COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judge Annunziata and 

 Senior Judge Coleman 

CASSIE VAN BUREN 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

v. Record Nos. 2622-02-2 through PER CURIAM 

 2625-02-2 APRIL 15, 2003 

CITY OF RICHMOND 

 DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 

Theodore J. Markow, Judge 

 (Robert J. Jacobs, on briefs), for appellant. 

 (Kate D. O'Leary, Assistant City Attorney; 

Marc Yeaker, Guardian ad litem for the infant 

Johnny Collins; Karen Matthews, Guardian ad

litem for the infants Catherine, Christina 

and Anthony Van Buren, on briefs), for 

appellee. 

 In four separately filed and numbered appeals, Cassie Van 

Buren (mother) appeals the decision of the circuit court 

terminating her parental rights to her four children: Catherine 

Van Buren (Rec. No. 2622-02-2); Christina Van Buren (Rec. No. 

2623-02-2); Johnny Collins (Rec. No. 2624-02-2); and Anthony Van 

Buren (Rec. No. 2625-02-2).1 

 

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not 

designated for publication.

1

 The record contains at least two different spellings for 

each twin girl's name. In this opinion, we will use the names 

listed in the final order dated September 3, 2002, and refer to 

the twins as Christina and Catherine. 
 Mother contends the evidence was insufficient to support the 

terminations under subsection (1) or (2) of Code § 16.1-283(C). 

She also asks this Court to apply the ends of justice exception to 

Rule 5A:18 and find that the trial court applied an incorrect 

standard to support termination. Upon reviewing the record and 

briefs of the parties, we conclude that these appeals are without 

merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decisions of the 

trial court. Rule 5A:27. 

BACKGROUND 

 On July 7, 1999, the Richmond Department of Social Services 

(RDSS) removed the children and placed them in foster care. The 

twins, Catherine and Christina, were three years old at the time 

of removal, Anthony was four and Johnny was eight. On July 8, 

1999, Charlotte Scharff with RDSS filed petitions alleging the 

children were abused and neglected. 

The First Hearing

 On February 20, 2002, the trial court conducted a de novo

hearing on RDSS's petition to terminate mother's parental rights. 

 Kelly Davis, a case worker with RDSS, began working with the 

family in July 1999. She related how the three younger children 

had bruises and bite marks on their arms and legs when she first 

saw them. Davis filed the initial foster care plan on September 

1, 1999, with a goal of return home by the target date of March 

2000. The parents were to have bi-weekly visitation with the 

children. RDSS provided the following services and referrals: 

- 2 -
(1) refer mother to SCAN, a parents support group; (2) refer 

father to Richmond Behavorial Health Authority (RBHA) for 

substance abuse evaluation and treatment, if necessary; and (3) 

refer father to Commonwealth Catholic Charities for anger 

management. RDSS indicated it would provide "other services if 

needed," involve parents in service plan updates, and inform them 

of court dates. 

 Davis and the parents returned to court in May 2000 to review 

the foster care plan. The report showed that mother attended all 

SCAN sessions. Father advised RBHA he had no substance abuse 

problem, so RBHA did not recommend treatment; however, father 

attended a substance abuse education course through the Richmond 

Office of Community Corrections (ROCC), and in January 2000, he 

completed an anger management course sponsored by ROCC. RDSS 

referred the parents for a parenting assessment and arranged for 

in-home services to work with the family. The program goal 

remained "Return Home," and the target date was extended to 

December 2000. 

 In April 2000, RDSS contracted with "Wilkerson's Consulting" 

(Wilkerson's) to provide in-home counselors "to work with the 

family" twenty hours per week to teach "effective ways of 

parenting." Marshelle Anderson is employed by Wilkerson's, which 

is a private agency providing "[i]ntensive in-home counseling, 

parent aid [and] therapeutic mentoring." She and other counselors 

worked with the family from April 2000 until April 2001. The 

- 3 -
frequency and length of Anderson's contact with the family 

increased to forty hours per week, five or six days per week. 

Anderson explained: 

In the beginning we were providing parenting 

services to assist [the parents] with better 

organizing their home. Keeping the home 

clean, washing the kid's clothes. Just 

daily living skills types of things. We 

were also doing about 40 hours of intensive 

in-home counseling. 

