U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

91–310 PDF 2014

S. HRG. 108–990 

OVERSIGHT ON TRANSPORTATION SECURITY 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, 

SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

SEPTEMBER 9, 2003 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation 

( 

(II) 

SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION 

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona, Chairman 

TED STEVENS, Alaska 

CONRAD BURNS, Montana 

TRENT LOTT, Mississippi 

KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas 

OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine 

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas 

GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon 

PETER G. FITZGERALD, Illinois 

JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada 

GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia 

JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire 

ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South Carolina, 

Ranking 

DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii 

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia 

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts 

JOHN B. BREAUX, Louisiana 

BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota 

RON WYDEN, Oregon 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

MARIA CANTWELL, Washington 

FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey 

JEANNE BUMPUS, Republican Staff Director and General Counsel 

ROBERT W. CHAMBERLIN, Republican Chief Counsel 

KEVIN D. KAYES, Democratic Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

GREGG ELIAS, Democratic General Counsel 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on September 9, 2003 ....................................................................... 1 

Statement of Senator Boxer .................................................................................... 107 

Statement of Senator Breaux ................................................................................. 104 

Statement of Senator Hollings ............................................................................... 2 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 2 

Statement of Senator Lautenberg .......................................................................... 5 

Statement of Senator Lott ...................................................................................... 4 

Statement of Senator McCain ................................................................................. 1 

Statement of Senator Snowe ................................................................................... 100 

WITNESSES

Bonner, Hon. Robert C., Commissioner, Customs and Border Protection, U.S. 

Department of Homeland Security ..................................................................... 16 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 19 

Collins, Admiral Thomas H., Commandant, Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Coast Guard ......................................................................................... 11 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 13 

Guerrero, Peter, Director, Physical Infrastructure, U.S. General Accounting 

Office; accompanied by Gerald L. Dillingham, Director, Civil Aviation 

Issues, and Margaret Wrightson, Director, Homeland Security and Justice 

Issues .................................................................................................................... 34 

Prepared statement of Peter Guerrero ........................................................... 37 

Prepared statement of Margaret Wrightson .................................................. 61 

Prepared statement of Gerald L. Dillingham ................................................. 68 

Loy, Admiral James M., Administrator, Transportation Security Administration, U.S. Department of Homeland Security .................................................... 21 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 26 

Shane, Jeffrey N., Under Secretary for Policy, U.S. Department of Transportation ..................................................................................................................... 7 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 8 

APPENDIX

Burns, Hon. Conrad, U.S. Senator from Montana, prepared statement ............. 111 

Inouye, Hon. Daniel K., U.S. Senator from Hawaii, prepared statement ........... 111 

Response to written questions submitted to Admiral Thomas H. Collins .......... 116 

Response to written questions submitted to Gerald L. Dillingham .................... 127 

Response to written questions submitted to Peter Guerrero ............................... 120 

Response to written questions submitted by Hon. Ernest F. Hollings to Admiral James M. Loy ................................................................................................. 120 

Response to written questions submitted by Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg to 

Gerald L. Dillingham and Margaret Wrightson ................................................ 124 

Response to written questions submitted by Hon. John McCain to Margaret 

Wrightson ............................................................................................................. 132 

Written questions submitted by Hon. Ron Wyden to Admiral James M. Loy .... 122 

Written questions submitted by Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg to Admiral James 

M. Loy, Hon. Robert C. Bonner, Peter Guerrero, Jeffrey N. Shane and 

Admiral Thomas H. Collins ................................................................................. 124 

Response to written questions submitted to Jeffrey N. Shane ............................ 112 

(1) 

OVERSIGHT ON TRANSPORTATION SECURITY 

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 9, 2003 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in room SR– 

253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. John McCain, Chairman 

of the Committee, presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN MCCAIN, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM ARIZONA 

The CHAIRMAN. Good morning. As we approach the second anniversary of the terrorist attacks on the United States, it’s appropriate that we again focus our attention on transportation security. 

Since that fateful day, our Nation has been fighting the war on terrorism, whether it’s our security abroad or at home. We can’t afford 

to lapse into complacency as we grow accustomed to the so-called 

new kind of normal. Much has been accomplished over the last 2 

years, and I think many would agree that transportation security 

is at its highest level ever, particularly aviation security. However, 

we need to remain vigilant across all modes of transportation, for 

the threat to our country has not waned. If we’re serious about 

countering terrorist threats, and we are, we need to have confidence in our security efforts across all modes of transportation, 

and that requires our continued attention to instituting or upgrading sound and reasoned security initiatives. 

Today’s hearing is intended to provide both a forum foro know 

is, reviewing what has occurred over the last 2 years and to determine what remains to be done to strengthen transportation security, and how we can do it. With respect to aviation security, we 

must ensure that the accomplishments of the Transportation Security Administration are not lost. 

Over the last 6 months, the TSA has reduced its screener workforce by 6,000 due to budgetary and appropriations pressures. 

While there has been a lot of discussion in the press about the impact of these reductions on waiting times at checkpoints, the real 

question we need to know is, what is the impact on security? A 

screener corps that is overworked and stretched too thin is simply 

not going to be able to carry out the job we’re relying on them to 

do. 

With respect to ground transportation, we need to make sure 

that the independent actions initiated so far by TSA, the DOT, and 

industry are followed up with a systematic program of security enhancements based on each mode’s particular needs. Clearly, there’s 

2 

need to enhance security on our highway and transit networks, yet 

both are intentionally open and easily accessible and, therefore, 

more difficult to harden against terrorist attacks. Railroads and 

pipelines, for their extensive unprotected rights of way, also 

present unique challenges. 

Further, we need to make sure that safety and security efforts 

at DOT and the Department of Homeland Security are adequately 

coordinated, since safety and security so often overlap. 

Maritime security, because of the immense volume of trade that 

must move through our Nation’s ports, remains a daunting task. 

While the Administration has taken action to implement the many 

important requirements of the Maritime Security Act of 2002, 

many in the maritime community still wonder who is in charge. 

They’re confused by what, in some cases, appears to be competing 

requirements of the various agencies claiming responsibility for 

maritime security. Such confusion, not unique to the maritime industry, is compounded by the lack of agreements between the various agencies and departments responsible for transportation security. Transportation security is far too important to be placed in 

limbo due to needless agency turf battles. I hope our witnesses 

today can finally clarify the roles and relationships of the agencies 

they represent. 

Our country was the victim of a terrible crime. Its after-effects 

will continue to be felt. We must be diligent in protecting our country, but always be cognizant of the burdens we’re placing on our 

citizens and industries. 

I thank our witnesses for being here and welcome their insights 

into transportation security. 

Senator Hollings? 

STATEMENT OF HON. ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH CAROLINA 

Senator HOLLINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for the 

hearing. 

I’ll ask that my prepared statement be included. 

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Hollings follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH CAROLINA

September 11 changed our world forever. It has changed our travel patterns, it 

has changed the way we balance civil liberties against security requirements, and 

ultimately it has changed the focus of our government. Terrorism is a war, and it 

is a war that is perpetrated against innocent civilians, so the stakes are extremely 

high, and failure could have catastrophic effects, not only on the lives of innocent 

civilians, but also on the economic health arid welfare of our nation. Sunday night 

the President announced the Administration wants an additional $87 billion to fight 

terrorism in Iraq, bringing the total amount spent in Iraq to $150 billion. This 

amount represents close to 5 times the amount of money that the President proposed to spend on our homeland security this year. We must be able to fight this 

war on two fronts—in Iraq and at home. 

I personally was reluctant to create a Department of Homeland Security to address the issues confronting us because of the horrific terrorists attacks. In fact, I 

was concerned that bureaucratic reshuffling, without prior planning, would detract 

from our ability to prepare and respond to threats of terrorism. However, we are 

stuck with what we have, and the Administration must take the steps necessary to 

help this bureaucracy work. Underfunding key transportation security initiatives, 

3 

and I know you all have to deal with OMB and the White House for your budgets, 

is not a choice we can afford. I still am very concerned that your agencies have a 

long way to go before you can claim coordinated integration and that petty bureaucracies have been overcome, and while we have some good people working on the 

problems, I think that the Administration has not dedicated the necessary resources 

to help you do the job. For example, we are busy taking pictures of the President 

in front of the Coast Guard at the vitally important Port of Philadelphia, yet we 

are not providing the port security funds for Philadelphia to comply with its federally approved security plan. In fact we are not even providing funding for the Coast 

Guard to review the security plan. This year, the President’s budget had not one 

penny explicitly provided to help ports comply with the Federal mandates for port 

security. When we passed the Maritime Transportation Security Act, the Senate insisted on a user fee. Unfortunately in order to gain passage of the bill we relented 

and we passed the bill without a user fee because I was convinced by some that 

this was important and would be supported by the Administration. Well the Administration was too busy focusing on the tax cut to provide more than meaningful 

glance at port security, and I have not been able to get votes needed to ensure this 

funding. 

However, that is water under the bridge, and we need to move forward and make 

sure that we provide the citizens of the United States a secure transportation system. We saw after 9/11 that without an enhanced security system, people would not 

get back onto planes. We had to bail out the airline industry twice and invest billions. People all over the United States are concerned about the issue of transportation security. but as a nation we should be able to provide them the security they 

deserve, and they should not have to be concerned about getting on an airplane or 

riding Amtrak or traveling through the Holland Tunnel from New Jersey into Manhattan. 

Our witnesses sit here today having done a remarkable job with what they have 

been provided. For instance, over the past year and a half, almost all of reports suggest that under the guidance of Admiral Loy, aviation security has improved dramatically that the screening workforce is well trained and doing a good job. But, 

and this is where we have problems—funding remains critical. You can not take the 

aggressive steps needed for cargo security, for research on new explosive detection 

systems, and for training of Federal Air Marshals without the money. You can not 

run an agency when Congress is putting in artificial staffing caps, forcing you to 

‘‘right size’’ the screener workforce that will result in longer lines at the airports. 

That makes no sense. I know you have to do what you are told and we both understand that. 

We have a long way to go at our seaports. Although the Coast Guard has stepped 

up to its new responsibilities for homeland security with its usual vigor and ‘‘can 

do’’ attitude, I have some very serious concerns that you are not able to implement 

the new Maritime Security Transportation Act to secure our ports. For instance, the 

Act mandated that certain large commercial vessels carry transponders to allow us 

to monitor their movements, to help ensure that an oil tanker was not hijacked and 

run into one of the many nuclear reactors located on our navigable waterways, yet 

the President’s budget included only $1 million to actually purchase the towers and 

equipment necessary to start monitoring the cruise ships and oil tankers that already are carrying identification equipment, and because of the insistence of the 

OMB, they proposed delaying this project until 2007. This is not right. While I am 

pleased that the Coast Guard receives an increase in your budget, I would say that 

this increase is long overdue, and yet it is still unclear if this increase is enough 

to ensure that all of the Coast Guard’s security and non-security missions are adequately funded. 

In general, I have real concerns about the whole surface transportation security 

issue as well. We need to do more in this area. The rail system traverses the entire 

nation, and our passenger rail service operates through and under many of the most 

important structures in the nation. We need to have a plan, and we need to follow 

through with the necessary resources to secure this system, as well as our other surface modes which move 800,000 shipments of hazardous materials annually. 

None of us want to shortchange transportation security. The Administration has 

got to let you do your job and provide the resources necessary to build a security 

system, like the one the Israeli’s used—the onion, with layers and layers of protections. I look forward to the statements of the witnesses. 

Senator HOLLINGS. And I was a little tardy because I was trying 

to figure out the exact figures. And I want the witnesses to correct 

what I have here, from the best staff in the U.S. Senate. 

4 

[Laughter.] 

Senator HOLLINGS. Airports. These are the figures, for, that we 

need, according to our figures and everything else of that kind. 

GAO, for example—and we’ve got the report in front of us—is $5 

billion more. We need to get the equipment for the baggage check 

and the additional redesign and everything else like that, a $5 billion amount. Tell me why that’s right or wrong. 

Ports, seven and a half billion. We told all the ports, Mr. Chairman, to prepare plans and everything else. Now they’ve submitted 

them, and everything else of that kind, and to flesh out those ports 

plans, seven and a half billion dollars. The Coast Guard needs an 

additional $500-million-point-five. Admiral Collins, tell me if we 

need more. I know at one time, the overall was about $7 billion for 

the Coast Guard. We’ve been putting some in there. I want to 

make sure the AIS towers are covered in the extra cost, and even 

craft, if we need them. That was a low figure. I was trying to get 

it up higher, and that’s why I was late. Rail security, $3 billion, 

for Amtrak and for the tunnels and what have you. The highways 

and transit, the states say $2 billion is needed there. And Mr. 

Bonner, Customs, I understand for cargo security the need is about 

$2 billion. 

So overall, you add up the airports, the ports, the Coast Guard, 

the rail security, the highways and transit, the Customs and cargo 

security, $20 billion. Now, we’ve got $87 billion for Iraq, Senator 

Lautenberg. I’m more for $87 billion for the United States this 

morning. Getting right to the point, getting $87 billion for the U.S., let me 

tell you how that works, Mr. Chairman. They expect that to be cut 

back, probably, to $77 billion. You know how we’ve got to try to act 

like we’ve really reviewed it in detail and done our jobs, so we’ll 

cut that back to $77 billion. The $20 billion for the transportation 

needs here will cut us back to some $50 billion, and we’ll hold that 

$20 billion until next year’s campaign and then Karl Rove will dish 

it out. So whatever we can get, don’t expect to get it here this year, 

and don’t expect to get it before March or April of next year, but, 

in the campaign, $20 billion will go around all over the durn countryside. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you for that optimistic overview—— 

[Laughter.] 

The CHAIRMAN.—Senator Hollings. 

Senator Lott? 

STATEMENT OF HON. TRENT LOTT, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSISSIPPI 

Senator LOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for having this hearing. 

Certainly, it’s appropriate, as we mark the two-year anniversary 

of 9/11/2001, we need to take a look at our transportation security. 

And you have undertaken a daunting and awesome task, and I 

think you should be commended, all of you here at the table, for 

the work that you’ve done and for the effort that’s still underway. 

Obviously, we’ve not done everything we need to do, and we 

haven’t always done it to perfection. But Congress mandated a real 

5 

challenge for you after the events of 9/11. We basically told you to 

completely overhaul security and aviation, and you went after it, 

and you got it done. And now, sometimes when you do things in 

haste or under mandate from Congress, you don’t get it all right, 

so we need to take a look at where we are and what additional 

funds you need or what additional authority you might need or 

what we need to do to change that. 

In the FAA Federal Aviation Reauthorization Conference Report, 

we did try to do a number of things that would help TSA with its 

burdens. We need to continue to do more. We’ve had, obviously, 

some things, some responsibility for the costs assigned in the 

wrong place. We’d like to get that more fairly and equitably assigned in the industry and with the government. I am concerned 

about AIP funds that have been diverted from the airport improvements over into the security area on a temporary basis. That was 

something we had to do, but I hope that certainly we don’t plan 

on continuing that. 

Under the persistence of Senator Hutchison, of course, we’ve had 

the cargo security bill passed. We need to continue to look very seriously at port and maritime security. Being from a state that’s got 

a river along one side and the Gulf of Mexico on the other, and the 

ports of Pascagoula, Gulf Port, Bienville, and even New Orleans 

right in the area, I continue to worry about how secure they are. 

Coast Guard has an important role in that area, and we’re working 

to add additional cutters, aircraft, command and control, and, of 

course, the Deepwater program, but I think we need to continue to 

ask ourselves just how secure we are. 

So I’ll look forward to your testimony, and I’ll have some questions based on my statement. 

Thank you, Senator McCain. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lautenberg? 

STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I welcome all the witnesses here, who have a significant 

task. Some of it is to—that task is to prove to Congress that we 

can get done what we’d like to get done with less and less funding 

to do it than is anticipated. 

This hearing, on the eve of the second anniversary of 9/11, is a 

very important one, and I wish I could tell my constituents, many 

of whom lost loved ones that terrible day nearly 2 years ago, that 

they’re much safer now than they were then. But I can’t say it with 

certainty. I’m not sure that what we’ve offered thus far has done 

the job. 

There was a disconcerting article in Sunday’s Washington Post, 

entitled ‘‘Government’s Hobbled Giant,’’ that talked about the slow 

start, confusion, and low morale at the Department of Homeland 

Security. The President initially resisted creating DHS, and I have 

to wonder if he’s fully committed to giving the Department the resources it needs to do the job that it must do, especially with regard to securing our transportation network. 

Inexplicably, the Administration moved to cut the number of airport baggage screeners and law enforcement officers, at a time 

6 

when the threat level was being raised. Inexplicably, the Administration proposed to cut funding for the Federal Air Marshal Program, just one day after citing specific terrorist threats to commercial air travel. Inexplicably, the Administration still fails to adequately fund port security, which remains highly vulnerable. Terrorists have tried to smuggle all sorts of weapons and even themselves inside shipping containers, and only a fraction of which are 

getting inspected. Inexplicably, the Administration remains obsessed with contracting out safety and security functions of the 

government, like air traffic control, with seeming disregard for the 

consequences it will have on our safety. And, all the while, the 

President stirs the hornet’s nest by saying things like, ‘‘Bring them 

on.’’ 

Since the last time we held a hearing on transportation security, 

there have been a number of breaches, some of which have taken 

place in or near New Jersey. For example, an arms dealer was 

caught trying to smuggle a shoulder-fired surface-to-air missile into 

our ports for terrorists to use on our own soil. Now, that investigation—and thank goodness it was successful—this man was importing shoulder weapons, shoulder-launched weapons, from St. Petersburg to Baltimore, just like you might ship—who knows what?— 

caviar or something like that. And he had studied it well and thoroughly enough that he knew that that was a route that could probably succeed. I don’t know whether we have 18 months to uncover 

some of these plots against us. 

In another instance, three young men floated in a raft across Jamaica Bay and wandered onto the runway at JFK Airport and almost had to knock on the door of the police headquarters to be discovered. This happened just shortly after the Transportation Security Administration cut the number of law enforcement officers 

working at airports, went down from 64 to 19 at the three major 

airports in the New York/New Jersey region. It’s time to disavow 

security on the cheap. 

On Sunday night, the President finally, Senator Hollings, talked 

about a preliminary cost for the War in Iraq. You wouldn’t bet the 

family farm that that’s going to be the final number, I’ll bet. And 

now we need to know what kind of costs it’s going to take to keep 

Americans safe here at home. 

While we have some improvements—and I congratulate those of 

you who have worked so diligently to try and organize this huge 

task force and to get the people in place—in the right places at the 

right time. So we’ve made some improvements with regard to 

transportation border security. And I’m sure that our witnesses 

will tell us about what we have to do to get where we’d like to finally be. 

I thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

I want to welcome the witnesses again, and I thank you for appearing today. 

And we’d begin with you, Mr. Shane. Thank you very much for 

being here. 

7 

STATEMENT OF JEFFREY N. SHANE, UNDER SECRETARY FOR 

POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Mr. SHANE. Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman, Members of the 

Committee. We appreciate very much the Committee’s decision to 

hold this important hearing on a very important issue. 

In the two years since that most monstrous crime ever perpetrated on America was committed, we’ve made enormous strides 

in the transportation security area. Secretary Mineta said, earlier 

this year, that creating the Transportation Security Administration 

was by far the toughest, most challenging, and most satisfying endeavor he had ever undertaken. We all owe a great deal of thanks 

to Secretary Mineta, to our former Deputy Secretary Michael Jackson, and certainly to my good friend, Jim Loy, now the Transportation Security Administrator, for their unwavering commitment to 

this country and the superb work they did in creating TSA. Because of their efforts and those of thousands of others, the Department met every congressional deadline on time and, in the process, 

transformed the security of our aviation system within the span of 

just a few short months. 

Mr. Chairman, I have a longer prepared statement. What I’d like 

to do, in the interest of time, is compress that and ask that the full 

statement be put into the record. 

The CHAIRMAN. All prepared statements will be made part of the 

record, and thank you. 

Mr. SHANE. Thank you very much. 

While much of the focus since September 11 has been on aviation 

security, the Department has also been doing a great deal of work 

with our DHS counterparts in assessing the vulnerabilities and improving the security of our other modes of transportation. For example, the Maritime Administration has worked closely with the 

United States Coast Guard and TSA to evaluate security at our 

Nation’s ports and to disseminate two rounds of port security 

grants facilitating $262 million in security upgrades. The Federal 

Transit Administration has also shared its expertise by funding 

$30 million in vulnerability assessments and the security training 

of transit operators across the country. Additionally, our Research 

and Special Programs Administration has worked closely with TSA 

to ensure that the transportation of hazardous materials fulfills 

both safety and security requirements. Finally, I’ve served, personally, as a Co-Chairman, together with Doug Browning, the Deputy 

Commissioner of Customs, a Co-Chairman of the Executive Steering Committee that oversees the Operation Safe Commerce Program. $58 million in Operation Safe Commerce grants was recently 

awarded to the three participating load-center ports. That’s Los 

Angeles/Long Beach, Seattle/Tacoma, and New York/New Jersey. 

Through those grants, we are creating an essential test bed for new 

technologies designed to provide greater security for freight containers as they move on inter-modal journals through global commerce. 

Since last March, of course, the primary responsibility for maintaining transportation security has been vested in the Department 

of Homeland Security. Two key elements of the DHS structure, 

DHS and the Coast Guard, came out of the Department of Transportation, and they remain key players, of course, in providing for 

8 

the Nation’s transportation security. The close ties that we have, 

at DOT, to TSA and the Coast Guard have helped us to establish 

extremely close links throughout DHS, and we continue to working 

closely with our former colleagues, supporting them in every step 

of the way as they defend our Nation’s homeland. 

We have taken a great many steps to ensure that this close 

working relationship continues into the future, as well. For example, just prior to the creation of DHS, our Federal Aviation Administration and TSA signed a memorandum of agreement specifying 

in detail the specific role that each agency would play in overseeing 

the safety and security of our aviation system. We have signed 

memoranda of agreement in some other areas, as well, and we will 

continue to evaluate the need for additional agreements as we gain 

more experience. In addition, we have supplemented these formal 

MOAs with regular discussions at various levels between DOT and 

DHS on the full range of transportation security issues. 

Finally, a key step we have taken is to designate a single point 

of contact for DHS and other agencies to access information about 

the transportation system, to tap into the network of contacts we 

have with our transportation stakeholders at DOT, and to learn 

from our technical expertise in dealing with complex issues, like 

the transport of hazardous materials. Our Office of Intelligence and 

Security has been designated as this formal point of contact and 

has played a key role in helping DOT support DHS on a number 

of critical issues in recent months. 

Mr. Chairman, recent GAO reports have documented that significant challenges remain in transportation security, and suggest that 

more coordination between TSA and DOT is needed. The Department’s Office of Intelligence and Security is providing that coordination while also representing DOT on over 40 security policy 

working groups. 

The key asset that DOT brings to the security table is our involvement in the operation of transportation systems. The blackout 

that occurred last month provided a good example of the Department of Transportation’s unique ability to assess the state of the 

transportation sector in multiple cities and in a very short time. 

We did it through our real-time communications network, with 

state, local and industry stakeholders. This information proved critical to DHS and other Federal decisionmakers throughout the incident. 

Remember that our modal administrations have decades of experience in responding to all kinds of emergencies—floods, hurricanes, blizzards, hazardous materials spills, and, yes, blackouts. 

This operational expertise will remain an essential ingredient in 

our Nation’s emergency response capability. 

Thank you very much for the opportunity to appear here, and I 

certainly look forward to answering your questions at the appropriate time. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Shane follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JEFFREY N. SHANE, UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLICY, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

It is a pleasure to be here today to discuss transportation security issues. For 

nearly two years, since that awful day when Secretary Mineta was compelled to 

9 

ground all aircraft over the United States for the first time in history, the U.S. Department of Transportation has been working with the Department of Homeland Security to make our transportation system more secure. We applaud the Committee 

for holding this hearing, and look forward to continuing to work with you on these 

critical issues. The monstrous crime perpetrated on America on September 11 crystallized for all of us the importance of enhancing security across our transportation 

system, and while we have accomplished a great deal since that day, much more 

can be done. 

As we discuss transportation security issues, it is also important, of course, to consider the substantial contribution that the transportation sector makes to our Nation’s economy. For example, transportation-related industries currently account for 

approximately 11 percent of the Nation’s GDP and 8 percent of our workforce. 

Transportation infrastructure and services enable our citizens to get to work or 

school, visit family, take vacations, and manage their businesses by moving materials, supplies, and products around the world as efficiently as possible, whether domestically or internationally. For all of these reasons, the importance of transportation to America’s economic and social well-being cannot be overstated, and that 

is why maintaining the highest levels of security throughout the system is so critical 

to our prosperity as a Nation. 

Past Accomplishments 

Secretary Mineta said earlier this year, when the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and U.S. Coast Guard were transferred to the new Department of 

Homeland Security, that creating TSA was by far the toughest, most challenging, 

and most satisfying endeavor he had ever undertaken. ‘‘Starting from a blank sheet 

of paper on November 19, 2001,’’ Secretary Mineta said, ‘‘we created an agency of 

more than 60,000 employees that is truly fulfilling its goal of protecting Americans 

as they travel across our country, and beyond.’’ We all owe a great deal to Secretary 

Mineta, to former Deputy Secretary Michael Jackson, and certainly to my good 

friend TSA Administrator Admiral Jim Loy for their unwavering commitment to 

this country and the superb work they did in creating TSA. Because of their efforts 

and those of thousands of others, the Department met every congressional deadline 

on time, and in the process transformed the security of our aviation system within 

the span of just a few short months. 

While much of the focus since September 11 has been on aviation security, and 

rightfully so, the Department has also been doing a great deal of work with our 

DHS counterparts in assessing the vulnerabilities and improving the security in our 

other modes of transportation. For example, the Maritime Administration has 

worked closely with the Coast Guard and TSA to evaluate security at our Nation’s 

ports and to disseminate two rounds of port security grants, facilitating $262 million 

in security upgrades as a result. The Federal Transit Administration has also 

shared its expertise by conducting $30 million in vulnerability assessments and security training of transit operators across the country. Additionally, the Research 

and Special Programs Administration has worked closely with TSA to ensure that 

the transportation of hazardous materials fulfills both safety and security requirements. 

Finally, I have served personally as a co-chairman of the Executive Steering Committee that oversees the Operation Safe Commerce program. Fifty-eight million dollars in Operation Safe Commerce grants have recently been awarded to the three 

participating load center ports—Los Angeles/Long Beach, Seattle/Tacoma, and New 

York/New Jersey. Through these grants we are creating an essential test bed for 

new technologies designed to provide greater security for freight containers as they 

move on intermodal journeys through global commerce. Working closely with other 

federal agencies, these efforts across all other modes of transportation are designed 

to create a comprehensive system of measures that will provide far greater security 

across the entire international supply chain than anything we have known before. 

Transition to DHS 

Today, of course, the primary responsibility for maintaining transportation security lies with the Department of Homeland Security. Formed in March of this year, 

this new Department has allowed formerly diverse security functions spread across 

the government to come together in a unified structure. Two key pieces of the DHS 

structure—TSA and the Coast Guard—moved from the Department of Transportation to DHS and continue to play major roles in providing for the Nation’s transportation security. The close ties that we have to these two agencies have helped 

us to establish extremely close links throughout DHS, and we continue working 

closely with our former colleagues, supporting them every step of the way as they 

defend our Nation’s homeland. 

10 

We have taken numerous actions to ensure that this close working relationship 

continues into the future as well. For example, just prior to the creation of DHS, 

the Federal Aviation Administration and TSA signed a memorandum of agreement 

specifying in detail the specific role that each agency would play in overseeing the 

safety and security of our aviation system. Aviation poses unique challenges, of 

course, not only because it was used to carry out the September 11 attacks, but also 

because of the FAA’s continuing responsibilities for managing the air traffic control 

system, and thus helping to secure our airways in times of crisis. Because of these 

considerations, we believed that it was very important to have a written agreement 

between DOT and DHS outlining exactly what each Department would be responsible for once TSA moved to the new department, and what we could expect from 

one another. 

We have signed memoranda of agreement in some other areas as well, and will 

continue to evaluate the need for additional agreements as the need arises. Now 

that DHS is fully established we will be in a better position to determine what role 

each of our departments will play in providing security for the other modes of transportation. In addition, we have supplemented these formal MOAs with regular discussions, at various levels, between DOT and DHS on the full range of transportation security issues. One of the things we have done during this transition period 

to help manage our relationship is a regular meeting that I conduct with senior TSA 

staff on a bi-weekly basis. These meetings give us the opportunity to coordinate our 

activities, identify potential issues or problem areas, and ensure that we are providing all the support we can to help TSA in securing our Nation’s transportation 

system. 

Finally, another step we have taken is to designate a single point of contact for 

DHS and other agencies to access information about the transportation system, tap 

into the network of contacts we have with our stakeholders, or learn from our technical expertise in dealing with complex issues like the transport of hazardous materials. Our Office of Intelligence and Security has been designated as this formal 

point of contact and has played a key role in helping DOT support DHS on a number of critical issues in recent months. A good example of the benefit of this single 

point of contact was our experience with the recent suspension of the Transit Without Visa (TWOV) program in response to credible intelligence that terrorists intended to take advantage of this program to carry out additional attacks on the 

United States. DOT’s Office of Intelligence and Security ensured that DHS had the 

information it needed to determine what the impact of that shutdown would be and 

helped it deal with the airline industry to ensure a smooth shutdown of the program. 

Future Challenges and DOT’s Role in Security 

While some assume that security simply moved to DHS when TSA and the Coast 

Guard departed earlier this year, there is no question that DOT can continue to 

make important contributions to the development and implementation of transportation security policy. Recent GAO reports have documented that significant challenges remain in transportation security, and suggest that more coordination between TSA and DOT is needed. The Department’s Office of Intelligence and Security 

provides that coordination service to the Secretary, while also representing the Department on over forty security policy working groups. 

The Department of Transportation’s mission is to ensure safety, mobility and the 

economic viability of the transportation system. Security is a fundamental element 

of each of these three key mission areas. To effectively integrate security into transportation decision-making, five enduring functions remain within DOT. They are: 

security policy development; transportation system design; intelligence; operations; 

and readiness, including plans and exercises. 

One other important role that the Department can play is in regards to the operation of transportation systems. The blackout that occurred last month proved a 

good example of the Department of Transportation’s unique ability to quickly assess 

the state of the transportation sector in multiple cities. This was done through our 

real-time communications network with state, local and industry stakeholders. This 

information proved crucial to DHS and other federal decision-makers as the crisis 

rapidly unfolded. 

Finally, there is one additional reason why DOT must be at the table during security emergencies. Our modal administrations have decades of experience in responding to all kinds of emergencies—floods, hurricanes, blizzards, blackouts and hazardous material spills. This operational expertise will remain an essential ingredient in our Nation’s emergency response capability, and this ‘‘all hazard’’ approach 

is consistent with the National Response Plan currently under development. 

11 

In this post-September 11 world, security has become a prerequisite to the development of an effective transportation system. Just think, for example, about how 

many fewer people might be flying today were it not for the decisive steps that were 

taken in the months after September 11 to tighten security throughout our Nation’s 

aviation system. The Department of Transportation continues to support the development of intelligent security policies. If it is not secure, then it is not safe and will 

not be good for our economy. 

Thank you very much for the opportunity to appear here today. I look forward 

to answering your questions. 

Senator LOTT [presiding]. In Senator McCain’s absence, Senator 

Hollings and I will just keep the testimony moving. So I believe Admiral Thomas H. Collins, Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard, 

we’ll be delighted to hear from you. 

STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL THOMAS H. COLLINS, 

COMMANDANT, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, 

U.S. COAST GUARD 

Admiral COLLINS. Thank you, Senator, distinguished Members of 

the Committee. I appreciate the opportunity to discuss our accomplishments in improving maritime security since September 11, 

2001, and additional measures we need to further promote our 

maritime security. 

I am very, very pleased to share the panel with my colleagues 

from Department of Homeland Security and Department of Transportation. I’m also grateful for the review and insight provided by 

the General Accounting Office, and look forward to their continuing 

recommendations to enhance our maritime safety program initiatives. 

Now, working within the Department of Homeland Security, the 

Coast Guard’s plan to reduce maritime security risks involves 

building capacity, capability, partnerships in four distinct but 

interrelated areas. The first is enhancing what we call ‘‘maritime 

domain awareness’’; second, creating and overseeing a maritime security regime for this nation; three, increasing our operational 

presence and enhancing deterrence; and, four, improving our response posture as an organization. And I’d like to briefly highlight 

some of the select few accomplishments in each of these areas. 

First, maritime domain awareness. We define that as having— 

ideally, the ultimate state—as having comprehensive information, 

intelligence, and knowledge of all relevant entities and activities in 

the maritime domain that would or can impact America’s safety, 

security environment, and the economy. We’ve been very, very busy 

in this area enhancing our ability to move toward that end state. 

Now, we’ve established a formal intel program in our organization. 

We have improved our command-control communications capability, connectivity, and interoperability. We’re requiring vessels 

entering our ports to provide 96-hour advanced notice of arrival, 

and then tracking and screening vessel arrivals—people, cargo, and 

vessels. We’ve established field intelligence support teams and increasing our collection and analysis capability, and aggressively 

pursuing systems that will give us greater visibility in the maritime environment, namely integrated Deepwater systems and Rescue 21 projects. 

In the second area, maritime security regime, we are very, very 

pleased with the progress that we have made in implementing the 

12 

terms and conditions of the Maritime Transportation Security Act 

of 2002. In a parallel effort, we have driven through IMO, a brand 

new international security regime for international ports and ships, 

in about a year’s time-frame. I think that’s quite an accomplishment. And we’ve issued interim rules in July 1, 2003, to implement 

MTSA and are on target to provide the final rules in October of 

this year. 

We’ve also completed 13 port security assessments, of a total of 

55, and by the end of calendar year 2004 we will complete those 

formal port security assessments through the 55 ports. And we’ve 

increased information sharing, at the national, state, and local 

level, with industry. 

The third area, operational presence. With the help of Congress 

and the support of the President and our Secretary, we have increased the capacity and the capability of the Coast Guard to have 

a increasing presence in our ports and waterways. We’ve created 

four maritime safety and security teams. Two more will be in place 

this fall, six more in the fiscal 2004 budget, for a total of 12. We’ve 

provided armed security boardings and onboard escorts of high-interest vessels, and enhanced our control of vessels, with escorts and 

sea marshals. And we’ve added new patrol boats and people to our 

inventory. 

In the fourth area, our response posture, we’re reconstituting the 

chemical, biological, and radiological dispersal program within our 

service and enhancing the strike-team capabilities that we maintain. 

Now, these security measures in these four areas we’ve instituted 

so far have had no significant adverse impact on maritime commerce. That said, the regulatory impact of MTSA on the maritime 

industry will be significant, affecting over 10,000 domestic vessels 

and 20,000 foreign vessels, 5,000 maritime transportation facilities, 

and 40 offshore platforms. And the timeline for implementing the 

new requirement is exceptionally short. The regulation would be 

fully implemented by July 1, 2004. We estimate the cost to industry to be $1.5 billion in the first year and $7.3 billion over the next 

10 years. 

We are making good use of the resources we received in Fiscal 

Year 2002 and 2003, and the planned resources for Fiscal Year 

2004. We have had outstanding support from the Administration 

and from Congress in this regard. A lot has been accomplished, but 

we still have a long way to go. 

We’re working diligently to increase maritime security by building a layered defense approach to maritime security by recapitalizing our Deepwater assets, by identifying and addressing 

vulnerabilities revealed by port security assessments, by putting a 

comprehensive planning and exercise scheme in place throughout 

the country, and monitoring foreign compliance with plan certification, as required by MTSA. 

Mr. Chairman, we have a solid plan for maritime security, and 

we are executing it. All of our efforts, again, are designed to build 

the necessary authorities, the necessary capability, the necessary 

capacity, and the necessary partnerships to mitigate maritime security risks to our Nation. To achieve these goals, we need support 

for our 2004 budget, continuing a phased approach to building out 

13 

these capability and capacity. We need support for our 2004 authorization bill. It provides necessary authority we need to protect 

our vital infrastructure and respond quickly, if necessary, and it 

adds ability for us to enforce laws ashore in proximity to the waterfront. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today, and 

I’m happy to answer questions at the appropriate juncture. Thank 

you. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Collins follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL THOMAS H. COLLINS, COMMANDANT, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, U.S. COAST GUARD

Good morning Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of the Committee. It is 

my pleasure to be here today to discuss the Coast Guard’s accomplishments in improving maritime transportation security since the terrorist attacks of September 

11, 2001, the impact of those accomplishments on maritime commerce, and the additional measures that may be needed to further promote maritime transportation security. 

The attacks of September 11, 2001, have required the United States and the 

world to recognize how vulnerable our international systems of transportation and 

trade are to those who intend to do us harm. A terrorist incident against our marine 

transportation system would have a serious and long-lasting negative impact on 

global shipping, international trade, and the world economy. Our ports and waterways also have significant strategic military value. Valuable and vulnerable . . . 

these factors make protection of our marine transportation system a high priority 

in the U.S. Maritime Homeland Security Strategy. 

Accomplishments 

Working in concert with the Department of Homeland Security and its agencies, 

we developed a strategic approach to maritime security that places a premium on 

identifying and intercepting threats well before they reach U.S. shores. We will do 

this by conducting layered, multi-agency, maritime security operations; strengthening the port security posture of our strategic economic and military ports; building 

on current international cooperative security efforts; and making risk-based decisions. These key elements form the basis of the Maritime Homeland Security Strategy, closely aligning with the President’s National Strategy for Homeland Security. 

This is a sound strategy that reduces maritime security risks through: (1) increasing 

our maritime domain awareness; (2) implementing preventative measures to detect 

and deter; (3) securing our borders and protecting vital infrastructure; and (4) preparing to respond quickly if necessary. 

Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, the Coast Guard has instituted measures to increase maritime domain awareness—a combination of intelligence, surveillance, and operational information to build as complete a picture as possible to the 

threats and vulnerabilities in the maritime realm. Within 30 days of the attacks, 

we amended our regulations to require ocean-going vessels approaching U.S. to provide advance notice 96 hours prior to arrival at U.S. ports. We also centralized reporting from individual Captains of the Port to a single location to enable better coordination and analysis of information and more rapid dissemination to other agencies. The Coast Guard Intelligence Coordination Center, co-located with the Office 

of Naval Intelligence at the National Maritime Intelligence Center in Suitland, 

Maryland, established COASTWATCH, a process that analyzes these notice of arrival reports using law enforcement and intelligence information and reporting vessels of interest so that Coast Guard and other agencies could appropriately respond 

to board those vessels before they reached port, if necessary. The Coast Guard continues this practice today and has improved electronic sharing of notice of arrival 

reports and accompanying intelligence information with Bureau of Customs and 

Border Protection (CBP), Transportation Security Administration (TSA), Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protections (IAIP) Directorate, Department of Defense, and other components of the Intelligence Community. 

Recognizing the criticality of intelligence in achieving maritime domain awareness, we have taken several key steps to grow our intelligence program. Last year 

we elevated the Director of Intelligence to an Assistant Commandant level to align 

with the importance I place on intelligence to support Coast Guard operations. Additionally, we are in the process of completing the measures required to fully implement the December 2001 legislation adding the intelligence element of the Coast 

14 

Guard to the U.S. Intelligence Community. Our primary focus on this point has 

been to meet the stringent legal and oversight requirements that accompany Intelligence Community membership as we begin to build better collection and analytical 

capabilities. We are able to provide more information on this initiative in a classified briefing. Within the last 6 months, the Coast Guard has transformed the existing Atlantic and Pacific Area intelligence staffs into Maritime Intelligence Fusion 

Centers Atlantic and Pacific. This change increased collection and analytical capabilities to enhance all-source fusion of intelligence and information and to improve 

the timeliness and quality of theater level intelligence support to Coast Guard operational forces. The new Maritime Intelligence Fusion Centers also ensure rapid reporting of information gathered by Coast Guard forces into the IAIP Directorate and 

Intelligence Community at the national level. We have established Field Intelligence 

Support Teams, consisting of Coast Guard intelligence analysts and Coast Guard 

special agents, to provide tactical intelligence support to Coast Guard Captains of 

the Port through collection and reporting of suspicious or criminal activity in the 

port areas, to share information with other agencies at the local level, and to rapidly 

disseminate intelligence to the Captain of the Port and other local commanders. 

The regulations which implement the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 

2002 (MTSA) require certain vessels to install an Automatic Identification System 

(AIS) by the end of 2004, and the Coast Guard will install AIS capabilities at each 

Vessel Traffic Service location nationwide with the long-term goal of National AIS 

coverage. Additionally, the Coast Guard has completed port security assessments at 

13 of the 55 most significant military and economic ports in the United States and 

will complete the assessments of all 55 ports by the end of calendar year 2004. 

These assessments are unique because they capture information from local law enforcement sources not previously shared with intelligence, thus making them more 

comprehensive. Finally, the Coast Guard continues to coordinate maritime security 

information sharing, consistent with the MTSA requirements, at the national level 

with other agencies, and at the local level with federal, state and local entities and 

with industry. Because the maritime industry has not organized itself to receive and 

send information regarding threats and vulnerabilities to maritime critical infrastructure as discussed in PDD 63, the Coast Guard formed a maritime information 

sharing process to share threat information with the maritime industry and to receive reports of suspicious activities from them. 

Terrorist activities and threats, coupled with our own acknowledged vulnerabilities, prompted unprecedented multi-lateral security activities over the past two 

years. The United States, working in concert with our trading partners, adopted a 

landmark international maritime security regime through the International Maritime Organization. This approach minimized the potential for a proliferation of national, unilateral security requirements that could impair maritime commerce, while 

at the same time ensured that meaningful security measures will be consistently 

implemented on a global scale. More specifically, on December 13, 2002, over 100 

nations at IMO adopted amendments to the International Convention for the Safety 

of Life at Sea (SOLAS) and an International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) 

Code. On November 25, 2002, President Bush signed the MTSA. In passing the 

MTSA, Congress expressly found that it is in the best interest of the United States 

to implement the security system developed by IMO because it contains the essential elements for enhancing maritime security. Both of these important instruments—the SOLAS security amendments and the MTSA—are major steps in addressing maritime security, and together they form the cornerstone of the nation’s 

maritime homeland security strategy. 

In coordination with the Transportation Security Administration, Maritime Administration, and Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, the Coast Guard, as 

the lead Federal Agency for maritime security, published regulations on July 1, 

2003 to implement the core security requirements of the MTSA consistent with the 

SOLAS amendments and the ISPS Code. And these regulations are essential to promote our national strategy of preventing terrorist attacks in the United States, to 

reduce our vulnerability to terrorism, and to minimize the damage and permit quick 

recovery from any attacks that might occur. The regulatory impact on the maritime 

industry will be significant—affecting over 10,000 domestic vessels, 20,000 foreign 

vessels, 5,000 marine transportation related facilities and 40 critical offshore platforms—and the timeline for implementing the new robust maritime security requirements is exceptionally short—the regulations will be fully implemented by 

July 1, 2004. 

Among other requirements, the regulations compel regulated vessels and facilities 

to conduct security assessments and to develop detailed security plans that address 

vulnerabilities revealed by those assessments. The regulations contain requirements 

for the designation and competency of security personnel, including standards for 

15 

training, drills, and exercises. The regulations further delegate authority to Captains of the Port to conduct Area Maritime Security Assessments and to develop 

Area Maritime Security Plans for their respective port areas. This ‘‘family of plans’’ 

approach establishes a layered system of protection that involves all maritime 

stakeholders and will be consistent with National Maritime Transportation Security 

Plan being developed in cooperation with the Transportation Security Administration, the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, and other agencies. 

For vessels subject to the SOLAS amendments and the ISPS Code, the Coast 

Guard is implementing strong Port State Control measures to aggressively ensure 

foreign vessels have approved plans and have implemented adequate security standards. The measures include tracking performance of all owners, operators, flag administrations, recognized security organizations, charterers, and port facilities. Noncompliance will subject the vessel to a range of control measures, which could include denial of entry into port or significant delay. This aggressive Port State Control regime will be coupled with the Coast Guard’s Foreign Country Security Audit 

program that will assess both the effectiveness of anti-terrorism measures in foreign 

ports and the foreign flag administration’s implementation of the SOLAS amendments and the ISPS Code. 

In addition to adopting the landmark SOLAS amendments and publishing comprehensive regulations implementing MTSA, the Coast Guard has successfully implemented other measures to increase maritime homeland security. The Coast 

Guard has increased port security in the nation’s most important economic and military ports through the use of: 

• more patrols by aircraft, ships, and boats; 

• more escorts of passenger ships; 

• armed security boardings; 

• and onboard escort of high interest vessels (vessels with cargoes, crewmembers 

or other characteristics that warrant closer examination, arriving at or departing from U.S. ports) 

• the creation and enforcement of hundreds of security zones in and around critical infrastructure; 

• and the establishment of six Marine Safety and Security Teams (MSSTs) (a 

highly specialized quick response force capable of rapid, nationwide deployment 

via air, ground or sea transportation in response to changing conditions and 

evolving Maritime Homeland Security mission requirements. 

Additionally, our Strike Teams, which were instrumental in response to the Anthrax attacks at the Hart Senate Office building, are being trained to respond to 

a CBR attack. We have also begun recapitalization of our Deepwater assets. Homeland Security necessitates pushing America’s maritime boarders outward, away 

from the ports and waterways, so integrated, maritime operations can be implemented. Deepwater provides this capability while developing a far more robust and 

effective MDA system. 

We also have not acted alone. At the field level, Coast Guard Investigative Service 

agents and Field Intelligence Support Teams directly liaise with their TSA, CBP, 

and ICE peers to collect and share operational intelligence. Coast Guard and TSA 

personnel are working together with the Port of Miami to facilitate cruise ship passenger and baggage screening. At the policy development level, an Underwater Port 

Security Working Group comprising representatives of the Coast Guard, TSA and 

the U.S. Navy has been established to implement promising technologies to mitigate 

underwater homeland security threats. Additionally, a Radiological Dispersal Device/Improvised Nuclear Device Working Group, consisting of representatives from 

16 government agencies and departments, has been established for deterrence and 

detection of nuclear smuggling into or within the United States. These are just a 

few examples of how we have actively sought out and leveraged inter-agency partnership to provide a defense in depth. 

Effect on Commerce 

The Coast Guard is sensitive to the impact that increased security may have on 

commerce. The wide variety of security measures implemented to date has had no 

significant adverse impacts on the flow of maritime commerce. That said, we note 

that the cost to industry of the MTSA implementing regulations is estimated to be 

$1.5 billion in the first year and $7.3 billion over the next 10 years. While we clearly 

understand that the cost of these security regulations to the maritime industry is 

not insignificant, a terrorist incident against our marine transportation system 

would have a devastating and long-lasting impact on global shipping, international 

trade, and the world economy. As part of a recent port security training exercise, 

16 

a maritime terrorist act was estimated to cost up to $58 billion in economic loss to 

the United States. Thus, the cost is outweighed by the mitigation of risk to the industry. We have, however, developed the security regulations to be performancebased, providing the majority of owners and operators with the ability to implement 

the most cost-effective operational controls, rather than more costly physical improvement alternatives. The Coast Guard will be vigilant in its Maritime Homeland 

Security mission and will remain sensitive to the impact of security measures on 

maritime commerce. 

Additional Measures 

We do note that, since September 11, 2001, we have increased our uniformed 

presence ashore at waterfront facilities and critical infrastructure adjacent to the 

marine environment. Immediately after September 11, 2001, however, we identified 

a gap in our authority ashore and developed a proposal to close that gap. Although, 

the Coast Guard is at all times an armed force and has broad authority to protect 

waterfront facilities and other shore installations under a number of statutes, such 

as the Maritime Transportation Security Act, the Ports and Waterways Safety Act, 

and the Espionage/Magnuson Act, we lack express authority to arrest a person who 

commits a Federal offense on shore and to carry a firearm ashore in the performance of official law enforcement duties. Clarifying this authority remains a top legislative priority for the Coast Guard, and we greatly appreciate the inclusion of legislation addressing this matter in the pending Coast Guard Authorization bill, S. 733. 

This authority is not included in the House version of the bill and H.R. 2443, and 

we appreciate the Senate’s support in including this provision at conference. 

The United States Coast Guard has and will continue to take a leadership role 

in coordinating the multi-agency, public, and private, national and international 

maritime security effort as part of the Department of Homeland Security’s larger 

national Transportation System Security Plan. The men and women of the Coast 

Guard are committed to the continuing protection of our nations. Thank you for the 

opportunity to testify before you today. I will be happy to answer any questions you 

may have. 

Senator LOTT. Now, let’s see, Mr. Bonner, thank you very 

much—Commissioner of Customs and Border Protection. If you 

would go ahead. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT C. BONNER, COMMISSIONER, 

CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 

HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. BONNER. Thank you, Senator Lott and Senator Hollings, 

other distinguished Members of the Committee. I want to thank 

you and the Chairman for the opportunity to discuss what U.S. 

Customs, now U.S. Customs and Border Protection, has been doing 

since 9/11 to protect the American people and to better secure our 

borders, the borders of our country and all of our ports of entry into 

our country, through which, as you know, all people and vehicles 

and goods must pass. 

First of all, I want to say I’m very delighted to be on this panel 

with my colleagues, Admiral Loy and Admiral Collins, as well as 

Under Secretary Shane and others. And suffice to say that Customs and Border Protection has been and continues to coordinate 

on many issues with the Coast Guard and with TSA, and that coordination has been and will be facilitated by the fact that all three 

of these significant agencies of the Department of Homeland Security are now in one department, the Department of Homeland Security. 

Let me say it’s—you know, it’s an understatement to say that before the terrorist attacks at our border, and particularly our transportation systems were designed not for security but for the rapid 

movement of people and commerce. And it has been our challenge, 

collective challenge, since 9/11 to essentially retrofit the global sysVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:02 Nov 21, 2014 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\91310.TXT JACKIE
17 

tem of commerce to protect the American people from terrorism 

and yet to do that in a way that it does not unduly impede and, 

where possible, actually facilitates a more efficient flow of legitimate trade and people. 

I want to just take a moment to talk about U.S. Customs and 

Border Protection, for just a brief moment, because it is a new 

agency that was formed on March 1 of this year by merging most 

of U.S. Customs with the immigration inspectors and the border 

patrol from the former INS and the agriculture inspectors from the 

Department of Agriculture. 

Now, since March 1 of this year, for the first time in our country’s history, there is one agency responsible for managing and securing the U.S. border and all of the 300-plus ports of entry into 

the United States. And by unifying the border agencies, we are 

more effective, certainly, than we were before March 1, before the 

Department of Homeland Security was created, when we were fragmented, literally fragmented. The border management and security 

effort was fragmented between four different agencies and three 

different departments of government—Immigration, Customs, Agriculture Inspectors, and Border Patrol. 

