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IRANIAN NUCLEAR TALKS:

NEGOTIATING A BAD DEAL?

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, 

NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

NOVEMBER 18, 2014

Serial No. 113–227

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

PAUL COOK, California 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

SEAN DUFFY, Wisconsin 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

TED POE, Texas, Chairman 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

PAUL COOK, California 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Ray Takeyh, Ph.D., senior fellow for Middle Eastern studies, Council on 

Foreign Relations ................................................................................................. 6

Mr. J. Matthew McInnis, resident fellow, American Enterprise Institute ......... 14

Mr. David Albright, president, Institute for Science and International Security ......................................................................................................................... 21

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Ray Takeyh, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ............................................................... 9

Mr. J. Matthew McInnis: Prepared statement ...................................................... 16

Mr. David Albright: Prepared statement ............................................................... 23

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 62

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 63

(1)

IRANIAN NUCLEAR TALKS: NEGOTIATING A 

BAD DEAL? 

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 18, 2014

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 o’clock p.m., in room 

2200 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ted Poe (chairman of 

the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. POE. Subcommittee will come to order. Without objection, all 

members may have 5 days to submit statements, questions and extraneous materials for the record subject to the length limitation 

in the rules. 

If someone could get the back door, it would be appreciated. It 

is not to keep you in or keep anyone out. We just want the door 

shut. 

Iran has defied and lied to the international community for over 

a decade when it comes to its nuclear weapons program. Finally, 

the West got serious and took a stand and imposed real sanctions 

in 2012. 

The sanctions actually worked and Iran came to the negotiating 

table, but then the West retreated. Loosening up on sanctions just 

when Iran was beginning to feel the consequences of its actions 

was a monumental mistake. 

Netanyahu was correct. When this deal was made by the Secretary of State he said that this was a bad deal, a very bad deal 

for Israel and for the United States and for world safety. Since 

then, Iranian leaders have been emboldened by the economic relief 

they have experienced and they have reverted to their defiant 

ways. 

Recently, a top advisor to Iranian President Hassan Rouhani 

said, ‘‘Obama is the weakest of all U.S. Presidents.’’ Now is the 

time for the leader of the free world to prove Iran wrong. 

The world, including our enemies and allies, are watching. We 

have already passed the deadline for negotiations to end in July 

and now we await a second deadline, which is next week. There is 

reason to believe that the Iranians——[Loses sound.] 

After all, we will continue to pay them millions whether the 

deadline is met or not, just for the promise of cooperation—a promise from, really, an enemy of the world. Each attempt at compromise has turned out to be a stall tactic by the Iranians. 

2

While the Iranians have their first string varsity team, we are 

playing our JV team, to quote a phrase. As it is, we don’t know 

how many centrifuges the Iranians currently have. The old principle of trust but verify does not work in this case because Iran has 

shown that it cannot be trusted. 

They will lie when the truth is not in their political interest. The 

IAEA hasn’t been able to verify Iran’s capabilities. The Iranians 

could have a bomb in as little as 3 months. 

The problem is we don’t know and neither does the IAEA. Making matters worse, we can’t take the Iranians at their word on 

their nuclear aspirations. They still haven’t come clean about their 

previous suspected nuclear weapons activities alleged by the IAEA 

back in November 2011. 

Iran’s real aspirations are simple. They want to annihilate Israel, 

and then they want to annihilate the United States. That is what 

the real leader of Iran, Khamenei, called for just last week. 

We are dealing with the devil and the clock is running out. The 

deal cannot be handled solely behind doors away from the public 

and away from scrutiny. There are dire consequences in these negotiations and the American people expect their representatives—

the U.S. Congress—to play a role. 

The U.S. Congress must approve or disapprove any potential 

final nuclear agreement with Iran. Here is what an acceptable 

agreement might look like. 

One, Iran would verifiably take apart its illicit nuclear infrastructure; two, Iran would resolve all past issues of concern including possible military aspects of its nuclear program development; 

three, the inspections regime must go beyond the authorities that 

the IAEA currently has; four, a permanent inspections team in 

Iran is needed and they must be allowed to go anywhere, see anything at any time; five, Iran must come into compliance with all 

six standing U.N. Security Council resolutions related to its nuclear program; and six, Iran’s ballistic missiles program must be 

addressed. 

Missiles, after all, can be used to deliver nuclear weapons. Any 

deal that does not address this is not only a bad deal but a dangerous one. We have to address the issue of deliveries. 

And seven, finally, no sanctions relief should be provided unless 

a final agreement can verify and permanently prevent Iran from 

acquiring nuclear weapons. 

Even if an acceptable agreement is reached, the sanctions relief 

must be limited and phased so that we can keep our economic leverage. In general, any good agreement is not about freezing Iran’s 

nuclear program but dismantling it. Anything less simply 

postpones the inevitable danger that a nuclear-armed Iran presents 

to the world. 

I look forward to hearing what our witnesses think about where 

we are and what we should be doing in Congress. The U.S. must 

be clear and unequivocal. There will be no reductions in sanctions 

without verified steps to show that Tehran is abandoning, not just 

freezing, its nuclear weapons program. 

I will now yield to the ranking member, Mr. Sherman from California, for his opening statement. 

3

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you, Chairman Poe, for holding these important hearings. 

I agree with you that any sanctions relief should come only 

through an act of Congress and I hope that the Iranians understand that any waivers granted by this President are waivers that 

do not necessarily apply to any future administration. 

Furthermore, looking at the statute, waivers are supposed to be 

case by case based upon the entity applying for the waiver, not 

blanket waivers in effect suspending our sanctions statutes. 

The one possible disagreement I have with you is I don’t think 

that even at their high water mark our sanctions were enough to 

really bring Iran to the table if that is the table where they are 

supposed to give up their nuclear program. 

We had sanctions significant enough to get them to come to the 

table where they do a kabuki dance and get some relief from the 

sanctions because it is always better to help your economy at least 

even from modest sanctions. 

So to say that we ever had sanctions significant enough to 

threaten regime survival and to cause this regime to be willing to 

give up its nuclear weapons program is questionable. 

The Joint Plan of Action gave Iran some very significant relief. 

First, it caused a pause in the reductions of oil purchases that were 

called for by the Menendez-Kirk provisions of the 2012 law. 

Second, it stopped Congress cold from adopting new sanctions 

statutes. And finally, and perhaps most importantly, it changed the 

whole psychology, and much of economics is psychology. It caused 

people interested in the Iranian economy to think that things 

would be on the upswing. Under this Joint Plan of Action, we are 

giving Iran $700 million, albeit of its own money, every month. 

I think we have got to be loud and clear to the administration 

that further releases of Iran’s frozen funds should not occur just because we are going into a new month. If these talks are extended 

they shouldn’t be extended with us paying a price for that extension. 

Now, we are in a much weaker bargaining position than we were 

at the beginning of this century. During the first decade of this 

century, we didn’t enforce our sanctions laws. 

The administration worked very effectively and successfully to 

prevent us from passing any new sanctions laws and the Shiites 

were put in control of Iraq. So today, we have to deal with a much 

weaker hand than if we had started to take this program seriously 

at the beginning of the century. 

We are told that this JPOA has frozen Iran’s program. That is 

not true and, to some extent, is true. Some of the program has been 

frozen. Some of it has been rolled back, particularly the 20 percent 

enriched uranium. 

Half has been diluted. Another half has been oxidized. But keep 

in mind even that oxidized portion is far more than Iran needs for 

any peaceful purpose. It is oxidized but it hasn’t been converted 

into fuel, pellets or rods so it is pretty available for use in creating 

a bomb and it is more than a bomb’s worth. 

So, even under this JPOA, they are close to their first nuclear 

weapon. But what concerns me just as much is their centrifuges 

are still turning, creating more and more low-enriched uranium 

4

that is oxidized, but reversing that oxidization process is rather 

easy, low technology and quick. 

This committee has been assured by the administration that, as 

part of this deal, we would learn of the possible military dimensions, or PMDs, of the Iranian program. 

Iran has stonewalled the IAEA on that and it should be part of 

any reduction of sanctions or any continuation of the suspension of 

Kirk-Menendez that we find out and that the IAEA is given answers to its questions. 

On the other hand, the JPOA has pretty much frozen the Arak 

plutonium reactor and that is one of its positive elements. In looking at a final agreement, a lot of focus is on how long the agreement will last, what enrichment will be allowed and how that enrichment will be monitored. 

We need to look just as much at how much uranium and in what 

enrichment levels Iran is able to stockpile and what tracing of ore 

and monitoring of ore and yellow cake is there so that we can make 

sure that the total grams of enriched uranium both in terms of 

quantity and enrichment level is consistent with the allegedly 

peaceful nature of Iran’s program. 

Finally, I am going to be asking our witnesses to help us identify 

how we can draft strong sanctions legislation that will go into effect in a few months unless Congress receives and approves a good 

deal negotiated with Iran. 

As I said, these sanctions would have to be regime threatening. 

They would have to go beyond where we were before these negotiations began, and I look forward to working with all of the members 

of this subcommittee and our witnesses to make sure that we are 

ready with sanctions that will go into effect early next year unless 

Iran enters into a good deal with the United States. 

