B RU CE C ALL , Mayo r and former City C ouncil Member, J IM 1 D ANKLEF , former Mayo r, M I KE D ANI ELS , former Mayo r, L EE J ENS EN , City C ounci l Member, C I ND Y B O YD , City C ouncil Member, J EFF W I L S ON , C i ty Council Memb er, V AL D ANKLEF , C ity C ou nc ilMem be r, K I M BERLY R OB I NS ON , City C ouncil Member, G. K E I T H C O RRY , f orm er City Council Member, M AR K A T WOOD , former City C ouncil Me m b e r, S CO TT D A R R I NG T ON , C i tyA d mi ni strat or , and F R ANK M I LLS , former City A dminis tr ator , Appe lle es

.

Thi s opi ni on i s su bj ec tt o r ev i si on be f or e f i nal pub l i cat i on in t he Pa ci f i c R epor t er
2015 UT 31

I N T HE 

### S UPR EM E 

### C OU RT OF TH E 

### S TA TE O F 

### U TAH

S UMM UM , a Cor porat ion Sole and Church,

Appe lla nt, v

. P LEAS ANT G ROVE C I TY , a muni cipal c or porat ion, 1

Appe lle es

.
No. 20120717 Filed January 30, 2015

Fou rth D is tric t, Provo D ep ’t Th e H ono rab leFred D . H ow ard No. 110401502

Att or neys: Brian M. Bar nard, Stewart Gollan, Pro vo , for appellant Edward L. White III, F rancis J . Manion, Geoffrey Surtees, Erik M . Zimmerman, Ann Arbor, M ichigan, Gre gory N . H oole , S al t La ke C ity, fo r ap pe ll ees
J UST I CE D U R H A M authore d the opinion of the Co urt, in which A S S OC I ATE C H IEF J UST I CE N EHR I NG and J UST I CE P A R R I S H joined. J UST I CE L EE filed an opinion c oncurring in partand in the judgment, in w hich

C H IEF J UST I CE D URR ANT joined.

J UST I CE D UR HAM , op inion of the Cou rt:
INTRODUCTION ¶1 We are asked t o decide whether the religio us liberty claus e of the Uta h C ons titu tion requir es a c ity t o in s tal l aprop os ed rel igi ou s mo nu me nt i n a pu bl ic pa rk w he re a Te n C om ma nd me nts monument is already situate d. We hold that itdoes not. Because we ha ve n ot b een

as ked to do so, w e d o no t de c id e w he the r the Te nS UMM UM v . P LEAS ANT G ROVE C I TY Opi ni on o f the Cou rt

2 Commandments m onument at iss ue in this case is a pr ohibited use of pu bl ic mo ne y or pro pe rty f or “re li giou s wo rs hi p, exe rc is e or instruction” under art icle I, sec tion 4 of the Ut ah Constitution. Instead, we concl ud e t hat the r emedy the plaintiff seeks—the in s tal la tion

of a s ec ond mo nu me nt—i s una vai labl e a s a m atte r of constitutional law.
BACKGROUND ¶2 Sinc e 1971, a monument displaying a repr esentation of the Ten Commandments tablets, inclu ding the full tex t, has st o o d in P ion eer P ark, a c ity pa rk ow ne d a nd ma intai ne d b y P le as ant G rove City. The Ten Commandments m onument was donated t o Pleasant Gro ve b y a l oc al c ha pte r of the Frate rna l Ord er of Ea gle s . T he pa rk al s o c ont ai nss evera l s tru c tu res an d m onu me nts tha t P le as ant G rove ha s c o l l e ct e d o r a cc e p t e d fr o m v a r i o us p r i v a t e d o no r s o verthe year s, inclu ding pioneer era b uildin gs, a September 11th memorial, and a

ro se garden. ¶3 Summum, is a c or porat ion sole and chu rch. Establis hed in S al t La ke C ity i n 19 75 , the rel igi on, ac c ordi ng t o its ten ets , i s fo un de d on t ea c hi ngs tha t pre da te th e a nc ie nt E gypt ia ns . T he s e te ac hi ngs are
s umma riz ed in

the Seven

Ap hori s ms , w hi c h S ummu m a dh erents believe to be complem enta ry to t he Ten Command ments. In 2003, the P res id ent of

S ummu m o ffered to do na te a nd erec t a S ev en Aphorisms monum ent in Pioneer Park t hat would be s imilar in si ze
an d n atu re to th e ex is tin g T en Comma nd me nts mo nu me nt. ¶4 Pleasant Gr ov e declined S ummum’s offer, ex plaining that it had an establis hed practice of acc eptin g o nly monuments that

w er e e i t h e r ( 1 ) d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d t o t h e h i s t o r y o f t h e c i ty or (2) donated by gr oups with long-standing ties to t he city. About nine months lat er, the city pass ed a resolutio n codifying the criter ia to be

c ons id ered w he n d ec id ing whe the r to pl ac e apri vate ly d ona ted

mo nu me nt o n p ub li c prop erty:
1. Th e i tem

mu s t di r ect ly rela te to th e h is tory of Pleasant Gro ve and have histor ical relevanceto t he

commu nity.