The unification of Customs and Border Protection was vehemently demonstrated at Dulles International Airport last week, 

when Secretary Ridge introduced the new CBP officer position, or 

Customs and Border Protection inspectional officer position, and 

the new Customs and Border Protection uniform—one uniform for 

all Customs and Border Protection inspectors, the inspectional 

work force, at all of our ports of entry—as well as one new Customs 

and Border Protection inspectional officer, rather than the legacy 

Customs inspectors, Immigration and Agriculture inspectors. And 

we’ll start with the new CBP officer by training a new cadre of 

front-line inspectors, Customs and Border Protection officers, to 

handle essentially all primary and secondary inspections for all 

purposes. And we’ll also be deploying some agriculture specialists 

to perform the specialized agriculture specialty inspection functions. 

Now, let me turn to the securing of our border, because securing 

of our border involves something more than just our physical border, either land border or seaports or international airports. It includes the notion of extended border, of a defense and depth strategy where Secretary Ridge has sometimes called it a ‘‘smart border.’’ And that means we want our border to be the last line of defense for the American people, not the first line of defense. And our 

strategic approach to secure the flow of cargo and people is multilayered, and it starts in many places. It starts as far away, by the 

way, as Central Asia where Customs and Border Protection personnel are working with our foreign partners to interdict special 

nuclear materials at or near their source. It extends, certainly, to 

the foreign loading docks and the more secure supply chains of our 

customs and trade partners in the Customs-Trade Partnership 

Against Terrorism. And it extends literally to the terminals of foreign ports, where we are—under the Container Security Initiative, 

which we have in place, where Customs and Border Protection officers are working with their foreign counterparts to target and inVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:02 Nov 21, 2014 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\91310.TXT JACKIE
18 

spect high-risk containers before they go onboard vessels headed 

for the United States. 

These extended border efforts are key components of Customs 

and Border Protection’s multilayered strategy for securing our border, yet also, at the same time, facilitating the more efficient flow 

of legitimate goods and people into our country. And it’s important 

to note, if I could, that these programs have been implemented— 

and they’ve been implemented, every program I just mentioned, 

since September 11, 2001. CSI is now operational in 16 foreign seaports around the world, and we’re continuing to expand it. And, 

that said, we have much work to do to get CSI fully operational. 

And with respect to the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism, over 4,000 companies are enrolled in C–TPAT, most major 

U.S. importers, but also major air, sea, rail, and trucking carriers, 

as well as domestic port and terminal operators. And we have 

opened C–TPAT to foreign manufacturers for the first time last 

month. 

Now, I just want to touch on one other thing before I close, and 

that is what we’re doing at the U.S. ports of entry to protect the 

American people and prevent terrorists and terrorist weapons from 

entering the country. And that’s our priority mission at Customs 

and Border Protection, preventing terrorists and terrorist weapons 

from entering the United States. 

First of all, we use risk-management techniques to identify and 

screen the relatively few high-risk cargo containers of the millions—actually, if you take sea containers, almost 7 million containers that come into the U.S. annually. But, that said, in the last 

2 years—if we go back 2 years ago, only 9 percent of all rail containers were inspected when they crossed the border into the U.S. 

That figure is now 22.6 percent. Two years ago, we inspected only 

2 percent of the sea containers coming into the U.S. We now inspect 5.2 percent. The truck inspections have increased from 10.3 

to 15.1 percent over the last 2 years. And, overall, if you look at 

all containers, no matter what the mode is, entering the United 

States, the Customs and Border Protection is inspecting, currently, 

approximately 12.1 percent of all cargo containers entering the 

United States. And that’s up from about 7.6 percent 2 years ago. 

But we’re doing it not just on a random basis, but we’re doing 

it on a targeted basis based upon advanced information we have to 

identify the high-risk containers, because that’s the key. And we’ve 

gotten this advance information through such things as the 24-hour 

rule, which we have implemented, to get advance information 

about cargo containers before they arrive in the United States; in 

fact, 24 hours before they leave the foreign ports destined for the 

United States. And we’re doing that through getting advance passenger information about all people flying into the United States, 

as well as under the proposed Trade Act of 2002 regulations, which 

will require advance information with respect to all shipments, irrespective of the mode of transportation—rail, air, truck. And it’s 

through effective targeting that we can and we are meeting our 

goal of inspecting 100 percent—because that’s our goal—of all of 

the high-risk cargo and people while, at the same time, allowing legitimate commerce and passengers to proceed unimpeded. 

19 

And our inspection rates have gone up, because, among other 

things, we have been able to deploy more sophisticated detection 

equipment, like large-scale X-ray machines. I know, Senator Hollings, you’ve seen some of these at the Port of Charleston. But 

we’ve increased the number of large-scale X-ray machines that can 

screen whole containers. From about 45 on 9/11 of 2001, we now 

have increased that by 200 percent; we have 135 of these largescale containers, and they are deployed at our northern border 

major crossing points, commercial entry points, and at our seaports, and they weren’t on September 11, 2001. 

So let me just say, in closing, that Customs and Border Protection has moved aggressively to secure the flow of trade and commerce into our country, and people into our country. And it’s done 

it at our physical border, and it’s done it beyond our physical borders, working both with foreign governments and the private sector. And it has done that without materially slowing down the flow 

of legitimate commerce and trade. 

We’re, by no means, finished yet, but I can say that America is 

safer and our borders are more secure, substantially more secure, 

than they were on 9/11/2001. And I look forward to working with 

Secretary Ridge, Under Secretary Hutchinson, Admiral Collins, Admiral Loy, and with this Committee to continue our project of securing America from international terrorism. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bonner follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT C. BONNER, COMMISSIONER, CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Chairman McCain, Senator Hollings, Members of the Committee: Thank you for 

the opportunity to testify today to discuss what U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

has been doing since September 11, 2001 to protect the American people, and to better secure the borders of our Nation and its ports of entry, through which all people, 

vehicles and goods must enter. This includes the systems by which people and goods 

move into and out of our country. 

First, I want to say how delighted I am to be here with Admiral Loy and Admiral 

Collins. CBP has coordinated on many issues with the Coast Guard and with TSA, 

as this coordination has been facilitated by the fact that all three agencies are now 

within the Department of Homeland Security. Indeed, TSA and CBP are agencies 

within the Border and Transportation Security (BTS) Directorate of the Department, which, under the leadership of Under Secretary Asa Hutchinson, has assisted 

greatly in our coordination efforts. 

It is an understatement to say that, in the days before the terrorist attacks, our 

border systems were designed, not for security, but for the rapid movement of people 

and commerce. It has been our challenge since September 11 to ‘‘retrofit’’ this global 

system of commerce to protect the American people from terrorism—and do it in a 

way that does not impede, and indeed, where possible, facilitates, the efficient flow 

of legitimate people and goods so vital to our economy, and the economy of the 

world. 

CBP Transition 

Before I go further, however, I want to spend a few moments talking about U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection—or ‘‘CBP.’’ As I am sure all of you know, CBP was 

formed on March 1, 2003 through the merger of most of the U.S. Customs Service 

with the immigration inspectors and U.S. Border Patrol of the former INS and the 

agricultural border inspectors of the USDA. Although under the Homeland Security 

Act and the Department’s Reorganization Plan, CBP is the successor agency to U.S. 

Customs, CBP is very much a new agency within the Department of Homeland Security. Now, for the first time in our Nation’s history, there is a single U.S. border 

agency, CBP—responsible for managing and securing the entire U.S. border, that 

is, all of the 300 plus ports of entry, and between the ports of entry. And, through 

the unifying of customs, immigration, and agriculture functions at the border, under 

20 

one unified chain of command, we are more effective than we were before March 

1, when we were fragmented into 3 agencies in 3 different departments of government. 

This was most vividly demonstrated last week, when Secretary Ridge, Under Secretary Hutchinson, and I were at Dulles Airport, introducing the new ‘‘CBP Officer’’—with a new CBP Officer’s uniform and DHS/CBP patch—to the American people. Starting this October, we will no longer be training legacy ‘‘immigration’’ or 

‘‘customs’’ inspectors. We will be training a new cadre of ‘‘CBP Officers,’’ who will 

be equipped and trained to handle all CBP primary and secondary inspections, for 

all purposes in the passenger environment. These CBP Officers will also perform all 

primary inspection functions in the cargo environment, although we will also be deploying CBP Agriculture Specialists to perform more specialized agricultural secondary inspection functions. 

And current legacy immigration and customs inspectors have already begun crosstraining. So, we’re not waiting for the new ‘‘CBP Officers’’ to graduate from FLETC 

to begin creating ‘‘one face at the border.’’ We have already begun to roll out unified 

CBP primary inspections at our international airports, and we are merging our specialized immigration and customs anti-terrorism secondary and passenger analytical 

targeting units. In short, we are moving out quickly to achieve the President’s and 

the Secretary’s goal of ‘‘One Face at the Border,’’ that is one unified, flexible, and 

effective agency to manage and control our Nation’s borders. 

This merger has allowed us to think comprehensively about how we better secure, 

manage and facilitate the movement of people and commerce into and out of our 

country. No longer is our government fragmented—with one agency thinking about 

the movement of people, another thinking about cargo, and still another thinking 

about agriculture protection. It’s one agency focusing on the whole picture at our 

borders. 

‘‘Beyond the Border’’ Initiatives 

And in our view, that picture does not begin at our land border or the U.S. water’s 

edge. We view our border as the last line of defense for the American people, not 

the first line. Our effort to secure the flow of people and cargo is many layered, and 

starts in many places—in Central Asia, where CBP personnel are working with foreign partners to interdict WMD material at its source. At the factory floors and in 

the secure supply chains of our partners in the Customs-Trade Partnership Against 

Terrorism, or C–TPAT. At the docks of our Container Security Initiative, or CSI, 

ports around the world, where CBP officers are working with our foreign counterparts to target and inspect high-risk containers before they are shipped to the 

United States. In Canada and Mexico, with the people and companies we vet 

through the FAST, NEXUS, and SENTRI programs. To ensure that our foreign 

counterparts have the right skills and capabilities to cooperate successfully, we also 

provide training and technical assistance when needed. 

And we also apply the ‘‘beyond the border’’ concept to targeting and interdicting 

high-risk people before they head to the United States. In fact, just a couple of 

weeks ago, CBP targeted two passengers traveling from Paris to Chicago who used 

a route typical of an individual trying to enter the U.S. with fraudulent documents. 

Because we were able to target these people before they got on the plane in Paris, 

we were able to enlist the air carrier to deny boarding to these individuals—who 

were a threat as the documents they were using were fraudulent. 

These ‘‘beyond the border’’ efforts are key pieces of CBP’s layered strategy for protecting the American people from terrorism, while facilitating the efficient flow of 

legitimate people and goods into our country. These programs are being implemented and have been effective. In the short life of CSI, we have already worked 

with our foreign partners to intercept and seize shipments that posed a potential 

threat to the American people—including machine guns, gas masks, and other military equipment that would clearly be on Al Qaeda’s shopping list. And CSI is now 

operational in 16 seaports around the world—in Europe, Asia and Canada. Once all 

the ports in Phases 1 and 2 of CSI become operational, approximately 80 percent 

of the 7 million maritime containers heading for the United States annually will be 

under the CSI blanket. That said, we still have much work to do to get CSI fully 

operational. 

It is also important to view CSI in the context of CBP’s layered-defense strategy. 

Just as important is our effort to secure the supply chain through C–TPAT. Currently, over 4,000 companies are enrolled in C–TPAT—not only U.S. importers, but 

also all the major air, sea, rail, and trucking carriers, a large number of brokers 

and forwarders, and domestic ports and terminal operators. And on August 18, we 

opened C–TPAT for the first time to foreign manufacturers—first those based in 

21 

Mexico, to facilitate their participation in the FAST program, and then to a select 

group of manufacturers based in other parts of the world. 

While CSI protects one means of moving goods into the country at a particular 

place—the foreign seaport—C–TPAT protects the entire supply chain, including 

goods moving across our land border by truck or rail and both sea and air cargo. 

Our C–TPAT partners are making great strides to secure every link in their supply 

chains. And, we are working with our C–TPAT partners to redesign the containers 

themselves—adding sophisticated technology to make them ‘‘smarter,’’ more secure, 

and tamper-evident. In short, we are in the process of revolutionizing and retrofitting global trade to face the 21st Century terrorist threat. 

And, we are validating that the security measures have been taken. We’ve 

launched a program to send teams of CBP Supply Chain Specialists around the 

world to verify that our C–TPAT partners, their suppliers, and logistics vendors are 

doing what they say they are doing. 

I’ve spent a great deal of time focusing on what we are doing ‘‘beyond the border.’’ 

But before I close, I should touch on what we are doing at U.S. ports of entry to 

protect the American people and prevent terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the United States. 

First, let me speak to the numbers. Two years ago, when I took over as Commissioner of Customs, 7.6 percent of all containers entering the United States—by land, 

sea, or rail—were inspected by Customs. That figure is now up to 12.1 percent, and 

it is rising. Two years ago, only 9 percent of all rail containers were inspected. That 

figure is now 22.6 percent. Sea container inspections have increased from 2 percent 

to 5.2 percent. And truck inspections have increased from 10.3 percent to 15.1 percent. These are impressive numbers, and, where necessary, I am pushing to increase 

CBP’s capacity to rapidly inspect containers without slowing legitimate trade. 

Advance Information and Technology 

I should point out there is no reason to increase the inspections blindly—or just 

for the sake of having higher inspection statistics. Quite frankly, it would be counterproductive and damaging to the U.S. economy to inspect 100 percent of the 7 million sea containers or the 11 million trucks that arrive in the United States every 

year. We must use some risk management techniques to identify and screen the relatively few high-risk shipments out of the millions of virtually no-risk shipments. 

Through regulations such as the 24 Hour Rule, those requiring advanced passenger information, and the proposed rules under the Trade Act of 2002 which require advance information on all shipments, I am pushing to improve our ability to 

focus our efforts on the high-risk shipments. We are also working with the Intelligence Community and others to improve our targeting rules and systems. It is 

through effective targeting that we meet our goal of inspecting 100 percent of highrisk people and cargo, while allowing legitimate commerce and passengers to proceed unimpeded. 

We are also increasing our inspection rates through the rapid deployment of radiation detection technology, as well as large-scale X-ray type imaging systems. In the 

almost two years since I became Commissioner of Customs, CBP has deployed this 

equipment to every major U.S. port of entry. This has dramatically increased our 

ability to inspect high-risk containers, but it has done so in a way that does not 

interrupt the flow of legitimate commerce. 

In closing, CBP has moved aggressively to secure the flow of people and commerce 

into our country. It has done this at our physical border, and beyond our border— 

working both with foreign governments and the private sector. And it has done this 

without materially slowing the flow of legitimate travel and commerce. Are we finished yet? No. Are we working to make America even more safe? Yes. And I look 

forward to working with Secretary Ridge, Under Secretary Hutchinson, Admiral 

Loy, and Admiral Collins—as well as this Committee—to continue our project of securing America from terrorism. 

Senator LOTT. Admiral Loy? 

STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL JAMES M. LOY, ADMINISTRATOR, 

TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Admiral LOY. Good morning, Senator Lott, Senator Hollings, 

Committee Members. I’m pleased to have this opportunity to appear before you and report on TSA’s progress and plans for improving security in the Nation’s transportation system and to discuss 

22 

the recommendations that we have all seen in the reports from the 

General Accounting Office. 

I, too, enjoy the opportunity to sit at this table with Tom Collins 

and Rob Bonner and Jeff Shane. These folks work daily, weekly, 

monthly with all of us at TSA in the efforts to secure the transportation system. It is always a personal pleasure to work with them 

then and to be with them here today and report back to this Committee. 

Under the leadership of Secretary Ridge and Under Secretary 

Hutchinson, we have forged working partnerships throughout the 

Department. We continue to work closely with the operating administrations in the Department of Transportation, especially TSA 

does. They provide another vital link with the transportation providers, and we communicate daily to share expertise, to ensure that 

we make the best use of each organization’s resources and opportunities in our mutual reach to the stakeholders throughout the 

transportation system. 

As we near the second anniversary of the terrorist attacks on our 

country that forever changed our sense of security in today’s world, 

I feel confident in assuring you and the American people that the 

civil aviation sector and the larger transportation sector is more secure today than it has ever been, and it will continue to become 

even more secure as we mature our complementary systems of systems. 

Today, I’d like to take just a moment to review some of the major 

strides that we’ve made in aviation security and our action plan for 

making further improvements. TSA is working with the other DHS 

agencies and DOT operating administrations to develop security 

standards and initiatives to create a more uniform level of security 

across all transportation modes; again, as both my colleagues, in 

advance, have said, without impeding travel or commerce, which 

has, for all intents and purposes, become one of those inalienable 

rights that the Founding Fathers were talking about but didn’t perhaps say it so clearly. 

First, let me respond to a concern this Committee voiced the last 

time I testified. It’s off the mission point, but, I think, very germane to this brand new agency that was created by the Congress. 

The Chairman, on that occasion, challenged me, specifically, to 

pay particular attention to financial management and contract 

oversight. NCS Pearson stories were in the air, and you suggested 

the reputation of a brand new agency could get labeled very quickly 

in one direction or the other. And the Pearson audit will run its 

course very shortly, and we will deal with it as we have to. And 

we’ll finally put that saga behind us. 

But, in the meantime, we’ve taken that challenge from this Committee very seriously. We’ve hired an excellent team of acquisition 

professionals and have designed first-class systems of program 

management. Investment review boards, constant contract oversight, is the routine of the day at TSA. And I can show the Committee, and will be happy to, dozens of major contracts, on time 

and on budget. The TSA was just notified of our clean-audit status 

just this last month, with every expectation that we’ll hold onto 

that status as the Fiscal Year closes. That is virtually unheard of 

23 

for a brand new agency, especially one that inherited some very serious property issues at our inception. 

But I’m proud of what we accomplished in this area, and I want 

the Committee to know that one of our strategic goals is organizational effectiveness, and we took seriously your commentary as we 

continue to take seriously our mission-related ones, as well. 

Mr. Chairman, I, too, will submit my written testimony for the 

record and discuss our short but productive history from a couple 

of charts, and the Members each have copies in front of them. 

The first one shows a system of systems that we’ve built as the 

foundation of security at our airports. We’ve looked hard for the silver bullet and found that none existed. And our default plan has 

become, as you’ve heard from the other speakers so far, a concept 

where we had to build a system of systems to build the adequate 

approach to aviation security. And the concepts and specific programs you see depicted as concentric ellipses on this chart begin 

out there when we’re gathering information, and end literally in 

the cockpit of each passenger-carrying airliner in this country. 

We leveraged these systems with CAPPS I, a system that we 

have in place at the moment that we want very much to replace 

with CAPPS II. Each is really a scalable dynamic that is keyed to 

the alert conditions system run by the Department of Homeland 

Security. But our notion is simply to take advantage of the law of 

aggregate numbers by sequencing these systems’ elements as a series of obstacles any terrorist would have to clear in order to accomplish his objective. Each of these elements has been carefully 

developed with attention both to security and customer service and 

minimum impact on the flow of commerce. I’m happy to try to answer questions on any of these elements in the Q&A, but they each 


909BONNE1.eps
24 

have prompted wide commentary as they have come into practice, 

and they were built and put into the system each for very, very 

good reasons. 

The second chart is more notional as it defines the shift that is 

actually taking place between almost exclusive concentration on 

aviation security to developing what we need to develop for the rest 

of the national transportation system. It is a corresponding array 

of tools or concerns more appropriate to the rest of that system, 

and it recognizes two simple realities. First, most of our attention, 

to be sure, energy and resources, have been focused on aviation 

these past 2 years. And, second, we’ve learned many lessons as a 

result, and many of the lessons learned in that work will allow us 

to take a threat-based risk-managed approach for the rest of the 

transportation system that will capitalize on industry ownership 

and a regulatory-compliance approach by TSA. There will be no 

need for hundreds of TSA operators like we see at airports; rather, 

an adequate cadre of policy analysts and a solid group of trained 

compliance inspectors will be what’s necessary to ensure accountability in this system. 


909BONNE2.eps
25 

The last chart depicts work accomplished and work still to be 

done. If I can look at it just for a second with you, I would like to 

offer some commentary on what we’re trying to do here. 

If you look at just the face, the upper face, of this cube, a classic 

Rubik’s cube of attempting to develop the transportation system security plan, you can see, aggregated down the lefthand side, what 

I feel are the six main elements of our national transportation system. A lot of attention has been given to air up front. Rail, maritime, highway, transit, and pipeline deserve attention such that 

none of them are perceived by the bad guys as a weak link in that 

system. 

If you look across the base of that upper level, whether we’re 

talking about cargo or people, in the form of passengers or crew, 

or infrastructure security or the notion of response preparedness, 

the face of that cube is really about understanding the entirety of 

the national transportation system. And in today’s parlance of computer technology, if we click on the face of any one of those upperlevel white squares, a couple of blue ones, and a green one, we 

should be able to look at the intersection between, for example, 

maritime and cargo, and grapple with what’s going on among all 

the agencies in the Federal Government, in the industry, at state 

and local levels, and truly in terms of our global partnerships 

around the world. Out of that should come our sense of vulnerability assessments, of standard-setting, of mitigation strategies, 

and of some notion of compliance at the other end of the day so 

that we can report back to this Committee as to how well those 

things are going across the full face of the transportation sector. 

The challenging reality is that the complexity of this chart depicting our approach for just the transportation-security piece is 


909BONNE3.eps
26 

just that, one puzzle piece in the construct Secretary Ridge and 

now Under Secretary Libutti, are building to represent the approach to the entire homeland security challenge. Today, we’re here 

to chat with this Committee about the transportation piece. 

Mr. Chairman, analysts can point to a veritable obstacle course 

of challenges to building a comprehensive system of security across 

all the modes. And while I recognize and respect the difficulty of 

these challenges, I remain optimistic. We can look, and must look, 

very positively on the dramatic change in landscape in only the 

past 2 years. We have learned a lot. We have done a lot. 

Mr. Chairman, as my colleagues at this table will attest, this is 

very hard work. I am blessed at TSA, as I know they are, with people who come to work for us because they were committed to our 

cause. Everything we’ve done, we’ve done with the whole world 

watching. And I appreciate the intellectual challenges offered by 

every Member of this Committee at one time or another over the 

course of the last year. Each time I’ve visited or talked to you on 

the phone, I am prodded in my agency to do something better. 

Senator Wyden, Senator Dorgan properly challenge us to be satisfied only when we’re doing the right things about civil liberties 

in our CAPPS II project. Senator Hutchison and I have talked long 

and hard about air cargo and about a registered traveler program. 

Senator Hollings and I have been discussing port security for 10 

years. Senator Burns has made it crystal clear to me where he 

stands on arming pilots. And I could go on with virtually every 

Member of this Committee. We are better off as a nation because 

we challenge each other. 

And I want to leave a word of thanks to each of you for your interest and your drive, personally, on these enormously important 

issues. As Tom said, as Rob said, we have accomplished a lot; we 

have a lot yet to do. 

I’ll happily answer your questions when the time is appropriate. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Loy follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL JAMES M. LOY, ADMINISTRATOR, 

TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND

SECURITY

Good morning Mr. Chairman, Senator Hollings, and Members of the Committee. 

I am pleased to have this opportunity to appear before you today to report on the 

Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) progress and plans for improving 

security in the Nation’s transportation system and discuss the recommendations of 

the General Accounting Office (GAO). 

Under the leadership of Secretary Ridge and Under Secretary Hutchinson, we 

have forged working partnerships with other Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS) organizations. We continue to work closely with the operating administrations of the Department of Transportation (DOT). They provide another vital link 

with transportation providers, and we communicate daily to share expertise, to ensure that we make the best use of each organization’s resources and opportunities. 

As we near the second anniversary of the terrorist attacks on our Nation that forever changed our sense of security in today’s world, I feel confident in assuring you 

and the American people that the civil aviation sector and the larger transportation 

sector is more secure today than it has ever been and it will continue to become 

even more secure as we mature our complementary ‘‘systems of systems.’’ 

Today, I would like to review some of the major strides that we have made in 

aviation security and our action plan for making further improvements. TSA is 

working with other DHS agencies and DOT operating administrations to develop security standards and initiatives to create a more uniform level of security across all 

transportation modes without impeding travel or commerce 

27 

1 Among the new measures that the Port Authority has instituted are increased perimeter patrols, posting police or security guards in marked patrol cars in unfenced boundary areas during 

nighttime hours, and directing other mobile patrol units to regularly monitor perimeter activity. 2TSA is also operating a pilot program at five airports using private screeners that must meet 

all TSA eligibility, training, and performance requirements and must receive pay and other benefits equal to those of TSA screeners. 3Prior to 9/11, an estimated 5 percent of checked baggage was screened. Now, all checked baggage is screened. 4 As required by Section 425 of the Homeland Security Act, P.L. 107–296, we are providing 

the Committee with a classified report every month on our progress on performing electronic 

screening at all airports by December 31, 2003. As noted in the unclassified segment of the report, we project that at 5 airports it will not be physically possible to provide for electronic 

screening of all checked baggage by December 31, 2003. 5 In a widely reported statement, a spokesman for The Boeing Company, which has produced 

thousands of flight deck door conversion kits, related that the new door withstands bullets and 

small explosives and can resist a force equivalent to an NFL linebacker hitting it at Olympic 

sprinter speed. 

Civil Aviation Security. First, the flow of intelligence on terrorists, their methods 

and their plans, has greatly improved our understanding of the threats that we face 

and helped us focus our resources on meeting those threats. There have been countless times when information shared with airports or airlines has alerted them to 

threats and encouraged enhanced security on their part. 

TSA and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) have helped fund many local 

airport projects to improve perimeter security, such as construction of perimeter access roads, installation of access control systems, electronic surveillance and intrusion detection systems, and security fencing. The realization of and the response to 

the threat from Man Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS) is part of our concern and focus on improved perimeter security, an element of the security plan required for each airport. 

One local initiative demonstrates how quickly interagency cooperation can be 

marshaled to fill security gaps when they are discovered. When perimeter security 

was breached at New York’s JFK Airport, the Port Authority of New York and New 

Jersey rapidly orchestrated an effective plan to enhance the protection of the remote 

runways of their facility.1 A new level of perimeter security is now in place that involves people, technology, and innovation. It is also an example of the products that 

skilled security planners can develop locally, without an impetus from a Federal 

agency. Our own TSA security inspectors, FAA’s Air Traffic Service, the Port Authority Police, the NYPD Boat Patrol, and the U.S. Coast Guard have joined forces 

to create a cooperative arrangement that will result in tighter perimeter security 

including the waterside runways of that airport. 

Every passenger entering the sterile areas of an airport is screened by a highly 

trained force of TSA screeners.2 Our screeners receive a minimum of 40 hours of 

classroom training, and 60 hours of on-the-job training. They are subject to periodic 

proficiency assessments and unannounced training. They are made aware of new 

threats and methods of concealment. We have also greatly improved the technology 

used at screening checkpoints and have improved our capability to detect weapons, 

explosives, and other prohibited items. The combination of our screening force using 

enhanced technology has resulted in almost 800 arrests at screening checkpoints 

and the interception of over 4 million prohibited items since the November 19, 2002 

deadline to have TSA screeners at all commercial airports. Deploying our screeners 

at almost 450 commercial airports around the country less than a year after our establishment was a remarkable feat. Similarly, by December 31, 2002, we met the 

congressional deadline in the Aviation and Transportation Security Act to screen all 

checked baggage.3 In large part this was met with explosives detection and explosives trace detection equipment. In some locations during peak periods we screen 

some bags with a variety of congressionally approved alternative methods.4

We expanded the Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS) from dozens of agents before 9/11 to thousands of highly trained law enforcement officers, flying the skies 

on high-risk flights. As you know, the FAMs will be transferred to the Bureau of 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (BICE). This will create a ‘‘surge capacity’’ 

to effectively deal with specific threats by cross-training FAMs and BICE agents to 

help disrupt aviation security threats. 

Under FAA rules, all commercial passenger aircraft that fly in the U.S. now have 

reinforced cockpit doors, making it highly unlikely that terrorists could successfully 

storm the cockpit.5 The ‘‘Crew Training Common Strategy’’ (commonly referred to 

as the ‘‘Common Strategy’’), was originally developed by FAA to address hijacking 

threats. It was restructured immediately after 9/11, and TSA and FAA are currently 

engaged in a further revision to the Common Strategy to address the threats posed 

by suicide terrorists. Pilots are now trained to not open the flight deck door, and 

28 

6See, Homeland Security: Protecting Airliners from Terrorist Missiles, Updated March 25, 

2003, CRS Report RL31741 7 Id, at CRS–3 

if terrorists should somehow breach the reinforced flight deck door, they would meet 

with a flight deck crew determined to protect the flight deck at all costs. An increasing number of pilots are armed and trained to use lethal force against an intruder 

on the flight deck. 

TSA has increased cooperation with our international partners at airports overseas and with air carriers that fly into and out of the United States. We have required thousands of criminal history records checks for U.S. airport workers needing 

unescorted access to secure areas of the airport and we are working on improving 

the access process as part of our overall airport security program. 

I am proud of the contributions that TSA and its employees have made to our 

country. It is with great sadness that I report to you that one of our screeners, Sgt. 

Jaror C. Puello, was recently killed in action while serving in Iraq. Sgt. Puello was 

a TSA screener at Newark International Airport in New Jersey. Sgt. Puello saved 

the life of a member of his platoon from a speeding truck but lost his life in the 

effort. Sgt. Puello leaves behind a wife and three children. Sgt. Puello served this 

country proudly, in his job with TSA, and in his service to the Army. Many other 

TSA personnel serve in the Reserves and National Guard and have been called up 

to active duty. 

During the past several months, the media has reported on improvised explosive 

devices secreted in ordinary items that passengers might carry onto an airplane, 

continued attempts by terrorists to perfect the shoe bomb apparatus employed, unsuccessfully, by convicted terrorist Richard Reid in December, 2001, and of course 

the recently reported sting operation concerning an attempt to smuggle a shoulder 

launched anti-aircraft missile into the United States, although no live missile was 

involved. These threats are a stark reminder that we must hold our focus on security. The number of prohibited items that TSA screeners continue to intercept from 

passengers is still large and does not show a downward trend. In May, June, and 

July of this year the total number of prohibited items that our screeners intercepted 

increased from 515,792, to 597,310, to 640,891, respectively. The number of intercepted firearms increased from 50, to 67, to 89, but these numbers are down from 

last year’s levels. 

Since I last appeared before this Committee I have been able to sign the first Letters of Intent (LOIs) that TSA has issued to airports. These LOIs will provide for 

the installation of efficient checked baggage systems that are integrated with explosives detection systems, thus reducing unacceptable clutter in the terminal buildings and efficiently moving passengers and checked baggage through the conveyor 

systems. TSA has established and is applying prioritization criteria to allocate appropriated funds amongst airports through the LOI program. I issued the first series of LOIs to Dallas–Fort Worth International Airport, Boston–Logan International Airport and Seattle–Tacoma International Airport. I awarded another set 

for McCarran International Airport in Las Vegas, Denver International Airport, and 

Los Angeles International Airport and Ontario International Airport in California. 

These six LOIs, covering 7 airports, represent a Federal commitment of approximately $670 million over the next four budget cycles. 

We take the threat of MANPADS extremely seriously and continue to perform 

vulnerability assessments on our airports even as both DHS, through its Science 

and Technology Directorate, and the Defense Department accelerate their review of 

technology to find the right way to protect commercial airliners from this threat. 

Protecting civil aviation from MANPADS remains a multi-faceted undertaking. As 

noted recently by the Congressional Research Service,6 effective countermeasures 

include ‘‘improvements or modifications to commercial aircraft, changes to pilot 

training and air traffic control procedures, and improvements to airport and local 

security.’’ 7 This includes enhanced perimeter security, particularly if a threat is 

made known to us via the intelligence information that we receive from a variety 

of sources. Other components to protect civil aviation from MANPADS are non-proliferation efforts and border and customs enforcement, all key areas that DHS, State 

Department, the Defense Department, and many other agencies, continue to press 

forward on. I want to emphasize, however, that there is no credible intelligence that 

MANPADS are in the hands of terrorists in this country. 

We know that we cannot solve all security concerns solely with the power of a 

strong security workforce. We must be able to develop and deploy new technology 

to make our screening operations more efficient, less time consuming and costly, 

and to be able to look beyond the horizon to adapt to new emerging threats. Led 

29 

in large part by our Transportation Security Laboratory (TSL), TSA is attempting 

to do just that. 

The certification, purchase, manufacture, and installation of some 1,000 explosives 

detection systems and 5,300 explosives trace detection machines at more than 400 

airports throughout the country in such a short time after TSA was created met an 

aggressive congressional deadline. Now we are working on faster machines that 

have a smaller footprint and can find even more minute amounts of explosives. We 

are improving the efficiency of the current machines even as we move forward with 

research on the next generation of screening equipment. TSL is looking at new applications of X-ray, electro-magnetic, and nuclear technologies to better probe sealed 

containers for materials that pose a threat. We are testing two Trace Detection Portals that analyze the air for explosives as passengers pass through them. 

I know that this Committee is very interested in blast resistant cargo containers, 

to hold either cargo or luggage and contain an explosion. The issues we face with 

devices now available in the marketplace involve weight, cost, and durability. TSA, 

through TSL, is working on improving this technology for use on wide body aircraft. 

In February, I heard the advice of Senator McCain and others loud and clear concerning the importance of good acquisition management and contract oversight. I 

have initiated a contract oversight strategy that includes significant support from 

the Defense Contract Management Agency, Defense Contract Audit Agency, and 

multiple independent third party contractors. TSA has developed a sound investment review process that mirrors the DHS review process. A lot of press has surrounded our contract last year with NCS Pearson, and we will follow the auditor 

conclusions carefully to ensure we got our money’s worth. 

Our rightsizing effort continues as we work to find the balance between airport 

and air carrier needs, and staffing requirements for TSA passenger and baggage 

screeners. After we ramped up to meet the deadlines for federalizing passenger and 

baggage screening, we had learned much about our staffing requirements. As we 

analyzed our staffing model it was clear that there were airports where we had an 

imbalance in staffing. In some airports this meant we had too many screeners for 

the passenger load at those locations. At others, particularly those in large metropolitan areas, we had too few screeners. In many locations it became clear that a 

part-time workforce segment makes sense, given the peaks and valleys of scheduled 

air carrier service. As a result, and in keeping with our budget limitations, I made 

a decision to reduce the number of screeners by 3,000 by May 31, 2003, and by an 

additional 3,000 by September 30th of this year. We have reached these targets. 

Where we required additional part-time staffing at airports we have opened assessment centers for individuals to apply for these positions. 

In light of the fact that TSA met this difficult target of reducing the workforce 

by 6,000 screeners before the end of this fiscal year, I ask this Committee’s understanding of our need to pause and stabilize the screener workforce during the next 

3 to 6 months. This will permit TSA to complete the conversion process of many 

screeners from full-time to part-time status as we reshape the workforce. It will also 

allow us to complete the immediate requirements to hire additional part-time employees to maintain our current levels of screener workforce and to balance the fulltime equivalence (FTE) allocations at the various airports throughout the country. 

Cargo security on passenger aircraft remains a matter of concern for this Committee and for all of us engaged in the area of transportation security. I am firmly 

convinced that our air cargo security strategic plan is on the right track. Proposals 

to require the physical inspection of every piece of cargo shipped on passenger aircraft without a risk-based targeting strategy are no more practical than similar calls 

to physically inspect each of the more than 6 million containers that enter the 

United States each year through our seaports. Proposals of this sort would simply 

prevent any cargo from being carried onboard passenger aircraft. Rather, we have 

focused our efforts on three key components in ensuring the security of air cargo. 

First, we use a threat-based, risk-management approach. All cargo should be information screened for a determination of the threat and the risk that it poses; moving forward, certain cargo deemed suspicious or high-risk needs to be subjected to 

heightened security screening under the TSA approach. Part of this process involves 

banning cargo from unknown shippers, and greatly strengthening the Known Shipper program. Participation in the Known Shipper program is now more rigorous, 

and all parts of the air cargo supply chain, especially air passenger carriers, allcargo carriers, and freight forwarders have been given added responsibility for 

verifying a customer’s status in the Known Shipper program. TSA performs inspections of these links in the supply chain to ensure compliance. TSA is also moving 

forward with the Known Shipper Database and automated Indirect Air Carrier certification/recertification. TSA plans on the full deployment of this database in FY 

04. 

30 

The second component of our strategic approach to air cargo security involves the 

use of information analysis to assist in pre-screening cargo. Using information external to TSA, we gather information on whether cargo is of a suspicious origin, warranting additional scrutiny. TSA is already working with BCBP and its National 

Targeting Center on pre-screening water borne cargo, and will be working closely 

with BCBP in the development of a similar system for air cargo. Again, we plan 

to develop and begin deployment of our targeting efforts in FY 04. 

The third component in our air cargo security strategic plan involves the development of technology to aid in screening and inspecting air cargo. Our goal is to subject higher-risk shipments to heightened security screening, but TSA will need a 

toolbox of inspection technologies, as no one technology can be applied in all operating environments. A combination of EDS, ETD, X-ray, canine, and perhaps even 

some emerging technologies will need to be made available to the field. We will have 

to overcome a number of hurdles to be able to inspect cargo efficiently by remote 

means without damaging the contents or unnecessarily delaying shipment. This research and development effort must be supported. 

Air cargo security, just like security for all other aspects of the transportation system, is a partnership. The air cargo industry must participate with us in a collaborative effort and must be able to bear its fair share of the costs. I am grateful for 

the cooperation that TSA has received from the industry through its participation 

in cargo working groups, an off-shoot of the Aviation Security Advisory Committee. 

We expect to receive air cargo security recommendations from these working groups 

in just a few weeks. 

Our continuing efforts to improve aviation security inevitably focus on greater information about people who have access to various aspects of the aviation system. 

That is why our plans to create uniform credentials for workers in the transportation industry are so critical. I am pleased with the continued support that this 

Committee has given to our Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) 

program. TWIC may establish a systemwide credential which, if necessary, has the 

potential to be used across transportation modes for personnel requiring unescorted 

physical and/or logical access to secure areas of the transportation system. TWIC 

will consider multiple access control points to a transportation facility through a variety of transportation vectors. Using funds already appropriated by Congress, we 

now have a technology evaluation underway at two sites. One is on the East Coast 

covering the Philadelphia-Delaware River area and the other is on the West Coast 

in the Los Angeles and Long Beach area. The information that we glean from these 

technology evaluations will enable us to make key decisions about further development of this program. 

Of course, our most visible mission since September 11 has been to keep terrorists 

off commercial airliners. Our plan to move forward with development, testing, and 

implementation of the second-generation Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening 

System (CAPPS II) is critical to a robust aviation security system. As part of its 

ongoing dialogue with the public on CAPPS II and related issues, DHS has issued 

a revised Interim Final Privacy Notice, which provides information regarding 

CAPPS II, including the type of data that the system will review, and how the data 

will be used. As always, public comment on the Notice is requested. The closing date 

for submission of comments is September 30. CAPPS II will be a threat-based system under the direct control of the government and will represent a major improvement over the decentralized, airline-controlled system currently in place. Mr. Chairman, I pledge to continue to work with this Committee to assure you and the Members of this Committee that our development of CAPPS II will enhance security 

without compromising important privacy rights. 

We are also developing the parameters for a pilot program to test key elements 

of the Registered Traveler program, including background checks, positive identification, and new checkpoint operations. We intend to test these concepts at several 

airports later this year. Our airline partners have expressed strong interest in working with us. 

We have implemented the Federal Flight Deck Officer (FFDO) program. We held 

the first training class this past April and we trained, deputized, and deployed our 

first group of volunteer pilots serving as Federal Flight Deck Officers. We closely 

reevaluated the training, and indeed, the entire program, and we have revamped 

both. In close cooperation with organizations representing many airline pilots such 

as the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) and the Coalition of Airline Pilots Associations (CAPA), we have begun full-scale training of volunteer pilots. The FFDOs that 

are currently flying have now flown several thousand flights, quietly providing another layer of security in our system of systems. As more FFDOs are deputized, this 

number will rise into the tens of thousands of flights. 

31 

We will transfer FFDO training on September 8, 2003 from the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) at Glynco, Georgia, to the new permanent site 

at FLETC’s training facility in Artesia, New Mexico. FLETC Glynco was operating 

over capacity, largely as a result of the added requirements for law enforcement 

training following September 11. The Artesia facility offers the capability to double 

the student throughput each week and we plan to do so starting in January 2004. 

FLETC Artesia is also the home of the basic training program of the FAMS, and 

thus, has training facilities specifically geared to the unique environment and circumstances present on an aircraft. FLETC Artesia has three environmentally controlled commercial passenger jets on hardstands available for use as tactical training simulators, and ample indoor and outdoor shooting ranges. A delegation of pilots 

and TSA staff has visited the site and was unanimous in its praise of Artesia as 

a better option. I intend to use dispersed private sector facilities for the regional 

semi-annual recertification training required of FFDOs. 

TSA’s actions to enhance aviation security are not limited to commercial aviation. 

We have made great strides in the last two years in improving security for the General Aviation (GA) community. This is a substantial undertaking, as there are approximately 220,000 GA aircraft in the United States, responsible for 77 percent of 

all air traffic, and more than 18,000 landing areas throughout the Nation. In addition to the GA initiatives I reported upon last February, TSA has several other initiatives underway that will continue to improve security in this critical arena. We 

are working collaboratively with key stakeholders in the GA community to develop 

and disseminate appropriate security guidelines for the thousands of public and private use GA airports and heliports. TSA is also preparing to launch a GA vulnerability assessment as part of it overall risk management program. We are looking 

at more in-depth background checks for GA pilots. This would assist in issuing 

waivers to certain restricted airspace to cleared individuals such as corporate pilots. 

Finally, we are reviewing some of the restrictions in current Notices to Airmen 

(NOTAM) to determine their lasting security value. We will engage in appropriate 

rulemaking to make permanent those restrictions that add real security value. 

I want to also bring to your attention the innovative methods we are using to enhance security and provide outstanding customer service. In cooperation with a host 

of Federal, State, and local agencies, TSA is exploring a variety of methods to 

smooth the transition of travelers through our transportation system. The first of 

these intermodal pilot projects, dubbed ‘‘Synergy Projects’’, was initiated in Miami, 

Florida earlier this year where we have tested integrating the seamless transfer of 

the baggage of cruise ship passengers from one mode of transportation to another. 

We have also cooperatively supported a Canadian Government initiative in Vancouver, British Columbia. In conjunction with Royal Caribbean Cruise Lines and Air 

Canada, this program maintains the security standards of U.S.—U.S. domestic baggage movements. As the success of these initial Synergy Projects becomes better 

known, other regions of the country are initiating their own proposals to maintain 

the security of the Nation’s transportation system while facilitating the smooth 

transfer of passengers and their baggage between transportation modes. 

As part of the Department’s Border and Transportation Directorate, one of our top 

priorities this year is the development of a comprehensive, coordinated security 

strategy for the transportation system. To accomplish this, TSA is coordinating the 

development of a National Transportation System Security Plan (NTSSP). The plan 

will provide guidance for national-level plans for all transportation modes and will 

be developed with the collaboration of many partners, including other DHS components such as the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate 

and the Coast Guard, the Department of Transportation (DOT) modal operating administrations, other Federal Government agencies and private interests. A wide 

range of perspectives, disciplines, and constituencies will be involved in the Plan’s 

development to ensure the guidance is comprehensive, credible, and executable. 

GAO has recommended that DHS and DOT establish a mechanism, such as a 

memorandum of agreement, to clarify and delineate TSA and DOT roles and responsibilities. We cooperate extensively with DOT and the modal administrations, and 

value the degree of cooperation that we receive as we work together to secure the 

transportation systems. We will continue to assess the need for MOAs for the future. 

GAO’s recommendation for a risk-management approach has been adopted by 

TSA as a cornerstone for its development of security strategies. Using risk analysis 

and working under the guidance of the IAIP Directorate, we hope to ascertain the 

threats, probabilities, and consequences of attacks on the different transportation 

systems. While security measures will continue to be developed to reflect the many 

different types of transportation operations, a certain level of consistency must be 

32 

established across the systems to ensure that risk is not driven from one mode to 

another that is perceived less secure. 

As they are determined necessary, TSA will develop standards for security that 

are both cost-effective and non-duplicative. Recognizing that transportation is global 

in nature, to the greatest extent possible, national standards should be compatible 

with international standards. 

TSA standards will be largely administered and implemented through operating 

administrations and private sector organizations when practical. Stakeholders will 

have multiple opportunities to provide input into the development of standards. TSA 

standards will be performance-based, allowing operators to determine how to best 

achieve a required level of security. As appropriate, standards will be threat-based 

and tied to the Homeland Security Alert Level. 

Just last week Secretary Ridge announced plans to centralize terrorism and emergency preparedness grant programs within a single office, providing a since point 

of access for obtaining critical funding. This will ensure that one focal point in the 

Department is available for potential grantees to tap into the resources and information they need, from applying for funds to protect critical infrastructure to receiving guidance and expertise for first responders. This will allow DHS to provide more 

consistent grant guidance, coordination, and oversight. 

TSA has already distributed substantial funding assistance for maritime and land 

security projects and will be working closely with other DHS agencies to provide a 

smooth transition of grant programs under the Secretary’s new plan. 

For port security assessments and enhancements, TSA issued (under DOT in co- operation with MARAD and the Coast Guard) $92 million in FY 02 funds to 79 

grantees for 143 projects. In June 2003, again with the teamwork of the Coast 

Guard and MARAD, TSA awarded $170 million in FY 03 funds to 199 grantees for 

392 projects. TSA is currently completing the selection process for $20 million in 

port incident response exercise contracts and is beginning the evaluation process for 

an additional $105 million in port security enhancement grants. 

With the assistance of FMCSA and the Federal Transit Administration, TSA selected and recently announced the award of 60 grants for 67 bus security projects 

totaling $20 million. These grants will enhance driver protection, passenger and 

baggage screening, and monitoring and communications technologies for over-theroad buses. 

Working with DOT and other DHS and Federal agencies, TSA is managing the 

Operation Safe Commerce (OSC) project. OSC will provide cooperative agreements 

to identify security weaknesses in the supply chain and fund business-driven pilot 

projects to enhance container security throughout the supply chain. Utilizing FY 02 

and FY 03 funding, TSA awarded funding for 18 projects totaling $58 million to the 

three largest container load centers in the U.S.—the ports of Los Angeles/Long 

Beach, Seattle/Tacoma, and New York/New Jersey. Together with the Bureau of 

Customs and Border Protection, TSA is also co-chairing the Container Working 

Group, which has recommended potential security technologies and procedures that 

are being operationally tested in OSC. 

To address one of the critical issues in the area of rail hazardous materials security policy, TSA held a workshop to explore the role of placards and their effects 

on the security of hazardous materials shipments by rail. TSA brought together experts from the response community and railroad community as well as government 

agencies to discuss security and safety impacts on the treatment of placards for hazardous material shipments by rail. 

Last May, GAO’s report ‘‘Rail Safety and Security—Some Actions Already Taken 

to Enhance Rail Security, but Risk-based Plan Needed,’’ noted that TSA has not yet 

developed a risk-based security plan to address rail security. TSA concurs with 

GAO’s recommendation, and is working under the guidance of the IAIP Directorate 

and with the Department of Transportation to develop a risk-based plan that specifically addresses the security of the Nation’s rail infrastructure. This plan will 

make maximum use of the railroad industry’s Terrorism Risk Analysis and Security 

Management Plan, which is being reviewed consistent with national interests and 

security goals. 

TSA has also provided comments to Amtrak on its Security Investment Plan. 

Given the vast infrastructure of the passenger rail system, security enhancements 

should be based on thorough risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis. Close coordination between Amtrak, the Federal Railroad Administration, and TSA is critical 

as we move forward. 

Good intelligence is an important tool for combating terrorism in all modes of 

transportation. In close coordination with the IAIP Directorate’s Intelligence Analysis section, TSA’s Transportation Security Intelligence Service (TSIS) receives, assesses, and distributes intelligence related to threats to transportation, and operates 

33 

an around-the-clock intelligence watch tied to all national intelligence and law enforcement intelligence programs. It maintains direct connections with TSA’s field operations and the security centers of major transportation stakeholders. It tracks intelligence and modal operations developments continuously. Staffed by experienced 

senior intelligence analysts, the intelligence watch is authorized to alert all appropriate entities to indications of a threat. As part of DHS, TSA is working to integrate its intelligence analysis and products with other intelligence components of 

DHS while continuing to support its transportation customer base with analysis on 

transportation security and intelligence. 

TSA shares transportation security intelligence directly with the Association of 

American Railroads (AAR) Operation Center in a manner similar to intelligence 

sharing for aviation security. To enhance cogent intelligence analysis, industry leaders recently provided briefings on land and maritime transportation to intelligence 

analysts from the TSIS, the Central Intelligence Agency, the U.S. Coast Guard, 

DHS’s Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate, the Northern 

Command, and the Defense Intelligence Agency through the auspices of TSA. We 

are also coordinating sponsorship of security clearances and secure communications 

for security personnel in the transportation industry. 

Implementation of the Maritime Transportation Security Act 

Leveraging work already undertaken by private industry and within the Federal 

Government, TSA is collaborating closely with the Coast Guard and the Bureau of 

Customs and Border Protection to enable DHS to meet the many requirements set 

forth in the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002. For example, in July, the 

Coast Guard published interim final maritime security regulations to require vessel 

and facility owners to complete security assessments, develop security plans, and 

implement security measures and procedures. The regulations will also implement 

Automatic Identification System (AIS) requirements for certain vessels, as required 

by MTSA. 

These regulations were developed in a collaborative process that involved both 

TSA and CBP, and are a good example of the benefits of creating the Department 

of Homeland Security and bringing the Federal Government agencies with complementary missions under one roof. TSA is coordinating with the Coast Guard and 

the IAIP Directorate to develop a vulnerability assessment tool that may be used 

by vessel and facility operators to help them meet their obligations under those 

rules. TSA is also working with the Coast Guard to ensure that the National Maritime Security Plan and the Area Maritime Security Plans are consistent with the 

National Transportation System Security Plan. TSA will also provide assistance to 

the Coast Guard and BCBP in conducting foreign port assessments and notifying 

foreign authorities when ports are not in compliance. 

To meet the remaining statutory requirements for which DHS is responsible 

under MTSA, TSA, BCBP and the Coast Guard are also collaborating closely in the 

arena of developing performance standards for containerized cargo, secure systems 

of transportation, and transportation security cards. I am pleased to report that a 

good portion of the preliminary work necessary to meet these requirements has already been done through the interagency container working group, and programs 

like Operation Safe Commerce, the Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism 

(C–TPAT), the Container Security Initiative (CSI) and the Transportation Worker 

Identification Card (TWIC). We are continuing to work closely with BCBP, the 

Coast Guard, IAIP and other Federal agencies like the Department of Transportation to identify gaps that need to be addressed in these arenas, and will continue 

to collaborate closely with those partners in identifying how those gaps should be 

filled. 

Conclusion 

Analysts can point to a veritable obstacle course of challenges to preparing a comprehensive system of security across the modes. While I recognize and respect the 

difficulty of meeting these challenges, I am optimistic in that TSA also has many 

compensating strengths to draw upon. We can look very positively upon the dramatic change in landscape in only two years. We have all learned a great deal very 

quickly. Also, the enormity of our transportation network and its workers means 

that we have alert eyes and ears throughout America, along thousands of miles of 

rail track, at every airport, behind the wheels of trucks and motorcoaches on our 

highways, throughout our transit stations and systems, and at our ports and loading 

docks. We also have remarkable, almost instantaneous communications tools to help 

us reach out as well as share information. Just as important, as this Committee 

knows so well, the transportation community has decades of success in engineering 

solutions to national challenges, such as improving transportation safety, building 

34 

and maintaining vast transportation systems, and harnessing technology to help 

them operate more efficiently. 

