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i 

89–505 2015

[H.A.S.C. No. 113–112] 

P5+1 NEGOTIATIONS OVER IRAN’S 

NUCLEAR PROGRAM AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR UNITED STATES DEFENSE 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

JUNE 19, 2014 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California, Chairman 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

E. SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

JOSEPH J. HECK, Nevada 

JON RUNYAN, New Jersey 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida 

KRISTI L. NOEM, South Dakota 

PAUL COOK, California 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio 

JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana 

BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., Georgia 

COLLEEN W. HANABUSA, Hawaii 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

RON BARBER, Arizona 

ANDRE ́ CARSON, Indiana 

CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire 

DANIEL B. MAFFEI, New York 

DEREK KILMER, Washington 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois 

SCOTT H. PETERS, California 

WILLIAM L. ENYART, Illinois 

PETE P. GALLEGO, Texas 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

ROBERT L. SIMMONS II, Staff Director 

ALEX GALLO, Professional Staff Member 

MIKE CASEY, Professional Staff Member 

AARON FALK, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2014 

Page 

HEARING: 

Thursday, June 19, 2014, P5+1 Negotiations Over Iran’s Nuclear Program 

and Its Implications for United States Defense ................................................ 1 

APPENDIX: 

Thursday, June 19, 2014 ......................................................................................... 33 

THURSDAY, JUNE 19, 2014 

P5+1 NEGOTIATIONS OVER IRAN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAM AND ITS 

IMPLICATIONS FOR UNITED STATES DEFENSE 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck,’’ a Representative from California, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services .................................................................. 1 

Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking Member, 

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 2 

WITNESSES 

Pickering, Ambassador Thomas R., Distinguished Fellow, Brookings Institution ........................................................................................................................ 8 

Singh, Michael, Managing Director, The Washington Institute for Near East 

Policy ..................................................................................................................... 5 

Tobey, William H., Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International 

Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School ....................................................................... 4 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ .................................................................... 37 

Pickering, Ambassador Thomas R. ................................................................. 67 

Singh, Michael .................................................................................................. 56 

Smith, Hon. Adam ............................................................................................ 39 

Tobey, William H. ............................................................................................. 41 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mrs. Walorski ................................................................................................... 79 

(1) 

† People’s Republic of China, French Republic, Russian Federation, United States of America, 

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Federal Republic of Germany. 

P5+1 NEGOTIATIONS OVER IRAN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAM 

AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR UNITED STATES DEFENSE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

Washington, DC, Thursday, June 19, 2014. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ 

McKeon (chairman of the committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, 

A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. 

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. 

The House Armed Services Committee meets to receive testimony from outside experts on the P5+1 † negotiations over Iran’s 

nuclear program and its implications for United States defense. 

Today we have with us Mr. William Tobey, Mr. Michael Singh, and 

Ambassador Thomas Pickering. Our witnesses have an immense 

amount of experience working Iran issues, and we appreciate them 

sharing their perspectives with us today. 

I am concerned that the scope of negotiations with Iran over its 

nuclear program was flawed from the outset. We know that Iran 

would be allowed to keep its nuclear capabilities, ability to enrich, 

and breakout capability. We know that Iran has had and may continue to have undeclared sites. 

We know that there are military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear 

program that it refuses to address. And we know that the nuclear 

program is but one facet of Iran’s overall grand strategy, which includes its sponsorship of terrorism, the largest ballistic missile arsenal in the Middle East, and other conventional military capabilities that continue to threaten the region and beyond. 

Yet none of these issues appear to be within the scope of the 

comprehensive deal. Our ally Israel has called this a bad deal. Our 

friends and allies in the region have both publicly and privately 

conveyed their deep reservations about this deal. I worry that the 

President wants to achieve a nuclear deal with Iran at almost any 

cost. 

Some will argue that this deal is better than no deal and that 

it would slow down Iran’s nuclear program. But how much time 

does it really buy us? 
2 

International sanctions, which took a decade to put into place, 

were finally starting to bite. Had the Administration maintained a 

strong regional presence, Congress’ robust sanctions, and a clear 

resolve to use the military option if necessary, we could have set 

the conditions for Iran to change its strategic calculus. 

Yet, through these negotiations, we have done the opposite. In 

fact, Iran already thinks that the P5+1 have legitimized its nuclear 

enrichment capability, thereby validating its nuclear calculus. 

The American public is understandably war-weary. I do not desire to go to war with Iran either, and that is precisely why I am 

concerned about the Administration’s approach in these negotiations. If the Administration signs on to a comprehensive deal that 

legitimizes Iran’s capability to enrich and that does not dismantle 

the nuclear program as well as the arsenal surrounding Iran’s nuclear program, I fear that a future President may have to seriously 

contemplate taking military action to enforce such a deal or to protect our allies in the region. This is the worst possible outcome. 

This is a very serious and complicated issue. And, again, I thank 

our expert panel for being here today, and I look forward to their 

testimony and insights. 

Mr. Smith. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the Appendix on page 37.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 

WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED 

SERVICES 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Well, let me just say, if, in fact, the United States agrees to the 

kind of deal that the chairman just described, then I think it would 

be a grave and terrible mistake. But what you just described, there 

is no resemblance whatsoever that I can see to what I have heard 

we are trying to accomplish. 

And let me be clear on one point. Without question, Iran is a bad 

actor, you know, independent of the nuclear issue. Since 1979, they 

have been pretty much nothing but a bad actor on a lot of different 

issues. And we will have to confront that no matter what. Whether 

we get a nuclear deal or not, Iran is going to continue to be a challenge and continue to be a threat that we have to measure and contain. 

But the question, the calculus that we have made is, are we better off with that Iranian threat if we can take the nuclear piece of 

it off the table? And I think there is no question about it. Iran is 

terrible; Iran with a nuclear weapon would be, you know, a much, 

much more difficult situation to deal with. So any steps that we 

can take to stop them from getting a nuclear weapon, I think, are 

important. 

And the sanctions regime has, in fact, been working. It drove 

them to the table. It drove them to the table because of the impact 

that it has had on their economy, which has been devastating. 

And I am well aware of what Iran wants. What Iran wants is 

they would love to be able to get a nuclear weapon without international condemnation. That is what they would love to figure out. 

But, unfortunately for them and fortunately for us, that is not 
3 

going to happen. If they pursue the nuclear path, there will be 

sanctions and there will be huge economic consequences, as there 

already have been. 

Point number one, we did not lift those sanctions in the interim 

agreement. It was a very, very small piece that was given to them. 

All of the sanctions put in place are still there. It is still having 

its impact on the economy. It gives Iran an incentive to come to the 

table. 

Now, if they come to the table and don’t offer something that 

gives us confidence that they will not develop a nuclear weapon, 

then we shouldn’t take the deal, absolutely. But pursuing these negotiations is the logical extension of sanctions. If we say to Iran, 

look, no matter what you do, no matter what you say, we are simply going to keep sanctioning you, then we give them incentive to 

just go ahead and build a nuclear weapon. 

And I think one of the biggest mistakes that I have heard in this 

debate, and I would be interested in hearing your comments on it: 

Everybody says that Iran is hell-bent to get a nuclear weapon, that 

they have made that decision, they are working towards it. And 

that simply isn’t true. And the reason I know that is not true is 

because, back in 2005, I was told that Iran was 6 months from having a bomb. And I believe that is true. I think they have been 6 

months from having a bomb for 9 years. They have chosen not to 

build one. Why? Why? Because of the sanctions, because of what 

they are concerned about. 

So there is absolutely an opportunity to stop them from going 

down that road. Now, it is not easy, and I will evaluate this agreement based on whether or not it truly does stop them, but we have 

to at least try. I am going to be very interested from our witnesses 

today, what is the minimum in a negotiated agreement that we 

need. 

Now, I will tell you, you can’t unring the bell. There is no agreement that is going to make us positive that, under no circumstances, never, ever, ever will Iran pursue a nuclear weapon 

again. But there are things that we can do that will significantly 

take down their enrichment, that will put in place a coercive inspections regime that will give us confidence that they are not 

building secret facilities. And if we can get that agreement that 

will tell us that we are going to know if Iran breaks it, then I think 

that is worth doing to stop Iran from getting a nuclear weapon. 

It is a difficult thing, and I will close by—one thing, I am not 

optimistic. I am not optimistic that Iran will be willing to give up 

what they need to give up in order to get this deal. And if that 

comes to pass, we will have to continue with the sanctions regime. 

We will have to continue trying to discourage them in that way. 

But I think it is folly not to at least pursue it to see if we can take 

the nuclear weapon off the table and deal with Iran on these other 

issues, you know, as we have dealt with them before. 

The choice here isn’t, you know, we can force Iran to give up all 

of their bad behavior. I wish that option was on the table. The 

choice here is, can we take a realistic step that is going to stop 

them, continue to stop them, from getting a nuclear weapon? And 

that is what I want to hear our witnesses talk about. What are 

those specifics that we are going to need to have, in your esti-
4 

mation, to give us that confidence? And then what your level of optimism is about, you know, whether or not we can reach this agreement and whether or not Iran is truly serious about it. 

I yield back and look forward to the testimony. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 39.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Tobey. 

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM H. TOBEY, SENIOR FELLOW, BELFER 

CENTER FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, HARVARD KENNEDY SCHOOL 

Mr. TOBEY. Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith, it is a 

privilege to testify on a matter of surpassing importance. Preventing Iran from attaining a nuclear weapon is a matter of vital 

national security interest to the United States. 

Should we be satisfied with a deal that simply pushes Iran from 

2 months to 6 months away from the nuclear threshold? Or should 

we expect more—that is, evidence of a fundamental decision not to 

pursue nuclear weapons? 

Last April, Secretary of State Kerry noted that Iran had reached 

a point perhaps only 2 months away from being able to produce 

sufficient fissile material to fabricate a nuclear weapon and raised 

the possibility of pushing that timetable back 6 to 12 months. 

Accepting a situation in which Iran insists on keeping a loaded 

weapon on the table but simply moves its finger farther from the 

trigger would not appear to offer sound prospects for long-term success. If Iran has not made a fundamental decision to foreswear nuclear weapons in return for better relations with other nations, 

Tehran will work to erode the firebreak by means overt and covert. 

And we have seen this situation in the past in North Korea. 

How can we judge whether or not Tehran has made such a fundamental decision, and how might we ensure that it endures? Satisfaction on three points would provide such insight and, just as 

important, offer the means to verify compliance or to detect cheating. These three potential elements of an agreement focus on preventing covert activities. They are: resolving concerns regarding 

possible military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear weapon program; 

comprehensive monitoring of nuclear-related procurement and 

manufacturing; and enhanced authorities for the International 

Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA]. 