. . . 2. It is being donated by an

es tab li s he d P le as ant G rove c ivi c organiz ati on w ith

s tron g tie s to th e co mmunity; or, 3 . T he don ors ha ve ahi s toric alc onnec tion w ith P le as ant Grove Ci ty; a nd 4. P la c em ent does notc rea te a ny s afety ha za rds ; a nd 5. It i s notob s c ene. ¶5 Su mmu m

s u e d P l e a s a nt G ro vei n

fe d e ra l court, allegingthat the city’s decision no t t o accept the propo sed S even Aphor ismsCite as: 2015 UT 31 Opi ni on o f the Cou rt

3 monument violated t he Fre e Sp e e c h a n d E s tab l i s hme nt c lauses of the federal Constitut ion. In Pl ea sa nt Gro veCit

y, Ut ah v. Sum mum , 555 U.S . 4 60 , 48 1 (2009) , th e Unite d S tate s S up rem e Co urtrej ec ted S u m m u m’s fre e s p e e c hc l a i m, h ol d i n g t h a t t h e p l a c e m e n t of a

mo nument on public propert y was a form of gov ernment speech that is not r egulated by t he Fre e Speech Clause. Su bs equently, the feder a l district court r ejected Su mmu m’s federal Establi shm ent Clause c laim. Sum mum v. Pleasant Grove City, No. 2: 05 CV 63 8 D AK, 2010 WL 2330336, at *3 (D. Utah June 3, 2010)

. ¶6 Summum then filed a complaint in s tate court, alleg ing that Pleasant Gro ve had v iolated the religio us liberty claus e of the Ut ah C o ns t i t ut i o n. Th e co mp l a i nt so ug ht a n i nj un ct i o n r e q ui r i ngPl e asant Gro ve to e rec t an d p erm an ently dis pl ay th e p ropos ed S even Ap hori s ms mo nu me nt. Both S ummu m a nd P le as ant G rove m oved fo r s umma ry j ud gm ent on S ummu m’ s c om pl ai nt. Th e d is tric t c ou rt conclu ded that Pleasant Grov e’s decis ion not t o i nstall t he

m o nu m e n td i d n o tv i o l a t e t h e U t a hC o n s t i t u t i o na n d g r a n t ed

summar y ju dgment in favor of the city. Summu m appealed. We revi ew the di s tric t c ou rt’s interp reta tion of the Uta h C ons titu tion

fo r
corr ectness. Snyde r v. Murray City Corp. , 2 0 0 3 U T 1 3, ¶ 17, 73 P.3d 325.
AN AL YSI S
I ¶7 Art icle I, sec tion 4 of the Ut ah Constitution, Ut ah’s religious liberty claus e, contains pr ov isions that both prot ect the free ex ercise of relig ion and prohibit t he gov ernment fro m promot ing relig ion. See S oc’y of Separation i s ts, In c. v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916, 935 (Utah 1993). Su mmu m relies o n t he prov ision o f t he religio us liberty claus e proh ib iti ng fin anc ia l s up port o f re li gion : “ No p ub li c mo ne y or proper ty shall be appropr iated for or applied to any r el igious worship, exercise or instruction . . . .” U T A H C O NST . art . I, § 4. ¶8 We interp rete d th is provi s ion in the c ont ex t o f p raye rs offered by pr ivate individuals at the commencement of city counci l meetings and developed a t wo-step analys i s to det ermine the

c ons titu tion al ity o f thi s pra c tic e. Firs t, w e a dd res s ed w he the r pra yer offe r ed in

a p ub li c me eti ng o f agovernme nt b ody c ons titu ted

“ re l i gi ou s w or s h i p , e xe rc i s e ori n s tr u c ti on

. ” S oc’y of Separationists , 870 P.2d at 930; see also S nyder v. Murray City Corp. , 2003 UT 13, ¶ 21, 73 P .3 d 3 25 . Havi ng conc lu de d tha t the pra yerful ad dre s s of a d ei ty is a religious exer cis e, we then examined whether arr anging for and permitt ing pray er ata city council m eeting amounted t o an
unc onstitutio nal appropriat ion of public money or propert y to thisS UMM UM v . P LEAS ANT G ROVE C I TY Opi ni on o f the Cou rt