Anderson also worked on ways to discipline and redirect the 

younger children's behavior. Anderson indicated that her 

company usually works with a family for a period of three to six 

months. Anderson recalled that the three younger children 

"weren't speaking" at the time and "couldn't communicate very 

well." Thus, "they would bite and push . . . to get what they 

wanted." According to Anderson, the three younger children 

"were really hard to handle." 

 Both case worker Davis and counselors with Wilkerson's noted 

that the home was disorganized and messy, and the parents were 

unable to control the children's behavior or maintain regular 

schedules and routines for things such as meals or bedtime. Davis 

recalled that mother and father were receptive to recommendations 

and advice, but they had difficulty implementing them. In 

addition to providing counselors, RDSS also provided daycare for 

the three younger children. 

 Dr. Beverley Chamblin performed psychological evaluations of 

father and mother in May 2000, ten months after the children were 

- 4 -
initially removed by RDSS.2 The purpose of the evaluation was "to 

help the home care workers teach the Van Burens to be more 

constructive parents." Dr. Chamblin also noted RDSS's concern 

regarding father's "somewhat negative and controlling attitude 

toward some of the assistance he is given" as well as mother's 

"very passive . . . behavior." Father dropped out of school in 

the seventh grade. He felt that he and his wife were good 

parents. Father denied having any emotional problems or any 

problems with alcohol, even though his father had problems with 

alcohol. Father told Chamblin he "drinks a six-pack of beer a 

day, especially on the weekends." Father tested "within the 

middle of the Borderline range of intellectual functioning." 

Dr. Chamblin noted "[a] severe degree of intellectual impairment 

[a]s evidenced by the variability among his levels of achievement 

(ranges from moderate mental retardation to average)." However, 

father's "[i]ntellectual impairment is secondary to central 

nervous system dysfunctioning and emotional factors, namely 

depression." Although Dr. Chamblin could not pinpoint the origin 

of father's "neurological impairment," she opined that "[c]entral 

nervous system dysfunctioning appear[ed] to interfere the most in 

his intellectual efficiency." Dr. Chamblin found father's 

thinking and reasoning "very simplistic and concrete and very 

 2

 RDSS moved to admit and the trial court admitted father's 

evaluation; however, RDSS failed to move to admit the evaluation 

of mother. Therefore, her evaluation is not in the record. 

- 5 -
rigid." As a result, "he can think of only one alternative in 

each problem situation." Father's "third grade [reading] level" 

prevented him from taking a "self-administered parenting 

inventory," which required at least a sixth grade reading level. 

Dr. Chamblin noted "[t]here is significant evidence to suggest the 

presence of alcohol dependence and dysthymic depressive disorder." 

She opined that father's neurological impairment might stem from 

alcohol abuse. Personality tests revealed "an emotionally 

immature adult" who "uses strong defenses of denial and repression 

and flight and avoidance." His emotional test responses indicated 

"that he easily regresses under stress and can become verbally 

aggressive." In her summary, Dr. Chamblin recommended that father 

"be seen for psychiatric evaluation to discuss medical 

intervention for his depression." 

 Although mother's evaluation was not made a part of the 

record, see note 2, supra, evidence established that she was 

passive and suffered from depression for which she had begun 

taking medication. 

 In June 2000, RDSS returned the children to the parents for a 

"trial placement." Wilkerson's continued to provide in-home 

consulting work with the family. 

 Davis left RDSS in October 2000, at which time Sharon Crone 

took over as foster care case worker. Crone worked with the 

family until September 13, 2001. Crone "saw a deterioration in 

the children's behavior from the time [she] received [the case]." 

- 6 -
In October 2000, the daycare facility that the children attended 

expressed concerns about the children's cleanliness and about the 

behavior of the three younger children. Crone learned of four 

complaints made to Child Protective Services (CPS) and spoke with 

a CPS worker who had visited the home and who "told [Crone] her 

concerns."3 Moreover, Crone "had seen the children on several 

occasions and [she] didn't see the concerns" pointed out to the 

parents by RDSS "being addressed." Specifically, Crone noticed 

that the "children were dirty" and had "multiple ear infections" 

for which treatment was not sought until RDSS intervened. Also, 

appointments for the children at therapy were not regularly kept. 

