294 (Tex. App.

— Dallas 2006, no pet

. ); s ee also Parker v. Dodge , 98 S.W.3d 297, 301 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (explaining that courts “ normally will not inquire into the adequacy of consideration supporting a cont ract[,]” unless there is evidence of “unconscionability, bad faith, or fraud”).9 rights now existing to any lessee or assigns under any valid and subs isting oil and gas lease heretofore executed and now of legal record” (emphasis added). We disagree with Appellant’s contention that we should go beyond the four corners of
the deed s and disregard its plain language in order to d iscern some purported
evidence of a gift

. Because a plain reading of the deeds shows that Lilly’s conveyances of an undivided one
- twelfth nonparticipating mineral interest each to W.T. and Chester constituted a sale for consideration , the se mineral interests
became their community property when the conveyances were consummated. As
such , these interests ultimately passed to their spouses. When W.T. and Chester both died intestate and without any surviving
children , the community property accumulated during their marriages became the sole property of their s urviving spouses , Lavon and Aud ra, respectively

. See T EX

. E ST

. C ODE A NN

. § 201.003 (b) (West 2020 )

. Thus, w hen Lavon and Audra subsequently died intestate , and without any surviving children or parents, the disputed mineral interest s would have first passed to their surviving siblings and then eventually to Appellees, not to Appellant. See id

. § 201.001 (a), (c), (e)

. Here, t he
mineral interest that Lilly conveyed to W.T. passed to Lavon , then to her only surviving sibling Verda , and finally to Verda’s two sons , the Fishers

. Similarly, the
mineral interest that Lilly conveyed to Chester passed to Audra, and then to the heirs
of her two brothers , which includ es the Elams and S.C

. We conclude, as the trial court did, that the disputed conveyances and mineral
interests were sold for consideration , rather than gifted as Appellant suggests. Therefore, and contrary to Appellant’s contention, A rticle XVI, Section 15 of the
Texas Constitution is in applicable because the mineral interests conveyed by Lilly
to W.T. and Chester bec a me, upon receipt, thei r community property, not their
separate property. See T EX

. C ONST

. art. XVI, § 15 (which defines property received by gift during marriage to be the separate property of the receiving spouse)

.10 Moreover, Section 201.002 of the Estates Code , which dictates how separate property is to be distributed in the event of an intestate succession , is equally inapplicable because t his s ection of the c ode would only be pertinent if the disputed
mineral interests that W.T. and Chester received were characterized as separate property

. In this case, i t can not. Because the trial court did not err when it granted Appellees’ motions for summary judgment, we overrule Appellant’s first, second , fourth , and sixth iss ues. In his seventh issue, Appellant contend s that the trial court erred when it
conclude d that the residual four

- year statute of limitations bar red his claim for title to the disputed mineral interests

. Because of our holdings above, we need not address Appellant’s seven th issue

. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P . 47. 1.
C

. The Fishers conclusively established their claim for money had and received

. 1

. Applicable Law “A claim for ‘money had and received’ is equitable in nature.” Plains Expl. &
Prod. Co. v

. Torch Energy Advisors Inc. , 473 S.W.3d 296, 302 n.4 (Tex. 2015). It
is applied to prevent unjust enrichment and “ to restore money where equity and good conscience require [a] refund.” Id. This cause of action focuses solely on justice

an d “ whether the defendant holds money , which

. . . belongs to the plaintiff.”
Staats v. Miller , 243 S.W.2d 686, 687

– 88 ( Tex. 1951 ) (citing U nited S tates v. Jefferson Elec. Mfg. Co. , 291 U.S. 386, 402

– 03 (1934))

. T herefore, t o prove their claim for money had and received, the Fishers were required to establish that Appellant held money that , in equity and good conscience , belonged to them. See
id

. ; Edwards v. Mid

- Continent Office Distrib., L.P. , 252 S.W.3d 833 , 837 (Tex. App.

— Dallas 20 08 , pet. denied ). It is immaterial whether Appel lant acquired the money wrongfully. See Doss v. Homecomings Fin. Network, Inc. , 210 S.W.3d 706, 711 (Tex. App.