We n o t e t h a t P l e a s a n t G r o v e a r g u e s t h a t t h e Te n 2 Comma nd men t s monu me nt, vie w ed in the c ont ext of

the oth er historical displays within Pioneer Park, does not convey a r eligious

mess age, but ra the r a his tor ical m essage about the import ance of this bibli cal scripture to Pleasant Grov e’s foundin g citizens. See Thomas

v. Da ugh te rs o

f U tah Pio nee rs , 197 P.2d 477, 488– 90 (Utah 1948) (the impa rtia l d is pla y of

arti fa c ts fro m M orm on p ion eers in a s tate

fu nd ed mu s eu m d id notviol ate Uta h’ s rel igi ou s libe rty c la us e)

4 religio us exercise. Soc’y of Separationists , 870 P.2d at 932. Under t his second s tep, we ad o pted a neutralit y te st, reasoning t hat when the governme nt p rovid es mo ne y or pro pe rty in an imparti alma nn er, “a ny b en efit flow in g to rel igi ou s wo rs hi p, exe rc is e, or in s tru c tion can b e fairly c haracter ized as indirect becau se the b enefit flows to all tho s e w ho a re b en efic ia rie s of the us e of

governm ent m one y or proper ty, which may inc lude, bu t is not limited to , those engag ed in religio us worship, exercise, or instruction.” Id. at 9 37 . T he provi s ion of mo ne y or prop erty to rel igi ou s exe rc is e is in di rec t, an d th eref ore constitutional, if (1) “the money or p r o p e rt y [is] provided on a nondisc riminator y basis ” and (2) “the publi c money or proper ty [is] equally acces sibl e to all.” Id. at 938; a cco rd Snyder , 2003 UT 13, ¶ 20. ¶9 Citing t his two-s tep te st from Society of Separationists and Snyder , S ummu m

a r gue s tha t P le as ant G rove’s ac c ep tanc e of the Te n Comma nd me nts mo nu me nt, bu t s ub s eque nt re j ecti o n of

a S even Ap hori s ms mo nu me nt, viol ate d th e c ons titu tion alproh ib iti on aga in s t th e a pp ropri ati on o f p ub li c mo ne y f or rel igi ou s ex er cise. Un de r the fi rs t s tep , S ummu m a s s erts tha t th e dis pl ay of the Te n Commandments monument in a publi c park constit utes “religio us
w ors hi p, exe rc is e or i ns tru c tion .” S ummu m the n a rgu es tha t u nd er the second step the allocation of publi c pr oper ty for t he monument

w as notne ut ralbe c au s e P le as ant G rove s ub s eque ntl y rej ec ted its offer t o display its own religious monum ent. Not ably, Summum does not seek the removal of the T en Commandments mo nument be ca use of this al leged constitutio nal violatio n. Instead, Su mmu m requests an inj unc tion r equiring Pleasant Grove to d i splay it s own prop os ed mo nu me nt. ¶10 We do not ad dre s s S ummu m’ s fi rs t c ont ention tha t th e T en Commandments monumenta mo un t s t o “ r e l i g i o us wo rship, exercise or in s tru c tion .” In s tea d w e a ffirm the di s tric t c ou rt’s grant of 2

s umma ry j ud gm ent in fa vor of P le as ant Gro ve on the grou nd tha t, reg ardless of whether the Ten Commandments monu ment constitutes religio us w or ship, exercise, or instruction, the re ligious libe r t y c la us e of

the Uta h C ons titu tion doe s notrequi re ac ou rt toCite as: 2015 UT 31 Opi ni on o f the Cou rt

5 fo rc e P le as ant G rove to p erm an ently d isplay a si mi la r S even Aphorisms monum ent. We come to this conclu sion for t wo reasons. ¶11 First, an inju nction requiring Pleas ant G ro ve to dis play the S even A phori s ms mo nu me nt w ou ld nots ati s fythe ne ut ral ity requirement ar ticulated in Society of Separation i sts and Snyder

