2012 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

1-10-2012

Daniel Gatson v. State of NJ

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 09-4731

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CLD-012 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 09-4731

___________

DANIEL GATSON;

ANTHONY HANKS;

Family Members

v.

STATE OF NEW JERSEY; ANNE MILGRAM, Attorney General, Individually and in 

her Official Capacity; SOMERSET COUNTY, NJ; OFFICE OF THE SOMERSET 

COUNTY PROSECUTORS; WAYNE FORREST, Individually and in his Official 

Capacity; MATTHEW MURPHY, Individually and in his Official Capacity; DET. 

CHRISTOPHER J. SHEA, Individually and in his Official Capacity; CAPT. THOMAS 

DUNNE, Individually and in his Official Capacity; CAPT. RONALD THORNBURG, 

Individually and in his Official Capacity; LT. RICHARD IKE, Individually and in his 

Official Capacity; DET. ROBERT L. BRYANT, JR., Individually and in his Official 

Capacity; SGT. RUSSELL LEFFERT, Individually and in his Official Capacity;

WARREN TOWNSHIP, NJ; SGT. TIMOTHY J. WENZEL, Individually and in his 

Official Capacity; MORRIS COUNTY, NJ; WATCHUNG BOROUGH, NJ; BRIAN 

NEWMAN, Individually and in his Official Capacity; BERGEN COUNTY, NJ; OFFICE 

OF THE BERGEN COUNTY PROSECUTOR; JOHN MOLINELLI, Individually and in 

his Official Capacity; JOHN W. DONOHUE, Individually and in his Official Capacity; 

WAYNE MELLO, Individually and in his Official Capacity; THOMAS CZULADA, 

Individually and in his Official Capacity; PARSIPPANY TOWNSHIP, NJ; TROY 

HILLS TOWNSHIP, NJ; MICHAEL LASALANDRA, Individually and in his Official 

Capacity; DET. RICHARD NICOLETTI, Individually and in his Official Capacity; 

HUDSON COUNTY, NJ; LIANE ABAD; IOANNIS JOHN ARVANITIS; PAUL 

SANGIULIANO, Individually and in his Official Capacity; FRANK MELE, Individually 

and in his Official Capacity; LEE NILES, Individually and in his Official Capacity; 

MARTHA ARVANITIS; ROBERT GROGAN; JOHN DOES (1-100) Individually and 

in her Official Capacity; ABC BUSINESS ENTITIES, ET AL.

Daniel Gatson,

Appellant

____________________________________
2

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

(D.C. Civil No. 2-09-cv-01658-001)

District Judge: Honorable Stanley R. Chesler

____________________________________

Submitted for Possible Dismissal Due to Jurisdictional Defect,

Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), and

Possible Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6

October 14, 2011

Before: RENDELL, HARDIMAN and ROTH, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: January 10, 2012)

_________

OPINION OF THE COURT

_________

PER CURIAM

Pro se appellant Daniel Gatson appeals the District Court’s order dismissing his 

complaint. For the reasons set forth below, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s 

order.

In the late 1990s, state and federal authorities came to believe that Gatson was the 

leader of a group that committed a string of burglaries in New Jersey. They assembled a 

task force and began to gather evidence against him. To this end, they interviewed 

informants, tapped Gatson’s phone, and subpoenaed a variety of records. This 

investigation led the authorities to obtain a warrant that permitted them to search 

Gatson’s home, his aunt’s home, and his grandmother’s home, and to seize a 28-foot 

Bayliner boat, which authorities believed Gatson had purchased with the fruits of his 
3

crimes. In 2001, New Jersey police officers executed the warrant. In the process, they 

seized over $256,000 in cash, the Bayliner boat, and assorted jewelry. 

Ultimately, state officials charged Gatson with numerous offenses, and in 

November 2004, Gatson was convicted in New Jersey state court of two counts of receipt 

of stolen property. The Appellate Division affirmed Gatson’s conviction. 