The first and most important step to ensure that Iran’s nuclear 

weapons activities have truly ceased and will not restart is to get 

to the bottom of what the International Atomic Energy Agency 

calls ‘‘possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear program.’’ Who 

did what, when, and where? 

The declaration can be verified by personnel files, invoices, manifests, inventories, disposition records, equipment, and buildings. 

The IAEA will construct a mosaic of the Iranian program. Some 

tiles will be missing, others might be fake, but the best way to understand the program and to ensure that it has stopped is to have 

as complete a picture as possible to identify and resolve inconsistencies. 
5 

The November 2013 interim agreement calls for a joint commission to facilitate resolution of past and present issues of concern. 

The White House fact sheet on the deal contends that this includes 

possible military dimensions of the Iranian nuclear program, but 

such an outcome is by no means assured. 

The second step to guard against resurgence of a covert Iranian 

nuclear weapons program would be to authorize the IAEA to monitor comprehensively all nuclear-related and dual-use procurements 

by Iran to ensure that they are used solely at declared facilities. 

Credible information on undeclared nuclear procurements could be 

considered prima facie evidence that Iran is violating the agreement. As a part of this process, the IAEA will also need to monitor 

related production within Iran. 

A third step to guard against resurgence of a covert Iranian nuclear weapons program would be to enhance the powers of the 

IAEA beyond the Additional Protocol. Evidence of Nonproliferation 

Treaty cheating is often subtle, taking the form of inconsistencies 

and irregularities. The IAEA must have ongoing authorities to pursue these anomalies should they arise, including access to documents, people, and facilities. 

These terms—getting to the bottom of possible military dimensions, comprehensive procurement monitoring, and enhanced authorities for the IAEA—cannot guarantee Iran’s compliance with a 

deal to block its pursuit of nuclear weapons. They can, however, 

test Tehran’s willingness to abide by a deal and, even as the negotiations proceed and if a deal is concluded, act as a deterrent to 

those who might seek to cheat on it. 

Would insisting on these terms be worth risking the possibility 

of no deal? Mr. Chairman, given the stakes invoked in the Iranian 

nuclear issue, we cannot afford a situation in which Tehran pretends to comply and we pretend to believe it. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Tobey can be found in the Appendix on page 41.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Singh. 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL SINGH, MANAGING DIRECTOR, THE 

WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY 

Mr. SINGH. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, members of the 

committee, it is an honor to be here today. Thank you for inviting 

me. 

The Iran nuclear negotiations are often reduced to a set of technical issues, such as breakout time, inspection regimes, and so 

forth. Those are vitally important issues, and my colleague here on 

the panel covered them, I think, very well, some of them. 

But I think it would be a mistake to view any agreement as primarily or merely technical, because any agreement is going to have 

profound strategic implications for the United States for good or for 

ill. And what makes a deal a good deal or a bad deal I think needs 

to be measured not just in terms of breakout time but in terms of 

how it advances or sets back American interests in the Middle East 

and beyond. And I am going to talk a little bit about what I think 
6 

needs to be in a deal beyond the technical issues to accomplish 

that. 

We all know that the nuclear weapons program has three elements. There is fuel fabrication, weaponization, and a delivery vehicle. And let me just go through each one of these things briefly. 

Fuel fabrication. Again, I am not going to cover in detail the centrifuges and so forth; my colleague has done that well. We need to 

recognize, though, that the technical compromises we make, however merited they may be or not, will also have strategic implications. They will send messages to folks in the region, especially if 

we are moving back from a position that we once held. And we 

need to make sure that we communicate what we are doing very 

clearly and that we take into account those strategic implications 

when we make compromises. 

We also need to take into account that whatever we permit Iran 

to keep in terms of nuclear capabilities, others in the region and 

beyond will have an incentive to match. And so we have to also 

think about what we allow Iran in terms of the implication for the 

global nonproliferation regime and our global interests, therefore. 

When it comes to weaponization research, here I would just identify myself with Mr. Tobey’s comments on making sure that Iran 

comes clean on what it has done in the past. This will not only facilitate the work of the inspectors by giving them a roadmap to 

Iran’s full nuclear ecosystem, it will give them a baseline for comparing future Iranian declarations and any intelligence information 

which we gather about Iran’s activities, and it also helps us to determine exactly how much progress Iran did, in fact, make on 

weaponization and whether, in fact, they have stopped—issues 

where I don’t think that we can say we are 100 percent certain at 

this moment. 

I would also say that, just as a practical matter, we can’t really 

expect much from this agreement going forward if it doesn’t begin 

with transparency. If it begins with obfuscation or dishonesty, I 

think it starts on the wrong foot. 

The third element is missiles, Iran’s delivery vehicles. This is 

controversial, in a sense, because the Iranians have said it can’t be 

included and P5+1 officials have been ambiguous on the matter. 

But if you look at Iran’s missile capability—Mr. Chairman, you 

said Iran has the largest missile arsenal in the Middle East. That 

is right, as far as I know. They are also the first country to develop 

2,000-kilometer-range missiles without first having a nuclear weapon. We also see that Iran’s missiles, because they have poor accuracy, are not suited for conventional payloads; they are part of a 

nuclear weapons program. Iran is working, as you know, on a space 

launch program and could have, according to the Defense Department, ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles] by 2015 at the 

earliest. 

So, in a sense, this is the leg of Iran’s nuclear program which 

needs the most work. And I think that we need to be sure that Iran 

doesn’t use the time and space provided by an agreement to perfect 

this last leg of their nuclear program so that in a couple years they 

come out having all three legs where they want them and ready 

for breakout. 
7 

One more thing on this. Addressing missiles and weaponization 

will also ensure that, because there are these competing power centers in Iran—civilian, military, and so forth—that those military 

power centers, and not just the civilian ones, are bound by any 

agreement we reach and that inspectors will have insight into what 

the military is doing on the nuclear front, as well, not just the civilian authorities. 

One additional consideration for the agreement I think has to be 

the enforcement mechanism. It is one thing to have great inspections and robust inspections and to have strict limits, but what do 

we do if Iran cheats? We need to decide that up front. And I think 

that, as a condition of U.S. agreement, we need to ensure that the 

U.N. [United Nations] Security Council gets behind very vigorous 

enforcement mechanisms. 

I think we also need to plan what happens if Iran bends those 

lines that we have set instead of breaking them. If they delay inspections or harass inspectors, we need to know what we will do 

in response and what our allies are prepared to do in response as 

a condition of our agreement. 

Finally, this issue of regional issues and whether they should be 

part of an agreement. For me, I think this is a very difficult issue, 

because on the one hand we are concerned about far more than just 

Iran’s nuclear program. And many of our allies in the region, especially our Arab allies, are more concerned about Iran’s regional activities in places like Syria and elsewhere than they are about even 

Iran’s nuclear program, and they don’t like the prospect of our relieving pressure before those issues are addressed. At the same 

time, though, I think that they worry about the optic of our dealing 

bilaterally with Iran on these regional issues over their heads and 

right now don’t necessarily trust us to come to the right conclusions 

on those regional issues. 

So I think, in balance, what we need to see is we need to leave 

those regional issues out of the nuclear negotiations but deal with 

them very firmly separately, ensure that we leave pressure in place 

and sanctions in place to put pressure on Iran on those issues and, 

frankly, also improve and make firmer our commitment to the Middle East security in places like Syria, Iraq, and elsewhere as part 

of the context, the broader context, for this agreement. 

I also worry when it comes to regional issues that, as we saw 

from Iranians yesterday, from President Rouhani’s chief of staff, 

that they view the regional issues as leverage to get us to dilute 

our positions on the nuclear front. 

Mr. Chairman, let me just end by saying that, whether we like 

it or not, many people, including in the region, see this as the most 

important issue in the region, with everything else that is going on. 

And we are going to be judged, in terms of our commitment to the 

Middle East, in terms of our commitment to our own interests, by 

how this agreement comes out and how firm and strong an agreement it is. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Singh can be found in the Appendix on page 56.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Ambassador Pickering. 
8 

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR THOMAS R. PICKERING, 

DISTINGUISHED FELLOW, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION 

Ambassador PICKERING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking 

Member Smith. It is a pleasure and honor to join you and all the 

members of the committee, and I thank you very much for the invitation. 

Since 2013, we have seen a shift in the U.S.-Iran relationship. 

Official bilateral talks held confidentially, the important election 

for the President of Iran, won by Hassan Rouhani, and the successful completion of the first step of negotiations with the November 

24th, 2013, Joint Plan of Action have opened the door to progress. 

Today this committee wishes to discuss how this progress and a 

possible comprehensive agreement can impact U.S. strategy in the 

region and beyond. 

The U.S. strategic objective in the Middle East should be a stable 

and secure region, open to commerce, to ideas, and to interchange. 

States in the region should have the opportunity to cooperate, enjoy 

peaceful relations and trade among themselves. It should be a region without nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and, I would 

certainly add, without a strong offensive missile capability, particularly at longer ranges. 

I want to be clear that I strongly oppose Iran acquiring nuclear 

weapons and am deeply concerned about its support for terrorism 

and Hezbollah, its violations of human rights of its citizens, and its 

threats against Israel. 

I recently led a delegation for the Iran Project to Israel and exchanged points of view with the highest levels of the Israeli government, military, and intelligence leadership, as well as respected 

foreign policy experts. We were well-received, and we had engaged 

discussions of key issues pertaining to Iran and its nuclear program, which lead to a greater understanding of Israeli assessments 

and outlook on this issue. We plan to continue these informal exchanges. 

The U.S. strategy should be to develop policies in support of its 

long-term goal of a more stable and secure Middle East through 

peaceful processes, with the use of force reserved only to address 

the most extreme and unmanageable threats to U.S. security. At 

the same time, we must recognize that this part of the world is 

likely to pass through many years, perhaps decades, of turmoil, violence, and problems that only the leaders and the people of the region can resolve finally for themselves. What role the U.S. can play 

and what goals we have laid out are important. 

An important variable in looking at the strategic outcome is 

whether the comprehensive nuclear agreement with Iran can be 

reached and on what time scale. Here, as we assess the strategic 

implications of that, there are two cases, obviously: an agreement 

or no agreement. 

Before we assess these two scenarios, however, there are important implications for the U.S. policy in terms of what has already 

been agreed. And it is instructive to acknowledge that Iran has, in 

fact, complied with its commitments taken last November in the 

Joint Program of Action. The IAEA, the International Atomic Energy Agency, which has long been skeptical of Iran’s seriousness, 
9 

has provided monthly reports verifying the scale and timeliness of 

its actions. 

