i i i i i i



### OPIN ION No
. 04 -0 9- 00 27 0- CR J ames R. HIA TT , Appellant
v . T h e STA TE of

Te xas, Appellee Fr om the 144th J udicial District Court, Be x ar County , Texas

Trial Court No. 06-CR-2741 Honora ble Catherine T orre s-Stahl, J udg e Presiding Opinion by : Catherine Stone, Chief Justice Sitt ing: Catherine Stone, Chief Justice

Sandee B ry an Mar ion, J ustice Rebec ca Simmons, J ustice Deliver ed and F iled: April 28, 2010 AFF I RMED J ames Hiatt was cha

rg ed with committing the of fense s o f i n d ec ency

with a child and ag g ravated sexual assault of a c hild. A jury found Hiatt g uilty

of five c ounts of indece ncy with a child and four

counts of ag g ravated sexual assault of a child. The jury assessed H iatt’s punishment at 20 y ear s confineme nt for ea ch count of indece ncy with a child and 60 y ear s confine ment for e ach count of a g g ravated sexual assault of a c hild. Hiatt appeals his convi ct i o n s , ra i sing twe nty -nine iss ue s o n a

pp e a l. We a ff

ir m th e tr ia l c ourt ’s jud g me nt.04
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- 2- B ACKG ROUND Th e c omp la ina

nt, D. H. , jo ine d th e B oy

Sc ou ts w he n h e wa s a

ro un d 1 2 o r 1 3 y e ars old
. Hi a tt was D.H .’s assistant S co u t M as t er. D .H.’s mother pe rmitted D.H. to spend about e very other
wee kend at Hiatt’s home from 2004 until November 2005. D.H. would g o to Hiatt’s house on F riday
and re tur n h ome on

Sun da y . O ver the c ours e of

D. H. ’s vis its , H iatt a lle g e dly be g an e ng a g ingin sexual acts with D.H. These acts include d masturbation and a nal interc ourse. A n e ig hb or

re po rt e d H iatt t o th e a

uth or iti e s in

No ve mbe r 2 00 5, a ft e r s he o bs erve d him eng ag e in an i n ap p ro priate a ct with D.H. Hiatt wa s subsequently arr ested a

nd indicted for the of fe ns e s o f i nd e c e nc y

wi th a c hil d an d ag g ra

vate d sexua l ass a

ult of a c hil d. He ple a de d not guil ty and proc eede d to a jury trial. The jury found Hiatt g uilty

of five c ounts of indece ncy with a child and four c ounts of ag g ravated sexual assault of a c hild, but acquitted Hiatt of one c ount of indece ncy wi th a c hil d. Hi a tt w a s se nte nc e d to 2 0 y e ars c on fi ne me nt f or e a c h c ount o f i nd e c e nc y

wi th a c hil d by contac t and 60 y ear s confine ment for each count of ag g ravated sexual assault of a c hild, with the
s e n t e n c e s t o r

u nc o n c u r r e n t l y. Hiatt filed a motion for ne w trial following his convictions, whic h w a s o v e r ruled by operation of law. Hiatt’s counsel fa iled to timely pursue his appe al, and the Court of Criminal Appeals g rante d him habeas c orpus re lief in the for m of an out-of

-time appe al. Hiatt filed a second moti on for ne w trial and pe rfe cted a

n appea l following th e C o u rt of Criminal Appea ls’s decision. Hiatt’s sec ond motion for new tria l was subseque ntly overr uled by operation of law. S U FF I C I ENC Y OF THE E VI DE NCE I n tw o iss ue s, Hi a tt c ha lle ng e s the le g a l and fa c tua l su ff ic ie nc y of the e vid e nc e to s up po rt

his convictions. Hiatt claims the evide nce is leg ally and fa ctually

insufficient to support his conviction04
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- 3- for a ggravated sexual assault of a c hild based on ac ts alleg edly occur ring on or about August 20, 2005. He a lso challenges t h e fa ctual suff iciency of the e vidence to support any of his other convictions. When review ing the leg al suffic iency of the e vidence , we c o n s i d er whether , afte r viewing the evidenc e in the lig ht most favor able to the prosecution, any rational trier

of fa ct could have found the essential elements of the offe nse beyond a re asonable doubt. J ac k so n v . V irg ini a , 443 U.S. 307, 31 9 ( 19 79 ); Cla

y ton v . S tate , 2 35 S.W. 3d

77 2, 77 8 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 07 ). “ Th is s tand ard a c c ounts for the f actfi n d er ’s duty

‘to resolve conflicts in the testimony , to weig h the evidenc e, and to dr aw
rea sonable infe renc es fr om basic fa cts to ultim ate f acts.’” Clayton , 235 S.W .3d at 7 7 8 (q u o t ing Ja ckson , 4 4 3 U
. S. a t 3 1 9 )
. T h u s , “ in an a ly zi n g le g a l s u f