. As s umin g th at th e T en Comma nd me nts mo nu me nt am o unts to rel igi ou s exe rc is e or i ns tru c tion , re qu iri ng P le as ant Gro ve to e rec t a

s ec ond rel igi ou s mo nu me nt w ou ld notren de r the al loc ati on o f publi c prop e r t y a nd money to t he two monuments neu tr al. The citizens of P leasant Grov e , and Utah in general, undoubtedly

es pou s e abro ad vari ety of rel igi ou s vie w s , i nc lu di ng a dh erenc e to one of multiple religio us de nominations, agnosticism, or atheism. D is pl ayi ng m onu me nts tha t c om mu ni c ate the be li ef s of onl y tw o of the s e vi ew poi nts w ou ld notam ou nt t o an impa rtia l d is trib ut ion

of publi c proper ty among the spectrum of religio us views held by Utah

c iti ze ns. An d be c au s e th ere i s a finite am ou nt o f s pa c e i n P ion eer P ark, al low in g al l intere s ted grou ps to ins tal l th ei r ow n re li giou s or antirelig ious monum ents in the park would be unw or kable. See Pl ea sa nt Gro veCit

y, Uta h v . Sum mum , 555 U. S. 4 6 0 , 479 (2009) ( “A pu bl ic pa rk, ove r the yea rs , c an provi de a s oap bo x f or a ve ry la rge
nu mb er of

orators —often, for all w ho wa nt t o s pe ak— bu t it i s ha rd to im agi ne how a pu bl ic pa rk c ou ld be ope ne d u p f or th e i ns tal la tion of pe rma ne nt m onu me nts byeverype rs on o r g r o up wi s hi ng t o engage in t hat form o f expression.”). Indeed, order ing Pleasant Grov e to allocate public proper t y t o wa rds a monument S ummum concede s to be relig ious in n ature would directly contradict t he prohibition contained in art icle I, sec tion 4. ¶12 Second, w e hold that t he neutrality test we ad opted in the

c ont ext of

pra yers offe r ed du rin g governme nt m eet in gs doe s not ap pl y to p ub li c mo nu me nts . B ec au s e th e a ll oc ati on o f p ub li c mo ne y or prop erty to ape rma ne nt re li giou s mo nu me nt i s pe r s e n ot neut ra l , th e a p p ro p ri a te re m e d y f ora m onu m e n t c on s ti tu ti ng “re li giou s w ors hi p, exe rc is e or i ns tru c tion ” w ou ld not be the fo rc ed in s tal la tion

of a s ec ond mo nu me nt. ¶13 The reasoning behind the adoption of the neutr ality t est in Society of Separationists de mo ns trate s w hy thi s tes t doe s notap pl y to

mo nu me nts . In

that case , w e h el d th at p raye rs offe red du rin g c ity

c ou nc ilme eti ngs ut il iz ed pu bl ic prop erty b ec ause th e p roc es s of pe rmi ttin g in di vid ua ls to offe r the m u s ed “c ity f ac il i tie s , e qu ip me nt, resources, and employee time.” Soc’y of Separationists , 8 7 0 P. 2 d at 93 2. We rea s one d, how ever, tha t if the Uta h C ons titu tion re qu ire d

an ab s olu te b ar of

rel igi ou s exp res s ion

bypri v at e ind ivi du al s on pu bl ic prop erty,S UMM UM v . P LEAS ANT G ROVE C I TY Opi ni on o f the Cou rt

6 it w ou ld me an

tha t w hi le the governme nt c ou ld al low a political gr oup to use a public park fo r a r ally, it could not allow a r eligious gr oup to us e the park for a r eviv al. S im il arl y, if an ope n mi c roph one an d soa pb ox were s et up outside ci ty hall for the use o f a ny individual w ho

w is he d to s pe ak, the governme nt c ou ld not pe rmi t its use b y tho se wh o wanted to pray, conduct an impromptu relig ious service, or pr oselytize o thers, but could permit ne o -Nazis , the Ku Klux K lan, the John Bi rc h S oc ie ty, th e S oc ie ty of S ep ara tionis ts , or m embe rs of the D em oc rati c or Rep ub li c an P arty to s pe ak.
Id. at 934. We r e

je ct e d suc h an abs olutist inter pret ation because it “would e v idence an af firmative ho stility t oward r eligion,” which would c ontr adict other prov isions of th e federal and Utah Constitutio ns that prot ect relig ious expressio n a nd fr ee speech. Id. at 934–35. Ins tead, we a d o pted a neutralit y te st that per mitted the use of pu blic proper ty in supp or t of priv ate r eligious expre ssi on so lon g as governme nt b en efits are “p rovid ed on anon di s c rim in atory basis ” and are “equally access ible to all.” Id. at 938. ¶ 1 4 T h u s w e a d o p t e d t h e n e u t r a l i ty t e s ti nt h e s p e c i f i c c o n t ext of tr ansient r e l igious expre ssi on by priv ate individuals on pub lic prop e r ty. I n the examples we c ited in Society of Separationists , the publi c proper ty at iss ue—pub lic b uildin gs and equipm ent, suc h as

a m i c ro p h on e a n d s ou n d s ys te m
— w a s i ts e l f n e u tr a l

. S o l on g as
ac c es s to the s e pu bl ic res ou rc es is provi de d i n a n i mp arti alma nn er, pri vate us e of

pu bl ic prop erty to e xpre s s rel igi ou s s entim ents doe s not vi ol a te th e re l i gi ou s l i b e rty c l a u s e of th e Ut a h C on s ti tu ti on