 Crone "observed the house in disarray several times." The 

top two bunks in the two sets of bunk beds in the children's 

bedroom contained "so much clutter" that the children had to sleep 

together in the bottom bunks. On November 27, 2000, Crone saw 

"many bruises on the children." Crone discussed the problem with 

the in-home workers, who indicated "they were addressing the same 

concerns," however, "they just weren't seeing any improvement." 

On November 28, 2000, RDSS removed the children from the parents' 

home a second time. 

 3

 Trina Coleman, a Child Protective Services (CPS) worker 

for RDSS, received a complaint in November 2000 alleging lack of 

supervision and possible physical abuse. According to Coleman's 

testimony, RDSS determined that the complaint was founded, level 

three (moderate), for lack of supervision. 

- 7 -
 On December 6, 2000, Crone filed another Foster Care Service 

Plan. The program goal was "Placement with Relatives" and the 

target date was July 2001. Crone explained that, at the time, 

RDSS had been involved with the family for seventeen months and 

things were not improving satisfactorily, so she felt it was time 

to "move on to a new goal." The relatives recommended by the 

parents to care for the children eventually declined to take them, 

so Crone advised the parents that she intended to change the goal 

to adoption. After visiting the parents and advising them of the 

decision, father asked her to leave. As she was leaving, mother 

assaulted Crone and threatened to kill her. 

 Crone testified that father failed to follow through with 

further counseling at Catholic Charities. Crone also asked the 

parents to return to SCAN for more parenting classes, which they 

did from March 26 until May 7, after which "they refused to go 

anymore." According to Crone, the parents failed to see that 

Catherine attended weekly speech therapy sessions, despite 

arrangements being made for her to get there in a Medicaid van. 

Johnny also missed sessions with therapist Maureen Mayer. 

 When asked if any other social service agencies had been 

involved with the family prior to RDSS's involvement, Crone 

testified that when Catherine and Christina were born in Caroline 

County, "they were removed for a very short time," and Johnny and 

Anthony "were living in the aunt's house." 

- 8 -
 Crone observed visitations after the children were removed in 

November 2000. The parents "had poor interaction" with the 

children. Specifically, Crone noted that father was "very rough 

with the children" and had to be redirected several times. Crone 

also had concerns that father refused to address apparent problems 

with his use of alcohol. Crone recalled that mother and father 

often argued and screamed at each other, causing the children 

anxiety. 

 Crone noted that Johnny, although a child, "was often given a 

caretaker role." It appeared to Crone that he "wasn't getting his 

emotional needs met." Crone opined it was "traumatic" for Johnny 

to be "going back and forth" between his parents and foster 

care, and she felt "he needs some permanency. He needs to know 

that one family is going to take him and he is going to be with 

them for the long run." 

 Dr. Jennifer Paul performed psychological evaluations of 

Anthony and Christina. Anthony, who was five years old at his 

June 2001 evaluation, "was very inattentive." He jumped on things 

and had a hard time sitting still. His "attentional skills were 

so poor," he was unable to complete an intelligence test intended 

for children his age. Therefore, Dr. Paul could not determine his 

IQ. His child development inventory indicated significant 

developmental delays. Dr. Paul gauged Anthony's overall abilities 

"at the 2 year, 4 month level," two years, eight months below his 

chronological age. Dr. Paul posited that Anthony's "developmental 

- 9 -
delays may be related both to cognitive delays/limitations and 

also to previous environments." She was "unclear how much 

stimulation he received in his previous environments and whether 

or not he received enough stimulation to promote normal 

development." "Behavorial reports and observations" were 

"consistent with a diagnosis of Attention Deficit Hyperactivity 

Disorder [ADHD]" According to Dr. Paul, "Anthony will need 

continued stimulation both at home and through a structured school 

program." 

 Christina's August 2001 test results indicated that she "has 

significant developmental delays," especially in speech, for which 

she needs immediate therapy. Like Anthony, Christina suffers from 

ADHD. She tested at least one year below her peers in every 

category. Dr. Paul said that Christina needed structure and 

consistency at home and at school and that a behavioral 

modification system should be implemented. Dr. Paul recommended 

that both children be taken to a pediatrician or psychiatrist to 

discuss the possibility of using medication to control effects of 

their ADHD condition. She also made several other recommendations 

for the parents, foster parents, and support personnel working 

with Anthony and Christina. 