And, under the Joint Plan of Action, Iran agreed to take several 

major steps to limit its nuclear capacity. In my testimony, I list 

these, but the most important is to get out of the 20-percent enrichment business and to convert that stockpile to something that cannot be rapidly enriched to higher levels. 

But there also have been a number of other important steps, including capping the number of centrifuges, limiting centrifuge production, capping enrichment at 3 to 5 percent, keeping the enrichment stockpile at the size and level it was when the agreement 

went into effect on the 20th of January, and preventing the startup 

of new centrifuge types and their use in the Iranian program, all 

of which the IAEA says Iran has been complying with. 

And, for the first time, the expanded safeguards have covered 

verification, something along the lines that Mr. Tobey and Mr. 

Singh have talked about. And I believe these represent a serious 

and important start. 

The consequences for U.S. strategic and defense issues and interests in the Middle East without an agreement are important. We 

are left there with two really unpalatable options: containing a nuclear-armed Iran or going to war. It is possible that Iran will decide 

not to pursue a nuclear weapon—and Mr. Smith referred to their 

attitudes on this up until now—even if an agreement is not 

reached. But understanding the consequences of alternative strategies to diplomacy is also important. 

And let me be clear about that. There are limits on the use of 

force in preventing a nuclear-armed Iran. The use of military force 

by Israel or the United States, at best, according to the best experts’ estimations, could set the Iran program back only 2 to 4 

years. It would not eliminate it. Iran’s nuclear capability is unfortunately in the minds of its scientists at the moment, which can’t 

be taken out by the use of force alone. In fact, military intervention, short of a decision by Iran to go for a nuclear weapon, might 

actually stimulate that kind of a decision, and that is important to 

consider. 

The failure to reach a diplomatic solution would have profound 

political implications inside Iran, as well. It will certainly weaken 

the moderates and embolden the hardliners, which would most certainly impact questions of human rights, political openness and 

freedoms, and all of the other related issues that concern us worldwide. 

Moreover, if an agreement is not reached, the U.S. and its allies 

in Western Europe will have no alternative but to fall back on adding more sanctions, which presents, in itself, new problems. We 

have learned from the past year that sanctions have worked to get 

the Iranians to the table to negotiate seriously about issues of 

great importance to our national security. Yet the imposition now 

of more sanctions to achieve a better deal will not, in my opinion, 

having looked at the Iranians for a long period of time, lead to Iranian capitulation on this issue. 

Sanctions are not in themselves alone the objective but are clearly the means to reach a specific goal—in this case, preventing Iran 

from acquiring a nuclear weapon. Sanctions work best, if at all, 
10 

only when the diplomacy around them can work. And additional 

sanctions during the diplomatic process could very well upend the 

entire course of the discussions, losing the transparency that we 

have gained in the Joint Program of Action and rolling back the 

important progress we have already made. 

If the U.S. were to walk away from a deal that most of the other 

P5+1 partners believe fulfills our main objective, those countries 

are no longer likely to see value in abiding by the strict sanctions 

regime that has been set in place under American leadership. This 

would leave us alone to enforce largely unilateral sanctions, which 

we know are unfortunately less effective. 

The consequences of reaching a comprehensive agreement are 

the opposite. The impact of an agreement that meets U.S. security 

needs would enhance our security as well as that of the other nations in the region. It would include a significant reduction in the 

Iranian program, the institution of the kind of intensive monitoring 

system that has been recommended by the other witnesses and 

with which I agree, the prevention of Iran from achieving a nuclear 

weapons capability. 

And my testimony assumes that neither the U.S. nor Iran would 

accept an agreement which was not in their long-term interest. 

Such an agreement, if it holds, could mark the beginning of a 

longer process of further efforts, including resolution of many of the 

problems between the two countries. 

Early efforts could take many different forms, including confidence-building measures; attempts, as Mr. Singh has outlined, to 

discuss and agree on regional questions as well as longstanding 

questions between the U.S. and Iran stemming back to the fall of 

the Shah. 

The process would be long, tenuous, and demanding. No early establishment of full diplomatic relations or normalization of those 

would be likely. Thirty-five years of mistrust and misunderstanding won’t disappear overnight despite the emergence of areas 

of mutual interest, such as the possibility for cooperation on Afghanistan and now, quite possibly, on Iraq. 

Even if the U.S. were to expand its relations with Iran over coming years, we are unlikely to ever want to accept Iran as a hegemonic force in the region nor withdraw U.S. military presence from 

the region. We have simply too much at stake with our friends and 

allies in the GCC [Gulf Cooperation Council] states, in Iraq, and 

with Israel to shift our strategic focus on the Gulf. Despite recent 

signs of instability and uncertainty in Syria and Iraq, the U.S. is 

unlikely to engage in seismic shifts in its policies. 

Regional strategic implications are harder to read and predict. 

The sharpening of sectarian conflict between Sunni and Shia, 

which we are reading about in the papers this morning, has impeded a rapprochement between Arabs and Persians across the 

Gulf. Yet both sides, at least on the surface, still profess to be committed against war and open for high-level visits and even seeming 

agreement, if not full cooperation. 

Saudi Arabia and its Arab neighbors will need to be satisfied and 

assured that the U.S. stands with them even as they seek some regional accord with the parties in the region, including Iran. More 

importantly, the U.S. support of Israel’s security must and will re-
11 

main the cornerstone of American interest in the region, and U.S. 

relations with Iran will not change this commitment. 

Rather than being taxed with building new relations with nations at odds with each other, whether it is Israel or across the 

Gulf, the U.S. needs to act carefully to achieve better balances on 

both sides without upsetting its own relationships. And this is a 

major challenge for our diplomacy. 

Without a comprehensive agreement, we can expect even more 

strategic challenges. Could the absence of an agreement encourage 

Iran to push for nuclear weapons? The answer to this is not clear, 

but, certainly, all contingencies have to be considered. 

The U.S. seeks a reduction in breakout time for Iran in any dash 

to a nuclear weapon, which is outlined in the comprehensive agreement. Without an agreement, the U.S. and others could still use 

sanctions, negotiations, and other measures short of force to prevent a potential breakout. Should that fail, in the event Iran were 

to decide to break out, the implication is clear that the U.S. would 

keep open its option to use force. 

My testimony then summarizes those points. It talks about the 

comprehensive negotiations and where they are. Just a brief set of 

statements on where I believe those negotiations are today and 

how we envisage things for the future. 

Both parties seem committed to finish the current process by 

July 20th, 2014. The early stages went quite smoothly. Serious differences, however, remain. And they are reported to cover enrichment, the numbers and other characteristics of centrifuges and the 

amount of low-enriched uranium which would be allowed to be produced under the deal; the Arak reactor and plutonium output; possible military dimensions concerns, now being handled by the 

IAEA, which, also, my colleagues here at the table focused upon; 

the extent of inspection, which I believe is extremely important; 

sanctions relief; and the duration of an agreement. There are possible paths through each of these issues, and an agreement will 

have to require very tough compromises. 

Iran is focused on creating a peaceful civil program, it says, protecting what it has already achieved, in part to address domestic 

political opposition in Iran, which remains strong. The U.S. seeks 

a minimal Iran civilian program capable of meeting its current 

needs without significant increases in breakout time. The scope of 

subjects to be resolved is reportedly agreed, and some progress has 

already been made on a number of these issues. 

My humble opinion is that it will be a real stretch and a hard 

push to get all of this in place by the 20th of July, much as it represents important advantages for the parties on both sides. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Pickering can be found 

in the Appendix on page 67.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Tobey, Mr. Singh, in your testimony, you describe what 

should be included in any comprehensive deal with Iran. 

As I said in my statement, I am pessimistic that the Administration will push the P5+1 to sufficiently address in a comprehensive 

deal Iran’s state sponsorship of terrorism, its ballistic missile pro-
12 

gram, any covert activities, and the conventional military programs 

that support the military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program. 

If the Administration does not address these facets that support 

Iran’s nuclear program and its ability to project power, what would 

be the implications for security in the region and beyond? 

Mr. SINGH. Well, Mr. Chairman, if I could just start on that, I 

think that if we do not address especially the other elements of 

Iran’s nuclear weapons program, its nuclear weapons capabilities, 

besides fuel fabrication—and let me be clear, I think it is very important that we extend Iran’s breakout time as much as possible. 

I don’t think it was wise to abandon our position arguing for no enrichment in Iran and no plutonium activities in Iran, but we are 

well beyond that point now, obviously. 

If we don’t, however, address those other two legs of the nuclear 

stool, as it were, then we really haven’t fully addressed even the 

nuclear weapons program. And I think that we will leave Iran in 

a position where it can continue to work towards a nuclear weapons capability and perfect a nuclear weapons capability, even if it 

has paused certain elements of its fuel fabrication program. 

We also, I think, put at greater risk the chance that Iran could 

covertly develop a nuclear weapon, because it would be openly and 

permissibly working on those other elements of a program, which 

means it would only covertly have to address the fuel fabrication 

side of things. 

I think, also, for our image in the region, our prestige in the region, an agreement which is very minimalist will result in some, 

as I mentioned in my testimony, negative reverberations within the 

region, because people will see it, in a sense, as a triumph for Iran 

and as a sign, again, that the United States has a weakening commitment to the region. 

Ambassador PICKERING. Mr. Chairman, may I make a remark or 

two on your question, which I think is extremely important. 

Since the beginning of the negotiation effort, beginning with the 

Bush administration and now the Obama administration, there has 

been a very strong reluctance to add to the nuclear negotiations 

other issues, however important they are. And that reluctance was 

based in, I think, a well-founded concern, which Mr. Singh mentioned in his discussion related to his testimony, and that was that 

the more things we add to the present deal, the more likely it is 

we are going to have to pay in the coin, if I could put it this way, 

of nuclear concessions to get the kind of additional objectives we 

want. 

And that it is very clear, as Mr. Singh said, that a missile without a nuclear capability is much less dangerous than one with. 

And, therefore, focusing our time and attention and putting every 

effort behind putting the nuclear business in a situation where we 

believe we have now high confidence that they will not develop a 

nuclear weapon, which is the objective of the comprehensive agreement, in my view, is probably worth the priority we have assigned 

to it, rather than to attempt to create a kind of grand bargain, including both the missiles and the nuclear weapons issue at the 

same time. 

I have thought a great deal about this because, seemingly, on the 

surface, dealing with missiles is persuasive. But missiles without 
13 

a warhead puts us in a lot stronger position to deal with missiles 

as a second issue, and I would certainly recommend very strongly 

that missiles not be left behind. 

But I think it is important to consider the thinking of both Administrations in this. 

