NIST Special Publication 1000-5

June 2004

Progress Report on the

Federal Building and Fire Safety

Investigation of the

World Trade Center Disaster

Volume 4

Contains Appendices G, H, and I

« J WS3 1 National Institute of Standards and Technology • Technology Administration • U.S. Department of Commerce
i
NIST Special Publication 1000-5

June 2004

Progress Report on the

Federal Building and Fire Safety

Investigation of the

World Trade Center Disaster

Volume 4

Contains Appendices G, H, and I

June 2004 -

U.S. Department of Commerce

Donald L. Evans, Secretary

Technology Administration

Phillip J. Bond, Under Secretary for Technology

National Institute of Standards and Teclinology

Arden L. Bement, Jr., Director
Disclaimer

Certain commercial entities, equipment, products, or materials are identified in this document in order to describe a procedure or concept adequately or to trace the history of the procedures and practices used. Such identification is not intended to imply recommendation, endorsement, or implication that the entities, products, materials, or equipment are necessarily the best available for the purpose. Nor does such identification imply a finding of fault or negligence by the National institute of Standards and Technology.

Disclaimer

The policy of NIST is to use the International System of Units (metric units) in all publications. In this document,

however, units are presented in metric units or the inch-pound system, whichever is prevalent in the discipline.

Use in Legal Proceedings

No part of any report resulting from a NIST investigation into a structural failure or from an investigation under the

National Construction Safety Team Act may be used in any suit or action for damages arising out of any matter mentioned in such report (15 USC 281 a; as amended by P.L. 1 07-231 ).

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 1000-5

Natl. Inst. Stand. Technol. Spec. Publ. 1000-5, 1,054 pages (June 2004)

CODEN: NSPUE2

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON: 2004

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov — Phone: (202) 512-1800 — Fax: (202) 512-2250

Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001
Master Table of Contents

Volume 1

< Table of Contents

List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

IVletric Conversion Table

Preface

Executive Summary

Chapter 1 Interim Findings and Accomplishments

Chapter 2

Progress on the World Trade Center Investigation

Chapter 3

Update on Safety of Threatened Buildings (WTC R&D) Program

Chapter 4

Update on WTC Dissemination and Technical Assistance Program

Volume 2

Table of Contents

List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

Metric Conversion Table

Appendix A

Interim Report on the Analysis of Building and Fire Codes and Practices

Appendix B

Interim Report on Development of Structural Databases and Reference Models

for the WTC Towers

iii
Table of Contents

Appendix C

Interim Report on Analysis of Aircraft Impact into the WTC Towers

Volume 3

Table of Contents

List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

Metric Conversion Table

Appendix D

Interim Report on Preliminary Stability Analysis of the WTC Towers

Appendix E

Interim Report on Contemporaneous Structural Steel Specifications

Appendix F

Interim Report on Inventory and Identification of Steels Recovered from the

WTC Buildings

Volume 4

Table of Contents

List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

Metric Conversion Table

Appendix G

Interim Report on Significant Fires in WTC 1, 2, and 7 Prior to September 11, 2001

Appendix H

Interim Report on Evolution of WTC Fires, Smoke, and Damage based on Image Analysis

Appendix I Interim Report on Assessment of Sprayed Fireproofing in the WTC

Towers—Methodology
June 2004 Progress Report

Volume 5

Table of Contents

List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

IVIetric Conversion Table

Appendix J

Interim Report on Experiments to Support Fire Dynamics and Thermal

Response Modeling

Appendix K

Interim Report on Subsystem Structural Analysis of the WTC Towers

Appendix L

Interim Report on WTC 7

Appendix M

Interim Report on 2-D Analysis of the WTC Towers Under Gravity Load and Fire

Volume 6

Table of Contents

List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

Metric Conversion Table

Appendix N

Interim Report on Analysis of First-Person Accounts from Survivors of the WTC

Evacuation on September 11, 2001

Appendix O

Interim Report on Telephone Interviews

Appendix P

Interim Report on Emergency Communications

Appendix Q

NIST's Working Hypothesis for Collapse of the WTC Towers
Table of Contents

This page intentionally left blank.

vi
List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

AAPOR American Association of Public Opinion Research

ABC American Broadcasting Company

ACI American Concrete Institute AISC American Institute of Steel Construction

AISI American Iron and Steel Institute ALE Arbitrary-Lagrangian-Evlerian

AMCBO Association of Major City/County Building Officials

ANSI American National Standards Institute ANSYS fmite element model

ARA Applied Research Associates, Inc. ASCE American Society of Civil Engineers

ASHRAE American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air-Conditioning Engineers, Inc. ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers

ASTM ASTM International

AWS American Welding Society

BOCA Building Officials and Code Administrators

BOCA/BBC BOCA Basic Building Code

BPAT Building Performance Assessment Team

BPS Building Performance Study

BSI British Standards Institution

C/F cancer free CATI computer-assisted telephone interviews

CBR chemical, biological, and radiological

CBS Columbia Broadcasting System

CERF Civil Engineering Research Foundation

CFD computational fluid dynamics

CIB International Council for Research and Innovation in Building and Construction

CII Construction Industry Institute CNN Cable News Network
List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

l^CllllaJv I^ClClJvd. l^ClCloUn, IIIC

\^ r Kj ppTitr^il nroppQ^iTi CT unit

CUT \_ i\ 1 cdiiivjU-C 1 ay Luuc

V_ 1 JjocUrl 1 /^iiTir'il /~\ n loll t-i iiil/Hinrrc ciniH 1 [ fr\ o T^ 1—1 o r^i irii" V„UUI1L11 Oil 1 all DUllUlllgb dllU UlDall rldDllal

LUClilClClllo Ui UlClIIlal CApdllblUll

DlaZ-CLjlllClU. LJ\^/ r illC piUlCCHVC lllbUlallUll

U-CaU lUaU. DTAP niccprninfition ij.idadiiiiiaii\jii aiiu. finn tpr*nnip?il i^k^iiiiiL'ai acQictatipp adoidiaiic^ vwnovciTin L/i\j^iaiii

niTicrgcnLy ivicuicdi ocrvicc

FlVfT JDiIlcigCliCy IVlCUlLal 1 Calll

1 , 1\ CV . 1 FRT rCUCldl DUlCaU Ui 111 VCaliyallUIl

PP A nux Lurcu dieiNcw 1 uiK v^iiy riic ucpdriiiiciii

r uo rirc i-zyiidiiiicb oiiiiuidiui FF IlllllC CiCiilClil FF A Tinitp plpTTipnt ?in?i Ia/qi Q iiiiiic ddiidii aiiaivoi^

FF^/^ iiniic cicinciiL niouci

PFN/T A recicidi jj/iiicrgency ividiidgcincni rvgciiLy

P

Q

r*^t~\t^ 7 \^ii^^iol oc o

o

vr* r\ ( /^t*n Fdciury iviuiudi ivCbCdrLii v^urp.

MiT"o xll^n 1 r»^n iT"o Tni"Ot*TQr*o

r V ivi FlIlllC VUlUIIlC IViClllUU nPT irrw/o'm mon f i imi c n oH Tn Tr\t*m cif i r\n vJU VClimiCllL F UllllbllCU llllUlllldllUll

nlQcc rwfc^f rrlocc gldSS UVCl gldbb

vjnz (Ti no ri OT^''7 glgdllCllZ

n\/lQ TIP vjiisdnz iViuiTdy oiciiccK,

H A 7 ViOqI" 0TTO(^i'O/l "v/^n o ncdi diicClcU ZUllC

ilU^VJ ]-Tncrr^ Miip IN Uv NpnTin'f"7Pr OL-llllU-lZ-Cl J_<aol Piict HRR heat release rate HVAC heating, ventilating, and air conditioning

lAQ indoor air quality

IBC International Building Code
June 2004 Progress Report

ICBO International Conierence oi Building Oriicials

ICC International Code Council

IMTI Integrated Manufacturing Technology

JFK John F. Kennedy International Airport

JIS Japan Industrial Standard

LERA Leslie E. Robertson Associates

LES Large Eddy Simulation

T T LL live load

LSTC Livermore Software Technology Corporation

MBC BOCA National Building Code

MCC Municipal Code of Chicago

MPI Message Passing Interface NBC National Broadcasting Company

NBFU National Board of Fire Underwriters

NCSBCS National Conference of States on Building Codes & Standards, Inc NCST National Construction Safety Team

NEMA National Electrical Manufacturers Association

NFPA National Fire Protection Association

NIBS National Institute of Building Sciences

XT T CT" NIS

I

National Institute of Standards and Technology

NYC New York City

NYCBC New York City Building Code

NYCDOB New York City Department of Buildings

NYPD New York City Police Department

NYSBC New York State Building Construction Code

P.L. Public Law

PANYNJ Port Authority of New York and New Jersey

PAPD Port Authority Police Department

PC&F Pacific Car and Foundry

PDM Pittsburg-Des Moines

PONYA Port of New York Authority

R&D research and development
List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

RWDI Rowan Williams Davis and Irwin, Inc. SBCCI Southern Standard Building Code

SDL superimposed dead load

SDO standards development organization

SEAoNY Structural Engineers Association of New York

SFPE Society of Fire Protection Engineering

SFRM spray-on fire resistant material or sprayed fire resistive materials

SHCR Skilling, Helle, Christiansen, & Robertson

SI metric

SLB short legs back-to-back

SMA Shielded Metal Arc

SOD Special Operations Division

SOM Skidmore, Ownings & Merrill

SPH Smoothed Particle Hydrodynamics

SQL Structured Query Language

SWMB Skilling, Ward, Magnussen, and Barkshire

TL Truss Lower Chord

TM Truss Middle Chord

TU Truss Upper Chord

UBC Uniform Building Code

UL Underwriters' Laboratories, Inc. use United States Code

USM United States Mineral Products Co.

VCBT Virtual Cybernetic Building Testbed

WABC WABC-TV New York

WCBS WCBS-TV New York

WF wide flange (a type of structural steel shape now usually called a W-shape). ASTM A 6

defines them as "doubly-symmetric, wide-flange shapes with inside flange surfaces that are substantially parallel."

WNBC NBC4 New York . WNYW F0X5 New York

WPIX WPIX-TV New York

WTC World Trade Center
June 2004 Progress Report

WTC 1 World Trade Center Tower 1 WTC 2 World Trade Center Tower 2

WTC 7 World Trade Center Building 7

xi
List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

Abbreviations

bvuy + nliiQ r^r tnitiiiQ

°c til WW3 V_'Wli31Lii3

LlC^ICCo 1 CliiiWllllCll

1 1 m m11 1 protnptpt* 11VI VJlllVlVi 2D two dimensional

3D three dimensional

cm centimeter

ft font

ftcrB aCCCiCIctllL/ll \^V<X\\\.yj

(J- 5

(jratn ^1 dllX

gallon

h hour

in111.

kiloffram

kip t\ *strf*<s*\ unit pnual to 1 000 noiinds

kJ kiloioiile kN rwlHJllC k' 1 1 on p\V

AVAtHJIl on

kPa kilonascal

1 000 nnnnrlQ

ksi 1 ,000 pounds per square inch

kW kilnwpitt IVllW W dll kW/m^ kilowatts ner souarp mptpr

T

1 - litpr

lb pound

m meter ^. m' square meter

mm millimeter -~

m/s meters per second
June 2004 Progress Report

min

MJ megajoule

ivur a

mf^cT^rs detect I mph miics per nour ms microsecond '

iVl w

IN lie W lUll Pa T\Q cr*ci 1 pabCal

pel

Plf pounds per linear foot

psf pounds per square foot

psi pounds per square inch

s second

xiii
List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

This page intentionally left blank.

xiv
Metric Conversion Table

To convert from to Multiply by

AREA AND SECOND MOMENT OF AREA

square foot (ft")

square inch (in")

square inch (in')

square yard (yd")

square meter (m")

square meter (m")

square centimeter (cm")

square meter (m")

9.290 304 E-02

6.4516 E-04

6.4516 E+00

8.361 274 E-01

ENERGY (includes WORK)

kilowatt hour (kW * h)

quad(1015BtuIT)

therm (U.S.)

ton of TNT (energy equivalent)

watt hour (W * h)

watt second (W * s)

joule (J)

joule (J)

joule (J)

joule (J)

joule (J)

joule (J)

3.6E+06

1.055 056 E+18

1.054 804 E+08

4.184E+09

3.6 E+03

1.0 E+00

FORCE

dyne (dyn)

kilogram-force (kgf)

kilopond (kilogram-force) (kp)

kipd kip=10001bf)

kipd kip=10001bf)

pound-force (IbO

newton (N)

newton (N)

newton (N)

newton (N)

kilonewton (kN)

newton (N)

1.0 E-05

9.806 65 E+00

9.806 65 E+00

4.448 222 E+03

4.448 222 E+00

4.448 222 E+00

FORCE DIVIDED BY LENGTH

pound-force per foot (Ibf/ft)

pound-force per inch (Ibf/in)

newton per meter (N/m)

newton per meter (N/m)

1.459 390 E+01

1.751 268 E+02

HEAT FLOW RATE

calorieth per minute (calth/min)

calorieth per second (calth/s)

kilocalorieth per minute (kcalth/min)

kilocalorieth per second (kcalth/s)

watt (W)

watt (W)

watt (W)

watt (W)

6.973 333 E-02

4.184 E+00

6.973 333 E+01

4.184 E+03

XV
Metric Conversion Table

To convert from to Multiply by

LENGTH

foot (ft) meter (m) 3.048 E-01

inch (in) meter (m) 2.54 E-02

inch (in) centimeter (cm) 2.54 E+00

micron (m) meter (m) 1.0 E-06

yard (yd) meter (m) 9.144 E-01

MASS and MOMENT OF INERTIA

kilogram-force second squared

per meter (kgf * s''/m) kilnpram ^kc^i 9 806 65 F+00

pound foot squared (lb *ft^) kilogram meter squared (kg * m") 4.214 011 E-02 pound inch squared (lb * in") kilogram meter squared (kg * m") 2.926 397 E-04

ton, metric (t) kilogram (kg) 1.0 E+03

ton, short (2000 lb) kilogram (kg) 9.071 847 E+02

MASS DIVIDED BY AREA

pound per square foot (lb/ft") kilogram per square meter (kg/m^) 4.882 428 E+00

pound per square inch

(not pound force) (lb/in") kilogram per square meter (kg/m^) 7.030 696 E+02

MASS DIVIDED BY LENGTH

pound per foot (lb/ft) kilogram per meter (kg/m) 11 .TOO 488 164 1 V/" F+00 i—i'\J\J

pound per inch (lb/in) kilogram per meter (kg/m) 1 785 797 F+01

pound per yard (lb/yd) kilogram per meter (kg/m) 4 960 546 F-01

PRESSURE or STRESS (FORCE DIVIDED BY AREA)

kilogram-force per square centimeter (kgf7cm") pascal (Pa) y.oUO OD E,+U4

kilogram-force per square meter (kgf/m^) pascal (Pa) y.ouo dj t+uu

kilogram-force per square millimeter (kgf/mm") pascal (Pa) 9.806 65 E+06

kip per square inch (ksi) (kip/in") pascal (Pa) 6.894 757 E+06

kip per square inch (ksi) (kip/in~) kilopascal (kPa) 6.894 757 E+03

pound-force per square foot (Ibf/ft") pascal (Pa) 4.788 026 E+01

pound-force per square inch (psi) (Ibf/in') pascal (Pa) 6.894 757 E+03

pound-force per square inch (psi) (Ibf/in^) kilopascal (kPa) 6.894 757 E+00

psi (pound-force per square inch) (Ibf/in^) pascal (Pa) 6.894 757 E+03

psi (pound-force per square inch) (Ibf/in^) kilopascal (kPa) 6.894 757 E+00

xvi
June 2004 Progress Report

To convert from to Multiply by

TEMPERATURE

degree Celsius (°C)

degree centigrade

degree Fatirenheit (°F)

degree Fahrenheit (°F)

kelvin (K)

icelvin (K)

degree Celsius (°C)

degree Celsius (°C)

kelvin (K)

degree Celsius (°C)

T/K = t/°C + 273.15

t/ °C « t /deg. cent.

t/°C = (t/°F2 32)/1.8 T/K = (t/°F + 459.67)/l.

t/°C = T/K2 273.15

TEMPERATURE INTERVAL

degree Celsius (°C)

degree centigrade

degree Fahrenheit (°F)

degree Fahrenheit (°F)

degree Rankine (°R)

kelvin (K)

degree Celsius (°C)

degree Celsius (°C)

kelvin (K)

kelvin (K)

1.0 E+00

l.OE+00

5.555 556 E-01

5.555 556 E-01

5.555 556 E-01

VELOCITY (includes SPEED)

foot per second (ft/s)

inch per second (in/s)

kilometer per hour (km/h)

mile per hour (mi/h)

mile per minute (mi/min)

meter per second (m/s)

meter per second (m/s)

meter per second (m/s)

kilometer per hour (km/h)

meter per second (m/s)

3.048 E-01

2.54 E-02

2.777 778 E-01

1.609 344 E+00

2.682 24 E+01

VOLUME (includes CAPACITY)

cubic foot (ft^)

cubic inch (in^

)

cubic yard (yd')

gallon (U.S.) (gal)

gallon (U.S.) (gal)

liter (L)

ounce (U.S. fluid) (fl oz)

ounce (U.S. fluid) (fl oz)

cubic meter (m )

cubic meter (m^)

cubic meter (m^)

cubic meter (m^)

liter (L)

cubic meter (m^)

cubic meter (m^)

milliliter (mL)

2.831 685 E-02

1.638 706 E-05

7.645 549 E-01

3.785 412 E-03

3.785 412 E+00

1.0 E-03

2.957 353 E-05

2.957 353 E+01

XVll
Metric Conversion Table

This page intentionally left blank.

xviii
Table of Contents

List of Tables G-ii

Appendix G

Interim Report on Significant Fires in WTC 1, 2, and 7 Prior to September 11, 2001 G-1

G. 1 Background G

G.2 FDNY Fire Reports and Fire Investigation Reports G-1

G.2. 1 Fire Record Forms G 2

G.2. 2 Overview of Fire Incidents 1970-2001 from FDNY Records G-3

G.2. 3 Fire Incidents Occurring in WTC 1 G-5

G.2.4 Fire Incidents Occurring in WTC 2 G-8

G.2. 5 Additional Fires Involving the Deployment of Standpipe Lines in WTC 1 and 2 G-9

G.2. 6 Fire Incidents Occurring in WTC 7 G-10

G.3 Summary G-10

G.4 Attachments to This Fire History G-1

G . 5 Conclusions G-1

G.6 References G-12

Attachments G-A.1 through G-A.3

Numeric Codes Used in the Fire Reports G-1

Attachments G-A.4 through G-A.7

Fire Reports Produced by the FDNY G-29

G-i
List of Tables

Table G-1. Categorization of WTC 1, 2, and 7 fires from FDNY records G-3

Table G-2. Significant fires in WTC 1 extinguished by sprinklers and/or multiple standpipe lines G-5

Table G-3. Significant fires in WTC 2 extinguished by sprinklers and/or multiple standpipe lines G-8

Table G^. Significant fires in WTC 7 extinguished by sprinklers and/or multiple standpipe lines.... G-10

G-ii
Appendix G

Interim Report on Significant Fires in WTC 1, 2, and 7 Prior

TO September 11 , 2001

Fires occurred in World Trade Center (WTC) 1, 2, and 7 prior to September 11, 2001. This appendix

documents the facts of significant fires in the building after first occupancy as they relate to the

performance of the automatic sprinkler, manual suppression, fire detection, and smoke purge systems.

The ultimate goal of this review was to identify from New York City Fire Department (FDNY) records

significant but not well known fires for ftarther study.

G.1 BACKGROUND

The fire protection engineering department of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey

(PANYNJ) maintained records of all significant fire events in the WTC buildings. These records were

lost in the collapse of the towers.

Two significant fire events involving WTC 1 are well known. On Februgry 14, 1975, a fire started on the

1 1th floor of WTC 1. Workers reported the fire to WTC police headquarters. When police reached the

fire floor, they reported a serious fire and ordered the heating, ventilating, and air conditioning (HVAC)

system be placed into the smoke purge mode. Fire spread through unprotected floor openings in utility closets. Fire damage occurred on floor 10 through floor 19. Approximately 800 m' (9,000 ft") of the

floor 1 1 contents were destroyed or damaged. At that time, sprinklers had not been installed in the office spaces. However, fire barriers divided the floor into quadrants. The fire on floor 1 1 was confined to the

southeast quadrant. Fire damage on other floors was confined to the utility closets. The fire was

extinguished by FDNY. More details about this fire incident can be found in Powers (1975), Lathrop

(1975), and a report that is being prepared for the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)

by Hughes Associates.

At 12:18 PM on February 26, 1993, a bomb exploded in an underground parking garage of the WTC complex. The explosion occurred on the B2 level in the area of the garage under WTC 3 and

adjacent to WTC 1. The explosion resulted in a loss of normal electric power in WTC 1 and WTC 2. HVAC systems shut down. Smoke spread throughout WTC 1 and to a lesser extent in WTC 2. More

details about this fire can be found in Isner and Klein (1993a, 1993b). The only historic record of smaller

fire incidents in WTC 1, 2, and 7 known to this investigation are the fire reports and fire investigation

reports prepared by the FDNY. These reports were provided to NIST by FDNY for use in this investigation.

G.2 FDNY FIRE REPORTS AND FIRE INVESTIGATION REPORTS

The FDNY released 397 Bureau of Operafions Fire Reports and 112 Bureau of Fire Investigation Records

(Fire Marshals' Reports) which served as the basis for a summary of the fire history in the WTC 1, 2, and

7. NIST obtained reports of fires for the period of 1970-2001 and fne investigation records between

1977 and 2001 for WTC 1, 2, and 7, which in total, consisted of over 500 documents on which to report.

G-1
Appendix G

These records included all responses to fires in buildings 1 , 2, and 7 by the FDNY. All of these records

consist of standardized forms that may be supplemented with other materials. Many were for minor fire events, such as fires that were extinguished by occupants before FDNY arrival. These were not of

interest for this investigation. The records of significant fires were identified.

Significant fire incidents were those that exercised the fire suppression systems, specifically multiple

sprinklers or multiple standpipes (with or without the activation of at least one sprinkler). These fires will

be discussed individually, organized by the building in which they occurred. In addition to these fires, generalized facts relating to those fires involving the use of one standpipe line and one sprinkler and the use of one standpipe line will be provided throughout this report. As an aside, the majority of fire records

for significant fires documented the performance of the detectors and sprinkler systems, but almost all reports lacked information about the performance of the smoke purge system.

G.2.1 Fire Record Forms

Depending upon the type and date of the incident, a specific fire report form was used by the FDNY to document the incident. For each type of emergency responded to by the FDNY, responders either

completed a form that would describe a structural fire (BF-24) or a form that would describe any other

type of emergency (BF-25), such as a nonstructural fire, transportation fire, and/or any other non-fire

emergency. For this historical summary, only those events logged and organized under the structural fire form, 345 documents total, were of interest and used. A structural fire form is a one-page document

(unless additional information is recorded on separate sheets) that gives valuable information about the

fire event on various subjects, including:

• Alarm-the date and time of the received alarm

• Injuries and casualties-the numbers of each for the incident

• Extinguishment-details of the sprinkler and standpipe performance

• Ignition-information on the equipment involved in ignition, the form of the ignition source, the material type and form that was ignited, and the ignition factor (cause)

• Structure-information on the class of construction, the use of the building, and its status (vacant, occupied, under construction, etc.)

• Fire origin-the fire location and classification

• Fire extension-the means of fire extension and number of buildings/vehicles involved

• Damage-information on the damage done by flame, smoke, and water

• Detectors-the type, power source and performance of the detectors in the fire area

Each subject of the incident is given a set of codes or numbers that correspond to any incident, and in order to read the fire records successfully, an understanding of the codes is necessary (see

G-2
Interim Report on Significant Fires in WTC 1, 2, and 7 Prior to 9/1 1/01

Attachments G-A.l, G-A.2 and G-A.3). For the nonstructural B-25 record forms, the only fire related subjects included are the injury and casualty numbers, ignition, and structure information.

Depending upon the date of the fire incident, certain information is lacking from the structural fire form.

Before 1980, a different record form for structural fire incidents was used which left out the following

subjects: fire extension, damage, detectors, and portions of the ignition data. Because of this, detection

data are not available for the majority ofthe fires occurring before 1980.

G.2.2 Overview of Fire Incidents 1970-2001 from FDNY Records

Table G-1 contains the categorization of all structural fire incidents contained in the FDNY records for WTC buildings 1, 2, and 7 available to this investigation. The table contains information on the category

of fire incident (whether or not the detection and/or sprinkler systems activated), the time period over which the fires occurred, the numbers of records in that category, and a descriptive statement about the

category.

Table G-1. Categorization of WTC 1, 2, and 7 fires from FDNY records.

tVTCl

Category Dates Number Generalization of Incidents

No detection, no

sprinkler

1980 2001 66 Unattended food/appliances, overheated elevator equipment, discarded material, welding

operations, electrical failure and suspicious fires No detection information and no

sprinklers

1970-1979 79 Trash can fires, discarded material, food on stove,

electrical failure, overheated equipment

Detection, no sprinklers 1980-2000 57 Unattended food/appliances, overheated elevator equipment, discarded material, welding

operations, electrical failure [Detection] and

sprinklers

1977-1999 18 Suspicious, electrical failure, discarded material fVTC2

Category Dates Number Generalization of Incidents

No detection, no

sprinkler

1980-1999 37 Discarded material, welding too close, overheated

equipment, suspicious, elevator motor No detection information and no

sprinklers

1975-1979 40 Discarded material, fire in office furniture, trash can fires

Detection, no sprinklers 1981-1999 40 Food on stove, small elevator fire, electrical

failure, suspicious, overheated equipment

[Detection] and

sprinklers

1977-2000 5 Mechanical failure, suspicious

WTC 7 Category Dates Number Generalization of Incidents

No detection, no

sprinkler

2000 1 Trash can fire/discarded material

Detection, no sprinklers 1990 1 Electrical switch on floor - explosion

[Detection] and

sprinklers

1988 1 Suspicious

G-3
Appendix G

All FDNY records provided to NIST, unless the records were not readable, contained relevant

information about the type and performance of the suppression system. Because of this, reports of

incidents in which the sprinkler system activated can range from 1970 to 2001. When the table lists "[detection]" in brackets, this is meant to symbolize that either detection was present or no information on

detector performance was included on the form (as is the case with the older records). An attempt was made to compare all investigation records with the fire reports, especially those which activated the

suppression system. Looking at the records in Table G-1, it is clear that only 24 fires activated the sprinkler system from 1970-2001 from all three buildings. Many of the other structural fires without

sprinkler activation were labeled as suspicious, trash can fires, electrical failures, unattended

food/appliances, or overheated equipment.

In order to report on significant structural fires occurring in WTC 1, 2, and 7, the FDNY records had to be

reviewed for those incidents that activated sprinklers, detectors, or were extinguished by hose line and

those smaller fires that self-extinguished or could be extinguished using a fire extinguisher. The

structural fire incidents without detection information (before 1980), had to be reviewed to locate any

fires that activated the sprinkler system.

The retrofit installation of sprinklers into WTC buildings 1 and 2 was accomplished in two phases.

During the first phase in 1976, sprinkler risers/mains were installed throughout WTC 1 and WTC 2. Sprinklers were installed to protect corridors, storage rooms, lobbies, and certain tenant/PANYNJ spaces. In the second phase of the retrofit from 1983 to 2001, sprinklers were installed in all remaining places in the complex (PACO 2002; shown in Attachment G-B). Prior to the retrofit only the sub-grade areas and

selected hazard areas were protected by automatic sprinklers. This retrofit proceeded throughout the buildings as much as practical when other renovations of the office spaces were underway, such as when

change of tenants occurred.

After the installation of the sprinkler risers in 1976, tenants had the option of providing sprinklers or compartmentation for fire protection in compliance with Local Law 5. It was therefore possible that during the period of time when retrofit installation of sprinklers was under way, a fire that occurred may

or may not have been in an area protected by automatic sprinklers.

The forms used by the FDNY after 1 987 give a detailed description of the event and whether or not a system was present at the time of the fire; however, a fire recorded before 1987 will give data only on the number of sprinklers opened. Because of this, an effort was made to look through all reports, especially

those that mentioned detection performance, in order to identify fires involving the use of standpipe lines by the FDNY as an alternate indication of a significant fire.

The next section of the report will highlight significant fires occurring in WTC 1, 2, and 7. The

significant fires will be described individually by WTC building, and organized by the date on which they

occurred in the building. In addition to these significant fires, ( 1) the fires that activated one sprinkler

head and involved the use of one standpipe and (2) the fires that involved the use of only one standpipe,

due to the number of incidents, will be generalized as to the nature of the incidents and the procedures

followed by the FDNY.

G-4
Interim Report on Significant Fires in WTC 1, 2, and 7 Prior to 9/1 1/01

G.2.3 Fire Incidents Occurring in WTC 1

After reviewing all the FDNY records of fire incidents in WTC building 1 since 1970, the significant fires were selected. There were 12 significant fires found for WTC 1, and the fire reports are included in Attachment G-A.4. Table G-2 provides a summary of the fire incident information from FDNY records,

which is followed by individual paragraphs about each incident.

Table G-2. Significant fires in WTC 1 extinguished by sprinklers and/or multiple

standpipe lines.

Significant Fire

Incident Date Fire Location# Sprinklers Activated

# Standpipes

Used Cause of Fire

Material

Ignited

1 9/9/77 B-6 level storage room2 0 None listed Not listed

2 9/23/77 Dumpster on B-4

level

2 0 Not

classified

Trash/waste

3 10/16/81 19th floor office area 2 Discarded

material

Furniture

4 12/23/83 2 dumpsters on B-4

level

2 1 Suspicious Trash/waste

5 1/27/85 Office space on

mezzanine level (Floor 2)

2 1 Incendiary Trash/waste

6 9/10/85 Garbage dumpster in service elevator lobby on floor 432 1 Suspicious Trash/waste

7 11/1/85 Storage closet on B-4

level

3 1 Suspicious Supplies/ stock

8 6/7/86 Dumpster fire on

floor 106, compactor room on floor 107

2 1 None listed Trash/waste

9 9/30/91 Office on B-4 level >1 2 Discarded

material

Trash/waste

10 11/19/91 Electrical closet on

floor 93

0 2 Short circuit Electrical wire or cable

insulation

11 7/23/92 Level B-5 at the power distribution panel0 2 Electrical

failure

Electrical wire or cable

insulation

12 11/10/99 Computer room on

floor 104

3 >1 None listed Plastics, electronic equip

Key: > symbol denotes that at least one of the units of the suppression system was used (and not specifically identified by the

fire report); - indicates that the report acknowledges 0 sprinklers open; however, due to the date of the fire, the space may not have had a sprinkler system installed.

G-5
Appendix G

Significant Fire #1

On September 9, 1977, at 1 1 :04 p.m., the FDNY received an alarm for a fire in the B-6 level storage room

at the address of WTC 1 . The fire activated two sprinklers, and was noted to be extinguished before the

FDNY's arrival.

Significant Fire #2

Another fire occurred on September 23, 1977, at 1 1:48 p.m., in a dumpster on the B-4 level of WTC 1. This fire also activated two sprinklers, and the FDNY noted that the fire had been extinguished prior to

their arrival. ' ^

In both cases, no injuries or casualties resulted from these fires, and the damage was confined to the area of origin.

Significant Fire #3

Six years later, on October 16, 1981, at 7:12 p.m., a fire occurred on floor 19 of WTC 1. The FDNY

noted that they used two standpipe lines to extinguish the fire and that one person was evacuated from the scene. Again, the fire report notes that no sprinklers opened, but does not note whether or not sprinklers were present at the time of the fire. Given the date of the incident, sprinklers are not expected to be

located on floor 19. The fire was caused by discarded material and involved furniture in an office area of

the floor.

Significant Fire #4

Six years later on December 23, 1983, at 2:50 a.m., the FDNY responded to an alarm of fire and heavy

smoke conditions on the B-4 level of WTC 1. The FDNY found two dumpsters fully involved in separate

locations on the same floor and noted that the two activated sprinklers extinguished a major portion of the

fire. The FDNY extinguished the rest of the flames by stretching hose from the standpipe system. Again, no injuries or casualties resulted from this fire. The cause noted on the report was suspicious and the damage was confined to the origin of the fire.

Significant Fire #5

On January 27, 1985, at 8:53 p.m., the FDNY was called for a fire located in an unoccupied office on the mezzanine level of WTC 1 . Two sprinklers contained the incendiary (involving arson) fire consuming

trash paper/waste. When the FDNY arrived, they extinguished the remaining fire with one standpipe line. Building and content damage was confined to less than 15 percent of the space. Also, no injuries or

casualties were reported.

Significant Fire #6

Eight months later on September 10, 1985, at 4:05 p.m., the Port Authority Police informed the FDNY on

arrival of a sprinkler flow and smoke condition on floor 43. A medium smoke condition was report by

the FDNY on floor 43, where a fire was extinguished by two sprinklers. The fire report notes the use of

one standpipe line; however, this was used during the overhaul process. This fire originated suspiciously

G-6
Interim Report on Significant Fires in WTC 1. 2. and 7 Prior to 9/1 1/01

in a garbage dumpster in a service elevator lobby. There was no building or content damage as well as no

injuries or casualties reported.

Significant Fire #7

On November 1, 1985, at 4:05 a.m., the FDNY was called for another suspicious fire producing heavy

smoke on the B-4 level under WTC 1 anci WTC 2. This fire occurred in a storage closet of the men's

bathroom, and the FDNY noted that three sprinklers activated to keep the fire under control until their

arrival. Upon arrival, the FDNY extinguished the remaining fire in the closet area with one standpipe

line. Again, the damage was noted to be confined to the area of origin.

Significant Fire #8

Less than a year later, on June 7, 1986, at 9:49 a.m., the FDNY received an alarm for a heavy smoke

condition on floor 1 10. For this call, fires were burning in two separate places; a garbage dumpster on

floor 106 and the compactor room on floor 107. Sprinklers were noted in operation in both locations and

seemed to control the fires, until the FDNY could complete extinguishment with one standpipe line on

floor 106. There was no report of injuries or casualties for the previous two fires.

Significant Fire #9

An additional fire occurred in WTC 1 where multiple standpipe lines were used along with the activation

of the sprinkler system. This fire occurred on September 30, 1991, at 6:32 p.m., in an office on the B4

level. The fire report noted that the sprinkler system operated; however, there is no mention of how many

sprinklers or even their activation in the Operations/Comments section of the report. Two 1 3/4 in. or

larger hose lines were used by the FDNY to extinguish this fire. The cause of the fire was abandoned

material (cigarette) igniting boxes/carton material in an office. The fire damage was confined to the area of origin and smoke damage was confmed to the floor. There was one uniformed officer injured and no

civilian injuries or casualties.

Significant Fire #10

A fire occurred on November 19, 1991, at 6:27 pm., and two 2 1/2 in. standpipe hose lines were used by

the FDNY. The FDNY responded to WTC 1 for this fire due to a report of fire and smoke condition in

electrical closets on possibly four floors (floors 93-96) and an alarm transmitted from floors 93-98.

According to the fire report, the sprinklers were in service, but did not operate for this fire. The noted

cause of this fire was a short circuit and the material that was ignited was electrical wire or cable

insulation. The fire and smoke damage was confined to its area of origin (electrical closet). Two

occupants were removed from stalled elevators during this incident, and occupants were evacuated from

the scene, although an exact number is not given. Also, two occupants were injured and required first aid.

Significant Fire #1

The FDNY responded to WTC 1 on July 23, 1992, at 10:02 p.m., due to a transformer fire on the 5th sub

basement level. Firefighters found a fire situation in a large power distribution panel, where a firefighter was knocked unconscious by a shock blast from the panel. Similar to the fire in November of 1991, two

2-1/2 in. standpipe hose lines were used by the FDNY on this fire. The cause of the fire was an electrical

G-7
Appendix G

failure and the material ignited was electrical wire or cable insulation. No appreciable damage is noted.

As mentioned earlier, one firefighter was injured as well as three civilians.

Significant Fire #12

The final fire associated with WTC 1 was one that occurred on November 10, 1999, at 11:01 p.m., in a computer room on floor 104. The FDNY noted that the fire was "knocked down" by three sprinklers

when they arrived and they completed extinguishment with a line extended from the standpipe. The

flame damage was confined to the area of origin and computer equipment was involved in fiaeling the fire. There was one injury and no casualties reported in the FDNY record for this fire.

Table G-2 presents the 12 significant fires in WTC 1. Five of the 12 fires occurred on the basement

levels and two occurred on the upper levels (above floor 100). The causes of these significant fires include suspicious, discarded materials, and electrical failures.

G.2.4 Fire Incidents Occurring in WTC 2

Table G-3 presents the significant fire occurring in WTC 2. There were three significant fires found for WTC 2, and the fire reports are included in Attachment G-A.5. Table G-3 provides a summary of the

fire incident information from FDNY records, which is followed by individual paragraphs about each

incident.

Table G-3. Significant fires in WTC 2 extinguished by sprinklers and/or multiple

standpipe lines.

Significant

Fire

Incident

Date Fire Location

# Sprinklers

Activated

# Standpipes

Used

Cause of

Fire

Material

Ignited

1 5/19/75 Floor 32 3 Incendiary Trash/waste

2 4/12/77 Duct work over

grill in restaurant on

floor 107

2 0 None listed Duct work

3 3/22/93 Fan motor room

on floor 108

2 0 Mechanical

failure Notclassified

- Indicates that the report acknowledges 0 sprinklers open, however due the date of the fire, the space may not have had a sprinkler system installed.

SiRnificant Fire #1

A fire occurred on May 19, 1975, at 9:38 p.m., on floor 32 of WTC 2. The FDNY noted that they used

three standpipe lines to extinguish the fire and that the Port Authority reported occupants trapped on

floors 3 1 and 32. The fire report notes that no sprinklers opened, but does not note whether or not

sprinklers were present at the time of the fire. Given the date of the incident, sprinklers are not expected

to be located on floors 3 1 and 32. The fire was labeled as incendiary and involved trash/waste. The

FDNY stated that the fire involved the core area of the floor and was confined to that area. Over 20

people (civilians and uniformed personnel) were injured by this incident.

G-8
Interim Report on Significant Fires in WTC 1, 2, and 7 Prior to 9/11/01

Significant Fire #2

On April 4, 1977, at 1:15 p.m., the FDNY was called to WTC 2 for a fire in the duct work over the grills in a restaurant on floor 107. The FDNY record on this fire noted that the fire was extinguished prior to its arrival. The damage was confined to the area of origin, and the fire caused no injuries or casualties.

Significant Fire #3

The second fire occurred on March 22, 1993, at 8:39 a.m., and caused a smoke condition on floor 108. The fire activated two sprinklers due to an overheated bearing in a fan motor room on floor 108. The

damage to the area did not exceed 15 percent of the space, and there were no injuries or casualties

reported.

Table G-3 presents the three significant fires in WTC 2. No fires were discovered in WTC 2 where

multiple sprinklers or standpipes were used with another suppression system. Two of the three fires occurred on the upper levels (above floor 100) and the other occurred on floor 32. The causes of these

significant fires included incendiary and mechanical failures.

G.2.5 Additional Fires involving the Deployment of Standpipe Lines in WTC 1 and 2

The fires described in this section (3 1 in total) involve the use of one standpipe, with and without the activation of one sprinkler for WTC 1 and WTC 2. Four of the 3 1 reports describe fires that were

extinguished with one sprinkler and one standpipe line (see Attachment G-A.6.1). Three of these fires were located in WTC 1 between the years of 1986-1991 and the other in WTC 2 in 1981. Two of these

fires occurred in basement levels, one occurred on floor 106 of WTC 1, and the last on floor 5 in WTC 1. In some of the fire reports, the FDNY noted that the sprinkler controlled the fire, and the standpipe was

used to actually extinguish the remaining fire. Half of the fires were labeled as incendiary/suspicious, one was an electrical failure, and the last was unknown.

In addition, 27 of the 3 1 fire reports describe fires that were extinguished using one standpipe line (see

Attachment G-A.6.2). Twenty of these fires occurred in WTC 1 and the other seven occurred in WTC 2. A majority of these fires (19) are labeled as incendiary/suspicious or unknown, while the other causes of

the fires are attributed to short circuits, abandoned material/cigarette, welding close to combustibles, and

a mechanical failure. The dates of occurrence for these fires range from 1973-1999, with a majority (23)

occurring between the years of 1973-1985. These fire incidents did not result in any casualties, but five civilians and one uniformed officer were injured.

Two of the 27 fires involved a 300 person (April 19, 1980) and a 1,500 person (April 17, 1981)

evacuation. These will be described in further detail. On April 19, 1980, at 2:06 p.m., the FDNY

received reports of an activated smoke detector in the return air duct on floor 106 of WTC 1. The FDNY

also received reports of heavy smoke on floor 106, light smoke on floor 109, and heavy odor of smoke in stairways A and B. The report notes that while only one standpipe was used, approximately 300 people were evacuated from the Windows on the World restaurant on floor 107 via stairway C (which was clear of smoke). The fire cause was labeled as abandoned or discarded material and involved plastic material.

This fire did not cause any injuries or casualties.

G-9
Appendix G

On April 17, 1981, at 9:18 a.m., the FDNY was informed of a fire on floor 7 and a smoke condition on

floors 7 through 1 1 of WTC 1. The FDNY hooked up one standpipe and extinguished the fire located in an air conditioning unit in the "MER" room on floor 7. The cause of this fire was labeled as a mechanical

failure. The fire report notes that the Port Authority personnel reported an evacuation of approximately

1,500 people from floors 9 through 23. However, no injuries or casualties were reported from this fire.

G.2.6 Fire Incidents Occurring in WTC 7.

Table G-^ presents the significant fire occurring in WTC 7. There was one significant fire found for WTC 7, and the fire report is included in attachment G-A.7. Table 4 provides a summary of the fire incident information from FDNY records, which is followed by an individual paragraph on the incident.

Table G-4. Significant fires in WTC 7 extinguished by sprinklers and/or multiple

standpipe lines.

Significant FireIncident Date Fire Location# Sprinklers Activated

# Standpipes

Used Cause of Fire

Material

Ignited

1 5/20/88 Construction shanties on floor 3

Multiple, # not

listed

1 Suspicious Shanties

Significant Fire #1

In WTC 7, a fire occurred on May 20, 1988, at 12:38 a.m., in the construction shanties on floor 3. Although the fire report does not specifically note the number of sprinklers that activated, the operations

notes state that Ladder Truck 10 found the sprinklers (noting more than one) in operation and shut them

down. The FDNY had to complete the extinguishment by stretching a line from the standpipe to the fire source. This fire is noted by the report as being suspicious in nature and the flame damage was confined

to the area of origin.

It is possible that the fire incidents that were not specifically highlighted, especially those in the areas without sprinklers, involved other methods of extinguishment before FDNY arrival, such as a WTC

houseline (pre-connected standpipe hose), hand extinguisher, or bucket of water, as noted on some of the

FDNY reports. All other fires, the majority, included in other categories were either self-extinguished,

extinguished prior to FDNY arrival (by staff, etc.), or a hand extinguisher was used by the FDNY.

G.3 SUMMARY

In summary, 16 significant fires occurred in WTC 1, 2, and 7, with 12 occurring in WTC 1, three in WTC

2, and one in WTC 7. In addition to these, 31 fires occurred in WTC 1 and WTC 2, which involved the use of one standpipe (with or without the activation of one sprinkler). Of these additional 31 fires, 23

occurred in WTC 1 and eight occurred in WTC 2. The following paragraphs will summarize findings

fi-om the 16 significant fires that occurred in all three buildings.

After reviewing the 1 6 significant fires, trends developed relating to the time of day that the fires occurred. Overall, 12 of the 16 fires occurred between the hours of 6 p.m. and 4 a.m. The fires that occurred during office hours (between 7 a.m. and 6 p.m.) included a dumpster fire in the floor 43 elevator

lobby (WTC 1), a dumpster fire on floor 106 (WTC 1), a kitchen fire on floor 107 (WTC 2), and a bearing

overheating in the fan motor room on floor 108 (WTC 2). Almost all of the incendiary (arson) and

G-10
Interim Report on Significant Fires in WTC 1, 2, and 7 Prior to 9/1 1/01

suspicious fires (5 out of 6 fires) and unclassified or unlisted fires (4 out of 5 fires) occurred after business

hours (before 7 a.m. and after 6 p.m.).

In addition to the time of day of the fire, trends in the cause of the fire and the materials involved in the

fire can be highlighted. Of the 16 fires and their causes, five were labeled as unlisted or unclassified, six as suspicious or incendiary, two as discarded material, and three as an electrical failure or mechanical

failure. For the material involved in the fire, eight reports noted trash, waste, and supplies; two reported not listed or not classified; one reported furniture; three reported electrical equipment; one reported duct

work; and one reported shanties were the material involved in the fire.

Lastly, the location of the fires throughout the buildings was of interest. Of the 1 6 fires, four fires were

concentrated above floor 100 or and six fires were located in the basement. The others (6 fires) were

spread throughout the rest of the building.