We can only surmount the very real threats to our security by working as a team. 

You have my assurance that TSA will reach out to all elements of the transportation and security communities, public and private, as we move forward. Thank 

you for the opportunity to testify before you today. I will be happy to answer any 

questions you may have. 

Senator HUTCHISON [presiding]. Thank you very much, Admiral 

Loy. 

Mr. Guerrero, welcome. 

STATEMENT OF PETER GUERRERO, DIRECTOR, PHYSICAL 

INFRASTRUCTURE, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE; 

ACCOMPANIED BY GERALD L. DILLINGHAM, DIRECTOR, 

CIVIL AVIATION ISSUES, AND MARGARET WRIGHTSON, 

DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND JUSTICE ISSUES 

Mr. GUERRERO. Thank you. 

Mrs. Hutchison, Mr. Hollings, and Members of the Committee, I 

appreciate the opportunity to testify today on the security of the 

Nation’s transportation system. With me, to my left, is Gerald 

Dillingham, and, to his left, Margaret Wrightson, who have both 

extensive experience in the areas of aviation and port security, respectively. My remarks summarize our statements that we have 

submitted for the record. 

The economic well-being of the United States is critically dependent on the flow of people and goods through the transportation system. The terrorist attacks 2 years ago illustrated the 

vulnerabilities of that system. 

Today, I will discuss the challenges we face in securing the Nation’s transportation system, the actions taken by stakeholders to 

enhance security since September 11, and where we go from here. 

My comments are based on GAO’s work on security issues, including our recent report on transportation security that we prepared 

for this Committee and several other Members. 

Securing the transportation system is fraught with challenges. 

The first challenge is the sheer size of the transportation system 

itself. Our transportation infrastructure crisscrosses the Nation 

and extends beyond our borders to move millions of passengers and 

tons of freight each day. We have developed a map to illustrate this 

point. Each of you has before you that map. It’s a small posterboard with several overlays attached to it, and we have here, for 

the audience, a larger board. 

The first layer of the map shows the transit systems in metropolitan areas. If you then—that’s the white base of the board—and 

then if you take the first overlay and flip that down for—the second 

layer shows U.S. ports. The next overlay will show the major airports in this country. The next layer shows the national highway 

system. The next layer shows large pipelines. And the final layer 

shows the location of Class I railroads. 

When all these layers are put on top of one another, it shows the 

extreme complexity, extensiveness interconnectivity of the transportation system. It shows how that an incident in one mode of the 

system can have ripple effects throughout not only the entire system, but also our economy. 

35 

The second challenge is funding future security enhancements in 

an environment where both industry and government are hurting. 

Throughout our work, transportation stakeholders have repeatedly 

noted that adequate funding is the most pressing challenge to securing the Nation’s transportation system. While some security improvements are relatively inexpensive, such as launching employee 

awareness campaigns, most require substantial funding. The total 

cost of enhancing the security over the entire transportation system is unknown. However, given its size, it could amount to hundreds of billions of dollars. The current economic environment 

makes this a difficult time for private industry, state and local governments, and the Federal Government to make these needed security investments. The sluggish economy has weakened the transportation industry’s financial condition by decreasing ridership and 

revenues. Additionally, many states and the Federal Government 

are facing very large budget shortfalls. 

Every time the national threat level is elevated, transportation 

stakeholders must provide heightened security. This drains resources from other needs, maintenance is deferred, service expansion plans are put on hold, and employees are diverted from regular duties. While the Federal Government has provided funding 

for transportation security since September 11, demand has far 

outstripped amounts made available. Given the high price tag of 

security enhancements and the limited resources to fund such enhancements, it’s critical that government and industry use a riskmanagement approach to ensure that private and government resources are directed to the highest priorities. 

Despite these challenges, numerous actions have been taken to 

enhance transportation security since September 11. Many transportation operators have conducted security assessments, undertaken emergency drills, and developed plans. State and local governments, which play a critical role in securing the system, because 

they own a large portion of the transportation network and also because they serve as first responders, have also acted to improve the 

security of the transportation system. 

Numerous agencies at the Federal level have also been involved. 

Notably, agencies within the Departments of Homeland Security 

and Transportation have played major efforts in this regard. For 

example, the Federal Transit Administration in the Department of 

Transportation has provided grants for emergency drills, security 

assessments, and training. TSA has met numerous challenges— 

challenging mandates, really, to aviation security, has hired and 

deployed an extensive workforce of over 60,000, including passenger and baggage screeners and Federal air marshals. In addition, TSA is working on a number of additional efforts to secure 

other modes of transportation, such as using a transportation 

workers identification card program, which would establish a uniform national standard for the secure identification of the 12 million transportation workers. 

The Coast Guard, Bureau of Customs and Border and Protection, 

and the Maritime Administration have also launched a number of 

initiatives to improve port security and have made important 

strides in implementing the security provisions of the Maritime 

Transportation Security Act. 

36 

As all of these stakeholders move forward with their security efforts, it will be critically important that their roles and responsibilities are clearly defined and coordinated. Lack of coordination can 

lead to problems, such as confusion, duplication, and gaps in preparedness. Moreover, lack of coordination can strain intergovernmental relations, drain resources, and raise the potential for problems in responding to acts of terrorism. Therefore, we have recommended that the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Transportation use a mechanism, such as a memorandum of agreement, to clearly delineate and coordinate their respective roles and responsibilities. 

While transportation security has increased since September 11, 

significant challenges still remain. The remaining work will be 

challenging and will likely prove as difficult to tackle as the issues 

addressed over the past 2 years. For example, although securing 

the aviation system has received considerable attention and funding over the past 2 years, vulnerabilities still remain. These 

vulnerabilities remain in the areas of airport perimeter, air cargo, 

and general aviation security, to just cite three examples. Additional strategies to further secure the maritime and land transportation modes, which typically, as we heard today, have open access 

designed so that they can facilitate commerce and the flow of passengers, must be developed and deployed. As solutions and strategies are developed, their impact on mobility and commerce must 

also be considered. It will be important to strike the right balance 

between increasing security and protecting economic vitality and 

mobility. Meeting these continuing as well as emerging challenges 

is made more difficult as the Federal Government reorganizes to 

address these challenges. 

The lead player, the Department of Homeland Security, will inevitably encounter funding, human capital, and other organizational challenges typically faced by new organizations, all of which 

could affect its ability to administer and implement security programs. During this transformation period, coordination among and 

congressional oversight of key Federal agencies is critical. 

In conclusion, securing the transportation system is not an easy 

or short-term task. Many challenges must be overcome. Transportation stakeholders have worked to strengthen the security of all 

modes of transportation since September 11. However, much more 

work remains to be done. It will take a collective and coordinated 

effort of all transportation stakeholders to meet the continuing 

challenges and enhance the security of the transportation system. 

We look forward to working with the Committee in meeting these 

challenges. 

This concludes my prepared statement. We’d be pleased to answer any questions. 

[The prepared statements of Mr. Guerrero follows:] 

37 

1Transportation operators may be private, public, or quasi-public entities that provide transportation services. 2 U.S. General Accounting Office, Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Help Address Security Challenges, GAO–03–843 (Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2003). For this report, we 

analyzed the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s threat assessment and the administration’s security strategies, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the Department of Transportation (DOT) security-related documents and reports, and relevant statutes and regulations. 

In addition, we interviewed officials from DOT, the National Railroad Passenger Corporation 

(Amtrak), and TSA as well as representatives from numerous transportation industry associations and transportation security experts. We selected transportation industry and state and 

local government associations that represent the different modes of transportation and levels of 

government. We selected transportation security experts on the basis of their knowledge and 

expertise and reputation as being experts in the transportation security arena. We also consulted with the National Academy of Sciences in identifying appropriate transportation security 

experts. Finally, we reviewed our past reports on homeland, port, transit, and aviation security 

and other research on terrorism and transportation security. We conducted our work from February 2003 through May 2003, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. 3See Related GAO Products at the end of this testimony. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF PETER GUERRERO, DIRECTOR, PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

ISSUES, UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE

FEDERAL ACTION NEEDED TO ENHANCE SECURITY EFFORTS

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: 

We appreciate the opportunity to provide testimony on the security of our Nation’s 

transportation system. Almost 2 years have passed since the attacks of September 

11, 2001, demonstrated the vulnerabilities of the Nation’s transportation system to 

the terrorist threat. Although most of the early attention following the September 

11 attacks focused on aviation security, emphasis on the other modes of transportation has since grown as concerns are voiced about possible vulnerabilities, such 

as attempts to introduce weapons of mass destruction into this country through 

ports or launch chemical attacks on mass transit systems. The entire transportation 

industry has remained on a heightened state of alert since the attacks. 

My testimony today examines (1) challenges in securing the Nation’s transportation system; (2) actions transportation operators,1 as well as state and local governments, have taken since September 11 to enhance security; (3) the Federal role 

in securing the transportation system and actions the Federal Government has 

taken to enhance transportation security since September 11; and (4) future actions 

that are needed to further enhance the security of the Nation’s transportation system. My comments are based on our recent report 2 on the security of the transportation system that we prepared for several Members of this Committee as well as 

a body of our work undertaken since September 11 on homeland security and combating terrorism.3

Summary 

Transportation stakeholders face numerous challenges in securing the Nation’s 

transportation system. Some of these challenges are common to all modes of transportation; other challenges are specific to aviation, maritime, or land transportation 

modes. Common security challenges include the extensiveness of the transportation 

system, the interconnectivity of the system, funding limitations, and the number of 

stakeholders involved in transportation security. For example, the transportation 

system includes about 3.9 million miles of roads, over 100,000 miles of rail, almost 

600,000 bridges, over 300 ports, 2.2 million miles of pipelines, 500 train stations, 

and over 5,000 public-use airports. The size of the system simultaneously provides 

a substantial number of potential targets for terrorists and makes it difficult to secure. Additionally, the number of stakeholders—including over 20 Federal entities, 

state and local governments, and hundreds of thousands of private businesses—can 

lead to coordination, communication, and consensus-building challenges. Further exacerbating these challenges are the financial pressures confronting transportation 

stakeholders. For example, the sluggish economy has weakened the transportation 

industry’s financial condition by decreasing ridership and revenues. The Federal 

Government has provided additional funding for transportation security since September 11, but demand has far outstripped the additional amounts made available. 

The aviation, maritime, and land transportation modes also face particular challenges in enhancing security. For instance, maritime and land transportation systems generally have open access designs so that users can enter the systems at multiple points; however, this openness leaves them vulnerable because transportation 

operators cannot monitor or control who enters or leaves the systems. 

38 

4DOT’s modal administrations are the departmental units responsible for the different modes 

of transportation, such as the Federal Railroad Administration or the Federal Highway Administration. 5GAO–03–843. 

Despite these challenges, transportation operators and state and local governments have implemented numerous actions to enhance security since September 11. 

Although security was always a priority, the terrorist attacks elevated the importance and urgency of security. According to representatives from a number of industry associations we interviewed, transportation operators have implemented new security measures or increased the frequency or intensity of existing activities. For example, many transportation operators conducted risk or security assessments, undertook emergency drills, and developed security plans. State and local governments, which play a critical role in securing the system because they own a large 

portion of the transportation system as well as serve as first responders to incidents 

involving transportation assets, have also acted to improve the security of the transportation system. Some examples of their actions since September 11 include deploying additional law enforcement personnel and participating in emergency drills 

with the transportation industry. 

The roles of Federal Government agencies in securing the Nation’s transportation 

system are in transition. Prior to September 11, DOT had primary responsibility for 

the security of the transportation system. In the wake of September 11, Congress 

created TSA and gave it responsibility for the security of all modes of transportation. During TSA’s first year of existence, its primary focus was on aviation security. While TSA was focusing on aviation security, DOT modal administrations 4

launched various initiatives to enhance the security of the maritime and land transportation modes. For example, the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) launched 

a multipart security initiative to enhance transit security, which included grants for 

emergency drills, security assessments, and training. TSA has started to assert a 

greater role in securing the maritime and land transportation modes and is launching a number of new security initiatives. For example, TSA is planning to issue security standards for all modes of transportation. However, a number of representatives from transportation industry and state and local government associations that 

we contacted expressed concerns about not being adequately involved in TSA’s decision-making, such as the development of security standards. DOT modal administrations are also continuing their transportation security efforts. For example, the 

Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) is coordinating a series of workshops this 

year on emergency response and preparedness for state departments of transportation and other agencies. The roles and responsibilities of TSA and DOT in transportation security have yet to be clearly delineated, which creates the potential for 

duplicating and/or conflicting efforts as both entities move forward with their security efforts. 

Transportation security experts and representatives from transportation industry 

and state and local government associations that we spoke with identified a number 

of actions that they said should be implemented to enhance the security of the Nation’s transportation system. In general, they believe that the transportation system 

is generally more secure today than it was prior to September 11; however, all 

1noted that more work is needed to improve the security of the system. Transportation security experts and representatives from transportation industry and state 

and local government associations identified a number of future actions needed and 

stated that the identified actions are primarily the responsibility of the Federal Government. For instance, representatives from industry and state and local government associations told us that clarifying Federal roles and coordinating Federal efforts are important because association members are not clear about which agency 

to contact for their various security concerns and which agency has oversight for 

certain issues. Some representatives from the transportation industry and state and 

local government associations also noted that they have received conflicting messages from the different Federal entities. 

In our June report, we recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security and 

the Secretary of Transportation develop mechanisms, such as a memorandum of 

agreement, to clearly define the roles and responsibilities of TSA and DOT in transportation security matters.5 DOT and DHS generally agreed with the report’s findings; however, they disagreed with the conclusions and recommendation that their 

roles and responsibilities in transportation security matters need to be clarified. On 

the basis of our discussions with transportation security stakeholders, we continue 

to believe our recommendation would help address transportation security challenges. For example, representatives from several associations stated that their 

members were unclear as to which agency to contact for their various security conVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:02 Nov 21, 2014 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00042 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\91310.TXT JACKIE
39 

6P.L. No. 107–71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001). 

7P.L. No. 107–296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002). 

cerns and which agency has oversight for certain issues. Furthermore, both DOT 

and TSA are moving forward with their security efforts, and both entities have statutory responsibilities for transportation security. Therefore, we retained our recommendation that DOT and DHS clarify and delineate their roles and responsibilities in security matters and communicate this information to stakeholders. 

Background 

The nation’s transportation system is a vast, interconnected network of diverse 

modes. Key modes of transportation include aviation; highways; motor carrier (i.e., 

trucking); motor coach (i.e., intercity bus); maritime; pipeline; rail (passenger and 

freight); and transit (e.g., buses, subways, ferry boats, and light rail). The transportation modes work in harmony to facilitate mobility through an extensive network 

of infrastructure and operators, as well as through the vehicles and vessels that permit passengers and freight to move within the system. For example, the Nation’s 

transportation system moves over 30 million tons of freight and provides approximately 1.1 billion passenger trips each day. The diversity and size of the transportation system make it vital to our economy and national security, including military 

mobilization and deployment. 

Private industry, state and local governments, and the Federal Government all 

have roles and responsibilities in securing the transportation system. Private industry owns and operates a large share of the transportation system. For example, almost 2,000 pipeline companies and 571 railroad companies own and operate the 

pipeline and freight railroad systems, respectively. Additionally, 83 passenger air 

carriers and 640,000 interstate motor coach and motor carrier companies operate in 

the United States. 

State and local governments also own significant portions of the highways, transit 

systems, and airports in the country. For example, state and local governments own 

over 90 percent of the total mileage of highways. State and local governments also 

administer and implement regulations for different sectors of the transportation system and provide protective and emergency response services through various agencies. Although the Federal Government owns a limited share of the transportation 

system, it issues regulations, establishes policies, provides funding, and/or sets 

standards for the different modes of transportation. The Federal Government uses 

a variety of policy tools, including grants, loan guarantees, tax incentives, regulations, and partnerships, to motivate or mandate state and local governments or the 

private sector to help address security concerns. 

Prior to September 11, DOT was the primary Federal entity involved in transportation security matters. However, in response to the attacks on September 11, Congress passed the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), which created 

TSA within DOT and defined its primary responsibility as ensuring security in all 

modes of transportation.6 The act also gives TSA regulatory authority over all transportation modes. Since its creation in November 2001, TSA has focused primarily 

on meeting the aviation security deadlines contained in ATSA. With the passage of 

the Homeland Security Act on November 25, 2002, TSA, along with over 20 other 

agencies, was transferred to the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS).7

The Transportation System as a Whole Faces Numerous Challenges 

The United States maintains the world’s largest and most complex national transportation system. Improving the security of such a system is fraught with challenges 

for both public and private entities. To provide safe transportation for the nation, 

these entities must overcome issues common to all modes of transportation as well 

as issues specific to the individual modes of transportation. 

All Modes of Transportation Face Common Challenges 

Although each mode of transportation is unique, they all face some common challenges in trying to enhance security. Common challenges stem from the extensiveness of the transportation system, the interconnectivity of the system, funding security improvements, and the number of stakeholders involved in transportation security. 

Size and Diversity of Transportation Modes Create Security Challenges 

The size of the transportation system makes it difficult to adequately secure. The 

transportation system’s extensive infrastructure crisscrosses the Nation and extends 

beyond our borders to move millions of passengers and tons of freight each day. The 

extensiveness of the infrastructure as well as the sheer volume of freight and pasVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:02 Nov 21, 2014 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00043 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\91310.TXT JACKIE
40 

8Similarly, there are opportunities for cross contamination within the same mode. For example, a bag containing an explosive device could be placed on one airline and then transferred 

to another airline where it explodes. 

sengers moved through the system creates an infinite number of targets for terrorists. Furthermore, as industry representatives and transportation security experts 

repeatedly noted, the extensiveness of the infrastructure makes equal protection for 

all assets impossible. 

Protecting transportation assets from attack is made more difficult because of the 

tremendous variety of transportation operators. Some are multibillion-dollar enterprises, and others have very limited facilities and very little traffic. Some are public 

agencies, such as state departments of transportation, and some are private businesses. Some transportation operators carry passengers, and others haul freight. 

Additionally, the type of freight moved through the different modes is similarly varied. For example, the maritime, motor carrier, and rail operators haul freight as diverse as dry bulk (grain) and hazardous materials. 

Interconnectivity and Interdependency Also Present Challenges 

Additional challenges are created by the interconnectivity and interdependency 

among the transportation modes and between the transportation sector and nearly 

every other sector of the economy. The transportation system is interconnected or 

intermodal because passengers and freight can use multiple modes of transportation 

to reach a destination. For example, from its point of origin to its destination, a 

piece of freight, such as a shipping container, can move from ship to train to truck. 

(See fig. 1.) The interconnective nature of the transportation system creates several 

security challenges. First, the effects of events directed at one mode of transportation can ripple throughout the entire system. For example, when the port workers 

in California, Oregon, and Washington went on strike in 2002, the railroads saw 

their intermodal traffic decline by almost 30 percent during the first week of the 

strike, compared with the year before. Second, the interconnecting modes can contaminate each other—that is, if a particular mode experiences a security breach, the 

breach could affect other modes.8 An example of this would be if a shipping container that held a weapon of mass destruction arrived at a U.S. port where it was 

placed on a truck or train. In this case, although the original security breach occurred in the port, the rail or trucking industry would be affected as well. Thus, 

even if operators within one mode established high levels of security they could be 

affected because of the security efforts, or lack thereof, of the other modes. Third, 

intermodal facilities where a number of modes connect and interact—such as 

ports—are potential targets for attack because of the presence of passengers, freight, 

employees, and equipment at these facilities. 

41 

9DHS created the Homeland Security Advisory System. The system has five threat conditions—ranging from low to severe—representing different levels of risk for terrorist attacks. 

Figure 1: Illustration of Possible Freight Movements within the 

Transportation System 

Source: GAO. 

Interdependencies also exist between transportation and nearly every other sector 

of the economy. Consequently, an event that affects the transportation sector can 

have serious impacts on other industries. For example, when the war in Afghanistan began in October 2001, the rail industry restricted the movement of many hazardous materials, including chlorine, because of a heightened threat of a terrorist 

attack. However, within days, many major water treatment facilities reported that 

they were running out of chlorine, which they use to treat drinking water, and 

would have to shut down operations if chlorine deliveries were not immediately resumed. 

The Number of Stakeholders Creates Challenges 

Securing the transportation system is made more difficult because of the number 

of stakeholders involved. As illustrated in figure 2, numerous entities at the federal, 

state, and local levels, including over 20 Federal entities and thousands of private 

sector businesses, play a key role in transportation security. For example, the Departments of Energy, Transportation, and Homeland Security; state governments; 

and about 2,000 pipeline operators are all responsible for securing the pipeline system. The number of stakeholders involved in transportation security can lead to 

communication challenges, duplication, and conflicting guidance. Representatives 

from several state and local government and industry associations told us that their 

members are receiving different messages from the various Federal agencies involved in transportation security. For instance, one industry representative noted 

that both TSA and DOT asked the industry to implement additional security measures when the Nation’s threat condition was elevated to orange at the beginning of 

the Iraq War; 9 however, TSA and DOT were not consistent in what they wanted 


909PGUER1.eps
42 

done—that is, they were asking for different security measures. Moreover, many 

representatives commented that the Federal Government needs to better coordinate 

its security efforts. These representatives noted that dealing with multiple agencies 

on the same issues and topics is frustrating and time consuming for the transportation sector. 

Figure 2: Key Stakeholders in Transportation Security 

Source. GAO. 

a ‘‘Other’’ includes private, public, or quasi-public entities. 

The number of stakeholders also makes it difficult to achieve the needed cooperation and consensus to move forward with security efforts. As we have noted in past 

reports, coordination and consensus-building are critical to successful implementation of security efforts. Transportation stakeholders can have inconsistent goals or 

interests, which can make consensus-building challenging. For example, from a safety perspective, vehicles that carry hazardous materials should be required to have 

placards that identify the contents of a vehicle so that emergency personnel know 

how best to respond to an incident. However, from a security perspective, identifying 

placards on vehicles that carry hazardous materials make them a potential target 

for attack. 

Funding Is Key Challenge 

According to transportation security experts and state and local government and 

industry representatives we contacted, funding is the most pressing challenge to securing the Nation’s transportation system. Although some security improvements 

are inexpensive, such as removing trash cans from subway platforms, most require 

substantial funding. Additionally, given the large number of assets to protect, the 

sum of even relatively less expensive investments can be cost prohibitive. For example, reinforcing shipping containers to make them more blast resistant is one way 

to improve security, which would cost about $15,000 per container. With several 

million shipping containers in use, however, this tactic would cost billions of dollars 

if all of them were reinforced. The total cost of enhancing the security of the entire 

transportation system is unknown; however, given the size of the system, it could 

amount to tens of billions of dollars. 

The current economic environment makes this a difficult time for private industry 

or state and local governments to make security investments. According to industry 

representatives and experts we contacted, most of the transportation industry operates on a very thin profit margin, making it difficult for the industry to pay for addiVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:02 Nov 21, 2014 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00046 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\91310.TXT JACKIE

909PGUER2.eps
43 

10Operation Safe Commerce focuses on using new technology, such as container seals, to help 

shippers ensure the integrity of the cargo included in containers being sent to the United States. 

tional security measures. The sluggish economy has further weakened the transportation industry’s financial condition by decreasing ridership and revenues. For example, airlines are in the worst fiscal crisis in their history, and several have filed 

for bankruptcy. Similarly, the motor coach and motor carrier industries and Amtrak 

report decreased revenues because of the slow economy. In addition, nearly every 

state and local government is facing a large budget deficit for Fiscal Year 2004. For 

example, the National Governors Association estimates that states are facing a total 

budget shortfall of $80 billion for Fiscal Year 2004. Given the tight budget environment, state and local governments and transportation operators must make difficult 

trade-offs between transportation security investments and other needs, such as 

service expansion and equipment upgrades. According to the National Association 

of Counties, many local governments are planning to defer some maintenance of 

their transportation infrastructure to pay for some security enhancements. 

Further exacerbating the problem of funding security improvements is the additional costs the transportation sector incurs when the Federal Government elevates 

the national threat condition. Industry representatives stated that operators tighten 

security, such as increasing security patrols, when the national threat condition is 

raised or intelligence information suggests an increased threat against their mode. 

However, these representatives stated that these additional measures drain resources and are not sustainable. For example, Amtrak estimates that it spends an 

additional $500,000 per month for police overtime when the national threat condition is increased. Transportation industry representatives also noted that employees 

are diverted from their regular duties to implement additional security measures, 

such as guarding entranceways, in times of increased security, which hurts productivity. 

The Federal Government has provided additional funding for transportation security since September 11, but demand has far outstripped the additional amounts 

made available. For example, Congress appropriated a total of $241 million for 

grants for ports, motor carriers, and Operation Safe Commerce in 2002.10 However, 

as table 1 shows, the grant applications TSA has received for these security grants 

totaled $1.8 billion—nearly 8 times more than the amount available. Due to the 

costs of security enhancements and the transportation industries’ and state and 

local governments’ tight budget environments, the Federal Government is likely to 

be viewed as a source of funding for at least some of these enhancements. However, 

given the constraints on the Federal budget as well as competing claims for Federal 

assistance, requests for Federal funding for transportation security enhancements 

will likely continue to exceed available resources. 

Table 1.—Comparison of Selected Transportation Security Grant Requests with Federal Funding Available, 

2002 to 2003 

[Dollars in millions] 

Type of grant Amount appropriated 

Total amount requested in all grant 

applications 

Port security grants a $93.3 $697 

Port security grants b 105 996 

Intercity bus grants b 15 45.6 

Operation Safe Commerce grants b 28 97.9 

Total $241.3 $1,836.5 

Source: TSA. 

Note: Both the Department of Defense and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act (P.L. No. 107–117) and the Supplemental Appropriations Act (P.L. No. 107–206) provided funding for port security grants. aP.L. No. 107–117, 115 Stat. 2230 (2002). 

bP.L. No. 107–206, 116 Stat. 820 (2002). 

Balancing Potential Economic Impacts and Security Enhancements Is Also 

Challenging 

Another challenge is balancing the potential economic impacts of security enhancements with the benefits of such measures. Although there is broad support for 

greater security, this task is a difficult one because the Nation relies heavily on a 

free and expeditious flow of goods. Particularly with ‘‘just-in-time’’ deliveries, which 

require a smooth and expeditious flow through the transportation system, delays or 

44 

11Meeting the Homeland Security Challenge: A Principled Strategy for a Balanced and Practical Response (September 2001); and Global Trade: America’s Achilles’ Heel (February 2002) 

by Admiral James M. Loy and Captain Robert G. Ross, U.S. Coast Guard. 12General aviation includes more than 200,000 corporate and privately owned aircraft at over 

19,000 airports. 

disruptions in the supply chain could have serious economic impacts. As the Coast 

Guard Commandant stated about the flow of goods through ports, ‘‘even slowing the 

flow long enough to inspect either all or a statistically significant random selection 

of imports would be economically intolerable.’’ 11

Furthermore, security measures may have economic and competitive ramifications 

for individual modes of transportation. For instance, if the Federal Government imposed a particular security requirement on the rail industry and not on the motor 

carrier industry, the rail industry might incur additional costs and/or lose customers 

to the motor carrier industry. Striking the right balance between increasing security 

and protecting the economic vitality of the national economy and individual modes 

will remain an important and difficult task. 

Individual Transportation Modes Also Confront Unique Challenges 

In addition to the overarching challenges that transportation stakeholders will 

face in attempting to improve transportation security, they also face a number of 

challenges specific to the aviation, maritime, and land transportation modes. Although aviation security has received a significant amount of attention and funding 

since September 11, more work is needed. In general, transportation security experts believe that the aviation system is more secure today than it was prior to September 11. However, aviation experts and TSA officials noted that significant 

vulnerabilities remain. For example: 

• Perimeter security: Terrorists could launch attacks, such as launching shoulderfired missiles, from a location just outside an airport’s perimeter. Since September 11, airport operators have increased their patrols of airport perimeter 

areas, but industry officials state that they do not have enough resources to 

completely protect against these attacks. 

• Air cargo security: Although TSA has focused much effort and funding on ensuring that bombs and other threat items are not carried onto planes by passengers or in their luggage, vulnerabilities exist in securing the cargo carried 

aboard commercial passenger and all-cargo aircraft. For example, employees of 

shippers and freight forwarders are not universally subject to background 

checks. Theft is also a major problem in air cargo shipping, signifying that unauthorized personnel may still be gaining access to air cargo shipments. Air 

cargo shipments pass through several hands in going from sender to recipient, 

making it challenging to implement a system that provides adequate security 

for air cargo. According to TSA officials, TSA is developing a strategic plan to 

address air cargo security and has undertaken a comprehensive outreach process to strengthen security programs across the industry. 

• General aviation security: Although TSA has taken several actions related to 

general aviation 12 since September 11, this segment of the industry remains potentially more vulnerable than commercial aviation. For example, general aviation pilots are not screened prior to taking off, and the contents of a plane are 

not examined at any point. According to TSA, solutions that can be implemented relatively easily at the Nation’s commercial airports are not practical 

at the 19,000 general aviation airports. It would be very difficult to prevent a 

general aviation pilot intent on committing a terrorist attack with his or her 

aircraft from doing so. The vulnerability of the system was illustrated in January 2002, when a teenage flight student from Florida crashed his single-engine 

airplane into a Tampa skyscraper. TSA is working with the appropriate stakeholders to close potential security gaps and to raise the security standards 

across this diverse segment of the aviation industry. 

Maritime and land transportation systems have their own unique security 

vulnerabilities. For example, maritime and land transportation systems generally 

have an open design, meaning the users can access the system at multiple points. 

The systems are open by design so that they are accessible and convenient for users. 

In contrast, the aviation system is housed in closed and controlled locations with 

few entry points. The openness of the maritime and land transportation systems can 

leave them vulnerable because transportation operators cannot monitor or control 

who enters or leaves the systems. However, adding security measures that restrict 

the flow of passengers or freight through the systems could have serious consequences for commerce and the public. 

45 

13 U.S. General Accounting Office, Rail Safety and Security: Some Actions Already Taken to 

Enhance Rail Security, but Risk-based Plan Needed, GAO–03–435 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 30, 

2003). 

Individual maritime and land transportation modes also have unique challenges 

and vulnerabilities. For example, representatives from the motor carrier industry 

noted that the high turnover rate (about 40 to 60 percent) of drivers means that 

motor carrier operators must be continually conducting background checks on new 

drivers, which is expensive and time consuming. Additionally, as we noted in our 

report on rail safety and security,13 the temporary storage of hazardous materials 

in unsecured or unmonitored rail cars while awaiting delivery to their ultimate destinations is a potential vulnerability. Specifically, unmonitored chemical cars could 

develop undetected leaks that could threaten the nearby population and environment. In addition, representatives from the motor coach industry commented that 

the number of used motor coaches on the market, coupled with the lack of guidance 

or requirements on buying or selling these vehicles, is a serious vulnerability. In 

particular, there are approximately 5,000 used motor coaches on the market; however, there is very little information on who is selling and buying them, nor is there 

any consistency among motor coach operators in whether they remove their logos 

from the vehicles before they are sold. These vehicles could be used as weapons or 

to transport weapons. Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration officials told us 

they have not issued guidance to the industry on this potential vulnerability because TSA is responsible for security and therefore would be responsible for issuing 

such guidance. 

Transportation Operators and State and Local Governments Have Taken 

Steps to Improve Security 

Since September 11, transportation operators and state and local governments 

have been working to strengthen security, according to associations we contacted. 

Although security was a priority before September 11, the terrorist attacks elevated 

the importance and urgency of transportation security for transportation operators 

and state and local governments. According to representatives from a number of industry associations we interviewed, transportation operators have implemented new 

security measures or increased the frequency or intensity of existing activities. Some 

of the most common measures cited include conducting vulnerability or risk assessments, tightening access control, intensifying security presence, increasing emergency drills, developing or revising security plans, and providing additional training. 

(Figure 3 is a photograph from an annual emergency drill conducted by the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority.) 

Figure 3: Emergency Drill in Progress 

Source: GAO. 


909PGUER3.eps
46 

14P.L. No. 107–71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001). 15P.L. No. 107–56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). 16P.L. No. 107–296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002). 17The U.S. Coast Guard was also transferred to DHS. In the Terms of Reference Regarding 

the Respective Roles of the U.S. Coast Guard and the Transportation Security Administration, 

the Coast Guard is designated as the lead DHS agency for maritime security and is directed 

to coordinate as appropriate with other agencies. The document further notes that a supporting 

memorandum of agreement between the Commandant of the Coast Guard and the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration is being developed. 18The Homeland Security Act, P.L. 107–296 (November 25, 2002) the legislation that created 

DHS, amended this deadline to allow some airports up to an extra year (December 31, 2003) 

As we have previously reported, state and local governments are critical stakeholders in the Nation’s homeland security efforts. This is equally true in securing 

the Nation’s transportation system. State and local governments play a critical role, 

in part, because they own a significant portion of the transportation infrastructure, 

such as airports, transit systems, highways, and ports. For example, state and local 

governments own over 90 percent of the total mileage of the highway system. Even 

when state and local governments are not the owners or operators, they nonetheless 

are directly affected by the transportation modes that run through their jurisdictions. Consequently, the responsibility for protecting this infrastructure and responding to emergencies involving the transportation infrastructure often falls on 

state and local governments. 

Security efforts of local and state governments have included developing counter 

terrorist plans, participating in training and security-related research, participating 

in transportation operators’ emergency drills and table-top exercises, conducting vulnerability assessments of transportation assets, and participating in emergency 

planning sessions with transportation operators. Some state and local governments 

have also hired additional law enforcement personnel to patrol transportation assets. Much of the funding for these efforts has been covered by the state and local 

governments, with a bulk of the expenses going to personnel costs, such as for additional law enforcement officers and overtime. 

Congress and Federal Agencies Have Taken Numerous Actions to Enhance 

Security, but Roles Remain Unclear 

Congress, DOT, TSA, and other Federal agencies have taken numerous steps to 

enhance transportation security since September 11. The roles of the Federal agencies in securing the Nation’s transportation system, however, are in transition. Prior 

to September 11, DOT had primary responsibility for the security of the transportation system. In the wake of September 11, Congress created TSA and gave it responsibility for the security of all modes of transportation. However, DOT and TSA 

have not yet formally defined their roles and responsibilities in securing all modes 

of transportation. Furthermore, TSA is moving forward with plans to enhance transportation security. For example, TSA plans to issue security standards for all modes. 

DOT modal administrations are also continuing their security efforts for different 

modes of transportation. 

Congress and Federal Agencies Have Acted to Enhance Transportation Security 

Congress has acted to enhance the security of the Nation’s transportation system 

since September 11. In addition to passing the Aviation and Transportation Security 

Act (ATSA),14 Congress passed a number of other key pieces of legislation aimed 

at improving transportation security. For example, Congress passed the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001,15 which mandates Federal background checks of individuals operating vehicles carrying hazardous materials; and the Homeland Security Act,16

which created DHS and moved TSA to the new department.17 Congress also provided funding for transportation security enhancements through various appropriations acts. For example, the 2002 Supplemental Appropriations Act, in part, provided (1) $738 million for the installation of explosives detection systems in commercial service airports, (2) $125 million for port security activities, and (3) $15 million 

to enhance the security of intercity bus operations. 

Federal agencies, notably TSA and DOT, have also taken steps to enhance transportation security since September 11. In its first year of existence, TSA worked to 

establish its organization and focused primarily on meeting the aviation security 

deadlines contained in ATSA. In January 2002, TSA had 13 employees to tackle securing the Nation’s transportation system; 1 year later, TSA had about 65,000 employees. TSA reports that it met over 30 deadlines during 2002 to improve aviation 

security, including two of its most significant deadlines—to deploy Federal passenger screeners at airports across the Nation by November 19, 2002; and to screen 

every piece of checked baggage for explosives by December 31, 2002.18 According to 

47 

to deploy all of the necessary explosive detection equipment to enable TSA to screen all checked 

baggage. TSA reported that as of December 31, 2002, about 90 percent of all checked baggage 

were screened with an explosive detection system or explosives trace detection equipment and 

the remaining checked baggage was screened using alternative means as is allowed under the 

law. 19The U.S. Customs Service was transferred from the Department of Treasury to DHS in the 

Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. No. 107–296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002)) and renamed the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection. 

TSA, other completed TSA activities included recruiting, hiring, training, and deploying about 56,000 Federal screeners; awarding grants for port security; and implementing performance management system and strategic planning activities to 

create a results-oriented culture. 

As TSA worked to establish itself and improve the security of the aviation system, 

DOT modal administrations acted to enhance the security of air, land, and maritime 

transportation. (See app. I for a table listing the actions taken by DOT modal administrations since September 11.) The actions taken by the DOT modal administrations have varied. For example, FTA launched a multipart initiative for mass transit agencies that provided grants for emergency drills, offered free security training, 

conducted security assessments at 36 transit agencies, provided technical assistance, 

and invested in research and development. The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration developed three courses for motor coach drivers. The responses of the 

various DOT modal agencies have varied due to differences in authority and resource limitations. 

In addition to TSA and DOT modal administrations, other Federal agencies have 

also taken actions to improve security. For example, the Bureau of Customs and 

Border Protection (CBP), previously known as the U.S. Customs Service, has 

launched a number of initiatives aimed at strengthening the security of the U.S. 

border.19 Some of the specific security initiatives that CBP has implemented include 

establishing the Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C–TPAT), which is 

a joint government business initiative aimed at securing the supply chain of global 

trade against terrorist exploitation; and launching the Container Security Initiative 

(CSI), which is designed specifically to secure ocean-going sea containers. In addition, CBP has developed and/or deployed tools to detect weapons of mass destruction 

in cargo containers and vehicles, such as the new mobile gamma ray imaging devices pictured in figure 4. 

Figure 4: Photograph of Inspection Equipment in Use 

Source: Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) ©2003. 


909PGUER4.eps
48 

20The Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate within DHS is working 

with TSA, the Coast Guard, and other Federal agencies on developing a set of national standTSA Moves Forward as its Role in Transportation Security Evolves 

TSA is moving forward with efforts to secure the entire transportation system. 

TSA has adopted a systems approach—that is, a holistic rather than a modal approach—to securing the transportation system. In addition, TSA is using risk management principles to guide its decision-making. TSA is also planning to establish 

security standards for all modes of transportation and is launching a number of new 

security efforts for the maritime and land transportation modes. 

TSA Adopts a Systems Approach and Risk Management Principles 

Using the systems approach, TSA plans to address the security of the entire 

transportation system as a whole, rather than focusing on individual modes of 

transportation. According to TSA officials, using a systems approach to security is 

appropriate for several reasons. First, the transportation system is intermodal, 

interdependent, and international. Given the intermodalism of the system, incidents 

in one mode of transportation could affect other modes. Second, it is important not 

to drive terrorism from one mode of transportation to another mode because of perceived lesser security—that is, make a mode of transportation a more attractive target because another mode is ‘‘hardened’’ with additional security measures. Third, 

it is important that security measures for one mode of transportation are not overly 

stringent or too economically challenging compared with the measures used for 

other modes. Fourth, it is important that the attention on one aspect of transportation security (e.g., cargo, infrastructure, or passengers) does not leave the other 

aspects vulnerable. 

TSA has also adopted a risk management approach for its efforts to enhance the 

security of the Nation’s transportation system. A risk management approach is a 

systematic process to analyze threats, vulnerabilities, and the criticality (or relative 

importance) of assets to better support key decisions in order to link resources with 

prioritized efforts. (See app. II for a description of the key elements of a risk management approach.) The highest priorities emerge where the three elements of risk 

management overlap. For example, transportation infrastructure that is determined 

to be a critical asset, vulnerable to attack, and a likely target would be most at risk 

and therefore would be a higher priority for funding compared with infrastructure 

that was only vulnerable to attack. According to TSA officials, risk management 

principles will drive all decisions—from standard-setting to funding priorities to 

staffing. 

Using risk management principles to guide decision-making is a good strategy, 

given the difficult trade-offs TSA will likely have to make as it moves forward with 

its security efforts. We have advocated using a risk management approach to guide 

Federal programs and responses to better prepare against terrorism and other 

threats and to better direct finite national resources to areas of highest priority. As 

representatives from local government and industry associations and transportation 

security experts repeatedly noted, the size of the transportation system precludes 

equal protection for all assets; moreover, the risks vary by transportation assets 

within modes and by modes. In addition, requests for funding for transportation security enhancements will likely exceed available resources. Risk management principles can help TSA determine security priorities and identify appropriate solutions. 

TSA Plans to Issue National Security Standards 

TSA plans to issue national security standards for all modes of transportation. 

The Federal Government has historically set security standards for the aviation sector. For instance, prior to the passage of ATSA, FAA set security standards that the 

airlines were required to follow in several areas including, screening equipment, 

screener qualifications, and access control systems. In contrast, prior to the September 11 attacks, limited statutory authority existed to require measures to ensure 

the security of the maritime and land transportation systems. According to a TSA 

report, the existing regulatory framework leaves the maritime and land transportation systems unacceptably vulnerable to terrorist attack. For example, the rail, 

transit, and motor coach transportation systems are subject to no mandatory security requirements, resulting in little or no screening of passengers, baggage, or crew. 

Additionally, seaborne passenger vessel and seaport terminal operators have inconsistent levels and methods of screening and are largely free to set their own rules 

about the hiring and training of security personnel. Hence, TSA will set standards 

to ensure consistency among modes and across the transportation system and to reduce the transportation system’s vulnerability to attacks.20

49 

ards that would apply to all ports. These efforts are well under way. The Coast Guard has been 

developing a set of standards since May 2002 as part of its efforts to conduct vulnerability assessments for all U.S. ports. The standards will go into effect on July 1, 2004, as part of the 

International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) amendments and the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS) that was adopted by the International 

Maritime Organization conference in December 2002. The Coast Guard considers that the implementation of these standards is best done through mandating compliance with the SOLAS 

amendments and the ISPS Code. According to TSA, because of the Coast Guard’s significant role 

in securing maritime transportation, TSA will likely play a coordination role in the maritime 

arena. 

According to TSA officials and documents, TSA’s standards will be performance-, 

risk-, and threat-based and may be mandatory. More specifically: 

• Standards will be performance-based. Rather than being prescriptive standards, 

TSA standards will be performance-based, which will allow transportation operators to determine how best to achieve the desired level of security. TSA officials believe that performance-based standards provide for operator flexibility, 

allow operators to use their professional judgment in enhancing security, and 

encourage technology advancement. 

• Standards will be risk-based. Standards will be set for areas for which assessments of the threats, vulnerabilities, and criticality indicate that an attack 

would have a national impact. A number of factors could be considered in determining ‘‘national impact,’’ such as fatalities and economic damage. 

• Standards will be threat-based. The standards will be tied to the national threat 

condition and/or local threats. As the threat condition escalates, the standards 

will require transportation operators to implement additional countermeasures. 

• Standards may be mandatory. The standards will be mandatory when the risk 

level is too high or unacceptable. TSA officials stated that in these cases, mandatory standards are needed to ensure accountability. In addition, according to 

TSA officials, voluntary requirements put security-conscious transportation operators that implement security measures at a competitive disadvantage—that 

is, they have spent money that their competitors may not have spent. This creates a disincentive for transportation operators to implement voluntary requirements. TSA officials believe that mandatory standards will reduce this problem. 

In determining whether mandatory standards are needed, TSA will review the 

results of criticality and vulnerability assessments, current best practices, and 

voluntary compliance opportunities in conjunction with the private sector and 

other government agencies. 

Although TSA officials expect some level of resistance to the standards by the 

transportation industry, they believe that their approach of using risk-, threat-, and 

performance-based standards will increase the acceptance of the standards. For example, performance-based standards allow for more operator flexibility in implementing the standards, compared with rigid, prescriptive standards. Moreover, TSA 

plans to issue only a limited number of standards—that is, standards will be issued 

only when assessments of the threats, vulnerabilities, and criticality indicate that 

the level of risk is too high or unacceptable. 

TSA also expects some level of resistance to the standards from DOT modal administrations. Although TSA will establish the security standards, TSA expects that 

they will be administered and implemented by existing agencies and organizations. 

DOT modal administrations may be reluctant to assume this role because doing so 

could alter their relationships with the industry. Historically, the missions of DOT 

surface transportation modal administrations have largely focused on maintaining 

operations and improving service and safety, not regulating security. Moreover, the 

authority to regulate security varies by DOT modal administration. For example, 

FTA has limited authority to regulate and oversee security at transit agencies. In 

contrast, FRA has regulatory authority for rail security, and DOT’s Office of Pipeline Safety has responsibility for writing safety and security regulations for liquefied 

natural gas storage facilities. In addition, DOT modal administrations may be reluctant to administer and implement standards because of resource concerns. FHWA 

officials commented that given the current uncertainty about the standards and 

their impacts, FHWA is reluctant to commit, in advance, staff or funding to enforce 

new security standards. 

Gaining Stakeholder Buy-in is Critical for Standards to Work, but Stakeholders 

Express Concerns 

Because transportation stakeholders will be involved in administering, implementing, and/or enforcing TSA standards, stakeholder buy-in is critical to the sucVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:02 Nov 21, 2014 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00053 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\91310.TXT JACKIE
50 

21P.L. No. 107–71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001). 

cess of this initiative. Compromise and consensus on the part of stakeholders are 

also necessary. However, achieving such consensus and compromise may be difficult, 

given the conflicts between some stakeholders’ goals and interests. 

Transportation stakeholders we contacted also expressed a number of concerns 

about TSA’s plan to issue security standards for all modes of transportation. For example, industry associations expressed concerns that the standards would come in 

the form of unfunded mandates—that is, the Federal Government would not provide 

funding to implement mandatory standards. According to the industry and state and 

local government associations we spoke to, unfunded mandates create additional financial burdens for transportation operators, who are already experiencing financial 

difficulties. Industry representatives also expressed concern that TSA has not adequately included the transportation industry in its development of standards. Many 

industry representatives and some DOT officials we met with were unsure of whether TSA was issuing standards, what the standards would entail, or the time frames 

for issuing the standards. The uncertainty about the pending standards can lead to 

confusion and/or inaction. For example, Amtrak officials noted that they are reluctant to spend money to implement certain security measures because they are worried that TSA will subsequently issue standards that will require Amtrak to redo 

its efforts. Transportation stakeholders also raised other concerns about TSA’s plans 

to issues standards, including questioning whether TSA has the necessary expertise 

to develop appropriate standards and whether mandatory standards, as opposed to 

voluntary standards, are prudent. 

TSA Is Launching Other Security Initiatives 

TSA is also working on a number of additional security efforts, such as establishing the Transportation Workers Identification Card (TWIC) program; developing 

the next generation of the Computer Assisted Passenger Pre-Screening System; developing a national transportation system security plan; and exploring methods to 

integrate operations and security, among other things. The TWIC program is intended to improve access control for the 12 million transportation workers who require unescorted physical or cyber access to secure areas of the Nation’s transportation modes by establishing a uniform, nationwide standard for secure identification of transportation workers. Specifically, TWIC will combine standard background checks and biometrics so that a worker can be positively matched to his/her 

credential. Once the program is fully operational, the TWIC would be the standard 

credential for transportation workers and would be accepted by all modes of transportation. According to TSA, developing a uniform, nationwide standard for identification will minimize redundant credentialing and background checks. 

DOT Modal Agencies Are Continuing Forward with Their Security Efforts 

As TSA moves forward with new security initiatives, DOT modal administrations 

are also continuing their security efforts and, in some cases, launching new security 

initiatives. For example, FHWA is coordinating a series of workshops this year on 

emergency response and preparedness for state departments of transportation and 

other agencies. FTA also has a number of initiatives currently under way in the 

areas of public awareness, research, training, technical assistance, and intelligence 

sharing. For example, FTA developed a list of the top 20 security actions transit 

agencies should implement and is currently working with transit agencies to assist 

them in implementing these measures. 

FAA is also continuing its efforts to enhance cyber security in the aviation system. 

Although the primary responsibility for securing the aviation system was transferred to TSA, FAA remains responsible for protecting the Nation’s air traffic control 

system—both the physical security of its air traffic control facilities and computer 

systems. The air traffic control system’s computers help the Nation’s air traffic controllers to safely direct and separate traffic—sabotaging this system could have disastrous consequences. FAA is moving forward with efforts to increase the physical 

security of its air traffic control facilities and ensure that contractors who have access to the air traffic control system undergo background checks. 

TSA’s and DOT’s Roles and Responsibilities Have Not Been Clearly Defined 

The roles and responsibilities of TSA and DOT in transportation security have yet 

to be clearly delineated, which creates the potential for duplicating or conflicting efforts as both entities move forward with their security efforts. DOT modal administrations were primarily responsible for the security of the transportation system 

prior to September 11. In November 2001, Congress passed ATSA, which created 

TSA and gave it primary responsibility for securing all modes of transportation.21

51 

22DOT and TSA have signed other memorandums of agreement that are narrow in scope and 

address a specific issue. For example, TSA and DOT signed a memorandum of agreement regarding the processing of civil rights complaints. 

However, during TSA’s first year of existence, TSA’s main focus was on aviation security—more specifically, on meeting ATSA deadlines. While TSA was primarily focusing on aviation security, DOT modal administrations launched various initiatives 

to enhance the security of the maritime and land transportation modes. With the 

immediate crisis of meeting many aviation security deadlines behind it, TSA has 

been able to focus more on the security of all modes of transportation. 

Legislation has not specifically defined TSA’s role and responsibilities in securing 

all modes of transportation. In particular, ATSA does not specify TSA’s role and responsibilities in securing the maritime and land transportation modes in detail as 

it does for aviation security. For instance, the act does not set deadlines for TSA 

to implement certain transit security requirements. Instead, the act simply states 

that TSA is responsible for ensuring security in all modes of transportation. The act 

also did not eliminate the existing statutory responsibilities for DOT modal administrations to secure the different transportation modes. Moreover, recent legislation 

indicates that DOT still has security responsibilities. In particular, the Homeland 

Security Act of 2002 states that the Secretary of Transportation is responsible for 

the security as well as the safety of rail and the transport of hazardous materials 

by all modes. 

To clarify their roles and responsibilities in transportation security, DOT modal 

administrations and TSA planned to develop memorandums of agreement. The purpose of these documents was to define the roles and responsibilities of the different 

agencies for transportation security and address a variety of issues, including separating safety and security activities, interfacing with the transportation industry, 

and establishing funding priorities. TSA and the DOT modal administrations 

worked for months to develop the memorandums of agreement and the draft agreements were presented to senior DOT and TSA management for review in early 

spring of this year. According to DOT’s General Counsel, with the exception of the 

memorandum of agreement between FAA and TSA, the draft memorandums were 

very general and did not provide much clarification. Consequently, DOT and TSA 

decided not to sign the memorandums of agreement, except for the memorandum 

of agreement between FAA and TSA, which was signed on February 28, 2003.22

The General Counsel suggested several reasons why the majority of the draft 

memorandums of agreement were too general. First, as TSA’s departure date approached—that is, the date that TSA transferred from DOT to DHS—TSA and DOT 

modal administration officials may have grown concerned about formally binding 

the organizations to specific roles and responsibilities. Second, the working relationships between TSA and most of the DOT modal administrations are still very new; 

as a result, all of the potential issues, problem areas, or overlap have yet to be identified. Thus, identifying items to include in the memorandums of agreement was 

more difficult. 