. If, for ex ample, Pi oneer Park had a pavilion av ailable for gr oup
reserv ations, Pleasant G ro ve could allow a Christian chu rch gro up to u s e th e p a vi l i on f or a n i c e c re a m s oc i a l w h e re p ra ye rs w ou l d be offered and relig ious sentiments expre ssed, so long as the city also allo wed equa l a c c es s to th e p avi li on f or an ath ei s t b arb eque or a Bu dd hi s t pot lu c k di nn er. ¶15 Th e T en

Comma nd me nts mo nu me nt i n thi s c as e, how ever, is fu ndamentally diffe r ent fro m a park pav ilion; it is not a neutral conduit for priv ate ex pressio n. Instead, the monument is itself go ve rnm e n t s p e e c h. P l easant Gro ve, 555 U.S. at 470. When Pleas ant Gro ve a c c ep ted the do nated mo nu me nt, it a dop ted the me s s age conveye d by the mo nu me nt a s it s own. Id. at 470–72. Bec ause the gov ernment pro pert y at issue in this case is itself the mess age, it

c annotbe al loc ate d i n a n i mp arti al manne r s inc e m onu me ntsCite as: 2015 UT 31 Opi ni on o f the Cou rt

One c ould imagine, of course, a monument desi gned to permit 3 citizens to post tempor ary mess ages for public c onsump tion. See Pleasant Gro ve, 555 U.S. at 480. In tha t theor etical situation, the

ne ut ral ity t es t m ight ap pl y.

7 “m ono pol iz e th e u s e of the la nd on wh ic h the y s tan d a nd interfere permanently with ot her uses of pu blic spac e.” Id. at 479. 3 ¶16 Therefore the s e co nd step of the analysis we app lied in So ci e t yo f S e p a ra t io ni sts and Snyder —the neutralit y te st—has no application in the cont extof go ver nment monum ents. The only relev ant question under art icle I, section 4’s pr ohibition against the

us e of pu bl ic mo ne y or pro pe rty f or rel igi ou s pu rpos es is w he t he r
am onu me nt c ons titute s “religious worship, exercise or instruction.” We do not reach that ques tion, howev er, because S ummum s eeks a

rem ed y th at w e m ay n ot c ons titu tion al ly gra nt. ¶17 In this case, Summum atte mpts t o use the neutrality test as a too l to facilitate t he placem ent of its own propo sed monum ent in Pioneer Park . It ar gues that the distr ict court should or d e r the installation of a Seven Aphor isms monument in or der t o establish an impa rtia l a ll oc ati on o f p ub li c prop erty tow ard s rel igi ou s exp res s ion in th e p a rk

. B u t b e c a u s e th e n e u tr a l i ty te s t d oe s n ot a p p ly in the context of publi c monuments, this too l is un available to Summu m. We ther efore affirm the summary judgment below.
II ¶18 This opinion does not foreclose the possibil ity o f adopting

a co nt e xt-dependant appro ach to deter mine w hether a public

mo nu me nt c ons titu tes an impe rmi s s ib le us e of pu bl ic prop erty f or “religio us w or ship, exercise or ins tr u c ti on” under the first step of t he So cie ty o f Sep a ra ti o nists tes t. T he U.S . Su pre me Cou rt ha s empl oyed

suc h a context -driven appro ach w hen determining whether t he Es tab li s hm ent Cl au s e of the fe de ralCons t ituti on p rohibi ts governme nt h oli da y di s pl ays an d m onu me nts tha t c ons titu te “gov ernment endor sement of religio n.” Cnt y. o f A lle gh eny v. ACLU Grea te r P it ts bu rgh Ch apter , 492 U.S. 573, 601 (1989). In applying this endorsement te st, the Court has ex amined the context o f a particular hol id ay d is pl ay or p ub li c mo nu me nt to de term in e th e m es s age conveye d by the di splay or monument in qu estion. McCreary Cnty., Ky. v. ACLU

of Ky. , 54 5 U.S . 8 44 , 8 67

– 68 , 8 74 (2 00 5) (c ons titu tion al ity of a Ten Commandm ents monument depen d s upon the context in whic h the monument is d isplayed); Cnt y. o f A lle gh eny, 49 2 U .S. at 595 (opinion of Blackmu n, J.) ( “[T] he qu e s ti on i s wh at v iewers may fairly

un de rs tan d to b e th e p urp os e of t he di s pl ay. Th at i nqui ry, of

necess it y , turns upon the context in wh ich the contested objectS UMM UM v . P LEAS ANT G ROVE C I TY J UST I CE L EE , concu rr ing in part and in the judgment