G.4 ATTACHMENTS TO THIS FIRE HISTORY

Attachments G-A. 1 through G-A.7 are included as a supplement to this report. The first three sections,

G-A.l through G-A. 3 are explanations of the numeric codes used in the fire reports by the FDNY.

Attachment G-A. 1 is included to explain the codes for the fire reports produced prior to and including

1980, Attachment G-A.2 is included to explain the fire reports produced from 1981 to May 31, 1987, and

Attachment G-A.3 is included to explain the fire reports produced fi-om June 1, 1987, to the present. The

report code explanations are divided into the same sections as the fire report and give short descriptions

for the numbers used in the fire report under each section. For example, if the ignition factor for a fire occurring in 1990 was given a number code of 54, the reader can find that the cause of the fire was a "short circuit, ground fault."

Attachments G-A.4 through G-A.7 include the actual fire reports produced by the FDNY on the

significant fires highlighted in the sections above. The reader can use Attachments G-A.l through G-A.

(depending upon the date of the fire) to read the fire reports in more detail than what is provided in this

fire history report.

G.5 CONCLUSIONS

From the information contained in FDNY fire reports and fire investigation records provided to NIST, 47

fires occurred in WTC building 1, 2, and 7 that were of sufficient size and duration to activate multiple

sprinklers or were estimated by NIST to be capable of doing so, over the time period the buildings were

occupied. This total does not include the major 1975 office fire in WTC 1 or the 1993 bombing.

The records indicate that in areas protected by automatic sprinklers, no fire activated more than 3

sprinklers. Three sprinklers would provide coverage for a floor area of approximately 63 m*^ (675 ft^). This area is much smaller than the 800 m" (9,000 ft") damaged by the 1975 fire in an office space

unprotected with automatic sprinklers.

Many of the fires that occurred were recorded as suspicious or unknown in cause, occurred during off- peak work hours, and involved materials such as trash or paper-based supplies. In cases where sprinklers

G-11
Appendix G

were activated, the FDNY records indicated that the sprinklers either extinguished the fire completely or aided in controlling the spread.

G.6 REFERENCES

Isner, M. S., and T. J. Klem. 1993a. Explosion and fire disrupt World Trade Center. NFPA Journal.

National Fire Protection Association. 91-104.

Isner, M. S., and T. J. Klem. 1993b. World Trade Center Explosion and Fire, New York, New York,

Februaiy 26, 1993. Fire Investigation Report. National Fire Protection Association. Quincy, MA.

PACO Group. 2002. World Trade Center General Description ofAll Building Systems and the Capital

Program. August.

Powers, W. R. 1975. One World Trade Center Fire New York, N.Y., February 13, J 975. National Fire

Protection Association. Boston, MA. 1-15.

G-12
Attachment G-A.1

Explanation of Numeric Codes Used on Fire and Emergency Reports -

Prior to 1980

G-13
Appendix G

CU^SSIFICATIOM OF BDILOING

BY USE

CO^^MEBC^^l.

01 Bank

.02 Brewery

03 Coal Pocket

0< DepartjaenC Store

05 Electric Power Plant

06 Factory :Hulti occu- pancy

07 Factory: Single

Occupancy

OB Foundry

09 Freight Pepot

10 Garage: Non-Storage

11 ' " Storage

12 Gas Works

13 Umber Yard

14 Motor Vehicle P^pair

Shop

15 Office Building

16 Oil Selling Statlcn

17 Oil Storage Plant

18 Pier, Hharve, Dock, Bulkhead Building

19 Restaurant, Diner

20 Shed, Newsstand, Shanty

21 Shipyard, Drydock

22 Stable

23 Steam Generating

plant

24 Store Building, Taxpayer

25 Warehouse, Storchous-s 26 Store Building > Private Dwelling

39 Other Comoiercial

4C Mn^ort Building

41 A-ylun

42 Bridge

43 Bus Teralnal

44 Church, Synagogue

45 Dance Ball, Banquet Hall

46 Dispensary, Clinic

47 Ferry Terminal

Covemjncnt Building

(Not otherwise classified) ; 48 City

49 Intersate

50 Federal

51 Foreign

52 State

53 Hospital, Inflnoary

54 Nursing Home

55 Railroad Station

56 School; College,

University

57 Private High

SB Public High

59 * Public Junior High

60 " Private Ele- mentary

61 School: Public Elementary

C2 • Children**

tUrsery

63 Other

64 Television S'-idio 65 Theatre, Legitimate

66 Theatre, Motion

Picture

67 Transit SyrtM -

Statlor. Structure

SB Tunnel

69 Other Public

RESIOENTIAI.

80 Apartment Hotel "A* 81 Apartjncnt House "A" 2 Boarding House, Room

ing House "B*

83 Convent, Rectory, Monastery, etc.

84 Dormitory-School

Club , LAdge

85 Hotel "B*

86 Lodging House *B* Motel

Pvt. Dwelling: 1 Family

" Two Family

Teneoent: New Law "A'

• Old Law "A* Converted Dwelling "A" Other Residential

87

88

89

9091

92

99- BOILDINC STATUS

1 Occupied

2 Partly Occupied,

Good Condition

3 Partly Occpuied, De- teriorating

4 Vacant

5 Under Deiiolition

6 Under Construction

DAHfiCEttoBuildinq or Contents )

0 Kone-No Appreciable

1 Light 0-15%

2 Medium 16%-49t

3 Heavy 50 t & Greater AMA FIRE ORGIH -FLOOR

34 Living Room

35 Lobby

36 Machinery Room' 37 Office Area

38 Operating Laboratory

Area

39 Partition

40 Porch

• 41 Projection Booth

42 Recreation Area

43 Roof

44 Sales Showroom Display Area

45 Shaft-Duct, pipe

46 Shaft-Dumbwaiter

47 Shaft-Elevator

48 Shaft-Exterior Light

49 Shaft-Interior Light

50 Shaft-Vent

51 Shipping Receiving

Loadina Area

52 Stage

53 Stairway

54 Storage Room Area

55 Vacant-Roon, Apzurt- ment or area

56 Work Area Workroom

57 Other Areas, Not

Classified (State

area) AREA FIRE ORIGIN-OCCWANCY

CLASSIFICATION

0001

to

94

9596

S7

Outild* (ulldlng

Isc riaor

94 th and Riigber Attic

Bascacnt

Cellar

Sob-cellar

COMMERCIAL

Factory:

00 Chemicals

Clothing:

01 Dresses

02 Dnderganaent

03 Other (State Type)

04 Dry Cleaning Laundry

05 Electrical Pro»'.ucts 06 Food t Drink Products

07 Furniture

08 Furs, Fur Goods

Rats:

09 Men's

10 Women's

11 Leather, Leather Products AREA FIRE ORGl:i-RDOM OR AREA 12 Machine Shop Hetal

works

10 Area i:ot Building 13 Paints

11 Attic 14 Paper Products

12 Awning IS Petroleua Products

13 Balcony 16 Plastics, Rubber

14 Basement 17 PrintinglAllied Ind15 Bathroon Toilet ustries

16 Bedroon, Sleeping 18 Shoes Area 19 Textl les

17 Ceiling 20 Toy or Doll

IB Cellar 21 Woodworking

19 Chimney 22 Other Factories not

20 Classroom Lecture Area

classif ievKstate type) Store

21 closet U 23 Auto Aoccssories

22 Cockloft 24 BaXer/

23 Court-Exterior 25 Butcher

24 Court-Interior 26 Cand^, Cigar, Stationery

2i Dining Room, Dining 27 Clothing Area 28 Dtfart-rcnt, large

2S Duct-Air CoDditioa- 29 Department, small (StlQ) ing 30 Dry Cleaner ( Tailor

27 Duct-Exhaust 31 Drug Flooring

32 Electrical Appliances

28 33 Fruit i Vegrjtables

29 Furnace Room 34 Furniture

30 Hallway-Private 35 Grocery , Dairy , Deli31 Hallway-Public catessen

32 Incinerator CI set ^ 36 Haberd*9hcry

or^ Room 37 Lddies Accessories

.33 Kitchen, Cooking 38 Laundry

Area 39 Faint Hardwa.-e

(2)

G-14
Interim Report on Significant Fires in WTC 1, 2, and 7 Prior to 9/1 1/01

40

4X

42

43

44

45

46

47

48

49

SO

SI

52

53

5455

56

57

SB59

Reatarttant Luncheonette Shoe Shoe Repair

Super Market Tavern Other Stores not classiEieiHstate

type)

Garages

Non Storage

Storage

Oil .Selling Station Motor Vehicle Re- pair Shop

Office Buililing Warehouse: Fil«

Paper, Rags,Fibre Other (state type)

Freight Depot

Pier

Shipyard

Luaber Yard

Shed, Newstaod, Shanty, etc. Other Commericial

Building Occupancies, not classified (state

type)

RgSIDEWTTM.

60 Apartment Ikatel, Multiple DMclling'A'

51 Apartment Hoose, Mul- tiple Dwellxng'A'

52 Boarding Hoose , Rooming House Multiple

Dwelling "o" 63 Hotel, .Multiple

Dwelling "B"

6 4 Lodging Eocse.M'jltiple DweUing'B*

65 Private Dv/elling 66 Rectory , Convent, Monastery

67 Tenement Hoose, Mew I,aw, Molti- pla IVelli^ 'A* 68 Teneacnt House, Old

Law, Multiple

Swelling

69 Gther Rcsi<iemtial, not classified

(state type) POBLIC

09 Shaft-Air, Light,

Chute, Duct, etc.

10 Ceiling

11 Window

12 Other (state how)- ClASSIFICATION BY TYPE FIRE

OR EMERGENCY TH.WSPORTATI0N PITES

87 Ship, Vessel

88 Itotor Vehicle

89 Other Transportation

(state type) MOW-STRUCTURAL flKES

86

9091

92

93

'94

95

96

98

99

ADV (Abandoned/

Derelict Motor

Vehicle)

Bonfire

Brush, Grass

Demolition Wood,

Building Site

Dunp , Land Fill Rubbish-Outside

Building

Ma:\hole N.Y. Transit SystenYard Roadway , Ties

,

etc. Railroad-Yard, Roadway, Ties, etc. Tunnel, Bridge

Other Non-Structural, not classified

(state type) EMERGENCY

02

03

0405

07

08

09

1011

12 70 Airport 13

71 Cabaret, Baaquet Hall 14

72 Churcb

73 Dance Ball IS

74 Bospital

75 Motion Pictare 16 Theatre 17

7* S.T. Transit

Systea-Statixm 18

77 Passenger Depot

78 School 19

79 Theatre 20

80 T.V. Studio 21

•1 Ot>ier Public, not classified (state 22

typ«) 23

24 MANNER EXTENSION 25

CO Confined to area 26

of origin 27

CI Cockloft 28

C2 Door or opening between ro<xs

03 Floor

94 Hall Stairway

OS Partition

OS Pipe Recess

07 Shaf t-Dujnbwalter

08 Shaft-Elevator

Chimney

Elevator, Escalator

Explosives Escort

First Aid - Assist

Person (s) First Aid - Resucitation

Marine

Precarious Condition

Signs, Trees, etc. Subway- Rail road Hater Lea)c Borab-Unexploded

,

Scare Collapse-Cave in Collision -Vehicular

Incident Controlled Fire,

Peraitred

Flood ConditionBroken Water Main

Incinerator

LeaJi-Fuel Oil, Gasoline

etc. Leak-Illum, Gas, Flaa,

Vapor

Lightning

Oil Burner

J>ex5on Locked in. Locked out Power - Electrical

Pressure Rupture

Refrigerant l.eak Snoke Condition,

Odor, Fumes Sprinkler

Steam Discharge Other

(3)

G-15
This page intentionally left blank

G-16
Attachment G-A.2

Explanation of Numeric Codes Used on Fire and Emergency Reports

From 1981 to May 31, 1987

G-17
Appendix G

Typ+i ol fl«fiort

1 SUUctusl

i TfSASjxinsiiwi fvv. 3 Men SiiucliXBl fnt

4 EtnmemGy ftesjlpilM. 5 FbIm AJiim- 6 flCdiitiinstiJaiJiiw 8f ''1*1

I Siiecl 8iB Manual.

3 V«fb|l.

5 CIm 3-V»Kit. PF/L C Lira 3-(hli3- AuiBfinic PF*

7 Cl8« 3 -fas B S?IMt Era fHS. 3 Clan J-Hnruat. fO(*y.

11) F^-s.recofdnd Wwm.

Inttuil Abira 0 Stro* Cal omet Iriaii tipiB (Hii-No Chsl.

; B«i (StirtI H Clsu .11 6 Senas' Ca> {sgi* flnlf -No Chiai. R 5«ttii( (CIn) OpceM

M SiiS

Highen Alorn 0 Isnial Warin

1 Wore tHenilH liiliil A'^J'n A Issi Ihanl EnipsM a 3

IsAtt Co. m wcik. J 2nd AIM.

3 3iil Atom

5 5111 Warm

? Sig,!^ 7-5. HW tuinguiahal) 0 ffliirs Artwal

1 nmi f ilmiu'i.'iifs.

2 Sfisiktei Ifn.iclj IS lie Ni^nfaerl.

3 Swnef 5 tie are

i LiM f'MSSJte llifdtiil Stie9<n. 5 Ona IV;" ar largff hemline tiQfn pujmnnq uml oi a

itjiifi^iit oufet, ratatiSsss ol Sjh Hnninsiijfi ICfjn ticK.nj NurHc Hiii Vmpi Eldi^ Mutli Va^ial. LaS<l«

Pipe, T.'L, K>arn 91t

)

5 TV(«-1 « lBiB»r li»!el»« J3 .9*^w

7 lhr«ff.l%" Of larger hoaeliftes oi sbovo

6 fni! sf mara I or IjTir hflMlinss » stwe.

'J Olhci IStdte Hatel:

igniiior Sap-Termiiittlaii St»9<

3 Sreolile; St»j«. bitatt wn fiBmc. 3 Rsmfi Staja. 0 tl(idu!ciirmii_i] ti ital (irfvrfnd

EDUlPMCilT IHVOLVED IH teMTIOR

I I teritrsl hcaino ww.

12 H!lti h?a;ei. 13 Vifed, n31um.Tiy Inc.^ hflslini) ufti )d llin;ijnc« 15 Puiurite hKel haalirtg unit. Ctranmy. gas «^ Hub

t7 thirnHiir unaeclix, nan unrHdw.

1^ Hta: iraicsf?T irntm.

IS llMiiiig !YS!tm nol c]S3sl''«il tc-'J

10 Heating rfjtpm. iimJrt?m7mHj.

CiJiliing Er|ii>!>iTiBnl 21 fiiiri. ntrioniif lurtnc* unii. 21 h«ed 3totV)r«/- owik

Z3 Fiml. fclnlBueaif fooil woiiiinQ applancii.

23 farist!^ coskiii, ivsrmnt mit.

21- iBEP Va grit.

S?' ronk'rng tf^sprmsll ml ciaisiliod flbovB. 3r CooVlnfl, B!]'jipniam, irMJaietwiBd.

H« C<)(lll!l!«i^iag, ItafriggisliDii (i|iiipimt«l

31 Cmiial at cunditBunna. leiiigCTJiioii mHipiMm,

.3? WiiM cooIkvj tieTie*, >nw«.

3.1 Filri, IWIioMiT local lalnjilltar WliL W Ttfrf, ilalicpjiy IocjI *' tll^)ill^^n»1g urur 35 Portabls si tnndiliwKn), (alojeralion uit 35 All ctnijitioiidg, f<lhgiralnn (iqnlpiiiMir nni

i;|^u.u{ifid a^ave. 30 fc( tsodtimwB. lel'UMalffln eipiiiiinaiil, cjn- daurfMied.

CiMlitcjl DiittjbyljM EqBipirert

4 1 f irieil' winig, TlMlSlsmtJ. a^roCTalBl am^twimi a ittonract

43^ Weter, nwlin hui 44 piTHur svjitcli g#!H, Dva'cursnE pr^T«cTi(m deificas. 4!> Swilch. iGLeplada, acillaL 4c> l>i,^iiir>o fiitun. Itmphaldcf. ballati, 47 Hnrft plug.

I Mip, ligiil bulb. 49 tletlf»CS( ^ij^rrljutMn equ[nienl, nol dussi^ipd

4G (licwicei dislnbuiton eqwrnunt. ttfiAtlftfiiliflad,

51 Telewijian. <s*ii. (Sionojw*.

"

52 Oryer 53 Warliinj mjitwnp

b6 Sqiiiiiili: Ataw. gefsni^t. Hamj toolj.

fj? Portatjfl ippltawrc (teaigned Id [iroducE cwiSidk-d

htas, ParlBblS acp^nrn iL-u^netl not to proriixa Ssat.

bSi ActiAataa, tqiipfram rxi classilitil 51 ihnvgji G8. 50 AppJjKlctJ. equiprnenl, i^cklwnwFd

61 flet!tsiuc aquipmen'L B7 Vanrfinfl mBclnic. iloptiug Pistifllwi 63 Olfis machias.

66 Sq^aiDi-a iKjinfi. canfuassoi. BE Coiriuiiion t^gina. 6? Comrrfnr

EC- PriMillS by SpL'ri;d eqinfuntrl. flot cUssitiad Ahova DC Spacisl o01«S.T,eiit, untasTmei. Prouuing tqiilpnwit

71 Fu'Wir*. njsn, liBli 72 CuwiQ. fwJduifl, l(BB«l Ptuiimwiit Hyjt Itifiilifiii «|iBpmeni. T4 V(«fk.itt9, i.'iaptng mschmc. Jb Coalmj raorliina

7fi PsnTw^ equipfnanL 77 Chwnicsl ptccen t5urpnimL 78 WostB nrtiwrnj nwiipflieiiT 79 Pracivic^ tquipn«il. net dmilied atmc. 70 PtocmsBifl rqtipnnfit. iiisd«lcirt'iift<i(l.

81 Ircifwiim.

23 ftacrifw, diargsr. 84 Tarpm. lai keiik. 85 Ate. id lamp ^6 ClevKM. 8/ Torchai. S«fkiu, iniHnisrij'iM oq<jipnmil, lal cluslWd

80 Sep»ici;. cuatnlEOonta BqiKpcmnl. unArtmmnmi ^hss Olbj^, Ex{fc«Mra Fin

9 1 Sa^b slo, I limnvod nipuuirg 9? SepalHS. dtlMM IXIKUbrt. S3 Soraia'tf, (KiiowH'.fl OTjmUFT. 94 Aiiathad tfciaaad tipum

95 AubcViI. unpiotrclci] aipusu^e

93 Mo CQUlkiiort ri<rAllr«i- 99 nihci ati^l, eipusute \ht rUT ddiSiM tlkM.

9fl OAier oliiacl;. axpcatiFC lire. Oft EqiiipPiSffl inrelfKl in ifiiliOT v^nirmiii gr Ml

FOBM Of Htar or iguitiom

Haat Uom fvat'FirvA. (hoI Pnvacrvd Object

1 1 Sfsul, amlie-. Han* (MitMlQ frOITI QltlMltd t^MC. num.

I 2 tteit Irem (utW aniupinpnl 13 SpaiV. emte, flM« bhehrj irflm kijuKi l«i«d tqupmanl. 14 Heat IrcHn Iquid lueled tiju^ijrwfti

I B Hrs)i Itenii 1D&1 lutlfj oiiupmeM

T / i^iuffl, ewba. Flann*. escaping fram ei]ui;inieor fuail nnl known.

I a Heal Iron s^iwnsfli: lutl rvil iinimn. 19 He^l Irvn luti fiiid. Pudpawtitd dlfMI til daiubad *bDvi. IQ Irorit luiH F»wl. fuel pc^eifil «*j<c(. on. SetPTTHiwU. Hui (rem Elactriul CqiaipiniiM Arcin], DvtrlctM

21 Wjlur >;i)u-ud sliiirl cutuil Arc. ?? Sfjflfl circuit afC liDfn itieChanrcal dailMge.

7 3 Shcn circuit acc Irnn d«fccii*B, laroin inwilaiiai 2* IjrtsjecHitiJ short circuit sec, 25 Arc Imni fauli» citniatl, lotss tunnetiBB, bfjkeri carxk;clor 23 ire. ipart Irqm oqrial^T^r ryiiipmcol or fwitcli r? HujI IfOin mftrkudi?d equlfmenr id rkxMBicmt ligSt baiflast. 29 Hm From »iaciric8l equiprneri arcng evatlaailtd- nil cIsssilKit stove. 2U Heat tiani e^liical ecuifineni arEin9. overloailfd

undBl.?rniine(J

K9BI Irnni Snwiiing Mulniiitl 31 Cifsntne, 32 CvgaT. 33 Pijc,

,1Q Hait iiiKii imaku'is mattna: aidileijninid

Hnal Irgm Dpmi Hajna. Sjuirk 41 CuiTinj t5r;li apMslni'.

i'l Welling, lorch DjieralKjn. tS3 tcKth aprraticm, o'Jict 1li,iit cjlhiiij ar:il wcyirig.

MaliJi.

'.Fj liahter. 4 7 Opea (ic« 43 BDTlilm Irem mleniil cfn*u!lio^ snjuw. 49 Htiar I'Orp (>p<!*> llafTM!, ipark, nol r:Us:if«il abow

40 lltti Irdin open Damt. i^srk. unditenrniKl

Hoat Uvm Not Dbfwt

Hint, ^sik li^in Irinjini 52 Mr^tan, lwi mauiial. 53 Hoi suHxi. isli. El9c1n{ lannp 55 Rdtindle, rtigndla be H/;at firmi ornpcity oiieraiiitq itactiicat equiprTwn. S7 Ikat Irom irrtpfovar*} 0|>»rsting electncal awipiiiBal

5'J Heat frcm hoi oTqcrl. naC c^asSifrcd abovfr 50 Hajt frani hm DlfiKI, nirKlstefinined.

Heal Uttn faploura, Firmorlii ^1 Eaplosiie S2 eisillr>B fsni. B3 FiL-nortj. E4 PacM tap. iMn:^ piwtst,' S5 Modd mckBl, iiol mralmjr rofliJili'ir. S£ IritMAiry datitl. 89 Hw>lfr(iiii M[*MT»c, linwiirts, 111)1 tls3!ilr«l sbovB.

G-18
Interim Report on Significant Fires in WTC 1, 2, and 7 Prior to 9/1 1/01

1

HbsI Iram Nalitral Source

/ ^ suii 1 hBji 72 Sponlsnniij! ttvyy {lien»rt miriKin 73 lilhir<n5 disctMri>r M Sutic iljichafgt- 7S Hrjl Itnm njlurjl tTjict, n\ tiniAii abavf. 7D Htal tram nivsiH i^eitrminrd

Hitt S|Hiillin4 Iroin Jknotliar HHn> Frg Kx

posurti] Bl Hfi31 Ifom 4irtC! llame, rif<itfEc[iDfl cunenji. 87 Rjilulcit taaL BJ H«al 'n?oi flying iH^nd. cmbei. ^p-sk 8* ConJuctid teal

BQ Hsji 4uiuiS<>9 1f»n inorhcH Intslie lire, w

aiim him oi Hmi oI Ignrtiog

?.? WJtipIs ftidns ol firaJ 0< iQTCBI'. 93 niiie< lD:m ol ol UO i-oitii 111 htjt ol ijniritn u«iti?iB»iiiiMl

TVPE OF MAIltlAl IGMITED

Csi

12 IP City gas IIH aii mbl n Manuf»ci>ire<

lb Anc^fi£iic gas. 16 irnylmip

I ' Spk'JUt 5in ifKiilmKL

19 Gis not clasubcd ;ibOrf. >Q Cu.

FIjruublt. Ctrnkuttiblg Isqiil

71 C!zst lA ImnM: liqMat >7 tbit IB Ilimfn3bl> liqiwl

?4 Clats IC Ibmnublc liqud. 2$ II toint»u!;l^e aquiL ?C CUiS IIIA COHlBiTJIil* fcqixl ?" [last 1110 conbiitil*: luiunl

^!l (Liaiiuilt. c»JriusaUt IujikI. nal c)a:iil:<ll tliM

ZU Mdriin.Alc. CD(rllL4lWt l«l>id, i««lsl«iMi«d

Uiiiiilt Solid. Ch«mic«l

31 f r jrcMc Hood!

3: Pol.* 34 AO^^MP. rtfi, t««

:!5 Appliri punt, ysnnsli Cnmsusrible mneJ. 3' SoW (rr«Tiica/ li^iliV fff'l 3& Fi3io»:[i-(e mslcfij^

Vul^'llr Sdlia Checlitol. M rJjiiiM |CCV«

311 v'B'ir^ chcnurai uniJtienninrt.

J I PoIyiHPlliJDt,

I.' foXfiWtlit

4 I 'alTloylic

^0 P'UIIC, wrarinlHfnirigd

Siiuril frtdun

5 ! RliSbC.

S!? learher

jb Cc3l toll- ll/i-iB5ClS!. y*-H ^ ? l-unij <rdTh

7 9 Kilifll 0(WJc<l rs! cUsu'ier! nbxir 5C l^ilo Jl P'aL'ij<l v<ia6:cili»*:intS.

Wcwl, Piper -

6 ; Crowirij wnuiL C7 Felted l>ul Kv.-aniti tvAcd 63 Sjmh wood. B* Wood ibavmss,

TiG rit«ll;«9rd llsw tlrn^itf nnacenj!], i^ood (Xilp

tj? P.ipsf, iiifcaied, ttncoalcd Sa Caiillm.vd.

fiO ?/Md. CapPr. LTUfc-IWHoiiwi

Fibric loililn, Fur

J I Mjn-made Ijbfit. hliet. Isrishttl jOiKjs ?2 CcUrji'-. ijftin. cD"aiwi (ab«:, ftnjshed gMds

73 Wool, yiiat mijlwt (jbric. !inj:had gooit;, 74 fiir. sJk. mte lalaii, linr^iol (pods 75 Wig. ^6 Hiimjo har. 73 fabsic, tn'ite. 'i.^- mil daiiii'iw) ibsre. JO fabfic, crilile. ^iji. iniilfilirii^iMd.

Mvleridl Cumpaundad with Oil £1 Ldslsuni 82 Cil ctulfa %i anditu coalflii paptr. E4 WateijKiijI i.-Hina^ B5 Dif rags.

Sfi flishah !/igie< miitnal 89 M.i^siisl cKiiod'j.ided jviifi Id, not classify* ai^vi;

SI) M3"c"i;H cDjnpoufided wiih *!. undeienwowj.

Othar Typi tl Waitrial Igxi^ail 97 Muliipic Ivi^i" ijl nuKfrJ Hrsi ignited. S3 ^YfK ol innlnbil net A(lpl<Cdli{a S9 lyM «1 malenjl wi i3.i-«aii!d atrnve. flO r>ps ol inatenBl under tcr mined oi lui ri^sTefl.

fURffl ar MArtDIAL IGNITED

Siru'ciiirtI Cemp-inanl. fipltN

1 1 EK'tiiui toul crneiing. Mirlac-B. I^rish. 12 6»l*'ioi sidcwoJl fijsMiiig jujlsce. fifliih.

1 3 E>l<iiM Irin, Bt]UTteii»iicn.

I "I F'fdw covftnog. t'ji^acc. IS l/il^iM wall cct'd'Mg, 9V''.ac? ilems permananilr

.iftiiiil to nail and dom iufltet, IS Ctilinj ;«>t"n|,-. •jkrtK.t 17 S'iuciural irrmbTi. Iiarninii 13 Th«nnV acausiicel imi^lwn willui mM, »y!i1ien

ill riMC'CSiliilJ 3(-ac< 13 SliucliiiJl cor^ntnl. (loish. nal elusilit^ JttH.

10 Suuc^ural cunjy^jiuan. *»iiih, utideiaimined.

Furnitur*

Z1 Upholslcml 50^9, r;li.iii. whlel? tmz.

71 N(ir'j|)l)alsWfEil thaa. bcwf..

?"3 CallinBlrv

Z') littfiii'ii) burd.

Z5 4ppS»aiice JHunniij ui Cdsirtg. ?9 ri/inil-jr: not [lass'lid gOgrc 20 fiiiniiiir<, uiid«ieirTOd.

Soli Saadi.. Wtaring Apparel

31 Maiirisi. |)%w.

32 Bolifcig, WankEi thaei. Mwla/IBI. 33 lifian. other ciijr tpiidiiifl 34 Wcanng apfaieJ nit <in ) |Ki»n.

3G Consii. twid. diixn-'^v. taficuir 37 riKiAi. not tntd; tf. ja liijg.n)'- 3d S^fl guids, wp^iii^j .1|i;i/|ikI nnl clasijli^ abdvt.

."W Sflll goodl. tnSJiirj aBssrjl, ui^-Jriiriniiiiffll

Atofiiirtn't. Raci«aiioR9l Mnlarul

III Chfifiiras fuf

47 fieciKaiioo lor jpecBl nn»l. « J ftct,» dJ Mj^a^aru^ icw%iwi:«. A*i!inCi iiaptf

<i5. Tiiy, fl.i'i^ Id Awninj. canapy, ,

•17 Taijaolij. iiiAi, 49 Si)cninien1. letieatioril rnaienal nij c^jjifiij

^Jwiman. rsc'taiHMl naisiiai. iintfete'rwri Slipplwi. StlLil 5 1 BiMi. 1:111 tiiii. biti). Fi? Bjskel. barfel 53 Pjibl. skid (not in u»*

54 Rcpa. cud. wins. yain. 55 PMkKIJ Wra«i»5 maitfijl.

J7 t:c>rsg<;.

Siipiltei. iiKk wi tlajsifKii aha'if Sugptics, jlxk. uniJclFiiwii.-J.

Poiv«r TrjMl«f Equipmeat Fual

ftl fWlcica' is-iif. cable p^iiilaion.

li^ Triiislome'. C3 Cwvefor bil:. d'ivi fcsH. Vfrelt- CI Tifs. 55 FmI. BU Pw/ar tia.^fef equipim-inL, diol. mA dLwiiFwd abiiw 50 Pwirr tf^n^iifi i^ipirwil, luel undglermincd.

CeikWtl Ftim

7 1 Agririil'uial pri^diiei. 72 fence, pnl*. 73 FeuilijB.-.

7>1 tiffft-mtj, li'^n^ lurni 76 Kiil/li.Ut. iM.vli. waste

7R Caatifig muarials ?7 Sign.

Spacial (urn* ei Umt. Iibn lihl 6'? t'^iQlL'c.lifiii.t. eiplasfuBi mnniind, lapiiirad lioiiid. M r.h„ps. B> r-ailgriraa ihskiis!. nsitfial slored in jsBcis 6& Gas CI lii^ud in oi I'am iuck ci ciKi^oiiicr g? n^nEiii matanal63- Ad!«siie.

Oilktf Tsini ol litdterial 9 7 Wultipli lorm «F maicnsl tgnitsd 9C Fofifi i( matEfiil tot applicable. 90 form ol macgrusl not claisiljcti alicvc UJ ^arIn ill maSL'rtal iHnlpIrtniaii^l nr mil ffiporled

ICfllTiON FACTCH

ln»pdlirir

I 1 hH'nidijiy, 11QI (luAfig dnil ditljrbarc? I? atiiKliiiv, ilui.vis civil Csiurlnncs

Sui|]it'l«liS

'1\ Su-.i>ir»jirt, not doiiufi rivil iHlIu dianr.fr 22 Si.ivii'i^'ii. liiilnj] civil dismrbanie.

MiatiM ef '^tH ol IgnitliR 3 1 Abiiniltiiitd. micardcd rralariil. 3i' Iifwiftiflij

.1.3 'allinq aslwp 34 IradKiiace cincrtl «l wx

3Ei Ctllina. i/r6ldill5 CM tkSie 10. 3C Childrtr with, chad pcymj. 37 'Jkikiscwj. nenttl. phirsicsl mpairmcw

39 Wiswe 01 Iwac ol t^raiim nut claisilnxi »tio>e 30 MiluSE t1 hs5[ 0) iflrwiDP, undtiftinincil.

Misuse »l MdhHiI Ignhgij *! fliH siiiaiMi, ii'iuasn) at.iritmi-i *7 lirHJiniK-l li>rIiiK| CiltlHUIIilftS i3 FLflinniiililir fa]iHil lafid to kind^ fiia. Ill Wjsljeig p.iil, cleaning, iglrfiiiliiftg. pa^ovng, V> Imfrtufifii fjintakisr. 4fi CnniliusSrhlt loo clOSe If licil lmp<opfir siniaga 48 CMHrEn 'A^th, pilii'g Miiuie ol miisfial isiiisi C'assil«if abif.'t' ^0 Minju ol matcnal igniicd. ur.Jclmnir.ciJ

G-19
Appendix G

MsdMnieil Fiilvrs, MtHanctiw 5 1 P«1 laAjie. leak. breaV 52 Automatic uotrol faSuft. 53 Manual control lalhirB. 54 Short cncuit. ground laull. . 55 Other electrical lailure 56 lick of maini stance, worn out. 57 BKkfiie 59 Mechanical failure, malfunction not Hassirad above 50 Mecharucal lajwe, mallunction, undeternvwd.

Dasign. Canitrvctioii. inxtallalioii Defkionqr 6) Design deficiencY 62 Construction deliciencY. 63 Installed loo dose to combuitiUes. 64 Other installation deficiency 65 Property loo dose to. 63 Design, construction, instalation deficiency not

classified alnve 60 Design, conslrvclion. installalion de'idency. undeter nwied

Dpwational Deficianqf

71 CoKsnn. oiertuin. knockdown. 72 Accidemair lurned on. not lurned off. 73 Unaneodeil. 74 Overloaded 75 Spontaneous heating 76 Improper startup, shutdown procedures 79 Operational deficiency not classifted above. 70 Operational deliciency. undetermined.

Natural Condition

e I High wmd.

82 Eaclliquake 63 High water, mchidvig floods. 64 Lighlning. 89 Natural condition not classified above. 80 Natural condition, undetermined.

Other Ignition Factor 91 Aramal 92 Rekindled Irom a previous ht. 99 Other ignition factor not dassified above. 00 Ignition factor undetermined or not reported

Construction Clasi 0 No Buidrng Involved.

1 fireprool Structure

? fire Protected Siruclixe 3 Non fireproof Structure. 4 Wood Frame Struauro

5 Metal Structure G Heavy Timber Structure.

CIsstificalion of Building By Uaa-Csmmarcial

01 Bank. 02 Brewery. 03 Coal Pocket. 04 Oepvtmeni Store 05 Electrical Power Plant 06 Factory: Multi Occupancy. 07 Faaorr. Smfile Occupancy 03 Foundry. 09 Freight Depot 10 Garage: Non Slora^.

11 Garagr Storage

1 2 Gas Works. 13 lumber Tard. 14 Motor Vehicle Repair Shop. 15 Office Building. IS Oil Selling Station

1 7 Oil Storage Plant

1 8 Pier. Wharve. Dock. Bulkhead Building. 19 Reslauranl. dmer. 20 Shed. Newsstand. Shanty

21 Shipyard. Orydock 22 Stable. 23 Sleam Generating Plant. 24 Store Building Tiipayer 25 Wa'ehouse Sicrehouse 26 Siore Building S Prnaie Dwelling. 39 Othp Commercial.

Clissilicitiaa ol Building By Ua-Poblic

40 Airport Building. 41 Asylum. 42 Bndge. 43 Bus Terminal. 44 Church, Synagogue. 45 Dance Hal, Banquet Hal. 46 Dispensary. Cliruc 47 Ferry Temunal

Govetnmenl BuMings-INol othen»is« dawM):

48 City. 49 Interstate 50 Federal 51 Foreign. 52 State. 53 Hospital, bifittnary 54 Nosing Home. 55 Railroad Slat ton. 56 School: Colege, University. 57 School: Pnvale High. ^

53 School: Public High. 59 Sdvol: PuMic Jr. High. 60 School: Private Elementary. 61 School: Public ElBiientary 62 Schoa^ Children's Nursery. 63 School Other 64 Television Studio. -65 Theatre, legitimate 66 Theatre, Mo.tion Picture 67 Transit System-Slalion Structure. 66 Tunnal. 69 Otftw Public.

Ratidtntial 80 Apartment Hotel "A." 81 Apartment House "A

" 82 Boarding House Roomng House "8 " 83 Convent, Rectory. Monastery, etc. 64 Dormitary-School. Ckib, Lodge. 85 Hold -B." 86 lodging House "B

" 87 Motel 88 Pnvate Dwelling; One Family. 89 Private Dwelkng: Two Family. 90 Tenement: New law "A." 91 Tenemenl: Ok) law "A." 92 Converted Dwelling "A." 99 Other Residential

BuiMing Sums

1 Occupied.

2 Partly Occupied. Good Condlion.

3 Partly Occupied. Deteriorating 4 Vacant. 5 Under Oemolilion, 6 Under Conslructiott Dsmagt Ito BuiMing or ContMtsI

0 None

1 1 to 15%.

2 16 to 49%

3 50% or Greater. Ana I ir* Origiii^Fhior 00 Outside Building 01 1st Floor

lu94 94th and H-ghei. 95 Att< 96 Roof. 97 Basement. 96 Cellar. 99 Sub cdlar Ana Fira Origia-Reoia or Arei 10 Area Noi in Building. 11 Atlit.

1 2 Awning

13 Balcony. 14 Basemeni.

15 Bathroom Toilcl.

1 6 Bedroom, Sleeping Area. 17 Ceiling 18 Cellar. 19 Chimney. 20 Classroom lecture Area. 21 Ckisel. 22 Cockloft. 23 Court-Exterior.

24 Coun-lnletior. 25 Oinng Room. Dining Area 26 Oucl-Air Conditioning. 2 7 Ouct-£ihausl. 28 Fboring. 29 Fumaca Room. 30 Hallway-Ptivate. 31 HaHway-Pubkc. 32 Incinerator Cbsel or Room. 33 Kitchen. Cooking Area. 34 Inrng Room. 35 lobby 36 Machinery Room. 37 OlficeAiea. 38 Operating laboratory Area. 39 Partition. 40 Porch 41 Proleciion Booth, 42 Recreation Area 43 Rool, 44 Sales Showroom Display Area. 45 Shaft-Duct. P«ie. 46 ShaM-Dumbwaiter.

47 Shaft-Elevator. 43 Shaft-Eiteriot light 49 Shaft-lnteriof light 50 Shaft-Venl.

51 Shipping Receiving Loading Area. 52 Stage. 53 Stairway. 54 Storage Room Area 55 Vacant -Room. Apartment or Arti. 56 Work Area. Workroom. 57 Other Areas. Not Classified Islate areaAraa Fira Origin-Occupancy Clatailicatioii- Commercial

Faotory: 99 Chemicals.

Cktbing:

01 Dresses. 02 Undergarment. 03 Other Islale lypel. 04 Dry Cleaning laundry. 05 Electrical Products 06 Food & Drink Products. 07 Furmlure 08 Furs. Fur Goods.

Hats: 09 Men's. 10 Women's.

1 1 Leather. UalHer Products.

1 2 Madvne Shop Melal Works. 13 Pwls.

14 Paper Products. 15 Petroleum Products. 16 Plastics. Rubber.

1 7 Printing & Alied Industries. 18 Shoes. 19 TeitDes 20 Toy or Doll. 21 Woodworking. 22 Oiher Factories Not ClassiFied Istatf typel.

Store: 23 Auto Accessories. 24 Bakery 25 Buidier.

G-20
Interim Report on Significant Fires in WTC 1, 2, and 7 Prior to 9/1 1/01

7B School 79 Theatre. 80 T V Simta

81 Oihei PuUrc. Not Classitied (stite type).

Minner Eitinsion 00 nnfined to area of ongm.

01 CocklofI 02 Oooi 01 Opening Between Rooms. 03 Floor. 04 Hal* Slairwiy. 05 Parlitinn OS Pipe Hecess. 07 Shaft DMTibwaiter. 08 Shalt-Elevator. 09 Shatt-Aa. light. Chute. Duct. etc. 10 Ceiling, n Window

1 7 Dihef (Slate how)

9S Manhole. SB N y Trsnsil Syitem-Yard. Roadway. Tiei, etc. 97 Rajlroad-Ya»d Hoadwey. Ties. etc. 9S Tunnel. Bridge. 99 Oihef Non Slivctuial. Not Classified Islite type).

Etmrfeftcy 02 Chimney. 03 Elevalar. Escahtor. 04 tiplojives Escort. 05 Fust Aid-Assisi Pefion()l. 06 Ftsi Ad-Resuscitation. 07 Manns 08 Precarious Coodrtion-Signi. Trees, etc. 09 Subway -Railroad. 10 Water leak.

1 1 Bomb-llneiploded. Scjtc. 12 Collaose-Cave In. 13 Coftsion-Vehicular kKident.

Arta Fire Origin-OecepinCT DiuKicititnIconlinued) Storr

26 Ca«ly. Cigar. Slatnnety 27 Clolhrng. 28 Depviment. large. 29 Oepartmeni. SmallS&IOI. 30 Ory Cleaner & Taio) 31 Drug. 32 Eleclncaf Apptances 33 Ffut & Vegetables 34 Furmtute 35 Grocery. Dairy. Deicilessan. 36 Haberdashery 37 lades Accessories _

38 Laundy. 39 Pjiffl Hardware 40 Restaurant luncheonette. 41 Shoe 42 Shoe Repav 43 Super Market. 44 Tavern. 45 Other Stores Not Classified (stale lypel.

Gerogts: 46 Non Storage. 4 7 Storage 48 04 Selling SUtion. 49 Motor Vehicle Repa« Shop 50 Otfice Bidiing^ WarihMst:

51 Film 52 Pa«er, Ragi. Fibre 53 Other Istiie tyiMl. 54 Freight Depot 55 Pw

56 Shipyard. 57 lumber Vard. 58 Shed. Newsstand. Shanty, etc. 59 Other Conmeroal BuldKig Qoupances Not

Classit«il Isiate typei

Rcsidealial 60 Apariment Hotel. Miitiple Owetnf "A."

61 Apaiimenl House. Multiole Oniefc^ "A

"

62 Boardng House. Rooming House. Multiple Dwelling B

•

63 Hold. Mulliple Dwekng B 64 lodging House Muhiple Owelmg 1."

65 Pmate Dwelnig 66 Rectori. Conrent. Monastery, etc 67 Tenement House. New law. MiApte Dwdmg A 68 Tenement House. OU Law Mull^ DweSng "A.

69 Oihei Residential. Mot C>assil*d bote type!

70 Airport. 71 Cabaret. Banquet Hat

72 Church 73 Dance Hall 74 Hospital 75 Motion Pictuie TheaHe

76 NY Tranrt System-Station 77 Passengei Depot

Numbor el Dccoponcios

01 1 OccuparKy 02 2 Occupancies. 99 99 or more Occupancies.

Buildings

0 did net spread beyond building ol origin.

1 I structure or veNcle. 9 9 or more buildings or vehicles. Mole Form BF 24A must bt submitted lor each building

o< <ehKle ksted in Ibis coded space. Smoke Detector 0 No detector present.

1 lonialion type, power dsconnected or banery removed by occupant.

2 loniiaiion type, provided early warning

3 loniiaiion type, tailed to operate, battery powered.

4 Ionization type tailed to operate, kne voltage power

5 Photoelectric type, power disconnected oi battery removed by occupant

6 PholoHectric type, provided early warning.

7 Phoioeleclric type tailed to operate, battery pnwered.

R Phoioeleclric type, tailed to opeiale. line voltage power 9 Not possible to deiefmne it detector operated or not

Classifintien ky Typ* Fire or Enwrgency

Transportation Fires 87 Slip. Vessel. eS Motor Vehicle 89 Other Transportation (stale type! Noa Stiuctaral Fires 86 AOV lAbandonedi'Oerelict Motor Vehiclel. 90 Bonfire 91 Brush Crass 92 Demolition Wood Building Site 93 Dump, land FiS 94 Rubbsh' Outside Budding

14 Controlled Fire. Permi'tcd.

1 5 Flood Condition-Brokefl Water Mean. 16 Incm^ator.

1 7 leak -Fuel OH. Gasokne. etc.. 18 leak-mum Gas. Flam. Vapor. 19 lightrang. 20 Od Buner

2 1 Person locked In. locked Out. 22 Power -Electncal. 23 Pressure Rupture. 24 Refrigerant leak. 25 Smoke Condition. Odor, Fines. 26 Sprinkhef 27 Steam Discharge. 28 Defective Alarm Device (older than Sprinklerl. 29 Smoke Oelector. 30 Other

Power tor Equipoieiil 01 1 23 volts A C. 02 24 volts A C 1116 volts D C. 12 7 12 vohs O.C. 15 115 vohs AC

28 208 volts A C. 30 220 230 volts AC.

33 231 330 volts AC

34 331 or higher volts AC

SO 25 50 volts A C 61 Butane 62 Coaf. Coke. Charcoal. Peat. 63 Fuel Oil. No 1 or No 2. 64 Fuel Oil. No 3 or No. 4. 65 Fuel Oi. No 5 or No. 6. 66 Gasoline 67 Kerosene 68 IN gas (stored as kguidJ 69 IP gas Islored as iqukSl 70 Natural or ikummating gan <as a gasl. 71 Paper 72 Piofane. ,\ 99 Other.

