# C_2016065EN.01012701.xml

| 19.2.2016 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 65/127 |
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19.2.2016

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 65/127

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P7_TA(2013)0281

Reconstruction and democratisation of Mali

European Parliament resolution of 13 June 2013 on the reconstruction and democratisation of Mali (2013/2587(RSP))

(2016/C 065/17)

The European Parliament,

The European Parliament

| — | having regard to its resolutions of 20 April 2012 on the situation in Mali (1) and of 14 June 2012 on human rights and the security situation in the Sahel region (2), |
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having regard to its resolutions of 20 April 2012 on the situation in Mali (1) and of 14 June 2012 on human rights and the security situation in the Sahel region (2),

1

2

| — | having regard to the European Union’s Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel, adopted in March 2011, |
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having regard to the European Union’s Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel, adopted in March 2011,

| — | having regard to United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions 2056 (2012) and 2071 (2012) on the situation in Mali, |
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having regard to United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions 2056 (2012) and 2071 (2012) on the situation in Mali,

| — | having regard to UNSC resolution 2085 (2012) authorising the deployment of an African-led International Support Mission in Mali (Afisma), |
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having regard to UNSC resolution 2085 (2012) authorising the deployment of an African-led International Support Mission in Mali (Afisma),

| — | having regard to the statements by the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 22 March, 26 March, 7 April, 21 December and 23 December 2012, as well as of 11 January, 7 March and 7 June 2013, regarding the situation in Mali, |
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having regard to the statements by the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 22 March, 26 March, 7 April, 21 December and 23 December 2012, as well as of 11 January, 7 March and 7 June 2013, regarding the situation in Mali,

| — | having regard to the EU Council Conclusions on the Sahel of 23 March 2012 approving the Crisis Management Concept for a civilian CSDP Advisory, Assistance and Training Mission in the Sahel, |
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having regard to the EU Council Conclusions on the Sahel of 23 March 2012 approving the Crisis Management Concept for a civilian CSDP Advisory, Assistance and Training Mission in the Sahel,

| — | having regard to the EU Council Conclusions on Mali of 31 January, of 18 February, of 23 April and of 27 May 2013, |
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having regard to the EU Council Conclusions on Mali of 31 January, of 18 February, of 23 April and of 27 May 2013,

| — | having regard to the letter of 25 March 2013 from the transitional authorities in Mali to the UN Secretary-General requesting the deployment of a United Nations operation to stabilise and restore the authority and the sovereignty of the Malian State throughout its national territory, |
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having regard to the letter of 25 March 2013 from the transitional authorities in Mali to the UN Secretary-General requesting the deployment of a United Nations operation to stabilise and restore the authority and the sovereignty of the Malian State throughout its national territory,

| — | having regard to the letter of 26 March 2013 from the President of the Ecowas Commission to the UN Secretary-General requesting the transformation of Afisma into a United Nations stabilisation mission, |
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having regard to the letter of 26 March 2013 from the President of the Ecowas Commission to the UN Secretary-General requesting the transformation of Afisma into a United Nations stabilisation mission,

| — | having regard to UN Resolution 2100 (2013) adopted by the Security Council at its 6952nd meeting on 25 April 2013 creating a peace-keeping force |
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having regard to UN Resolution 2100 (2013) adopted by the Security Council at its 6952nd meeting on 25 April 2013 creating a peace-keeping force

| — | having regard to the Malian roadmap for transition which was unanimously approved by the country’s National Assembly on 29 January 2013, |
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having regard to the Malian roadmap for transition which was unanimously approved by the country’s National Assembly on 29 January 2013,

| — | having regard to the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, |
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having regard to the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance,

| — | having regard to all African and international human rights conventions signed by Mali, |
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having regard to all African and international human rights conventions signed by Mali,

| — | having regard to Written Questions O-000040 — B7-0205/2013 and O-000041 — B7-0206/2013 to the Council and the Commission, respectively, on the reconstruction and democratisation of Mali, |
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having regard to Written Questions O-000040 — B7-0205/2013 and O-000041 — B7-0206/2013 to the Council and the Commission, respectively, on the reconstruction and democratisation of Mali,

| — | having regard to the ‘Together for a New Mali’ conference of donors for development held in Brussels on 15 May 2013, |
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having regard to the ‘Together for a New Mali’ conference of donors for development held in Brussels on 15 May 2013,

| — | having regard to Rules 115(5) and 110(2) of its Rules of Procedure, |
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having regard to Rules 115(5) and 110(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

| A. | whereas the effects of the military coup d’état in Mali in March 2012, the occupation of the northern part of the country by armed rebel jihadist groups, and the following armed conflict in the northern part, are felt far beyond Mali and the Sahel region, with repercussions elsewhere in Africa and in Europe; |
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A.