I say that not to make our negotiators’ position more difficult but 

because only with such strong sanctions legislation is there any 

hope that they will be successful. I yield back. 

Mr. POE. The Chair will recognize other members for their 1-

minute opening statements. The Chair recognizes the gentleman 

from South Carolina, Mr. Wilson, for a minute. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I thank 

you for your leadership, and Ranking Member Sherman. It is really 

reassuring to see Members of Congress working together facing a 

common threat. This is so unusual. 

I am just so pleased to see you working together and all of us 

working together, hopefully, on this subcommittee. I agree very 

much with the senior senator of South Carolina, Lindsey Graham, 

who, this weekend, pointed out that the administration needs to 

understand that this Iranian regime cares more about trying to 

weaken America and push us out of the Middle East than cooperating with us. 

Until we recognize that reality and formulate a regional strategy 

to counter the Iranian regime’s malign influence, we will continue 

to harm U.S. national security interest. Additionally, I support 

holding the President accountable by requiring congressional approval of any deal that is reached with Iran, and I want to conclude 

by agreeing with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu who indicated, ‘‘Iran is not your ally.’’

5

As the Prime Minister said on Face the Nation, ‘‘Iran is not your 

friend. Iran is your enemy. It is not your partner. Iran is committed to the destruction of Israel.’’

Facing this, again, I want to thank the leadership who are here 

today and in a bipartisan manner to protect the people of the Middle East and the United States. Thank you. 

Mr. POE. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. 

Kinzinger, for 1 minute. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think it is important to remind everybody here that during the time of the Iraq war 

it is estimated that upwards of half of the Americans that were 

killed were killed either directly or indirectly by Iranian EFPs—explosive foreign penetrators—Iranian direct military action and 

things along that line. 

So yeah, you are right, Mr. Wilson. They are not our friend. I 

think the message to Iran is simple—just stop or pay a price, and 

I think we had them at that position a year ago, and for some reason we saw an administration collapse in a desperate desire to 

enter a deal. 

We knew that, of course, the first 6 months wouldn’t happen so 

we extended another 6 months and I believe that in a week they 

are going to come in front of Congress and say, we need an additional 6 months, which I think would be the wrong message. 

So the question here is, with the collapse of U.S. foreign policy 

in the last couple years, what leverage do we have and I think it 

is important for us, and I appreciate the chairman calling this 

hearing, to stand together and say that we will not allow a bad 

deal with Iran. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentleman. The Chair will yield 1 minute 

to Mr. Perry from Pennsylvania. 

Mr. PERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have, like many of us, 

numerous concerns regarding the Joint Plan of Action and the continued negotiations as being a viable avenue for preventing—I just 

stress preventing—Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon, which is 

and should be the primary objective of our policy and our actions. 

However, a great concern that seems to be sometimes getting lost 

in the more technical debate is the potential for a nuclear agreement to recognize Iran’s right to enrich, and I take great exception 

with this. 

It sets a unacceptable precedent, in my mind. Other signatory 

states to the Non-proliferation Treaty—the NPT—may then choose 

to enrich themselves after they observe Iran being allowed to continue to enrich despite breaking its NPT commitments. 

A nuclear arms race is absolutely the last thing we need in this 

region of the world, and I yield back. 

Mr. POE. The gentleman yields back his time. 

The Chair will recognize the other gentleman from Illinois, Mr. 

Schneider, for his opening statement. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to thank 

the witnesses for joining us today on a most crucial issue as we sit 

less than 1 week from the deadline for negotiations under the Joint 

Plan of Action. 

6

The prospect of a nuclear Iran—I believe is the single greatest 

threat to the region, to the world, and it is imperative that we find 

a way to prevent that. 

If there is to be a deal it must absolutely ensure that any and 

all paths for Iran to get a nuclear weapon are blocked and, ultimately, permanently closed. 

What I am looking forward to hearing from you all in the time 

we have together today is your sense of the potential for a deal, 

whether it is in the next week or shortly thereafter, what are the 

consequences and concerns if there is to be a delay further than on 

November 24th, as the current deadline is, and, on the assumption 

that there is not a deal to be had, what would be the next steps 

you would want to see from this Congress. 

And with that, I yield back. Thank you. 

Mr. POE. Do any other members wish to make an opening statement? Seeing no show of hands, the witnesses will be introduced 

and then they will have their time for opening statements and then 

proceed to questions. 

Dr. Ray Takeyh is a senior fellow for Middle East studies at the 

Council of Foreign Relations and an adjunct professor at Georgetown University. Dr. Takeyh was previously a senior advisor on 

Iran at the Department of State and is widely published. 

Our next witness, Mr. Matthew McInnis, is a resident fellow at 

the American Enterprise Institute, focusing on Iran. Previously, 

Mr. McInnis worked on Middle East and counterproliferation issues 

during his long tenure at the Defense Intelligence Agency. 

And Mr. David Albright is the founder and president of the Institute for Science and International Security. Mr. Albright holds 

Masters degrees in both physics and mathematics. 

Our first witness, Dr. Takeyh, we will start with you. You have 

5 minutes. Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF RAY TAKEYH, PH.D., SENIOR FELLOW FOR 

MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

Mr. TAKEYH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for inviting me here. I 

will be brief and it is always good to be with 

Mr. POE. If your mike is working. 

Mr. TAKEYH. Oh, sorry. Better? 

Mr. POE. A little better. 

Mr. TAKEYH. I think it is fair to say—I am sure there will be 

agreement on this issue, perhaps even a unanimous one—that the 

Islamic Republic has not been responsible stakeholders in international affairs. 

I don’t think I am being too provocative with that. Yet, I think 

Iran over the years has had some success in conditioning the narrative of the nuclear negotiations. 

The Iranian regime has obtained an acknowledgment of its right 

to enrich. That is not necessarily a right in principle but acknowledgment in practice, which is a distinction of a rather limited nature. 

It has also persistently suggested that all U.N. Security Council 

resolutions are politically contrived and have neither authority nor 

legitimacy, and there may be indication that the P5+1 countries—

7

the five members of the Security Council and Germany—that are 

negotiating on this issue may actually not adhere to certain aspects 

of the U.N. Security Council resolution themselves, particularly the 

provision demanding suspension, and it is probably unlikely that a 

final agreement will have a suspension component and that brings 

into question, of course, the legitimacy of international law in this 

particular respect. 

Iran has continued to insist that its existing enrichment capacity 

has to be respected and it has also maintained that any inspection 

modality has to be limited to the existing NPT measures which, 

perhaps, fall short of some of the expectations that we have. 

Another aspect of the Iranian diplomacy over the past year that 

has been successful has been President Rouhani’s notion that he 

has inculcated rather effectively that he is under hard pressure 

from hardliners at home and the implication of that being that if 

the Western powers want a deal they should essentially deal with 

him and make the necessary concessions to obtain that deal. 

I don’t think that is true. I think a more careful examination reveals that the Islamic Republic has actually reached an internal 

consensus. Today, I think the Islamic Republic is ruled by a unity 

government and some of the factionals in that has historically bedeviled the theocracy has at least for now been set aside. 

For the first time in the three decades of the existence of the Islamic Republic it is not troubled by divisions and dissension that 

have plagued previous governments. So I am not quite sure if 

President Rouhani is under the type of pressure that he speaks 

about. 

However, I think going into these negotiations there are many 

advantages that the Western powers have, particularly the United 

States, and one of those advantages are raised expectations. There 

has been a lot of raised expectations. 

Both parties—United States and Iran—have unwisely at times 

raised expectations about a possible deal and fed a media narrative 

of a potential historical breakthrough between the two old nemesis. 

Suddenly, the hard-pressed Iranian public has come to expect imminent financial relief should the negotiations not yield an agreement. Then Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, not President Obama, 

would have a popular backlash at his hand. A disenfranchised dispossessed population is an explosive political problem for the Iranian leadership. 

Therefore, I think the Western powers should not be afraid to 

suspend negotiations or walk away from the table should Iran 

prove intransigence. Ironically, a stalemate in negotiations are likely to pressure Iran into offering more concessions rather than the 

United States. 

I want to highlight briefly that what we are dealing with here 

is not necessarily just nuclear infractions but also the Islamic Republic’s regional policies. The Islamic Republic remains a revisionist state that has done much to imperil American interests in 

the Middle East, as was just mentioned. 

It has been recently fashionable to suggest that the two parties 

have an interest in the rise of ISIL and that could essentially offer 

a pathway for cooperation. On the surface, this may seem sensible. 

8

Both parties do have an interest in defanging the militant Sunni 

group. 

However, the essential axiom of Middle East politics has always 

been that the enemy of my enemy is still my enemy. The ebbs and 

flows of war on terrorism should not be allowed to conceal the fact 

that the Iranian regime and its attempt to upend the regional 

order remains the United States’ most consequential long-term 

challenge. 

The Islamic Republic is not a normal nation state seeking to realize its legitimate aspirations within the existing international 

system. It is a country whose leadership tends to put premium on 

conspiracies to explain its predicament, and as was mentioned it 

has been a staple of Ali Khamenei’s speeches that United States 

is a declining power whose domestic sources of strength are fast 

eroding. 

