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“While chances of agreement between the United 

States and Pakistan appear 

slim in the CD, the administration must be mindful of Pakistan’s strategic and security 

concerns—many of which are 

dictated by developments in 

Pakistan’s threat perceptions 

vis-à-vis India—if it intends to 

move forward on the treaty.”

January 28, 2011 

Bleak Outlook for 2011 Conference 

on Disarmament

Summary

•	 The 2011 Conference on Disarmament (CD) began contentiously when Ambassador Zamir 

Akram, Pakistan’s permanent representative to the United Nations, criticized United States’ 

support of India’s membership in export organizations that would allow it to engage in 

nuclear trade. 

•	 Pakistan believes such membership would further favor India and accentuate the asymmetry 

in fissile materials stockpiles of the two states. 

•	 Strategic and security concerns drive Pakistan’s commitment to block negotiation of a fissile 

material cutoff treaty. 

•	 Progress during the CD seems unlikely if the United States and Pakistan remain entrenched in 

their respective positions. 

Introduction

The opening sessions of the 2011 Conference on Disarmament (CD) appear to be on a tumultuous 

track. During the first plenary of the CD, Ambassador Zamir Akram, permanent representative of 

Pakistan to the United Nations in Geneva, criticized recent shows of support by the United States 

and others for India’s membership in the four major multilateral export control organizations—the 

Nuclear Supplier’s Group (NSG), the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Wassenaar Arrangement and the Australian Group. These organizations seek to reduce proliferation risks by regulating 

and restricting trade in materials and technology associated with weapons of mass destruction 

and their delivery systems. 

Pakistan reaffirmed its long-standing commitment to block negotiation on a fissile material 

cutoff treaty (FMCT), a major priority for the Obama administration’s nonproliferation policy and 

a key tenet of the work plan at this year’s CD. Akram argued that admitting India to the 46 nation 

NSG and other export control organizations would lead to a strategic imbalance between the two 

nuclear-armed adversaries. The ambassador warned that continued movement down this path 

would tip the scales even further in India’s favor. This imbalance would force Pakistan to “take 

measures to ensure the credibility of its [nuclear] deterrence.”1

Rose Gottemoeller, assistant secretary of state for arms control, verification and compliance, 

addressed the CD on the second day, and pressed the disarmament body to make “concrete progress” on critical nonproliferation and disarmament goals, which she noted had been languishing 

for nearly 15 years.2 She called on the CD to carry forward its June 2009 agreement on a program 

Brian Rose

E-mail: brose@usip.org

Phone: 202.429.3812

peaceBrieF78
© USIP 2011 • All rights reserved.

Bleak Outlook for 2011 Conference on Disarmament

page 2 • PB 78 • January 28, 2011

of work to begin negotiations on an FMCT. Without mentioning Pakistan by name, Gottemoeller 

noted: “a single country—a good friend of the United States—changed its mind and has blocked 

the CD from implementing its work plan.” She argued that waiting for movement by the CD to 

begin negotiations on an FMCT is not a viable option, and other alternatives may have to be found 

if the CD does not take up the issue.3

Pakistani Threat Perceptions

In 2008, as part of the negotiating process for the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, 

or 123 Agreement, the NSG granted India a waiver after considerable lobbying by the United 

States. The waiver permitted India to engage in nuclear trade with other countries despite not 

having all of its nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) comprehensive 

safeguards. Under the NSG waiver, only India’s civilian nuclear facilities are subject to IAEA inspections.4

 Military nuclear facilities, i.e., the Indian nuclear weapons program and force structure, are 

not covered by the 123 agreement.

Although not a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, Pakistan vocally opposed the 2008 

agreement. The new movement to fully integrate India into the four export control groups has 

compelled Pakistan to voice opposition again. Akram called the waiver “discriminatory,” and 

argued in his opening statements that the NSG waiver “will further accentuate the asymmetry in 

fissile materials stockpiles in the region, to the detriment of Pakistan’s security interests.”5

Pakistan sees India, who already possesses a comparatively large stockpile of fissile materials, as 

able to direct some of its existing material toward increasing its nuclear weapons program since 

the 123 Agreement provides for the transfer of U.S. fuel to India for civilian purposes. From Pakistan’s perspective, surplus nuclear fuels and materials not used by India for civilian industry could 

be diverted to make more weapons. Akram noted this could significantly widen the gap between 

the two states’ stockpiles of weapons grade fissile materials and potentially reduce the effectiveness of Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent.6

Similarly, in discussions on the possibility of crafting an FMCT, Pakistan sees significant inequities. In a recent interview, Akram stated Pakistan’s opposition to accepting an FMCT as it currently 

stands.7 This position is a reversal of Pakistan’s previous commitment to a 2009 agreement on a 

program of work for the CD that included FMCT negotiation on its task list. Pakistan, however, 

maintains this has been its position since the FMCT’s inception. 