In 2009, Gatson filed the action at issue here against numerous defendants (who 

will be treated collectively in this opinion). Gatson raised two claims under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983. First, he alleged that the defendants conspired to invent a criminal case against 

him, violating his rights at every step; he has framed this as a malicious prosecution

claim. Second, he claimed that the defendants deprived him of his property in violation 

of his due process rights. More specifically, he alleged that after his trial, the defendants 

should have returned the cash, jewelry, and boat that they had seized from him; instead, 

they disposed of this property without according him due process. Gatson also raised 

several state law claims. The District Court dismissed Gatson’s complaint pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1915, and Gatson then filed a timely notice of appeal.1

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise a plenary standard 

of review. Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). As an initial matter, we 

will dispose of two preliminary issues. While Gatson’s appeal was dismissed for failure 

 

1 While Gatson filed his notice of appeal more than 30 days after the District Court 

entered its order dismissing his complaint, he timely requested and received an extension 

from the District Court under Rule 4(a)(5) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

Gatson’s appeal is therefore timely. 
4

to prosecute because he neither paid the fees nor filed an application to appeal in forma 

pauperis (IFP), he soon thereafter filed an IFP application and a motion to reopen. We 

are satisfied that Gatson has established good cause to reopen his case, see 3d Cir. L.A.R.

107.2(a), and that he is entitled to proceed IFP, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Accordingly, we 

will grant his motion to reopen and his IFP application.

Nevertheless, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. Gatson’s first claim is 

that he was the victim of malicious prosecution. To establish malicious prosecution, 

however, Gatson must show that “the prior criminal proceedings . . . have terminated in 

[his] favor.” Hector v. Watt, 235 F.3d 154, 156 (3d Cir. 2000). In his complaint, Gatson 

acknowledges that he was, in fact, convicted, and that his conviction remains valid. 

Accordingly, this claim fails as a matter of law. See Kossler v. Crisanti, 564 F.3d 181, 

190 n.6 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc).

2

We will likewise affirm the District Court’s disposition of Gatson’s due process 

claim. This claim arises under § 1983 and, as a consequence, is subject to a two-year 

 

2

In the course of setting forth his malicious-prosecution claim, Gatson alleges that each 

part of the criminal investigation — including the searches — violated his constitutional 

rights, and that as a consequence, the government unlawfully obtained all the evidence 

that it used against him at trial. It is not clear whether Gatson intended to raise standalone Fourth Amendment claims; to the extent that he did, we conclude that the claims

were properly dismissed. Under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994), a 

prisoner may not use § 1983 to obtain damages if success on the merits necessarily would 

imply the invalidity of a conviction. Here, Gatson affirmatively contends that the 

allegedly illegal searches resulted in an unlawful conviction, and accordingly, he cannot 

bring these claims until and unless he successfully attacks his conviction. See Gibson v. 

Superintendent of N.J. Dep’t of Law & Pub. Safety-Div. of State Police, 411 F.3d 427, 

445 (3d Cir. 2005); see also Evans v. Poskon, 603 F.3d 362, 364 (7th Cir. 2010).
5

statute of limitations. See O’Connor v. City of Newark, 440 F.3d 125, 126-27 (3d Cir. 

2006). In his complaint, Gatson alleges that the defendants improperly withheld and 

disposed of his property after his November 2004 conviction. This claim thus accrued 

soon after his conviction, see Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007); however, he did 

not file his complaint until April 3, 2009 — well outside the limitations period.

Moreover, we perceive no basis to toll the statute of limitations. State law 

typically governs the issue of whether a limitations period should be tolled. See Dique v. 

N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2010). In New Jersey, a statute of 

limitations may be tolled “until the injured party discovers, or by exercise of reasonable 

diligence and intelligence should have discovered, that he may have a basis for an 

actionable claim.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, Gatson’s own 

allegations reveal that he was aware of this claim soon after he was convicted in 

November 2004, but nevertheless failed to file his federal complaint until April 2009. 

Accordingly, we agree with the District Court that Gatson’s due process claim is timebarred.3

 See generally Fogle v. Pierson, 435 F.3d 1252, 1258-59 (10th Cir. 2006)

(explaining that dismissal is appropriate under § 1915 when it is “patently clear” that 

tolling argument lacks merit).

Finally, we conclude that the District Court acted within its discretion in declining 

 

3 Because this claim — that the defendants disposed of his property without according 

him due process — does not implicate the validity of Gatson’s conviction, the deferredaccrual rule of Heck does not apply. See Harvey v. Waldron, 210 F.3d 1008, 1016 (9th 

Cir. 2000). 
6

to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Gatson’s state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1367(c)(3); Figueroa v. Buccaneer Hotel Inc., 188 F.3d 172, 181 (3d Cir. 1999).

Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s order dismissing 

Gatson’s complaint. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.