— Corpus Christi

– E dinburg 2006, pet. denied). As such, t he sole11 inquiry is whether Appellant received money that rightfully belonged to the Fishers

. See Everett v. TK

- Taito, L.L.C. , 178 S.W.3d 844, 860 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth 2005, no pet.). Here, because the Fishers proved their claim for money had and received, the y were entitled to actual damages in the amount that Appellant wrongfully received in
their stead. See GRCDallasHomes LLC v. Caldwell , 619 S.W.3d 301, 310 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth 2021, pet. denied).
2

. Analysis When they moved for summary judgment , t he Fishers submitted t he affidavit of Carrie Pitts, a manager employed by Pioneer , in support of their claim

. Pitts stated
that Pioneer received a n affidavit of death and heirship and an amended division
order from Appellan t

. The a ffidavit of d eath and h eirship contained the false

assert ion that Appellant was one of Lavon’s five heirs

. Further, t he amended
division order was erroneous in that its effect was to credit and equally divide
Lavon ’ s royalty interest to the five named heirs

. Pitts stated that, in its reliance on those documents, Pioneer “ paid [ Appellant ] in the amount of $5,521.16 through August 30, 2019 [ , ] with respect to mineral interest s of Lavon

. ” First, Appellant complains that t he Pitts affidavit does not specify when Appellant began receiving the payments that belong ed to the Fishers

. Although t he royalty payment history offered by Appellant demonstrates that the payments began
sometime in 2014 , w e can discern that the se payments commenced on or about July
29 , 2014 , because that is the date that Pioneer received the amended division order from Appellant and upon which Pioneer relied in vesting Appellant with one

- fifth
of Lavon’s one

- twelfth royalty interest

. Next, Appellant complai ns that the royalty payment amount stated in the Pi tts affidavit is not supported or substantiated by any sort of reliable accounting method

. Appellant advanced these complain t s in an objection that he urg ed to the trial court12 and attached a document to his objection that list ed all royalty payments that were
made to him by Pioneer from March 2009 to March 2018

. This document demonstrates that Appellant began receiving one

- fifth of Lavon ’s royalty interest
from Pioneer “ sometime ” in 2014 and that he receiv ed an initial payment of $4,139.98. Appellant avers that the discrepancy between this amount and the $5,521.16 amount referenced in the Pi tt s affidavit creates a disputed issue of material
fact or otherwise defeats the Fishers ’ conclusive entitlement to the $5,521.16 in damages they sought from him

. However, in her affidavit , Pitts clear ly state s that the payments to Appellant erroneously continued until August 2018

. By

a ccumulat ing the remaining payments that are listed in the document that Appellant attached to his objection

— payments made through March 2018

— the amount totals $5,312.54. Because other small, additional payments were made to Appellant
between March 2018 an d August 2018 , it is reasona ble to conclude that the total royalties that w ere erroneous ly paid to Appellant by Pioneer i s $5,521.16, as stated
in the P itts affidavit

. Thus, Appellant’s summary judgment evidence does not
controvert the Pi tts affidavit. Moreover, a lthough there is nothing in the Pi tts affidavit or the Fishers’ motion for summary judgment that demonstrat es or explain s how they arrived at the $5,521.16 amount , it is clear from the Pitts affidavit that Pioneer had paid royalties

to Appellant in the amount of $5,521.16 for Lavon’s share of the mineral interest that Appellant claimed in 2014 when he signed the amended division order

. Although Appellant questioned this figure, he did not pr esent any summary judgment evide nce to controvert or dispute it. As such, we hold that the Fishers conclusively establish ed th eir entitle ment to $5,521.16 on their money had and
received claim. Therefore, the trial court did not err when it granted their motion for summary judgment on this claim. Accordingly , we overrule Appellant’s fifth issue

.13 D

. Before Appellant filed his notice of nonsuit

, S.C. asserted a claim for affirmative relief that survive d the nonsuit.
1

. Applicable Law “Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 162 provides that a plaintiff may take a nonsuit at any time before introducing all of [hi s] evidence.” Rogers v. Bagley , 623 S.W.3d 343, 357 (Tex. 2021 )