whereas the effects of the military coup d’état in Mali in March 2012, the occupation of the northern part of the country by armed rebel jihadist groups, and the following armed conflict in the northern part, are felt far beyond Mali and the Sahel region, with repercussions elsewhere in Africa and in Europe;

| B. | whereas Mali is one of the ten poorest countries in the world and ranks 182nd among the 187 countries on the UNDP’s Human Development Index for 2013; whereas even before the current crisis Mali suffered from socio-economic disparities between North and South, as well as from weak democratic institutions, poor governance, corruption and organised crime; |
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B.

whereas Mali is one of the ten poorest countries in the world and ranks 182nd among the 187 countries on the UNDP’s Human Development Index for 2013; whereas even before the current crisis Mali suffered from socio-economic disparities between North and South, as well as from weak democratic institutions, poor governance, corruption and organised crime;

| C. | whereas Captain Amadou Haya Sanogo, appointed head of the Military Committee for Reform of the Armed Forces and Security, remains a dangerous figure who retains his capacity to cause damage, not least in light of his new functions which provide him with a direct contact with the military; |
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C.

whereas Captain Amadou Haya Sanogo, appointed head of the Military Committee for Reform of the Armed Forces and Security, remains a dangerous figure who retains his capacity to cause damage, not least in light of his new functions which provide him with a direct contact with the military;

| D. | whereas a roadmap for transition has been approved by the Malian authorities and a Commission for Dialogue and Reconciliation has been set up; whereas the EU, together with Mali’s transitional authorities and other regional and international organisations, has started working on the implementation of the roadmap in order to bring lasting peace; |
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D.

whereas a roadmap for transition has been approved by the Malian authorities and a Commission for Dialogue and Reconciliation has been set up; whereas the EU, together with Mali’s transitional authorities and other regional and international organisations, has started working on the implementation of the roadmap in order to bring lasting peace;

| E. | whereas political dialogue and reconciliation between ethnic groups — to keep the peace and create a willingness among the country’s different ethnic groups to live together — represent a challenge to the reconstruction of Mali; whereas the situation in Kidal, still controlled by Tuaregs from the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), could well jeopardise this reconciliation process; whereas only those groups that respect Mali’s Constitution and the integrity of the country’s territory will be allowed to participate in the Commission for Dialogue and Reconciliation; |
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E.

whereas political dialogue and reconciliation between ethnic groups — to keep the peace and create a willingness among the country’s different ethnic groups to live together — represent a challenge to the reconstruction of Mali; whereas the situation in Kidal, still controlled by Tuaregs from the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), could well jeopardise this reconciliation process; whereas only those groups that respect Mali’s Constitution and the integrity of the country’s territory will be allowed to participate in the Commission for Dialogue and Reconciliation;

| F. | whereas at a donors’ conference in Addis Ababa organised by the African Union (AU) on 29 January 2013, a total of EUR 337,2 million were pledged by donors toward resolving the Mali crisis, of which sum the EU awarded EUR 50 million to Afisma and, under the Instrument for Stability, EUR 20 million to provide immediate support to Mali’s law enforcement and justice services, local authorities, dialogue and reconciliation efforts and the first phases of the preparatory process for the coming elections; |
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F.

whereas at a donors’ conference in Addis Ababa organised by the African Union (AU) on 29 January 2013, a total of EUR 337,2 million were pledged by donors toward resolving the Mali crisis, of which sum the EU awarded EUR 50 million to Afisma and, under the Instrument for Stability, EUR 20 million to provide immediate support to Mali’s law enforcement and justice services, local authorities, dialogue and reconciliation efforts and the first phases of the preparatory process for the coming elections;

| G. | whereas the Commission has announced a gradual resumption of development aid, to the sum of EUR 250 million, in support of areas such as: reconciliation and conflict prevention; the electoral process; the provision of basic services, including health and access to water and sanitation; the strengthening of food security; and the re-launching of the economy; |
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G.

whereas the Commission has announced a gradual resumption of development aid, to the sum of EUR 250 million, in support of areas such as: reconciliation and conflict prevention; the electoral process; the provision of basic services, including health and access to water and sanitation; the strengthening of food security; and the re-launching of the economy;

| H. | whereas many international organisations and non-governmental organisations work in Mali to help provide basic services to local communities, including food aid, access to water and healthcare; |
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H.

whereas many international organisations and non-governmental organisations work in Mali to help provide basic services to local communities, including food aid, access to water and healthcare;

| I. | whereas the international community and Mali agree on the fact that the Plan for the Sustainable Recovery of Mali (PRED) constitutes a sound basis for mutual commitments; that the implementation of the PRED requires monitoring and evaluation of the planned programmes and expenditure; that the donors’ support for the PRED depends on Mali honouring its commitments, and in particular implementing the necessary reforms with regard to democratic governance; |
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I.

