[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 22-13172

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

AKRUM ALRAHIB, 

Defendant,

LEXINGTON NATIONAL INSURANCE CORPORATION, 

GEORGE ANTAR,

MARTIN KERRINS, 

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Interested Parties-Appellants.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 1:19-cr-20165-RS-1

____________________

Before NEWSOM, ABUDU, and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

This appeal was taken from the district court’s denial of 

bond remission to three appellants, Lexington National Insurance 

Corp., George Antar, and Martin Kerrins (the “Sureties”). On appeal, the Sureties claim that the district court abused its discretion 

when it improperly denied them remission of their bonds because 

its decision did not serve the interests of justice. After careful review, we affirm.

I.

The relevant background is this. Starting around April 2013, 

Akrum Alrahib imported and sold various tobacco products and 

marijuana paraphernalia to U.S. customers. Federal law required 

Alrahib to pay federal tobacco excise taxes on imported large cigars. But he developed a scheme through which he avoided paying 

the true amount of the mandatory excise taxes he owed. In the 

scheme, Alrahib concealed the price he actually paid for each cigar

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by creating false invoices, which showed a lower price per cigar, 

and in turn triggered lower excise taxes. In early 2019, a federal 

grand jury sitting in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida indicted Alrahib on thirty counts, including 

charges of conspiracy to commit an offense against the United 

States by fraudulently refusing to pay or evading federal tobacco 

excise tax (18 U.S.C. § 371 and 26 U.S.C. § 5762(a)(3)) (Count 1); 

conspiracy to commit wire fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1349) (Count 2); wire 

fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1343) (Counts 3–4); and fraudulent refusal to pay 

or evasion of federal tobacco excise tax (26 U.S.C. § 5762(a)(3)) 

(Counts 5–30). The indictment also sought over $9.9 million in 

forfeiture. 

At Alrahib’s initial appearance, the Government claimed Alrahib was a flight risk and sought pretrial detention. The magistrate judge disagreed, and, ultimately, the district court adopted the 

magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) and 

granted pretrial release to Alrahib. In so doing, the court entered a 

$1 million corporate surety bond, secured by Lexington National 

Insurance Corporation (“Lexington”), George Antar, and Martin 

Kerrins, and a $1.5 million personal surety bond, secured by the

latter two co-signatories. The appearance bond provisions also (1) 

established the conditions of Alrahib’s home confinement, (2) proscribed Alrahib from “work[ing] in any business involving the sale 

or importation of tobacco products,” and (3) observed that Alrahib, 

as a condition of his release, “[s]hall not commit any act in violation 

of state or federal laws.” Upon the Sureties’ agreement, Alrahib 

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was released and placed on house arrest at a friend’s home in Coral 

Gables, Florida. 

Once out on house arrest, however, Alrahib violated key 

conditions of his pretrial release. For one thing, he attempted to 

bribe a key witness with the payment of $200,000 per year to leave 

the country and hide in Mexico so that the witness -- who was listed 

as the sole officer and registered agent of Alrahib’s tobacco business 

-- would avoid his scheduled grand jury testimony. Alrahib also 

attempted to continue his tobacco business by instructing this employee on its day-to-day management, in violation of the condition 

forbidding Alrahib from working in the tobacco industry. In addition, Alrahib failed to comply with certain provisions of his house 

arrest, including failing to satisfy permitted reasons for leaving the 

residence. 

Upon learning that the bond conditions had been violated, 

the Government moved to revoke and estreat Alrahib’s bonds and 

obtained a second, 12-count indictment against Alrahib, alleging 

witness tampering and obstruction of justice. The second indictment also charged ten new counts of refusal to pay federal tobacco 

excise taxes, along with seeking an additional $1.95 million in forfeiture. Alrahib’s release was revoked, and the district court ordered forfeiture of the $2.5 million in bonds. 

Thereafter, Alrahib entered into a plea agreement in the 

original criminal case. He agreed to plead guilty to Count 1 of the 

first indictment, which charged him with conspiracy to defraud the 

United States by fraudulently refusing to pay or evading federal 

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tobacco excise tax, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 and 26 U.S.C. § 

5762(a)(3), and he acknowledged that the Government would seek 

over $7.2 million in restitution. In exchange, the Government dismissed Counts 2–30 of the initial indictment and the second indictment in full. 