 In September 2001, Jenny Money took over for Crone as the 

foster care case worker. She testified that Johnny had been in 

foster care since November 2000 and is doing well in school and in 

the foster home. Christina, Catherine and Anthony are in a 

- 10 -
therapeutic foster home and are "doing marvelously." Money 

explained that therapeutic foster parents are trained to deal with 

a child's special needs. All three younger children demonstrated 

delayed development in speech. Christina also "suffers from 

underlying anxiety," and she and Anthony have been diagnosed as 

having ADHD. In addition, Anthony shows signs of mental 

retardation. All three younger children see a psychiatrist for 

medication and participate in speech therapy. Anthony began 

taking medication in August 2001, and Christina began taking 

medication in October 2001. Money stated that the children still 

need supervision and structure. 

 When Money took over in September 2001, she reminded the 

parents about the services already in place. Money also 

recommended that mother participate in an anger management class 

and that father attend Alcoholics Anonymous (AA). Money directed 

father to obtain documentation of AA meetings he attended. 

According to Money, the parents have attended fourteen out of a 

possible 132 parenting classes offered during the time RDSS was 

involved in their case, making their attendance rate 11%. Mother 

never attended anger management class, and father failed to 

provide written verification that he attended any AA meetings. 

Father told Money the AA meetings depressed him. 

 When Money first got the case, the parents' home was 

condemned because of lead paint and electrical and plumbing 

deficiencies. The parents moved in with friends, then lived in a 

- 11 -
hotel for a few weeks until moving into the house they now occupy. 

Money observed several visits between parents and the children and 

recalled how Johnny would appear to stay by himself, isolated and 

ignored. Usually some problem would occur with one of the younger 

children, such as Anthony choking after eating too many donuts or 

Catherine spilling an overfilled cup of drink on herself. 

 Although Money referred father and mother "to family 

counseling at Commonwealth Catholic Charities," the parents 

decided to meet with Robert Osborn for counseling. Initially, 

Osborn told Money he did not believe the parents could cope with 

children with special needs. However, according to Money, he 

later altered that opinion and currently feels the parents could 

maintain the children in their home "as long as there were a lot 

of supportive services in the home." 

 Sharon Jacobs has been the foster mother for Christina, 

Catherine and Anthony since December 3, 2001. Jacobs explained 

how she and her husband were able to successfully alter the 

children's behavior by establishing a system of rules and 

rewards. Jacobs noted that the children appear happier and more 

responsive. She attributes their progress to the daily routine 

and structure she and her husband offer in their therapeutic 

foster home setting. There have been no incidents of biting 

since the placement. 

 Robert Osborn, a licensed clinical social worker, testified 

that he first met with the parents in October 2001 and has been 

- 12 -
seeing them weekly. Initially, both parents exhibited symptoms 

of "affective disorders," mother suffering from depression and 

father from bipolar disorder. Both parents are currently taking 

antidepressants and their conditions are stabilized. Although 

Osborn was not concerned about the children's safety if they 

returned home, he felt "there's still room for growth in their 

parenting skills." Osborn opined they may pay less attention to 

the children's emotional needs and show inconsistency in their 

care. According to Osborn, the parents have made much progress 

since their first meeting in October 2001. He acknowledged that 

the parents failed to advise him they had psychological 

evaluations done in May 2000 and that access to those results 

would have been helpful in their treatment. Osborn felt the 

parents might be able to be more effective with the children in 

terms of incorporating what they have learned if they were able 

to practice what they have learned for three or four months. 

Osborn noted that children with ADHD need "consistency, 

support," medication, and structure. According to Osborn, the 

parents would need two to three months "to get back into the 

swing of parenting and be able to incorporate [their] new 

information." Osborn noted that both parents came from 

dysfunctional family situations, making it more difficult for 

them to overcome their past and become effective parents. 

 By order dated February 28, 2002, the trial court deferred 

making a determination "until early August 2002" in order to 

- 13 -
allow the parents, who had recently been diagnosed and 

prescribed medication and therapy, to show that they could 

effectively remedy the situation causing removal and take care 

of their children. The trial court directed RDSS to "provide 

appropriate services to determine if reunification of this 

family can be accomplished" and to "file a report of its efforts 

and any reaction thereto and results thereof" before the August 

hearing. 