Rather than execute memorandums of agreement, the Secretary of Transportation 

and the Administrator of TSA exchanged correspondence that commits each entity 

to continued coordination and collaboration on security measures. In the correspondence, the Secretary and Administrator also agreed to use the memorandum of agreement between TSA and FAA as a framework for their interactions on security matters for all other modes. TSA and DOT officials stated that they believe memorandums of agreement are a good strategy for delineating roles and responsibilities and 

said that they would be open to using memorandums of agreement in the future. 

Experts and Associations Identified Future Actions to Advance the 

Security of the Transportation System 

Transportation security experts and representatives of state and local government 

and industry associations we contacted generally believe that the transportation 

system is more secure today than it was prior to September 11. Transportation 

stakeholders have worked hard to strengthen the security of the system. Nevertheless, transportation experts, industry representatives, and Federal officials all recommend that more work be done. Transportation experts and state and local government and industry representatives identified a number of actions that, in their 

view, the Federal Government should take to enhance security, including clarifying 

Federal roles and coordinating Federal efforts, developing a transportation security 

strategy, funding security enhancements, investing in research and development, 

and providing better intelligence information and related guidance. Specifically: 

52 

23TSA hopes to have a draft of the national transportation system security plan prepared by 

the end of this year. 

• Clarify Federal roles and responsibilities. The lack of clarity about the roles and 

responsibilities of Federal entities in transportation security creates the potential for confusion, duplication, and conflicts. Understanding roles, responsibilities, and whom to call is crucial in an emergency. However, representatives 

from several industry associations stated that their members were unclear 

about which agency to contact for their various security concerns and which 

agency has oversight for certain issues. Furthermore, they said that they do not 

have contacts within these agencies. As mentioned earlier, several industry representatives reported that their members are receiving different messages from 

various Federal agencies involved in transportation security, which creates confusion and frustration within the industry. According to industry representatives and transportation security experts, uncertainty about Federal roles and 

the lack of coordination are straining intergovernmental relationships, draining 

resources, and raising the potential for problems in responding to terrorism. 

One industry association told us, for instance, that it has been asked by three 

different Federal agencies to participate in three separate studies of the same 

issue. 

• Establish a national transportation strategy. A national strategy is crucial for 

helping stakeholders identify priorities, leveraging resources, establishing stakeholder performance expectations, and creating incentives for stakeholders to improve security. Currently, local government associations view the absence of 

performance expectations—coupled with limited threat information—as a major 

obstacle in focusing their people and resources on high-priority threats, particularly at elevated threat levels. The experts also noted that modal strategies— 

no matter how complete—cannot address the complete transportation security 

problem and will leave gaps in preparedness. As mentioned earlier, TSA is in 

the process of developing a national transportation system security plan,23

which, according to the Deputy Administrator of TSA, will provide an overarching framework for the security of all modes. 

• Provide funding for needed security improvements. Although an overall security 

strategy is a prerequisite to investing wisely, providing adequate funding also 

is essential, according to experts we contacted. Setting security goals and strategies without adequate funding diminishes stakeholders’ commitment and willingness to absorb initial security investments and long-term operating costs, an 

expert emphasized. Industry and state and local government associations also 

commented that Federal funding should accompany any Federal security standards; otherwise, mandatory standards will be considered unfunded mandates 

that the industry and state and local governments will have to absorb. 

• Invest in research and development for transportation security. According to 

most transportation security experts and associations we contacted, investing in 

research and development is an appropriate role for the Federal Government, 

because the products of research and development endeavors would likely benefit the entire transportation system, not just individual modes or operators. 

TSA is actively engaged in research and development projects, such as the development of the next generation explosive detection systems for baggage, hardening of aircraft and cargo/baggage containers, biometrics and other access control methods, and human factors initiatives to identify methods to improve 

screener performance, at its Transportation Security Laboratory in Atlantic 

City, New Jersey. However, TSA noted that continued adequate funding for research and development is paramount in order for TSA to be able to meet security demands with up-to-date and reliable technology. 

• Provide timely intelligence information and related guidance. Representatives 

from numerous associations commented that the Federal Government needs to 

provide timely, localized, actionable intelligence information. They said that 

general threat warnings are not helpful. Rather, transportation operators want 

more specific intelligence information so that they can understand the true nature of a potential threat and implement appropriate security measures. Without more localized and actionable intelligence, stakeholders said they run the 

risk of wasting resources on unneeded security measures or not providing an 

adequate level of security. Moreover, local government officials often are not allowed to receive specific intelligence information because they do not have appropriate Federal security clearances. Also, there is little Federal guidance on 

how local authorities should respond to a specific threat or general threat warnings. For example, San Francisco police were stationed at the Golden Gate 

53 

24See appendix III for a listing of active GAO engagements related to transportation security. 

Bridge to respond to the elevated national threat condition. However, without 

information about the nature of the threat to San Francisco’s large transportation infrastructure or clear Federal expectations for a response, it is difficult 

to judge whether actions like this are the most effective use of police protection, 

according to representatives from a local government association. 

Observations 

Securing the transportation system is fraught with challenges. Despite these challenges, transportation stakeholders have worked to strengthen security since September 11. However, more work is needed. It will take the collective effort of all 

transportation stakeholders to meet the continuing challenges and enhance the security of the transportation system.24

During TSA’s first year of existence, it met a number of challenges, including successfully meeting many congressional deadlines for aviation security. With the immediate crisis of meeting these deadlines behind it, TSA can now examine the security of the entire transportation system. As TSA becomes more active in securing 

the maritime and land transportation modes, it will become even more important 

that the roles of TSA and DOT modal administrations are clearly defined. Lack of 

clearly defined roles among the Federal entities could lead to duplication and confusion. More importantly, it could hamper the transportation sector’s ability to prepare for and respond to attacks. Therefore, in our report, we recommended that the 

Secretary of Homeland Security and the Secretary of Transportation develop mechanisms, such as a memorandum of agreement, to clearly define the roles and responsibilities of TSA and DOT in transportation security and communicate this information to stakeholders. 

This concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to respond to any questions you or other Members of the Committee may have. 

54 

APPENDIX I 

Key Actions Taken by DOT Modal Administrations to Secure the Different Transportation Modes, 

September 2001 to May 2003 

Mode DOT modal 

administration Examples of actions taken 

All (transport of 

hazardous materials) 

Research and Special 

Programs Administration 

(Office of Hazardous 

Materials Safety) 

• Established regulations for shippers and transporters 

of certain hazardous materials to develop and implement security plans and to require security awareness 

training for hazmat employees. 

• Developed hazardous materials transportation security awareness training for law enforcement, the industry, and the hazmat community. 

• Published security advisory, which identifies measures that could enhance the security of the transport 

of hazardous materials. 

• Investigated the security risks associated with 

placarding hazardous materials, including whether removing placards from certain shipments improve shipment security, and whether alternative methods for 

communicating safety hazards could be deployed. 

Aviation Federal Aviation 

Administration 

• Established rule for strengthening cockpit doors on 

commercial aircraft. 

• Issued guidance to flight school operators for additional security measures. 

• Assisted Department of Justice in increasing background check requirements for foreign nationals seeking pilot certificates. 

• Increased access restrictions at air traffic control facilities. 

• Developed computer security strategy. 

Highways Federal Highway 

Administration 

• Provided vulnerability assessment and emergency preparedness workshops. 

• Developed and prioritized list of highway security research and development projects. 

• Convened blue ribbon panel on bridge and tunnel 

vulnerabilities. 

Maritime U.S. Coast Guarda • Activated and deployed port security units to help 

support local port security patrols in high threat 

areas. 

• Boarded and inspected ships to search for threats and 

confirmed the identity of those aboard. 

• Conducted initial assessments of the Nation’s ports to 

identify vessel types and facilities that pose a high 

risk of being involved in a transportation security incident. 

• Established a new centralized National Vessel Movement Center to track the movement of all foreignflagged vessels entering U.S. ports of call. 

• Established new guidelines for developing security 

plans and implementing security measures for passenger vessels and passenger terminals. 

• Used the pollution and hazardous materials expertise 

of the Coast Guard’s National Strike Force to prepare 

for and respond to bioterrorism and weapons of mass 

destruction. 

Maritime Administration • Increased port security and terrorism emphasis at National Port Readiness Network Port Readiness Exercises. 

• Provided port security training and developed standards and curriculum to educate and train maritime 

security personnel. 

• Increased access restrictions and established new security procedures for the Ready Reserve Force. 

• Provided merchant mariner background checks for 

Ready Reserve Force and sealift vessels in support of 

Department of Defense and Coast Guard requirements. 

• Provided merchant mariner force protection training. 

55 

Key Actions Taken by DOT Modal Administrations to Secure the Different Transportation Modes, 

September 2001 to May 2003—Continued 

Mode DOT modal 

administration Examples of actions taken 

Motor carrier Federal Motor Carrier 

Safety Administration 

• Conducted 31,000 on-site security sensitivity visits for 

hazardous materials carriers; made recommendations 

after visits. 

• Initiated a field operational test to evaluate different 

safety and security technologies and procedures, and 

identify the most cost-effective means for protecting 

different types of hazardous cargo for security purposes. 

• Provided free training on trucks and terrorism to law 

enforcement officials and industry representatives. 

• Conducted threat assessment of the hazardous materials industry. 

Motor coach Federal Motor Carrier 

Safety Administration 

• Developed three courses for drivers on security-related 

information, including different threats, how to deal 

with packages, and how to respond in the case of an 

emergency. 

Pipeline Research and Special 

Programs Administration 

(Office of Pipeline Safety) 

• Developed contact list of operators who own critical 

systems. 

• Convened blue ribbon panel with operators, state regulators, and unions to develop a better understanding 

of the pipeline system and coordinate efforts of the 

stakeholders. 

• Worked with TSA to develop inspection protocols to 

use for pipeline operator security inspections. The Office of Pipeline Safety and TSA have begun the inspection of major operators. 

• Created e:mail network of pipeline operators and a 

call-in telephone number that pipeline operators can 

use to obtain information. 

• Directed pipeline operators to identify critical facilities 

and develop security plans for critical facilities that 

address deterrence, preparedness, and rapid response 

and recovery from attacks. 

• Worked with industry to develop risk-based security 

guidance, which is tied to national threat levels and 

includes voluntary, recommended countermeasures. 

Rail Federal Railroad 

Administration 

• Reviewed Association of American Railroads’ and Amtrak’s security plans. 

• Assisted commuter railroads with their security plans. 

• Provided funding for security assessments of three 

commuter railroads, which were included in FTA’s assessment efforts. 

• Reached out to international community for lessons 

learned in rail security. 

Transit Federal Transit 

Administration 

• Shared threat information with railroads and rail 

labor. 

• Awarded $3.4 million in grants to over 80 transit 

agencies for emergency response drills. 

• Offered free security training to transit agencies. 

• Conducted security assessments at the 36 largest 

transit agencies. 

• Provided technical assistance to 19, with a goal of 60, 

transit agencies on security and emergency plans and 

emergency response drills. 

• Increased funding for security research and development efforts. 

Source: GAO presentation of information provided by DOT modal administrations. 

aThe U.S. Coast Guard was transferred to DHS in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. No. 107–296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002)). 

56 

APPENDIX II 

Elements of a Risk Management Approach 

A risk management approach encompasses three key elements—a threat assessment, vulnerability assessment, and criticality assessment. In particular, these 

three elements provide the following information: 

• A threat assessment identifies and evaluates potential threats on the basis of 

such factors as capabilities, intentions, and past activities. This assessment represents a systematic approach to identifying potential threats before they materialize. However, even if updated often, a threat assessment might not adequately capture some emerging threats. The risk management approach, therefore, uses vulnerability and critical assessments as additional input to the decision-making process. 

• A vulnerability assessment identifies weaknesses that may be exploited by identified threats and suggests options to address those weaknesses. 

• A criticality assessment evaluates and prioritizes assets and functions in terms 

of specific criteria, such as their importance to public safety and the economy. 

The assessment provides a basis for identifying which structures or processes 

are relatively more important to protect from attack. Thus, it helps managers 

determine operational requirements and target resources to the highest priorities while reducing the potential for targeting resources to lower priorities. 

APPENDIX III 

GAO Active Engagements Related to Transportation Security 

TSA Baggage Screening 

Key Questions: (1) What are the status and associated costs of TSA efforts to acquire, install, and operate explosive detection equipment (Electronic Trace Detection 

Technology and Explosive Detection Systems) to screen all checked baggage by December 31, 2003? (2) What are the benefit and tradeoffs—to include costs, operations and performance—of using alternative explosive detection technologies currently available for baggage screening? 

General Aviation Security 

Key Questions: (1) How has security concerns and measures at changed at general 

aviation airports since September 11, 2001? (2) What steps has the Transportation 

Security Administration taken to improve general aviation security? 

Banner Pilot Waivers 

Key Questions: (1) What are procedures for conducting background and security 

checks for pilots of small banner-towing aircraft requesting waivers to perform stadium overflights? (2) To what extent were these procedures followed in conducting 

required background and security checks since 9/11? (3) How effective were these 

procedures in reducing risks to public safety? 

U.S. Coast Guard Budget And Mission Performance 

Key Questions: (1) What are the levels of effort for USCG’s various missions? (2) 

What is USCG’s progress in developing a strategic plan for setting goals for all of 

its various missions? (3) What is USCG’s mission performance as compared to its 

performance and strategic plans? 

Transportation Security Administration’s Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening 

System II (CAPPS–II) 

Key Questions: (1) How will the CAPPS–II system function and what data will 

be needed to make the system operationally effective? (2) What safeguards will be 

put in place to protect the traveling public’s privacy? (3) What systems and measures are in place to determine whether CAPPS–II will result in improved national 

security? (4) What impact will CAPPS–II have on the traveling public and airline 

industry in terms of costs, delays, risks, and hassle, etc.? 

Transportation Security Administration Passengers Screening Program 

Key Questions: (1) What efforts have been taken or planned to ensure passenger 

screeners comply with Federal standards and other criteria, to include efforts to 

train, equip, and supervise passenger screeners? (2) What methods does TSA use 

to test screener performance, and what have been the results of these tests? (3) How 

have the results of tests of TSA passenger screeners compared to the results 

achieved by screeners prior to 9/11 and at the 5 pilot program airports? (4) What 

actions are TSA taking to remedy performance concerns? 

57 

TSA’s Use of Sole Source Contracts 

Key Questions: (1) To what extent does TSA follow applicable acquisition laws and 

policies, including ensuring adequate competition? (2) How well does TSA’s organizational structure facilitate effective, efficient procurement? (3) How does TSA ensure that its acquisition workforce is equipped to award and oversee contracts? (4) 

How well do TSA’s policies and processes ensure that it receives the supplies and 

services it needs on time and at reasonable cost? 

TSA’s Efforts to Implement Section 106, 136, and 138 of the Aviation and 

Transportation Security Act 

Key Questions: (1) What is the status of TSA’s efforts to implement section 106 

of the Act requiring improved airport perimeter access security? (2) What is the status of TSA’s efforts to implement section 136 requiring assessment and deployment 

of commercially available security practices and technologies? (3) What is the status 

of TSA’s efforts to implement section 138 requiring background investigations for 

TSA and other airport employees? 

Implementation of the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 

Key Questions: (1) How effectively is the port vulnerability assessment process 

being implemented, and what actions are being taken to address deficiencies identified? (2) What progress is being made to develop port, vessel, and facility security 

plans? (3) Does the CG have sufficient resources and an action plan to ensure the 

plans be completed, reviewed and approved in time to meet statutory deadlines? (4) 

What will it cost stakeholders to comply? 

Assessment of the Portable Air Defense Missile Threat 

Key Questions: (1) What is the nature and extent of the threat from MANPADs? 

(2) How effective are U.S. controls on the use of exported MANPADs? (3) How do 

multilateral efforts attempt to stem MANPAD proliferation? (4) What types of countermeasures are available to minimize this threat and at what cost? 

Federal Aviation Administration Designee Program 

Key Questions: (1) What is the nature, scope, and operational framework of the 

designee program? (2) What are the identified strengths and weaknesses of the program? (3) What is the potential for FAA’s ODA proposal and other stakeholders’ alternatives to address the identified program weaknesses? 

Custom Cargo Inspections at Seaports 

Key Questions: (1) How has Customs developed the Automated Targeting System 

(ATS) and the new anti-terrorism rules? (2) How does Customs use ATS to identify 

containerized cargo as ‘‘high risk’’ for screening and inspection to detect cargo that 

might contain weapons of mass destruction (WMD)? (3) To what extent is ATS implemented at seaports, including impact and challenges involved? (4) What is Customs’ plan for assessing system implementation and performance? 

Enhancement Options for Intermodal Freight Transportation 

Key Questions: (1) What are the current and emerging national challenges to 

freight mobility and what proposals have been put forth to address these issues? (2) 

To what extent do these current and emerging challenges exist at container ports 

and surrounding areas and to what extent do the proposals appear to have applicability to these locations? 

Social Security Administration’s Role in Verifying Identities for State’s Licensing of 

Drivers 

Key Questions: (1) What are states’ policies and practices for verifying the identity 

of driver’s license/ID card applicants and how might they more effectively use SSNs 

or other tools to verify identity? (2) How does SSA assist states in verifying SSNs 

for driver’s license/ID card applicants and how can SSA improve the verification 

service it provides? 

United States Coast Guard’s National Distress and Response ‘‘Rescue 21’’ System 

Modernization 

Key Questions: (1) What are the status, plans, and technical and programmatic 

risks associated with the National Distress and Response System (NDRS) Modernization Project? (2) How is the Coast Guard addressing concerns with the new 

NDRS, such as communication coverage gaps and the inability to pinpoint distressed boaters? (3) How will Coast Guard’s new homeland security role affect the 

NDRS project? 

58 

U.S. Border Radiation Detection 

Key Questions: (1) What is the status of Customs’ plan to install radiation detection equipment at U.S. border crossings? (2) What is the basis for the plan’s time 

frame? (3) What is Customs’ technical capability to implement the plan? (4) How 

well is Customs coordinating with other agencies in the area of radiation detection? 

(5) What are the results of Customs’ evaluations of radiation detection equipment 

and how are the evaluations being used? 

Airline Assistance Determination of Whether the $5 Billion Provided by P.L. 107–42 

Was Used to Compensate the Nation’s Major Air Carriers for Their Losses 

Stemming from the Events of Sept. 11, 2001 

Key Questions: (1) Was the $5 billion used only to compensate major air carriers 

for their uninsured losses incurred as a result of the terrorist attacks? (2) Were carriers reimbursed, per the act, only for increases in insurance premiums resulting 

from the attacks? 

Effectiveness of the Transportation Security Administration’s Research and 

Development Program 

Key Questions: (1) What is the budget profile for the Federal Aviation Administration’s and the Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA’s) aviation security research and development (R&D) program? (2) How effective is TSA’s strategy for determining which aviation security technologies to research and develop? (3) To what 

extent do stakeholders believe that TSA is researching and developing the most 

promising aviation security technologies? 

Federal Air Marshals 

Key Questions: (1) How has the FAM program evolved, in terms of recruiting, 

training, retention, and operations since the transfer of program management to 

TSA? (2) To what extent has TSA implemented the necessary internal controls to 

meet the human capital and operational challenges of the FAM program? (3) To 

what extent has TSA developed plans and initiatives to accommodate future FAM 

program sustainability, growth and maturation? 

RELATED GAO PRODUCTS

Transportation Security Reports and Testimonies 

Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Help Address Security Challenges, GAO–03–843 (Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2003). 

Transportation Security Research: Coordination Needed in Selecting and Implementing Infrastructure Vulnerability Assessments, GAO–03–502 (Washington, D.C.: 

May 1, 2003). 

Rail Safety and Security: Some Actions Already Taken to Enhance Rail Security, 

but Risk-based Plan Needed, GAO–03–435 (Washington, D.C.: April 30, 2003). 

Coast Guard: Challenges during the Transition to the Department of Homeland 

Security, GAO–03–594T (Washington, D.C.: April 1, 2003). 

Transportation Security: Post-September 11th Initiatives and Long-Term Challenges, GAO–03–616T (Washington, D.C.: April 1, 2003). 

Aviation Security: Measures Needed to Improve Security of Pilot Certification Process, GAO–03–248NI (Washington, D.C.: February 3, 2003). (Not for Public Dissemination) 

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Transportation, 

GAO–03–108 (Washington, D.C.: January 1, 2003). 

High Risk Series: Protecting Information Systems Supporting the Federal Government and the Nation’s Critical Infrastructure, GAO–03–121 (Washington, D.C.: January 1, 2003). 

Aviation Safety: Undeclared Air Shipments of Dangerous Goods and DOT’s Enforcement Approach, GAO–03–22 (Washington, D.C.: January 10, 2003). 

Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities and Potential Improvements for the Air Cargo 

System, GAO–03–344 (Washington, D.C.: December 20, 2002). 

Mass Transit: Federal Action Could Help Transit Agencies Address Security Challenges, GAO–03–263 (Washington, D.C.: December 13, 2002). 

Aviation Security: Registered Traveler Program Policy and Implementation Issues, 

GAO–03–253 (Washington, D.C.: November 22, 2002). 

59 

Computer Security: Progress Made, But Critical Federal Operations and Assets Remain at Risk, GAO–03–303T (Washington, D.C.: November 19, 2002). 

Container Security: Current Efforts to Detect Nuclear Materials, New Initiatives, 

and Challenges, GAO–03–297T (Washington, D.C.: November 18, 2002). 

Coast Guard: Strategy Needed for Setting and Monitoring Levels of Effort for All 

Missions, GAO–03–155 (Washington, D.C.: November 12, 2002). 

Mass Transit: Challenges in Securing Transit Systems, GAO–02–1075T (Washington, D.C.: September 18, 2002). 

Pipeline Safety and Security: Improved Workforce Planning and Communication 

Needed, GAO–02–785 (Washington, D.C.: August 26, 2002). 

Port Security: Nation Faces Formidable Challenges in Making New Initiatives 

Successful, GAO–02–993T (Washington, D.C.: August 5, 2002). 

Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Faces Immediate and 

Long-Term Challenges, GAO–02–971T (Washington, D.C.: July 25, 2002). 

Critical infrastructure Protection: Significant Challenges Need to Be Addressed, 

GAO–02–961T (Washington, D.C.: July 24, 2002). 

Combating Terrorism: Preliminary Observations on Weaknesses in Force Protection 

for DOD Deployments Through Domestic Seaports, GAO–02–955TNI (Washington, 

D.C.: July 23, 2002). (Not for Public Dissemination) 

Information Concerning the Arming of Commercial Pilots, GA0–02–822R (Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2002). 

Aviation Security: Deployment and Capabilities of Explosive Detection Equipment, 

GAO–02–713C (Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2002). (Classified) 

Coast Guard: Budget and Management Challenges for 2003 and Beyond, GAO–02– 

538T (Washington, D.C.: March 19, 2002). 

Aviation Security: Information on Vulnerabilities in the Nation’s Air Transportation System, GAO–01–1164T (Washington, D.C.: September 26, 2001). (Not for 

Public Dissemination) 

Aviation Security: Information on the Nation’s Air Transportation System 

Vulnerabilities, GAO–01–1174T (Washington, D.C.: September 26, 2001). (Not for 

Public Dissemination) 

Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities in, and Alternatives for, Preboard Screening Security Operations, GAO–01–1171T (Washington, D.C.: September 25, 2001). 

Aviation Security: Weaknesses in Airport Security and Options for Assigning 

Screening Responsibilities, GAO–01–1165T (Washington, D.C.: September 21, 2001). 

Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Illustrate Severe Weaknesses in Aviation Security, 

GAO–01–1166T (Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2001). 

Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Demonstrate Urgent Need to Improve Security at 

the Nation’s Airports, GAO–01–1162T (Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2001). 

Terrorism and Risk Management 

Homeland Security: Information Sharing Responsibilities, Challenges, and Key 

Management Issues, GAO–03–715T (Washington, D.C.: May 8, 2003). 

Transportation Security Administration: Actions and Plans to Build a Results-Oriented Culture, GAO–03–190 (Washington, D.C.: January 17, 2003). 

Homeland Security: Management Challenges Facing Federal Leadership, GAO– 

03–260 (Washington, D.C.: December 20, 2002). 

Homeland Security: Information Technology Funding and Associated Management 

Issues, GAO–03–250 (Washington, D.C.: December 13, 2002). 

Homeland Security: Information Sharing Activities Face Continued Management 

Challenges, GAO–02–1122T (Washington, D.C.: October 1, 2002). 

National Preparedness: Technology and Information Sharing Challenges, GAO– 

02–1048R (Washington, D.C.: August 30, 2002). 

Homeland Security: Effective Intergovernmental Coordination Is Key to Success, 

GAO–02–1013T (Washington, D.C.: August 23, 2002). 

60 

Critical Infrastructure Protection: Federal Efforts Require a More Coordinated and 

Comprehensive Approach for Protecting Information Systems, GAO–02–474 (Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2002). 

Critical Infrastructure Protection: Significant Homeland Security Challenges Need 

to Be Addressed, GAO–02–918T (Washington, D.C.: July 9, 2002). 

Homeland Security: Intergovernmental Coordination and Partnership Will Be Critical to Success, GAO–02–901T (Washington, D.C.: July 3, 2002). 

Homeland Security: New Department Could Improve Coordination but May Complicate Priority Setting, GAO–02–893T (Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2002). 

National Preparedness: Integrating New and Existing Technology and Information 

Sharing into an Effective Homeland Security Strategy, GAO–02–811T (Washington, 

D.C.: June 7, 2002). 

Homeland Security: Responsibility and Accountability for Achieving National 

Goals, GAO–02–627T (Washington, D.C.: April 11, 2002). 

National Preparedness: Integration of Federal, State, Local, and Private Sector Efforts is Critical to an Effective National Strategy for Homeland Security, GAO–02– 

621T (Washington, D.C.: April 11, 2002). 

Combating Terrorism: Intergovernmental Cooperation in the Development of a National Strategy to Enhance State and Local Preparedness, GAO–02–550T (Washington, D.C.: April 2, 2002). 

Combating Terrorism: Enhancing Partnerships Through a National Preparedness 

Strategy, GAO–02–549T (Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2002). 

Combating Terrorism: Critical Components of a National Strategy to Enhance 

State and Local Preparedness, GAO–02–548T (Washington, D.C.: March 25, 2002). 

Combating Terrorism: Intergovernmental Partnership in a National Strategy to 

Enhance State and Local Preparedness, GAO–02–547T (Washington, D.C.: March 

22, 2002). 

Homeland Security: Progress Made; More Direction and Partnership Sought, 

GAO–02–490T (Washington, D.C.: March 12, 2002). 

Combating Terrorism: Key Aspects of a National Strategy to Enhance State and 

Local Preparedness, GAO–02–473T (Washington, D.C.: March 1, 2002). 

Homeland Security: Challenges and Strategies in Addressing Short-and LongTerm National Needs, GAO–02–160T (Washington, D.C.: November 7, 2001). 

Homeland Security: A Risk Management Approach Can Guide Preparedness Efforts, GAO–02–208T (Washington, D.C.: October 31, 2001). 

Combating Terrorism: Considerations for Investing Resources in Chemical and Biological Preparedness, GAO–02–162T (Washington, D.C.: October 17, 2001). 

Information Sharing: Practices That Can Benefit Critical Infrastructure Protection, 

GAO–02–24 (Washington, D.C.: October 15, 2001). 

Homeland Security: Key Elements of a Risk Management Approach, GAO–02– 

150T (Washington, D.C.: October 12, 2001). 

Chemical and Biological Defense: Improved Risk Assessment and Inventory Management Are Needed, GAO–01–667 (Washington, D.C.: September 28, 2001). 

Critical Infrastructure Protection: Significant Challenges in Safeguarding Government and Privately Controlled Systems from Computer-Based Attacks, GAO–01– 

1168T (Washington, D.C.: September 26, 2001). 

Homeland Security: A Framework for Addressing the Nation’s Efforts, GAO–01– 

1158T (Washington, D.C.: September 21, 2001). 

Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related Recommendations, GAO– 

01–822 (Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2001). 

61 

Senator LOTT [presiding]. Mr. Dillingham and Ms. Wrightson, I 

believe you’re just with Mr. Guerrero for possible questions later 

on. Thank you very much for being here. 

[The prepared statements of Ms. Wrightson and Mr. Dillingham 

follow:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MARGARET WRIGHTSON, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY

AND JUSTICE ISSUES, UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE

PROGRESS MADE IN IMPLEMENTING MARITIME TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ACT, BUT

CONCERNS REMAIN

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: 

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the implementation of the Maritime 

Transportation Security Act (MTSA) of 2002. This sweeping piece of legislation was 

enacted just 10 months ago, but it has already produced major changes in the Nation’s approach to maritime security. At your request, we have begun reviewing the 

implementation of security provisions of Title I of MTSA. I am here today to tell 

you about our preliminary findings and what agencies within the Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS) and other Federal departments are doing to fulfill their 

many responsibilities under the act. I also want to advise you about specific matters 

that agency officials or others have brought to our attention thus far and other 

issues that may require further oversight. We will be continuing our efforts to more 

fully evaluate a number of the issues I will address today, and we plan to issue a 

report when this work is complete. 

Our information is based on interviews with agency officials charged with implementing MTSA’s provisions, as well as with officials and stakeholders from several 

ports. 

Our preliminary findings are as follows: 

• Progress has been made in implementing MTSA. MTSA called for actions in 46 

key areas we identified, such as creating a maritime intelligence security system, assessing security conditions in port areas, creating and implementing a 

vessel tracking system, and creating identification systems for port workers and 

seafarers. So far, we have obtained information for 43 of these areas, and agency officials indicate that actions are complete or under way in 42 of them. For 

example, the Coast Guard, which had lead responsibility for most of the assignments, has six interim rules in place covering major areas of responsibility, 

such as security in and around the ports, aboard individual vessels, and at individual facilities. All six Coast Guard Maritime Safety and Security Teams included in the Fiscal Year 2003 budget are expected to be operational by the end 

of September 2003; these teams are designed to provide increased protection 

against terrorism in and around the Nation’s harbors. Also, the Transportation 

Security Administration (TSA) is testing new identification cards for controlling 

access to secure transportation facilities, including vessels and port facilities. 

The agency plans to start issuing the cards to millions of port workers in 2004. 

The Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (BCBP) and the Maritime Administration (MARAD), the two other agencies with the largest set of responsibilities under MTSA, also are making progress on major projects. Agency officials told us that cooperation and coordination on MTSA implementation has 

been strong. Further work will be needed to determine the extent to which early 

progress will be sustained over the course of implementation efforts and whether the spirit of cooperation translates into efforts at the port level. 

• These findings not withstanding and bearing in mind our caveats as to the preliminary nature of these results, five areas have surfaced as potentially requiring further attention. (See table 1.) 

62 

Table 1.—Summary of Areas That Require Further Attention 

Area Description 

Security-related matters 

Vessel identification system A system has been developed and is being implemented, but the shorebased infrastructure needed is not present at many U.S. ports. As a result, 

the system may not be in place at these ports for several years. 

Port security assessments Assessments being conducted by an outside contractor have been criticized 

for their scope and quality, and the contractor has attempted to move to 

the next phase of the work before evaluating essons learned. 

Vessel security plans Concerns have been raised about the Coast Guard’s plan to accept other 

countries’ certification of vessel security plans. 

Operational and efficiency matters 

Maritime intelligence system Coast Guard and Transportation Security Administration may be duplicating efforts in collecting intelligence information about vessels and cargoes. 

Grants program A MTSA-required program of grants for assisting in security preparations 

is being folded into an existing grants program, affecting the application of 

MTSA grant requirements. 

Source: GAO. 

Three of these areas, as shown in table 1, primarily have security implications. 

For example, MTSA called for development of an automatic identification system. 

The Coast Guard developed a system that would allow port officials and personnel 

on other vessels to determine the identity and position of vessels entering or operating within the port. While the Coast Guard is implementing this system, more 

than half of the 25 busiest U.S. ports will not have it for the foreseeable future, because it requires extensive shore-based equipment and infrastructure that many 

ports do not have. The two remaining areas relate primarily to operational or efficiency matters, such as duplication of effort in collecting intelligence information. 

We are continuing to examine all five areas. 

Background 

MTSA was landmark legislation that mandated a quantum leap in security preparedness for America’s maritime ports. Prior to the terrorist attacks of 

September 11, 2001, Federal attention at ports tended to focus on navigation and 

safety issues, such as dredging channels and environmental protection. While the 

terrorist attacks initially focused the Nation’s attention on the vulnerability of its 

aviation system, it did not take long for attention to fall on the Nation’s ports as 

well. Besides being gateways through which dangerous materials could enter the 

country, ports represent attractive targets for other reasons: they are often large 

and sprawling, accessible by water and land, close to crowded metropolitan centers, 

and interwoven with highways, roads, factories, and businesses. Security is made 

more difficult by the many stakeholders, public and private, involved in port operations. These stakeholders include local, state, and Federal agencies; multiple law 

enforcement jurisdictions; transportation and trade companies; and factories and 

other businesses. 

Passed in November 2002, MTSA imposed an ambitious schedule of requirements 

on a number of Federal agencies. MTSA called for a comprehensive security framework—one that included planning, personnel security, and careful monitoring of vessels and cargo. (See table 2 for examples of key MTSA activities.) MTSA tasked the 

Secretary of DHS, and the Secretary in turn has tasked the Coast Guard, with lead 

responsibility for the majority of its requirements. Timetables were often daunting. 

For example, one of the Coast Guard’s responsibilities was to develop six interim 

final rules implementing MTSA’s operational provisions in sufficient time to receive 

public comment and to issue a final rule by November 25, 2003. 

63 

1Work has not yet begun on issuing a report to the Congress regarding MARAD’s expenditure 

of funds for training—no funds were expended in Fiscal Year 2003. 

Table 2.—Examples of Key MTSA Activities 

Type of activity Specific provision 

Planning 

Conduct vessel, facility, and port vulnerability assessments to determine 

potential risks. 

Develop transportation security plans for vessels, facilities, port areas, and 

the Nation. 

Develop security incident response plans for vessels and facilities. 

Assess foreign ports for security risk. 

Identification of personnel 

Create security cards required of any person seeking to enter a secure area 

of a vessel or facility; cards would have biometric information (such as fingerprint data) to guard against theft or counterfeiting. 

Tracking of vessels 

Install automatic identification systems on numerous categories of vessels. 

Authorized to create and implement a long-range vessel tracking system. 

Source: GAO. 

Adding to the difficulty has been the need to implement MTSA against the backdrop of the most extensive Federal reorganization in over a half-century. Most of 

the agencies with MTSA responsibilities were reorganized into the Department of 

Homeland Security in March 2003, less than 5 months after MTSA enactment. 

Among the 22 agencies in the new department were some relatively new organizations, such as TSA. Other more longstanding agencies, including the Coast Guard, 

U.S. Customs Service, and Immigration and Naturalization Service, were transferred from a variety of executive departments. This vast recombination of organizational cultures introduced new chains of command and reporting responsibilities. 

MTSA implementation also involved coordination with other executive agencies, including the Departments of State, Transportation, and Justice. 

Progress Has Been Made in Implementing MTSA 

Since the passage of MTSA in 2002 the responsible agencies—primarily the Coast 

Guard, TSA, and BCBP in DHS, along with MARAD in the Department of Transportation—have made strides in implementing the act’s security provisions. MTSA 

called for actions in 46 key areas we identified. Thus far, we have received information from the responsible agencies on 43 of these areas. Of the 43 areas, work is 

done in 2 (issuing interim rules and developing training for maritime security personnel), and under way in 40 others.1 These agencies also reported that cooperation 

and coordination has been extensive throughout the course of their activities. 

A major achievement has been the Coast Guard’s publication on July 1, 2003, of 

six interim rules on the provisions where it had lead responsibility. The rules set 

requirements for many of the provisions delegated to the Coast Guard under MTSA. 

The rules, which included sections on national maritime security initiatives, area 

maritime security, vessel security, facility security, outer continental shelf facility 

security, and automatic identification systems, were published approximately 8 

months after MTSA was enacted. Doing so kept the Coast Guard on schedule for 

meeting MTSA’s requirement to receive public comment and issue the final rules 

by the end of November 2003. The rules provided a comprehensive description of 

industry-related maritime security requirements and the cost-benefit assessments of 

the entire set of rules. The Coast Guard plans to publish the final rules before November 25, 2003, after receiving and acting on comments to the interim rules. 

Another Coast Guard accomplishment was the establishment of Maritime Safety 

and Security Teams called for under MTSA. These teams, which can be rapidly deployed where needed, are designed to provide antiterrorism protection for strategic 

shipping, high-interest vessels, and critical infrastructure. The Coast Guard has already deployed four teams—in Seattle and Galveston and near Norfolk and Los AnVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:02 Nov 21, 2014 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00067 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\91310.TXT JACKIE
64 

2 Biometric refers to technologies that can be used to verify a person’s identity by characteristics such as fingerprints, eye retinas, and voice. 

geles. The Coast Guard will deploy teams in New York City and near Jacksonville 

this year, and six more teams have been requested in the president’s budget in 

2004. These are to be located in San Diego, Honolulu, Boston, San Francisco, New 

Orleans, and Miami. 

Other agencies in DHS have also made progress in their implementation of MTSA 

provisions. Responding to MTSA’s requirement for the development of biometric 2

transportation security identification cards that would allow only authorized persons 

access to secure areas of vessels or facilities, TSA is currently testing several different technology credentialing systems on sample cards. The agency will begin testing prototypes of the entire security card process, including conducting background 

checks, collecting biometric information on workers, verifying cardholders’ identities, 

and issuing cards in early 2004. TSA plans to start issuing about 5 to 6 million new 

cards per year in the middle of 2004. Developing all of the policies and programs 

to make this system work is still under way and will continue to pose challenges 

to continued progress. Another DHS agency, BCBP, was delegated the responsibility 

for issuing regulations for electronic transmission of cargo information to BCBP by 

October 1, 2003; BCBP published its proposed rule on July 23, 2003. BCBP was 

waiting for comments on the proposed rule, and BCBP officials told us that they 

expect to publish the rule on time. 

MARAD has also made progress in its requirements. Among the provisions for 

which MARAD is responsible are developing standards and curricula for the training of maritime security personnel. MARAD submitted a Report to Congress, dated 

May 2003, containing the standards and curriculum called for by MTSA in the form 

of model course frameworks for seven categories of maritime security professionals. 

As an extension of the MTSA project, MARAD also produced three model maritime 

security courses for the International Maritime Organization (IMO). An IMO validation team has reviewed drafts of these courses, which found little need for change. 

Agency officials told us that cooperation and coordination on MTSA implementation has been strong. Coast Guard officials said that they had developed channels 

of communication with other relevant agencies, and they said these other agencies 

were supportive in implementing provisions for which they did not have primary responsibility. In the work we have conducted at ports since the September 11 attacks, we have noted an increasing level of cooperation and coordination at the port 

level. However, ensuring smooth coordination as the many aspects of MTSA implementation continue is a considerable challenge. Additional work will be needed to 

determine the extent to which this spirit of cooperation continues to be translated 

into effective actions at the level where programs must be implemented. 

Issues Raised Include Both Security and Operational Concerns 

While progress is being made, our preliminary work has identified five areas that 

merit attention and further oversight. Three relate primarily to security issues: (1) 

the limited number of ports that will be covered by the vessel identification system, 

(2) questions about the scope and quality of port security assessments, and (3) the 

Coast Guard’s plans not to individually approve security plans for foreign vessels. 

The remaining two relate primarily to operational and efficiency matters: (1) potential duplication of maritime intelligence efforts and (2) inconsistency with Port Security Grant Program requirements. 

Vessel Identification System Will Cover a Limited Number of Ports 

The main security-related issue involves the implementation of a vessel identification system. MTSA called for the development of an automatic identification system. 

Coast Guard implementation calls for a system that would allow port officials and 

other vessels to determine the identity and position of vessels entering or operating 

within the harbor area. Such a system would provide an ‘‘early warning’’ of an unidentified vessel or a vessel that was in a location where it should not be. To implement the system effectively, however, requires considerable land-based equipment 

and other infrastructure that is not currently available in many ports. As a result, 

for the foreseeable future, the system will be available in less than half of the 25 

busiest U.S. ports. 

The identification system, called the Automatic Identification System (AIS), uses 

a device aboard a vessel to transmit a unique identifying signal to a receiver located 

at the port and to other ships in the area. This information gives port officials and 

other vessels nearly instantaneous information about a vessel’s identity, position, 

65 

3 All vessels of certain specifications on international voyages; self-propelled commercial vessels 65 feet or more in length; towing vessels 26 feet or more in length and more than 600 horsepower; vessels of 100 gross tons or more carrying one or more passengers for hire; and passenger 

vessels certificated to carry 50 or more passengers for hire. 4These locations are New York/New Jersey; the mouth of the Mississippi River; New Orleans; 

Houston/Galveston; Port Arthur, Texas; Los Angeles/Long Beach; San Francisco; Seattle/Tacoma; Alaska’s Prince William Sound; and Sault Ste. Marie, Michigan. 5 Under Coast Guard rules, all vessels arriving from foreign ports must inform a U.S. port, 

at least 96 hours in advance, of its intent to enter the harbor. Ports without AIS will still have 

this notice; what they will lack is the ability to verify ships’ identities electronically when they 

arrive, or to quickly identify ships that are attempting to arrive unidentified. 

speed, and course. MTSA requires that vessels in certain categories 3 install tracking equipment between January 1, 2003, and December 31, 2004, with the specific 

date dependent on the type of vessel and when it was built. 

The only ports with the necessary infrastructure to use AIS are those that have 

waterways controlled by Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) systems. Similar to air traffic 

control systems, VTS uses radar, closed circuit television, radiophones, and other 

technology to allow monitoring and management of vessel traffic from a central 

shore-based location. The Coast Guard currently plans to install AIS receiving 

equipment at the 10 locations with VTS systems.4 More than half of the 25 busiest 

ports, such as Philadelphia, Baltimore, Miami, Charleston, Tampa, and Honolulu, 

do not have VTS systems; hence, AIS will be inoperable at these locations for the 

foreseeable future. When AIS will be operable at these other ports depends heavily 

on how soon the Coast Guard can put an extensive amount of shore-based infrastructure in place. For the present, the Coast Guard is requiring AIS equipment 

only for (1) vessels on international voyages and (2) vessels navigating waterways 

under VTS control. Some of these international ships will be calling on ports that 

will not have AIS equipment. In such cases, the transmitters aboard the vessels will 

be of no use for the ports, because they will not have equipment to receive the signals.5

Cost is a major factor in the full implementation of AIS. Expanding coverage will 

require substantial additional investment, both public and private. The Coast 

Guard’s budget request for Fiscal Year 2004 includes $40 million for shore-based 

AIS equipment and related infrastructure—an amount that covers only current VTS 

areas. According to a Coast Guard official, wider-reaching national implementation 

of AIS would involve installation and training costs ranging from $62 million to 

$120 million. Also, the cost of installing AIS equipment aboard individual ships 

averages about $10,000 per vessel, which is to be borne by the vessel owner or operator. Some owners and operators, particularly of domestic vessels, have complained 

about the cost of equipping their vessels. 

Concerns about Port Security Assessments 

Another security-related issue involves the Coast Guard’s efforts to address 

MTSA’s security planning requirements through a series of security assessments of 

individual ports. Security assessments are intended to be in-depth examinations of 

security threats, vulnerabilities, consequences, and conditions throughout a port, including not just transportation facilities, but also factories and other installations 

that pose potential security risks. The Coast Guard had begun these assessments 

before MTSA was passed and decided to continue the process, changing it as needed 

to meet MTSA planning requirements, which include developing area security plans 

based on the evaluation of specific facilities throughout the port. At the request of 

the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, House Committee 

on Transportation and Infrastructure, we have been examining these assessments, 

which are being conducted by an outside contractor. Our preliminary work has surfaced several potential concerns, which we are still in the process of reviewing. 

One concern involves an apparent truncation of the review process for ensuring 

that the assessment methodology will deliver what MTSA requires. When MTSA 

took effect, the outside contractor already completed the first 10 of 55 planned assessments. The Coast Guard directed the contractor to modify the assessment methodology to take MTSA’s planning requirements into account, and it decided that the 

next two assessments would be a pilot test of the revised methodology. The Coast 

Guard plans to use the pilot test to evaluate lessons learned, so that additional 

modifications can be made before any further contracts are signed. 

Instead of waiting to see what changes might be needed as a result of the pilot 

projects, however, the contractor has apparently started the scoping phase for the 

next six port assessments. Scoping is a significant part of the new methodology, and 

as such, it is a major determinant in the nature and breadth of the issues to be 

addressed, as well as the assessment’s cost. The contractor has also reportedly 

66 

6This code was ratified by the International Maritime Organization, to which the United 

States is a party. 

sought to negotiate and sign contracts to review the next six ports. Since the pilot 

projects will not be completed until at least October 2003, it seems premature to 

reach decisions about the scope of the assessments and sign contracts for them. The 

revised methodology needs to be reviewed so that any needed changes are reflected 

in the next contract. 

A second concern that has surfaced involves the scope and quality of the assessments themselves. As part of our work, we have interviewed port stakeholders to 

obtain their views on the process. At one port, where the assessment has been completed and the report issued, stakeholders said they had not been given an opportunity to comment on the report, which contained factual errors and did not include 

an assessment of railroads and the local power generating plant. At the other port, 

where the assessment was still in process, local Coast Guard personnel and port 

stakeholders noted that a survey instrument referred to the wrong port, asked questions they regarded as not pertaining to security, and was conducted in ways that 

raised concerns about credibility. Many of these stakeholders saw little usefulness 

in the assessments, believing that they added little to what the stakeholders had 

already learned from conducting their own more extensive security reviews of individual facilities or installations. They said the assessments focused on the same systems that had already been reviewed and would have greater value if they were focused on matters that had not already been thoroughly studied, such as the potential for waterborne assault. Coast Guard officials at the two ports said, however, 

that in their view the assessments would provide such benefits as a more comprehensive perspective on port operations and vulnerabilities and validate their 

need for additional assets and people to provide adequate security. Ensuring that 

the assessments are of high quality is important not only for their effectiveness as 

security instruments, but also because of their cost. For the most part, assessments 

have been conducted only at medium-sized ports, and even there they are costing 

$1 million or more per assessment. 

Coast Guard Not Intending to Individually Approve Security Plans for Foreign Vessels 

Concerns have been raised about the proposed approach for meeting MTSA’s requirement that the Secretary of DHS approve vessel security plans for all vessels 

operating in U.S. waters. Vessel security plans include taking such steps as responding to assessed vulnerabilities, designating security officers, conducting training and drills, and ensuring that appropriate preventive measures will be taken 

against security incidents. To implement this MTSA requirement the Coast Guard 

has stated, in general, that it is not the Coast Guard’s intent to individually approve 

vessel security plans for foreign vessels. Separate from MTSA, an international 

agreement requires vessels to carry on board a vessel security plan that is approved 

by the vessel’s country of registry—its ‘‘flag’’ state—to ensure that an acceptable security plan is in place. The Coast Guard provides that it will deem a flag state approval of a vessel security plan to constitute the MTSA-required Secretary approval 

of MTSA vessel security plans. However, MTSA does not mention any role for foreign nations in the Secretary’s required approval of vessel security plans, and some 

concerns have been raised about the advisability of allowing flag states—some with 

a history of lax regulation—to ensure the security of vessels traveling to the United 

States. 

The international requirement for a security plan is contained in the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code.6 Under this requirement, 

which was adopted about the same time that MTSA was enacted and will go into 

effect on July 1, 2004, the vessel’s flag state is responsible for reviewing and certifying the vessel’s security plan. Prior to this time, the vessels’ flag state had already 

been responsible for ensuring that its vessels met safety requirements. Critics of 

using this approach for MTSA-required security plans have pointed out that in the 

past, some flag states had a spotty record of enforcing safety requirements. 

Rather than individually approving security plans for vessels overseen by foreign 

flag states, the Coast Guard plans an extensive monitoring effort as part of its oversight of vessels bound for U.S. waters. However, the Coast Guard’s interim rule 

stated that, as part of an aggressive port state control program, the Coast Guard 

would verify that foreign vessels have an approved, fully implemented security plan, 

as well as tracking the performance of owners, operators, flag administrations, charters, and port facilities. Coast Guard officials have said that they are working from 

existing procedures, in that their security effort is modeled after their safety proVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:02 Nov 21, 2014 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00070 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\91310.TXT JACKIE
67 

gram. They also said, however, that they have no contingency plans in case stronger 

measures than those called for in their current plans are required. 

The concerns are limited mainly to foreign flag vessels. Vessels registered in the 

United States will have their security plans reviewed and approved by the Coast 

Guard. It has been reported that the Coast Guard estimates that review and approval of security plans for domestic vessels and facilities will require 150 full-time 

personnel and cost $70 million as part of its 2004 budget. 

Potential Duplication of Maritime Intelligence Efforts 

Turning to issues that are related more to program efficiency and management 

than to security concerns, one issue that has arisen involves potential duplication 

in the area of maritime intelligence. MTSA required the Secretary of Homeland Security to implement a system to collect, integrate, and analyze information on vessels operating on or bound for U.S. waters. The Secretary of DHS in turn delegated 

responsibilities to TSA and the Coast Guard. There appears to be potential for duplication by TSA and the Coast Guard in these efforts. 

The duplication concerns center on the new Integrated Maritime Information System (IMIS) required under the Secretary’s delegations. The Secretary of DHS delegated primary responsibility for this system to TSA, and TSA was appropriated $25 

million to develop it. Coast Guard officials have voiced concerns that TSA’s efforts 

in developing the overall system are duplicating existing Coast Guard efforts that 

are more extensive and better funded. According to these officials, IMIS is very 

similar to the Coast Guard’s Intelligence Coordination Center (ICC) Coastwatch program, an effort that has 10 times the amount of funding appropriated for IMIS, involves 100 more staff members, and has staff already in place with considerable intelligence analysis capability. Coast Guard officials questioned whether TSA’s smaller effort could yield information of similar quality. 

Coast Guard officials also expressed concerns about potential duplication of effort 

at the port level. TSA’s tests of the system would place TSA personnel at the port 

level. Coast Guard personnel noted that these efforts seemed similar to the Coast 

Guard’s Field Intelligence Support Teams, as well as teams from the legacy agencies, the Customs Service and the Immigration and Naturalization Service, that also 

operate at the port level. Coast Guard officials said that they saw little sharing of 

the intelligence at that level. 

While we have not yet had the opportunity to observe the intelligence arms of 

TSA and the Coast Guard in action to more fully evaluate the potential for duplication of effort, it does appear that some potential duplication exists. From conversations with TSA and Coast Guard officials, we could discern little difference in a 

number of their information and integration efforts. Aside from potential inefficient 

use of resources, this possible duplication may also limit either agency from obtaining a complete intelligence picture and detecting potential threats. 

