Vehicle Immobilization Technologies: 

Best Practices for Industry 

and Law Enforcement 

Final Report 

November 2007
FOREWORD 

This study focused on the development of “best practices” associated with the use of Vehicle 

Immobilization Technologies (VITs) in support of hazardous material (hazmat) transportation, 

and commercial vehicle safety and security. A secondary objective was to develop a Concept of 

Operations for law enforcement based on project experiences. 

The work performed under the project included: 

• Conducting an extensive survey of VITs developers and vendors in both United States 

and Canada, including visits to several companies and organizations. 

• Developing a database with VIT vendor and technical information (included in the 

companion CD). 

• Interacting with organizations and stakeholders involved with previous VIT testing and 

evaluation, including law-enforcement, carriers, and industry organizations. 

• Conducting demonstration tests, at a test track facility in South Carolina, of these 

technologies, including driver authentication, vehicle shutdown technologies, and others. 

(Two companion DVDs containing videos that summarize these demonstration tests are 

included with this report.) 

• Conducting a VIT Stakeholder Workshop at the March 2007 Commercial Vehicle Safety 

Alliance conference (CVSA), followed by two industry-related and two law enforcementrelated webinars. 

• Performing three case studies involving current users of these technologies: one large 

high-value carrier, one large and one small hazmat carriers, and interviewing an 

insurance brokerage company providing services to the commercial vehicle 

transportation industry. 

NOTICE 

This document is disseminated under the sponsorship of the Department of Transportation in the 

interest of information exchange. The United States Government assumes no liability for its 

contents or the use thereof. 

The contents of this Report reflect the views of the contractor, who is responsible for the 

accuracy of the data presented herein. The contents do not necessarily reflect the official policy 

of the Department of Transportation. 

This Report does not constitute a standard, specification, or regulation. 

The United States Government does not endorse products or manufacturers named herein. Trade 

or manufacturers’ names appear herein only because they are considered essential to the 

objective of this document. 
Technical Report Documentation Page 

1. Report No. 

FMCSA-RRT-07-021 

2. Government Accession No. 3. Recipient's Catalog No. 

5. Report Date 

November 2007 

4. Title and Subtitle 

Vehicle Immobilization Technologies: Best Practices for Industry and Law 

Enforcement 6. Performing Organization Code 

7. Author(s) 

Oscar Franzese (ORNL), Helmut Knee (ORNL), Thomas Urbanik (UTK), 

Joseph Massimini (Purdue University), Randall Plate (ORISE) 

8. Performing Organization Report No.

9. Performing Organization Name and Address 10. Work Unit No. (TRAIS) 

Oak Ridge National Laboratory 

Bethel Valley Rd, Oak Ridge, TN 37831 11. Contract or Grant No. 

DTMC7503-X-0047 

13. Type of Report and Period Covered 

Final Report, May 2006 – September 

2007 

12. Sponsoring Agency Name and Address 

Department of Transportation 

Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration 

Office of Research and Analysis 

1200 New Jersey Ave. SE, Room 600 West 

Washington, DC 20590

14. Sponsoring Agency Code 

FMCSA 

15. Supplementary Notes 

This program was administered through the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA). The FMCSA 

Program Manager is Joseph DeLorenzo, HM Program Manager, FMCSA Midwestern Service Center. 

16. Abstract 

Since September 11, 2001, the U.S. Department of Transportation’s FMCSA has been actively investigating methods to 

improve safety and security, as well as efficiency, in the trucking industry. To achieve these goals, FMCSA conducted 

various tests and evaluations of security technologies, including the 2004 Hazardous Materials Safety and Security 

Technology Operational Test, the Expanded Satellite Tracking, and the Untethered Trailer Tracking and Control 

Security projects. As a result of these studies, it was determined that additional technologies, including panic buttons, 

driver identification, and vehicle disabling could be deployed to obtain additional security benefits. In FY 2005, the 

House of Representatives Conference Report 108-792 stated that further testing of technologies, including vehicle 

disabling was necessary. FMCSA funded this project to support the Congressional need called out in the 

aforementioned report, and built it on the experience and lessons learned from previous field operational tests. The 

primary objective of this project was to develop “Best Practices” associated with the use of Vehicle Immobilization 

Technologies (VITs) in support of hazmat transportation, and commercial vehicle safety and security. A secondary 

objective was to develop a Concept of Operations for law enforcement based on project experiences. Conclusions from 

this study suggest that VITs are currently being used by early adopters in the trucking industry for the security of highvalue goods and for the protection of drivers against theft and hijacking. Driver Authentication Technologies were 

shown to be the first and most important line of defense to improve security and are being deployed rapidly. In terms of 

best practices, several items were clearly shown to be key elements of an effective system to improve security, including 

prioritization of security-related messages from wireless communications systems, company protocols involving law 

enforcement in a vehicle shutdown, and smart vehicle immobilization technology that can act in accordance with 

surrounding conditions. 

17. Key Words 

Remote Vehicle Shutdown, Remote Vehicle Disablement, 

Driver Authentication Technologies 

18. Distribution Statement 

No restrictions

19. Security Classif. (of this report) 

Unclassified 

20. Security Classif. (of this page) 

Unclassified 

21. No. of Pages 

161 

22. Price 

N/A 

Form DOT F 1700.7 (8-72) Reproduction of completed page authorized. 
SI* (MODERN METRIC) CONVERSION FACTORS 

APPROXIMATE CONVERSIONS TO SI UNITS APPROXIMATE CONVERSIONS FROM 

Symbol When You Know Multiply By To Find Symbol Symbol When You Know Multiply By T

LENGTH LENGTH 

in inches 25.4 millimeters mm mm millimeters 0.039 inft feet 0.305 meters m m meters 3.28 feyd yards 0.914 meters m m meters 1.09 ymi miles 1.61 kilometers km km kilometers 0.621 m

AREA AREA 

in2 square inches 645.2 square millimeters mm2 mm2 square millimeters 0.0016 sft2 square feet 0.093 square meters m2 m2 square meters 10.764 syd2 square yards 0.836 square meters m2 m2 square meters 1.195 sac acres 0.405 hectares ha ha hectares 2.47 ami2 square miles 2.59 square kilometers km2 km2 square kilometers 0.386 s

VOLUME VOLUME 

fl oz fluid ounces 29.57 milliliters ml ml milliliters 0.034 flgal gallons 3.785 liters l l liters 0.264 gft3 cubic feet 0.028 cubic meters m3 m3 cubic meters 35.71 cyd3 cubic yards 0.765 cubic meters m3 m3 cubic meters 1.307 c

MASS MASS 

oz ounces 28.35 grams g g grams 0.035 olb pounds 0.454 kilograms kg kg kilograms 2.202 pT short tons (2,000 lbs) 0.907 megagrams Mg Mg megagrams 1.103 s

TEMPERATURE (exact) TEMPERATURE (exact) 

°F Fahrenheit 5(F-32)/9 Celsius °C °C Celsius 1.8 C + 32 F

temperature or (F-32)/1.8 temperature temperature te

ILLUMINATION ILLUMINATION 

fc foot-candles 10.76 lux lx lx lux 0.0929 fofl foot-lamberts 3.426 candela/m2 cd/m2 cd/m2 candela/m2 0.2919 fo

FORCE and PRESSURE or STRESS FORCE and PRESSURE or ST

lbf pound-force 4.45 newtons N N newtons 0.225 ppsi pound-force per square inch 6.89 kilopascals kPa kPa kilopascals 0.145 p

p

* SI is the symbol for the International System of Units. Appropriate rounding should be done to comply with Section 4 of A
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 

This project was sponsored by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) and 

the Tennessee Department of Safety (TDOS). The authors would like to thank Lt. Colonel 

Strawther, Capt. Binkley, and Lt. Robinson from TDOS for their valuable contributions in 

developing the Law Enforcement Concept of Operations. 

FMCSA and the authors wish to gratefully acknowledge the contributions of all the companies 

that participated in the demonstration tests: Satellite Security Systems, Blue Bird Body 

Company, Qualcomm, MAGTEC, Celadon Trucking, International Truck and 

Engine/NAVISTAR, BSM Wireless, GlenHugh Enterprise, and Archetype. Their contributions 

of equipment, work force, and personal support made this formidable project a success. The 

authors also wish to thank the South Carolina Department of Public Safety; their participation 

added realism to the demonstration tests. The help provided by Mr. Gary Capps and Ms. Sheila 

Moore of Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) during the demonstration tests was invaluable 

to the success of the project. 

Lastly, the authors would also like to thank all the other companies that participated in this 

project, the Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance (CVSA) Hazmat and Transportation Security 

Committees, all the stakeholders that gave their time and input to this project, in particular, Dr. 

John Conley with the National Tank Truck Carriers Association, and Ms. Sheila Moore and Ms. 

Teresa Ferguson (ORNL) for the assistance provided during and after the CVSA Workshop. 

The Law Enforcement Concept of Operation section of this report was authored by Dr. Thomas 

Urbanik, University of Tennessee at Knoxville; Appendix A was authored by Mr. Joseph 

Massimini, Purdue University; and Mr. Randall Plate, ORISE, contributed to the development of 

Appendix D. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 

1. INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................................1

2. TECHNOLOGY OVERVIEW............................................................................................4

2.1 TECHNOLOGY COMPONENTS AND SUBSYSTEMS............................................4 

2.2 FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENT MAPPING .............................................................8 

2.3 TECHNOLOGY SCAN AND EVALUATION..........................................................10 

3. DEMONSTRATION TESTS.............................................................................................26

3.1 DEMONSTRATION TESTS DESCRIPTION ...........................................................27 

3.2 DEMONSTRATION TESTS RESULTS....................................................................35 

3.3 DEMONSTRATION TESTS CONCLUSIONS .........................................................59 

4. CASE STUDIES..................................................................................................................61

4.1 HIGH-VALUE CARRIER: CELADON TRUCKING ...............................................61 

4.2 LARGE HAZMAT TRANSPORTATION COMPANY ............................................65 

4.3 SMALL HAZMAT TRANSPORTATION COMPANY: SWAIN OIL TRANSPORT68 

4.4 INSURANCE BROKERAGE COMPANY: FIRST HORIZON INSURANCE, INC.71 

5. VIT BEST PRACTICES ....................................................................................................73

5.1 STAKEHOLDERS WORKSHOP, WEBINARS, AND DISCUSSIONS ..................73 

5.2 IDENTIFIED BEST PRACTICES..............................................................................73 

5.3 VIT TECHNOLOGY-RELATED BEST PRACTICES..............................................74 

5.4 LAW ENFORCEMENT-RELATED BEST PRACTICES FOR VITS ......................78 

5.5 PRIORITIZATION OF BEST PRACTICES ..............................................................80 

6. VST CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT............................81

6.1 OVERVIEW OF PROCESS........................................................................................81 

6.2 VEHICLE INTERDICTION .......................................................................................83 

7. CONCLUSIONS .................................................................................................................87

8. REFERENCES....................................................................................................................90

APPENDIX A: DRIVER AUTHENTICATION TECHNOLOGIES....................................93

A.1 INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................93 

A.2 BACKGROUND .........................................................................................................93 

i 
A.3 LOG-IN DEVICES......................................................................................................96 

A.4. BIOMETRIC SYSTEMS.............................................................................................98 

A.5 SMART CARDS .......................................................................................................112 

A.6 CONCLUSIONS........................................................................................................112 

APPENDIX B: VIT VENDOR/DEVELOPER QUESTIONNAIRE ...................................114

B.1 OVERVIEW ..............................................................................................................114 

B.2 BACKGROUND .......................................................................................................114 

B.3 POTENTIAL TESTING AND EVALUATION APPROACHES ............................115 

B.4 VEHICLE IMMOBILIZATION TECHNOLOGY (VIT) QUESTIONNAIRE........117 

APPENDIX C: DEMONSTRATION TESTS PROGRAM..................................................128

C.1 BACKGROUND .......................................................................................................128 

C.2 SCHEDULE OF EVENTS ........................................................................................128 

C.3 DEMONSTRATION TESTS PROGRAM ...............................................................129 

APPENDIX D: VENDOR INFORMATION AND DEMONSTRATION TESTS 

VISUALIZATION SOFTWARE....................................................................................132

D.1 BACKGROUND .......................................................................................................132 

D.2 VENDOR INFORMATION SOFTWARE INTERFACE DESCRIPTION .............132 

D.3 DEMONSTRATION TESTS SOFTWARE INTERFACE DESCRIPTION............135 

APPENDIX E: VIT STAKEHOLDERS LIST.......................................................................139

E.1 BACKGROUND .......................................................................................................139 

ii 
LIST OF TABLES 

Table 1. Initial List of VIT Companies Potentially Satisfying One or More FRs........................ 11 

Table 2. VIT Technology Matrix—Functional Requirements (FR), Vehicle Disablement Method 

(VDM), Costs and Other Considerations................................................................................ 14 

Table 3. Available VIT Developers Testing Capabilities (Testing Modes) ................................. 27 

Table 4. Demonstration Test Matrix............................................................................................. 28 

Table 5. Demonstration Vehicles.................................................................................................. 36 

Table 6. Satellite Security Systems VST Test Results— Slow Speed (Run 1) and Arterial Speed 

(Runs 2–4)............................................................................................................................... 42 

Table 7. MAGTEC/Qualcomm VST Tests Results—Qualcomm Demo (Run 1), MAGTEC 

Demo (Run 2), and Hijack Demo (Run 3).............................................................................. 46 

Table 8. International Truck and Engine VST Tests Results— Engine Shutdown (Run 1), Severe 

(75%) Depower (Run 2), and Extreme Depower (Run 3) ...................................................... 50 

Table 9. BSM Wireless VST Tests Results—Slow Speed (Run 1), Arterial Speed (Runs 2 and 3), 

and Geofence Demo (Run 4) .................................................................................................. 54 

Table 10. GlenHugh Enterprise VST Tests Results— Geofence Demo (Run 1) and Arterial 

Speed (Run 2) ......................................................................................................................... 57 

Table 11. Prioritized List of Best Practices by Four Criteria........................................................ 80 

Table 12. VST Activation Checklist............................................................................................. 86 

Table 13. Driver Authentication Technology List........................................................................ 96 

Table 14. VIT Stakeholders List and Contact Information......................................................... 139 

LIST OF FIGURES 

Figure 1. Components of a VIT System ......................................................................................... 4 

Figure 2. Information Flow for VDT Activation with a VIT Vendor Control Center.................... 6 

Figure 3. Information Flow for VDT Activation without a VIT Vendor Control Center .............. 6 

Figure 4. Information Flow for VST Activation with Dispatcher Control..................................... 7 

Figure 5. Information Flow for VST Activation with VIT Vendor Control................................... 8 

Figure 6. Mapping of FMCSA’s Functional Requirements on a Generic VIT System.................. 9 

Figure 7. Laurens Proving Grounds (LPG)................................................................................... 30 

Figure 8. Schematic Diagram of Test Track 8 at LPG Used for the Demonstration Tests .......... 31 

Figure 9. S3 Driver Authentication Swipe Card........................................................................... 36 

Figure 10. BSM Wireless Driver Authentication Stage 1: Proximity Card.................................. 36 

Figure 11. BSM Wireless Driver Authentication Stage 2: Keypad Code Entry........................... 37 

Figure 12. MAGTEC Driver Authentication Keypad Code Entry ............................................... 37 

Figure 13. Qualcomm and Celadon Trucking Driver Authentication Keypad Code Entry.......... 37 

Figure 14. International Truck and Engine Driver Authentication Keypad Code Entry.............. 37 

Figure 15. GlenHugh Driver Authentication Transponder.......................................................... 38 

iii 
Figure 16. MAGTEC Vehicle Disablement Due to Wire Tampering .......................................... 39 

Figure 17. BSM Wireless Vehicle Disablement Due to Loss of Signal ....................................... 39 

Figure 18. S3 Panic Button ........................................................................................................... 40 

Figure 19. BSM Wireless Key Fob Device .................................................................................. 40 

Figure 20. S3 and Blue Bird VST Demonstration Test ................................................................ 41 

Figure 21. S3 and Blue Bird VST Demonstration Test at Arterial Speed Run 2 Speed Profile... 43 

Figure 22. S3 and Blue Bird VST Demonstration Test at Arterial Speed Vehicle Trajectory 

Immediately before Stopping (Run 2) .................................................................................... 43 

Figure 23. S3 and Blue Bird VST Demonstration Test at Arterial Speed Run 3 Speed Profile... 44 

Figure 24. S3 and Blue Bird VST Demonstration Test at Arterial Speed Run 4 Speed Profile... 44 

Figure 25. MAGTEC VST Demonstration Test........................................................................... 45 

Figure 26. Qualcomm VST Demonstration Test at Arterial Speed Run 1 Speed Profile............ 47 

Figure 27. MAGTEC VST Demonstration Test at Arterial Speed Run 2 Speed Profile.............. 48 

Figure 28. MAGTEC Demonstration Test at Arterial Speed Run 3 (Hijack Case) Speed Profile

................................................................................................................................................. 48 

Figure 29. International Truck and Engine VST Demonstration Test.......................................... 49 

Figure 30. International Truck and Engine VST Demonstration Test at Arterial Speed Run 1 

(Engine Shutdown) Speed Profile........................................................................................... 51 

Figure 31. International Truck and Engine VST Demonstration Test at Arterial Speed Vehicle 

Trajectory Immediately before Stopping (Run 1)................................................................... 51 

Figure 32. International Truck and Engine VST Demonstration Test at Arterial Speed Run 2 

(75% Depower) Speed Profile ................................................................................................ 52 

Figure 33. International Truck and Engine VST Demonstration Test at Arterial Speed Run 3 

(Extreme Depower) Speed Profile.......................................................................................... 52 

Figure 34. BSM Wireless VST Demonstration Test .................................................................... 53 

Figure 35. BSM Wireless VST Demonstration Test at Arterial Speed Run 2 Speed Profile...... 55 

Figure 36. BSM Wireless VST Demonstration Test at Arterial Speed Run 3 Speed Profile....... 55 

Figure 37. BSM Wireless VST Demonstration Test at Arterial Speed Run 4 (Geofence Demo) 

Speed Profile........................................................................................................................... 56 

Figure 38. GlenHugh Enterprise VST Demonstration Test.......................................................... 56 

Figure 39. GlenHugh Enterprise Demonstration Test at Arterial Speed Run 1 (Geofence Demo) 

Speed Profile........................................................................................................................... 57 

Figure 40. GlenHugh Enterprise VST Demonstration Test at Arterial Speed Run 2 Speed Profile

................................................................................................................................................. 58 

Figure 41. GlenHugh Enterprise VST Demonstration Test at Arterial Speed Vehicle Trajectory 

Immediately before Stopping (Run 2) .................................................................................... 59 

Figure 42. VIT Definitions ........................................................................................................... 94 

Figure 43. Visual Representation of Verification......................................................................... 94 

Figure 44. Visual Representation of Identification....................................................................... 95 

Figure 45. Truck Cab Outfitted With Swipe Card System. .......................................................... 97 

Figure 46. Global Log-in Device.................................................................................................. 97 

Figure 47. FAR and FRR Graphical Representation .................................................................. 100 

iv 
Figure 48. Fingerprint Minutia ................................................................................................... 101 

Figure 49. Fingerprint Scanner. .................................................................................................. 102 

Figure 50. Vehicle Fingerprint Scanner...................................................................................... 102 

Figure 51. Iris Patterns Used for Identification. ......................................................................... 103 

Figure 52. Vein Recognition Process.......................................................................................... 104 

Figure 53. Finger Vein Authentication Technology................................................................... 105 

Figure 54. Voice Authentication User Input............................................................................... 106 

Figure 55. Geometric Measurement Points ................................................................................ 106 

Figure 56. Eigenfaces.................................................................................................................. 107 

Figure 57. Hand Geometry Measurement System...................................................................... 108 

Figure 58. Hand Geometry Measurement System in Use........................................................... 109 

Figure 59. Ear Shape Biometric Signature. ................................................................................ 110 

Figure 60. Biometric Technology Comparison. ......................................................................... 111 

Figure 61. VIT Information Visualization Interface................................................................... 132 

Figure 62. Interface Background ................................................................................................ 133 

Figure 63. VIT Vendor Contact Information.............................................................................. 133 

Figure 64. VIT Product General Information ............................................................................. 134 

Figure 65. VIT Product Technical Information .......................................................................... 135 

Figure 66. Running the Demonstration Tests Visualization Software from the CD .................. 136 

Figure 67. Interface Background ................................................................................................ 136 

Figure 68. Speed Profile Graph .................................................................................................. 137 

Figure 69. Control Tool Bar........................................................................................................ 137 

Figure 70. Resizing Interface Window ....................................................................................... 138 

v 
ACRONYMS 

ACS Acceleration Control System 

AQ Answered Questionnaire 

AW Automotive Wireless 

ATA American Trucking Associations 

BB Blue Bird Body Company 

CHP California Highway Patrol 

COO Concept of Operation 

CVIEW Commercial Vehicle Information Exchange Window 

CVO Commercial Vehicle Operations 

CVSA Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance 

DT Demonstration Tests 

DAT Driver Authentication Technologies 

DOT Department of Transportation 

EA Eureka Aerospace 

EER Equal Error Rate 

eVID Electronic Vehicle Immobilization Device 

FAR False Acceptance Rate 

FMCSA Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration 

FOT Field Operational Testing 

FR Functional Requirement 

FRR False Rejection Rate 

GHE GlenHugh Enterprise 

GL Global Log-in 

GPS Global Positioning System 

GVWR Gross Vehicle Weight Rating 

HPEMS High-Power Electromagnetic System for Stopping Vehicles 

LED Light Emitting Diode 

LLNL Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 

LPG Laurens Proving Grounds 

MCSAP Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Program 

MOPS Measures of Performance 

MSC Monitoring and Support Center 

NCIC National Crime Information Center 

NDA Non-Disclosure Agreement 

OEM Original Equipment Manufacturer 

OR Owner Representative 

ORNL Oak Ridge National Laboratory 

PSAP Public Safety Answering Point 

RFID Radio Frequency Identification 

S3 Satellite Security Systems 

SD Shutdown 

SOS Semi Onboard Shutdown 

SQ Submitted Questionnaire 

ST Safefreight Technology 

vi 
TDOS Tennessee Department of Safety 

TI Teleconference Interview 

TMC Technology and Maintenance Council 

TSA Transportation Security Administration 

UIP Unattended Idle Protect 

UTK University of Tennessee at Knoxville 

UVW Unloaded Vehicle Weight 

VCC Vehicle Command and Control 

VDT Vehicle Disabling Technologies 

VO Vehicle Owner 

VIN Vehicle Identification Number 

VIT Vehicle Immobilization Technology 

VST Vehicle Shutdown Technologies 

VV Visited Vendor 

WM Wireless Matrix 

vii 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

The catastrophic events of September 11, 2001 and the ongoing war on terrorism have 

heightened the level of concern from Federal government officials and the transportation 

industry regarding the secure transport of hazardous materials (HAZMAT). Security concerns 

focus on the potential of HAZMAT shipments as targets for terrorists. HAZMAT shipments 

through intermodal connectors, modes, and facilities are all attractive targets for terrorists, and 

pose a much greater concern to public safety than most other shipment types. HAZMAT 

shipments, especially fuels and chemicals, are especially attractive targets due to the multiple 

points of vulnerability. These vulnerabilities exist at shipper, motor carrier, and shipment 

recipient facilities, and during shipment movement en route throughout the nation’s roadway 

infrastructure. 

Numerous international and domestic incidents occurred over the past several years that 

demonstrate the real threat potential that HAZMAT shipments pose. For example, the following 

events all occurred in a two-month period in 2002: 

• March 31, 2002: A 29-year-old driver for a propane distributor drove away with a 3,000- 

gallon bobtail. He made a telephone threat stating that he wanted to kill President George 

W. Bush and that he would use the bobtail as a “bomb”. 

• April 11, 2002: A terrorist driving a truck carrying liquefied natural gas ignited his cargo 

in front of a synagogue on the Tunisian Island of Djerba, killing 17 people, mainly 

German and French tourists. Al Qaeda claimed responsibility for the blast. 

• May 16, 2002: A tractor-trailer carrying 10 tons of deadly cyanide in 96 drums was stolen 

after three armed men held up the vehicle north of Mexico City. Six drums were never 

found. 

• May 2002: A fully loaded tanker truck pulled into Israel's largest fuel depot and suddenly 

caught fire due to an explosive charge connected to a cellular phone. The fire was 

extinguished, but had the truck exploded, destruction and death would have resulted. 

Events such as these demonstrate the security and safety risks associated with HAZMAT 

shipments. The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA), working in close 

cooperation with the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), has attempted to proactively 

address public and private sector HAZMAT security concerns by identifying potential security 

risks related to HAZMAT transportation and proposing solutions to minimize those risks. 

FMCSA embarked on a program to improve HAZMAT security and safety by using regulatory 

measures, security assessments, and outreach efforts. Part of this effort was to sponsor an 

industry competitive procurement to conduct a national level field operational test (FOT). This 

resulted in FMCSA awarding a contract for a team led by the Battelle Memorial Institute 

(Battelle) (Deployment Team) to test currently existing major technologies that could offer 

solutions to minimize security risks of truck-based HAZMAT shipments. Supporting 

Deployment Team members included: QUALCOMM; the American Transportation Research 

Institute (ATRI); the Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance (CVSA); Savi Technologies; the 

Biometrics Solutions Group (BSG); Total Security-US; and the Spill Center. 

viii 
ix 

To evaluate the technologies tested in this FOT; their costs, benefits, and the operational 

processes required to be performed, the FMCSA, supported by the Intelligent Transportation 

Systems (ITS)/Joint Program Office (JPO), awarded an independent evaluation contract in 

August 2002. Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) (Evaluation Team) led the 

independent evaluation for this HAZMAT FOT. 

Overview of the Field Operational Test 

This Hazardous Materials Safety and Security Technology Field Operational Test was focused 

on four different HAZMAT truck transportation scenarios representing the following industry 

segments: 

• Bulk Petroleum 

• Bulk Chemical 

• Less-than-Truckload (LTL) 

• Truckload Explosives industries 

The scenarios were chosen based on the results of a hazardous materials risk and threat 

assessment that was conducted in the initial phase of this project by the Deployment Team, and 

was combined with a desire to test the technology in different types of industry. The risk and 

threat assessment methodology was used to identify the types of materials that were of highest 

concern, as well as the most likely attack scenarios (theft of a material, 

interception/diversion, and legal exploitation). Specific vulnerabilities were also 

identified during this phase of the project, which served as the basis for selecting the 

technologies within each scenario. 

As detailed in Table 1 on page 10, a wide variety of existing technologies were tested within 

each scenario. These technologies were integrated based on meeting specific functional 

requirements that FMSCA had set for the Deployment Team contract.1 FMCSA also stipulated 

that these would need to be commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) technologies, such that they could 

conceivably be implemented rapidly by the motor carrier industry in the very near future. 

The technologies were grouped together into several packages within each scenario. The 

grouping assisted in addressing the wide range of vulnerabilities identified in the risk/threat 

assessment, and for testing several different cost tiers reflecting a range of carrier deployment 

options based on market conditions. Based on this premise, the various technology components 

were separated into six technology tiers, ranging from a low-end cost of approximately $800 per 

vehicle to a high-end of approximately $3,500 per vehicle. 

The technologies were matched to testing scenarios, which were developed to address the 

functional requirements and the threats and vulnerabilities identified in the Threat/Risk 

Assessment. With the overall goal of the FOT being to test technologies installed in 100 

vehicles, each scenario tested a total of 25 vehicles, with various combinations of technology 

installed on each vehicle. Table 2, on page 13, provides a summary of each scenario and the 

technology components to be tested by scenario.
1. INTRODUCTION 

Since September 11, 2001, the U.S. Department of Transportation’s Federal Motor Carrier 

Safety Administration (FMCSA) has been actively investigating methods to improve safety 

and security, as well as efficiency, in the trucking industry. In order to achieve these goals, 

FMCSA has conducted various tests and evaluations of security technologies. The purpose of 

the 2004 Hazardous Materials Safety and Security Technology Field Operational Test 

(FMCSA, 2004a; 2004b; 2004c) was the quantification of the security costs and benefits of an 

operational concept that applies technology and improves enforcement procedures to 

hazardous materials (hazmat) transportation. Subsequently, FMCSA undertook the Expanded 

Satellite Tracking (FMCSA, 2006) and the Untethered Trailer Tracking and Control Security 

(FMCSA, 2005) projects. These projects used wireless communication systems with position 

tracking as the base technology and included the wireless transmission of tracking data to law 

enforcement and emergency responders, in addition to the carrier. It was determined that 

additional technologies, including panic buttons, driver identification, and vehicle disabling 

could be built onto the wireless communication system to obtain additional security benefits. 

In FY 2005, the House of Representatives Conference Report 108-792 (U.S. House, 2004) 

stated that further testing of technologies, including vehicle disabling, was necessary. 

This Vehicle Immobilization Technology (VIT) Evaluation Project was conducted to support 

the Congressional need called out in the aforementioned report and was built on the experience 

and lessons learned from previous field operational tests. To that end, the Oak Ridge National 

Laboratory (ORNL), in partnership with the University of Tennessee at Knoxville (UTK) and 

the Tennessee Department of Safety (TDOS), conducted an assessment and demonstration 

testing of VITs for application to commercial vehicle hazmat transport in support of the 

FMCSA’s goal of continued improvement of safety, security, and efficiency. 

The high-level approach taken to conduct this study focused mainly on how the VITs are being 

deployed and used by the motor carrier industry. To that end, the project first identified 

technology providers that commercially offered hardware and services (i.e., technologies that 

were readily available) and that satisfied at least one of the five VIT functional requirements 

that were identified by FMCSA in previous studies. A wide variation of technologies and 

approaches to vehicle disablement and vehicle shutdown were identified and served as the 

basis to compile a preliminary list of “best practices.” as well as other issues involved in the 

deployment and usage of VITs. These preliminary “best practices” and VIT issues were further 

discussed in different forums (e.g., the 2007 Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance Conference, 

several industry and law-enforcement-focused webinars, and discussions with both large and 

small trucking companies) in an attempt to capture the perspectives of the primary VIT 

stakeholders. Those “best practices” also played a critical role in the development of a concept 

of operation (COO) for law enforcement application of VITs, which was developed by UTK in 

close collaboration with the Tennessee Department of Safety. 

Section 2 of this report presents a discussion of the different VITs that are currently 

commercially available and also includes a few that are in the development stage. The section 

starts with a discussion of the components of a VIT system and their interactions, and 

1 
continues with specific descriptions of the different technologies surveyed, touching on issues 

such as cost, installation, and maintenance, among others. 

Section 3 focuses on the vehicle disabling and vehicle shutdown tests that were conducted as 

part of this project. This is a technical section that presents the different driver authentication 

technologies that were demonstrated by the participating vendors and discusses Vehicle 

Shutdown Technology (VST) parameters, such as the elapsed times between the instant the 

order to shutdown the vehicle was given and the time the vehicle came to a stop. The section 

also presents speed profiles of the test vehicles obtained while they were in the shutdown 

process. All of the demonstration tests were videotaped and are included in a companion DVD, 

with software that permits the user to see, in a dynamic way, the speed profiles and trajectories 

of the demonstration vehicles that participated in the VST tests. Also included is a copy of the 

VIT information database that includes data and information on all of the vendors that 

participated in this project (the ones that participated in the demonstration tests as well as many 

others) and that completed a survey about their technologies and systems. 

In Section 4, the real-world experiences in the deployment and usage of VITs by large and 

small trucking companies are presented. Those include a large (3000+ trucks), high-value 

carrier, and two hazmat transportation companies: one large and one small. The section also 

includes a discussion with a large commercial insurance brokerage firm, providing risk 

management services, insurance, and bonds to commercial clients, including the transportation 

industry. 

All of the information collected in Sections 2, 3, and 4, as well as the results of interactions 

with other stakeholders, contributed to the list of VIT Best Practices presented in Section 5. 

Due to the diversity in the organizations that provided input to this project, it would have been 

very difficult to arrive at an absolute group-consensus on how these identified “best practices” 

should be prioritized. Therefore, the interactions with the stakeholders focused mainly on the 

identification of VIT best practices and only secondarily on their prioritization. Nevertheless, 

Section 5 presents a prioritization of these different “best practices” according to their impacts 

on four main criteria: security, safety, reliability, and readiness for deployment. 

Section 6 presents a law enforcement concept of operations for stopping moving vehicles using 

VSTs. This COO provides an appropriate protocol to avoid inadvertent activation, a list of 

steps and procedures to be followed before activation, and a checklist of organizations that 

should be coordinated with in order to ensure safe utilization. 

The next section of this report, Section 7, summarizes the findings of this study. The last 

section is the References section, which is followed by five supporting appendices. 

One of the early primary conclusions of the study was that the industry, as a whole, favors an 

approach that focuses on theft prevention—before a vehicle is actually underway. As a result, 

the project provided emphasis on the evaluation of driver authentication technologies to ensure 

verification of authorized personnel, as well as preventing hijack situations. Appendix A of the 

report presents a discussion of these driver authentication technologies that complement the 

ones showcased in the demonstration tests. 

2 
The remaining four appendices describe the Vendor Questionnaire (Appendix B) and the 

software to access the information collected in the demonstration tests and Vendor 

Questionnaire (Appendix D). Appendix C presents the schedule of events for the 

demonstration tests and a description of the different technologies and scenarios tested for each 

VIT provider; and Appendix E provides the list of all of the stakeholders that participated in 

this project. 

3 
2. TECHNOLOGY OVERVIEW 

Vehicle Immobilization Technologies (VITs) are classified into two main categories, 

Vehicle Disabling Technologies (VDTs) and Vehicle Shutdown Technologies (VSTs), 

depending on the kinematic status of the vehicle at the time the immobilization process 

starts. VDTs are immobilization technologies that impede restarting a vehicle. They can be 

activated when the vehicle is moving or stationary, but the VDT will only immobilize the 

vehicle the next time an attempt is made to start it. VSTs, on the other hand, are 

technologies that cause a vehicle to loose power while it is moving and will cause it to 

eventually come to a stop, as well as impede the restarting of the vehicle after the 

technology has been triggered. While there are VIT systems that are composed only of a 

VDT, those that have vehicle shutdown capabilities always have vehicle disabling 

capabilities as well. 

2.1 TECHNOLOGY COMPONENTS AND SUBSYSTEMS 

The surveys conducted in this project, as well as the vendors’ questionnaire results, 

indicated that although there are as many configurations and setups for a VIT system as 

there are vendors, the basic components are similar for all of them. Referring to Figure 1, 

at the core of any VIT system, there is (usually) an electronic vehicle immobilization 

device (eVID, indicated as item 1 in the figure) mounted somewhere in the engine 

compartment of the equipped vehicle. This device can be actuated remotely and/or locally 

to impair the performance of the vehicle (through, for example, an acceleration control, a 

throttle reduction, or a power reduction mechanism) up to a complete engine shutdown. 

Figure 1. Components of a VIT System 

4 
In general, the default mode of the eVID is “active.” That is, vehicles equipped with this 

technology cannot be started until the eVID is deactivated. The deactivation of the device 

can be achieved through different means (Item 2 in Figure 1) which range from keypads—

the most common, where the driver enters a predefined code—to swipe cards and RFID 

(Radio Frequency Identification) tokens, up to biometric devices (note: for VIT systems, 

biometric devices were still in a research stage at the time this report was completed). A 

more detailed description of different driver authentication devices can be found in 

Appendix A. Usually, the eVID is activated automatically when the driver shuts down the 

engine, but it can also be triggered when one of the cabin doors is opened while the engine 

is running (hijack prevention mode). 

Outside the cabin, with the engine idling, the eVID can be actuated locally (i.e., at a short 

range) by the driver of the vehicle. This is done through a key fob device (Item 3 in Figure 

1) similar to those used to lock/unlock the doors of passenger cars, but usually requiring 

two buttons to be pressed at the same time to avoid unintentionally triggering the device. 

The eVID can also be actuated remotely by the dispatcher (Item 4 in Figure 1) or the 

technology provider (Item 5 in Figure 1) if the vehicle is equipped with a wireless 

communication system, generally satellite (Item 6 in Figure 1) or cell phone 

communications (Item 7 in Figure 1), or both. This remote actuation also requires a GPS 

(Global Positioning System) device (Item 8 in Figure 1) that provides location information 

of the equipped vehicle. 

The flow of information to and from the equipped vehicle is as follows. From the vehicle, 

its position plus eVID status information is forwarded to the technology provider’s 

computers (Item 9 in Figure 1) using the available communication links (Items 6 or 7 in 

Figure 1). Conversely, from the technology provider’s computers and using the same 

communication links, messages can be sent to the eVID, including those that initiate the 

shutdown of the vehicle while it is moving. 

For the case of a local vehicle disablement (for example, when the eVID enters into a 

tampering mode after a given number of authentication attempts have been made and 

failed), the device generally disables the vehicle without waiting to receive a message from 

the central computers (i.e., the decision is made locally). However, the device sends a 

message to the technology provider’s computers indicating the problem at hand (in the 

previous example, conveying that the device has entered into a tampering mode). In some 

cases, this message is immediately forwarded to the owner of the vehicle through e-mails 

or phone messages, so the trucking company can take some action (e.g., contacting the 

driver to determine the nature of the problem). In other instances, the vendor’s control 

center deals with the problem directly and, subsequently, notifies the owner. Figure 2 and 

Figure 3 show schematic diagrams of the information flows to and from the vehicle for 

VDT activation, with and without a VIT vendor control center, respectively. 

5 
Figure 2. Information Flow for VDT Activation with a VIT Vendor Control Center 

Figure 3. Information Flow for VDT Activation without a VIT Vendor Control Center 

Regarding remote vehicle shutdowns, two different models are currently in use to trigger 

the process. In the first model, the trucking company’s operation center (Item 4 in Figure 

1) has direct access to the eVID (Item 1 in Figure 1) through the technology provider’s 

computers (Item 9 in Figure 1) and the available communication links (Items 6 and/or 7 in 

Figure 1). The trucking company can then send a message to the eVID that initiates the 

shutdown (or disablement) process without any other exogenous intervention. Figure 4

presents the flow of information for this model in a simplified diagram (note: dashed lines 

indicate components that may or may not be present in this model). 

6 
Figure 4. Information Flow for VST Activation with Dispatcher Control 

The second model adds a technology provider’s control center (Item 5 in Figure 1), which 

is the one that ultimately sends the message to the eVID to start the shutdown process. In 

this model, the technology provider’s control center identifies the location of the vehicle in 

distress (Item 8 in Figure 1) and contacts the law enforcement organization with 

jurisdiction in that area. The shutdown process is initiated only when law enforcement 

personnel (Item 10 in Figure 1) are in visual contact with the truck and when they 

determine that is safe to do so. Of course, this involvement of law enforcement personnel 

is also possible in the first model, although it is a cumbersome process for the trucking 

company since it would have to have up-to-date contact information for all the law 

enforcement jurisdictions in the country.1 A simplified diagram of the information flow for 

this case is presented in Figure 5. 

 1

 At the time of the publication of this report, there had been at least one reported remote shutdown of a heavy vehicle in the United 

States (see Section 4 of this report for additional details). 