RDSS's Report of Reunification Attempt

 Pursuant to the trial court's February 28, 2002 order, 

Money prepared and submitted a report "documenting the efforts 

made by [RDSS] to attempt to reunify" the parents with the 

children. Money first changed the one and one-half hour 

bi-weekly supervised visits to unsupervised visits. The visits 

took place in a playroom at the RDSS office; a two-way mirror 

enabled RDSS staff to observe. If, during those visits, the 

parents "could demonstrate that they could keep the children 

safe, . . . then the visits could begin to take place at the Van 

Buren's home." 

 By April 2002, visitation took place weekly and was 

increased to two hours. In May 2002, "the visits were changed 

back from weekly to bi-weekly, as [the three younger children's] 

behavior had declined dramatically, and Mr. and Mrs. Van Buren 

were not demonstrating appropriate parenting skills." "On many 

occasions," Money observed situations where the parents "have 

- 14 -
not been able to keep the children safe, supervise them, or 

discipline them appropriately." For example, "[d]uring 

unsupervised visits, Anthony has bitten his siblings on several 

occasions and he has fallen off the back of the couch and bumped 

and scratched his head." Moreover, father "has been observed 

spitting on the children, and walking out in traffic while 

holding Christine and Katherine's hands." Money noted that 

father "does not follow the instructions that [she] makes 

regarding the visits, [and] he spends little time actually 

interacting with the children, as he uses the telephone, leaves 

the room to smoke cigarettes, or" complains about the children's 

foster care case. Money detailed several inappropriate comments 

made to the children by mother and father and noted that mother 

"has not shown any ability to discipline the children." It 

"appear[ed]" to Money that the parents "rely on Johnny [the 

oldest child] to discipline his younger siblings." The parents 

bring no toys or games with which to engage the children during 

the visits, instead promising them there will be toys when they 

return home. 

 Money wrote that father "will not accept redirection, or he 

will deny that he responded in a particular way." For example, 

he "attempted to schedule visits with Johnny through the foster 

mother, rather than scheduling them through [Money]." When 

confronted with the issue, he denied making such a request to 

the foster mother. Another time, father "went against [Money's] 

- 15 -
recommendations and allowed" the mother, who had a suspended 

driver's license, to transport Johnny and him to an event in the 

city. Money documented other instances in which father acted 

against her advice and "attempted to deceive [her]." 

 Money reported that Anthony, Catherine and Christina's 

"foster parents . . . have noticed a decline in the children's 

behavior since the visits have been unsupervised." Following 

the visits, "the children are much more aggressive" and they 

experience nightmares. Christina "wets the bed for several 

nights following visits" and has "temper tantrums." After one 

visit at which father spit water on the children, "the children 

were spitting on one another." Following a visit on May 22, 

2002, Anthony's foster mother noted "6 small bruises on his 

back." Anthony said "that Johnny had touched his back" and that 

"he had bitten" Johnny and his mother because they "were holding 

him tightly." Money observed several situations where the 

parents failed to properly discipline or supervise the children, 

either ignoring the behavior or merely saying, "No," often to no 

avail, but refusing to actively address the situation. 

 Money spoke with Debra Robbins, the therapist for the three 

younger children, and reported Robbins' opinion that father 

"would not be able to attend the children's needs, due to his 

own limitations." 

- 16 -
The Second Hearing

 On August 7, 2002, the parties appeared before the trial 

court. Prior to the hearing, Money submitted her report. Four 

witnesses testified, including Osborn, the clinical social 

worker working with the parents. The evidence established that 

father suffers from bipolar disorder, an "emotional disorder," 

and mother suffers from depression. Osborn noted that these 

"chronic conditions" can be treated in the long-term only if the 

parents regularly obtain and take their medication. 

 The guardian ad litem for Johnny, the oldest child, advised 

the trial court that Johnny's "connection is very strong with 

the [three younger] siblings," and that connection is "clearly 

the stronger one." Johnny lives with different foster parents 

than the three siblings. Johnny's guardian ad litem reported 

that Johnny expressed that he did not desire to return home if 

his siblings did not return. The guardian noted that Johnny's 

connection with his siblings would be cut off completely if 

Johnny remained at home alone with the parents and the parental 

rights to the younger siblings were terminated and they were 

adopted. However, if Johnny remains in another foster home or 

is adopted by another family, there is a possibility that 

visitation among the siblings could be arranged. 