G-21
This page intentionally left blank

G-22
Attachment G-A.S

Explanation of Numeric Codes Used on Fire and Emergency Reports - From June 1, 1987 to present

G-23
Appendix G

HOW H1-Sll?6S.5.f»&115

K-l TYp-e OP PEj^Bl

Cede Nft

1 SlIUCllQl

Z Tiaiwponaaan fire 3 Hon-Euuctiiral nre

•1 E^iwsesicy flespflflse 5 raise Mitm

B ASdllloMl Ilia (Br.34A}

Code Mil. 10 Iclt-plione K Sired — Manisil

Zl Cfiss 3 — MbthhI

30 Class 3 - P.rA_

31 Class 3 VnWf. Sprlnklni ~ PJA.

3?. Class 3, Othtr Autamjtic - P F.A.

SO Vorhal 60 Pro Riwifflcd T«lftnfionc Aljrm

70 Tl(i I In* (Dlrftcr t Inc to ni-inantis r — Piraire Ccrp .) 80 awftl Bo> - ERS

ai 3 - fUS

JO Cjlite Uk-ihna LmK

Woro- I. P.PA. stands lai Pmnia rim Alarm

'UtGso jtro rccoivixi jrajVag rftn S^Baxr-Tarminni

?. It TtjB ulnim M/Jis Bncovntemtl whUf

rfir.pnn(1Jn^ m or rarumin^ from unuVwr afarm, Jt

if. cr^sifjrMTfKt .1 uf^ftini nijitm

3. A pre-mcofilasiailtiplioivii'tt'm (PflJAf

is vsea la aasJgnale tfumt iL^^ffione islixmt racalvoiS Imnt rircarCing or pre-diniOQl minsMms.

H'flftr/tn/ atacSy lo 9lt. l-illgit tviQpfKfiit m an

alarm sarvtoi

M.3 IIIHIflL MflllH

Code Ha

n KpprJni Dll Oiher Tft^n Ffiome Onl/ — Na CftlSl

1 floJ (Sircci or CS35! 3) r Soicbl Call fngtV Onlv — Hfl Owfit 6 Special Cai; itUM Qmxthti)

s s;iii

mCHtST SLMIM

Cii<Sn Ho.

(1 Inilijl Al?im

^ More Uian ttw lititai AUnr j l«i mm 3 ^coftm i

2 U<iaer Cis. at vrark.. 2 2nd Aljrnv

^ SimunineiKis

7 Slgnsi 7-5

14.S BOBOUiSHS

Ca^Se No.

I Manhattan t BrKis

J Saten Islaca i Brooklyn

5 Ouse.is

n.s KazflRDous h«epials

H.G.t Clasj to be olniiiiHl fram DJ3T. rcquu'Ecl MkfSs

«r placait or ttooi sJiipping [lapecT. O! other docuirsnis W No Hjsrdijyc- Mjieiijls dvolv?*

11 Uasa A. txpl'jsrvts

12 Class 8 E^BIos^'^s

IS DaSS r, CKptflSiilB 15 Basting Sgcnts

Jl Haiiiir.aUi; GzjCi K llnn-riammablc Gases

7"^ nilsnn u.isj:;^ H Chlorine 2b iivf^n

FIRE RECORD CODE LEST

Si Rsr]rrd* Lifics. nasTiH*! WS5gT« or !«s

SI Rar-irr-^ SoSi*

s5 Stwtta.-seotsl;; Cc-rri&js?'* Mssriis

tS Uj|ir'ial5 Bar^tjw ''^

yi vo*«t$

51 ftltSWH BJ Ebclopc nnfedous) Sutislanas 6j Inita^M

71 Ii8di(sctri» I Hslsiiia

72 RaditadrvE 11 VaJenjis 73 Radlssaivi IH Mrxibb

81 Cotrosrus SS ItUiKsit ChxsEs {Fiiiife «iar< ong hazinlaic itatdfSil) 93 Oilier

.2 ftftSsrt S fitil - If* IcOff dirag-isliTiB INs imd

Ol ITH-il-*Cfl)ffS Sfti l Iffi Ins d-ii^a imSotrs Sw

•mscml. £&n9tc, SOW g! ;ac-lm fia'ii be nmccDy coaeiJ c In Hw "Arrjrtmt" lietJ «» Ho Hoiatttoic; Vjy.rul iTTOfrtM

O'l Lryi Bun ' F C'jfec lirt. far p»3 orfy CB C Gsloii

fl iqud a7i£l L isltd 05 100-199 P Pox»i (B 'm-m T Tan lOMtwsgg K iaQ«M9SSS

ID S0,1X>3-ffiia?3

I". iOQOlC ins ran

ia,7 Hjjcrmi; |aDi: inwnn iHvai.irei)- 7yf% DT FUEL asny

Code N&

1. Ktrmesie

2. L P£.

5 Caal G OE

e. CiiESStns

S. OHiet

14J HOW DfTWSULS«HI

Code KcL 0 Briore ATiYji

1 Hard Siwijt-iSfJs-r?.

in Ciperawns Siaiwj

S. Btioser St^ara

e. Ijpw P/EjfVf Hyclr3!i: Smot

5, One >^»' V 'X'SStH I'vi^ i! CTTiaiS UrS or i sUr^JcnK ouS?!, R553tt?B s4 6i"i3 ttiTiiniCen

Udder Pipe Trl. Fc^n Hc3i= B:L;i

5- T»«; f-.i' c- l^ger t3S:»5-»! is aic^.

7. Trres IW* cr hrgsr hc-h^k as jim

E. fc;: cr irii,-5 tU" K fi-jer hcsijnai 2^ s^es?

5 Ch-iw iS^a K'ru'i VS SPBIKKLER PtRFtF.li' Vi'K—II Erinlder^ a-ers

1 fqul^"a*a Opsrss*! 1 Eflulfimrt; In lavbi. Cjj rw ooems

3 EJiUfirtMrt (iftsar fits 14 ssfsn to ooeratc

« S^|jt!fi«t Mifttta. fr^ T>:^ eaiinciiCfMirs 8 tie Ki"crs« (.n«4fi 9 EnifiHtifli trecent . Tict si tKf.-jcc. (Keccri irfcr aterr

<p Ofpi-rsbors Sectwi

pfrlsrTTlSJlCt

1. Sl?J5Spipg SSratHti! JiS U5*S

1

2. Sianaprst pi'ssn; stji not csca

3, Equipinar crsam. iiiit Ifl Mrvics, (Rscoid icScmtaKcn * OwitiMni Sec&fll

14.11 COHDmOM OH ASaillflt CQ^SS

(I My nUiiitltfn oi M

\ Chrartisat i S.TOltJ^tliig

8 fju! 91) A.Tr/^J

14.12 EOUIPMEKT IKVDIVED \H IGHITtOH I KEATUJIi SySTEMS

13. SaLir panel.

II Cancrji tieicing ijwl, Igrmee 11 V^JtH lieater. ij VMwIstwu. yfl* lunacfls. llxttl loai imjihiiii unii M Inflaof flr^ptia)

1.'i PijnjWu toln!! urnl

16, RijmriiY. Das vsrt nun.

I/. Clrmray vsnl carnwor

la Hmi tniKJiif S¥-Ji^li, docl3. pipo.

la «a! SJliilicd ab»i:

2. COflWHO EQUIfMElfT

21 rowf. aniotwrv suiiacc imii. stcwe 22 Hxal. ilaticKLir^ witn 23 HtCiI. sU1ldmr> todd w^rmifiig appllc^wis

.2+ Dt«a fat fri«r 2i FWahifl fjMkuifl. Mrmiiii) uflit ?6 Own fartJ dull Zr GrcM€ liood. dtct. 53 tiel clrfkd show

I »IR COHDmo,'«iMG, HtmiGERSnON EQUIPWINT

31 CenUsJ iLi ctitAt'kmis. relrtflsfattort *f]iilpfiwnt

iii. Viiltiii Gtidli/\fi dri'l{:o. In/iBf 33 CcM ba«5. Iresisrs. icfrigerjtors- 54 Fiited. stiJiciui> iocal nil cuiicliljoninij uriil £5 r\jrtjt*j air ooniiitjoiiiafl. leflrije/ation unit, ctehu- midrlKr.

L aCCTKICAL QISlftlSUIigN EQUIPME^KT

*i rati y^Tflno, BtrW lines, luneiiuri tiaici.

'13 Jrf-i'Ofrnif. wJiCnirtnl ur ili^ramecl equipmetiL

^3, Metsr, cnetEf tcx.

44, Ps^Wf SJriiafi 9SS£ tusiid, Citicflt blfciterS.

45, S'liflliyt. f«iO(lde outlet 48 Lightiiig iiilurc lanip-haldi-i billist. sgn. 4? Cord, plus

48. Limp, Ight tua.

43. Not :ci3^ified jbxa

5. SP1>Ui«SS WUlPKiHT

SU QlSfrftSJtie/. SI- !slOT3i:n, rariia sound or pictiirg. 52. OotSas tfr^wi

53. WaaiisV^ fMclma.

E4 Fcor aft tTjijlfiKn!. iranium,

S5- Sfpar3te> raotai, jeneritac

56. Hard mcls, scbiarinq Itnns, drills

57. C^.nrsHed MECtMplanw, elcetriial bUnke's, stcjm

injn;. rxFJl tSBSS. 55 tlBiSri^jl raarj. tan etsnsrs.

list cisuillsd aboA

6. SPECIAL taUIPHEHI

61 Elearanic cquiprncnl, rsdJC i-racj. corrputcr. IcIC' phone, Irsnsrritfer eq«ipnisnl.

62. VendEH) rnjchisi*, dtfnklrrg ftiursiln. E3 OHics m^.-Jiii;^i

S-i &ic-ri)i;ai?-D ?(iuipii'i!nl, device.

SS. 'Si.'parjt'j pump, rjtppriasiir, Mniu fjinp.

iritsrrial cmpttisiian Hitisw,

fi* Pntning aim.

b9 Nd claosifEd-iibovt

G-24
Interim Report on Significant Fires in WTC 1, 2, and 7 Prior to 9/11/01

2

7. PKdCESSlHC EQUIE^ENT

71. pLiiTiMa, eow, loin. ra. CaRim;, raoltJlj, toeing. 71 HiH tnsatina. <isencli tent M. v»t!iisng.siuplng.ma(*ift?s*As. griftflfiis, sa.ites.

75. Cosirig machiisc. asphill saSurelns- tljbcf spsmlins

nvjthlnts. 76 Piiiiljiifl. <i5pp!iij. sp.'sjiRD.

77. Chemiol pfncfss. (SsSlliiig. 7a VV3SJ9 rscoueiy 79 Moi classiliW sf^i*

3l 5IRV1CE, MAIHTfJUMCf EQUIPMEHT

6t. Indnen;iir

81 RcKilic-, cltirjcr, bSitfy. «. larpDt. tHT bcttt

es. Am. a3 Utio. nuntte.

87 IbfWCj, Uinsen biimeis.

I mUEft CEJEnS, EIPC3URE RRE

96 \fehiclc. dtau-i iysjcro, whictc (urts. 9a No cquiirrEiil inv'olvHj. 99. Other objeo, Cxgidsm Pii^ ncir classified KKnt.

11-13 FpBH OF HSAT CTrriOH

1. Htm fHOW FVSl-FIHEB, FUEL-POWERED OBJECI

dtflerencE oaswi stMi'.i'Sfir 11 ard siibdiwini 1?

IS wtiKtief a !!^1((<. ftnssj ortvmc sHually Exciwd frtwi 916 HiiSpmsJl, a 'iifletry:r it «vi3 amply cwtirirtlirig cl (Wi5(4f 5urfaK 01 tl* ecnpniEil (ol ib mtaral hell) c£;sjng the igi'.itior cl nearby combuslibles.

II Sjart. eratief. fuTM e?M[iiftg lrem on fusled

12. Htj' fiom g«i fueled nj'jipmcnl. pilot lights, normsl

11 Spiri. <rrb6i: fjmt escaping fram fxjuid (ueled eqiipmeni.

14 Htil Imm liquio fueled equipfnenl. pilot liqri!^. 15 itiix. fnwr. OiinK escaping "oi" solid luelrf eqUpmenl.

IS Htii frofn .«lii1 li:elffi! snnipirsm

17 Sb^i*. em;sr f.ime eicioing froir eqiiiprnent. tuil iwt Known.

18. H{5l frwn sgoioment: IMI r,sl l/iwm

19 Km dassiflsd absw,

2. H£AT FRaH ELtCTRICW. EQUIPMHHT ARCmB.

CVERUIADEa

21. Vtilti cjusei! sburt arcurl arc. 22- Short d.iciilt art frojr mEChanisl damag*

23. Shod circuit arc from defectiuei wmt ini«ialijn. 24, ynsocC'iifC snon cmwt arc. S. fur. laij!^ txKilact. loose csnnesicn, braten

ffi Arc. i(>arlN Injrn Pireriung cquipritsnt or s«ilch.

Z7, HtsI tipm jwlculsfl Bqiiipmenl, wires, mntors- 2a FiunrjsEent Sett ballaa. 25 Ucn clM»j(i«1 shave & KEXt FHOM SWOKIHC HATEfttftl

31. CijsrElle. 32- Cigar 31 Pipe. sa Nol clusified a!iove

A Hta maw opeh fume, wrk

i1 Curjog loicli opcialiuii fstpariVig inslals). iZ /A;Wiri5 (oich opfnlion (joi-mj ir^laJs). 13. Bloiv lCTctis-5, p^rrbsrs lordws. Bunssn Burners,

soldeiinj, paint stipfiis 44 Candle. IiJer 45 Mzach. 45 Ujht'.r {fane type] /' Carr.ffjies, tCinirK, ».a,-;r.,- T-irt:. r;ihish lire; a6 E.irKire Iron inrerr.jl conihu5rlci.i «nc|ine. 49 Men cUssified aboi/e

a HEW FROM HOT OBJECf

51. HtiX. Irani friijiari. ovsrhEatsd tiies 52. Mallsn mem, tio! tCKfji/ii) M hot gliss. SI Hot ember. *sh. 54 Elcdiic lanip, li^ht bulbs.

ib. Heldiidls, ra'grilioa. 55 Heat from prapejly op«i<l<>ia elwtlical. 57 Had Iroir Imprapalycjwniing eiKtncal BqoipmEnl. 59 No! clKsllied jbgne,

». HEAT FROM EXPUSIVES, RREWORXS

61. CxplosUss, Iximiis, ammunitiortfi?. flu.'ffin!! ageJti a. Piicworte, spiirl«!c!5. M. ?3p«r cap. pirty piBptf

65. M«i5l foshsr, rai jwsteur icxtebj.

GG. intfeftdiary device. 67 Not ddsalicd abin-s.

7- HEfiT mow RATUnAL SOUfiCE

71 Sun's heat. 7? Spontaneous igiitsjn, tfigniiKl fsadicii. 7S. Lijiiinirg (JiicSwrp,

7j. SijW; tuscliargj,

79. Not classiSsd 3Mif.-a I HEUT Sf^EAOIKG f«OW ANOTHEn HOSTllf riR£

SI. HE3t trwn inm tbmt. eflltvMJion currents. 82, nMlatsd Iwst. 63 llsat from fl^ng bimd. tiiiber, spark.

B;. Conducted ted. 89 NO! Clissilied abcre

S. OfHER FOHN CF HEVCT 01 IGMlllOft

97. Multipls fonrs of tieJl 01 Igiiilton. 9!i Not clusiligcl

-H.M TVre or HOTtRlftL ICHHtO

1. GAS

II Han;ril qii.

12. LP-Crly Gas (LP and lir rtiU). TJ Msnuljcurti sas. K. IP-Gas.

16. AnMhpjic

1C /VietylciKr.

17. Sptualty flas other than arrssrlietic- 15. Hot dassifiKl abcvii

2. FLAMMARlf. t»M3USTIBU UDIID

21 flhyl ether, pmtini; aiid el^-leree oxide {<;ia« 1ft|, 22. AtclDiit:. elliyt ilonhol, JP4 je; (wl anO noilyl tlhy! ketone, (ClaiS 1S) 23 GaGOline.

24. Bui'/i jiwlwl. propyl aJcolial sivrene and turptnrtint.

25. Kfirosane. fuel Oil 1. 2. 4. S and Oiisel Fuel

?(i Ha 6 lud ixL CtMlDiiseeil oil and cierL;ert<> oil, (Clasi IIIA). 27. Choking iiil.ltar\5fi>r(»eraiidlut»CE;jr>juI.<ClasilllB) 28 Na) dawificd abon'.

3. VOLATIIE SDUD, CHtMICAi,

31. Fat, grease (tocfl) 32. Gneua [nonfcKxfj , seirelcuiri islliei Xi Polis.'i, pjialin. W3B, 3< Citojgte, Bilcf,. atltiesfiS, nain, ta.'. gilaliJi. lO'sii. asplialt. 35 Applied Mint, vi/msli, 3{ &omb(j'jlible met^l magne.^iiini titanium ^iid aiCunium.

37, SqiIj clisfTtical. Biploslugs,

18. RiJioscfivs msidtial

rtpt t^'assiii»i anove^

1. TLASnC

A], niGIO P1/6TICS

InciL'Sed sre mtiatijiiteilics soch a-'i-appJunre rA5:«s tmnr tilft. dtiMriitiM; kjlchen la.-ninai«

-I?, nc.in fo.v.i PLssTi'vS

lni:liid;d anj^iflid tliErmal foam h^iiUtioa ior wjilc am) lilrigciatots.

i3- FLEXIBLE Pl.*5llCS

Included h citciiicai wire insulation, M PLEXIBLE FOAM PLASI ICS

Infltided are nuaressci. luriiilure inwiinr Im^ and ailit (viil4 15- FILM PlASnCS

IntfudRii ate polYeihylenc trash baijs, plioliigrnihit

fi;ni a^d cmlEd wall piper

I'j. Plabt; nut classifted absvt

5. KATUIIAl PROIRlCn^

51. Etiibber 52. Cortc. ML UMltitr M. CI35S, IsavES, hsy ard sia-w

55. Giaii. leaLlars. fell. lepS. iiama |iit«. Mnoii. lafpri piscKising.

OS. CMI. coit. Uri'jircltcs, psal. W Food, siafcti. csvludiiia lal aiiil ^reasa

58. Tobacco

59. Not tlassified jhcre. & WOOB. PAPER

Cl Growing wkM. trti-. f/J, Felled but uoMwn tvood

63. Finiswo iimsbcr. finiihed wed. M. Wood s tuning;, S3<rtlu&t excelsim

65. Hanlboarri, piyucHXl.

66i Fibsrixjard, w-ond pulp, pn«$ tioan].

faV, Paper, untreated, uncoirad.

CiidbganS.

69. No! dassiliKl atwit.

7. FABRIC TECTLE, FUR

71. Mafi-t7i2dc (atnc, flbar, linLLihed toot'!

J2, Cplloti. rsfis. conon labrSc, 73. VAjoi, TOtji mlxuire. lalTlc

7d. Fur silk., otbfi labric 75 Wifl. 7B- llu.Tiar ta]r

flat tiassliie'J ibnvs.

8. HAIEHIAL COHPOUNDEO WITK OIL

81. Lncleuni- 62 0.1 ClOtn, fB Tr^tcd ifdloi conkd pap«r. wix paper

k'lSleninjof canvas.

85. Qti' rs<i.<: K. Asptin iriiiierl m.Tten.?l «a INC. eassllieil ibrrvB.

9 OTHEfl lYPE OF IrtATEHIAL IGHPTED

pi. nutiple lypfs oS iiialBtal IlitsI i^.iltEd, 99. (loL c-aKliicd sljuvc.

M.15 FORM OF M/ITBllAL lOnnEB

1. srnuciiJnAi. component, finish

It. ExtEilar real S(j.i;t1ru3, antace. finisa.

i<!. tJitenar s;dfv/all, ecvBrlnj surfiee, Jlntrti. t!i.-s5 il (iwjrs, purchQS and platloims.

1^. Tilr. Rip^, rug nooring aii<l stairs, 15- Intengi vrti] cBVEilng.

16- Ceiling cavtnsig suilace. 17 Slractutal nicriiber. Uraming.

18. ThErir«l.acoui"1ii.iil insulation, wilticn wall oi ceiling. 19 Itot cJffi5i1icii abo-«.

2. njftwnLRE

21. UphcJBEi'ed mfa, chair, vetiirjs test; 22. Konuptatstcitd diair, tutucb. 23. t^jbinE'j)'. lifihg cabinets, placos, dressers, desks, lablci £;rJ bookcases24. Iroriirig board.

25. Apjlianct housing ur casing, 29 riot cli5i<lntf abuve, 1 SOFT GOODS. WEARING APPAflEL

31- Matrifu, pillow 32, B?dfllnG, hiankiel. shed, camloiter. heslina fl-t 33. Liner,, tMij, tahienloihs. J4. Wealing apparsl nt>v cn a jHirair.

'ii. Vtailiig ifviii] an a ft:san. 36 Cii\Ur-i, Wf4. iripsn tipesiri'.

38. Lcjgjgi;, 3J Hot d^tsitigd sti?'«-

G-25
Appendix G

i. mnmon, RECREAnotuL m;iteiiciu.

<11- Chj^stmjs ?ree,

. Oeoo.TiiiOT far spcntil w;ii!.

44. MsgannE. rcwspapei. -Mifog paptr, 1i!t5. 13 Toy, game

46, owning, cJt>opy47. feipjiiiiii, ten;. AS. f;;i csassifieti aftwe,

5. SUPPUESs STOCK

51 Ban, tarlAI. ha<| 5Z, Bjslict, barrel 51 PilEl. sM.

54 Uope, cottl. Wflre. yara. 55 hrSstis. wraqpInG insteclil. 6S B.1I6 jtoraue

tuik. storage.

53. Blooms, blushes, maps, deaiuiig tlOtTiS. acanifii)

iitpplics.

& mutn TnA?J5FEn ecuipmeht. fubl

61 (SfTvirjil wira, cihia hEulaiicm,

62. T(3>isto5m?-'. Cuiuiyvi (fJI, aiiK Dcll. V'bCll. 64. T«E. 6S Fue! 69 fCol clas&ifiK) aboue.

7. ?EII6RAL FOHM

71. ArfijIUi.'sl product.

77 ftass. pole. n rfftilirsr 7i, iujcsts. brush snd g'ss:.

75- Film, cieosele. mLilijIi lash, ^>asle.

76i CoDkinq materisls. 77 .^ign.

g. SPECIAL FORK

81, D-Jsl. liU:r. Iirit. MivrJuSt,

6?. PiTotechrdcs, explostvES, 63 Aronireil, uapcrlzgd liriiiid 54. Mas.

85. Walst'Ol scorM or pallets, 8S. PcKletii-Hs, a? Ml&S niatensl. 88 /Wfi«ivf

g, CRH^a FCHTii Of M/treRIAL

S7. Muliiple lorm 91 iral«nS iBPiltU- 93. no; ci^ssjri'id i&uw,

«.16 ItSamOM FACTBfl (CAUSE)

1. IHC^NDIARY

11. licEJdlaij. 1? Iiss3di3^y. tiilns cfiil dlstLT'itsnK:.

2. SUSPICIOUS 21 SiKpiSDJS.

22 SiispiticiJS. flori.ig civil diaurhancB. 1 MISUSE OF HEAT OF IGNmDH

31 *l)i.idoa»ii, dlscanded mateiizi, dgarette, etc 33, Tnjning

JJ, Palling sil«fp,

2-1 Inai-squate cociuol cl opsn litc. SS Cjrinfl, VMiillJ TOT ClQSf Ifl 35 CtiiMicn 'ftiyi mitehes. lighle.'. fM

37. UncCTiscious. intrlii, physical iitiiMirtnent 39 Mot dsssl'ied abcte

I, MISUSE OF MATERIA!. IGNITED

•11, f lisl spllleil. t!;t,assd sk*iiuiI/

A2 irr.piope? luaiidC isclmlque.

i'i Hcfiitiiabie fHjuiiJ used io icaflii lirt, AA. yiziiimif tail. dcWiiiS. itllfii5hiiig. pjinti.i5. _

1(5 l-npinper ccmsinei. +j CoTipuitibie ico cins« in tr2a- +7 linpieptT sluraao. -3 fJot olassiiieti 4t«w:.

5, MECHANICAL FAIUillE, MALFUHCIION

01, Psa f?iiurs, le-iic, iwav

52, Aijinmstic wntii)! failure. a. SliOit ciicuit. 4r«ufld laulL

55. Other ele dries! lijilurc, 5S. Lack af maintensnce. wum duI. liilure Ifl tfcsa,

57, Bjckfirs,

!S. N(i; clJCTSeil abmi«.

G. DESIGN, CDNsmurnoK, innALumoN

61. Dwigi dtrPciewy, cjiilytic corwerter hiluns i2. CvisVucUsn dutticiii.v. 83. lAStallEd too doss Id (xmliusliMes,

64. Qihsr inttslliilon de-lidcticy. G5- Propeiiv loo dose io, Uidiiileri are enpts'jta fires,

6(1- l>lal cljssilied jbonc7. OPERSIIONAL DEFICIENCY

7l- Callisioi*, (Trenurfl, knorkriawn.

72. AcciiieiiltiHy Imiicd on, nel turiieil utt. 73. Uialtendei). 7S Os^rlAadPlI

75- Spontaneous healinr]

715 liiipiupL^i ^tailup. shutsltwn proctdurcG.

79. Not dissilied slx?/a.

i. NATURAL tCNDIIIOM

91. Kigli wmg,

62. E^rtKiualK,

B3. lUph u'ai^r InsludUK] Hoods, 84 liqMniri] m cldiiilid aliurt,

9. OTHER mmmu mmrRS

91- A;i:indl 'X Itckii idled Irani a piotcio liie- 93 Nul d.3ssi'ied itan.

CO, Mo rirs.

14,17 mmn irm)iv6P m Kmm

0- Jiu«niif Ntii lii."d'«Jin Iqaition or Mo i.n1orm3t'on lh.Tt

3 Ju^^nilS Vfii TMiw(5,

1. JuvEnilt IrwoKsni in Ipn'tian.

14 IS COHStRUETION CLASS

Code Ha

0. No build'ng lanliw).

1. firepinnl Stuiisiirc, ? , Ii.-e Prwemd SiriraiJte.

3. Nun hifpiOiil Struiaurc- i. V/ood FrauiE Sliudute.

5- Mfial Stiiicure G Heavy Timtier Scnicnire,

1-1.13 CLftSSIFICfinilH OF EUllPING BT U56

COFJilCnClAL 5?? dank

ax, CfJI StSrajS

5ft1 nepjniniat Swre

615 Bectral Power Plant

7t)* Fiaory. MuHi-Oocopanty

Tiyj F^ciijry; Sii'Sli: Occupjncy

tTJuiidiy, B'JS Freijtit Dsptit. ES2 Carz^E: Hcn-Slarage, Bag Gjibjs; SiorajE. 757 Gjs VftrliS, Nalufal Gas Plmt. 851 lumbar Yici S73 MOMr \fehic!s Ri^plif .Sfl(ti>, PfliJlf .SUftP

.'iSI Otilca Sulldinq, Surs. CltV', F5dp.'.il or CnmnKrclsl

5-71 Oil Soi:ing S'jtio-.

Oil Storige Ptini fisa Pier, Wlurl, Doclt. BiilHie,5d Euildinfl,

Ifrt Rtiliuran:. Diner

Sf.i!d. Nj>v.5iand, iruntj. 7S1 biiipyw-if, ViyilucK.

S1i^ blablE. 614 bteatr Cen-jrsiing Plant,

3

539 Siorcbuildcng. Taxpayer S91 Vi'i'stiausa Sl4rarioiJS4, 41Q Sicrc V-Mmg S Ptivdh.- thMellliia. £30 Other Cnmrnereiai. PUBUC

171 Airporl Budding.

351 Asvliim

S21 bftdse. 173 Bii.? Terminjl

,

Xil Cliiiidi, Synagogue,

1?1 Dance Hal'. Rmq»jet Hali. 334 DlspwKaty. Cilnit, 17/ ftary Icmisnal, 331 Husplni, Infinojry: 311 Nursins Hume.

171 Rsilreiatl St.ilion, Strtet Imi,

fih Railroad Staloii, Bcfa* Grade.

175 RailfssS -.tiratiM, Hho^, Grtifle 241 SdioMl. Colles-s, Univsrsity. 515 Schnol: Hit]!i SciiooL

Z'i4 SdiuD): Jaiior Hij/h, S13 School: Elemsrttjjj; 211 School: Children's "i'i uisify, 210 School. Olhcr. 1Si Television Sludia

1B1 Theatre. Ligltimalc. 1B3 Ttiaatn Motion Piaurt

170 Trjnyi Sy«i;ni-!Sialii« Slfueture, 922 Tunnel,

IIS Otner Pvtjiit. RFSIDFKIIAL

4S9 Apanmetii iMnl "A' iiS Ap-irimem house "A': <39 dMrding liau,'?R, Rnnnkiti*;- HtiiiM 'S ', 46S Ccn-n,-;il, Becloij. Monaslery. etc ^Sl Dormitrtry—SfihOOl. Club. Lodge

+I'J Hslol "B". 430 LflddiiU) FiOijM T! ', 440 Mutc-I. 411 Privif^ rjvreiriiiQ- One Family 414 Ptiratc Uwcling, Iatj Fimily, 420 T!:n(5mt;m: tJsw Lswr "A:

i'i'i ii:iii;iin;iil. Old Lsrt" 'X.

ri>r..«!,-Ifd [>*^!ling H". 430 Uiihei Resi^iemial. SPECIAL PROPfcRTtES

972 Airijon Rtimsw

93^ C^mtniy.

531 Conaiuctio^t Slta 9S2 Oamp, LandlilL 931 0!«n Land, riald.^. 966 Pjik^ng Ar:a. Lul. 9B3 Piptliiic, PokVer l infl K!3;:-«!-V.',j/ 362 P.i3iii; Sirert, 355 Riilmad SAitchinq Vond, irarshaliiiig y^ifl. 936 Vat'diit Lub, 933 Qutdiicir PittOflrtt' Ntil OsssiBtd.

M.2D BUILDIHG SIAHIS COPE

e«de Dcsniptiar

1 Dircup''^ ' "^"^ liiiilrSrg 1$ niirmally tully OCtupiSd

VI is inieniltd to be lully occupied. A Itm mcsM

iiti%. which are imstle. nay

2 Pally UKupirJ: 1ti5 twUng is in gssA eondilnn and more Id ui 25 pstsntci the rcas are vagim.

3 Partly to:upi&a, DttenoraffliB: TJis tiuildird has some vacant i-e« jnd tiiv.^s ait ?jpscled W

lerrain vaant j*il dcndibon o- jI: raon hgcai se

01 ItioVnilJ toll til Uicbuildin} cr its STirroiadin^s, 4 Vacarr 1m huilrlin!] Is eniiisiy «T;Mrit- (Evsn it sifiisUsis'are present.) 5 Undei oenofiiion-. The buiiamg t? In Uw pn)C(»s

al Twirg lorn dowi

6 Under liDmlmctiwi Ibc UuilJmg is undo constiuainn aj5fl tlw, nnr have any ocuioaiils

7 Urd'.'i tonsliiHrtjon: Ihe buildinn is psrtially occupied, wtiether undei a lempeiajs esrli'iHtc o1 Kcupancy or not. Hole: The ri.Ttas coSs applies to'lic-biiili^g. not Uw file an:a. Therctoie, cndss I, 7 an! 3 maj be

used v.'hcthtrth( bit ilsill ocgured in a vacani

or c-:ciiE<Ed a'ea. a,nd ctxu I may aprlv evsn i( ine iirv aeunvd m t racant jjsa (lor e^arnpta.

a 1ir*i In ^ vJiCJ^ii 3p?,nms»r; t»?^ii5 rets^intW fl?r e nt'A" tB:iant)- The occupied or racani status ai

Itiefre area is tow reaDiwe<ionth; "Aicaot Origin" Code. [Sit rs,-a5rB[h 2.12.2)

G-26
Interim Report on Significant Fires in WTC 1, 2, and 7 Prior to 9/1 1/01

4

t42I COHPia

11- ftjeiSC RECREOTW COMPLEX mduoM 5ts afls. ariSEEisn! pals and jsiimi

nccreabon parte.

12. SISDrUM. DtHEinO?! KILL CCft*PlfX Indudsd bjllp^ts. rscgtacis. sports gandens and U CUJ8 iX/i^wEX

Irdudo] 0? ^dut!5. ems diiss sttI cauap/ cMs.

2(1 rDUC/fflONAL COMPISX

Induderi are schtds. ccilt^i ind unficiaDes.

lnduch.iJ aa- Hospito. Msdfcil Csntsn. llcntel

*a suswtss wiH residcmhu cmifia

niduded ara ipartirams ovk smbe41. W/Fl lING COMPIEIC (CM: ME "IV.B-FW,SILy) -a. APARTUifJt COUITUX

44 HDTTL cntmn

IrdiKS^ are OKCds. tins and lodges

<:7. HOSiU HOMt FW, CraPLCX

51 SHOPPIMG CnmR

indudei! are flwfpnem aorcs mais. discouit kouks »a stiofipinij cenan;- Wmi infludcd »rf {igjps al

fciiSirlfisS and CornmeraiiJ rjUblrshmeiTti wliidi trsy ainain |)iMt*ia and stlrj pidca ol isjcmW/, 5T rrFICH COf.lPLEX

Incl'jdeo lie non-mnitjry govemmsiu office cnmpleiss.

61 FOVfER PaOOUCriOli COMfUX

63. raLnwT/ Rrs-Rifflriofi d-itnsc companv

65. FARM COfJPlfX 7a IHDLfelRIAl PLWir. MAHUFaCWRlNG COMPLEX

eo. vAncnousr. sioiuge complex

81. CONSTRUCriOM CCUPI.6H

IxiudaJ arc dt roilwri opsrabuns. 91 CA,M?aTr CQMPLCX

94 VWERFROUT COMPLEX

lidviKd are nrarims. 9i RAILROAD TTU.'iSPOflT COUPLDf

96 RO1DC0»#>LK

IndwSal trc hig.'wn/r;, stoti and a,1 putfa raj's.

97. AIRPOHT COMPLO

91 KO COMPtPt

K oBw propenie!. meeiing O^tbtxi (w j nmja

at defined lOcvf KatiUi. iricy niay tic iraJiistsa by Conipta Co-Ji; 'J'J

AREA FIRE ORIGIK T<2? FIQPH CCPi m.

00 OETTSIOE BlIUIHG

01 lot Floor to to 94 S4iri and HIaner 85 *lTlr. 96 Reof

97 B*Min«.n

98 CiTzr 99 Sub-Crti.' K23 Atm Fff-E QfllCmOCtUPftUCY ClAaSIFlSWIOW

Fattorr 99 fy\^rrwK

01 Dreoces 02 U«idcf?iiiTicriI C3 01h?t {Male lypt| W Diy CIsanirg Lijxry

05 Daerial Pioducis 06 rood and Drink P.TdinSs

(T FtmJnas 08 Fins, fur &aoils 09 Msn's Use

10 Womsns HiQ

11 Uathet Leather ProiSiKts 1Z Machme Stiop MeulCftfks

13 hffiiLs

1-1 Paper Products 15 P«rolej|tri Products

16 flisfe, Rubber

17 PMting sna Allied Indiiilms

IB Slwas

19 IsctSu 29 lay 0! Dtfl 21 kvpaOwihug

2? Ottxr f-ictunes nut dasslTied {am lyps)

Slurs:

2'J Aulo tecESSOties Baktry 25 Sulcficr ?C Candy. Ogar Slalianary ?7 PWMg

?6 flsparmiefii. large 29 Dapamnftci. tnull 15 a IflJ 30 Dry CUusr t Ijllor 31 Drug 32 Electncsl ApoQcante

9? Ftuils uiO VEgsiaKu

&-» Furinlurj 35 GroMTy, Uaiiy. DeFiiatESsan

3ij HjfjenJasneiv 37 Ladit! *<xeisorKB

38 L;suiK1ry 39 Palra, Hjrjmgre 40 flestturani Lmcheorjcni!

41 S\«

42 Snoc Repiir 43 SupCfnarkil

45 Oiher SioiBC not dassjlieil (StalE tyje)

45 Non aorijt 47 Stixane 4a Oil Srtriii) smm

49 Motor WeNcJe Repjlr Snop

50 OtfiK ajihSng

51 FJm

52 l\per. Rai]?, fiDre W OUier (state t>-ps) 54 frvigU Depot 55 Pici 56 SDipyiirJ 57 LumtH ysrl M Shed. Wj/.ritand, Shasr/. an

59 (Wiei Contireroal BuildTi} Ocicij[Bnciis. not ttessifltd (sQit typel Hciltfaitlsl: 60 Atwrtinent. Hotel. I.lultipl? fV'airnig "«"

Ijl AplHiient HouEE. Multple ttMXuri X

62 fcaardirig HS1B4 Fl»rajng llOliffl, Multiple D^irfliiia -8" C3 Hoitcl, Mullipte l>wsBrng "B" it (.cOgrnj Mtfiee, Wuliipli! Dwtlling 'D" €5 Prnjie D»<C'lllrrg €5 ft!a(5ry. Con»t-nt. Monadtry. ric. 67 Tenement Mouse. Ken Law. Mu'tipts Dvitlling "A" 68 Tenttnflnt rtouie. Old ).\\ill/f\ti D^'slling fC

t3 CtM R«i(l^nlLd. no! clisstlicd (slate n/je) PrbSc; 70 Ajpcrt

71 Cabaret. 6anqa<( Hill 7? Ct\mct. n D^nce Hill 74 Hcst>i'a' 7> MarrflB Pianr? Theatre 76 ri -Y. Transii S-yaem Sutior 77 Ps53eii?er Depat

V8 S*!ial

"7;J i lie dire 80 lY. SlLdo

«1 Ollm Pu5:ii;. nst SiS'jfied Istalc tyx)

14.?4 AflEA OF F1HE CRlGltl

fl. HEflWS Of teHESA

Q1. Hsllvn/. cflfridor. mall, 03. Exteripf ^irvr^,

03. Irrterior sSainrrsj. 04. Escalator. 05. LDtjby. Eulraice wjy.

OS. km cljsaried aboue.

1. ASSSHSUf UREA

11. Fttt-d 56 its (IM or more personsi

12. WiUitfui fiffld ssats <I00 or mnne persons)

13 Willi 01 wjth:«1i)ffi-3 Mats. van lOO (lersws)

t^. Living rrjom, Ismjly rDom, Irjitiria jr^^. 15 Sales, shtrwDom arpj.

16, Liliiarv, art !>illjri«. •wSibil 17 Swlmraing («ol jrea.

19. Noi oLiuiHec! atoie.

2. FUdCTlOU ARIAS

21. BEdmoms. paiem rooms, ceili. locVupi. 22. iVauls. floimitartes. turrxki

23 Dldind area, tvrstiioom, esU'tciiSJ-l, Kiichen. coolaeg aru-i. cludWoum.

26 Laundry arci

23. Hoaliti cluljs. nassBBE pjlors, fcartier. beairly.

3. FUN AREAS (CbrJtinutd)

31. IsSxnacr,:

32. Prirong nr plrKcpr^ptiic room. 31 First ail. treaninil rocm

34. Op«rtrirt!l room. 35 EiwrpTiic.. computi:, Iticphaiic rtsjia, I'JlcplMM booth. 36 Pertoiinancc. staj-; aies. indorr sports. 37 Pn)i«ttiOft rwiii. slajs liglil, 3fl Process, raaiiiteluring atEi. 39 No! clasatied alxne.

I. SItinABEARJAS

41. li.ik, bin. prodiia storagj room.

42. Clasa. 41 Jiuppiy room.

ii. Rerjirls stonge fixiin, wuH

45 Shipsing. receiving. lasiJiiiE mail rojra, «C trjiti «r oititnsli CTiilsnisr compastor

47. Garage, eirpiirl. vslilt! acrags.

49 No: ctosiiied aboi*. £ SERVICE FAClin-lES

51. Flevitor duiiWKikr

siecincai, ;)luml)lng. s-nlilslicn jtwil. 53 Liglit Shall, 54. Laundry or mail chine.

55. OuCI,

5ii Uisplsy windcrw

57. Cfiirrrey; Hue, nnvppipe.

58. ConvBinr

Not classilieA 3br»A.

5. SamCE, mUlPMEHT AREA

61. Hacfiirerv mcini

B2. Heainf] eqiBpnenl, vjsh heater area. 63. f!*itthtJMr an:a, tnaniformcr null. M. incir.error fcaiii »r<-l, 61 i.uintei»ifii;e shijp. '.vvrMap. p&Int Shop, v<TH)iny

stiop. 6G ft SI «IL

'

67. Engiosure wilii F.'5ssch2Ei sir. 64 tnclosin'e witn enrtiaiHl ovygnn sliiw.isphtte.

6'J. No; claEsllied ahnva.

7. SmUCTUIlAL AREAS, NdH-FUHCriOMAl

71, Gr^ftt spaos, ctHa', suljsfuctunil area

72, Exlarior ttalMny, opta porcti

73. riDor sort cefad aisembly contsaleS lloof'celllng spare

74. Rofil and ceiling aMOimbly. coiia'alcd lool/ceilinc spjce. 73 Wall asMnibly. cuncealEd v;all space, 76 Edtriur wall suilice.

77, Ejilenor iml surface. 7a Awnir.s. ovsrtiiig. TX Not classif.Ed Mm;?

G-27
Appendix G

I TRANSroffTATION. VEHICU AREAS

81. Passenger area. 82. Trunk, load carrying area

83. Engine, running gear, wheel area.

84. Fuel lanl(. lud line 85. Operating, control area. ca6. cockpit.

86. Exterior exposed surtace

89. Not classified atxjve.

9. OTHER AREAS OF ORIGIN

91. On or near railroad nght of way. embankment.

92. On or near higrrA^y. public way. street, 93. Terrace, palra. courtyard. 94. Lawn, field, open area, vacant lot. 95. Wldland area, woods.

97. Multiple location 98. Vacant room, apartment or area.

99. Not classified abovt

14.25 MANNER OF EXTEHSION

Code Na

00 coflfiriea to area ot onjin

01 CocWott. 02 Door Of opening bet«cn rooms.

03 floor 04 Hall. SUirway. 05 Partition 06 Pipe Recess

07 Shati-dumbwarter 08 Shafl-Ele'.'ator 09 Shafl-air. Light, Chute, Duct, etc

10 Ceiling

II Window

12 Other (slate type) U H NUMBER OF OCCUPANCIES

Cades Oescription

01 1 occupancy 02 2 occupancies

99 99 or more occupancies

14.r7 BUILDINGS

Cade: 0 to 9 0- did not spread beyond bulldino of origin 1—1 structure or vehicles

14.29.2 Type

1. Snnte

2. Heat M 293 Power Source

1. Battery

2. A-t; M,29.4 Penonnance

1. In room o( Gre; operated

2. Not in room ol tire: operated 1 In room d lire: did not operate

4. Not in room a( fire: did not operate 5 In room: lire too small to operate

6. Did not operate; power souree temcved

9. Not classified

14JO POWER FOR EQUIPMEWT

01 1-23 volts A.a

02 24 volts A C

11 i.e volts o.a

12 7-12 voits DC

15 115 volts A£. V

28 208 volts A C. 30 220-230 volts A.C 33 231-330 volts A C. 34 331 or higher volts AjC

50 25-50 volts A£.

61 Butane

62 Coal, Cote. Charcoal. Peat S3 Fuel Oil. No 1 or No. 2 64 Fjel Cil. No 3 or No. 4

65 Fuel Oil. No. 5 or No. 6

66 Gasoline 67 Kerosene 68 LN gas (stored as kqud)

69 LP gas (stored as liquid) 7D Natural or Illuminating gas (as i gas)

71 Paper

72 Propane 99 Other

1431 CODE FOR TYPE OF ACHON TAKEN

1- Extinguishment Rescue

3, Investigation 4 Remove Haard

5, StandOy

6. Salvage I Firsi Aid 9 Cancelled Enroute

06 First Aid—Resusdtation

07 Marine

08 Precarious Condition—Signs. Trees, etc. 09 Sutway. RaiJnjad

10 Water Leak

11 Bomb—Unexptoded, Scare

12 Collapse—Cave In 13 Collision—Vehicular Incident

14 Comnjlied fire. Permitted

15 Flood Ccndition-Broken Water Main

16 Incinerator 17 Leak—Fuel Oil. Gasoline, etc

18 Leak—Illuminating Gas. Flammable Vapor

19 Lightning 20 Oil Burner

21 Person Lociad In, Locked Out 22 Pwer Electrical 23 Pressure Rupture 24 Relngeram Leak 25 Smoke Condition, Odor. Fumes

26 Spnnklef-leak, Water Discharge. Damaged Head, etc 27 Steam Discharge 28 Defective Alarm Device (other then Sprinkler) 29 Smoke Detector 30 Defective Alarm (SprinWerHSurge.VAjrk on System, etc

31 Ottier

•UJ33 MOBIU PHOPEBTY TYPE CODES

11 Automobile

12 Bus

13 Motorcycle. Snowrtiobile

14 Motorhome

15 Travel Trailer 17 Mobile Hnmr

20 FreigW, Road Transport 30 Rail Transport 40 Water Transport 50 At Transport 60 Heavy Equipment 70 Speaal Vehicles. Containers 99 Other Mobile Property Types

9—9 or more buiklings or vehicles NOTE: Form BF-24A must be submitted tor each building or vehicle listed in this coded space

14.28 DAMAGE COOES

14.28 1 Percentage Codes

0 No appreciable damage

1 From 1 through 15%

2 From 16 through 49%

3 50% or greater

14.28.2 Extern cf Damage Codes: To be used in ifie Damage Category Boxes "Flame. Smoke and

Water.