. An order signed by the trial court is not required. Epps v. Fowler , 351 S.W.3d 862, 868 (Tex. 2011) (citing Travelers Ins. Co. v.
Joachim , 315 S.W.3d 860, 862 (Tex. 2010)). A nonsuit extinguishes a case or controversy from “ the moment it is filed

. . . with the clerk of the [trial] court.” Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch at Galveston v. Estate of Blackmon ex rel. Shultz , 195 S.W.3d 98, 100 (Tex. 2006) (quoting Shadowbrook Apartments v. Abu

- Ahmad , 783 S.W.2d 210, 211 (Tex. 1990))

. A plaintiff’s nonsuit , however, “shall not prejudice the right of an adverse party to be heard on a pending claim for affirmative relie f.” T EX

. R. C IV

. P

. 162 ; s ee also Epps , 351 S.W.3d at 868; Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch at Galveston , 195 S.W.3d
at 100

. A claim for affirmative relief “must allege a cause of action, independent of the plaintiff’s claim, on which the claimant could recover compensation or [obtain] relief, even if the plaintiff abandons or is unable to establish his cause of action.” Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch at Galvesto n , 195 S.W.3d at 101 (citing BHP Petroleum
Co. v. Millard , 800 S.W.2d 838, 841 (Tex. 1990) ). However, “ i f a defendant does nothing more than resist plaintiff’s right to recover, the plaintiff has an absolute right
to the nonsuit.” BHP Petroleum Co. , 800 S.W. 2 d at 841 (quoting Gen

. Land Office v. Oxy U.S.A ., Inc. , 789 S.W.2d 569, 570 (Tex. 1990)). Pleadings filed by a party must provide fair notice of the nature of the claim s asserted so that the opposing party can prepare a defense. Bos v. Smith , 556 S.W.3d 293, 305

– 06 (Tex. 2018) (citing T EX

. R. C IV

. P. 47(a) ) ; Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp. v. Auld , 34 S.W.3d 887, 8 96

– 97 (Tex. 2000). While “w e liberally construe14 the pleadings in the pleader’ s favor ,” we cannot “read into a petition what is plainly
not there.” Bos , 556 S.W.3d at 306 ( first citing Auld , 34 S.W.3d at 897 ; then quoting Heritage Gulf Props., Ltd. v. Sandalwood Apartments, Inc. , 416 S.W.3d 642, 658 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14 th Dist.] 2013, no pet.))

. Because a pleading’s title does not determine its character, w hen we consider the nature and effect of a pleading,
we will focus on the substance of the relief sought , rather than the formal styling of the pleading. In re J.Z.P. , 484 S.W.3d 924, 925 (Tex. 2016) ( ci ting Ryland Enter., Inc. v. Weatherspoon , 355 S.W.3d 664, 666 (Tex. 2011))

. 2

. Analysis In November 2018, Pioneer filed a p lea in a batement arguing that , pursuant t o Rule 39(a) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure , S.C. and Audra’s other heirs were necessary and indispensable parties to the underlying suit

. See T EX

. R. C IV

. P. 39(a)

. Pioneer a ssert ed tha t the only question before the trial court was whether Appellant
or Audra ’s heirs

— including S.C.

— own ed the disputed mineral interests. L ater, in May 2019, Pioneer filed its “ Petition in Intervention for Interpleader, ” in which it
named S.C. ( and others ) as a n interpleader

- defendant because he had previously
asserted a n ownership claim to a portion of the disputed mineral interests. Shortly thereafter, in June 2019, S.C., who at the time was ostensibly pro se, appear ed in the

case when he fil ed an answer

. I n August 2019, Appellant filed his n otice of n onsuit

w ithout p rejudice

. Two months later , S.C., through his attorney of record , filed
another answer

. Appellant now argues that S.C

. ’s motion for summary judgment, and the trial
court’s order which grant ed it, are both void because Appellant “had taken [a]
nonsuit ” before S.C. moved for summary judgment. S.C. responded, inter alia , that
because he had “properly answered and appeared, cross

- claimed, and moved for summary judgment[,]” the trial court correct ly consider ed and rul ed on his motion for summary judgment. While it is true that Appellant nonsuited his claims long15 before S.C. moved for summary j udgment , Appellant’s nonsuit c ould not have extinguish ed S.C.’s claim for affirmative relief , if such a claim was raised, so long

as S.C. had asserted and pleaded this claim before Appellant ’s notice of nonsuit was filed

