J-A08015-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

RICKEY EARL DEHART, JR.,

Appellant No. 1419 MDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 23, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Union County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-60-CR-0000078-2009

BEFORE: SHOGAN, WECHT, and STRASSBURGER,*JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED MAY 20, 2015

Appellant, Ricky1 Earl Dehart, Jr., appeals from the judgment of 

sentence entered in the Union County Court of Common Pleas, following the 

revocation of his probation. We affirm.

As the “Statement of the Case” section of Appellant’s brief consists of 

two sentences,2 we glean the relevant facts from the certified record on 

____________________________________________

*

 Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 Appellant advises that the proper spelling of his name is “Ricky.” 

2

Pa.R.A.P. 2117(a)(1) requires that the statement of the case shall 

contain “[a] statement of the form of action, followed by a brief procedural 

history of the case.” Pa.R.A.P. 2117(a)(4) further instructs that the 

statement of the case shall include “a closely condensed chronological 

statement of all necessary facts . . . . ” Although counsel’s non-compliance 

with Rule 2117 does not preclude review in this instance, we remind counsel 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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appeal and the transcript of the probation revocation proceeding. On 

February 21, 2014, the Commonwealth filed a motion to revoke Appellant’s 

probation, alleging that he had violated the conditions of his probation 

related to the use of narcotics and compliance with drug and alcohol 

treatment programs. On July 22, 2014, the trial court held a probation 

revocation hearing. Appellant presented testimony from Aimee Benfer, a 

caseworker from the Union County Children and Youth Services, concerning 

Appellant’s attempts to maintain contact with his son while Appellant was in 

custody. She also confirmed that Appellant was not the subject of an 

investigation surrounding suspected abuse of his son. N.T., 7/22/14, at 8–

11. Appellant testified on his own behalf and admitted the allegations of the 

Commonwealth’s motion. Id. at 5. Appellant also detailed his struggle with 

drug addiction and his participation in drug treatment and parenting 

programs offered at the county jail where he was then incarcerated. Id. at 

12–18. Susan Stout, Appellant’s probation supervisor, appeared for the 

Commonwealth and stated that Appellant should be sentenced to a state 

facility because he brought illegal narcotics into a drug treatment facility and 

was resistant to the treatment offered there. Id. at 24. At the completion 

of testimony and argument, the trial court sentenced Appellant to a nine-

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

that meaningful appellate review is best served when the parties comply 

with the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure. Commonwealth v. 

Henry, 706 A.2d 313, 318 (Pa. 1997).
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month-to-thirty-six-month term of incarceration in a state correctional 

institution. Id. at 33–34. 

Appellant raises a single issue for review: “Did the Trial Court commit 

error in sentencing Appellant to a state prison when less restrictive and more 

appropriate alternatives were available?” Appellant’s Brief at 4. Appellant 

argues that the trial court’s decision to sentence him to a state term was 

inappropriate because he is a drug addict in need of treatment, not 

incarceration. Id. at 6.

As presented, Appellant’s claim challenges a discretionary aspect of his 

sentence. Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 83 A.3d 1030, 1033 (Pa. Super. 

2013) (en banc) (appellants may challenge discretionary aspects of sentence 

imposed following revocation). Challenges to the discretionary aspects of 

sentencing do not entitle an appellant to an appeal as of right. 

Commonwealth v. Lamonda, 52 A.3d 365, 371 (Pa. Super. 2012). 

Rather, prior to reaching the merits of a discretionary sentencing issue, we 

conduct a four-pronged inquiry to determine: (1) whether Appellant filed a 

timely notice of appeal; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved; (3) 

whether Appellant’s brief includes a Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) concise statement of 

the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal with respect to the 

discretionary aspects of sentence; and (4) whether there is a substantial 

question that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the 
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Sentencing Code. Commonwealth v. Lewis, 45 A.3d 405, 410 (Pa. Super. 

2012).

Herein, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and preserved the 

issue of state versus county incarceration during the probation revocation 

hearing. In addition, Appellant’s brief contains the required Rule 2119(f) 

statement. Thus, we must next determine whether Appellant has stated a 

substantial question justifying this Court’s review of his sentencing claim.

The determination of what constitutes a substantial question must be 

evaluated on a case-by-case basis. A substantial question exists “only when 

the appellant advances a colorable argument that the sentencing judge’s 

actions were either: (1) inconsistent with a specific provision of the 

Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie 

the sentencing process.” Commonwealth v. Glass, 50 A.3d 720, 726–

727 (Pa. Super. 2012) (quoting Commonwealth v. Phillips, 946 A.2d 103, 

112 (Pa. Super. 2008)). 