Alrahib subsequently was sentenced to 60 months in prison, 

to be followed by 3 years of supervised release, and ordered to pay 

about $7.2 million in restitution. Separately, in yet another criminal action brought against Alrahib for tax evasion -- this time in the 

United States District Court for the Eastern District of California --

the Government also charged Alrahib with conspiracy to commit 

mail fraud. Alrahib pleaded guilty in that case too and was sentenced to 60 months’ imprisonment to run concurrently with his 

sentence in the Southern District of Florida, and was ordered to 

pay over $10 million in restitution. See United States v. Alrahib, Case 

No. 21-cr-185 (E.D. Cal.).

Lexington then sought remission from the district court in 

the instant case, under Fed. R. Crim. P. 46(f)(2)(B), of its $1 million 

corporate surety bond, claiming that it was not responsible for Alrahib’s violations and, in any event, Alrahib had not “abscond[ed].” 

Kerrins sought the same relief as to his $1.5 million bond obligation 

(co-signed by Antar), arguing that, because he had no knowledge 

or involvement in Alrahib’s bond violations, the interests of justice 

required setting aside Kerrins’ bond forfeiture because Kerrins “has 

done nothing wrong here.” Antar, too, claimed that the interests 

of justice did not require bail forfeiture. He said that Alrahib’s 

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conduct was without Antar’s knowledge or participation, that Alrahib never missed any court appearances as a result of his violations, and that the Government had not lost money or suffered any 

inconvenience in taking custody of Alrahib because Alrahib was 

never a fugitive. In response, the Government claimed that it had

incurred significant expense investigating Alrahib’s conduct, which 

led to a second indictment; that the Sureties were well aware of the 

risks involved in signing the bonds; and that Antar and Kerrins profited from Alrahib’s fraudulent conduct. 

In support of its claim that the co-signatories profited from 

Alrahib’s conduct, the Government filed a notice and provided evidence of payments from Alrahib to Antar and Kerrins concerning

the corporate bond entered by the co-signatories. These payments 

reflected a series of wire transfers seemingly to the co-signatories, 

including a transfer of $180,000 to Kerrins in March 2019, and a 

transfer of $1.25 million to the “John Antar Trust,” among others. 

In response, the Sureties said that these payments reflected legitimate business transactions or were unrelated to their participation 

as a co-signatory to the bond for Alrahib.1

Following the resolution of Alrahib’s criminal cases, the 

magistrate judge conducted an evidentiary hearing to address the 

1 Antar claimed that the payments he had received from Alrahib were legitimate business transactions – thus, for example, that the $1.25 million wire 

transfer actually returned funds to a trust account following Antar’s investment into Alrahib’s company and a subsequent demand for a refund. Likewise, Kerrins claimed that the $180,000 payment he received was unrelated to 

his participation as a co-signatory to the bond for Alrahib.

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forfeiture action and whether any portion of the bond should be 

remitted or set aside. In an R&R, the magistrate judge recommended that no portion of the bond be remitted, and over the Sureties’ objections, the district court adopted the order. 

Lexington, Antar, and Kerrins timely appealed.

II.

An appearance bond is “a contract between the government 

on one hand and a principal and his surety on the other.” United 

States v. Miller, 539 F.2d 445, 447 (5th Cir. 1976).2 Federal Rule of 

Criminal Procedure 46 governs the setting and revocation of 

bonds. Under Rule 46, a court must declare a bond forfeited if any 

conditions are breached. Fed. R. Crim. P. 46(f)(1). Nevertheless, a 

court may set aside all or a portion of a bond forfeiture if: (A) the 

surety to the bond later surrenders the person released on the 

surety’s appearance bond; or (B) justice does not require forfeiture. 

Id. 46(f)(2). District courts have “virtually unbridled discretion” to 

remit bond forfeiture. United States v. Diaz, 811 F.2d 1412, 1415 

(11th Cir. 1987).

Thus, we review a district court’s decision to remit forfeiture of a bond for “arbitrary and capricious abuse of discretion.” Id.

We may not substitute our discretion for that of the district court. 

2 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), we 

adopted as binding precedent all Fifth Circuit decisions issued before October 

1, 1981.