. See
, e.g. , Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch at Galveston , 195 S.W.3d at 10 0

– 01

. Under that scenario , S.C.’s motion for summary judgment would have been properly
before the trial court. Id. Appellant further argues that S.C. “was not a part of ” the “[ l]ive pleadings [that] were

. . . filed prior to Appellant’s nonsuit .” We disagree

. A reviewing court

“ look [s] to the substance of a plea for relief to determine the nature of the pleading, not merely at the form of title given to it.” State Bar of Tex. v . Heard , 603 S.W.2d 829, 833 (Tex. 1980). In this instance, while the term “Answer” may be th e title that
is assigned to the pleading that S.C. ’s attorney fil ed on S.C.’s behalf in October 201 9,
it was in substance an amended answer because i n June 2019, more than two months before Appellant filed his n otice of n onsuit, S.C. , ostensibly pro se, filed a document
in the case that he considered to be his original answer.
The trial court ’s conclus ion that t he original pro se document filed by S.C.
constitute s an a nswer is consistent with t he Texas Supreme Court’s holding in
Smith v. Lippmann , 826 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. 1992) . At issue in Smith was a letter t hat

t he court held “ sufficiently answered the respondent ’ s service of citation .” 826
S.W.2d at 137. In that case, Smith , the named defendant, mailed a letter to the
district clerk acknowledg ing tha t he had received the citatio n issued in the suit

. The
district clerk received and filed Smith’s letter two days later

. Although Smith ’ s letter

was n o t drafted in a “ typical answer form at , ” it nevertheless provided the trial court with a timely response by Smith to the suit that was filed against him and his acknowledg ment and acceptance of Lippmann ’ s citation and petition. Id

. at 138. Based on its content, t he c ourt held that Smith’s letter was sufficient to constitute an
answer to the suit. Id. Likewise , S.C.’s correspondence , although lacking in style16 and the routine denials and defenses one typically note s in a formal pleading , identified the cause number assigned to the suit and stated that his letter was “[ i ] n response to [the] citation [in] cause no [.] 1865 ” and the “ Petition in Intervention for Interpleader [ that ] Pioneer Natural Resources [had] made.” Accordingly, S.C.’s pro

se letter was sufficient to constitute his original a nswer to the claims asserted against
him in th is case

. While pro se litigants are not exempt from compl iance with the applicable laws and procedural rules , p r o se pleadings must nonetheless be liberally construed

. T herefore, to ensure that a pro se litigant is afforded a fair opportunity to be heard,

w e review and construe the pleadings of pro se litigants by less stringent standards than we do when considering pleadings that are drafted by lawyers

. See Veigel v.
Tex

. Boll Weevil Eradication Found., Inc. , 549 S.W.3d 193, 195 n.1 (Tex. App.

— Austin 2018, no pet.); see also Thomas v. Collins , 860 S.W.2d 500, 503 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied)

. W e note that S.C.’s pro se answer
references two other documents: (1) Pioneer’s citation (with the filed and attached

p etition in i ntervention that nam ed S.C. as a n interpleader

- defendant) in the underlying suit ; and (2) S.C.’s file d affidavit of heirship. These refer ence s in his

answer provide some context 3 to our determin ation of whether he asserted a claim
for affirmative relief in advance of Appellant’s nonsuit

. In the pro se answer that he filed in response to Pioneer ’ s p etition in
i ntervention , S.C. affirmatively claims that he ( and two others named in the pleading ) are “ the only living blood relatives inheriting the minera l rights from said property ” (emphasis added). He also attested to the same information in his affidavit

3 Documents “filed” may be incorporated into a pleading by reference. See T EX

. R. C IV

. P

. 59 (“or filed and referred to as such”). Regarding Pioneer ’s interpleader petition an d the affidavit of heirship filed by S.C. , both had been previously “filed” in Glasscock County and were identifiable. Notwithstanding, we need not address whether the documents referenced in S.C.’s answer were “incorporated by reference” because hi s pro se answer is sufficient for purposes of our analysis