f ic ie n c y , w e ‘ d e te r

mi n e w h e th e r

the
nece ssary infere nces a

re r easona

ble base d upon the combined a nd cumulative for ce of

all the evidenc e whe n viewed in the lig ht most favorable to the verdic t.’” Id. I n r e vie wi ngthe fa c tua l su ff ic ie nc y of the e vid e nc e , w e loo k at th e e vid e nc e in a ne utr a l li g ht, g iving almost complete defer ence to the j ury ’s deter minations of cre dibilit y . Lan c on v . S tate , 253 S.W .3d 699, 705 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). We r ever se only if the evidenc e supporting the ver dict is so weak that the ve rdict see ms clear ly wrong and manifestly unjust or if the evidenc e supporting the ver dict is outwe ighe d by the g reat w eig ht and pre pondera nce of the ava ilable evidenc e. W atson
v . S tat e , 204 S.W .3d 404, 414-15 (Te x . Crim. Ap p . 2006). We may not rewe igh the evidenc e or substitut e our judg ment for that of the jury under a fa ct u al sufficie ncy revie w. Id. a t 41 7; King v. Sta te , 29 S.W .3d 556, 563 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). Counts one through four of t he indictment alleg e Hiatt committed the off ense of ag g ravated sexual assault of a child. A person commits the offense of ag g ravated sexual assault of a c hild if,04
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1 ... T e x a s P e n a l C o d e se c tio n 2 1 .1 1 w a s a m e n d e d a fter H ia tt’ s tria l. See A c t o f M a y 3 0 , 2 0 0 9 , 8 1 st L e g ., R .S ., c h . 2 6 0 , § 1 , 2 0 0 9 T e x . S e ss. L a w S e rv . 7 0 9 , 7 0 9 ( a m e n d e d 2 0 0 9 ) (c u rr e n t v e rs io n a t T EX . P E N A L C O D E A NN . § 21. 11 (V ernon S up p . 20 0 9 ).

- 4- with a child y oung er tha n fourtee n y ea rs , the per son intentionally or knowing ly : (1) ca

uses the penetr ation of the a

nus or sexual or g an of the child by any means; or (2) cause s the sexual org an of the child to contac t or pene trate the mouth, anus, or sexual org an of a nother pe rson, including the actor
. T EX . P EN A L C ODE ANN . § 22
. 0 2 1 (a)(1)( B) , (2)( B) (Ve rnon Supp. 2009). Counts seven throug h ten of the indictment alleg e Hiatt committed indece ncy with a child by

contac t. A person commits the offense of indec ency with a child by co n t act if, w ith a child y oung er tha n sevente en y ear s and not the person’ s spouse, the person e ng ag es in sexual contact with the child or c auses the
c hil d to e ng a g e in s e xua l c on ta c t. Id. § 21.11(a) (1) ( Ver non 2003). 1 “Sexual c ontact” inc ludes the following acts, if c ommitt ed with the intent to arouse or gratify the s exual desire of any person: (1) any touching by

a per son, including touc hing thr oug h clothing, of the anus, brea st, or any part of the gen i t al s o f a ch i l d ; o r ( 2 ) a n y t o u ch i n g o f a n y

p ar to f t h e b o dy

o f a ch i l d , i n cl u d i n g t o u ch i n g t h ro u gh clothing, w ith the anus, brea st, or any part of the g enitals of a pe rson. Id. § 21.11(c)
. Counts thr e e and fo ur of the ind ic tme nt a c c us e Hi a tt o f c omm itt inga g g ra vate d s e xua l a ssa

ult of a c hil d b y int e nti on a lly

and kn ow ing ly

c a us ingD. H. ’s se xua l or g an to c on ta c t and pe ne tr a te his anus and by

penetr ating D.H.’s a

nus with his fing er on or about Aug ust 20, 2005. Hiatt claims the evidenc e is insufficient to support his convictions for the se off enses be cause D.H. fa iled to provide prec ise details about the alleg ed abuse that occur red around Aug ust 2005. We disag ree with Hiatt’s contention.04
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- 5- Th e re c or d s ho ws D. H. te sti fi e d he wa s y oung e r tha n f ourt e e n y e ars of

a g e wh e n h e and

Hi a tt eng ag ed in various sexual a cts toge ther. D.H. stated he and Hiatt re g ularly masturbated e ach othe r to t he po int of e ja c ulatio n f

ro m 20 04 un til No ve mbe r 2 00 5. D. H. te sti fi e d he vis ite d H iatt “ pr e tty
muc h e ve ry

oth e r w e e ke nd ” and that he an d Hiatt w ou ld t a ke tur ns ma sturb a tin g e a c h o the r a lmo st
ever y time he visited Hiatt. D.H. expressly stated these pa rticular se x ual ac ts occurr ed duringJ une 2005, Aug ust 2005, and Novembe r 2005. Be sides eng ag ing in a cts of masturbation togethe r, D.H. stated Hiatt “put his f inge r up . . . my anu s” and

“ ha d me sti c k my

. . . p ri vate are a

up his anu s. ” D. H. e xplain e d th e se a c ts w ou ld g ener ally occur afte r the a cts of masturbation had occur red, but that H iatt ha d also inserted his fing er into D.H .’s anus while Hiatt was masturbating him. Acc ording to D .H., the ac t s o f di g ital pe ne tr a tio n a

nd ana l in te rc ours e oc c ur

re d s ome tim e duri ngJune 20 05
. Whe n ask e d whe the r t he a c ts also occ urre d during Aug ust 2005, D.H. indi cate d “those thi ng s happene d in Aug ust [ 2005] as well.” D.H. fur ther testified Hiatt touched him inappr opriately up until his last visit t o Hiatt’s home, whe n Hiatt rubbed D .H.’s “pa

nts near the crotc h are a.” Child vi ctims of sexual crimes are af forde d g reat latitude when testifying a nd they are not
e xpe c te d to te sti fy

wi th t he same c lari ty

and a bil it y as is expe c te d o f a

matur e and

c a pa ble a du lt. Vi lla lon v . S

tate , 791 S.W .2d 130, 134 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). The jury hear d D.H. testify about having to put his private part into Hiatt’s anus a nd having Hiatt’s finger penetr ate his anus in J une 2 0 0 5
. It f u rt h e r h e ar d D
. H
. c o n f