Finally, the United States and Iran tend to see the region from 

opposite ends. The Islamic Republic’s ideological compulsions and 

sheer opportunism makes it an unlikely ally for the West. 

The coincidence of mutual interest in opposition to a radical 

Sunni group should not blind us to the enduring threat that the 

Iranian regime represents to its population and to the region at 

large. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Takeyh follows:]

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Mr. POE. Perfect timing. The Chair recognizes Mr. McInnis for 

5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF MR. J. MATTHEW MCINNIS, RESIDENT 

FELLOW, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE 

Mr. MCINNIS. Thank you, Chairman Poe, Ranking Member Sherman and distinguished members of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. 

Thank you for inviting me here to testify on the current ongoing 

Iran nuclear negotiations. As has already been noted, prospects for 

an actual agreement on the 24th of November are dim but I do not 

underestimate the desire on both sides to get a deal. 

We may yet see a breakthrough but I think it is doubtful. While 

I strongly support finding a diplomatic solution to the impasse with 

Iran, I also share your concern that this eagerness on our part may 

cause us to settle for a deal that has not sufficiently addressed the 

challenge of their program. 

I fear since the beginning we have not fully understood what was 

driving Iran to the table and underestimated our leverage once 

they got there. It is a recipe for a very frustrating diplomacy. 

So what is Iran’s calculus here? Most importantly, we should remember there has been no sign—and I think this has been noted 

here before—no sign of real change in their nuclear policy. 

They still want to man a robust Iranian enrichment program 

that is far beyond what is needed for civilian purposes. They have 

shown no willingness to come clean on the possible military dimensions of their nuclear research. 

If Iran had had a true change of heart we could have resolved 

all the outstanding concerns a long time ago. Iran would have flung 

open the doors of Parchin military complex to IAEA inspectors. 

That is not the case here. This is not South Africa. This is not 

Libya. The new diplomatic approach adopted by the supreme leader 

and President Rouhani is notable but at its heart it is a tactical 

move. 

They may accept some limits on the output of the program but 

no actual reversal of technological achievements and capabilities 

will be allowed. This is why we keep stumbling over their red lines, 

refusing to dismantle any part of their nuclear infrastructure. 

However, the supreme leader and President Rouhani and the 

rest of the Iranian leadership have decided they need to get out 

from underneath the sanctions and I agree with my colleague, Dr. 

Takeyh here, on his assessment of the internal dynamics inside the 

regime right now. 

The short and long term economic challenges are just too great 

for them. They need this deal now and, frankly, they need it more 

than we do and we don’t take advantage of that. 

So what are the basics of an acceptable deal? They are quite simple and I think we have discussed them already in the opening 

statements—a reasonably verifiable regime administered by the 

IAEA that ensures Iran cannot pursue a nuclear weapon with a 

clear mechanism to reimpose sanctions for noncompliance. 

My colleague, David Albright, will certainly go into much more 

of the technical discussions about things that we need to address. 

15

But first I want to highlight a couple of things I am concerned 

about. 

First, we need to be aware of the trap of centrifuge numbers. As 

the efficiency of Iran’s centrifuges improve, actual quantities of the 

machines will matter less. We need to have the right metrics for 

any type of deal on that topic. 

Second, for me, the heart of the matter, really, is bringing Iran 

into compliance with the IAEA on the possible military dimensions. 

There should be no relief in the most critical sanctions without resolving this issue satisfactorily. 

Third, given the long history of Iran’s nuclear activity being exposed rather than willingly acknowledged, the need for a rigorous 

verification regime goes without saying. There is not trust here, 

just verify. 

Since there was a real risk of additional covert enrichment or 

weapons development activity, the ban of critical technologies, especially for missiles, needs to be maintained to the greatest degree 

possible. 

Fourth, we need to be very careful about how sanctions are unravelled. Many sanctions are related to Iran’s nuclear program 

even if they are also tied to the regime’s support for terrorism and 

human rights violations. 

The reverse is also true. Unthoughtful relaxation of financial 

sanctions, for example, could prove a great boon to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp’s activities across the region. 

And that brings me to my final point and, again, agreeing with 

my colleague, Dr. Takeyh, we should not be looking to use the nuke 

negotiations as a stepping stone, as a confidence-building measure 

toward greater cooperation with Iran, unless we see real changes 

in their behaviors, which I do not expect under this supreme leader. 

Tehran is still trying to overhaul the political system in the region through subversive and violent means. It is still supporting 

and building proxy forces beholden to Iran, designed to threaten 

the U.S. and our allies and ensure the capacity to execute terrorism missions worldwide. 

This includes groups like Lebanese Hezbollah, Palestinian Islamic jihad, Hamas and, most recently, the Houthis on the march 

in Yemen. Our end states for Syria and Iraq are different. We may 

have some form of deconfliction with Quds Force Commander 

Qasem Soleimani against ISIS on the ground in Iraq. We may even 

have some form of detente. But this is not rapprochement. Until we 

see actual shifts in the policy from the supreme leader, our negotiations, our sanctions strategies and our regional policies need to be 

very sober. 

We should recognize at best we are checking the regime’s worst 

behavior while we wait for real change in Tehran. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. McInnis follows:]

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Mr. POE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Albright for 5 minutes his 

opening statement. 

STATEMENT OF MR. DAVID ALBRIGHT, PRESIDENT, 

INSTITUTE FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Thank you, Chairman Poe and Ranking Member 

Sherman, for the opportunity to testify today. 

I would like to just go through several points, really, headlines 

of what I see is important to consider today in this deal. 

First, I think a long-term deal, if carefully crafted, can keep Iran 

from building nuclear weapons. But getting that deal is a major 

challenge, particularly by November 24th. If not achieved, the interim deal will need to be extended, and that brings me to my second point. 

The interim deal has accomplished many worthwhile goals, as 

Mr. Sherman has pointed out, but it appears to be fraying at the 

edges and needs to be strengthened if it is to continue being effective. We work on the technical side of this and we noticed in the 

last International Atomic Energy Agency report that some of the 

expectations of the interim deal have not been met. One is that 

Iran started to enrich for the first time in an advanced centrifuge 

called the IR–5. 

I know we relayed those concerns to the administration pretty 

early on Friday and the administration got a commitment by Iran 

that weekend that it would stop. Whether it will continue to stop, 

we don’t know. Iran continues to or still needs to oxidize at least 

500 kilograms of newly produced 3.5 percent LEU that they produced, and this was produced since the July extension. 

Also, Iran had said it would convert 25 kilograms of the near 20 

percent LU oxide into fuel assemblies. From the IAEA data, only 

5 kilograms have actually been turned into fuel assemblies and I 

think we don’t view these as violations of the deal since they still 

have until November 24th. But to us and ISIS it represents a fraying of the deal and so—even if it is extended—these things need 

to be addressed. 

The third issue I want to discuss, and I won’t spend much time 

on it because I think we are all in agreement, is that, there has 

been little progress on getting Iran to address the IAEA conditions 

and I will just say that there needs to be at least concrete progress 

on that issue before a deal is signed. 

Obviously, Iran can’t address all the IAEA’s issues prior to November 24th and, in fact, the IAEA director general has said Iran 

isn’t even trying. 

But the negotiators should only sign a deal if Iran has made 

some concrete progress and that can be anything from allowing visits to the military sites such as Parchin to some kind of international recognition that Iran had a nuclear weapons program and 

then others can think of other things. 

Later on, Iran is going to have to address the IAEA issues and 

some sanctions are going to have to be tied to that. I don’t know 

what the U.S. is thinking on that but I would hope that there are 

very significant sanctions tied to actually addressing those issues. 

Another issue that we have worked on extensively in the last 

several months has been the sanctions on what we call proliferaVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:45 Jan 07, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_TNT\111814\91453 SHIRL
22

tion sensitive goods. They have got to stay in place during the 

length of the agreement or through at least most of it until Iran 

has demonstrated that it is in full compliance and things are going 

well. And in particular, U.N. Security Council sanctions on such 

goods need to remain in place. 

Iran is not expected to stop seeking proliferation-sensitive goods 

abroad for its missile and other military programs. It may seek 

goods abroad for its clandestine nuclear activities and facilities. 

It is certainly doing so today. Iran’s regime is well known to European authorities, including the Germans, for constantly trying to 

break their laws. In 2012 and 2013, more than two-thirds of their 

264 investigations in Germany were involving the Islamic Republic. 

And Germany expects the proportion to remain the same this year. 

So Iran is a habitual sanctions violator and that is not expected to 

change. 

Now, if the sanctions legislation or sanctions continue through 

the U.N. Security Council resolutions there will be a need to provide goods to authorized nuclear programs, whatever level of those 

programs that remain, and the precedent for that is the exemption 

created for the Bushehr reactor and that exemption can be applied 

to an authorized nuclear programs. 

The difference between the Bushehr exception and any newly authorized exports would be that that channel or procurement channel is going to have to be monitored extremely carefully and involve the U.N. panel of experts, the International Atomic Energy 

Agency and supplier states. 