.17 of heirship

. W ith respect to the unpaid royalties that Pioneer interpleaded into the registry of the trial court, S.C. set forth a claim to the disputed royalty monies and alleged that he was one of only three persons that were entitled to do so

. A s such , S.C

. asserted his own affirmative claim to a portion of the disputed mineral interests
and the unpaid royalties , which Pioneer had “unqualified[ly] tender[ed ] ” into the registry of the trial court.
S.C.’s asserted claim to the disputed mineral interests i s independent of the competing and rival claim raised by Appellant because S.C. could have recover ed
title to his respective portion of the mineral interest and unpaid royalties , even if Appellant had either abandon ed his own claim or fail ed to establish his entitlement

to it

. See Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch at Galveston , 195 S.W.3d at 101. F ar from

“ do[ing] nothing more than resist[ing] [Appellant ’s] right to recover, ” we conclude
that S.C. , on his behalf, clear ly asserted an independent claim for affirmative relief
when he answered

. See BHP Petroleum Co. , 800 S.W.2d at 841 (quoting Gen. Land Office , 789 S.W.2d at 570). Therefore, based on the summary judgment evidence
before us , we can n ot say that the trial court erred either in its construction of S.C.’s

pro se answer or it s determin ation that a n affirmative claim for relief was alleged by
S.C. in his own right.
Because S.C. asserted his entitlement to a portion of the disputed mineral
interests and the unpaid royalties that Pioneer unqualifiedly tendered into the registry
of the trial cour t before Appellant filed his notice of nonsuit, S.C.’s claim for
affirmative relief survived and was not extinguished . As such, S.C. ’s m otio n for

s ummary j udgment was properly before the trial court and ripe for determination. Therefore, the trial court did not err when it considered and granted S.C.’s motion. Accordingly , w e overrule Appellant’s th ird issue.18 I I I

. Interpleader Discharge Finally, i n his eighth issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred when it signed the parties’ a greed o rder , in which the trial court granted Pioneer’s petition in interpleader and d ischarg ed Pioneer from the suit , because Pioneer had purportedly “re

- entered the case” when one of its employees prepared an affidavit at the request of the Fishers

. A. Standard of Review We review a trial court’s grant of interpleader relief for an abuse of discretion and resolve every reasonable doubt in favor of a stakeholder’s right to interplead

. Bryant v. United Shortline Inc. Assurance Servs., N.A. , 972 S.W.2d 26, 31 (Tex. 1998). The complaining party bears the burden to presen t a record that demonstrat es an abuse of discretion

. Simon v. York Crane & Rigging Co

. , 739 S.W.2d 793, 795 (Tex. 1987).
B. The trial court did not abuse it s discretion whe n it sign ed the parties’ agreed order that discharg ed Pioneer.
1. Applicable Law
An i nterpleader action under Rule 43 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure requires only that rival and conflicting claims exist

. See T EX

. R. C IV

. P . 43; State
Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Martinez , 216 S.W.3d 799, 807 (Tex. 2007). When p resented with conflicting claims to the stake it holds, a disinterested and innocent stakeholder
who does not know which claimant should be paid and fears potential exposure to double or multiple liability for the single stake, may apply to a trial court for protection. Nixon v. Malone , 98 S.W. 380, 385 (Tex. 1906). The stakeholder may do so by plac ing the fund in the control of the trial court so that it may determ ine the
fund’s ownership , thereby reliev ing the stakeholder from the potential liability to pay the single fund more than once. See id. ; see also Martinez , 216 S.W.3d at 806

– 07

. As such, t o be entitled to interpleader relief, the interplead ing party must19 establish that ( 1 ) it was fac ed with rival and competing claims to the interpleaded
fund s , and ( 2 ) a reasonable doubt existed in law or fact as to which claim was valid.
Broesche v. Jacobson , 218 S.W.3d 267, 277 ( Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied)

. 2. Analysis
In this case , Pioneer would be entitled to interpleader relief so long as it
established that it faced rival and competing claims from Appellant and Appellees to the same property

— namely the nonparticipating mineral interests in dispute that previously belong ed to W.T. and Chester