i r m “ t h o s e t h i n g s h a

p p e n e d i n A u g u s t [ 2 0 0 5 ] a s w e l l
. ” T h e j u r y, as the trier

of fa ct, was f

ree to draw r easona

ble infer ence s from D. H. ’s t es timony , including that “those thing s” re ferre d t o t h e acts of dig ital penetration and anal inter course involving Hiatt. See Ho op e r v . S

tate , 2 14 S.W. 3d

9, 15 -1 6 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 07 ) ( statin g the jur y , a s th e tr ie r o f f

a c t,04
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- 6- may dr aw r e a so na

ble inf e re nc e s f ro m the fa c ts)
. I n lig ht o f D .H .’ s te sti mony , w e c on c lud e the re is le g a lly and fa c tua lly su ff

ic ie nt ev ide nc e to s us ta in H iatt’ s c on vic tio ns fo r a g g ra vate d s e xua l a ssa

ult
a s se t f or th i n c ounts thr e e and

fo ur of the ind ic tme nt. Turn ingto H iatt’ s r e ma ini ngsu ff ic ie nc y c halle ng e s, Hi a tt a lle g e s th e re is f a c tua lly insuf fi ci en t evidenc e to support the following finding s by the jury : (1) he c ommitt ed ag g ravated sexual assault of a child by intentionally

and knowing ly

causingD.H.’s se x ual org an to contac t and penetr ate his anus a

nd by penetr ating D.H.’s a

nus with his finge r on or about J une 18, 2005; and ( 2) he c omm itt e d in de c e nc y

wi th a c hil d b y int e nti on a lly

and kn ow ing ly

tou c hin g pa

rt of D. H. ’s g e nit a ls and by causingD.H. to touch par t of his ge nitals on or about J une 18, 2005, August 20, 2005, and November

13, 2005. As previously

discussed, the jury

hear d ample testimony

from D.H. c oncer

ning multipl e instance s of sexual misconduct by Hiatt on or about the dates alleg ed. This testimony , by itself, is sufficient to sustain Hiatt’s convictions for ag g ravated sexual assaul t of a c hild and indece ncy with a child by

contac t. See T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . A NN . ar t
. 38.07 (Ve rnon 2005); Gloc k zin v . S tate , 220 S.W .3d 140, 147 (Tex. A pp.—Waco 2007, pet. ref ’d) (“The testimony

of a child victim al o n e i s s u fficient to support a conviction for a g g ravated sexual assault or indece ncy with a child.”) . M o re o ver, the jury hear d testimony

from Dr . Nanc y

Kellog g , the phy sician who examined D .H. following the acc usations a g ainst Hiatt. Dr. Ke lloggtestified that D.H. infor med her about multiple inst ance s of abuse by Hiatt, which invol ved both touching and penetration, and that D.H. did not repor

t the abuse beca

use he was a fra id of Hiatt. Dr. Ke lloggfurther testified that D.H.’ s
manner isms and history

wer e consistent with sexual abuse. To support his claim of fa ctual insuffic iency , Hiatt points to t he following : (1) the lac k of medical or other evidence to corr oborate D.H.’s alleg ations; (2) the unre liability of D.H.’ s testimony04
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- 7- du e to h is u se of

a medi c a tio n th a t a lte rs its us e rs ’ p e rc e pti on of the tr uth ; ( 3) the a lle g e dly contra dictory

/false state ments made by D.H. duringhis testimony ; and (4) the moti v e of va rious witnesses to f

abric ate acc usations ag ainst him. None of these issues, howeve r, re nders the e vidence fa c tua lly ins uf fi c ie nt t o s up po rt

Hi att’ s c on vic tio ns . F ir st, the pr os e c uti on is n ot r e qu ir e d to introduce a

ny medical r eports or othe r phy sical evide nce to corrobor ate a child victim’s testimony during trial. Se e Gloc k

zin , 220 S.W .3d at 147. Second, Hiatt’s rema ining contentions all g o to the
cre dibilit y

of the witnesse s. “The jury is the exclusive judge of

the cr edibility

of witnesses a

nd of the weig ht t o b e gi v en their testimony ,” Ba rn es v . S tate , 876 S.W .2d 316, 321 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994), and “ rec onciliation of conflicts in the evidenc e is w ithin the exclusive pr ovince of the jury .” Los ad a v . S tate , 7 21 S.W. 2d 30 5, 30 9 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 86 ). Th e jur y , as f a c t f ind e r, a pp are ntl y be lie ve d th e te sti mony

of D. H. and the ot her pro secut or ia l w itn e sse s; the re fo re , w e mus t de fe r t o
su c h c re dib ili ty

de te rm inatio ns on

a pp e a l. Acc ording ly , we hold the evidenc e is fac tually sufficie nt to support Hiatt’s convictions. Hiatt’s eig hteenth and nine teenth issues ar e over ruled. N E W T R I A L H E ARI NG I n his first issue, Hiatt contends the trial court abused i ts discretion when it failed to conduc t a hea ring on his moti ons for ne w trial. “When a n acc u s ed presents a motion for ne w trial ra ising
ma tte rs no t de te rm ina

ble fr om the re c or d, wh ic h c ou ld e nti tle him to r e lie f, the tr ia l ju dg e a

bu se s h is discretion in f

ailing to hold a

hear ing.” King , 29 S.W .3d at 569. A def endant must prese nt a motion for new t rial to the trial cour t within ten day s of beingfiled. Ga rd ne r v . S tate , A P- 7 5 , 5 8 2 , 2 0 0 9 WL 3365652, *17 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009)
. “The purpose of the pre sentment rule is ‘to put the trial c ourt on actua l notice that a de fenda nt desires th e t ri al court to t ake some action on the motion for ne w trial such as a r

uling or a hea ring on it.’” Sto k

es v . S tate , 277 S.W .3d 20, 21 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009)04
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2 ... S t ars, und erli ning, an d seve ral o t he r ha nd w rit t en no t ati o ns ap p ea r o n sev era l p ag es o f t he d o cu m en t s.