7 
Figure 5. Information Flow for VST Activation with VIT Vendor Control 

2.2 FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENT MAPPING 

As part of previous research efforts, FMCSA had identified five functional requirements 

(FRs) of interest for VITs. These FRs are: 

FR1: Vehicle disablement if the vehicle senses an unauthorized driver 

FR2: Vehicle disablement/shutdown in the event of a loss of signal 

FR3: Remote vehicle disablement/shutdown by the driver 

FR4: Remote vehicle shutdown by the dispatcher 

FR5: Remote vehicle shutdown by law enforcement 

Functional Requirement 1 falls into what has been defined in this document as a VDT, 

while FRs 4 and 5 are the main attributes of VSTs. FRs 2 and 3 would be applicable to 

both VDTs and VSTs, depending on whether the vehicle is stationary or moving. 

This taxonomy is adopted in this report, although, as discussed later in this report, there is 

a strong stakeholder consensus that FR5 should always work in conjunction with FR4. 

That is, discussions with law enforcement personnel have indicated that it would be very 

difficult and impractical for law enforcement to remotely shutdown a vehicle without 

coordination with the dispatcher or some other party in possession of all the necessary 

information and control capabilities to trigger such an event. A more detailed discussion on 

this issue is presented in the Best Practice and Concept of Operation chapters of this report. 

8 
These five functional requirements can be mapped to the VIT system components and 

subsystems discussed in the last section. Figure 6 reproduces all the elements and 

interactions of a generic VIT system that was shown in Figure 1, but identifies which of 

these components and interactions are parts of the five functional requirements. While all 

of the FRs involve the eVID in this generic VIT system, FR1 is restricted to the truck 

cabin, the driver, and his/her interaction with the vehicle immobilization device. Notice 

that this particular FR can also be satisfied by means other than an eVID; that is, there are 

mechanical (e.g., brake locks) and other types of devices that can make the vehicle undrivable unless the device is disengaged. 

Functional requirement 2 implies the activation of the eVID when one or more of the 

communication links, either GPS or data transfer, become unavailable for a given period of 

time. In general, the VIT systems that satisfy this FR allow the user to define the interval 

of time that needs to elapse before a loss of signal causes a vehicle shutdown. Loss of 

signal can also produce a vehicle disablement if, for example, a communication wire (e.g., 

antenna wire) is physically severed or even if somebody tampers with the antenna itself 

(e.g., covers the antenna with a metal dome) while the truck is idling. 

Remote disablement/shutdown by the driver (FR3) is accomplished, in general, by a key 

fob device that allows that driver to send a short range wireless message to the eVID for its 

activation. This can be achieved while the vehicle is idling (i.e., vehicle disablement) or if 

someone commandeers the vehicle while the driver is away but at a short range (i.e., 

vehicle shutdown), such is the case of a vehicle theft at a truck stop. 

Figure 6. Mapping of FMCSA’s Functional Requirements on a Generic VIT System 

9 
While the first three functional requirements involve VIT system components that are on 

the vehicle itself (e.g., in-cabin driver authentication devices for FR1, and antennas and 

communication systems for FR2) or at a very short distance (e.g., key fobs carried by 

drivers for FR3), FRs 4 and 5 involve VIT system components that can be located 

anywhere in the country. A remote vehicle shutdown relies on spatial information 

regarding the location of that vehicle and bidirectional communication links between 

centralized computers and the onboard eVID. Those computers can be accessed by an 

external control center and/or by the trucking company dispatcher. By mapping the 

vehicle’s location information provided by the GPS device, it is possible to determine safe 

places to initiate the shutdown process or to provide information to law enforcement at the 

scene to identify the vehicle that is about to be shutdown. The bidirectional communication 

links with the vehicle serve to receive this spatial information and to send a message to the 

eVID to initiate the shutdown process. 

2.3 TECHNOLOGY SCAN AND EVALUATION 

The assessment and evaluation of the existing (or under development) VITs encompassed 

two main activities. The first consisted of a technology scan aimed at identifying those 

companies that were providing (i.e., commercializing) VIT technologies covering one or 

more of the FMCSA functional requirements described previously. Certain companies and 

research organizations with technologies under development were also included if a 

prototype of that technology existed at the time. The second activity focused on 

demonstrations of the different technologies provided by different vendors. For this 

activity, only companies with commercially available products were invited to participate 

in the demonstrations. 

2.3.1 Technology Scan 

The process of identifying companies that were developing vehicle disabling technologies 

commercially or that were underdevelopment and that could potentially satisfy one or more 

of the five FRs was initiated with a review of previous studies, including FMCSA’s 

Hazmat Safety and Security Field Operational Test (FMCSA, 2004a), and through webbased searches. The identified companies were subsequently contacted through e-mail 

and/or phone calls to further refine the information collected and eliminate from the list 

those companies that, although technologically advanced, did not offer solutions that 

complied with one or more of the FRs. This process resulted in a down-selection of 28 

companies and research organizations that are presented in Table 1, all of which received a 

questionnaire aimed at providing more specific technical and economic information 

regarding their particular technologies (see Appendix B for more details on this 

questionnaire). 

10 
Table 1. Initial List of VIT Companies Potentially Satisfying One or More FRs2

Company Location Interaction 

w/Vendor 

1. Aircept Irvine, California AQ 

2. AirIQ Lake Forest, California AQ 

3. AirLink Inc. Fremont, California SQ 

4. Automotive Wireless Wayland, Michigan AQ+TI 

5. Base Engineering New Brunswick, Canada AQ 

6. BSM Wireless Ontario, Canada AQ+DT 

7. CGM Security Solutions, Inc Punta Gorda, Florida AQ 

8. Enfora Plano, Texas SQ 

9. Eureka Aerospace Pasadena California AQ+VV 

10. GlenHugh Enterprise (Autowatch) Ontario, Canada AQ+T+DT 

11. GPS Management Brownsburg, Indiana AQ 

12. Homeland Security Technology Corporation Ontario, Canada SQ 

13. Insite Technologies Colorado Springs, Colorado SQ 

14. Integrated Decision Support Corporation Richardson, Texas SQ 

15. International Truck and Engine Corporation Chicago, Illinois AQ+DT 

16. Lat-Lon LLC Sheridan, Colorado SQ 

17. MAGTEC Products, Inc Alberta, Canada AQ+DT 

18. Pana-Pacific Brentwood, Tennessee SQ 

19. Qualcomm San Diego, California AQ+VV+DT

20. Safefreight Technology Inc. Edmonton, Alberta AQ+TI 

21. Satellite Security Systems San Diego, California AQ+V+DT 

22. Spot Trac Des Moines, Iowa SQ 

23. Telogis Costa Mesa, California SQ 

24. Track Star International Inc. New Hartford, New York SQ 

25. Trackn Mission Viejo, California AQ+VV 

26. Vericom Columbia, Maryland SQ 

27. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Livermore, California SQ+VV 

28. Wireless Matrix (former MobileAria) Mountain View, California AQ+VV 

SQ: Submitted questionnaire to vendor; AQ: Vendor answered questionnaire; VV: Visited vendor; TI: Teleconference interview; DT:

Company participated in Demonstration Tests. 

As of June 15th, 2007 Insite Tech (13) and Spot Trac (22) were no longer in business. Satellite Security System (21) is under 

business restructuring. 

Sixteen companies, covering 19 different VIT products returned a completed questionnaire 

(companies with the label “AQ” in the third column of Table 1), and this information was 

compiled into a database attached to this report. Several of those companies were selected 

for a field visit by the project researchers (“VV” in the third column of) while other 

companies, due to time and location constraints, were contacted by phone (“TI” in the third 

column of Table 1) to further discuss their technology. Those interactions indicated that 

out of the 28 companies listed in Table 1, 19 were potential vendors for various forms of 

VITs. The VIT capabilities that were cited by their respective vendors ranged from the 

ability to disable a vehicle while it is parked to safely shutting down a vehicle while 

 2

 More details about these companies can be found in the attached VIT Vendors Database. 

11 
traveling at highway speeds. These capabilities were later demonstrated by six of the 

companies (“DT” in the third column of Table 1), with each of these six vendors 

showcasing technologies that covered at least four of the five identified FRs. 

2.3.2 Technology Matrix 

The information collected through the vendor’s questionnaires, visits, and teleconferences 

is summarized in Table 2, with more details included in the database attached to this 

report. Fifteen companies indicated that their technology covered the driver authentication 

FR, with two of them (i.e., Ravelco and CGM Security Solutions) using keys to 

disable/enable the vehicle. Keypads are used by six companies (Base Engineering, BSM 

Wireless, International Truck and Engine, MAGTEC, Qualcomm, and Wireless Matrix); 

one company, Automotive Wireless, provides driver authentication through a display and 

RFID tags, with the latter also being used by GlenHugh Enterprise; two other companies 

(BSM Wireless and Satellite Security Systems) use swipe cards. None of the companies 

use biometric technologies, although Satellite Security System (which at the time that this 

report was being written was in a business reassessment process) was developing such an 

interface for its system. 

Six technologies have the capability of implementing the disablement and/or shutdown of 

the vehicle if there is a loss of signal (FR2), either through a communications signal or 

GPS signal. It was found, however, that in practice this feature is never used, especially for 

the shutdown case. In fact, for those vendors that deal with loss of signal capabilities, their 

current protocol includes notification of a dispatcher who subsequently seeks a decision 

about vehicle disablement/shutdown.3

 Nevertheless, the technology provided by some 

vendors (e.g., MAGTEC, Qualcomm, BSM Wireless), can cause the disablement of the 

vehicle if a communication wire is physically cut. An illustration of this feature is included 

in the attached videos that documented the demonstration tests conducted under this 

project. 

For FR3, some vendors indicated that their protocol is for the driver to contact the 

dispatcher to initiate the shutdown or disablement sequence. As defined in this project, the 

described protocol falls within the realm of FR4, or remote shutdown by a dispatcher. 

Other companies, however, provide devices that satisfy FR3. For example, through their 

key fob device, Wireless Matrix allows the driver to send a “Driver Panic” alert to the 

onboard eVID, which immediately notifies the call center and triggers the vehicle 

shutdown sequence. In case of a false alarm, the driver can notify the call center within a 

certain time period, so that the shutdown sequence is not initiated. 

Thirteen companies indicated that their technology could remotely shutdown a vehicle at 

the discretion of the dispatcher. Two different models were identified for the triggering of 

the shutdown procedure. In both of them, the information from the vehicle to the 

dispatcher and from the dispatcher to the vehicle always flows through the vendors’ 

computers. The difference involves how the shutdown procedure is initiated. In one of 

these two models, the technology vendor acts only as a collector and distributor of 

 3

 Because of the involvement of a dispatcher, the current handling of loss of signal events falls under FR4 (Remote Vehicle Shutdown 

by a Dispatcher). 

12 
13 

information and is completely oblivious to how the system is used by their customers. In 

this case, the carrier’s dispatcher, or any authorized company manager, simply sends a 

message (e.g., presses a button on a computer screen) to the specific vehicle in order to 

initiate the shutdown procedure. In the other model, the dispatcher goes through a control 

center, manned by the technology vendor or a third party, to trigger the vehicle shutdown 

procedure. Two companies, Wireless Matrix and Satellite Security Systems, operated 

under this model. 

Regarding FR5 (remote vehicle shutdown by law enforcement) and with the exceptions of 

the Wattenburg Device (which can be activated directly by the physical tapping of the 

vehicle’s bumper by the bumper of a law-enforcement vehicle) and the Eureka system, 

which operates as a “microwave gun,” (more details about these devices are given below), 

none of the other vendors indicated that their technologies were currently involved in 

networks in which law-enforcement could independently disable a vehicle. Currently, 

when law enforcement is involved with VITs, it is done through the dispatcher or another 

party (e.g., vendor, call center), although some vendors indicated that granting direct, albeit 

limited, access to their system by law enforcement is feasible. The “Xs” in the FR5 column 

of Table 2 reflect discussions with vendors who indicated that working more closely with 

law enforcement in a more direct fashion would be desirable. 

Several approaches are used to disable/shutdown an appropriately equipped vehicle. Those 

range from physically cutting, or opening, the air line to the service brakes (Wattenburg 

Device, CGM Security Solutions) to engine performance impairment, including 

acceleration control mechanisms (MAGTEC, Qualcomm), speed reduction (BSM 

Wireless), throttle control (Automotive Wireless, GlenHugh Enterprise, Wireless Matrix), 

and power reduction (International Truck and Engine) to complete engine 

disablement/shutdown, either immediately or after the next start-up of the vehicle (AirIQ, 

Automotive Wireless, BSM Wireless, Base Engineering, GlenHugh Enterprise, Ravelco, 

Satellite Security Systems, Trackn) to the destruction of onboard electronic components 

(Eureka Aerospace). Due to proprietary information protection, many of the remaining 

vendors did not provide information about how their technology achieves the 

disablement/shutdown of the vehicle equipped with their technology. 

Table 2 also summarizes other important aspects of these technologies, including unit and 

licensing costs, installation and maintenance requirements, and robustness against hacking. 

Some vendors also provided information about the number of units deployed in the field at 

the time of the survey. That information is included in the attached database but not in 

Table 2, since it consists of the total number of VITs deployed for both commercial and 

passenger car vehicles. Referring to Table 2, the first column under “Costs and Other 

Considerations” shows the price of the equipment for just one unit (in general, all the 

vendors provide a quantity discount) and, where available, the installation cost and other 

one-time fees. Except for the HPEMS, which is in a prototype stage, the cost of the 

individual devices is below $2,000 and in many cases, below $500. Although at the time 

the survey was conducted, VIT customers only had the choice of buying the technology; 

since then, MAGTEC has started a leasing program that reduces the initial investment in 

the deployment of VITs and also permits customers to have access to the latest technology 

available. 
Table 2. VIT Technology Matrix—Functional Requirements (FR), Vehicle Disablement Method (VDM), Costs and O

Company Name Product Name 

FR 1 

FR 2 

FR 3 

FR 4 

FR 5 

VDM: Restricts Fuel Flow 

VDM: Disengages Starter 

VDM: Locks Air Lines 

VDM: Electronic 

Immobilizer 

VDM: Other 

Equip. + Installation Cost & 

Other One-Time Fees ($) 

Aircept MB 3000 X X X 399/75 AirIQ Vehicle Disable X X X X X X 230 VAutomotive Wireless SOS X X X X X X X 1,700/TBA Base Engineering DAS 100 X X X X 358/142 BSM Wireless Guardian X X X X X X X Varies VCGM Security Solutions, Inc TS4A X X 289 Eureka Aerospace HPEMS (Prototype) X X X X 60,000 GlenHugh Enterprise Autowatch 211Hi X X X X X 85/35 

Autowatch 1R2 X X X X X 18/35 Autowatch 573PPi X X X 95 Autowatch 898 X X 120 

GPS Management Systems Aircept MB 3000 X X X 399/75 VInternational Truck & Engine Corp. AWARE(SM) - Under Dev X X X X n/a MAGTEC Products, Inc MAGTEC M5K X X X X X X X X X 1,300/515 Qualcomm MAGTEC M5K X X X X X X X X X n/a Ravelco Ravelco Anti-Theft Device X X X X 359 Safefreight Technology Inc. SecurityGuard/Smartfleet X X X X X 700 VSatellite Security Systems GlobalGuard System X X X X X 445 VTrackn MB 3000 X X X 399/75 Vericom VeriGuard X X X n/a Lawrence Livermore National Lab Wattenburg Device X X n/a Wireless Matrix (ex-MobileAria) TDSS X X X X X X X 1,000/200 V

Ease of Installation: E(easy): User/less than 1 hr; M(moderately difficult): Professional/1 to 2 hrs; D(difficult): Professional/2+ hrs; F: factory installed; V: varies 

Required Maintenance: N: None; S: Some maintenance required; P: Periodic maintenance required. Ease of Hacking: E: Easy; M: Moderately difficult; D: Difficult. 

14 
Some of the vendors require a monthly fee to access their system, which, for those who 

provided this information, is less than $500/year. In cases where the communication 

system is already deployed, this amount can be substantially less (for example, Celadon 

Trucking, which was already using the Qualcomm communication and tracking system, 

added MAGTEC VIT technology for an additional $60/year/truck; see Section 4 of this 

report). The installation of the VIT device and associated hardware can be performed by 

the user for some of the technologies; although in general, this is done by the vendor or by 

the customer with vendor training. Depending on how long and the level of training 

required, each product was labeled as being easy to install (i.e., done by an untrained 

person in less than one hour), moderately difficult (i.e., installation performed by a trained 

professional and requiring between one-to-two hours), and difficult (i.e., installation 

performed by a trained professional and requiring longer than two hours). Most of the 

products presented in Table 2 do not require any maintenance; in some cases, however, the 

vendors indicated that periodic testing or other small maintenance tasks may be needed. 

The last column of Table 2 shows an assessment, based on the information provided by the 

vendors, on how difficult it would be to hack or disconnect the VIT device. Notice that this 

labeling refers only to what has been defined here as the eVID and not to the other 

associated components that may be part of the system (i.e., communication system and 

GPS). 

2.3.3 Technology Description 

Several of the companies offering VIT devices were visited by the researchers to gather 

more in-depth information about the technologies and processes involved in vehicle 

disablement and shutdown. The main criterion in selecting these companies was the ability 

of their technology to satisfy the highest number of FMCSA identified FRs. However, 

budgetary and geographic constraints also played a relatively important role in the 

selection. Table 1 shows that there is a high concentration of VIT providers located in 

California (10 out of 28), followed by six companies in Canada, and two in Texas and in 

Colorado, and the remaining vendors located in other states. A decision was made to travel 

to California for direct visits to selected vendors, to conduct teleconferences with 

companies located in other areas, and to invite all the companies offering technologies 

covering most of the five FRs to participate in demonstration tests of remote vehicle 

disabling/shutdown technologies that were identified as part of this project. 

Six companies were visited by the researchers and four others were contacted by phone. 

The visited companies included Satellite Security Systems, Wireless Matrix, Qualcomm, 

Trackn/Aircept, Eureka Aerospace, and the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 

(LLNL). The last two only covered FR5 and, therefore, did not meet the main selection 

criterion. However, out of all the companies/organizations listed in Table 1, Eureka 

Aerospace and LLNL were the only ones providing technology that could be directly 

triggered by law enforcement. Four other companies, MAGTEC, Automotive Wireless, 

GlenHugh Enterprise, and Safefreight Technology participated in extensive teleconference 

calls. A summary of the highlights of these visits and teleconferences is presented below. 

15 
Satellite Security Systems (S3)4

The system developed by S3 (GlobalGuard) has four main components: (1) the electronic 

vehicle disabling device, which is discretely embedded in a vehicle to deter hackers, (2) the 

GPS system, which reads spatial location information every 2 seconds (and can store up to 

one month’s worth of location data onboard), (3) the communications system, which can 

be pager (ReFLEX), wireless (GSM), or satellite (INMARSAT), and (4) command center 

through which all the messages to and from the equipped vehicles are handled. This central 

system can be accessed by the users, allowing them to view vehicle position at any time 

and driver activity (e.g., on duty, off duty, stops, etc.) for any given date (with up to one 

year of data history), among other information. 

The driver authentication process is through a swipe card (driver’s license), although the 

company was starting to conduct research involving biometrics. In the case of an event 

requiring vehicle shutdown (initiated either by the driver or the dispatcher), the following 

procedure is used by S3: 

1. The vehicle is located. 

2. The center contacts the law enforcement agency with jurisdiction in that area where 

the vehicle is located (note: S3 maintains a national law enforcement database with 

over 80,000 entries). 

3. The center talks to the officer in charge. 

4. The officer gives the order to shutdown. 

5. The center sends the shutdown message to device mounted on the vehicle. 

6. An action report is completed. This action report includes a description of the 

event, plus all of the voice communications, data, and other relevant information. 

The service is relatively inexpensive; for example, one of S3 customers with a small fleet 

(nine fuel tankers) paid $30/month/truck. This service allowed the customer to access the 

location information multiple times per day if needed. 

Site Visit Demonstrations: Two demonstrations were presented during the team’s visit to 

S3: a truck and a passenger car demonstration. The truck demo involved a tanker owned by 

Swain Oil,5

 a small (about nine tankers) hazmat transportation company. The truck could 

not be started without swiping the driver’s license to allow the system to check whether he 

was an authorized driver. After the driver was successfully identified, he was able to start 

the truck. If the driver was not successfully authenticated, then the S3 call center would 

have been notified, tracking procedures activated, law enforcement contacted, and after the 

vehicle had been identified and surrounded, law enforcement personnel in the field would 

have given the order to disable (notice that under the S3 model, no disablement/shutdown 

is made directly by the carrier). An unsuccessful driver authentication was also 

demonstrated and once the vehicle was disabled, a call placed to the call center by an 

 4

 At the time this report was prepared, S3 was under business restructuring and their officers were not sure if the company was going 

to continue in the VIT business. 5

 Since this demonstration in August 2006, Swain Oil Transport has been sold and has changed management (April 2007). 

16 
authorized person (e.g., dispatcher) was necessary to re-enable the vehicle. A similar 

demonstration was conducted using a passenger car. 

Project Demonstrations: S3 later participated in the demonstration tests that were 

conducted at Laurens Proving Grounds (LPG) in February 2007 under this project (to be 

discussed in more detail later in this report). S3 showcased their technology capabilities 

not only for vehicle disablement, but also for vehicle shutdown. Unfortunately, at the time 

this report was being compiled, S3 was in the process of reorganization and it was 

uncertain whether they would continue providing VIT technology and services. 

Wireless Matrix (WM) 

The WM system involves the following functions and resources: driver authorization via 

keypad entry, panic button capability (including shutdown sequencing), call center, vehicle 

tracking on demand, access control, tamper detection, and self diagnostics (Wireless 

Matrix, 2006). The system can be configured to meet customer’s needs regarding these 

different services/capabilities. 

A keypad is used by the driver to enter his/her authentication code. If a valid code is 

provided, then the throttle will be enabled and the vehicle can then be driven normally. If, 

on the other hand, an erroneous code is entered, the vehicle’s throttle will not be engaged 

and a message will be sent to the call center indicating the erroneous attempt. In a distress 

situation, the driver can enter a special “under-duress” code that will enable the throttle 

momentarily; however, after 120 seconds, the throttle will become inactive and the vehicle 

will be go to an idling mode. 

After an incident is verified, the information is sent to a Public Safety Answering Point 

(PSAP) service provider, who then contacts the appropriate law enforcement authority and 

the relevant people at the company that own the truck under distress. The vehicle can be 

disabled by the call center or by the driver; the carrier, through the call center, can also 

initiate the shutdown operation. However, the call center is the only authority that can reenable the vehicle. 

The WM system offers both wireless and satellite coverage. The company also has 

software technology that allows the system to switch from one communications platform 

to another based on a set of selected criterion, thus providing redundancy in 

communications and increasing the reliability of the system. 

Other features of the system include geofencing capabilities (with boundary definitions 

that can reside in the central system or in the onboard computer), as well as tampering 

protection and self-diagnosis. System components, which are fabricated by WM, need no 

regular maintenance, and the worst situation encountered has been that WM has had to 

repair loose connections. WM installs the system and performs any maintenance if 

necessary. The cost of the unit is less than $1,000 per vehicle plus a monthly fee per 

vehicle. 

Site Visit Demonstrations: WM’s primary customer in the VIT area is a large, national 

hazmat transportation carrier. At the time of the visit, that carrier had about 400 trucks 

17 
instrumented with the WM system. There was a demonstration with one of the trucks from 

this large hazmat customer. In that demonstration, the driver entered the distress code (i.e., 

under-duress code) and after two minutes the vehicle’s throttle was disabled; that is, the 

truck was idling, but the driver could not accelerate. There was also a demonstration of the 

key fob for remote disablement/shutdown by the driver. At the end of the demonstration, 

the truck was re-enabled through the call center and the driver left the parking lot. 

Qualcomm 

VIT research and development at Qualcomm started in 1990 in Brazil because of the high 

number of theft incidents in that country. In 2002, FMCSA conducted a Field Operational 

Test in conjunction with the TMC (Technology and Maintenance Council) Commercial 

Vehicle Security Task and the California Highway Patrol (CHP), in which Qualcomm 

demonstrated the Brazilian-based technology. In 2004, Qualcomm’s Vehicle Command 

and Control concept was developed (Qualcomm, 2007). In 2006, the Orange County 

Transportation Authority deployed a Qualcomm-based driver authentication and vehicle 

immobilization system that was tested successfully in a Transportation Security 

Administration (TSA) demonstration. 

Because Brazil presents a different legal and operational environment from that of the 

United States, the technology used there cannot be deployed in the United States, and 

Qualcomm adopted MAGTEC technology (MAGTEC, 2005) for its VIT applications and 

deployments in North America in early 2006. This technology was integrated with 

Qualcomm’s OmniTRACS® Mobile Communications System and later with the 

company’s OmniVisionTM Mobile Computing Platform. 

Regarding communications, 90% of Qualcomm customers use satellite communications 

and the remaining 10% use terrestrial (cellular) wireless communications (Qualcomm does 

not offer the capability of switching dynamically between these two communication 

networks). 

The primary vehicle disabling/shutdown philosophy of Qualcomm is that the carrier is in 

control of their assets. Under this philosophy, truck shutdown will be managed by the 

respective carrier, and if a vehicle disablement/shutdown sequence is enacted, Qualcomm 

is not notified. Also, if law enforcement needs to be involved, it is the carrier’s 

responsibility to communicate with them. 

Site Visit Demonstrations: A demonstration of the Qualcomm capabilities (including 

vehicle disabling/shutdown capabilities) was provided to the team through the Qualcomm 

“Rolling Laboratory.” The demonstration vehicle was equipped with Qualcomm 

OmniTRACS Mobile Communications System and it also had a terminal for the 

OmniVision system. 

Qualcomm integrates with MAGTEC® VIT technology. Interaction with the MAGTEC 

M5K is predominantly handled by the 12-key, 4-LED keypad and audible alarm. The 

keypad is used to enter the (configurable and assigned) authentication codes for drivers and 

maintenance staff, as well as to perform some general predefined alert and safety 

18 
functions. The LEDs and alarm allow operators to quickly recognize the MAGTEC M5K’s 

current status and provides feedback when switching between modes. 

The MAGTEC disablement technology is built around the Acceleration Control SystemTM 

(ACS). The ACS technology is designed primarily for vehicles that have over-the-air 

capability and can be initiated through integrated computer applications such as 

Qualcomm’s VCC (Vehicle Command and Control). The Acceleration Control System 

prohibits acceleration beyond fixed intervals. These limits are based on the speed that the 

vehicle was traveling when an ACS command is issued, and is fully configurable in situ 

and over the air. 

When the eVID is activated, the MAGTEC M5K keypad emits an audible warning for 30 

seconds, after which the ACS process begins. During the speed reduction process, the 

keypad and vehicle lights flash in an SOS pattern to alert surrounding traffic, and the 

vehicle throttle is deactivated to assist in reducing the vehicle’s speed. The throttle is only 

removed when the vehicle exceeds the speed threshold. In the event that a vehicle is 

moving down a slope and not decelerating, the throttle pedal is immediately returned to 

assist in shifting gears. The vehicle is continually forced to slower speeds incrementally 

until is reaches a top speed of 10 mph, which will be maintained for a specific 

(configurable) period of time. When the time expires, the vehicle is automatically 

shutdown and secured. During the shutdown process, the braking and steering systems are 

fully operable permitting the driver to continue operating the vehicle safely. 

The MAGTEC M5K also provides an operational mode called Unattended Idle ProtectTM 

(UIP). This system allows a vehicle to be secured while at idle with the same level of 

protection it would receive if actually shutdown and secured. The keys can be removed 

from the ignition, the cab locked, and the vehicle left running while the operator is away 

from the vehicle. To assist with vehicle idling regulations, the UIP can be configured to 

shutdown the vehicle after a specific amount of time. In order to exit UIP and begin 

operating the vehicle again, the operator must possess the ignition key and a valid 

authentication code. 

The MAGTEC device also has provisions for both maintenance operations and local 

disabling. The maintenance setting allows the dispatcher to generate a one-time 

maintenance access code that can be used for a preset period of time. Duress codes entered 

by the driver will disable the truck after five minutes. Qualcomm does not theoretically 

support the concept of a driver distress signal, indicating that a driver-initiated but 

automated shutdown sequence, might compromise the safety of the driver. The device can 

also be programmed to send out an alarm without disabling or shutting down the vehicle 

when the under-duress code is entered. 

Qualcomm, together with one of its customers, Celadon Trucking, participated in the 

demonstration tests that were conducted at LPG under this project (to be discussed in more 

detail later in this report), showcasing both their disabling and shutdown technology 

capabilities. 

19 
Trackn/Aircept 

Trackn is a “distributor/enabler” of Aircept products (Trackn/Aircept, n.d.). Their primary 

customer base involves: (a) customers wishing to track vehicles, (b) geofencing, and (c) 

communication to vehicle owners when certain thresholds (speed, distance from a central 

point, mileage, etc.) are violated. The vehicles of interest to Trackn are passenger vehicles 

and some small vocational fleets, although Aircept has some independent customers that 

include large fleets. 

There are close to 300,000 Aircept devices deployed, with about 8,000 to 10,000 being 

sold each month. The device offers an ignition disabling capability that the owner of the 

vehicle can activate manually or automatically, for example, if the vehicle exceeds a 

certain distance from a designated point. The eVID consists of a simple relay that is 

activated when a vehicle disabling signal is sent via the cellular communication system 

provided by Trackn (the company works with several commercial cellular communications 

providers). In that case, the next time that the vehicle is shut off, it cannot be re-started. 

Trackn indicated that although the device could be configured to shutdown a vehicle while 

in motion, such functionality has never been deployed by the company. Moreover, Trackn 

does not support such deployment because of safety issues. 

The device costs $395 for the hardware/software, and another $100 for installation (done 

by a professional). The average cost of the service is about $30/month/vehicle, which 

includes 1,000 locate-requests (i.e., 1,000 spatial location queries), and it can be as low as 

$48/year (the range is $48 to $200 per year, although it can go higher if the user needs to 

query the system very often). 

In summary, although this technology has vehicle disabling capabilities, its current markets 

are very different from the Hazmat Safety and Security market. In addition, the device does 

not validate a driver’s identity, but can protect assets that are Trackn equipped. Overall, 

this technology, while very good for its particular market niche, is inadequate at this time 

to support hazmat safety and security needs. 

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) 

After September 11th, 2001, and in response to a mandate by the governor of California to 

investigate ways to counter the potential threat of a terrorist stealing or hijacking fuel 

tankers, LLNL developed a simple mechanical device (the Wattenburg Truck-Stopping 

Device; Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, 2004) that would allow law 

enforcement to stop a tractor-trailer on demand. The concept involves the installation of 

that device on a trailer which, when activated by a series of bumper taps, would engage the 

trailers service brakes. Research and development on this device, reached a level of $1M, 

of which $750K was provided by the California Highway Patrol and $250K by LLNL. The 

device has been demonstrated several times in California and in Nevada on tankers and 

box trailers. 

The device involves about $40 of hardware and can be installed in a matter of hours at a 

cost of about $260. Once installed, the trailer does not look differently than un-equipped 

20 
trailers. If the device is accidentally tripped, a light comes on in the cab indicating that the 

first of the two required taps has been experienced. The driver must then go to the rear of 

the trailer and “reset” the device by inserting a rod into a hole in the bumper. A similar 

procedure is followed to reset the device if tapped twice (which would engage the service 

brakes). None of these devices were in operation at the time of the visit to LLNL and at 

that time there were no plans/strategies for marketing the device. 

LLNL has also developed a version of the Wattenburg device that can be triggered 

wirelessly. This device is to be used at certain facilities where the trucks entering these 

facilities can be easily fitted with the device, which could be triggered wirelessly if the 

truck goes into areas where it is not authorized. 

It is clear that the market for the Wattenburg devices is different from the market of 

wireless-based remote vehicle disabling technologies described previously. The 

Wattenburg device is a “last resort” type of device that can be utilized by law enforcement 

to stop a vehicle on demand. On the other hand, the device can be easily engaged by 

anyone, not just law enforcement. Thus, it does not provide sufficient robustness against 

foe misuse. 

Eureka Aerospace (EA) 

Originally funded by the Marine Corps, EA has developed a High-Power Electromagnetic 

System for Stopping Vehicles (HPEMS) (Eureka Aerospace, 2007). This prototype system 

uses microwave energy to disable a vehicle’s electronic microprocessors that control the 

engine’s vital functions and its transmitter can be mounted on buildings or other nonmobile 

structures, or conceptually even on law enforcement vehicles. At the time of this project’s 

interview with EA, they were in Phase 2 of a contract with the Los Angeles Sheriff’s 

Department to develop a mobile version of the HPEMS system. 

This VIT device generates microwave radiation which, after striking the wires connected 

to a vehicle’s microprocessors, induces parasitic currents that disable the electronic 

components of those microprocessors. The system generates a 15-nanosecond pulse in the 

300 MHz to 2.0 GHz range. This range was selected because any lower frequency would 

require a much larger power source, and any higher frequency would severely limit 

penetration. EA has found that to disable a vehicle requires being able to generate 10 

KV/m at the vehicle site. This is well below the air ionization level (i.e., the maximum 

level that can be achieved without ionizing the air and generating sparks is 1MV/m) and 

would, therefore, not produce “sparking,” thus making the device theoretically safe to be 

used with fuel tankers. 

The prototype was once used to disable a 1999 Honda Civic owned by the company. The 

results of this test indicated that with only one very short pulse of the device, the car was 

disabled. The vehicle did not shutdown completely, but it was difficult to drive since the 

engine revolutions were fluctuating. Regarding other types of vehicles, EA indicated that 

the effect of the device on diesel engines has not yet been studied. This type of engine does 

not have ignition controls, which is the main component that the HPEMS device disables, 

so for this application, it would be necessary to look at other engine-related components. 

21 
Visit to the EA Laboratory: The team visited the EA lab where parts of the prototype 

were shown; however, the prototype was not demonstrated. EA estimated that it would 

require $5M and two more years of effort to achieve the production stage. 

Safefreight Technology (ST) 

The ST vehicle immobilization technology consists of an onboard “box” that can receive 

input from 8-12 sensors (analog or digital signals) and that can also be tied to the vehicle’s 

data bus, a GPS device, and a communications system that can use cell or satellite 

networks (Safefreight Technology, 2007). This is a web-based system that requires no 

software interface. Customers can choose between cell and satellite, or have both; in which 

case, an algorithm selects the one that is most cost-effective, thus ensuring almost 100% 

coverage at a minimum cost. 

Customers may choose which types of sensors they want onboard (temperature, light, tank 

fill volume, etc.) that will function in conjunction with their device. ST consults with their 

customers to create response protocols that meet their customer’s needs and that can be 

modified at a later time, if necessary. When the Response Center receives the “real-time” 

notification of a sensor violation, ST security specialists immediately implement the 

associated response protocol, which includes contacting key personnel and/or the 

authorities as identified by the client, in the order specified by the client. These protocols 

and systems are predetermined so that key personnel can be reached at their office, at home 

or on the road, or through a 24/7/365 call center. In addition to events triggered from 

onboard sensors, ST also provides geofencing and landmark mapping capabilities. ST has 

the ability to provide remote ignition lockout and driver authentication. 

Other ST technologies include a version of their device that can function in a battery mode 

on an untethered trailer, and can be configured to get power from the tractor when mated. 

A portable version of the onboard “box,” which operates on rechargeable batteries, has no 

external wires or antennas and does not require “line-of-sight” for GPS fixes. It can 

interface with wireless sensors onboard the tractor-trailer and has the ability to link to an 

electronic cargo manifest. 

ST has over 1,000 units deployed in the United States and 1,500 in Canada. The vast 

majority of the units sold to date have been installed by the customer; ST provides 

installation instructions, a manual, and customer support. The cost of a base unit is $625-

$700, plus $35 to $40/month/vehicle for reporting at a 2-minute interval. The cost of the 

dual reporting system adds $350 for a modem plus a “Sim card,” and requires an additional 

service contract. 

Automotive Wireless (AW) 

AW technology initially included the remote start of a vehicle, door locking/unlocking, 

and other similar capabilities, and utilized a pager-based system (Automotive Wireless, 

2007). With the AW system, a vehicle could be “called,” and these functions could be 

performed at a distance via telephone or computer. At the time of this interview with AW, 

the company had a working model of their Semi Onboard Shutdown (SOS) system, which 

22 
was also pager-based with the same capabilities mentioned earlier, plus the ability to 

connect the device with the vehicle’s data bus. The eVID component of the system works 

by closing a valve to the fuel and thereby stopping the vehicle’s engine. 

The initial SOS pager system had one-way communication (i.e., from the user to the 

vehicle) and did not offer spatial location capabilities (i.e., the system did not include a 

GPS device). Because of the one-way communications, when a pager signal was sent to 

disable the vehicle, no confirmation of shutdown was provided by the system. And due to 

its lack of spatial location capabilities, only a visual confirmation of the vehicle location is 

possible. This makes the initial system cumbersome if not impossible to use within the 

parameters of what has been defined as a VIT system in this project. The system, however, 

could still be used in critical situations where law enforcement is present and the situation 

is such that it is imperative that the truck be shutdown. 

At the time of the interview that was conducted with AW, the company had just partnered 

(merged) with an undisclosed company in the Chicago area, which specializes in cellular 

and satellite communications, GPS technology, and currently provides body, transmission, 

and universal controller units to Fortune 200 original equipment manufacturer (OEM) 

truck manufacturers. AW is currently developing and testing this SOS system prototype 

that provides GPS tracking, cellular communications, vehicle disablement and shutdown 

capabilities, driver identification/authentication, and access to a web interface for 

configuration. AW claims the SOS cellular offering is superior to those using satellite 

systems because large buildings can shadow the vehicle’s line of sight to the satellite, 

resulting in loss of signal and, therefore, it delivers a more reliable metropolitan coverage. 

Over the air configuration and programming provides easy time-saving, OEM-approved 

system adjustments that eliminate the need for physical servicing and downtime. The AW 

SOS also has a reserved protocol that works in conjunction with the American Trucking 

Associations’ (ATA’s) Highway Watch program to further increase monitoring of the 

equipped vehicle in all coverage areas. The AW SOS platform has evolved from a 

simplistic pager-based environment, to a rugged cellular-based GPS system capable of 

OEM integration that eliminates system failures common to postproduction installation. 

MAGTEC Products, Inc. 

The MAGTEC® VIT technology provides various features and capabilities, including a 

driver authentication system, vehicle protection logic, hijack code, maintenance code, and 

an acceleration control system, among other features (MAGTEC, 2005). The MAGTEC 

Authentication System includes a keypad used by the driver to enter a pre-assigned PIN or 

a driver authentication code; without a correct code, the onboard eVID would not allow the 

truck to be started. The Protection Logic component is an automated vehicle disabling 

technology that allows the driver to leave the truck idling and will prevent any 

unauthorized person from driving that truck. The system also offers a hijack code or underduress code, which once entered and after some predefined period of time, will send a 

distress message to the dispatcher. However, regardless of any communication system, the 

hijack feature will always work and disable/shutdown the vehicle; that is, once the hijack 

feature is activated by the driver, the vehicle will shutdown. The maintenance code feature 

allows the dispatcher to generate a one-time maintenance access code that can be used for 

23 
a preset period of time (up to 99 hrs). If the truck is in maintenance mode and someone 

attempts to steal the vehicle, the truck will enter into a shutdown sequence after the 

maintenance period has expired. 