Mr. TOBEY. Mr. Chairman, my fellow panelists have dealt with 

other aspects of your question. I would like to focus on the covert 

problem, as I did, really, in my testimony. 

I think a failure to deal with the covert issue and focusing on— 

you know, there are really three ways in which Iran could attain 

a nuclear weapon. They could break out of the treaty using declared facilities, they could sneak out of the treaty using 

undeclared facilities, or they could buy a weapon or materials from 

some other state. Those are the theoretical possibilities. 

A lot of the focus of the negotiations has been on the overt facilities, putting in place a firebreak that would make it a longer period 

during which they would need to break out of the treaty. I am concerned that the most likely path that Iran would take would be use 

of covert facilities. And that is why I recommended the three elements of a deal that I did. 

The CHAIRMAN. I might be very naive, but it seems to me, if they 

were just wanting to have nuclear capability to provide energy for 

their nation, they wouldn’t have to have their facility under a 

mountain. It could be open. They could have inspectors. I mean, it 

could be totally transparent. 

And it just seems to me that it is so obvious what their real goal 

is that anything else that we think about is just kind of superfluous to the situation. I just think we just play right into their 

hands. The longer we talk, the more they are able to do. And it just 

seems that we just play right into their hands on this whole subject. 

Is Mr. Smith gone? 

Ms. Sanchez. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I appreciate the fact that we are holding this hearing today. As 

you know, the 18 years I have been here in the Congress, I think 

I have been on the subcommittee that deals with this for 16 of 

those 18 years. So I am incredibly interested in this topic. 

And I think that there is real doubt by many of us here that 

there is going to be a deal by July 20th on the P5+1. And I think 

when we hear the chairman and, you know, his understanding of 

the situation, our understanding, the negotiations that are going on 

with respect to the number of centrifuges and giving that up, the 

Arak heavy water reactor, all of these issues, I think, give us an 

inability to trust that even if we made a deal that the deal would 

be followed through. 

When I look back, I look at the fact that Iran has defied six U.N. 

Security Council resolutions that have called for it to suspend uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities and that it has consistently pursued, I believe, a very covert action of enrichment in 

its capabilities. And it is, of course, very evident that it has ignored 

or not allowed IAEA inspectors full access to nuclear-related sites. 

So my questions—I have several. The first would be, how can the 

P5+1 more effectively pursue better monitoring and verification 
14 

processes during these ongoing negotiations? That would be my 

first question. 

And how can we ensure that the IAEA inspectors can have better 

access to Iran’s facilities? Because a lot of this negotiation deals 

with ability to verify and actually go in and seek out these issues. 

So that would be my first set of questions to whomever. 

Yes, Doctor? 

Ambassador PICKERING. Perhaps I could begin. 

I think that your point is very important, and, indeed, full inspection and monitoring is a critical question in dealing with a lot 

of potential issues. 

The Joint Plan of Action itself has unprecedented new monitoring arrangements in the current 6-month period for the International Atomic Energy Agency, including for the first time ever inspection of centrifuge parts, production, and centrifuge assembly 

plants, including daily access to Iran’s nuclear facilities, something 

that has been, I think, speeded up and is unusual, and including, 

instead of providing the world with quarterly reports of what is 

happening in Iran, the IAEA is now providing monthly reports on 

Iranian compliance with all of the aspects of the Joint Plan of Action. 

The IAEA is clearly, in my view, at an absolute minimum, going 

to have to apply something called the Additional Protocol, something the Iranians agreed to for a period of 2 years. They signed 

but did not ratify. And at the end of the 2-year period, because of 

their objections to continued Western insistence that they go to 

zero centrifuges and zero enrichment, they resumed a regular inspection cycle rather than the Additional Protocol. 

The Additional Protocol provides a great deal more access, including at the choice of the IAEA, rather than on the basis of prior 

agreement. I, myself, have believed for a long period of time we 

also ought to draw lessons from the Iraq inspections that were 

under a separate negotiated arrangement with Iraq stemming out 

of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and indeed the period after 

that and a series of U.N. resolutions. That, at a minimum, in my 

view, should give the IAEA anytime, anywhere access, which was 

the standard in Iraq. 

And it turned out, in fact, that that standard was a lot better, 

despite the fact that the Iraqis had on occasion tried to resist those 

inspections. Nevertheless, it was the mobilization, put it this way, 

of international strength and support, our military presence in the 

area, the no-fly zone, and, indeed, other capabilities which, in the 

end, I think helped a great deal to get the kind of level of assurance that we had. Those kinds of approaches are important. 

Finally, since Iraq and, indeed, since the Additional Protocol, 

new technical techniques for examining and following the kinds of 

activities that should constitute part of the inspection mechanism 

should themselves be incorporated in any new ramified inspection 

arrangement with regard to Iran. 

That obviously has to be based on access, but with the access of 

the Additional Protocol and what I would suggest beyond that, I 

think we have gotten close to the kind of inspection that can give 

us not absolute certainty but at least a high confidence that our 
15 

system can not only monitor what is already going on but have a 

reasonable chance of finding covert activities. 

The reasonable news is that, up until now, when Iran started 

hidden activities, we had a very good indication through our national intelligence mechanism several years ahead of the actual 

declaration of those facilities, about which the Iranians disputed 

with the U.N., but, nevertheless, we knew. 

I think, finally, we have a huge envelope of ambiguity against 

the Iranians in attempting covert activity, particularly if we make 

our capacity to respond to that, up to and including the use of force 

if necessary, as clear and on the table as a part of the agreement; 

the ambiguity being that the uncertainty on their side and the consequences of failing to comply with the agreement become a great 

deal more punishing than the uncertainty on our side. 

And that is helpful in deterring the Iranians from moving in that 

direction, but I would be the first to say we will never achieve 100 

percent. We can achieve very high confidence, as you know. On a 

regular basis, General Clapper is able to tell us in his annual report that the Iranians have not made a decision to make a nuclear 

weapon, and he continues to say this with what he calls high confidence, which, as I read the intelligence in this particular issue 

and the judgments about intelligence, is a pretty solid basis for 

making that kind of conclusion. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Mr. Chairman, I would just like to put on the 

record that if we are to continue down this particular path of this 

negotiation, this ‘‘anytime, anywhere’’ issue for me is really a 

make-or-break. Because, you know, the problem is not what they 

are going to let us take a look at; the problem is what they don’t 

show us in what they have. And that is where all of these issues 

have occurred. 

And thank you for your indulgence on the time, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I join with you that I am very concerned about superfluous, 

to me, almost wishful thinking, as world peace is at risk with the 

potential of Iran developing a nuclear capability. And I appreciate, 

too, that the concerns we have really are bipartisan. There is just 

such a concern. 

We need to, I think, refresh our memories. And that is that, in 

considering these negotiations with Iran, a state sponsor of terrorism, I believe that the President is putting American families at 

risk by ignoring the clear threats of Iran’s rulers. In fact, I believe 

that weakness will lead to conflict and more attacks worldwide. 

In 1983, we should not forget, but somehow people have, that the 

bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut was by Iran. It was the 

largest explosive device since Hiroshima; 305 personnel were killed. 

We should remember that, of course, it was Iran that produced the 

IEDs [improvised explosive devices] to kill American troops in Iraq 

and Afghanistan, killing civilians too. And it is horrific that these 

IEDs were used, vehicle-borne, to purposely kill Iraqi children. This 

was not an accident. 

The President has failed to encourage the Green Revolution, 

where the young people of Iran wanted change, regime change. 
16 

And the people seeking regime change actually were shot and 

killed in the streets and were not given the encouragement they 

should. And we know Iran is the culture of ancient Persia, and 

there is a great history that should be reestablished but not 

through an authoritarian regime. 

And, just this spring, we know that Iran was transshipping missiles to terrorists. But, fortunately, Israel has stopped this transfer. 

The message that we should understand—at rallies in Tehran, 

the signs that are carried are in English for our benefit, and they 

are very clear. They say, ‘‘Death to America. Death to Israel.’’ That 

is what they mean. 

In light of that, Mr. Singh, as Iran refuses to reveal the extent 

of its nuclear program now while talks are ongoing, what would 

make anyone believe that they would reveal the extent of these 

programs accurately once a comprehensive agreement is reached? 

In your view, should the P5+1 sign a comprehensive deal with 

Iran if Iran has not fully satisfied all the IAEA concerns regarding 

possible military dimensions? 

Mr. SINGH. Thank you, Congressman. 

I think it is an excellent question. I think the answer is ‘‘no,’’ 

that this has to be a key element of what we do. 

Right now, this is being pursued by the IAEA, this question of 

possible military dimensions. And let’s face it, that word, ‘‘possible,’’ is a bit generous. These are military dimensions to a program. That is what the weaponization research is for. 

And these clearly need to be resolved, and we need to see Iran 

come clean. Because it is important, I think, that this start from, 

as Mr. Tobey said, a clear strategic decision by Iran to leave the 

military elements of its program behind. And unless they are willing to do that, then I don’t think we should sign an agreement. 

I think it is also very important for the inspectors. And the Congresswoman’s question about how do we strengthen inspections, I 

think that having these issues resolved, having Iran come clean on 

its past activities is absolutely key to that so the inspectors have 

a roadmap, have a baseline. 

But there are other elements to that, Congressman. I think we 

need to make sure that we keep our own intelligence resources in 

place, that we don’t start drawing them down because we think 

this issue is finished after an agreement is signed. We have to keep 

our eye on Iran. 

I think it is important that we keep military forces in the region, 

that we don’t draw those down, thinking that the problem is solved 

after an agreement is signed, because, again, we need a credible 

enforcement mechanism and a credible military threat if necessary, 

which hopefully we will never have to use. So I do think that that 

is an incredibly important part of the program. 

Look, I think that what we really want to see is a strategic decision by Iran to forego any hope of having nuclear weapons in the 

future. We would like to see a broader shift by Iran such that we 

could have a better relationship with them. But I don’t see yet evidence of that shift, nor am I necessarily confident that if we sign 

a nuclear agreement you will start to see that kind of broader easing of tensions. We could hope for that, but I think we need to be 

clear-eyed, we need to be realistic. 
17 

And we are going to need to continue to push back, I would say, 

far harder than we are now on Iranian shipment of arms, Iranian 

support for terrorism, and other activities like that, in part to show 

our allies that we are not stepping back from the region in the 

wake of an agreement. 

Mr. WILSON. And I appreciate that very much. And I share your 

concern. And, hey, the thought that we would be considering military dimensions—as we know, they are developing a ballistic missile capability that could attack southeastern Europe all the way 

back over to India. So our allies are at risk. 

Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Ms. Davis. 