The fifth point I want to address is that I think we have all 

agreed that Iran should have a limited number of centrifuges. My 

group probably has one of the high numbers. We would accept up 

to 4,000 IR–1s and view that level can be verified. 

Now, the important way to strengthen that goal is also to reduce 

the stocks of low-enriched uranium and there has been discussion 

in the media about how the administration plans to remove large 

amounts of the stocks from Iran. I think that is a workable proposition but it should not substitute for the reduction in numbers of 

centrifuges—it should strengthen that goal but it should not substitute for the goal of achieving low numbers of centrifuges. 

And I just want to close by mentioning that Congressman Sherman mentioned uranium ore. That often does not receive the attention it needs. 

The administration has told me in the past that they are seeking 

limitations on uranium ore but we will see if that happens. But it 

requires not only knowing how much they made it total, but also 

knowing how much they are making every year, how much they 

have stockpiled, their past illicit efforts to acquire uranium internationally and then to cap that uranium in a way that Iran would 

not have more uranium on hand inside the country than it 

needs——

Mr. POE. Conclude your remarks, please. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT [continuing]. It needs to meet its actual needs. 

Thank you. Sorry. 

Mr. POE. Thank you. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Sorry for going over. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Albright follows:]

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Mr. POE. Thank you, gentlemen. The Chair will begin with its 

questions—5 minutes of questions. 

Are the Iranians working on a delivery system for nuclear weapons—intercontinental ballistic missiles? 

Mr. MCINNIS. I would say that the pursuit of an ICBM has been 

something that the Iranian regime has been going after for some 

time. I think the U.S. intelligence community has been watching 

that fairly closely. 

So, obviously, they portray it as usually tied to their space program or other types of activities but 

Mr. POE. The Iranians have a space program? 

Mr. MCINNIS. They have been able to put some stuff up there. 

Mr. POE. I understand. But the intercontinental ballistic missile 

pursuit that is not a part of the negotiations and this discussion, 

as far as I know. Is that correct? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Yes. No, the missiles are not. That is one of the 

reasons why you want to keep the U.N. Security Council sanctions 

in place because one would expect them to go out and acquire or 

seek goods illicitly. 

Now, the reentry vehicle that would hold a nuclear weapon and 

the warhead itself are certainly part of this and a lot of the IAEA’s 

concerns are exactly on those two issues. In 2003, their information 

is that they were developing a reentry vehicle and developing a 

warhead that was about .55 meters across that could fit inside that 

reentry vehicle. So that part of it is very much part of this issue. 

Mr. POE. Are the Iranians delaying and cheating at the same 

time, in your opinion? Delaying implementation of another deal but 

also pursuing violations of previous agreements. What is your opinion on that? 

Mr. MCINNIS. I mean, would you characterize the IR–5 issue that 

has come up as a——

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Yes, we asked the question if the IR–5 or feeding 

the IR–5 was a violation. I mean, we think it shouldn’t have happened. I mean, we are not lawyers so I would go as far as saying 

we think it shouldn’t have happened. 

Now, the issue of violation. Right now the IAEA says that Iran’s 

declared program is in compliance with its obligations under the 

nonproliferation treaty. 

They cannot say if there are undeclared nuclear activities or facilities that Iran may be pursuing. They don’t have the mechanisms and the tools to do that. So we just don’t know. 

On the PMD, the IAEA continues to say that some of the activities, and they would talk about nuclear weapons-related activities, 

may have continued and I don’t know if that would be a violation 

but it would certainly be troubling if that was the case. 

Mr. TAKEYH. I just——

Mr. POE. Sure. 

Mr. TAKEYH. I think there are six U.N. resolutions—Security 

Council resolutions—including 1929 that was negotiated in May 

2010 that have enjoined Iran to suspend all its enrichment and reprocessing activities. 

And so the continuation of those activities stand in violation of 

that. So in a sense, the entirety of the Iranian program that continues to operate is an illicit one. 

43

Mr. POE. Mr. McInnis, do you want to weigh in that? 

Mr. MCINNIS. No. I certainly don’t disagree with Dr. Takeyh’s assessment on that. 

Mr. POE. You do disagree or do not? 

Mr. MCINNIS. No, I definitely do not disagree with it. What I 

would add is, certainly, given the history of Iran’s nuclear program, 

in my own personal opinion, I would be very, very surprised if 

there is not some type of clandestine and other types of activities 

ongoing that we, obviously, don’t know about or it is going to be 

a while before we find out. 

So that is, again, there is nothing in their history to change that 

assessment. 

Mr. POE. Has the supreme leader’s statements, philosophy about 

demanding the destruction of Israel and then the destruction of the 

United States, has that changed his political statements? 

Mr. TAKEYH. No. Actually, he has remained rather persistent in 

his notion and kind of fantastic claims that he attributes to the 

United States such as, for instance, that the United States deployed atomic weapons in Japan to test them out against—to see 

how it would work on human beings. I mean, he makes—those 

statements continue unabated. So he is not providing his nuclear 

negotiators with sufficient public relations concessions. 

Mr. POE. And I agree with you. He has not changed their philosophy about destruction of Israel and the United States and we 

ought to deal with them with that understanding. 

The Chair will yield 5 minutes to the ranking member, Mr. Sherman from California, for his opening or his questions. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. We ought to be trying to prevent them 

from developing missiles but let us remember you can smuggle a 

nuclear weapon. It is about the size of a person. 

If Iran were to smuggle one into an American city and then let 

us know they had it somewhere there, that would put them in a 

position to blackmail us. Or if they decided to use a nuclear weapon against the United States they could do so with plausible 

deniability and I don’t know how you would have retaliation in the 

absence of being sure that you knew where the weapon came from. 

Among all the things we are doing for Iran or at least in ways 

that benefit them our Sunni allies and human rights groups have 

asked us for a no-fly zone. That might very well lead to the departure of Assad, but we have not done so, just one of the many 

forbearances that Iran benefits from. I don’t want to get partisan 

here but I noticed one of my colleagues talking about the collapse 

of our foreign policy under this administration. That implies that 

there was a foreign policy against Iran with the prior administration. I will simply say that most of you think this is genuine male 

pattern baldness. 

It is actually what happens to a Member of Congress who spends 

8 years pounding my head into a very effective and successful Bush 

administration that was successful in not enforcing a single one of 

our sanctions and not allowing Congress to pass a single significant 

statutory sanction in 8 years. 

The question is what is to be done. We are going to need additional sanctions on Iran unless we get a good agreement and we 

44

are not going to get a good agreement if we don’t have the prospect 

of much tougher sanctions, regime-threatening sanctions. 

I have got two ideas I want to preview with our panel but, more 

importantly, I want to get your ideas because our negotiators will 

not be successful unless Iran is convinced that their economy will 

be crippled in 2015 by actions taken in the United States Congress 

should they fail to reach a deal with the United States. 

One of those ideas is to take all the way down to zero in a 3-

month period the amount of oil that we allow countries to buy and 

still be able to transact business with the New York Fed and dollar 

U-turn transactions. 

We listened to our allies who said, don’t eliminate all of our access to Iranian oil—there might be an oil shortage and what will 

that do to our economy. 

The world is currently swimming in oil. Some of my colleagues 

are concerned that oil is selling too low and that that is having an 

averse effect. I don’t join them in that pain. 

But, certainly, our allies can deal with $75 a barrel oil. Second, 

we could provide that—so as to cut Iran off from all the major 

Western and Japanese multinational corporations that if any corporation—has any contract with the United States Government 

that it must certify that all of its parent and subsidiary and brother-sister corporations are adhering to U.S. sanctions against Iran, 

which I describe as the not one paper clip rule, so that we would 

put Iran in a position where it could not do business with any of 

the world’s major multinational groups or corporations. 

I would like our—I will start with you, Doctor, both to comment 

on those but to give me some other ideas. What would cause at 

least a little bit of fear in Qom right now? 

Mr. TAKEYH. The Iranian Central Bank has suggested, for what 

it is worth and it is usually not worth very much, that what they 

need for their budgetary allocations about oil to be about $70. 

So any kind of reduction——

Mr. SHERMAN. Oh, clearly, the best sanctions didn’t come from 

our committee. The best sanctions came from lowering the price of 

oil from $140 down to below $75. 

Mr. TAKEYH. So anything below that, if that figure is taken into 

consideration, will likely to affect it. To have the kind of sanctions 

regarding cutting off Iran along the pace that you are suggesting, 

I think that has to be accompanied by very significant diplomacy 

with our allies and China and other countries. 

In and of itself, I think it is going to create some disquiet in 

those particular capitals and it is going to lead to a lot of complaints. I think with suitable diplomacy and a lot of work it might 

come about. 

My suggestion has always been in terms of congressional action. 

A lot of people are involved in dealing with the Iranian nuclear negotiations—5+1, U.S. and so on. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I have got to go. I have got to go on to your copanelists here. 

Mr. TAKEYH. I think you should have the parameters of what is 

an acceptable deal legislated. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Yes? 

45

Mr. MCINNIS. I would just add to Dr. Takeyh Rouhani’s economic 

reforms, which are actually part of what has been going on behind 

the scenes here, I mean, Ray is right in that they need about, you 

know, $70, $75 to be able to maintain their current budget. 