The Acceleration Control SystemTM (ACS) is the core of the MAGTEC VIT system. It is 

an eVID that restricts the acceleration capability of the vehicle, diminishing the maximum 

speed achievable by the vehicle by constant intervals triggered at predefined periods of 

time (see the Qualcomm section for more details about MAGTEC’s ACS). These 

parameters, which define the shutdown process, are configurable over the air. This is a 

very important feature, particularly for FR5, which would allow the vehicle to be shutdown 

quickly if so required (for example, in less than a mile, instead of shutting down gently 

over several miles). MAGTEC’s remote deceleration technology has not, as of yet, been 

used in a real situation, but their idle protection technology (which ultimately uses the 

same VIT) has been used many times. 

MAGTEC indicated that a customer, if he or she so desires, could get a system that 

includes only the driver authentication portion of the technology without the 

disabling/shutdown technology. However, the VIT functionality portion of the technology 

is inherently part of the system and would be wired but not active. The VIT functionality 

could, in theory, be activated (if the vehicle has communication capabilities) even if the 

customer has not chosen to use that technology. 

Other features include geofencing capabilities (for those vehicles equipped with GPS and 

communication systems), back office software and communication technologies for 

customers that do not want to go with complete packages (such as the one offered by 

Qualcomm), and, shortly, the availability of technology that will protect the trailer/cargo 

(at the present time, only the tractor is protected). 

MAGTEC participated in the demonstration tests that were conducted at LPG under this 

project (to be discussed in more detail later in this report), showcasing its vehicle 

disablement and shutdown technologies among other capabilities. 

GlenHugh Enterprise (GHE) 

GHE provides a modular platform consisting of different modules that cover different FRs 

(GlenHugh Enterprise, 2007). Specifically, the GHE platform consists of four separate 

modules that provide different levels of protection and can be configured to any 

communications carrier. 

Module 1 (573): The 573 PPI (Passive Proximity Immobilizer), with driver authentication, 

is the primary immobilization system that ensures that a truck cannot be started and driven 

by an unauthorized operator. Disabling up to three vital circuits of the vehicle, the 583 

system will not allow an unauthorized driver to start and drive the vehicle. GHE makes 

available authentication codes for lost codes via toll-free and fleet identification. The 573 

PPI is an Underwriters Laboratory of Canada certified device. 

Module 2 (898): The 898 Safe-Stop Immobilizer, with driver authentication, allows the 

truck to idle with the key removed. If a thief attempts to steal the vehicle while it is idling, 

24 
25 

as soon as the brakes are disengaged, any change in the engine revolutions triggers an 

engine shutdown. This device is being used by many trucking companies and public 

service fleets. 

Module 3 (211): For FRs 1, 3, and 4, GHE’s anti-hijack technology is adaptive and can be 

customized to any specific fleet requirement triggered by various initiating events such as 

pressing a button or opening the driver’s door, the latter being a main feature for the 

company’s anti-hijack technology. The primary goal is focused on safely bringing the 

vehicle to a stationary position and to distance the driver from the hijacker as quickly as 

possible. The hijacker has to gain access to the truck cab and when the door or brake valve 

is opened, the shutdown sequence is automatically initiated. The driver then has the option 

to allow the vehicle to shutdown, cancel shutdown, or offer the hijacker access to an 

override button that will immediately send an alert signal to the dispatcher, indicating that 

an unauthorized driver has taken control of the vehicle. Once this is done, the dispatcher 

has the option to shutdown the vehicle. The shutdown sequence consists of slowly opening 

and closing the fuel line while the truck retains power. The truck comes to a slow, albeit 

jerky, stop as the vehicle runs out of fuel. The relay timing increases so that the moving 

vehicle’s engine slows down until it stops. During this shutdown sequence, the truck lights 

are also flashing and the horn or siren is sounding loudly. 

Module 4 (1r2): The 1r2 provides the dispatcher with the ability to prevent a vehicle 

equipped with this device from starting. This is achieved remotely via a message sent 

wirelessly to the vehicle. Once the message has been sent and the device is activated, the 

vehicle will not start and an alarm (buzzing sound) will be heard, indicating that the 

vehicle has been immobilized. 

There are no GHE vehicle shutdown devices currently deployed in North America, but the 

company has other technologies deployed in Mexico, the United States, and Canada. The 

company has, however, an international market and has engaged in a small number of 

shutdowns in South Africa. In that country, there is an insurance-based requirement 

regarding truck security and, therefore, thousands of their products (not necessarily 

shutdown capable however) have been sold/deployed. Their system is also broadly used 

(and has been certified) in England, Australia, and Belgium. All of the installers of their 

products have to have background checks to ensure that the security of the GHE’s systems 

is as high as possible. 

GHE also participated in the demonstration tests that were conducted at LPG under this 

project (to be discussed in more detail later in this report). For these demonstrations, GHE 

partnered with Archetype as their GPS/communications provider. 
3. DEMONSTRATION TESTS 

One of the main objectives of this study was to further investigate the functionalities of 

VITs, focusing mainly on those VITs that were readily available or in the last stages of 

development and testing. The information collected through the questionnaires, as well as 

site visits and interviews with vendors and VIT developers permitted the identification of 

those companies that were marketing, or about to market, this type of technology. The first 

selection criterion used to reduce the set of technology companies from further 

investigation were those technologies that were in the research and development stage. 

In addition to market readiness, it was also required that the technology could be tested in a 

real-world environment. One of the questions included in the vendor/developer survey was 

related to the willingness/capability of the company to demonstrate their products in 

different settings, going from their own vehicles and laboratories to independent testing 

(see Table 3). The vendor-provided information was used as a second selection criterion to 

further eliminate from consideration vendors with technologies that were not easily 

testable. The products that met these two criteria, along with the ability of the technology 

to satisfy one or more of FMCSA’s identified FRs, were the focus of additional analyses. 

All of the vendors that satisfied these three basic criteria were invited to demonstrate, in a 

quasi-real world environment (i.e., a test track environment), how their VITs could 

perform the identified VIT FRs. The main goal of the demonstration testing was to gain 

practical information about VIT operations for input into the development of VIT best 

practices for both the technology itself and the operational use of the technology, and a 

concept of operations for the use of this technology by law enforcement. Within this main 

goal, the demonstration testing had several subobjectives. These were to: 

1. Gain unique and first-hand understanding of how different VITs are triggered and 

activated. 

2. Acquire actual speed-of-activation/usage and lag-time data. 

3. Understand the effects of different VITs on the level of vehicle controllability after 

activation (for VSTs). 

4. Understand the effects of different VITs on the level of vehicle re-enablement after 

activation (for both VSTs and VDTs). 

5. Gain a better understanding of the impacts of the technologies on the level of 

interference with the traffic stream once activated (for both VSTs and VDTs). 

6. Gain insights on the impacts of VITs on the driving task, including driver’s 

opinions on VIT functionality. 

26 
Table 3. Available VIT Developers Testing Capabilities (Testing Modes) 

Company Name 

Vendor-Owned Vehicle Vendor-Owned Lab Independent On-Vehicle Independent Laboratory 

Aircept 

AirIQ X X1 X1

Automotive Wireless X X1 X1

Base Engineering X X X1 X1

BSM Wireless X X1 X1

CGM Security Solutions, Inc X X X 

Eureka Aerospace X X X1 X1

GlenHugh Enterprise X X X 

GPS Management Systems 

International Truck & Engine Corp. X X X1 X1

MAGTEC Products, Inc X X X1 X1

Qualcomm X X X1 X1

Ravelco 

Safefreight Technology Inc. X X X X 

Satellite Security Systems X X1 X1

Trackn X X1 X1

Vericom X X 

Lawrence Livermore National Lab 

Wireless Matrix (ex-MobileAria) X X X1 X1

1

With conditions such as Non-Disclosure Agreement 

(NDA), Loaned Material Agreement, installation done 

by vendor, etc. (see attached database).

3.1 DEMONSTRATION TESTS DESCRIPTION 

In order to achieve the objectives described in the previous section, a VIT test plan was 

developed and demonstration tests, in which nine companies participated, were conducted 

at the Laurens Proving Grounds, a test track facility in South Carolina. 

In keeping with the differences between VDTs and VSTs and their FRs—recall that VDTs 

are technologies that impede restarting a vehicle, while VSTs are technologies that cause a 

vehicle to lose power and come to a stop while moving—a two-phase test plan was 

developed. The first phase (Phase I) focused on VSTs with the objective of demonstrating 

remote vehicle shutdowns by a dispatcher and law enforcement (i.e., FRs 4 and 5). 

Although not part of the identified FRs, Phase I was also used to demonstrate geofencing 

27 
capabilities for those companies that provided this technology. Geofencing capabilities 

consist of the deployment of a virtual boundary on a geographic region that can trigger an 

event when that boundary is crossed. This event could be, for example, the triggering of 

the onboard VST device when the vehicle has crossed a virtual boundary around a 

protected facility. 

The second part of the demonstration tests, Phase II, concentrated on VDTs, with special 

emphasis on driver authentication. Since in some cases, the remote vehicle disablement by 

the driver (FR3) can be triggered while the vehicle is moving, the demonstration of this 

type of technology was tested in both Phase I (vehicle moving) and Phase II (vehicle 

stationary). 

The test series and FR combinations relative to Phases I and II testing are listed in Table 4. 

All of the VST demonstration tests (Phase I) were performed at the test track, while 

demonstrations involving static vehicles (Phase II) were conducted off of the test track. For 

safety reasons, vehicles participating in Phase I demonstration tests using technologies that 

completely shutdown the engine were required to undergo a preliminary test in which the 

VST was activated while the vehicle was traveling at a slow speed (e.g., 10-15 mph). 

Depending on the observed controllability of the vehicle after the VST was triggered, it 

was determined whether it was safe to conduct a second series of demonstration tests at a 

higher speed (35-45 mph). As described below, those vehicles equipped with engine 

shutdown technologies were highly controllable and none of the second series of 

demonstration tests had to be cancelled. 

Table 4. Demonstration Test Matrix 

Test 

Series 

Technology 

Type 

Test 

Phase 

Test 

Track 

Test 

Test 

Speed 

Functional 

Requirements 

0 VST I Yes 10-15 mph 5/4/3 

1 VST I Yes 35-45 mph 5/4 

2 VST I Yes 35-45 mph 5/4 

3 VST/VDT I Yes TBD at Test Time 3 

4 VDT/VST II No 0 mph 3 

5 VDT II No 0 mph 1 

Demonstration Vehicles: The participating vendors provided their own demonstration 

vehicles—or vehicles of their customers equipped with their technology—for the 

demonstration tests. Those vehicles, because of the nature of the project, were required to 

be heavy trucks or busses. Prior to the test, the vendors also submitted information 

regarding the type of VST that was going to be demonstrated, as well as details about the 

necessary steps to trigger the device, including a description of the protocol that was 

normally followed and phone numbers and other means of communications that were to be 

used to trigger the onboard VST device during the demonstration tests. This information 

was necessary since, as described below, the shutdown of the vehicles was controlled by 

the project researchers who mimicked the actions that law enforcement would take in the 

28 
field under situations that would require stopping a moving vehicle equipped with this type 

of technology. 

For the demonstration tests, no restrictions were imposed on vehicle weight, other than 

indicating, prior to the test, that if their vehicles were going to be fully-loaded (i.e., at their 

maximum legal gross vehicle weight rating, GVWR), empty (unloaded vehicle weight, 

UVW), or loaded at any other level between UVW and GVWR. No hazardous materials 

were allowed on the test track. 

Data Acquisition: No specialized instrumentation for data acquisition was installed in the 

participating vehicles other than a GPS device6

 connected to a laptop computer that stored 

the information. Specifically, a Racelogic VBOX data acquisition system was used to 

measure the speed and position of the moving vehicle at 10.0 Hz (i.e., a sampling 

frequency of one measurement every 0.1 second). This spatial information allowed for the 

determination, in a precise manner, of the trajectory followed by the demonstration vehicle 

after the VST device had been activated. The information collected was used to evaluate 

the effects of the VST on vehicle maneuverability. 

In addition to the GPS device, a set of stopwatches were used to determine the latency of 

the system (i.e., the elapsed interval of time between the moment the order to activate the 

VST device is given and the point in time when the actual activation occurs). A two-way 

communication radio was also used to communicate with the driver and/or to onboard 

testing personnel in order to determine when the device was actually activated. This 

information was used to corroborate the data collected through the GPS and the 

information provided by the vendors regarding their own demonstrations (i.e., the 

timestamp messages that were generated between the vehicle and the vendor’s computers 

during the demonstrations). 

An integral part of the data collected during the test events was the videotaping of the 

demonstrations to document the trajectory and behavior of the vehicle after the activation 

of the VST device. Two cameras were used to record the total vehicle during the test 

maneuvers. That is, these cameras recorded the approaching and departing paths of the 

vehicle under the test, with a sufficient angle to allow for total viewing of the vehicle at 

critical points during the testing. In addition, a third camera was installed inside the cab of 

the tractor to document the driver’s reactions during the test event, and a fourth one was 

onboard a South Carolina State Highway Patrol vehicle that participated in the tests. The 

raw footage was edited and summarized into two video productions of the demonstration 

tests (a short, eight-minute video, showing the driver authentication and vehicle shutdown 

technologies, and a longer, 20-minute video that captured how the different vendors 

satisfied all or most of the FRs). These two videos are part of this report. 

Event Venue: The demonstration tests were conducted at the Laurens Proving Grounds 

(LPG) in South Carolina. LPG is a vehicle testing facility operated by Michelin Americas 

Research and Development Corporation, providing services to all of Michelin's North 

 6

 Usually, vendors provide GPS capabilities with their VST products, which in general operate with a low data acquisition rate (once 

every few seconds). The GPS equipment used in the test was a temporary device, quickly installed by ORNL on the test vehicle at the 

beginning of the demonstration, that gathered positional information at a higher rate (10.0 Hz). 

29 
30 

American operations. The 3,000-acre site has over a dozen special tracks that simulate the 

entire spectrum of driving conditions and road hazards. About 50 employees, including 

engineers, technicians, test drivers, mechanics, electricians, testing support specialists, 

utility workers, and administrative personnel work at the facility. LPG, which has been 

operating since 1976, is located in Laurens County, South Carolina, about 40 miles from 

Greenville. An aerial photograph of the site is presented in Figure 7, while Figure 8 shows 

a schematic diagram of Test Track 8 at LPG, which was used for the demonstration tests. 

Test Track 8

Figure 7. Laurens Proving Grounds (LPG) 
1,400 ft

2,850 ft

1,

100 ft

1,900 ft

400 ft

410 ft

LPG Test Track 8

“Asphalt Lake“

 34°23'20.51"N 82°01'39.72"W

 34°23'8.34"N 82° 1'31.21"W

 34°23'5.13"N 82° 1'38.10"W

400 ft

B

O

A

PII

P

C

D

E

F

O

G

Geofence

(Protected Area)

S’

Figure 8. Schematic Diagram of Test Track 8 at LPG Used for the Demonstration Tests 

31 
3.1.1 Test Track Testing (Phase I) 

Each one of the vehicles participating in Phase I of the tests performed several tests at arterial 

speeds (i.e., 30 to 45 mph), demonstrating how their VST device accomplished the shutdown of 

the vehicle. For technologies that used engine shut-off as the mechanism for disabling the 

vehicle, the first test was conducted at a relatively slow speed (i.e., 10 to 15 mph) and was used 

to assess the maneuverability and controllability of the vehicle after shutdown. In all cases it was 

determined that the vehicle could be safely maneuvered; therefore, a second test(s) was 

conducted at normal arterial speed (i.e., 30 to 45 mph). The arterial speed tests (no demonstration 

tests were conducted at highway speed for safety reasons) mimicked the activation of the VST 

device by the dispatcher and/or law enforcement personnel (i.e., FR4 and FR5). For those 

vendors that offered technology that allows the shutdown of the vehicle by the driver (i.e., FR3), 

a third test was conducted demonstrating this capability. 

The drivers of all of the demonstration vehicles were either employees of the respective vendors 

or the vendors’ customer. Before testing was initiated, all of the demonstration vehicles entered 

the test track (i.e., LPG Test Track 8, see Figure 8) through the access road close to point G and 

completed several laps to get familiar with the test track layout. The vehicles were then parked 

off of the test track at point F. 

VST Demonstration at Slow Speed 

This evaluation was conducted to determine a vehicle's response to the activation of the VST 

device while moving at a slow speed and was only conducted for those technologies that 

completely shutdown the engine. The results of this first test were used to determine the total 

activation time of the VST device (i.e., the time from when the order to activate was given to the 

time when the device was actually activated). This was done to assess the maneuverability of the 

vehicle and to determine whether a test at a higher speed could be conducted with a reasonable 

level of safety. 

Setup: A pylon was placed on the shoulder of the test track at Point E to indicate the VST device 

trigger point. This allowed sufficient distance to the next curve (i.e., 3,700 ft to point G), with the 

“asphalt lake” (starting at point F) in between, such that even in the case of very poor vehicle 

maneuverability, there would be no safety concerns. (Note: the green arrow shown in Figure 8

indicates the direction of travel.) A member of the research team traveled in a South Carolina 

State Highway Patrol vehicle that shadowed the demonstration vehicle, while another member 

was in the cabin of the test vehicle. 

Procedure: From their parked position, the demonstration vehicle started to travel in a clockwise 

direction, such that when it reached point E, it was moving at approximately 15 mph. At that 

time the procedure order to activate the VST device was given from the highway patrol car. The 

order was communicated wirelessly (using two-way radio communications) to simulate a realworld scenario in which a highway patrolman would call for the shutdown of the vehicle when 

he had determined that it is safe to do so. The time that elapsed between the instant that the order 

was given and the alarm inside the demonstration vehicle sounded (indicating that the eVID was 

32 
activated) was recorded. Also recorded was the elapsed time between the activation of the eVID 

and the instant that the driver felt that the power to the vehicle was lost. 

Once the vehicle came to a stop, the research team corroborated that it was not possible by the 

driver to re-start the vehicle. Subsequently, the order was given to re-enable the vehicle in the 

same fashion as was done to shutdown the vehicle. The time that elapsed between the instant that 

the research team gave the order to re-enable the vehicle and the instant the driver was able to restart the vehicle was also recorded. This data will be presented later in the report. 

VST Demonstration at Normal Arterial Speed 

This test series was performed at normal arterial speed (i.e., 35 to 45 mph) instead of at a slow 

speed. Since for all demonstrations the results of the first test indicated that the vehicle could be 

safely shutdown while moving (i.e., its controllability did not degrade significantly), this second 

test series was performed by all of the participating vendors. 

Setup: The setup for this second test was similar to that of the first one, with the exception that 

the order to shutdown was given in a quasi-random fashion, although always in the segment CD-E, and sometimes in the first part of segment E-F (see Figure 8). Again, this was done in such 

a way that the VST device would be activated while the vehicle was traveling on a straight 

segment; both for safety reasons and to better assess its maneuverability through visual 

observation and the positional information gathered by the onboard installed GPS device. 

Procedure: The procedure used in this test was the same as in the Slow Speed Demonstration 

Test. From their parked position, the demonstration vehicle started to travel in a clockwise 

direction, such that when it reached the segment C-D-E, it was moving at a speed between 35 

and 45 mph. At some point when the vehicle was traveling on this segment, a research team 

member, following in the South Carolina State Highway Patrol vehicle, gave the order to 

shutdown the vehicle. As in the previous test, elapsed times to activation and stopping were 

recorded. The vehicle re-enabling procedure was repeated and the elapsed time was recorded. 

VST Geofencing Capability Demonstrations 

Although geofencing was not one of the identified FRs, those vendors who provided this feature 

and wanted to demonstrate it were allowed to do so. 

Setup: A week prior to the tests, a boundary (or geofence) defined by three latitude-longitude 

points (see Figure 8) was provided to the vendors so they could include this information in their 

central and/or onboard systems. 

Procedure: Although this test started in a similar way as the two previous ones, the triggering of 

the eVID was done automatically when the vehicle crossed the defined geofence and entered into 

the protected area. 

The time that elapsed between the instant that the vehicle crossed the geofence (point F in Figure 

8) and when the onboard alarm sounded (indicating the activation of the VST device) was 

recorded. Also recorded was the time that elapsed between the sound of the onboard alarm and 

the instant that the driver sensed the vehicle was shutdown. 

33 
For those vendors that did not have their VIT device connected to their geofencing capabilities, 

the research team requested the set of timestamp messages that were passed between the vehicle 

and the central computer as the former crossed the geofence. This allowed the measuring of the 

latency time that it took the system to become aware that the vehicle had crossed the geofence 

boundary. Under the conservative assumption that it would take the same amount of time7 for 

the onboard device to receive a shutdown message from the central computer, it is possible

determine how far inside the protected area a vehicle could travel before the onboard device is 

activated. In addition, the vehicle would travel for another number of seconds (determined in the 

previous tests) until the shutdown process would be initiated, plus the time it takes to get to a 

complete stop (also determined in the previous tests). 

 to 

VST FR3 Demonstration 

This demonstration test was only conducted for these technologies that allow the shutdown of the 

vehicle remotely by the driver with his/her intervention (i.e., through a key fob) or without it 

(i.e., by not providing authentication). Technologies that allow for the shutdown of the vehicle 

by the driver using the same protocol as was addressed in the previous demonstrations were not 

tested here. 

Setup: The setup for this demonstration test was similar to that of the previous tests. Depending 

on the capability being demonstrated, the driver played the role of a thief and another participant 

played the role of the authorized driver (person outside the vehicle). In other cases, a second 

person played the role of a hijacker. 

Procedure: Two different procedures were proposed to demonstrate FR3 VST capabilities, 

depending on the type of technology being showcased. 

Theft Case: The test would start with the vehicle idling and the driver outside the cab. The 

driver, playing the role of a thief, would enter the cab and start driving the vehicle. If the vehicle 

could not be driven by a non-authenticated driver, then the test was not conducted here, since this 

type of technology (i.e., VDT) was to be tested in Phase II. 

Once the vehicle was moving, if the VST was to be triggered by the authorized driver (role 

played by another participant) through a key fob or another similar mechanism, then the VST 

was activated. Elapsed times were measured between the activation time, the instant that the 

VST is actually activated, and the time the vehicle came to a stop. 

Hijack Case: Normally, in hijack cases the VST devices do not get activated immediately 

because such activation could contribute to jeopardizing the life of the driver. A signal is sent to 

a control center, through the introduction of an under-distress code or other means. From this 

point forward, the situation becomes similar to those analyzed in the two previous tests (i.e., 

remote vehicle shutdown). 

For the hijack demonstrations, the sequence was initiated with the vehicle idling (parked close to 

point E on segment E-F, see Figure 8) and the driver being inside of the cab. A second person, 

 7

 This elapsed time takes into account the communication time between vehicle and central computer, plus the time that it takes for the central 

computer to determine that the geofence has been crossed. If these computations are performed onboard, as applied to some of the vendors, then 

the elapsed time to determine that the geofence has been crossed is almost 0. 

34 
playing the role of a hijacker, entered the cab and instructed the driver to start moving the 

vehicle. At that point, the driver triggered the device using the protocol provided by the vendor 

of the technology. Elapsed times were measured between the activation time, the instant that the 

VST was actually activated, and the time the vehicle came to a stop. Vehicle re-enabling time 

was also measured. 

3.1.2 Stationary Vehicle Tests (Phase II) 

The second part of the demonstration tests was conducted on the “asphalt lake,” close to the area 

where the test observers were stationed (point PII in Figure 8). Although the demonstration tests 

of this second phase covered FR1, FR3, and for those companies offering this capability, FR2, 

the emphasis was on driver authentication devices. 

No specialized instrumentation for data acquisition was installed in the participating vehicles. 

However, all of the demonstrations were videotaped and are included in the videos attached to 

this report. 

VDT Demonstrations 

There are many different technologies that satisfy FR1 and, to a lesser degree, FR3. Because of 

this, no rigid protocols were used for the demonstration tests of Phase II. Instead, each vendor 

was allowed to showcase their vehicle disabling technologies as they considered appropriate. 

There were, however, restrictions on the time (see Schedule of Events in Appendix C) for these 

demonstrations, and each vendor was required to provide, in advance, a list of the technologies 

that would be demonstrated for driver authentication and other VDTs. No particular data was 

gathered during Phase II (other than measuring vehicle re-enabling times), but the 

demonstrations were documented via videotape. 

3.2 DEMONSTRATION TESTS RESULTS 

Nine companies participated in the VIT demonstration tests that were conducted at the LPG 

facility on February 27, 2007. These companies included six VIT vendors/developers: Satellite 

Security Systems, MAGTEC, Qualcomm, International Truck and Engine Corporation, BSM 

Wireless, and GlenHugh Enterprise; two customers using VIT products: the Blue Bird Body 

Company, a Satellite Security Systems customer, and Celadon Trucking, a customer of 

Qualcomm; and a GPS tracking service provider company: Archetype, a partner of GlenHugh 

Enterprise. The event lasted one day and was attended by representatives from FMCSA, TSA, 

TDOS, South Carolina Department of Public Safety, and OEM companies, as well as ORNL and 

UTK researchers. Appendix C presents the schedule of events and program for the demonstration 

tests. 

As described previously, the vendors provided their own vehicles for the demonstrations or used 

vehicles belonging to one of their customers. Table 5 presents a detailed description of the 

vehicles that were used in the demonstration tests. 

35 
Table 5. Demonstration Vehicles 

VIT Vendor 

Communication 

System 

Vehicle Type and 

Information 

Total 

Weight 

(lb) 

Owner 

Satellite Security Systems Cellular School Bus 20,000 Blue Bird Body Co 

MAGTEC Cellular Class-8 Truck Kenworth T800 30,000 MAGTEC 

Qualcomm Satellite 2005, Freightliner, Columbia 18,000 Celadon Trucking 

International Truck & 

Engine 

Cellular 2005 International 4300 SBA 

4x2 

26,000 International 

BSM Wireless Cellular* Tandem Axle Truck 26,000 Leased 

GlenHugh Enterprise Cellular 2001, Mack CH613 E7427 30,000 Leased 

*Dual mode analog and digital cellular. 

3.2.1 Driver Authentication Demonstrations (FR1) 

All of the participating companies demonstrated their driver authentication technologies. Two 

companies, S3 and BSM Wireless, used cards for driver authentication. In the case of S3, a 

magnetic card reader served as the device to identify the driver (Figure 9); however, at the time 

of the demonstration, this company was conducting research to add a biometric device for 

increased security. BSM Wireless, on the other hand, used a two-step driver authentication 

process. The first step required the driver to use a proximity card (RFID tag) that is waved in 

front of the driver authentication device (Figure 10). 

Figure 9. S3 Driver Authentication 

Swipe Card 

Figure 10. BSM Wireless Driver Authentication 

Stage 1: Proximity Card 

Once the system has accepted the driver as being a valid driver for that vehicle, then he/she must 

enter a numerical identification code to allow the vehicle to be drivable (Figure 11). The code is 

also transmitted to the backend application for driver verification and historical logs. The system 

uses a synthesized voice to guide the user during the authentication process. 

36 
Qualcomm (which deploys MAGTEC’s VIT technology in their system) also uses a keypad to 

allow the driver to enter an identification code (Figure 12). The vehicle could be left unattended 

with the engine idling. However, if a thief were to attempt to drive the vehicle before entering a 

valid code, as soon as the parking brake is released, the engine would shutdown (Figure 13). 

Figure 11. BSM Wireless Driver 

Authentication Stage 2: Keypad Code Entry 

Figure 12. MAGTEC Driver Authentication 

Keypad Code Entry 

A similar procedure is utilized by International Truck and Engine, which also includes a keypad 

for driver authentication. However, since in this case, the technology is developed by an OEM, 

the device is integrated in the vehicle dashboard. In Figure 14, the row of keys immediately 

underneath the radio/CD player is used for driver authentication purposes. As in the previous 

case, if someone tried to drive away without entering a valid authentication code, the engine 

would shut off as soon as the parking brake is released. 

Figure 13. Qualcomm and Celadon Trucking 

Driver Authentication Keypad Code Entry 

Figure 14. International Truck and Engine 

Driver Authentication Keypad Code Entry 

The last demonstrating company, GlenHugh Enterprise, showcased their autoWATCH VIT 

technology, which, for driver authentication, uses a transponder device shown in Figure 15. The 

37 
driver has to be in possession of this device to be able to move the vehicle. The vehicle can be 

left unattended with an idling engine. If someone tries to drive that vehicle and that person is not 

in possession of the transponder (the transponder has to be inside the vehicle’s cabin), the engine 

will shut off as soon as the parking brake is released. 

Figure 15. GlenHugh Driver Authentication 

Transponder 

3.2.2 Loss of Signal Vehicle Disablement Demonstrations (FR2) 

None of the companies that demonstrated their products at this event offer automatic vehicle 

shutdown if a loss of signal occurs, not because of technical impediments, but due to safety 

concerns. For example, a vehicle might be stopped in an urban area with tall buildings and urban 

canyons, where it is very easy to lose communication/GPS signals, or in an area with low 

coverage of cell towers. For such cases, however, some of the companies indicated that it is 

possible to implement a minimum interval of time with no signal that will be accepted before the 

vehicle is disabled/shutdown. 

Nevertheless, two companies demonstrated how their VIT products disabled the vehicle in case 

of a loss of signal. MAGTEC showed how tampering with the wires (see Figure 16 in which a 

communication wire is being cut off) would immediately shut off the engine and send out a 

tampering message. MAGTEC also demonstrated how it was not possible to drive the vehicle 

(i.e., the engine would shut off) if someone tried to cover the communication/GPS antenna, for 

example, with the bucket that can be seen on the lower left corner of Figure 16. This capability is 

disabled by default; when enabled, the vehicle will continue operating without signal until the 

time threshold is reached (configurable from 1 to 120 minutes), at which point the vehicle will 

automatically activate the eVID. 

A similar demonstration was provided by BSM Wireless wherein the cable to the GPS antenna 

was cut and the truck engine was shut off (Figure 17). An alarm message was also sent out 

indicating the GPS antenna cable was cut. 

38 
Figure 16. MAGTEC Vehicle Disablement Due 

to Wire Tampering 

Figure 17. BSM Wireless Vehicle Disablement 

Due to Loss of Signal 

3.2.3 Vehicle Disablement by Driver Demonstrations (FR3) 

Two companies demonstrated vehicle disablement by the driver. Satellite Security Systems 

included a panic button in their Blue Bird school bus demonstration vehicle. When that button 

was activated (Figure 18), a distress message was sent to the central system, which was 

immediately forwarded, by e-mail, cell phone, or other means, to the person(s) designated by the 

company using the technology. MAGTEC and Qualcomm also offer the ability to enter a distress 

or “under-duress” code as well as a “hijack” code through their driver authentication keypad. 

Similarly, International Truck and Engine provides a feature that allows the driver to send a 

notification to a control center. This alert is sent, regardless of the ignition status of the vehicle, 

and the control center can then disable the vehicle remotely. 

BSM Wireless demonstrated the use of a key fob device to disable/shutdown the vehicle, as well 

as arming and disarming its alarm system (Figure 19). The device has a range of approximately 

100 ft. The company also provides the capability to enter an “under-duress” code that sends a 

silent alert and message to persons designated by the carrier. The BSM Wireless system also 

monitors all doors and the tractor’s hood for unauthorized entry. During the demonstration, 

opening any of the rear doors on the vehicle caused the vehicle engine to be disabled and a 

message transmitted to the backend application (and e-mails distributed to anyone who is to be 

notified of the breach). 

GlenHugh Enterprise demonstrated a VIT feature for hijack cases. Their system is armed every 

time the vehicle’s engine is turned on or every time a door is opened. The lawful driver must 

therefore disarm the system upon entry. In the case of a hijack, as soon as the cabin door is 

opened, the system will be armed. The driver can then give the vehicle control to the hijacker 

and exit the cabin. The vehicle will be drivable for a few minutes before it is completely 

shutdown. 

39 
Figure 18. S3 Panic Button Figure 19. BSM Wireless Key Fob Device 

3.2.4 Remote Vehicle Shutdown Demonstrations (FR4 and FR5) 

A large part of the event was devoted to the demonstration of remote vehicle shutdown 

technologies. At the present time, the remote shutdown of a vehicle is always accomplished 

through the company dispatcher and/or through the VIT vendor control center (see Section 2 for 

more details), and law enforcement are currently not allowed to accomplish this task 

independently. While this satisfies FMCSA FR4 (remote vehicle shutdown by dispatcher), FR5 

(remote shutdown by law enforcement) has to be accomplished through the same channels as 

FR4. Section 6 of this report presents, in detail, a concept of operations for law enforcement, but 

to summarize the current procedures here, law enforcement may or may not be involved 

depending on the company that owns the VIT-equipped vehicle and the VIT vendor protocols. 

The VST demonstration tests were conducted under the assumption that a vehicle shutdown 

would be performed with law enforcement in visual contact with the distressed vehicle. 

Therefore, the order to shutdown the vehicle was always initiated from the highway patrol car 

that shadowed the truck to be shutdown. In a real-world situation, the order would be given when 

the officer determines that it is safe to initiate the shutdown procedure. For the tests, the order 

was done in a quasi-random fashion to test system latencies and vehicle maneuverability after 

shutdown. 

The spatial information collected during the tests was used as input to a software utility, 

developed by ORNL for this project that permits dynamic viewing of the trajectory of the 

vehicles and the speed profile as they performed the runs. The software, which is included in the 

attached CD, is described in Appendix D. 

S3 VST Demonstrations 

Satellite Security Systems demonstrated their vehicle shutdown technology in conjunction with 

one of its customers, the Blue Bird Body Company (BB). Figure 20 presents the four views of 

the demonstration tests that were captured by the four deployed cameras: the view from inside of 

the cabin (upper left corner); the view from the South Carolina State Highway Patrol vehicle 

(upper right corner) from which the order to shutdown was always given (except in the geofence 

tests in which the triggering of the eVID was done automatically); and the views from two 

40 
cameras positioned at strategic places on the “asphalt lake” to capture the vehicle trajectory after 

shutdown. 

Figure 20. S3 and Blue Bird VST Demonstration Test 

S3 and BB performed four runs demonstrating their vehicle shutdown capabilities. The results of 

these runs are presented in Table 6. Because S3 used a technology that completely shuts off the 

engine while the vehicle is moving, a first run was conducted at a slow speed as explained in the 

previous section. After it was determined that the vehicle was fully controllable following the 

engine shutdown, three more runs at arterial speeds were conducted. 

In Table 6, each run is presented in three columns. The first one is the clock time (i.e., the 

Eastern Daylight Time at which the different test events occurred). These times are shown in 

hours, minutes, and seconds. The second column is the cumulative, or elapsed time, subsequent 

to the order to activate the device (i.e., the order to shutdown the vehicle) was given. Elapsed 

times are shown in minutes and seconds. The last column shows the speed, in miles-per-hour, at 

which the vehicle was traveling when the particular test event occurred. 

The first column of the table (the left most column) is a list of test events. It should be noted that 

in general, the events are different for different technologies. Nevertheless, the order to shutdown 

(SD) is always the first test event for any technology. Notice also that this event was initiated 

from the law enforcement vehicle or by crossing the geofence for those companies that 

demonstrated that capability. In the case of S3, it was always initiated from the highway patrol 

vehicle. The second test event is the sound of the alarm inside the cabin of the vehicle being shut 

down, which indicated that the eVID was activated. The third event is the actual shutdown of the 

vehicle engine. The next event is the time at which the driver applied the brakes. Because of time 

constraints, when the researcher traveling inside the shutdown vehicle observed that it was 

traveling at a very slow speed, he asked the driver to apply the brakes and to bring the vehicle to 

a final stop. The time at which the vehicle stopped was noted as the next event. 

41 
The next row in Table 6 shows a computation of the deceleration rate, measured in ft/sec2

, to 

which the vehicle was subjected to from the instant that the engine was shutdown to when the 

brakes were applied. 

After the vehicle came to a stop, the onboard researcher asked the driver to re-start the vehicle 

and confirmed that it was not possible to do so (i.e., the vehicle was effectively immobilized). 

Sometime after that, the researcher that was traveling inside the law enforcement vehicle gave 

the order to re-enable (RE) the vehicle, which is shown as the next test event (notice that the 

elapsed time counter is reset when this test event occurs). The last test event in the table shows 

the time at which the driver was able to re-start the vehicle. 

Table 6. Satellite Security Systems VST Test Results— 

Slow Speed (Run 1) and Arterial Speed (Runs 2–4) 

Run 1 

Clock 

Time 

[hh:mm:ss] 

Run 1 

Elapsed 

Time 

[mm:ss] 

Run 1 

Speed 

[mph] 

Run 2 

Clock 

Time 

[hh:mm:ss] 

Run 2 

Elapsed 

Time 

[mm:ss] 

Run 2 

Speed 

[mph] 

Run 3 

Clock 

Time 

[hh:mm:ss] 

Run 3 

Elapsed 

Time 

[mm:ss] 

Run 3 

Speed 

[mph] 

Run 3 

Clock 

Time 

[hh:mm:ss] 

Run 3 

Elapsed 

Time 

[mm:ss] 

Run 3 

Speed 

[mph] 

Order to SD 09:00:40 00:00 19.50 09:10:38 00:00 27.90 09:17:34 00:00 32.90 09:24:24 00:00 30.10 

Alarm 09:00:51 00:11 11.50 09:10:47 00:09 28.40 09:17:48 00:14 29.00 09:24:36 00:12 28.00 

Vehicle SD 09:00:55 00:15 10.10 09:11:16 00:38 28.40 09:18:12 00:38 27.20 09:24:53 00:29 30.20 

Brakes App. 09:01:08 00:28 6.44 09:11:50 01:12 8.30 09:19:11 01:37 2.41 09:25:32 01:08 12.20 

Veh. Stop 09:01:14 00:34 0.00 09:11:56 01:18 0.00 09:19:15 01:41 0.00 09:25:39 01:15 0.00 

Dec. (fps2) 0.41 0.87 0.62 0.68 

Order to RE 09:01:37 00:00 0.00 09:12:39 00:00 0.00 09:19:53 00:00 0.00 09:25:45 00:00 0.00 

Veh. RE 09:01:54 00:17 0.00 09:12:58 00:19 0.00 09:20:07 00:14 0.00 09:26:00 00:15 0.00 

Consider, for example, Run 2 of Table 6. The order to shutdown the vehicle was given at 9:10:38 

AM while it was traveling at 27.9 mph. This test event is also marked on the speed profile of this 

run shown in Figure 21, in which the last two minutes of the run are shown, and in Figure 22, as 

the first yellow circle in the direction of travel. The next event, that is, the sound of the alarm, 

occurred at 9:10:47, or nine seconds after the order to shutdown was given, while the vehicle was 

traveling at 28.4 mph. The engine shutdown occurred at 9:11:16, or 38 seconds after the order 

was issued, while the vehicle was traveling at 28.4 mph and at a location marked by the second 

yellow circle in Figure 22. 