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Id. “A district court . . . abuses its discretion when it makes an error 

of law.” United States v. B.G.G., 53 F.4th 1353, 1360 (11th Cir. 2022). 

In order to establish that “justice necessitates remission” of 

a bond under Rule 46(f)(2)(B), the party seeking remission generally must establish that the forfeiture “bears no reasonable relation” to: 

1) the cost and inconvenience to the government in 

regaining custody of the defendant, 

2) the amount of delay caused by the defendant’s default and the stage of the proceedings at the time of 

his disappearance, 

3) the willfulness of the defendant’s breach of conditions and the prejudice suffered by the government, 

and 

4) the public interest and necessity of effectuating the 

appearance of the defendant.

Diaz, 811 F.2d at 1415; see also United States v. Parr, 594 F.2d 440, 444 

(5th Cir. 1979). Although these four factors -- “the Diaz factors” --

are not the only factors that may be relevant, this Court has made 

it clear that the movant’s “financial plight” is not a valid consideration. Diaz, 811 F.2d at 1415 n.2, 1416. 

Here, the Sureties argue that the interests of justice require 

remission of the $2.5 million bond amount, and that the district 

court improperly denied remission of all or part of the two bonds. 

We are not convinced. 

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To begin with, the district court correctly considered the 

Diaz factors. Starting with the “willfulness” of Alrahib’s conduct, 

it is significant that Alrahib tried to bribe an employee to leave the 

country to frustrate his prosecution, violated his location monitoring condition, and continued to operate his tobacco business while 

on house arrest. As we’ve explained, the “degree of blatancy or 

extenuating circumstances in [a] defendant’s bond violation are 

necessary considerations” when assessing “discretionary remission.” Parr, 594 F.2d at 442. Alrahib’s violations were “blatant” and 

plainly designed to undermine the Government’s prosecution efforts, and, as the district court found, Alrahib’s “egregious federal 

criminal conduct [has] frustrate[d] the justice system.” 

The Sureties try to brush aside Alrahib’s “blatant” conduct 

by emphasizing that Alrahib himself never fled. It is true that Alrahib did not attempt to flee. But the Sureties were on notice that 

the bonds contained several important conditions beyond merely 

prohibiting Alrahib’s flight. Indeed, Antar and Kerrins were even 

present at the bond-setting hearing where the conditions were discussed. Moreover, as the district court suggested: “[T]his federal 

crime of witness tampering defeats the purpose of satisfying his 

mere appearance. . . . . A defendant should not be permitted to 

substantially violate the terms of his bond without penalties and 

sanctions.” 

As for Lexington’s claim that “willfulness” can only be considered under Diaz when a defendant fails to appear, this argument 

lacks support in the case law. As we’ve noted, a district court is 

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empowered with “virtually unbridled discretion” to determine 

whether a bond violation was inadvertent or willful, and there is 

nothing to suggest that the district court could not consider Alrahib’s willfulness in this instance.

Nor did the district court improperly weigh the cost and inconvenience to the Government caused by Alrahib’s violations. 

See Diaz, 811 F.2d at 1415. The district court docket sheet reflects 

that the court conducted no fewer than six court hearings about

Alrahib’s bond violations, and the Government was thereafter required to bring a second indictment following Alrahib’s witness 

tampering, which resulted in even more hearings and briefs. On 

this record, there is ample evidence to support the finding that Alrahib’s bond violations triggered additional time, inconvenience, 

and cost to the Government. And while the Sureties argue that the 

cost or inconvenience cannot be assessed because the Government 

did not submit precise monetary or temporal calculations, we’ve 

said that the district court need not find a precise cost. See, e.g.,

Parr, 594 F.2d at 442 (noting that “[w]e cannot fault the district 

court for not requiring a dollar mark” on the expense of apprehending a fugitive, even where “the exact dollar expense evidence was 

sparse,” because “we know that the search could not have been 

carried on without the use of government vehicles, long distance 

telephone communications and the like”); see also United States v. 

Cervantes, 672 F.2d 460, 463 (5th Cir. 1982) (observing that Parr’s 

rationale relied on United States v. Kirkman, 426 F.2d 747 (4th Cir. 

1970), and that, after Kirkman, the Fourth Circuit clarified “that the 

government has no burden to produce any evidence of its expense 

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unless and until the district court, in its discretion, requires it to do 

so” (emphasis added)).