8 appears . . . .” (citation omitte d) (inter nal quot ation mark s omitted)). In oth er w ords , the S up rem e Co urtha s look ed to c ont ext to deter mine w hether t he mess age conve yed i s a per miss ible sec ular

commu nicatio n or a pr ohibited endorsement o f religion. Co mpa re Cn ty . o f A lle gh eny, 4 92 U. S. a t 5 9 8 ( “ [ T ] h e e ff e c t of a c rè c he displ ay turns on i t s set ting. Her e, . . . nothing in the conte xt o f the display detr acts from the crèche’s rel i g i o us message.”), with id. at 620–21 (o pi ni on o f B la c km un

, J .) (the us e of

a m en orah

as pa rt of a l arge r hol i d a y display did “not have an effect of endor sing religious faith”). ¶19 Th e te xt an d h is tory of Uta h’ s rel igi ou s libe rty c la us e d iffe rs
s ignific antly fromtha t of the En dors em ent Cl au s e, and w e h ave charted our own course in inter pret ing this clau se o f the Ut ah Constitutio n. See S oc’y of S ep arationists, Inc. v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916, 940 (Utah 1993). But that does not mean that the context in whic h a particular m onument is displayed does not play a si milar

ro l e i n determining whether t he monument convey s an impe rmi s s ib le me s s age . In de ed , th is c ou rt ha s impl ie d th at c ont ext is an import ant consideration when it held that the impart ial disp lay of art ifacts fro m Mor mon pioneers in a sta t e -f un ded mus eum did not v iolate t he Utah Constit ution’s religio us liberty claus e. Thomas

v. Da ugh te rs o

f Uta h P io nee rs , 197 P.2d 477, 488– 90 (Utah 1948); seea lso Lynch v . Do nnel ly, 4 65 U.S

. 66 8, 69 2 (1 98 4) (O ’Connor, J. , c onc urri ng) (“[A] typical museu m setting, tho ugh not neutr alizing the re ligious content o f a religio us painting, negat es any mess age o f endorsement of that cont ent.”). ¶20 Any exa mi na tion

of the c ont ex t of

a p ub li c mo nu me nt t o d e t e r mi new h a t th e p ub li c w ou ld un de rs tan d th e m es s age c onve yed by the monument to be, howev er, would be under t a ken under the fir st s tep of

the So cie ty

o f Sep a ra ti o nists tes t. T hi s fi rs t s tep in qu ire s whether a challenged monum ent o r p r a ctice “cons titute s religious worship, ex ercise or instr uction.” Soc’y of Separationists , 870 P.2d at 93 0 ( intern alqu otation m arks om itte d) . W e n eed not, a nd do n ot,

en gage in

s uc h an ana lys is in

rel ati on t o th e T en

Comma nd me nts

m onu m e n t s i tu a te d i nP i on e e r P a rki nth i s c a s e. Supr a ¶ 10. Thus , ou r hol di ng tha t th e s ec ond s tep of the So cie ty

o f Separati on ists test doe s not ap pl y to mo nu me nts ha s no b ea rin g on the qu es tion

of how

c ou rts s hou ld de term in e w ha t th e messa g e conveye d b y a challen ged monument is.

J UST I CE L EE , c onc urri ng i n p art a nd c onc urri ng i n th e j ud gm ent: ¶21 I conc ur i n p ara grap hs 1 throu gh 1 1 of the ma j ority opi ni on, an d a ls o in

the j ud gm ent affi rmi ng the di s tric t c ou rt’sCite as: 2015 UT 31 J UST I CE L EE , concu rr ing in part and in the judgment