After engine shutdown occurred, Figure 21 shows a constant deceleration rate that, for this 

particular run, was computed to be 0.87 ft/sec2

. Notice, however, that the deceleration rate was 

constant up to about 10 mph, at which point it changed to a lower deceleration rate. As illustrated 

in Figure 22, the brakes were applied after this point, and the reported deceleration rate is 

computed using the speed at the time when the brakes were applied as the ending speed. If the 

vehicle continued traveling with the deceleration rate that it attained after the speed crossed the 

10 mph threshold, the vehicle would have come to a stop at about 9:12:22 AM,

8

 or one minute 

and forty-four seconds after the order to shutdown was given, traveling a distance of 2,700 ft. 

Instead, because the brakes were applied at 9:11:50, it stopped at 9:11:56, or one minute and 

eighteen seconds after the order was issued. A similar speed profile (i.e., constant deceleration 

rate from shutdown to a speed of 10 mph, followed by a lower deceleration rate, but also 

 8

 This calculation assumed a flat surface, as was the case at the test track. Downslopes or upslopes can change the stopping time and distance 

considerably. 

42 
constant) was observed for Run 3. In Run 4, the brakes were applied when the vehicle was 

traveling above 10 mph (12 mph as shown in Table 6). If stopping distance computations similar 

to that of Run 2 are made (i.e., no brake application), the vehicle would have traveled 2,600 and 

2,780 ft in Runs 3 and 4, respectively from the instant that the order to shutdown was given to 

the instant the vehicle came to a stop. 

For the last set of test events in Run 2, nineteen seconds elapsed from the instant that the order to 

re-enable the vehicle was given to the instant at which the driver was able to re-start the bus. 

0.00

5.00

10.00

15.00

20.00

25.00

30.00

35.00

40.00

09:10:30 09:10:45 09:11:00 09:11:15 09:11:30 09:11:45 09:12:00 09:12:15 09:12:30

Time [hh:mm:ss]

Speed [mph]

Order to Shutdown

Alarm Starts

Vehicle Shutdown

Brakes Activated by Driver

Vehicle Immobilized

Figure 21. S3 and Blue Bird VST Demonstration Test at Arterial Speed 

Run 2 Speed Profile 

Figure 22. S3 and Blue Bird VST Demonstration Test at Arterial Speed 

Vehicle Trajectory Immediately before Stopping (Run 2) 

43 
Figure 22 presents the trajectory (shown in red and overlaid on the test track) that the bus 

followed during the two minutes previous to coming to a complete stop. As can be seen from that 

figure, the vehicle followed a straight line trajectory. Figures 23 and 24 present the speed profiles 

corresponding to Runs 3 and 4, respectively (see Table 6). 

0.00

5.00

10.00

15.00

20.00

25.00

30.00

35.00

40.00

09:17:30 09:17:45 09:18:00 09:18:15 09:18:30 09:18:45 09:19:00 09:19:15 09:19:30

Time [hh:mm:ss]

Speed [mph]

Order to Shutdown

Alarm Starts

Vehicle Shutdown

Brakes Activated by Driver

Vehicle Immobilized

Figure 23. S3 and Blue Bird VST Demonstration Test at Arterial Speed 

Run 3 Speed Profile 

0.00

5.00

10.00

15.00

20.00

25.00

30.00

35.00

40.00

09:24:15 09:24:30 09:24:45 09:25:00 09:25:15 09:25:30 09:25:45 09:26:00 09:26:15

Time [hh:mm:ss]

Speed [mph]

Order to Shutdown

Alarm Starts

Vehicle Shutdown

Brakes Activated by Driver

Vehicle Immobilized

Vehicle Re-enabled

Order to Re-enable Vehicle

Figure 24. S3 and Blue Bird VST Demonstration Test at Arterial Speed 

Run 4 Speed Profile 

44 
The results of these VST tests show that on average, the S3 VIT required 30 seconds between the 

instant that the order to shutdown the vehicle was given to the instant that the engine was shut 

off, and 16 seconds to re-enable the vehicle. The average deceleration rate after shutdown was 

0.64 ft/sec2

. 

MAGTEC/Qualcomm VST Demonstrations 

MAGTEC and Qualcomm demonstrated their technology with class-8 trucks, the former with 

their own vehicle and the latter with one of their customers, Celadon Trucking Company. While 

the VDT demonstrations were conducted using these two trucks, all of the VST demonstrations 

were showcased with the MAGTEC truck. However, during the first part of the test (Run 1 in 

Table 7) the control and activation of VIT device was accomplished through the Qualcomm 

system, while in the other two runs, MAGTEC was in control. Figure 25 shows the views from 

the four cameras during one of the MAGTEC/Qualcomm demonstration tests. 

As explained in Section 2, the technology used by MAGTEC (i.e., the Acceleration Control 

System) does not result in an engine shutdown, but rather in a speed decrement (i.e., a controlled 

speed reduction) at given intervals of time. Once a speed decrement has been actuated, a new 

speed ceiling is implemented and it is not possible for the driver to travel at a speed higher than 

that ceiling (except if the vehicle is on a down grade). The length of the intervals of time at 

which the speed decrements are actuated is a parameter of the system and can be changed (even 

wirelessly). For the demonstration tests, the time intervals for enacting the speed decrements 

were shorter than what is usually specified in the MAGTEC and Qualcomm systems because of 

time constraints (each company had 45 minutes to demonstrate their VSTs). Other than a 

reduction of the total time of the test run, no other aspects of the technology were affected. For 

the tests, MAGTEC/Qualcomm implemented a six-minute cycle from device activation to the 

limp mode. As an example of a “real-world” implementation, the Celadon truck used by 

Qualcomm to demonstrate driver authentication had a twenty-minute seven-step cycle vehicle 

shutdown implementation. Each step had a duration of 45 seconds, for a total of 5 minutes before 

the truck enters into a limp mode (10 mph), and an extra 15 minutes at that speed before it is 

completely shutdown. 

Figure 25. MAGTEC VST Demonstration Test 

45 
Table 7 shows the results of three test runs at arterial speed. Because the technology used by 

MAGTEC is different from that of S3 (and other vendors), the test events in Table 7 (leftmost 

column) are different from those shown in Table 6, with the exception of the first two items—

that is, the order to shutdown and the sound of the alarm inside the cabin, respectively. Notice, 

however, that while in Runs 1 and 2 the order to shutdown was given from the law enforcement 

vehicle, in Run 3 the driver enters a distress code that results in the activation of the eVID. 

The information presented in Table 7 is also depicted graphically in Figure 26, Figure 27 and 

Figure 28, which show the speed profiles for the last eight minutes of the three runs. In these 

figures, it is possible to discern the different speed thresholds that the vehicle experiences while 

the steps down were being actuated. The figures also show the instant that the vehicle entered the 

“limp mode” status, which imposes an upper speed limit of 10 mph. For example, Figure 26

shows that after the limp mode was enacted, the driver tried to accelerate, but he was not able to 

break the 10 mph barrier. 

As in the case of S3, the average deceleration rate reported in Table 7 is computed between the 

instant that the first speed decrement was actuated to the time that the brakes were applied by the 

driver. Notice, however, that in this case, this is a pseudo deceleration rate since the driver could 

still accelerate within the upper limit imposed by each threshold. This deceleration rate is 

presented here for completeness since it is shown as part of the tests that were conducted for all 

of the other companies. For the same reason, it is only possible to compute an approximate upper 

bound of the distance that a truck with this VST would travel before coming to a stop. Assuming 

a flat terrain, a limp mode interval of 15 minutes (similar to the one implemented for the Celadon 

truck), and that the driver would keep a speed of 10 mph during this interval, the traveled 

distances for Runs 1 and 2 would have been approximately 24,800 ft (4.70 miles) and 25,700 ft 

(4.87 miles), respectively, since the order to shutdown was given to the point where the vehicle 

would have come to a stop. It should be noted that the MAGTEC parameters can be modified 

over-the-air and on-the-fly without causing any system problems. This functionality provides 

users with the ability to quickly adjust settings and shut the vehicle down in the event of an 

emergency. 

In the hijack demonstration, Run 3 in Table 7 and Figure 28, the VIT device was triggered by the 

driver entering a distress or “under-duress” code. As can be seen in Figure 28, the vehicle 

behaved in a similar fashion as was the case for the two previous runs. 

Table 7. MAGTEC/Qualcomm VST Tests Results—Qualcomm Demo (Run 1), 

MAGTEC Demo (Run 2), and Hijack Demo (Run 3) 

Run 1 

Clock 

Time 

[hh:mm:ss] 

Run 1 

Elapsed 

Time 

[mm:ss] 

Run 1 

Speed 

[mph] 

Run 2 

Clock 

Time 

[hh:mm:ss] 

Run 2 

Elapsed 

Time 

[mm:ss] 

Run 2 

Speed 

[mph] 

Run 3 

Clock 

Time 

[hh:mm:ss] 

Run 3 

Elapsed 

Time 

[mm:ss] 

Run 3 

Speed 

[mph] 

Order to SD* 10:24:22 00:00 41.20 10:48:01 00:00 24.70 10:59:20 00:00 0.00 

Alarm 10:24:45 00:23 41.90 10:48:06 00:05 23.00 11:02:34 03:14 29.10 

1st Speed Decrement 10:25:58 01:36 38.10 10:49:09 01:08 40.10 11:03:13 03:53 39.80 

2nd Speed Decrement 10:26:55 02:33 28.80 10:50:39 02:38 30.20 11:03:28 04:08 30.20 

3rd Speed Decrement 10:28:08 03:46 19.30 10:52:15 04:14 21.00 11:04:41 05:21 19.80 

Limp Mode 10:29:34 05:12 9.96 10:53:52 05:51 12.50 11:06:07 06:47 10.20 

Brakes Applied 10:30:40 06:18 9.48 10:55:06 07:05 9.43 11:06:53 07:33 8.66 

46 
Run 1 

Clock 

Time 

[hh:mm:ss] 

Run 1 

Elapsed 

Time 

[mm:ss] 

Run 1 

Speed 

[mph] 

Run 2 

Clock 

Time 

[hh:mm:ss] 

Run 2 

Elapsed 

Time 

[mm:ss] 

Run 2 

Speed 

[mph] 

Run 3 

Clock 

Time 

[hh:mm:ss] 

Run 3 

Elapsed 

Time 

[mm:ss] 

Run 3 

Speed 

[mph] 

Vehicle Stopped 10:30:55 06:33 0.00 10:55:20 07:19 0.00 11:06:58 07:38 0.00 

Dec. (fps2) 0.15 0.13 0.21 

Order to RE 10:32:10 00:00 0.00 10:55:45 00:00 0.00 

Vehicle RE 10:41:40 09:30 0.00 10:58:05 02:20 0.00 

 *For Run 3, the under-duress code triggered the device. 

The vehicle re-enabling tests were conducted for Runs 1 and 2. In Run 1, it took over nine 

minutes from the moment the order to re-enable was given to the instant when the driver was 

able to start the vehicle. This was the case because after five failed attempts to enter the driver 

authentication code due to a temporary technical glitch (i.e., a communication delay in the 

satellite system), the device entered into a tampering mode and required a second message from 

the central system to allow the re-enabling process to be started again. 

0.00

5.00

10.00

15.00

20.00

25.00

30.00

35.00

40.00

45.00

50.00

10:24:00 10:25:00 10:26:00 10:27:00 10:28:00 10:29:00 10:30:00 10:31:00

Time [hh:mm:ss]

Speed [mph]

Order to Shutdown

Alarm Starts

First Speed Decrement Starts

Brakes Activated by Driver

Vehicle Immobilized

Alarm Ends

Second Speed Decrement Starts

Third Speed Decrement Starts

Limp Mode Starts

Figure 26. Qualcomm VST Demonstration Test at Arterial Speed 

Run 1 Speed Profile 

47 
0.00

5.00

10.00

15.00

20.00

25.00

30.00

35.00

40.00

45.00

10:47:00 10:48:00 10:49:00 10:50:00 10:51:00 10:52:00 10:53:00 10:54:00 10:55:00 10:56:00 10:57:00

Time [hh:mm:ss]

Speed [mph]

Order to Shutdown

Alarm Starts

First Speed Decrement Starts

Brakes Activated by Driver

Vehicle Immobilized

Alarm Ends

Second Speed Decrement Starts

Third Speed Decrement Starts

Limp Mode Starts

Figure 27. MAGTEC VST Demonstration Test at Arterial Speed 

Run 2 Speed Profile 

0.00

5.00

10.00

15.00

20.00

25.00

30.00

35.00

40.00

45.00

50.00

10:59:00 11:00:00 11:01:00 11:02:00 11:03:00 11:04:00 11:05:00 11:06:00 11:07:00

Time [hh:mm:ss]

Speed [mph]

Distress Code Entered

Speed Decrement Process Starts

Brakes Activated by Driver

Vehicle Immobilized

Vehicle Starts

Limp Mode 

Figure 28. MAGTEC Demonstration Test at Arterial Speed 

Run 3 (Hijack Case) Speed Profile 

The results of these VST tests show that on average, the MAGTEC vehicle immobilization 

technology required five minutes and 57 seconds from the instant that the order to shutdown the 

vehicle was given (or the “under-duress” code was entered) until the instant that the vehicle 

reached the limp mode speed of 10 mph. As explained earlier, this total time is a variable that 

can be imposed to the system and configured or modified on-the-fly. The average deceleration 

rate after shutdown was 0.16 ft/sec2

, although this is highly correlated to the total time to reach 

the limp mode. Re-enablement under normal conditions required two minutes and 20 seconds, 

48 
and could be close to ten minutes if mistakes are made while entering the authentication code 

(after five attempts, the system enters into a tampering mode). For the hijack case (Run 3), the 

time elapsed between the instant that the distress code is entered and instant when the eVID gets 

activated (three minutes for the demonstration) is a configurable parameter of the system. 

International Truck and Engine VST Demonstrations 

International Truck and Engine presented a VIT that can be readily and wirelessly adapted to 

different situations (International Truck and Engine, n.d.). In their VST demonstration tests 

(Figure 29), International showed three different levels of engine impairment to accomplish a 

vehicle shutdown. Those included a straight engine shutdown (Run 1 in Table 8 and Figure 30

and Figure 31); a severe, 75%, engine depower (Run 2 in Table 8 and Figure 32); and an extreme 

engine depower (Run 3 in Table 8 and Figure 33). A fourth test with a two-step (75% and 10%) 

engine depower was also scheduled but, because of time constraints, had to be cancelled. Remote 

and local re-enabling were also demonstrated by International Truck and Engine. 

The information presented in Table 8 is arranged similarly to that of Table 6 and Table 7 for the 

S3 and MAGTEC/Qualcomm demonstrations, respectively. Again, and due to the differences in 

the way the immobilization technology works in various vendor technologies, the test events on 

the first column of Table 8 are slightly different from those of Table 6 and Table 7. One main 

difference is that the vehicle came to a stop without any significant brake application by the 

driver and, therefore, that test event is not included in the table (note, brakes were applied at the 

end of Run 3 when the vehicle had traveled at close to five mph for about two minutes after the 

end of the extreme depower period). 

Figure 29. International Truck and Engine VST Demonstration Test 

49 
Run 1 shows the information for a vehicle shutdown procedure with the engine shut off. This 

particular run presented the highest deceleration rate of all the demonstrations, 1.87 ft/sec2

. 

However, the vehicle was perfectly controllable after the engine shutdown occurred. Figure 31

shows the trajectory that the vehicle followed (shown as a red line over the test track) during the 

last 90 seconds of the run, where the first yellow circle marks the place where the order to 

shutdown was given by law enforcement (12:45:42 PM), and the second yellow circle marks the 

place where the engine shutdown commenced (12:46:47 PM). Subsequently, the vehicle traveled 

in a straight line 603 ft in 25 seconds before coming to a stop. 

Stopping distance computations, assuming a flat terrain (such as the one at the test track), 

indicated that the demonstration vehicle traveled 3,330 ft and 4,230 ft for Runs 1 and 2, 

respectively, from the instant that the order to shutdown was given to the instant the vehicle 

came to a complete stop. 

Table 8. International Truck and Engine VST Tests Results— 

Engine Shutdown (Run 1), Severe (75%) Depower (Run 2), and Extreme Depower (Run 3) 

Run 1 

Clock 

Time 

[hh:mm:ss] 

Run 1 

Elapsed 

Time 

[mm:ss] 

Run 1 

Speed 

[mph] 

Run 2 

Clock 

Time 

[hh:mm:ss] 

Run 2 

Elapsed 

Time 

[mm:ss] 

Run 2 

Speed 

[mph] 

Run 3 

Clock 

Time 

[hh:mm:ss] 

Run 3 

Elapsed 

Time 

[mm:ss] 

Run 3 

Speed 

[mph] 

Order to SD 12:45:52 00:00 34.30 12:55:30 00:00 33.20 13:05:31 00:00 32.10 

Alarm 12:45:59 00:07 34.90 12:55:38 00:08 35.10 13:05:41 00:10 30.70 

Start of Depower 12:55:48 00:18 35.20 13:05:50 00:19 31.10 

End of Depower 13:06:25 00:54 4.95 

Vehicle SD 12:46:47 00:54 31.20 12:56:42 01:12 25.90 

Vehicle Stop 12:47:11 01:19 0.00 12:56:57 01:27 0.00 13:08:45 03:14 0.00 

Dec. (fps2) 1.87 0.75 1.10 

Order to RE 12:47:23 00:00 0.00 12:57:27 00:00 0.00 13:09:00 00:00 0.00 

Vehicle RE 12:52:14 04:51 0.00 12:57:40 00:13 0.00 13:09:27 00:27 0.00 

1

 Remote vehicle re-enable. 

2

 Local vehicle re-enable. 

50 
0.00

5.00

10.00

15.00

20.00

25.00

30.00

35.00

40.00

12:45:00 12:45:30 12:46:00 12:46:30 12:47:00 12:47:30 12:48:00

Time [hh:mm:ss]

Speed [mph]

Order to Shutdown Alarm Starts

Vehicle Shutdown

Vehicle Immobilized

Figure 30. International Truck and Engine VST Demonstration Test at Arterial Speed 

Run 1 (Engine Shutdown) Speed Profile 

Figure 31. International Truck and Engine VST Demonstration Test at Arterial Speed 

Vehicle Trajectory Immediately before Stopping (Run 1) 

51 
0.00

5.00

10.00

15.00

20.00

25.00

30.00

35.00

40.00

12:55:00 12:55:30 12:56:00 12:56:30 12:57:00 12:57:30 12:58:00

Time [hh:mm:ss]

Speed [mph]

Order to Shutdown

Alarm Starts

Vehicle Shutdown

Vehicle Immobilized

Vehicle Depower

Order to Re-enable

Vehicle Re-enabled

Figure 32. International Truck and Engine VST Demonstration Test at Arterial Speed 

Run 2 (75% Depower) Speed Profile 

0.00

5.00

10.00

15.00

20.00

25.00

30.00

35.00

40.00

13:05:00 13:05:30 13:06:00 13:06:30 13:07:00 13:07:30 13:08:00 13:08:30 13:09:00

Time [hh:mm:ss]

Speed [mph]

Order to Shutdown

Alarm Starts

Vehicle Immobilized

Vehicle Extreme Depower Starts

Brakes Activated by Driver

Vehicle Extreme Depower Ends

Figure 33. International Truck and Engine VST Demonstration Test at Arterial Speed 

Run 3 (Extreme Depower) Speed Profile 

The results of the International Truck and Engine VST tests show that on average, the company’s 

vehicle immobilization technology required 63 seconds from the instant that the order to 

52 
shutdown the vehicle was given to the instant at which the vehicle shutdown process started, and 

for Runs 1 and 2, 83 seconds from when the order to shutdown was given by law enforcement to

the instant the vehicle came to a stop. The average deceleration rate after the order to shutdown 

was given was 1.24 ft/sec2

. Re-enablement required, on average, 110 seconds. 

BSM Wireless VST Demonstrations 

e reaches a speed of 15 mph, the vehicle enters the second stage in which its engine is 

shut off. 

in Table 9 and graphically depicted (i.e., speed profiles) in 

Figure 35, Figure 36 and Figure 37. 

BSM Wireless (BSM Wireless, 2007) demonstrated their VIT (Figure 34) under two conditions: 

activation by law enforcement and activation by crossing a geofence. BSM provides a two-stage 

shutdown process. During the first stage, the engine is set in an idle mode in which pressing the

accelerator pedal has no effect on the engine revolutions (i.e., the engine remains idling). This 

mode causes the speed of the vehicle to decrease at a more dramatic rate than in stage 2. Once 

the vehicl

The results of the tests are presented 

Figure 34. BSM Wireless VST Demonstration Test 

ay 

eed 

sufficiently, the driver was asked to apply the brakes until the vehicle came to a full stop. 

The company’s VIT uses an engine shutdown technology; therefore, the test events shown in 

Table 9 are the same as in the case of S3. Also, as described in the last section, the company was 

required to perform a test at a slow speed (Run 1). The shutdown process started with the issuing 

of the order by law enforcement (i.e., a researcher traveling in the South Carolina State Highw

Patrol vehicle) (Runs 1 to 3) or by crossing the geofence (Run 4); after some time, the alarm 

indicating that the eVID was activated was heard inside the cabin. This was followed by the 

initiation of the vehicle engine shutdown process, and after the truck had diminished its sp

53 
The results of Runs 1 to 4 indicated that on average, it took 22 seconds to start the engine shut 

off process from the instant that the order to shutdown the vehicle was issued, and about 30 

seconds to re-enable the vehicle. The average deceleration rate from engine shutdown to the 

instant the brakes were applied was 0.53 ft/sec2

. Because the brakes were applied, the vehicle 

stop times are, of course, shorter than if the vehicle came to a stop without intervention from the 

driver. However, the difference is not significant. Consider, for example, Run 2. The 0.67 ft/sec2

deceleration rate reported Table 9 is an average of a deceleration of 1.1 ft/sec2

 during 31 seconds 

(from shutdown to about 15.9 mph) and a deceleration of 0.31 ft/sec2 for 38 seconds (from 15.9 

mph until the brakes were applied at 7.7 mph). That is, as can be seen in Figure 35 (and also 36 

and 37), this particular vehicle showed two distinct deceleration rates after the shutdown process 

was initiated. From that moment until the vehicle reached 16 mph, it decelerated at a higher rate 

than from 16 mph onwards. If the vehicle continued traveling with the second deceleration rate 

(and the brakes were not applied), it would have come to a stop at approximately 13:58:37; or 2 

minutes and 33 seconds after the order to shutdown was issued, instead of the one minute 49 

seconds indicated in Table 9 (i.e., a difference of 44 seconds). 

Assuming a flat terrain and no application of brakes, the BSM Wireless truck would have 

traveled 4,220 ft, 4,160 ft, and 1,750 ft for Runs 2, 3, and 4, respectively from the moment the 

order to shutdown was given to the instant the vehicle came to a complete stop. 

Table 9. BSM Wireless VST Tests Results—Slow Speed (Run 1), 

Arterial Speed (Runs 2 and 3), and Geofence Demo (Run 4) 

Run 1 

Clock 

Time 

[hh:mm:ss] 

Run 1 

Elapsed 

Time 

[mm:ss] 

Run 1 

Speed 

[mph] 

Run 2 

Clock 

Time 

[hh:mm:ss] 

Run 2 

Elapsed 

Time 

[mm:ss] 

Run 2 

Speed 

[mph] 

Run 3 

Clock 

Time 

[hh:mm:ss] 

Run 3 

Elapsed 

Time 

[mm:ss] 

Run 3 

Speed 

[mph] 

Run 4 

Clock 

Time 

[hh:mm:ss] 

Run 4 

Elapsed 

Time 

[mm:ss] 

Run 4 

Speed 

[mph] 

Order to SD* 13:51:08 00:00 16.40 13:56:04 00:00 34.20 14:02:32 00:00 36.60 14:08:37 00:00 26.10 

Alarm 13:51:14 00:06 16.10 13:56:09 00:05 34.20 14:02:38 00:06 39.50 14:08:38 00:01 26.00 

Vehicle SD 13:51:16 00:08 15.50 13:56:40 00:36 39.10 14:03:08 00:36 35.40 14:08:43 00:06 25.00 

Brakes App. 13:51:52 00:44 8.79 13:57:49 01:45 7.71 14:03:49 01:17 13.50 14:09:47 01:10 7.47 

Veh. Stop 13:52:01 00:53 0.00 13:57:53 01:49 0.00 14:03:55 01:23 0.00 14:09:54 01:17 0.00 

Dec. (fps2) 0.28 0.67 0.78 0.40 

Order to RE 13:52:10 00:00 0.00 13:57:58 00:00 0.00 14:04:05 00:00 0.00 14:10:36 00:00 0.00 

Veh. RE 13:52:39 00:29 0.00 13:58:26 00:28 0.00 14:04:07 00:02 0.00 14:11:03 00:27 0.00 

 *For Run 4, crossing the geofence boundary triggered the device. 

54 
0.00

5.00

10.00

15.00

20.00

25.00

30.00

35.00

40.00

13:56:00 13:56:30 13:57:00 13:57:30 13:58:00 13:58:30 13:59:00

Time [hh:mm:ss]

Speed [mph]

Engine Shut off Order to Shutdown

Alarm Starts

Vehicle Shutdown 

(Idle Mode)

Brakes Activated by Driver

Vehicle Immobilized

Order to Re-enable

Vehicle Re-enabled

Figure 35. BSM Wireless VST Demonstration Test at Arterial Speed 

Run 2 Speed Profile 

0.00

5.00

10.00

15.00

20.00

25.00

30.00

35.00

40.00

14:01:30 14:02:00 14:02:30 14:03:00 14:03:30 14:04:00 14:04:30

Time [hh:mm:ss]

Speed [mph]

Vehicle Shutdown 

(Idle Mode)

Engine Shut off

Order to Shutdown

Alarm Starts

Brakes Activated by Driver

Vehicle Immobilized

Figure 36. BSM Wireless VST Demonstration Test at Arterial Speed 

Run 3 Speed Profile 

In the last run, Run 4, BSM Wireless demonstrated their VIT Geofence (or geozone) capabilities. 

In this case the eVID was activated when the vehicle crossed the geofence (see Figure 8). 

Because the geofence coordinates were resident in the onboard system, it took only one second 

for the system to sound the alarm (i.e., activate the vehicle immobilization device). 

55 
0.00

5.00

10.00

15.00

20.00

25.00

30.00

35.00

40.00

14:07:30 14:08:00 14:08:30 14:09:00 14:09:30 14:10:00 14:10:30

Time [hh:mm:ss]

Speed [mph]

Vehicle Shutdown 

(Idle Mode)

Engine Shut off

Geofence Crossed

Alarm Starts

Brakes Activated by Driver

Vehicle Immobilized

Figure 37. BSM Wireless VST Demonstration Test at Arterial Speed 

Run 4 (Geofence Demo) Speed Profile 

GlenHugh Enterprise (autoWATCH) VST Demonstrations 

The last company to demonstrate its VST at LPG in February 2007 was GlenHugh Enterprise 

(GHE), which used a class-8 truck for the tests (see Figure 38). Because of some minor technical 

difficulties, it was only possible to demonstrate the autoWATCH technology in two runs: a VIT 

geofence demonstration test (Run 1) and a vehicle shutdown at arterial speed demonstration 

(Run 2). The results of these runs are shown in Table 10 and the corresponding speed profiles for 

the last three minutes before the vehicle came to a stop are illustrated in Figure 39 and Figure 40. 

Figure 38. GlenHugh Enterprise VST Demonstration Test 

56 
Table 10. GlenHugh Enterprise VST Tests Results— 

Geofence Demo (Run 1) and Arterial Speed (Run 2) 

Run 1 

Clock Time 

[hh:mm:ss] 

Run 1 

Elapsed 

Time 

[mm:ss] 

Run 1 

Speed 

[mph] 

Run 2 

Clock Time 

[hh:mm:ss] 

Run 2 

Elapsed 

Time 

[mm:ss] 

Run 2 

Speed 

[mph] 

Order to SD* 14:48:38 00:00 34.00 15:55:03 00:00 30.5 

Alarm 14:48:43 00:05 34.20 15:55:42 00:39 33.8 

Vehicle SD 14:48:50 00:12 34.30 15:56:10 01:07 33.6 

Brakes App. 15:57:28 02:25 14.8 

Vehicle Stop 14:49:17 00:39 0.00 15:57:39 02:36 0.00 

Dec. (fps2) 1.86 0.35 

Order to RE 14:49:53 00:00 0.00 

Vehicle RE 14:49:59 00:06 0.00 

 *For Run 1, crossing the geofence boundary triggered the device.

The VIT geofence run showed that it required only five seconds for the system to determine that 

the boundary of the protected zone was crossed and to activate the eVID. Seven seconds later, 

the shutdown process was initiated and brought the vehicle to a stop 39 seconds after the 

geofence was crossed. The speed profile shown in Figure 39 indicates two clearly distinct 

deceleration rates after shutdown. However, as opposed to the demonstration vehicles used by S3 

and BSM Wireless, the second deceleration rate was larger than the first one. The driver only 

applied the brakes when the vehicle was traveling at less than one mph, so the total deceleration 

rate for this run was 1.86 ft/sec2

, second only to that shown by the International Truck and 

Engine demonstration vehicle in their first run. 

0.00

5.00

10.00

15.00

20.00

25.00

30.00

35.00

40.00

14:47:30 14:48:00 14:48:30 14:49:00 14:49:30 14:50:00 14:50:30

Time [hh:mm:ss]

Speed [mph]

Geofence Crossed

Alarm Starts

Vehicle Shutdown

Local Re-enable

Vehicle Immobilized

Vehicle Re-enabled

Figure 39. GlenHugh Enterprise Demonstration Test at Arterial Speed 

Run 1 (Geofence Demo) Speed Profile 

57 
Run 2 of GlenHugh Enterprise was a demonstration of remote vehicle shutdown in which law 

enforcement initiated the shutdown process. The order to shutdown the vehicle was given when 

the truck was traveling on the southwest curve of the test track, indicated in Figure 41 with a 

yellow circle. Thirty-nine seconds after that, the eVID was triggered while the truck was on 

segment E-F (second yellow circle in Figure 41). Although the engine was in a dying mode, it 

was possible for the driver to negotiate, with no problems, the northeast curve of the track before 

the vehicle came to a complete stop (in this case the driver applied the brakes when the vehicle 

was traveling at about 15 mph as shown in Figure 40). Assuming a flat terrain and that the 

vehicle would have continued decelerating at the same rate that was experienced just before the 

brakes were applied, the GHE truck would have traveled 7,000 ft (1.33 miles) from the instant 

that the order to shutdown was issued to the instant the vehicle would have come to a stop. 

Only one local vehicle re-enable test was performed (at the end of Run 1), and that required only 

six seconds for the driver to be able to re-start the vehicle. 

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

15:55:00 15:55:30 15:56:00 15:56:30 15:57:00 15:57:30 15:58:00

Time [hh:mm:ss]

Speed [mph]

Order to Shutdown

Second Alarm

Vehicle Immobilized

Brakes Activated by Driver

First Alarm - Device Activated

Third Alarm - Vehicle Shutdown

Figure 40. GlenHugh Enterprise VST Demonstration Test at Arterial Speed 

Run 2 Speed Profile 

58 
Figure 41. GlenHugh Enterprise VST Demonstration Test at Arterial Speed 

Vehicle Trajectory Immediately before Stopping (Run 2) 

3.3 DEMONSTRATION TESTS CONCLUSIONS 

All the participating vendors successfully demonstrated their VDT and VST products, which 

were documented through videotaping. For FR1, different technologies were demonstrated 

including swipe cards (S3), proximity cards (BSM Wireless), keypads (MAGTEC, Qualcomm, 

International Truck and Engine, and BSM Wireless), and transponders (GlenHugh Enterprise). 

Two companies (MAGTEC and BSM Wireless) demonstrated how their technologies were able 

to disable the vehicle in response to a loss of signal (FR2) event. No company demonstrated FR2 

for a shutdown situation. For FR3, a panic button (S3) and a key fob (BSM Wireless) were 

demonstrated. Also related to this FR, MAGTEC and BSM Wireless demonstrated their “underduress” code entry capability, and GlenHugh Enterprise showed a technology that arms itself 

every time a cabin door is opened. 

The vendors also showed a variety of VSTs (FR4 and FR5). Those included engine shutdown 

technologies (S3, International Truck and Engine, BSM Wireless), engine power degradation 

technologies (International Truck and Engine, GlenHugh Enterprise), and speed control 

technology (MAGTEC and Qualcomm). International Truck and Engine demonstrated how 

different levels of engine power degradation could be implemented by sending different 

messages to the vehicle to be shutdown. In the same way, although not demonstrated at this 

event, MAGTEC and Qualcomm can change the parameters governing the total time to shut off 

the vehicle wirelessly. 

The tests provided a first-hand understanding of how these different vehicle immobilization 

technologies are triggered and activated. The tests were also used to investigate the level of 

vehicle control by the driver once the shutdown sequence started and until the vehicle reached a 

complete stop. The most sophisticated technologies allowed for a gradual speed reduction during 

the shutdown process in which all of the vehicle functions are available to the driver. The only 

exception is that the driver cannot accelerate the vehicle above a speed threshold, which is 

59 
60 

constantly decreasing during the shutdown sequence, but otherwise he/she can maintain 

complete control of the vehicle. Depower technologies work in the same way (i.e., the driver has 

complete control of all of the mechanical functions of the vehicle during the shutdown process 

except for the ability to accelerate), but in a shorter spatial and temporal interval. 

The simplest VSTs demonstrations consisted of technologies that shutdown the engine 

completely, with the consequence that the vehicle mechanical functions cease to operate. 

Nevertheless, because of residual air pressure in the brake system, some of those functions are 

still available to the driver until the service brake reservoir is depleted. The tests demonstrated 

that even for these technologies, the vehicles did not experience any significant loss of 

maneuverability. Although the demonstrated VSTs were tested in a controlled environment, it 

does not appear that these technologies would have had an impact on the stream of traffic 

different from what, for example, a vehicle that runs out of gas would have produced. However, 

steering may present some problems, especially for loaded vehicles facing even moderately 

sharp curves. 

The tests also provided an indication of how long it takes from the instant that the order to 

shutdown the vehicle was given to the instant that it comes to a stop, as well as the time it takes 

to re-enable the vehicles. Both measurements strongly depend on the type of technology and 

communication used. In general, for engine shutdown technologies and cell phone 

communications, it took, on average, 30 seconds from the time the order to shutdown was issued 

by law enforcement to the time the shutdown process was initiated. The average was 64 seconds 

for technologies that degrade the engine performance. For acceleration control technologies, this 

number depends on the parameters entered in the system. The remote re-enabling of the vehicle 

took, on average, 52 seconds. All the VST tests used cellular communications (note: Qualcomm 

used satellite communications, but the demonstrations were limited to driver authentication 

technologies with a stationary Celadon truck; however, vehicle remote disabling was 

demonstrated and the elapsed time between the instant that the order was given and the engine 

shutoff was measured at about 80 seconds, only slightly longer than the elapsed times observed 

for cellular wireless communication technologies). 

Stopping distances depend on many factors, including topography, speed at which the vehicle is 

traveling when the eVID is activated, the type of VIT, and the way in which the vehicle is driven 

(e.g., whether the driver maintains the maximum possible speed or not). Because of the 

dependency of these factors on the particular situation in which a vehicle is to be shutdown, it is 

not possible to generalize regarding these parameters. Nevertheless, some technologies, 

specifically those that allow changing parameters wirelessly, offer better control over the 

maximum expected distance that a vehicle would travel after shutdown. 
4. CASE STUDIES 

Previous sections of this report presented technical and other VIT issues from the perspective of 

the technology vendors. Although those vendors are providing products that are market driven 

and are continuously capturing and incorporating attributes that customers require in their 

products and services, a more in-depth understanding of the perceived/real benefits and costs that 

a VIT deployment in the real-world involves is necessary for completeness. For this purpose, 

three carriers using VITs provided by three of the vendors that participated in this project were 

interviewed. These transportation companies included: (1) a large high-value carrier, Celadon 

Trucking, (2) a large hazmat transportation carrier of bulk flammable liquids that, because of 

security reasons, preferred to keep its name anonymous, and (3) a small hazmat carrier of bulk 

flammable liquids, Swain Oil Transport. A large commercial insurance brokerage firm, First 

Horizon Insurance Inc., providing risk management services, insurance, and bonds to 

commercial clients, including the transportation industry, was also interviewed. The results of 

these interactions are presented below. 

4.1 HIGH-VALUE CARRIER: CELADON TRUCKING 

Celadon Group, Inc. is a publicly-traded truckload carrier with a fleet of approximately 2,900 

trucks and 7,600 trailers that, through its subsidiaries, provides service across the United States, 

Canada, and Mexico. 

In the United States, Celadon’s corporate headquarters, including its dispatch office, are located 

in Indianapolis, while the subsidiaries are dispatched from their respective countries, Canada and 

Mexico. The company transports diverse freight. It started with auto parts and has diversified its 

business to a point where no single customer accounts for more than 5% to 6% of the total 

volume transported by Celadon. 

The information below was the result of discussions with Mr. Bruce Wishart, Celadon’s Director 

of Security. 

4.1.1 VIT System at Celadon Trucking 

When the decision was made to incorporate VITs into their fleet, Celadon was already a 20-year 

customer of Qualcomm and was using their location and communication services for their entire 

fleet. 

The main criteria used in the decision for adopting a VIT system were the security of the freight 

and, more importantly, the safety of the driver (note: Qualcomm uses the MAGTEC VIT system, 

see Sections 2 and 3 for more information about this VIT device). The driver authentication 

technology was viewed as a very powerful feature that almost eliminated the need for tracking a 

vehicle (for security purposes) since the technology makes it very unlikely that someone would 

be able to steal the vehicle. The company identified the proactive approach offered by the driver 

authentication component as critical and was the main focus of the decision to adopt VIT. It 

viewed the (remote) disablement of the vehicle as an added feature that it probably would not 

have to use except in very rare occasions, such as an internal theft, a disgruntled driver, or in a 

61 
hijack situation where the driver has no control over the situation. Even though the company 

only expected to use the vehicle stopping capabilities very rarely, the features of this VIT system 

that ensures a safe shutdown of a vehicle for both the driver and the public were additional 

factors in making the decision to adopt this particular technology. 

The VIT system at Celadon consists of Qualcomm’s Vehicle Command and Control (VCC) 

coupled with MAGTEC’s immobilization technology. It was deployed initially on 100 vehicles 

for beta testing and has expanded to about 200 trucks as of the end of June 2007. The company 

policy is to deploy this technology mainly for their high-value cargo (the company only 

transports a minimal amount of hazmat). It was pointed out that the technology may not be 

required for every application (e.g., low-value cargo); therefore, the decision should remain a 

company decision and not be a mandate. 