In his Rule 2119(f) statement, Appellant asserts that the trial court’s 

sentence was unreasonable because he received a term in a state facility for 

a non-violent probation violation occasioned by his drug addiction and 

concern for his child. Appellant urges that the trial court should have 

considered his cooperation with the authorities investigating the suspected 

abuse of his son and his efforts at rehabilitation as factors indicating that 

incarceration in a county prison was appropriate. 
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We first observe that Appellant has not identified any provision of the 

Sentencing Code calling into question the trial court’s state facility decision.3 

Nor has he cited any authority for the concept that imposition of a state 

sentence for non-violent crimes is contrary to fundamental norms underlying 

the sentencing process. Facially, then, Appellant has failed to present a 

substantial question concerning the propriety of his sentence. See 

Commonwealth v. Brown, 982 A.2d 1017, 1020 (Pa. Super. 2009) 

(appellant’s claim that state incarceration was unreasonable because he 

committed a non-violent offense and was not confrontational during court 

proceedings did not present a substantial question). Additionally, 

Appellant’s assertion that the trial court did not adequately consider his 

rehabilitative needs fails to raise a substantial question. See 

Commonwealth v. Griffin, 65 A.3d 932, 936–937 (Pa. Super. 2013) 

(allegation that court’s sentence failed to take into account rehabilitative 

needs does not raise a substantial question). Similarly, Appellant’s claim 

that the court did not factor in his drug addiction does not raise a substantial 

____________________________________________

3

 Appellant’s one and one-half page argument references one case and one 

statutory section related to the substantial question requirement, but fails to 

cite a single case supporting his distinct argument about the place of 

incarceration. Appellant’s Brief at 8–9. Pursuant to the Pennsylvania Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, failure to cite to relevant authority provides a basis 

for us to find waiver. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119; Commonwealth v. Bowen, 55 

A.3d 1254, 1263 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2012) (holding that appellant’s failure to 

properly develop claims in brief could support a waiver determination). 

Nevertheless, we consider the merits of Appellant’s claim.
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question. See Commonwealth v. Coolbaugh, 770 A.2d 788, 793 (Pa. 

Super. 2001) (appellant’s claim that the court did not consider his personal 

life situation of drug addiction does not raise a substantial question).

Even if we were to determine that Appellant raised a substantial 

question, we find no merit in the underlying allegation. 

Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of 

the sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on 

appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an 

abuse of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. 

Rather, the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, 

that the sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, 

exercised its judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias 

or ill will, or arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision. 

Commonwealth v. Raven, 97 A.3d 1244, 1253 (Pa. Super. 2014) (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Shugars, 895 A.2d 1270, 1275 (Pa. Super. 2006)). 

At the revocation hearing, the trial court explained its reasons for 

imposing a state sentence, as follows:

[Appellant] was on the street for 19 1⁄2 months. In 19 1⁄2 

months he had four relapses, he had two failed treatment 

programs. There was a question about his attitude on the street 

which is in contrast to his attitude in prison. He is seeking help 

and doing what he needs to do. There is an issue of honesty on 

top of his attitude.

* * *

The whole incident involving his son is not a factor in here 

at all. If anything, it mitigates in favor of the Commonwealth’s 

proposal because, quite frankly, my inclination was 1 to 3 years 

with RRRI sentence of nine months; but I’m willing to go along 

with the Commonwealth’s recommendation and mainly for these 

reasons.
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He’s currently on state supervision. It makes absolutely 

no sense to split the sentence where you have one sentence 

that’s county supervised and another sentence state supervised. 

He’s been on state supervision and failed on state supervision, 

which it makes no sense to go back to a county level where he’s 

not done well on a higher level of supervision. And, as pointed 

out, the services that we have to offer at the county level at this 

time are not the same as in the state facility with the 

programming on the grounds. 

N.T., 7/22/14, at 32–33. The trial court also had access to and referred to a 

pre-sentence report that had been prepared in connection with Appellant’s 

2010 burglary conviction. Id. at 5–6. See Commonwealth v. Macias, 

968 A.2d 773, 778 (Pa. Super. 2009) (when pre-sentence reports exist, it is 

presumed that the sentencing judge was aware of relevant information 

regarding defendant’s character). 

Nothing in the trial court’s sentencing decision demonstrates that the 

court misapplied the law, or exercised its judgment for reasons of partiality, 

prejudice, bias, or ill will. To the contrary, the trial court observed that 

Appellant’s rehabilitative needs would be better served in the state system. 

And, while the court stated that the situation concerning Appellant’s son was 

not relevant to its sentencing determination, it later mentioned that this 

factor weighed in favor of the sentence recommended by the 

Commonwealth, rather than the longer sentence that it was contemplating. 

Thus, Appellant would not be entitled to relief on his challenge to the 

discretionary aspects of his sentencing. Accordingly, we affirm. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/20/2015