- 8- (c i t i n g Car

ra nz a v . S

tate , 960 S.W .2d 76, 78 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998)). The Court o f C riminal Ap pe a ls ha s a c kn ow le dg e d “ the re are many wa y s to sh ow pr e se ntm e nt of a mot ion fo r n e w tri a l to the trial court,” but “ mere ly filing a motion is insufficient.” Id. a t 24 . N on e the le ss, “ ‘[p ]re se ntm e nt’ must be appar ent from the r ecor d, and it may be shown by

such proof

as the judge’ s signature or notation on the motion or proposed or der, or an entr y on the docke t sheet showing prese ntment or setting a hear ing date.” Gardner , 2009 WL 3365652, at *17. I t is undisput ed that there was no ruling on Hiatt’s motions for new tria l. The trial judg e’s signature doe s not appea r on eithe r Hiatt’s motions for new tria l or the propose d order s
acc ompanying the m. Addi tionally , there are no entries on the c ourt’s docke t sheet showing prese ntment or

the setting of a he aringdate. The only sug g estions of prese ntment appea ring in the
recor d inc lud e : (1 ) a state me nt in the mot ion s fo r ne w tr ia l that “ TH E DE F EN DA NT HER EBY PRES ENTS THI S MOTI ON TO TH I S HONORABL E COURT”; and ( 2) seve ral a nony mous
no ta tio ns and

mark ing s a

pp e ari ngon

the c op ie s of the mot ion s f or ne w tri a l f

ile d w iththe tr ia l c ourt
. 2 This evidence is insufficient to establish prese ntment. Hiatt argues the inclusion of a st atement in a motion for new trial re flec ting “ THE DEF ENDAN T HEREB Y P RESENTS THI S MOTI ON TO THI S HONORAB L E COURT” is an a ct of pre sentment. Courts have c onsistently reje cted the notion that a statement, similar to the one at issue here , is sufficient to establish pre sentment. For example, in Bu rru s v . S

tate , 266 S.W .3d 107, 115-16 (Te x . App.—For

t Worth 2008, no pet.), the court a ddresse d whether prese ntment was
e sta bl ish e d b y

a state me nt i n a

mot ion fo r n e w t ri a l ti tle d “ Ce rt if

ic a te of Pr e se ntm e nt” a lon g wi th a notation in the docket sheet stating that the motion for new trial was f

iled. The c ourt deter

mined04
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- 9- the ce rtificate of pre sentment and the docket sheet notation w ere insufficient to establish that the trial court re ceive d actua l notice of the motion for new tria l and held the tria l court did not err by failing to hold a hear ing on appellant’s moti on for ne w trial. Id. ; se e als o Ka luz a v . S tate , No. 01-07-00737- CR, 2008 W L2465891, *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1s t Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (me m. op., not desig nated f

or publication) ( holding a “ce rtificate o f p re s en t ation” appe aringon the last pag e of
a pp e lla nt’ s motio n f

or ne w tri a l di d n ot e sta

bli shpr e se ntm e nt) ; Lar uev . S tate , N o. 09 -0 5- 14 5- CR, 2007 WL 1501646, *12 (Tex. App.—Be aumont 2007, pet. re f’d) (m em . o p . , not desig nated f or pu bli c a tio n) (h old ing

a state me nt i n the mot ion fo r ne w t ri a l e nti tle d “ c e rt if

ic a te of pr e se ntm e nt” in wh ic h a pp e llate c ouns e l s tat ed th e mot ion wa s h and -d e liv e re d to the tr ia l c ourt ins uf fi c ie nt t o
e sta bli shpr e se ntm e nt) ; Ow e ns v . S tate , 832 S.W .2d 109, 111-12 (Tex . App.—Dallas 1992, no pe t.), overruled on othe r grounds , Da v is v . S tate , 8 7 0 S
. W
. 2 d 4 3 , 4 6 (T ex . C ri m . Ap p . 1 9 9 4 ) ( h o l d i n g a

“ Ce r ti f ic ation of Service and Prese ntment” was insuff icient to establish the trial cour t rec eived a ctual
n o t i ce o f t h e d e fe n d an t ’s m o t i o nfo r n ew t ri al ). As fo r t h e a n o n y m o u s n o t at i o n s an d

m ark i n gs appea ring on the copies of the m otions for new t rial filed with the trial court, they too are insufficient to establish presentment. See Stokes , 277 S.W .3d at 25 (re cogn i zing that anony mous notations at the end of a propose d order

will not suffice to establish pre sentment). After the par ties filed t heir re spective br iefs, Hiatt’s a ppellate c ounsel submitted a “Motion t o Abate A

ppeal a nd Remand to the Tria l Court.” Hiatt’s unver ified motion discusses an off-therec ord conve rsation counse l held with the trial judge conce rning Hiatt’s m otions for new tria l, where the judg e “a cknowledg ed that she ha d persona lly seen and was a

war e of both motions for new trial.” Hi at t ’s m o t i o ns ee k s an ab at em en tt o p ro v i d e t h e t ri al co u rt wi t h an o p p o r t u n i t y t o m ak e f

i n d i n gs of fa ct conc erningthe judg e’s a ctual notice of the motions for new tria l.04
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- 10- The pa rticulars of