1. Confined to object or origin 2 Confined to part of room or area o( origin.

3. Confined to room ol ongin.

4. Confined to fi.'e-raied compartment of origin.

5. Confined to floor ct origin 6 Coolned to sfruOure ol origin. 7 Extended beyond ihe structure of origin. 9 No damage o( this typc,

14.29 SMOKE AND HEAT DETECTOR CODES -

14,29.1 Present

1 Present 0 Not Present

1432 CLASSIFICATION BY TYPE ORE OR EMERGENCY

TRANSPORTATION

Cede No. 87 Slip. Vessel 88 Motor Vehicle 89 Other TransportaSon (state type) NON-STRUCTURAL HRES

Cede No. 84 Explosion, no after lire 85 Outside Soinyieak with Fire 86 AOV (Abandoned/Derelict Motor Vehicle) 90 Bonfire 91 Brush, Grass 92 Demolition Wbod. BuHdirtg Site 93 Dump, Land rdl 94 Rubbish-Outside Building 95 Manhole 96 N Y Transit System-Yard. Roadway. Ties, etc

97 Ftailroad Yird. Roadway. Ties, etc. 98 Tunnel, Bndge

99 Other N on Structural, not dassified (slate type) EMERGENCY

Code No. 03 Elevator. Escalator 04 ExpkJSivBS Escort 05 First Aid-Assist Person(s)

G-28
Attachment G-A.4

Significant fire incidents occurring in WTC 1 (12)

Significant Fire

Incident Date Fire Location# Sprinklers Activated

# Standpipes

Activated Cause of Fire

Material

Ignited

1 9/9/77 B-6 level storage room

2 None listed Not listed

2 9/23/77 Dumpster on B-4

level

2 Not

classified

Trash/waste

3 10/16/81 19th floor office area 2 Discarded

material

Furniture

4 12/23/83 2 dumpsters on B-4

level

2 1 Suspicious Trash/waste

5 1/27/85 Office space on mezzanine level (Floor 2)

2 Incendiary Trash/waste

6 9/10/85 Garbage dumpster in service elevator lobby on floor 43

2 1 Suspicious Trash/waste

7 1 M 85 Storage closet on B-4

level

3 1 Suspicious Supplies/stock

8 6/7/86 Dumpster fire on

floor 106, compactor room on floor 107

2 1 None listed Trash/waste

9 9/30/91 Office on B-4 level >1 2 Discarded

material

Trash/waste

10 11/19/91 Electrical closet on

floor 93

0 2 Short circuit Electrical wire

or cable

insulation

11 7/23/92 Level B-5 at the power distribution panel

0 2 Electrical

failure

Electrical wire

or cable

insulation

12 11/10/99 Computer room on

floor 104

3 >1 None listed Plastics, electronic equip

G-29
Appendix G

ADDRESS

BUIlDiNf

I lEfl IM CHAtCE

5 006 0 10 7 001 0 10 7 00* 0 —

1 11 '! , it 1

1

1»PE r-o. seci. PIS

hJ. to OPERA

10 It' HONS

^1 19 ?9 A

Upon arrlTal at ctMnaand port vu told of flra In B 6 larel Btorafie rt>o«,

oporatioos as f&ULOW&a

Ladder 1 aade nocassary Iscfiotafatlon^ located JFir«, Tented, oTerhaiil*d.

Laddar t ciiecke4 for «xt-ea«lon, ¥«at«d OTerbaul^d.

EiXclde 6 stretched line froB standpipe and etood £a.B%»

Fire waa extinguished by sprlnklsi' oyste* befOi^ arxlVal*

WHm k 9n9perTi8«d operations on tin floor*

Fire Patrole Z co the scene.

Rndy E. Plgeorelo

Hue of A.ll»rw»L tVPfc fULl NAMF

G-30
Interim Report on Significant Fires in WTC 1, 2, and 7 Prior to 9/11/01

71001 6

- 1 \\\

3 £i • S5

,

! . 1 f " ^ P5 •-

1 ' '

r 1

i i i

T^AC Lin rE/~T 1 C

- ^ -

*-*

'

^ 1

ft \^.:^\10 ulli J3 OPERATIONS .

'= ' Reapond»d to ^-TO-IO (Manual llju?n>

IToon »rrlT«l «ia Infomed fir« la Dssz^jster lave! 1 VTC. Ora«p*i :" ? InTBstifiaUoa fowid «.r« tfeertin, widdi bud beea 6atttB«Bl^»d prior = to th« arrival of till a d«pt. Oparatloaa aa followa ,|

Hollbd up laacths stood fast* --1^

Search. «ia"iJi*tlon» -rantllatloii of B-V Inclg ooaditioM pM rt*t«S» i

>^ aw.

net fULi iUmE TIME OF AiXIIVAl 177 1 FULI t-tKmt imt Of ARSlVAl

ADMINISTRATIVE COMPANY

G-31
Appendix G

ARMiWISTRATIVE COIVIPAWY
Interim Report on Significant Fires in WTC 1, 2, and 7 Prior to 9/1 1/01

" STRUCTURAL FIRETTRANSPORTATION FIRE, NON STRUCTURAL FIRE OR EMERGENCY

ismisiaMguiinniiiDiimDiinE

D mtzi HtPMftii /^ /f^^/ STREET NAME

IF MOBILE PROPERTY

79 S^RIAI. NO I I IJIIIIIIII

^ssniDiiiiEiiiiiniinnEiiiniiMiiiiiDE

UNIT PTS^ ^ 189 OPERATIONS

Lad«8 (eont.)- Jorcad door to Office roafl#2073

£•8.1- Ch«ck«d Tent dncts and staiivays on and at>oT« Tire floor, ••curtd

passengar elaTatox^ a erring fire floor.

Patrol#i- On scene, aalrage work on 16th and 17th floors.

Patrol#2- On scene, salrage work on 18th floor.

])i-7-.1« D.C. EoBsi on scene, in charge of Department operations upon arriral.

Jaaes J. KcKenna 1916 John D. Hoasi

Type full name timeof abrival type full name time of arrival

PAGE

G-33
Appendix G

G-34
G-35
Appendix

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cd

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td

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ftj:: x: -H c

t3 4-> 3 to cd

a <M -H

fIRE RECORDS

G-36
Interim Report on Significant Fires in WTC 1, 2, and 7 Prior to 9/1 1/01

OPERATIONS

Engine 6- (teamed with E.10) Assisted E. 10 in Standpipe stretch.

Engine 7- Manned the Standpipe phone in Stairway B on 1 st KL., relayed

nessages to and from Coinnand Center

Ladder 10- To ^3 fl , stairway B, found fire, searched ^3 f3. (negative)

made neeeasary examination and overhaul of fire area. Ladder 1-to Uh fl, searched for fire, smoke extension, searched for troubled

occupants (negative) Checked top ten fls (101-110) for smoke (Neg.)

Ladder 8- Made secondary search of ^4-3 fl (negative). Searched fls to ^9.

Searched affected service elevator cars #17 & 29.

Batt. h~ Set up operations post on ^3 fl. Comraiinicat ed with Command Center,

supervised operations of units on and kh fls,

E. lf, E.3 (HiRise Unit), L.l5 & Res. Co 1 stood fast, took up.

Brooklyn Cos responding on supplemental Boxes 9031 & 9032 at 161? hrs Batt ji,

Batt 32, E. 205, E.Zfi 279, L.161, L.110 stood fast, took up.

F. C.IJ. - Established Field Hqtrs, ^Monitored Communications.

Sprinkler heads (2) replaced by P. A. personnel.

Signal 10-1+1 , Code 1 transmitted, Evidence of separate, previous fire

reported to FM KcCaffrey.

Responded to Scene: AC Matthew Farrell, Manhattan Borough Commander

Signal

lO-SM- 10-76

P.W.H.

U.C.

Tims 1609

1615

1627

161+0

E.10

Batt 1 Div 1 Div 1

Kenneth T. McGov;an

n

Jqian Hodgens.

PAGE

TVP£ FULL NAME TIME OF AIWJVAL TYPE FULL NAME B3

FIRS REC0SD5

TIME OF ARRIVAL

G-37
Appendix

G

*3 o s

T3 CO C > 0 5 as i-( 3 o 1—t u o tH u :t

:4 c u • tl c

CO c 0 c c 0 p u o m a tn 0 c

•H tH T3 oc -H S> o

KJ c H 0 <-(

U

u -H

a (4 0 0 3 <M Id o 0 C

i-H

Q •rH f-l a c>. o s

<l-l

m s o d s> •H T3 4J C

Q> T3 P. ca

un mo > c • 4J0 • « X 0

C3 f . *H -3

+J

C

g •H P 0 tl 0 0

P.

u

fH « 0

pi I-H

4->C c

OJ

p •H

'JM (40, 0 C9 T3 CV a cH 0

(h r- c^

T3 • h

a 0 ca 4-> a 0 u c 0 0 p c -r4 0 3

-H a> » a p

c; 0 (S

p 3 (D

C5 •d

U 3 m

rr\ cp 0 c -H

JC c ta 0 4J 0 X (D C 0 3 •ri ^ nd C a 0 a 0

4J

B 0 B ^1 0 sz c p > 0 c —t • ,0 u • cS CO a 0 c t u 0 c a e 0 0 c "-I ^' P •H 0

^3M>OP«oooo

a'

G-38
Interim Report on Significant Fires in WTC 1, 2, and 7 Prior to 9/1 1/01

O t r \j wy — HUUIIIUI1HL UHIH

STRUCTURAL FIRE, TRANSPORTATION FIRE. NON STRUCTURAL FIRE OR EMERGENCY

IGNITION / STRUCTURE

y NUMBEB / X rma. HiiPHEw 7

STREET NAME

•

il MODEL 79 SE

IF MOBILE PROPERTY

UCE^ISE STATE

1*7 153 59 7 1

1 5i

77 ml T8ft

: : 1

- X

:-'« ' ?

T.

UNIT 193 201 2 13 22l> 231 OPERATIONS

E-10 stretched line into fire area froo standpipe and extinquished all

renaininfr in closet area

ii-7 Stretched line fron opposite side of fire and stood fast

.Ii-6 assisted 1^10 in stretching line and relieved on line and then washdown

L-1C found fire and perforned necessary VEG and overhaul in area, maae primary and secondary search , then up

L-1 perforaed necessary YIL!^ and checked for possible extension in

surrounding areas

:ines: 10-84 0^08

10-75 04-10 All i;andB 0^^25 10-41-1 0425

•'ILO I DC PAGE

JoseT' -ih L. barracato 0408 — E"0

TYPEFULLNAME TIME OF ARRIVAL TYPE FULL NAME T IME Of ARRIVAL ADMINISTRATIVE COMPANY

G-39
Appendix

G

m co ^U a

(J (J o o •H

+> n" d •H « T5 U » on o u

1-1 tH

•H Sh J3

t3§

rao • a

(4 o Oo

1-1 iH e

(S>

he • 6 a

t- \

he on i o

ft

Bo o B -H o • P

IE •H e u o o (B CI •H P.

T3O ?i •H V u

EH •3 t-i a C iH •H ou Cm C3 : 3

OJ C3 « M

A! iH > OE B •a o >; •H S o P

n. Q)u

O • c

(4 o

-C3Cou

;^

s»o 3 1

-pBo

ID +>

0)

B

^3

J,C

uLu.

J

G^O
Interim Report on Significant Fires in WTC 1, 2, and 7 Prior to 9/1 1/01

KEPORT— ADDITIONAL DATA

STRUCTURAL FIRE, TRANSPORTATION FIRE, NON STRUCTURAL FIRE OR EMERGENCY

TB MAKC ^' M0D6L 79SCR|ttl.NO LirFNSt STflTF

1 GC1 Op 5 C03 02

^.6

1 . 1 c

L.7- Lpcr. arrival reported to ^^^"^^^^oor ar.d stretched fron

s"zrd'-ipe to fire and e:-: tinsui shed sszie. Fire ir. dir^pster

.wssisted L.1C ir. search of area, .-egative

c-^o-ted tc 106ti- floor, v-rdered to st:j:d fast. 2her. up.

.«^crted to ICCth n.ccr. Ordered tc 3ta:-.d fast. xner. up.

tc lC7t:. -iccr. -oi^r.d fire ir. cor:p--.ctcr rocu-. o,,rin.aer

o-er_uicr..i crcea -.".trj s^-----^- si.^^ —

L.1 ..e^Srted lb7t:^ -leer, .-i^siste:! -adder IC ir; search a::d cx^-

^--ticn. . ec.-tive scare. Tnen up.

v-l 7earc;-.ed fleers abcve fire. Lieht sr.c-.e. ..ec-.i-e. -hen u^. "

i_ i-e Lr.it: v^r^ered to 10-2

St! ^r..st?^3;..-s^???.s;^n^.6.nc n==rs...i== -.7,1.10

I.l a:.d ..-1. -he:. Ui-

B.C.

TYPE FULL NAME TIME OF ARRIVAL TYPE FULL NAME TIME Of ARRIVAL ADMINISTRATIVE COMPANY

G-41
Appendix G

G-42
Inten'm Report on Significant Fires in WTC 1, 2, and 7 Prior to 9/11/01

CO

0) Q

Ou

p

E-i M

V

4JC

0)

31

1-1 a

0

ou

c

n

-JJ

r-f

r-i

u

o

uu

E3

M

O , aH .

r-i Si -Hoo

0J

'3

11R

e3 .coy o n D, u

- O 0>H

ni a 4J O

Q) <<-l rn+j

ca CI p, fa -a" hH

•a K a

U C >H U O O 01 r-°.^

O -H O

O O <g C GJ K a -a -H >

M E £

-H tij « -H

"-I R b. O U

0

+J *J P! HMO

O O O

a- p,a d >d j:: « CI > a

-H -H E O CJ fj a o ra

ai d <

Ul f3 rH <N n

(3 a

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QJ MS:

a .1-1 O

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Id U H

H 41 & M

!3

G-43
Appendix G

1} 'WWW •250 J Til":

&7 I I ... OCCUmUT (Dnver)

IF MOBILE PROPERTY

^ ! I ! !!

j3 M i"!!' 1 ; 5 .K02 4 |:p2 ; 5 IpOl \ii2 ;

.•7:O10:- 30

1 1 i i 7;v00J.;?3p"

i - 1 1 1 . 7- llOglO; 7^^-131^10:

^ ^ M fes L i ^ S . L

! gf 1 S

OPERATIONS

STR?.TEGY: TQ attCRpt to cc?ntain the fire situation to electrical

closets, and to prevent panic and hycteria in occupanaiGs

T-7ith large cicili&n populations , arifl establish parameters

of firG ar.fi cir,o>:c: conditiou as quickly as possible.

-Actiori taken:

1. Dn -Errivftl at WTC comiuanri post, assuitied cormnsnd of

^ire Eituation,

2- Coircaujiicate<3 with r.afid'ftr Co. lOnwho confirnied fi^'e' situationon floors 93, 94, 95 and pocEibly on 96,

3. Ordered the transtrjission of signal 10-7G basefl on: potential for largfe volume of tizc, heinht to fire'^ area, time involved in units response, difficulty in

effecting good voiue cosnirtunications in building,

4. Ordered Manhattan Dispatcher to ilext 10-7 5 arriving

units to assemble in LolSby Staging, area, pending

unit atJiiiyiuiitiiit , i 5. Ordered firnt nlarni units to conduct diligent search.

6, Or3ared 1st alarm Cngina companies to- stretch firom • the

"A" stairwell, but not to use. water until confrimatioii

of power of? w^s jraceived for electrical closets, . - .

. ONE ncv, -v-^- ' .-^ ' /-.• ..-y.^' Lawrence H. Byrnes

TYPE FUU HAKE

B.N 1830

7*f^C ARRIVED TVfCf JLL NAME TIME AnniVED...

G-44
Interim Report on Significant Fires in WTC 1, 2, and 7 Prior to 9/1 1/01

BF-24A (12^56) isw4njjvJCTi)i

. . :. REPORT .~ ADDITIONAL DATA STRUCTUfmL FIRE; JRANSPORTATIO rf , FIRE;' NON-STRUCTURAL FIRE OR' EMERGENCY

; DATE AND TIME = A OOX: . :•/.•/.: '~

ALARM RECEIVED '/LOCAnOw/ ji.

R

i i!^ / / «,

: ^- 1 1 t If

^

37 «3 CE K • S

s [f ijtjORLDj ^RAi^E! CEjlTERj \^\[ I |:

ftRCA

Kori^l Tradei cLnUr!

OCCUPAtJT (Dnvar) K0O^/WPT.

WIDTH ^ LEMTTH ^'J.

li MAKE HI';' :

I \

I

. .

. LICENSE

Pi f f X-f. !

I S- i

m UNfr PIS OPERATIONS

7. ConfiVTtcd vitii v,-^C parsonnel, cntjineering staff es Lo ' i-iac frJirae i5Dr alec-rliaX ppwor removal for effected flooru,

E. Denied WTC rolice request to iniatate general evacuation

of floors "95 to roof level", based on unknowns of; a. smoke

conditions ,1). stair availability, c.ojj:r.ber3 o£ people that

may Lo involved,

9. Upon notif icatian Ijy VJYC Enginsi^ring ctaff of (2) elevator£3 stuclc et f3cor 8E and 101, Ladder Co. C aEsirjnaO. task Of

victt* renoval, es accompanictJ by wtc ele.vntor Rechanic,.-'.

10. 7\s Chief Officess arrived a^: Command ?oat thsy were issuod

WTC Handle 'ial};i.s.s end their esgignmentn,

11, Called for EMS rosponse for reported b-urn victim (mechanic . ': with facial burns and for pcDsible neddn,

12, Priniarjr search of upper floors proved to tine consuming

due to large floor rarea and limited Handio Talkie capabalitles,

conducted by Ist ale.3nn trucks, :, • 13. P<?scuo Coropany 1 assigned to follow up cccondarv search of'-

14» 10-75 Signal proved vary ef fective, provided noiflediate • ' .-.

response of Chief officers -^o iiitiate various sector' coh-trbla,.'

A

lYPEFULLNAMg " IIME *BBIVED rYPE FULL NAME . . ,. I IMS ARfllVEO -

IB.'^n D.C.

G-45
Appendix G

BF-2*A

{igSTRiiCTURAL FIRE, TFL^NSPORImM

OCCUPANT (Drivw)

IF MOBILE ROPERTY

'.;

i i iiiMnni!!!!: i!!ii!n nil! ! i ! 1 ! 1

i H 1 i 1

I 3 i 1 ; : r

; 1

5 i TYPE YR. 126 MAKE 1U MODEL V.I.N. LICENSE STATE

s

i b ! fel 1

• i ' ; i .

] tA i

t> M I

' V! 1 !

' i'i

.1 • • 1 -•

. jit::;. 1 i '

- M ' i ; P 1 1 ! 1 \%\\^\: 5 pi

1

! ffi 1i

OPERATIONS

Chief Officers scene: DAC

.

DC.

DC.

B.C.

B.C.

B.C,

a.c.

E. Butler,,,

}\ . ;:eyer5 V. Dunn

L. Byrnes

R. Ardisson

Davison

Roche

Shelley

Wagner

Dawe

Cesark

CW Duty,

Div. 1,

Div. 3,

Batt. ONr:,

Batt. 2 Batt. 4,

Batt. 6,

Batt. 31,

Batt. 22,

Batt. 7,

Safety Battalion.

Personnel Present at Scene:

R. Sclhkirer Fire Coitcti. Laison,

D.C. Basile EMS Supervisor,

n n, T-'-i aioin ..-T^^ ^ , •< J . . - . • Lt. Valle HYPD Pet. 1 supervisor,

Mr. T. Cancolliere WTC Bldg Mgr.,

(2) Representatiive of Salvation Army. •

ONE.

Lawrence M. Byrnes

aN. 1830

DIV.;

TYPE FULL NAME TIME ARRIVED TYPE FUU NAME TIME ARRIVED,, i

G^6
Interim Report on Significant Fires in WTC 1, 2, and 7 Prior to 9/1 1/01

^ STRUCfURAl/FIRE^^

'

tF MOBILE PROPERTV

nrPE YR. ilHIiiiiii iiH

I !

I

I

' i

\ \ [ I {Ml

ill

MODEL

O

1^;

Is I ^11

if? ! is

; ^5 I j !:•?

; ?4 \

r--

i I III I

L.crj4SE m nr.STATE

I i237 UNIT PTC- 2*5 OPERATIONS

Time Sequences:

Sicnal

Box S08 4 IO-8'I 10-76

10-44

10-84

10-75

i 22-3064

; 10-S4

i UC/8084

1P27

1G30

1833

1Q42

1845

1048

1858

1904

200S

Injuries

By Order of:

Diupatcher

,

Batt. 1,

Batt. 1,

Batt. 1,

Div. 1,

Div . 1

,

Batt. 1,

Car. 6B, Chiif Butler,

Car. 6B, via FCU.

superficial burna,

^, chest pains.

Unit Citations to subnitted for Ladder Co. 10 iad Engine Co. 10.

rrPE FULL NAM

OHE

1 fi-^n TIME AHhlveO

L.

TVPE FULL NAME

PAG

TIME ARRIVED

G-47
Appendix G

t^lpfS^rIj^|u^^ PIPj

DATE AND H lME ::;/ y.J J!pX?^=,>y4^

a .3-1. ... Tj '.I —

4 ^'^/4:/0^msm':^/!^r/^fi^/

OCCUr/LNT jr>ii«r)

IF MOBILE • PROPERTY

i ;

j

i IN I]

1 if 11

1 1' M 1 1 t

1 1 1 1 !

! WM\\\\mm TYPf- UAXE It.) MOOKL VIM .T^^mglt^

I i

I

i d i i P [ i

I !

UNIT PTE. J«3 OPERATIONS

Ot.>ei*iitions

.nc]. 10: R<2spoiu5ecl to :,thc 93rd floor/ stretcUC^

of Z"";" hoser huok-ifi wp to ctandpipo iif^^j fiss£sh£5d La-d. 10 in Beart.-h and 3iz« ^^f"

' 94th floorsr used a fog nozzle to oy-^- in electrical closets, asaistC'Cl in f'^'A civilirjiiB, corinncted to buiWi-igs

Rcispondec! to the 95th floor, 3tretUil|

2^''"hQse, stood fast, astiisted in

of fire area., cL>nnuctcd to and suitpJ:/^

siair.ese,

R(?sponded to Uhe 93rd floor, fitl.'Q 251"- hose ^ror.i the "B" stalrvvay, c* EC'C. cTonniicted to GtGTidpipe and Pljj R<ssDortd3d to the 97t3! floor, had

2H''~ V-'sa^, Etnoa fast, e£4iet«d

l"'ov?iri.g Engi,c!/Con£nies rtjtjotted to LOt/bi«-j«i^;

stood fast: Eng. 18, 2 05 , 24, i^jM

:.v,H^ r-TO A^'. r,*. "J 'J=Ai

** E-in also uccd dry chen o-n ^^^.^M^

ONE

Fc

La-9r enr.e M. ByriieS

TYPE t-UU. NAUC

H N. 18 30

TIME ARRIVED.

G^8
Interim Report on Significant Fires in WTC 1, 2, and 7 Prior to 9/1 1/01

.

.

' DATE AN D TlweX BOX IG N'l 1 1 ON-i:^,-: /S i Hua UH c

/

.J AREA ORsy

6! ;i»^M#['^Hl#HNHI#yi^?|pi4lli'HH^?^

/ (iMa mfhiH /^/ * ^ STREET NAME uil

1a.

1 \

1 i

r f.

1 i

i . » i^pBtij I'RpJpEi pl^H'fRi [ ; i 1

•irld; Oracle i Center

OCCUPAJJl (Dtivoi) IF MOBILE1 i l 1 1 i » iiHiiiin.MiM!

'» 1 i ; ; •

; M 1 ! I

i M J ' ; M 1 1 1 .

1VPH VB. 1J« »3 MODEL UCEMSi- STATE

ft!

1 1; ! 1 i i

?s i Mi

UNIT PTS. OPERATIONS

UNIT OPERATIOHS cont:

Lail, 10; Conducted prLznarj searcHi on floors 93, 94, 95 ^ and • and £3. Unit split into 3 tGDjTiG, locateddfiro

condition in olyctrica]- distributiun closets, called

for placcnont of hand Linos, conducted opening up

opGiatioiiK on 94 Lh floor to check for firo cxtenEion,

evacuated unknovm meiaber of civilians from floors 94

througli 9?" during initial operations.

Lad- 1: Conduct<5d pri.r^-ary sea^-cl; on 53rd floor, conducted

cecondari'. Ecarch on. floors ?4 to 101, proved to be

nega-tive, conducted survey on floorc 31 through 92

for water dejne,<je to elsctricai closets due to Iil<nd- line use, negative.

Lad. 15: Conducted prinary and eeconds-ry seesched of 'f loora

93 to 97, nogatiVQ results, .. • Lad. 8; Conducted c^xa-Mination of floors 92 to 10\ ^nr

possible fire extension froia electrical closets, .

and 95, . , •, , Lad. 110; Performed eecondoxy search of floors 95 through 110> . negative reeults,

•

' ; ONE nr • y

Lawrence 11. Byrnes .1830

.Diw. ..

"Type FULL NAME TIMEAK8IVED TYPE FULL NAME I.IME flflBIVEDM;-,; ,^.,.7..

G^9
Appendix G

7l|i| ebbyf :obB 141

STTIEET NAMf-

!] ! 1 1 1 ! 1 1 i illllii

1 OCCUPANT (Drirar)

UCEMSe SlATE

10! 11 iili il

5?r I i 1 11! Hi; i k1

j m 1 1

5- iillilf(1 i ill 1 1 1 fl 1 i i ^8 M i B 1 1

13.' UNIT FIX !" OPERATIONS

Unit Operations Cant:

Lad. 6: Conducted scnondary search 66 floora 105 to 110,

ncqative^tgHultB , removed (2) civilians from stalled

eTtsvAtors on the SBth and 101st floors, no injuries

to civilians , or damage to bailding,

Lad. 20: Conducted secondary seaz-ch of floore y0,99, and 100

negative ifesfclts.

Lad. 131: Condu.cted search of floors 103 to 110, with negative

eesults

Field CDn-iuunicatians Unit: Set up Coyrjiftunications/CoiTjiiind Post

in BacCTient, WC CorrMand Post,

Eattalion 2 supervised Lobby £ta.g±ng Area,

Battalions 4, 6, anta 7 operated on various floors pith

units so assigned/ ' /

Division 3 operated as Operations OIC on varioUQ floof-s, . .Division 1

' coerated at .the ConEiand. Post ak CIC

/6

LawrGncQ M. Dyrjiea

8.N. 1830

. V

DC

FULL NAUR llWE AHFtrVED

\ ; ,\ fV '

TVPE FULL -nam:.

G-50
Interim Report on Significant Fires in WTC 1, 2, and 7 Prior to 9/11/01

G-51
Appendix G

DATE AND.TIME:;;:f: A-,.80X^,- "alarm HSCErVED ; / LOCATION./

•2202i[l

a, : ---- «

D-. •- • 0

"r - n

E

" s

,. s

5 / NUMQOl . / (INCL inrpufti)"A

AS /^:#

. -a

i.

; l.H

! H 1 1 li i 1 1 i i Ml 1 M j

S7

Port; Aiathbrifcyj KY/NJ

OCCUPAIJT (Driver)

IF

lYrE VR. 12a MAKE 193 l.'.ODEL V.I.N. UCEN3= STATE

115 201 K.V ?13 219 225 J31 o

7'tOlO 2 0 7 001.20 7 008; 20 7 obe: 20 1 noi-20 100022 bo 5 021 1?

5 OOS 12 7 013 12 7 020 12 '- '- !

i

'

i

OPERATIONS

Due tci high elentrical voltage ( 1. 50 CO (['volts confixzied, no watex was liscd in

Ijiitially, penfLing rfonf irniation uf pov.'or of 5 at the electrical distribution panel.

Due to large floor aroa of the 5th f l.oor-s\il3-J>age3nenfc, responcUng units were split into teaias v.lr, : T.a!.V2Gi: Co. 10 ar*d Engine 10 using the 1^13 stair

to approach the fire ataca, La^Jdcr 1 to use sacor.d stairBay-Kl2 , to access th-i: 5th sub. bucment level. These imits were taJsJs^cl with pinpointing the fire area, an area of 2C0' k 400'.

A incu-'J^er of Ladcter Co. 1 having fcuml the fire siturition in a very large

po'.^er dihitribtition ca-nel, -attempfccd to ri2lay inforTciation to his officer.

Prior to his tran.Srtissirtn firefighter was struck by a shocJc hi^st. <^&n- emted bye the involved panel. Ladder 1 firefighter )tn.OOked uhconscienee

required a conserLcd effort to remove to a separate safe area. ' ' ; Unit Ooeratiojis

,

Engine lO - operated on 5th sub level, stretched a 2h" hoiid linc-frmnnn •

' the stantlpipHr operctad vhen power off confirmstion received. Coraoany

Engine 7 - Operatsa on fire floor with line off standpipo; opergtcd , Ounder B-.C. T>sm2rest, Satt* 4, extinguished, flic, used dry chimical

extinguishers on, fire, • /.-••"'.- - ,

Lavrrencc hl.£yrn.ys / ?.205 ' •' , ••.T"^._^ TYPE I^IILL NAME TIME ARRIVED '

• ""7^^" lYI-E FULL , >. .-U- .^^^TIME AnfllVED

.1 V , * . .1. » 5:^. . I

G-52
Interim Report on Significant Fires in WTC 1, 2, and 7 Prior to 9/1 1/01

^^^"^ STRUCTURAL FIREinTRAN^ EMERGENCY;- .^i'

OCCUPANT (Driver)

1 / §/ WIDIH y/ LENGTH^ 5th sub. base.

D

1NG '99 M ! s •

1

1

: 0200-0400

ROOMAPT. 114 1Z3 IF MOBILE PROPERTY Mr. i i I 1 ! I

!

I

i i

. i Hi!;!'!! i i

i

!

i I

' TYPE va

i ;

237 UNIT PTS 2" OPERATIONS

Operation cont:

Engine 6 - Assisted Eng 7 in stretch of and operation of a 2';" line

into fire area, perforrried search of area, overhauled as nscaesary.

Engine 55 - Operat€^ with and relieved Eng. 7 on hand line on fire

floor, took up hose lines.

Engine 4 - Under supervision of BC. Turnee,B2, transported injured member

of Lad. 1 to ambulance on the Bl level of the fire building, relieved Eng.

10 on a Ihnd line, oberhaviled, took up hand line.

Engine 24 - Transported Air Cylin^ees fire area under supervision of

BC. Jackson,

Engine 3 - Ordered to and did provide air cylingers to operatind ,

- units of the B5 level. ., Engin

c ._ — , 1-^1 - r-^—— =• r> »-

Stood Fast - EngSSatl, Engines 15, 23. 33, 34, 207/Maxi, 284/Sat.3,

o

Lawrence 31. Byrnes 2205 -0 S

TYPE FULL NAME TIME ARRIVED J . .:. ... J^P.E FULL NAME ., . Jl^,^ t^Si*

G-53
Appendix G

BF-24A (l'2/86);:

STRUCnJRAl^FIRE,;TRANSF^

n i i

3

I

'

I

' • 1 i i i 1 : ; '

1 1 1 ii i i

i WORLD : TRADE ' CENTER ;

1

i 1 ! i

57

0 0 boo 0 OiO 0

« S3 i^ort Authority HY/NJOCCUPANT (Driver) 5th sub base.

> HOOWAPT.

IF MOBIte PROPERTY

i

t

; H i

TYPE YH. 128

Q 237 UNIT PTS. 2« OPERATIONS

Operations cont:

L,addGr 1- Operated at the 35 level, conducted search to pinpoint the

fire area, concucted a primary search for possible employees trapped.

TV. A-^odio injured in explosion of 13000 volt distribution panel.

Ladder 10- Perforrced a search of the E5 level Ito identify the fire

area, and searched for possible trapped employees, gathered and used

dry chEinical extinguishers on the fire prior to pov;er removal, oner- hauled as required.

Ladder 8- Perfortnad a secondary search of the fire area, used dry

chemical extinguishers, assisted in overhauling.

Ladder 6- Piiced and used portable exhaust fans in stairwells to . affict ventilation , took up,

^

T.pfldr^r IS- Sunolied sr<are SCBA cylinders to sta<Tina area.

Ladder 20- Supplied spare SCBA cylinders to staging area* .. . .. o

Laqrcnce M. Bvrnes .7 2205

DIV. '

.

" rn

TYPE FULL NAME TIME ARRIVED" TYPE FULL NAME .- TIME ARRIVED

. .

G-54
Interim Report on Significant Fires in WTC 1, 2, and 7 Prior to 9/1 1/01

(J

-r-.-V"- A

". 0

D

R

E

. s

s

/ NUMBER' / (INa. HYPHEN)A

WS

fl Mil /III i;

1

; i M M

4. i ;

i ! ; ! I ; i i I

!

I M i I

i

: 'odttAuthority fUY/NJ 5th sub. base. 99 -0200 0400

OCCUPANT (DrtveO

I! TYPE YR. 128

O

Zff UNIT PTS. 2*3 OPERATIONS

Operation cont:

Rescue 1- Compacy split to perfor?:! several 6cerations1. Assisted in adihinistering first aid to Injured firefighter,

2. Conducted secondari' search of fire area, flicgativc,

3. Used Thermal Ca:nera to checJ: for f)ossibla fire extension.

Rescue 2- Assisted (2) civilian electricians (with SCBA's) to confirm

power off in electrical^)anel , relayed conf im\ation of power off to

Command Post. Cssisted in hand line iperation, assisted in VES of

fire floor.

Chief Officers present:

DAC R. Palmer, CW Duty

DC. R. Hanson Div. 1,

B.C. L. Byrnes Batt. 1,

B.C. W.Demarest Batt. 4,

§.C. R.Turner, Batt. 2,

B.C. Costa Batt. 7,

B.C. Miccio Batt. 6,

B.C. Nardone Batt. 9. oar I-aWrence M. Byrnes

// y - 7 "^YPE FUa NAMg^^ • TIME ARRIVED , . TYPE FULL NAME . , TIME ARRIVED - ^

G-55
Appendix G

:3DPB

BEET-NAME1: ll n

*

i

' -i 1 i 1 |

i 1 1 M 1 hi-l 1 1 4 1 j WORLD; TRADE qiTNTERt

1 i 1

i T 1 1 ! M 1 I rill 1-1 M iin 1 r 1

63 B9

iMiiiimjill!

IF MODILE PROfERTY

R-CXIJA/AKT. 114 123

!

1

! ji i i: ! t iniNNin HI M i 1

; I I

; 1 ; ' S

i K.' mm i

TtTC Vn. ia»

o

^ 1

! d! ' I ii Si ]

; 1 iiilli

3 p 11-!

;. Si I

OPERATIONS

hi

Oners Lions cont;

Greater alarms transinitted dur Lo Magnitude of fire area involved, . _ potential for GTotokG and heat problorjs, nur.ibers of employees in building

need tosunply and rcliGvc operating pcrsonne.

Injuries: FF. Amodio, Lad. 1,- concussion, jreniaoed to Eeckraan Hosp.,

FF. Cancel, Lad 10, graniifed I>5L. , PF. Hanson, Lad. 10, granted HT.. , FF, Selletti, Lad. 10, Granted I-IL.

Note: Staff and craployees of the New York Port A-uthority provided

excellent guidance and assistance. Jielp provided includied

mechanical, ventilation, electric.il distiriijution disciplinoE

whicli lUiiOe Tor a rauch easier fire ground operation ^

oBJC. . li

TYPE rULL HAME iS

TIME AnniVED

,

. /

•

rrperuU NAMEG-56
Interim Report on Significant Fires in WTC 1, 2, and 7 Prior to 9/1 1/01

G-57
Appendix G

F-24A (12/861 11M1-MH31JI02M REPORT -- ADDITIONAL DATA

STRUCTURAL FIRE, TRANSPORTATION FIRE. NON-STRUCTURAL FIRE OR EMERGENCY

'^"•iJ i i pfrtyb 1 m 1 Il l

231

MOB

"ROPER

TVPE VR. 126

195

MAKE TH MODEL

JO? in 219 225 II i 1 liti

! 1 \

t

1' i l»

f i 1 1 \\\ i f I!!! \ 11 i

i

1

OPERATIONS

E-7 Sirelcbtd precamionary line from standpipe. F.S.D. for World Trade Cenler - Mr. .Vlike Hurl). O.E.M. U. Wilson.

F.M. Kregler #361 reipooded oo BH's own knowledge of prior suspicious activity. Job #11201.

Be John Akern»an

01

23:07

PAGE

TYPE FULL NAME TIME ARRIVED TYPE FULL NAME TIME ARRIVED

G-58
Attachment G-A.5

Significant fire incidents occurring in WJC 2 (3)

Significant

Fire

Incident

Date Fire Location

# Sprinklers

Activated

# Standpipes

Activated

Cause of

Fire

Material

Ignited

1 5/19/75 Floor 32 3 Incendiary Trash/waste

2 4/12/77 Duct work over

grill in restaurant on floor 107

2 None

listed Duct work

3 3/22/93 Fan motor room

on floor 108

2 Mechanic

al failure Not

classified

G-59
Appendix G

Eniijpi-^-:;'^

2—WDiLLa-Trade-Cfinter.-

isUMBfiT' S'^Jli- Jli IT "' Xo -'-BJJlM§^^L-<2- V.jsToFiii ' ASfA. „ , , ^ r-x ..frsu'l'ii rln-imn eh^i iisilT ^as^i liinoci o5 J29lst'*£0; ' -^.d

5 023 Oi 30:

5 024 0 12 5 017 "0 12^

5 irrC ffO-ittl. Pib

|2-

3 057 0^36

6 oor 0

36- 5" 610^0^

:

a. ,—

&

15

0? 7' 010 0 W7001 0

H-.l J 20 7 ooS 0: 50"

U9v' . ,• OPERATIONS

PR 3?. 'riyor-and- occxipants reported ti-apped cm^.3ll"aQd/j2'ifloors

E£5tabllshjedi comnianii post and ord-ered Engine 5' (28)' and En.clne'7 to proeeet

to fire area atid ,pi3erate.in.:separate stnii:T^aysjtr^l&dder.3_rl0eajid Ittoj'traiisi.ialt..i:rmfldiate ' rep<jrt- of fire ddnditlona iiitti,jto.~mk^ occnpants

anil perfurrn necassf-ry duties^ Battalioii'V to 'snpftrvise' operations la Tire area- Dlvi slon ,1 ^as suaied conuaand uppn...-.arrival ^ ;Ord ere4.^oEL8;-;add it-ionali?

euglne and ladde f tmits;' Tlieia"'ti^saisttlt'te^"£nd alafm upon receipt of repoi

froni fire area of. .".heavy fixe aad .snokc ^condition" »:-„fiBaJ:t^^ 10-'and'-Ladder/-8;ciraer^ o.pe ii^^td' I'iJ^ -t -aiilts put to'-wurk -as \'a^irRd~aad tb^'T^lieVe ' Operati uxHts'iT l^lire. -^tsa involvec core area throuehaut anfl was conTlnsd to samaE.'6(2I5) "stretched, line to 32n via stairuay-'S. * Operated to extinfiulsh"

major body of fire, Tiiea reliered by, E.?^ •^^^^ r.,-

' tt'-.m > j>jv.-iTMlir~-at' ,s.-X£.'-c7,xo lEI fifi'£^.«.-:!.x?^ .2>.tfi3ii ^^^-^f^^ ^""^'^fj^.f^*

35.7— Assi sted F..6 ^irt.'nt,rfit-:o>v.^.rrf*' ^Tit1'-'H>fv^:iHMtf<j^^^^^ TTienr^sSr'oliRhfid ?n

UN Charies J, Totruba.

1 .Cjrti

Of,A«RlVAI

G-60
Interim Report on Significant Fires in WTC 1, 2, and 7 Prior to 9/1 1/01

L,l-\M£de search 5-^*^v?^\ ^5*r. Tf{ea jBoXe^'eiiminiiVloit 'at 33rd r

E.10(SpF

. e ccni£3iiet.Ci3^Sridj : 3^1 -^Tli cjt! r^eJjL o;radl iT* 10 _| cT?;cjrtlHuliiT^^

Bat-t.V- Supervised unitti inttlallj operating on the 32nd fl,

^fBatt.l- Orderi--d^.to fiBslct ±n s\iparvi slcn Tif fife area. THen relloved BalA

r.idlO'^.'- ; an1i-'E^pervisdd; eecondaxyj.ser.rchV- e^^^ ^

I5.9— Ordered tO stand fas+i. Then tT^ade search of AnVth^fl,, .. i

E.55--, Relleredlioperatl^ unitB^^ 32nd flv ^-ihero: necsSssair.- '

s E.2i]^HadQ^^amiriatiort, 2rit^.,t^0t\i. and/dOth- fls, ('?.- ViTC) - :- . \ ••

i 0-:; V iX- ^ic-;- v;--v;v -.^--v • -J'^";,:

'

'

L,l>- Made sQaxch oX peml^etcr.o"!jTlce. occupancies.32nd-.i'a». ^Thgrt- loidQ

;ir,i;:.-I?:.'r:' search and~exriciJiatlon-'oir- itAtK ii';_Th^ , of-'^lst-'fl core' area-' "'.'X"- f^.T-./'V.;;''.,-^" ",.,7,_' V"^ i">r;'-.'ti"^;^'""'

-

' "Batt. '32 f?uT5crYised- erainiii^'t'lcn in ^l^'iltCi 'THea^siiparriEedv-iK

Mar.:i 1- Stretched I'lJie ^to 7|at

eJsid" W s^snd.^faLEt»j^,i^'j' suij-s

; ^ ;Ees* -1- Jblixci^JtiLSLtftd AdIi^IiL£^t.^^.ed•^D ,to- 'Tx,- ;ol*,Ffeili' -S^?^^ '"Tt'eii, mad'

r.:i_'"''i'" exfijiiinatltin Tor'-'ffre exu'ensibn. 5rc"und^p^^iEoVer^of -flr^-,^^^^ {

^.;^,T o n-' f r-.''ri r.-J- ro'.iJ.^l "ZCJIC!^ '-^irC"-''.

laade

and

£':2 >'i oci '--•'•'S£t'''i' crdered' t'o 'st aiii "fast "ati'"£o 6£ ' up " siie "thiyi

FCO. Established Ffeltf U'AtssV 'Eo'citored HT circuit e* Traivsmitted

^Tlis8 of Special Calls: 2150 hrs. — -^''-^-^

„ v n«.j~ .,. ujtder control!^' ^2257 bra.

Chief Orricors OpBratijass EG Votruha, Batt. 1 J3G Basloy. Bn.

G-61
Appendix G

p. -IS. 7? , , P-T ! 1 .—vjti — „ m 1 05 5 004 0

I ^ rl , m : -a i

- ^ ' '1? !

5-

"- i ' ^ }

< f

i

rTi>t HO. sto. ns. Kin M OPERATIONS

mm

On arrlTal found fire to be eoctlagultshed fryor to arrlTal I .. . ^

Fire was located la duct toork oyer grilla la la t^tsurant oa 10? th v^-

fXovTf Bn^ 1 notiried dlapatcher to Botlfy board of Health of posvibXd

ro!>d coatasdaatlon Jtrom beat smoke and gasss in restauraat. .j,,

S*. 6 Took rolled tips to U}? floor, atrstched line axid asbood f&jst« A'

L* 1 Mad« ndCSBsary seardi and inTBStijEatlon.