Ambassador PICKERING. Mr. Wilson, could I just make a comment on what Mr. Singh—— 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired, so we need to 

move on. 

Ambassador PICKERING. Okay. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Davis. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you to all of you. 

It seems to me that we are looking at a number of continuums 

here, I mean, from what I guess we might see as ideal to absolutely 

horrible, in addition to the time factors that we are looking at. And 

I wonder if you could talk a little bit about that and where time 

itself fits into this and who it is serving. 

The sanctions seem to have had an impact in terms of bringing 

Iran to the table, but how much longer and how more aggressive 

if we were to move in that direction in a different way? Where do 

you see that? I mean, is there a breaking point here, in some ways, 

in terms of Iran and the impact of those sanctions and, certainly, 

the public reaction as well? Some people have talked about facesaving measures, things that are needed. Could you help out with 

that? 

Ambassador PICKERING. Perhaps I could take a shot at that. 

I think that up until November it was, I think, quite clear to all 

of us, as Iran made larger amounts of 20-percent material and increased the number of centrifuges it had in operation on a regular 

basis, that time was not on our side. 

At least momentarily, through the 20th of July, the Joint Plan 

of Action gets rid of the 20-percent material, keeps the level of lowenriched uranium stockpile the way it was at the beginning, allows 

the introduction of no more centrifuges, and, indeed, does a great 

number of things, not everything, but does a great number of 

things that I think are helpful. 

And various estimates have been made of the amount of breakout time that particular agreement allows us, perhaps going from 

as low as 2 weeks to something on the order of 2 or 3 months. 

These are just estimates. I don’t know that anybody can, you know, 

prove this on a stack of Bibles, but I think it is a more comfortable 

position. 

It also set a standard for the comprehensive agreement. The 

comprehensive agreement must be based on our agreement about 

an ongoing Iranian civil nuclear program as the basis. It says ‘‘joint 
18 

agreement,’’ but that means our agreement has to be there. That 

is an extremely important standard that has to be met. 

If time does not allow us until the 20th of July, we have another 

opportunity, because the Joint Plan of Action allows another 6 

months—— 

Mrs. DAVIS. It includes another step, right. 

Ambassador PICKERING. It includes that. And presumably, but I 

don’t know, it would have to be decided whether, in fact, all of 

those limitations will apply, will there be any more sanctions relief 

or no more sanctions relief. 

My own view would be the status quo, as it exists now, should 

be extended for additional negotiations if it looks like we have 

made real progress. If we don’t, then we have to face the hard decision as to whether we walk away from the table. And the consequences of that—— 

Mrs. DAVIS. Right. 

Ambassador PICKERING [continuing]. I have laid out in my testimony. I think it is very important. 

I would like just to add one more point. Mr. Singh seems to put 

a lot of faith—he and I don’t agree on a lot of things, but I agree 

on most of what he and Mr. Tobey have said here today, particularly on inspection. 

But Mr. Singh seems to put a lot of faith in the notion that the 

Iranians would somehow tell us that they have been involved in a 

weapons program and they now no longer are, and I would not. 

The history with Iran and perhaps with North Korea, I would put 

a lot of faith in the ideas that they and I have put forward, that 

it is through inspection and intelligence collection and the best job 

we can do in squeezing that program down that will give us the 

faith that they aren’t going to go. 

And even if they say, in fact, well, we made these steps and we 

are not serious and we are not going to do it again, thank you very 

much, I would not at that point be convinced. I would want very 

much to see an ongoing program of monitored, verified action on 

their part. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Yeah. And I guess there is an expectation there. I 

would think that they anticipate also that that is part of the deal. 

Do you—we are going to go past July 20th, likely. 

Mr. SINGH. I think so. 

And to be clear, I would say that both are necessary, not just one 

or the other. I think we have to have an accounting of past work 

as well as ongoing, very intrusive inspections, where I agree with 

Ambassador Pickering, for whom I have great respect, that we 

need to have Iraq-style on-demand inspections. 

I have a hard time believing that the current differences that we 

have between the United States side and our P5+1 partners and 

Iran on the issues of centrifuges, sanctions relief, the timeline of 

an agreement can be bridged before July 20th, especially the centrifuge issue, because there we are very far apart. 

And it is hard, in a sense, to understand the Iranian position. 

Because Iran, if it really just wants nuclear power—remember, 

most states in the world that have nuclear power import their nuclear fuel. We here in the United States import a good portion of 
19 

our nuclear fuel. Iran itself, for its one working nuclear reactor, imports its nuclear fuel. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Right. 

Mr. SINGH. And so it is hard to make sense of that position absent a desire for nuclear weapons. 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentlelady’s time has expired. 

Mr. Franks. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, I guess the first thing I should do is to ask for 

diplomatic immunity here today, because I have heard some things 

that leave me bewildered or even astonished. 

I have heard statements that the goal of Iran is to gain nuclear 

weapons without international condemnation. And I think, if Iran 

could gain nuclear weapons, with or without international condemnation, if that was the only thing that they had to worry about, 

that they would proceed tomorrow. 

I have heard it said that there is evidence that they don’t intend 

to do it because they have chosen not to build, when every piece 

of evidence we have says that they have been pursuing this for a 

long time. 

I have heard it said, you know, that we need to just cap the enrichment to 3 to 5 percent, when most people who are familiar with 

that process know that, from the time we find uranium in the 

ground until the time that we can take it to 41⁄2 percent, we are 

80 percent or more the way there to a fissile material, to a weapons-grade material. 

I have heard it said that we could possibly, only possibly, set 

them back 2 to 4 years, that somehow we would suggest that the 

United States of America could not prevent Iran from gaining nuclear weapons if the commitment was there. And I find that just, 

again, hard to express here. 

I have heard it said that there are conclusions that there is a 

high confidence that they have not made the decision to pursue a 

nuclear weapons capability, and I would suggest to you that that 

involves having to have clairvoyance and, especially in the face of 

any available evidence, points exactly to the opposite. 

Mr. Chairman, I believe that this Administration is placing us all 

on a trajectory where Iran gains a nuclear weapons capability and 

sets the entire world walking in the shadow of nuclear terrorism. 

And I find it just astonishing that there is such a casual cognitive 

dissonance here that somehow that we don’t seem to understand 

how significant the issue really is. To see the world’s leading sponsor of terrorism gaining a nuclear weapons capability will cause us 

to need a new calendar. It will change everything. Our children 

will never walk in peace again if that happens. The American people understand that, and I am astonished that some of the most 

erudite leaders in this country don’t seem to grasp that. 

Mr. Chairman, under the interim agreement, Iran is essentially 

protected in a protocol for enrichment up to 3 to 5 percent, and Mr. 

Chairman, I would suggest to you, sir, that that is the whole ball 

game; that if Iran can enrich uranium or produce plutonium that 

it is within their power to proceed to a nuclear weapons capability 

at will. The breakout is just a matter of a few months at most. 
20 

And Mr. Chairman, I guess I need to calm down here a little bit 

and just ask one basic question: You know, we have seen the 

United Nations Security Council adopt multiple resolutions since 

2006 demanding Iran’s full and sustained suspension of all uranium enrichment-related and reprocessing activities and Iran’s full 

cooperation with the IAEA on all outstanding issues related to its 

nuclear activities. And to date, Iran has violated almost all of those 

resolutions. And if Iran’s nuclear aspirations are only for peaceful 

purposes, why would they continually violate these resolutions and 

hide their nuclear facilities, as, Mr. Chairman, you said, under a 

mountain, a very appropriate question in my mind, for decades in 

these secretive compounds? 

So my question, and I am going to send it to Mr. Singh if I could, 

and incidentally, sir, I think your analysis has been excellent here 

today. The interim agreement did not fulfill the demands of the 

United Nations Security Council resolutions and the question is: 

Do you have confidence that any final deal will satisfy those resolutions? 

Mr. SINGH. Thank you, Mr. Congressman. 

It does not look like a final deal will satisfy those requirements. 

What the resolution said was that—and these were often unanimous resolutions—said that Iran had to suspend its enrichment reprocessing and heavy-water-related work. Right now, the heavy 

water reactor at Arak is continuing, although they have suspended 

some elements of that under the interim agreement, but it looks 

like as part of a final deal, they will be permitted to continue with 

that work. Enrichment we have conceded also on enrichment, as 

you have indicated, and so, no, I can’t say that a final agreement 

would—— 

Mr. FRANKS. So, Mr. Chairman, ultimately, the centrifuges are 

going to continue to spin and this Administration is going to continue to fiddle. 

I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Gabbard. 

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Good morning, gentlemen. Thanks for being here. First question 

really goes to transparency in this process, and I am wondering, 

Ambassador, is it possible or realistic, and if so, how, to create an 

environment where the IAEA has full access to the entirety of the 

Iranian nuclear program to include the military sites, and if they 

are refusing to reveal the extent of their research and development 

[R&D] now, what would give us any assurance or confidence that 

once an agreement is reached, that we would have access both to 

the sites and to the extent of their R&D? And how can we reach 

an agreement unless we have this? 

Ambassador PICKERING. The purpose of the present agreement is 

to satisfy your second point; that is, that the IAEA will be satisfied 

that all of the actions taken by Iran under the rubric of possible 

military developments, that is, actions they took between 1998 and 

2003, which we have good reason to suspect were involved in the 

militarization of their nuclear program, have to be explained and 

revealed, if I can put it that way, for the reasons that Mr. Singh 

made clear, and with which I agree, that we can’t inspect future 
21 

programs if we don’t know how they misbehaved in the past. And 

so that is very important. 

That work is apparently going ahead. Will it be done by the 20th 

of July? I very much doubt it. And that will be an important factor 

in the consideration. But I don’t think we should have a comprehensive deal until we are satisfied on that point. With respect 

to the first question, is it possible for us to put into place a regime 

under which we could expect any time, anywhere, and the answer 

to that is yes. The difficulty is, is it possible to put into a place 

where we know exactly what is going on in the head of the Iranian 

leadership at any particular time and at any particular moment? 

At the moment, we have not yet, with all respect, solved that problem. That is a traditional problem of intelligence where, in fact, we 

can know a great deal. We may know a lot. Congressman Franks 

was rather disparaging of General Clapper a moment ago, the Director of National Intelligence, who continues to say, year after 

year, he believes with high confidence, and if Mr. Franks doesn’t 

really know, he should ask General Clapper because it is important 

that he understand why General Clapper agrees with high confidence that Iran has not made a decision to go for a nuclear weapon. 

But the principal problem is going anywhere and looking at everything gives us a leg up. But it doesn’t give us total, absolute, 

100 percent, you know, vacuum-proof confidence that we can do it. 