Installation 

The installation of the eVIDs was performed by MAGTEC’s representatives onsite. Although, as 

indicated previously, all of the Celadon trucks already had the Qualcomm unit on board (GPS 

and communications), the installation of the VIT units required an additional 3-4 hours for 

complete installation. This was primarily due to the fact that this was relatively high-tech 

equipment, and it was important that it be done carefully to avoid subsequent problems. Once the 

installation of the unit had been completed, it was integrated into the Qualcomm system. The 

eVID, which has its own particular NCP (network control protocol) number, will not work with 

any other Qualcomm unit unless it is re-programmed. After this installation, the truck is ready to 

be assigned to a driver. 

Training 

Celadon has a training department that has developed a training protocol and a companion book 

to instruct Celadon drivers’ managers, supervisors, and operation personnel on how to operate 

and work with the VCC system. Initially, the company was apprehensive about safety issues that 

may arise when shutting down a vehicle on public roads. However, after Celadon conducted 

extensive tests in a controlled environment, the company realized that, because of the way in 

which this particular technology works, safety concerns and endangerment to the public were 

minimal in terms of consequences. 

Regarding the drivers, they receive a short, one-to-two hour training course. In this training, an 

overview of the system and its capabilities is presented, alongside instructions and 

demonstrations on how to use the keypad, how to start the truck, how to proceed when the truck 

has to go into maintenance, how to configure the device when the driver has to stop and take a 

break, and other situations that may be encountered by the drivers while operating their vehicles. 

The reason that the training period is so short is that the system is very driver-accommodating 

(i.e.; the unit is designed to take the driver out of the equation). As pointed out by Celadon, 

“other technologies have to be engaged by a person and are only good if the person remembers 

to operate them; this technology eliminates that requirement.” For example, if the driver forgets 

to input the code when he/she takes a break, then the device arms itself as soon as the parking 

brake is engaged. The driver can even leave the engine running. If someone touches the brake, 

62 
then the device will shutdown the engine unless the correct override code is entered. In other 

words, the driver is not required to perform any dedicated tasks devoted to the system since the 

default setting of the device is armed. 

System Operation 

Celadon has an equipment control manager (ECM) that assigns trucks to new drivers. When a 

new driver is to be assigned to a truck that has the Qualcomm/MAGTEC unit, the ECM accesses 

the VCC system through its website, enters the driver information (name, code, etc.), and then 

issues the information to that driver. The actual command and control of that vehicle is then 

passed to the driver’s manager. 

If during the day-to-day operations, the driver enters a wrong code several times, the system goes 

into a tampering mode and several managers get a notification (e.g., an e-mail into a blackberry 

device). The protocol then calls for these managers to contact the driver to determine the nature 

of the problem and proceed accordingly. In some cases, and depending on the situation, the 

triggering of a shutdown procedure may follow. If that were the case, the shutdown procedure 

can be initiated with just the approval from the Operations Supervisor and/or driver managers 

(DMs). At the beginning of the VIT deployment, the company’s Director of Security and VP of 

Safety had to be notified and they were the only ones authorized to initiate the shutdown 

procedure. However, after the tests conducted by Celadon, which underscored the high level of 

safety with which this technology can achieve a vehicle shutdown, this requirement was relaxed 

and currently it only requires approval from the Operations Supervisor or DM, who receive 

training on this particular issue and know when and how to implement the shutdown procedure. 

The ECM had no operational function with the VCC after the initial entry/removal of new 

drivers. 

In addition, since the system allows changing the code or password over the air, if there is an 

internal problem (e.g., a problem with a driver), the managers can change the code through the 

Qualcomm system and block a driver from driving the vehicle. 

Celadon had a few instances where the VIT was activated, but these events were due to driver 

error (i.e., a wrong code was entered). Thus far, the company has not had to shutdown a truck 

traveling on public roads; however, they have had a real-world instance of shutting down a 

vehicle in a parking lot and changing the code over the air to impede a driver from moving that 

vehicle. This was done during a controlled theft simulation of a high-risk load, conducted by the 

VP of Operations and the Director of Security. The simulation was not disclosed to anyone in the 

company until it was completed. Operations followed all of the high-risk procedures and initiated 

the shutdown; the operation was considered to be 100% successful. 

As discussed in Sections 2 and 3, this technology has other capabilities such as VIT-based 

geofencing and vehicle disablement due to loss of signal. Celadon has chosen not to implement 

the geofencing capabilities on their day-to-day operations (they only use it for inventory control) 

because sometimes due to accidents or road closures, for example, the driver has to deviate from 

his/her assigned road, which could trigger an involuntary truck shutdown. Celadon has also not 

enabled the loss of signal capability. Also, at the present time, the company does not use the 

system to keep track of hours-of-service and other related information. 

63 
4.1.2 VIT System Costs and Benefits 

Besides the training costs, which were estimated to be minimal, the VIT system also incurs 

maintenance and operating costs. 

Maintenance 

The system is very reliable and requires minimal maintenance. Celadon encountered only one 

problem with the system, which was related to the keypad in 50 of its units. This was a 

manufacturer’s problem resulting in the keypad having functionality in only one digit. Although 

it was still possible in this situation to give an access code to the drivers (using just a single digit) 

in order to start the vehicle, the security of the system was severely reduced. MAGTEC replaced 

all these keypads and they have not had this or any other widespread problems since. 

There were, however, some isolated problems derived mostly from driver errors or 

misinformation. For example, in one instance, a driver installed a power inverter in the truck to 

be able to connect some appliances (a refrigerator and other devices). This caused an overload of 

the electrical system, which in turn caused the device (keypad) to operate incorrectly and 

impeded the driver from entering his access code to start the truck. Celadon contacted 

MAGTEC’s 24-hour technical support and the problem was solved over the air (i.e., by asking 

questions to the driver over the phone). 

Operating Costs 

The VIT system operating costs are minimal since it takes only a few minutes per driver to enter 

the code and other system relevant information; additionally, the company did not have to add 

any extra employee to operate the VIT system and support the new capabilities it provides. The 

additional monthly costs are also minimal (about $5.00/truck), since Celadon already had the 

Qualcomm GPS/communications system in all of their vehicles. The system also requires some 

upfront disbursement to buy and install the eVID units. For a generic MAGTEC customer, these 

amount to about $1,300/unit plus $515/unit for the installation (see Table 2; notice also that most 

vendors offer quantity discounts and that the prices listed in that table are for just one unit). 

Celadon investigated the feasibility of leasing the equipment from MAGTEC, however, the 

company opted to own the equipment. 

Benefits 

The tangible benefits that the VIT can bring to the company could be substantial. During the 

interview, it was mentioned that there had been a theft recently of a truck (belonging to another 

company) carrying $5M in pharmaceuticals in West Memphis, Arkansas. Having VIT deployed 

in that one truck would have paid for the substantial part of the system for the entire fleet. 

Celadon also had an instance in which the VIT system would have helped; unfortunately, this 

incident involved a truck that did not have the eVID deployed (note that Celadon is just starting 

to add this system to its fleet). The case involved a driver who disconnected the Qualcomm 

device in Memphis, TN, and traveled to Baltimore, MD. Just the fuel itself for this 800-mile trip 

and the salary of the people who were associated with tracking the vehicle (the MD Highway 

Patrol found the truck) and bringing it back to Indiana would have been enough to pay for the 

64 
device. A quick calculation of these savings was computed at about $1,330 for the recovery of 

the vehicle (i.e., 800 miles @ 5.1 mpg X $2.75 per gal of fuel = $ 431.48, plus $300.00 recovery 

fee and about 20 total man hours @ $30.00 per hour = $600). In this particular circumstance, the 

intention of the driver was not to steal the cargo; if that were the case, with the cost of the load, 

the savings would have been over $2 million. 

However, from the perspective of Celadon, one thing that outweighs any monetary gain that the 

system could provide is the peace of mind that it brings to the company managers and customers, 

especially when transporting high-value cargo. The system also provides a deterrent; that is, a 

disgruntled driver would think twice before stealing the truck since he knows that the VITinstrumented truck could easily be stopped. 

Risk Reduction 

Most, if not all of the large carriers in the United States, including Celadon, are self-insured. The 

use of VITs significantly reduces the risks of theft or hijacking and, in consequence, reduces the 

expected losses that thefts could impose on the company. In addition, this reduction in risk 

increases customer confidence that Celadon can haul their freight securely and not have it stolen. 

Moreover, although Celadon does not specialize in high-risk freight, because of the confidence 

that the technology brings to the company, they are not averse to taking on this type of cargo. 

4.2 LARGE HAZMAT TRANSPORTATION COMPANY 

This case study involves a large hazmat transportation company that covers the entire United 

States, but involves mostly local operations. The company has its own fleet and also works with 

independent contractors to increase coverage. Both the company’s trucks and the subcontracted 

vehicles have the VIT deployed. 

Due to security concerns, the company preferred to remain anonymous in this report (the 

company will be referred as LHMT hereafter). The information below was provided by two 

managers, the company’s national fleet manager, and a manager in the United States logistics 

department. 

4.2.1 VIT System at the LHMT 

Both of these managers were part of the original decision-making group that some years earlier 

was in charge of evaluating and making recommendations regarding the adoption of a VIT 

system for the LHMT. The main needs that the group addressed were: (1) driver security and 

protection, (2) product security and protection, and (3) the ability to remotely locate and 

shutdown a truck. These were the system requirements that the company used to identify the VIT 

system and its vendor (which was one of the vendors interviewed in this report). The entire fleet 

was then equipped with the technology. 

At the present, the national fleet mangers are in charge of the LHMT VIT system, overseeing its 

operation and making sure that all of the system components, including all the eVID units, are 

functional and in perfect working order. The fleet manager is also tasked with keeping the 

technology up-to-date. 

65 
Installation 

The adopted system is similar to the one shown in Figure 1 of this report (note: prior to the 

adoption of the VIT system, the LHMT did not have any vehicle tracking technology deployed in 

its fleet). The installation of the system, specifically the eVIDs, was performed by the LHMT 

after the appropriate personnel were trained by the vendor/developer of the technology. 

Installation took around two hours per vehicle. 

Training 

All of the company’s drivers, fleet managers, area managers, and personnel at the dispatch center 

receive a training course, which can vary from between four and eight hours, depending on the 

trainee function and the different and relevant aspects of the VIT system for the respective 

functions. 

The drivers go through eight hours of training that instructs them on how every component that 

is relevant to their mission works, what to expect under different situations, and the different 

ways to use the system. The main objectives in designing this extended training for the drivers 

was that the LHMT wanted to make sure that their drivers were very familiar with the system in 

order to enhance their comfort in using it, and also to minimize, or completely avoid subsequent 

and associated downtime. The training is a one-time event. Everyday use of the system maintains 

high levels of familiarity and experience. 

The managers of the system (i.e., fleet managers, area managers, and dispatchers) take a shorter, 

four-hour training session to learn how to use the system, get trained on the web-based 

application that is used to access and change related information such as the type of data 

requirements, learn how and when to make changes, and other relevant tasks. This is also a onetime training event, but everyday use of the system maintains high levels of familiarity and 

experience. 

Besides these managers, the company also has other employees that act as administrators of the 

system. Those administrators, who also receive a four-hour training course, have as their main 

mission, the task of overseeing the entire system database in order to ensure its correctness—

they deal with tasks such as certifying that the pin numbers are assigned correctly and that driver 

authentication information is up-to-date. These administrators are the company’s personnel who 

interact with the system the most. 

System Operation 

After deploying the VIT system, the company noted that they did not have the need to add 

anyone to their staff to manage it; the new tasks that resulted from the deployment were absorbed 

by existing personnel. It did require, however, that the LHMT give the responsibility for specific 

parts of the system to different managers that oversee the fleet. For example, after the VIT 

system was deployed, when assigning a driver to a truck, more information than what was 

previously required needed to be entered into the system (e.g., authentication codes). Overall, the 

experience of the LHMT is that a day-to-day management of the system is not required; only 

when there is a need to assign or re-assign a driver to a truck would it necessitate providing or 

updating new information to the system. This is done through a web-based application. 

66 
In the LHMT VIT system, each driver has a personal PIN and is assigned to a specific truck. If it 

becomes necessary for a driver to operate a different truck, then he/she is assigned to that truck 

by the manager through the VIT system web-based application. If the managers have any 

problems, then they contact the system administrators. Those system administrators are also 

responsible for initiating any VIT-based shutdown procedures. 

The company has conducted (and conducts) tests with moving vehicles. Those tests, which are 

conducted at the company’s vehicle maintenance facilities, have shown that the adopted VIT 

produces a controlled shutdown of the truck with the driver never losing control of the vehicle. 

These tests are also used to corroborate that the vehicles are in fact disabled and cannot be driven 

away. The onboard system is tested every time the truck has scheduled maintenance (e.g., about 

three times a year). There have been some accidental activations of the system, but those 

occurred in the early deployment stages, and after small changes were introduced, the system 

became very stable. 

The driver authentication part of the system is, of course, used everyday so that the vehicles can 

be started and driven. To disable a vehicle, the drivers have three different options: (1) through 

the onboard keypad, (2) using the remote system (i.e., key fob), or (3) by sending an alert. 

The LHMT has also had the opportunity to use the remote shutdown capabilities of the VIT 

system in a real-world situation. This is the only corroborated real-world shutdown of a moving 

vehicle that has occurred in the United States. The incident was a hijack case wherein the driver 

was abducted and placed in the trunk of one of the hijacker’s cars. However, before that 

happened and as soon as he realized that his truck was being hijacked, the driver activated the 

alert system, indicating that there was something wrong. The company’s managers proceeded 

with the established protocol that requires them to contact the driver. Because they were not able 

to do so, the company went to the next step, that is, the initiation of the vehicle shutdown 

procedure. Law enforcement was involved in this event and the LHMT shutdown the vehicle 

when it was determined that the driver was not in danger. The vehicle was successfully stopped; 

however, the hijacker was not apprehended because he abandoned the truck as soon as he 

realized it could not be accelerated. Using the system, the vehicle's location was identified, 

which aided the police in quickly locating the truck and recovering it with the cargo intact. The 

apparent main motivation for the hijack of this vehicle was a monetary one (the truck and cargo 

were valued at $250K). However, the path of the vehicle would have taken it by a public facility 

(a hospital); it is not known if that was coincidental to where the thief was trying to take the 

truck. For the company, the main benefits were the ability to track the unit and have police 

dispatched immediately, as well as impeding the vehicle from traveling any distance by shutting 

it down remotely. 

The LHMT does not use the technology for fleet management purposes. The system also has the 

ability to implement geofences, but the company is not using this capability at the present time. 

However, in the future the company expects to implement this capability so that if the vehicle 

strays off course more than an established number of feet/miles from its prescribed route, then 

the dispatcher and fleet managers will get notified and, if required by the particular 

circumstances, could react immediately. 

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4.2.2 VIT System Costs and Benefits 

Three main cost items are part of the LHMT VIT system: the cost of the training the drivers, 

managers, and system administrators have to take; system maintenance costs; and system 

operating costs. Training costs are a one-time expenditure, and although higher than those 

incurred by Celadon on a per capita basis (i.e., eight hours versus two hours for the drivers), they 

can still be considered minimal. 

Maintenance 

The LHMT has found that the devices are very reliable and the company only had to replace 

some of the key fob devices because of malfunction problems. On a regular basis, the only 

maintenance requirement is the replacement of the key fob batteries; however, the system is also 

tested every time a truck goes for its scheduled vehicle maintenance. Overall, maintenance costs 

are minimal. 

Operating Costs 

Regarding labor costs, the system requires only a minimal amount of time for the managers and 

administrators to update the information when a new driver is added, an existing driver is reassigned, or an existing driver leaves the company and is deleted from the database. Overall, the 

labor costs associated to the VIT system are minimal. Other operating costs include the monthly 

fees that the company pays to the VIT technology provider. The system also requires an upfront 

one-time disbursement to buy and install the eVID units, which, for a generic customer like that 

of the LHMT technology vendor, is in the $1,000-$1,500/unit range, including installation. The 

company bought 450 units. 

Benefits 

One of the main benefits identified by the LHMT is the increased security that the VIT system 

brings. The ability to track their vehicles and shut them down if necessary gives management 

“peace of mind” as indicated by both interviewees. The VIT system is very important for the 

drivers as well, who feel not only very secure, but also that the company is proactively taking 

care of their personal safety and well being. Besides these intangibles, the company had a realworld case in which, because it had the VIT system deployed, was able to recover a truck with its 

cargo intact with a benefit of $250K. 

Risk Reduction 

Because the LHMT is a large company, it is self-insured. The benefit that the VIT system brings 

manifests itself in risk reduction. 

4.3 SMALL HAZMAT TRANSPORTATION COMPANY: SWAIN OIL TRANSPORT 

Swain Oil Transport is a small San Diego, California-based petroleum hauler that started 

business in 1994 with a single tractor-tanker combination. At the time of this interview, the 

company had a fleet of nine tankers and 18 drivers, and had recently announced plans to expand 

68 
operations into Arizona and Nevada. The company’s drivers handle, on average, six and four 

loads during the day and night shifts, respectively. The business strategy of Swain is on building 

strong relationships with its customers by providing personalized and flexible service. 

The information below was provided by Doug Kenner, Swain Oil Transport Operations 

Manager.9 

4.3.1 VIT System at Swain Oil Transport 

Because of its customer-oriented and flexible service business philosophy, Swain Oil relies 

strongly on technology to accomplish its mission. This, together with the fact that after 9/11, the 

company’s operating costs, particularly insurance premium costs, increased substantially, were 

the main triggers for Swain to investigate the utilization of VIT in its fleet. 

The main criteria used in the decision of adopting a VIT system were to increase driver safety 

and cargo security, the need for a communication and vehicle tracking capability, and to increase 

the company’s productivity through a system that could provide added capabilities such as, for 

example, tracking drivers’ hours-of-service. 

The company selected Satellite Security Systems as the VIT technology provider because it 

offered an easy-to-use, web-based, vehicle tracking capability, improved security through their 

vehicle disabling/shutdown technology, and was cost competitive (a very important factor for a 

small company such as Swain Oil). 

Installation 

The installation of the eVIDs was performed by Satellite Security Systems and it took about 45 

minutes per vehicle. 

Training 

The system is very easy to use and requires very little training of the drivers since its 

authentication system consists of a swipe card (see Sections 2 and 3 for more details about S3’s 

VIT). The managers of the VIT system required little training as well since they only needed to 

get familiar with the web-based application for tracking and information entering purposes and 

because their intervention in the shutdown process is minimal (i.e., the VIT provider used a 

vendor-based control system and a large part of the vehicle shutdown protocol was handled 

directly by S3). 

System Operation 

The driver authentication component consists of a swipe card system. The truck cannot be started 

without the driver swiping his/her driver’s license (or any card with a magnetic strip that has 

been programmed to do this) to allow the system to check whether that person has been 

authorized to drive the vehicle. (Note: in future versions of the system, it is expected that this 

 9

 As of April 30, 2007 Swain Oil Transport was sold and changed management personnel; Mr. Keener is no longer with the company. 

69 
identification procedure will be conducted using biometric technology.) The carrier, through the 

system web-based interface, can add or delete particular drivers. 

If the driver is not identified, then the S3 center (called the Monitoring and Support Center or 

MSC) is notified and the vehicle is disabled. To re-enable the vehicle, a call by an authorized 

person at Swain Oil has to be made to the MSC to reactivate the eVID. In the case of a shutdown 

event, as soon as the problem is identified and it is determined that a such procedure is 

warranted, the protocol at the MSC calls for activating the vehicle tracking process, contacting 

law enforcement, and after the vehicle has been identified and surrounded, triggering the 

vehicle’s shutdown as soon as law enforcement personnel in the field give the order to do so. No 

disablement is made directly by Swain Oil. 

Besides the described capabilities, the system also offers geofencing (which is available with a 

remote truck shutdown option; a similar procedure as the one described above for vehicle 

shutdown would be used if the vehicle equipped with the device passes through a virtual 

boundary), as well as serving as the driver’s timecard to track work hours. Swain Oil uses the 

latter feature of the system for improved fleet management. However, the company decided not 

to implement the geofencing capabilities since they did not want involuntary shutdowns in case a 

truck had to divert from its prespecified route due to an incident or road construction. 

4.3.2 VIT System Costs and Benefits 

Similarly to the two previous cases, the training costs attributed to the system are negligible, and 

maintenance and operating costs are minimal. Those costs, as well as perceived and real benefits 

are described below. 

Maintenance 

The system is very reliable and requires minimal maintenance, if any. Once the unit is installed 

and operational, its performance is monitored by the vendor on a daily/weekly basis to ensure it 

is connected to the network and is fully operational. If any anomalies occur, the S3 staff can 

perform over-the-air diagnostics to determine what the problem may be. 

Operating Costs 

The VIT system operating costs are minimal. The additional labor required by the system 

amounts to a few minutes per month per truck. The system, however, has a monthly fee that, in 

the case of S3, is in the range of $25 to $45 per month, per vehicle. The system also requires 

some upfront expenditure to buy and install the eVID units (about $445/unit for a generic S3 

customer). 

Benefits 

Tangible benefits for Swain Oil Transport that are derived from its VIT system include a 

reduction in insurance premiums (Swain Oil, being a small company cannot self-insure as in the 

other two cases) and an improvement in productivity by using the system to aid in the tasks of 

accounting and personnel management. Increased driver safety and equipment/cargo security are 

also benefits derived from the VIT system. 

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4.4 INSURANCE BROKERAGE COMPANY: FIRST HORIZON INSURANCE, INC. 

First Horizon Insurance, Inc., a subsidiary of First Horizon National Corp., is among the 50 

largest commercial insurance brokerages in the United States with over $350 million in 

premiums. The company provides risk management services, insurance, bonds and employee 

benefits to commercial clients, including the transportation industry, in 40 states. 

The information below was provided Mr. Ed Bass from First Horizon Insurance, Inc. 

4.4.1 Insurance Considerations Regarding VIT Systems 

Insurance for the commercial sector is different from that of individual households, and in that 

sense, it is not appropriate to talk about "discounts" (such as those obtained by a household with 

an honor student, for example) when discussing the benefits of VIT deployments by a trucking 

company. Instead, underwriters from insurance companies look at how a trucking company is 

being managed and how the drivers are hired, trained, and managed. The commercial risk 

management side of insurance companies is a very involved process by which the underwriters 

analyze the financial situation of the trucking company, its previous five-year loss history (i.e., 

actuarial assessments of the company’s crash trends in relationship with frequency and severity 

of crashes), and the safety management culture of the company. 

The latter information is essential for the insurance carriers, and the analysis focuses on 

determining the company’s safety management procedures, its driver hiring practices, how the 

company trains these drivers, the type of driver management and control, how they communicate 

with their drivers, the type of disciplinary procedures that are in place, and the type of safety 

bonuses/incentives that are provided to the drivers, among other safety-related factors. The 

mechanics of the process involve the trucking company filling out a three-to-five page insurance 

application, which is followed by a site visit by the insurance company's safety engineers to 

determine how safety is being considered by the carrier. Adoption of technologies that can help 

positively affect a company’s safety and security practices is crucial. VITs provide a proactive 

technology for protecting and managing drivers, while also being very important for truck and 

cargo security. 

VITs have characteristics that are appealing to the insurance companies. Those include: (1) 

provision of cargo security that would keep the truck from being stolen without driver 

intervention (e.g., it is possible to leave the truck unattended at a truck stop), (2) protection of the 

driver, and (3) enhanced driver management tools. The adoption of VITs by a trucking company 

provides inferences to insurers on where that company is with regard to their commitment to 

safety management and the culture of the organization (i.e., it shows a strong commitment 

towards safety since a deployment of a VIT system involves initial investments by the carrier). 

All the different aspects involved in the safety management procedures of a given company are 

important per se, but they also interplay. For example, a trucking company may have a very good 

driver hiring and managing processes, but if something goes wrong while that driver is on the 

road (e.g., he/she is driving erratically), a deployed VIT system can allow the trucking company 

to take some action (e.g., stop the vehicle) that could not be possible if the system were not in 

place. In the pre-VIT era, there was only information about location of the vehicle, but it was not 

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72 

possible to take any action (other than contacting law enforcement) if a vehicle strayed off 

course. For example, VIT allows companies to act proactively when dealing with driver-related 

issues that if left unchecked could result in a serious crash, or if the results of a drug test indicate 

that a driver has tested positive, the company can immediately initiate an action plan to safely 

impede him/her from continuing to drive their vehicles. Also, the carrier can now be proactive 

when receiving and dealing with qualified ‘How’s my driving’ complaints. VITs are also 

important for the cargo side as well. Many carriers are required to have team drivers because the 

load cannot be left unattended; however, with a VIT system, the situation can be managed with 

just one driver, saving the company a great deal of money. 

All of this has a value in reducing risks and, therefore, are pondered by insurers at the time of 

assessing a trucking company. In other words, if the trucking company has appropriate VITs, 

then the underwriter can take an aggressive approach rather than a conservative one in estimating 

the risks of that company. A carrier that has very little safety management processes underway 

will be underwritten very differently from one with a more comprehensive safety culture and that 

has specific technologies in place (not only VITs but other technologies such as warning devices 

for lane changes). 

Regarding the specific type of VIT, insurance carriers prefer a controlled vehicle shutdown 

process because it minimizes the likelihood of potential liabilities. Technologies that slow down 

the truck in a controlled process while permitting the driver to control the vehicle are the ones 

that are valued the most by the insurance companies. However, the underwriters also analyze 

how the trucking company uses the technology, how the vehicle deceleration process is 

designed, and the policies that are implemented around the technology. 

In summary, trucking companies that deploy VITs with the characteristics described above show 

a strong commitment to safety practices, which is decisively taken into consideration by 

insurance underwriters when assessing the risks of those carriers. 
5. VIT BEST PRACTICES 

The previous two chapters focused on the description of the current status and characteristics of 

VITs in North America. The experience and information collected from the direct interactions 

with different stakeholders (i.e., vendors, users, and law enforcement) permitted a preliminary 

compilation of best practices, both from a technological and a deployment point of view. 

A VIT "best practice" is defined here as any procedure, approach, method or technique, 

technology application, or other type of activity that improves the overall performance of a 

vehicle immobilization system. As defined in Section 2, a VIT system involves a number of 

technologies, companies, and agencies. Therefore, the best practices described below have three 

main purposes: (1) to assess the current state of the practice of VITs for feedback to the industry, 

(2) to provide input to hazmat and other carriers regarding the functionality and characteristics of 

VITs in order to support better decision making regarding the utilization of VITs in the industry, 

and (3) to provide input to government decision makers regarding the functionalities that can be 

expected from VITs in order to assess their value in providing security and safety. 

5.1 STAKEHOLDERS WORKSHOP, WEBINARS, AND DISCUSSIONS 

The direct interactions described in Sections 2, 3, and 4, although comprehensive, by their very 

nature only covered a limited number of stakeholders. In order to reach a larger audience to 

discuss the preliminarily compiled “best practices,” as well as to identify other VIT issues, a 

Stakeholder Workshop was organized and conducted in conjunction with the Commercial 

Vehicle Safety Alliance (CVSA) Annual Conference and FMCSA MCSAP Leadership 

Conference that was held in Atlanta, GA, on March 24-30, 2007. Many stakeholders with 

potential interests in the deployment of VITs (i.e., law-enforcement and hazmat carriers, among 

others) attended the Stakeholder Workshop, which was organized in conjunction with the CVSA 

Transportation Security and Hazardous Materials Committees. The Stakeholder Workshop was 

followed by a series of webinars that focused on industry and law enforcement stakeholders (see 

Appendix E for a complete list of all the stakeholders with which the research team interacted for 

this project). The discussions resulted in a list of VIT best practices that is presented in the next 

section. 

5.2 IDENTIFIED BEST PRACTICES 

The approach taken in the determination of VIT “best practices” was descriptive rather than 

prescriptive. That is, the interactions with the different stakeholders permitted the identification 

of the types of VITs, procedures, and methodologies that are “best” at the current time—as 

assessed by these stakeholders and the research team—compared to all of the surveyed 

technologies. For example, there are VIT vendors that currently have the capability to switch 

between different type of communication systems (e.g., satellite and cellular), while others offer 

just one or the other. The ability to dynamically switch between communication networks, which 

enhances the reliability of the entire VIT system, was identified as a “best practice,” as compared 

to having to select that communication system up front. 

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In some cases, however, the stakeholders provided suggestions on how these technologies should 

operate or be deployed, such as, for example, VITs that can be easily integrated with existing 

systems or technologies that allow for the rapid identification of the distressed vehicle in the 

stream of traffic. These suggestions are also included below. 

Due to the diversity in the organizations that provided input to this project, the interactions with 

the stakeholders focused mainly on the identification of VIT “best practices” and only 

secondarily on their prioritization. Because of the different concerns of the participating 

stakeholders, it would have been very difficult to arrive at an absolute group consensus on how 

these identified “best practices” should be prioritized. The lists presented below, for both 

technology- and law enforcement-related “best practices,” are organized based on the chronology 

of events that occur in the usage of VITs. Following this, Subsection 5.5 presents a prioritization 

of these different “best practices” according to their impacts on four main criteria: security, 

safety, reliability, and deployability. 

5.3 VIT TECHNOLOGY-RELATED BEST PRACTICES 

The following identified VIT best practices focus primarily on the different technological aspects 

of the system. 

5.3.1 VITs that Can Be Easily Integrated with Existing Systems 

The proliferation of technologies that can improve the operations of trucking companies, while 

being a welcome development by the industry, also brings concerns about how these different 

technologies can be integrated such that there are no redundant subsystems. An example of this 

is the need for multiple communication antennas. A VIT that can be easily incorporated into 

existing systems (new or legacy systems) without unnecessary duplication of components would 

expedite its adoption. 

At the present, some vendors are seamlessly incorporating VITs into their already existing 

communications/AVL systems; this integration is even tighter for OEMs who choose to provide 

VIT capabilities with the vehicles they manufacture. 

5.3.2 Enhanced Security, Reliability, and Safety 

The VIT system should have a high level of security built in to prevent spoofing and other forms 

of attack, as well as the necessary precautions to avoid circumventing or tampering with the 

system. The security of the system should address attempts to meddle with the system 

originating outside and inside of the system. 

The system should also be robust enough to minimize the number of false alarms, inadvertent 

disablements, and, particularly, inadvertent shutdowns. The safety of the driver is also critical, 

and the system should provide all the necessary measures so it is as safe as possible, particularly 

in hijack cases. 

All the technologies surveyed in this project had as main objectives the security of the system 

and the safety of the driver. For enhanced security, many vendors offered tampering protection 

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of their systems, as well as self-diagnosis to detect any potential problems. Some vendors also 

require background checks on their installers, thus reducing the chances of their technology 

being defeated. Regarding reliability, no case of inadvertent disablements or shutdowns were 

reported by any of the vendors surveyed (the few cases of vehicle disablement shutdowns were 

triggered by a dispatcher or a call center). 

5.3.3 Robust Driver Authentication System 

The first line of defense in any VIT deployment is its driver authentication system. If an 

unauthorized driver cannot drive the vehicle, then the chances of needing a remote vehicle 

shutdown are greatly reduced. Therefore, a robust driver authentication capability and 

subsequent, periodic re-authentication should be the first element of a vehicle immobilization 

system. The system should have the necessary provisions to reduce the possibility of nonauthorized persons being able to drive the vehicle, such as, for example, requiring a form of 

identification that cannot be easily duplicated or unlawfully appropriated. The system should 

also be able to give indications to the driver that the VIT system is working properly. 

Some of the vendors surveyed in this project require not only a form of ID (such as a driver’s 

license) but also an entering of an authentication code. This combination of IDs results in a 

reasonably robust driver authentication system. 

5.3.4 Driver Authentication Technologies that Can Be Used under Different Operational 

Environments 

There are cases in which the vehicle has to be accessed and driven under conditions that are 

outside of the day-to-day operations. The VIT system should be flexible enough to accommodate 

these situations without decreasing the security level. For example, it should be possible for the 

authorized driver to enter an “under-duress” code to indicate a distress situation or for the 

dispatcher to supply a one-time access code for vehicle maintenance purposes. In the latter case, 

a combination with a VIT geofence capability could completely secure the vehicle inside a 

defined area. (Note: VIT geofencing, although demonstrated in this project by several vendors, is 

not one of the five FRs identified by FMCSA. For systems providing this capability, it is 

suggested that the geofence boundaries reside in the onboard computer since, in this case, the 

eVID can be triggered faster, thus reducing the potential distance that the vehicle can travel 

inside the protected area.) 

5.3.5 Technologies that Arm Themselves with no Human Intervention 

The disabling/shutdown system should be armed when the door is opened in order to protect the 

driver and the vehicle/cargo, particularly in a hijack scenario. Similar to other authentication 

technologies, this technology requires an action by the driver to disarm the system every time the 

vehicle is to be driven. However, in a hijack case, the driver does not have to do anything to arm 

the system, not even enter a distress code (e.g., a distress message can be automatically and 

silently sent to the control/dispatch center after a certain interval of time has elapsed since the 

last time a door was opened without a subsequent system disarm action issued). 

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5.3.6 Redundancy in Communications 

One of the key components of any remote VIT is its communications system. A disruption in the 

communication links between the call center/dispatch center and the equipped vehicle would 

render any remote control of the eVID impossible, thus precluding a vehicle shutdown. These 

disruptions, many times, happen because of a lack of cell-tower coverage (for these technologies 

that use cell phone communications) and because of interference with the infrastructure (e.g., 

bridges, tunnels, urban canyons) and environment (e.g., tree canopies) for satellite 

communications. While some VIT vendors offer the choice between one and the other (paging 

communications is also offered in some cases), there are a few companies that can provide 

automatic switching between communications systems. This capability of choosing among 

different communication modes based on availability greatly enhances communication 

redundancy (although it also increases operation costs). 

5.3.7 Capability to Override Loss of Signal Disablement 

As indicated in the previous chapter, FR2 is not implemented by any vendor at the present time 

for moving vehicles (i.e., vehicle shutdown due to loss of signal). However, this feature is 

implemented for stationary vehicles which, as was demonstrated, may become disabled if there 

is tampering with the communication system (including GPS). A local override, to allow the 

lawful driver of the vehicle to re-enable it even under conditions in which the communications is 

lost, diminishes the consequences (e.g., down-time) of false alarms. This feature, however, has to 

be implemented in such a way that it is required by the driver to contact the dispatcher (e.g., by 

calling in) in order to obtain the override code. Otherwise, disgruntled drivers could easily defeat 

the system. 

5.3.8 Backup Power Supply for VIT 

The VIT system should have an internal battery so that if the power is lost, the unit can still send 

and receive messages from the central computer (dispatcher). If, for example, the loss of power 

is due to tampering, the dispatcher or control center would be notified and would be able to send 

a message to disable the vehicle. 

5.3.9 Control Center Awareness 

Unintentional loss of power or inadvertent loss of all communication links should not prevent a 

call center to be notified of such an occurrence. Some existing systems provide the capability of 

labeling vehicles by the elapsed time since they have reported their location. This capability can 

be extended to flag certain types of vehicles that have not reported in a predefined interval of 

time; those vehicles, in turn, could implement some VIT action if they have not received a 

handshake from the central system during that interval of time. This, however, would require 

human confirmation (i.e., checking with driver on the status of the vehicle). 

5.3.10 Technologies that Acknowledge Task Accomplishment 

It is important that when any action is taken to disable or (especially) shutdown a vehicle, that 

the onboard device notifies the call center/dispatch center when the immobilization process starts 

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and ends. In general, all the technologies tested in this project provided this capability. However, 

for its implementation, the vehicle has to have a communication system. 

5.3.11 Alarm Queuing Prioritization 

Alarms at a call center should be prioritized so that the most urgent alarms (e.g., hazmat, highvalue) go to the top of the queue. Prioritization was identified by law enforcement as being 

critical since they consider that it is not necessary that law enforcement be involved in all cases 

of vehicle immobilization, particularly those involving non dangerous/low-value goods carried 

by vehicles with VITs that gradually degrade the vehicle performance to a stop. For the other 

cases, it is important that the call center personnel have the required training to handle different 

situations and keep an effective contact list. 

5.3.12 Technologies that Degrade the Vehicle Performance Rather than Implementing a 

Complete Power Cutoff 

When a vehicle has to be shutdown, the safety of the drivers traveling alongside that vehicle is 

very important. Therefore, the VIT should utilize an approach involving vehicle degraded 

performance while maintaining power so that vehicle can be maneuvered in the stream of traffic. 

The demonstration tests conducted in this project showed that approaches that completely shut 

off the engine were still safe to maneuver. However, this was done in a very controlled 

environment and under a non stressful situation for the driver. 

Technologies that provide a degradation of the vehicle performance together with an over-the-air 

control of the settings to achieve a gradual vehicle shutdown also have the advantage that they 

could allow for the cancellation of the shutdown process once it was initiated simply by 

changing system parameters. Some of these technologies can also provide a better estimate of the 

distance that it would take to stop the vehicle once the process has started (see previous chapter). 

For example, engine depower technologies that are able to wirelessly change the level of engine 

degradation (i.e., the deceleration of the vehicle) for the shutdown procedure can better control 

the vehicle stopping distance by selecting the appropriate engine degradation level (notice that 

for vehicles equipped with GPS or for technologies that are able to read information from the 

vehicle’s data bus, the speed of the truck around the time of shutdown can be determined, which 

is the other parameter needed to estimate stopping distance). 

5.3.13 Adaptive VITs 

Vehicle shutdown may occur anywhere under different traffic conditions and roadway geometric 

configurations. Particularly regarding the latter, rigid (i.e., non-adaptive) VITs could impair the 

maneuverability of the vehicle, thus increasing the risk of crashes and, therefore, decreasing the 

safety of the surrounding traveling vehicles. It is, therefore, important that the vehicle shutdown 

technologies are responsive to changing road conditions, including downward slopes and 

roadway curvature. Some of the technologies surveyed in this project achieve this by returning 

full control of the vehicle in distress to the driver if the technology senses that, for example, the 

vehicle is traveling in a down grade and return to the shutdown process once the geometry of the 

road has changed. 

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5.3.14 Variable Spatial Data Polling Frequency 

As described below (see Law Enforcement-Related Best Practices), in general, the shutdown of a 

vehicle should be done with visual contact from the law enforcement agency with jurisdiction in 

the area. In some cases, however, this will not be feasible. For instance, it was pointed out that in 

some remote areas (e.g., Oregon), law enforcement may not be able to have visual contact with a 

vehicle to be immobilized. That is, it may take as much as 1.5 hours before officers can interact 

visually with that vehicle. It is therefore important to track the vehicle accurately in order to 

determine the area in which it is traveling when the shutdown process is initiated. Usually, and 

because under normal circumstances there is no need to determine the spatial location of a 

vehicle with a high accuracy, their locations are pinged at a lower frequency than would be 

necessary in cases involving a vehicle shutdown. A spatial data polling frequency that can be 

changed depending on the circumstances for a given VIT equipped vehicle would provide a 

means to make better determinations of when to start the shutdown process, especially if law 

enforcement is not readily able to be in visual contact with the vehicle. 

5.4 LAW ENFORCEMENT-RELATED BEST PRACTICES FOR VITS 

The following identified VIT best practices focus primarily on issues concerning the deployment 

and activation of these technologies. 