Differences between Current TSA Grant Program and MTSA Grant Requirements 

The final issue involves TSA’s implementation of MTSA’s grant program. MTSA 

required the Secretary of Transportation to establish a program of grants to ports 

and other entities to implement area and facility-specific security plans. Prior to the 

enactment of MTSA, TSA, in partnership with MARAD and the Coast Guard, already had begun a port security grant program in February 2002. This program was 

originally intended to fund security assessments and enhanced operational security 

at ports and facilities, and two rounds of grants were funded before MTSA was enacted in November 2002. TSA officials told us that, rather than creating a new 

grant program to specifically respond to MTSA, they are adapting the existing program to meet MTSA requirements. Under this approach, some time will elapse before all of the grant requirements specified under MTSA are in place. 

The existing grant program differs from MTSA requirements in several respects. 

Most significantly, the existing grant program does not require cost-sharing, while 

MTSA does. MTSA grant provisions state that for projects costing more than 

$25,000, Federal funds for any eligible project shall not exceed 75 percent of the 

total cost. A TSA official said that, in starting to fold MTSA grants into the existing 

program for the third round of grants, TSA was still disbursing monies from a prior 

appropriation, and the language of that legislation limited its ability to make 

changes that would meet MTSA requirements. As a result, TSA encouraged costsharing but did not require it. While TSA limited its changes for the first three 

rounds of grants, in the future continued deviation from MTSA cost-sharing requirements would keep Federal dollars from reaching as many projects as possible. By 

not requiring a grantee to share in the financial burden, TSA does not take into 

account the applicant’s ability to participate in the funding. If applicants have such 

68 

7MTSA contains provisions for waiving the cost-sharing requirement if a higher level of Federal funding is required. 

ability, the result is that available Federal dollars are not effectively leveraging as 

many projects as possible.7

There are two additional areas where TSA’s current grant program differs from 

MTSA provisions. First, the current grant program does not specifically correspond 

to the stated purpose of MTSA’s grant funding, which is to implement area and facility-specific security plans. TSA officials told us that in round three, they would 

give preference to regulated facilities and vessels that were already required to have 

security assessments and plans in place. As a result, the grants would likely be for 

mitigating identified vulnerabilities rather than developing plans. Second, in the application instructions for the current program, TSA said that recurring costs for personnel and operations and maintenance costs were not eligible for funding. MTSA 

specifically includes these costs. 

TSA officials said that for later rounds of grants during Fiscal Year 2004, they 

would discuss potential changes in the Port Security Grant Program with the Coast 

Guard and MARAD. These potential changes would include requiring that all grant 

proposals be designed to meet MTSA port security grant requirements. The officials 

said, however, that before making any changes, they would look for specific directions accompanying currently pending appropriations for Fiscal Year 2004. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to answer any questions that you or other members of the Committee may have. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GERALD L. DILLINGHAM, DIRECTOR, CIVIL AVIATION

ISSUES, UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE

PROGRESS SINCE SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, AND THE CHALLENGES AHEAD

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: 

In the 2 years since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the security of 

our Nation’s civil aviation system has assumed renewed urgency, and efforts to 

strengthen aviation security have received a great deal of congressional attention. 

On November 19, 2001, the Congress enacted the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), which created the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) 

within the Department of Transportation (DOT) and defined its primary responsibility as ensuring security in aviation as well as in other modes of transportation. 

The act set forth specific improvements to aviation security for TSA to implement 

and established deadlines for completing many of them. The Homeland Security Act, 

passed on November 25, 2002, transferred TSA to the new Department of Homeland 

Security, which assumed overall responsibility for aviation security. 

My testimony today addresses the (1) progress that has been made since September 11 to strengthen aviation security, (2) potential vulnerabilities that remain, 

and (3) longer-term management and organizational challenges to sustaining enhanced aviation security. The testimony is based on our prior work, our review of 

recent literature, and discussions with aviation industry representatives and TSA. 

In summary: 

Since September 2001, TSA has made considerable progress in meeting congressional mandates related to aviation security, thereby increasing aviation security. 

For example, by the end of December 2002, the agency had hired and deployed a 

workforce of about 65,000, including passenger and baggage screeners and Federal 

air marshals, and it was using explosives detection equipment to screen about 90 

percent of all checked baggage. In addition, TSA has initiated several programs and 

research and development efforts that focus on the use of technology and information to advance security. For example, the agency is developing the Transportation 

Workers Identification Card program to provide a nationwide standard credential 

for airport workers that is issued after a background check has been completed and 

biometric indicators have been incorporated so that each worker can be positively 

matched to his or her credential. TSA is also developing the next-generation Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS II), which would use national security and commercial databases to assess the risk posed by passengers and 

identify some passengers for additional screening before they board their flights. 

These uses of technology and information—particularly CAPPS II—have raised 

some concerns about privacy rights that will need to be addressed as these programs move toward implementation. 

69 

Although TSA has focused much effort and funding on ensuring that bombs and 

other threat items are not carried onto planes by passengers or in their luggage, 

vulnerabilities remain in areas such as air cargo security, general aviation security, 

and airport perimeter security. For example, air cargo is vulnerable because very 

little of the estimated 12.5 million tons transported each year on all-cargo and passenger planes is physically screened for explosives. As a result, a potential security 

risk is the introduction of explosive and incendiary devices in cargo placed aboard 

aircraft. We have recommended in prior work that TSA use a risk management approach to prioritize actions and funding as it works with industry to determine the 

next steps in strengthening air cargo security, and industry stakeholders have suggested the application of such an approach to general aviation security. 

TSA faces longer-term management and organizational challenges to sustaining 

enhanced aviation security that include: (1) developing and implementing a comprehensive risk management approach, (2) paying for increased aviation security 

needs and controlling costs, (3) establishing effective coordination among the many 

public and private entities involved in aviation security, (4) strategically managing 

its workforce and ensuring appropriate staffing levels, and (5) building a results-oriented culture as it shifts its aviation security and other functions to the Department 

of Homeland Security. We have issued reports and made recommendations that address many of these challenges, and some actions are under way. In addition, we 

have studies in progress on some of these issues. 

Background 

Before September 2001, we and others had demonstrated significant, long-standing vulnerabilities in aviation security, some of which are depicted in figure 1. These 

included weaknesses in screening passengers and baggage, controlling access to secure areas at airports, and protecting air traffic control computer systems and facilities. To address these and other weaknesses, ATSA created the Transportation Security Administration and established security requirements for the new agency 

with mandated deadlines. 


909GDILL1.eps
70 

1 U.S. General Accounting Office, Aviation Security: Long-Standing Problems Impair Airport 

Screeners’ Performance, GAO/RCED–00–75 (Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2000) and U.S. General 

Accounting Office, Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Illustrate Severe Weaknesses in Aviation Security, GAO–01–1166T (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 20, 2001). 2 U.S. General Accounting Office, Security: Breaches at Federal Agencies and Airports, GAO– 

OSI–0010 (Washington, D.C.: May 25, 2000). 

Source: GAO. 

Civil Aviation Was Vulnerable before September 11, 2001 

Before September 2001, screeners, who were then hired by the airlines, often 

failed to detect threat objects located on passengers or in their carry-on luggage. 

Principal causes of screeners’ performance problems were rapid turnover and insufficient training. As we previously reported, turnover rates exceeded 100 percent a 

year at most large airports, leaving few skilled and experienced screeners, primarily 

because of low wages, limited benefits, and repetitive, monotonous work.1

In addition, before September 2001, controls for limiting access to secure areas of 

airports, including aircraft, did not always work as intended. As we reported in May 

2000, our special agents used fictitious law enforcement badges and credentials to 

gain access to secure areas, bypass security checkpoints at two airports, and walk 

unescorted to aircraft departure gates.2 The agents, who had been issued tickets 

and boarding passes, could have carried weapons, explosives, or other dangerous objects onto aircraft. DOT’s Inspector General also documented numerous problems 

with airport access controls, and in one series of tests, nearly 7 out of every 10 attempts by the Inspector General’s staff to gain access to secure areas were successful. Upon entering the secure areas, the Inspector General’s staff boarded aircraft 

117 times. The Inspector General further reported that the majority of the aircraft 


909GDILL2.eps
71 

3 U.S. General Accounting Office, Aviation Security: Weak Computer Security Practices Jeopardize Flight Safety, GAO/AIMD–98–155 (Washington, D.C.: May 18, 1998); Computer Security: 

FAA Needs to Improve Controls over Use of Foreign Nationals to Remediate and Review Software, GAO/AIMD–00–55 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 23, 1999); Computer Security: FAA Is Addressing Personnel Weaknesses, but Further Action Is Required, GAO/AIMD–00–169 (Washington, 

D.C.: May 31, 2000); FAA Computer Security: Concerns Remain Due to Personnel and Other 

Continuing Weaknesses, GAO/AIMD–00–252 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 16, 2000); and FAA Computer Security: Recommendations to Address Continuing Weaknesses, GAO–01–171 (Washington, 

D.C.: Dec. 6, 2000). 

boardings would not have occurred if employees had taken the prescribed steps, 

such as making sure doors closed behind them. 

Our reviews also found that the security of the air traffic control computer systems and of the facilities that house them had not been ensured.3 The 

vulnerabilities we identified, such as not ensuring that contractors who had access 

to the air traffic control computer systems had undergone background checks, made 

the air traffic control system susceptible to intrusion and malicious attacks. The air 

traffic control computer systems provide information to air traffic controllers and 

aircraft flight crews to help ensure the safe and expeditious movement of aircraft. 

Failure to protect these systems and their facilities could cause a nationwide disruption of air traffic or even collisions and loss of life. 

Over the years, we made numerous recommendations to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), which, until ATSA’s enactment, was responsible for aviation security. These recommendations were designed to improve screeners’ performance, 

strengthen airport access controls, and better protect air traffic control computer 

systems and facilities. As of September 2001, FAA had implemented some of these 

recommendations and was addressing others, but its progress was often slow. In addition, many initiatives were not linked to specific deadlines, making it difficult to 

monitor and oversee their implementation. 

Legislation Transferred Most Aviation Security Responsibilities to TSA 

ATSA defined TSA’s primary responsibility as ensuring security in all modes of 

transportation. The Act also shifted security-screening responsibilities from the airlines to TSA and established a series of requirements to strengthen aviation security, many of them with mandated implementation deadlines. For example, the act 

required the deployment of Federal screeners at 429 commercial airports across the 

Nation by November 19, 2002, and the use of explosives detection technology at 

these airports to screen every piece of checked baggage for explosives not later than 

December 31, 2002. However, the Homeland Security Act subsequently allowed TSA 

to grant waivers of up to 1 year to airports that would not be able to meet the December deadline. 

Some aviation security responsibilities remained with FAA. For example, FAA is 

responsible for the security of its air traffic control and other computer systems and 

of its air traffic control facilities. FAA also administers the Airport Improvement 

Program (AIP) trust fund, which is used to fund capital improvements to airports, 

including some security enhancements, such as terminal modifications to accommodate explosives detection equipment. 

Since September 2001, Multiple Initiatives Have Increased Aviation 

Security 

Over the past 2 years, TSA and FAA have taken major steps to increase aviation 

security. TSA has implemented congressional mandates and explored options for increasing the use of technology and information to control access to secure areas of 

airports and to improve passenger screening. FAA has focused its efforts on enhancing the security of the Nation’s air traffic control systems and facilities. In ongoing 

work, we are examining some of these efforts in more detail (see app. IV). 

TSA Met Many Aviation Security Mandates but Encountered Some Difficulties 

In its first year, TSA worked to establish its organization and focused primarily 

on meeting the aviation security deadlines set forth in ATSA, accomplishing a large 

number of tasks under a very ambitious schedule. In January 2002, TSA had 13 

employees—1 year later, the agency had about 65,000 employees. TSA reported that 

it met over 30 deadlines during 2002 to improve aviation security. (See app. I for 

the status of mandates in ATSA.) For example, according to TSA, it: 

• met the November 2002 deadline to deploy Federal passenger screeners at airports across the Nation by hiring, training, and deploying over 40,000 individuals to screen passengers at 429 commercial airports (see fig. 2); 

• hired and deployed more than 20,000 individuals to screen all checked baggage; 

72 

4 Explosives detection machines are used to screen baggage for explosives and work by using 

CAT scan X-ray technology to take fundamental measurements of materials in bags to recognize 

characteristic signatures of threat explosives. Explosives trace detection systems (trace detection 

machines) are used to screen baggage for explosives, and work by detecting vapors and residues 

of explosives. 

• has been using explosives detection systems or explosives trace detection equipment to screen about 90 percent of all checked baggage as of December 31, 

2002;4

• has been using alternative means such as canine teams, hand searches, and 

passenger-bag matching to screen the remaining checked baggage; 

• confiscated more than 4.8 million prohibited items (including firearms, knives, 

and incendiary or flammable objects) from passengers; and 

• has made substantial progress in expanding the Federal Air Marshal Service. 

In addition, according to FAA, U.S. and foreign airlines met the April 2003 deadline to harden cockpit doors on aircraft flying in the United States. 

Source: FAA. 

Not unexpectedly, TSA experienced some difficulties in meeting these deadlines 

and achieving these goals. For example, operational and management control problems, cited later in this testimony, emerged with the rapid expansion of the Federal 

Air Marshal Service, and TSA’s deployment of some explosives detection systems 

was delayed. As a result, TSA had to grant waivers of up to a year (until Dec. 31, 

2003) to a few airports, authorizing them to use alternative means to screen all 

checked baggage. Recently, airport representatives with whom we spoke expressed 

concern that not all of these airports would meet the new December 2003 deadline 

established in their waivers because, according to the airport representatives, there 

has not been enough time to produce, install, and integrate all of the systems required to meet the deadline. 

TSA Is Making Greater Use of Technology and Information to Enhance Aviation 

Security 

To strengthen control over access to secure areas of airports and other transportation facilities, TSA is pursuing initiatives that make greater use of technology and 

information. For example, the agency is investigating the establishment of a TransVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:02 Nov 21, 2014 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00076 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\91310.TXT JACKIE

909GDILL3.eps
73 

5 Under 49 C.F.R. sec. 1542.101, all qualified airports are required to have a TSA-approved 

security program that includes procedures to control movement within the secured area, including identification media required under sec. 1542.201(b)(3). 6 U.S. General Accounting Office, Aviation Security: Registered Traveler Program Policy and 

Implementation Issues, GAO–03–253 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 22, 2002). 

portation Workers Identification Card (TWIC) program. TWIC is intended to establish a uniform, nationwide standard for the secure identification of 12 million workers who require unescorted physical or cyber access to secure areas at airports and 

other transportation facilities. Specifically, TWIC will combine standard background 

checks and biometrics so that a worker can be positively matched to his or her credential. Once the program is fully operational, the TWIC card will be the standard 

credential for airport workers and will be accepted by all modes of transportation. 

According to TSA, developing a uniform, nationwide standard for identification will 

minimize redundant credentialing and background checks. Currently, each airport 

is required, as part of its security program, to issue credentials to workers who need 

access to secure, nonpublic areas, such as baggage loading areas.5 Airport representatives have told us that they think a number of operational issues need to be resolved for the TWIC card to be feasible. For example, the TWIC card would have 

to be compatible with the many types of card readers used at airports around the 

country, or new card readers would have to be installed. At large airports, this could 

entail replacing hundreds of card readers, and airport representatives have expressed concerns about how this effort would be funded. In April 2003, TSA awarded a contract to test and evaluate various technologies at three pilot sites. 

In addition, TSA has continued to develop the next-generation Computer Assisted 

Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS II)—an automated passenger screening system that takes personal information, such as a passenger’s name, date of birth, 

home address, and home telephone number, to confirm the passenger’s identity and 

assess a risk level. The identifying information will be run against national security 

information and commercial databases, and a ‘‘risk’’ score will be assigned to the 

passenger. The risk score will determine any further screening that the passenger 

will undergo before boarding. TSA expects to implement CAPPS II throughout the 

United States by the fall of 2004. However, TSA’s plans have raised concerns about 

travelers’ privacy rights. It has been suggested, for example, that TSA is violating 

privacy laws by not explaining how the risk assessment data will be scored and 

used and how a TSA decision can be appealed. These concerns about the system will 

need to be addressed as it moves toward implementation. In ongoing work, we are 

examining CAPPS II, including how it will function, what safeguards will be put 

in place to protect the traveling public’s privacy, and how the system will affect the 

traveling public in terms of costs, delays, and risks. 

Additionally, TSA has begun to develop initiatives that could enable it to use its 

passenger screening resources more efficiently. For example, TSA has requested 

funding for Fiscal Year 2004 to begin developing a registered traveler program that 

would prescreen low-risk travelers. Under a registered traveler program, those who 

voluntarily apply to participate in the program and successfully pass background 

checks would receive a unique identifier or card that would enable them to be 

screened more quickly and would promote greater focus on those passengers who 

require more extensive screening at airport security checkpoints. In prior work, we 

identified key policy and implementation issues that would need to be resolved before a registered traveler program could be implemented. Such issues include the 

(1) criteria that should be established to determine eligibility to apply for the program, (2) kinds of background checks that should be used to certify applicants’ eligibility to enroll in the program and the entity who should perform these checks, (3) 

security-screening procedures that registered travelers should undergo and the differences between these procedures and those for unregistered travelers, and (4) concerns that the traveling public or others may have about equity, privacy, and liability.6

FAA Is Strengthening Air Traffic Control Security 

Since September 2001, FAA has continued to strengthen the security of the Nation’s air traffic control computer systems and facilities in response to 39 recommendations we made between May 1998 and December 2000. For example, FAA 

has established an information systems security management structure under its 

Chief Information Officer, whose office has developed an information systems security strategy, security architecture (that is, an overall blueprint), security policies 

and directives, and a security awareness training campaign. This office has also 

managed FAA’s incident response center and implemented a certification and accreditation process to ensure that vulnerabilities in current and future air traffic 

74 

7For example, on November 15, 1979, an explosive device contained in a parcel shipped by 

U.S. mail exploded aboard an American Airlines flight; on April 7, 1994, a Federal Express employee attempted to hijack a company plane and crash it into the company’s headquarters. We 

reported on the security risks associated with dangerous goods in Aviation Security: Vulnerability of Commercial Aviation to Attacks by Terrorists Using Dangerous Goods, GAO–03–30C 

(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 3, 2002). 8Freight forwarders consolidate shipments and deliver them to air carriers and cargo facilities 

of passenger and all-cargo air carriers. 9 U.S. General Accounting Office, Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities and Potential Improvements for the Air Cargo System, GAO–03–344 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 20, 2002). 10GAO–03–344. 

control systems are identified and weaknesses addressed. Nevertheless, the office 

faces continued challenges in increasing its intrusion detection capabilities, obtaining accreditation for systems that are already operational, and managing information systems security throughout the agency. In addition, according to senior security officials, FAA has completed assessments of the physical security of its staffed 

facilities, but it has not yet accredited all of these air traffic control facilities as secure in compliance with its own policy. Finally, FAA has worked aggressively over 

the past 2 years to complete background investigations of numerous contractor employees. However, ensuring that all new contractors are assessed to determine 

which employees require background checks, and that those checks are completed 

in a timely manner, will be a continuing challenge for the agency. 

Potential Vulnerabilities Remain in Several Aviation Sectors 

Although TSA has focused much effort and funding on ensuring that bombs and 

other threat items are not carried onto commercial aircraft by passengers or in their 

luggage, vulnerabilities remain, according to aviation experts, TSA officials, and others. In particular, these vulnerabilities affect air cargo, general aviation, and airport 

perimeter security. For information on legislative proposals that would address 

these potential vulnerabilities and other aviation security issues, see appendix II. 

Air Cargo Security 

As we and DOT’s Inspector General have reported, vulnerabilities exist in securing the cargo carried aboard commercial passenger and all-cargo aircraft. TSA has 

reported that an estimated 12.5 million tons of cargo are transported each year— 

9.7 million tons on all-cargo planes and 2.8 million tons on passenger planes. Some 

potential security risks associated with air cargo include the introduction of undetected explosive and incendiary devices in cargo placed aboard aircraft; the shipment of undeclared or undetected hazardous materials aboard aircraft; and aircraft 

hijackings and sabotage by individuals with access to cargo aircraft.7 To address 

some of the risks associated with air cargo, ATSA requires that all cargo carried 

aboard commercial passenger aircraft be screened and that TSA have a system in 

place as soon as practicable to screen, inspect, or otherwise ensure the security of 

cargo on all-cargo aircraft. In August 2003, the Congressional Research Service reported that less than 5 percent of cargo placed on passenger airplanes is physically 

screened. TSA’s primary approach to ensuring air cargo security and safety and to 

complying with the cargo-screening requirement in the act is the ‘‘known shipper’’ 

program—which allows shippers that have established business histories with air 

carriers or freight forwarders 8 to ship cargo on planes. However, we and DOT’s Inspector General have identified weaknesses in the known shipper program and in 

TSA’s procedures for approving freight forwarders.9

Since September 2001, TSA has taken a number of actions to enhance cargo security, such as implementing a database of known shippers in October 2002. The database is the first phase in developing a cargo-profiling system similar to the Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System. However, in December 2002, we reported that additional operational and technological measures, such as checking the 

identity of individuals making cargo deliveries, have the potential to improve air 

cargo security in the near term.10 We further reported that TSA lacks a comprehensive plan with long-term goals and performance targets for cargo security, time 

frames for completing security improvements, and risk-based criteria for prioritizing 

actions to achieve those goals. Accordingly, we recommended that TSA develop a 

comprehensive plan for air cargo security that incorporates a risk management approach, includes a list of security priorities, and sets deadlines for completing actions. TSA agreed with this recommendation and expects to develop such a plan by 

the fall of 2003. It will be important that this plan include a timetable for implementation and that TSA expeditiously reduce the vulnerabilities in this area. 

75 

11For example, TSA issued a rule requiring that certain aircraft operators using aircraft with 

a maximum takeoff weight of 12,500 pounds or more carry out security measures, including conducting criminal history records checks on their flight crew members and restricting access to 

the flight deck. This rule went into effect in April 2003. 12 U.S. General Accounting Office, Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Help Address Security Challenges, GAO–03–843 (Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2003). 

General Aviation Security 

Since September 2001, TSA has taken limited action to improve general aviation 

security, leaving it far more open and potentially vulnerable than commercial aviation.11 General aviation is vulnerable because general aviation pilots are not 

screened before takeoff and the contents of general aviation planes are not screened 

at any point. General aviation includes more than 200,000 privately owned airplanes, which are located in every state at more than 19,000 airports. Over 550 of 

these airports also provide commercial service. In the last 5 years, about 70 aircraft 

have been stolen from general aviation airports, indicating a potential weakness 

that could be exploited by terrorists. Moreover, it was reported that the September 

11 hijackers researched the use of crop dusters to spread biological or chemical 

agents. General aviation’s vulnerability was revealed in January 2002, when a Florida teenage flight student crashed a single-engine Cessna airplane into a Tampa 

skyscraper. 

FAA has since issued a notice with voluntary guidance for flight schools and businesses that provide services for aircraft and pilots at general aviation airports. The 

suggestions include using different keys to gain access to an aircraft and start the 

ignition, not giving students access to aircraft keys, ensuring positive identification 

of flight students, and training employees and pilots to report suspicious activities. 

However, because the guidance is voluntary, it is unknown how many general aviation airports have implemented these measures. 

We reported in June 2003 that TSA was working with industry stakeholders as 

part of TSA’s Aviation Security Advisory Council to close potential security gaps in 

general aviation.12 According to our recent discussions with industry representatives, however, the stakeholders have not been able to reach a consensus on the actions needed to improve security in general aviation. General aviation industry representatives, such as the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association and General Aviation Manufacturers Association, have opposed any restrictions on operating general 

aviation aircraft and believe that small planes do not pose a significant risk to the 

country. Nonetheless, some industry representatives indicated that the application 

of a risk management approach would be helpful in determining the next steps in 

improving general aviation security. (We discuss risk management in more detail 

later in this testimony.) To identify these next steps, TSA chartered a working 

group on general aviation within the existing Aviation Security Advisory Committee, and this working group is scheduled to report to the full committee in the 

fall of 2003. We have ongoing work that is examining general aviation security in 

further detail. 

76 

13The Department of Homeland Security is assessing proposals from eight contractors for 

technology to protect commercial aircraft from shoulder-fired missile attack. 14GAO–03–843. 

Source: Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association. 

Airport Perimeter Security 

Airport perimeters present a potential vulnerability by providing a route for individuals to gain unauthorized access to aircraft and secure areas of airports (see fig. 

4). For example, in August 2003, the national media reported that three boaters 

wandered the tarmac at Kennedy International Airport after their boat became 

beached near a runway. In addition, terrorists could launch an attack using a shoulder-fired missile from the perimeter of an airport, as well as from locations just outside the perimeter. For example, in separate incidents in the late 1970s, guerrillas 

with shoulder-fired missiles shot down two Air Rhodesia planes. More recently, the 

national media have reported that since September 2001, al Qaeda has twice tried 

to down planes outside the United States with shoulder-fired missiles.13

We reported in June 2003 that airport operators have increased their patrols of 

airport perimeters since September 2001, but industry officials stated that they do 

not have enough resources to completely protect against missile attacks.14 A number 

of technologies could be used to secure and monitor airport perimeters, including 

barriers, motion sensors, and closed-circuit television. Airport representatives have 

cautioned that as security enhancements are made to airport perimeters, it will be 

important for TSA to coordinate with FAA and the airport operators to ensure that 

any enhancements do not pose safety risks for aircraft. We have separate ongoing 

work examining the status of efforts to improve airport perimeter security and assessing the nature and extent of the threat from shoulder-fired missiles. 


909GDILL4.eps
77 

15 U.S. General Accounting Office, Homeland Security: A Risk Management Approach Can 

Guide Preparedness Efforts, GAO–02–208T (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 31, 2001); and GAO–03–344. 

Source: GAO. 

Aviation Security Poses Longer-Term Management and Organizational 

Challenges 

TSA’s efforts to strengthen and sustain aviation security face several longer-term 

challenges in the areas of risk management, funding, coordination, strategic human 

capital management, and building a results-oriented organization. 

Risk Management 

As aviation security is viewed in the larger context of transportation and homeland security, it will be important to set strategic priorities so that national resources can be directed to the greatest needs. Although TSA initially focused on increasing aviation security, it has more recently begun to address security in the 

other transportation modes. However, the size and diversity of the national transportation system make it difficult to adequately secure, and TSA and the Congress 

are faced with demands for additional Federal funding for transportation security 

that far exceed the additional amounts made available. We have advocated the use 

of a risk management approach to guide Federal programs and responses to better 

prepare for and withstand terrorist threats, and we have recommended that TSA 

use this approach to strengthen security in aviation as well as in other transportation modes.15 A risk management approach is a systematic process to analyze 

threats, vulnerabilities, and the criticality (or relative importance) of assets to better 

support key decisions linking resources with prioritized efforts for results. Comprehensive risk-based assessments support effective planning and resource allocation. Figure 5 describes this approach. 


909GDILL5.eps
78 

16The House agreed to $3.7 billion in funding for TSA and the Senate approved $4.5 billion. 17TSA suspended the security fees from June 1 to September 30, 2003, as mandated by the 

Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2003. 

Source: GAO. 

TSA agreed with our recommendation and has adopted a risk management approach in attempting to enhance security across all transportation modes. TSA’s Office of Threat Assessment and Risk Management is developing two assessment tools 

that will help assess criticality, threats, and vulnerabilities. The first tool, which assesses criticality, will arrive at a criticality score for a facility or transportation 

asset by incorporating factors such as the number of fatalities that could occur during an attack and the economic and sociopolitical importance of the facility or asset. 

This score will enable TSA, in conjunction with transportation stakeholders, to rank 

facilities and assets within each mode and thus focus resources on those that are 

deemed most important. TSA is working with another Department of Homeland Security office—the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate— 

to ensure that the criticality tool will be consistent with the Department’s overall 

approach for managing critical infrastructure. 

The second tool—the Transportation Risk Assessment and Vulnerability Evaluation tool (TRAVEL)—will assess threats and analyze vulnerabilities for all transportation modes. The tool produces a relative risk score for potential attacks against 

a transportation asset or facility. In addition, TRAVEL will include a cost-benefit 

component that compares the cost of implementing a given countermeasure with the 

reduction in relative risk due to that countermeasure. We reported in June 2003 

that TSA plans to use this tool to gather comparable threat and vulnerability information across all transportation modes. It is important for TSA to complete the development of the two tools and use them to prepare action plans for specific modes, 

such as aviation, and for transportation security generally. 

Funding 

Two key funding and accountability challenges will be (1) paying for increased 

aviation security and (2) ensuring that these costs are controlled. The costs associated with the equipment and personnel needed to screen passengers and their baggage alone are huge. The administration requested $4.2 billion for aviation security 

for Fiscal Year 2004, which included about $1.8 billion for passenger screening and 

$944 million for baggage screening.16 ATSA created a passenger security fee to pay 

for the costs of aviation security, but the fee has not generated enough money to 

do so. DOT’s Inspector General reported that the security fees are estimated to generate only about $1.7 billion in Fiscal Year 2004.17

A major funding issue is paying for the purchase and installation of the remaining 

explosives detection systems for the airports that received waivers, as well as for 

the reinstallation of the systems that were placed in airport lobbies last year and 

now need to be integrated into airport baggage-handling systems. Integrating the 

equipment with the baggage-handling systems is expected to be costly because it 

will require major facility modifications. For example, modifications needed to integrate the equipment at Boston’s Logan International Airport are estimated to cost 


909GDILL6.eps
79 

18With FAA’s approval, commercial airports may charge boarding passengers a fee of up to $4.50 per trip segment to raise funds for airport capital development. 19 A letter of intent represents a nonbinding commitment from an agency to provide multiyear 

funding to an entity beyond the current authorization period. Thus, that letter allows an airport 

to proceed with a project without waiting for future Federal funds because the airport and investors know that allowable costs are likely to be reimbursed. 20 U.S. General Accounting Office, Airport Finance: Past Funding Levels May Not Be Sufficient 

to Cover Airports’ Planned Capital Development, GAO–03–497T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 25, 

2003). 21The proposed Vision 100—Century of Aviation Reauthorization—Act, H.R. 2115. 

$146 million. Estimates for Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport are $193 million. DOT’s Inspector General has reported that the cost of integrating the equipment nationwide could be as high as $3 billion. 

A key question is how to pay for these installation costs. Funds from FAA’s AIP 

grants and passenger facility charges are eligible sources for funding this work.18

In Fiscal Year 2002, AIP grant funds totaling $561 million were used for terminal 

modifications to enhance security. However, using these funds for security reduced 

the funding available for other airport development projects, such as projects to 

bring airports up to Federal design standards and reconstruction projects. In February 2003, we identified letters of intent 19 as a funding option that has been successfully used to leverage private sources of funding.20 TSA has since signed letters 

of intent with three airports—Boston Logan, Dallas-Fort Worth, and Seattle-Tacoma 

International Airports. Under the agreements, TSA will pay 75 percent of the cost 

of integrating the explosives detection equipment into the baggage-handling systems. The payments will stretch out over 3 to 4 years. Airport representatives said 

that about 30 more airports have requested similar agreements. The slow pace of 

TSA’s approval process has raised concerns about delays in reinstalling and integrating explosives detection equipment with baggage-handling systems—delays that 

will require more labor-intensive and less efficient baggage screening by other approved means. 

To provide financial assistance to airports for security-related capital investments, 

such as the installation of explosives detection equipment, proposed aviation reauthorization legislation 21 would establish an aviation security capital fund that 

would authorize $2 billion over the next 4 years. The funding would be made available to airports in letters of intent, and large-and medium-hub airports would be 

expected to provide a match of 10 percent of a project’s costs. A 5 percent match 

would be required for all other airports. This legislation would provide a dedicated 

source of funding for security-related capital investments and could minimize the 

need to use AIP funds for security. 

An additional funding issue is how to ensure continued investment in transportation research and development. For Fiscal Year 2003, TSA was appropriated about 

$110 million for research and development, of which $75 million was designated for 

the next-generation explosives detection systems. However, TSA has proposed to reprogram $61.2 million of these funds to be used for other purposes, leaving about 

$12.7 million to be spent on research and development this year. This proposed reprogramming could limit TSA’s ability to sustain and strengthen aviation security 

by continuing to invest in research and development for more effective equipment 

to screen passengers, their carry-on and checked baggage, and cargo. In ongoing 

work, we are examining the nature and scope of research and development work by 

TSA and the Department of Homeland Security, including their strategy for accelerating the development of transportation security technologies. 

By reprogramming funds and making acknowledged use of certain funds for purposes other than those intended, TSA has raised congressional concerns about accountability. According to TSA, it has proposed to reprogram a total of $849.3 million during Fiscal Year 2003, including the $61.2 million that would be cut from research and development and $104 million that would be taken from the Federal air 

marshal program and used for unintended purposes. Because of these congressional 

concerns, we were asked to investigate TSA’s process for reprogramming funds for 

the air marshal program and to assess the implications of the proposed funding reductions in areas such as the numbers of hours flown and flights taken. We have 

ongoing work to address these issues. To ensure appropriate oversight and accountability, it is important that TSA maintain clear and transparent communication 

with the Congress and industry stakeholders about the use of its funds. 

In July 2002, we reported that long-term attention to cost and accountability controls for acquisition and related business processes will be critical for TSA, both to 

80 

22 U.S. General Accounting Office, Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration 

Faces Immediate and Long-Term Challenges, GAO–02–971T (Washington, D.C.: July 25, 2002). 23 Aviation Security Costs, Transportation Security Administration, statement of the Honorable Kenneth M. Mead, Inspector General, U.S. Department of Transportation, before the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Subcommittee on Aviation, U.S. Senate, 

Feb. 5, 2003 (CC–2003–066). 24DOT Inspector General, CC–2003–066. 25Office of Inspector General, DOT, Report on Oversight of Security Screener Contracts, TSA, 

FI–2003–025 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28, 2003). 26GAO–03–322. 

ensure its success and to maintain its integrity and accountability.22 According to 

DOT’s Inspector General, although TSA has made progress in addressing certain 

cost-related issues, it has not established an infrastructure that provides effective 

controls to monitor contractors’ costs and performance.23 For example, in February 2003, the Inspector General reported that TSA’s $1 billion hiring effort cost more 

than most people expected and that TSA’s contract with NCS Pearson to recruit, 

assess, and hire the screener workforce contained no safeguards to prevent cost increases. The Inspector General found that TSA provided limited oversight for the 

management of the contract expenses and, in one case, between $6 million and $9 

million of the $18 million paid to a subcontractor appeared to be a result of wasteful 

and abusive spending practices.24 As the Inspector General recommended, TSA has 

since hired the Defense Contract Audit Agency to audit its major contracts. To ensure control over TSA contracts, the Inspector General has further recommended 

that the Congress set aside a specific amount of TSA’s contracting budget for overseeing contractors’ performance with respect to cost, schedule, and quality.25

Coordination 

Sustaining the aviation security advancements of the past 2 years also depends 

on TSA’s ability to form effective partnerships with federal, state, and local agencies 

and with the aviation community. Effective, well-coordinated partnerships at the 

local level require identifying roles and responsibilities; developing effective, collaborative relationships with local and regional airports and emergency management 

and law enforcement agencies; agreeing on performance-based standards that describe desired outcomes; and sharing intelligence information. The lynchpin in TSA’s 

efforts to coordinate with airports and local law enforcement and emergency response agencies is, according to the agency, the 158 Federal security directors and 

staff that TSA has deployed nationwide. The security directors’ responsibilities include ensuring that standardized security procedures are implemented at the Nation’s airports; working with state and local law enforcement personnel, when appropriate, to ensure airport and passenger security; and communicating threat information to airport operators and others. Airport representatives, however, have indicated that the relationships between Federal security directors and airport operators are still evolving and that better communication is needed at some airports. 

Key to improving the coordination between TSA and local partners is establishing 

clearly defined roles. In some cases, concerns have arisen about conflicts between 

the roles of TSA, as the manager of security functions at airports, and of airport 

officials, as the managers of other airport operations. Industry representatives 

viewed such conflicts as leading to confusion in areas such as communicating with 

local entities. According to airport representatives, for example, TSA has developed 

guidance or rules for airports without involving them, and time-consuming changes 

have then had to be made to accommodate operational factors. The representatives 

maintain that it would be more efficient and effective to consider such operational 

factors earlier in the process. Ultimately, inadequate coordination and unclear roles 

result in inefficient uses of limited resources. 

TSA also has to ensure that the terrorist and threat information gathered and 

maintained by law enforcement and other agencies—including the Federal Bureau 

of Investigation, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Department of State—is quickly and efficiently communicated among Federal agencies and to state and local authorities, as needed. Disseminating such information is important to allow those who are involved in protecting the Nation’s aviation system to address potential threats rather than simply 

react to known threats. 

In aviation security, timely information sharing among agencies has been hampered by the agencies’ reluctance to share sensitive information and by outdated, 

incompatible computer systems. As we found in reviewing 12 watch lists maintained 

by nine Federal agencies, information was being shared among some of them but 

not among others. Moreover, even when sharing was occurring, costly and overly 

complex measures had to be taken to facilitate it.26 To promote better integration 

81 

27 U.S. General Accounting Office, Information Technology: Terrorist Watch Lists Should Be 

Consolidated to Promote Better Integration and Sharing, GAO–03–322 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 

15, 2003). 28GAO–03–843. 29 U.S. General Accounting Office, A Model of Strategic Human Capital Management, GAO– 

02–373SP (Washington, D.C.: March 2002). 30 U.S. General Accounting Office, Transportation Security Administration: Actions and Plans 

to Build a Results-Oriented Culture, GAO–03–190 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 13, 2003). 

and sharing of terrorist and criminal watch lists, we have recommended that the 

Department of Homeland Security, in collaboration with the other departments and 

agencies that have and use watch lists, lead an effort to consolidate and standardize 

the Federal Government’s watch list structures and policies.27

In addition, as we found earlier this year, representatives of numerous state and 

local governments and transportation industry associations indicated that the general threat warnings received by government agencies are not helpful. Rather, they 

said, transportation operators, including airport operators, want more specific intelligence information so that they can understand the true nature of a potential 

threat and implement appropriate security measures.28

Strategic Human Capital Management 

As it organizes itself to protect the Nation’s transportation system, TSA faces the 

challenge of strategically managing its workforce of more than 60,000 people, most 

of whom are deployed at airports or on aircraft to detect weapons and explosives 

and to prevent them from being taken aboard and used on aircraft. Additionally, 

over the next several years, TSA faces the challenge of ‘‘right-sizing’’ this workforce 

as efficiency is improved with new security-enhancing technologies, processes, and 

procedures. For example, as explosives detection systems are integrated with baggage-handling systems, the use of more labor-intensive screening methods, such as 

trace detection techniques and manual searches of baggage, can be reduced. Other 

planned security enhancements, such as CAPPS II and the registered traveler program, also have the potential to make screening more efficient. 

To assist agencies in managing their human capital more strategically, we have 

developed a model that identifies cornerstones and related critical success factors 

that agencies should apply and steps they can take.29 Our model is designed to help 

agency leaders effectively lead and manage their people and integrate human capital considerations into daily decision-making and the program results they seek to 

achieve. 

In January 2003, we reported that TSA was addressing some critical human capital success factors by hiring personnel, using a wide range of tools available for hiring, and beginning to link individual performance to organizational goals.30 However, concerns remain about the size and training of that workforce, the adequacy 

of the initial background checks for screeners, and TSA’s progress in setting up a 

performance management system. As noted earlier in this testimony, TSA now 

plans to reduce its screener workforce by 6,000 by September 30, 2003, and it has 

proposed cutting the workforce by an additional 3,000 in Fiscal Year 2004. This 

planned reduction has raised concerns about passenger delays at airports and has 

led TSA to begin hiring part-time screeners to make more flexible and efficient use 

of its workforce. In addition, TSA used an abbreviated background check process to 

hire and deploy enough screeners to meet ATSA’s screening deadlines in 2002. After 

obtaining additional background information, TSA terminated the employment of 

some of these screeners. TSA reported 1,208 terminations as of May 31, 2003, that 

it ascribed to a variety of reasons, including criminal offenses and failures to pass 

alcohol and drug tests. Furthermore, the national media have reported allegations 

of operational and management control problems that emerged with the expansion 

of the Federal Air Marshal Service, including inadequate background checks and 

training, uneven scheduling, and inadequate policies and procedures. In ongoing 

work, we are examining the effectiveness of TSA’s efforts to train, equip, and supervise passenger screeners, and we are assessing the effects of expansion on the Federal Air Marshal Service. In addition, we reported in January 2003 that TSA had 

taken the initial steps in establishing a performance management system linked to 

organizational goals. Such a system will be critical for TSA to motivate and manage 

staff, ensure the quality of screeners’ performance, and, ultimately, restore public 

confidence in air travel. 

Building a Results-Oriented Organization 

For TSA to sustain enhanced aviation security over the long term, it will be important for the agency to continue to build a results-oriented culture within the new 

Department of Homeland Security. To help Federal agencies successfully transform 

82 

31 U.S. General Accounting Office, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist 

Mergers and Organizational Transformations, GAO–03–669 (Washington, D.C.: July 2, 2003). 32 U.S. General Accounting Office, Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Homeland Security, GAO–03–102 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 1, 2003). 33GAO–03–190. 

their cultures, as well as the new Department of Homeland Security merge its various components into a unified department, we identified key practices that have 

consistently been found at the center of successful mergers, acquisitions, and transformations.31 These key practices, together with implementation strategies such as 

establishing a coherent mission and integrated strategic goals to guide the transformation, can help agencies become more results oriented, customer focused, and 

collaborative. (See app. III.) These practices are particularly important for the Department of Homeland Security, whose implementation and transformation we have 

designated as high risk.32

The Congress required TSA to adopt a results-oriented strategic planning and reporting framework and, specifically, to provide an action plan with goals and milestones to outline how acceptable levels of performance for aviation security would 

be achieved. In prior work, we reported that TSA has taken the first steps in performance planning and reporting by defining its mission, vision, and values and that 

this practice would continue to be important when TSA moved into the Department 

of Homeland Security.33 Therefore, we recommended that TSA take the next steps 

to implement results-oriented practices. These steps included establishing performance goals and measures for all modes of transportation as part of a strategic planning process that involves stakeholders, defining more clearly the roles and responsibilities of its various offices in collaborating and communicating with stakeholders; 

and formalizing the roles and responsibilities of governmental entities for transportation security. Table 1 shows selected ATSA requirements, TSA’s actions and 

plans, and the next steps we recommended. TSA agreed with our recommendations. 

Table 1.—Requirements, Actions and Plans, and Recommended Next Steps for Results-Oriented Practices 

ATSA requirements TSA actions and plans Next steps 

Leadership commitment to creating a high-performing organization 

• Requires performance agreement between the Secretary of 

DOT and the Under Secretary 

of Transportation for Security 

and between the Under Secretary and TSA executives. 

• Stated leadership commitment to 

creating a results-oriented culture in 

its 180-day action plan. 

• Expressed plans to use the Baldrige 

performance excellence criteria as a 

management tool to promote quality 

and performance. 

• Established standardized performance agreements for TSA executives. 

• Establish a performance agreement for the Under Secretary 

of Transportation for Security 

that articulates how bonuses 

will be tied to performance. 

• Add expectations in performance agreements for top leadership to foster the culture of a 

high-performing organization. 

Strategic planning to establish results-oriented goals and measures 

• Requires a 5-year performance 

plan and annual performance 

report consistent with the principles of the Government Performance and Results Act. 

• Articulated vision, mission, values, 

strategic goal, and performance goals 

and measures. 

• Developed automated system to collect performance data to demonstrate progress in meeting goals. 

• Aligned aviation security performance goals and measures with DOT 

goals. 

• Reported it submitted first annual 

performance report. 

• Establish security performance 

goals and measures for all 

modes of transportation as part 

of a strategic planning process 

that involves stakeholders. 

• Apply practices that have been 

shown to provide useful information in agency performance 

plans. 

Performance management to promote accountability for results 

• Requires a performance management system. 

• Requires performance agreements for all employees that include organizational and individual goals. 

• Established an interim performance 

management system. 

• Created standardized performance 

agreements for groups of employees 

that include organizational and individual goals and standards of performance. 

• Build on the current performance agreements to achieve additional benefits. 

• Ensure the permanent performance management system 

makes meaningful distinctions 

in performance. 

• Involve employees in developing its permanent performance management system. 

83 

Table 1.—Requirements, Actions and Plans, and Recommended Next Steps for Results-Oriented Practices— 

Continued 

ATSA requirements TSA actions and plans Next steps 

Collaboration and communication to achieve national outcomes 

• Requires TSA to work within 

and outside the government to 

accomplish its mission. 

• Establishes a Transportation 

Security Oversight Board to facilitate collaboration and communication. 

• Established Offices of Security Regulation and Policy, Communications 

and Public Information, Law Enforcement and Security Liaison, and 

Legislative Affairs to collaborate and 

communicate with stakeholders. 

• Convened the Oversight Board, 

which has met twice. 

• Stated plans to use memorandums of 

understanding and memorandums of 

agreement to formalize roles and responsibilities of TSA and other agencies in transportation security. 

• Define more clearly the collaboration and communication roles 

and responsibilities of TSA’s 

various offices. 

• Formalize roles and responsibilities among governmental entities for transportation security. 

Public reporting and customer service to build citizen confidence 

• Requires a 180-day action plan 

and two progress reports within 

6 months of enactment. 

• Submitted 180-day action plan and 

both progress reports within established time frames. 

• Maintains a Website to provide information to the public. 

• Created ombudsman position to 

serve customers. 

• Developed measures to track customer satisfaction. 

• Reviewed and eliminated security 

procedures that do not enhance security or customer service. 

• Stated plans to develop a customer 

satisfaction index to analyze customer opinions to improve performance. 

• Fill the ombudsman position to 

facilitate responsiveness of TSA 

to the public. 

• Continue to develop and implement mechanisms, such as the 

CSI, to gauge customer satisfaction and improve customer 

service. 

Source: GAO. 

Concluding Observations 

After spending billions of dollars over the past 2 years on people, policies, and procedures to improve aviation security, we have much more security now than we had 

before September 2001, but it has not been determined how much more secure we 

are. The vast number of guns, knives, and other potential threat items that screeners have confiscated suggests that security is working, but it also suggests that improved public awareness of prohibited items could help focus resources where they 

are most needed and reduce delays and inconvenience to the public. Faced with vast 

and competing demands for security resources, TSA should continue its efforts to 

identify technologies, such as CAPPS II, that will leverage its resources and potentially improve its capabilities. Improving the efficiency and effectiveness of aviation 

security will also require risk assessments and plans that help maintain a balance 

between security and customer service. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer any 

questions that you or other members of the Committee may have. 

84 

APPENDIX I: SELECTED DEADLINES IN THE AVIATION AND TRANSPORTATION SECURITY

ACT AND THEIR STATUS

Deadline Provisionsa Status 

Nov. 19, 2001 Require new background checks for those who have access to secure areas of the airport. Completed 

Institute a 45-day waiting period for aliens seeking flight training 

for planes of 12,500 pounds or more. 

Completed 

Dec. 19, 2001 Establish qualifications for Federal screeners. Completed 

Report to the Congress on improving general aviation security. Completed 

Jan. 18, 2002 Screen all checked baggage in U.S. airports using explosives detection systems, passenger-bag matching, manual searches, canine 

units, or other approved means. 

Completed 

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is to develop guidance 

for air carriers to use in developing programs to train flight and 

cabin crews to resist threats (within 60 days after FAA issues 

the guidance, each airline is to develop a training program and 

submit it to FAA; within 30 days of receiving a program, FAA is 

to approve it or require revisions; within 180 days of receiving 

FAA’s approval, the airline is to complete the training of all 

flight and cabin crews). 

Guidance issued 

Develop a plan to train Federal screeners. Completed 

Foreign and domestic carriers are to provide electronic passenger 

and crew manifests to Customs for flights from foreign countries 

to the United States. 

Completed 

Begin collecting the passenger security fee. Completed 

Feb. 17, 2002 The Under Secretary is to assume civil aviation security functions 

from FAA. 

Completed 

Implement an aviation security program for charter carriers. Completed 

Begin awarding grants for security-related research and development. Completed 

The National Institute of Justice is to report to the Secretary on 

less-than-lethal weapons for flight crew members. 

Completed 

May 18, 2002 Report to the Congress on the deployment of baggage screening 

equipment. 

Report submitted 

• Report to the Congress on progress in evaluating and taking the 

following optional actions: 

Report submitted 

• Require 911 capability for onboard passenger telephones. • Completed 

• Establish uniform IDs for law enforcement personnel carrying 

weapons on planes or in secure areas. 

• Ongoing 

• Establish requirements for trusted traveler programs. • Ongoing 

• Develop alternative security procedures to avoid damage to medical products. • Completed 

• Provide for the use of secure communications technologies to inform airport security forces about passengers who are identified 

on security databases. 

• Ongoing 

• Require pilot licenses to include a photograph and biometric 

identifiers. 

• Ongoing 

• Use voice stress analysis, biometric, or other technologies to prevent high-risk passengers from boarding. • Ongoing 

• Provide for the use of instant communications technology between planes and ground. • Ongoing 

Nov. 19, 2002 Deploy Federal screeners, security managers, and law enforcement 

officers to screen passengers and property. 

Completed 

Report to the Congress on screening for small aircraft with 60 or 

fewer seats. 

Report submitted 

Establish pilot program to contract with private screening companies (program to last until Nov. 19, 2004). Completed 

Dec. 31, 2002 Screen all checked baggage by explosives detection systems. Ongoing 

No deadline Carriers are to transfer screening property to TSA. Completed 

FAA is to issue an order prohibiting access to the flight deck, requiring strengthened cabin doors, requiring that cabin doors remain locked, and prohibiting possession of a key for all but the 

flight deck crew. 

Completed 

Improve perimeter screening of all individuals, goods, property, 

and vehicles. 

Ongoing 

Screen all cargo on passenger flights and cargo-only flights. Ongoing 

Establish procedures for notifying FAA, state and local law enforcement officers, and airport security of known threats. Completed 

85 

Deadline Provisionsa Status 

Establish procedures for airlines to identify passengers who pose a 

potential security threat. 

Ongoing 

FAA is to develop and implement methods for using cabin video 

monitors, continuously operating transponders, and notifying 

flight deck crew of a hijacking. 

Ongoing 

Require flight training schools to conduct security awareness programs for employees. Completed 

Work with airport operators to strengthen access control points 

and consider deploying technology to improve security access. 

Ongoing 

Provide operational testing for screeners. Ongoing 

Assess dual-use items that seem harmless but could be dangerous 

and inform screening personnel. 

Ongoing 

Establish a system for measuring staff performance. Ongoing 

Establish management accountability for meeting performance 

goals. 

Ongoing 

Periodically review threats to civil aviation, including chemical 

and biological weapons. 

Ongoing 

Source: TSA. 

a Except where otherwise indicated, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is responsible for implementing the provisions. 

APPENDIX II: BILLS RELATED TO AVIATION SECURITY

H.R. 2144—Aviation Security Technical Corrections and Improvements Act— 

Many of the important provisions of this bill have been incorporated into the Conference Report version of the FAA Reauthorization Act, H.R. 2115. 