But for the kinds of structural reforms that Rouhani needs to get 

the economy moving past the really horrible management of 

Ahmadinejad for the previous 8 years, he needs more money than 

$70, $75. 

So that is one of the reasons why I think the oil is having a 

major impact on their calculus right now. Certainly, on being able 

to cut them off from finances and money to the greatest degree that 

you can do toward that is always going to be the, you know, that 

plus oil prices is the—is the right combination, from my perspective. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Yes. We don’t work on sanctions but I think what 

we see in my group is there is a need for a Plan B, as we have 

called it. Ideally, that Plan B would be run by the administration, 

if things are not going to work out. I don’t think we have reached 

that point. I don’t think we will reach it in November if there is 

an extension, that there is a need to be able to impose sanctions 

and to be able to modulate those sanctions. 

And so I think, from my own point of view, the best situation 

would be if the administration and Congress are working together 

to create a Plan B. 

Now, I understand your frustration. There isn’t exactly that kind 

of cooperation going on and so——

Mr. SHERMAN. We will get to the administration panel next and 

its presence here demonstrates how closely they are working with 

us. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Okay. And so I think it if this isn’t going to work, 

I think the planning for the additional sanctions has to be going 

on now because you also, and I would want to recommend the administration do this, you don’t want to have it happen in 1 day—

in 1 day. 

Mr. POE. Excuse me, Mr. Albright. Time has expired. Time has 

expired. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Okay. 

Mr. POE. Excuse me. The Chair will recognize the gentleman 

from South Carolina, Mr. Wilson, for 5 minutes for his questions. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Judge Poe, for your leadership in conducting this hearing. I am very grateful that in my home state of 

South Carolina we have a significant number of Iranian Americans 

who are leaders in our state in the medical community and business community. 

It is a very dynamic community that means a lot for our state, 

and I meet with so many of them who are in distress about the authoritarian regime in Tehran and how sad it is that the young people of Iran are held back because of the regime there and denied 

freedom and democracy, which can be so positive for such a great 

culture as that of Iran. 

Mr. McInnis, a very important question which is facing Congress 

is what should be the minimum requirements that Iran should 

meet before Congress agrees to lift the major sanctions that it has 

imposed? 

46

Included in the question is the future of Iranian enrichment the 

Arak heavy water reactor, answering questions about the possible 

military dimensions and past Iranian violations of the United Nations sanctions, the underground Fordow fuel enrichment plant and 

Iran’s nuclear-capable missile force? 

Mr. MCINNIS. I mean, the short answer should be all of those 

but, certainly, if we are going to be looking at lifting the sanctions 

and, again, I want to emphasize and from my comments and my 

submitted testimony that, you know, we have to be careful about 

what is tied in with human rights violations and counterterrorism 

sanctions in with the nuclear sanctions. 

Not that they were necessarily all tied together to begin with, 

but some of these same mechanisms that we use, you know, so far 

as financial sanctions have a compounding effect on the situation. 

For me, I mean, it is coming clean on the PMD and being able 

to cap the ability for their enrichment to a breakout level. We 

talked about the breakout idea. Six to 12 months, for me, is a minimum—that we have to have that type of warning to be able to do 

something and we need to be—do whatever we can to prevent 

whatever clandestine or covert activities are happening right now. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much, and Dr. Takeyh, how do we 

trust a regime that has doubled executions of its own people, called 

explicitly, as you have indicated, for the destruction of another 

U.N. member, being the state of Israel, labels the United States 

the Great Satan, exports terrorism as a matter of state policy and 

has trained and supplied terrorists, including the IEDs that we 

faced in Iraq which have killed U.S. soldiers? 

And how can we trust them to abide by any agreement? 

Mr. TAKEYH. I think it would be very difficult and I suspect in 

any agreement as even in JPOA there will be occasions and indications of violations. There are two things I will say. 

Any agreement negotiated with Iran, as I think Dave has suggested, has to have clarification of previous military activities. I 

don’t know if you can actually verify a current agreement without 

knowing the clandestine history of the program. 

Second of all, I will say U.N. Security Council resolutions should 

be suspended in the event of a deal and not discarded because then 

you have a mechanism that can come online should there be indication of Iranian violation. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much. And, Mr. McInnis, out of 

what has been leaked and/or disclosed about a potential final deal, 

what most concerns you? 

Mr. MCINNIS. For me, it is that we are not going to be able to 

resolve the PMD issues and that, frankly, that we are not going to 

be able to really have an effective metric and mechanism to monitor the enrichment capacities. 

So those and, certainly, the other sidebar issue of whether this 

is going to lead into other efforts we may do with them regarding 

ISIS, and other things that I fear very much where the path that 

we are going down, we are being a little naive about that. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much and I yield the balance of my 

time. 

Mr. POE. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California, 

Mr. Lowenthal, for 5 minutes. 

47

Mr. LOWENTHAL. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I am just trying to understand kind of where we are now and where we go to follow up, 

I guess, on some of the questions raised by Congressman Sherman. 

As I understand, we are not going to have an agreement. We will 

probably be talking about an extension after the 24th of November. 

I am also hearing that both Iran, for different reasons, and the 

United States it would be beneficial to both to have some kind of 

agreement for different reasons and that—and I am wondering, 

and I thought I heard also that a stalemate in these negotiations 

will benefit the United States more than Iran. 

Is that true or not, and why is that so and how long does that 

mean, given the existing conditions that we have? 

Mr. TAKEYH. In terms of extension of an agreement, November 

24th is a sort of a self-declared deadline. They actually—according 

to the terms of JPOA, they have until January so that date is in 

many ways a self-imposed deadline. 

I think the Iranian regime, given its predicament, probably requires an agreement more than 5+1 do simply because they arouse 

expectations of the population that they are going to get financial 

relief and somehow their economic fortunes are going to turn, and 

you really cannot have a normal economy in Iran in absence of a 

nuclear agreement because so much of its economic activities are 

retarded by international sanctions, banking regulations and so on. 

So we do have that leverage going forward that the Iranian regime is in a worse position than we are. 

Mr. LOWENTHAL. Do you all agree with that? 

Mr. MCINNIS. I, certainly, would agree with that and I pointed 

out in my initial comments that we are in a situation where we 

have underestimated, in my opinion, our leverage. And, as was also 

pointed out by the chair and the ranking member, we are actually 

in a situation of bringing them to the table but in many ways the 

effects of these sanctions were not really allowed to settle. 

I mean, we could have gone much further by keeping up these 

sanctions at their current pace because the impact that was happening on their reduction in GDP, their inflation issues, those are 

very serious and, again, as I pointed out before, it wasn’t just their 

current economy. 

They have very long-term problems that in some ways have nothing to do with the sanctions. But they can’t solve those problems 

without having major infusions of cash and better access to the 

international markets. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Yes. I guess on a technical level and then on a 

sanctions level I am not sure I agree. I mean, I think in the short 

run I think we have a tremendous advantage. 

But they continue to operate centrifuges. They are learning to 

operate them better. They are working on more advanced centrifuges in places that are outside the purview of the International 

Atomic Energy Agency. 

The way they have structured their centrifuge R & D program 

the IAEA does not know how well they are working even at the 

places where they are monitoring. 

And so I think they are going to make progress and that is worrisome in the long run. The other is that, again, I am not a sanctions 

48

expert but I can look and see in the news from places like Germany 

the exports to Iran are increasing. 

You know, there are things happening. It is just, you know, people are getting used to it. They are being more relaxed about it. I 

mean, we continue at ISIS to see Iran actively going out to buy 

things illegally for its nuclear program. 

We see in the last couple years that they have actually become 

more sophisticated at hiding, particularly, the connection between 

the nuclear program in Iran and the trading companies that go out 

and get these things and that is important because you can’t chase 

everything. 

So if you had information linking the effort to the nuclear program then you would apply more resources. So I think that in the 

long run I am not so sure, I think, that this plays best for us. 

Mr. LOWENTHAL. Thank you, and I yield back. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentleman. The Chair recognizes Mr. 

Kinzinger from Illinois for 5 minutes and his questions. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Close. Close. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you all for being here. I will say to the ranking 

member and, with a bit of a smile, I get your point about the collapse of foreign policy. 

I wasn’t speaking of just Iran. I was more thinking of the rest 

of the world and everywhere else. So but let me just say thank you 

all for being here. 

As I mentioned in my opening statement, with Iraq specifically, 

again, and I want to make this mention one more time, as Mr. Wilson alluded to as well, there are American soldiers that are not 

alive today because of the actions of Iran. 

I think that is something that is very important to keep in mind. 

Not just direct Iranian involvement, which existed—I know that 

first hand as a veteran of the area—but also with the supplying of 

materiel and knowledge meant to kill American soldiers, meant to 

take their lives away because of their meddling in the region, 

which they have been doing everywhere. 

We see Iran very vested in propping up Bashar al-Assad in 

Syria, investing financial resources in this, by the way. At a time 

when supposedly their economy is so bad even in the interim deal 

that they are, you know, going to do whatever the United States 

wants, they are investing in the existence of this guy who has brutally murdered 200,000 of his own people—Bashar al-Assad. 