F.P. 2 on aceuQ replaced two sprinkler h^ads* ^

ABC Vdlllaa M. Tcshan 131<

nPE FUIU NAME

G^62
Interim Report on Significant Fires in WTC 1, 2, and 7 Prior to 9/1 1/01

>

Xi

X)

0)

1 in N

150 73 1

i_ in 0 3

0 Tl0 ID

4J a o

jr (D B

m

CD C O (0 ID <<- —

)

jC o

o

c ID

(55 in

-LJ m

(0

I o Q

o 00 "0 3 o 0 D

c •H 0 c C o 1 >i 0) »H iT) m 0

XJ O t

•fH <I > ' TD t- C c "D O (D o 0 ID -H u 0 JJ *jGO

(1) O c

ID 3

o 0 a £ o

Jj o (D D a

in 0 X

in 4-) 0 c

•o o

c •H c o m

CO c o c in o «»- 3> nj

ID ID

(0 a 4-1 u- •rH O X u

00 c 0 a I- (D 1- o •H "0 "S CD 0 c ID ID 01 Ui </) 5 in X c «t- O •H o in > c

CD -U •D 0 0)

j-l (1) (0 m ^ o

(0 i3 •D m U

<0 a (D (D _l 0 0) 3 o

m ID X o D

> .J V ID H (0 L. 0)

0) w J£ ID o m

!• O TJ •l-l 'f* O <i JJ tn

ID c X X. •H in > 1 1 D 1

0 0 o o c a a -< —4 o vO

in UJ _1 u UI

c

o

E

>>

G-63
Appendix G

F.24A (12/86) is»o«i53vi«OT REPORT - ADDITIONAL DATA STRUCTURAL FIRE, TRANSPORTATION FIRE, NON-STRUCTURAL FIRE OR EMERGENCY

OCCUPAMT (Drivor) IF MOBILE ROPERTy

TYPE YR i?e

fr,

] ii ' i

' 1 ; i : 1 &

a- % • { If—

i

UNIT (TS 243 24B 2M Ml 261 273 27» OPERATIONS

E7-Assisted ElO in stretching line, then up.

Ll-Assisted LIO in search, then up.

it

B.C uordati Symon ^ a^C oiv I I I

^. o^^Y y'^i^ TYPE FULL NAME TIME AHRIVEO TYPE FULL NMC TIME ARRIVED

G-64
Attachment G-A.6.1

Additional fire incidents involving the deplpyment of standpipe lines in WTC I and WTC 2 -

• Fires involving the use of one standpipe line and the activation of one sprinkler (4 in total)

G-65
Appendix G

ADMINJSTRATIVE COMPANY

G-66
Interim Report on Significant Fires in WTC 1, 2, and 7 Prior to 9/11/01

ao

i-t o

o

u

•3

C4

u

o

oH

Si

4-1 o

I

p

o o

r-i H

O O <— si) t>- t- C '> • • • • o f-i to u *o

i:..H q c c ri

G-67
Appendix G

G-68
Interim Report on Significant Fires in WTC 1, 2, and 7 Prior to 9/1 1/01

«!•>>>

•H C -H ,H Q P) Q Q D

-CJi O U3 C3 n

O iH CM OJ n

Q

-J ft m ca O +J i» it^ rtj jJ +1 M p, a

OT nJ nj oj >M >< K m PI «= z 2

Q ^ O S n 51 O" fl Cr« m CO E 1-1 tji©

15 rrf 3 O «HI X i> o u a ca U U U- Q +>

• S tri &

Q ?r, fq pc, ui

G-69
This page intentionally left blank

G-70
Attachment G-A.6.2

Additional fire incidents involving the deplqyment of standpipe lines in WTC 1 and WTC 2 -

• Fires involving the use of one standpipe line (27 in total)

G-71
Appendix G

01 20

"FT

7 oio'cc33 0C6S 01

Ol 6^1 I'll

1 ! 1 5i 1 i 1

1 world 7Tht^ Center

7j;;irT ^sifiEi

110

Man,

570 X 970

(Belcv Grade)

i i. I

!

Mickey Seebecl: - Sur.^rv. Er.gr.

PA - Lt. ;;evL-n #21

1

i 5 occ 0 '10 ^< 007 c

i 02 5 027 0 02 ? 010 0 02 7 01c 0 1C 7 r:Oi r, 10

i 1

1 i

OPE?>AT!ON'S

On c^rrivf.l found fire in elevator car (J3) - E2 level, -J-h area - Ht=:vy sr:Dj-:f coriiiticn in adjacent areas, B-2 level. Light sraoke ccnc.

in Conic v,ri€; . on I9th, 35tn e 7c*.p floors f.nd various otr.er floors.

Fire v.as confinsd ani extinguished with 1 house lin? and on"? F.D. hand

lir.e frc;:i standr.ipe. .^.reas involved vith s^oke vere searched, occur-an". arsisted where required. Operations as follovs:

zj6- stretch line fron standpire J-'t area, ext. fire in elev. &: sh?,ft,

Z7 - assist Sc in stretching handline.

L10 - ;:ade search upper floors - 77th to 79th (light ssoke cond.)

£27 - cade search upper floors - 3oth fl. d- vic^

L10(L4S; - report to CP - search a ej:^r;inati6n of concourse area.

L1 - forced elev . doer B-2 level, examine ear, overhaul.

B2 - supervise operations of E6 <k Li opening elef. car door & ext. firt

h~2 m: level (28^)

Frani: L. Picariello 0312

Div John J. Kart

rTP£ full NAk/f Tlfc-£ Of *Sf.:VAl

G-72
Interim Report on Significant Fires in WTC 1, 2, and 7 Prior to 9/1 1/01

l|o6 1? 73 201 ?joD Up 2 1 O' 1 |oC67|7 CI 0 j 003:- 1 01 0^ 1 02 1 325

| /

/

'^7M>u/Jf7 /^^M<77^///^^

\ \ \ OOjOOj 00-00,01

1 C5i2

1 ! ViOOjGI 1 jcWj 1 |o6 57; 50 j 00

1 .-.-orld : Center Unoc 6515

BU'lDINC- 1?^L 200>:200 Security G-jards

5 006 0;10 7 010 0 10

1

i

!

!

OPFRATION'S

Upon arrival found fire ir rufciish in roo.-z 651 5 On the 65th. floor,

firi confir-ed and extinguished /i^" ^--^ ii" ^ ur.occuj-ifd office of tid£

E.6: Stretched line off standpipe extinguished. fire,h3d ta>:en rolled

ups to 65th. floor.

L.10: Overhauled jTT.aae necessary examination, ventilated.

On Scene: Fire Patrol #2.

Injured MeaaberrFr. 1st. Vincent Segretto #9050 Lad.1C,tvnst right knee.

Dr. Schwarts notified. ^'o time lost.

LcTiis Pike

EN. 2017

"7-

-I 1 John J. Hart

ll»/.£ Of A^RiVAl Tin fUil NAM'

G-73
Appendix G

5 rrrE wo ifCT. fts OPEHATI'ONS

On Arxl-ffal proceeded to tha Xleor, amoks rflported th»r« anfS floor* r^^rf

S.-6 &colt In roiled-up ler.g:ths and nasic*, proca-cded. t.o cbeck o^l^

lOth. floore, then ebeckod 21st,22iid» and 6lsfi, rioors,

found fii-«,rubbiali buralog o< foyor of 5tli* Xl&or, erf^nguLaliiSi^i^rtth:,?;

line takea frooi etandpipe-. --^---3; ^ L.-IO- cxandjatd snd oTerhauledi chtciad ±k^tx to 17th. floors £oT saok^*

LJ.- checked fcHowins floors,9jlO,Il,fi3-Bt, and 69th* ASr.lstod In crow4 . control •

' '-^ E-27- checked 10th and 11th. flooy aad assisted tn croi*i control*

ehacked th« SOth tbrvi 99tii- flft^rL,-15- checked IfiOth thru llOth. Hoora. , Deputy chl*!" Rsst. w-ae ph scena*

BC, i/tiltney Byp«=nniBad following Cob. L.l-fL.10,E.7,1.27( Uatt* 4)

Sgt, Ee^^jan of 7P.^^2 was oa sceas, 4. * ^ Fire was also found on 49tii» Floor, Extlnguisbsd oa arrival, fotind and

checked ctat bj E.?. flra Mareliall Perittl Called, becauaa of suspi clous

firo.

Charles H» Bl^ich

TYPE f U« NAHC 0907 John J« Hart

iinFof ABinvAi ~ tip£ full KamE

KV.

G-74
Interim Report on Significant Fires in WTC 1, 2, and 7 Prior to 9/1 1/01

report:- bTRUCIUKAL MKt

ADDRESS. # 2 World Trade Caotar MAnhattan

BUIIOING

(Second Cin^l no

(OtOUCH 250x250

Port of {f.T. Aothorlty ^

N*M| Of OCCUPaNI IOO»r«/»«. no. nre Safety Director

UF1 IN CKADGE >

N

1, hi

JtSi i3 i —a

III

i H !

1 & (I

I'i 1 t ' 1 ' ' IB; Si 3

i

;2 ia

^ Eg f> E i «s

? ra 1

A

' t' < 1 *'

Tfn NO sto.

ft7 rts It ;t OPERA

M M HONS22 3»

;;.»!~isi-;

Eeoponded to Class 3-70-V

Upon arrlTal found fire In planter on 32 floor there confined end HQEXSpSS

extlnfulahed as follows*

E.6 - Carry in rolled up le: sbhs, hook up to S/P outlet, etrectc line and \

operate on and extln^^lsb fire and necessary wash dowv.

L,10 - Make necessary exaMlnation of 32 and 33 floora and overhatil

burnt debits on 32 floor*

Fergus J. WePemott #2

rrrt run name iime Of a»«ivai rin fuu. name time of ahivai

G-75
Appendix G

-I UKAL FIRE

ADDRFs'; ^ *>rld Trad» Center

NUMBEi BUILDING 110

(Second Card) SIO>IES

NAME Of OCCUPAN, .OOM/AfT HO: Lt« John Elliott PAPO

lEFI IN CH4«GE '

,

J 055 0 10 7 OOd 0 05

J—a. p—Jl

NO. «a IS

in

Cta main

arrlral fotmd light firs condition la rubbish piled against «ll concoorse «hich had caused scortching to kald%Slir

^ " SS^fSoif^' standpipe outlet «d extingoiahed firm.

L S Examined for extension and mrhaoled*

tanley Hirschfield i6o«

itrc fuu n*me tiME OF *«BlV*l "'E FUU NAME IIM£ OF Ail2iv*(

ADMINISTRATivc /-o,..f>.

G-76
Interim Report on Significant Fires in WTC 1, 2, and 7 Prior to 9/1 1/01

ADDRESS _

BUILDING

ISL-cond Can))

1 Jhrii'Tx^dm^

TovftT "B* UP /goo I itnn

....

u 7i 1^'

11 j-j mHr III !^{

49

ill

M

n« NO sea.

ill

ns. 7 O03 O

liMij

It^ pn j P —ii? sal

! m 1 m I 1 ' i

3» OPCRATJONS

Oa «rriTal waa notlfi«d by Mr Samelll of a mbblBh flz^ oa tih* 79 flooj^

E. 7 HeapomSed to 79 rioor stretched lln« rnjw staildpip*, mXiapai^^tiil^fi^^

B. 6 Stret(dk«d lin» and stood fa«t Itt nr« contwil c«itw ana. ^ - ; : St^^^ ^1

Z. Str^ched lino and stood fast In atalncay In lobby ar«a.

L. 1 Performed necessary B«arch,T<artJ.latlo£ij and oTer hata on flra floor*

L. t Stood faiit with toola arid naska in ctalrway at lobby*

^nWred P,0. I««l7wftly (port Asttorlty Asttorlty Police) # 1501 renoTed to Beekman Rospltaa public /aBbulanee.^Annftrftrtt. unmlrn inhalation.

- _I62Q_

TIME OF ARRlVil. TTfE FUll N*«E

ADMIhJISTP ATIVP <-nMoMJV

DIV. jIIME OF AIlt/Al

G-77
Appendix G

ADDR!:5S.

duuding^

JWpj-ld Trade Ctr__ Port of IT.Y. Aiit.hrvT-lf.y J^ally

Niuf or occur»r/i • • — -- KOOM.'APr, wo Richard HintpBii^Firo fSafnty D

5 006 0 20

TI

5 007 0 iz t 001 0 10 ocn 0

at

io 0C8 0 :

1

i

7 015" 0 10

5 UH u<t itCI HI OPERATIONS

Ilesponded to 3-7O72 (K^ual Alarm)

VAiile respoBciirig Bafct.l notified via dept, radio of special o&ll additional

Ladder Co(L.1 5') «3-ue to report of fire ^6th. fl. Upon arrival informed of

fire ^6th. fl public hallway nsar freight elevator. Ordered investigation

a nd found fire therein, which had bsen extinguished prior to the arrival

of this dept. 'Evacuation instituted by Port Authority persomiQl prior to

airiva 1 of Fire Dept. unitg. Report of staoke detector operational of the

103rd fl. pire located between freight elevatora h9 & 'i?. E.6- Rolled -ap jle^gthg to ths hkth fl. Connected to standplpe therein and'

stretched to fire floor C-bth) Washed down fire area for ovexhEnling

purposes.

E,7- Assisted in stretch, thea ordered to rsearchj exaaLnatloii of 5^Td to

jSth flsQ Also Checked ^^th fl. report of srcoko c-cndltSonlp

Reported to secor.daxy coiLsand post TJisn otfiercd. to check

- ^ — J •— ^J-t^+A-^w AV of ?3x3 to 56th fir, Also checked out sEoise defeB<;tor 103rd f1.

1 =£. Matthev J. Parreli. 1 Ha

l!CC full K«.Uf *i Qi- )i!.Siy*l

;ADMIN1STRATIVE COMPANY

G-78
Interim Report on Significant Fires in WTC 1, 2, and 7 Prior to 9/11/01

BF.34A ;4/7t) REPORT - Additional Data

Structural Fire, Transportation Fire, Non-Structural Fire or Emergency

_2Lj n

1 &| X

s nn HO. MO. rts.

OPERATIONS

L.t*> ^ti^^^ tha fire floor (V6th) operated for orerfaaollBc search

ft euaiivatloaiM Tentilatlcn of same. Then search, exajtlnatlon A

TentllatloQ of the 107th to ^th fl». St&lnnqr "B".

L,8- L:iltlally to seconiarjr cocamand post. (Vest St). Then ordered to cheek

78thf to 60th fls search & examination. Also assisted In OTerhaullnc

fire floor Ofr6th)

L.I 5- Special called to report to West St. Then trough lobbj to svcoodanr

command post. Enroute found (2) cirlllan cleanlnc personnelCfeBaleV^

had been reaored to lebbj rafferine saoke Inhalation. Perforaed first

Aid on lAjored clTlllans. Then relleTed by Bes. t vlth resnstltator

Than xxy ordered to 3erach£W7th to 52nd fls as (2) Injtired elTlllans

reported to ha Te worked on the hBth A 50th fls.

Bes.l- Relieved L.I 5 and administered first aid (Inhalation)to Injured

clTlicms. T^n ordered Office r ft reoalnder of neabers vent to

Ingestlgate report of ssoka ft people on the 55th fl» T^^njRK^liown tt W6th fl. Search) ezt mlnatlon of floors enroat«.

£att.1- Inltla llj In coaaand, thenordered to jWHUWBiyji-MMHB g^t Uf

additional cooaand In lobby, as first aid statlon.Tvo public

aabulances standing by vlth (V) resuscltatorr. Directed search

operations of B.7, L.I 5, Bes. 1. Ordered smoke puree W^th to 107

vhen fire vaa out.

Batt,2- Ordered to supervise units on the fire floor ft report conditions

therein. Supervised In part operation of E.6, L.^1

Batt.32 - Ordered to supervise operations of units aboTe fire floor*

JDlT.t^ /^~^ overha^iled cooaand of operations at command post B.t level.

rfa/^Vjy>^/i^^—_oc

I Lm^^ L/MfiXoimfl „J^§jE>§EVM tUtttheVh^f ft)ii^^^f^<^ „me of A.Jif"

''—^

nPE FULl NAM

G-79
Appendix G

^cM^^^Sffici&i iiri^f Fire; Non:Structjral: Fi6Kottmergehcy;iSi3^^

id

' n 77

p 2lJ

s tm NO. sta. fii.

] ^—*r:=:r::.".I__„ OPERATIONS . • .' .. ....

Act-^ A^at'chler MonV: on the scene to snpervised overall operetioas.

Reoarks* L. t checked all elevator zkz ca rs before leaving a4:eni»» Orderefl tO-^t Code 1 due to report from Port Authority police

of later trouble with Kalntainence personnel (Tesco)

Dept. Fhotgra pher ordered to scene to take pictures of fire

area*

Alarm was tlrned in Mr. Kick Cappola, Temco Ma:lntalnence

(2) '^ekoan Amlmlances on the scene under ^Sr. B. John

Injured Civilians «

Jn-itirv Treated Beekoc

Scroke lnhal.& ileleased

Eooke Inhal. " " ' "

Smoke Inhal I^^'^^^^l'^^^^^c "reaoved to Hos

Note : All of the above are enployees of the Temco Co.

Sgt. Steve Fox Bd# 26'* Bum to Finge^rs Rt Hand.

Ptl A. Hallcker Bum to Rt Wrist

Ptl Jfeyers Scoke Inhal

Ptl. Carcalc Snoke Xn^al.

I7ote> Police oenbers of Port Authority Police Dept"* All Injured treated at

Qi^kBum ^s8lta3,jSt released.

^9^vM -^thcv^^^ffBatell , .

G-80
Interim Report on Significant Fires in WTC 1, 2, and 7 Prior to 9/11/01

f 1 World_Tr_ad«_C^^e^Tow^^^

Port-—Authority ^~ HOOM/Afl —

TTjiMt OF oc<;up>-Nt

lEn iH CH»«c>i

- OPERATIONS

, r ^ «r« to be iii aircoBdltionlnc room on th<? 9th fl

On arrlTal found fire to D« m

E. 7 stretched Uae, extiiictiishsd fire.

L. 1 >4a<le necessary

oTerhaul,

Tbeodore k- Canpbeli

IKX Of ftf^*'

Of »l

, -^..,vllCTRATlVE COMPANY

G-81
Appendix G

uuiiDiNG : f&udnd Card) 200 X ZOO

TO

PI a. 23- [1 1 j

=

• h Si

• i

iOPEBATIONS

Qa «zt1t«1 fotmd flra la csctaaalff6«d rubblirili in tlrrsAar IcibixT

«f 35th floor which had c&a»»4 •eortcMiuc oT tlia %blL1a and ceiXliv* - ^ Pert Authority peraotmol had sxtliij;alshar rire with hmi extlstfolahers /^Jl^ and standpi|« hBad« Fir« tomsd vasplcloas hy P«A»PD*

K 6 aeispondad ^th roliftd- up len^thSy h^olcfrd^tip to stwidpip* sod •^^'^

L 1 59aT<ihssd, exsmlxsad far ex&eiislcs] «nd efrerh&uled* '

^

mo

iTfC Fun t<AMl TIME Of ASMVAl t»Pt f-Ull fSAMf

_

Time Of «uiv*i

G-82
Interim Report on Significant Fires in WTC 1, 2, and 7 Prior to 9/1 1/01

BUILDING

(Second Coed)

lEfT IN CHAtCE

5 006 0 10 7 Od 0 05

nn NO. SECT.

IT fIS.

^

*4 K 71 77 OPERATIONSIt za 21

On urrlral fonnd cauae of alarm to btt firm in Janatorlal cloMt

la Tolring raga and mbbiah* Bstt 4 nquested a 10-*41 Codsl

Fire caoaad searing ot paint on walls and ceiUsc*

E-6 Stretched rolled up lengths md hooked up to stanlpipo cntlat

axtd extinguished rire*

I/-1 Mttda examination of walls and ceiling and TSEtilatod aa

necessary*

ADMINISTRATIVE COMPANY

G-83
Appendix G

R«>spond«»d to aa^^tul ala rm box 8089^

Upon arrival vas informed of fixe 107th fl. Ordpr«d invpstieatlon and

found fire in rabclah A aalnt. Bat^rials therein. Batt. 1 ordered

additional Battalion Chief to respond on report of deflnate fire.

Batt.^f respoode d.

Rolled up lengths to the fire floor extinguished remalntat fire

L.I- Search, e xamina tion of fire floor & floor above. Opened vails for

exanination. Overhauled burned, oaterials*

Bn.W- Ordered to supervise operations on the fire floor.

Dlv. 1- Responded to scenei and as<;uraed coa.'nand.

Note: Batt.1 transaitted lO-Wt Code 2 & requested F.H. to respond.

J

Jnaefi J. f>fcKpnnfl ?Q?Q Matt.hev J. Farrell ,.„^^,

TTFE run NAME TIMj Of A««IV*l TYPt fUU NAMf tIME Of A««IVAl

-I r- OF

ADMINISTRATIVE COMPANY

G-84
Interim Report on Significant Fires in WTC 1, 2, and 7 Prior to 9/1 1/01

ADDRESS. 2 World Trade Center Man.

BUILDING

(S*cond Cord)

NUMItt STIEET lOIOUCH 110 150x150

H.I. State

NAME Of OCCUrAMT lOOM/An. He Bon Bally P. A. Police

UFT IN CMAtOE

TPE HO StCI. PIS "

5 006 0 10 5 007 0 7 001 0 10 7 OOA 0 10

OPERATIONS

Upon arrival was told of fire on the 6th floor, operations as follows.

Ladder 1 made necessary investagation, located the fire, vented,

overhauled and searched.

Ladder 8 searched and vented floor above, overhauled.

£ngine 6 stretched a line from standpipe and extinguished the fire.

inline 6 washed down.

Batt. 2 on the scene.

Div. 1 on the scene.

l?- — ii Joseph A. Hingerton 2355 1 M 1

rrft Euii NAME TIME OF AlllVAl TTPE rUU NAME TIME OF AltrVAl

A DMl 1 ; I S T .^ A, T I V P C0 M PA K Y

G-85
Appendix G

G-86
Interim Report on Significant Fires in WTC 1, 2, and 7 Prior to 9/1 1/01

,.^,.,REPORT-ADDlT80fSAL OATA

'

?|g|^|:^^ y:SIRUDTURflL FaRE^IRAWSPDRTA^ RHE. WDI^-SIRUCTURAL FIRE OR EMERGEMC\Nrg

DATE ANDTIMEj'/4a-gOX.-v.r/^-."/f«->!.ry>.. ifiMTICW - / STHUCTIm'^' fiBBA OP'oHIGIN >^

f. . . . A,

j SHilH tmi lMi

UMIT

1 39

107 . . 213

.;• OPEftATIONS

froji tlie I07th» floor 3?flBtaoraiit, There la an open access ataii^ froaj

106, opening into 107tli. TLoor restanrant riin^ng arsa, "v, ; ^l^-- "

t At this point fire hart not been located* On "beisis of atiov*, B»tt« ,1.^1

or<ler«d approx- 500 persona ©vaeiiated from ths * Wlndovs on tHei vor],d\^

restaiiraiit " On tbd i07tli. floor via stairway " C " whioli w»33 Ol«eii*.;'crA^

emoke. Later stairway " B ' was cl*«r of amoke and was mado «.yail^Wi^

y

for evacuation.,

Cn Arrival of D.C. Rosai, Div. 1 Batt. ladriaed Ela ©f above ' wad

recommended a 2nd. alarm be transEiittad, as fire had not. t)een^lo?a|«

Restaurant vaa being aracuated and all units >fer« nov aasignad^t^i^

D.C, Ho88i tranBialtted a 2nd. alara and requested 2 additional'?!*

Operations of Cos. sure as followat >t.krsi^.

Ene. 6 Masks, rolledups, reaponded to fir© floor via freight^,.e^leTatgg

to 104 fl. via stairway to 106 fl. Mat Lad. 1 who had located 'X^^^^S

106 fl, EooJted 4 lengts of 2l/2 hose to atRiidpipe» operat&d

*^ on James J, KcKsjiaa 1409

TTHtFUlANAMe TYPE FULL NAME 1|M£ OF AflFllVAU

'

G-87
Appendix G

W^^^j^-A DATE ANq».TlMf?-/-*s' B0X^--'y^'-->4.i-*«lfi«TOH-v;^^iL'i/--- ST6UC7UBI-

'

' ^

W^r^^'^/Sv ALARM, HECaVED./ lOCATIOM ;

1^1 frriii itrrr

fj.r^ UNI I IS?

.

----- - L 213 .... OPERATIOWS

Lad, i to 106 floor to invesfcagate actiTa-fced smoks alatm, B4«XCilf^

''"' and located fii-e, checked floor above for ext$ii6i0fi» Slid WerliaUw

, Ejag* 7 Responded to 109 tl^ to invastigata a api^ijikler .pljuss,^^^^^

no spi-iiikler- flow, and light smoice condition.

Lad. 8 fieaponded to ^09 fl, with Eiig. ?•

Eng. 7, SBd Lad. 8 then reported to 108, 107, «iid I06?ls. J^dot^^e

End aBsisted In evacuation of fiestaurent.

.-••'tK.'.'-i*«W

Eng. 10, fiespond^d to 106 ri* to aBslet and relieve Ejag. 6 ©n^ tiieM^^

2nd, alarm units reported to ooMiaad post, stood fa&t tlien ord

Rescue 1 reapondad on 2nd, alarm, reported to 107 H,* aBslatfHi;-_ln;^t^|*

eVftCUSition of rcataurent, then to 106 fl. to assist Lad, 1, then.oiued^

to take up.

.B.C.- James J. HcKeima 1409,

TYPE HILl. N/,P/l mWhhe Coov- Rie

->TTpg FULL NAME

G-88
Interim Report on Significant Fires in WTC 1. 2, and 7 Prior to 9/1 1/01

R^a-fc STRUCTURAL F|BE:^IRANSpaRTATlDN m OR EMERGENCY -.i

-IGNinON AREA OF ' tXTPOOa ,

X. Jan. Himw

.^jfs-i^-;

"if MOKLEPflOPtRTY ::

I t I

' ^^r 1 IT

"OPERATIONS

>a1:ions Qt Cos.. e^ntittuftd: V . • . ?^vv::^-.=;-.-^^^

i^.';- ChieJ

DAC GlaS9«, Clt7 vide coHmand.. CM&f*

D.C. Rossi Dept. chief let. Piv.

B.C. Jamea J, McKerma Chi«r iBt. Batt. . . B.C. Lo\i±B Pike CM«f 2iid- Batt,

B.C. John T, Carroll Chief 4tii* Batt,

B.C. Edward J. Miller Chief 6th. Batt.

Field Coimn., unit, Liaut, Soranno on scena^

Pire Patrol #2 oil Bftene,

W.T.C, flM BBLlctT director Mr* John Barrett on '"a caiie» -'r: .:

p.A, Patrolmen Cemonuk, and Oorboalt on I^uty at Oommand PoeW;:^^

Building Mechanical System falurea not^di

?f1 SpriiiXler alarm 'received for ansprinlclerd 109 Fl. : ;' / l\4.,;§:^y-s^S

#2 fietvm air duct aao]ce detectora did not shut fans ds^viLt, \ #3 Beat fused link shut damper in purge systeau -/".t

#4 -lO? floor Btandpipe phone unroliable dvie .to feed hack from radiosj

Jafflss J. KcEenna

BN. 1409

•.aiV.*=jS-!.:'^.?£'

TIME OF ARHIVAL

G-89
Appendix G

-^-.^EPOn"r#ADDITl QKAt . DAT/Si Wi^m^-^'^ „

ETRIJCTURE--X AREA Of ORIGIN /ij*

tell^av,^^^'-

s h.^'Tjalldw. up joii WflchascaJL Electid-cal Balfuac'&ton.s being aada..

Port- ixv^iiord^ ^. /IC,;

: -----

M[f^^-a^ Ciy0 'ot Higli Miie report .for detadls.

. D.C

lY«rfLB_I_NAME TiMcor AnnivAL

G-90
Interim Report on Significant Fires in WTC 1, 2, and 7 Prior to 9/1 1/01

ADMINISTRATIVE COMPANY

G-91
Appendix G

G-92
Interim Report on Significant Fires in WTC 1, 2, and 7 Prior to 9/1 1/01

ADMINISTRATIVE COMPANY

G-93
Appendix G

REPORT - Additional Data

Structural Fire, Transportation Fire, Non-Structural Fire or Emergency

OPERATIONS

Eescue i Masks, searched floors i8 thru 25* ' ^; 2nd. alara units:

Engs. 24, 15, 55, 9, 241, and Hariae 1 were orded to stand fast at thsrs

** assl^ed locatlona. . ^

Div« 1, C.C. DeCaprlo responded and supervised opperations'

Chiefs Gomley, Bishop, and Farrell also on scene. . P. A. personell reported evacuation of aprox, 1,500 persons from floors S 9 thru 23.

F.C. unit on scene

?.F. 2 on scene.

Box

2-2

D/C

TIKES

0918

0928

0959

Peter Costello

rrri Riu nami 0920 Angelo DeCaprio

TIME or AinVAL Tm ruu NAMC 1IM£ Of AltfVAl >[!]

ADMINISTRATIVE COMPANY

G-94
G-95
Appendix G

G-96
Interim Report on Significant Fires in WTC 1, 2, and 7 Prior to 9/1 1/01

AOMIfJISTRATIVE COMPANY

G-97
Appendix G

G-98
Interim Report on Significant Fires in WTC 1, 2. and 7 Prior to 9/1 1/01

G-99
Appendix

G

ca (H <o -H _ a 3 O

hb

O

© -H

q 4i ^ 4^ X © a-H o 4^ a d

jTS 3 a o K (4 § o M-P o •

rH

O

U ^ (0 a o

0}d o o o I • h

XI CO 1 3 M -P

f-l • o fl -P

r-i « a -p o S

caB o <s ^

O-H

h • g ^ p a o 'O 9 p 5) • Oi o o q q *> o 2 *^ k a: ft ® 3 H ^ o drH-o MO m Qt9 • a o 2 o « 0 o o 4 o

4i

O <H

a Bi >s 13 t4

M

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Interim Report on Significant Fires in WTC 1, 2, and 7 Prior to 9/1 1/01

ADMlNISTBAViVf roMPflWV

G-101
Appendix G

G-102
Interim Report on Significant Fires in WTC 1, 2, and 7 Prior to 9/1 1/01

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G-103
Appendix G

MAKC

3»

UChHSE CTAIE L

7 •'008 'IQ 1 p

i? !

zsr UNIT PTS, !^ OPERATIONS L-R- search floors 9-40 results negative and than upcsUaElishod operations post ort 6tb. fJoor., then wenu .feg.7Lh D.oar MF.Tl and

Oir---t--d oy^-r-3T--loii of "units. Supervicod £iO,E5,];'1 and T.15. 3_j:,"^rvoGrv;,ce?! opcrationE or US/ 110; a.i L8 on floors ctaove fire uni.ba

SOnJLicted EiPiTr.ary «nd secondary search of floors above, rcsult3 negative. , TisJiDS 10-76 1314 - ElO

Under control 1340 ^ Dlv \ injured Civilliivs - ^W^^^Mm. - sno>: a i aha 1 a t i on sxoke infiniaT-ion

ta.>:en tc It . ViiicrGnts Hospital

- ssoke inl'iS.latinTi stroke inhaldbion

tuj;en-. to Beekrian

F-WS Chief cervo directed operations for SMS

?JV Q;3!=ry tlon.i CoDiaanccr on scene CEpt. Stinr.cri

Charjec CaHRhaa

rvpt ruuL N»-"E 1517

nut A»i=5ivE0 TYJ-fc fULt riAME TIMC ARFltVED ,

• HM3I

G-104
Interim Report on Significant Fires in WTC 1, 2, and 7 Prior to 9/11/01

G-105
Appendix G

2<A (12/05) iiTOjr:\wi-mawj REPORT - ADDITIONAL DATA STRUCTURAL FIRE, TRANSPORTATION FIRE, NON-STRUCTURAL FIRE OR EMERGENCY

M

es

s

1 2 WTC

9«

OCtUPftNT (Driver)

WIDTH / LEt.aTH ,

rF

TK(i* VK ISO

2 24sn2-: 5 ;^a24':;O7 S'a0 2S - 02 5: 003.' 02 7';-0IO: 20 7 .fiOl ?,0 7 015 .20 7 008 20

Oil 1^0' 7•:'0O3'507• ^7j 005's0'7^ :l*Ob l- '20

OPERATIONS

E3-5tood fast at the Lobby Command Fost.then up.

ESS-Stooil fatil al Lobby Command post, then up.

1. 1 0-Pcerat ed on the 107th f i oor , opened various walls ard door s , f i nd 1 ng no

J" d re or ex t e n t i on , t hen up.

LlS-.A.'i.sisied Kl in opening up a wall exposing fire in ahaft , mads nscessnry

search and exam from 94 thru "DOtfi f 1 oor ( Terinina t ion point of

shaft )Nc^nt i ve

.

L8-Madc necessary search and exam of floor.s 100 iluu lOSvfound negatine.

1,5-5100(3 fast at ttie Lo&by Command Posl,lhe.n tip.

LaS-Stood fast at the Lobby Coimiand Post, then up. LlOl-Searsh 75,91 and 92nd floor. found ncgat i ve , i hen up. I.i-Made necessary search and exam of floors 104 thru 106. then up. ii224-Stood fast at the Lobby Command Post.th cn u p . Rl-nsed Thermal -Imegirg camera and located fire in shaft on the 94th floor.

Ba 1

1 -Supe rvi .scd operation on the fire floor, then up. hnttfi-Supervi sed operations on 107 and 74 floors, then tip, ., Ball2-Stood fast, then up. FCU-Moni 1 ured handi-lalkie c i rcu i t . progre ss reports, then up.

//A . 01 Lawxence M Byrnes 1 J : 2

1

David Corcoran

oiv. 13: 25 d or

TYPE FULL WAME TYPE FULL KAMI:

G-106
Interim Report on Significant Fires in WTC 1. 2, and 7 Prior to 9/11/01

G-107
Appendix G

i--2*A 112/66} i9yHi.t«*»)i-M03B« REPORT - ADDITIONAL DATA

STRUCTURAL FIRE, TRANSPORTATION FIRE, NON-STRUCTURAL FIRE OR EMERGENCY

DATE AND TIME / BOX ALARM RECEIVED /LOCATION ' EXTENSION

eio 1 sis 91 0 1 \ 8

II I 08 4; oil

! el

1 qo lllll

1

\ 1 \

\

1 I ^

is

1 2 6 12 1' J3 32 37 ti 47

STREET NAME ////

WORLD it

j I ill 11 III IJJ

llHllIli S00M,'AP7

IF MOBILE PROPERTY 1 1 1 1

TVrc va. 129 143 MODEt 1 be V.l.M LICEKiSE 1TaTE ICM

l!9 '35 201 207 213 2'S 225 231

iinililiMiiii

rmnj

237 UNIi ?T5. 243 nn rmn

OPERATIONS

E-6 Took hydrant, assist«l E-7 in strtich.

^//(^^ /GL-^^ 01 D C PAGE - ^

n OFp

William Oehm 07:51 NIP. 00:00 ^

TVP= FULL NAVE TIME ARHIV60 TYPE FULL NAME TIME ABRfVED

G-108
Attachment G-A.7

Significant fires occurring in WTC 7 (^)

Significant

Fire

Incident Date Fire Location

# sprinklers

activated

# standpipes

activated

Cause of

fire

Material

Ignited

1 5/20/88 Construction

shanties on floor

3

Multiple, # not

listed

1 Suspicious Shanties

G-109
Appendix G

G-110
Interim Report on Significant Fires in WTC 1, 2, and 7 Prior to 9/1 1/01

er..4..^,., REPORT - ADDITIONAL DATA STRUCTURAL FIRE, TRANSPORTATION FIRE, NON-STRUCTURAL FIRE OR EMERGENCY

D / NUMBER /t'/fp/

o L L Z / STREET NAME M/

7

57 6» ea S3

liP WIDTH y ItNGTH

OCCUPANT (Orrvw)

TYPE VH. va UCENSE STATE (

? 010 20 7 0O8'^ 5? : :l

< / y ZB uNfT PT5 2« J49 zss «i 261 ""^ OPERATIONS

' Operations as follows;

LS-AsBieted L10 ilade prixajy and secendory segirch of 5-10,11 ,12. Then up,

Ll-I'Iade search end ex£:aination of the •'i-th floor. Then assisted L8 in the

exanination of upper floors, Then up.

Batt ii-Supervised iic End_L10 on fire floor,

Batt 2-Supervised EA- and 16 end L1 on floors above fire.

Fcu- ao?

VlSU- sop

E5- Stood fast.

Batt 6- Stood fast.

o - pr ^ — '

.../^ '

.

- _' -^r Bn-1 DC r-,''*' bTT^ oiv 0

TYPE FULL NAME TIME ARRIVED TYP5 FULL NAME TIME ARRIVED

G-111
This page intentionally left blank
Attachment G-B

PACO 2002 Report: World Trade Center General Description of All Building Systems and

the Capital Program. Extracted page.

Miscellaneous Life Safety Improvements and Sprinklerization Program

G-113
Appendix G

I

I

I

!| ,

12. Miscellaneous Life Safety Improvements and Sprinklerization Program

12.1 Descriplion of the Program

The initial base building provided for Fire Standpipe (FSP) protection in the Towers and Plaza Buildings and no sprinkler system installation (except in the sub-grade

Levels). In response to the enactment of Local Law 5 and other NYC Building Code

Local Law enactments related to the fire protection of high rise office towers built after 1973 the Port Authority voluntarily retrofitted the WTC complex to comply with the new NYC Building Code Requirements supplemented by PA imposed life safety requirements unique to the WTC. These requirements provided tenants the option

- of achieving fire protection compliance by a compartmentalization or a

sprinklerization option. The Scope of miscellaneous life safety and sprinkler system

upgrades/improvements, other than certain fire alarm, concourse circulation and

blast recovery improvements discussed elsewhere, included but was not limited to:

12.2 Scope of Fire Life Safety Improvements

Architectural Modifications - On all floors:

• Upgraded core wall construction to provide for a 2 hour rated fire separation from one side of a tower floor to the opposite side (Where core wall were

already 2 hour rated, such as in elevator shafts, upgraded where not previously

required).

• Installed a double acting set of rated HM fire doors in the core corridors where

the above 2 hour rated fire separation crossed the corridor (This enabled one

half of a typical tower floor to serve as a horizontal fire refuge for the other.) Doors included special magnetic hold open hardware and closures linked to smoke detectors in floor return air ducts.

• Restored all ceilings in corridors and lobbies affected by fire protection

installations.

• Provided slab-to-slab Ihour fire rated walls to enable a maximum of 10,000

gross square foot compartmentalization on each side of the 2 hour rated fire separations.

Sprinkler System Installation

• The entire WTC complex was fully sprinklered. The Sprinkler System was

installed in three basic phases. Phase 1: Sub-grade areas for the initial building construction; Phase 2: Sprinkler riser/main installation throughout 1 & 2 WTC

including the sprinklerization of corridors, storage rooms, lobbies and certain tenant/PA spaces in 1976 in compliance with Local Law 5 to provide tenants with a compartmentation or sprinkler fire protection option; Phase 3: The full sprinklerization of the entire complex for all remaining places from 1983 to the 2001 (including 1993 blast recovery and ongoing up-grades/improvements and

replacements).

The Tower sprinkler systems were fed in the various zones from the gravity feed

fire reserve tanks located on the 20"^, 4l",75'^ and 110"^ Floors through a

4"

vertical sprinkler riser located in the Janitor Closet on each floor of each building

in the WTC complex.

EXP 013001

CONFIDENTIJUii

rT» IV rmcMXr .i i

G-114
Table of Contents

List of Figures H-iii

List of Tables H-v

Appendix H

Interim Report on Evolution of WTC Fires, Smoke, and Damage Based on

Image Analysis H-1

H. 1 Collection and Analysis of Visual Material H

H.1.1 Sources H-2

H. 1 .2 Procedures H-2

H.1.3 Contents H-3

H.2 Databasing and Cataloging H-3

H.2.1 Digital Storage H-3

H.2. 2 Digitizing Techniques H-4

H.2. 3 Searchable Database H-^

H.3 Timing of Photographs and Video Clips H-8

H.3.1 Digital Timestamps H-8

H.3. 2 Reference Time H-1

H. 3 . 3 Timing Techniques H-1

H. 3 .4 Absolute Time Accuracy H-1

H.4 Analysis of Visual Images H-1

H.4. 1 Window Numbering H-1

H.4.2 Fire Properties H-1

H.4. 3 Window-by-Window Assessment H-1

H.5 Initial Damage Patterns on WTC 1 and WTC 2 Due to the Plane Strikes H-22

H.5.1 WTC 1 H-22

H.5.2 WTC 2 H-25

H.6 Fire Behaviors in the Two Towers H-32

H.6.1 WTC I H-35

H.6.2 WTC 2 H-36

H.7 Evidence for Collapsed Floors in WTC 2 H-3 7

H.7.1 Hanging Objects H-37

H.7.2 Molten Material H-38

H-i
Appendix H

H.8 Progress on Collection of Images and Analysis for WTC 7 H-39

H.9 Summary with Key Findings H^O

H. 10 References H^3

H-ii
List of Figures

Figure H-1 . An example of the VideoList data entry sheet for video assets H-5

Figure H-2. An example of the first page of the Cumulus data entry sheet for photographic assets.. H-12

Figure H-3. An example of a Cumulus asset screen display for the video database H-1

Figure H^. An example of the PhotoTiming sheet for calculating times for photographs

containing Exif meta data H-1

Figure H-5. An example of the VideoList sheet for calculating clip times for video assets H-14

Figure H-6. Photograph taken at 9:26:20 a.m. on September 11, 2001, showing the east face of

WTC2 H-1

Figure H-7. This photograph is cropped from the image shown in Figure H-6. It was taken on September 1 1 and shows the east face of WTC 2 at the northeast comer from floor 77

. to floor 82 H-1

Figure H-8. The key used to describe observations with regard to fire, smoke, and window

breakage in Excel data files for individual windows in the two towers H-1

Figure H-9. A portion of the Excel spreadsheet describing fires on the east face of WTC 1 around

9:42 a.m H-20

Figure H-10. A representation of fires for floors 91 to 100 on the east face of WTC 1 around

9:42 a.m H-21

Figure H-1 1 . A single frame from a time-dependent visualization generated by Smokeview H-21

Figure H-1 2. A drawing of the damage to the steel fa9ade of WTC 1 H-23

Figure H-1 3. The condition of windows is shown for the four faces of WTC 1 around 8:47 a.m.

shortly after it was struck by American Airlines Flight 11 H-24

Figure H-14. Photograph showing a full panel section lying in Cedar Street near its intersection

with West Street H-26

Figure H-1 5. Series of sequential cropped frames taken from a video shot on September 11, 2001,

showing the plane approaching WTC 2 H-27

Figure H-1 6. Plots of pixel locations for the nose and tail of the plane that struck WTC 2 as a function of time H-28

Figure H-1 7. Frames from a composite video H-29

Figure H-1 8. The time when null points are observed in the difference video following the plane

strike on WTC 2 are plotted versus the null point number H-30

Figure H-1 9. A drawing of the damage to the steel facade of WTC 2 H-3

Figure H-20. The condition of windows is shown for the four faces of WTC 2 around 9:03 a.m.

shortly after it was struck by United Airlines Flight 175 H-33

Figure H-21 . An enhanced photograph of the north face of WTC 2 taken at 9:58 a.m. shows the

east side of the north face H-34

H-iii
Appendix H

Figure H-22. Images of the east face of WTC 2 taken shortly after the plane struck and shortly

before the tower collapse H-38

H-iv
List of Tables

Table H-1 . Attributes for photographic assets H-6

Table H-2. Attributes for video assets H-9

Table H-3 . Times for major events of September 1 1 , 200 1 H-1

H-v
Appendix H

This page intentionally left blank.

H-vi
Appendix H

Interim Report on Evolution of WTC Fires, Smoke, and

Damage Based on Image Analysis

H.1 collection and analysis of visual material

Photographic and video images of damage and fires in the World Trade Center (WTC) towers and WTC 7

are critical for guiding the investigation led by the National Institute of Standards and Technology

(NIST). The conditions of the towers immediately following the plane strikes, the rates of fire development and spread through the buildings, and indications as to the floors on which the structural collapses may have begun and their causes are examples of issues that are being addressed using imagery.

Observations discussed below demonstrate the importance of such visual evidence.

This appendix is designed to provide an update on NIST efforts to collect and analyze visual material

available for the WTC disaster. This effort is part of Project 5, Reconstruction of Thermal and Tenability

Environment, and this is the focus of the material presented. It is important to recognize that the effort is coordinated with the other projects that form the NIST-led WTC Investigation, and the visual material is being used as the basis for additional analysis in these projects.

The amount of visual material recorded on September 11, 2001, was extraordinary. The terrorist attacks occurred in an area that is the national home base of several news organizations, has several major

newspapers, and is the center of the fashion industry. As a result, there were likely hundreds of

professional photographers and videographers equipped with excellent equipment and the knowledge to use it in the immediate area. New York City is also a major tourist destination, and visitors often carry cameras to record their visits.

The WTC towers (WTC 1 and WTC 2) were immense, and they dominated the New York City skyline.

When WTC 1 was struck by American Airlines Flight 1 1 around 8:46 a.m., the approach of the plane was

captured by at least two videographers who were coincidentally filming nearby. Other photographers and

videographers in the vicinity began recording within a few seconds of the impact. As fires grew in the tower, smoke pouring from the building formed a plume that could be seen for miles in all directions in the clear air of September 11, 2001 . People in Manhattan, Brooklyn, Queens, and New Jersey began to turn their cameras toward the WTC complex. The major news organizations began coverage almost

immediately and began moving professionals into position to cover the event. Numerous other

videographers and photographers, both professional and amateur, started moving toward the WTC in order to create their own visual records.