S. 1409—Rebuild America Act of 2003—Establishes a new grant program in the 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for airport security improvements, including projects to replace baggage conveyer systems and projects to reconfigure terminal baggage areas as needed to install explosives detection systems. The Under 

Secretary for Border and Transportation Security is authorized to issue letters of 

intent to airports for these types of projects. One billion dollars is authorized for 

this program. 

H.R. 2555—House and Senate versions of the Department of Homeland Security 

Appropriations Act for 2004 House version—Makes Fiscal Year 2004 appropriations 

of $3.679 billion for the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to provide 

civil aviation security services (aviation security, Federal air marshals, maritime 

and land security, intelligence, research and development, and administration): 

• $1.673 billion for passenger screening activities, 

• $1.285 billion for baggage screening activities, 

• $721 million for airport support and enforcement presence, 

• $235 million for physical modifications of airports to provide for the installation 

of checked baggage explosives detection systems, and 

• $100 million for the procurement of the explosives detection systems. 

Continues to cap the number of screeners at 45,000 full-time equivalent positions. 

Prohibits the use of funds authorized in this Act to pursue or adopt regulations 

requiring airport sponsors to provide, without cost to TSA, building construction, 

maintenance, utilities and expenses, or space for services relating to aviation security (excluding space for necessary checkpoints). 

Senate Version of H.R. 2555—Makes Fiscal Year 2004 appropriations of $4.524 

billion for TSA to provide civil aviation security services: 

• $3.185 billion for screening activities, 

• $1.339 billion for airport support and enforcement presence, 

• $309 million for physical modifications of airports to provide for the installation 

of checked baggage explosives detection systems, and 

• $151 million for the procurement of the explosives detection systems. 

Prohibits the use of funds authorized in this Act to pursue or adopt regulations 

requiring airport sponsors to provide, without cost to TSA, building construction, 

maintenance, utilities and expenses, or space for services relating to aviation security (excluding space for necessary checkpoints). 

Prohibits the use of funds authorized in this Act for the Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS II) until GAO has reported to the Committees 

on Appropriations that certain requirements have been met, including (1) the existence of a system of due process by which passengers considered to pose a threat 

may appeal their delay or prohibition from boarding a flight; (2) that the underlying 

86 

error rate of databases will not produce a large number of false positives that will 

result in a significant number of passengers being treated mistakenly or security 

resources being diverted; (3) that TSA has stressed-tested and demonstrated the efficacy and predictive accuracy of all search tools in CAPPS II; and (4) that the Secretary has established an internal oversight board to monitor the manner in which 

CAPPS II is being developed and prepared. 

Requires a report from the Secretary of Homeland Security on actions taken to 

develop countermeasures for commercial aircraft against shoulder-fired missile systems and vulnerability assessments of this threat for larger airports. 

H.R. 2115—Flight 100—Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act—Conference Report version—Gives FAA the authority to take a certificate action if it is notified by 

DHS that the holder of the certificate presents a security threat. 

Gives the Secretary of Transportation the authority to make grants to general 

aviation entities (including airports, operators, and manufacturers) to reimburse 

them for security costs incurred and revenues lost because of restrictions imposed 

by the Federal Government in response to the events of September 11. The bill authorizes $100 million for these grants. 

Authorizes DHS to reimburse air carriers and airports for all security screening 

activities they are still performing, such as for providing catering services and 

checking documents at security checkpoints and for providing the space and facilities used to perform screening functions to the extent funds are available. 

Requires air carriers to carry out a training program for flight and cabin crews 

to prepare for possible threat conditions. TSA is required to establish minimum 

standards for this training within 1 year of the Act’s passage. 

Requires DHS to report in 6 months on the effectiveness of aviation security, specifically including the air marshal program; hardening of cockpit doors; and security 

screening of passengers, checked baggage, and cargo. 

Establishes within DHS a grant program to airport sponsors for (1) projects to replace baggage conveyer systems related to aviation security; (2) projects to reconfigure terminal baggage areas as needed to install explosives detection systems; and 

(3) projects to enable the Under Secretary for Border and Transportation Security 

to deploy explosives detection systems behind the ticket counter, in the baggage 

sorting area, or in line with the baggage handling system. Requires $250 million annually from the existing aviation security fee that is paid by airline passengers to 

be deposited in an Aviation Security Capital Fund and made available to finance 

this grant program. 

Requires TSA to certify that civil liberty and privacy issues have been addressed 

before implementing CAPPS II and requires GAO to assess TSA’s compliance 3 

months after TSA makes the required certification. 

Allows cargo pilots to carry guns under the same program for pilots of passenger 

airlines. Permits an off-duty pilot to transport the gun in a lockbox in the passenger 

cabin rather than in the baggage hold. Also provides that both passenger and cargo 

pilots should be treated equitably in their access to training. 

Requires security audits of all foreign repair stations within 18 months after TSA 

issues rules governing the audits. The rules must be issued within 240 days of enactment. 

Requires background checks on aliens seeking flight training in aircraft regardless of the size of the aircraft. For all training on small aircraft, includes a notification requirement but no waiting period. For training on larger aircraft, adopts an 

expedited procedure if the applicant already has training, a license, or a background 

check, and adopts a 30-day waiting period for first-time training on large aircraft. 

Makes TSA responsible for the background check. Requires TSA to issue an interim 

final rule in 60 days to implement this section. This section takes effect when that 

rule becomes effective. 

S.236—Background Checks for Foreign Flight School Applicants—Amends Federal 

aviation law to require a background check of alien flight school applicants without 

regard to the maximum certificated weight of the aircraft for which they seek training. (Currently, a background check is required for flight crews operating aircraft 

with a maximum certificated takeoff weight of 12,500 pounds or more.) 

S. 165—Air Cargo Security Act—House companion bill (H.R. 1103)—Amends Federal aviation law to require the screening of cargo that is to be transported in passenger aircraft operated by domestic and foreign air carriers in interstate air transportation. Directs TSA to develop a strategic plan to carry out such screening. Requires the establishment of systems that (1) provide for the regular inspection of 

shipping facilities for cargo shipments; (2) provide an industrywide pilot program 

database of known shippers of cargo; (3) train persons that handle air cargo to ensure that such cargo is properly handled and safeguarded from security breaches; 

and (4) require air carriers operating all-cargo aircraft to have an approved plan for 

87 

the security of their air operations area, the cargo placed aboard the aircraft, and 

persons having access to their aircraft on the ground or in flight. 

H.R. 1366—Aviation Industry Stabilization Act—Requires the Under Secretary 

for Border and Transportation Security, after all cockpit doors are strengthened, to 

consider and report to the Congress on whether it is necessary to require Federal 

air marshals to be seated in the first class cabin of an aircraft with strengthened 

cockpit doors. 

Requires the Under Secretary to (1) undertake action necessary to improve the 

screening of mail so that it can be carried on passenger flights and (2) reimburse 

air carriers for certain screening and related activities, as well as the cost of fortifying cockpit doors, and for any financial losses attributed to the loss of air traffic 

resulting from the use of force against Iraq in calendar year 2003. 

Establishes an air cargo security working group composed of various groups to develop recommendations on the enhancement of the current known shipper program. 

H. R. 115—Aviation Biometric Badge Act—Amends Federal aviation law to direct 

TSA to require by regulation that each security screener (or employee who has 

unescorted access, or may permit other individuals to have unescorted access, to an 

aircraft or a secured area of the airport) be issued a biometric security badge that 

identifies a person by fingerprint or retinal recognition. 

H. R. 1049—Arming Cargo Pilots Against Terrorism Act—Senate companion bill 

(S. 516)—Expresses the sense of Congress that a flight deck crew member of a cargo 

aircraft should be armed with a firearm to defend such aircraft against attacks by 

terrorists that could use the aircraft as a weapon of mass destruction or for other 

terrorist purposes. Amends Federal transportation law to authorize the training and 

arming of flight deck crew members (pilots) of all-cargo air transportation flights to 

prevent acts of criminal violence or air piracy. 

H.R. 765—(No title)—Legislation to arm cargo pilots—Amends Federal aviation 

law to allow cargo pilots (not just air passenger pilots) to participate in the Federal 

flight deck officer program. 

H.R. 580—Commercial Airline Missile Defense Act—Senate companion bill—S. 

311—Directs the Secretary of Transportation to issue regulations that require all 

turbojet aircraft of air carriers to be equipped with a missile defense system. Requires the Secretary to purchase such defense systems and make them available to 

all air carriers. Sets forth certain interim security measures to be taken before the 

deployment of such defense systems. 

APPENDIX III: KEY PRACTICES AND IMPLEMENTATION STEPS FOR MERGERS AND

ORGANIZATIONAL TRANSFORMATIONS

Practice Implementation step 

Ensure top leadership drives the 

transformation. 

• Define and articulate a succinct and compelling reason for 

change. 

• Balance continued delivery of services with merger and transformation activities. 

Establish a coherent mission and 

integrated strategic goals to guide the 

transformation. 

• Adopt leading practices for results-oriented strategic planning 

and reporting. 

Focus on a key set of principles and 

priorities at the outset of the 

transformation. 

• Embed core values in every aspect of the organization to reinforce 

the new culture. 

Set implementation goals and a time line 

to build momentum and show progress 

from day one. 

• Make public implementation goals and a time line. 

• Seek and monitor employee attitudes and take appropriate followup actions. 

• Identify cultural features of merging organizations to increase understanding of former work environments. 

• Attract and retain key talent. 

• Establish an organizationwide knowledge and skills inventory to 

exchange knowledge among merging organizations. 

Dedicate an implementation team to 

manage the transformation process. 

• Establish networks to support the implementation team. 

• Select high-performing team members. 

Use the performance management system 

to define responsibility and ensure 

accountability for change. 

• Adopt leading practices to implement effective performance management systems with adequate safeguards. 

88 

Practice Implementation step 

Establish a communication strategy to 

create shared expectations and report 

related progress. 

• Communicate early and often to build trust. 

• Ensure consistency of message. 

• Encourage two-way communication. 

• Provide information to meet specific needs of employees. 

Involve employees to obtain their ideas 

and gain their ownership for the 

transformation. 

• Use employee teams. 

• Involve employees in planning and sharing performance information. 

• Incorporate employee feedback into new policies and procedures. 

• Delegate authority to appropriate organizational levels. 

Build a world-class organization. • Adopt leading practices to build a world-class organization. 

Source: GAO. 

APPENDIX IV: GAO ACTIVE ENGAGEMENTS RELATED TO AVIATION SECURITY

Transportation Security Research and Development Programs at DHS 

and TSA 

Key Questions: (1) What were the strategy and organizational structure for transportation security research and development (R&D) prior to 9/11 and what is the 

current strategy and structure? (2) How do DHS and TSA select their transportation 

security R&D projects and what projects are in their portfolios? (3) What are DHS’s 

and TSA’s goals and strategies for accelerating the development of transportation 

security technologies? (4) What are the nature and scope of coordination of R&D efforts between DHS and TSA, as well as with other public and private sector research organizations? 

Federal Air Marshal Service 

Key Questions: (1) How has the Federal air marshal program evolved, in terms 

of recruiting, training, retention, and operations since its management was transferred to TSA? (2) To what extent has TSA implemented the internal controls needed to meet the program’s operational and management control challenges? (3) To 

what extent has TSA developed plans and initiatives to sustain the program and 

accommodate its future growth and maturation? 

TSA Baggage Screening 

Key Questions: (1) What are the status and associated costs of TSA’s efforts to acquire, install, and operate explosives detection equipment (electronic trace detection 

technology and explosives detection systems) to screen all checked baggage by December 31, 2003? (2) What are the benefits and trade-offs—to include costs, operations, and performance—of using alternative explosives detection technologies currently available for baggage screening? 

Reprogramming of Air Marshal Program Funds 

Key Questions: (1) Describe the internal preparation, review, and approval process 

for DHS’s reprogrammings and, specifically, the process for the May 15 and July 

25 reprogramming requests for the air marshal program. (2) Determine whether an 

impoundment or deferral notice should have been sent to the Congress and any 

other associated legal issues. (3) Identify the implications, for both the air marshal 

program and other programs, of the pending reprogramming request. 

General Aviation Security 

Key Questions: (1) How have security concerns and measures changed at general 

aviation airports since September 11, 2001? (2) What steps has TSA taken to improve general aviation security? 

Background Checks for Banner-Towing Aircraft 

Key Questions: (1) What are the procedures for conducting background and security checks for pilots of small banner-towing aircraft requesting waivers to perform 

stadium overflights? (2) To what extent have these procedures been followed in conducting required background and security checks since September 11, 2001? (3) How 

effective have these procedures been in reducing risks to public safety? 

TSA’s Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System II (CAPPS II) 

Key Questions: (1) How will the CAPPS II system function and what data will be 

needed to make the system operationally effective? (2) What safeguards will be put 

in place to protect the traveling public’s privacy? (3) What systems and measures 

are in place to determine whether CAPPS II will result in improved national secuVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:02 Nov 21, 2014 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00092 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\91310.TXT JACKIE
89 

rity? (4) What impact will CAPPS II have on the traveling public and on the airline 

industry in terms of costs, delays, risks, inconvenience, and other factors? 

TSA Passengers Screening Program 

Key Questions: (1) What efforts have been taken or planned to ensure that passenger screeners comply with Federal standards and other criteria, including efforts 

to train, equip, and supervise passenger screeners? (2) What methods does TSA use 

to test screeners’ performance, and what have been the results of these tests? (3) 

How have the results of tests of TSA passenger screeners compared with the results 

achieved by screeners before September 11, 2001, and at five pilot program airports? 

(4) What actions is TSA taking to remedy performance concerns? 

TSA’s Efforts to Implement Sections 106, 136, and 138 of the Aviation and 

Transportation Security Act 

Key Questions: What is the status of TSA’s efforts to implement (1) section 106 

of the act requiring improved airport perimeter access security, (2) section 136 requiring the assessment and deployment of commercially available security practices 

and technologies, and (3) section 138 requiring background investigations for TSA 

and other airport employees? 

Assessment of the Portable Air Defense Missile Threat 

Key Questions: (1) What are the nature and extent of the threat from man-portable air defense systems (MANPAD)? (2) How effective are U.S. controls on the use 

of exported MANPADs? (3) How do multilateral efforts attempt to stem MANPAD 

proliferation? (4) What types of countermeasures are available to minimize this 

threat and at what cost? 

Airline Assistance Determination of Whether the $5 Billion Provided by 

P.L. 107–42 Was Used to Compensate the Nation’s Major Air Carriers 

for Their Losses Stemming from the Events of Sept. 11, 2001 

Key Questions: (1) Was the $5 billion used only to compensate major air carriers 

for their uninsured losses incurred as a result of the terrorist attacks? (2) Were carriers reimbursed, per the act, only for increases in insurance premiums resulting 

from the attacks? 

TSA’s Use of Sole-Source Contracts 

Key Questions: (1) To what extent does TSA follow applicable acquisition laws and 

policies, including those for ensuring adequate competition? (2) How well does TSA’s 

organizational structure facilitate effective, efficient procurement? (3) How does TSA 

ensure that its acquisition workforce is equipped to award and oversee contracts? 

(4) How well do TSA’s policies and processes ensure that TSA receives the supplies 

and services it needs on time and at reasonable cost? 

RELATED GAO PRODUCTS

Aviation Security 

Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Help Address Security Challenges. GAO–03–843. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2003. 

Transportation Security: Post-September 11th Initiatives and Long-Term Challenges. GAO–03–616T. Washington, D.C.: April 1, 2003. 

Aviation Security: Measures Needed to Improve Security of Pilot Certification Process. GAO–03–248NI. Washington, D.C.: February 3, 2003. (NOT FOR PUBLIC DISSEMINATION) 

Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities and Potential Improvements for the Air Cargo 

System. GAO–03–286NI. Washington, D.C.: December 20, 2002. (NOT FOR PUBLIC 

DISSEMINATION) 

Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities and Potential Improvements for the Air Cargo 

System. GAO–03–344. Washington, D.C.: December 20, 2002. 

Aviation Security: Vulnerability of Commercial Aviation to Attacks by Terrorists 

Using Dangerous Goods. GAO–03–30C. Washington, D.C.: December 3, 2002. 

Aviation Security: Registered Traveler Program Policy and Implementation Issues. 

GAO–03–253. Washington, D.C.: November 22, 2002. 

Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Faces Immediate and 

Long-Term Challenges. GAO–02–971T. Washington, D.C.: July 25, 2002. 

90 

Aviation Security: Information Concerning the Arming of Commercial Pilots. 

GAO–02–822R. Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2002. 

Aviation Security: Deployment and Capabilities of Explosive Detection Equipment. 

GAO–02–713C. Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2002. (CLASSIFIED) 

Aviation Security: Information on Vulnerabilities in the Nation’s Air Transportation System. GAO–01–1164T. Washington, D.C.: September 26, 2001. (NOT FOR 

PUBLIC DISSEMINATION) 

Aviation Security: Information on the Nation’s Air Transportation System 

Vulnerabilities. GAO–01–1174T. Washington, D.C.: September 26, 2001. (NOT FOR 

PUBLIC DISSEMINATION) 

Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities in, and Alternatives for, Preboard Screening Security Operations. GAO–01–1171T. Washington, D.C.: September 25, 2001. 

Aviation Security: Weaknesses in Airport Security and Options for Assigning 

Screening Responsibilities. GAO–01–1165T. Washington, D.C.: September 21, 2001. 

Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Demonstrate Urgent Need to Improve Security at 

the Nation’s Airports. GAO–01–1162T. Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2001. 

Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Illustrate Severe Weaknesses in Aviation Security. 

GAO–01–1166T. Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2001. 

Responses of Federal Agencies and Airports We Surveyed about Access Security Improvements. GAO–01–1069R. Washington, D.C.: August 31, 2001. 

Responses of Federal Agencies and Airports We Surveyed about Access Security Improvements. GAO–01–1068R. Washington, D.C.: August 31, 2001. (RESTRICTED) 

FAA Computer Security: Recommendations to Address Continuing Weaknesses. 

GAO–01–171. Washington, D.C.: December 6, 2000. 

Aviation Security: Additional Controls Needed to Address Weaknesses in Carriage 

of Weapons Regulations. GAO/RCED–00–181. Washington, D.C.: September 29, 

2000. 

FAA Computer Security: Actions Needed to Address Critical Weaknesses That 

Jeopardize Aviation Operations. GAO/T–AIMD–00–330. Washington, D.C.: September 27, 2000. 

FAA Computer Security: Concerns Remain Due to Personnel and Other Continuing 

Weaknesses. GAO/AIMD–00–252. Washington, D.C.: August 16, 2000. 

Aviation Security: Long-Standing Problems Impair Airport Screeners’ Performance. GAO/RCED–00–75. Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2000. 

Aviation Security: Screeners Continue to Have Serious Problems Detecting Dangerous Objects. GAO/RCED–00–159. Washington, D.C.: June 22, 2000. (NOT FOR 

PUBLIC DISSEMINATION) 

Computer Security: FAA Is Addressing Personnel Weaknesses, but Further Action 

Is Required. GAO/AIMD–00–169. Washington, D.C.: May 31, 2000. 

Security: Breaches at Federal Agencies and Airports. GAO–OSI–00–10. Washington, D.C.: May 25, 2000. 

Aviation Security: Screener Performance in Detecting Dangerous Objects during 

FAA Testing Is Not Adequate. GAO/T–RCED–00–143. Washington, D.C.: April 6, 

2000. (NOT FOR PUBLIC DISSEMINATION) 

Combating Terrorism: How Five Foreign Countries Are Organized to Combat Terrorism. GAO/NSIAD–00–85. Washington, D.C.: April 7, 2000. 

Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities Still Exist in the Aviation Security System. GAO/ 

T–RCED/AIMD–00–142. Washington, D.C.: April 6, 2000. 

U.S. Customs Service: Better Targeting of Airline Passengers for Personal Searches 

Could Produce Better Results. GAO/GGD–00–38. Washington, D.C.: March 17, 2000. 

Aviation Security: Screeners Not Adequately Detecting Threat Objects during FAA 

Testing. GAO/T–RCED–00–124. Washington, D.C.: March 16, 2000. (NOT FOR 

PUBLIC DISSEMINATION) 

Aviation Security: Slow Progress in Addressing Long-Standing Screener Performance Problems. GAO/T–RCED–00–125. Washington, D.C.: March 16, 2000. 

91 

Computer Security: FAA Needs to Improve Controls Over Use of Foreign Nationals 

to Remediate and Review Software. GAO/AIMD–00–55. Washington, D.C.: December 

23, 1999. 

Aviation Security: FAA’s Actions to Study Responsibilities and Funding for Airport 

Security and to Certify Screening Companies. GAO/RCED–199–53. Washington, 

D.C.: February 24, 1999. 

Aviation Security: FAA’s Deployments of Equipment to Detect Traces of Explosives. 

GAO/RCED–99–32R. Washington, D.C.: November 13, 1998. 

Air Traffic Control: Weak Computer Security Practices Jeopardize Flight Safety. 

GAO/AIMD–98–155. Washington, D.C.: May 18, 1998. 

Aviation Security: Progress Being Made, but Long-Term Attention Is Needed. GAO/ 

T–RCED–98–190. Washington, D.C.: May 14, 1998. 

Air Traffic Control: Weak Computer Security Practices Jeopardize Flight Safety. 

GAO/AIMD–98–60. Washington, D.C.: April 29, 1998. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE 

–DO NOT DISSEMINATE) 

Aviation Security: Implementation of Recommendations Is Under Way, but Completion Will Take Several Years. GAO/RCED–98–102. Washington, D.C.: April 24, 

1998. 

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Crosscutting Issues. T–NSIAD–98–164. 

Washington, D.C.: April 23, 1998. 

Aviation Safety: Weaknesses in Inspection and Enforcement Limit FAA in Identifying and Responding to Risks. GAO/RCED–98–6. Washington, D.C.: February 27, 

1998. 

Aviation Security: FAA’s Procurement of Explosives Detection Devices. GAO/ 

RCED–97–111R. Washington, D.C.: May 1, 1997. 

Aviation Security: Commercially Available Advanced Explosives Detection Devices. 

GAO/RCED–97-ll9R. Washington, D.C.: April 24, 1997. 

Aviation Safety and Security: Challenges to Implementing the Recommendations of 

the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security. GAO/T–RCED–97–90. 

Washington, D.C.: March 5, 1997. 

Aviation Security: Technology’s Role in Addressing Vulnerabilities. GAO/T–RCED/ 

NSIAD–96–262. Washington, D.C.: September 19, 1996. 

Aviation Security: Oversight of Initiatives Will Be Needed. C–GAO/T–RCED/ 

NSIAD–96–20. Washington, D.C.: September 17, 1996. (CLASSIFIED) 

Aviation Security: Urgent Issues Need to Be Addressed. GAO/T–RCED/NSIAD–96– 

251. Washington, D.C.: September 11, 1996. 

Aviation Security: Immediate Action Needed to Improve Security. GAO/T–RCED/ 

NSIAD–96–237. Washington, D.C.: August 1, 1996. 

Aviation Security: FAA Can Help Ensure That Airports’ Access Control Systems 

Are Cost Effective. GAO/RCED–95–25. Washington, D.C.: March 1, 1995. 

Aviation Security: Development of New Security Technology Has Not Met Expectations. GAO/RCED–94–142. Washington, D.C.: May 19, 1994. 

Aviation Security: Additional Actions Needed to Meet Domestic and International 

Challenges. GAO/RCED–94–38. Washington, D.C.: January 27, 1994. 

Other 

Homeland Security: Information Sharing Responsibilities, Challenges, and Key 

Management Issues. GAO–03–715T. Washington, D.C.: May 3, 2003. 

Information Technology: Terrorist Watch Lists Should Be Consolidated to Promote 

Better Integration and Sharing. GAO–03–322. Washington, D.C.: April 15, 2003. 

Combating Terrorism: Observations on National Strategies Related to Terrorism. 

GAO–03–519T. Washington, D.C.: March 3, 2003. 

Transportation Security Administration: Actions and Plans to Build a Results-Oriented Culture. GAO–03–190. Washington, D.C.: January 17, 2003. 

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Homeland Security. GAO–03–102. Washington, D.C.: January 1, 2003. 

92 

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Transportation. 

GAO–03–108. Washington, D.C.: January 2003. 

National Preparedness: Integration of Federal, State, Local, and Private Sector Efforts Is Critical to an Effective National Strategy for Homeland Security. GAO–02– 

621T. Washington, D.C.: April 11, 2002. 

Homeland Security: Progress Made, More Direction and Partnership Sought. 

GAO–02–490T. Washington, D.C.: March 12, 2002. 

A Model of Human Capital Management. GAO–02–373SP. Washington, D.C.: 

March 2002. 

Senator LOTT. Under the early bird rule, Senator Hollings, you’ll 

get the first shot at questions. 

Senator HOLLINGS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Most advisedly, I got here before we even had a Department of 

Transportation, and the country is very, very fortunate in having 

the team that we do have at the table here testifying this morning. 

This is the best working group I’ve ever seen on the transportation 

needs of the country. 

Having said that, let me get right to the money part, because, 

Admiral Collins, again on Sunday, and then now in the morning 

[Washington Post] paper, business section, you have the Coast 

Guard doing an outstanding job—there’s no question about it—but 

shortchanged on money. You see, you can come up and ask for $87 

billion for some other place, over in Iraq, but you can’t ask for the 

money here, because OMB has got you fellows all lockjawed. This 

is your one chance to get it. That’s our problem here. And the military has a bad habit of saluting and going forward, rather than, 

by God, raising the question. If Secretary Powell had not saluted 

and raised some questions and stuck with them, we wouldn’t be in 

that quagmire. 

But, having said that, Admiral Collins, where do you get, now, 

the automated identification system? I find that the oil tankers and 

the cruise ships have transponders, I guess. We don’t have the towers up yet, do we? 

Admiral COLLINS. No, Senator, we do not. The infrastructure— 

that particular infrastructure is not in place. The two approaches 

to that, a short-term approach, is to embed AIS in all our vessel 

traffic service systems, the existing infrastructure there, and that’s 

unfolding and will be completed through and into 2005. The longerterm effort is to build an infrastructure around our entire coast 

that can take those signals. 

Senator HOLLINGS. Well, we’ve taken care of overall needs there. 

You had a $7.2 billion needs projection. And how much of that have 

you received and how much do you need? 

Admiral COLLINS. The figures on $1.5 and over $7 billion of the 

cost estimates associated with the implementation of the Maritime 

Transportation Security Act, and those would—that would be the 

costs, the estimated costs, that the private sector would bear in implementing the terms and conditions of that act. It would be $1.5 

billion the first year, and over $7 billion over 10 years. That would 

be all the efforts they would need to conduct assessment, develop 

plans, structure exercises, and make associated investments in 

their infrastructure relative to security needs. So that’s the—— 

Senator HOLLINGS. Has the Committee approved all you need? 

You’ve got all you need? 

93 

Admiral COLLINS. We think that the support of the budget 2004 

budget, the President’s budget, would be a great benefit to the 

United States Coast Guard and maritime security. We have over 

a 10 percent—— 

Senator HOLLINGS. I know it’s going to be a great benefit. Do you 

have all you need? 

Admiral COLLINS. I guess you could say you’d never had all 

you—— 

Senator HOLLINGS. Well, what—— 

Admiral COLLINS.—would desire. But I think that’s a very significant—between the 2003 and the 2004 budget, we’ve realized a 

30-percent increase in the budget, going to the United States Coast 

Guard—that’s a significant increase, and we’ll—— 

Senator HOLLINGS. Admiral, most advisedly, I know it’s an increase, but I’ve been listening for years on end that you’re underfunded, and you have been underfunded. Senator Lott, Senator Stevens, and myself are on the Appropriations Committee have to 

steal from 050 from the Defense Department to supplement you. 

And I can’t ever get the testimony from you, other than, ‘‘Oh, it’s 

a wonderful thing, and it’s happy, and it’s going to be a big help.’’ 

Anyway, let me move then to—since my time is limited here— 

Admiral Loy. Again, you’re doing a magnificent job, you and Commissioner Bonner, working as a team. You say we have forged 

working partnerships. But the integrated system of maritime intelligence. Now Customs has pulled out, Coast Guard has opened up 

two new centers, and TSA is planning one of its own. I speak, 

again, from experience. Forty-nine years ago, I served on the Hoover Commission investigating Alan Dulles and J. Edgar Hoover 

and the intelligence activities. They didn’t talk to each other. Tenet 

and Mueller now do talk to each other. But within your own department you all are going off on all directions, and you get that 

little lady from the National Security Agency hollering, ‘‘They 

didn’t have anything specific. They didn’t have anything specific,’’ 

like the terrorist’s going to call up on the phone and tell you they’re 

going to hit the tower. You know what I mean? 

[Laughter.] 

Admiral LOY. Yes, sir. 

Senator HOLLINGS. You’ve got to have these things coordinated 

and the dots joined, and you all are going in all different directions 

rather than forge working partnerships. How is it that Customs 

has pulled out, the Coast Guard has opened two new centers, and 

the TSA, you’ve got planning one intelligence entity of your own? 

Admiral LOY. Sir, what we have in place is what we inherited 

from the FAA, in terms of an intelligence—— 

Senator HOLLINGS. But you’re supposed to clean it up—— 

Admiral LOY. Yes, sir. I’m working hard—— 

Senator HOLLINGS.—and you all are supposed to work together. 

Admiral LOY. I’m working hard to—doing that. There are a variety of requirements that Tom has, for example, at Coast Guard, 

with respect to counter-narcotics or fisheries enforcement that are 

not appropriate for an integrated center that’s focused principally 

on the rest of maritime security. The Judge has things that he and 

I have in common, about cargo, for example, or passenger concerns, 

that perhaps aren’t the responsibility of Tom. 

94 

My concern here is that the functional purpose of maritime security be dealt with, intelligencewise, in the manner you and I have 

talked about many times, and I think that’s not a bricks-and-mortar kind of notion; it’s a collaborative coordination kind of notion. 

And, at the moment, with a brand new department, with an organization being stood up known as TTIC, with lots of other things 

in the intelligence world going on, that sorting process has just not 

come to closure as to whether or not, for example, as the appropriation called for, that $25 million would come to TSA to build an intelligence cell—— 

Senator HOLLINGS. But as Mr. Guerrero just pointed out, you 

need a working agreement. You get on top of that, and rather than 

going all off and starting new intelligence endeavors, hither, thither, and yon, get all together one, because that was one of the big 

misgivings by the Congress itself, that Homeland Security did not 

include, of course, the intelligence efforts of the CIA and the FBI. 

Admiral LOY. Yes, sir. 

Senator HOLLINGS. And now if you all are going all different directions, the same thing that happened on 9/11 can happen again, 

even though you all knew about it. 

Admiral LOY. Yes, sir. And I think the greatest opportunity for 

doing exactly that, Senator Hollings, is—now that Under Secretary 

Libutti is in his chair, he’s responsible for that intelligence analysis 

and information-sharing piece of the new department, that will 

allow us all to centralize one place where we deal with what we’re 

dealing with in the maritime—— 

Senator HOLLINGS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator LOTT. Thank you, Senator Hollings, for your interest and 

involvement in this area for many, many years and for your always 

interesting, entertaining questions and comments. 

Let me see here. Admiral Collins, in the past you have experimented with the aerostat balloon radars and other systems to provide your cutters with large area radar picture surface targets. You 

know, if that can be used at a reasonable cost, wouldn’t it be 

worthwhile to pursue that kind of technology? 

Admiral COLLINS. Clearly, we’re, Senator, looking at ways to enhance what we—as I referred to, maritime domain awareness, and 

that’s a visibility of what’s happening in the maritime, and it’s— 

there are a variety of systems and subsystems that are part of 

that—that can be and should be part of that architecture. For instance, vessel traffic systems in the radar NTVs and so forth are 

part of that system. Our integrated Deepwater system, which 

building out a fleet of cutters in UAVs is part of that, that’s a subsystem of this larger awareness thing where we’ve done some development and demonstration of a high-frequency surface-wave 

radar in the Florida Keys to get a picture of moving traffic. And 

we have a demonstration project that I know that Senator Stevens 

is very, very interested in, and it’s using UAVs in Alaska. So we’re 

approaching this in a multifaceted way, looking at various sensor 

options that will give us the visibility that we need. 

And I know that the United States Navy, NORTHCOM, and others are very, very interested in that national surveillance architecture, and that’s what we really need. I don’t think there’s any one 

silver bullet, but we need a national maritime surveillance archiVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:02 Nov 21, 2014 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00098 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\91310.TXT JACKIE
95 

tecture. We don’t have that now. And we’re going to work very, 

very hard to create that picture. 

I have just set up a program office within Coast Guard headquarters, which we call the Maritime Domain Awareness Program 

Office, to develop specifically that overarching architecture where 

all these systems would plug in and give us the integrated picture 

that we need. 

Senator LOTT. All right. You mentioned the Deepwater Project. 

How is that coming? I mean, I know you’ve made some preliminary 

decisions, and you’ve got some companies that are working toward, 

you know, producing all this additional equipment you need—— 

Admiral COLLINS. Yes, sir. 

Senator LOTT.—cutters and everything. And it has been, you 

know, budgeted by the Administration, but each year, we’ve had to 

move it up, and you’re already beginning to fall behind. 

Admiral COLLINS. Yes, sir. We—— 

Senator LOTT. We need to try to make up some ground this year. 

Would you give us a specific report on that? 

Admiral COLLINS. Yes, sir. Of course, we awarded that contract 

last June, I think, a very, very positive or—in a strategic partnership with—Northrop Grumman and Lockheed Martin are the jointventure folks orchestrating that, the integrators. A lot of progress 

in the ship-design task order for initial engineering and development of the two Casa aircraft that are a part of that program, and 

more to follow—110 patrol boats going into Lockport and Bollinger 

Shipyards to get stretched into 123 vessels and some improvements 

in the C4ISRs, a lot of movement, a lot of very, very good progress. 

One of the issues, of course, is the capital cash flow associated 

with this project and how—and we are, as you noted, a little behind the initial design that said that to get to a 20- to 25-year program, which is the long program, that you’d need, at minimum, 

$500 million a year in 1998 dollars to meet that timeline. At the 

present clip, we’re about—and I think there are verified by GAO 

as a number—we’re $202 million behind that timeline through 

2004, and I know both the House and the Senate have increased 

the President’s request for Deepwater in recognition of that hole in 

the road, so to speak, that we have. 

Senator LOTT. All right. We’ll keep pushing that to try to be 

helpful, but I do think that the success of this program will depend, 

to a large degree, on how closely you manage it and stay on top 

of it now. And so I hope you will continue to do that. 

Admiral Loy, I mentioned, in my opening statement, you know, 

my concern about AIP funds going for security costs. And, obviously, the Committee and Congress has indicated a desire not for 

that to continue. Would you like to comment on that? If you’re not 

going to get AIP funds, are you, you know, getting what you do 

need for airport security from other accounts? 

Admiral LOY. Sir, to get back to the Senator’s number that he 

used in his opening statement, I think you used a $5 billion estimate that may have come out of the GAO reports, as well as other 

places. Yes, sir. 

First of all, with respect to AIP, it was an enormously valuable 

jumpstart kind of notion that in the interest of the airports and all 

of us across the country sharing in the burden of jumpstarting 

96 

aviation security, AIP funds in 2002 and 2003 were used in the 

fashion you described. We have no intention of continuing to depend on AIP money, which is there for another purpose, and we 

understand that to be the case. The greatest boost that allows us 

to not go there any longer, Senator Lott is the recognition by the 

Congress and by the Administration that letters of intent, the same 

kind of tool used in the AIP structure, can be used literally out of 

our own appropriation to fund some of these challenges that continue to exist across the country. Senator Hollings’ number of $5 billion, I would offer that comes 

probably more from the airport directors and their summation than 

from what I’d call a bit more objective read. The DOT IG’s read in 

that regard is somewhere between $2 billion and $3 billion to deal 

with the cleanup process, if you will. We, as an organization, when 

we installed this EDS equipment across the country, left a bit of 

a wake behind us in a number of different places. This estimate is 

between $2 billionand $3 billion to go and clean that up. So far, 

we have issued, as you know, sir, six letters of intent to major airports in the country—adds up to about $670 million over the course 

of the next four or five budget cycles. But the good thing is there— 

it’s not all capital up front; it’s a reimbursable kind of a process, 

like AIP. 

Senator LOTT. Well, now, let me—I guess this is a statement 

more than a question, but I would hope that you would apply common sense in the things that you direct the airports to do. Some 

of the things I have been made familiar with that you’ve requested 

or ordered don’t make common sense, like reinforce that entrance 

wall of a small remote airport. I mean, a terrorist couldn’t find the 

place, let alone blow the wall up. And also be careful about taking 

over local law enforcement stuff. When you tell an airport that 

you’ve got to do more about security in the parking area that’s 

away from the terminal, if I were the local people, I’d tell you, ‘‘OK, 

you pay for it, because we’re not going to do what you dictate to 

us. We don’t think it makes common sense.’’ I just hope we would 

use some common sense and practicalities, and remember that 

these people, local people, have to come up with these costs from 

somewhere and—tell you no, unless you can justify it or come up 

with the money. 

And I do think, in a lot of areas, you’ve gobbled up a lot of space 

that really is not necessary. You know, maybe you needed it at the 

beginning, but you need to go back and evaluate that. Those airports have other uses for that space. 

I don’t know how many pilots you’ve really trained, but I understand it’s only about a hundred. A year ago, I urged you to use 

some of the same people that train our Special Forces, our Delta 

Force, our—oh, the guys—well, the Special Forces, let’s leave it 

there. You didn’t—that’s done in the private sector. You said, ‘‘Oh, 

no, we’ll do it.’’ It hasn’t worked very well. I would urge you to go 

back and let the same people that trained the SEALs and the Special Forces, you know, train these pilots. It, you know, would take 

about 2 weeks, maybe. And you’ve trained about a—I don’t know, 

maybe a hundred in a year. 

One final point. On the ports and security ports, the size of the 

port is not as important as the threat, what’s coming into that port. 

97 

If you just do it on the basis of size, I mean, you just come to the 

biggest port right on down. But if you have a port, for instance, 

that’s got—right close to the mouth of the channel, national security components, Coast Guard cutters, oil refineries, that would be 

a more dangerous port than one that might be bigger located in another area. So be careful not to neglect some of the medium- or 

smaller-sized ports that have a higher risk prospect. 

Admiral LOY. Sir, if I could comment just once—on one or two 

of those notions. 

The last one, I could not agree with you more. The approach is 

to weigh very carefully, together with the Coast Guard and all the 

other players that are a part of those decisions, is this an out-load 

port, is this an economically important port, is this a port that 

deals precisely with taking the opportunity to think through the 

kind of things that you’re mentioning. 

And I think you’re going, sir, toward the ultimate notion of port 

security grants and being able to make sure that we’re not just exclusively giving them out to the largest ports, based on the thinking pattern that you just described. That’s precisely the kind of 

weighted algorithm, if you will, that we’re using to make those decisions. 

As it relates to FFDO, sir, the Federal Flight Deck Officer Program, we will probably have about 500 trained by the end of this 

month. We have used every nickel that was provided to us in that 

program to do that training this year. We have $25 million in the 

President’s request and, I think, surviving in both the Senate and 

the House mark for next year, which will train every volunteer 

that has identified themselves as being interested in the program. 

So the Federal Flight Deck Officer Program is on track. It is a 

high-quality program that we can all be proud of. 

Senator LOTT. Thank you very much. 

Senator Lautenberg? 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

I think it’s fair to say that we’ve got a very distinguished group 

of leaders here, and we appreciate the difficulty of the task that 

you’ve taken. But I also commend you on your policy to swallow 

hard and go forward, because there are all kinds of questions 

raised about whether or not we sacrifice something out of Customs 

in order to take care of security, and what does that mean by way 

of tax collections, cargo inspections, et cetera. And I’ll try to ask my 

questions quickly so we can get quick answers and I don’t run too 

much—I know the red lights permit continuing conversation, 

but—— 

Something Senator Lott just said struck me, and he comes from 

a port state or a coastal state, as I do, and that is the high-threat 

areas. Now, what better evidence do we need of a high threat than 

the attack on the Trade Centers? What better example do we need 

of a high-threat area than to look at the volume of traffic that goes 

through the Port of New York/New Jersey? What better example 

do we need of a high-threat area when you have all of these airplanes coming into three major airports plus a couple of relatively 

smaller ones? So I think when we talk about delineating dollars for 

the right places, we have to look at the New York/New Jersey area. 

And I’ll tell you, on the formula for distribution that we’ve got, we 

98 

are really left out in the pasture, and it’s not fair and it’s not sensible not to go ahead and reexamine the allocation of the funds for 

security. 

Admiral Loy and Admiral Collins, we’re all friends of the Coast 

Guard. I very much appreciated what you did. And Senator Hollings is a fan of the Coast Guard, as well. And we always wondered—because we served in Appropriations together in my former 

life here, and you were always getting new tasks, always getting 

new assignments, whether it was pollution control or illegal immigrants or manifests or navigation aids, you name it, and we kept 

on reducing the size of the budget, and I never could quite understand how you did it, Admiral Loy, in your day, and now Admiral 

Collins. And I see things as small as rubber boats, inflatables, with 

a couple of Coast Guard’s people going up and down the Hudson 

River helping to keep our ports safe. 

So I would—you know, I don’t want you to come here and crow 

about what you don’t have. You’ve taken it with a semi-smile, Admiral Collins, but I’d like to sneak in there and find out what you 

really think about your budget. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator LAUTENBERG. But I want to ask, Admiral Loy, Commissioner Bonner, my colleagues introduced legislation to protect aircraft against SAM attacks, but it would take a few years to upgrade all the airliners with proper anti-SAM technology. What do 

we do now, beside worry? And I don’t ever mean to trivialize your 

efforts. What, realistically, can we do to protect the perimeters of 

our airports? 

Admiral LOY. Let me take a first stab at it, sir. First of all, we 

have instituted a pretty aggressive assessment program for all of 

the major airports. We’re done with the category-X airports, well 

through the inventory of category-1 airports, and have focused, as 

well, on those 17 airports, that are foreign, from which most highprofile aircraft are coming to the United States. So the notion of 

those places where U.S. carriers are operating most of the time carrying heavy loads of people from place to place, the assessment effort is what I’d call one of the three legs of this stool of attack on 

the MANPADS issue on the shoulder-fired weapons issue. And that 

is about tactical countermeasures. What kind of things can we do 

in a tactical countermeasures sense to do a better job than has 

been done in the past? 

In the wake of those assessments, an engagement effort with the 

local Federal Security director and his team or her team, with local 

law enforcement, with state law enforcement, has been engaged at 

each one of those major airports, with the view that we would be 

identifying logical places where such a missile could be launched, 

and dealing as constructively as we can with either perimeter security associated with it, with lighting, with fencing, with cameras, 

with roving patrols, or whatever might be appropriate that that 

local team takes on. That’s one piece. 

The second piece is about nonproliferation. In other words, in the 

same vein that we have been concerned about international nonproliferation of any kind of a weapons system, we want to be as 

aggressive with respect to that in MANPADS as we can possibly 

be. That is, we’ve all heard numbers of how many hundreds of 

99 

thousands of these things are actually in inventory around the 

world. Inducing the international community to hold onto that inventory, to identify where each and every one of them is, and deal 

with manufacturing and distribution things that are under the control of major government forces, whether it’s buyback programs, 

whether it’s destruction programs. That second—— 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Admiral Loy, I hate to interrupt, but I 

must, only because if we tell the public-at-large that we’re going to 

inventory the four or five hundred thousand of these things, et 

cetera, et cetera, it’s not really comforting. And I’m not criticizing 

you. The magnitude of the problem that we’re dealing with here is 

something almost beyond comprehension, because if we look at the 

SAM program and then, taking Mr. Guerrero’s report from GAO 

where he says according to TSA solutions that can be implemented 

relatively easily at the Nation’s commercial airports are not practical at 19,000 general aviation airports. And I use a lot of the general aviation. 

Now, it would be awful if one of our airplanes or another nation’s 

airplanes was struck by a missile, but somebody can get into a single-engine plane, and if they carry enough explosive in that airplane to go down to one of our nuclear plants and decide that suicide is the way for them to go, we are practically helpless to guard 

against that. The one thing that I would hope is, maybe a system 

can be introduced at these general aviation airports that says you 

can’t even takeoff—provided there’s a manager there; a lot of these 

places don’t have a manager, rely on the pilot to light the runway 

lights, but if there is a manager there—is to demand that any 

flight that takes off has some kind of a log that they have to fill, 

or be introduced to a human being, at least you know who’s getting 

out there. It’s a very complicated—— 

Admiral LOY. That’s exactly the direction we’re going with respect to the GA community, sir, with respect to background investigations on players that are always at the airport, local knowledge 

of who’s getting in that airplane, tie-downs required when—you 

know, just so that any terrorist can’t go and find that aircraft, get 

in it, and take it where he wants to go. 

To close the MANPADS thing, sir, the most important leg is the 

technical countermeasures piece, which is what Ms. Boxer’s bill is 

about, which is what your concern is about. That is probably, in my 

estimation, clearly one of the most important projects being undertaken by the combination of DOD and DHS to come to closure on 

what we’re going to do with technical countermeasures. 

Mr. BONNER. Can I just add one thing, Senator, just very briefly? 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Sure. 

Mr. BONNER. There’s no one solution, but another thing you want 

to do here is to prevent those terrorists that might get that general 

aviation airplane or the terrorist who might bring a terrorist weapon into the United States, like a SAM–7 or a MANPAD, and you 

want to do everything we can to be able to identify and detect that 

when it’s being brought into the country. And we have systems, 

we’ve increased our staffing to do that, and we use a targeted system to identify both the high-risk people and the high-risk shipments into the country. So it’s just another layer of things that 

we’re doing to prevent a MANPAD attack. 

100 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Mr. Chairman, I’ll conclude, because the 

red light is on, and usually in traffic that means speed up. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator LAUTENBERG. What I would like to ask here is, the Department—— 

Well, you see it—don’t get in the crossroad too early—— 

[Laughter.] 

Senator LAUTENBERG. The Department of Homeland Security has 

proposed, even as we labor to make this program ever more effective, cutting the port security grant program by $105 million. In 

the interest of security, I have to raise the question about why, at 

the three major airports—that’s Newark, JFK, and La Guardia— 

they reduced the Federal complement of law enforcement personnel 

from 64 to 19. I mean, that’s kind of going backward. Why are 

the—did the Air Marshal Program wind up as a target for cuts, 

and suddenly there was a reverse field here that said, ‘‘Now, wait 

a second. We’re going to take other people from other departments 

and train them as air marshals.’’ Is there no price to the other departments when we grab people from one and put them in another, 

when we train them to be air marshals, when, in fact, they’re Customs people, or otherwise? 

Admiral LOY. Shall I take a shot at that, sir? 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Please, somebody. 

Admiral LOY. Sure. The shift of the Federal Air Marshal Program from TSA to BICE, the law enforcement gathered functional 

centralization effort that both Under Secretary Hutchinson and 

Secretary Ridge have decided to do, was a move that takes advantage of a number of things and I don’t believe disadvantages TSA 

at the other end of the day, in terms of becoming, if you will, a demanding customer of BICE services about Federal air marshals, 

when heretofore we’ve been able to schedule them on our own. 

I’ll let the Judge or anyone else answer the question about surge 

capability, which is, in fact, what the Secretary has in mind. He 

is so concerned, as we all are, about the path of aviation-related 

intelligence things going by, that he wanted surge capability to be 

available to him if we felt that we needed more air marshals for 

whatever the short period of time might be. He feels that the relocation to the BICE bureau offers a chance for cross-training among 

Federal law enforcement officers that could potentially provide that 

surge, and, further, to get the Federal air marshals out of the absolute uniqueness of only going to the air and back on a daily basis, 

and offer career-path adjustments and opportunities for them elsewhere inside the BICE location. 

So that’s the thinking pattern behind why we sent the Federal 

air marshals to the BICE bureau. 

Senator LOTT. Senator Snowe? 

STATEMENT OF HON. OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM MAINE 

Senator SNOWE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank all 

of you for being here today. 

Beginning with you, Admiral Loy, I know our director in Portland, Maine, testified during a Senate Governmental Affairs hearing recently that there is little or no coordination between the FedVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:02 Nov 21, 2014 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00104 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\91310.TXT JACKIE
101 

eral Government and that his department comes to protecting the 

Port of Portland. In fact, he said, ‘‘We find ourselves in the unique 

position of acting as mediators between various rulemaking bodies. 

On my desk, I have a plethora of paper designed to help me secure 

the port. These rules cover everything from the height of fences to 

the height of lettering on badges. They’re issued by agencies without regard or knowledge of what other agencies are regulating.’’ 

I understand we’re obviously in a transitional phase here, but 

what can we do to have a better order and system involved among 

all the agencies with respect to the types of rules and regulations 

that are imposed on, in this case, in port directors and transportation directors? Because that is an issue and has been problematic, I know, in the past. But I think it is important to have some 

kind of consistency, some kind of organization where they can respond to, you know, one agency—— 

Admiral LOY. Absolutely. 

Senator SNOWE.—one individual. 

Admiral LOY. Absolutely. The notion of what kind of cross-modal 

oversight and responsibilities should be borne by a single agency 

in the Federal establishment, if you will, is part and parcel behind 

what TSA is supposed to be all about. That was the congressional 

intent, that was why the President signed the bill, and that’s why 

we exist. So to the degree we can take and fill in the blanks on 

that Rubik’s cube chart that I showed before, that is the intended 

purpose for all of that. 

On the other hand, as it relates to a port I think it’s quite clear 

that the Coast Guard is the lead Federal agency with respect to 

that kind of oversight. The captain of the port is the fellow, locally, 

that should represent, if you will, the aggregate interest of Federal 

requirements for that particular port across the country. The harbor safety committees, or whatever functional entity serves as a 

harbor safety committee in each and every port, usually has the 

captain of the port sitting at the head of the table able to make 

good consensus judgments from all the players that are there. 

I’d be happy, by the way, to engage this particular gentleman or 

lady with respect to those issues you described and see what we 

can do to work that out. 

Senator SNOWE. Right. He was recommending—and it would be 

interesting hearing from you, Admiral Collins, as well, about—he’s 

proposing a representative of some of the critical non-Federal agencies in each port to have top security clearance so they can respond 

to the threats, as well. 

Admiral LOY. Sure. 

Senator SNOWE. Because who currently is aware of the types of 

threats that might exist in the ports and can receive that information? Is there anybody who’s designated? Is it the port director? 

Who receives that information? I gather it’s given from you, Admiral Collins. 

Admiral COLLINS. Right. The port under MTSA, of course, the 

captain of the port, as Admiral Loy has indicated, is designated as 

the Federal Maritime Security Coordinator in the port and is the 

clearinghouse for that kind of information. And it’s true, and I have 

great hopes and expectations for the port security committees that 

are required to be established under MTSA, chaired by each capVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:02 Nov 21, 2014 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00105 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\91310.TXT JACKIE
102 

tain of the port, that they become that kind of clearinghouse, with 

very diverse representation from the port members, that decide 

those kind of things and become a clearinghouse of information in 

and through the port. 