whereas the international community and Mali agree on the fact that the Plan for the Sustainable Recovery of Mali (PRED) constitutes a sound basis for mutual commitments; that the implementation of the PRED requires monitoring and evaluation of the planned programmes and expenditure; that the donors’ support for the PRED depends on Mali honouring its commitments, and in particular implementing the necessary reforms with regard to democratic governance;

| J. | Whereas the French military operation ‘Serval’, launched in support of the Malian army on 11 January 2013 in response to an offensive by radical Islamist groups, has been successful in retaking northern towns and areas captured by rebels, and whereas, according to the French government, the French troops began their phased withdrawal from Mali in April 2013; |
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J.

Whereas the French military operation ‘Serval’, launched in support of the Malian army on 11 January 2013 in response to an offensive by radical Islamist groups, has been successful in retaking northern towns and areas captured by rebels, and whereas, according to the French government, the French troops began their phased withdrawal from Mali in April 2013;

| K. | whereas the UN-sanctioned African-led International Support Mission in Mali (Afisma) already has 6 500 troops in the country; whereas UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has pleaded that a UN peacekeeping force be deployed to Mali to stabilise the country; |
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K.

whereas the UN-sanctioned African-led International Support Mission in Mali (Afisma) already has 6 500 troops in the country; whereas UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has pleaded that a UN peacekeeping force be deployed to Mali to stabilise the country;

| L. | whereas on 25 April 2013 the UN Security Council adopted, under Chapter VII of the Charter, Resolution 2100 (2013) establishing the United Nations Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) in line with recommendations of the UN Secretary-General; whereas the 12 600-strong MINUSMA force will take over from Afisma on 1 July 2013, while the French troops are authorised, upon request of the UN Secretary-General, to intervene in support of elements of MINUSMA when under imminent and serious threat; |
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L.

whereas on 25 April 2013 the UN Security Council adopted, under Chapter VII of the Charter, Resolution 2100 (2013) establishing the United Nations Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) in line with recommendations of the UN Secretary-General; whereas the 12 600-strong MINUSMA force will take over from Afisma on 1 July 2013, while the French troops are authorised, upon request of the UN Secretary-General, to intervene in support of elements of MINUSMA when under imminent and serious threat;

| M. | whereas while the security situation in northern Mali has improved since the French intervention, the struggle against radical Islamist groups continues; whereas there is a need to maintain the momentum against isolated terrorist threats in some northern areas, such as the recent threats to Timbuktu and Gao, requiring a stabilising force and quick response capacities; whereas armed extremists are increasingly resorting to asymmetric tactics, such as guerrilla ambushes, suicide attacks, car bombings and the use of anti-personnel land-mines; whereas, therefore, maintaining peace and security in the medium and long term presents exceptional challenges; |
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M.

whereas while the security situation in northern Mali has improved since the French intervention, the struggle against radical Islamist groups continues; whereas there is a need to maintain the momentum against isolated terrorist threats in some northern areas, such as the recent threats to Timbuktu and Gao, requiring a stabilising force and quick response capacities; whereas armed extremists are increasingly resorting to asymmetric tactics, such as guerrilla ambushes, suicide attacks, car bombings and the use of anti-personnel land-mines; whereas, therefore, maintaining peace and security in the medium and long term presents exceptional challenges;

| N. | whereas the situation in Mali constitutes a threat to international peace and security, and requires a response that goes beyond addressing security threats, including a long-term commitment on the part of the international community and decisive action to tackle deep-rooted political, governance, development and humanitarian challenges; |
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N.

whereas the situation in Mali constitutes a threat to international peace and security, and requires a response that goes beyond addressing security threats, including a long-term commitment on the part of the international community and decisive action to tackle deep-rooted political, governance, development and humanitarian challenges;

| O. | whereas for the past two decades elections have been held on a regular basis in Mali, and whereas prior to the coup d’état the country was seen as a success story for democracy in Africa, even though the country’s economy never did progress sufficiently to provide a better future for its young people (many of whom were instead forced to migrate) or to improve the livelihood of the population in general; |
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O.

whereas for the past two decades elections have been held on a regular basis in Mali, and whereas prior to the coup d’état the country was seen as a success story for democracy in Africa, even though the country’s economy never did progress sufficiently to provide a better future for its young people (many of whom were instead forced to migrate) or to improve the livelihood of the population in general;

| P. | whereas relaunching the economic development of Mali requires targeted aid focusing on the real needs of the country; |
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P.