Hi at t’s counsel’s c onversation with the trial court ar e not par t of the officia l appellate r ecor d. The Court of Criminal Appea ls has stated that an “appe llate cour t may not consider f actua l assertions that ar e outside the re cord.” J ac k v . S tate , 1 4 9 S. W. 3 d 1 1 9 , 1 2 1 n . 1 ( T e x. Cr im
. A p p . 2 0 0 4 )
. A n a f f id a v it a tt a c h e d to a mo ti o n f il e d in an a

p p e ll a te c o u rt is n o t p art of the appellate rec ord re g ardingtrial court events, a nd thus cannot be c onsidered a s proof of the matters
rec ited in the aff

idavit. Id. We the re fo re c ann ot c on sid e r Hi a tt’ s c ouns e l’ s a sse rt ion s fo r t he tr uth of the matter asser

ted and must de ny Hiatt’s reque st to abate the appe al. Se e He rn an de z v . S tate , 84 S.W .3d 26, 32-33 (Tex. A pp.—Texarkana

2002, pet. re f’d) (re fusing to abate a ppeal to trial c ourt for f indings of f

act c oncer ning the prese ntment of the motion for new tr ial despite an a ffidavit fr om former prosec utor indicating the trial cour t had ac tual n o t i ce o f ap p ellant’s motion for new trial beca use the a ffidavit wa s outside the rec ord). Hiatt direc ts our attention to Bu tle r v . S tate , 6 S.W. 3d

63 6, 63 8 (T e x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [1s t Dist.] 1999, pet. ref

’d), in w hich the First Court of Appea ls a bated a case to t h e t ri al co u rt for finding s of fa ct on the issue of pr esentment. Butler is d ist inguis ha ble , h ow e ve r, be c a

us e in t hat c a se (1) the f iling of the motion for new tria l was noted with an e ntry in the court’s c omputer sy stem; and (2) a subsequent ag ree d setting form was ex ecute d. By contra st, there is no evide nce of prese ntment i n t h i s c a s e. At t ac h ed t o t h e mo t i o n s fo r ne w tri al i n t h i s ca s e we re a pr o p o s ed o rd er s et t i n g a hear ing date and a

proposed or der r

uling on th e m o t i o n . Both orde rs ar e blank a nd unsigne d. Acc ording ly , Butler

offe rs no support for a

batement in this case
. I n the abse nce of

a prope r showing that Hiatt’s motions for new trial wer e prese nted to the trial court, the tr ial court did not abuse its discre tion in failing to conduc t a h ea ri n g on Hiatt’s motions for new trial. Hiatt’s first issue is overruled.04
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- 11- M OT I ON F OR DNA T E S T I NG I n his se cond issue, Hiatt alleg es the trial c ourt err ed by denying his motion for DN A testing “of a Kleene x containing biologica l evidence that would prove [his] innocenc e.” A rticle 64.01 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedur e provide s a “c onvicted per son may submit t o the convicting court a motion for fore nsic DNA t es t i n g of evide nce c ontaining biolog ical mater ial.” T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . ANN . art . 6 4. 01 (a ) ( Ve rn on 20 06 ). Th e mot ion

“ may re qu e st f or e ns ic DN A t e sti ngon ly of evide nce” containing biologica l material that “ was sec ured in re lation to t h e o ff en s e t hat is the basis of the c halleng ed convic tion.” Id. art. 64.01(b). The statute c onfer s jurisdiction on thi s court to r e vie w a

tr ia l c ourt ’s or de r re g ard ing po st- c on vic tio n DN A te sti ng in any c a se in wh ic h the de a th penalty is not imposed. Id. art . 6 4. 05 ; Re ge r v . S tate , 2 22 S.W. 3d

51 0, 51 3 ( Te x. Ap p. —F or t Wor th 2007, pet. re f’d)
. Hi a tt s tate s p oli c e re po rt s r e fl e c t D .H . w ipe d h is m ou th w itha tis su e a ft e r a lle g e dly perf orming oral sex on Hiatt to the point of ejaculation. He cl ai ms the tissue will rebut the alleg ations of sexual abuse bec ause it will not c ontain any of his D NA. Althoug h the re cord shows Hiatt filed hi s motion for DN A testing in conjunction with his second motion for new tr ial, the trial court ha s y et t o ru l e o n Hiatt’s re quest for D NA testing . Thus, the trial cour t has not made a

n ap p ea lable finding as to the DNAissue. Cf. Cra v in v . S tate , 9 5 S
. W
. 3 d 5 0 6 , 5 0 8 ( T e x. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. re f’d) (holding a written order is require d for a n appea l from
a c on vic tin g c ourt ’s ru lin g on a po st- c on vic tio n moti on fo r D NAte sti ng ); In re J ohnston , 79 S.W .3d 19 5, 19 8 ( Te x. Ap p. —T e xar ka na 20 02 , or ig
. pr oc e e din g ) (c on c lud ing the tr ia l c ourt is r e qu ir e d to04
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3 ... F u r t h e r , w e a r e u n a b l e t o c o n s t r u e Hi a t t ’ s s e c o n d m o t i o n f o r n e w t r i a l a s a n i n d e p e n d e n t m o t i o n f o r DNA t es t i n g . Ar t i cl e 64. 01 r equ i r es a de f en dan t ’ s mot i on f

or D N A t es t i n g t o “ be ac compa n i ed by a n a f f i dav i t , s wor n t o by t he convi cted per s on, cont ai ni ng s t at ement s of f act i n s uppo r t of

t he mo t i on. ” T EX . C O D E C R IM . P R OC . A NN . ar t. 6 4 .0 1 (a ). H ia tt’ s m o tio n fo r n e w trial is n o t su p p o rte d b y a n a ff id a v it fro m the d e fen d a n t, a n d thu s fails to c o m p ly with t he d i ct at es of

art i cl e 6 4
. 0 1 (a).