Keep in mind, I know ISIS is a major concern. We are all united 

on that. But the existence of Assad is an anathema to humanity, 

in my mind, and the way he governs. 

I just want to ask the three of you a couple of questions. First 

off, what message do you think was sent to Iran in terms of helping 

them to come to an agreement that makes sense for us and for the 

peaceful world? 

What message was sent? You know, what we are seeing today in 

Russia, for instance? Iran doesn’t just look at the Middle East. 

They look at the United States foreign policy all over the place. The 

Iraq pullout in 2011 as well as the comments by the administration 

about this idea of a pivot away from the Middle East, which I know 

and I have heard from the administration they regret using those 

words and I understand that and I appreciate it. 

49

But they were used and that is the perception. So I ask the three 

of you if you could talk about kind of those foreign policy areas 

where, I think, there has been some difficulty and talk about what 

message that has sent to Iran in terms of motivating them to come 

to the table with a good deal for us. 

Mr. TAKEYH. On the issue of the tensions between United States 

and the Russian Federation, I think they have become more obvious and a more tangible impact on the negotiations if there is a 

breakdown of some sort of a diplomacy on the P5+1. 

I think then you can see the Russians pulling away from the 5+1 

consensus as may the Chinese as well in terms of repatriating Iranian money and so on. So the Russian angle is not obvious at this 

point but it can be. 

The region itself today is, as you mentioned, Congressman, is 

rather disorderly, to say the least, and Iran is an opportunistic 

country that is trying to take advantage in Syria, in Iraq, in Lebanon, in Yemen, and so they do seem to be engaged in a sort of 

a cold war with the Saudis that is playing us off throughout the 

region. 

And as I have mentioned, there is a persistent narrative on the 

Iranian leadership that, you know, they do have opportunities at 

this point that they have to exploit because they were not that obvious before. 

Mr. KINZINGER. But wouldn’t it—it also seems that if we had 

Iran, and I think we did a year ago, to the point where they were 

in pretty—I mean, we had our boots on their neck, basically, on 

these—or before the negotiations started. 

But if even in this interim agreement is such that, you know, 

their economy is still taking it on the chin, they have been able to 

invest a stunning amount of resources in expanding their influence 

around the Middle East. It has been amazing. 

Mr. TAKEYH. There is no question that they are apportioning 

whatever money they have in an injudicious way and the welfare 

of their population doesn’t seem to be their priority on that. That 

is true about most revolutionary states and this is one of them. 

Mr. MCINNIS. I would just add to that point that one of our major 

foreign policy failures several years ago was the underestimation of 

how far Iran would go to prop up Assad. 

I think there was a general consensus here in Washington and 

other capitals that Assad’s days were numbered, as the President 

said. That really underestimated the fact that Syria is absolutely 

essential for Iran’s foreign policy, for its ideological objectives, for 

its religious objectives, that they cannot—even if they have lots of 

problems with Assad himself, they can’t lose Syria and I think we 

have kind of lost the fact that Iran is not going to be pulling back 

from its foreign policies that it has been pursuing since the end of 

their revolution. 

And, frankly, on the money issue, yeah, the money keeps flowing 

but at the same time the amount of money it needs—that Iran 

needs to be able to kind of keep up its efforts there in the region 

is still—I mean, Iran—as much as Iran’s economy is strained, it 

still doesn’t spend tons of money on military issues. Its percentage 

of GDP on defense is, like, under 4 percent. 

50

Mr. KINZINGER. And because my time is up, I just want to wrap 

up with saying this. I think if there is an attempt by the administration to come to this body and even—or not come to the body but 

say, we need additional time, I mean, I hope and I think there 

would be bipartisan support to not give that because I can’t see 

what would happen in another 6 months that we didn’t have an opportunity to do in the first year and I, frankly, think reinstating 

the sanctions and walking away from the table and saying fine, you 

chose your own destiny, is much more powerful than saying yeah, 

I know, we didn’t have enough conversations so you need another 

6 months. I yield back. 

Mr. POE. The gentleman yields back his time. The Chair recognizes Mr. Schneider, the gentleman from Illinois. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. Takeyh, you mentioned that there are multiple—you referenced the fact that there are multiple U.N. Security Council resolutions saying that Iran has effectively zero right to enrichment. 

Yet, Mr. Albright, you talked about, potentially, 4,000 centrifuges. Could all of you touch on, I’m trying to think of the best 

way to phrase the question is why, if any, number of centrifuges 

are acceptable for a final agreement with Iran? 

Mr. TAKEYH. I think the U.N. Security Council resolutions have 

suggested that Iran has to suspend its activities and come into 

compliance and then a deal can be negotiated that may actually involve some residual enrichment. 

One of the assumptions that has guided the United States across 

two administrations has been that, if you settle for limited number 

of centrifuges and limited enrichment, then Iranian pride would be 

satisfied and therefore they would settle for that permanent symbolic program. 

What the Iranians have said persistently, publicly and privately, 

is that they are seeking an industrial-size program. So whatever 

enrichment capacity they have, they do envision that capacity to be 

industrialized, and I would just say that the comprehensive deal 

that is being negotiated today in of itself is also an interim deal 

of duration. 

It will have a sunset clause at some point. Maybe that sunset 

clause is 15 years, maybe it is 10 years, and there is some discrepancy about that. But subsequent to that, Iran is under no legal 

stricture to expand its program. 

It can, therefore, have an industrial enrichment capability that 

is legal, sanctioned and without any hazards of economic penalties. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Mr. McInnis? 

Mr. MCINNIS. Actually, I yield to Mr. Albright. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Yes. If you think of it in terms of breakout time, 

which is what drove us to this number and it is a combination of 

centrifuges and stocks——

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Yes, I have turned in your submitted testimony 

to the charts. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Okay. Oh, okay. But if they had no centrifuges at 

all we would estimate their breakout time is 2 years. So, they know 

how to do it. They can make them and so you can’t eliminate that 

and so then the question is how many can you accept under some 

51

kind of criteria like breakout and verifiability and we ended up 

that we could live with 4,000. 

Now, in terms of their right, I think we’re paying a very heavy 

price. I mean, I am not a lawyer. I understand—I have seen Senator Kerry say they have no right to enrich—it is not in the treaty. 

But for us, it is a tough compromise to accept because we work 

just as much on North Korea, in theory at least, as Iran. This is 

a special time, and that pivot to Asia, while it may be opposed by 

those working on the Middle East, those working on North Korea 

see a desperate need for more U.S. attention to stop North Korea’s 

nuclear weapons advancements. 

And so, now I know it probably will be impossible to argue that 

North Korea give up its centrifuge program because of what is happening in Iran. 

So I think that it is where compromises are being made. We are 

accepting them at my organization but they are very problematic 

and they are going to cause problems and that means that, in any 

deal that is gained, Iran has to be made to pay a very heavy price 

for it and there does need to be some kind of condition at the end 

so that the program is under special arrangements that keep it and 

other countries from being able to claim that they can just go 

ahead and build as many centrifuges as they want. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. And—I am sorry. Go ahead, Mr. McInnis. 

Mr. MCINNIS. I would just add one quick comment on that. One 

of the things I think we underestimated in why Iran came to the 

table last year is because, as Mr. Albright was saying, they have 

actually achieved a certain technological capability that is almost 

impossible to walk backwards from and so that is something that, 

you know, once they had—which they were not at, say, 6, 7 years 

ago when there was much more at risk for them. 

So I think they are at a confidence level that allows them to 

come to the table because there is only so much we can do to them. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you. Mr. Albright, to build on your comment, at zero centrifuges because of their know-how they are 2 

years away from a breakout. 

At the current 19,000, approximately, IR–1 centrifuges if they 

were to operate all of those you estimated a year ago that the 

JPOA moved it back from, if I remember correctly, 1.3 to 1.6 

months? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Yes, there is a difference now for us. It was from 

2 months to 3 months, that was the walk back, still well within 20 

percent. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. But still well within a year. My question is what 

is an acceptable time frame moving them back from that 3 months 

to somewhere between 3 months and 2 years that the international 

community should be expected to live with if there is a number? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. The U.S. position is 1 year. That translates into, 

at least in our calculations, about 2,000 IR–1s staying in place with 

certain amounts of low-enriched uranium. 

So we think 6 months and, again, it is 6 months to the point 

where they have enough weapon-grade uranium for a bomb and we 

think that is—that is acceptable. 

52

The administration told us many times that they want a year. 

They see ours as too short and, you know, if they can get a year 

I am all for it. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Just because of limited time I am going to take 

back and turn now to the Iraq heavy water reactor. Is there——

Mr. POE. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I am out of time. 

Mr. POE. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania, 

Mr. Perry, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. PERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen. It 

seems to me that any negotiation deal is predicated on trust and 

whether it is regarding Iran’s nuclear program or buying a car that 

is the minimum requirement. 

So with that in mind, as far as I am aware, last month the IAEA 

reported that Iran did not provide information about work it had 

completed on high explosives for a nuclear bomb and other possible 

military dimensions of its nuclear program, even though it promised to do so back in November 2011. 