5.4.1 Law Enforcement Involvement in Remote Vehicle Shutdown Incidents 

The general consensus of the stakeholders was that a moving vehicle shutdown should be 

accomplished with visual contact by law enforcement personnel (although with some caveats), 

and that the activation of the system should be done through the control center (if one exists) in 

conjunction with the carrier, as opposed of being accomplished directly by law enforcement. 

Safety and security were identified as the critical elements in deciding whether the vehicle 

shutdown requires the involvement of law enforcement. Public safety is a major concern and is 

the reason why many police departments no longer chase stolen vehicles. However, law 

enforcement should be involved if there is a security concern, such as if the vehicle is 

transporting a high-value or high-risk load or the driver is in a hijack situation. Under other 

situations and depending on the type of VIT and the reaction sequence of the vehicle after 

activation, the carrier should be allowed to shutdown the vehicle. Stakeholders also determined 

that vehicle disablements, in general, do not necessarily warrant the involvement of law 

enforcement personnel. 

Legal concerns were also identified as an area to be taken into account for law enforcement 

involvement in vehicle shutdown events. In particular, there should be a mechanism that permits 

determination and verification that a crime has occurred before law enforcement is involved. 

Some of these events may be civil in nature, not criminal, and do not necessarily require law 

enforcement participation; except if safety and/or security are at stake. The other legal concern 

identified, and one that requires further discussion, is how easy would it be to trigger these 

devices, given that certain legal-based procedures were required to be followed; that is, although 

the VITs can shutdown a vehicle quickly, they may be delayed because certain legal procedures 

may need to be followed before the order is issued. This is an area that remains to be researched. 

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5.4.2 VIT Systems that Permit Identifying Law Enforcement Jurisdictions 

For those cases deemed to require the involvement of law enforcement in a vehicle shutdown 

event, it is necessary that the identification of the corresponding jurisdiction on where that event 

would be facilitated be done via a national call center with appropriate, up-to-date, nationwide 

contact information for all law enforcement agencies. Some of the vendors surveyed offer this 

capability to their customers, either through their own or third-party managed call centers. 

5.4.3 Technologies that Permit Easy Identification of Distressed Vehicle 

In order for law enforcement to identify a particular vehicle that is to be shutdown, or has been 

shutdown, a capability to distinguish the vehicle from others in a traffic flow needs to be 

deployed. However, this capability should be designed in such a way that it does not further 

endanger the safety of the authorized driver involved, for example, in a hijack situation. 

Some of the vendors surveyed in this study flash the trailer and tractor lights when the truck is in 

distress. In many cases, this is not done if the driver has entered the under-duress code 

(indicating a hijack situation) so that the driver’s life is not further endangered. In these cases, 

other ways of identifying a distressed vehicle should be used, including an increase in the spatial 

data polling frequency (see 5.3.14) to enhance the truck location accuracy. 

5.4.4 Technologies that Are Easy to Use by Law Enforcement 

The VITs should be easy to use by law enforcement, including the determination of the time that 

it would require to shutdown the vehicle and the likely distance that it would traverse before 

coming to a stop. 

Although, there are VITs that are completely activated and controlled by law enforcement (see 

Section 2 for two examples), the result of the interactions with different law enforcement 

stakeholders has determined that law enforcement does not need to activate the devices directly. 

This simplifies the usage of the technology since the activation is reduced to an order given 

wirelessly as described in Section 3 of this report. This also eliminates issues related to 

technology obsolescence and legacy systems for law enforcement agencies since under the 

model described here, the technology would reside outside of these agencies. 

Regarding the time it takes to stop a vehicle from the time the order to shutdown is given and the 

distance traversed, those parameters can be assessed and predicted by the VIT systems in the 

same way as was described in Section 3, and passed along to the law enforcement personnel at 

the scene so informed decisions can be made on when to start the shutdown process. 

5.4.5 Technologies that Permit Quick Recovery after Shutdown 

A swift recovery from immobilization—that is, the ability to quickly restart the vehicle—is a 

necessary capability to minimize the effects (e.g., congestion increase or disablement on critical 

infrastructure) that any vehicle shutdown would cause. In general, the technologies surveyed in 

this study provide rapid re-enablement of vehicles (see Section 3). 

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5.5 PRIORITIZATION OF BEST PRACTICES 

As explained previously, the diversity in the organizations that participated in this project, while 

fundamental to obtain the widest spectrum in VIT best practices, was not conducive to their 

prioritization since it would have been very difficult to arrive at an absolute group consensus. 

The “best practices” identified in this section, however, were prioritized by the research team 

following four main criteria: security, safety, reliability, and deployability. The results are 

presented in Table 11 below (notice that some of the “best practices” are relevant to more than 

one criteria and, therefore, may appear more than once in the table). 

Table 11. Prioritized List of Best Practices by Four Criteria 

Criterion and 

Priority Best Practice 

Security 1 5.3.2 Enhanced Security, Reliability, and Safety 

Security 2 5.3.3 Robust Driver Authentication System 

Security 3 5.3.5 Technologies that Arm Themselves with no Human Intervention 

Security 4 5.4.1 Law Enforcement Involvement in Remote Vehicle Shutdown Incidents 

Security 5 5.3.6 Redundancy in Communications 

Security 6 5.3.11 Alarm Queuing Prioritization 

Security 7 5.4.2 VIT Systems that Permit Identifying Law Enforcement Jurisdictions 

Security 8 5.3.9 Control Center Awareness 

Security 9 5.3.10 Technologies that Acknowledge Task Accomplishment 

Security 10 5.3.4 DATs that Can Be Used under Different Operation Environments 

Security 11 5.4.3 Technologies that Permit Easy Identification of Distressed Vehicle 

Security 12 5.3.8 Backup Power Supply for VIT 

Security 13 5.4.4 Technologies that Are Easy to Use by Law Enforcement 

Security 14 5.3.14 Variable Spatial Data Polling Frequency 

Safety 1 5.3.2 Enhanced Security, Reliability, and Safety 

Safety 2 5.3.13 Adaptive VITs 

Safety 3 5.3.6 Redundancy in Communications 

Safety 4 5.3.9 Control Center Awareness 

Safety 5 5.3.12 Technologies that Degrade the Vehicle Performance 

Safety 6 5.4.5 Technologies that Permit Quick Recovery after Shutdown 

Safety 7 5.3.5 Technologies that Arm Themselves with no Human Intervention 

Safety 8 5.4.1 Law Enforcement Involvement in Remote Vehicle Shutdown Incidents 

Safety 9 5.4.2 VIT Systems that Permit Identifying Law Enforcement Jurisdictions 

Safety 10 5.3.14 Variable Spatial Data Polling Frequency 

Safety 11 5.4.3 Technologies that Permit Easy Identification of Distressed Vehicle 

Safety 12 5.4.4 Technologies that Are Easy to Use by Law Enforcement 

Reliability 1 5.3.2 Enhanced Security, Reliability, and Safety 

Reliability 2 5.3.6 Redundancy in Communications 

Reliability 3 5.3.7 Capability to Override Loss of Signal Disablement 

Reliability 4 5.3.8 Backup Power Supply for VIT 

Reliability 5 5.3.10 Technologies that Acknowledge Task Accomplishment 

Deployability 1 5.3.1 VITs that Can Be Easily Integrated with Existing Systems 
6. VST CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS FOR 

LAW ENFORCEMENT 

The concept of operations (COO) for stopping moving vehicles using VSTs provides the 

appropriate protocol to avoid inadvertent activation, a list of steps and procedures to be followed 

before activation, and a checklist of organizations that should be coordinated with to ensure safe 

utilization. The target application of the COO is hazmat safety and security in Tennessee. The 

COO includes the steps and procedures from the identification of the need for stopping a moving 

vehicle through the shutdown and securing of the vehicle. 

6.1 OVERVIEW OF PROCESS 

The security of vehicles is accomplished in many ways. This COO focuses ONLY on the 

potential stopping of a moving vehicle with the assistance of law enforcement. There are several 

steps in the proposed protocol for a law enforcement-supported remote stopping of a vehicle 

equipped with a VST: 

• Initiation of a VST protocol 

• Threat/risk assessment 

• Vehicle interdiction 

Each of these steps will be discussed in the subsequent sections. 

If adopted by TDOS, it would be expected that this protocol would be implemented as a General 

Order similar to General Order 412 on the use of tire deflation devices. A General Order would 

establish the policy basis for the use of VSTs. 

6.1.1 Initiation of VST Protocol 

A law enforcement-assisted VST implementation would only be considered when the requesting 

party has been determined to meet minimum best practices as defined above. It is also possible 

for a vehicle owner (VO) or owner representative (OR) to be certified as prescribing to minimum 

best practices. The OR would typically be a fleet management service that has vehicle tracking 

and remote stopping capabilities. 

The most likely first notice of an incident is from the vehicle owner or owner’s representative. 

The most likely first point of law enforcement contact would be law enforcement dispatch. 

Dispatch should acquire the following information from the VO or OR: 

• Company name 

• DOT number 

• Vehicle license plate number 

• VIN (optional) 

• Driver’s name 

• Driver’s license number 

81 
• Cargo 

• Current or last known position of vehicle 

The dispatcher will verify the credentials through the Commercial Vehicle Information 

Exchange Window (CVIEW) and National Crime Information Center (NCIC). Verification of 

credentials will provide a presumption of a valid incident and initiation of the remaining steps of 

the protocol. (Failure to verify credentials requires additional intervention by higher levels of 

authority.) 

6.1.2 Threat Assessment and Risk 

The second step is an assessment of the threat and risk. The assessment is primarily of the 

vehicle and its cargo. The three levels of threat are: low, moderate, and high. 

Low 

The primary damage potential is that which can be caused by the size and weight of a large 

vehicle impacting another object. The vehicle is essentially a stolen vehicle and should be 

handled using normal procedures, that is, which would not require the initiation of the VST 

protocol. 

Under low risk, law enforcement should encourage restraint by the VO or OR to not create a 

larger risk by potential intervention. The initial response should be to perform a normal traffic 

stop. If the vehicle complies, the officer should call for activation of VDT as soon as the vehicle 

is off the roadway. If the vehicle being pursued does not comply, the primary response vehicle 

will not chase the vehicle. 

Moderate 

The vehicle contains material that if released following an impact with an object has moderate 

environmental impact. Such an incident would be a moderate priority and intervention would be 

considered only when interdiction was likely to be capable of reducing the risk. A moderate level 

of risk would endorse a more limited use of VSTs; that is, a moderate risk situation could 

escalate to be more serious if a VST protocol were enacted. A stolen vehicle would be less likely 

to suggest the need for an immediate VST implementation. A terrorist-related event would 

suggest a more immediate implementation of VST. 

A moderate risk event, such as a stolen gasoline truck, suggests the need for a graduated 

response, unless it is known that there is a hostage or that it is a terrorist situation. The dispatcher 

should immediately contact a supervisor to assist in assessing the response options in the event 

that the incident escalates. The initial response should be to perform a normal traffic stop. If the 

vehicle complies, the officer should call for activation of VDT as soon as the vehicle is off the 

roadway, as this technology only activates when the vehicle is stopped. 

If the vehicle being pursued does not comply, the probability increases that it is a terrorist-driven 

action. The supervisor will determine if the incident requires escalation to the VST moving 

vehicle protocol described below. 

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High 

A potential impact has long-term health and safety impacts that are significantly greater than that 

caused by a traffic accident. The incident would receive high priority, and interdiction would be 

actively considered due to the potential to reduce risk. 

A high-risk incident exists when the subject vehicle has an extremely dangerous cargo and is 

believed to be in the control of terrorists. The goal is still to shut the vehicle down at the safest 

possible location. However, if the vehicle is near a known or suspected target, a more aggressive 

approach may be undertaken. A supervisor should be involved prior to implementation of a VST 

unless circumstances are so time-sensitive as to preclude such involvement. Otherwise, the 

moving vehicle protocol described below should be followed. 

6.2 VEHICLE INTERDICTION 

The moving vehicle interdiction is the most complex portion of the protocol and dictates that the 

response always be tempered by the ongoing assessment of the threat and risk. The goal is to 

implement VST only when it is likely to reduce the risk of an undesirable outcome. Unless the 

threat is so severe that immediate action is the only logical course of action, the goal is to select a 

point of interdiction that maximizes the likelihood of a safe and orderly VST activation using 

this moving vehicle protocol. 

6.2.1 Issues 

Vehicle interdiction requires that the VST be activated by some form of communication. This 

communication may or may not be timely or continuous. Communications may be lost in remote 

areas or tunnels. If a VST is activated and a vehicle is shut down in a tunnel, it may require some 

form of manual intervention by the VR to move the disabled vehicle. 

VSTs will NOT be considered when the VSTs do not allow for maintaining the steering and 

braking functions, unless the threat is high. Even in a high-threat event, the risk of an out-ofcontrol vehicle should be assessed before implementing a VST that allows for the loss of braking 

and steering. 

The ideal shutdown location is a straight, level road in a rural area. However, an ideal location 

seldom exists in practice. Therefore, an understanding of how a vehicle shutdown would occur is 

necessary to make an informed decision on when to implement a VST. Critical issues include: 

• How quickly does the VST begin to impact the vehicle? 

• How will the vehicle function after a VST has been activated? 

• How quickly after activation of the VST does the vehicle come to a stop? 

The answers to the above questions indicate the length of roadway potentially impacted by VST 

activation and the potential need to avoid curves and grades. (Note: For the technologies 

demonstrated in this project, this information can be found in Section 3 of this report.) 

83 
An additional consideration in a hostage scenario is the factor of not alerting the perpetrator to 

the impending VST activation. The presence of alerting technology (horns, lights, etc.) on 

particular vehicles should be ascertained by the VO or OR. 

6.2.2 Moving Vehicle Protocol 

The moving vehicle protocol requires a minimum of two vehicles, with three vehicles being 

desirable. The roles of these vehicles are more fully discussed below. The following items need 

to be determined prior to initiation: 

• Expected time and length of roadway to implement VST 

• Roadway, traffic, and weather conditions along the roadway 

• Locations to avoid VST activation (hills, curves, tunnels) 

• Communications dead spots 

The law enforcement role is to aid in maintaining the health, safety, and welfare of the general 

public. Law enforcement’s role is continually being shaped by risk assessment. The following 

steps should only be undertaken when the roadway ahead is safe to engage in a traffic stop and 

the deployment of a VST, or the threat is so great that immediate action is likely to be less severe 

than waiting. 

Initiation 

The activation of VST requires consideration of a number of important issues. The checklist 

shown in 

84 
Table 12 has been put together to guide the dispatcher in considering a number of factors 

associated with initiation of VST. Therefore, a critical requirement in moving forward with 

assisting in a VST event is a determination by the dispatcher that the checklist criteria in Table 

12 have been met. The only immediate VST implementation would be when a higher authority 

has determined that failure to immediately implement VST is a greater threat than the worst case 

outcome of an immediate VST event. 

A critical aspect of activation of a VST is the necessity of having the moving vehicle in sight of 

the primary law enforcement vehicle. This is necessary to ensure that all requirements of the 

shutdown protocol listed above are in fact being met, including acceptable traffic and roadway 

conditions. 

Initiation should not begin unless there are two, and preferably three, law enforcement vehicles 

in close proximity to the shutdown. 

The primary (first) unit is responsible for continual visual contact with the vehicle and 

communication with the dispatcher concerning activation of the VST. 

The responsibility of the backup (second) unit is to provide traffic control. It is also the first unit 

to respond to a traffic accident. If requested by the primary unit, it could replace the primary unit. 

The responsibility of the support (third) unit is to assist with arrests or to replace the backup unit 

in case of a traffic accident. This unit can replace the primary or backup unit should one of those 

units not be able to continue. 

When the primary unit makes an assessment that roadway and traffic conditions are favorable for 

activating the VST, he/she notifies the dispatcher. The dispatcher is responsible for ensuring that 

all checklist items in Table 12 have been addressed. The dispatcher then notifies the VO or OR 

of the location, conditions, and presence of law enforcement. The VO/OR makes the 

determination that all technical requirements are met and that the VO/OR wants to activate the 

VST. The VO/OR then initiates the VST activation and notifies law enforcement dispatch. 

Post-Initiation 

Law enforcement has two principal roles following activation of a VST: maintaining traffic 

safety and apprehending the stopped vehicle’s driver. Following completion of the VST event, a 

debriefing should be undertaken to determine any lessons learned from the VST event. 

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86 

Table 12. VST Activation Checklist 

Check 

Here Issue Result/Action 

Company Name 

DOT Number 

Vehicle License Plate Number 

VIN (optional) 

Driver’s Name 

Driver’s License Number 

Cargo 

Current/Last Known Position 

Credentials Validated (Yes/No) If no, refer to supervisor. 

Risk Assessment If low; no action. 

If medium; proceed if the threat is higher than 

the risk. 

If high; proceed with VST activation. 

Does VST disable brakes and steering? If yes, proceed only if high-level risk. 

How quickly (minutes) before the effect of 

VST activation is realized? 

How long (minutes) does VST activation take 

to stop the vehicle? 

Speed of Vehicle (mph) 

What is the expected distance (miles) 

traveled by the vehicle with an activated 

VST? 

Multiply total minutes times speed and divide 

by 60 (e.g., 2 minutes to implement plus 2 

minutes to shut down is 4 minutes times 60 

mph divided by 60 is four miles to shut 

down). 

Is the road ahead safe enough to begin VST 

activation? Consider roadway, traffic, and 

weather conditions along the roadway. 

Locations to avoid: (hills, curves, tunnels, 

bridges and known communications dead 

spots). 

Check criteria met 

Advise VO or OR that VST can be activated. 

Notify field units when VO or OR initiates 

VST activation. 
7. CONCLUSIONS 

Building on previous FMCSA studies, field operational tests, and evaluations of security 

technologies for the motor carrier industry, this VIT Evaluation Project focused on 

demonstration testing and assessment of VITs for eventual application to Hazardous Materials 

and other transportation applications. Within that framework, the main goal of this high-level 

study was to determine how these technologies are being deployed and used by the motor carrier 

industry. The results showed that the industry, as a whole, favors an approach that focuses on 

theft prevention before a vehicle is underway (i.e., technologies that ensure verification of 

authorized personnel as well as prevent hijack situations) and that vehicle shutdown technologies 

are viewed as a last resort. This is not a surprise since the Major Theft Unit at the FBI's Criminal 

Investigative Division identifies cargo theft as their number-one priority (FBI, 2006). 

Specifically, the study conducted under this project determined that VITs are being developed in 

various VDT and VST forms, and have been implemented primarily as a security technology by 

early adopters, especially those involved with high-value cargo. In the last several years, VIT 

deployment has moved from the theoretical domain to reality, and its adoption continues to be on 

the rise. 

From a technological stand point, this study found that there are several approaches being 

currently used for driver authentication which, as pointed out above, is identified by the industry 

as one of the first and most important lines of defense to improve security. Currently available 

driver authentication technologies for CVO include swipe cards, proximity cards, and keypads; 

no biometrics technology is being used by the VIT vendors identified in this study. Keypads or 

combinations of swipe/proximity cards with keypads are the most secure driver authentication 

technology types. 

VSTs can be divided into two main types: (1) complete engine shutdown technologies and (2) 

engine performance degradation technologies. Engine performance degradation technologies are 

safer because the vehicle never loses power during the process and can be controlled by the 

driver at all times. Some of these technologies use a multiple step approach that implements 

decreasing speed thresholds triggered at constant intervals during the vehicle shutdown process, 

with a longer interval once the vehicle has reached a very low speed (usually 10 mph). Other 

engine degradation technologies use just a single or a two-step process by which the vehicle is 

rapidly decelerated while maintaining all the mechanical functions available to the driver. 

The demonstration tests conducted in this project allowed for the measurement of some 

parameters associated with VSTs, which play an important role in the potential use of these 

technologies by law enforcement. The tests showed that, on the average, it took 30 and 64 

seconds for engine shutdown and engine performance degradation technologies, respectively, 

using cellular communications to shutdown the vehicle. For acceleration control technologies, 

this number depends on the parameters entered in the system to define the speed decrement 

intervals. In general, several speed decrement intervals are implemented, each with lengths of 

about one minute (although these are user defined), and, therefore, the longer latency in satellite 

communications, as compared to that of wireless cellular communications, does not have a 

significant impact in the length of the entire shutdown process. Regarding remote vehicle re87 
enable, it took 52 seconds on the average when cellular communications was used and slightly 

longer, 80 seconds, when it was performed using satellite communications. 

Another important parameter for the law-enforcement COO is the distance that the vehicle would 

travel during the shutdown process. Stopping distances depend on many factors, including the 

type of VST, the vehicle speed at the moment the eVID is activated, the topography and 

geometric characteristics of the roadway, and the behavior of the driver (e.g., whether the driver 

maintains the maximum possible speed or not). Because of the dependency of these factors on 

the particular situation in which a vehicle is to be shutdown, it is not possible to generalize 

regarding these parameters. Nevertheless, some VSTs, specifically those that allow changing 

parameters wirelessly, offer better control over the maximum expected distance that a vehicle 

would travel after shutdown. 

The research also showed that at the present time, it is possible to achieve four out of the five 

FRs identified by FMCSA. Functional Requirements 1 (vehicle disablement if the vehicle senses 

an unauthorized driver), 3 (remote vehicle disablement/shutdown by the driver), and 4 (remote 

vehicle shutdown by the dispatcher) were fully demonstrated in this project. Loss of signal 

disablement (FR2) is only being implemented for VDTs (e.g., wire cutting), but not for VSTs. 

The latter, although technically feasible, may cause undesired vehicle shutdowns and, therefore, 

is not implemented by the vendors or the users of the technology. Regarding FR5, at the present 

time, law enforcement cannot independently trigger a remote vehicle shutdown and has to 

accomplish shutdown through the carrier or the VIT vendor. The lack of this capability was 

viewed as an advantage since there was a strong consensus among stakeholders that FR5 should 

always work in conjunction with FR4 (remote vehicle disabling by the dispatcher). That is, 

discussions with law enforcement personnel have indicated that it would be very difficult and 

impractical for law enforcement to remotely shutdown a vehicle without coordination with the 

dispatcher or some other party in possession of all the necessary information and control 

capabilities to trigger such an event. 

Regarding VIT’s fixed and periodic costs, the research demonstrated that there is a wide 

variation of VIT capabilities and, in consequence, prices among the vendors. The price of the 

unit varies between $100 and $1,700, with an average of $535. The monthly fees are in the $25-

to-$85 range, with an average of $45. Identified benefits by companies using VITs include risk 

exposure reduction, theft avoidance, insurance premium reduction, and increased driver and 

cargo safety. Other spillover benefits resulting from the deployment of a VIT system include 

better fleet management by using its driver and vehicle tracking capabilities. 

VIT “best practices” and issues were identified in this project and further discussed in different 

forums (e.g., the 2007 Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance Conference, several industry and law 

enforcement-focused webinars, and discussions with both large and small trucking companies) in 

an attempt to capture the perspectives of the main VIT stakeholders. Among those VIT “best 

practices,” it was determined that law enforcement should be involved in vehicle shutdown 

events in which a crime has been committed. Furthermore, the technology should be easy to use 

by law enforcement and allow for easy identification of the vehicle under distress in the stream 

of traffic. Other “best practices” included robust driver authentication systems, adaptive VITs, 

technologies that degrade the vehicle performance, technologies that permit quick recovery after 

shutdown, technologies that arm themselves with no human intervention, alarm queuing 

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89 

prioritization at the control center, and redundancy in communications, among others. The “best 

practices” also played a critical role in the development of the concept of operation for law 

enforcement application of VITs, which is included in this report. 

While VITs can greatly increase the security of any trucking operations and would certainly 

decrease the number of cargo thefts, the technology is not infallible. The communication 

component of VIT systems is its weakest link. As pointed out before, one of the findings of this 

project is that vehicle shutdown due to loss of signal cannot be implemented because it would 

create too many undesired shutdown events. Therefore, anyone with knowledge of the system 

can cut the communication link (with the vehicle moving) and continue driving the truck. There 

are, however, anti-hijack technologies that trigger the eVID locally if someone opens the door to 

the cab and the device is not deactivated. If the driver is abducted and kept in the cab, this could 

also be defeated by forcing the driver to re-enable the truck. 

The fact that the study shows that the technology is not infallible has repercussions on findings 

of past studies, specifically the “Hazardous Materials Safety and Security Technology Field 

Operational Test” (FMCSA, 2004b; 2004c). Although the costs of deploying VIT systems were 

found to be in range with those of that study, the security benefits that this technology may 

provide would probably need to be revised. That is, in calculating the benefits that can be 

accrued from the deployment of the technology, it was (correctly) assumed in the 2004 FOT that 

partial deployments might not necessarily result in a directly proportional security benefit (e.g., x 

percent deployment may not yield x percent of achievable security benefits). The conclusion then 

was that it was necessary to have a full deployment of the technologies. The study shows that, 

with the current state of the art in terms of VIT systems, even in a full deployment case, there is 

no warranty that 100% of the security benefits that this technology can provide would be 

achievable. 

Future research, therefore, should focus on how to make these VIT systems more robust if they 

are to be used to enhance national security. In the meantime, and to both assist law enforcement 

in the application of the COO and to minimize the impacts that vehicle shutdowns could cause in 

the stream of traffic, it is important that stopping distances for different VSTs be further studied. 
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APPENDIX A: 

DRIVER AUTHENTICATION TECHNOLOGIES 

A.1 INTRODUCTION 

This appendix summarizes the results from a technology scanning study of Driver Authentication 

Technologies (DAT), which was undertaken as part of this FMCSA’s VIT Project. The study 

presented here pays particular attention to devices that fall in the realm of log-in devices and 

biometrics. The basic science behind biometric technologies is also presented. Application of 

many of these technologies to commercial vehicle operations (CVO) and carrier safety and 

security is a growing area, but still very limited. Because of this limitation, the spectrum of 

devices considered in this scanning study includes those devices that may not currently be 

implemented in the industry, but show considerable promise for being deployed. 

The study presented in this appendix will first discuss log-in devices, particularly those with 

global log-in (GL) capabilities, and their relationship, or potential relationship, to CVO. The 

science of biometrics will be discussed and various biometric technologies will be introduced. 

Benefits and concerns for each of these technologies will be presented. Best practices for the 

integration of these devices into CVO will be recommended as well. The report will conclude 

with a discussion on the potential use of smart cards in CVO; a combination of log-in and 

biometric devices.

A.2 BACKGROUND 

Driver Authentication Technologies, which are a subgroup of Vehicle Disabling Technologies 

(VDTs), require users to prove their identity before operating a vehicle (see Figure 42 and 

Section 2 for further definitions and a taxonomy of Vehicle Immobilization Technologies, VITs). 

This can be accomplished in several ways: through a password, token (e.g., a swipe card), a 

biometric device, or a combination of the two. In any case, unless the driver is authenticated, the 

vehicle will remain disabled and will not start. Vehicle Shutdown Technologies (VSTs), on the 

other hand, are typically electronic technologies capable of stopping a moving vehicle or 

disabling a stopped vehicle. Immobilization can be achieved by any number of methods, 

including impeding fuel to the engine or using the onboard computer to limit the vehicle’s speed. 

DATs and VSTs are related technologies. VSTs tend to be a last line of defense in vehicle 

security, while DATs are viewed as one of the first technological interventions. With proper 

installation and implementation of a DAT, a VST system may never have to be used. Since usage 

of VSTs have the potential to be dangerous, may be complex to implement, and may cause 

collateral damage in a high-risk/high-consequences event, they should be used only in a last 

resort situation. DATs, on the other hand, are relatively easy to implement, are cost-effective, 

and tend to be relatively safe to use. Preventing a potential hijacker or thief from ever starting a 

vehicle significantly improves overall safety and security. 

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Figure 42. VIT Definitions 

A.2.1 Driver Authentication Technology Attributes 

Some of the technologies discussed in this appendix have not yet been implemented in CVO, 

mostly due to their unsuitability for that environment. To bridge the shortcomings of these 

technologies for their potential future use in this industry, they should be designed according to 

the following paradigm. 

Ability to Verify or Identify a Driver 

When dealing with authentication, it is important to recognize the difference between the two 

modes of authentication: verification and identification. In a verification situation, a user makes a 

claim as to his/her identity and the system determines if the claim is correct. When using a DAT, 

a user enters his/her identity into a system using a scan card or keypad, and then the system 

verifies that this claim is correct. The user’s ID signature is only compared to one reference; the 

claim must be the same as the reference in order to gain access. A visual example is provided in 

Figure 43. 

?

Signature Reference

Claim

Figure 43. Visual Representation of Verification 

In this example; consider the blue circle on the left as a user’s ID signature, the circle is 

compared only to one reference image (blue circle on the right). If the reference image were not 

a blue circle, verification would not be made. Since the reference is also a blue circle, in this case 

94 
the system would make verification. A log-in device is an example of a verification system. A 

good way to think about how verification works is to pose the question, “Am I who I claim to 

be?” This is the fundamental idea behind verification. 

In an identification situation, a user’s input is compared to all other users’ unique inputs in the 

system, information that, in general, is contained in a database. The system views the user and 

identifies his ID signature in the system’s database. A visual example is provided in Figure 44. In 

this example, the blue circle is again a user’s ID signature. This time it is compared to all other 

users’ ID signatures in the database. Since the database contains a blue circle, identification 

would be made. A good way to think about how identification works is to pose the question, 

“Who am I?” This is the fundamental idea behind identification (Bromba, 2007). 

?

ID Signature

Claim

Database of All Users’ ID Signatures

Figure 44. Visual Representation of Identification 

Verification is a faster method, while identification is more secure. Both have their benefits in 

DAT. High-security operations may need to use a combination of identification and verification. 

For small groups of people, identification may not be very time consuming. For a large group of 

users, where a database may be large, identification may take a large amount of time. DATs in 

this report should be capable of either verification or identification or use both. Some of the DAT 

technologies demonstrated in this project (see Section 3) offered both verification and 

identification procedures. For example, BSM Wireless uses a proximity card as identification 

(i.e., the person in possession of that card shows that he/she is a valid driver for the particular 

vehicle) and a keypad for verification purposes (i.e., once the driver has been identified as a 

valid driver for the vehicle, he/she gets authenticated by providing a unique code number that 

belongs to that person). 

The Technology Should Be Non-Intrusive 

A DAT technology must not interfere with daily CVO. It must perform its tasks without greatly 

impeding a driver’s ability to perform his/her daily duties. Also, the DAT must be easy enough 

to use so that it will not be a nuisance to the driver. For this reason, the majority of current DAT 

technologies that require the analysis of behavioral traits will not be discussed in this report. For 

example, a walking gait sensor would require the driver to walk in front of a camera in a specific 

way. This would be an annoyance to a driver and is not easily or normally performed in daily 

vehicle operation. Additionally, the technology should not involve excessive examination of the 

driver. For example, technologies such as retinal scanning will not be discussed in-depth because 

they require an unacceptable amount of time/intrusion on behalf of the driver. 

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The Technology Should Have Potential Application in CVO 

The technologies discussed in this appendix may not be in current use in CVO or may not yet be 

commercially available. They all, however, have the potential to be used in CVO in the future. 

Many biometric technologies currently available exist only in location security applications, like 

a door access guard. However, if current trends continue, many of these technologies may see 

utilization in CVO. Other technologies, such as signature or keystroke verification, will not be 

discussed here because their associated sensors would not easily integrate into a vehicle. 

Technologies still in early development, such as ear shape identification/matching and body odor 

sensors, will be discussed, however, not in depth. Table 13 shows the technologies, including 

their level of detail, mentioned in this appendix (Kalyanaraman, 2006). 

Table 13. Driver Authentication Technology List 

Technology 

Level of Detail 

Discussed in this 

Report 

Log-in Devices Full 

Finger Print Scanner Full 

Iris Scanner Full 

Vein Recognition Full 

Voice Authentication Full 

Voice Recognition Full 

Hand Geometry Authentication Full 

DNA Sampling Brief 

Ear Shape Scanner Brief 

Body Odor Sensor Brief 

Retina Scanner None 

Walking Gait Sensor None 

Keystroke Recognition None 

Signature Recognition None 

A.3 LOG-IN DEVICES 

A log-in device prevents access or movement of a vehicle without proper credentials (i.e., an ID 

card, prox card, or a password). A user makes a claim to the validity of his or her identity and the 

system, locally or remotely (i.e., by accessing a centralized database), recognizes or rejects that 

claim. If the user is recognized, a particular action is allowed, such as unlocking a door or 

starting a vehicle. 

A.3.1 Token Devices Overview 

The use of a card and accompanying reader to gain access to a vehicle or initiate start up 

provides a secure way to authenticate the identity of a driver. Without possession of the card, use 

of the vehicle is disallowed. A typical system can be seen in Figure 45 (see also Section 3 where 

different “flavors” of this technology, demonstrated by Satellite Security Systems, BSM 

Wireless, and GlenHugh Enterprise, are discussed). Often times, as an added measure of safety, 

the card (or token device) must remain in the reader during operation of the vehicle. Of course, if 

the card is lost or stolen, access to the vehicle by an unauthorized user would be possible. 

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Typically, these devices are paired with a biometric device to become a “Smart Card” (discussed 

later in this appendix in more depth). 

Figure 45. Truck Cab Outfitted With Swipe Card System. 

 Source: AutoCab, n.d. 

A.3.2 Keypad Devices Overview 

A common use of verification devices in CVO is the use of a keypad in order to prevent 

unauthorized access to a vehicle. The keypad, in a sense, acts as a door lock, preventing access 

into a vehicle without entering the correct code. This is a well-developed technology and seen 

quite regularly on both commercial and personal vehicles. 

In more recent applications, the use of a keypad has been shifted from preventing access into the 

vehicle to preventing startup without proper input. Figure 46 provides an example of such a 

device. The use of a keypad in this way, while allowing unauthorized access into a vehicle, will 

prevent unauthorized startup and also hotwiring. When coupled with communication capabilities, 

keypads not only prevent unauthorized actions, but also provide the vehicle’s dispatch office 

with notice of all actions, such as repeated failed attempts at log-in (MAGTEC, n.d.). This 

feature makes it ideal for use in VIT concepts, that is, after notification of multiple failed 

attempts at entering the correct code, a dispatcher (i.e., remote vehicle control) or the onboard 

system itself (i.e., local vehicle control) could initiate a vehicle immobilization protocol and 

prevent any movement of the vehicle. 

Figure 46. Global Log-in Device

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A downside of keypad devices is that they require the knowledge of a password in order to 

operate; anyone with this knowledge is, therefore, capable of access. Passwords can also be lost, 

stolen, forgotten, or observed. However, when this password is protected and not compromised, 

there is little possibility of error in the device. Individual CVO companies determine the length 

and complexity of a log-in. Additionally, they determine how often log-ins are updated; frequent 

updates protect vehicles from being accessed by former employees. 

Four out of the six companies that demonstrated their vehicle immobilization technologies for 

this project at Laurens Proving Grounds (LPG) in February 2007 used keypad technology for 

driver authentication (see Section 3), with one of them combining keypads and a token device (a 

proximity card). 

A.3.3 Log-in Devices and CVO 

During the VIT and DAT demonstration and evaluation event at LPG, examples of several 

keypad and log-in device technologies that were currently integrated on working commercial 

vehicles were presented (see Section 3). Log-in devices, swipe cards, and proximity cards were 

all demonstrated. Without proper authentication from the driver, these DAT devices prevented 

vehicle startup. 

The major benefit of using a simple log-in device is that without knowledge of a password or the 

possession of token, false positives or imitation attempts are nearly impossible. Devices can 

easily be implemented into the locks or ignition system of a vehicle. GL devices provide an 

added level of security and communication. Compared to more robust systems, these verification 

devices are relatively inexpensive. A GL system can be purchased for approximately $1,500 and 

typically involves a yearly licensing fee (see Section 2 of this report for more details; if there is a 

communication system already in place, the upfront cost for the device does not change 

significantly, but the added monthly fee is minimal as discussed in Section 4 of this report). 

Another benefit is that compared to biometric devices, the time necessary to enroll and become 

familiar with the device is much shorter. Once the password or token is acquired, the user can 

operate the system. 

The drawback to these systems is that if compromised, a device provides little or no protection 

against unauthorized access. The only remaining protection in this case is being that the 

unauthorized user may not be familiar with the system. While an unauthorized user may have 

knowledge of a log-in, he/she may not know the correct log-in protocol, thereby, providing 

added security. Clearly, in some applications, simple authentication devices provide more than 

adequate security. Nevertheless, in high-risk or high-value shipment situations, something more 

robust may be necessary. 

A.4. BIOMETRIC SYSTEMS 

Biometric systems use automated methods to recognize unique features of a user. These features 

can be physiological or behavioral traits. Physiological traits, such as a thumbprint, tend to be 

stable and unlikely to change during one’s lifetime. Behavioral traits reflect a user’s individual 

psychological makeup; one’s upbringing and gender also have affects. Examples would include a 

98 
user’s walking gait or typing dynamics. Biometric systems generally identify users in the 

following way: 

1. A sensor takes an observation. 

2. The sensor data is used by the biometric system to describe an observation 

mathematically and creates a biometric signature. 

3. The biometric system compares this signature with signatures in a database. 

The majority of biometric systems complete their recognition through identification, though 

some use a combination of verification and identification (Blackburn and FBI, 2004). Biometric 

systems require users to enroll into a database and have their information captured, extracted, 

and encoded into a biometric signature so that it can be compared during authentication. A 

system is only as strong as its enrollment program. A weak program will lead to high levels of 

false rejection or acceptance (Rosenzweig, et al., 2004). 

When comparing different biometric technologies, it is important to use common nomenclature 

and standards. This way, technologies that may work in different ways can still be compared 

fairly. It is common in the industry to use different equations and rates in order to present the 

accuracy of their product. A large concern in the industry revolves around False Rejection Rates 

(FRR) and False Acceptance Rates (FAR) associated with a particular product. The FAR and 

FRR are described by equations (1) and (2): 

FAR(λ) = Number of False Attempts / Number of Imposter Accesses (Eq. 1) 

FRR(λ) = Number of False Rejects / Number of Client Accesses (Eq. 2) 

where λ = Security Level 

The FAR and FRR are dependent on the security level of the system and are opposing 

parameters. That is, as the security level goes up, the number of false rejections will increase, but 

the number of false acceptances will decrease and vice versa (Kalyanaraman, 2006). This is 

apparent in Figure 47. Statistically, they are Type-1 (false positive, or the error of identifying 

something as true when it is actually false) and Type-2 (false negative, or the error of identifying 

something as false when it is actually true) errors. 

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Figure 47. FAR and FRR Graphical Representation 

Source: Das, n.d. 

The point where the FAR = FRR is called the Equal Error Rate (EER) and is often reported on 

product information sheets, since it is independent of security level. When available, the FAR, 

FRR, and EER are used to compare biometric systems in this report. 

A.4.1 Biometric Technologies 

When evaluating and comparing different biometric technologies, the following criteria should 

be considered by individual end users of each technology: 

Universality: Unlike log-in devices, it is possible that a person may not be able to use a 

biometric system. For example, someone without an iris could not use an iris scanner. 