- 12- enter a wr itten order in r esolving a motion seekingDNA testing of evide nce) . We theref ore de cline to a dd re ss t he me ri ts o f H iatt’ s se c on d is su e on a pp e a l. 3 N E W T R I A L E VI DE NCE I n issues three thr oug h ten and twenty -nine, Hiatt claims he is entitled to a new trial bec ause: (1 ) h is r ig ht t o due pr oc e ss wa s viol a te d w he n s e ve ra l of the State ’s ke y

wi tne sse s w e re a llo we d to prese nt perjure d testimony during trial; (2) the State fa iled to disclose alleg edly exculpatory

materia l to him prior to trial; and (3) ther e is additional new e vidence relating to his ca se. Hiatt’s a lleg ations
are based up o n affidavits and evidenc e attac hed to his motions for new trial, whic h wer e neve r prese nted to the trial co u rt an d overr uled by operation of law without a hea ring . The Court of Criminal Appeals has he ld that post-trial motions, l ike Hiatt’s motion s for ne w trial, “a re not self-pr oving a

nd any alleg ations made in support of t hem by way of affidavit or other wise must be offe red into evide nce at a hea ring .” Ro us e v . S

tate , 300 S.W .3d 754, 762 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) ;
se e Lam b v . S

tate , 680 S.W .2d 11, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). Be cause the evidenc e Hiatt relies on
was ne ver of

fer ed o r admit ted at a he aring , we a re pr eclude d from conside ring such evide nce on appea l. Se e Ro us e , 300 S.W .3d at 762. Acc ording ly , these issues ar e over ruled. M OT I ON T O Q U A SH I n his eleventh a

nd twelfth issues, Hiatt claims the trial c ourt should have g rante d his moti on to qua sh the indictment be cause the “on or a bout” languag e used in the indictment fa iled to provide him with adequate notice of the c harge d offe nses. Assuming H iatt preser ved this argument for04
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- 13- a pp e llate re vie w, we are no t pe rs ua de d by his c on te nti on . Th e Court of Cr imi na l App e a ls h a s h e ld an indictment nee d not s p ec i fy the pre cise date or a “nar row window of

time” within which the char g ed off

ense oc curr ed. Ga rc ia v . S tate , 981 S.W .2d 683, 685-86 (Tex . Crim. App. 1998). I t has further “ca utioned that courts ca

nnot impose unrealistic e x p ec t ations reg ardingproof of when a n offe nse ac tually

occur red: ‘[I ]t is not often that a child knows, eve n within a fewday s, the date that [he or] she was sexually assaulted.” Di x on v . S tate , 201 S.W .3d 731, 736 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (c itatio n o mitte d) . H iatt h a s n ot d e mon str a te d r e ve rs ibl e e rr or i n con nectionwi th h is m oti on to quash; there fore , his eleventh a nd twelfth issues ar e over ruled. D OU BLE J E OP ARDY I n four issues, Hiatt complains his convictions for both aggra v at ed sexual assault and ind e c e nc y wi th a c hil d v iol a te his do ub le j eop ardy ri g hts un de r b oth the fe de ra l and

state constitutions. The double jeopardy clause of t he Fifth Amendment to t he United States Constituti on, applicable to all states throug h the Four teenth Amendme nt, provides that no person sha ll “be subjec t to the same of

fe ns e to be tw ic e put in je op ard y of lif e or lim b. ” U. S. C O N ST . amends. V, X I V. The double jeopar dy

clause embodies three essential guara ntees: (1 ) i t p ro t ects a g ainst a succ essive prosec ution for t he same offe nse after a cquittal; (2) it protec ts ag ainst a sec ond prosec ution for the
same offe nse afte r conviction; and (3) it pr otects ag ainst multipl e punishments f or the same offe nse. Br own v . O hio , 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977). Ar ticle I , section 14 of t he Tex as Constitut ion provides the same double jeopar dy p ro tections as the United States Constitution. T EX . C O N ST . art. I , § 14; Ste ph e ns v . S

tate , 806 S.W .2d 812, 814-15 (Te x . Crim. App. 1990). As discussed above , Hi att was indicted f or the followingoffe nses: (1) a g g ravated sexual assault of a

child for c ausing D.H.’s se x ual org an to c ontact and penetr ate his a nus on or about J une04
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- 14- 18 , 2 00 5 ( c ount o ne ); (2 ) ag g ra vate d s e xua l a ssa

ult of a c hil d f or pe ne tr a tin g D. H. ’s anu s w ithhis fi ng e r o n o r a

bo ut Jun e 18 , 2 00 5 ( c ount t wo ); (3 ) i nd e c e nc y

wi th a c hil d fo r tou c hin g D. H. ’s g e nit a ls on or about June 18, 2005 (count seve n); (4) inde cenc y with a child for c ausing D.H. to touch par t of his g enitals on or about J une 18, 2005 (count e ight) ; (5) ag g ravated sexual assault of a c hild for causingD.H.’s se x ual org an to contac t and pene trate his anus on or about August 20, 2005 (count three ); (6) a g g ravated sexual assault of a child for penetr ating D.H.’s a nus with his finge r on or a

bout Aug ust 20, 2005 (count four) ; (7) indec ency with a child for touc h i ng D.H.’s g enitals on or about Au g us t 20 , 200 5 (c ount nin e ); and (8 ) ind e c e nc y wi th a ch ild fo r ca us ing D. H. to tou c h part