At the time United Airlines Flight 175 struck WTC 2, around 9:03 a.m., the approach and collision of the

aircraft were recorded by numerous cameras from a variety of directions. Many people continued to record images until WTC 2 collapsed, around 9:59 a.m. Following this collapse, the amount of visual

material decreased markedly as people rushed to escape the area and the huge dust clouds generated by

the collapse obscured the site. This situation was only exacerbated by the collapse of WTC 1, around

H-1
Appendix H

10:28 a.m. The visual record between the period following the collapse of WTC 1 and the collapse of

WTC 7, around 5:21 p.m., is much less complete, but there is still a substantial amount of material.

Even as the disaster unfolded, it was clear that a large amount of visual material was being recorded that was being used to inform the public, demonstrate the immensity of the disaster, and to chronicle the associated human suffering. It is now clear that the imagery of September 11, 2001, is the most extensive ever recorded of such a single tragic event. The resulting visual record offers an unparalleled opportunity

to contribute to the technical understanding of the tragedy of September 1 1 . Even though it was clear that an extensive visual record of the events of September 1 1 existed, approaches for obtaining access to photographs and videos and cataloging the material had to be developed. These critical aspects of the task have required a great deal of time and effort.

H.1.1 Sources

Potential sources of visual material have been identified in a number of ways. Recordings of newscasts

from September 11, 2001, and afterwards, documentaries and other remembrances, provided information

directly, but also pointed toward other potential sources of material. The major photo clearinghouses,

such as AP, Reuters, and Corbis, have World Wide Web sites that were reviewed for material related to September 1 1. Several members of the media suggested sources. Several collections of visual material

have been assembled for charitable or historical purposes. Collections from the Here is New York City

exhibition and the September 11 Digital Archive were reviewed. Many photographs and videos began

appearing on the Web as early as September 1 1 . These could often be identified by Web searches, and in many cases contact information was provided. Public appeals for visual material were made during

Investigation news conferences and updates. News accounts of these events led many to contact NIST

using the toll-free number or the Investigation Web site. Frequently, a new source would provide

information about other potential sources.

NIST hired a visual media consultant, Mr. Valentine Junker, to act as its representative in the New York

City area. In addition to interacting with a number of individuals, his efforts were particularly valuable in interfacing with the major television networks and local New York City stations as well as the major

photographic news services.

H.1.2 Procedures

The identification of sources was only the first step in the collection process. It was then necessary to contact the source, request the material, and make arrangements for its transfer. Special considerations

such as copyright and privacy issues often needed to be addressed. Once an agreement was reached,

arrangements were made to review and transfer copies of the material to NIST.

In the collection process, emphasis has been placed on obtaining material in a form that is as close as possible to the original in order to maintain as much spatial and timing information as possible. In the case of digital photographs and videos this implies a direct digital copy. For film or slide photographs, it would be a high-resolution digitized version of the original media, and for analog video, a direct copy

from the original source. While it was not always possible to maintain this standard, the majority of

material ultimately collected was handled in this manner.

H-2
Interim Report on Evolution of WTC Fires Based on Image Analysis

H.1.3 Contents

Significant progress has been made in collecting visual material related to September 11, 2001. Thus far, in excess of 150 hours of video have been assembled. At the time of preparation of this update, video

footage has been provided by NBC, CBS, ABC, CNN and local New York City stations WABC, WCBS,

WNBC, WPIX, WNYW and New York Cit^- One. In many cases, the videos provided not only include

material broadcast (known as air checks), but also material that was recorded but not broadcast (known as outtakes). Additionally, videotapes recorded by more than 20 individuals have been received.

Photographs have been provided by a number of sources dominated by commercial photo services, the New York City Police Department (NYPD), the New York City Fire Department (FDNY), and

individuals. Well in excess of 6,000 photographs, representing more than 185 photographers, have been

received. Professional news organizations that have provided material include AP, Corbis, Reuters, the Nen' York City Times, the Daily News, and the Star Ledger. As for the videos, many of these

organizations have provided access to unpublished photographs. The majority of photographs have come

from individual photographers, both professional and amateur.

It is difficult to estimate the actual amount of relevant visual material recorded on September 11, 2001,

and thus to estimate how complete the collection efforts have been. There is certainly material that has

not been identified and collected. However, NIST believes that the extraordinarily large collection of

video material that it possesses is sufficient for the Investigation.

H.2 DATABASING AND CATALOGING

It would be impossible to effectively use the vast amount of visual material collected for the Investigation

without some means of organizing and cataloging the material.

H. 2.1 Digital Storage

Very early in the task, the decision was made to save all material in digital format on large digital data

storage devices. This approach has several advantages. Because the material is in digital form, it can be

assessed quickly. It is not necessary to search for a particular photographic collection or videotape, and no special equipment is required to display it. Because most material is received in other forms, the

digital storage is in effect a backup system for the original. Additional redundancy is provided by

backing up the entire digital storage system at regular intervals. Because videos are saved digitally, they can be analyzed using a variety of commercially available editing software.

Various storage solutions were considered. An approach was finally adopted in which a central server along with two 325 gigabyte and one 160 gigabyte external hard drives were connected with eight

personal computers equipped with 70 gigabyte hard drives. The personal computers not only provide

additional disk storage, but also serve as workstations for data entry and analysis. All of the systems are connected by high-speed ethemet to form a single network configured such that the entire system

becomes, in effect, a single mass storage device. The total amount of storage available is roughly

I. 4 terabytes.

H-3
Appendix H

Due to security concerns related to the sensitive nature of some of the visual material and copyright

issues, the computer network has been set up with its own dedicated connections and is isolated from the

internet backbone of NIST. Policies have been adopted that require all viewing and analysis of the

material to be done in secured rooms using secured networks.

H.2.2 Digitizing Techniques

When new visual material is received at NIST, it is stored digitally on the dedicated system. If the material is already in digital form this simply means copying and saving it on the system. Analog

material must be first digitized in some manner. For instance, a photograph might be scanned and

digitized, or a video might be converted to a digital video format (typically mini-DV) and then copied to a hard disk.

Each arriving video is logged into VideoList, a Microsoft Access database written specifically for this application. There it is assigned a unique identification number. Pertinent information concerning the tape is recorded, including its duration, the network and broadcast date if applicable, its physical format

(e.g., VHS, Hi-8, or mini-DV), where the tape is stored, whether the tape is an original or a copy, its source, whether it has been digitized, whether it contains embedded timecode, and general notes on its content. Figure H-1 shows an example of the entry sheet for the VideoList database. Videos to be stored

digitally are copied onto mini-DV media, and each copy is also logged into the database. VideoList also contains a calculator for assisting in the calculation of clip timing that is described in H.3. 1 . Selected

video material is then transferred to hard disk for storage. Video material is often found to have natural

breaks, such as when the camera is turned off and on (e.g., by an individual videographer) or when

multiple cameras are used (e.g., during a newscast). It is advantageous to treat each of these breaks as the end of an individual video. This is accomplished by a process known as "clipping." By using Adobe

Premiere software and a personal computer to control the video player, it is possible to identify and note such breaks in a "clip file." The clip file can also contain notes related to the material. Once a clip file has been generated for an entire tape, the software goes through and automatically generates multiple data

files containing the video material. The material is stored in "avi" format, which maintains all of the

digital information. The maximum video file size that can be handled by this system is 1 gigabyte. This

corresponds to slightly more than 4 1/2 min of avi video. Longer continuous video segments are broken

into lengths having roughly this period. Breaking longer videos up in this manner also makes them easier

to search and catalog.

H.2.3 Searchable Database

As noted earlier, a vast amount of visual material has been collected and saved digitally as part of the

investigation. Without some organization, it would be impossible to use this material effectively. A

commercial database program written specially for organizing visual material. Cumulus, was chosen for

this purpose. This software is designed to collect individual "assets" in specified catalogs and to allow

the assets to be characterized with a variety of attributes. It is possible to generate specific attributes and

include these in specially designed forms for data entry. Once a catalog has been assembled, it is possible

to search for assets having a specific attribute or combinations of attributes. Quite sophisticated searches can be created. It is also possible to order assets based on a particular attribute. As an example, when

dates and times are assigned, the assets can be ordered in chronological order.
Interim Report on Evolution of WTC Fires Based on Image Analysis

NOtK

1 ^R;\Databases 1 ;^C:\Documents .,, ®]ScottMyersScre. . .

| HI frmMain : Form 1

1 ^ Videos ^.Q; 11:23 AM

Figure H-1 . An example of the VideoList data entry sheet for video assets.

Two separate catalogs, one for photographs and one for video clips, have been created for visual materials

collected as part of the Investigation. Each catalog has a similar set of attributes that is used to characterize the assets that are included. These attributes were chosen based on the needs of this task

dealing with fire conditions within WTC 1, 2, and 7 and by consultation with members of other project teams. Tables H-1 and Table H-2 list the attributes used for photographic and video catalogs,

respectively. A description of each attribute is provided along with details on how information

concerning the attribute is input into the worksheet. Figure H-2 shows an example of the first screen for the photographic data entry form.

Cumulus allows thumbnails of entire catalogs or selected subsets to be displayed. This makes it possible

to review large numbers of photographs and video clips quickly and to decide which are most likely to be

useful for a particular purpose. A variety of asset characteristics can also be shown simultaneously.

Typically, the asset name and the time the asset was recorded are displayed. Figure H-3 shows an example of thumbnails taken from the video database.

H-5
Appendix H

Table H-1. Attributes for photographic assets.

Attribute Definition Entry Choice

Asset Reference Location of photograph in file system Set by Cumulus

Categories List of categories under which the photograph

is listed, typically the photographer's name or source

Set by Cumulus

Record Name File name of photograph Set by Cumulus

Photographer Photographer's name Text Received from Where photograph was obtained ("Other" may

refer to a third party, for example)

Photographer

WWW

Other

Original Source nuw puuiugiapii wda duucu lu uic cuiicLtiuii Tlinit"Ql 1 llfimTiQl L-'lglLal V„Opy OA V->'rigulal Digital Copy from Program

Digitized Slide or Negative

Digitized Photograph

Uploaded from Web

Use Limited Photographer has requested that use of the photograph be limited Checkbox

Copyright A copyright exists Checkbox

Copyright Agreement Usage agreement with NIST Text

Shot From Location of photographer Text

Date Recorded Date and time of shot Date and time

Time Uncertainty (s) Number of seconds uncertainty in the time

assigned

Integer

View Direction Location of photographer with respect to the WTC

North

Northeast

East

Soiithpast

South

Southwest

West

Northwest

WTC Faces Building face(s) visible in the photograph Checkbox for each choice

WTC 1 North Face WTC 1 East Face WTC 1 South Face WTC 1 West Face WTC 2 North Face WTC 2 East Face WTC 2 South Face WTC 2 West Face WTC 7 North Face WTC 7 East Face WTC 7 South Face WTC 7 West Face

H-6
Interim Report on Evolution of WTC Fires Based on Image Analysis

Attribute Definition Entry Choice

Distance

Near

Medium

Far

Clarity of the photograph

Near = Can make out details in windows

Medium = Can count windows

Far = Unable to count windows

Checkbox for each choice

Ruildins? WTC 1 WTC 2 WTC 7 Other Buildnig

Building(s) visible in photograph f^hprkHoY for parh rhoipp

1st Plane Strike Photograph shows the plane strike on WTC 1 Checkbox

2nd Plane Strike Photograph shows the plane strike on WTC 2 Checkbox

WTC 1 Collapse Photograph shows the collapse of WTC 1 Checkbox

WTC 2 Collapse Photograph shows the collapse of WTC 2 Checkbox

WTC 7 Collapse Photograph shows the collapse of WTC 7 Checkbox

Street Street scene, or a street is visible in the photograph

Checkbox

Debris

Aircraft Debris

Collapse Debris

Debris Inside Building

Street Debris

Debris is visible in the photograph

Type of debris: Aircraft = Can be identified as plane debris

(e.g., tires, engines)

Collapse = Resuhing from collapse

Inside Building = Visible through windows

or openings

Street = On street

Checkbox for each choice

Fireball Initial fireball from plane strike is visible Checkbox

Thermal The thermal is a tall region of the smoke plume

that results from the lift caused by the hot gases of the initial fireball

Checkbox

Plume Smoke plume generated by the fires within the towers and blown downwind. This marker is checked if the smoke plume in the photograph

extends farther than a single tower width.

Checkbox

Flames Visible Flames are visible in the photograph Checkbox

People

Inside Falling

Outside

The photograph includes people

Inside = People inside the buildings, at the windows or climbing down

Outside = People on the street

Checkbox for each choice

Falling building

component

'T-'l 1 , 11 I'll" A The photograph shows a building component

falling (e.g., aluminum cladding)

Checkbox

Streamers Falling The photograph shows a streamer, an object

that emits smoke as it falls and leaves a trail

Dripping Molten material dripping from WTC 2 is visible

Checkbox

Hanging Floor A sagging or hanging object suggesting a floor

is visible within the windows

Checkbox

H-7
Appendix H

Attribute Definition Entry Clioice

Building Core Photograph shows the core of WTC 1 or WTC 2 —both remained standing briefly

during collapse before falling

Checkbox

FDNY

FDNY Apparatus

FDNY Personnel

FDNY personnel or vehicles are visible, including EMTs, fire trucks, and ambulances

Checkbox for each choice

NYPD

NYPD Apparatus

NYPD Personnel

NYPD personnel or vehicles are visible, also includes FBI and other police officials Checkbox for each choice

Impact Aircraft Photograph shows aircraft approaching WTC 1 or WTC 2 before or during the strike Checkbox

Other Aircraft Aircraft other than the impact aircraft are included in the photograph, such as helicopters or fighter jets

Checkbox

Good for Analysis Mark photograph for possible window-bywindow analysisCheckbox

Analyzed The photograph has been used for window-bywindow analysisCheckbox

Notes Notes, including a description of how the photograph was timed

Checkbox

Not all collected visual material is incorporated into the two catalogs. Photographs and videos judged not

to contain information directly relevant to the Investigation are not included. Even so, the number of

photographs and clips included in the catalogs is huge. At the time of writing, the photographic catalog

includes 6,759 assets and the video catalog includes 6,91 1 assets.

H.3 TIMING OF PHOTOGRAPHS AND VIDEO CLIPS

Since one of the major goals of this task is the development of time lines for fire growth and spread in WTC 1, 2, and 7, it is important to assign times of known accuracy to assets included in the two catalogs.

This task is complicated by the absence of accurate times for the majority of visual materials collected.

H.3.1 Digital Timestamps

Modem photographic and video digital cameras often record camera clock times as part of their output.

For photographs, this information is usually stored as an integral part of the image in a header known as an Exif file. Similarly, digital video cameras often embed a variety of information, including the camera

clock time, as part of what is known as meta data. Software is available for reading these clock times

from Exif and other meta data media file formats. While a great help, these times usually still require some adjustment because people do not generally set their camera clocks accurately. In some cases, camera clocks were off by days or even years. Even so, the relative times over the short time period of

the events of September II, 2001, are quite accurate.

H^8
Interim Report on Evolution of WTC Fires Based on Image Analysis

Table H-2. Attributes for video assets.

Attribute Definition Entry Choice

Asset Reference Location of video clip in the file system Set by Cumulus

Categories List of categories under which the video clip is listed, typically the photographer's name or source

Set by Cumulus

Record Name File name of video clip Set by Cumulus

Photographer Photographer's name Text

Content Content of video clip WTC 9/11 Footage

WTC 9/1 1 Footage = Events before collapse

of WTC 7

Street Scene (no timing)

Debris field = Ground Zero after WTC 7 collapse

Construction = Construction of WTC towers from documentary

Normal Operation = Normal operation of

uuiiuili^^ usually liUlll LlUL-UlllClllal y Animation = Animation of 9/11 events from

documentary

Still(s) = Photographs contained within

documentary

Interview = Clip only shows interview

Street scene (no timing)

Debris field Construction

Normal operation

Animation

Sfill(s) Interview

Use Limited Videographer has requested that use of the videotape be limited Checkbox

Copyright A copyright exists Checkbox

Copyright Agreement Usage agreement arrangements with NIST Text

Shot From Location of videographer Text Date Recorded Date and time of beginning of video clip Date and time

End Recording Date and time of end of video clip Date and time

Duration Number of mniutesiseconds contained in clip Real number

Time Uncertainty (s) Number of seconds uncertainty in the time

recorded / end recording

Integer

View Direction Location of videographer with respect to the WTC

iNonn

Northeast

East Southeast South

Southwest

West

Northwest

H-9
Appendix H

Attribute Definition Entry Choice

WTC Faces Building face(s) visible in the video clip Checkbox for each choice

WTC 1 North Face WTC 1 East Face WTC 1 South Face WTC 1 West Face WTC 2 North Face WTC 2 East Face WTC 2 South Face W 1 L z West race WTC 7 North Face WTC 7 East Face WTC 7 South Face - WTC 7 West Face

Distance Clarity of the video clip Checkbox for each choice

Near Near = Can make out details in windows

Medium Medium = Can count windows

Far Far = Unable to count windows

Building Building(s) visible in video clip Checkbox for each choice

WTC 1 WTC 2 WTC 7 Other Building

1 st Plane Strike Clip shows the plane strike on WTC 1 Checkbox

2nd Plane Strike Clip shows the plane strike on WTC 2 Checkbox

w 1 L. 1 L,oiiapse Clip shows the collapse of WTC 1 Checkbox

WTC 2 Collapse Clip shows the collapse or WTC 2

/^i It- Checkbox

WTC 7 Collapse Clip shows the collapse of WTC 7 Checkbox

Street Street scene, or a street is visible in the video Checkbox

clip

Debris Debns is visible in the video clip Checkbox tor each choice

Aircraft Debris Type of debris: Collapse Debris Aircraft = Can be identified as plane debris Debris Inside Building (e.g., tires, engines)

Street Debris Collapse = Resulting from collapse

Inside Building = Visible through windows

Street = On street

Fireball Initial fireball from plane strike is visible Checkbox

1 hermal I he thermal is a tall region oi the smoke plume Checkbox

that results from the lift caused by the hot gases of the initial fireball Plume Smoke plume generated by the fires within the Checkbox

towers and blown downwind. This marker is checked if the smoke plume in the video clip

extends farther than a single tower width. Flames Visible Flames are visible in the video clip Checkbox

H-10
Interim Report on Evolution of WTC Fires Based on Image Analysis

Attribute Definition Entry Choice

People

Inside Falling

Outside

The video clip includes people

Inside = People inside the buildings, at the windows, or climbing down

Outside = People on the street

Checkbox for each choice

Falling building component The video clip shows a building component

falling (e.g., aluminum cladding)

Checkbox

Streamers Falling The video clip shows a streamer, an object that emits smoke as it falls and leaves a trail Checkbox

Dripping Molten material dripping from WTC 2 is visible Checkbox

Hanging Floor A sagging object suggesting a floor is visible within the windows

Checkbox

Building Core Video clip shows the core of WTC 1 or WTC 2 - both remained standing briefly during

collapse before falling

Checkbox

rFDNY Uly I FDNY Apparatus

FDNY Persoimel

ruiy I pCioUllllcl Ul VClllLlCci alC VlblUlC, including EMTs, fire trucks, and ambulancesv^necKDOx ior eacn cnoice

NYPD

NYPD Apparatus

NYPD Personnel

NYPD personnel or vehicles are visible, also

lliClUUCo rDl allU UlllCI puiicc UlllClalo Checkbox for each choice

Aircraft Impact Aircraft Other AircraftAircraft are visible in the video clip

Impact: Shows aircraft approaching WTC 1 or WTC 2 before or during the strike Other: Helicopters or fighter jets

Checkbox for each choice

Major Change

Major Fire Change

Major Smoke Change

Windows Opened

One of the following events takes place in the video clip: Major Fire Change: Fire flares up, dies down, or spreads to a new region

Major Smoke Change: Smoke bursts, dies down, or spreads to a new region

Windows Opened: Window breaks open,

either due to fire or to people

Checkbox for each choice

Good for Analysis Mark video clip for possible window-bywindow analysis

Checkbox

Analyzed The video clip has been used for window-bywindow analysis

Checkbox

Notes Notes, including a description of how the video

clip was timed

Text

H-Il
Appendix H

Qlnrormation for Asset "MarkStetter.wrajUlTIF" of "dbWTC"

Frdd Name ReU C^enl

Categories Roin

RecoidName [MaikSteMei_WTC9_1113.TIF _ Thumbnail

Photographa ^lark SleHer

Received From Photographer _ _ d

Original Soutce Digital Copy o( Origin^ d

Use Limited

Copyright?

Copyright Agieem...

Shot From BO Nassau St:

Date Recorded 9/11/2001 9:10 44 AM

Time Uncertainty |sl|2 View Dnection east d

WTC 1 Faces WTCl North F . T

WTC 1 East Facet? WTC 1 South F r

WTC 1 West Fa . WTC 2 Faces WTC 2 North F... T.

!i8start| V| ,^ ^ > |] S]t.| f]t.. Qk\ 'SC.\ ^fl.| 4;R.| 4:P.| |lw.| aR.| B]l..| ^S.| a]C.| j^A.!!-?!.. sj ^ 3!l3PM Figure H-2. An example of the first page of the Cumulus data entry sheet

for photographic assets. Thumbnail © 2001 Mark Stetler.

^ Rle Edit View Catalog Category CgPection Asset Special Wimjow Help

TouT*] miw ^\@\fi\ ii 1*J MlJ

MSNB-; Investigalt NBC Atlanira 10 to NBC Atlanta noon to Z NBCPestricted-2Tape' NBC Short Collapse of W

NeC_8roadc ast _8-'l5A NBC_News Oub from Jim New York Firefighters br NOVA PBS_Why Towers NY 1-6 raw field tapes

NYl-onair plus 5 raw b-r NYPO Aviabon 9-11 NYPDOfWB

Onno deJong

Pavel fHavel PBS - The Center of the PBS Twin Towers A Kistc PBS_Heroe5 of Ground 2 Report from Grourtd Zen

Richard Peskin SamRregel

Scott flyers Sekani Comptlahon of Cli SWdmore, Owmgs and M

Sorensen WTC

Special/Important Cl?>s Steve Spak 8mm

Steve Spak Mini DV

Stevens - 2 Tapes

Tim Main and Mike BaOou TLC _WTC_Anatcmy_of. Unknown Source - Short

Vince Dementfi CBS WTC—

V^'ABC Broadcast WABCrjISTDut)#l

WA8C_Heiicoptef Shots WCBS NIST Dub#l_Dar WCBS NIST Dub #2 WCBS NIST Dub #3 -Be

Myeis_clip1.avi

If 127 of 146 Categories (1 Setected) Figure H-3. An example of a Cumulus asset screen display for the video

database. Thumbnails are shown along with the time and dates when the

recording started and ended. Thumbnails © 2001 Scott Meyers.

H-12
Interim Report on Evolution of WTC Fires Based on Image Analysis

Occasionally analog photo and video cameras imprint a time stamp on their outputs that can provide

relative times similar to Exif or meta data, but generally there is no time information available, and such

material must be timed in some other way. Some of the approaches used are described later in this section.

Photograph Tools

In order to make the best use of the information embedded in digital photographs, software was required

to retrieve the Exif file information and software to adjust the recorded clock times. The commercial

software package CatDV is able to retrieve meta data embedded in a variety of media formats, including

digital photographs and mini-DVs. The Access database PhotoTiming was written for the purpose of

determining the actual times for a set of photographs given the Exif time for each and an accurate time

reference. For a set of photographs sharing a common clock from the same digital camera, an accurate time for a single photograph is sufficient to set the times for the entire set. Figure H-4 shows a PhotoTiming data sheet for a selected photographer. A file generated by CatDV containing the Exif data

for each photograph, if available, is read into PhotoTiming. The equivalent Exif and actual times are entered into the appropriate fields at the upper right of the data sheet. Selection of the Calculate Photo

Times button fills the Actual Time column with the appropriate value for each Exif time. In this example,

the Exif time was found to be off by 62 s.

Q PhotoTiming

. He Edt VJew Insert Format Records Tools Window Help

i| n MSSansSerif -8 . g j ^ S m m

CIANtt_DSCH2161 JPGI

|I3A,NCA,_DSI>I2162JPG|

EXIF Releience Time |Sep ^frr,|2001

IS equivalent lo

|?ep jJfTl

[9~ :[25" .f42" |AM Calculate Photo

Times

Actual Tim 001 [sr:[2r.[or |am _j

Repoit Photo

Times

EXIF Tin "3

CIANCA_DSCN216'JJPGI

Ct4,Ni:A_DSCN2164JPGl

CIANCA_D5CN2165JPGI

Sepll 2001 1726131 9/11/2001 5 24 31 Pl»l

Sep 11 2001 17:27:491 9/11/2001 5:2S07PM

Sepl1,2001 17:28:24! 9/11/2001 5 26:42 Pt«l

Sep 11 2001 17 23 55! |9/11/2001 5:2713PM

Sepll.2001 17:29:16! 9/11/2001 527 34 Pt^

UncheckAll

Photos

70 > I >l l>*l of 115

1^ ;:JR:tDatatiases | fritiMain : Form 1

1 gj ftnPhotolKt '2' Cumulus - dbWTC | Information for ...| 6:t

Figure H-4. An example of the PhotoTiming sheet for calculating times for

photographs containing Exif meta data.

H-13
Appendix H

Video Tools

In addition to containing the video database described in Section H.2.3, VideoList also assists with timing

the clips from a videotape. This function is similar to that in the PhotoTiming tool. For a broadcast video

that was filmed in real time, the timing of every clip in the video, except for replays, can be set from

knowing the time at a single point. An example is shown in Figure H-5. A clip file generated in Adobe

Premiere for a specified video is read into VideoList. The mini-DV time of an event in the video whose

timing is known, such as the moment of the second plane strike, is identified. Both times are entered into the fields at the upper right of the data sheet. Clips to be timed (excluding replays) are identified by a check mark, and the requested calculation results in the actual times in and out for each clip as shown in Figure H-5. This tool is also useful in calculating timings for continuous video segments broken into multiple clips.

U Videotapes

Fite Edit View Insert Format Records lools Window Help ^ i MS Sans Serif r 8 B / U B: S

S FrmTapeClips ]xj

Video Clips

Tape_Name ISco» Myers 9/1 1 video East faces) 1

Hour Mm Sec Frame DV Relerence Trme I : I . I ; I Calculate Clip

'

' ' ' Times

TapeJD | 32 Tape Length (min):

Clicl. on button to lelect clip tor time calculation

is equivalent to

Actual Time | : |

: |: | Report Clip Times

Clip Name DV Time In DV Time Out Actual Time In Actual Time Out Durahon

0000:03:00! 00.013312! 1 00 01 30 1 3 |East faces ol 1 and 2 From street Medium distant vie

00.01:33:131 00 01:5202! |00 00 18.20 |East face: of 1 and 2 From street Medium view Befi

iJO 05 52 00! 349 38 11 |08 53 38 08 |00 03 59 28 |Starl ol continuous track East laces ot 1 and 2 From

00.05.42 00! 1 00 09 52130! |0853 28 08 |08 57 ; |00:04. 10.01 |2nd in continuous tiack East laces oil and 2 From

00 09 42 001 00 13 52 00! 0901

:

|00:04 10 01 1 3rd in continuous track East faces of 1 and 2 From $

00:1 3 42 001 00.17:52 00! 09:01 28,1: 09:05:38.08 00 04,10:01 4lfi in continuous tracking East laces ol 1 and 2 Iron

00,15,07,101 00 15 21 TGI |00,00 14 07 |Plane strike East laces oil and 2 From street Medii

|00 17 42 OQl "100,21-52 001 |I3905 28;08 [09 09 38 08 (0004,1001 [sih in continuous track East laces ot 1 and 2 From s

Uncheck All Clips

111 » I H of 172

Tape name

:i»5tart| !| S3 ^ * PI ai frmTapeCI... lli24AM

Figure H-5. An example of the VideoList sheet for calculating clip times for video assets.

For each mini-DV video that contains meta data, CatDV is used to extract the clock times for the In and

Out point for each clip. These values enable the timing of every clip in the video from a single reference

time.

H-14
Interim Report on Evolution of WTC Fires Based on Image Analysis

H.3.2 Reference Time

Faced with the timing considerations above, a timing scheme was developed in which all of the times in the databases are placed on a relative time scale tied to a single well-defined event. Due to the large

number of different views available, the moment the second plane struck WTC 2 was chosen to be this time. This event was defined to have occurred at 9:02:54 a.m. based on times for major events included

in the earlier Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) report (McAllister 2002) describing the events of September 1 1, 2001.

H.3.3 Timing Techniques

Once the reference time was chosen, it was possible to place times on videos that showed the second

plane strike. By matching other photographs and videos to these initially assigned videos, the assignments were extended to visual materials that did not include the primary event. By such a bootstrap

process, it was possible to place photographs and videos extending over the entire period of the event on a

single time line. Sets of photographs containing Exif times and video clips that either contained meta data

or were continuous over relatively long periods were particularly useful for this purpose because a single

time assigrmient would allow the entire series to be timed. Sets of photographs recorded on film or analog videos that were frequently turned on and off caused the most difficulty in timing, and individual

matches were required for each photo or video clip.

Matching visual images and assigning times has turned out to be a demanding task requiring unique

approaches. A variety of characteristics have been employed to match times in different photographs and

videos. These include distinct shadows cast on the buildings by the smoke plumes, the appearance and

locations of smoke and fire plumes, the occurrence of well-defined events such as a falling object or the sudden appearance of smoke, and a variety of other unlikely clues such as a clock being recorded in an

image.

To assist in the timing process, relative times for the five major events of September 1 1 , 2001 : first plane

strike, second plane strike, collapse of WTC 2, collapse of WTC 1, and collapse of WTC 7 have been

determined with 1 second accuracy. These times are summarized in Table H-3. Note that the building

collapse times are defined to be when the entire building is first observed to start to collapse. In the case of WTC 7, a penthouse on the roof sank into the building before the main collapse started.

Table H-3. Times for major events of September 11, 2001.

Event

Relative Time from

Visual Analysis

Adjusted Time from

Television Broadcasts

Time Reported in the FEMA Study

First plane strike 8:46:25 a.m. 8:46:30 a.m. 8:46:26 a.m. Second plane strike 9:02:54 a.m. 9:02:59 a.m. 9:02:54 a.m.

Collapse of WTC 2 9:58:54 a.m. 9:58:59 a.m. 9:59:04 a.m.

Collapse of WTC 1 10:28:20 a.m. 10:28:25 a.m. 10:28:31 a.m.

Collapse of WTC 7 5:20:47 p.m. 5:20:52 p.m. 5:20:33 p.m.

It is not only important to assign relative times for photographs and videos, but also to estimate how

accurately they are known. For this reason, timing uncertainties are estimated for each determination and

are included in the databases.

H-15
Appendix H

The bootstrap timing process was initially quite difficult. However, team members' timing skills improved with practice at the same time as more visual material became available and the number of

timed assets increased. At the present time, 3,032 of the 6,759 catalogued photographs and 2,673 of the

6,91 1 video clips in the databases are timed with assigned relative accuracies of 3 seconds or better.

H.3.4 Absolute Time Accuracy

Many of the news broadcasts on September 11, 2001, included small clocks, known in the industry as "bugs," imprinted on the screen. As such broadcasts were timed, it became apparent that there were small

differences between times for the second plane strike based on these bugs and the time used as the basis

for the database. Checks with several broadcasters indicated that the bugs should be quite close to the

actual time because their clocks are regularly updated from highly accurate sources such as geopositioning satellites or the precise atomic-clock-based timing signals provided by NIST as a public

service. Careful checks showed small time differences between different video recordings, but these were

generally less than 1 second. These small discrepancies are likely due to variations in transmission times

resulting from the different pathways that the video signals take to the sites where they are recorded.

Based on four such video recordings, the time of the second plane impact is estimated as 9:02:59 a.m., or

5 seconds later than the time assumed in developing the database. The estimated uncertainty is 1 second.

Table H-3 compares times for the major events taken from the database, adjusted to television time, and

reported in the FEMA report (McAllister 2002). Possible explanations for the observed differences are

still under investigation. Because times based on the television broadcasts appear to be accurate (i.e., those in column 3 of Table H-3), 5 seconds will be added to times included in the databases when precise

times are reported for the Investigation.

H.4 ANALYSIS OF VISUAL IMAGES

Once the two visual databases became available, it was possible to use the images to begin characterizing

the events of September 1 1, 2001 . Some of the images are quite close up and can be used to learn

specific details concerning the towers. As an example. Fig. H-6 shows an image of the east face of

WTC 2 recorded at 9:26:20 a.m., and Fig. H~7 shows an enlarged portion of the same photograph. The

photograph has been enhanced using Adobe Photoshop, and lettering has been added to indicate the floors and the numbering system used to identify specific windows in the tower. The amount of detail available

is evident. For instance, large piles of debris are present on the north side of the tower on floors 80 and

8 1, and locations with fires visible or with windows missing are easily identified.

H.4.1 Window Numbering

The system used to describe window locations in the two towers and WTC 7 requires some elaboration.

It is based on the outer-wall column numbering system used in plans for the buildings. First, consider the towers. In these structures individual windows were placed between two exterior columns. In order to refer to a particular window the designation for the column to the right as viewed from the outside is assigned to that window. These columns are numbered from 1 to 59 from right to left across a tower face,

and windows are numbered from 1 to 58. Faces for the towers are also assigned numbers as follows;

WTC 1 —north: 1, east: 2, south: 3, and west: 4, and WTC 2—west: 1, north: 2, east: 3, and south: 4. By

combining the floor number, the face number and a column number, a specific window on one of the

H-16
Interim Report on Evolution of WTC Fires Based on Image Analysis

Figure H-6. Photograph taken at 9:26:20 a.m. on September 11, 2001, showing the east

face of WTC 2. It has been enhanced, and lettering Indicating floors and columns has

been added.

towers can be identified. As an example, for WTC 1, the number 94-214 refers to the fourteenth window

from the right on the east face of floor 94.

The window numbering system is somewhat different for WTC 7. It is also based on the outside column

numbers, but in this building the numbering of columns was continuous around the structure and ranged

from 1 to 57. Column 1 was located at the northwest comer of the building, and the numbering

proceeded counter clockwise around the building faces with columns 15, 28, and 42 located at the southwest, southeast, and northeast comers, respectively. Note that the total number of perimeter

columns is actually 58. An extra column, numbered 14A, was included on the west face between

columns 14 and 15. Unlike the towers, the number of windows to the right of a given column varied from

one to five depending on location. In some cases, the windows are located in front of the column.

Individual windows to the right of a column are assigned letters increasing from left to right as seen from

the outside. As an example, 12-45c refers to a window on the north face of WTC 7 that is the third window to the right of column 45 on floor 12.

H-17
Appendix H

Figure H-7. This photograph is cropped from the image shown in Figure H-6. It was

taken on September 1 1 and shows the east face of WTC 2 at the northeast corner from

floor 77 to floor 82. Note the large piles of debris evident on floor 80 and floor 81.

H.4.2 Fire Properties

Photographs and video images have been used to characterize a number of properties relevant to fire growth and spread in the towers as a function of time. Specific properties addressed include whether or not fire and smoke are present and whether windows are still in place. When smoke and/or fire are present, additional details concerning their appearances are documented. A numbered coding system is used to describe these characteristics. The key for this numbering system is shown in Fig. H-8.

H.4.3 Window-by-Window Assessment

The key in Fig. H-8 is used as the basis for a window-by-window assessment of the towers. The results are coded in three separate data sheets using Microsoft Excel. The floor and window locations are

identified using the numbering system described in the last section. Separate files containing the three data sheets are generated for each face of a tower and time analyzed. Figure H-9 shows a portion of such

a data sheet describing fires (i.e., sheet one) on the east face of WTC 1 around 9:42 a.m.

H-18
Interim Report on Evolution of WTC Fires Based on Image Analysis

KEY FOR ANALYSIS

Sheet #1 Fire Visible

0 No fire

1 Spot fire

2 r ire visible inside

3 External flaming

9 Not visible

Sheet #2: Smoke

0 No smoke evident

1 Light smoke

2 "Heavy smoke"

-

9 Not visible

Sheet #3: Windows

0 Window open

1 Window in place

9 Not visible

Figure H-8. The key used to describe observations with regard to fire, smol<e, and

window breakage in Excel data files for individual windows in the two towers.

H-19
Appendix H

E Microsoft EKcel - Analysis on the WTC 1 east face around 9-42j<ls a] Eile D la; 6

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A W X Y AA AB AC AD AE AF AG AH Al

1 238 237 236 235 234 233 232 231 230 229 228 227 226 225

2 110 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9

3 109 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 g "

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9 9 9 9

4 108 9 9 9 9 9 9 9, 9 9 9 9 9 9 9

5 107 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9

6 106 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9

7 105 9 9 9 9 9

' 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9

8 104 9 1 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9

9 103 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9

10 102 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9

11 101 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9

12 100 9 q 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9

13 99 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9

14 98 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 0 0 0 0 0 9 9

15 97 9 9 9 D 0 0 2 2 2 0 0 0 0

16 96 3 3 ' 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0

17 95 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 o" 0 0 0 0

18 94 0 0 0 Q 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0

19 93 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Q 0 0 0 0

20 92 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

21 91 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 L_ 0 0

22 90 0 0 0 0 ° 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

23 89 0 0 0 0 0 0 "0

0 0 0 6 0 0

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Figure H-9. A portion of the Excel spreadsheet describing fires on the east face of

WTC 1 around 9:42 a.m. is shown. The numbers at the left refer to floors, and those at the top are the window numbers.

While the data sheets capture the desired behaviors, it is very difficult to use them to track changes

without visualizing the results in some way. Two approaches have been developed for this purpose. The

first employs a Web-based system that generates color-coded maps of the results contained in the data

sheets. Figure H-10 shows such a map for the fire data included in the data sheet shown in Fig. H-9.

The second approach uses the program Smokeview (Forney and McGrattan 2003; Forney,

Madrzykowski, and McGrattan 2003) to generate a time-dependent visualization of the results. Smokeview was developed at NIST in order to display the results of fire dynamics calculations. In the current application, it is used to visualize the properties of interest on a three-dimensional representation

of a tower fa(?ade as a function of time. Because Smokeview allows the point of view to be varied at will,

this approach is a powerful means for investigating the temporal behavior of the fires on different faces of

the tower. Figure H-1 1 shows a frame taken from a visualization in which results from the fire and

windows data sheets for WTC 2 have been combined.

H-20
Interim Report on Evolution of WTC Fires Based on Image Analysis

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258 201

Figure H-1 0. A representation of fires for floors 91 to 1 00 on the east face of WTC 1 around 9:42 a.m. is shown. Results are taken from the Excel spreadsheet shown in

Figure H-1 3. The color coding is based on the key shown. The color assignments are: |

0-No fire, | 1-Spot fire, | 2-Fire visible inside, 3-External Flaming, and | 9-Can't see.

NIST WTC 2, Floors 78 to 83

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Figure H-11. A single frame from a time-dependent visualization generated by

Smokeview is reproduced here. The frame is a three-dimensional representation of the

condition of windows and fires on WTC 2 from the time the second tower was struck at 9:02:59 a.m. until it collapsed at 9:58:59 a.m. The color assignments are: - window in place, I - missing window, | - external flaming, - fire inside, and -spot fire.

H-21
Appendix H

H.5 INITIAL DAMAGE PATTERNS ON WTC 1 AND WTC 2 DUE TO THE

PLANE STRIKES

Close-up photographs and videos have been used to characterize the initial damage to the facades of the towers struck by the two planes along with precise determinations of the locations of the plane strikes. For WTC 2, analysis of videos has also been employed to estimate the speed of the airplane that struck

the tower and to show that the tower swung back and forth for several minutes after it was struck. The

period of the swinging has also been determined.

H.5.1 WTC 1 Damage Resulting from Plane Strike

A detailed drawing of the damage to the steel fa9ade of WTC 1 was included in the FEMA World Trade

Center Building Performance Study (McAllister 2002). A careful inspection using photographs and

videos in the database confirmed the accuracy of this analysis. Figure H-12 shows a drawing that represents this damage. It is similar to that included in the FEMA report, but it incorporates several minor

changes that better reflect the geometry of the north face of WTC 1 in the vicinity of the plane strike.

It was observed that the wing tips and the end of the vertical stabilizer at the plane's tail section damaged

the aluminum column covers on the steel fafade without cutting through the steel below or completely

removing the covers. By inspection it was possible to map out locations on columns where the wingtips

and the vertical stabilizer struck the tower. These locations were then transferred to the representation of

the damaged steel facade shown in Fig. H-12 and are represented by dashed lines, with wings to the right

and left and the vertical stabilizer in the center. The good agreement between the damage pattern and the wing tip locations is evident. It is reported in the FEMA report (McAllister 2002) and widely in the

media that American Airlines Flight 1 1 struck floors 94 to 98 of WTC 1 . The dotted horizontal lines on

the left side of Fig. H-12 indicate the locations of concrete floors. It can be seen that while the tip of the

left wing of the aircraft struck very close to the base of floor 94, the wing end marked column 153 at the very top of floor 93. It is evident from the figure that the right wing actually struck well up on floor 99 on column 109. The impacted floors therefore range from floor 93 to floor 99.

Fireballs and Missing Windows

Additional insights into the initial damage inflicted on the towers by the plane strikes can be obtained by

considering locations where fireballs are observed immediately following the plane strikes as well as locations where windows are missing. Videos and photographs recorded during and immediately

following the plane strike on WTC 1 show that significant fireballs formed at the plane strike location on

the north face, as well as near the center of the east face and on the western side of the south face. Figure H-13 compares window damage for the four sides of WTC 1 immediately after the plane strike. The floors shown extend from 91 to 100. The missing windows on the north face are consistent with the plane strike location and strike angle. The plane struck very close to the center of the face. Interestingly, the damage on the east and west faces appears to be asymmetric with a much higher number of windows

missing on the east face than on the west. This observation is consistent with the formation of a fireball on the east side of the tower and not on the west side. Areas obscured by smoke are also much larger on

H-22
Interim Report on Evolution of WTC Fires Based on Image Analysis

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Figure H-12. A drawing of the damage to the steel fagade of WTC 1. The dark dotted

lines show locations where the airplane wings and vertical stabilizer marked the

aluminum cladding on columns.

the east side suggesting that more fire is present on this face as well. An asymmetry is also apparent on

the south face where only a single window is missing on the east side while numerous windows are missing and significant smoke is present on the west side. Taken together, these observations suggest that debris and fuel from the airplane as well as any building materials and contents tended to pass straight across the building on the west side, while material on the east side was somehow reflected and more

heavily damaged the east face.

H-23
Appendix H

H-24
Interim Report on Evolution of WTC Fires Based on Image Analysis

Panel Section in Street

A photograph supplied by the NYPD provided additional details with regard to the initial damage

suffered by WTC 1. Figure H-14 shows a full three-story three-column-wide steel panel section lying on

the comer of Cedar Street near its intersection with West Street. This location is to the south of and

roughly 210m from the south face of WTC 1 . The photograph was taken prior to the collapse of either tower. Closer inspection shows that there is an aircraft wheel embedded in one of the windows. The

most likely source location for this panel section has been identified as being near the center of the south

face of WTC 1 (i.e., columns 329 to 331) and extending from the middle of floor 93 to the middle of floor

96. This conclusion remains tentative since, as indicated in Fig. H-13, the area is obscured by smoke in

all of the close-up photographs of the area in NIST's possession. If the location is identified correctly, the wheel is stuck in window 95-329.

H.5.2 WTC 2

Calculation of Plane Speed

One of the videographers who provided material to the Investigation filmed from the top of his apartment

building located to the east of the WTC complex. His camera was located on a tripod so that the images

are very steady. One of the events he captured was United Airlines Flight 175 as it approached WTC 2. Figure H-15 is a series of cropped fi-ames captured from this video that show the plane approaching the

building.

The images included in Fig. H-15 have been used to determine the speed of the plane as it approached the tower. This is done by identifying the locations of the nose and tail of the airplane relative to a fixed

point defined to be the point on the frame where the plane passes out of sight behind the comer of the building. The plane is very nearly level relative to this point, so it is appropriate to simply count the

number of picture elements, pixels, between this location and the two measurement points on the aircraft.

This analysis, which presumes that the aircraft at this time travels in a straight path such that the nose and

tail pass through the same point in space, has the advantage of being independent of the orientation of the

flight path with respect to the line of sight of the observer.

Figure H-16 shows the locations of the two points as a function of time. Using linear least squares curve

fits, the exact relative times when the nose and tail pass the reference location are estimated. The

difference between these two times is the period required for the entire length of the aircraft to pass the reference location. The resuh is 0. 1939 s. Since the length of the plane is known to be 155.0 ft, the speed can be determined simply by dividing this length by the passage time to give 155.0 ft/0.1939 s = 799 ft/s = 545 mph. An uncertainty estimate based solely on the uncertainty in the determined time difference

yields a value of ±18 mph with 95 percent confidence.

H-25
Appendix H

Figure H-14. Photograph showing a full panel section lying in Cedar Street near its intersection with West Street. An aircraft wheel can be seen imbedded in one of the

windows. The building behind the panel is Saint Nicholas Greek Orthodox Church and

the lower section of WTC 2 can be seen across Liberty Street.