Uniqueness: In most situations, two people will not have the same biometric signatures; 

however, some systems may have a difficult time distinguishing between very similar signatures. 

Permanence: A person’s biometric signature should not change over time; it should remain 

nearly constant over their lifetime. 

Acceptability: A technology can not be so intrusive that users will have little acceptance of the 

system. 

Circumvention: The technology should be difficult to deceive or spoof (Global Security, 2007). 

Finger Print Scanning Technology 

Fingerprint biometrics is one of the oldest and most tested biometric technologies. Mathematical 

algorithms are used to create a biometric signature of the print. A print is matched to a stored 

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signature in the database using the minutia, or unique features, of a user’s fingerprint. Examples 

of these unique features can be seen in Figure 48 (Kalyanaraman, 2006). 

Figure 48. Fingerprint Minutia 

Source: Kalyanaraman, 2006 

There are several different types of sensors used in the attainment of the fingerprint. Optical 

sensors use light to make the biometric signature. Electric field sensors measure small local 

variations in an electric field due to fingerprint ridges. The electric field is created when the 

sensor releases a small electric signal onto the finger. Finally, a capacitive sensor works by 

creating a capacitor when the finger comes in contact with its surface. The capacitance changes 

locally due to the differing shapes and depths of ridges in a fingerprint. Optical technology is the 

most frequently used. Many manufacturers claim EERs for their product to be less than 1% (BSI, 

2004). 

It should be noted that some people cannot be enrolled into a fingerprint scanning system. 

Fingerprints can become worn or damaged due to age, dryness, or work with corrosive 

chemicals. Additionally, it is not uncommon for some people to be wary of using a fingerprint 

scanner as fingerprints are often associated with law enforcement and criminal offense 

(Rosenzweig, et al., 2004). 

Fingerprint scanning systems have often been criticized for being easy to spoof. Often, the 

simple use of a fake finger could fool a scanner. A new technology uses multi-spectral imaging 

that not only looks at the fingerprint, but also beneath the surface at the finger’s deep tissue. It 

also eliminates the need for a high-quality fingerprint. The manufacturer can enroll 2%-5% of 

the population that conventional scanners cannot (Lumidigim, 2004). A scanner with this system 

is presented in Figure 49. Another problem with scanners is that if they become dirty, they may 

give false readings. If oils from a fingerprint remain on the scanner after use, there may be the 

possibility that an imposter may gain access due to a false reading. Care must be taken to keep 

the scanners clean of residual prints. 

Fingerprint scanning technology is already being used on vehicles, particularly as a device that 

prevents vehicle mobilization without authentication. The device in Figure 50 is an after-market 

device for personal vehicles, but could possibly be used in CVO as well. 

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Fingerprint scanning technology shows great potential for use in CVO and, if the system is well 

maintained, it may provide adequate security in many situations. The technology is quick and 

easy to use, noninvasive, and new technologies are difficult to deceive. Compared to other 

systems, such as iris or hand scanners, it is also inexpensive. Moreover, it appears that this new 

generation of scanners have solved some of the problems identified in the 2004 FMCSA FOT 

(FMCSA, 2004a), such as errors derived by skin temperature variations, or the need to introduce 

very consistent fingerprints in the biometric reader. Other problems, such ergonomics in a truck 

and the unwillingness of people to get “fingerprinted,” are inherent to this technology and may 

remain a barrier for its deployment in CVO. 

Figure 49. Fingerprint Scanner. 

Source: Lumidigim, 2004. 

Figure 50. Vehicle Fingerprint Scanner 

Source: Spectrotec, 2005. 

Iris Scanning Technology 

Unlike the more well-known retinal scanning technology, iris scanning is much less invasive to 

the user. While retinal scanning requires infra-red light to illuminate the retina, which is not 

clearly visible otherwise, the human iris is plainly visible and is a highly unique attribute. Figure 

51 shows a picture of an iris. The probability of two people having the same iris pattern is 1 in 

1078 (LG Electronics, n.d.). Even monozygotic twins have different iris patterns. 

Iris scanning works by using a black and white camera to take an image of the iris and 

subsequently turning the image into a digital template to use as a biometric signature. It then 

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identifies the signature by comparing it to the contents of its user database. Iris recognition 

devices can recognize up to 240 unique features about the iris (high-end fingerprint systems can 

only recognize 40-60 unique features); even an angled glance at the camera often provides 

enough information to make an identification. Contrary to popular belief, a living eyeball must 

be used for identification (i.e., the system checks for pupil adjustment as part of its algorithm). 

Figure 51. Iris Patterns Used for Identification. 

Source: Biometric Watch, n.d. 

A benefit of iris scanning technology is that standards have been created to ensure that quality 

products are released on the market. Iridian Technologies created the ProofPositiveTM program to 

ensure quality products. Proof PositiveTM certification is based on the following criteria, quoted 

from Iridian’s website (Iridian Technologies, 2003): 

Performance: Certification ensures that iris cameras meet stringent requirements for FARs, 

FRRs, Failure to Enroll Rates (FTEs), Failure to Acquire Rates (FTAs), and response time. 

Interoperability: Proof PositiveTM guarantees PrivateID application program interface (API) 

and KnoWho API compliance and interoperability across all Proof Positive certified cameras and 

software solutions. 

Safety: Proof Positive iris cameras have met stringent government and industry standards for eye 

safety. 

Security: Proof Positive certification ensures compliance with Iridian and industry standards for 

cryptographic and physical security, as well as countermeasure protection. The protection and 

integrity of the biometric data is maintained throughout the solution. 

Scalability: Proof Positive solutions built on Iridian's PrivateID and KnoWho architecture are 

scalable to millions of records. 

Usability: Proof Positive ensures compliance with Iridian and industry usability standards. Iris 

cameras and software solutions meet requirements for user feedback, non-intrusiveness, 

simplicity, consistency, and use for the disabled. 

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Reliability: Certification ensures that iris cameras and software solutions have met Iridian's 

minimum system robustness requirements. 

Statistically, iris recognition technology has an EER of 1 in 1.2 million, or 0.0008% (LG 

Electronics, n.d.). Clearly it is a highly accurate technology and is well-equipped to handle high 

security situations. Adding to this accuracy is the fact that the human iris remains stable over a 

user’s lifetime. Although many people wear glasses or contacts, the technology still works in 

most cases because the iris is still visible. However, anti-glare and color changing contacts may 

lead to errors. Price is another concern. The cameras used in the technology can cost a few 

thousand dollars (no official prices were available), though in a high-risk security situation, this 

cost may be relatively minimal compared to other concerns. 

Vein Recognition Technology 

Vein authentication technology consists of a scanner that uses near-infra-red light to create an 

image of the veins in the hand or finger. The light is absorbed by the de-oxygenized hemoglobin 

in the vein vessels, and the device traces out these lines to create a signature. This process is 

shown pictorially in Figure 52. As with the iris, even twins have different vein patterns, making 

this another extremely unique biometric signature. The difficulty required to forge the veins in 

the hand make this technology highly secure. 

Figure 52. Vein Recognition Process 

Source: Watanabe, et al., 2005. 

The product shown in Figure 52 is contactless. The hand does not have to touch the sensor itself 

in order to work; though other products do require contact. The intensity of the light that this 

product emits is controlled by measuring the surrounding ambient light. The sensor is capable of 

capturing an image regardless of hand position, but the position with the highest possibility for 

an accurate result is having the hand perpendicular to the sensor. Internal testing from the 

manufacturer claims a FRR of 0.01%, and a FAR of 0.00008% or lower, based on 140,000 palms 

(Watanabe, et al., 2005). 

Vein recognition technology has seen some development for application in the transportation 

industry. The system in Figure 53 fits onto the handle of a vehicle door. The development of a 

products specific to vehicle access shows promise that more authentication technologies will be 

created for use in CVO (Knight, 2005). 

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Figure 53. Finger Vein Authentication Technology. 

Source: Knight, 2005. 

Vein authentication technology’s accuracy, small size, and ease of use make it a good candidate 

for use in CVO. A scanner could easily fit within the cab of a vehicle. It is also a very robust 

technology, having the potential to work in early-morning/late-night conditions where little 

ambient light is available. The system is also not affected by unclean hands. If the system is 

verifying a user, a keypad is also required. Additionally, changes in temperature may affect a 

user’s blood flow which in turn may affect the reader. However, this non-invasive technology 

may be more comfortable for drivers to use as many may feel wary using technologies that 

require cameras (Watanabe, 2005). 

Voice Authentication Technology 

Voice authentication technology, while measuring a behavioral biometric, has potential for use in 

CVO. Voice authentication is a simple technology: a user speaks into a microphone and the 

accompanying software creates a biometric signature using the sound, pattern, and rhythm of the 

user’s voice. Algorithms used for verification are able to classify impersonations and detect 

distortions created by using a recorded voice. A sample user input can be seen in Figure 54

(Authentify, 2007). 

In another security mechanism, verification is performed by using a randomly generated string of 

words. The user must repeat this random phase into the microphone. This prevents the use of a 

previously recorded message (Authentify, 2007). Some other devices use a neural network to 

“learn” a user’s speech patterns. The use of statistical tools allows the program to predict 

inflections and accents in a user’s speech pattern. This may alleviate concerns that a change in a 

user’s voice because of illness or age may cause a false rejection (Findbiometrics, n.d.). 

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Figure 54. Voice Authentication User Input 

Source: Kalyanaraman, 2006 

A voice authentication system could easily be implemented into CVO and be relatively 

autonomous to a driver. The driver would simply be asked to repeat a phrase, and then the 

vehicle would be mobilized. Situations in which there are large amounts of background noise 

may, however, not be ideal for this technology. Compared to technologies like iris scanning, 

voice authentication is much less expensive; the only sensor required is a microphone 

(Information Technology Standards Committee, 2004). 

Facial Recognition Technology 

Facial recognition technology is a well-tested method of biometric identification. Using the face 

to create a biometric signature is a very natural and non-invasive method. Facial recognition can 

work by comparing geometric attributes of a user to a database. A sample of facial geometric 

measurement points can be seen in Figure 55 (Kalyanaraman, 2006). 

Figure 55. Geometric Measurement Points 

One of the more advanced approaches is the Eigenface approach. The Eigenface approach 

describes images in terms of linear combinations of base images. A set of eigenvectors, or 

standardized facial ingredients, can be combined to reconstruct a reference image (Turk and 

Pentland, 1991). Different facial features are singled out and scored individually. Each individual 

106 
feature is an Eigenface. Sample Eigenfaces are shown in Figure 56. There are many other 

algorithms for facial recognition: some use neural networks to “learn” the user’s facial attributes 

(Kalyanaraman, 2006). 

Figure 56. Eigenfaces. 

Source: Kalyanaraman, 2006. 

Facial recognition can also be implemented using skin recognition technology. Identix, a 

company that takes such an approach, reports an increase in program accuracy (L-1 Identity 

Solutions, n.d.). Accuracy data is compiled by the Face Recognition Vendor Test, the last for 

which results are available was in 2002. There was another scheduled for January 30, 2006, but 

the data is not yet available. The latest information can be found at: 

www.identix.com/trends/face.html and www.frvt.org (NIST, 2006). In 2002, under optimal 

lighting and pose conditions, accuracy was only 90%, at a 1% FAR for verification, and only 

73% for identification in a database of 37,437 individuals (NIST, 2006). 

The cameras used in facial recognition need not be the quality of those required by some other 

technologies; a simple surveillance camera may be adequate (Gaits, 2007). The systems are 

capable of very fast searches. A manufacturer claims to be able to search through 2.7 million 

eight-image templates per second on a standard 2 GHz PC expanded with 2 GB of RAM. The 

cameras used, however, require a proper amount of lighting to work (Haase, 2005). This may be 

a concern for CVO, since users may need to gain access in the dark. Items such as glasses and 

earrings may also cause problems, as well as changes in facial features due to age. In some 

situations, where low-cost may outweigh decreased accuracy, facial recognition may be a good 

fit for a CVO application. However, this would require mounting a camera in the CV cabin, 

which is viewed by most drivers as an invasion of privacy. Nevertheless, cameras have already 

been deployed inside truck cabins for security and safety purposes. One such example was given 

by Wireless Matrix (see Appendix C) in which a large hazmat transportation customer of the 

company deployed in-cabin cameras to collect data via a 15-minute loop. The collected 

information is only used in the event of a hard-braking incident or a severe turn that causes a 

107 
crash (e.g., similarly to airplane black boxes). The “invasion of privacy” concerns were 

addressed in this case by only storing the “last” 15 minutes of information and by pointing the 

camera towards the direction of travel instead of the inside the cabin. 

Hand Geometry Recognition Technology 

Hand geometry technology measures a user’s finger length, thickness, and curvature using a 

camera or infra-red light. Since the signature created using this technology is not as unique as 

other technologies, it is not descriptive enough to identify a user, but provides a very robust 

verification system (Ross and Jain, n.d.). 

The camera captures two orthogonal, two-dimensional images of the palm and sides of the hand, 

and measures as many as 90 different points. Finger width, height, and length; distances between 

joints; and knuckle shapes are all possible measurements. Since the technology measures 

geometry, finger or palm prints are not necessary for verification (Global Security, n.d.). A 

typical sensor, with measurement lines, is shown in Figure 57. The rods in the figure are simply 

used for finger placement; they take no part in measurements. Generally, the verification process 

can be done in less than five seconds. 

Figure 57. Hand Geometry Measurement System. 

Source: Kalyanaraman, 2006. 

Currently, systems do not have the ability to detect if a hand is living or not, though the time 

necessary to create a model that would be able to spoof the system would likely be excessive. 

The system also tends to be rather large; currently, its overall footprint may be too cumbersome 

for CVO use. An access system can be seen in Figure 58 (National Center for State Courts, n.d.). 

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Figure 58. Hand Geometry Measurement System in Use. 

Source: Human Recognition Systems, n.d. 

If there is space to fit the system, it provides a quick way to verify identity. However, the 

possibility for spoofing and the inability to identify a user may pose the need for a different 

technology in high-risk situations. 

A.4.2 Future Biometric Technologies 

Biometric technologies continue to be developed on a regular basis. This bodes well for CVO, 

for as technologies continue to be developed they will become faster, less expensive, and more 

accurate. Some interesting up-and-coming technologies include: 

DNA Sampling 

DNA sampling requires the user to present some form of tissue, blood, or bodily fluid for 

authentication. This is a rather intrusive method and quite slow, taking as much as ten minutes to 

perform. The method used to obtain DNA still needs to be refined. However, such a technology 

would be very difficult to deceive (Kalyanaraman, 2006). 

Ear Shape Sensor 

The ear is another biometric feature that does not change over time or with facial expression. It 

remains fixed in the same location for life. These sensors look like a telephone headset, where a 

camera takes a picture of the ear. An artistic rendering of the signature is presented in Figure 59

(Kalyanaraman, 2006). 

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Figure 59. Ear Shape Biometric Signature. 

Source: Kalyanaraman, 2006. 

Body Odor Sensor 

Virtually everyone’s smell is unique. Sensors are used to measure the odor from a non-intrusive 

part of the body, such as the back of a user’s hand. Volatiles from the odor are used to create a 

biometric signature (Kalyanaraman, 2006). 

A.4.3 Biometrics Summary 

Biometric technologies provide an extra layer of security that log-in devices do not. The 

requirement of a highly unique feature makes unauthorized use of a commercial vehicle much 

more difficult. It is clear that different biometric technologies provide different strengths and 

weaknesses. A report by the International Biometric Group presents a comparison of biometric 

technologies; a summary of their results are shown in Figure 60 (International Biometric Group, 

2006). 

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Figure 60. Biometric Technology Comparison.

Poor measures of performance (MOPS) fall towards the center of the chart, while excellent 

MOPS fall towards the edges. It is clear that there is no single technology that represents the 

“ideal” biometric. It is up to the end user to weigh the pros and cons of each technology and 

choose the device best suited for a particular operation. 

Biometrics show great promise for future use in CVO. If sensor prices continue to become 

affordable and accuracy increases, they will become a staple of the transportation industry. 

However, the need still exists for unified standards across technologies. While the industry is 

beginning to address this need, it will likely not mature significantly until this concern is fully 

addressed. Currently, the need for standards exists for the following areas: 

• System communications 

• Biometric signature extraction 

• Signature comparison methods 

• Encryption methods 

• Signature storage and retrieval methods (Kalyanaraman, 2006) 

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The creation of these standards may encourage more risk-averse companies to invest in 

biometric systems. 

A.5 SMART CARDS 

Smart cards are credit card-sized tokens with embedded integrated circuit chips and memory 

capacity. They have the ability to store both biographical and biometric information. Often, they 

are capable of performing biometric matching entirely within the card itself. Smart cards store 

biometric information without the need for a central computer system. When coupled with a 

biometric sensor, a smart card provides the ability to both verify and identify a user. Smart cards 

combined with biometrics provide a multimodal method of authentication. When a user 

possesses a smart card, both “who you are” and “what you have” are satisfied (International 

Biometric Industry Association, n.d.). 

According to the Smart Card Alliance (quoted directly), smart cards combined with biometrics 

provide the following benefits: 

• Enhanced privacy, securing information on the card, allowing the individual to control 

access to that information and removing the need for central database access during 

identity verification. 

• Improved security, protecting information and processes within the ID system and 

actively authenticating the trust level of the environment before releasing information. 

• Improved ID system performance and availability through local information processing 

and contactless ID card and reader implementations. 

• Improved system return on investment through the flexibility and upgradeability that 

smart cards provide, allowing support of different authentication methods and multiple, 

evolving applications (Smart Card Alliance, 2002).

Smart cards combine the benefits of token devices and biometric technologies. A user must not 

only possess the card, but must also provide a biometric signature. Smart cards provide the added 

benefit of being capable of being combined with Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) 

technology so that the card does not have to come into contact with the biometric sensor used. 

This “contactless” smart card would not require the user to present the card. Simply having 

possession would be sufficient. This adds a level of security as well as a level of transparency for 

the user. When coupled with a high-security biometric device, the smart card provides an 

extremely robust method for authentication for CVO applications (note: numerous projects have 

been conducted to study smart cards in a commercial vehicle environment; see, for example, 

FMCSA, 2004a; DOT, 2000; Gifford, et al., 1996; and FHWA, 1996). 

A.6 CONCLUSIONS 

Driver authentication technologies clearly have a place in CVO. The security that these 

technologies add could prevent possible hijackings and terrorist plots involving any type of 

commercial vehicle. Driver authentication technologies have a place in the heavy vehicle 

industry, vehicles carrying high-cost cargo, and vehicles carrying hazardous materials. Log-in 

112 
devices, biometrics, and smart cards provide various strengths and weakness, but all have some 

form of benefit for CVO applications. The device chosen for a particular operation must be 

decided upon based on ease of use, amount of invasiveness, and the amount of security provided. 

As these technologies continue to develop, they will become smaller, faster, and less expensive. 

It is important that these technologies be understood fully now so that when they begin to 

become more fully implemented in CVO, their benefits and limitations are well-defined and 

documented. Questionnaires developed within this project and sent to VIT vendors revealed that 

several claim to have thousands of DAT devices in use today. It is a fair estimate that over 

100,000 are in use in United States CVO market today. 

Field Operational Testing (FOT) of these technologies on a small fleet of vehicles and regularly 

interviewing those involved would provide data on real-world experiences. This data may help to 

create technologies better suited for use in CVO with a better ability to integrate into VIT. 

Additionally, bench-top testing could be completed on biometric technologies to obtain better 

accuracy and error information. 

113 
APPENDIX B: 

VIT VENDOR/DEVELOPER QUESTIONNAIRE 

B.1 OVERVIEW 

The materials presented in the subsequent sections were part of a questionnaire package that was 

distributed in May 2006. Some of the material was developed early in the project, at which time 

a much more aggressive multi-faceted testing and evaluation effort was envisioned. However, 

because of project funding constraints, only some components of the envisioned multi-faceted 

testing were pursued. 

B.2 BACKGROUND 

Since September 11, 2001, FMCSA has been actively investigating methods to improve safety, 

security, and efficiency through the Hazardous Materials Safety and Security Technology 

Operational Test. The purpose of that Operational Test was to quantify the security costs and 

benefits of an operational concept that applies technology and improved enforcement procedures 

to hazmat transportation. Subsequently, the FMCSA undertook the Expanded Satellite Tracking 

and the Untethered Trailer Tracking and Control Security projects. In 2005, the U.S. House of 

Representatives Conference Report 108-792 stated that further testing of technologies, including 

vehicle disabling would be necessary. 

This VIT Testing and Evaluation Project is being conducted to support the Congressional need 

called out in the aforementioned report, and it builds on the experience and lessons learned from 

previous field operational tests in order to generate Best Practices and a COO. The Best Practices 

and COO will be based on data and information gathered from identified vendors (like 

yourselves) via various media, interaction with organizations involved with previous VIT testing 

and evaluation efforts, as possible, from experience with vendor demonstration vehicles and 

vendor laboratories, and possibly independent testing and evaluation by a VIT Project Team. 

The purpose of this initiative is to test and evaluate various commercially available VITs for 

assessment of Best Practices and for input into COO development. It is intended to cover 

multiple technologies from simple to sophisticated. This questionnaire will assist the project 

team in determining which of the available technologies would be appropriate to test as part of 

the project. Although not all technologies will be tested, information on all technologies will be 

included in our analyses. It is NOT the purpose of this project to compare one vendor’s products 

with that of another. Rather, information related to the functionalities and operability of VITs 

and their associated protocols for utilization will be sought. Positive examples for applying VITs 

for enhanced safety and security of Hazmat shipments will be examined for their applicability as 

national guidelines for VIT implementation in Hazmat shipment safety and security. 

Your participation in this project, as a vendor for VITs or vehicle immobilization 

systems/networks, is extremely important for meeting the Congressional goals of this project. It 

is your expertise and experience with VITs that will provide the basis for the development of 

industry Best Practices and Concepts of Operation. In the longer term, such guidelines will 

114 
contribute to the safety and security of Hazmat shipments by leading to technologies and systems 

that are more robust, more easily understood and applied, and capable of being adapted to new 

safety and security situations or circumstances. 

This project will involve demonstration testing and evaluation of VITs for five functional 

requirements (FRs): 

FR1: Vehicle disablement if the vehicle senses an unauthorized driver 

FR2: Vehicle disablement/shutdown in the event of a loss of signal 

FR3: Remote vehicle disablement/shutdown by the driver 

FR4: Remote vehicle shutdown by a dispatcher 

FR5: Remote vehicle shutdown by law enforcement 

Testing and evaluation will be conduced within a multi-faceted approach. For the technologies 

selected for testing, approaches may include one or more of the following test methods. A 

description of each of these approaches is provided in the next section. 

• Vendor-Owned Vehicle Demonstrations 

• Vendor-Owned Laboratory Demonstrations 

• Independent Laboratory Testing and Evaluation 

• Independent On-Vehicle Testing and Evaluation 

• Observation Testing and Evaluation of a Commercial Fleet 

In preparation for determining which VITs will be selected for testing and evaluation, ORNL has 

prepared a questionnaire (see below) to assist with the necessary data collection. Information 

gathered via this questionnaire will be utilized by ORNL and FMCSA to determine a series of 

vendor visits to be conducted in the third quarter of 2006 to gather additional information. 

B.3 POTENTIAL TESTING AND EVALUATION APPROACHES 

Vendor-Owned Vehicle Demonstrations: Some vendors have their VITs operating on various 

vendor-owned vehicle platforms. ORNL will work with vendors that have such platforms to 

identify an opportunity to assess, first-hand, the functionality of the VITs within an operational 

vehicle environment. Special scenarios related to the FRs and COO may be requested to be 

performed to allow for an evaluation of the VIT that has greater face validity. ORNL may 

request that some instrumentation may be added to the vendor’s vehicle platforms to gather 

selected quantitative information during the demonstrations—such instrumentation will not be 

added without the concurrence of the vendor. Staff from ORNL, TN-DOS, and possibly FMCSA 

may be present for these demonstrations. 

Vendor-Owned Laboratory Demonstrations: Several of the vendors have indicated that they 

have their technologies functioning within a vendor-owned laboratory environment in addition 

to, or in lieu of, a demonstration vehicle. These laboratory environments provide a demonstration 

potential that although it does not have the face validity of a vehicle-based demonstration, can 

demonstrate the controlled functionality of a vendor’s product. Special scenarios as described in 

115 
the previous testing and evaluation approach may not be as likely; however, emulated scenarios 

may be possible. The compilation of some quantitative information may be easier, and testing in 

difficult or challenging environments may be emulated more easily in a laboratory setting. 

Independent Laboratory Testing and Evaluation: There may be instances where a closer look 

at selected VITs might be desirable. For these technologies, ORNL will request that vendors loan 

or donate the VITs to ORNL for independent laboratory testing. Such testing will likely be done 

in the instrumentation labs at ORNL or at the National Transportation Research Center 

(NTRC—see http://www.ntrc.gov/visit.shtml) located near ORNL, in Knoxville, Tennessee. 

Such testing will allow the VIT team to gain greater familiarity with the technology, will allow 

more depth in testing and evaluation as compared to testing and evaluation in vendor-owned 

laboratories, and will allow for testing and evaluation that may not be able to be carried out in 

vendor-based laboratories. 

Independent On-Vehicle Testing and Evaluation: For several of the VITs, it may be beneficial 

to conduct independent, on-vehicle testing and evaluation. For these tests, a test vehicle (a class8 tractor-trailer or possibly another vehicle platform) will be available at a closed test site that 

can accommodate vehicle-based testing and evaluation. ORNL will request that vendors loan or 

donate the VITs to ORNL for independent on-vehicle testing. ORNL will integrate the VITs into 

the test vehicle (either at the test site, if relatively easy, or at the NTRC if installation is more 

complex). Vendor participation in these efforts may also be requested. Testing will involve 

specific scenarios or COO-based scenarios developed by ORNL and TN-DOS. A professional 

driver will operate the test vehicle. Such testing will allow the VIT team to gain greater 

familiarity with the technology, and will allow more depth in testing and evaluation as compared 

to testing and evaluation on vendor-owned vehicle platforms. 

Observation Testing and Evaluation on a Commercial Fleet: Several of the vendors have 

already deployed versions of their VITs for use by carriers and shippers in North America. 

ORNL would like to talk with users to see how VITs have been deployed, identify good 

protocols associated with VIT usage, and hear about instances wherein the VITs have been 

utilized to thwart a theft or hijacking. Working with the end-user over the time period of this test 

will be desirable. That is, ORNL would meet periodically with user carriers or fleets to review 

recent usage histories of their VITs. Compiled information would be reviewed by the user and 

maintained anonymously by ORNL. Such real-world opportunities will provide data related to 

protocols, ease of use, etc., that will be useful for generating Best Practices and input for the 

COO. 

116 
B.4 VEHICLE IMMOBILIZATION TECHNOLOGY (VIT) QUESTIONNAIRE 

Please complete one questionnaire for each VIT that your company produces. 

1. Please provide the information below on a VIT that your company produces (or is 

involved with) that can provide one or more of the vehicle disabling functions listed 

below (i.e., FR1 through FR5) (if your company has more than one VIT product, please 

complete this form for each VIT produced by your company). The Functional 

Requirements (FRs) are: 

FR1: Vehicle disablement if the vehicle senses an unauthorized driver 

FR2: Vehicle disablement/shutdown in the event of a loss of signal 

FR3: Remote vehicle disablement/shutdown by the driver 

FR4: Remote vehicle shutdown by a dispatcher 

FR5: Remote vehicle shutdown by law enforcement 

a. Name of the product:___________________________________________________ 

b. Briefly describe the purpose of the product:____________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________ 

c. Please circle all of the functional requirements that can be provided by the product. 

FR1 FR2 FR3 FR4 FR5 

d. For those functions not circled in question 1c, does your company intend on 

providing these functions with this product in the future (Please circle a response)? 

YES NO 

If so, please circle which FRs will be provided. 

FR1 FR2 FR3 FR4 FR5 

(Page 1 of 11) 

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Question 1 continued: 

e. Does your company currently provide, or intend on providing any of the functional 

requirements not addressed by the product identified in item 1a via another product 

(Please circle a response)? If so, please name the product. 

 

 YES NO Name: _____________________________ 

Which functional requirements will this product provide? 

FR1 FR2 FR3 FR4 FR5 

f. Please describe how your product provides each of the FRs circled in question 1c 

(please continue on a separate sheet of paper if necessary). 

__________________________________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________ 

2. Please provide the technical specifications (e.g., power requirements, range, data 

exchange rate, speed of execution, etc.) for the product named in question 1a (or please 

provide a technical specification list) (please continue on a separate sheet of paper if 

necessary). 

__________________________________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________ 

(Page 2 of 11) 

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Question 2 continued: 

a. What precautions and safeguards are available to discourage hacking into your 

product or disabling your product once it is deployed? 

__________________________________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________ 

b. Is your product susceptible to electronic interference (Please circle a response)? 

Please elaborate. 

YES NO 

__________________________________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________ 

3. What volume of this product has been sold or is in-use in the industry? 

Number sold or in-use: ____________________________ 

(Page 3 of 11) 

119 
4. Please generally describe installation of the product. Is it vendor-installed only? How 

long does it take (per vehicle)? What qualifications are required for someone to install the 

product? Is any special equipment needed for installation? How invasive into the vehicle 

is the installation (air/electrical lines cut?)? 

__________________________________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________ 

5. Please describe any periodic maintenance or calibration requirements for this VIT. 

__________________________________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________ 

6. Is the installation of your VIT restricted to certain vehicle types, or to vehicles with 

certain features (please circle a response)? If yes, please describe the restrictions and the 

types of vehicles that can accept this VIT. 

YES NO 

__________________________________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________ 

(Page 4 of 11) 

120 
7. Please describe any special training that the users of your VITs must take in order to fully 

utilize your product. ...the length of the training. ....where the training is provided. 

__________________________________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________ 

8. Please describe how your product is utilized by a fleet or carriers? That is, does it require 

driver intervention? ....Does it require GPS? ....Who gets notified, and by what means 

are they notified when your product senses a violation? Please continue on a separate 

sheet of paper if necessary. 

__________________________________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________ 

9. Please describe what happens when your product senses a violation. Please describe any 

protocols (rules) for response that you or your customers advocate for the use of your 

product. Please continue on a separate sheet of paper if necessary. 

__________________________________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________ 

(Page 5 of 11) 

121 
10. Are there situations or circumstances that would be problematic for the performance of 

your VIT? For example, does it perform less reliably during poor weather? Do city 

“canyons” cause problems? Do you ever find your product “cutting out,” and if so, why? 

Please elaborate. 

__________________________________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________ 

11. What aspect of your VIT do you feel could be improved? What can be done to make it 

even better? 

__________________________________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________ 

12. Please describe any instances where your VIT has worked exceptionally well. Please 

provide a detailed description of the circumstances, and the events surrounding the 

circumstance. Please continue on a separate sheet of paper if necessary. 

__________________________________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________ 

(Page 6 of 11) 

122 
Please share the direction of the evolution of this VIT? How do you see your product 

changing over time? Will the customer base be the same? What features or functionalities 

do you think might be added? Please elaborate. 

__________________________________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________ 

13. Has your product ever been used in conjunction with law enforcement? If so, please 

elaborate. 

__________________________________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________ 

14. What are the costs associated with this VIT? 

a. Cost of the product: ________________ 

b. Does the cost vary with volume purchased (Please circle a response)? 

YES NO 

If so, please describe:_____________________________________________ 

_______________________________________________________________ 

_______________________________________________________________ 

_______________________________________________________________ 

_______________________________________________________________ 

(Page 7 of 11) 

123 
Question 14 continued: 

c. Is the equipment cost associated in any way with a service contract? 

YES NO 

If so, please describe: _____________________________________________ 

_______________________________________________________________ 

_______________________________________________________________ 

d. annual maintenance costs:: _______________ 

e. monthly fees: __________________________ 

f. periodic licensing fees: ________________ period of license: ____________ 

g. other costs (please elaborate): ______________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________ 

15. Does your company own a vehicle-based demonstration platform that has (or could have) 

your VIT product mounted on it for demonstration or test purposes? 

YES NO 

If yes, please describe the vehicle.______________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________ 

(Page 8 of 11) 

124 
Question 15 continued: 

a. Would your company be willing to demonstrate your products on this vehicle for 

the VIT research team (please circle a response)? 

YES NO 

16. Does your company own or have access to a development or testing laboratory (please 

circle a response)? 

YES NO 

a. If yes, would your company be willing to demonstrate your VIT in this laboratory 

for the VIT research team (please circle a response)? 

YES NO 

17. Would your company be willing to loan or donate your VIT to the VIT research team for 

independent testing (please circle a response)? 

YES YES (with conditions – please elaborate below) NO 

Please describe conditions: ____________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________ 

18. Would your company be willing to introduce the VIT team to some of your customers to 

discuss with them how they have used your VIT and their experiences with the use of 

your product (please circle a response)? 

YES YES (with conditions – please elaborate below) NO 

Please describe conditions: ____________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________ 

(Page 9 of 11) 

125 
19. Please provide the following contact information, and information related to your 

company and VITs. 

a. Primary contact with your company for the VIT team: 

Company Name: _____________________________________________ 

Contact Person: ______________________________________________ 

Contact Person’s Office phone(s): ________________________________ 

Contact Person’s E-mail address: ________________________________ 

Business Address: ____________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________ 

Company website: ___________________________________________ 

Product website: _____________________________________________ 

b. Does your company have literature, brochures, videos, or other information about 

this VIT that you can share publicly (please circle a response)? 

YES NO 

If yes, would you please forward this material to: 

Bill Knee or Oscar Franzese 

Center for Transportation Analysis 

Oak Ridge National Laboratory 

2360 Cherahala Blvd. 

Knoxville, Tennessee 37932 

Office Phone: (865) 946-1300 

E-mail address: kneehe@ornl.gov / franzeseo@ornl.gov

(Page 10 of 11) 

126 
127 

20. Is there any other information about your VIT that you would like to share with the VIT 

research team? If so, please elaborate. 

__________________________________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________ 

__________________________________________________________________ 

(Page 11 of 11) 
APPENDIX C: 

DEMONSTRATION TESTS PROGRAM 

C.1 BACKGROUND 

Prior to the VIT demonstration, the participating vendors were given a set of guidelines 

describing the proposed tests, specifically what type of capabilities they had to demonstrate. 

Since there was a limited time allocated to each company for the VST (Phase I) and VDT (Phase 

II) demonstrations, it was left to the vendors to decide the order in which different capabilities 

were to be demonstrated within each phase. The general schedule of events (supplied by the 

project researchers to the vendors) and the demonstration tests program (proposed and described 

by the vendors to the project researchers) are included below. 

C.2 SCHEDULE OF EVENTS 

Start 

Time 

End 

Time Location Description of Events 

7:30 8:30 Test Track Videotaping Equipment Setup and Testing. 

7:30 8:00 Test Track Vendors report to testing area with their vehicles. 

8:00 8:15 Biltmore 

Bldg* 

Safety and track usage discussion (LPG personnel). 

8:15 8:25 Biltmore Bldg Discussion of project objectives and goals. 

8:25 8:45 Biltmore Bldg Summary of test objectives and procedures. Q&A for participating drivers. 

8:45 9:00 Test Tack Positioning of test participants on the test track. This includes bringing the 

first demonstration vehicle to the test area and the deployment of test 

assistance personnel at key points alongside the test track. 

9:00 Test Track Start of Demonstration Tests 

9:00 9:45 Test Track Satellite Security Systems/Blue Bird – FRs 3, 4 and 5 Demos (+ 

Geofencing Test) 

9:45 10:00 Asphalt Lake Satellite Security Systems/Blue Bird – Driver Authentication Demonstration 

10:00 10:15 Asphalt Lake Satellite Security Systems/Blue Bird – Other VITs 

10:00 10:20 Test Track Qualcomm/Celadon/Magtec Set up 

10:20 11:05 Test Track Qualcomm/Celadon/Magtec – FRs 3, 4 and 5 Demos (+ Geofencing Test) 

11:05 11:20 Asphalt Lake Qualcomm/Celadon/Magtec – Driver Authentication Demonstration 

11:20 11:35 Asphalt Lake Qualcomm/Celadon/Magtec – Other VITs 

11:20 11:35 Test Track International Truck and Engine Corp Set up 

11:35 12:30 Biltmore 

Bldg 

Lunch 

12:30 Test Track Demonstration Tests Continue 

12:30 1:15 Test Track International Truck and Engine Corp – FRs 3, 4 and 5 Demos 

1:15 1:30 Asphalt Lake International Truck and Engine Corp – Driver Authentication Demonstration 

1:30 1:45 Asphalt Lake International Truck and Engine Corp – Other VITs 

1:30 1:45 Test Track BSM Wireless Set up 

1:50 2:35 Test Track BSM Wireless – FRs 3, 4 and 5 Demos (+ Geofencing Test) 

2:35 2:50 Asphalt Lake BSM Wireless – Driver Authentication Demonstration 

2:50 3:05 Asphalt Lake BSM Wireless – Other VITs 

2:50 3:05 Test Track GlenHugh Enterprise Set up 

3:10 3:55 Test Track GlenHugh Enterprise – FRs 3, 4 and 5 Demos (+ Geofencing Test) 

3:55 4:10 Asphalt Lake GlenHugh Enterprise – Driver Authentication Demonstration 

4:10 4:25 Asphalt Lake GlenHugh Enterprise – Other VITs 

4:30 5:00 Biltmore 

Bldg 

Adjourn - End of Demonstration Tests 

*Facility attached to LPG Test Track 8.

128 
C.3 DEMONSTRATION TESTS PROGRAM 

09:00 – 10:15 Satellite Security Systems/Blue Bird 

VST Demonstration Tests 

1. Test Track Test 1: motion test at lower speed; engine shutdown via phone call to 7/24 

Monitoring and Support Center (MSC). 

2. Test Track Test 2: motion test at higher speed; engine shutdown via phone call to 7/24 

MSC. 

VDT Demonstration Tests 

1. Demonstrate the ability to enable/disable starter via valid/invalid card swipes. 

2. Demonstrate remote engine shutdown by depressing panic button. 

3. Demonstrate remote engine shutdown via phone call to 7/24 MSC (simulate law 

enforcement protocol). 

4. View the Global Guard Enterprise Solution (GGES) software and Virtual Parameters 

(geofencing) reports and additional reporting and mapping features. 

10:20 – 11:35 MAGTEC/Qualcomm/Celadon 

VST Demonstration Tests 

1. VST 35-40 MPH – Qualcomm/Celadon Demo Standard Road Configuration 

a. Qualcomm/Celadon will demonstrate the default working configuration of the 

MAGTEC M5K with a step down to 10 MPH (5 min), but not to shutdown. 

b. The vehicle will then park at the Asphalt Lake for Driver Authentication 

Demonstrations (second part; see below). 

2. VST 35-40 MPH – MAGTEC Demo Short Stepping Configuration to full shutdown. 

3. VST 35-40 MPH – MAGTEC Demo Geofencing and Speed Threshold of 40 MPH 

without a MAGTEC ACS. 