So I think, as we implement MTSA and the rulemaking, I think 

we’re going to see some real positive coordination. There’s going to 

be an overarching area security plan for the port, individual facility 

plans that each facility will do, vessel plans, and all integrated and 

reviewed at that port security committee, and that port security 

committee being the funnel for that information, up and down. 

Incidentally, all those port security committees are, even though 

the bulk of the rule goes into effect 1 July of next summer, most 

of those port security committees around the country have been established, membership is being determined, and meetings are happening. So I think that—again, no one silver bullet to information 

exchange, but I think that is going to be a very, very positive development for information sharing. 

Senator SNOWE. And when is—— 

Admiral LOY. On that, Senator Snowe, if I may—— 

Senator SNOWE. Yes. 

Admiral LOY.—ma’am. You asked about classification. I think 

that’s a legitimate issue. In the aviation environment, each of the 

airlines has a security director, properly cleared, that we can engage, as necessary, in passing information of a classified nature 

when we have it and when it’s appropriate to be passed. That 

needs to be part of the scene at the port, as well. And MTSA 

notionalizes that in the construct Tom just described there should 

be a number of players with adequate clearances that can accept 

classified information and take care of the port in that regard. 

Senator SNOWE. I appreciate that. 

How would you grade the port security threat now, in terms of 

the fact that we have taken sufficient or insufficient mitigating 

steps at this point? 

Admiral LOY. I think each of us probably has an answer to that, 

but first let me—I would say we are significantly better off than 

we were on the occasion of 9/11/01. The description of CSI and 

CTPAT, the kind programs that Judge Bonner has mentioned here 

with respect to pushing our borders out, that’s a concept the three 

of us have bought into—— 

Senator SNOWE. Right. 

Admiral LOY.—100 percent. The notions Tom was just describing 

on MTSA and how that’s going to play out in the port, this is all 

a sort of step function on the way to where we want to be. We’re 

certainly not there yet, but we’re an awful lot better off than we 

were, with a good game plan in place to get where we need to be. 

Senator SNOWE. I’m certainly—I know that Customs, Mr. 

Bonner, for example, has initiated their container security initiative in assigning 20 inspectors to foreign ports, but that seems like 

a very minuscule number considering the number of foreign ports 

that exist, and also requires the acquiescence and the approval of 

host countries to allow our inspectors on their docks to inspect the 

containers before they are loaded on, which obviously would be 

preferable, rather than waiting until those ships are coming to the 

United States. 

103 

Mr. BONNER. Well, we’re at 16 foreign ports right now, so we 

have it operational. And the number is probably closer to about a 

hundred U.S. Customs and Border Protection personnel that are 

stationed overseas that are working with our host nation counterparts for the container security initiative. 

It’s important to realize what they’re doing. They’re principally— 

you know, they are principally over there to do the targeting and 

work with the host nation to identify particularly the high-risk containers for terrorism security issues. And then our host nation actually, in each and every instance, has agreed to go forward and 

do the security check of those containers, which is both for radiation detection and running them through large-scale X-ray type 

scanning machines to make sure that those containers do not pose 

a risk to U.S. seaports. 

So we have implemented it. The surprising thing, Senator 

Snowe—and I don’t know that it’s so surprising—but the reality is 

that we started off targeting or identifying the 20 largest foreign 

seaports, in terms of the shipments of containers to the United 

States. We have agreements from the countries that represent 19 

of those 20 to implement the container security initiative. And, as 

I said, we’ve actually now have expanded the number of agreements, and we—it’s not just something we’re talking about; it’s 

something that we’ve actually implemented now in 16 foreign 

ports, and we’re expanding. We’ll have it up and operated in over 

20 of the top foreign ports. 

That’s important, because just the top 20 foreign ports alone represent almost—over two thirds, almost 70 percent, of every cargo 

container that’s shipped to the United States—and there’s 7 million 

a year—originate from or are trans-shipped through just those 20 

ports. So we’ve made great progress. 

Now, the reason why is that those other countries are willing to 

do this because they recognize it’s in their own interest to protect, 

essentially, the trade lanes between Rotterdam and U.S. ports, or 

from Singapore and U.S. ports, or for Yokohama, Hong Kong, Bremerhaven, and those places. They recognize it’s in their interest to 

protect these shipping lanes. It also provides us with a protection 

for what is the primary system of global trade, which is containerized shipping to U.S. seaports. 

So it’s working very well, and there’s a tremendous acceptance 

of this by other nations of the world, so far. 

Senator SNOWE. And just one other issue, and I appreciate it. 

Admiral Loy, pre-clearance at Canadian airports, is that something that you intend to address? That does concern me. Of the 

seven airports in Canada that have pre-clearance, and in Vancouver, they even have an in-transit pre-clearance, so that other— 

so that people can bypass Canadian Customs. 

Admiral LOY. We pre-clear, actually—— 

Senator SNOWE. You do the pre-clearances. 

Admiral LOY.—Senator Snowe. It’s actually Customs and Border 

Protection, which is now both Customs and Immigration Inspectors. 

We have a pre-clearance for both Customs and Immigration purposes at all of the seven largest international airports in Canada, 

so we actually do pre-clear there—actually in several other counVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:02 Nov 21, 2014 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00107 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\91310.TXT JACKIE
104 

tries, as well. And that gives us an opportunity to identify people 

that pose a potential threat to the United States, identify them 

there, deny admissibility or take other appropriate law enforcement action with respect to those interviews—individuals. We 

have, right now—it’s maybe 150, 160—no, it’s probably—actually, 

with Customs and Immigration, probably closer to about 300 U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection Inspectors at the Canadian airports 

that pre-clear, both pre-screen and pre-clear, for Customs and Immigration purposes, at those airports. 

Senator SNOWE. Well, given the recent report that came out regarding the huge gaps in the security systems in Canada, it raises 

those issues as to whether or not it’s sufficient enough to ensure 

that anybody who poses a risk to our security enters the country— 

doesn’t enter the country. 

Admiral LOY. Well, I know, but we have a chance in Canada actually to stop them—— 

Senator SNOWE. OK. 

Admiral LOY.—in Canada, rather than waiting for them to actually get on an airplane headed for the U.S., which actually gives 

us—— 

Senator SNOWE. They’re all screened. 

Admiral LOY. They are all screened. 

Senator SNOWE. OK. 

Admiral LOY. Each and every person is. And we also have advance information, so we’re also doing some risk analysis with respect to people. But everybody is screened, and we have the right 

to question and to carry out searches of their luggage, both carryon and checked luggage, before they leave—before they get on 

planes from Canada for the U.S. 

Senator SNOWE. Thank you. 

Senator LOTT. Senator Breaux? 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN B. BREAUX, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM LOUISIANA 

Senator BREAUX. Let me thank the panel members. Every one of 

you are distinguished public servants. We’ve worked with you for 

a number of years. 

Admiral Loy, you mentioned something early in your testimony 

about the weakest link and trying to find it. If I were looking for 

the weakest link in our security system in transportation, I’d look 

to the maritime ports, and I think I’d find it there. The Administration has requested $87 billion for Afghanistan 

and for Iraq, partially for security purposes in that country. The 

Administration has requested zero for grants to the ports. And yet 

the legislation that we have passed have required the ports to do 

innumerable activities that are going to cost money. And I think 

that that is a huge hole that we have created, and a burden on the 

local ports. Aviation, I think, is in fairly good shape. We’ve got Federal officials running around all of the airports, and we’ve got 

screeners, we’ve got Federal officials. We don’t have that type of 

system in the ports. There’s a great deal that needs to be done. 

And, for the life of me, I cannot understand the justification for not 

a dollar, not a dime, being requested for new grants for the maritime ports. And every single one of them—and you’ve met with 

105 

them, and Admiral Collins has, and we all have—there’s a huge 

need. And to come before the Congress and say zero dollars for 

grants to maritime ports is unacceptable. I think it is unconscionable as a matter of priorities, considering what we’re doing in other 

parts of the world, which many of us will try and support. 

But there’s a great need here in this country. And I’m all for improving port security in Iraq, but I’m also for securing the Port of 

New Orleans and the Port of Los Angeles and the Port of New 

York. And we’re not doing enough domestically in that area. 

Can I have a comment from anybody about that, in terms of priorities? 

Admiral LOY. Senator Breaux, yours is a voice that is very carefully listened to. I will carry that message back to the boss, as it 

relates to the request on the part of budgets as they are coming 

forward to the Congress. I will also recognize that over the course 

of the last two budget cycles, the Congress has recognized port security grants and bus grants and highway grants and other such 

things as being enormously important. 

I think, sir, we’re in this classic place we’ve been often in our 

country, where a tragedy happened, and it was immediately followed by a relatively emotional piece of legislation, or multiple 

pieces of legislation, and then 8 months later the sticker shock set 

in, in terms of sorting out what was needed to be done and what 

was the resource base necessary to do that. And in the case of TSA, 

of course, we didn’t even have a base by which to make—you know, 

from which to make marginal adjustments. We literally had to create that. 

That discussion is still, I think, going on and often takes—as it 

did, for example, when OPA 90 happened, in the aftermath of the 

Exxon Valdez hitting the rocks in Prince William Sound—it took 

us 10 years to sort out the regulatory regimes that were necessary 

to deal with that. 

Senator BREAUX. Well, the sticker shock apparently has not set 

in on Iraq. 

Admiral LOY. Sir. 

Senator BREAUX. You’ve also requested on the Automatic Identification System, which we all felt was a good idea before 9/11, to 

know where these ships are coming from, who they are, what their 

cargo is. And we all agreed, even before 9/11, this is the right thing 

to do. We’d like to know where the ships are coming from, with 

greater detail of what’s in the cargo, who’s manning the ships, et 

cetera, why they’re sitting out there. An Automatic Identification 

System would help us in that. 

And, Admiral Collins, you talked about how the towers aren’t 

there, and I note that the budget request is a million dollars. One 

million dollars, for the entire country for the Automatic Identification System, AIS. That is not going to get it done. That’s not going 

to get you started, in a real significant way, in putting into play 

a system for the maritime ports to allow us to know where the 

ships are coming from. We know where the airplanes are coming 

from. We know where they’re going. We track them constantly. But 

we’re not doing that to the ships, and we’re not going to have 

enough money for the ports to do what we are requiring them to 

do. 

106 

So if I was looking at the weakest link, it wouldn’t be at the airports. If I was a terrorist, I certainly wouldn’t want to try something that dealt with aviation, because of all the security we have 

on the ground, around the airports, on the airplanes, with marshals. We do not have anything comparable in the maritime ports 

of this country. It is a huge problem. And if it’s a huge problem, 

I don’t see the wherewithal, financially, to address it. It’s a huge 

vacuum. I mean, I don’t know how better to say it, and I don’t 

know what we can do about it. I mean, Congress is going to have 

to come in and say, ‘‘Look, get some priorities here.’’ $87 billion for 

Iraq is probably going to get adopted. But zero for ports? It’s not 

a good balance. 

Mr. GUERRERO. Senator Breaux, if I could put the needs in perspective, in our testimony, and also in our report, we have a table 

that shows, for selected grants, including grants for ports, the 

amounts that have been requested exceeded the amounts available 

by a factor of eight to one. 

Senator BREAUX. Well, I—— 

Mr. GUERRERO. So the demand is very, very—— 

Senator BREAUX.—understand that. But if you have zero—I 

mean, there’s nothing out there. I mean, the Coast Guard has estimated, as I understand it, that the ports would require $1.1 billion 

in security investments if we’re talking about them implementing 

it—1.1 billion is what this gentleman says is going to be needed for 

the ports of this country to address their security needs, from a 

Federal standpoint. And we have requested—you have requested, 

the government has requested, zero. 

So we can talk about how the requests greatly exceed the 

amount of money that is there, but when the Coast Guard says 

$1.1 billion is needed for security to the ports, and we request zero, 

there’s a huge disconnect. There’s a huge disconnect between what 

the Coast Guard is saying is needed for the maritime ports and 

what is being requested by others who make the request. Now, we 

can say that there is—if you let the ports make the request, you 

add it all up, it’s going to be a gazillion dollars. But when the Coast 

Guard tell me it’s 1.1, and the Administration says zero, that’s the 

huge disconnect. 

Mr. GUERRERO. Senator, I think I was trying to agree with the 

point you were making, that there is that huge disconnect, and I 

think the data shows that. 

Senator BREAUX. Well, I mean, that—and I’m not beating on you 

guys, because you are the people we work with the closest. I mean, 

you understand the problem. But, I mean, there’s only so much 

money, unless you don’t worry about the deficit at all, which is 

$500 billion, and just keep adding to it. But for us to add another 

$87 billion for Afghanistan and Iraq for security, et cetera, and for 

rebuilding them, and to say we’re going to allocate zero to the 

ports, when our own Coast Guard says it’s a $1.1 billion requirement, there’s something missing somewhere. There’s a huge disconnect, in terms of priorities. 

And I thank you for your diligence. 

Senator LOTT. Senator Boxer? 

107 

STATEMENT OF HON. BARBARA BOXER, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM CALIFORNIA 

Senator BOXER. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, this is not a happy hearing. I think the people 

sitting here are good public servants. But this is not a happy hearing, because, to say it directly, we are under-funding homeland defense. And you can sugarcoat it, and you can do everything you 

want, but that’s the truth. And just as the President came to the 

microphone, finally, and said, ‘‘We need tens of billions of dollars 

for Iraq,’’ someone has to come to the microphone and say what we 

need to keep our country safe, because September 11 changed everything, and this was the first attack of this nature in the continental United States. 

Now, Senator Breaux did it today with port security. He basically 

said the emperor has no clothes. We’re asking for all this money, 

more money to protect the ports in Iraq, than has been asked to 

protect us. 

Now, I’m not going to ask you your questions on whether you 

agree or disagree with the budget. You’re dealing with what the 

Administration has told you you’ve got. So I’m not going to put you 

in that situation. I mean, this is something that happens under 

Democratic and Republican administrations. The people who are 

fighting for their areas, you know, sometimes lose the fight around 

the table. 

But we’ve got to be honest with the American people. We are vulnerable. Have we made some progress? Yes. Can we make more? 

Yes. Should we? Yes. And it is a question of priorities. 

You know, when I go home, and I ask the people in my state, 

who have earned millions of dollars, if they need a tax cut or they 

would prefer it if their homeland was safe, let me tell you, to the 

person, they say, ‘‘Oh, you’ve got to be kidding. I’ve got enough. I’ve 

got enough plasma TVs to last a lifetime. I’ve got enough homes. 

I’ve got enough yachts. I’ve got enough airplanes.’’ And, let me tell 

you, a lot of those people live in my state. Good, successful people. 

They don’t want more money in their pocket. They want more 

money in your pocket. And port security is clearly necessary. 

I just did a tour of the ports in California during this month, Mr. 

Chairman. It was really fascinating. All the way from the top of my 

state, Crescent City, down to Long Beach, in this particular tour. 

I’ve been to San Diego. I’ve been to every other port. And I have 

to say, it’s all the same; they’re worried. They’re doing their best, 

but they’re very worried. 

And I want to show you what the FBI told us about the threat 

of shoulder-fired missiles. And they told us this in April—May 

2002. Show it so that Senator Lott can see it. ‘‘Given al Qaeda’s 

demonstrated objective to target the U.S. airline industry, its access to U.S. and Russian-made MANPAD systems, and recent apparent targeting of U.S.-led military forces in Saudi Arabia, law enforcement agencies in the U.S. should remain alert to the potential 

use of MANPADS against U.S. aircraft.’’ That is a direct warning 

to us. 

Now, since that time, there have been attempts to shoot down an 

Israeli commercial airliner and several of our military planes— 

most recently, the other day, a C–17 aircraft made in my state, an 

108 

incredible, incredible plane. Now, there but for the grace of God, 

those attempts were not successful. 

Honest to God, I am begging you that you need to do all you can 

so we are not back in here after we have seen a plane brought 

down, or perhaps hit in some way, the airline industry on its back, 

and people saying, ‘‘You know what? It isn’t worth it. I’ll do a conference call. I’ll drive to grandma’s house.’’ 

It is unbelievable to me the pace at which we are moving. Now, 

we have companies telling us if they were able to move forward, 

they could begin installation within a few months. And I know, Admiral, that you care about this. And there is—I have spoken to Secretary Ridge, and he cares about this. But we are fooling ourselves. 

If we don’t put the money behind it, nothing will happen. We saw 

what this great country could do. 

We saw what we did in World War II with the ‘‘greatest generation.’’ We saw this great generation of military men and women, 

what they did here, how we moved mountains to get them over 

there and how we won the military victory really quickly. Lots of 

other problems that we didn’t plan for, as well. 

But this is staring in our face, this FBI warning, and I am just 

so concerned that we are not treating this in the right way. I’ve 

been around here long enough—ten years in the House, ten years 

in the Senate. I served on the Military Committee in the House 

and also the Government Operations Committee, where we 

oversaw the FAA. I know bureaucratic talk from real talk, ‘‘We’re 

examining, we’re surveying, we’re looking.’’ This is an emergency 

circumstance. 

$87 billion for Iraq and Afghanistan, a lot of that for rebuilding, 

a lot of that for protecting airports and ports. We’re going to debate 

it, we’re going to discuss it. The military will get what they need. 

But I have to tell you, our people are vulnerable. And my message to you gentlemen, since—well, there is a woman here—ladies 

and gentlemen, is I don’t—I want you to fight harder around the 

table. This is our country. Even if you have to take a little heat 

from some other folks over at OMB, who cares? Who cares? Their 

job is to cut budgets. Your job is to protect the country. And I’m 

worried, and I’m concerned. How we cannot sit here after the GAO 

report and say, ‘‘We aren’t doing enough for our ports, Senators. 

And I’m going to take a risk, and I’m going to tell the President 

this, because if he really hears this from me, he will act.’’ That’s 

what I want to hear. I don’t expect to hear. 

But I hope you’ll just take back my concern, as Admiral Loy said 

he would do that, because I don’t have the questions. You’re doing 

everything you can do within, you know, your parameters. Air marshals, arming the pilots, too slow. Too slow. You don’t have enough 

air marshals. Let the pilots defend the aircraft, for God sakes. Only 

a couple of hundred? I agree with Senator Lott on that. This is 

something we can work together in a bipartisan way. Get the pilots 

trained. Most of them fought in the military. Don’t tie their hands 

when you don’t have enough air marshals. And all this moving 

Customs agents and all that. Frankly, I think that’s just moving— 

it’s like a shell game; it’s not real. 

Anyhow, you can tell my concern and my frustration, my fears. 

I want them to be allayed. I’m looking to you to do that, and I hope 

109 

that we can work together to make more progress than we’re making. 

Thank you. 

Senator LOTT. Thank you, Senator Boxer. 

And thank the panel for your time and testimony. We’ll look forward to working with you in the future. 

The Committee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:25 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

(111) 

A P P E N D I X 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. CONRAD BURNS, U.S. SENATOR FROM MONTANA

Thank you Mr. Chairman for calling this important hearing on transportation security. As you know, Thursday will mark the two-year anniversary of the horrible 

terrorist attacks of 2001. I see no better time to look into the progress of our national safety than today. 

In 2002 we created the Department of Homeland Security by moving 22 agencies 

dispersed over 100 different government organizations. I believe the intention and 

consensus of this Committee was to consolidate those 22 agencies to provide a unified homeland security structure capable of responding to current and future 

threats. I will be interested to hear from the panel today whether that intention 

has/or will be accomplished anytime soon. 

In my state of Montana we have a northern border with Canada that spans 630 

miles which is equivalent to the distance from Chicago the Washington, D.C. and 

much of that border is rural. I will be interested to hear what progress has been 

made in northern border security. In the past, massive resources have been stationed along the U.S. southern border with Mexico and the northern border has 

been left vulnerable. 

I look forward to testimony from Admiral Loy. Admiral Loy I commend you for 

the service you are paying your country but like many of my colleagues, I have been 

contacted by countless constituents regarding TSA over the last two years and much 

of the response has not been positive. For example, agriculture in my state is worried about the May interim final rule regarding hazmat background checks, which 

are scheduled to take effect in November. Rural businesses that provide petroleum 

and fertilizer are concerned these background checks will add another cost to their 

bottom line which is already troubled. I would like to hear the panels view on these 

broad rule making and I am curious to whether rural circumstances are considered 

before final rules are put out. 

Finally, I am very concerned about the future of the Federal Flight Deck Officers 

Program. TSA seems to have a lack of enthusiasm for this program and its implementation. Myself, and many of my colleagues on this committee and in the entire 

body worked very hard to pass that program and to this point I have been less than 

enthusiastic about TSA’s lackluster performance in implementing the program. I 

look forward to testimony on that program. 

Mr. Chairman, again thank you for scheduling this important hearing and I look 

forward to the testimony. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. DANIEL K. INOUYE, U.S. SENATOR FROM HAWAII

Over the last two years, the Congress has passed numerous bills and appropriated 

billions of dollars to protect our Nation’s transportation system. Today we have the 

opportunity to review and assess the actions taken and discuss what additional tools 

and resources are needed to achieve our Nation’s transportation security goals. 

Being from an island state, air and ocean transportation are critical for the movement of people and goods where nearly 99 percent of all travelers arrive by air and 

95 percent of all goods arrive by ship. Any disruption in these lifelines will jeopardize our island economy as well as threaten the health and well being of our residents and visitors. 

Securing our Nation’s immense, complex, and interwoven transportation system 

has been, and will continue to be, one of our greatest challenges. The United States 

has 5,525 miles of border with Canada and 1,989 miles of border with Mexico. Our 

maritime border includes 95,000 miles of shoreline, more than 360 maritime ports, 

and 3.4 million square miles of exclusive economic zone, 1.5 million square miles 

of which are in the Western Pacific. 

In between our borders and coastlines are approximately 5,000 public use airports, including 430 commercial airports, 317 intermodal official ports of entry, 3.9 

112 

million miles of roads, 100,000 miles of rail, 2.2 million miles of pipelines, 500 train 

stations, and almost 600,000 bridges. 

The challenges common to ensuring the safety of our Nation’s diverse modes of 

transportation include: 

• Coordinating numerous stakeholders, including federal, state and local governments and private businesses; 

• Coordinating an intelligence system in order to effectively collect and analyze 

information; 

• Developing and implementing the right technology to meet security needs; 

• Adequately funding transportation security programs; and 

• Ensuring safety of the transportation system without sacrificing efficiency. 

I look forward to hearing from the distinguished witnesses on these important 

issues. I am most interested in hearing your thoughts on which programs are working, which are not working, and what additional resources you need to fulfill your 

missions. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED TO JEFFREY N. SHANE

Question 1. It is my understanding that prior to TSA’s transfer to the Department 

of Homeland Security, DOT and TSA intended to sign a series of MOAs (Memoranda of Agreement) to clarify their roles and responsibilities. Why were the MOAs 

not signed and what is their current status? As you have read, MOAs are one of 

GAO’s top recommendations. 

Answer. TSA was created here at the Department of Transportation, and as such, 

we retain very close ties with TSA and its leadership. In fact, these relationships 

have helped us to develop close links throughout the new department, and we continue working closely with our former colleagues, supporting them every step of the 

way as they defend our Nation’s homeland. 

As noted in my written testimony, we have taken numerous actions to ensure that 

this close working relationship continues into the future as well. Just prior to TSA’s 

transition to DHS, the Federal Aviation Administration and TSA signed a memorandum of agreement specifying the roles and responsibilities that each agency 

would play in overseeing the safety and security of our aviation system. Given the 

unique challenges we face in aviation security, the heavy emphasis in the Aviation 

and Transportation Security Act on specific deadlines for improving aviation security, and the FAA’s continuing responsibilities for managing the air traffic control 

system, we believed that it was important to have a written agreement between 

DOT and DHS in this area. 

Extensive, regularized lines of communication have been and are being established with emphasis on coordination. At present, we are working together effectively in areas where our responsibilities intersect. As our relationship continues to 

develop, and we gain additional experience, we intend to focus on identifying areas 

of common concern and determine the most effective means for formalizing our relationship. As a result of our communication and coordination over the past year— 

which includes a regular meeting with senior TSA staff on a bi-weekly basis to discuss current issues and ensure full cooperation between TSA and our modal administrations on security issues—we have begun to identify areas of DOT/DHS interaction that could benefit from formalization in written documents. When areas of 

recurring interaction between the two Departments have been sufficiently identified, 

we will work with DHS to pursue one or more additional memoranda of agreement 

to clarify the roles and responsibilities of the two Departments in those areas. 

Question 2. What is DOT’s role in transportation security? 

Answer. Since the transfer of TSA to DHS, we have found that we continue to 

have a role in transportation security. Our statutory mission of providing for a safe, 

efficient and economically viable transportation system is inextricably linked to the 

security mission of DHS. The Department also provides a critical link to transportation stakeholders based on decades of experience working closely with those involved in various parts of the transportation system. This means that we must work 

hard to integrate smart and efficient security measures and ensure that they are 

developed with sufficient stakeholder input—to fail to do so can be dangerous or economically unsustainable. Additionally, in accordance with the Homeland Security 

Policy Directive, issued on December 17, 2003, the Department continues to collaborate with DHS on all matters relating to transportation security and transportation 

infrastructure protection. 

113 

To accomplish this, our Office of Intelligence and Security and Office of Emergency Transportation, in conjunction with each of the Operating Administrations, 

the Homeland Security Council and DHS components including TSA, FEMA and 

CBP and provides five primary services: 

• Policy: Ensure transportation security policy complements safety, mobility and 

economic viability. 

• System Design: Incorporate security policy decisions in the design of transportation systems and infrastructure (i.e., bridges, tunnels, and transit systems). 

• Intelligence and Information: Analyze and provide important security and economic intelligence to DOT customers, including DHS, offices negotiating international treaties, operating administrations, and to industry stakeholders, to 

the extent authorized by law. 

• Operations: 

—Monitor the real-time status of the transportation system. This historically 

proves valuable during emergencies, including the August blackout, Hurricanes (most recently Isabel), earthquakes and hazmat incidents. 

—Provide emergency transportation services in support of the ‘‘all hazard’’ National Response Plan, which now expands our response and recovery functions 

to include terrorist attacks with our more traditional scope of accidents and 

natural disasters. This role, formerly under the Federal Response Plan, is one 

for which we are especially well suited and experienced. 

• Readiness: In support of the new Homeland Security Presidential Directive on 

Preparedness, coordinate DOT’s role in readiness and response exercises. We 

continue to be primary participants in exercises, including TOPOFF 2, Forward 

Challenge, Crimson Shield, Scarlet Cloud, and others. Virtually every safety or 

security-related exercise directly involves management of the transportation 

system. 

Question 3. What share of DOT’s work do you believe is security-related? Have 

the modal agencies shifted resources toward security-related initiatives since September 11, 2001? 

Answer. In addition to the creation of TSA, each DOT modal administration aggressively pursued security initiatives in response to our post 9–11 realities. Since 

its creation on March 1, 2003, DHS has assumed primary responsibility for transportation security programs and initiatives. However, because of the complexity of 

the system and considerable expertise, DOT has played a direct supporting role in 

DHS’s major transportation-related security initiatives. Resource expenditures by 

DOT on transportation security, including those cited below, are now coordinated 

with DHS and are consistent with DOT’s ongoing responsibilities for the safety, mobility, and economic viability of the National Transportation System. 

With that said, it is very difficult to quantify, in percentage terms, what share 

of DOT’s work is security related. Some of the work cited below is directly related 

to DOT’s ongoing role in transportation security, such as the Office of Intelligence 

and Security’s continued support of national and homeland security policy development, and those critical infrastructure programs involving joint DOT/DHS legal responsibilities such as hazardous materials. The difficulty lies in quantifying the 

many efforts that benefit both security and safety or efficiency (dual use), or where 

we are attempting to build security into transportation rather than adding it as an 

expensive overlay, such as the Federal Transit Administration’s regional security 

and response forums or Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration’s truck security prototypes. 

The national strategies (National Strategy for Homeland Security and the National Strategy for the Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets) designated DHS as the lead for transportation critical infrastructure issues. DOT retains lead roles, however, in other critical areas: 

• DOT and DHS share responsibility for hazardous materials transportation security per the Homeland Security Act of 2002. Much of the Research and Special 

Programs Administration’s work revolves around the safe and secure movement 

of hazardous materials, including the Nation’s pipeline infrastructure (800,000 

surface shipments; 2.1 million miles of pipelines). The two agencies are working 

cooperatively on a number of fronts to address hazardous materials transportation security issues. 

• DOT remains responsible for significant portions of our own internal (DOT 

owned and operated) infrastructure. This includes the physical and cyber security of the National Airspace System, consisting of about 1,000 staffed and 

114 

10,000 un-staffed facilities. The Infrastructure Protection Program for this system will cost $300 million. GPS augmentation sites critical to transportation applications, U.S. portions of the St. Lawrence Seaway, and vessels of the Ready 

Reserve Force are some other examples of critical DOT owned/managed infrastructure. 

DOT Operating Administrations remain essential partners and contributors with 

DHS in nearly every transportation security program. A few examples of DOT contributions include: 

• The Federal Aviation Administration operates the National Airspace System 

and, as the safety regulator of the aviation industry, works closely with DHS 

and TSA to ensure security of the airspace and industry through daily operations, policy and rulemaking. 

• The Federal Railroad Administration currently employs about 457 inspectors 

that integrate safety and security in their track, operations and emergency plan 

inspections. In a joint effort with the Federal Transit Administration, TSA and 

DHS, FRA assisted both passenger and commuter rail systems with the development of System Security Plans. FRA inspectors assist DHS (U.S. Customs 

and Border Protection) with joint border crossing inspections using the Vehicle 

Cargo Inspection System. 

• The Federal Highway Administration continues to work with DOD’s Transportation Command to ensure adequate planning is conducted for strategic movement of military cargoes between military installations and port facilities. 

• The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration is assisting TSA in implementing Section 1012 of the USA PATRIOT Act by developing security risk review procedures for all persons seeking issuance or renewal of hazardous materials endorsements of commercial driver’s licenses. 

• FTA and TSA have closely coordinated efforts to enhance transit system security. TSA is focusing on developing threat and vulnerability processes, standards for plans, and exploring advanced technologies. FTA is developing training 

forums to promote emergency preparedness and best practices, security design 

information, and facilitating chem-bio detection technologies for the unique 

transit environment. 

• RSPA is working closely with TSA and pipeline operators to develop an understanding of pipeline security issues, share best practices, improve coordination 

among diverse stakeholders; plan for preparedness, response and recovery; and 

verify that significant major operators have acceptable security plans and programs. In consultation with DHS, they are conducting an assessment of hazardous materials transportation vulnerabilities and issued security regulations. 

• The Maritime Administration provides strategic sealift capacity to support deployment of U.S. military forces for national security objectives through management of the Ready Reserve Force. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, MARAD 

coordinated the mobilization of 135 ships and over 5,000 crewmembers. 

• DOT co-chairs with DHS the Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation Transportation Security Experts Group as well as Operation Safe Commerce, a program 

that funds the testing of industry solutions to the need for increased security 

in the international movement of intermodal containers. 

Question 4. Last January I asked TSA and FRA to review Amtrak’s security plan. 

Unfortunately, the plan on which you provided comments turned out not to be Amtrak’s official plan. Have you had the opportunity to review Amtrak’s official plan, 

submitted April 10, 2003 and do you have any recommendations for the Committee? 

Answer. The Federal Railroad Administration directly provides the oversight and 

funding conduit for Amtrak’s appropriated funds. The FRA routinely conducts validation reviews of Amtrak’s financial activities and budget requests. The FRA reviewed both Amtrak’s system security plan and the April 2003 security plan modifications for capital improvements. The FRA, in conjunction with TSA and Amtrak 

management and security officials, found the security plan satisfactory and the security-related capital improvements to be appropriate. 

Question 5. What is the greatest security challenge facing your agencies and what 

actions are being taken to address the challenge? 

Answer. The effective integration of security, as a cornerstone of transportation— 

alongside safety, mobility and economic viability—is our biggest challenge. America’s ability to sustain smart security precautions and measures over the long term 

will depend entirely on how effectively and efficiently they are integrated into transportation system policy, design (i.e., hardened bridges, multi-use databases, etc.) 

115 

and operations. Security, without appropriate consideration for costs and efficiency 

will not be effective. Only smart and efficient security measures that balance security with safety, mobility and sound economics will endure. In this way, our economy will grow and our people and goods move safely and securely. 

DOT is actively pursuing this integration on several fronts. We have learned that, 

while much of transportation security resides in DHS; the integration of security 

into a system as complex as transportation requires a significant and ongoing coordination and cooperation between DHS and DOT. The Secretary of DOT has designated the Deputy Secretary as his primary liaison with DHS. The Deputy Secretary, with assistance from DOT’s Office of Intelligence and Security, will work to 

maintain constant communication and information exchange with TSA. The Office 

of Intelligence and Security also leads a security working group, with participation 

from each DOT operating administration, along with TSA’s participation, to address 

specific security issues. Within DOT, that office is also working with each operating 

administration to ensure that there is an adequate network to accommodate the expeditious flow of security related information throughout the Department. 

I highlighted some of the specific actions we have taken, in cooperation with DHS, 

during my testimony before the Committee. For example, the Maritime Administration has worked closely with the Coast Guard and TSA to evaluate security at our 

Nation’s ports. These evaluations enabled TSA to disseminate two rounds of port security grants, facilitating $262 million in security upgrades as a result. The Federal 

Transit Administration has shared its expertise by conducting $30 million in vulnerability assessments and security training of transit operators across the country. 

Additionally, the Research and Special Programs Administration has worked closely 

with TSA to ensure that the transportation of hazardous materials fulfills both safety and security requirements. 

Finally, I personally have served as a co-chairman of the Executive Steering Committee that oversees the Operation Safe Commerce (OSC) program. Fifty-eight million dollars in OSC grants have been awarded by DHS to the three participating 

load center ports—Los Angeles/Long Beach, Seattle/Tacoma, and New York/New 

Jersey—and these grants will serve as an essential test bed for new technologies 

designed to provide greater security for freight containers as they move on intermodal journeys through global commerce. 

Question 6. Do your agencies have sufficient authority to ensure transportation 

security? What action do you believe Congress needs to take to assist in your efforts 

to improve transportation security? 

Answer. We believe that, in general, the Department possesses the authority it 

needs to carry out our statutory responsibilities. Where we see the need for additional authority or for clarification of existing authority we will develop appropriate 

legislation on behalf of the Administration, as in the Administration’s railroad safety reauthorization proposal, which was submitted to Congress in July 2003. Recognizing that, in some situations safety and security issues are woven together, we 

value the emphasis that Congress, in sections 1710 and 1711 of the Homeland Security Act, placed on the joint nature of DOT’s security responsibilities with DHS for 

rail transportation of all cargoes, and for hazardous material transportation by all 

modes. This statutory authority gives us a clear basis on which to work even more 

closely with DHS on these two areas. Of course, the Federal Railroad Administration coordinates closely with the Department of Homeland Security wherever its exercise of safety authority would have security implications. 

There are two areas in which we need the continued support of Congress in order 

to succeed in our mission. 

• We seek your continued support for the resources necessary to sustain our links 

and important services to DHS and TSA. This comes in three key areas: 

(1) It is critical for DOT to have the appropriate resources—staff and budget— 

to assist in the development of transportation-related security policy, system 

design, intelligence and information and readiness. This will enable DOT to 

be an effective partner with DHS as both Departments deal with the integration of transportation security measures into the transportation system 

while maintaining safety, mobility and economic viability. 

(2) DOT must maintain the emergency transportation capabilities for response 

to all hazards, ranging from terrorist attacks to natural disasters like hurricanes and earthquakes. This unique capability has been developed and 

honed within DOT and demonstrated effectively, most recently during Hurricane Isabel. 

(3) We need to have appropriate resources to plan and participate in readiness 

exercises like Topoff 2, Determined Promise, Forward Challenge, and othVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:02 Nov 21, 2014 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00119 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\91310.TXT JACKIE
116 

ers. Although the new Homeland Security Presidential Directive on Preparedness will improve coordination and effectiveness of exercises and other 

pre-incident activities, it will require increased DOT involvement to succeed. 

Within DOT, the three functions discussed above are primarily accomplished 

through the Office of Intelligence and Security, and the Research and Special Program Administration’s Office of Emergency Transportation. Together these small 

staffs provide valuable support in security policy, system design, intelligence, emergency preparedness, readiness and response operations. 

If need arises, we will seek your support in legislation that clarifies DOT’s role 

in security policy decision making, and in the emergency transportation services 

provided to DHS. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED TO ADMIRAL THOMAS H. COLLINS

MTSA Compliance Costs and Port Security Grants 

Question 1. I understand the Coast Guard estimates the private sector costs for 

compliance with the requirements of the Maritime Transportation Security At to be 

$4.4 billion, with annual costs of $500 million. Since the September 11 attacks, Congress has provided a total of $348 million for port security grants. While the Administration’s Fiscal Year 2004 budget requests $38 million for the 

Department’s Directorate of border and Transportation Security for grants, subsidies, and contributions and $51 million for the Department’s Directorate of information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection for the same purpose, it is unclear 

what these requests are for. Additionally, it is unclear whether or not these line 

items will fund the maritime and port security grants to be awarded in accordance 

with the Maritime Transportation Security Act. Is this $4.4 billion figure accurate? 

If so, what is it based on? How much is the Administration requesting for maritime 

and port security grants for Fiscal Year 2004? Which agencies or directorates will 

be managing these funds? While I understand the Coast Guard will not directly administer these funds, what role does the Coast Guard play in awarding these 

grants? Can you explain how the awarding of these grants will be coordinated with 

Port Security Assessments being identified by the Coast Guard as part of your ongoing assessments? In light of this $4.4 billion backlog, do you think the Administration’s request is adequate to address these vulnerabilities? 

Answer. The $4.4 billion figure contained within this question is not accurate. As 

part of the rulemaking process, the Coast Guard conducted an assessment of the 

cost to industry of implementing the SOLAS Amendments, the ISPS Code and Section 102 of the MTSA. The final rules published October 22, 2003 estimates the 

MTSA implementation costs to industry to be $1.5 billion. Following implementation, the annual cost is approximately $884 million for a total of $7.331 billion over 

the next 10 years. 

In the DHS FY 04 budget, $125 million was appropriated for port security grants. 

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) manages the grant funds and administers the grant process in cooperation with the Maritime Administration 

(MARAD) and the Coast Guard. Coast Guard Captains of the Port and MARAD Region Directors provide the first level of review and prioritization within the grant 

requests. A National Level Selection Board consisting of the Undersecretary of TSA, 

the Commandant of the Coast Guard, and the Administrator of MARAD, or their 

representatives, constitutes the final grant approval body. 

A prerequisite for submitting physical and operational security enhancement proposals is the completion of a security assessment, the findings of which are incorporated into determining the grant selection criteria in partnership with TSA and 

MARAD. The required assessment does not have to be a Coast Guard Port Security 

Assessment, but the Coast Guard does make PSA findings available to applicants 

and port security committees for use in developing grant proposals. However, a port 

that has not received a PSA is not be penalized during the grant evaluation process. 

While clearly there is a governmental role in providing port security, vessel and 

facility owners and operators have a shared responsibility to provide port security 

measures. The requirements contained on the final rule are intentionally performance based to allow innovative and cost-effective solutions by industry to improve 

security with minimum capital outlay and burden on legitimate use of the maritime 

transportation system. In light of this and the numerous additional initiatives that 

have been undertaken by the Federal Government to improve maritime security, the 

Coast Guard believes the Administration’s request is adequate. 

117 

MTSA Facility Security Rules 

Question 2. On July 1 of this year, the Coast Guard proposed seven rules implementing requirements of the Maritime Security Act. Doing all seven at once is ambitious, but I want to commend you and your staff for pushing forward with this very 

important work. One of the proposed rules would establish requirements for facility 

security. I understand several of the requirements have caused some concern within 

the maritime industry. Specifically, facility owner and operators would be required 

to establish ‘‘waterborne security patrols’’ for ‘‘examination of piers, wharves, and 

similar structures . . . for the presence of dangerous substances and devices underwater.’’ While I agree this is an important part of facility security, it is my belief 

that security in U.S. waters is inherently a government function that must be performed by a law enforcement officer. Can you explain the Coast Guard’s view on 

this issue? 

Another Proposal within the rule regarding facility security would require the facility to have the capability to ‘‘be able to check cargo entering the facility for dangerous substances and devices at the rate specified in the approved Facility Security 

plan (FSP). I may be a bit confused, but I was under the belief that the Bureau 

of Customs and Border Protection was responsible for screening inbound and outbound cargo and had in fact received considerable increases in appropriations to increase these capabilities. Is this correct, and if so, why are we requiring this of facility operators? 

Answer. On July 1 of this year, the Coast Guard published six temporary interim 

rules to promulgate maritime security requirements mandated by the Maritime 

Transportation Security Act of 2002. The Coast Guard believes owners and operators have the authority to implement the identified security measures. The final regulations published on October 22, 2003 do not require owners or operators to undertake law enforcement action, but rather to implement security measures consistent 

with their longstanding responsibility to ensure the security of their vessels and facilities as specifically prescribed by 33 CFR 6.16–3 and 33 CFR 6.19–1. It is also 

important to note that the security measures identified only relate to MARSEC 

Level 3 implementation and do not include Coast Guard and/or other Federal Government maritime security efforts. 

We recognize that screening for dangerous substances and devices is a complex 

and technically difficult task to implement. In the final rules published on October 

22, 2003, we have clarified that cargo checks should be focused on the cargo arriving 

at or on the facility or vessel to detect evidence of tampering or to prevent cargo 

that is not meant for carriage from being accepted and stored at the facility without 

the knowing consent of the facility owner or operator. 

Sharing the Infrastructure Burden of AIS 

Question 3. GAO has pointed out that implementation of the Automatic Identification System (AIS) could require substantial Federal infrastructure investment in 

new Vessel Traffic Service systems for U.S. cities to receive and process important 

security information transmitted from vessels. Installation and training costs for 

this infrastructure could cost more than $100 million. To reduce the budgetary burden on the Federal Government, has the Coast Guard and DHS considered 

partnering with local entities to provide the VTS service and share in its costs-such 

as in the case at the Los Angeles/Long Beach VTS? 

Answer. The Coast Guard has completed many Ports and Waterways Safety Assessments to specifically determine the need for VTS systems in other ports. A VTS 

system is not needed in every port to use the AIS information for security purposes. 

In non-VTS ports, implementation of AIS receive/transmit capability will be accomplished through cooperative arrangements with Federal, State and local stakeholders on integrated command center projects such as the Joint Harbor Operations 

Centers in Hampton Roads, Virginia and San Diego, CA, as well as through the 

Rescue 21 and the Integrated Deepwater System projects. The Coast Guard is continuing to partner with local entities and is also leveraging efforts already underway 

in other areas. For example, the Coast Guard is receiving AIS information from the 

St. Lawrence Seaway Development Corp, the Department of Justice SEAHAWK 

Project in Charleston, SC, and the Joint Maritime Operations Center (JMOC) in Seattle, WA. The DOJ SEAHAWK project is an inter-agency effort to establish a port 

security command center and will include AIS capability integrated with other sensor information. A similar approach is being pursued for the JMOC. 

Review of Pilot Port Security Assessment Reports 

Question 4. Given the importance of and expense involved with the Port Security 

Assessments (PSA), do you plan to enter into another contract with Northrop for 

additional PSAs before a thorough evaluation of the pilot assessments are completed 

118 

and a new methodology is devised? How long will the Coast Guard’s evaluation of 

the pilot projects take and do you plan to get any independent viewpoints (outside 

of DHS) on the process before finalizing it and awarding additional contracts for 

these PSAs? 

Answer. No additional work will be contracted with Northrop Grumman Mission 

Systems until we have evaluated the pilot port reports (Huntington & Tampa) and 

determined that the quality of their work warrants awarding of future work in support of the PSA program. 

The Coast Guard decided to test the revised PSA assessment methodology 

(version 2) on the ports of Tampa, FL and Huntington, WV to ensure that the report 

added value to the Captains Of The Port (COTP) and their Area Maritime Security 

Committee in drafting Area Maritime Security Plans. The draft pilot reports were 

delivered to the Coast Guard on 20 October 2003, and the final reports were delivered on 19 November. During our review of the draft reports for these two pilot 

ports, we identified areas that need further modification. These modifications are a 

result of the lessons learned though the pilot process, changes in the maritime security environment as a result of the publication of the MTSA of 2002 Final Rules, 

and the development of industry self-assessment methodologies. DHS has also provided guidance that impacts what areas/facilities we are to focus on during our 

PSAs, and many stakeholders have completed their own assessments. In order to 

accommodate these changes and provide a more dynamic report, the PSA program 

is moving onto a PSA version 3 (V3). 

The draft pilot reports have been supplied to the respective Coast Guard COTPs, 

as well as the pertinent port stakeholders in each pilot port, for comment. To the 

extent that they are applicable, comments from these primary users of the PSA report will be incorporated into the development of the V3 assessment methodology. 

Additionally, before the Coast Guard fields teams to conduct V3 PSA, the PSA staff 

will present the intended approach to a sampling of COTPs and Coast Guard Area/ 

District staffs. Comments and observations from the GAO will also be incorporated 

into this revised methodology, which should be fielded with the support of multiple 

contractors sometime in early 2004. 

PSA Program Duplication of Assessments 

Question 5. What is the Coast Guard doing to avoid duplication of security assessments done by port stakeholders? 

Answer. The Coast Guard Port Security Assessment program has changed to reflect the availability of vulnerability assessments by marine facilities and other entities. The new focus of the program is providing the Federal Maritime Security Coordinator and Area Maritime Security Committee with a terrorist evaluation of the 

waterway and navigation system in the ports. The program is also providing a database tool that integrates the available assessments and response capabilities from 

all sources and displays the information in a layered, geospatial format to assist in 

security planning. This evolution of the program avoids duplication of effort and provides additional critical information for each port to improve their countermeasure 

development and incident response capabilities. 

Lead Agency on Maritime Security 

Question 6. Which agency within DHS is the lead agency on maritime security? 

Which agency do you believe is best equipped to take the lead role in maritime security? 

Answer. The Coast Guard is the lead Federal agency for maritime security. However, the Coast Guard will continue to work closely with its DHS partners from the 

Information Analysis, and Infrastructure Protection (IADP) Directorate and the 

Boarder and Transportation Security (BTS) Directorate (which includes the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the Bureau of Customs and Border 

Protection (CBP)) which each have important roles to play in maritime security. 

Lead Agency on Cargo Security 

Question 7. Which agency within DHS is the lead agency on cargo security? Which 

agency do you believe is best equipped to take the lead role in cargo security? 

Answer. The Border and Transportation Security Directorate’s (BTS’) Customs 

and Border Protection (CBP) is the lead agency on cargo security. 

As the single unified border agency of the United States, CBP is best equipped 

to protect America and the American people as lead agency for cargo security in 

order to facilitate the flow of legitimate trade and travel. 

International Efforts to Improve Transportation Security 

Question 8. What efforts are underway internationally to improve transportation 

security? 

119 

Answer. The answer provided below focuses on international ‘‘maritime’’ security. 

The Coast Guard actively participates in several international forums such as the 

International Maritime Organization (IMO), International Labor Organization 

(ILO), the G–8, and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) to develop international security standards and encourage harmonization of maritime security. 

Based on IMO guidelines, the Coast Guard conducts security audits of foreign port 

passenger terminals as required by the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and 

Antiterrorism Act of 1986. Audit findings are provided to Department of State and 

to the host government via the local American Embassy/Consulate. 

To assess the effectiveness of antiterrorism measures maintained in foreign ports 

as required by the MTSA, the Coast Guard is developing a Foreign Port Security 

Audit Program. This effort began in FY 2003 with a foreign port assessment team 

in the Latin American/Caribbean region that was organized and funded by DOD. 

Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and led by MARAD and included the Coast 

Guard and Customs and Boarder Protection (BCBP) personnel. MARAD was assigned the responsibility of field assessment team chief, development of a comprehensive cargo security assessment tool, field methodology, and production of Assessment Team reports to SOUTHCOM for subsequent use by the involved U.S. embassies. Beginning in FY 2005 the Coast Guard will assume the lead for these assessments as mandated by the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) of 

2002, Section 109. Using the International Maritime Organization International 

Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code and the ILO Code of Practices for Port 

Security (currently under development to assist countries in the development of port 

security plans) as a baseline, the Coast Guard will audit foreign countries’ compliance with these international standards. The Coast Guard will work with other elements of the Department of Homeland Security as well as other agencies (DOS, 

DOD, MARAD, and Treasury) to prioritize countries and to carry out the audits. 

The audit will include physical visits to a sample of ports in each country to verify 

country compliance. This process will start after the implementation date of the 

ISPS Code on July 1, 2004 and result in the audits of approximately 30–40 countries annually. If the audit findings indicate that adequate antiterrorism measures 

are not maintained, the MTSA requires the Coast Guard to notify the country and 

in conjunction with Department of State develop a port security training program 

for foreign officials as may be required. During FY 2003, two courses were conducted under the Inter-American Port Security Training Program (IAPSTP), which 

is funded by the Organization of American States (OAS) and organized, managed, 

and executed by the U.S. Maritime Administration (MARAD) for the OAS. The 

IAPSTP was developed in cooperation with the OAS Inter-American Committee on 

Ports to provide port security training courses for port authority police and security 

personnel from OAS member countries of Central and South America, and the Caribbean. By November 2003, a total of 550 personnel had received IAPSTP training 

since its commencement in 1998. The four courses conducted each year account for 

200 personnel trained. MARAD and OAS funds to conduct assitional courses in 

2004. 

Each year the Coast Guard provides assistance to approximately 60 countries 

worldwide. This assistance has been in the form of sales of new and excess materiel 

(e.g., ships, patrol boats, etc.), resident training, exportable training, and temporary 

maritime advisors to host nation navies or coast guards. Through provision of Coast 

Guard expertise in ship handling, maritime law enforcement, boarding officer and 

team member training, port security vulnerability assessment and professional development for maritime officer and enlisted corps, host nation navies and coast 

guards become force multipliers in the global war on terrorism. 

International Aviation Security Initiatives 

The Department of Homeland Security actively promotes the strengthening of 

international standards and recommended practices for aviation security through 

the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and G–8 consultations, as well 

as within the framework of a formal and continuing dialogue with the European 

Union, the European Civil Aviation Conference, Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation, 

and other regional entities. 

In October 2001, a meeting of the International Civil Aviation Organization 

(ICAO) Aviation Security Panel was held to consider changes in international aviation security standards in light of 9/11. The Aviation Security Panel holds responsibility for promulgating international security standards and includes as a member 

the U.S. Government represented by TSA’s Director of International Affairs. TSA 

proposed, and the Panel accepted, changes to amendment 10 of Annex 17 (the document that sets forth international aviation security standards) that elevates several 

120 

recommendations to the level of standards and provides language for the new standards. 

Ministers and other high-level officials from 154 countries and 24 international 

organizations met in February 2002 to endorse the creation of a mandatory aviation 

security audit program, drawing upon the expertise of the Aviation Security Panel, 

the TSA’s Foreign Airport Assessment Program, and other existing, viable programs. The mandatory audits are intended to determine a State’s compliance with 

international standards by observing measures at airports and assessing the State’s 

capabilities to sustain those measures. 