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you. Thank you. And the second question 

for Mr. Tobey: With your involvement and experience with North 

Korea, I am wondering what lessons learned should we be cognizant of now to make sure that this deal does not end up with the 

situation where we are today where we continue to deal with a nuclear threat from North Korea? 

Mr. TOBEY. There is a very direct lesson. At the time of the 

agreed framework, there was a dispute between the IAEA and 

North Korea about whether or not they would have access to certain of the material in North Korea that would give them definitive 

knowledge of what North Korea had done in the past. The United 

States actually undermined the IAEA by saying it wasn’t worth 

blocking a deal to go back and understand what had happened before. And unfortunately, that—I think it was done in good faith, 

and in—with some reasonably credible view that in a time when 

communist regimes were falling all over the world, the North 

Korea problem would solve itself within 5 years, and it wasn’t 

worth risking no deal to understand history. 

My point about understanding the possible military dimensions 

in Iran, is that it is worth and it is necessary to have a good deal. 

And one thing I would clarify with respect to the possible military 

dimensions, the point has been made that they halted in 2003. Actually, what the IAEA has reported is that there are indications 

that some activities relevant to the development of nuclear explosive device continued after 2003, and that some may still be ongoing. So this isn’t all about history. This is about the future. 

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Lamborn. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
22 

Last month, I offered an amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act, which stated that the United States should only 

agree to a comprehensive agreement with Iran if three conditions 

are met: One, Iran must cease enriching uranium; two, Iran must 

cease pursuing or developing nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons and ballistic missile technology; and three, Iran must stop supporting terrorism. 

These are positions taken by the House in the past. This language was adopted by this committee, and the bill passed unanimously out of this committee and passed the House by a strong bipartisan vote. So let the record reflect that this now is the position 

of the U.S. House of Representatives. 

For Mr. Tobey or Mr. Singh, can you describe the difference between the Israel and the U.S. definitions of what the red line is 

that should not be crossed, must not be crossed by Iran? 

Mr. TOBEY. Well, I am actually a little unclear as to what, if any, 

red lines the United States has drawn with respect to Iran. I think 

it was pretty clear from Prime Minister Netanyahu’s speech at the 

United Nations, where he had the graphic that production of 20 

percent enriched uranium beyond a certain level was unacceptable 

to Israel. So I guess that would describe the difference as I understand it. 

Mr. LAMBORN. And, Mr. Singh, how would you answer that? 

Mr. SINGH. I think that Mr. Tobey is right. I think that the 

Israelis—but also not just the Israelis. I mean, the Israelis are very 

vocal on these points, but I think their basic view is shared by 

quite a few of our allies in the region, that some of the concessions 

that we have already made in the negotiations go too far for their 

comfort level. And so there is a lot of nervousness about what we 

are prepared to concede in this agreement, what we have already 

conceded in the negotiations, and what sort of stance we will have 

after an agreement is reached if in fact an agreement is reached. 

And so I would say that we—there are significant gaps between 

the U.S. and our allies, both Israel and the Arab allies, and it is 

very important that as part of our Iran policy, broadly, we address 

these differences; that we address these concerns that our allies 

have, lest we find ourselves again in a strategically much worse position after an agreement is signed. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Well, when I look at—my personal opinion is that 

when you look at those differences, I am inclined to agree with 

them more than the Administration’s position on which is the better approach. 

Changing subjects here, Secretary Kerry indicated that we are 

open to cooperate with Iran on the ISIS [Islamic State in Iraq and 

Syria] crisis in Iraq. Do you think that if such cooperation with 

Iran were to take place, that that would give them license to be 

more aggressive in the region, thus impacting the nuclear negotiations? Mr. Tobey. 

Mr. TOBEY. Well, I think, actually, what Iran has—some Iranian 

officials already have said is that the crisis in Iraq should give 

them greater leverage on the nuclear matter. In other words, if the 

United States expects Iranian help in Iraq, the United States 

should show greater flexibility in the nuclear talks. I think, of 
23 

course, that were we to pursue such flexibility, it would be a disaster. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Another question, changing subjects. There has 

been some discussion in the Senate and it has been squelched, but 

I know Senators Menendez and, from Illinois, Kirk, want to have 

a—pass a bill, have sanctions in place in case the negotiations 

break through, do not go forward, as an incentive to the Iranians 

to keep negotiating. Would either of you two agree with that being 

a good bill to pass at this time? 

Mr. TOBEY. I think the notion of contingent sanctions being real 

to the Iranian Government is a constructive one for the—a good 

outcome. 

Mr. SINGH. I would just add to that, look, I think in any negotiation like this there has to be an ‘‘or else’’ that is out there for the 

Iranians. And I think that ‘‘or else’’ can take multiple forms, a 

credible military threat, which I think right now isn’t very credible, 

or contingent sanctions. 

Mr. LAMBORN. And I agree with both of you. I am glad to hear 

you say that. 

And Mr. Pickering, my last question, if Iran were somehow to develop a nuclear weapon, what would be—can you list some of the 

other countries in the region that would want to have their own 

nuclear program and/or weapon, just so the public can be aware? 

Ambassador PICKERING. Well, I can. I think that we have always 

been concerned that countries like Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt 

less so because of the turmoil in Egypt at the present time, although Egypt still a formidable potential power for moving in this 

direction, and in the past, we saw indications over the last three 

or four decades of Egyptian interest in this area. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Any others? Any others? 

Ambassador PICKERING. I think the United Arab Emirates, although we have a very tight 123 agreement with them that rules 

out enrichment and reprocessing, and so that is important. Could 

I just mention on contingency sanctions? My sanctions—we have 

contingency sanctions in place at the present time. 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman’s time is expired. 

Ambassador PICKERING. But the Iranians believe, in fact, that 

sanctions will happen immediately when the President wants it. 

Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. I—we need to stay within the 

timelines or we won’t be able to get all of the questions in. Ms. 

Duckworth. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Ambassador, it is good to see you. I want to return to the 

inspection regime, and you know, what we are talking with Iran 

right now, is that—or all the things we are asking them to do are 

all reversible, right, not enriching the uranium beyond the 20 percent and the like. But going back to the inspection regime, how 

confident are you, given U.S. intelligence and IAEA’s verification 

capabilities, that a 6-month breakout window would be a sufficient 

period of time for us to actually even detect and counter them 

doing so? I mean, do we have the intelligence capabilities right now 

to even detect? I am afraid that we are going to—they are going 
24 

to be further down in that 6-month window, and we won’t even detect it, and we won’t be able to react in time. 

Ambassador PICKERING. I think it is a very good question. My 

own sense is that there are some people who would like to have 

the breakout window as long as 5 years. There are some who might 

agree on 3 years. The U.S. Government is purported to have said 

6 months to 12 months, maybe more if they could get it, would be 

very useful. 

I think breakout is just one measure. The important questions 

that my two colleagues and I have put before you on inspection and 

monitoring, are really a key. In effect, if you don’t know what is 

going on, no amount of breakout time is of any value. So we have 

to look at this as a whole nexus of factors and elements that we 

have to take into account. And so it is very important. 

I think that breakout time, as my testimony makes clear, is designed to provide us an opportunity before using force, which the 

President has kept on the table and says it is on the table, to see 

if we can stop a breakout short of the use of force. But the use of 

force is not taken off the table by an extension of breakout time. 

It shouldn’t be, in my view. It is still there. A use of force might 

stop a breakout. It might not stop a breakout, but it appears to be 

one of the better factors that we have going for us in that particular set of issues. 

I am not sure if I have addressed your question well, but I think 

that it is that combination of doing our best to know what is going 

on. I think our intelligence has been pretty good. But anybody who 

believes their intelligence is perfect is in trouble. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Well, thank you. I want to follow up on that, 

you know, and sort of go back to what you said earlier about the 

need for inspections and that we can’t come from a position where 

we trust that Iranians will tell us that they are doing things in secret, and you know, if an agreement is reached which involves 

sanctions relief, I mean, how do we assure that the relief is not 

abused to advance a secret program beyond the inspection regime? 

And also you know, are there additional steps that the U.S. needs 

to take to combat the illicit procurement activities? And I am 

thinking specifically, they are going to have, if we reduce some of 

these sanctions, greater access to other markets. They are going to 

have more participation with other potential providers, and they 

are not going to tell us, Hey, we are secretly buying this stuff on 

the side because we now have access. What other things can we do 

beyond the inspection regime to ensure that we safeguard—— 

Ambassador PICKERING. I think we have heavily relied on our intelligence in the past to look at procurement activities. The IAEA 

does not have an intelligence system. It relies, in effect, on tip-offs 

from the intelligence systems of the big powers and other countries 

that have good intelligence. And in the past, intelligence has sometimes erred. But in my view, it is better to make a mistake and 

go look at it than it is to make the mistake of not taking into account what you think you are seeing and not look at it. And that 

is very, very important. 

I do agree that as we have gotten down into procurement, particularly into centrifuge construction, and the making of the rotors 

for the centrifuges, which are a very important element, and some 
25 

of the specific materials that are not available to the Iranians or 

the Iranians have trouble making and are heavily dependent on 

the import is significant, it is very significant to look at that kind 

of material and take a look at whether, in fact, there may be covert 

operations using that material because the material balance between what we know and the material balance between what they 

import will show differences which will give us that kind of telltale. 

So there are useful ways of looking at these particular problems 

that can give us confidence, even high confidence. I keep telling 

you, however, I think there is nothing perfect. But I would rather 

go with the deal, with all of the monitoring and access that we 

have been talking about here at this table, and on which I think 

we have an agreement, than not go with a deal and have no monitoring and access at all. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. THORNBERRY [presiding]. Thank you, Ms. Duckworth. 

Mr. Nugent. 

Mr. NUGENT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And you know, the testimony we heard today ranges across the 

board to—from being very optimistic to being pessimistic, talking 

about inspections. Do we truly believe that the IAEA is going to 

have the power to do the inspections necessary, because I do believe that we need to be more than just hopeful that we are getting 

the right information, and we hear that, well, we are never going 

to be certain. Well, I would rather err on the side of certainty, overinspect than under-inspect. 

Do we have any confidence that we can have that occur on inspections? 

Mr. TOBEY. The IAEA has very important, significant verification 

capabilities, great technical expertise. But ultimately, their power 

to sort of use those authorities is a political one. It depends on the 

board of governors in the first instance and, after that, the United 

Nations Security Council. So if it comes to a point where there is 

a dispute as to what they should be looking at and what they 

shouldn’t, it will be resolved politically in the Security Council. 