of his g enitals on or about August 20, 2005 (count ten). H iatt argues “Counts 7 and 8 a re le sser include d offe nses of Counts 1 and 2” a nd “Counts 9 and 10 are lesser inc luded offe nses of Counts 3 and 4.” He thus conc ludes: “[s] ince ther e wa s no proof that separ ate acts of assa ult and indece ncy

happene d
on Au g us t 20 , 200 5 or June 18 , 2 00 5, Counts 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, and 10 a ll c ha

rg e d [hi m] wi th committing the same crime a nd result in multipl e punishment.” Separate cha

rg es of indec ency

with a child and sexual a ssault of a child are proper when the evidenc e indicate s separ ate of fense s took place. Se e, e .g ., Pa tt ers on v . S tate , 152 S.W .3d 88, 92 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (holding that when two pene trations wer e sepa rate d by a short per iod of tim e , tw o ind e pe nd e nt a ssa ult s o c c ur re d) ; Bo tte nfi e ld v . S

tate , 77 S.W .3d 349, 358 (Tex. App.—For t Worth 2002, pet. ref’ d) (holding even thoug h appellant’ s two acts may have been c ommitt ed during the same oc curr ence , appellant’ s touching of the victim’s g enitals with his fing er was a separ ate a

nd dis tin c t cr imi na l ac t fr om tou c hin g he r g e nit a ls with his p e nis ); Mu rra yv . S tate , 24 S.W .3d 881, 889 (Tex. A pp.—Waco 2000, pet. ref ’d) (holding defe ndant’s double jeopar dy rig hts were not violated by his punishment for both ag g ravated sexual as s au l t an d i ndece ncy with a child bec ause the04
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- 15- e vid e nc e a t tr ia l sh ow e d h e “ c omm itt e d tw o se pa rate a c ts– pe ne tr a tin g the vic tim ’s se xua l or g an w ith his f i n ger and touchingher g enitals with his tongue–that constituted two separate offe nses”) ; Hu tc hin s v . S

tate , 992 S.W .2d 629, 633 (Tex. App.—Austin 1999, pet. ref ’d) ( aff irming c onvictions fo r a g g ra vate d s e xua l a ssa

ult and ind e c e nc y

wi th a c hil d by c on ta c t be c a

us e the a c ts, a lth ou g h c los e in time, were separ ate) . Her e, the r ecor d shows D.H. an d Hi at t h ad multipl e sexual encounte rs during th e s u m m er of 2005, during which Hiatt committed distinct offense s based upon diff ere nt
c on du c t. Se e ge ne ra lly

Sle dge v . S

tate , 953 S.W .2d 253, 256 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (“[T]he ‘on or about’ la

ng uag e of a

n indictment allows the S tate to prove a date other than t he one a lleg ed in the indictment as long as the date is anterior to the prese ntment of the indictment and withi n the statutory limit ation period.” ). D.H. testified he and Hiatt masturbated ea ch other almost ever y time he visited Hiatt, who he visited “pr etty much eve ry o t h er weeke nd” fr om 2004 until November 2005. He sp e c if ic a lly state d he and Hi a tt mas tur bate d ea c h o the r d

ur ingthe mon ths of

June 20 05 and

Au g us t 2005 and testified Hiatt digitally penetr ated his a nus and made him e ng ag e in ana l intercourse during those same months. D.H. e x plained the digital penetr ation and anal intercour se would g ener ally take place afte r the a cts of masturbation had occur red. D.H.’s testimony

discloses multipl e instance s of inappropr iate touchingand pene tration during the summer of 2005, which justifies the State’s prose cution of Hiatt for the offe nses alleg ed in counts one, two, three , four, seven, eight, ni ne, and ten of the indictment. Se e Ha ns on v . S tate , 18 0 S. W.3 d 7 26 , 7 32 -3 3 ( Te x. Ap p. —Wa c o 2 00 5, no pe t.) (a ff ir min g c on vi cti on s f

or tw o c ounts of ag g ravated sexual assault and t wo counts of indec ency with a child wher e evide nce show ed
a pp e lla nt: c a us e d c hil d v ic tim ’s pe nis to c on ta c t his mouth; pe ne tr a te d the c hil d v ic tim ’s anu s w ith his pe nis; touche d the child victim’s g enitals; and cause d the child victim to to u ch h i s gen itals).04
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- 16- Be cause counts one, two, thre e, four , seven, e ight, nine, a nd ten of the ind i ct m en t alleg e distinct offe nses base d on differ ent conduc t, and bec ause t h e evide nce suppor ts the jury ’s finding s on the counts, Hiatt’s four

teenth, fifte enth, six teenth, and se ventee nth issues are ove rruled.

J URY C HARG E Hi a tt a rgue s th e tr ia l c ourt e rr e d by su bmi tti ng a c ha

rg e that a llo we d the jur

y to c on vic t hi m
on less than a unanimous verdic t in violation of the Texas Constit ution and Texas Code of Criminal Procedur e. Se e Ngo v . S

tate , 175 S.W .3d 738, 745 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (r ecog nizi ng a def endant is entitled to a unanimous verdic t in felony case s). Hiatt alleg es the c ourt’s cha rg e wa s err oneous beca use it is c onceiva

ble jurors improperly “applied testimony reg arding counts 1 and 2 to convict [him ] on c ounts 3 a