Given the FMCT parameters proposed by the United States and the potential implementation of 

a number of bilateral nuclear trade agreements, Akram estimates that India would have the capacity to produce 40 warheads per year.8

 Pakistan also differs with the United States on the categories 

of fissile materials that should be covered by a treaty. For example, the United States, as well as 

most of the P-5 states, supports a ban of future stocks of fissile materials, thereby permitting those 

with existing stockpiles to maintain them. Pakistan says it would only support a total ban on fissile 

materials, including current stockpiles of all nuclear weapons states, as a step toward complete 

and total disarmament. 

In terms of Pakistan’s security concerns in relation to India regarding the FMCT, Pakistan 

perceives that India, with its comparatively larger stockpiles of existing fissile materials, could 

divert some of its nuclear material from a civilian program to boost its military program even after 

a ban on future materials comes into effect. Therefore, moving forward, a best case scenario for 

Pakistan would be to postpone any ban on fissile materials so Pakistan can hedge its fissile 

material production options for as long as possible. 
© USIP 2011 • All rights reserved.

Bleak Outlook for 2011 Conference on Disarmament

page 3 • PB 78 • January 28, 2011

Moving forward or watching failure?

The tense nature of the discussion thus far, coupled with the firm positions of the United States 

and Pakistan, are likely to present significant challenges to a successful 2011 CD if a compromise 

is not found. Moreover, the Obama administration’s near- to -midterm nonproliferation goal of 

negotiating an FMCT, a treaty supported by the Congressional Commission on the Strategic 

Posture of the United States and more broadly by other American political leaders, may be in 

danger as a result of this impasse. 

While chances of agreement between the United States and Pakistan appear slim in the CD, the 

administration must be mindful of Pakistan’s strategic and security concerns—many of which are 

dictated by developments in Pakistan’s threat perceptions vis-à-vis India—if it intends to move 

forward on the treaty. Pakistan must also be cognizant of the international community’s call for the 

control of fissile material as a cornerstone of a broader nonproliferation effort that would benefit 

all nations, including Pakistan.

Endnotes

1. “Pakistan Warns Against India Nuclear Support,” Agence France-Presse, January 26, 2011, 

http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iv8V-px8Zw1R1FENPSvBtLd0PLtQ?docId

=CNG.148a6c382024ebbebe64021de441dac9.751.

2. Rose Gottemoeller, U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and 

Compliance, “2011 Opening Statement to the Conference on Disarmament,” January 27, 2011, 

http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/155400.htm.

3. Ibid.

4. “The Nuclear Suppliers Group at a Glance,” Arms Control Association, http://www.armscontrol.org/

factsheets/NSG.

5. D. Ravi Kanth, “Pak Blocks FMCT Negotiations,” Public Trust India via Yahoo! News India, January 

26, 2011, http://in.news.yahoo.com/pak-blocks-fmct-negotiations-20110126-000200-683.html.

6. United Nations Office at Geneva, United Nations Information Service, “Conference on Disarmament Holds First Plenary Session of 2011,” DC11/002E, January 25, 2011, http://www.unog.ch/80256ED

D006B9C2E/%28httpNewsByYear_en%29/78D4B45D3569A799C125782300458999?OpenDocument.

7. Kanth, “Pak Blocks FMCT Negotiations,” January 26, 2011.

8. Ibid.

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About This Brief

The 2011 Conference on Disarmament began contentiously when 

Pakistan’s representative criticized 

U.S. support for full Indian membership in export control organizations that would allow it to engage 

in nuclear trade. This Peace Brief 

seeks to capture some of the 

areas of contention, including the 

Pakistani block of a fissile material 

cutoff treaty, and place them in 

the context of Pakistan’s larger 

strategic and security concerns 

vis-à-vis India. The author, Brian 

Rose, is a program specialist with 

the Institute’s Nonproliferation and 

Arms Control Program, directed 

by Paul Hughes.