4. VST Hijack - MAGTEC Demo Time Delayed Shutdown for Hijack. Based on a Hijack 

Scenario, MAGTEC will demonstrate the hijack notification system and the automatic 

time delayed shutdown of a vehicle. 

VDT Demonstration Tests 

1. Driver Authentication - Celadon 

2. Driver Tamper - MAGTEC 

3. Driver Alarm Demonstration - MAGTEC 

4. Idle Protection Demonstration – MAGTEC 

5. Reconfigure for COM and Signal Protection - MAGTEC 

6. Communication Signal Loss Protection – MAGTEC/Celadon 

7. Communication Tamper Protection - MAGTEC 

11:35 – 12:30 Lunch 

129 
12:30 – 01:45 International Truck and Engine Corporation 

VST Demonstration Tests 

Two different modes will be demonstrated: remote shutdown mode and vehicle depower 

mode. While in remote shutdown mode, vehicle operation will cease. The normal anti-theft 

mode will not re-enable normal vehicle operation. When the depower mode is active, there 

will be audible and visible alarms inside the cab, as well as performance impact to the 

vehicle. The vehicle will remain operational during this mode. 

1. Shutdown at Speed with Remote Re-enable: This demonstration consists of entering the 

shutdown mode when the vehicle is operational and traveling at normal highway speeds. 

There will be audible and visual alarms in the cab, but vehicle operational will not cease 

until the vehicle reaches speeds lower than ~5 mph. Once that speed is reached, vehicle 

operation will cease. The vehicle will not be operational until it is re-enabled. The 

demonstration will end with the vehicle being re-enabled remotely. Concepts: Shutdown 

while at speed, Remote re-enable, automatic engagement of Park Brake if vehicle is 

stationary, automatic engagement of Hazard lights and Brake lights if vehicle is in motion 

(provides warning to surrounding traffic). 

2. Severe Depower with Remote re-enable: This demonstration consists of placing the 

vehicle in a severe depower state and demonstrating the performance impact to the 

vehicle. The demonstration will end with the vehicle being re-enabled remotely. 

Concepts: Severe depower (provides limited capability to operate vehicle), Remote reenable, Automatic engagement of Hazard lights and Brake lights (provides warning to 

surrounding traffic). 

3. Extreme Depower with Local re-enable: This demonstration, like the previous one, 

consists of disabling the vehicle by depower at an extreme level. The vehicle will be 

operating, but will only be able to move at a slow rate of speed. The demonstration will 

end with the vehicle re-enabled locally (via the in-cab keypad). Concepts: Extreme 

depower (provides only enough capability to move vehicle at a slow rate of speed), Local 

re-enable (provides method to re-enable vehicle if out-of-coverage), Automatic 

engagement of Hazard lights and Brake lights (provides warning to surrounding traffic). 

VDT Demonstration Tests 

1. Theft-deterrent. This section will demonstrate theft-deterrent technology. The vehicle 

will automatically disable when operated by an unauthorized driver. 

a. Theft Case: This demonstration consists of automatic disablement when an idling 

vehicle is driven by an unauthorized driver. Concepts: Automatic vehicle 

disablement without authentication, latching capability to survive power loss. 

b. Driver Authentication Technology: This demonstration consists of driver 

authentication when the vehicle is idling without which, the vehicle will 

automatically disable. Concepts: Driver Authentication. 

2. Hijack Case: This section will demonstrate driver alert to Control Center 

a. Driver Alert Notification: This demonstration consists of a driver notification sent 

to a Control Center regardless of ignition state. Vehicle can be “on” or “off” for 

the alert to be sent. Concepts: Driver alert notification regardless of ignition state 

130 
131 

b. Shutdown while stationary with Local re-enable: This demonstration consists of a 

Control Center command to disable the vehicle based on a driver alert 

notification. Immediate shutdown will result if the vehicle is stationary, regardless 

of ignition state. Concepts: Immediate vehicle disable with local re-enable. 

01:50 – 03:05 BSM Wireless 

VST Demonstration Tests 

1. Authorized administrator shutdown. 

2. Geofence crossed shutdown. 

VDT Demonstration Tests 

1. Driver authentication including, 

a. key fob entry 

b. voice commands 

c. proximity card authorization 

d. keypad authorization 

e. silent alarm triggered by keypad entry (hijack scenario) 

2. Key fob shutdown. 

3. GPS tamper shutdown. 

4. Box tamper shutdown. 

03:10 – 04:25 GlenHugh Enterprise 

VST Demonstration Tests 

1. Geofence test. 

2. VST tests at normal speed. 

3. Hi-jack from stationary position. 

VDT Demonstration Tests 

1. VDT test (immobilizer VDT all circuits disabled, driver authentication). 

2. VDT test (safe stop idle, driver authentication). 

3. VDT test (remote engine starter disable). 

04:30 – 05:00 Adjourn – End of Demonstration Tests 
APPENDIX D: 

VENDOR INFORMATION AND DEMONSTRATION TESTS 

VISUALIZATION SOFTWARE 

D.1 BACKGROUND 

The information collected in this project—vendors’ questionnaires and data trajectory and speed 

information from the demonstration tests—can be accessed and visualized using the software 

provided with the companion CD. To run the software, simply insert the CD in the CD/DVD 

drive and close the drawer; the software should run automatically showing an access window as 

show in Figure 61 (note: if the software fails to start automatically, use the Windows Explorer 

feature to access the information on the CD and double-click on the file named 

“VITDTCD.exe”). 

Figure 61. VIT Information Visualization Interface 

Three different frames are presented to the user to access the report in pdf format (left-hand side 

frame), vendor information (central frame), and the demonstration tests (right–hand side frame). 

As the mouse cursor is moved over the provided window, different options are highlighted and 

can be accessed by clicking the left-mouse button on that option. Figure 61 shows the Project 

Report - Executive Summary highlighted; by clicking on that highlighted label, Adobe Acrobat 

will be launched and the executive summary of the project loaded (note: users have to have 

Adobe Acrobat reader installed in their computer for this option to work). 

D.2 VENDOR INFORMATION SOFTWARE INTERFACE DESCRIPTION 

Three different options are offered to the user to access the information collected through the 

questionnaire package that was distributed to VIT providers. Moving the mouse cursor to the 

“Vendor Information” frame highlights it, permitting access to company information, as well as 

general and technical information about the different VIT products offered by the different 

vendors. By double-clicking on the “Company Information” option (Figure 62), a screen with 

132 
contact information about the VIT vendors that completed the questionnaire is shown (see 

Figure 63). The controls located on the lower left corner of this dialog box allow the user to 

navigate the database. 

Figure 62. Interface Background 

Figure 63. VIT Vendor Contact Information

In the same way as in the case of “Company Information,” general and technical product 

information can be access from the main screen (Figure 61). By clicking on the “Product General 

133 
Info” and “Product Technical Info” options, dialog boxes are displayed similar to the ones shown 

in Figure 64and Figure 65, respectively. As in the case of the company contact information 

dialog box, database navigation is accomplished using the controls located on the lower left 

corner of the dialog boxes. All the dialog boxes can be closed by clicking on the “Exit” button 

(lower-right corner). 

The information displayed on these three dialog boxes is contained in a Microsoft Access 

database, which can be found in the “Database” folder included in the CD. 

Figure 64. VIT Product General Information

134 
Figure 65. VIT Product Technical Information

D.3 DEMONSTRATION TESTS SOFTWARE INTERFACE DESCRIPTION 

The main screen (Figure 61) also allows the user to access the information collected during the 

demonstration tests. Two options are provided: to install the visualization software and run it 

from the user’s computer or run it directly from the CD. Each one of these options can be 

accessed as discussed in the previous sections. 

The visualization software allows the user to see the truck’s location on the track, the current 

time, the vehicle’s speed, and the record number currently being analyzed. The interface consists 

of three main elements: a map of the test track, a graph displaying vehicle speed, and a control 

tool bar. To load this interface directly from the CD, the user clicks on the “Run from CD” 

option (highlighted in Figure 66), and a window, similar to that shown in Figure 67, is 

immediately displayed. 

135 
Figure 66. Running the Demonstration Tests Visualization Software from the CD 

The Map: The map portion of the interface (i.e., the background) is simply an aerial photograph 

of the test track that was used for the testing at Laurens Proving Grounds in South Carolina 

(Figure 67). When the software is run, a red dot representing the selected truck will appear and 

travel around the track indicating the truck’s position. At the same time, in the upper-left corner, 

the name of the vendor is shown together with a clock that displays the current time as the 

vehicle moves and a counter showing the data record id. 

Figure 67. Interface Background

136 
Speed Profile Graph: The lower right-hand corner of the interface contains a graph that 

displays the current speed of the vehicle (Figure 68). When a simulation is in progress, the 

current speed of the vehicle is plotted versus time (i.e., a speed profile). The window always 

displays 50 seconds worth of speed data and scrolls from left to right to allow the user to always 

see the current speed of the vehicle as well as a portion of the speed history. The graph also 

contains a digital readout of the current speed in miles-per-hour (mph) and linear acceleration in 

feet-per-second-squared (fpss) in the upper right-hand corner. 

Figure 68. Speed Profile Graph 

The Tool Bar: The tool bar at the bottom of the window provides the user a set of controls to 

manipulate the displaying of the demonstration tests information (Figure 69). 

Figure 69. Control Tool Bar 

There are five buttons on the left side that represent the nine corporations (including six VIT 

providers, two companies using vehicle immobilization technologies, and a GPS tracking 

provider) that demonstrated VIT devices: 

1. “S3”—Satellite Security Systems and Blue Bird Body Co. 

2. “MAGTEC”—MAGTEC, Qualcomm, and Celadon Trucking 

3. “ITE Corp”—International Truck and Engine Corporation 

4. “BSM”—BSM Wireless Inc. 

5. “GHE”—GlenHugh Enterprise and ARCHETYPE 

Clicking a company’s button will start the simulation for one of their truck runs. 

To the right of these are three text boxes. The first, titled “Animation Delay,” allows the user to 

modify how fast the displaying of the data runs. Smaller numbers mean less delay and thus the 

animation runs faster; similarly, higher numbers correspond to more delay and thus cause slower 

animations. Note that any delay time change must be followed by clicking the “Pause” button 

and then clicking “Continue” for the change to take effect. 

137 
138 

The next two text boxes are titled “Start From” and “End At”; these control at what record 

numbers a simulation begins and stops. These boxes can either be populated with any positive 

number, or the words “First” (representing the first record number) or “Last” (representing the 

last record number). The “Start From” box can also be populated with a number that is higher 

than the “End At” number, in which the case the animation will run backwards between these 

two record numbers. Note that an animation run must be ended and then restarted for changes in 

these text boxes to take effect; pausing and continuing will not recognize them. 

There are two buttons at the right of the tool bar that are labeled “Pause” and “End Run.” The 

pause button only has an effect when an animation is in progress and will stop the animation 

without resetting it. The button text then changes to “Continue” and pressing it again will cause 

the animation to resume from where it was paused. The “End Run” button also stops the 

animation, but it resets the program so that a new truck run must be selected to resume viewing 

animations and it will start from the beginning of the run (or whatever record number is entered 

into the “Start From” box). 

There is a check box labeled “Allow Pause” to the left of the pause button that enables or 

disables pausing or stopping a run once it has been started. This feature has been included 

because it increases the maximum animation speed by allowing the program to only process the 

run and not poll for user input. When the check box is unchecked, the “Pause/Continue” and 

“End Run” buttons will both be disabled. Note that once a run has been started in this mode, 

attempting to click on another control (such as a different company name) before the run has 

completed could cause the program to freeze. Thus, it is important to allow the simulation to 

completely finish before attempting to issue any other command. 

Finally, there is one control that is not listed on the tool bar at the bottom of the screen; doubleclicking anywhere on the map will resize the interface to accommodate different monitor 

resolutions. There are two sizes and repeated double-clicking will toggle between the two 

(Figure 70). 

Figure 70. Resizing Interface Window 
APPENDIX E: 

VIT STAKEHOLDERS LIST 

E.1 BACKGROUND 

The following table (Table 14) includes contact information for all the stakeholders with whom 

the research team interacted for this project. The columns to the left of each name show the type 

of interaction of that person with the project, with CVSA W indicating participation in the CVSA 

Workshop; IW participation in the industry-focused webinar; LEW, law enforcement webinar; 

D, direct contact; DT, demonstration tests; Q, vendors’ questionnaire; and V, personal visits. The 

table also show contact information for the research team (RT). 

Table 14. VIT Stakeholders List and Contact Information 

CVSA 

Interaction Contact Information CVSA Interaction Contact Information 

Q Lew Arcari 

AirIQ Inc. 

1099 Kingston Road, Suite 233 

Pickering, ON L1V 1B5 Canada 

Ph: 905-831-6444 

Fx: 905-831-0567 

E-mail: larcari@airiq.com 

www.airiq.com

CVSA SW Jerry Baker 

HazMat Training Coordinator 

Missouri State Highway Patrol 

1510 E. Elm St. 

Jefferson City, MO 65101 

Ph: (573) 526-6128 ext. 

Fx: (573) 526-4637 

E-mail: cindy.martin@mshp.dps.mo.gov

D Jim Balestra 

Safefreight Technologies, Inc. 

8000 N.E. Parkway Drive, Suite 200 

Vancouver, WA 98662 

Ph: 360-944-6722 

Fx: 360-253-6424 

E-mail: jbalestra@safefreight.com

www.safefreight.com

IW Thomas Ballard 

NAM Driving Special Projects 

Schlumberger 

200 Gillingham Ln. 

Sugar Land, TX 77478 

Ph: (281) 285-7606 ext. 

Fx: (281) 285-8526 

E-mail: ballards@slb.com

D Ed Bass 

First Horizon National Corporation 

165 Madison 

Memphis, Tennessee 38103 

Ph: 630-294-4337 

E-mail: ebass@firsthorizonins.com

V Mark Bauckman 

Director, Business Development 

Qualcomm 

5775 Morehouse Dr. 

San Diego, CA 92121 

Ph: 619-517-7295 

E-mail: mbauckman@qualcomm.com 

www.qualcomm.com

D David Beasley 

Master Sergeant 

Illinois State Police, Commercial Vehicle 

Section 

500 Iles Park Place, Suite 400 

Springfield, IL 62703 

Ph: 217-558-4060 

Fx: 217-524-2391 

E-mail: David_Beasley@isp.state.il.us

Q, D Stephen A. Belyea 

Base Engineering Inc. 

600 Rothesay Ave. 

Saint John, New Brunsw E2H 2H1 

Canada 

Ph: 800-924-1010 

E-mail: s.belyea@baseng.com 

www.baseng.com

139 
CVSA 

Interaction Contact Information CVSA Interaction Contact Information 

RT Capt Steve Binkley 

Tennessee Highway Patrol 

Tennessee Department of Safety 

1148 Foster Avenue 

Nashville, Tennessee 37210 

Ph: 615-687-2317 

E-mail: Steve.Binkley@state.tn.us 

IW Paul Black 

PO Box 5010, 825 Highway 33 

Freehold, NJ 07728 

Ph: 732-462-1001 

E-mail: pblack@freeholdcartage.com

V, DT Michael Bray 

Business Development Mgr. 

Qualcomm 

5775 Morehouse Dr. 

San Diego, CA 92121 

Ph: 858-651-6241 

Fx: 858-651-3740 

E-mail: mbray@qualcomm.com 

www.qualcomm.com

CVSA SW Bruce Bugg 

Captain 

Georgia Department of Public Safety 

959 E. Confederate Ave. 

Atlanta, GA 30316 

Ph: (404) 624-7226 ext. 

Fx: (404) 624-7295 

E-mail: obbugg@gsp.net

CVSA SW Reggie Bunner 

Supervisor 

Public Service Commission of West 

Virginia 

P. O. Box 812 

Charleston, WV 25323 

Ph: (304) 340-0322 ext. 

Fx: (304) 340-3742 

E-mail: crandolph@psc.state.wv.us

IW Jerry Bunning 

Fleet Safety Manager 

RSC Equipment Rental 

215 E. Baseline Road 

Gilbert, AZ 85234 

Ph: 602-448-7690 

E-mail: Jerry.Bunning@RSCrental.com 

http://www.RSCrental.com

IW Michael A. Caldarera, P.E. 

Vice President, Regulatory and Technical 

Services 

National Propane Gas Association 

1150 17th Street NW, Suite 310 

Washington, D.C. 20036 

Ph: 202-466-7200, ext. 223 

E-mail: mcaldarera@npga.org

CVSA SW Kenneth Carr 

Major 

Florida DOT, Motor Carrier Compliance 

325 John Knox Rd., Bldg. K 

Tallahassee, FL 32303 

Ph: (850) 245-7900 ext. 

E-mail: kenneth.carr@dot.state.fl.us

V Eric Chapman 

President 

Satellite Security Systems Inc. 

6779 Mesa Ridge Road, Suite 100 

San Diego, CA 92121 

Ph: 858-638-9700 

E-mail: echapman@satsecurity.com 

www.satsecurity.com

CVSA SW Rose Clark 

Section Head 

Maryland Department of Environment 

1800 Washington Blvd. 

Baltimore, MD 21230 

Ph: (410) 537-3400 ext. 

Fx: (410) 537-3017 

E-mail: rclark@mde.state.md.us

D John Conley 

President 

National Tank Truck Carriers, Inc 

2200 Mill Rd. 

Alexandria, VA 22314 

Ph: 703-838-1960 

E-mail: jconley@Tanktruck.org

IW Richard Craig 

Director of Regulatory Affairs 

OOIDA 

P.O. Box 1000 

Grain Valley, MO 64029 

Ph: (816) 229-5791 ext.1603 

Fx: (816) 427-4468 

E-mail: denise_volmer@ooida.com

140 
CVSA 

Interaction Contact Information CVSA Interaction Contact Information 

Q Chris Crowle 

Director Prod.Dev. 

Safefreight Technologies, Inc. 

4220 98 Street, Suite 303 

Edmonton, Alberta, T6E 6A1 Canada 

Ph: 780-421-9055 232 

Fx: 780-421-9011 

E-mail: ccrowle@safefreight.com 

www.safefreight.com

CVSA SW Gary Davenport, CDS 

Director of Safety & Risk Management 

Kansas Motor Carriers Association 

P.O. Box 1673 

Topeka, KS 66601 

Ph: (785) 267-1641 ext.102 

Fx: (785) 266-6551 

E-mail: gary@kmca.org

IW Donald Davis 

SPILL CENTER 

22 Kane Industrial Dr. 

Hudson, MA 01749 

Ph: (978) 568-1922 x222 

Fx: (978) 580-7416 cell 

E-mail: ddavis@spillcenter.com

IW Joe Delfino 

Security Manager 

Trans Bridge Lines, Inc. 

2012 Industrial Drive 

Bethlehem, Pa. 18017 

Ph: 610-868-6001 ext.163 

Fx: 610-868-9057 fax 

E-mail: jdelfino_tbl@fast.net

RT Joseph DeLorenzo 

HazMat Program Manager 

U.S. DOT/FMCSA 

19900 Governors Dr., Ste. 210 

Olympia Fields, IL 60461 

Ph: (708) 283-3572 ext. 

Fx: (708) 283-3579 

E-mail: joseph.delorenzo@dot.gov

IW William F. Downey 

Vice President - Security 

Kenan Advantage Group 

4895 Dressler Road 

Canton, Ohio 44718 

Ph: 800-969-5419 

E-mail: bdowney@thekag.com 

www.thekag.com

Q Christopher Farmer 

Sr Account Executive 

Vericom 

9881 Broken Land Pky. 

Columbia, MD 21046 

Ph: 410-381-5707x36 

Fx: 410-381-2997 

E-mail: cfarmer@vericomtech.com 

www.vericomtech.com

CVSA SW David Feather 

Sgt. 

Virginia State Police 

P.O. Box 27472 

Richmond, VA 23261 

Ph: (804) 674-2005 ext. 

Fx: (804) 674-2916 

E-mail: herbert.bridges@vsp.virginia.gov

Q, D Jake Fifelski 

President 

AutoMotive Wireless Incorporated 

P.O. Box 172 

Dorr, MI 49323 

Ph: 616-308-3960 

E-mail: j.fifelski@automotivewireless.com 

www.automotivewireless.com

CVSA SW Michael Filiaggi 

Program Manager 

Transportation Security Administration 

601 S. 12th St. 

Arlington, VA 22202 

Ph: (571) 227-4262 ext. 

Fx: (571) 227-2935 

E-mail: michael.filiaggi@dhs.gov

IW Jack Foley 

Director, Regulatory Compliance 

P. S. MARSTON ASSOCIATES 

38B South Road 

North Hampton, NH 03862 

Ph: 800-643-9537 ext. 17 

Fx: 603-964-8269 (fax) 

E-mail: jack@abenaquicarriers.com 

RT Oscar Franzese 

Sr. Researcher 

Oak Ridge National Laboratories 

2360 Cherahala Blvd. 

Knoxville, TN 37932 

Ph: (865) 946-1304 

E-mail: franzeseo@ornl.gov

141 
CVSA 

Interaction Contact Information CVSA Interaction Contact Information 

CVSA SW Sgt. Thomas Fuller 

New York State Police 

1220 Washington Ave. Bldg. 22 

Albany, NY 12226 

Ph: (518) 457-3258 ext. 

Fx: (518) 457-9620 

E-mail: rweiss@troopers.state.ny.us

D Winston Gaffron 

Director, TN DOT Region 3 

6601 Centennial Blvd. 

Nashville, TN 37243-0360 

Ph: 615-350-4300 

Fx: 615-350-4396 

Winston.Gaffron@state.tn.us

Q, D, DT Sherwin Gilbert 

Business Development Manager 

International Truck and Engine 

Corporation 

4201 Winfield Rd 

Warrenville, IL 60555 

Ph: 630-753-6153 

Fx: 630-753-3000 

E-mail: Sherwin.Gilbert@NAVINTERNATIONAL.com 

www.internationaldelivers.com

IW Dale Goetz 

Director - Safety & Environmental 

Services 

YRC Worldwide 

10990 Roe Ave. 

Overland Park , KS 66211 

Ph: (913) 344-5375 ext. 

Fx: (913) 344-3614 

E-mail: dale.goetz@yellowcorp.com

LEW Sgt. Alan Hageman 

Oregon State Police - GHQ/PSD 

255 Capitol St NE 

Salem, OR 97310 

Ph: 503-378-3725 ext. 4201 

E-mail: alan.hageman@state.or.us

V Jeff Hall 

Field Engineer, Sr. 

Qualcomm 

5775 Morehouse Dr. 

San Diego, CA 92121 

Ph: 619-517-7295 

E-mail: jhall@qualcomm.com 

www.qualcomm.com

V John Harvey 

Engineer, Sr. Staff 

Qualcomm 

5775 Morehouse Dr. 

San Diego, CA 92121 

Ph: 619-517-7295 

E-mail: jharvey@qualcomm.com 

www.qualcomm.com

www.tandet.com

IW Dave Herdman 

Safety/ Training Supervisor 

1006 Prescott Drive 

Sarnia, ON N7T 7H3, Canada 

Tandet Logistics Inc. 

Ph: 519-332-6000 ext. 2111 

Fx: 519-332-5986 

E-mail: dherdman@tandet.com 

www.tandet.com

IW Bill Hershey 

PGT Trucking Inc 

One PGT Way 

Monaca, PA 15061 

Ph: 724-987-1715 

E-mail: BHershey@pgttrucking.com

Q, D Erik Hoffer 

President 

CGM Security Solutions, Inc 

24156 Yacht Club Blvd 

Punta Gorda, FL 33955 

Ph: 941-575 0243 

Fx: 941-575 0971 

E-mail: tamperguru@comcast.net 

www.airbrakesecurity.com

CVSA SW Dean House 

Captain 

Iowa DOT/Motor Vehicle Enforcement 

Park Fair Mall, 100 Euclid Ave. 

Des Moines, IA 50313 

Ph: (515) 237-3278 ext. 

Fx: (515) 237-3387 

E-mail: dean.house@dot.iowa.gov

LEW Ron Hughes 

Research Support 

NC State Highway Patrol 

7760 Netherlands Dr. 

Raleigh, NC 27606 

Ph: (919) 515-8523 ext. 

E-mail: rghughes@ncshp.org

142 
CVSA 

Interaction Contact Information CVSA Interaction Contact Information 

V Patricia Hurst-Alger 

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 

7000 East Avenue 

Livermore, CA 94550 

Ph: 925-422-0246 

Fx: 925-423-0411 

E-mail: hurstalger1@llnl.gov 

www.llnl.gov

LEW Dennis Hult 

Chief, MCS Operations Bureau 

Montana DOT 

P.O. Box 4639 

Helena, MT 59604-1001 

Ph: (406) 444-9237 ext. 

Fx: (406) 444-9263 

E-mail: dhult@mt.gov

CVSA SW Thomas B. Jacobs 

L/Cpl. 

SCDPS - State Transport Police Division 

10311 Wilson Blvd. 

Blythewood, SC 29016 

Ph: (803) 896-5500 ext. 

Fx: (803) 896-5526 

E-mail: tbjacobs@scstp.org

V Larry Jones 

Trackn/Aircept 

27758 Santa Margarita Pkwy, Suite 363 

Mission Viejo CA, 92691 

Ph: 877-684-2040 

Fx: 949-260-0889 

www.aircept.com

IW Patrick Kaigle 

National Transportation Manager 

Air Liquide Canada Inc. - Process 

Industries 

1250 Rene-Levesque Blvd. West, Suite 

1700 

Montreal, Quebec H3B 5E6 

Ph: 514-846-3917 phone 

Fx: 514-846-3915 fax 

E-mail: patrick.kaigle@airliquide.com

V, D Doug Kenner 

Operations Manager 

Swain Oil Transport 

P.O. Box 131567 

Carlsbad, CA 92013 

Ph: 760-607-0242 (Office) 

E-mail: Doug@swainoiltrans.com 

www.swainoiltrans.com

V, D, DT Tom King 

VP Product Development 

Satellite Security Systems Inc. 

6779 Mesa Ridge Road, Suite 100 

San Diego, CA 92121 

Ph: 858-638-9700 

E-mail: tking@satsecurity.com

www.satsecurity.com

CVSA SW Jim Kitchen 

Load Engineering Manager 

Schneider National Carriers 

P.O. Box 2417 

Green Bay, WI 54306 

Ph: (920) 592-6248 

Fx: (920) 592-6169 

E-mail: kitchenj@schneider.com

RT Helmut Knee 

Group Leader 

Oak Ridge National Laboratory 

2360 Cherahala Blvd. 

Knoxville, TN 37932 

Ph: (865) 946-1300 

Fx: (865) 946-1314 

E-mail: kneehe@ornl.gov

CVSA SW Mark Lepofsky 

Manager, Transportation Analysis & 

Risk Assessment 

Battelle Memorial Institute 

901 D St, SW, Ste. 900 

Washington, DC 20024-2115 

Ph: (202) 646-7786 ext. 

Fx: (614) 458-6656 

E-mail: lepofskym@battelle.org

V Pat Lewis 

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 

7000 East Avenue 

Livermore, CA 94550 

Ph: 925-422-0042 

E-mail: lewis26@llnl.gov 

www.llnl.gov

IW Tom Lynch 

Vice President 

The National Tank Truck Carriers, Inc. 

2200 Mill Road 

Alexandria, VA 22314 

Ph: 703-838-1960 

Fx: 703-684-5753 

E-mail: tlynch@tanktruck.org

143 
CVSA 

Interaction Contact Information CVSA Interaction Contact Information 

Q, D, DT David McMillan 

Manager of Product Development 

MAGTEC Products, Inc 

9152 - 52nd Street SE 

Calgary, Alberta T2C 5A9 Canada 

Ph: 403-215-0748 

E-mail: dmcmillan@magtecproducts.com 

www.magtecproducts.com

V Al Milligan 

Executive Vice President 

Wireless Matrix 

12369-B Sunrise Valley Drive 

Reston, VA 20191 

Ph (703) 262-0500 

Fax (703) 262-0380 

www.wirelessmatrixcorp.com

D Jim Moberg 

Vice President Sales 

Blue Bird Body Company 

402 Blue Bird Boulevard 

Fort Valley, GA 31030 

Ph: 478-822-2239 

Q, D Bob Morisset 

President 

MAGTEC Products, Inc 

9152 - 52nd Street SE 

Calgary, Alberta T2C 5A9, Canada 

Ph: 403-252-2169 

E-mail: rmorisset@magtecproducts.com 

www.magtecproducts.com

CVSA SW 

IW 

DT 

M. R. (Mitch) Morisset 

Manager, Field Operations 

MAGTEC 

9152 - 52nd Street SE 

Calgary, Alberta T2C 5A9 Canada 

Ph: 403-252-2169 

E-mail: mmorisset@magtecproducts.com

CVSA SW Douglas Morris 

Commander 

Maryland State Police 

901 Elkridge Landing Rd., Ste. 300 

Linthicum, MD 21090 

Ph: (410) 694-6100 ext. 

Fx: (410) 694-6135 

E-mail: cved@mdsp.org

Q, V, DT Hugh Morris 

GlenHugh Enterprise 

19 Muir Crescent 

Alma, ON N0B 1A0 Canada 

Ph: 519-846-8941 

Fx: 519-846-2870 

E-mail: h_autowatch@highspeedfx.net 

www.autowatchamerica.com

IW Thomas Moses 

President 

SPILL CENTER 

22 Kane Industrial Drive 

Hudson, MA 01749 

Ph: 978-568-1922 x222 

Fx: 978-580-7416 cell 

E-mail: tmoses@spillcenter.com

IW Richard Moskowitz 

Assistant General Counsel and Regulatory 

Affairs Counsel 

American Trucking Associations 

2200 Mill Road 

Alexandria, Va. 22314 

Ph: 703-838-1910 

E-mail: RMoskowitz@trucking.org

CVSA SW Steven Niswander 

VP, Safety & Regulatory Relations 

Groendyke Transport Inc 

P.O. Box 632 

Enid, OK 73702 

Ph: (580) 213-9237 ext. 

Fx: (580) 234-2150 

E-mail: sniswander@groendyke.com

CVSA SW David O'Neal 

Safety Coordinator 

Martin Transport, Inc. 

4200 Stone Rd. 

Kilgore, TX 75663 

Ph: (903) 812-1069 ext. 

Fx: (903) 981-3199 

E-mail: david.oneal@martinmlp.com

CVSA SW Ron Ostler 

Captain 

Utah Highway Patrol 

5500 W. Amelia Earhart Dr., Ste. 360 

Salt Lake City, UT 84116 

Ph: (801) 596-9248 ext. 

Fx: (801) 596-9751 

E-mail: rostler@utah.gov

144 
CVSA 

Interaction Contact Information CVSA Interaction Contact Information 

Q, D Mark Ochitwa 

Vice President, Operations and Product 

Development 

MAGTEC Products, Inc 

9152 - 52nd Street SE 

Calgary, Alberta T2C 5A9 Canada 

Ph: 403-215-0748 

E-mail: mochitwa@magtecproducts.com 

www.magtecproducts.com

CVSA SW Wes Pace 

Director, Hazmat & Trade Compliance 

Landstar Carrier Services 

13410 Sutton Park 

Jacksonville, FL 32224 

Ph: (904) 306-2372 ext.2372 

Fx: (904) 306-2668

Q, D, DT Chris Panczuk 

BSM Wireless Inc 

5875 Highway 7, Suite 200 

Woodbridge, Ontario L4L 1T9 Canada 

Ph: 905-265-1200 (266) 

Fx: 905-265-1288 

E-mail: cpanczuk@bsmwireless.com 

www.bsmwireless.com

D Michael Paton 

Skywave 

Sales Manager 

1145 Innovation Drive, Suite 288 

Ottawa, ON K2K 3G8, Canada 

Ph: 613-836-6288 ext 234 

Fx: 613-836-1088 

E-mail: michael.paton@skywave.com 

www.skywave.com

CVSA SW Rob Patrick 

Captain 

California Highway Patrol 

444 N. 3rd St., #310 

Sacramento, CA 95814 

Ph: (916) 445-1865 ext. 

Fx: (916) 446-4579 

E-mail: RPatrick@chp.ca.gov

CVSA SW Bob Powers 

Captain 

Michigan State Police 

4000 Collins Rd. 

Lansing, MI 48910 

Ph: (517) 336-6447 

Fx: (517) 333-4414 

E-mail: powersr@michigan.gov

CVSA SW Joseph Rajkovacz 

Regulatory Affairs Specialist 

OOIDA 

P.O. Box 1000 

Grain Valley, MO 64014 

Ph: (816) 229-5791 ext.1680 

Fx: (816) 427-4468 

E-mail: denise_volmer@ooida.com

Q Vincent Raviele 

President 

Ravelco 

6920 Oak Knoll Drive 

Richmond, TX 77469 

Ph: 281-341-6222 

E-mail: ravelco@aol.com 

www.ravelco.com

CVSA SW Michael Ritchie 

Hazardous Materials Specialist 

Minnesota DOT 

395 John Ireland Blvd. 

St. Paul, MN 55155 

Ph: (651) 366-3697 ext. 

Fx: (651) 366-3719 

E-mail: michael.ritchie@dot.state.mn.us

RT Lt Ray Robinson 

Tennessee Highway Patrol 

Tennessee Department of Safety 

1148 Foster Avenue 

Nashville, Tennessee 37210 

United States of America 

Ph: (615) 687-2304 

E-mail: Ray.Robinson@state.tn.us

IW Drew Schimelpfenig 

Ops Contact Center Mgr. 

J B Hunt Corp 

300 Delaware Avenue 

Wilmington, DE 19801-1607 

Ph: 479.820.6676 

E-mail: Drew_Schimelpfenig@jbhunt.com

Q, V Marvin Serhan 

Vice President of Business Development 

Satellite Security Systems Inc. 

6779 Mesa Ridge Road, Suite 100 

San Diego, CA 92121 

Ph: 858-638-9700 

E-mail: mserhan@satsecurity.com 

www.satsecurity.com

145 
CVSA 

Interaction Contact Information CVSA Interaction Contact Information 

IW Kirk Shrader 

Manager of Safety Services 

Trimac Transporation Inc 

3663 N. Sam Houston Parkway E. 

Houston, Texas 77032 

Ph: 918-439-4642 

Fx: 918-439-4760 

E-mail: kshrader@trimac.com

Q Barry Smith 

GPS Management Systems 

480 Northfield Drive, Suite 500 

Brownsburg, IN 46112 

Ph: 317-852-5229 

E-mail: bsmith@gpsmanagement.com 

www.gpsmanagement.com

CVSA SW Carlisle J Smith 

Hazardous Materials Supervisor 

Public Utilities Commission Ohio 

180 E. Broad St., 14th Fl. 

Columbus, OH 43215-3793 

Ph: (614) 728-9126 ext. 

Fx: (614) 752-8349 

E-mail: Carlisle.Smith@puc.state.oh.us

CVSA SW Forrest Smith 

Col. 

NM Department of Public Safety 

P.O. Box 1628 

Santa Fe, NM 87504 

Ph: (505) 827-0148 ext. 

Fx: (505) 827-0324 

E-mail: forrest.smith@state.nm.us

CVSA SW Joseph Smith 

Sgt. 

DPS/Nevada Highway Patrol 

555 Wright Way 

Carson City, NV 89711 

Ph: (702) 432-5121 ext. 

Fx: (702) 486-4143 

E-mail: tshaw@dps.state.nv.us

CVSA SW Thomas Snyder 

Safety and Compliance 

Austin Powder Company 

11910 V.O. Dr. 

Poseyville, IN 47633 

Ph: (812) 963-9293 ext. 

Fx: (216) 464-4418 

E-mail: tom.snyder@austinpowder.com

CVSA SW Rion Stann 

Motor Carrier Enforcement Supervisor 

Pennsylvania State Police 

20th and Herr Streets 

Harrisburg, PA 17120 

Ph: (717) 346-7350 ext. 

E-mail: rstann@state.pa.us

CVSA SW Daniel Stock 

Sr. Transportation Specialist 

SAIC 

5 Mitchell Ave. 

Wakefield, RI 02879 

Ph: (401) 792-8175 ext. 

Fx: (401) 792-8176 

E-mail: stockd@saic.com

Q, V James Tatoian 

President 

Eureka Aerospace 

3452 E. Foothill Blvd, Suite 528 

Pasadena, CA 91107 

Ph: 626-844-6664 

Fx: 626-844-6665 

E-mail: tatoian@eurekaaerospace.com 

www.eurekaaerospace.com

LEW Sergeant Doug Taylor 

Tennessee Highway Patrol 

Research, Planning, and Development 

Ph: 615-687-2400 

Fx: 615-253-2096 

E-mail: Doug.Taylor@state.tn.us

D, DT Gregg Tilston 

Fleet and Data Solutions Specialist - 

Government Sector 

BSM Wireless 

5875 Hwy 7., Suite 200 

Woodbridge, ON L4L 1T9, Canada 

Ph: 905-265-1200 x255 

E-mail: gtilston@bsmwireless.com 

www.bsmwireless.com

RT Tom Urbanik 

Professor 

University of Tennessee 

219-B Perkins 

Knoxville, TN 37996 

Ph: (865) 974-7709 

Fx: (865) 974-2669 

E-mail: turbanik@utk.edu

146 
147 

CVSA 

Interaction Contact Information CVSA Interaction Contact Information 

CVSA SW Brad Wagner 

Sgt. 

Nebraska State Patrol 

3920 W. Kearney St. 

Lincoln, NE 68524 

Ph: (402) 471-0105 ext. 

Fx: (402) 471-3295 

E-mail: bwagner@nsp.state.ne.us

Q, V, D Tom Wainwright 

Vice President, Sales & Marketing 

Wireless Matrix (ex. MobileAria) 

800 W El Camino Real 

Mountain View, CA 94040 

Ph: 650-237-4455 

E-mail: TWainwright@MobileAria.com 

www.wirelessmatrixcorp.com

V Jeff Waterstreet 

Sr. Mgr, Business Development 

Qualcomm 

5775 Morehouse Dr. 

San Diego, CA 92121 

Ph: 619-517-7295 

E-mail: jwaterstreet@qualcomm.com 

www.qualcomm.com

V Bill Wattenburg 

Consultant 

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 

BillWattenburg2 @yahoo.com

IW Dave West 

DOT Compliance Manager 

RSC Equipment Rental 

A Company within the Atlas Copco Group 

P.O. BOX 19 

West Valley, NY 14171 USA 

Ph: 716-983-0140 

E-mail: David.West@RSCrental.com

CVSA SW Mike Windsor 

Sr. Manager - Hazardous Materials 

YRC Worldwide 

10990 Roe Ave. 

Overland Park, KS 66211 

Ph: (913) 344-3057 ext. 

Fx: (913) 344-3614 

E-mail: mike.windsor@yellowcorp.com

D Bruce Wishart 

Director of Security 

Celadon Trucking 

9503 E.33rd Street 

Indianapolis, IN 46235-4207 

(800) CELADON 

(317) 972-7000 

www.celadontrucking.com

V, D Michael T. Yura 

NBSP 

150 Clay Street, Suite 350 

Morgantown, WV 26501 

Ph: 304-292-8800 

Fx: 304-292-8803 

E-mail: yura@nationalbiometric.org