Note that the airplane speed and uncertainties are slightly different than listed in an earlier report

(NIST 2003) due to a correction of the plane length to reflect the actual distance between the nose and the

end of the body at the rear stabilizer and a math error in the uncertainty calculator. Uncertainties

associated with aircraft motion that are not aligned with the aircraft body are judged to be less than the uncertainties in plane passage time.

Observation of WTC 2 Sway Following the Plane Strike

Close examination of the video revealed a perceptible movement of WTC 2 after it was struck by the

aircraft. The building rocked back and forth much as a pendulum for at least 4 minutes. Image

H-26
Interim Report on Evolution of WTC Fires Based on Image Analysis

© 2001 Scott Myers

Figure H-15. Series of sequential cropped frames taken from a video shot on

September 11, 2001, showing the plane approaching WTC 2. The frames, ordered

from left to right and top to bottom, are separated by 33.3 ms.

H-27
Appendix H

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Figure H-16. Plots of pixel locations for the nose and tail of the plane that struck WTC 2 as a function of time taken from the images shown in Fig. H-15. Straight lines are the

results of linear least squares curve fits to the data. Extrapolation of the lines to pixel 0

analysis was used to enhance this motion and estimate the period required for the building to sway

through one complete cycle. This was accomplished by creating a new video in which a single frame just

prior to the plane strike was subtracted from subsequent frames. In this way, small differences between

images can be identified. If the image is unchanged from the initial frame, the result should be a black

image, but any changes in location or color will appear in the difference video. When this approach was

applied to the video, a region of windows was observed on the building that seemed to appear and

disappear. Figure H-17 shows several frames of a composite video formed by overlaying half frames of

the original video and the difference video. In the initial frame (time = 0.0 seconds), the plane has not yet

appeared and the difference frame is black. In the next frame (time = 10.7 seconds), the plane is approaching the building. The plane is evident in the difference frame since it represents a change in the frame. WTC 2 is still dark except near the top where changes due to smoke movement are apparent. In

the third frame (time = 1 1.3 seconds), the plane has struck the building and dramatic changes in the

appearance of the building fa9ade in the difference frame occur. Careful inspection shows what appear to be curved lines running across the face of WTC 2. These curves result from an interaction between the

straight lines fonned by the windows on the tower and the straight lines of picture elements that make up

the detector in the digital video camera. This well-known behavior is called the moire effect. The moire

effect also provides a sensitive approach for determining the displacement of the building. Such an

analysis is in progress and will be reported at a later time.

allows the time for the passage of the plane to be calculated.

H-28
Interim Report on Evolution of WTC Fires Based on Image Analysis

30.9 s 33.5 s

Figure H-17. Frames from a composite video are shown. Tlie half frames on the left are taken from a video showing the plane strike on WTC 2, while the half frames on the right are generated by subtracting a frame recorded prior to the plane strike from all subsequent frames in the original video. Times refer to the period since the

start of the difference video.

Following the plane strike, areas of the tower face above the strike floors become hidden by smoke, and it

is difficult to see the moire patterns in the difference frames. However, the area of the tower below the

strike floors to the left of the building in the foreground continues to show a distinct difference pattern

because it is not obscured by smoke. This pattern is apparent in the fifth frame (time = 30.9 seconds). On

the other hand, frames 4 and 6 (times = 28.0 seconds and 33.5 seconds, respectively) have been chosen

because they are near null points, and the area appears dark in the difference frame because the location

of the building is essentially unchanged from its position before the plane struck. When the video is

H-29
Appendix H

played, the moire patterns in this area of the tower face alternately appear and disappear in the difference

video.

Because the absence of color is easiest to identify, it is straightforward to determine times when the null points occur in the difference image. Figure H-I8 shows a plot of time versus null point number obtained

from the difference video. The points fall on a straight line having a slope of 5.647 seconds

± 0.008 seconds (95 percent confidence interval). Because the building passes through a null point twice

during a single full oscillation, the period required for a single oscillation is 11. 3 seconds.

0 10 20 30 40

Null Point

Figure H-18. The time when null points are observed in the difference video following

the plane strike on WTC 2 are plotted versus the null point number. The points fall on a very good straight line having a slope of 5.647 seconds ± 0.008 seconds.

The measured oscillation period is consistent with measurements that are available from WTC 1 that yielded periods of 10.9 seconds in the east-west direction (averaged over a 9-year period that ended in 1993) and 1 1.6 seconds in the north-south direction (averaged over a 14-year period that also ended in 1993). The cores of the two towers were oriented perpendicular to each other so the motion monitored

here should be comparable to the east-west direction of WTC 1

.

H-30
Interim Report on Evolution of WTC Fires Based on Image Analysis

Damage Resulting from the Plane Strike

The results of an analysis of the damage to the steel facade of the south face of WTC 2 are provided in Fig. H-19. Much of the steel damage pattern is revealed, but it should be noted, as indicated, that a portion of this face on the east side of the plane strike location was constantly obscured by smoke, and the detailed pattern could not be discerned. The'FEMA report (McAllister 2002) also includes a figure

describing the damage to the steel fa9ade inflicted by United Airlines Flight 1 75. The pattern in Fig. H-19 differs somewhat from that provided in this earlier study. Some inconsistencies in fa9ade

dimensions have also been corrected in the current version.

Damage in shaded area cannot be accurately determined.

Figure H-19. A drawing of the damage to the steel facade of WTC 2. The dark dotted

lines show locations where the airplane wings and tall marked the aluminum cladding on

the columns. The area shaded In gray was hidden by smoke and could not be observed.

H-31
Appendix H

As was true for WTC 1 , in areas of the facade struck by the wing tips and the upper portion of the vertical stabihzer the aluminum covering was marked, but the aluminum covers were not removed and the steel was not cut through. Measurements for the location of the left wing tip were mapped out as shown in Fig. H-19. As already noted, the area at the end of the right wing was obscured by heavy smoke.

However, there were brief periods when the location of the last column struck by the wing tip could be

observed. This location is indicated on column 404 of floor 95 in Fig. H-19. The center of the plane

strike is clearly located towards the east side of the face. The left wing mark extends to the bottom of the spandrel located below floor 78. The actual location of the concrete floor is well above this point, which means the lowest point struck lies on floor 77. Thus, the plane strike location on WTC 2 extends from

floor 77 to floor 85. This can be contrasted to the FEMA study (McAllister 2002) and most media

sources that report the floors struck extended from floor 78 to floor 84.

Fireballs and Missing Windows

Intense fireballs were observed on the south, east, and north faces of WTC 2 following the plane strike. Figure H-20 compares missing windows on floor 77 to floor 86 for the four faces of WTC 2 shortly after the plane struck at 9:02:59 a.m.

The distribution of missing windows on the south face traces roughly the outline of the plane strike, with

missing windows increasing in height from left to right. Recall that a portion of the east side of this face

could not be observed due to smoke obscuration. The analysis indicates that a very large number of

windows were removed on the east face by the collision and subsequent fireball. This is particularly true on floor 80 to floor 82. Photographs and videos show that extensive areas of the aluminum covering the facade and holding windows were removed, exposing the steel panels, as a result of the plane strike and

fireballs. This damage is much more extensive than observed on the east face of WTC 1, consistent with

the plane strike occurring closer to this face. In contrast to the extensive damage on the east face of the

tower, no missing windows were found on the west face. A large number of windows are also missing on the north face of WTC 2. A substantial area of the

aluminum fa9ade was also removed during the plane strike and subsequent fireball. The missing

windows on this face almost appear to be a mirror image of the south face with damage towards the center being on lower floors than on the eastern edge. This suggests that a great deal of debris passed

through the entire length of the building. This hypothesis is supported by close up images that show large

piles of debris on the east side of the north face on floor 80 and floor 81, and on floor 79 near the center of the face. Figure H-21 includes a photograph showing these debris piles. Recall that piles of debris were also evident on floor 80 and floor 81 on the north side of the east face (see Fig. H-7).

H.6 FIRE BEHAVIORS IN THE TWO TOWERS

Analysis of the fire spread in the towers is ongoing as this update is being prepared, but sufficient information is available to allow some of the fire characteristics to be described.

H-32
Interim Report on Evolution of WTC Fires Based on Image Analysis

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H-33
Appendix H

H-34
Interim Report on Evolution of WTC Fires Based on Image Analysis

H.6.1 WTC 1

It has already been mentioned that substantial fireballs formed on the north, east, and south faces

immediately following the plane strike. A brief period of intense burning from openings on these faces was observed after the fireballs dissipated, but in a short period (on the order of 60 seconds) the fires seemed to "damp down" and very little flame and only light smoke was evident from the outside. This

period of light burning lasted several minutes before fires began to reappear.

Rapid early fire growth was observed on the east side of the north face on floor 96 and floor 97, the center of the east face on floor 94 and floor 97, and the western side of the south face on floor 96. Even though

relatively little initial damage was sustained by the west face, heavy smoke followed shortly by flame

appeared around window 97-437 at 8:55 a.m. After this time, a very rapid fire spread was observed

across the west face on this floor. Within a couple of minutes, over half of the windows were emitting

smoke, and flames were visible in many. Even though floor 92 was not directly struck by the airplane,

fire appeared on the east side of the tower on this floor shortly after 9:00 a.m.

Following the initial development of large fires, fire spread continued until WTC 1 collapsed around

10:28 a.m. At times the fires displayed the systematic, relatively slow spread expected for fire growth in a typical building. For instance, after the initial rapid growth phase, fires on floors 92, 94, 96, and 97 on

the east face began to move deliberately toward the south. As they spread, the fires would bum intensely

at a given location for a while before dying down. As a result, these fires developed the appearance of a wave moving slowly across the building.

There were also certain times and locations during which fire appeared to spread quite rapidly. Some of

these episodes were clearly connected with rapid fire growth and likely flashover in rooms. During the

first half hour, significant fires were observed toward the centers of floors 92, 94, 96, and 97 on the east face that were spreading towards the north. Each of these fires eventually reached a certain point where

ftjrther fire spread was inhibited for many minutes. A review of building plans showed that walls of

offices or meeting rooms were presented at the locations where fire spread was inhibited.

Apparently, these walls served as effective fire breaks that protected against fiirther fire spread. However,

for each of these floors fire and smoke eventually appeared at one of the windows beyond the walls, and

after one of these windows was broken fire growth was extremely rapid and robust across the remaining

windows. These observations are consistent with the occurrence of flashover within an enclosed space.

At other times, unusually rapid fire growth apparently occurred in areas that are believed to have been

relatively open and not constrained by walls. One of these episodes occurred around 9:54 a.m. on the north face. Fire suddenly appeared on floor 96, a location to the west of the damage inflicted by the

airplane. Within a very short period of time, fire could be seen in roughly 10 windows covering a distance of more than 30 ft.

Another example of very rapid fire growth appeared to take place on floor 98. In the early period of the

fire, this floor did not appear to be heavily involved, and this remained true for quite a while. However,

after 9:30 a.m., fire began to appear on this floor and by 10:00 a.m., fires were observed over significant

lengths on all four faces of the tower.

H-35
Appendix H

One of the more unusual fire spread episodes in WTC 1 occurred just after the collapse of WTC 2 around

9:59 a.m. Within a couple of minutes, a large intense fire suddenly appeared on the south side of the west

face on floor 104 in an area well above any other apparent fire. This unusual jump in fire location is difficuh to explain, but is likely associated with vertical shafts located in the core of the tower.

For most of the time following the plane strike, no fire was observed on any of the floors on the south

face over lengths extending from the eastern edge of the tower to near the center of the face. Fires were

not observed in this region of the building until around 10:00 a.m. By the time this tower collapsed

roughly 25 minutes later, intense fires extending over significant lengths of the originally uninvolved area were burning on floor 94 to floor 98 in this area. A final example of rapid fire spread and growth in WTC 1 was described previously in the May 2003

Progress Report for the Investigation (NIST 2003). In this case, a line of smoke appeared suddenly over

a significant length of floor 92 on the north face of WTC 1 at 10:18:48 a.m., or roughly 9 minutes before

the collapse of the tower. Puffs of smoke were observed simultaneously on the north face from floors 94,

95, and 97. More isolated puffs were seen at the same time from floor 92 and floor 95 on the west face

and from floor 92 on the south face. Very shortly (seconds) after the appearance of the smoke, a localized

fire on floor 95 to the west of the plane strike location grew very rapidly and flames erupted from

windows. Following the smoke release, a large fire began to spread rapidly across the western side of

floor 92 on the north face. Previous to the appearance of the smoke, only small fires were evident on this

floor. By the time the tower collapsed, this fire had spread across most of the floor and had reached the western wall. This fire was responsible for the large burst of flame from the north face observed when

this tower collapsed.

H.6.2 WTC 2

The fire behavior observed in WTC 2 was qualitatively different than occurred in WTC 1 . Intense

fireballs were created by the released jet fuel on the south, east, and north faces immediately after the

airplane struck the building. As observed for WTC 1 , the fireballs were followed by a brief period (on the order of a minute) of intense flaming from windows over a large area of the building. Most of these

flames then "damped down" as observed in WTC 1 , but two regions of intense burning remained. One of

these areas was located on floor 81 and floor 82 at the northeast comer of the tower. Flames were evident

from windows on either side of the comer as well as the comer itself, which had become exposed by

removal of the comer facing during the plane strike. This area is in the vicinity of large piles of debris

formed during the plane strike. The second fire was located primarily on floor 79 just to the left of the center (roughly from windows 79-231 to 79-238) of the north face. This is in the area of the second

debris pile described earlier. Both of these fires died slowly with time when compared to fires at other

locations in WTC 1 and WTC 2. Both were still burning lightly when the tower fell 56 minutes after the

plane strike. A curious aspect of the fire behavior is the existence of an area of the building facade between these two

fire locations on the north face where very little fire and/or smoke was observed before the tower

collapsed. This area is roughly rectangular in shape, covering floor 80 to floor 82 and extending across windows 249 to 239. Infrared images recorded shortly following the plane strike showed that this region was quite cool relative to other sections close to the fires. This area will be referred to as the "cold spot."

Spreading fires seemed to move around this cold spot.

H-36
Interim Report on Evolution of WTC Fires Based on Image Analysis

In general, the fires in WTC 2 appeared to be less active than those observed in WTC 1 . The fires covered a smaller area of the fa9ade and did not spread as quickly. This is true even when the shorter

time between the plane strike and collapse for WTC 2 (1 hour 42 minutes for WTC 1 and 56 minutes for WTC 2) is taken into account. Nevertheless, there was significant fire spread, and instances of rapid fire growth similar to those seen in WTC 1 did take place.

Around 9:29 a.m., large flames and heavy smoke erupted from an area on the north face just to the right

of the cold spot (around window 83-236) on floor 83. Four minutes and forty-one seconds later, flames

suddenly appeared at a separate location on the same floor further to the right near window 83-226.

Another area of fire formed just to the right of the cold spot on floor 82 around 9:54 a.m. or 5 minutes

before the collapse. The fires on floor 79 of the north face also spread towards the west, approaching the western edge of the tower just prior to the collapse.

Initial fire growth on the east face was on floor 82. Around 9:12 a.m., flames could be seen in nearly half

of the windows on this floor, and heavy smoke was pouring from additional windows. Only limited fire was evident on lower floors at this time. The fires on floor 82 grew smaller after this time, and most were no longer visible when the tower collapsed. Around 9:35 a.m., heavy flames and smoke appeared over

large areas of floor 79 and floor 80. These fires abruptly died down 45 seconds later, before growing

back slowly during the remainder of the time before the tower collapsed.

In the early period following the plane strike, fire growth on the south face was seen primarily on floor 8

with active fires present on both sides of the airplane strike location. Smaller isolated fires were present on other floors around the area damaged by the airplane. These fires were relatively quiet and stationary

until just prior to the collapse. At 9:56 a.m., there was a sudden release of smoke along much of floor 80

extending from the area of the plane strike to near the western edge. During the next 2 minutes, an

intense fire developed covering approximately windows 81-441 to 81-454.

No smoke or fire was observed near the floors struck by the airplane on the west face of WTC 2. Some

smoke was apparent at windows higher on the face. This was most likely coming from windows broken

by occupants located on these floors.

H.7 EVIDENCE FOR COLLAPSED FLOORS IN WTC 2

H.7.1 Hanging Objects

In the May 2003 Investigation Progress Report (NIST 2003), a photograph was shown in which there appeared to be a floor draped across a number of windows extending roughly from 3 10 to 342 across the

east face of floor 82 of WTC 2. Figure H-22 compares an image taken shortly after the plane strike at 9:03 a.m. and one taken at 9:55 a.m. shortly before the tower collapsed. At the earlier time, the hanging

object is already present, but is seen through the windows draped much higher on the floor 82. An

interpretation consistent with these observations is that floor 83 along the east side of WTC 2 was

partially collapsed over a significant fraction of its length by the passage of the plane through the

building. At the later time the floor has sagged further. By reviewing a number of photographs and

videos, it has been determined that the change in floor position occurred between 9:34 a.m. and 9:38 a.m.

H-37
Appendix H

iniinwii

ib2d0'li l\)lark ^t^tfe

M i i ' , 340 330 320 310 9:03:41 a.m.

©2001 Mark Stetler

340 330 320 310 9:55:04 a.m.

Figure H-22. images of tlie east face of WTC 2 taken shortiy after thie piane struck and

shiortiy before the tower coiiapse are sliown. An object that is most likely a floor can be seen through windows on floor 82 as indicated by the arrows. The object has dropped

lower between the times the two photographs were taken.

Very similar objects, albeit of shorter length, are seen hanging in windows in images taken from the

north. These objects are apparent in Fig. H~2I hanging below floors 81, 82, and 83. As seen through

windows on floor 82 (corresponding to the floor 83), the floor appears to have split into at least two

sections.

H.7.2 Molten Material

It has been reported in the FEMA report (McAllister 2002) as well as in the media that what appeared to be molten metal was observed pouring from the north face near the northeast comer. This is the area where the sustained fires were seen. Video records and photographs indicate that the material first

H-38
Interim Report on Evolution of WTC Fires Based on Image Analysis

appeared at 9:51:52 a.m. and continued to pour intermittently from the building until the time of collapse.

Some of the material can be seen falling in Fig. H-2 1 . Close-up video and photographs of the area where

the material is pouring from have been examined and show that it is falling from near the top of

window 80-256. The most likely explanation for this observation is that the material had originally

pooled on the floor above, that is, floor 81, and that it was allowed to pour out of the building when this floor either pulled away from the outer spandrel or sank down to the point where the window was

exposed. The fact that the material appears intermittently over a several minute period suggests that the

floor was giving way bit by bit.

The composition of the flowing material can only be the subject of speculation, but its behavior is consistent with it being molten aluminum. Visual evidence suggests that significant wreckage from the plane passed through the building and came to rest in the northeast comer of the tower in the vicinity of

the location where the material is observed. Much of the structure of the Boeing 767 is formed from two

aluminum alloys that have been identified as 2024 and 7075 and closely related alloys. These alloys do

not melt at a single temperature, but melt over a temperature range from the lower end of the range to the upper as the fraction of liquid increases. The Aluminum Association handbook (Aluminum Association

2003) lists the melting point ranges for the alloys as roughly 500 °C to 638 °C and 475 °C to 635 °C for alloys 2024 and 7075, respectively. These temperatures are well below those characteristic of fully

developed fires (ca. 1,000 °C), and any aluminum present is likely to be at least partially melted by the intense fires in the area.

H.8 PROGRESS ON COLLECTION OF IMAGES AND ANALYSIS FOR WTC 7

Visual material is also required to characterize the initial damage to, fire spread in, and collapse behavior

of WTC 7. Considerable useful material has been collected, but the visual record for times between the collapses of WTC 1 and WTC 7 is much less complete than those for the two towers. The reasons for this are easy to understand. Following the collapses of the towers, most people were focused on escape or

rescue. A large dust cloud was formed by the collapses, and fires developed that generated large amounts

of smoke. Both tended to obscure views of WTC 7, particularly from the south due to the northwesterly

wind direction on September 11, 2001.

Both photographs and videos have been included in the database that show fires and damage to the east, north, and west faces of WTC 7. Some of this material has been timed, but in general the record is insufficient to allow generation of a complete time line of fire behavior for the relevant period. Numerous

images show the upper portion of WTC 7 from the south, but the actual face of the building is generally

obscured by smoke. No clear images of the lower portion of the south face have been obtained despite a careful search and repeated appeals for the public's help. This is particularly unfortunate since most of

the damage caused by the collapses of the towers, and particularly WTC 1 , should have occurred on this

face.

There is considerable interest in images showing the collapse of WTC 7. Currently, there are at least four

videos in the database that include the collapse, primarily from northerly directions, as well as several photographs. While not ideal, these are providing adequate information for characterizing the collapse

sequence, and some progress along these lines has been made.

H-39
Appendix H

An effort has begun to map out the same information concerning fires, smoke, and windows as in the

towers using visual material in the database. This effort will continue with a goal of mapping out as much

of the fire time line as possible based on the material in the database.

H.9 SUMMARY WITH KEY FINDINGS

This section provides a brief summary of progress on the collection and analysis of visual data along with

key findings.

The approaches used to identify and obtain visual material related to the WTC disaster are described

along with the approaches employed by NIST to archive and catalog the material. Material is either saved

in its original digital format or digitized and saved, and a commercial software package has been used to provide data entry, a searchable database, and ready access to assets for review. The large numbers of

attributes used to characterize the photographs and videos are included.

Separate databases are provided for photographic and video materials. A major effort has focused on

assigning accurate times to the material, and the approaches used are summarized. In excess of

6,700 photographs and 6,900 video clips have been included in the databases and 45 percent and

39 percent, respectively, of these have assigned times accurate to 3 seconds or better.

Major events timed to an accuracy of 1 second are:

• First plane strike on WTC 1 : 8:46:30 a.m.

• Second plane strike on WTC 2: 9:02:59 a.m.

• Collapse of WTC 2: 9:58:59 a.m.

• Collapseof WTC 1: 10:28:25 a.m.

• Collapseof WTC 7: 5:20:52 p.m.

An approach has been developed to characterize the observed fire behaviors at the periphery of the

buildings on a window-by-window basis by determining whether windows are open or closed and

whether smoke and/or fire are observed. If smoke is present, it is characterized as "light" or "heavy", and

fires are characterized as "spof (a small local fire), "fire inside," and "external flaming." The

observations are coded in separate electronic spreadsheets for each building, fa9ade, and time.

Two approaches are used to visualize the fire-related parameters. The first is a Web-based application

that displays single sides of the towers at a single time. The second is a time-dependent three- dimensional representation based on Smokeview (Forney and McGrattan 2003; Forney, Madrzykowski,

McGrattan, and Sheppard 2003).

Photographs and videos have been used to characterize several aspects related to the plane strikes on the towers and the distribution of damage on the external faces. For WTC 1 , locations where the ends of the wings and vertical stabilizer of the tail section struck the north face and the damage to the steel fa9ade are mapped. The behavior of fireballs generated by the release of fuel as a result of the collision of the

H^O
Interim Report on Evolution of WTC Fires Based on Image Analysis

aircraft with the tower and initial tower damage as reflected in broken windows is used to characterize the

distribution of damage to the facades of the tower. In addition, it has been shown that an exterior panel

section from the south face was dislodged and landed on the ground. It contained an aircraft wheel that passed through the tower.

The following conclusions are reached concerning the immediate effects of the plane strike on WTC 1

• The airplane struck columns on the north face ranging from 109 to 152 and covering floor 93

to floor 99.

• Damage and initial fire growth were greater on the east face of the tower than on the west.

Significant damage and early fire growth occurred on the west side of the south face, but not on the east side.

• A three-story panel section was knocked from the south side of the tower and had an aircraft wheel lodged in window 95-329.

Visual evidence related to the plane strike on the south face of WTC 2 is more extensive than for WTC 1

This has allowed additional analyses beyond the mapping of damage on the plane strike face and facade

damage to the remaining faces. The following conclusions have been reached concerning the immediate

effects of the plane strike on WTC 2:

• The aircraft struck the tower with a measured speed of 545 miles per hour ± 1 8 miles per

hour.

• The collision of the aircraft caused a measurable sway of the tower that lasted more than

4 minutes. The period of oscillation was 1 1.3 seconds.

• The airplane struck columns on the south face ranging from 404 to 443 and covering floor 77

to floor 85.

• Large areas of the facade were removed and/or damaged along the east face of the tower and on the eastern side of the north face. No fafade damage or window breakage was evident on

the west face.

• Debris piles are observed in the northeast comer of the tower primarily on floors 80 and 8 1

Debris is also evident towards the center of the north face on the floor 79.

• Column 253 on the north face is broken on the floor 81 and the column 254 is severely

distorted.

Detailed maps for fire behavior are currently being made. This update characterizes general fire behaviors for the two towers and notes some particularly interesting observations. For WTC 1 , the following observations are highlighted.

• Extensive fires observed immediately following the plane strikes and which are most likely

associated with released jet fuel damped down after roughly 60 seconds.

H^l
Appendix H

• In the period following the plane strikes fires tended to reappear over a period of many

minutes. Initial fire growth was principally observed on floor 96 and floor 97 on the north

face, floor 94 and floor 97 on the east face, floor 96 on the south face, and floor 97 on the west face.

• Observed fire spread rates were quite variable. Examples of both relatively slow and very

rapid apparent fire spread are described.

• Interior walls at several locations were inferred to protect areas of the towers for a period of

many minutes, though they were typically eventually breached by nearby fires.

• Following the collapse of WTC 2, a large fire appeared and grew rapidly on the west face at floor 104.

• There was an extensive area of the facade on the eastern side of the south face for which no

fire was observed until at least 1 hour following the plane strike. When fires finally did

appear in this area their growth was rapid over multiple floors.

• A large amount of smoke was suddenly released from floor 92 on the north face at 10:18:40 a.m. Smoke was expelled simultaneously from other floors and faces. Immediately

after the smoke release rapid fire growth was observed at an isolated location on floor 95 and

across much of the west side of the north face on floor 92.

Observed fire behaviors for WTC 2 were somewhat different than for WTC 1 . This is true even when the differences in times between plane strikes and collapses (1 hour and 42 minutes for WTC 1 and 56

minutes for WTC 2) are considered. The following observations concerning fire behavior in WTC 2 are emphasized:

• Extensive fires observed immediately following the plane strikes and most likely associated

with released jet fuel damped down after roughly 60 seconds.

• Two regions of intense fire remained following the initial fire period due to jet fuel burning.

These fires were located on floor 8 1 and floor 82 in the northeast comer and towards the center of the north face on floor 79. These fires burned for longer periods than observed

elsewhere in WTC 1 and WTC 2. They are located in regions of the tower where debris piles are observed.

• No large fires were observed in a multi-floor region on the north face located between the two fire areas described in the last bullet.

• Initial fire growth in areas away from the sustained fires was along the east face of floor 82. Large fires did not appear on lower floors of this face until later and were sporadic in space

and time.

• Prior to the tower collapse, fire spread primarily from east to west was observed on floors 79,

82, and 83 of the north face.
Interim Report on tvolution of WTC Fires Based on Image Analysis

• A sudden release of smoke from windows on the west side of the south face on floor 80

occurred at 9:56:37 a.m. This was followed very shortly by the appearance of heavy fire. A number of photographs and videos show what appears to be floor 83 hanging across window openings

over a large fraction of floor 82 on the east face of WTC 2. This object is observed very shortly after the plane strike and is found to drop lower prior to the tower collapse. On the north face, shorter lengths of

what appear to be floors 81, 82, and 83 are seen hanging through the windows below.

Starting around 9:52 a.m., a molten material began to pour from the top of window 80-256 on the north

face of WTC 2. The material appears intermittently until the tower collapses at 9:58:59 a.m. The

observation of piles of debris in this area combined with the melting point behaviors of the primary

aluminum alloys used in the Boeing 767 suggest that the material is molten aluminum derived from

aircraft debris located on floor 8 1

The visual record for the period following the collapses of the two towers is much less complete than

prior to this time. In addition to the general chaos caused by the collapses, significant dust and smoke

from fires started by the collapses obscured the site. As a result, it has not been possible to identify clear visual images showing the damage to the south face of WTC 7 caused by the collapses of WTC 1 and

WTC 2. The number of videos and photographs showing fires on the east, north, and west faces of

WTC 7 is limited and sporadic. The images that are available are being used to generate an approximate

time line for fire growth and spread.

H.10 REFERENCES

Forney, G. P., and K. B. McGrattan. 2003. User's Guidefor Smokeview Version 3.1: A Tool for Visualizing Fire Dynamics Simulation Data. NISTIR 6980. National Institute of Standards and

Technology. Gaithersburg, MD.

Forney, G. P., D. Madrzykowski, K. B. McGrattan, and L. Sheppard. 2003. Understanding fire and

smoke flow through modeling and visualization, IEEE Computer Graphics and Applications, vol. 23,

p. 6-13.

-

McAllister, T., ed. 2002. World Trade Center Building Performance Study: Data Collection, Preliminary

Observations, and Recommendations. FEMA 403. Federal Emergency Management Agency.

Washington, DC, May.

NIST (National Instimte of Standards and Technology). 2003. May 2003 Progress Report on the Federal

Building and Fire Safety Investigation ofthe World Trade Center Disaster. NIST Special Publication

1000-3. U.S. Department of Commerce, Washington, DC, May.

The Aluminum Association. 2003. Aluminum Standards and Data - 2003. The Aluminum Association,

Inc., Washington, DC.

H^3
Appendix H

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*
Table of Contents

List of Figures ^ I-ii

List of Tables 1-iv

Appendix I Interim Report on Assessment of Sprayed Fireproofing in the WTC Towers

IVIethodology 1-1

LI Introduction I-l

1.2 Sensitivity of Thermal Response to Fireproofing Geometer/ I-l

1.3 In-Place Conditions of Fireproofing before Impact 1-7

1.3.1 History of WTC Fireproofing 1-7

1.3.2 Specified Thickness of Fireproofing 1-8

1.3.3 As-Applied Thickness and Variability 1-9

1.3.4 Equivalent Thickness 1-20

1.3.5 Thickness of SFRM for Use in Analyses 1-23

1.4 Thermal Properties 1-25

1.4. 1 Thermal Conductivity Measurements 1-25

1.4.2 Specific Heat Measurements 1-26

1.4.3 Density Measurements 1-27

1.5 Response to Impact 1-27

1.5.1 Mechanical Properties of SFRM 1-28

1.6 Summary 1-31

I-i
List of Figures

Figure I-l. Model used to study effects of fireproofing thickness and variability of thickness on

steel temperature 1-3

Figure 1-2. Temperature distribution after 1 h of exposure to gas temperature of 1,100 °C

(1,373 K) 1-3

Figure 1-3. Variation of steel temperature (at a point 6 in. from end of plate) with time for different average thicknesses of fireproofmg 1-4

Figure I^. Example of "gap" in fireproofmg on diagonal member of a bridging floor truss 1-5

Figure 1-5. Effects of gap in fireproofmg 1-6

Figure 1-6. Example of plot matrix from sensitivity study of the effects of missing fireproofmg

and variability of fireproofmg thickness on steel temperature 1-7

Figure 1-7. Dotplot of average thickness from floor trusses for floors 23 and 24, histogram of

average thickness, normal probability plot of average thickness, histogram of

natural logarithm of average thickness, and probability plot of natural logarithm of

average thickness 1-12

Figure 1-8. Example of measurement procedure used to estimate fireproofmg thickness from

photographs 1-14

Figure 1-9. Normal probability plot of estimated fireproofmg thickness based on photographs,

and normal probability plot of natural logarithms of thickness 1-16

Figure 1-10. Dotplot of individual thickness measurements on floor trusses from Port Authority

Construction Audit Reports, histogram of thickness measurements, normal

probability plot of thickness measurements, histogram of natural logarithms of

thickness measurements, and normal probability plot of natural logarithm of

thickness measurements 1-18

Figure 1-1 1. Fireproofing thickness on floor trusses in upgraded portions of WTC towers 1-19

Figure 1-12. Individual and average thickness for core columns, normal probability plot of

individual measurements on columns, individual and average thickness for core beams, and normal probability plot of individual measurements on beams 1-20

Figure 1-13. Randomly generated thickness profiles with average thickness of 0.75 in. and

standard deviation of 0.3 in., cumulative element size, and deformation of 1 in. bar

compared with deformation for uniform thickness of fireproofing 1-22

Figure 1 14. Randomly generated thickness profiles with average thickness of 2.5 in. and

standard deviation of 0.6 in., normal probability plots of thickness values, and

deformation of 1 in. bar compared with deformation for uniform thickness of

fireproofing 1-24

Figure 1-15. Preliminary test results: thermal conductivity as a function of temperature, and

specific heat as a ftanction of temperature 1-26

Figure 1-16. Pull-off test of SFRM applied to steel plate 1-29

I-ii
Interim Report on Assessment of Sprayed Fireproofing in the WTC Towers—Methodology

Figure 1-17. Derivation of acceleration to dislodge SFRM from planar substrate 1-29

Figure 1-18. Derivation of acceleration to dislodge SFRM surrounding a round bar 1-30

I-iii
List of Tables

Table I-l . Specified passive fire protection 1-9

Table 1-2. Average fireproofing thickness from six measurements taken in 1994 on each of

16 random floor trusses on floors 23 and 24 of WTC 1 I-l 1

»

I-iv
Appendix I Interim Report on Assessment of Sprayed Fireproofing in

THE WTC Towers—Methodology

1.1 introduction

The structural steel in the World Trade Center (WTC) towers was "fireproofed" with sprayed fire resistive materials (SFRMs). These materials are packaged as dry ingredients, and water is added by a pressurized system as the materials are sprayed onto the steel. The water mixes with the cementitious

materials and provides "stickiness" that allows the SFRM to adhere weakly to the steel. With time, the

cementitious materials harden, and excess water evaporates. When dry, SFRMs provide an insulation

barrier to reduce the vulnerability of the steel to excessive temperature rise during a fire.

Analysis of the effects of the fires on the structural capacity of the damaged WTC towers as a function of

time requires knowledge about the condition of fireproofing on the various structural components,

namely, the exterior columns, the spandrel beams, the floor trusses, and the core columns. Because of the method of application, sprayed fireproofing will have variable thickness, especially when applied to long,

thin elements such as the diagonals and chords of the floor trusses. In addition, fireproofing was

dislodged during the impact, either from direct impact by debris or from vibrations of the members. The

thermal properties of the fireproofing also need to be known as a fiinction of temperature.

The thermal-structural analysis of the WTC towers focused on two objectives: (1) analysis of the undamaged buildings exposed to postulated fires, and (2) analysis of damaged buildings exposed to the

fires that occurred after impact. In order to reduce the uncertainties in the calculated thermal histories of

various structural elements, the condition of the sprayed fireproofing as it existed on September 1 1, 2001,

needs to be estimated as accurately as possible. In addition, reasonable estimates of the extent of

fireproofing dislodged by the aircraft are needed. This appendix discusses the approach that will be used

for this purpose.

To gain an understanding of the effect of fireproofing thickness and its variability on the steel temperature

during exposure to fire, a simple finite-element model was used for a sensitivity study. The information

gained from that study is reviewed first. A brief summary of the construction history of the sprayed

fireproofing in WTC 1 and WTC 2 is presented. This is followed by a quantitative assessment of in-place

thickness and its variability based on available data. The rationale for the thickness of fireproofing to be

used in the structural fire endurance analyses is presented. The tests conducted to determine the thermal

properties of fireproofing materials similar to those used in the WTC towers are reviewed. The approach

used to gain an understanding of the inherent fragility of sprayed fireproofing is discussed, and the scheme for estimating the extent of damage during impact is summarized.

1.2 SENSITIVITY OF THERMAL RESPONSE TO FIREPROOFING GEOMETERY

The fireproofing thickness has a great effect on the thennal response of the structural elements for a given

fu-e condition. While others have considered the effect of thickness of fireproofing, the effect of the

I-l
Appendix I

variation of thickness along the length of a member is not well known. A sensitivity study using finite element modeling of heat transfer was conducted to investigate the sensitivity of steel temperature to the

variability in fireproofing thickness.

The simplified model that was used is shown in Fig. I-l. A 1 in. thick, 60 in. long steel plate (cyan color) was coated with fireproofing material (purple color) and subjected to the uniform radiative flux arising

from a 1,100 °C fire. As shown in Fig. I-l (b), the fireproofing is modeled with a layer of finite elements

(0.125 in. thick and 0.6 in. long) having the thermal properties of fireproofing (purple). A parametric

study was conducted with average thickness of fireproofing varying from 0 in. to 2 in. in increments of

1/4 in. The effect of variability in thickness was modeled by imposing a normal probability distribution on the fireproofing thickness along the length of the steel plate. The assumed standard deviation varied

from 0 in. (uniform thickness) to 1 in. A psuedo-random number generator was employed to determine

the thickness at each cross section based on the assumed average thickness and standard deviation. The

layer representing fireproofing was taken to be twice the average thickness, and the thickness of

fireproofing at any cross section was modeled by assigning a low heat capacity and a high thermal

conductivity to those elements that do not provide fireproofing. Figure I-l (c) shows an example of

variable thickness fireproofing; in this case, the average thickness is 1 in. and the standard deviation is 3/8 m.

When the model in Fig. I-l is exposed to the thermal flux representing an 1,100 °C fire, the surface of the insulation heats up quickly to the gas temperature (1,100 + 273 = 1,373 K). Numerical simulation was

performed over a 2-h period, and the steel temperature at five locations was recorded at 30 min, 60 min,

90 min, and 120 min of exposure. The temperature recording locations are 6 in. from each end and at 12 in. intervals, which are shown as numbers 1 to 5 in Fig. I-l (a). The initial temperature of the model is 300 K.

Figure 1-2 shows temperature contours (in K) through the fireproofing and steel at 60 min after initial exposure for the model shown in Fig. I-l (a). The fireproofing surface temperature is close to the gas

temperature of 1,373 K, while the steel temperature is 3 11 K. If the fireproofing were of uniform

thickness, the isotherms would be a series of lines parallel to the plate. It is seen that, when the thickness

of fireproofing is variable, the isotherms follow the shape of the fireproofing surface contour. Thus, the

temperature history at any point in the steel depends on the loc al thickness of the fireproofing.

Figure 1-3 shows the steel temperature at the far sensor #1 (6 in. from the end) as a function of time for various insulation thicknesses ranging from 0 in. to 2 in. (the thickness is indicated by the numbers on the

curves). For the case in Fig. 1-3 (a), the fireproofing is of uniform thickness, and for the cases in Fig. 1-3 (b), the thickness varies with a standard deviation of 1 in. The time to reach a temperature of

600 °C is used as a measure of relative performance. It is seen that the presence of high variability in thickness has a detrimental effect of the protection provided by the fireproofing. For example, for a uniform thickness of 0.5 in., it takes about 60 min for the steel at point #1 to reach 600 °C; but when the

standard deviation of the thickness is 1 in., the average thickness has to be 1.75 for the same level of

thermal protection.

1-2
Interim Report on Assessment of Sprayed Fireproofing in the WTC Towers—Methodology

(a)

1 in. thick steel plate Fireproofing

_2 in.

2 in.

60 in.

0.5"

(c)

-—----^--sr1

Figure 1-1. Model used to study effects of fireproofing thickness and variability of

thickness on steel temperature: (a) physical model used in analyses (points 1 to 5 are locations where temperatures are monitored), (b) finite element mesh used to represent

physical model, and (c) finite element model to represent variable thicknessof

fireproofing (purple) (the elements in red represent material of high thermal

conductivity).

TEMF^311.368

300

500

700

900

1100

1300

1400

Figure 1-2. Temperature distribution after 1 h of exposure to gas temperature of

1,100 °C (1,373 K).

1-3
Appendix I

Sensor Location: Far Lett (inch 6 of 60) Case 1: Non-Stochastic & No Gap

1200 —

1000 —

rr 800

600

400

200

Sensor Location: Far Left (inch 6 of 60) Case 2: Stochastic (SD = 1 in.) & No Gap

1200

1000

— 800

600

400

200

0 —

Time (IMinutes)

Figure 1-3. Variation of steel temperature (at a point 6 in. from end of plate) with time for

different average thicknesses of fi reproofing (shown as numbers on the curves):

(a) uniform thickness, and (b) variable thickness with a standard deviation of 1 in.
Interim Report on Assessment of Sprayed Fireproofing in the WTC Towers—Methodology

In addition to the effect of variation in thickness, it is important to understand the effect of missing

fireproofing over a portion of a member. As an example, Fig. 1-4 shows missing fireproofing from a diagonal of a bridging truss of the WTC towers floor system. Figure 1-5 (a) shows an example of a numerical model with missing fireproofing. In this case, there is 12 in. of missing fireproofing on the

steel plate, which is otherwise protected by 2 in. of uniform thickness fireproofing. Figure 1-5 (b) shows

the temperature contours (isotherms) at time 50 min. For comparison. Fig. 1-5 (c) shows isotherms at the same time in a plate with no gap in the fireproofing. As expected, the bare steel at the missing

fireproofing is at the gas temperature, but more importantly the "gap" in fireproofing leads to a "leakage"

of heat into the interior steel.

Figure 1-4. Example of "gap" in fireproofing on diagonal member of a bridging floor

truss.

The combined effects of variation in thickness of the fireproofing and length of missing fireproofing were examined by a factorial study with the following factors:

• Average thickness of fireproofing varying from 0 in. to 2.0 in. in 1/4 in. increments;

• Standard deviation of fireproofing thickness of 0 in., 0.25 in., 0.5 in., 0.75 in. and 1.0 in.; and

• Length of missing fireproofing varying from 0 in. to 30 in., in 6 in. increments.

1-5
Appendix I

2"

300 /uu 1100 1400

500 900 1300

Figure 1-5. Effects of gap in fireproofing: (a) model of plate with fireproofing having 2 in. uniform thickness and 12 in. gap, (b) isotherms (K) at time = 50 min with 12 in. gap, and

(c) isotherms without gap.

The results of the sensitivity study can be summarized in a series of plot matrices, which show the time

histories of the steel temperature for different combinations of gap length and variability in fireproofing

thickness. For example, Fig. 1-6 shows the plot matrix for the temperature history at point #2(18 in. from the end of the plate). Each plot contains a series of curves representing different average thickness

of fireproofing, as in Fig. 1-3. Each column of plots represents a constant value of thickness variability

(standard deviation), and each row represents a constant gap length. The plot in the upper left comer

represents the case of uniform thickness of fireproofing and no gap, which is the same plot as in Fig. I 3(a). (Note that for the case of uniform thickness and no gap, the steel temperature at any point in a cross section is the same along the length of the plate, as shown in Fig. l-5(c).) For gaps of 24 in. and

30 in., the temperature at point #2 rises rapidly because there is no fireproofing on the plate at that location. This explains the shapes of the curves in the two lower rows. In going from left to right in one

of the top four rows it is seen that as variability of thickness increases, the time histories shift upward,

thereby reducing the time to reach 600°C. This is the same observation as shown in Fig. 1-3. Moving

from the top to the bottom in any column shows the effects of increasing gap length. The effect of gap

length depends, of course, on where the steel temperature is measured. At a point within the portion of

steel that is bare, the temperature rises quickly. At points within the steel that are surrounded with

fireproofing, the gap provides a path for heat flow, as shown in Fig. 15 (b). As a result, points in the

steel within the vicinity of the missing fireproofing will experience higher temperatures, as indicated by

the rising trend of the curves in going downward from the top of a column in Fig. 1-6. The National

1-6
Interim Report on Assessment of Sprayed Fireproofing in the WTC Towers—Methodology

Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) does not have sufficient information to determine the frequency of occurrence of these gaps or their typical locations. Therefore, gaps in fireproofing will not be considered in the thermal modeling.

standard Deviation {Thickness) (in.) 0 0.25 ' 0.5 0.75 1

0 30 60 90 120 0 30 60 90 120 0 30 60 90 120 0 30 60 SO 120 0 30 60 90 120 Time (Minutes)

Figure 1-6. Example of plot matrix from sensitivity study of the effects of missing

fireproofing and variability of fireproofing thickness on steel temperature. Each graph is a temperature history of the steel at point #2

(see Fig. 1-5) for different thicknesses of fireproofing.

1.3 IN-PLACE CONDITIONS OF FIREPROOFING BEFORE IMPACT

1.3.1 History of WTC Fireproofing

In Appendix 4 of the May 2003 Progress Report (NIST SP 1000-3), the history of the sprayed

fireproofing, as reconstructed from available documentation, was reviewed. Basically, the following

significant activities took place:

• 1969: Decision made to use 1/2 in. of CAFCO BLAZE-SHIELD Type D (asbestos fibers)

sprayed fireproofing.

1-7
Appendix I

• 1970: Use of CAFCO BLAZE-SHIELD Type D was discontinued at the 38th floor of

WTC 1; remaining fireproofing to use CAFCO BLAZE-SHIELD Type DC/F (mineral wool

fibers).

• 1994: Thickness measurements of fireproofing on trusses of floors 23 and 24 of WTC 1.