Mr. SINGH. And if I could just say, Congressman, that I think 

this may sound obvious, but the bigger the program you leave Iran 

with, the harder the inspections are. And so I would encourage us 

not to see the size of the program and the rigor of the inspections 

as somehow a tradeoff that, well, if you have got good inspections, 

you can give them a lot more residual capacity. I think you would 

want to help the inspectors by ensuring that program is as constrained as possible and that it has that political backing via a very 

strong enforcement mechanism to which we have a credible commitment. 

Ambassador PICKERING. And Mr. Nugent, I think it is extremely 

important that we get a Security Council resolution supporting the 

agreement and hopefully one that says that if it is necessary to use 

force, sanctions, and pressure, we have the right to do so. 

Mr. NUGENT. Well, I appreciate that succinct answer. There was 

a comment made about their covert activities, and I guess that 

really is the crux of it. You know, you have heard the chairman 

talk about, well, you know, if you are doing this for peaceful 

means, why would you have the facility under a mountain? Well, 
26 

you wouldn’t. I mean, you just wouldn’t. But what are the chances, 

I guess, and this is the hard question, because intelligence is great. 

But we know that the intelligence community has missed the mark 

on so many issues. But once you miss it, it is almost impossible to 

go back and correct the issue, talk about covert opportunities that 

they have, or even the opportunities to purchase a weapon. 

Mr. TOBEY. Verification is the process of presenting a complete 

picture of the entire fabric of activities. And if there are inconsistencies, loose threads, pulling at those loose threads until you understand exactly what happened. And if you actually have access 

to people and documents and places, it becomes very difficult to 

hide those things, especially when the inspection process interacts 

with intelligence means. 

Mr. NUGENT. But do we have that today? 

Mr. TOBEY. It is not in place today. It is my hope that any agreement would have that as a key component. 

Mr. SINGH. Congressman, if I could just add, you asked, what 

confidence do we have? A former Deputy Director General of the 

IAEA, Olli Heinonen, has pointed out that if Iran doesn’t have a 

covert element to its program now, it would be the first time in 

decades that they don’t have that. Remember that all of these facilities we are talking about, Arak, Natanz, Fordow, were once 

clandestine facilities, which were exposed, which were not declared 

by Iran, but exposed, and they are all still in place and all still 

functioning. 

Mr. NUGENT. And lastly, we talked about ballistic missiles. Why 

would we have a ballistic missile or in development of a ballistic 

missile for conventional versus the need, obviously, to have a delivery vehicle if you are going to go down the weaponization of nuclear? Why would you be spending time and money on development 

of ballistic missiles if your intention was just to use it as a conventional delivery system? 

Mr. TOBEY. It makes no military sense. There could be some argument that it could be useful as a terror weapon, not particularly 

appealing either. 

Ambassador PICKERING. I would just have to add that, of course, 

Iran and Iraq fought an 8-year war. They all had ballistic missiles 

at that time. They had no nuclear weapons. We were worried about 

nuclear weapons, but the nuclear weapon program came along in 

Iran after that war. 

Mr. NUGENT. And I guess the last thing is, I just have a hard 

time trusting Iran just from the mere fact when I was in Iraq in 

2011, an Iranian warhead was use to kill five of our soldiers. And 

they didn’t get that off the shelf at Walmart. 

And I yield back. Thank you. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Nugent. 

Mr. Barber. 

Mr. BARBER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And gentlemen, thank you for being here today and for your testimony. As a cosponsor of H.R. 850, the Nuclear Iran Prevention 

Act, I am very concerned, as many of my colleagues are, about a 

nuclear Iran and what that would mean for our ally in Israel. I was 

in Israel last August and I saw firsthand the threats on every border. But every official I met with, whether they were military or 
27 

political, from all across the spectrum, said one thing consistently, 

and that is: We have to stop Iran from getting a nuclear weapon. 

And I agree with that. We cannot be talking about containment. 

We have to talk about prevention. And I understand the importance of attempting a diplomatic solution. And I hope that there is 

some success here. But I remain skeptical about Iran and how 

trustworthy they could be on any agreement. In fact, when I was 

meeting, along with other Members, with representatives from the 

Administration we asked them, Have you identified, has intelligence identified all of the Iranian nuclear facilities? And they 

said, No, we haven’t because some are hard to find. And entering 

into the negotiations or an agreement on that basis is very worrisome to me. And I think we need to be very careful about it. 

So I would like you, if you could, to comment on that issue of 

whether or not we can, in fact, reach an agreement that would 

identify the facilities so they can be inspected. 

Secondly, I am concerned about the removal of sanctions. I think 

it is going to be extraordinarily difficult to rebuild sanctions if an 

agreement does not get concluded. And I would like you, if you 

could, to comment on that. 

And then, finally, I want to go to the issue that was raised earlier by my colleague about the recent advice we have been getting 

across the board that we should perhaps have some discussions 

with Iran about joining together to secure Iraq from ISIS. It seems 

to me that this is a peculiar step for us to take with Iran, given 

our position on Syria and historically on Iran, so I would like you 

to explain in a little bit more detail if you could, to how the negotiations, if they occur, with Iran and ISIS in Iraq, how will they 

affect in any specific way the P5+1 negotiations? And conversely, 

can the P5+1 negotiations further complicate and potentially worsen an already delicate situation with Iraq, and how would these negotiations potentially affect our relationship with Israel? 

I know I have given you a lot, but I wanted to get all of the questions in so we could conserve on time and perhaps you could respond as quickly as possible. Thank you. 

Ambassador PICKERING. Perhaps I could take a shot at a couple 

of the points that you make. I think that Iran has said they want 

to use the Iraq issue to see if they can effect a nuclear negotiation. 

The U.S. has said very clearly, it is not going to do that. And I 

think that that is important. I don’t see the President at the moment rushing into Iraq again. I think, if anything, he is consulting 

up here and being very cautious about it, but we can all have our 

own ideas about that particular issue. 

I think on the question of inspections, you have gotten us into 

Don Rumsfeld’s unknown unknowns. Of course, by definitions, unknown unknowns are not knowable, and there is no way to get 

around that. What we do, I think, see is that Iran’s nuclear capacities are understood and known. We know where the pieces are, 

and I don’t believe there are pieces that we don’t know about in 

terms of the chain of facilities required to do enrichment, the chain 

of facilities required to produce heavy water. They have no capacity 

to produce plutonium in a reprocessing plant at the present time. 

So we see most of that. The really interesting question is, could 

there be an entirely black covert program going on? And Olli 
28 

Heinonen, whose views I respect, may not have been referring to 

anything that large. He may have been referring to individual experiments about pieces of activity that we saw back before 2003. 

We don’t know. 

But it is important to believe at least that we have a pretty good 

chance, and I think there is agreement here at the table, of finding 

bigger pieces that would be important in producing the nuclear fuel 

or conforming and configuring the warhead that we are worried 

about, and there I have some confidence that we are in better 

shape. 

Mr. BARBER. Okay, I know we have very little time. 

Quickly, Mr. Tobey, Mr. Singh? 

Mr. SINGH. Let me just say on sanctions relief that I think we 

should, that if there is an agreement, sanctions relief should be 

backloaded, that anything that is irreversible, and I agree that 

sanctions would be very hard to put back together, should come at 

the end of the process once we have seen what Iran’s track record 

is. And even then, I think there are a number of sanctions that are 

going to have to stay in place because they address issues like terrorists. 

Mr. BARBER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Barber. 

Mr. Byrne. 

Mr. BYRNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, thank you for being here today. Like many of my colleagues, I am a skeptic about the reality of what these talks can 

produce for us. But I am even further concerned by some of the testimony we have already heard about what might be the threat to 

the talks by introducing as a sidebar issue, this issue of the potential of some help or some cooperation between the United States 

and Iran in the Iraq ISIL [Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant] 

issue. 

I heard, Mr. Tobey, you made some pretty strong comments 

about that. From my experience in negotiating, if I introduce a new 

issue in negotiations, the person with whom I am negotiating is 

going to want something back in return for that. 

Are we, in fact, endangering our position in the negotiations over 

this agreement by introducing, even as a sidebar issue, this whole 

issue of some communication or cooperation between the United 

States and Iran with regard to the ISIL issue in Iraq? 

Ambassador PICKERING. I think, sir, that Iran will be moved to 

do what they think they need to do to save Prime Minister Maliki 

and his regime. In my view, that fundamentally means changing 

Mr. Maliki’s view on how he deals with the minorities in his own 

country. The ISIS people have scooped up lots of people who have 

been antagonized by Mr. Maliki among the Sunni population. And 

you remember back when we moved into Anbar and changed our 

policies and worked with the Sunnis. He has done exactly the opposite. He hasn’t helped them. He hasn’t supported them. He has put 

them in jail. He has treated them very badly. ISIS has made a lot 

of progress because, in fact, it has captured Sunni villages in northern Iraq. 

We now have to trust to see whether Maliki can do two things 

at once: can change his policies with respect to his minorities and 
29 

begin to bring them back on his side; and at the same time, provide 

a significant defense so he doesn’t lose his capital at the same time. 

Mr. BYRNE. But my concern is is that we are introducing into the 

negotiations with regard to this agreement a new issue. 

Ambassador PICKERING. I am not introducing the issue, and I 

don’t think the U.S. is going to introduce the issue. 

Mr. BYRNE. Well, we have some reports that they are. If that is 

true, does that change our position? 

Ambassador PICKERING. Well, you know, I have reason to believe 

that those reports are at this point very tentative kinds of things. 

I think people are thinking better of this now. I hope they are. My 

own view is that Iran has to look out for its own interests in Iraq; 

that it is not up to the U.S. to teleguide them, to make deals with 

them. I think it is very important, particularly not at the expense 

of the issue we are here to discuss today, the nuclear deal. 

Mr. BYRNE. Let me ask Mr. Singh and Mr. Tobey to respond to 

that. 

Mr. SINGH. What I would say is I think that U.S. officials have 

tried to clarify that we don’t want to see these two issues linked, 

and I think that is right. I think one of the dangers we have, 

though, is, again, the sort of perception in the region, and I think 

that when we are sitting there, sort of talking with the Iranians 

about these issues, it does raise those kind of worries in the region 

about, are we sort of sitting here and deciding regional issues on 

a bilateral basis with Iran, which our allies absolutely don’t want 

to see us do and, frankly, isn’t a wise thing for us to do from a policy perspective. 

And I agree with Ambassador Pickering. The Iranians see these 

things as leverage over us, and we don’t want to see them linked 

at all. I think, more importantly though, what we really don’t want 

to see, we don’t want to see any increased Iranian involvement in 

Iraq. We want to see Iran out of regional conflicts, not further in 

regional conflicts. 

Mr. BYRNE. Mr. Tobey. 