9 s umma ry di s mi s s alof

the c om pl ai nt in thi s c as e. I w rite s ep ara tel y, however , becau se I disagree with the analysis in the balance of the court’s o p i ni on, whic h strikes me as internally inconsis tent and pote nti al ly c onfus in g. ¶2 2 Sum mum

a s s e rt s a ri ght u n d e r a rt i c l e I, s e c ti on 4 of the Utah Co nsti t ut ion to have its “Seven Aphor isms ” monument di s pl aye d i n Pl ea s ant Gro ve City’ s P ion eer P ark. Be c au s e th at p ark already includes a Ten Commandm ents monument thatSummum views as an

item of “relig i ous worship, exercise or instruction” under art icle I, sec tion 4, Summum as sert s a r ight t o add its own parallel item to the City ’s monum ents in Pioneer Park. And in

s up port o f thi s c la im S ummu m invokes the ne ut ral ity t es t s et f orth in Society o

f Separa tionists, Inc. v. W hitehead, 870 P.2d 916 (Utah 1993). ¶2 3 I agr e e w i th

th e m a j or i tyth a t t h i s c l a i mf a i l s on the thre s hol d grou nd tha t “a n i nj unc tion requi rin g P le as ant G rove to display the Seven Aphorisms monu ment would no t satisfy the neutrality requirement ar ticulated in Society of Separationists ,” in that “as ec ond rel igi ou s mo nu me nt w o uld no t ren de r the al loc ati on o f publi c pr oper ty and money to the two monuments neutral.” Supra ¶ 11. Given that “[t ]he ci t i zens of Pl easant Grov e, and Utah in gener al, undoub te d l y e spo use a b ro ad var iety o f religious views, inclu ding adherence t o one of multiple religio us den ominations, agn os tic is m, or ath ei s m, ” th ere i s no ba s is fo r c onc lu di ng tha t a m ere two monuments (T en Commandments and Seven Aphorisms)

w ou ld ren de r “n eu tral ” the g overnme nt’ s us e of pu bl ic mo ne y or proper ty. Supra ¶ 11. ¶24 Th at i s al l w e n eed to s ay to d ec id e th is c as e. We ne ed not, and in my v iew we s hould not, pro ffer a view on the “second” gr o un d art icul ated by t he majority fo r its holding—t hat “the neutrality test we adopte d in the context of praye rs offered during governm entalme eti ngs ” c ou ld ne ver b e a pp li ed in a m anne r up ho l d i ngr e l i g i o us l y o r i e nt e d “publ ic monu ments.” Supr a ¶ 12. The ap pl ic ab il ity o f the Society o f Separationists neutrality test is notone
we ne e d to r each bec ause S ummum’s c laim fai ls on the threshold gr ound that it has sought a remedy that is un available to it . And the majority ’s analysis on this point is internally inc onsist e nt a nd pote nti al ly c onfus in g. ¶25 Th e i nte rna l i nc ons is tenc y is in (a ) the opi ni on’ s as s erti on (i n P art I) tha t th e Society of Separatio n ists ’ n eu tral ity t es t “d oes not apply to publi c monum ents,” sup ra¶ 12; and (b) the concess ion (in P art II ) tha t a re li giou s mo nu me nt co uld be upheld if in c ontex t it

w ou ld notbe pe rc ei ved as “re li gious wo r s hi p, exe rc is e, orS UMM UM v . P LEAS ANT G ROVE C I TY J UST I CE L EE , concu rr ing in part and in the judgment

See McCreary Cnty., Ky. v. ACL U of Ky. , 545 U.S. 844, 867– 68, 874 1 (2 00 5) (c onc lu di ng tha t c ons titu tion al ity o f T en Comma nd me nts monument depends on contex t in whic h it i s dis played); Thomas v. Da ugh te rs o

f Uta h P io nee rs , 197 P.2d 477, 488– 90 (Utah 1948) (holding tha t c ons titu tion al ity o f d is pl ay of Morm on p ion e e ra r t ifa c ts in s tate

fund ed mus eum w ould depend on context ).

10 instruction,” sup ra¶¶ 18–21. I agree with t he latter co nces sion, as there is good r eason to e x p ect that a monument could satisf y
c ons titu tion als c rut iny u n de r Society of Separationists if it w ere p la c ed in a neutral s ett ing alongside a wide arr ay of other monuments. But 1 the c ou rt’s ult im ate c onc es s ion in P art II un de rc ut s the ea rli er
c onc lu s ion

in P art I. ¶26 Th at gi ves ris e to th e potentia l for confu s ion in the c ou rt’s opinion as written. In light of the ultimate conces sion (in Part II ) that the Society of Separationists tes t co uld apply in a mann er upholding the use of g o v e r nment funds on a religious monument, the

ma j ority ’s as s erti ons ab ou t th e i na pp li c ab il ity of the tes t ( in P art I)

c ou ld mi s le ad li tiga nts an d j ud ges in fu tu re c as es . If

rea d o utof contextand taken at face value, the c ourt ’s general stat ements that S oc iety of Separatio nists “d oes not ap pl y to mo nu me nts ” ha ve a signific ant pot ential to confus e. SeeSupra ¶ 12 ¶27 Th e m aj ority ’s r espons e to th is prob le m i s the as s erti on that the discu ssi on in Part I o f its opinion conc erns only t he “second