So we’re 3 years in. Can anybody explain what this means? I 

mean, to me it is somewhat obvious but maybe I am missing something. 

Sometimes things are counterintuitive. So is there something I 

am—you know, if I am trying to build a nuclear weapon I imagine 

I want a triggering device and so on and so forth and I don’t want 

to tell anybody if everybody is mad about me doing it. 

So this seems axiomatic to me. Are we foolish Americans missing 

something? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. No, I don’t think so. No, I think it is one of the 

reasons why I don’t think there should be a deal until Iran has 

demonstrated some concrete progress on addressing the inspectors’ 

issues and that dealing with the high explosives was one of the test 

cases. 

They promised to do it I forget when. Was it back in May, I 

think? And they didn’t and then they told the IAEA, in my mind 

making it even worse, that we don’t even want to have another 

meeting until after November 24th. 

So I think it is a very troubling development and I think what 

Iran is trying to do is seeing if they can get away with it. There 

are also many people who are saying the past doesn’t matter and 

that why do we bother with this. 

So I think it is very important that Congress have a very strong 

voice in saying that it does matter and I know all my experience 

in inspections and working on verification is the past does matter 

and the warning for that should be what happened in Iraq in 1991 

when the IAEA and others did not worry about the past and only 

focused on the present and the future. It turned out they had a 

very large nuclear weapons program that had been missed by the 

inspectors. 

So I think the IAEA learned from that and they want to know 

the past. 

Mr. PERRY. Well, why wouldn’t the past matter in this context? 

I mean, what other measure of trust would you have? If you just 

met somebody—Country A met Country B for the first time—you 

53

establish a certain level—a base level of trustworthiness because 

you have to start somewhere. 

But in this context——

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Well, you can’t build it on trust. That is why they 

have the rules we want to know the past. 

Mr. PERRY. Right. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. I mean, you can’t build it on trust. Maybe you 

can—later you can have trust——

Mr. PERRY. But aren’t our—but aren’t our actions currently—

don’t they portend that they are built on trust? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. No, I—no, I don’t think so. No, I don’t——

Mr. PERRY. Are our actions? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. In terms of there is—in the negotiations I think 

there has been quite a rapport built up between U.S. negotiators 

and the Iranians but I don’t think the U.S. actions are based on 

trust. 

Mr. Kinzinger raised an important point. I had the privilege of 

listening to some of the investigators who tracked back not only the 

IEDs but it was the purchase of key electronic components for 

those IEDs in the United States and they were able to identify the 

Iranians, particularly one Iranian in Tehran, who was at the center 

of this network. 

So I think all of them understand that we are dealing with a regime we cannot trust. 

Mr. PERRY. That is exactly my point, but yet we are moving forward as if we should trust them when they have given us nothing 

to be trustworthy about. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Well, I think the United States has to remain 

firm. I mean, I think they have conditions, they were laid out and 

that they should remain firm in achieving those conditions and not 

very much from the—I don’t want to call them red lines because 

they tend not to use those terms but they are core—they are core 

requirements for a successful deal. 

Mr. PERRY. Does a nuclear explosive device that—the triggering 

that you discussed in May, is there any other application for said 

device other than——

Mr. ALBRIGHT. There are always other applications, and Iran is 

seeking those. That is how it tries to answer this; it comes up with 

some civil use. 

Mr. PERRY. Give us some examples, if you have them. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Well, with the exploding bridge wires—the IAEA 

evidence combined on those, combined with other information is 

pretty clear that it was to detonate a nuclear explosive. 

Iran has tried to argue no, no, it is just for other military purposes. They have tried to even concoct, I believe, some civil purposes. 

You can always do that and in fact the approach Iran has taken 

and it could be an effective one, is to give nothing away. They deny 

they ever had a nuclear weapons program. 

They deny the IAEA access to all information that could confirm 

what they are suspecting or alleging. They deny them access to facilities where they could get information and they deny them access to people. 

54

In a sense, what Iran learned is the best lie is the total lie. So 

if you are going to have a front have a complete front and don’t 

give at all. That is what, I think, Iran cannot get away with if 

there is going to be a deal. 

Mr. PERRY. Okay. So——

Mr. POE. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. PERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Mr. POE. Gentleman’s time has expired. I thank the gentleman. 

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. Vargas, 

5 minutes. 

Mr. VARGAS. And thank you, Judge Poe, and again, thank you for 

holding this hearing and the people who are here today testifying. 

I am—I think that they have denied everything and I actually 

never agreed to the interim agreement. 

I thought it was a mistake. I continue to think it is a mistake. 

I think that we were naive going into this entire process. I believed 

that the sanctions were working. 

I voted to screw down even harder sanctions and I think that 

that is the way we should have gone. We should have made them 

make that decision, do you want your nuclear program or do you 

want an economy—do you want a society. 

Unfortunately, we didn’t go down that route and here we are, 

and I don’t believe we are going to get an agreement. I remember 

thinking that once we got to the end of that interim agreement 

that in fact it was going to be extended. 

People said no, we will get to that agreement. Well, we are about 

to reach the extension and say well, we are going to—we are going 

to extend it again, and it is exactly, I think, what many of us believed. 

And during the whole time they haven’t stopped. They haven’t 

gotten rid of their centrifuges. In fact, I will ask you about that. 

Do they still have their centrifuges? Can they still enrich? They 

haven’t gotten rid of a single one of them, have they? 

Mr. TAKEYH. They have committed to—David can speak about 

this—essentially transform the enriched uranium into a chemical 

compound that is less accessible in terms of oxidization. 

Mr. VARGAS. Right. But the centrifuges themselves—have they 

committed to getting rid of them? Have they gotten rid of any? 

Mr. TAKEYH. The parameters of the Joint Plan of Action they 

were not required to so. Yes. 

Mr. VARGAS. That is right, and I think it has been a terrible mistake. The other thing, though, I want to—because I don’t have 

much time, I do want to focus on the sunset because I think that 

is even more dangerous. 

Do you remember when the revolution started there? 1979. How 

many years is that? Thirty-five years. Now, they want a 5-year 

deal. We are looking at maybe a 10- or 15- or 20-year deal, and 

after that they are treated the same as Japan or Germany or any 

of these other countries. 

They get to walk out from underneath these sanctions and all 

these other restrictions. I mean, how can that possibly be the case? 

Mr. TAKEYH. My guess would be that if there is a comprehensive 

plan of action negotiated it will be an extraordinary complicated 

55

document which will have stages and there will not be a single 

sunset clause but sunset clauses. 

So some capabilities come online after 2 years, some after three, 

some after five and I think that is how they are going to pursue 

and at some end point and then the program will be unhinged from 

any kind of internationally mandated restrictions. 

Mr. VARGAS. Would anyone else like to comment? I haven’t heard 

that process until right now. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Yes. Yes. I don’t know the details. I mean, originally, and I heard this currently from administration officials, is 

they were really thinking on order of 30 years, a full generation, 

and that in that time they would expect Iran to have changed at 

least on the nuclear——

Mr. VARGAS. As they have in the last 35 years? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Well, I am explaining on the nuclear issue. They 

weren’t expecting them to change on the regime necessarily but on 

the nuclear program the people would have aged. 

We saw this in the Iraqi nuclear program. I mean, the people—

the nuclear experts in 2003, when I met some of them after the fall 

of Baghdad, were not of the caliber they had been in 1999 and 2000 

when they—when they were actively engaged in their centrifuge 

program and in 2003 there were fewer of them. 

So I think they are counting on a whole generation to have an 

impact. Now, the trouble is they have walked back from that 30 

years and we are now hearing of 10 years, 15 years. So there will 

have to be some criteria on the—at the end of the deal. 

It can’t just be some, you know, it is tough and then suddenly 

it disappears. So there is going to have to be——

Mr. VARGAS. Doctor, did you have a comment on that? It seemed 

like you wanted to comment. 

Mr. TAKEYH. Well, no. I just think that, you know, given the fact 

that this—I mean, I don’t know the details of negotiations but 

given the fact that any agreement will unfold in stages, presumably at every stage Iranian nuclear capacity enlarges after the initial agreement that puts some curbs and perhaps some restrictions 

on it, and then the trajectory is that it will get to—it will get to 

a point where it is without restriction and then the decision to have 

an industrial-size program will be a national decision—the Iranian 

Government’s decision and they take into account all the factors 

that go into that. 

Mr. VARGAS. Well, I just have 20 seconds left. I guess I would 

say I think we are going down the wrong path. I have always believed that. I hope we get back to the sanctions and I think that 

they have stalled. 

They have stalled magnificently. We have been caught up in it. 

We have been naive and we continue to be naive. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentleman from California. The Chair will 

recognize the gentleman from Arkansas, Mr. Cotton, for his 5 minutes. 

Mr. COTTON. Thank you, and first, to save my time, I will associate myself with all the comments Mr. Vargas just made about the 

folly of pursuing this course from the outset. But here we are. 

56

I have heard it said that any attack on a nuclear weapons system could only set back a country by 5 years because a country 

starting from scratch could develop nuclear weapons in 5 years 

with the right technical expertise. 