— and that it had a reasonable doubt as to
which claimants were entitled to t he property. See Broesche , 218 S.W.3d at 277

. Any reasonable doubt as to whether Pioneer satisfied these two conditions must be
resolved in Pioneer ’ s favor. See Bryant , 972 S.W.2d at 31

. The record before us contain s a transcript of a hearing that occurred on August 28, 2019

. The order by which the trial court discharg ed Pioneer was sign ed by the trial court and approved by the parties the same day ; it contain s a provision ,

a s Appellant concedes on appeal, that all parties to the suit had agree d to Pioneer’s discharge and dismissal

. Moreover , Appellant does not dispute that Pioneer fac ed
rival and competing claims to the funds , which it unconditionally tendered, that were generated from the disputed mineral interests . N or does Appellant deny that Pioneer
had a reasonable doubt as to wh om it owed the disputed royalty payments , Appellant or Appellees

. Here, Appellant shouldered the burden to establish that the trial court abused its discretion when it discharged Pioneer; he failed to do so. Therefore , Pioneer w as entitled to the interpleader relief it requested

. Despite this, Appellant now advance s the argument that the trial court abus ed
its discretion when it discharg ed Pioneer on August 28, 2019 , because later , on October 3, 2019, Pioneer allegedly “ re
- enter [ ed ] the case ” when a b usiness r ecords

a ffidavit prepared at the request of the Fishers , and executed by a representative from20 Pioneer, w as subsequently submitted with the Fishers ’ motion for summary judgment in support of their claim for money had and received. Although innovative, w e decline to a dop t th e argument offered by Appellant. If Pioneer had

or was permitted to reenter the case, the trial court’s misstep , if any, would have
be en to permit the reentry , not it s prior decision to discharge Pioneer in the first place. Here, Pioneer did not reenter the case in any respect

. Rather, as an operator , Pioneer merely execut ed and furnished , upon the Fishers ’ request, a b usiness r ecords

a ffidavit that included relevant documents to a nonoper a tor who possessed oil and gas interest s which could be potentially affected

. When it execut ed this affidavit, Pioneer did not assert any claims or defenses , nor d id it become a party or resurrect its status as a party to the underlying suit

. Appellant further argues that Pioneer violated its duty of “utmost good faith and fair dealing ” when it “ reenter [ed] the case with the [ b usiness r ecords] affidavit [it prepared and executed] , knowing that the Appella nt could not respond to [the] affidavit’s accuracy or to the issues of fact raised

. ” In support of his argument , Appellant cites to Texas Outfitters Ltd., LLC v. Nicholson , 572 S.W.3d 647, 653 (Tex. 2019). However, Nicholson is inapposite and does not support Appellant’s
contention because he has fail ed to establish that such a duty exists or would be applicable in this context or , if it did , that a breach occurred

. Fi nally, Appellant had the right and opportunity to subpoena documents , depose individuals , and conduct other forms of appropriate discovery. Appellant’s nonsuit did not prohibit him from challeng ing either the veracity or the merits of the
Pioneer b usiness r ecords a ffidavit relied on by the Fishers

. In fact , in his n otice of

n onsuit, Appellant stated that, with respect to the Fishers ’ pending counterclaims for affirmative relief, he planned to “ defend against said counterclaim[s] and file [any] necessary defenses and objections subsequent to this Nonsuit Notice.” We are not persuaded by Appellant ’s assertion that he was somehow h inder ed by th e Pioneer21 affidavit that the Fishers presented and relied on , particularly when Appellant failed

to either move for a continuance or r equest additional time to pursue the discovery
he considered to be necessary to contest the Fisher s’ summary judgment evidence.
See T EX

. R. C IV

. P. 166a(g).
For the reasons stated above , we overrule Appellant’s eight h issue.
IV. This Court’s Ruling We affirm the judgment of the trial court

.

W. STACY TROTTER
JUSTICE April 28 , 20 2 2
Panel consists of: Bailey , C.J., Trotter , J

. , a nd Wright , S.C. J. 4

Williams, J., not participating

4 Jim R. Wright, Senior Chief Justice (Retired), Court of Appeals, 11th District of Texas at Eastland, sitting by assignment.