 In light of Money's report documenting the parents' 

inability to safely care for the younger three children in a 

controlled setting for a short period of time, and because they 

- 17 -
are doing so well in their foster home, the younger children's 

guardian ad litem recommended that "it's in their best interest 

to end this and move forward with the adoption." 

 The trial court ruled as follows: 

 I do find by the appropriate standard 

clear and convincing evidence that it is 

appropriate that there be termination of 

parental rights of all four children. I 

have no question in my mind whatsoever about 

the appropriateness of that decision, with 

the exception of Johnny. 

 That one, I think Mr. Yeaker [Johnny's 

guardian ad litem] has set out at least 

three of the most obvious options. There's 

not one of them in that whole group that is 

a great one. I think the best one and the 

most likely to result in a long-term benefit 

for [Johnny] is going to be terminate and 

attempt to get him into an adoptive home. 

That needs to be done soon. He's eleven 

years old now. Time is running out for him. 

 The trial court directed the attorney for RDSS to draft an 

order reflecting his ruling. 

 The final order dated September 3, 2002, contains the 

following: 

 The Court having heard and considered 

the evidence and arguments of counsel FINDS 

by a preponderance of the evidence that the 

goal of adoption is in the best interests of 

[the children]. The Court also FINDS by 

clear and convincing evidence that it is in 

the best interests of [the children] to 

terminate the parental rights of Michael and 

Cassie Van Buren and that Michael and Cassie 

Van Buren have failed to remedy the 

conditions, which led to [the children's] 

placement and continuation in the custody of 

the Richmond Department of Social Services. 

- 18 -
 Therefore the Court ORDERS that the 

residual parental rights of Michael and 

Cassie Van Buren are terminated, the goal of 

adoption is approved and the Richmond 

Department of social Services is granted the 

rights to place the child[ren] for adoption. 

ANALYSIS 

 "When addressing matters concerning a child, including the 

termination of a parent's residual parental rights, the paramount 

consideration of a trial court is the child's best interests." 

Logan v. Fairfax County Dep't of Human Development, 13 Va. App. 

123, 128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 463 (1991). "'In matters of a child's 

welfare, trial courts are vested with broad discretion in making 

the decisions necessary to guard and to foster a child's best 

interests.'" Id. The trial judge's findings, "'when based on 

evidence heard ore tenus, will not be disturbed on appeal unless 

plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.'" Id. (citation 

omitted). 

Sufficiency of the Evidence

 Appellant contends the evidence was insufficient to support 

the termination under either subsection of Code § 16.1-283(C). 

 Although the trial court did not specifically state under 

which subsection of the statute it found termination of mother's 

parental rights to be appropriate, RDSS's evidence and the 

language used by the trial court make clear that the termination 

occurred pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(C)(2). Thus, we limit our 

sufficiency analysis to Code § 16.1-283(C)(2), which provides 

- 19 -
that a court may terminate a parent's residual parental rights 

where a child has been placed in foster care as a result of 

court commitment if the court finds, based upon clear and 

convincing evidence, that (1) it is in the best interests of the 

child; (2) that the parents without good cause have been 

unwilling or unable within a reasonable period of time not to 

exceed twelve months to remedy substantially the conditions 

which led to the child's foster care placement; and (3) that 

reasonable and appropriate efforts of social, medical, mental 

health or other rehabilitative agencies have been made to such 

end. 

 Clear and convincing evidence is "that measure or degree of 

proof which will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a 

firm belief or conviction as to the allegations sought to be 

established. It is intermediate, being more than a mere 

preponderance, but . . . [less than] a reasonable doubt . . . ." 

Gifford v. Dennis, 230 Va. 193, 198 n.1, 353 S.E.2d 371, 373 n.1 

(1985). 

We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

party prevailing below and grant to that evidence all reasonable 

inferences fairly deducible therefrom. Logan v. Fairfax County 

Dep't of Human Dev., 13 Va. App. 123, 128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 463 

(1991). Although "[t]he termination of residual parental rights 

is a grave, drastic and irreversible action," Helen W. v. 

Fairfax County Dep't of Human Dev., 12 Va. App. 877, 883, 407 

- 20 -
S.E.2d 25, 28-29 (1991), we "'presume[] [the trial court has] 

thoroughly weighed all the evidence [and] considered the 

statutory requirements,'" Logan, 13 Va. App. at 128, 409 S.E.2d 

at 463 (quoting Farley v. Farley, 9 Va. App. 326, 329, 387 

S.E.2d 794, 796 (1990)). 