Is that a correct estimate, in your opinions? Let me start with 

Mr. Albright and go down the——

Mr. ALBRIGHT. I think it is hard to know. I mean, in the case of 

the Iraq bombing in 1981, I mean, it may have accelerated the program. I mean, it was limping along quietly, a small program 

around a safeguarded reactor and after that bombing it took off. 

And the issue, though, I think is—it is not—is to—if any military 

strategy is going to be proposed, I mean, I and my organization are 

opposed to those. I mean, we see it as a failure of policy. 

But if anything like that was proposed, you can’t go in with just 

one strike. I mean, you have to be able to go back. You have to ensure that any military strategy is constructed so that Iran doesn’t 

rebuild—that it understands that to rebuild is to suffer even worse 

consequences. 

And so that has to be more of the guiding philosophy than thinking that one strike could do much of anything. 

Mr. COTTON. Mr. McInnis? 

Mr. MCINNIS. What I would add, and certainly, this was, you 

know, something that is involved in the U.S. Central Command 

and other parts of the government. I think that there is, in agreement with Dr. Albright, a general understanding that you have to 

take, to use an Israeli expression here, mowing the lawn with this 

type of approach—that there is no way to really walk this all the 

way back more than a few years. I think this was, again, one of 

the reasons why, again, Iran was willing to come to the table at 

this stage because they had gotten this far and they don’t have to 

go backwards or at least they could never be pushed back far 

enough that they couldn’t recuperate. And I think that there is another, you know, issue here that, you know, that the Iranians are 

looking, you know, frankly, at. A potential loss of a deal, if nothing 

comes through in November or beyond, the prospects for a military 

option could be back on the table either with Israel or the U.S. 

I have been, you know, in watching the Iranians talk over the 

last few months, you know, they have been going through some additional interesting cycles of being spooked by the Israelis and beginning in August of this year and I do think that even though I 

think the drop in oil prices has been a particular pressure on them 

this fall to make them a little bit more eager and desperate for a 

deal I think behind the scenes the thought that the military option 

may be back on the table is affecting their calculus to some degree. 

Mr. COTTON. Dr. Takeyh? 

Mr. TAKEYH. I agree with those statements. 

Mr. COTTON. Okay. And thinking about negotiations it is always 

important to think about the ultimate motives or goals of your negotiating partner or adversary, as the case may be. 

Thucydides said peoples go to war because of fear, interest and 

honor. Why do you think Iran has been pursuing a nuclear weapon 

for so long? Start with Dr. Takeyh and go down the other way. 

Mr. TAKEYH. I do think they have a nuclear weapons program 

because they think that having achieved that capability, and I do 

57

think when they get to the point of threshold they will cross. I 

don’t think they will have this sort of a murky hedge options. 

It, first of all, provides them a deterrent capability and that deterrent capability gives you an ability to project power. So there is 

a seamless connection between projection of power and deterrence. 

Mr. COTTON. Primarily against the United States and Israel? 

Mr. TAKEYH. Primarily but not exclusively. So in that particular 

sense, also when Iran looks at the Persian Gulf the conventional 

balance of power tends to be—to its disfavor, given the level of 

Saudi armament and so on. So a combination of nuclear capability, 

unconventional capability married to a significant missile fleet kind 

of negates that. 

Mr. MCINNIS. Yes. I would just add that, you know, certainly 

coming out of the Iran-Iraq war we knew back in the 1980s there 

was, you know, a real kind of prohibition, I think, in thinking 

about a nuclear program because the shah had pursued one. 

But I think that watching what happened after the Iran-Iraq war 

and seeing how existential some of their crises they are facing that 

they would need some type of capacity to basically make us back 

off or make Iraq back off or, you know, or Israel or anyone else. 

I mean, they look at what happened with Libya. They look at 

North Korea and those situations and I think they continue to take 

it to heart that they need something to make us never ever think 

about invading. 

Mr. TAKEYH. If there is time I would like to have a slight disagreement with Bill but if there is not that is fine. 

Mr. COTTON. It is the hands of the judge. 

Mr. POE. Well, the gentleman’s time has expired. Mr. Albright, 

you can put your answer in writing and so can you, Dr. Takeyh. 

The Chair will recognize the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Castro, 5 

minutes. 

Mr. CASTRO. Thank you, Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen, for 

your testimony this afternoon. I came in a little bit late so I apologize if I am retreading over ground that was covered. 

But do any of you recommend an extension for the bargaining period—the negotiations period? 

Mr. TAKEYH. I think November, as I mentioned, the 24th deadline is an artificial one and the administration does really have 

until January according to the terms of the Joint Plan of Action. 

So they don’t really require an extension up to that point. 

Mr. CASTRO. Okay. 

Mr. MCINNIS. Certainly, if it actually gets us a better deal and 

allows some of the additional pressures to take hold, yes, I would 

support an extension. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Yes. I would accept an extension. I would add, 

though, that it needs to be negotiated carefully because I think the 

current interim deal is fraying and there are problems and that 

those have to be addressed and so that it can’t just be some simple 

rubber stamp extension. 

Mr. CASTRO. So it sounds like the panel here is open to an extension. But let us imagine that everything falls apart and there is no 

agreement. What happens then? 

58

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Well, I think—I hope and I am not encouraged, 

but I would hope the administration had worked up a plan of action. I mean, that is what one would expect is——

Mr. CASTRO. A plan of action on sanctions, for example? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Well, that would include sanctions. I mean, you 

have to manage the escalation. Iran, in reaction to the Kirk-Menendez bill, they sent out a signal that if that bill is passed or they 

called it sanctions imposed that they would then start making 60 

percent enriched uranium which, if you do the calculations, is awfully close to weapon grade. 

Mr. CASTRO. I guess let me ask you what additional sanctions——

Mr. ALBRIGHT. You want to manage the escalation. 

Mr. CASTRO. Sure, and what additional sanctions would you all 

impose that we aren’t already doing? What are the additional sanctions you would impose? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Well, I think Congressman Sherman had a few 

ideas——

Mr. CASTRO. Sure. Sure. Sure. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT [continuing]. That I think there is lots of room for 

imposing sanctions. I think the——

Mr. CASTRO. But what specifically are the additional sanctions 

you would impose? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Well, you could impose driving down the oil exports of Iran further. You could take steps to discourage any foreign companies selling to Iran. I mean, I think there is——

Mr. CASTRO. But aren’t we—I mean, aren’t we applying a lot of 

that pressure now? Are sanctions doing a lot of that now? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. No. No. There is a lot of pressure to do—there are 

things happening. I think another area that would be fruitfully explored is additional financial sanctions. 

Not all banks are sanctioned in Iran. They have some connections to the international financial system. So I think that you 

could—you could explore that. I think those tend to be the most effective. 

But, again, I think it—you don’t want to have a wildly escalating 

situation. 

Mr. CASTRO. Sure. Well, and let me ask you——

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Iran already knows how to make nuclear weapons. 

Mr. CASTRO. Let us imagine that Iran become more isolated and 

the sanctions are not enough. Do you support military action 

against Iran? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. No, I do not. 

Mr. MCINNIS. Only in the most extreme circumstances where we 

have a clear indication that they are actually breaking out and pursuing a nuclear weapon. 

Mr. CASTRO. What would that extreme circumstance look like exactly? 

Mr. MCINNIS. Well, it would be us detecting they actually have 

decided to pursue this. I think this is something that I would be 

very hesitant to take, given some of the implications from—it is the 

same reason why the Israelis have held back on the trigger for so 

long. 

59

Mr. TAKEYH. And just in terms of, briefly, on the sanctions, 

under the previous legislation Iran, which has about five or six 

purchasers of oil, had to decline their oil purchases by 5 percent 

every several months to conform with those sanctions and not be 

subject to secondary measures by the United States. 

Under the Joint Plan of Action, those have been suspended so 

the reenactment of those, I think, could affect markets. Now, 

whether the Chinese are going to comply to them or not I am—it 

is going to be difficult. As of when—I can’t make that decision, 

Congressman, when to use military force. 

I just cannot at this point have the necessary information to 

think about that particular issue. I think it is one of the most serious considerations that an American President has to make and he 

has to take into consideration a great many things before making 

that decision—the scope, pace of the program, the ramifications of 

that attack. 

There is one thing and only one thing that Hitler knew and that 

was war—he used to say war is like stepping into a dark room—

you could step on something toxic or nothing at all, but you never 

know until you walk in. 

So you are essentially suggesting when do you walk into the dark 

room. 

Mr. CASTRO. How much time do I have, Chair? How am I doing? 

Mr. POE. Twenty seconds. 

Mr. CASTRO. All right. I yield back. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentleman. I will say this to the gentleman 

from Arkansas who wanted to continue to ask questions, congratulations on your election and you will find that in the Senate they 

have no time limits on anything. 

So you will be able to pontificate and ask questions indefinitely. 

Mr. COTTON. I am going to have to learn to be much more long 

winded then. 

Mr. POE. I want to thank all the gentlemen for being here. The 

information has been excellent. And this subcommittee is adjourned. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 3:31 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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