Mr. TOBEY. I think greater Iranian involvement in Iraq would be 

against U.S. interests for its own sake, and I think it would be 

against U.S. interests in the P5+1 talks. I don’t know what the Administration is doing with respect to talking to Iran about this. 

Mr. BYRNE. Okay, thank you. 

I yield back. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Byrne. 

Mr. Kilmer. 

Mr. KILMER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you for being here. 

I had a couple of questions for the panel. What I want to get a 

better understanding of is what the barriers are to Iran actually 

developing a nuclear weapon. Is it knowledge about how to do it? 

Is it a resource issue? Is it a capability issue? And in the event that 

a deal is actually reached, is there something that the P5+1 can 

do to ensure that we keep those barriers up and you don’t see an 

erosion of those barriers? 

Mr. SINGH. Well, I guess what I would say is, as I mentioned, 

there are three elements to a nuclear weapons program. You have 

got the fuel fabrication, where there is no great challenge before 
30 

Iran on that side, except just doing it. They could produce highly 

enriched uranium to weapons grade with the technology they have 

now and with the knowledge they have now, as far as I know. The 

danger would be detection. The danger would be if they chose to 

do that, what reaction would that prompt from Israel or from the 

United States in terms of a military response? 

On the weaponization research side, it is difficult to say, but 

what I have seen from the IAEA, what I have sort of seen in news 

reports, leads me to suggest that they have done a lot of 

weaponization research and perhaps at least on a theoretical basis, 

they have gone far along on that. 

On the missiles, on the question of delivery vehicle, which is 

third leg, I think there, what I have seen is a lot spottier. It is not 

clear to me that they have, that they are close yet to an ICBM to 

be able to deliver a missile against a faraway foe or being able to 

put a nuclear warhead onto even a shorter range missile. And 

again, that is one of the reasons I am concerned that an interim 

agreement—I am sorry, a comprehensive agreement might allow 

them to continue that work and to perfect that leg of the program 

even while it pauses some of the other areas where it is further 

along. But on that question, I would say that what you would really need to get is an update from the Defense Department about exactly where do they stand on that particular leg. 

Mr. KILMER. Anything either of you want to add? 

The other thing I want to get an understanding of, you know, it 

seems to me one that of the greatest dangers when a nation becomes a nuclear nation is their ability to transfer that knowledge 

to non-state actors or to non-nuclear nations. You know, as part of 

this conversation, is there anything that can be done to limit Iran’s 

ability to transfer whatever knowledge they have to non-nuclear 

states or to non-state actors? 

Mr. TOBEY. I think returning to understanding these possible 

military dimensions to the program is also key to that because it 

would allow the IAEA to understand who was involved in these 

programs and what they are doing, what they continue to do even 

today, and, therefore, could provide the basis for both the IAEA 

and perhaps even other nations to keep watch to make sure that 

those contacts are diminished. 

Ambassador PICKERING. I think there is some good news here 

that every country that has developed a nuclear weapon, with the 

exception of Mr. A. Q. Khan in Pakistan, has had two imperatives 

on its plate: One is to make sure no other country or organization 

ever gets another—a nuclear weapon. And putting nuclear weapons 

in the hands of terrorists, particularly when should those be exploded, there are pretty good telltales as to where that particular 

weapon came from, is a very dangerous enterprise. And so the deterrence goes to the fabricator in some ways, and that is something 

that at least we have some hope there. 

The second thing they always have a problem with when they get 

a nuclear weapon is what they are going to use it for. But we don’t 

want to see that. And here, I think it is extremely important that 

the major effort now being made is to prevent them from getting 

a weapon, and if that should fail through not getting an agreement, 

which I think is a very important part of this, then we do face, as 
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I said earlier in my testimony, the question of whether we have a 

war or an Iranian nuclear weapon. I think that those two outcomes, with the failure of a negotiated effort or the failure of a 

combination of sanctions and a negotiated effort, are things we 

ought to keep crystal clear in our mind. 

Mr. SINGH. If I could just add to that, Congressman, I would say 

that I think I would be more concerned than Ambassador Pickering 

on this score because we have seen Iran share technology with its 

non-state proxies, like Hezbollah, on the missile front in a way that 

has really destabilized the region. Most of the technology that 

Hezbollah has that it has actually deployed in the field in combat, 

as far as I know, is obtained from Iran, based on earlier Iranian 

advances. And I think it is actually more common than Ambassador Pickering suggested that nuclear states do end up sharing 

nuclear technology with others. 

Mr. KILMER. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Kilmer. 

Gentlemen, thank you so much for joining us today. We appreciate you spending your time with us. If there are any further 

questions from the committee, they will submit them to you in 

writing. We would ask that you respond back. 

Hearing no further business before the House Armed Services 

Committee, we are adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:42 a.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

JUNE 19, 2014 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

JUNE 19, 2014 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

JUNE 19, 2014 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. WALORSKI 

Mrs. WALORSKI. President Rouhani announced to reporters on June 14 that ‘‘If we 

can’t reach a final agreement in negotiations by July 20 . . . conditions will never 

go back to the past. The sanctions regime has been broken.’’ Do you agree with his 

assessment? What options to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon exist 

if negotiations fail? Under what conditions do you think Congress should enact additional sanctions? 

Mr. TOBEY. In the days before the July 20 deadline, Iran took aggressive stands 

seemingly to advance its bargaining position. In addition to the Rouhani statement, 

according to press reports, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei stood before a banner that read, 

‘‘America cannot do a [expletive] thing’’ and taunted President Obama. Moreover, 

Iran announced that it would not agree to an extension of the interim agreement, 

unless Washington paid a substantial price, and Khamenei issued a demand for enrichment capacity that had no relation to reality. 

I do not believe the sanctions regime has been broken, although it has been weakened. Sanctions cannot prevent the Iranian regime from building nuclear weapons, 

if Tehran is determined to do so at all costs. They can, however, impose penalties 

so severe that any decision to do so would entail significant risks. I would recommend that Congress enact additional sanctions if Iran refuses come to an agreement that would not only limit activities at declared facilities, but also signal a strategic decision to abandon any nuclear weapons ambitions. Two indicators of such a 

decision would be full disclosure of the so-called ‘‘possible military dimensions’’ of 

Iran’s nuclear program, and a willingness to accept strict and verifiable controls on 

the import and domestic manufacture of nuclear-related equipment and materials. 

Mrs. WALORSKI. President Rouhani announced to reporters on June 14 that ‘‘If we 

can’t reach a final agreement in negotiations by July 20 . . . conditions will never 

go back to the past. The sanctions regime has been broken.’’ Do you agree with his 

assessment? What options to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon exist 

if negotiations fail? Under what conditions do you think Congress should enact additional sanctions? 

Mr. SINGH. Sanctions regimes tend to degrade over time due to declining enforcement and compliance, and/or efforts by the sanctioned state to develop workarounds. 

We already see both effects at work in the case of sanctions on Iran. China, for example, imported record levels of oil from Iran in the first six months of 2014, yet 

drew no response from the United States. This is possible in part because of Iranian 

efforts to exploit loopholes in sanctions, in part by exporting condensate products 

not covered by U.S. legislation, and by exporting oil to Syria, apparently without 

receiving payment. Due to the degradation of sanctions over time, it is important 

both to enforce them vigorously and to maintain their momentum by imposing new 

sanctions and blocking workarounds. For these reasons, the Joint Plan of Action 

(JPOA)-mandated ‘‘pause’’ in the imposition of new nuclear sanctions and to some 

extent the enforcement of existing sanctions is problematic. If the current round of 

nuclear negotiations ends without an agreement, it may be difficult to resuscitate 

sanctions, in accordance with Iranian President Rouhani’s prediction, for two reasons. First, oil importers such as China and India—already reluctant to comply with 

unilateral U.S. sanctions—may accept the Iranian argument that sanctions are no 

longer merited, especially if Iran continues to honor some or all of the limitations 

on its nuclear work imposed by the JPOA. Second, having already significantly reduced (albeit temporarily, in the case of China) their oil imports from Iran, importers may determine that the cost of further reductions outweighs the benefit. Nevertheless, if negotiations fail, strengthening sanctions in hopes of persuading Iran to 

refrain from further advancing its nuclear efforts and to approach negotiations more 

realistically will remain the United States’ best course of action. It will also be important to enhance the credibility of American military threats, to which end our 

willingness to intervene in Iraq is potentially beneficial. It is important to bear in 

mind that Iran—like all parties to a negotiation—will evaluate any potential deals 

not in isolation, but in comparison to the most likely alternative. If that alternative 

is even heavier economic pressure and the credible possibility of a military strike 

on Iranian nuclear facilities, Iran may be more likely to accept the sort of stringent 
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nuclear limitations we require, especially if those limitations are paired with various incentives. In that vein, I think it is important that Congress and the White 

House first ensure that existing sanctions not suspending by the JPOA continue to 

be vigorously enforced. In addition, they should send a clear and unified message 

that additional sanctions will be imposed on Iran and military action will be contemplated if the current round of negotiations does not produce a deal by the new 

deadline of November 24. Ideally that message should be echoed by allies internationally. This is a matter on which, whatever their tactical differences, the legislative and executive branches—and key U.S. allies in the Middle East, Europe, Asia, 

and elsewhere—share the same objectives and strategy. 

Mrs. WALORSKI. President Rouhani announced to reporters on June 14 that ‘‘If we 

can’t reach a final agreement in negotiations by July 20 . . . conditions will never 

go back to the past. The sanctions regime has been broken.’’ Do you agree with his 

assessment? What options to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon exist 

if negotiations fail? Under what conditions do you think Congress should enact additional sanctions? 

Ambassador PICKERING. I do not agree with his assessment. The bulk of the sanctions continue in force. If negotiations fail because Iran does not agree with a reasonable approach, there will be continued world support for sanctions. If the responsibility is reversed, it will be harder to get cooperation, but sanctions on banking 

and financial transactions pose the question to citizens of other states—‘‘Do you 

want to do business in Iran or the U.S.?’’ That is a powerful tool of influence. 

To prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon (Iran says it does not wish to 

obtain such a weapon and the U.S. DNI reports on an annual basis that Iran has 

made no such decision with high confidence) there are additional sanctions which 

could lead to reopening negotiations, sanctions and threats of military force which 

might also lead to an agreement not to produce a weapon and, as the President has 

indicated, he will keep all options on the table including the use of military force 

in the case Iran should move toward building such a weapon. 

Congress should consider additional sanctions if negotiations truly breakdown and 

cannot be restarted, should there be clear evidence of Iran moving its nuclear program in a military direction, and in any case should the President ask for further 

sanctions. 

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