 The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to RDSS, 

proved, by clear and convincing evidence, both (1) that RDSS 

made "reasonable and appropriate efforts" to help mother remedy 

the conditions "which led to or required continuation of the 

child[ren]'s foster care placement" and (2) that appellant, 

without good cause, failed "to substantially remedy" those 

conditions. In reaching this conclusion, the court was required 

by Code § 16.1-283(C)(2) to "take into consideration the prior 

efforts of such agencies to rehabilitate the parent." 

 The evidence established that RDSS began working with 

mother and father in July 1999 after it obtained custody of the 

children. RDSS submitted a foster care plan with a goal of 

returning the children home, first by March 2000, then by 

December 2000. During the children's temporary placement in 

foster care, RDSS assisted mother and father in obtaining help 

so as to improve their parenting skills and regain possession of 

their children. The case worker referred mother to a parents 

support group and father to agencies to evaluate and treat him for 

substance abuse and anger management. In April 2000, RDSS 

contracted with Wilkerson's to provide in-home assistance, and in 

- 21 -
May 2000, RDSS had mother and father evaluated by a psychologist. 

The evaluation revealed that father has below average cognitive 

abilities, he is emotionally immature, and he may suffer from 

neurological impairment, alcohol dependence, and depression. The 

evaluation recommended a psychiatric evaluation for possible 

medical intervention. The evaluation found father to be rigid, 

simplistic, and limited in solving problems. 

 Mother was found to be suffering from depression. She was 

viewed as the more passive parent. Evidence also indicated she 

had a problem controlling her anger. 

 Eleven months after removing the children and providing 

services to help the parents be more effective and diligent, 

RDSS returned the children to the parents for a trial placement. 

Five months later, in November 2000, RDSS again removed the 

children based on a founded complaint of lack of supervision and 

deteriorating behavior by the children, which the parents were 

unable to control or ameliorate. The children were again placed 

in foster care homes. 

 The children had spent eleven months in foster care during 

the first removal and another twenty months after the second 

removal. During that thirty-one month period, three different 

case workers worked on the case. Throughout that period, RDSS 

provided services and referrals and made "reasonable and 

appropriate efforts" to help the parents remedy the conditions 

- 22 -
which both "led to" and "required continuation of" the 

children's foster care placement in 1999 and 2000. 

 By the time of the February 2002 hearing, the parents, 

Anthony and Christina had been diagnosed and were taking daily 

medication to manage their respective conditions. Therefore, 

the trial court directed RDSS to attempt to reunify the family a 

third time and determine if they could parent the children 

effectively and safely now that Anthony, Christina, father and 

mother were being treated. RDSS tried to expand visitation in 

hopes of reunifying the parents and the children; however, the 

case worker reported several instances in which father and 

mother acted inappropriately, failed to maintain control of the 

children, and/or demonstrated an inability to keep them safe. 

 The record showed that the parents repeatedly placed Johnny 

in the role of caretaker for the three younger siblings, 

requiring him to supervise and discipline them. This role was 

inappropriate for Johnny's young age and made him uncomfortable. 

Moreover, throughout RDSS's involvement, the parents continued 

to thrust Johnny into this role, neglecting his own needs. 

 The record established that RDSS provided services and 

resources for an extended period of time, well over the 

twelve-month period. Despite those services, mother and father 

failed to make reasonable progress towards eliminating 

substantially the conditions which led to the children's foster 

care placement. See Code § 16.1-283(C)(2). 

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"'It is clearly not in the best interests of a child to 

spend a lengthy period of time waiting to find out when, or even 

if, a parent will be capable of resuming his [or her] 

responsibilities.'" Richmond Dept. of Soc. Servs. v. L.P., 35 

Va. App. 573, 584, 546 S.E.2d 749, 754-55 (2001) (quoting 

Kaywood v. Halifax County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 10 Va. App. 535, 

540, 394 S.E.2d 492, 495 (1990)). 

Waiting indefinitely to find out if the 

[parents] might someday remedy the 

conditions that resulted in [the children's] 

foster care placement only prolongs the lack 

of stability and permanency in [the 

children's] li[ves], with no guarantee or 

even reasonable likelihood that the 

[parents] will ever be able to adequately 

care for [the children] in the future." 