As a demonstration of U.S. support, the TSA committed and provided U.S. $1 million as an initial injection of funds to the Aviation Security Mechanism specifically 

for the development of the security audit program. ICAO now has a roster of certified auditors totaling 70 aviation security experts, representing 39 States from 

across all ICAO regions. 20 audits are expected to be completed by the end of 2003, 

and 40 audits each year thereafter. ICAO’s goals are to complete a total of 60 audits 

by the end of 2004 and to audit all 188 ICAO contracting States within five years. 

TSA also influences the work of ICAO and the setting of international standards 

by developing and supporting initiatives within the framework of the Group of Eight 

(Canada, Germany, France, Japan, Italy, U.S., Russia, and U.K.). The most recent 

initiative, which was agreed upon at the G–8 Summit in June 2003, called for the 

continued support for the implementation of the ICAO Security Audit Program by 

all ICAO Member States. Agreement was also reached to implement national measures to combat the threat to civil aviation from the illegal use of surface-to-air missile systems by terrorists, to reduce their proliferation and strengthen control of 

stockpiles by G–8 and other states and to promote the application of Wassenaar Arrangement principles to MANPADS export controls. Most of the work on MANPAD 

within the G–8 has been focused on proliferation; the area of developing and implementing appropriate countermeasures has not been addressed. In light of this, the 

U.S. has recommended to the G–8 in a recent meeting of the Roma/Lyon group that 

G–8 countries establish a working group to develop and agree upon a methodology 

to be used by G–8 countries in assessing an airport’s vulnerability to the threat of 

MANPADS. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTION SUBMITTED TO PETER GUERRERO

Question. Given GAO’s extensive body of work on security issues, what do you believe are the top three challenges the Nation faces in securing the Nation’s transportation system? 

Answer. Transportation stakeholders face numerous challenges in securing the 

Nation’s transportation system. Three significant challenges include: determining 

the appropriate level of security for all modes of transportation; coordinating among 

the various stakeholders and funding security improvements. First, the size of the 

transportation system makes it difficult to adequately secure. For example, the 

transportation system includes about 3.9 million miles of roads, over 100,000 miles 

of rail, almost 600,000 bridges, over 300 ports, 2.2 million miles of pipeline, 500 

train stations, and over 5,000 public-use airports. The size of the system simultaneously provides a substantial number of potential targets for terrorists and makes 

it difficult to secure. Second, the number of stakeholders—including over 20 Federal 

entities, state and local governments, and hundreds of thousands of private businesses—can lead to coordination, communication, and consensus-building challenges. For example, representatives from several state and local government and 

industry associations told us that their members are receiving different messages 

from the various Federal agencies involved in transportation security. Finally, funding security improvements to our transportation system is challenging. The sluggish 

economy has weakened the transportation industry’s financial condition by decreasing ridership and revenues. While the Federal Government has provided additional 

funding for transportation security since September 11, demand has far outstripped 

the additional amounts made available. A risk-based approach will be needed to target available funds to the most pressing needs. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTION SUBMITTED BY HON. ERNEST F. HOLLINGS TO

ADMIRAL JAMES M. LOY

Question. I understand that on July 28, 2003, you denied a petition submitted by 

Midway Airlines on May 31, 2002 for an adjustment to the Aviation Security Infrastructure Fee due in accordance with the Aviation Transportation Security Act. 

121 

When Congress approved the ATSA, we included language requiring airlines to 

pay to TSA a fee to cover its cost of providing increased civil aviation security services. We capped the amount you could collect as the amount the carrier paid for airline security in 2000. 

During the hearing, we talked about the funding crises you are facing at TSA. 

I did not originally support the remittance of the fee for many reasons, but ultimately agreed to the remittance. 

Apparently, with the denial by TSA of the petition, Midway will be required to 

pay TSA for the time period. Congress gave all carriers a ‘‘fee holiday’’ as part of 

the Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act on April 16, 2003, that 

provided reimbursement to airlines for security costs that they paid to TSA. Had 

Midway paid the full amount due, it would have been fully reimbursed for these 

fees. However, because it paid only a percentage of the fee TSA claims it owes, it 

received only a percentage in return, leaving the balance outstanding. Now, after 

passage of this reimbursement provision, TSA demands that Midway pay the remaining balance. 

If Midway does repay the remaining balance, would Midway be entitled to receive 

reimbursement for that amount under the Appropriations Act? If so, does TSA have 

monies left under the Appropriations Act to repay Midway? 

If no monies are available to repay Midway, wouldn’t that result in Midway being 

the only airline in the Nation that must pay the security infrastructure fee without 

reimbursement. 

Please provide an explanation for what appears to be a unique situation. 

Answer. The Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2003, (P.L. 108–11) provided TSA $2.3 billion to compensate U.S. air carriers for their expenses and any revenue forgone that related to aviation security. Rather than providing a reimbursement of TSA security fees, Congress provided this additional 

funding and specifically stated in the Act that U.S. air carriers would be compensated based on the ratio of security fees paid to TSA by each U.S. carrier compared to the total fees paid to TSA by all U.S. air carriers. 

The statutory language of the Act stipulated only the security fees remitted to 

TSA by the date of enactment, April 16, 2003, were to be considered in determining 

distribution of the relief funds. Therefore, the amount of unremitted fees could not 

be taken into account in calculating the relief. Based on the statutory formula and 

the amount remitted by Midway Airlines to TSA by April 16, 2003, TSA issued a 

payment to the carrier of nearly $1.4 million. 

The Act also required TSA to distribute the funding within 30 days of the enactment of the Act. Accordingly, TSA obligated or disbursed the funding within that 

time-frame based on the required formula and, therefore, does not have any relief 

funds remaining. As noted above, since Midway did not fully pay the fees by April 

16, 2003, as specifically required by the Act, it is not entitled to additional compensation. 

Although the Act suspended collection of the fees for 4 months as discussed below, 

it did not provide for cancellation of debts from unremitted security fees due before 

the suspension. TSA does not have the authority under the Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996 to waive this indebtedness under these circumstances. Thus, the 

fees owed by Midway Airlines are still owed to the United States. 

Midway Airlines is not unique in not receiving relief from its un-remitted security 

fee debt. TSA is collecting past-due fees from other carriers, which like Midway, had 

failed to follow the law and regulations and timely pay their fees. Based on the specific language of the Act, and as described above, TSA has denied all such requests 

for relief. 

The Act did provide a separate relief measure to domestic and foreign air carriers 

by suspending both the passenger and air carrier security fees (‘‘fee holiday’’) for all 

air carriers from June 1, 2003, through September 30, 2003. In addition to the nearly $1.4 million in direct relief, this separate measure provided Midway Airlines additional relief of approximately $612,000 in suspended fees. 

Finally, TSA responded to concerns about assessing the security fee at the carrier’s year 2000 screening costs since a number of the carriers, including Midway 

Airlines, now operate at a significantly reduced level compared to year 2000. Although the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) authorizes TSA to 

charge the security fee up to each air carriers’ year 2000 screening costs, it also 

grants TSA the authority to adjust the fee based on market share beginning in Fiscal Year 2005. TSA is working to ensure that a new air carrier fee structure, based 

on market share or another appropriate measure, is implemented as close as possible to October 1, 2004. TSA has already issued a notice in the Federal Register 

(68 FR 62613) requesting industry proposals on the methodology to be used in assessing future security fees. 

122 

WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. RON WYDEN TO

ADMIRAL JAMES M. LOY

On August 1, 2003, the Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) published 

a Federal Register Notice (68 Fed. Reg. 45265) concerning its plans to develop and 

implement a new version of the Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System, 

commonly known as ‘‘CAPPS II.’’ I believe that this Notice was a positive first step 

in explaining to the public TSA’s plans for CAPPS II, and in providing information 

needed to assess the program’s potential impact on privacy. However, the Notice 

also left me with a number of questions as to how CAPPS II would operate. I believe 

that the answers to these questions are crucial to understanding the nature and implications of the system TSA is proposing. My questions fall into six main areas. 

Question 1. What goes on in the ‘‘Risk Assessment’’ Portion of the Process 

According to the explanation contained in the August 1 Federal Register Notice, 

CAPPS II will involve two main steps. The first step is authentication, in which the 

system will compare PNR data with data contained in commercial databases ‘‘for 

the sole purpose of authenticating passenger identity.’’ The result will be a numeric 

score showing the confidence level that the identity the passenger provided is accurate. 

The second step is the risk assessment. This is an area where I believe the explanations to date have been insufficient, making clarification essential. 

Question 1a. The Federal Register Notice states that ‘‘[t]he risk assessment function is conducted internally within the U.S. government.’’ Does this mean that, for 

purposes of the risk assessment, CAPPS II will not in any way query or otherwise 

make use of commercial databases? 

Question lb. If the risk assessment process does not involve making additional 

queries of commercial databases, then what information does it rely on? At a minimum, it appears that the risk assessment will involve checking to see if the passenger is on any Federal list of known or suspected terrorists, or persons with outstanding arrest warrants for violent crimes. But are there additional sources of information, inside or outside government, that the risk assessment will use? Or does 

the risk assessment simply produce a ‘‘yes or no’’ answer as to whether the passenger is already on a government list of persons considered dangerous? 

Question 1c. Checking against existing government watch lists seems like a 

straightforward way of determining whether a passenger is already known as a terrorist or suspected terrorist. But according to the Federal Register Notice, the risk 

assessment process will do more than that it will determine the likelihood that the 

passenger has ‘‘identifiable links’’ to known terrorists or terrorist organizations. 

How can the risk assessment process ferret out such links, if the information it relies on consists of existing government watch lists? Is it envisioned that the government will compile lists of all persons who have any link with a known terrorist or 

terrorist organization? Wouldn’t this be an exceedingly broad list? 

Question 1d. For example, suppose that a passenger once shared an apartment 

or college dorm room with a person who is now on a U.S. list of known terrorists. 

Would the risk assessment capture this link? If so, how? Would the risk assessment 

process check commercial databases, which may contain records of the passenger’s 

past addresses? Or is it envisioned that this passenger would already be on a government watch list, based on this solely on this possibly innocent link? 

Question 1e. The Federal Register Notice says that CAPPS II will generate a ‘‘risk 

score’’ for each traveling passenger. Is this ‘‘risk score’’ the product solely of the risk 

assessment process, or does it does it take into account the results of the authentication step as well? If the latter, does it factor in any data or information from the 

authentication process other than the numeric authentication score? 

Question 1f. Suppose a passenger is not on a government watch list of known or 

suspected terrorists. Could the CAPPS II system nonetheless produce a high enough 

‘‘risk score’’ to bar the passenger from flying? 

Question 2. Process for Detecting and Correcting Mistakes 

The Federal Register Notice states that a passenger will be able to request access 

to the PNR data CAPPS II contains on him/her, and to request the modification of 

that data if the passenger believes it is inaccurate. However, the Notice goes on to 

observe that because CAPPS II will not retain data on passengers for any significant time, in most cases there will be nothing for the passenger to obtain or correct. 

Question 2a. This suggests that, while a procedure for accessing and requesting 

modifications to records may be important in other contexts, this approach really 

isn’t very useful for addressing mistakes that may occur under CAPPS II. Does TSA 

agree that CAPPS II is going to require other types of redress procedures? 

123 

Question 2b. For example, if the system repeatedly flags a particular individual 

as suspicious, what options will that individual have to rectify the problem? Suppose 

the problem stems from inaccurate information in a commercial database, which results in a low authentication score for that individual. In such a case, accessing 

records held by the CAPPS II system would be useless. How will the system deal 

with mistakes of this kind? 

Question 2c. What is the justification for exempting CAPPS II from the Privacy 

Act’s data access and correction requirements? 

Question 3. Accuracy of the ‘‘Identity Authentication’’ Part of the Process 

The Federal Register Notice states that ‘‘[o]ne of TSA’s primary purposes in creating this new system is to avoid the kind of miscommunication and improper identification that has, on occasion, occurred under the systems currently in use. During 

the test period, TSA hopes to confirm that the use of the CAPPS II program will 

significantly reduce improper identification.’’ 

However, a recent Associated Press article (‘‘Feds Don’t Track Airline Watchlist 

Mishaps,’’ by David Kravets, July 23, 2003) reported that TSA does not keep information on the number of people who are misidentified and wrongly delayed or 

barred from flights under the current system. 

Question 3a. Does TSA have any systematic way of tracking how often the current 

system makes mistakes? 

Question 3b. If not, how will TSA determine whether and to what extent CAPPS 

II will reduce the number of cases of mistaken identity? 

Question 3c. To what extent will TSA make public the results of its testing on 

the accuracy of the identity authentication process? Will the public be permitted to 

see the numbers behind any claimed decrease in misidentification—and to evaluate 

the rate at which mistakes still occur under the new system? 

Question 4. Financial and Health Data 

The Federal Register Notice states that the CAPPS II system ‘‘will not use measures of creditworthiness, such as FICO scores, and individual health records.’’ However, this statement appears in the explanatory ‘‘Supplementary Information’’ section of the Notice. In what appears to be the official portion of the Notice the part 

headed ‘‘DHS/TSA 010’’—there is no reference to such a limitation. 

Question 4a. What is the legal effect of the statement in the ‘‘Supplementary Information’’ section that CAPPS II will not use individual financial and health information? 

Question 4b. Why is there no comparable statement in the body of the official Privacy Notice itself? 

Question 4c. The Notice makes the CAPPS II system ‘‘exempt from publishing the 

categories of sources of records.’’ Why is TSA claiming this exemption? As a legal 

matter, wouldn’t this permit TSA, a year or two down the road, to reverse its decision to refrain from using individual financial and medical data—and to start using 

such data without telling the public? How can the public rely on any current TSA 

description of what information the CAPPS II system will or will not use, if TSA 

is reserving the right to expand or modify the information it uses without any public 

notice or scrutiny? 

Question 5. Procedures for Future Changes to CAPPS II 

As noted above, the Notice makes CAPPS II ‘‘exempt from publishing the categories of sources of records.’’ It also gives the CAPPS II system a security classification of ‘‘classified, sensitive.’’ 

Given this classified status and the exemptions from the Privacy Act, could TSA 

modify significant aspects of the CAPPS II program without disclosing the changes 

to the public? To what extent would TSA have the ability, from a legal perspective, 

to depart from the CAPPS II system description set forth in the Notice? Could a 

future TSA elect to make changes regarding the scope or operational characteristics 

of the CAPPS II system—and do so secretly, without a formal and public regulatory 

process? How easily could the various representations and assurances made in the 

Notice be withdrawn? 

Question 6. Intended Future Link to Immigration Data 

The Federal Register Notice states that ‘‘[i]t is . . . anticipated that CAPPS II 

will be linked with the U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology 

(US–VISIT) program at such time as both programs become fully operational, in 

order that processes at both border and airport points of entry and exit are consistent.’’ 

Question 6a. If the sole mission of the CAPPS II system is to determine whether 

a passenger may pose a risk to aviation security, why does the system need to be 

124 

linked with immigration data? Is it anticipated that CAPPS II may eventually be 

used not only for safeguarding aviation security, but also for enforcing immigration 

law for example, for apprehending illegal aliens or visitors who have overstayed 

their visas? 

Question 6b. What are the specific ‘‘processes at both border and airport points 

of entry and exit’’ to which the Notice refers? What are the specific types of potential 

inconsistencies that TSA hopes to avoid by linking the CAPPS II and US–VISIT systems? Please provide some concrete examples of problems that could arise if the two 

systems were not linked. 

WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. FRANK R. LAUTENBERG TO

ADMIRAL JAMES M. LOY, HON. ROBERT C. BONNER, PETER GUERRERO, JEFFREY N. 

SHANE AND ADMIRAL THOMAS H. COLLINS

Question for Admiral Loy and Commissioner Bonner. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has proposed cutting the port security grant program by $105 

million. Does the Administration still propose this cut? 

Question for Admiral Loy and Mr. Guerrero. I am concerned that DHS and the 

Transportation Security Administration (TSA) are dealing with our nation’s pressing 

life and death security needs by playing shell games with critical resources. Last 

week, Secretary Ridge announced that 5,000 new air marshals would be trained, but 

that these individuals would come from the existing ranks of custom and immigrations agents. During high-threat periods, this cross-training plan might enhance air 

security but will come at the expense of border and ground security. Under the Administration’s plan to utilize current immigrations and customs employees to double 

as air marshals, how will DHS ensure that, during high-threat periods, there are 

adequate personnel to function both in air marshal roles and at the border as customs/immigrations agents? 

Are any new air marshals currently being trained? 

Question for Admiral Loy and Mr. Guerrero. Similarly, DHS has recently tried to 

divert $30 million from the Operation Safe Commerce pilot program intended to 

identify and implement the systemic port security initiation in order to cover a 

budget shortfall in airport security. Do you believe Federal port security programs 

are adequately funded? 

Question For Undersecretary Shane. Recently, the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) reported its findings on the shuttle accident on February 1. That 

Board found an intricate link between the poor safety culture, poor communication 

structure, and high level of outsourcing, or use of contractors, in the program. If the 

Administration truly believes that the safety and security of the American people 

is a top priority, why does it continue to press for outsourcing of our air traffic control system? Other countries have tried privatizing their air traffic control systems, 

and the results have been disastrous. What lessons do you feel we can learn from 

this CAIB report and from other countries with respect to the U.S. air traffic control 

system? 

Question for Admiral Collins. The Maritime Transportation Security Act of2002 

requires DHS to conduct vulnerability assessments of the nation’s 55 largest seaports. At the current rate that they are being conducted, these assessments will not 

be completed for another five years. What is being done to expedite the completion 

of these vulnerability assessments? 

Question For Admiral Collins, Admiral Loy, And Commissioner Bonner. The 

President has said that the transfer of weapons of mass destruction into the hands 

of terrorists is the gravest danger facing U.S. and global security. Please update me 

on DHS’s efforts to improve the security of our ports by deploying detectors that can 

identify dangerous radioactive material hidden in containers on vessels. Also, please 

update me on DHS efforts to designate secure shipping lanes that meet an objective 

standard of security for origin-to-destination shipping. 

Question for Admiral Loy. When does TSA plan to issue standards for security 

training of cabin flight crew members? 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. FRANK R. LAUTENBERG TO

GERALD L. DILLINGHAM AND MARGARET WRIGHTSON

Question 1. I am concerned that DHS and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) are dealing with our Nation’s pressing life and death security needs 

125 

1 U.S. General Accounting Office, Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Is Addressing 

Challenges of Its Expanded Mission and Workforce, but Additional Actions Needed, GAO–04– 

242 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 19, 2003). 

by playing shell games with critical resources. Last week, Secretary Ridge announced that 5,000 new air marshals would be trained, but that these individuals 

would come from the existing ranks of custom and immigration agents. During highthreat periods, this cross-training plan might enhance air security but will come at 

the expense of border and ground security. Under the Administration’s plan to utilize current immigration and customs employees to double as air marshals, how will 

DHS ensure that, during high-threat periods, there are adequate personnel both in 

air marshal roles and at the border as customs/immigration agents? 

Mr. Dillingham’s Answer. DHS’s plan does not explicitly address the adequacy of 

the current immigration, customs, and air marshal workforces to address concurrent 

high threats to border, ground, and aviation security. Rather, the plan provides for 

temporarily enhancing the air marshal workforce to respond to high threats to aviation. Specifically, according to Secretary Ridge, cross-training immigration and customs officers in air marshal tactics would give DHS greater flexibility to adjust its 

law enforcement resources according to varying threats and provide a surge capacity 

during periods of high threats to aviation. The immigration and customs officers 

would not be used as air marshals during every high-threat period; they would be 

used as such only when there was a high risk to aviation. 

DHS’s cross-training plan could have some benefits, but, as we recently reported, 

it also poses training and administrative challenges.1 According to the Secretary, 

the cross-training for immigration and customs agents and Federal air marshals 

will be centralized. Centralization could eventually produce some cost efficiencies. 

However, cross-training will expand the roles and responsibilities of all three lawenforcement workforces, and a needs assessment will have to be conducted to identify each workforce’s additional training requirements. Cross-training requirements 

and curriculums will also have to be established and approved. In addition, each affected workforce’s organization will have to coordinate the new training requirements with its other mission requirements as it schedules its officers for cross-training. Finally, planned changes in the roles and responsibilities of the Federal law enforcement officers could have implications for their performance evaluations and 

compensation. Currently, the three law enforcement workforces are under different 

pay systems and are compensated at different rates. DHS has efforts under way to 

deal with these issues. 

Question 2. Are any new air marshals currently being trained? 

Mr. Dillingham’s Answer. New air marshals are currently being hired and provided basic training at the rate of about one class per month, a rate sufficient to 

offset attrition and maintain the current number of air marshals. According to the 

Federal Air Marshals Service, there is no surge in hiring or training forecasted because the goal for hiring air marshals set by the Secretary of Transportation after 

September 11, 2001, was met in July 2002, as planned. 

In addition to the required basic training, the Service instituted a 4-week advanced training course for air marshals in October 2002. All air marshals hired from 

October 2001 through July 2002 were required to complete the course by January 

2004. Air marshals hired after August 2002 attend this advanced training course 

after completing their basic training. In August 2003, the Service reported that proposed cutbacks in its training funds would require it to extend the January 2004 

date to mid-2004. According to DHS, the Service’s transfer to Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) will not adversely affect either the funding for air marshals’ training or the schedule for newly hired air marshals to complete the 4-week 

training course, since a total of $626.4 million is being transferred from TSA to ICE. 

However, it is not clear how much of the funding will be allocated for training. 

Given the importance of training to ensure that air marshals are prepared to carry 

out their mission, we believe that maintaining adequate funding for training should 

remain a priority. 

Question 3. DHS has recently tried to divert $30 million from the Operation Safe 

Commerce pilot program intended to identify and implement the systemic port security initiation in order to cover a budget shortfall in airport security. Do you believe 

Federal port security programs are adequately funded? 

Ms. Wrightson’s Answer. Effective maritime security requires the ability to put 

preventive systems, controls, and infrastructure in place. According to transportation security experts and state and local government and industry representatives 

we contacted, funding is the most pressing challenge to accomplishing this task. 

While some security improvements are inexpensive, most require substantial fundVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:02 Nov 21, 2014 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00129 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\91310.TXT JACKIE
126 

2 All vessels of certain specifications on international voyages; self-propelled commercial vessels 65 feet or more in length; towing vessels 26 feet or more in length and more than 600 horsepower; vessels of 100 gross tons or more carrying one or more passengers for hire; and passenger 

vessels certificated to carry 50 or more passengers for hire. 3 In addition to Los Angeles/Long Beach, the other ports that currently have this system are 

New York/New Jersey; the mouth of the Mississippi River; New Orleans; Houston/Galveston; 

Port Arthur, Texas; San Francisco; Seattle/Tacoma; Alaska’s Prince William Sound; and Sault 

Ste. Marie, Michigan. 4Similar to air traffic control systems, VTS uses radar, closed circuit television, radiophones, 

and other technology to allow monitoring and management of vessel traffic from a central shorebased location. 

ing. Additionally, given the large number of assets to protect, the sum of even relatively less expensive investments can be cost prohibitive. According to Coast Guard 

estimates, the cost of implementing the new International Maritime Organization 

security code and the security provisions in MTSA will be approximately $1.5 billion 

for the first year and $7.4 billion over the succeeding decade. These are substantial 

sums, but it is not clear at this point how the costs will be paid, as the following 

examples illustrate. 

Funding difficulties can be seen in the implementation of TSA’s Transportation 

Worker Identification Card (TWIC). Although no national estimates of the cost are 

currently available, they are likely to be substantial. According to a TSA official, nationwide the agency expects to issue five to six million identification cards a year 

from mid-2004 to the end of 2007. In our work at Los Angeles, port authority officials expressed concern as to how much it may cost to implement this card and all 

the steps and equipment associated with it, such as the installation of card readers 

throughout the port, the issuance of cards to port personnel, and adding staff to operate and maintain the system. A study for the ports of Los Angeles and Long 

Beach estimates that it will cost at least $40 million to perform the necessary startup tasks. Because of these significant costs, maritime stakeholders are concerned 

about who will ultimately end up paying for the TWIC. One port authority official 

indicated that the cost may be passed on to workers as a cost of their employment. 

Another example of funding difficulties can be seen at the Federal level, where 

a MTSA requirement for a vessel identification system is being phased in over time 

partly because of funding limitations. This identification system, called the Automated Identification System (AIS), uses a device aboard a vessel to transmit a 

unique identifying signal to a receiver located at the port and to other ships in the 

area. This information gives port officials and other vessels nearly instantaneous information about a vessel’s identity, position, speed, and course. Such a system would 

provide an ‘‘early warning’’ of an unidentified vessel or a vessel that was in a location where it should not be. MTSA requires that vessels in certain categories 2 install tracking equipment between January 1, 2003, and December 31, 2004, with the 

specific date dependent on the type of vessel and when it was built. Effectively implementing the system requires considerable land-based equipment and other infrastructure that is not currently available in many ports. As a result, for the foreseeable future, the system will be available in less than half of the 25 busiest U.S. 

ports.3

Installing AIS at the remaining ports depends in part on when funding will be 

available. The only ports with the necessary infrastructure to use AIS are those that 

have waterways controlled by Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) systems.4 Expanding coverage will require substantial additional investment, both public and private. The 

Coast Guard’s budget request for Fiscal Year 2004 includes $40 million for shorebased AIS equipment and related infrastructure—an amount that covers only current VTS areas. According to a Coast Guard official, wider-reaching national implementation of AIS would involve installation and training costs ranging from $62 

million to $120 million. Also, the cost of installing AIS equipment aboard individual 

ships averages about $10,000 per vessel, which is to be borne by the vessel owner 

or operator. Some owners and operators, particularly of domestic vessels, have complained about the cost of equipping their vessels. 

As I suggested in my testimony, where the money will come from to meet these 

funding needs is not clear. One theme we have heard from maritime stakeholders 

is that the current economic environment makes this a difficult time for the private 

industry or state and local governments to make security investments. According to 

industry representatives and experts we contacted, most of the transportation industry operates on a very thin profit margin, making it difficult to pay for additional 

security measures. In addition, nearly every state and local government is facing a 

large budget deficit for Fiscal Year 2004. For example, the National Governors Association estimates that states are facing a total budget shortfall of $80 billion this 

upcoming year. Given the tight budget environment, state and local governments 

127 

and transportation operators must make difficult tradeoffs between transportation 

security investments and other needs, such as service expansion and equipment upgrades. According to the National Association of Counties, many local governments 

are planning to defer some maintenance of their transportation infrastructure to 

pay for some security enhancements. At the same time however, the Federal Government faces its own challenges in finding considerable additional funding. Due to 

the costs of security enhancements and the transportation industries’ and state and 

local governments’ tight budget environments, the Federal Government is likely to 

be viewed as a source of funding for at least some of these enhancements. While 

Federal monies have been made available, requests for Federal funding for transportation security enhancements will likely continue to exceed available resources 

given the constraints on the Federal budget as well as competing claims for Federal 

assistance. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED TO GERALD L. DILLINGHAM

Question 1. I am interested in whether we have enough screeners in place to facilitate the efficient AND secure movement of passengers through the airport security systems. I understand that TSA has recently reduced its screener workforce by 

6,000. Could you tell us if the airports and representatives of airports with whom 

you recently spoke had any thing to say about the situation at airports with regard 

to whether they had an adequate screening workforce? In GAO’s opinion, what 

would be the right number of screeners at an airport? 

Answer. According to airport representatives, their needs are not being matched 

with the number of available screeners. Some airports maintain they have too many 

screeners, while other airports say they do not have enough screeners. Airport representatives argue that across-the-board reductions do not necessarily take into account operational issues at airports, such as peaks and valleys throughout the 

course of the day or week. In addition, seasonal demands, such as summer vacation 

travel, and demands at airports in certain localities, such as Florida and Nevada, 

need to be considered. 

We do not know the ‘‘right’’ number of screeners, but that number should be based 

on the operational needs of airports and assume the use of part-time screeners. In 

addition, the number of screeners needed at individual airports can be expected to 

change as explosives detection systems (EDS) are integrated with airport baggagehandling systems and used instead of explosives trace detection equipment to screen 

checked baggage. Because EDS require fewer screeners than trace equipment, less 

manpower will be needed as more EDS are placed in service. 

Question 2. What is the short list of actions that you believe must still be taken 

in the area of aviation security and TSA? 

Answer. We believe the following actions still need to be taken in the area of aviation security: 

• Further develop a strategic plan and continue implementation of a risk-based 

management approach: As aviation security is viewed in the larger context of 

transportation and homeland security, and new potential threats emerge daily, 

TSA needs adequate tools to ensure that its efforts are appropriately focused, 

strategically sound, and achieving expected results. As we have recommended, 

it will be important for TSA to set priorities using a risk-based approach so that 

its resources can be focused and directed to those aviation security enhancements most in need of implementation. TSA is currently developing the National Transportation System Security Plan, which is designed to be a comprehensive security strategy for the transportation system. 

• Share and use intelligence information: No technology can outperform the use 

and sharing of intelligence information. It is important to identify and handle 

terrorists and threats before they come into the country. 

• Address funding issues: Securing aviation and other critical infrastructure is 

turning out to be much more costly than originally thought, and the Congress 

is faced with demands for additional Federal funding for transportation security 

that far exceed the funds that might be available through the traditional processes. Funding approaches may include (1) better management of available resources and improved accountability systems—including general cost accounting 

systems and contract management and improved communications with Congress and aviation stakeholders on changing funding needs—and (2) the use of 

innovative financing options, such as letters of intent and an aviation security 

capital fund. 

128 

1 U.S. General Accounting Office, Information Technology: Terrorist Watch Lists Should Be 

Consolidated to Promote Better Integration and Sharing, GAO–03–322 (Washington, D.C.: 

Apr. 15, 2003). 2 U.S. General Accounting Office, Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Help Address Security Challenges, GAO–03–843 (Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2003). 

• Accelerate the development and use of security technologies: When faced with 

vast and competing demands for security resources, it will be important for TSA 

to continue its efforts to identify technologies, such as next-generation passenger and baggage screening technologies that will leverage its resources and 

potentially improve its capabilities. 

• Improve coordination and communication between TSA and airports/local law 

enforcement: The development of effective, collaborative relationships between 

airports, local emergency management agencies, and law enforcement is important to coordination and communication. Key to improving coordination between 

TSA and airports is establishing clearly defined roles for airport operators and 

Federal security directors, who are responsible for ensuring that standardized 

security procedures are implemented at the Nation’s airports. 

Question 3. In your testimony, you describe the challenge of coordination and communications among different aviation stakeholders. I’m concerned about this, especially in regards to intelligence sharing. I’m concerned about the level of intelligence 

that is being shared among Federal agencies, which was an identified weakness in 

our security prior to 9/11. You note in your testimony that GAO has examined the 

status of terrorist watch lists. What were your key findings in this area with regard 

to the development of an integrated database of CIA, FBI, DOD and other government agencies with potential terrorist connections? 

Answer. In reviewing 12 watch lists maintained by nine Federal agencies, we 

found that information was being shared among some of them but not among others.1 Moreover, even when sharing was occurring, costly and overly complex measures had to be taken to facilitate it. To promote better integration and sharing of 

terrorist and criminal watch lists, we recommended that the Department of Homeland Security, in collaboration with other departments and agencies that have and 

use watch lists, lead an effort to consolidate and standardize the Federal Government’s watch list structures and policies. We recommended that this collaborative 

effort include: 

• updating the watch-list information that we reported on to develop an architectural understanding of the Nation’s current watch-list environment; 

• defining the requirements of the future consolidated (or ‘‘target’’) watch list’s architectural environment, including requirements that address any agencyunique needs that can be justified; 

• basing the target architecture on the achievement of the mission goals and objectives contained in the President’s homeland security strategy and on congressional direction, as well as on opportunities to leverage state and local government and private sector information sources; 

• developing a near-term strategy for implementing the target architecture that 

provides for the integration of existing watch lists, as well as a longer-term 

strategy that provides for migrating to a more consolidated and standardized 

set of watch lists; 

• ensuring that these strategies provide for defining and adopting more standardized policies and procedures for watch-list sharing and addressing any legal 

issues affecting, and cultural barriers to, greater watch-list sharing; and 

• developing and implementing the strategies within the context of the ongoing 

efforts of each of the collaborating departments and agencies. 

In addition, as we reported earlier this year,2 representatives of numerous state 

and local governments and transportation industry associations indicated that the 

general threat warnings received by government agencies are not helpful. Rather, 

they said, transportation operators, including airport operators, want more specific 

intelligence information so that they can understand the true nature of a potential 

threat and implement appropriate security measures. In our recent interviews with 

airport representatives, they stated that intelligence information generated at the 

local level can differ from intelligence information that is received from the Federal 

level. Airport representatives are concerned because there is currently no system to 

reconcile these differences in intelligence information. In addition, airport operators 

said that it is difficult to assess what is ‘‘actionable intelligence.’’ 

129 

3 U.S. General Accounting Office, Aviation Security: Registered Traveler Program Policy and 

Implementation Issues, GAO–03–253 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 22, 2002). 

Question 4. I have heard various opinions about the vulnerability associated with 

general aviation. On one hand, I have heard it argued that it is a vulnerability because terrorists could use these types of aircraft to deliver a dirty bomb or spread 

a chemical or biological agent. On the other hand I have heard that the GA community has significantly enhanced GA security since 9/11. What does GAO see as the 

nature and scope of potential vulnerabilities for general aviation? 

Answer. General aviation is vulnerable because general aviation pilots and passengers are not screened before takeoff and the contents of general aviation planes 

are not screened at any point. General aviation includes more than 200,000 privately owned airplanes, which are located in every state at more than 19,000 airports. More than 550 of these airports also provide commercial service. In the last 

5 years, about 70 aircraft have been stolen from general aviation airports, indicating 

a potential weakness that could be exploited by terrorists. This vulnerability was 

demonstrated in January 2002, when a teenage flight student stole and crashed a 

single-engine airplane into a skyscraper in Tampa, Florida. Moreover, general aviation aircraft could be used in other types of terrorist acts. It was reported that the 

September 11 hijackers researched the use of crop dusters to spread biological or 

chemical agents. 

Since September 11, 2001, the general aviation community, in concert with TSA, 

has taken several steps to increase security. These steps include the development 

and publication of plans like General Aviation Security Best Practices by the New 

York State Department of Transportation. Most steps have been voluntary, and no 

mechanism is in place to ensure that these actions are effective or being implemented. 

Question 5. Your testimony states that advancements such as CAPPS II and a 

trusted traveler program could make screening more efficient. How? Are these programs key to improvements in the screening process? What are the hurdles that 

need to be overcome to move these programs further along? 

Answer. TSA initiatives, such as the next-generation Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS II) and registered traveler program, can improve security by ‘‘making the haystack smaller’’ when looking for the needle (i.e., 

the terrorists). CAPPS II would use national security and commercial databases to 

identify passengers who could pose risks for additional screening. Under a registered traveler program, those who voluntarily apply to participate in the program 

and successfully pass background checks would receive a unique identifier or card 

that would enable them to be screened more quickly. These initiatives have the potential to be important aspects of the screening process by enabling TSA to focus 

its limited resources where they will have the greatest impact. 

TSA faces a number of challenges that could impede its ability to begin implementing CAPPS II in the fall of 2004, as called for in its current plans. Among the 

most significant are the following: 

• concerns about travelers’ privacy rights and the safeguards established to protect passenger data; 

• the accuracy of the databases being used by the CAPPS II system and whether 

inaccuracies could generate a high number of false positives and erroneously 

prevent passengers from boarding their flights or delay passengers; 

• the length of time that TSA will retain data; 

• the availability of a redress process through which passengers could get erroneous information corrected; 

• concerns that identify theft, in which someone steals relevant data and impersonates another individual to obtain that person’s low-risk score, may not be detected and thereby negate the security benefits of the system; and 

• obtaining the international cooperation needed for CAPPS II to be fully effective, since some countries consider the passenger information required by 

CAPPS II as a potential violation of their privacy laws. 

In a previous report,3 we identified key policy and implementation issues that 

would need to be resolved before a registered traveler program could be implemented. Such issues include: 

• the criteria that should be established to determine eligibility to apply for the 

program; 

130 

4 U.S. General Accounting Office, Transportation Security Administration: Actions and Plans 

to Build a Results-Oriented Culture, GAO–03–190 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 13, 2003). 

• the kinds of background checks that should be used to certify applicants’ eligibility to enroll in the program and the entity who should perform these checks; 

• the security-screening procedures that registered travelers should undergo and 

the differences between these procedures and those for unregistered travelers; 

and 

• concerns that the traveling public or others may have about equity, privacy, and 

liability. 

Question 6. Your testimony states that Federal Security Directors are the 

lynchpin of TSA’s efforts to coordinate with airports and local law enforcement, but 

you also allude to some coordination problems out in the field. What’s going on, and 

what can we do to make things better? 

Answer. According to aviation stakeholders, cooperation between airport operators 

and Federal security directors (FSD) has been improving, but the level of coordination varies across airports. Our recent discussions with airport representatives indicated that cooperation and coordination often depend on good working relationships, 

based in large part on a clear understanding of respective roles and responsibilities, 

between individual airport operators and FSDs. While some relationships have been 

successful, others are not working well, according to airport representatives. For example, one FSD directed an airport to implement TSA guidance that contradicted 

the airport’s security plan, which TSA had approved. This situation was confusing 

for the airport operator. One potential fix is additional training to ensure that all 

FSDs are uniformly implementing TSA policies. 

Question 7. GAO has done a significant number of studies and analyses related 

to human capital issues across the Federal Government as well as looking at TSA 

in particular. Now that the agency and its staff are in place, we are moving more 

into the area of sustainability and institutionalizing a high-performance organization. What does GAO think are the challenges for TSA as it moves into its next 

phase of development and what do you think of TSA’s efforts to date to meet those 

challenges? 

Answer. TSA faces the challenge of strategically managing its workforce of more 

than 60,000 people to ensure that this new and relatively inexperienced workforce 

expands its skills and becomes a world-class security workforce. This effort will entail the establishment of a screener performance management system so TSA will 

know where to concentrate its training efforts. Additionally, over the next several 

years, TSA faces the challenge of ‘‘right-sizing’’ this workforce as efficiency is improved with new security-enhancing technologies, processes, and procedures. For example, as explosives detection systems are integrated with baggage-handling systems, the use of more labor-intensive screening methods, such as trace detection 

techniques and manual searches of baggage, can be reduced. Other planned security 

enhancements, such as CAPPS II and the registered traveler program, also have the 

potential to make screening more efficient. 

In January 2003, we reported 4 that TSA was addressing some critical human capital success factors by hiring personnel, using a wide range of tools available for hiring, and beginning to link individual performance to organizational goals. However, 

concerns remain about the size and training of the screener workforce, the adequacy 

of the initial background checks for screeners, and TSA’s progress in setting up a 

performance management system. The next steps are for TSA to clearly define the 

roles and responsibilities of its various offices, provide training for supervisors and 

managers to ensure that they are capable supervisors, and continue workforce planning efforts to have the right number and mix of staff. As a step in that direction, 

TSA is currently developing a human capital strategy, which it expects to be completed by the end of this year. 

Question 8. In your testimony before our aviation subcommittee in April of this 

year, you told us that in FY 2002 over half a billion dollars of AIP money had been 

used for aviation security and had resulted in some airport capacity projects going 

unfunded. Your testimony today again raises the issue of how we can fund needed 

security projects and maintain and expand the system’s capacity. In your testimony, 

you state that one of the key challenges in aviation security is paying for it. This 

concerns me, as AIP money is supposed to go towards other airport development 

projects. How can we adequately fund aviation security without such a great reliance on AIP money? 

131 

5 U.S. General Accounting Office, Airport Finance: Past Funding Levels May Not Be Sufficient 

to Cover Airports’ Planned Capital Development, GAO–03–497T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 25, 

2003). 

Answer. As we previously reported to this committee,5 consideration should be 

given to establishing a dedicated and predictable source of funds for aviation security. Proposed aviation reauthorization legislation would establish an aviation security capital fund that would authorize $2 billion over the next 4 years. This funding 

would be made available to airports in letters of intent, and airports would be expected to provide a match of either 5 or 10 percent of a project’s costs. This proposed 

capital fund could minimize the need to use AIP funds for security projects. We also 

identified letters of intent as a funding option that has been successfully used to 

leverage private sources of funding. TSA has since signed letters of intent covering 

seven airports—Boston Logan, Dallas/Fort Worth, Denver, Los Angeles, McCarran 

(Las Vegas), Ontario (California), and Seattle/Tacoma. Airport representatives said 

that about 30 more airports have requested similar agreements. 

Question 9. I see from your testimony today that you solicited the aviation security concerns and issues of some of the principal stakeholders in the aviation community including representatives of the airports, airlines and the general aviation 

community. Could you share with us some of what you heard about their key concerns and issues? 

Answer. Key issues raised by aviation stakeholders include the following: 

• Coordination—During our discussions, stakeholders noted that coordination at 

the local level depends, in large part, on the relationship between the Federal 

security director and the airport operator. Some stakeholders also said that TSA 

does not work with them early in the decision-making process and only informs 

them of decisions after the decisions have been made. According to the stakeholders, this lack of coordination leads to confusion and resentment, along with 

policies that are difficult to enforce operationally, because the policies have been 

created without any input from the airport operators. In addition, this process 

can be costly. For example, TSA may decide on a policy without receiving any 

input from stakeholders and then have to change the policy because the airports 

find the policy unworkable. 

• Funding—Stakeholders noted funding as a major issue. Airports are concerned 

about the high price of terminal modifications for explosives detection systems 

and other security improvements. In addition, airlines are concerned that the 

addition of passenger security fees may lead to fewer people flying, at a time 

when the industry is experiencing economic hardship. 

• Hassle Factor—Stakeholders are concerned about the ‘‘hassle factor,’’ or the perception of it. For example, stakeholders told us that long lines at security checkpoints discourage the public from flying and reduce the number of ‘‘short haul’’ 

trips and business travelers, thereby reducing the airlines’ income. 

• General Aviation—Industry representatives are concerned that information 

about general aviation security and its vulnerabilities is not based on intelligence data or accurate information. For example, representatives said that although there are a number of general aviation aircraft located near nuclear 

power plants, a small general aviation plane could not damage a plant. Stakeholders from the general aviation community told us that they would like to see 

a risk-based plan that addresses general aviation security, including an evaluation of the threats, vulnerabilities, and criticalities of general aviation. 

Question 10. The expansion of the Federal Air Marshal Service is one of the enhancements that were initiated after the attacks of 9/11. Since that time, I have 

seen several stories in the national media that could lead one to believe that the 

service is in total disarray and raise some serious questions as to whether the service can adequately fulfill its mission. I see from your testimony that you have a 

study of the Federal Air Marshal Service underway. Could you tell the Committee 

what issues you are focusing on in your study and when you expect to have a report? Will you be looking at the effect of moving the FAMs out of the TSA? 

Answer. We are examining the past, present, and future of the Federal Air Marshal Service (the Service). The study examines how the Service has evolved since 

its post-9/11 expansion, including the extent to which TSA has developed plans and 

initiatives to sustain the program and accommodate its future growth and maturation. We are also looking at the challenges the Service faces as it moves from the 

Department of Transportation to the Department of Homeland Security and from 

TSA to the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, as well as the effects 

of these challenges on its overall sustainability and status as an integral part of the 

132 

aviation security system. Within this framework, we are examining whether any activity, including background checks and training, compromised aviation security and 

the Service’s ability to carry out its mission. In addition, we are looking at the adequacy of efforts to rectify any problems that surfaced. We expect to issue our report 

on this work at the end of November. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. JOHN MCCAIN TO

MARGARET WRIGHTSON

Question 1. In your written statement, you identify 5 issues that bear watching. 

Could you briefly describe the ones you see as most important and how they impact 

port security? What future oversight or actions would you see as needed in these 

areas to ensure that MTSA is effectively implemented and achieves the results Congress intended? 

Answer. The issues we identified, while separate and distinct, share two common 

themes related to solving them and ensuring that MTSA is implemented effectively. 

Given the limited resources that are available relative to the needs that exist, attention to both of these matters is important. 

• Need for cost-conscious project design and management. Several important considerations need to be kept in mind. First, DHS and the Coast Guard should 

avoid putting money into duplicative efforts unless there is a compelling business case for doing so. Intelligence is one area where we already have identified 

the potential for duplication; the Port Security Assessment program (discussed 

further under question 2 below) certainly represents another. Second, DHS cannot afford to subsidize activities and improvements that could be readily supported by other means. Making sure that TSA enforces matching requirements 

for future port security grants is one example of how to avoid such subsidies. 

Third, where new security processes and technologies are being put into place, 

it is worth considering whether there might be innovative approaches for sharing costs or operations. For example, to implement MTSA’s automatic identification system (AIS) requirement for a system that identifies and tracks vessels 

entering key ports, expensive new infrastructure will be needed at a number of 

ports. One model worth considering is the one already in place at the ports of 

Los Angeles and Long Beach, where the cost for both the infrastructure and ongoing operations of a vessel traffic service system was shared between the Coast 

Guard and local and state sources. 

• Use of risk management in decisionmaking. Risk management is important for 

decisionmaking because of the difficult trade-offs the government will likely 

have to make as it moves forward with its security efforts. Ports will always 

be at risk to some degree, but the risk can be reduced. Since spending is already 

constrained by budget limitations, it is important to spend as wisely as possible 

for efforts to reduce the risk to ports. Under a risk management approach, for 

example, decisions would be based both on the nature of the threat, the vulnerability of an asset at a port, and the criticality (that is, the relative importance) 

of the asset. Infrastructure that is both critical and highly vulnerable would be 

a high priority for funding. By comparison, infrastructure that is vulnerable to 

attack but not as critical, or infrastructure that is very critical but already well 

protected, would be lower in priority. The importance of such an approach merits continued congressional attention to whether the cognizant agencies are 

using it adequately and appropriately. 

Finally, at this early stage of the process, it is difficult to be certain that the key 

issues have surfaced. Partly for this reason, a number of GAO engagements, requested by this Committee and others in Congress, are still ongoing. Further oversight may be needed in the future—for example, after the June 30, 2004, implementation deadline for security plans and the December 31, 2004, deadline for AIS. 

Other programs with longer-term implementation schedules, such as the Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC), may require additional regular 

oversight. 

Question 2. You note in your written statement that GAO has concerns about the 

Port Security Assessments now under way at the Coast Guard. What do you think 

the Coast Guard needs to do to fix this problem? 

Answer. The Coast Guard and its contractor should take several actions to improve the Port Security Assessment program. First, to incorporate knowledge gained 

from the pilot assessments in Huntington and Tampa, the Coast Guard should not 

start any additional port security assessments until the two pilots have been completed. Second, rather than comprehensively reassess facilities for which security asVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:02 Nov 21, 2014 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00136 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\91310.TXT JACKIE
133 

sessments have previously been completed, the Coast Guard should review these assessments, identify gaps, and supplement them as needed. In this regard, the Coast 

Guard should give leading roles to its Port Security Assessment Team and its Captains of the Port in deciding what facilities or infrastructure need to be assessed, 

because these officials have the necessary expertise and experience to decide which 

work will add the most value to what is already known about security at the port. 

Third, to reduce the burden on port stakeholders and encourage their participation, 

the Coast Guard and its contractor should be more careful about limiting information requests to security-related matters. Third, Such actions would reduce the burden on stakeholders and save money and time. Finally, to ensure the quality and 

accuracy of the final assessment report, the Coast Guard should incorporate a quality review into the report drafting process. This action provides an opportunity for 

stakeholders to review the draft for accuracy. We are in discussions with the Coast 

Guard on these matters, and they have indicated they are in the process of making 

changes to correct the problems. 

Question 3. It’s troubling to read in your statement that two years after September 11 we will not have AIS coverage in 25 of the busiest ports in America. 

What is the problem here, and what will it take to solve it? 

Answer. The main problem is one of insufficient infrastructure at about half of 

the 25 ports, and solving it will take both money and time. AIS is a shipboard device that transmits identity and location information via radio broadcast as frequently as every two seconds, both ship-to-ship and ship-to-shore. This allows persons both on shore and aboard each ship to identify vessels and track their position. 

According to the Coast Guard, only 10 ports with Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) systems will have the infrastructure in place to implement AIS by December 31, 2004; 

ports without existing VTS service will require additional time and investment to 

develop the necessary infrastructure. [This additional infrastructure includes transmission towers, control rooms, and equipment for receiving and transmitting radio 

signals. The cost of this infrastructure will likely run into the millions of dollars at 

each port.] Expanding coverage will also require the installation of AIS technology 

on substantially more vessels and hence additional private investment. Additionally, 

legal questions pertaining to licensing of radio frequencies needed to operate AIS 

in some areas may need to be resolved. 

The absence of AIS at a port does not mean that the port is unprotected. All ports, 

including those that will not have AIS implemented by December 31, 2004, are protected by several layers of defense. For example, vessels coming into U.S. ports must 

provide 96-hour advance notice of arrival, sensitive facilities in ports are surrounded 

by security zones that preclude intrusion by unauthorized vessels, and the U.S. 

Coast Guard and other security organizations patrol waterways in the ports. Local 

port control by harbormasters can also monitor vessels traffic in and out of ports. 

Question 4. Which agency within DHS is the lead agency on maritime security? 

Which agency do you believe is best equipped to take the lead role in maritime security? 

Answer. The Coast Guard is currently the lead agency for maritime homeland security, while the Navy has primary responsibility for maritime homeland defense. 

The Coast Guard has historically performed the maritime homeland security role, 

and it—more than any other agency within DHS—has the resources, expertise, and 

legal authority to continue in this capacity. While our work in this area is ongoing, 

we have not identified other organizations or entities better situated to take the 

lead role in accomplishing the mission of maritime homeland security. However, the 

Coast Guard needs to keep two main considerations in mind as it exercises this responsibility: 

• Need to balance this role with other missions. It is clear that the Coast Guard 

is facing daunting challenges to fulfill these new responsibilities while also 

meeting its other missions. As we testified last spring, there were two missions 

in which the Coast Guard’s level of effort (as measured by resource hours spent 

using cutters, boats and aircraft) were significantly below historical levels. 

These were drug interdiction (down by about two-thirds between the first quarter of 1998 and the first quarter of 2003) and fisheries enforcement (down about 

one-third for the same period). The Coast Guard’s alignment of missions has 

been an area of much congressional concern, and the Coast Guard has been 

tasked with developing a strategy that outlines how it sees its resources—cutters, boats, aircraft, and personnel—being distributed across all of its various 

missions, as well as a time-frame for achieving the desired balance among missions. The Coast Guard is currently working on this plan but has not yet completed it. 

134 

• Need for coordination across all of DHS. Although the Coast Guard has lead 

responsibility for maritime security, it cannot or should not go it alone in isolation from other DHS Directorates or offices. As we have testified, for an effective maritime security strategy to be developed and implemented, it is critical 

that the Coast Guard and the other agencies folded into DHS deal effectively 

with a myriad of organizational, human capital, process, technology, and environmental challenges. Because we recognize the difficulty of this enterprise 

while also working to maintain readiness, we have designated the implementation and transformation of DHS—including those aspects pertaining to the 

Coast Guard—as a high-risk area. 

Æ