nd 4 a nd on 7 a nd 8 to c on vic t [hi m] on

c ounts 9 a

nd 10 .” Al tho ug h H iatt a sse rt s he wa s deprived of

his r ight to a unanimous verdic t, the re is no jury unanimity

problem in this case. The jury char g e conta ined ten diffe rent counts, eac h relating to a se parate and distinct offe nse. See Bo tte nfi e ld , 77 S.W .3d at 359 (holding unanimity require ment not violated when c harg e stated “ two separ ate c ounts with two separate and dist inct offe nses in eac h case ”). In addition, the jury was not ch ar gedi nt h e d i s

j u n ct i v e, b u twa s re qu i re d t o re ac h a v er d i c t a s t o ea ch co u n t
. T h u s , n o ch ar ge
err or exists on this basis. Hiatt’s thirteenth issue is overrule d. E VI DE NT I ARY R UL I NGS A. Co nfro nt at ion Cl aus e Hiatt asser

ts the trial court’s limit ation of his r ight to c ross-examine D.H. and Cry stal Espino violated his rig ht of confr ontation. Hiatt ha s failed to pre serve his complaint for appe llate re view beca use he ne ver ma de a Confr ontation Clause objection at trial. Se e Re y na v . S tate , 168 S.W .3d 173, 179-80 (Te x . Crim. App. 2005) (holding appellate court e rre d in revers i n g co nviction on04
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- 17- Confrontation Clause g rounds bec ause ap p el l ant did not “clea rly articulate” to trial c ourt that C o n f r o n t a t i o nC l a

u s e d e m an d e d

a dm i s s i o no f

e v i d e n c e i nqu e s t i o n )
. H i a t t ’ s t w e n t y- s i x t h , t w e n t yseventh, a nd twenty -eig hth issues are ove rruled. B. Te xa s R ule of Ev ide nc e 60 8( b) I n four issues, Hiatt claims the trial court a bused its discretion when it pre cluded him from asking D.H. and Espino a bout the ir cha

rac ter a nd truthfulness. Specific ally , Hiatt complains about the tria l c o u rt’ s f

a il u r e to a ll o w h im to a tt a c k D
. H
. ’ s c r e d ib il it y r e g ar d in g a s to le n c h e c k and Espino’s cre dibilit y based upon her misre prese ntations on a cre dit application. Rule 608(b) of the Te xas R ule s o f E vid e nc e pr ov ide s: “ ‘[s ]pe c if ic ins tanc e s of the c on du c t of a wi tne ss, fo r the purp os e of attac king or

suppo rt i n g h i s cr edibility , other than c onviction of crime a s provided in Rule 609, may not be inquired into on cross-e x amination of the witness nor proved by ex t ri n s i c e vidence .’” Lop e z v . S tate , 1 8 S
. W
. 3 d 2 2 0 , 2 2 3 (T ex . C ri m . Ap p . 2 0 0 0 ) ( qu o t i n g T EX . R. E V ID . 6 08 (d )) . I t is appar ent from the rec ord t hat Hiatt soug ht to impeach D .H.’s and E spino’s cre dibilit y by introducing
e vid e nc e of

sp e c if ic ins tanc e s in

wh ic h th e y

ha d e ng a g e d in

imp ro pe r c on du c t. Rule 60 8( b) pr oh ibi ts
su c h in qu ir

y . We the re fo re ov e rr

ule Hi a tt’ s tw e nti e th, tw e nty -s e c on d, tw e nty -t hir d, and tw e nty -f if th iss ue s. C. Evid ence of Bias/Pre judice I n his twenty -first and twe nty -four th issues, Hiatt argues t he trial court erre d in sustaining the State’s objection to def

ense c ounsel’s cr oss-examination of Espino conce rning whether she wa s ever sexually abused. A fter the trial court sustai n ed the St ate’ s objection to defe nse counse l’s line of questioning, the rec ord i ndicates counsel informed the court that he would make a bill on the issue04
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4 ... T o t he ex t en t H i att arg ue s he m ad e an o f f er o f p ro o f i n his att ac hm en t s t o his m o t i o n for ne w t rial , w e m ust re je c t h is c o n te n tio n b e c a u se h e w a s re q u ire d to d e v e lo p the re c o rd b e fo re the c h a rg e o n g u ilt w a s re a d to the ju ry. See T EX . R. E V ID . 1 0 3 (b ); W a rn e r v . S ta te , 9 6 9 S .W .2 d 1 , 2 ( T e x . C rim . A p p . 1 9 9 8 ); N ix o n v . S ta te , No. 12
- 07
- 00 00 4- CR, 2 0 0 8 W L 8 3 6 4 9 5 , *5 (T e x . A p p .— T yle r 2 0 0 8 , no p e t.) (m e m . o p ., no t d e sig n a te d fo r p u b lica tio n ).

- 18- later. D efe nse counse l, however , failed to make a b i l l o f exception or offe r of pr oof showing the testimony he expected to e licit from Espino. “Err or in the exclusion of evide nce ma y not by urg ed unless the pr oponent per fec ted an of fer of proof or a bill of exceptions.” Gu idr yv . S tate , 9 S.W .3d 1 3 3 , 1 5 3 (T ex . Crim. App. 1999). Fa ilure to make a

n offe r of pr oof or a

bill of ex ception whe re t h e re co rd d o es not show what the excluded testimony would have been or shown waives the complaint for a ppellate r eview. Id. Any
err or in the exclusion of the evidenc e was not pr eser ved for revie w beca

use Hiatt did not make a

n offe r of pr oof or a

bill of ex ception or othe rwise make a rea sonably specific summary of the e vidence offe red. 4 Acc ording ly , Hiatt’s twenty -first and twe nty -four th issues are ove rruled. C ONCL US I ON Ba sed on the for eg oing, the judgme nt of the trial cour t is affirmed.
Catherine Stone, Chief Justice
PUB L I SH