As for the fourth Diaz factor, the court did not improperly 

conclude that the public interest cut against remission. See Diaz, 

811 F.2d at 1415. We recognize that, on one hand, “[t]he purpose 

of a bail bond is not punitive. Its object is not to enrich the government or punish the defendant.” Parr, 594 F.2d at 444; see also United 

States v. Bass, 573 F.2d 258, 260 (5th Cir. 1978) (“The purpose of a 

bail bond is not punitive; it is to secure the presence of the defendant.”). But on the other hand, as the magistrate judge observed in 

the R&R, “setting aside the sureties’ obligations on this bond 

would have future effects on bond commitments in this district because future sureties would not take their obligations seriously.” 

Moreover, the bond conditions unequivocally provided that 

the signatory was responsible for payment in full should Alrahib 

violate “any” condition. The bond itself also expressly noted that 

Alrahib “[s]hall not commit any act in violation of state or federal 

laws.” Further, each signatory signed under language admitting 

that “I have carefully read and I understand this entire appearance 

bond consisting of four pages, . . . and I know that I am obligated 

by law to comply with all of the terms of the bond.” As a result, 

we have little doubt that the Sureties understood their potential 

exposure at the time of signing should Alrahib commit further illegal acts or violate the conditions of his bond.

Finally, we are unconvinced by the Sureties’ remaining arguments in support of their claim that the district court abused its

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broad discretion by failing to grant full or partial remission. Lexington, for its part, asks us to reject the district court’s reliance on

the contract principle of “liquidated damages” as supporting bond 

forfeitures. But other courts consistently characterize surety bonds 

as contracts, see Diaz, 811 F.3d at 141, and when interpreting contracts, we must “give effect to the reasonable intentions of the parties,” Parr, 594 F.2d at 442 -- which includes any liquidated damages 

provisions. Lexington has not persuaded us that we should do otherwise. As the R&R observed, an appearance bond “is a form of 

liquidated damages in the event of a breach” because “[t]he government is not required to prove the actual cost of [a] defendant’s 

breach.” United States v. Sar-Avi, 255 F.3d 1163, 1168 (9th Cir. 2001). 

“The hallmark of a liquidated damages provision is reasonableness 

at the time the agreement is made rather than a calculation of actual provable losses when the breach occurs.” United States v. Amwest Sur. Ins. Co., 54 F.3d 601, 604 (9th Cir. 1995). 

In this case, under any theory, the bond amount was reasonable -- Alrahib himself proposed a comparable bond portfolio totaling $2 million, and the district court raised the total package only 

slightly, to a total $2.5 million. Furthermore, the $2.5 million bond 

forfeiture amountreflected less than 15% of the total $17.25 million 

that had been ordered in restitution by that time. 

As for the Sureties’ claim that the district court improperly 

refused to consider them individually, the magistrate judge’s R&R 

clearly considered each Sureties’ relationship with the defendant 

and their awareness of bond conditions separately. Further, to the 

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extent Kerrins relies on United States v. Steinger, 2012 WL 4978843 

(S.D. Fla. Oct. 17, 2012), it is neither binding on this Court nor apposite. The court in Steinger merely held that a non-surety who 

had not “sign[ed] onto, and agree[d] to be bound by, all the conditions of Defendant’s bond” should be remitted the bond. Id. at *1. 

But here, Kerrins was a signatory,so Steinger would not apply. Similarly, we find no basis for Kerrins’ argument that the district court 

erroneously “treated the bond violation as a purely contractual 

matter rather than considering all relevant factors” under Fed. R. 

Crim. P. 46(f)(4) (permitting courts to set aside in part or whole the 

forfeiture amount if “it appears that justice does not require bail 

forfeiture”). As the record amply reveals, the district court considered the nonexclusive Diaz factors, as well as several additional factors. 

Lastly, Kerrins’ claim that his health and financial hardship 

required remission is unconvincing. The district court considered 

Kerrins’ poor health and finances among a panoply of other factors 

before concluding that the Rule 46(f) standard “does not depend on 

the nature and relative severity of the harm that would be visited 

upon the surety.” 

Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its broad discretion in denying the Sureties remission of their bonds, and we affirm. 

AFFIRMED.

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