Id. at 585, 546 S.E.2d at 755. 

 Moreover, 

a parent's mental deficiency that is of such 

severity that there is no reasonable 

expectation that such parent will be able 

within a reasonable period of time befitting 

the child's best interests to undertake 

responsibility for the care needed by the 

child in accordance with the child's age and 

stage of development does not constitute 

"good cause" under Code § 16.1-283(C)(2). 

Id.

 The children are doing well, living with foster families 

who love them and provide safe, clean environments and 

appropriate supervision. That situation contrasts sharply with 

the chaotic and unclean conditions they repeatedly experienced 

with the parents. Being ADHD, Anthony and Christina require 

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care and supervision that father and mother cannot now provide. 

Johnny has undergone three years of foster home placement and 

uncertainty, and is now at the age where he needs permanence. 

The decision to terminate mother's parental rights to Johnny 

does not foreclose Johnny from maintaining a relationship with 

his three younger siblings. 

 RDSS presented clear and convincing evidence that termination 

is in the children's best interests and it is not reasonably 

likely that the conditions which led to the children's neglect or 

abuse can be substantially corrected or eliminated to allow them 

to return within a reasonable period of time. 

Standard of Proof

 Mother contends the trial court based its findings on an 

incorrect standard. She bases her argument on a statement in 

RDSS's closing argument and on language used in the draft of the 

final order prepared by RDSS. 

 At the August 2002 hearing, counsel for RDSS summarized Code 

§ 16.1-283(C)(2) as allowing termination if parents are "unwilling 

or unable within any reasonable period of time not to exceed 12 

months . . . to remedy the situation." The final order, which the 

trial court directed RDSS to prepare, states that the trial court 

found by clear and convincing evidence that the parents "have 

failed to remedy the conditions" which led to removal and 

placement by RDSS. 

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 On appeal, mother points out that RDSS misstated the law in 

its closing argument and in its draft of the final order in that 

the statute requires a showing that a parent need only "remedy 

substantially," not remedy completely, "the conditions which led 

to or required continuation of the child's foster care 

placement." Code § 16.1-283(C)(2) (emphasis added). 

 Mother failed to raise before the trial court the argument 

she makes here. Rule 5A:18 provides, in pertinent part, that 

"[n]o ruling of the trial court . . . will be considered as a 

basis for reversal unless the objection was stated together with 

the grounds therefor at the time of the ruling." Thus, we will 

not consider a claim of trial court error as a ground for 

reversal "where no timely objection was made." Marshall v. 

Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 627, 636, 496 S.E.2d 120, 125 (1998). 

The purpose of these rules is to ensure that the trial court and 

opposing party are given the opportunity to intelligently 

address, examine, and resolve issues in the trial court, thus 

avoiding unnecessary appeals and reversals. Lee v. Lee, 12 

Va. App. 512, 514, 404 S.E.2d 736, 737 (1991) (en banc). 

 Mother acknowledges that she did not preserve these issues 

but asks us to invoke the "ends of justice" exception to Rule 

5A:18 in order to consider the merits of her claims. "[T]he 

ends of justice exception is narrow and is to be used sparingly 

. . . ." Brown v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 126, 132, 380 S.E.2d 

8, 10 (1989). "In order to avail oneself of the exception, a 

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[party] must affirmatively show that a miscarriage of justice 

has occurred, not that a miscarriage might have occurred." 

Redman v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 215, 221, 487 S.E.2d 269, 

272 (1997). The trial error must be "clear, substantial and 

material." Brown, 8 Va. App. at 132, 380 S.E.2d at 11. 

 In expressing its decision, the trial court found "by the 

appropriate standard clear and convincing evidence" to support 

its decision to terminate mother's residual parental rights. 

Moreover, we found in the previous discussion that RDSS 

presented clear and convincing evidence to support the trial 

court's decision. That evidence proved that the mother failed 

to remedy substantially the conditions that caused the children 

to be removed and placed with RDSS. Specifically, the evidence 

established that, after more than two and one-half years of RDSS 

assistance, the parents were unable to safely and appropriately 

supervise the children and take care of their special needs. 

Therefore, the record does not reflect any reason to invoke the 

good cause or ends of justice exceptions to Rule 5A:18. 

 Accordingly, the decisions of the circuit court are summarily 

affirmed. 

Affirmed.

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