• 1995: Port Authority performed study to establish sprayed fireproofing thickness for tenant

• 1 999: Port Authority established guidelines for fireproofing repairs, replacement, and

• Late 1990s: Floor truss fire protection upgraded to 1 1/2 in. during tenant alterations using

CAFCO BLAZE-SHIELD Type II. In-place measurements of thickness, density, and bond

strength recorded.

1.3.2 Specified Thickness of Fireproofing

WTC project specifications for spray-applied fireproofing do not provide required material thickness or hourly ratings. However, a letter dated October 30, 1969, from Robert J. Linn (manager. Project

Planning, WTC) to Mr. Louis DiBono (Mario & DiBono Plastering Co., Inc.) states, in part:

...Tower "A" columns that are less than 14WF228 will require 2 3/16"

thick of 'Cafco [BJlaze-Shield Type D' spray-on Fireproofing. All

Tower columns equal to or greater than 14WF228 will require 1 3/16" of

fireproofing...

All Tower beams, spandrels and bar joists requiring spray-on

fireproofing are to have a 1/2" covering of "Cafco."

No reference is made in this letter to the required thickness of fireproofing of core box columns or

exterior built-up columns.

Alcoa was the supplier of the aluminum cladding on the exterior columns (Contract WTC 400.00), and

the following "Note 1 1" was included among the "General Notes" of their drawings:

11. Exterior column and spandrel fireproofing-CAFCO BLAZE

SHIELD Type D Fireproofing. Interior column and spandrel

fireproofing-Vermiculite plaster aggregate fireproofing with finished

plaster coat on exposed areas of columns. (3 hr on spandrels, 4 hr on

columns)

alterations.

upgrades.

Fireproofing Thickness

Rating

4 hr (heavy column)

Cafco Vermiculite Aggregate

1 3/16' 7/8'

ill

3 hr (spandrels) 1/2'

II 1/2"

1-8
Interim Report on Assessment of Sprayed Fireproofing in the WTC Towers—Methodology

In 1995, the Port Authority performed a study to establish the requirements for applying spray-on

fireproofmg to the floor trusses in the case of new construction (alterations conducted when tenants vacated the space) in the towers. The study estimated the fireproofmg requirements for the floor trusses of the towers based on "the fireproofmg requirements for Design No. G805 contained in the Fire

Resistance Directory" of Underwriters' Laboratories. The study concluded that 1 1/2 in. of spray-on

mineral fiber fireproofmg, "when appHed directly to the chords and web members," was sufficient to achieve the required 2 h rating for the floor trusses. In the years between 1995 and 2001, fireproofmg was upgraded in a number of the floors affected by the fires on September 11, 2001.

The specified fire protection is summarized in Table 1-1.

Table 1-1. Specified passive fire protection.

Structural Component Member Size Location Material Thickness (in.)

Floor trusses All NA CAFCO DC/F 1/2

Interior columns'* < 14WF228 NA CAFCO DC/F 2 3/16 > 14WF228 NA CAFCO DC/F 1 3/16

Exterior columns "heavy" Exterior

faces CAFCO DC/F

1 3/16

"heavy" Interior faces Vermiculite

aggregate

7/8

Spandrel beams All Exterior face CAFCO DC/F 1/2

All Interior face Vermiculite

aggregate

1/2

a. No thicknesses specified for core beams and box columns. Key: NA, not applicable.

In a letter dated July 25, 1966, from Emery Roth and Sons to the Port of New York Authority, it is stated "Since the deck is non-structural it will not be fire proofed." Photographs show that in some areas the .underside of the metal deck was indeed not fireproofed, while in other areas fireproofmg appears to be

present but of undetermined thickness and possibly resulting from overspray. Photographs reveal that the dampers and damper saddles were not fireproofed. Additionally, it is unclear whether the bridging trusses were required to be fireproofed in all areas. Subsequent to the design and construction of the WTC

towers, some information has been found that further describes the elements of the structural systems that were indeed fireproofed.

1.3.3 As-Applied Thickness and Variability

The actual thickness of a spray-applied fire protection material generally exceeds the specified thickness

by some amount. Since both towers collapsed on September 11, 2001, and most of the fireproofing was

either dislodged or abraded (or scraped) off in the collapse, no examples remain of the "as installed" condition of the fireproofing. To make an estimate of the as-applied thickness and variability in thickness, several sources of information have been employed, including measurements taken by the Port Authority, condition surveys and anecdotal information, and photographs and video clips showing the condition of the fireproofing in selected areas. Each of the structural components or systems is considered here separately.

1-9
Appendix I

Steel Truss-Supported Floor System

Qualitative information on the "as installed" fireproofing thickness for the floor system first appears in Sample Area Data Sheets from 1990, in which comments on the state of the in-place fireproofing were

recorded. As an example, the data sheet for floor 29 of WTC 1 states the following for the South West

quadrant of the floor:

Fluffy spray-on fireproofing coating the support beams, joists, and deck

above the ceiling. The thickness of the material on the beams and joists was consistently about 1/2" Regarding the deck it ranged from very

sparce [sic] in areas to 1/4" other areas.

Similar statements were recorded for the remaining quadrants of the floor.

Information regarding quantitative inspection of existing fireproofing appears in documentation from

1994. That year, the Port Authority perfomied a series of thickness measurements of the existing

fireproofing on floors 23 and 24 of WTC 1 . Six measurements were taken from "both flanges and web"

of each of 1 6 randomly chosen trusses on each floor at those locations where the fireproofing was not damaged or absent.

The averages of six measurements per joist that were recorded on the two floors are presented in Table 1-2. Measured average thickness varied between 0.52 in. and 1.17 in. For the 32 measurements

(16 on each floor), the overall average was 0.74 in. and the standard deviation of these averages was

0.16 in. Four of the 32 floor trusses, had an average thicknesses between 0.52 in. and 0.56 in. These

measurements suggest that the minimum average thickness exceeded 1/2 in.

This same report stated that, on floor 23,

... truss members located adjacent to the outside walls (within 3 ft) are devoid of fireproofing material. Visual inspection on floor 24 was not

possible, as this area still has a lowered ceiling in place.

The data in Table 1-2 can be examined further to understand the variability of the fireproofing thickness

in the non-upgraded locations. Figure 1-7 (a) shows the average thicknesses measured on the floor trusses of floors 23 and 24. The values appear to be similar for the two locations in terms of overall

average thicknesses and the variation in average thickness. A formal analysis of variance indeed

indicated no statistically significant differences between the overall mean thicknesses for the two floors. Thus, the two groups of data can be combined into one. A question to be answered is whether the values

of average thickness follow a normal distribution. To answer this question, histograms and normal

probability plots are used. Figure 1-7 (b) shows a histogram of the average thicknesses, and it appears to be non-symmetrical and skewed to the right, which is characteristic of a lognormal distribution.' Figure I-7(c) is the normal probability plot of the average thicknesses for the combined data. If the points

fall approximately on a straight line, it indicates that the data are normally distributed. It is seen that there

are systematic deviations of the data from the best-fit line. To examine whether the data are represented

better by a lognormal distribution, the average thicknesses, in Table 1-2 were transformed by taking their

In a lognormal distribution, the natural logarithms of the values of a variate have a normal distribution.

I-IO
Interim Report on Assessment of Sprayed Fireproofing in the WTC Towers—Methodology

natural logarithm. Figure 17 (d) is a histogram of the natural logarithms of thickness, and Fig. I 7(e) is the corresponding normal probability plot. It is seen that the data are less dispersed about the straighter

line, and the correlation coefficient has increased form 0.97 to 0.99. Thus, there is some indication that the distribution of fireproofing thickness is lognormal in the non-upgraded floor trusses.

Table 1-2. Average fireproofing thickness from

six measurements taken in 1994 on each of

16 random floor trusses on floors 23 and 24

of WTC 1. Fireproofing Thickness (in.)

F lUUI r luur

yj u. / u

u.uu

0.70 0.90

0.76 0.72

0.88 0.64

0.89 0.80

0.83 0.68

1.17 0.65

0.88 0.67

0.71 0.77

0.82 0.96

0.52 0.66

0.69 0.65

0.52 1.11

0.64 0.95

0.52 0.56

Source: Data provided by Port Authority of New York and New

Jersey. A lognormal distribution for the average thickness of the fireproofing on the non-upgraded floor trusses is explained as follows. It is expected that the thickness of fireproofing will be highly variable due to the

difficulty in spraying the material on the relatively thin members. If the overall thickness is low and the

variability is high, a normal distribution would require a fraction of the surfaces to have negative values

of fireproofing. If the thickness distribution is lognormal, the thickness cannot be zero, and there is a low

likelihood of having thickness close to zero. If the underlying distribution of fireproofing thickness is lognormal, the average thickness overestimates the thickness expected to be exceeded with 50 percent

probability, and the median is the appropriate statistic for the 50 percentile value.

I-ll
Appendix I

in

CDc

o

'sz

1.2

1

0.8

0.6

•

•

f

*

1

• - *

i

1

•

f

"

, , , , i , , , . i , , , , I , r , 1 , , , , i r , > r 22

12-

10-

8-

1

^- O

4-

2-4

0-

(b)

0.3 0.5 0.7 0;9 1.1 Average Thickness, in

23

1.3

Floor

1.2

24 25

y = 0.74187 + 0.1607norm(x) R= 0.97209

1 \ m—I—I—I

\—I\—I r

01 .1 1 5 10 2030 50 7080 90 95 99 99.999.99 Percent

y = -0.32122 + 0.21269norm(x) R= 0.98754

-0.4 -0.2 0 Ln (Thickness)

0.2 0.4

"1—I—I

1 rn—I—I r

1 1 5 10 20 30 50 7080 90 95 99 99,9 99.99 Percent

Figure 1-7. (a) Dotplot of average thickness from floor trusses for floors 23 and 24,

(b) histogram of average thickness, (c) normal probability plot of average thickness,

(d) histogram of natural logarithm of average thickness, and (e) probability plot of

natural logarithm of average thickness.

1-12
Interim Report on Assessment of Sprayed Fireproofing in the WTC Towers—Methodology

As stated, the standard deviation of the average thicknesses in Table 1-2 is 0. 16 in. Since each of the

averages is based on six individual measurements, the variability in average thickness is less than the

variability of the fireproofing thickness on a given element. If it is assumed that the true average

thicknesses of fireproofing at the truss locations represented in Table 12 are the same, it is possible to estimate the variability of individual measurements from the following well-known relationship:

S_

4n

Sj=— (I.l)

where:

= standard deviation of the average thicknesses

S = standard deviation of the individual thickness measurements

n = number of measurements to obtain the average thickness

Thus, an estimate of the standard deviation of the individual measurements is 0.1 6V6 ss 0.4 in. Since it

is unlikely that there is no difference in average fireproofing thickness at different cross sections, the standard deviation of 0.4 in. is an upper limit for the variability of fireproofing thickrvesses in the non- upgraded floor trusses on the basis of the information provide in Table 1-2.

Analysis of Photographs

Additional data regarding the thickness of fireproofing has been gathered by evaluating photographic

evidence. Although photographic evidence of the state of the fireproofing is limited, two groups of

photographs have been located and used for estimating fireproofing thickness.

The first group of photographs was provided to NIST by Morse Zehnter Associates and includes images

of floor trusses trom WTC 1 (floors 12, 22, 23, and 27) and WTC 2 (floor 26). From this group, only

photographs from floors 22, 23, and 27 of WTC 1 were analyzed. Photographs provided by Morse

Zehnter Associates were taken in the mid-1990s and illustrate the fireproofing conditions prior to the upgrade carried out by the Port Authority. Thus, fireproofing thickness on the photographed trusses should be at least 1/2 in. as specified by the Port Authority on October 1969.

The second group of photographs, taken in 1998, was provided by Gilsanz Murray Steficek (consulting

engineers). This group illustrates the state of fireproofing after the upgrade program that was initiated in 1995. The photographs were of trusses for floor 31 and below in WTC 1.

Selection of which photographed trusses were used to estimate thickness of fireproofing was based on

clarity of fireproofing edges and whether a feature of known dimensions was present. Thus, only

photographs where reference measurements could be performed were used. The general approach to the analysis involved the estimation of distances based on the computed reference length per pixel. The

procedure is summarized as follows:

• A feature of known dimension (based on construction drawings) that could be used as reference was located in the photograph. For example, the dimension of the bare vertical leg

of a damper saddle was a dimension that could be obtained from shop drawings.

1-13
In the photograph, the length of the reference dimension was measured in pixels.

The scaling factor of length per pixel was computed by dividing the known dimension in inches by the number of pixels. For example, if the vertical leg of the damper saddle was

measured as 48.2 pixels in the photograph, and it is known that the actual size of the leg was

3.13 in., the scaling factor would be 3.13 in./48.2 pixels - 0.065 in./pixel.

Only truss webs or struts (diagonal bar at end of truss) located near and in the same plane as the reference object were selected for analysis. This selection was made to minimize error due to perspective.

It was assumed that the fireproofing on web bars was applied evenly around the perimeter of

the bar. Based on this assumption, a "virtual" centerline along the length of the bar was

drawn in the photograph.

Lines were drawn perpendicular to the "virtual" centerline. The number of pixels along the

lines from the "virtual" centerline to the edge of the fireproofmg was determined from the cursor positions indicated by the software. Measurements were made at regularly spaced

intervals to avoid bias. Figure 1-8 is an example of a series of measurements made on a strut.

a

© 1993 Reproduced with permission of U.S. Mineral Products Company dba Isolatek International and Morse Zehnter Associates

Figure 1-8. Example of measurement procedure used to estimate

fireproofing thickness from pliotograplis.

Each measurement in pixels was multiplied by the scaling factor (in./pixel) to estimate the bar

radius plus fireproofmg thickness.

1-14
Interim Report on Assessment of Sprayed Fireproofing in the WTC Towers—Methodology

• The radius of the bar was subtracted to provide the estimate of the fireproofing thickness.

It was observed that the estimated thickness of fireproofing in the non-upgraded floors tended to be larger

for the webs of the main trusses. Hence estimates of fireproofmg thickness were divided into three groups:

• Webs of main trusses,

• Webs of bridging trusses, and

• Diagonal strut at the exterior wall end of the truss.

No estimates of fireproofing thickness on top and bottom chords were possible using photographs. For

the upgraded floors in WTC 1 that were included in the second group of photographs, only estimates of

the thickness on the web bars of the main trusses were made. Figure 19 (a) shows normal probability

plots of the fu-eproofing thickness estimated from the photographs. It is seen that the points for the "upgraded" main trusses follow a generally linear trend, which indicates that the estimated thicknesses for the upgraded main trusses are approximately normally distributed. The estimated thicknesses from the non-upgraded floors, however, do not follow linear trends on the normal probability plot. Figure 1-9 (b)

shows normal probability plots of the natural logarithms of the thicknesses. The transformed values for the non-upgraded fireproofing now follow generally linear trends, which means that a lognormal

distribution is more appropriate for the non-upgraded floors. This reinforces the observation noted in the previous section. Thus there is strong evidence that the original fireproofing thickness on the floor trusses follows a log normal distribution.

The average, standard deviation, and coefficient of variation were computed for the total number of

measurements in each of these groups. The results are summarized as follows:

• Main trusses before upgrade: Average thickness 0.6 in., standard deviation = 0.3 in., and

coefficient of variation = 0.5.

• Bridging trusses before upgrade: Average thickness 0.4 in., standard deviation = 0.25 in., and

coefficient of variation = 0.6.

• Diagonal struts before upgrade: Average thickness 0.4 in., standard deviation = 0.2 in., and

coefficient of variation = 0.5.

• Main trusses after upgrade: Average thickness 1.7 in., standard deviation = 0.4 in., and

coefficient of variation = 0.2.

Port Authority Data on Upgraded Fireproofing on Trusses

As discussed in the May 2003 Progress Report (NIST SP 1000-3), the Port Authority provided

information on fireproofing thickness from tenant alteration Construction Audit Reports prepared in 1 997

to 1999. Those reports included average thicknesses of fireproofing at the "bottom of truss." In 2004, the Port Authority provided NIST reports of the individual measurements for many of the average thicknesses

in the Construction Audit Reports. With the individual measurements, it is possible to investigate the

1-15
Appendix I

0

c

o

1 \ \ I I \ I I r 5 10 2030 50 7080 9095

Percent

99 99.999.99

Figure 1-9. (a) Normal probability plot of estimated fireproofing

thickness based on photographs, and (b) normal probability plot

of natural logarithms of thickness.

variation of thickness at a cross section of a truss member and the variation in average thickness from

truss to truss. To permit such analyses, only those data having the same number of individual

measurements at each cross section were used. This resulted in 18 data sets for WTC 1 (including

floors 93, 95, 98, 99, and 100) and 14 data sets for WTC 2 (includmg floors 77, 78, 88, 89, and 92).

An analysis of the individual measurements was carried out to determine the underlying distribution for the measured thicknesses. Figure I-IO (a) is a dotplot of the individual measurements in WTC 1 (144 measurements) and in WTC 2(112 measurements). It is observed that the central values and ranges

1-16
Interim Report on Assessment of Sprayed Fireproofing in the WTC Towers—Methodology

are similar for the two towers, and the two groups of measurements were combined into one group. Figure I-IO (b) is the histogram of the individual measurements, and Fig. 1-10 (c) is the corresponding

normal probability plot. A straight line fit to the normal probability plot shows a tendency of the points to deviate from the line. Figure 1-10 (d) is a histogram of the natural logarithms of the individual thickness

values, and Fig. 1-10 (e) is the corresponding lognormal probability plot. A comparison of the probability

plots shows that natural logarithms fall closer to a straight line. Thus, it appears that the thickness of the upgraded fireproofing on the floor trusses is described by a lognormal distribution. This contradicts the observ ation based on analysis of photographs from lower floors discussed in the previous section. The

overall average thickness of the 256 individual measurements is 2.5 in. with a standard deviation of

0.6 in. Thus, the average thickness on the upgraded upper floors appears to be greater than that estimated

from photographs taken on upgraded lower floors.

The overall standard deviation of 0.6 in. includes two contributions: ( 1

) the variation of thickness at the cross section (within-truss variability), and (2) the variation of average thickness between trusses (between-truss variability). Figure H1 shows these two components of the thickness variability for the two towers. Figures 1-1 1 (a) and (c) show the within-truss variability, and Figs. 1-1 1 (b) and (d) show the variation of average thickness of each truss. From analysis of variance, it was found that the within-truss

standard deviation is 0.4 in., and the between-truss standard deviation is also 0.4 in. The within-truss

standard deviation of 0.4 in. is similar to the standard deviation of the estimated individual thickness

obtained from analysis of the photographs of upgraded main trusses.

Column Fireproofing Thickness

NIST requested that the Port Authority provide available information on the thickness of fireproofing for the exterior and interior columns of the WTC towers. Specifically, the request included the following:

• The fireproofing material used and the thickness on the various plates comprising the exterior

columns and spandrels.

• The fireproofing material used and the thickness on core columns.

• Confirmation that the wide flange column sections were protected with CAFCO

BLAZESHIELD Type DC/F with specified thickness of 2 3/16 in. for sections smaller than

14WF228 and 1 3/16 in. for 14WF228 and larger.

• Information on in-place fireproofmg thickness.

The Port Authority replied that, due to inaccessibility of exterior columns and core columns, there were no recent records of fireproofing thickness for these elements. The only available measurements of

fireproofmg thickness were for beams and columns accessible within elevator shafts. The most complete

data set included measurements on beams and columns taken within shaft 14/15 in WTC 1. These

measurements were taken in April 1999 and included measurements from floor 1 to floor 45. The

thicknesses were recorded to the nearest 1/8 in., with a few thicknesses recorded to the nearest 1/16 in. The columns included 10 to 18 replicate measurements, and the beams included 1 1 to 16 replicate

measurements.

1-17
Appendix I

c

13oo

5

4.5

4

3.5

3

2 5

2

1.5-

1

= (a) : i •

: 1 * *

- i

•I-- •

* ---- ; :

«

•

•

I

' i

f

•* — -•

•

•

: : »

Tower

5

4.5

4-

3.5-

3

2.5-

2

y = 2.5449 + 0.57398norm(x) R= 0.98583 J

(c) J ] j

\ ii i i i i i i i i

.4 0.8 1.2 1.6 2 2.4 2.8 3.2 3.6 4 4.4 4.8 5.2 Thickness, in.

,01 .1 1 5 1 0 203 0 50 7 080 90 95 99 99.999.99 Percent

y = 0.90833 + 0.2266norm(x) R= 0.99261

I I 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1. Ln (Tliickness)

.01 .1 5 10 2030 50 7080 9095 99 99.999.99 Percent

Figure 1-10. (a) Dotplot of individual tliickness measurements on floor trusses from Port

Authority Construction Audit Reports, (b) histogram of thickness measurements,

(c) normal probability plot of thickness measurements, (d) histogram of natural

logarithms of thickness measurements, and (e) normal probability plot of natural

logarithm of thickness measurements.

1-18
Interim Report on Assessment of Sprayed Fireproofing in the WTC Towers—Methodology

(a)

4--

w 3- w

0

CoZ 2-

+ +

92 94

i WTC 1

--+-

4^

+

-H- +

^ I

+ +

- -mIh- t

96 98

Floor 100 102

05

CD><

3.5-

3-

2.5-

2-

1.5-t

1

0.5-t

0

:(b) •

I WTC 1 •

•

•

• *

1

92 94 96 98

Floor 100 102

3-

y 2-

1-

; (c) WTC2

+

++

h

- 1+

Tr

|!^

-§- +

*- f-i" -«-

h

—1—1—1 1 1

3.5

75 80 85

Floor

90 95

c

o

0

03><

3-.

2.5-

2-

1.5-

1-

0.5-

: (d) WTC 2

•

• :

•t s

• ••

•

75 80 85

Floor

90 95

Figure 1-11. Fireproofing thicl^ness on floor trusses in upgraded portions of WTC

towers: (a) individual measurements in WTC 1, (b) average thickness in WTC 1, (c) individual measurements in WTC 2, and (d) average thickness in WTC 2.

Figure 1-12 (a) shows the individual and average fireproofing thickness on the core columns. Analysis of

variance indicated no statistically significant differences among the average values and all data were

pooled together. The average thickness for the columns is 0.82 in., the standard deviation is 0.20, and the

coefficient of variation is 0.24. The information from the Port Authority indicated that the "minimum

thickness required" for the columns was 0.5 in. Figure 1-12 (b) is the normal probability plot of the individual thickness measurements. Because most of the thicknesses were reported to the nearest 1/8 in., the points are staggered instead of uniformly distributed. The plot, however, shows that the points follow

a linear trend, and it appears that the thickness of the fireproofing on the core columns could be described

by a normal distribution. Figures 1-12 (c) and (d) shows the corresponding plots for the thickness of

fireproofing on the beams. The average thickness for the beams is 0.97 in., the standard deviation is 0.21 in. and the coefficient of variation is 0.21. The information from the Port Authority indicated that the "minimum thickness required" for the beams was 0.75 in.

1-19
Appendix I

2.0

1.5

^ 10

o

0.5

0.0

(a) Columns

—« .» ». —»-• ^ f • f

•• • : • • *

10

Individual Average

• » —•-

if .

_L20 30 Floor

40 50

1.6

1.4

1.2 c

1 0 0

c

o 0.8 c

0.6

0.4

0.2

y = 0.82308 + 0.1 8921 norm(x) R= 0.96692

!

I

!

! 1 1

I

1

ill***

1 1 1 1 i i i i i 1 1 1

.01 .1 1 5 10 2030 50 7080 90 95 99 99.999.99 Percent

Figure 1-12. (a) Individual and average thickness for core columns, (b) normal probability

plot of individual measurements on columns, (c) individual and average thickness for core beams, and (d) normal probability plot of individual measurements on beams.

As might be expected, the variation in thickness of fireproofing for the beams and columns is lower than

the variation observed in the floor trusses. The planar surfaces of the beams and columns result in more

uniform application of the sprayed fireproofing than for the slender truss members. This results in reduced differences in the average thickness of fireproofing on different members and less variability

within a member.

1.3.4 Equivalent Thickness

The sensitivity study summarized in Section 1.2 indicated that variation in the thickness of fireproofing

reduced the "effective thickness" of the fireproofing. It would be impractical to attempt to account for the variation in fireproofing thickness in the thermal modeling by introducing variable thickness fireproofing

in the finite-element models. As an alternative, it was decided to attempt to determine the "equivalent

unifonn thickness" of fireproofing that would result in the same thermo-mechanical response of a

1-20
Interim Report on Assessment of Sprayed Fireproofing in the WTC Towers—Methodology

member as variable thickness fireproofing. An approach similar to the methodology described in Section 1.2 was used to model a 1 in. diameter by 60 in. long bar with fireproofing and subjected to the

heat flux arising fi-om a 1,100 °C fire. The bar was subdivided into 0.6 in. long elements, so that there were 100 elements along the length of the bar. The thennal history of the bar was calculated, and that history was used to calculate the length change of the unrestrained bar under a tensile stress of 12,500 psi.

The bar was assumed to be similar to the steel used in the floor trusses, and the temperature dependence

of the coefficient of thermal expansion and the modulus of elasticity were based on NIST measurements.

The fireproofing thickness in the models was based on the measurements summarized in the previous

section for the web bars of main trusses in the original condition and after the upgrade. Specifically, the following target values were investigated:

• Original: average thickness = 0.75 in., standard deviation = 0.3 in., lognormal distribution.

• Upgrade: average thickness = 2.5 in., standard deviation = 0.6 in., lognormal distribution.

The variation of fireproofing thickness along the length of the bar was established by using a psuedo

random number generator to select values from a lognormal distribution with central value and dispersion

consistent with the above average values and standard deviation. Three sets of random data were

generated for each condition.

When the randomly selected thicknesses of each element were applied to the bar, it resulted in sudden

changes in firepro.ofing thickness along the length of the bar. This resulted in a "rough" surface texture as shown by the dotted thickness profile in Fig. 1-13 (a). It was felt that this rough texture (see also

Fig. I-l (c) might not be representative of actual conditions, so an alternative approach was to use 5-point

averaging to reduce the roughness of the fireproofing profile. The solid line in Fig. 1-13 (b) shows such a "smooth" profile. The two profiles in Fig. 1-13 (a) have approximately the same average value and

standard deviation and have similar cumulative distribution of fireproofing thickness as shown in Fig. 1-13 (b).

As stated, the calculated thermal histories of the bar elements were used to calculate the unrestrained

length change of the bar due to thermal expansion and an applied stress of 12,500 psi. Work is currently

underway to examine the performance of the bar under fully restrained conditions in which the induced

stress history is computed. For comparison, the deformation of the bar with different but uniform

thickness of fireproofing was calculated. The "equivalent thickness" was taken as the uniform thickness

that resulted in similar deformation as under the variable thickness conditions. Figure 1-13 (c) shows the

results of these calculations for the original fireproofing. The three continuous curves are the deformation-time relationships for uniform thickness of 0.4 in., 0.5 in., and 0.6 in. The solid symbols

represent the results for three cases with "rough" texture, and the open symbols are for the "smooth"

texture. The following values summarize the six variable thickness profiles:

• Rough 1 : average = 0.79 in., standard deviation = 0.29 in.

• Rough 2: average = 0.77 in., standard deviation = 0.27 in.

• Rough 3: average = 0.79 in., standard deviation = 0.3 1 in.

1-21
Appendix I

1.60

Rough Texture

' Smooth Texture

10

c

o

1.60

1.40

1.20

1.00

0.80

0.60

0.40

0.20

(b) »

-- )«-

(

«•

mm

Rough Texture Smooth Texture

20 30 40

Bar Position, in. 50 60

20 40 60 80 100 Cumulative Number of Elements

120

0.80

~ 0.60

c

.2'*-> 03 0.40

0.20

0.00

: 9800 lbs _J

Rough 1 Rough 2 Rough 3 Smooth 1 Smooth 2 Smooth 3

14" Uniform FP

0.5" Uniform FP

0,6" Uniform FP

10 15

Time (min)

20 25 30

Figure 1-13. (a) Randomly generated thickness profiles with average thickness of 0.75 in. and standard deviation of 0.3 in., (b) cumulative element size, and (c) deformation of 1 in. bar compared with deformation for uniform thickness of fireproofing.

1-22
Interim Report on Assessment of Sprayed Fireproofing in the WTC Towers—Methodology

• Smooth 1 : average = 0.79 in., standard deviation = 0.28 in.

• Smooth 2: average = 0.78 in., standard deviation = 0.31 in.

• Smooth 3: average = 0.78 in., standard deviation = 0.32 in.

Figure 1-13 (c) shows that the "rough" texture reduces the effectiveness of the fireproofing by a small

amount compared with the "smooth" texture. As noted above, it is believed that the "smooth" texture is more representative of the actual conditions. On the basis of these analyses, it is concluded that fireproofing with an average thickness of 0.75 in. and a standard deviation of 0.3 in. provides equivalent

protection to 0.6 in. of uniform thickness.

The results for the upgraded fireproofing are shown in Fig. 1-14. Only the "smooth" texture was used,

and the values for the three cases are as follows:

• Case 1 : average

• Case 2: average

• Case 3: average

2.50 in., standard

2.43 in., standard

2.55 in., standard

deviation = 0.71 in.

deviation = 0.51 in.

deviation = 0.63 in.

Figure 1-14 (a) shows the three profiles, and Fig. 1-14 (b) shows the normal probability plots of thickness

values. Because the three randomly generated profiles do not have the same averages and dispersions, the responses show more scatter than in Fig. 1-13 (c). On the basis of these analyses, it is concluded that an average thickness of fireproofing of 2.5 in. with a standard deviation of 0.6 in. is equivalent to 2.2 in. of

uniform thickness.

1.3.5 Thickness of SFRM for Use in Analyses

Analyses of available data on fireproofing thickness and thermal modeling revealed the following:

• From measurements of fireproofing thickness, the average values exceeded the specified

thickness.

• Fireproofing thickness was variable, and the distribution of thickness in the floor trusses appears to be described best by a lognormal distribution.

• The standard deviation of fireproofing thickness on the trusses varied between about 0.3 in. to 0.6 in.

• The standard deviation of fireproofing on columns and beams from the core tended to be

lower, with a value of 0.2 in. for the available data.

• No information is available on the fireproofing thickness on the exterior columns and

spandrel beams.

• Variation in thickness reduces the effectiveness of fireproofing, and the equivalent uniform

thickness is less than the average thickness.

1-23
Appendix I

Figure 1-14. (a) Randomly generated thickness profiles with average thickness of 2.5 in. and standard deviation of 0.6 in., (b) normal probability plots of thickness values, and

(c) deformation of 1 in. bar compared with deformation for uniform thickness

of fi reproofing.

Based on the above findings, the following uniform thickness for the undamaged fireproofmg will be

used in calculating thermal response under various fire scenarios:

• Original fireproofmg on floor trusses: 0.6 in.

• Upgraded fireproofmg on floor trusses: 2.2 in.

• Fireproofmg on other elements: the specified thickness.

The choice of specified thickness for those members lacking data is justified by offsetting factors as follows: (1) measured average thicknesses exceed specified values, and (2) variation in thickness reduces

the effectiveness of fireproofmg.

1-24
Interim Report on Assessment of Sprayed Fireproofing in the WTC Towers—Methodology

1.4 THERMAL PROPERTIES

Based on the information provided by the manufacturers, three SFRMs have been identified in WTC 1 , 2, and 7: (1) CAFCO BLAZE-SHIELD Type DC/F, (2) CAFCO BLAZE-SHIELD Type U, and

(3) Monokote MK-5. Of the three SFRMs, only CAFCO BLAZE-SHIELD Type II is currently sold m

the U.S., and CAFCO BLAZE-SHIELD Type DC/F is sold in Canada.

CAFCO BLAZE-SHIELD Type DC/F is manufactured by Isolatek International (Stanhope, New Jersey)

and was used in the interior columns, floor systems, and the exterior faces of the exterior columns of

WTC 1 and WTC 2. CAFCO BLAZE-SHIELD Type II, also from Isolatek, was used in subsequent

retrofit of WTC 1 floor systems. CAFCO BLAZE-SHIELD Type DC/F and Type II are portland cementbased products. Monokote MK-5 a gypsum-based SFRM, was manufactured by W.R. Grace and Co.

(Cambridge, Massachusetts) and used in WTC 7. W.R. Grace stopped the production of Monokote MK-5

in the 1980s. In addition to these three SFRMs, vermiculite plasters, manufactured by W.R. Grace until the 1970s, were used on the interior faces of the exterior columns of WTC I and WTC 2.

To provide thermophysical property data for the modeling effort in fire-structure interaction, the thermal

conductivity, specific heat and density of each SFRM were detennined as a function of temperature up to 1200 °C. Tests were performed by Anter Laboratories, Inc. in Pittsburgh, PA through an open-bid

contract. Anter Laboratories is an ISO 9002 certified company.

Samples of CAFCO BLAZE-SHIELD Type DC/F and Type II were prepared by Isolatek, Inc. in Stanhope, New Jersey, and sample of Monokote MK-5 were prepared by W.R. Grace and Co. in Cambridge, Massachusetts according to their respective application manuals. Since Monokote MK-5 is no longer on the market, it was specially manufactured by W.R. Grace according to the original MK-5

formulation. The samples were made from the same batch of raw material, shipped to NIST for examination and documentation, and sent to Anter Laboratories for testing. The sample is 9 in. long, 4.5 in. wide, and 3 in. thick. Three samples of each material were sent for testing. Two of them were

used for the thermal conductivity measurements, and the third was used to prepare specimens for the other measurements involved.

1.4.1 Thermal Conductivity Measurements

The thermal conductivity measurements were performed according to ASTM C 1 11 3 Test Method for Thermal Conductivity of Refractories by Hot Wire (Platinum Resistance Thermometer Technique). This

test method is based on heating two specimens with a platinum wire placed between them. The thin platinum wire serves not only as a heater, but also as a temperature sensor, since the variation of its

electrical resistance during the test is converted into variation of temperature. Thermal conductivity is calculated based on the rate of temperature increase of the wire and power input. It was reported that substantial shrinkage during the measurements occurred for the three materials. The two MK-5

specimens shrunk, exposing the platinum wire positioned between them. For this reason, no thermal

conductivity measurement could be performed for this material at 1,200 °C. Figure 1-15 (a) shows

preliminary results for thermal conductivity as a function of temperature. The results show similar trends

of increased thermal conductivity with increasing temperature; however, the Monokote MK-5 specimens

had a different behavior than CAFCO BLAZE-SHIELD Type DC/F and Type II at temperatures above

500 °C.

1-25
Appendix I

(a)

0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400

Temperature, °C

0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400

Temperature, °C

Figure 1-15. Preliminary test results: (a) thermal conductivity as a function of temperature, and (b) specific heat as

a function of temperature.

1.4.2 Specific Heat Measurements

For the specific heat capacity measurements, the same instrument (Unitherm Model QL-3141) was used

with a slight modification. A thermocouple was added to the system and mounted on the specimen,

parallel with the platinum wire at a known distance from the thermocouple. The test was performed in a

similar manner as the thermal conductivity measurements, but from the thermocouple output the thermal

diffusivity of the material was derived. Knowing the thermal conductivity, the thermal diffusivity, and

the density calculated from the thermal expansion results and the thermogravimetric analysis, the specific

heat of the material was calculated. Figure 1-15 (b) shows preliminary results for specific heat as a

fiinction of temperature. It is seen that the materials had similar increasing trends with temperature, but

the actual values differed.

1-26
Interim Report on Assessment of Sprayed Fireproofing in the WTC Towers—Methodology

1.4.3 Density Measurements

Densities of the samples were not measured directly (except at room temperature) but were calculated

from TGA (thermal gravimetric analysis) and thermal expansion measurements. The TGA tests were

performed according to ASTM Test Method El 13 1 using an Orton Model ST-736 TGA instrument. The

thermal expansion tests were performed according to ASTM Test Method E228 using a Unitherm Model

1161 instrument. Since the materials were not isotropic, separate tests were performed for the X and Z

orientations. It was assumed that the X and Y directions had the same thermal expansion. The

Z direction was defined as the direction perpendicular to the fibrous strands in the specimens. The

specimens were tested from room temperature to 1,200 °C at a heating rate of 2 °C/min. All of the

specimens shrank during the tests and, in all cases, lost contact with the pushrod before reaching the maximum test temperature.

From the thermal expansion test results, the change in volume for each material was calculated at each

temperature of interest. The density values were calculated from the results of the TGA and thermal

expansion.

1.5 RESPONSE TO IMPACT

In order to estimate the extent of damage or loss of SFRM due to aircraft impact, the detailed finite element analysis of aircraft impact into the WTC towers, conducted within the framework of Project 2 of

the investigation, will provide the following information:

Debris Field—A database and graphics of the major fragments of the aircraft and destroyed structural components of the towers, including their mass, approximate size, speed, and trajectory will be developed

in the global analysis of aircraft impact into WTC 1 and WTC 2. The trajectory of each fragment will consist of the initial point of entry, point of exit or resting place. This debris field database will be used to estimate which areas within the impacted floors would likely have lost their fireproofing due to direct impact by debris.

Deformations and Accelerations—Estimates of accelerations and deformations, including localized

effects, as a function of time on steel members in each of the two towers will be developed in the global

analysis of the aircraft impact. Accelerations will be determined at representative locations on the floor

truss systems and columns in the impact-affected zones of both towers (floors 93 to 98 of WTC I and

floors 78 to 83 of WTC 2). These accelerations will be compared with the threshold values estimated

from the adhesion and cohesion properties of SFRM developed in the experimental and analytical study

presented below to estimate the likely extent of damage to the fireproofing on the columns and floor systems.

Preliminary results from the subassembly impact analysis of an aircraft engine into a strip of the towers with a width and height of single exterior panel (three exterior columns width and three floor height)

extending all the way through the core indicate that the accelerations on the lower chords of floor trusses

will need further analysis to account for high frequency vibrations and the short-duration sharp peaks in the computed acceleration time-histories and their effects on damage to SFRM. One possible approach is to low-pass filter the acceleration records to remove these high-frequency vibrations. Another approach

is to develop "shock spectra" for a number of steel members with fireproofing configurations using finite

1-27
Appendix I

element analysis to determine, for a given frequency, the acceleration amplitude that is needed to dislodge

the fireproofmg based on its adhesive and cohesive strength. The shock spectra will then be compared

with spectra of the calculated acceleration time-histories to estimate the extent of damage to the

fireproofmg.

1.5.1 Mechanical Properties of SFRM

The purpose of these tests is to develop a rational basis for estimating the extent of loss of SFRM as a

result of impact loads on protected members. Tests will (1) determine the mechanical properties of

CAFCO BLAZE-SHIELD Type DC/F, and (2) verify models for estimating loss of fireproofmg when a protected member is subjected to impact-induced vibration. The mechanical properties to be measured

are: " ^

• SFRM cohesive strength, and

• SFRM adhesive strength to steel substrates with and without primer.

The adhesive and cohesive strengths will be measured for static loads, as described below for Phase I

tests. The tests will be done on 1/4 in. thick steel plate specimens, with and without primer (Tnemec

Series 10 red primer), and for nominal SFRM thickness of 3/4 in. and 1 1/2 in. Specimens are fabricated

and testing will be done during June and July, 2004.

From the measured strength properties, estimates will be made of the local accelerations required to damage or dislodge the SFRM, as described below. These estimates will be verified by impact tests of

plates and bars covered with SFRM and instrumented with accelerometers, as described in the Phase II

tests.

Phase I —Tensile Pull-off Test to Measure Adhesive Bond Strength and Cohesive

Strength

Specimen—Steel plates (8 by 16 by 1/4 in.) with CAFCO BLAZE-SHIELD Type DC/F and nominal

thickness of3/4 in. and 1 1/2 in.

Pull-Off Test Procedure (see Fig. 1-16)

• Using a fine-tooth saw, cut into SFRM applied to plate to obtain 2 3/4 in. square test specimens to ensure that the area resisting the applied load is well defined.

• Affix aluminum plates with two-component adhesive.

• Allow adhesive to cure.

• Measure force required to pull off the plate.

• Record load and note failure mode (cohesive, adhesive, mixed).

1-28
Interim Report on Assessment of Sprayed Fireproofing in the WTC Towers—Methodology

Adhesive

Al Plate

Figure 1-16. Pull-off test of SFRM applied to steel plate.

If all failures are adhesive, the cohesive strength will be determined by bonding the SFRM block to a steel plate with adhesive and repeating the test.

Phase II —Verification of Models to Predict Dislodgement of SFRM

Impact tests of plate and bar specimens will be done to determine the impact loads needed to produce

different levels of accelerations. Plates and bars with SFRM will be subjected to different levels of

impact until the SFRM is dislodged. Two simplified models will be used to estimate the relationships

between material strengths and impact required to dislodge the SFRM. Model predictions will be

compared with test results.

CASE 1: Planar Element

The simplified model considers the substrate and SFRM as rigid bodies. The SFRM would dislodge

when the inertial force exceeds the smaller of the adhesive bond strength or cohesive strength.

Figure 1-17, shows the free body of the fireproofing being acted upon by its inertial force and the adhesive force. The acceleration to dislodge the SFRM is:

pt

(1.1)

Inertial Force Equilibrium

;:SFRM

t

A = area of SFRM

/ = thickness of SFRM

p = density of SFRM

fb = bond or adhesive strength

F = m a fbA = p A t a

a

fb

P t

Figure 1-17. Derivation of acceleration to dislodge SFRM from planar substrate.

1-29
Appendix I

where:

fb = bond or adhesive strength

t = thickness of SFRM

p = density of SFRM

For example, for an SFRM with cohesive and adhesive strength of 150 psf, a density of 15 pcf, and an

applied thickness t = 1 in., we would find that a = \ 19g, where g is the gravitational acceleration. This

shows that acceleration on the order of lOOg would be required to dislodge this SFRM from a planar

surface.

CASE 2: Encased Round Element

Again, a rigid body model is used. In this case, the SFRM would mobilize its cohesive tensile strength,/,

and adhesive bond strength, yj,. Figure 1-18 shows the derivation for the relationship between material

strengths and acceleration to dislodge the SFRM from a round bar. The required acceleration is as follows:

^ 2. 2,

where:

/ = cohesive tensile strength of SFRM

do = outside diameter of SFRM

Inertial Force Equilibrium

do

^^ 4ft{do^{a-\)di)

{dl-df)pn:

Figure 1-18. Derivation of acceleration to dislodge SFRM surrounding a round bar.

1-30
Interim Report on Assessment of Sprayed Fireproofing in the WTC Towers—Methodology

di = steel bar diameter

a = Rrtio of bond strength to cohesive strength of SFRM

p-Ddnsity of SFRM

For example, if the steel bar has a diameter of d, = 1 in., the SFRM has an outside diameter of do = 2 in., a density p = 15 pcf, a cohesive tensile strength of/ = 300 psf, and a bond strength to cohesive strength

ratio of a = 0.5, we would find that an acceleration of a = 152g is required to dislodge the SFRM from the

bar.

1.6 SUMMARY

This appendix has focused on conditions of the fireproofing (or SFRM) in the WTC towers before and

after aircraft impact. Results of simplified finite-element simulations of heat transfer under fire conditions have shown that variability in thickness of fireproofing reduces the effectiveness of the fireproofing so that protection is less than implied by the average thickness of the fireproofing. As a

result, the NIST-led investigation sought available information on the in-place condition of the SFRM

used in the WTC towers. Limited information was provided by the Port Authority in the form of

thickness measurements taken at various times during the 1990s. Additional informadon was obtained

from photographs of floor trusses provided to NIST. Analysis of the data indicated that fireproofing

thickness was variable, as would be expected for application to floor truss members with small cross

sections. Based on analyses of the available data, the following values were taken to be representative of

the SFRM thickness on the floor trusses:

• Original SFRM: Average thickness of 0.75 in. with a standard deviation of 0.3 in. (coefficient

of variation = 0.40)

• Upgraded SFRM: Average thickness of 2.5 in. with a standard deviation of 0.6 in. (coefficient of variation = 0.24)

Based on finite-element simulations of a 1 in. round bar covered with SFRM having lognormal

distributions for thickness that are consistent with the above values, it is concluded that the original

fireproofing on the floor trusses is equivalent to a uniform thickness of 0.6 in. and the upgraded

fireproofing is equivalent to a uniform thickness of 2.2 in.

No information is available on in-place conditions of the fireproofing on the exterior columns and

spandrel beams, and little information is available on the conditions of fireproofing on core beams and

columns. In subsequent thermal analyses, the fireproofing on these elements will be taken to have

uniform thicknesses equal to the specified values. This assumpfion is believed to be jusdfied by the

offsetting factors of measured average thicknesses tending to be greater than specified thicknesses and the reduced effectiveness of a given average thickness of fireproofing due to thickness variability.

Another objective of this appendix is to review the methodology that will be used to estimate how much

of the SFRM may have dislodged as result of aircraft impact. Simple stafic models have been developed

for an order of magnitude estimate of the acceleration that would be required to dislodge the SFRM.

Based on these models and assumed, but representative, values of density and strength (adhesive and

1-31
Appendix I

cohesive), it is estimated that acceleration on the order of lOOg to 150g (where g is the acceleration due to gravity) would be needed dislodge the fireproofing. Additional analytical studies will be conducted to account for dynamic effects, and tests will be performed to verify these predictions.

1-32