s tep ” of the Society of Separationists test (whether t he gov e rnment expenditures in question are “neutr al”), and the insis tence that t he “h old in g” th at tha t “s tep ” of the tes t “d oesnotap pl y to m onu me nts has no bearing on the question of how court s sh ould deter mine w hat the message conveyed by a challenged monument is.” Supra ¶ 20. Bu t th at e xpl an ati on d oes not s olve the prob le m; it s impl y hi ghl ights the fa c t tha t the c ou rt’s proffe red “s ec ond ” ba s is for its hol di ng— tha t th e Society of Separationists tes t “d oes not ap pl y to publi c monum ents,” sup ra ¶ 12 —i s not in fa c t a s ep ara te grou nd fo r the c ou r t ’s ho ldi ng. S tep tw o of the Society of Separationists test has no independent si gnificance. If a religiously or iented monument would not qualify as “religio us worship, exer cis e or instruction” as viewed in it s r eal-world context(step one), then it matter s not at all

w he the r the governme nt e xpe nd iture s at i s s ue are ne ut ral(s tep two). ¶28 For th at re as on, the ma j o r it y’s c onc es s ion

tha t a T en Commandments monument coul d wi t hs t a nd co ns t i t ut i o na l scrutiny onl y u nd ers c ores the fa c t th at th e c ou rt is notrea ll y pro fferin g a second basis for our h olding in this cas e. We are no t “hold[ing] thatCite as: 2015 UT 31 J UST I CE L EE , concu rr ing in part and in the judgment

11 the ne ut ral ity t est we ad opte d i n th e c ont ext of pra yers offe red during go ver nment meetings does not apply to p ublic monuments,” sup ra ¶ 12, be c au s e we are ul tim ate ly conc lu di ng tha t s uc h te s t co uld apply. And in light of that, t here is no “ second” b asis for r ejecting S ummu m’ s c la im

in thi s c as e ( as of

c ou rs e th e f ac t th at th e Society of Separationists test might falter at the seco nd st e p of the analysis is irr elevant if the t est would be rendered irr elevant at the first step). ¶29 Ultimately , and in any event, t he majorit y ’ s views on the inapplic ability

of the Society of S eparationists test t o cases invo lving Te n C o m m a n d m e n t s m o nu m e n t s a r e n o tl o g i c a l l y a b a s i s fo r rej ectingSummum’s claim in this c ase. S uc h views may prov ide gu i d a n c e f o r l a w y e r s a n d l i t i g a n t s i n fu t u r e c a s e s , b u t t h e y d o no t

es tab li s h agrou nd fo r rej ec tin g S ummu m’ s c la im in thi s c as e. ¶30 Society of Separationists establ i shes an exception t o the gen era l rul e. Th e gen era l rul e is tha t “[ n] o pu bl ic mo ne y or pro pe rty shall b e appropr iated for or applied t o any r eligious worship,

exer cis e or instruction.” U T A H C O NST

. art

. I, § 4. Taken literally and to it s logi c alextre me , th at c ou ld be un de rs tood to f orec los e a nyuse of public fund s that would even incidentally benefi t r eligious

w ors hi p. Yet So ci e t

yo f S ep a ra t io ni s ts r e co gnized a limitation on t he literal application of ar ticle I, section 4. So c’y o f Sep a ra ti o nists, In c. , 870 P.2d at 932– 34 (rej e ct i ngthe “absolutist position” advanced by So cie t y of

S ep ara tionis ts ). It h el d th at “ arti c le I, s ec tion 4 d oes not require . . . ho stility t oward r eligion,” but in st e a d allows pu blic money or proper ty t o support r eligiou s wo r ship or exer cis e if it is “p rovid ed on anon di s c rim in atory b as is ” a nd “th e pu bl ic mo ne y or proper ty [is] equally acc essib le to all.” Id . at 938. ¶31 A co nclusion that this neutrality analysis i s inapp licab le

w ou ld not be a b as is fo r dis mis sing a p la intif f’ s c la im un de r arti c le I, section 4. To the ext ent the courtis s ignaling its skepticism that t he Society of Separationists test—o r ev en part o f it—is inap plicab le, that rep res ents a p oint in favor of a plaintiff u nder art icle I, sec tion 4. That, ultimately, is what the court appears to be doing—identifying a point of analysis that may favo r a plaintiff like Summum in a future case. Becaus e that cannot be a second gro und f or dism iss ing S ummu m’ s c la im

in thi s c as e, I c onc ur o nl y in pa ragra ph s 1–11 of the ma j orityopi ni on a nd di s agre e w ith the res t.

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