whereas relaunching the economic development of Mali requires targeted aid focusing on the real needs of the country;

| Q. | whereas the Malian crisis is manifold and complex, and cannot be reduced to an ethnic conflict; whereas the solutions must therefore be comprehensive and coherent, encompassing economic, social and environmental policies that aim to improve the living standards of the population, and to achieve this it is important to understand past mistakes by analysing the internal and external factors of Mali’s economic development failure; |
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Q.

whereas the Malian crisis is manifold and complex, and cannot be reduced to an ethnic conflict; whereas the solutions must therefore be comprehensive and coherent, encompassing economic, social and environmental policies that aim to improve the living standards of the population, and to achieve this it is important to understand past mistakes by analysing the internal and external factors of Mali’s economic development failure;

| R. | whereas unconstitutional change of government is a major obstacle to peace, security and development; whereas Article 25 of the African Charter — on democracy, elections and governance — stipulates that individual perpetrators shall not be allowed to participate in elections held to restore the democratic order or to hold any position of responsibility in political institutions of their State; |
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R.

whereas unconstitutional change of government is a major obstacle to peace, security and development; whereas Article 25 of the African Charter — on democracy, elections and governance — stipulates that individual perpetrators shall not be allowed to participate in elections held to restore the democratic order or to hold any position of responsibility in political institutions of their State;

| S. | whereas the human rights situation in Mali deteriorated sharply after the start of the rebellion in the north of the country and the military coup on 22 March 2012; |
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S.

whereas the human rights situation in Mali deteriorated sharply after the start of the rebellion in the north of the country and the military coup on 22 March 2012;

| T. | whereas there are massive humanitarian needs in Mali, where up to 1 million people have been dependent on food assistance, including 174 129 refugees in neighbouring countries and 300 783 internally displaced people; whereas an integrated return strategy is needed for when conditions in the north are conducive to safe, voluntary and dignified returns; |
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T.

whereas there are massive humanitarian needs in Mali, where up to 1 million people have been dependent on food assistance, including 174 129 refugees in neighbouring countries and 300 783 internally displaced people; whereas an integrated return strategy is needed for when conditions in the north are conducive to safe, voluntary and dignified returns;

| U. | whereas 750 000 people are in need of immediate food assistance and 660 000 children are at risk of malnutrition, including 210 000 at risk of severe malnutrition; whereas access to basic social services remains limited, particularly in the north; |
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U.

whereas 750 000 people are in need of immediate food assistance and 660 000 children are at risk of malnutrition, including 210 000 at risk of severe malnutrition; whereas access to basic social services remains limited, particularly in the north;

| V. | whereas an Action Plan for the Rehabilitation of Cultural Heritage and the Safeguarding of Ancient Manuscripts in Mali was adopted at an international experts meeting organised by Unesco in February 2013; |
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V.

whereas an Action Plan for the Rehabilitation of Cultural Heritage and the Safeguarding of Ancient Manuscripts in Mali was adopted at an international experts meeting organised by Unesco in February 2013;

| W. | whereas the European Union attaches great importance to the respect of human rights; whereas the population in northern Mali lives in an atmosphere of fear, and their human rights are systematically violated by radical Islamist groups; |
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W.

whereas the European Union attaches great importance to the respect of human rights; whereas the population in northern Mali lives in an atmosphere of fear, and their human rights are systematically violated by radical Islamist groups;

| X. | whereas on 15 May 2013 a high-level donor conference, ‘Together for a New Mali’, was held in Brussels convening delegations from 108 countries, including 13 heads of state and government, a large number of foreign affairs ministers and senior representatives of regional and international institutions, together with representatives of local authorities and civil society; whereas donors have undertaken to donate EUR 3,25 billion to Mali in the next two years, with the EU taking the lead by pledging EUR 520 million; |
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X.

whereas on 15 May 2013 a high-level donor conference, ‘Together for a New Mali’, was held in Brussels convening delegations from 108 countries, including 13 heads of state and government, a large number of foreign affairs ministers and senior representatives of regional and international institutions, together with representatives of local authorities and civil society; whereas donors have undertaken to donate EUR 3,25 billion to Mali in the next two years, with the EU taking the lead by pledging EUR 520 million;

| Y. | whereas the EU will collectively allocate EUR 1,35 billion in support of the Plan for the Sustainable Recovery of Mali (PRED), of which the Commission will contribute EUR 523,9 million, including EUR 12 million in humanitarian aid to meet the most urgent needs; |
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Y.

whereas the EU will collectively allocate EUR 1,35 billion in support of the Plan for the Sustainable Recovery of Mali (PRED), of which the Commission will contribute EUR 523,9 million, including EUR 12 million in humanitarian aid to meet the most urgent needs;

| Z. | whereas the situation in Kidal remains uncertain and is threatening to disrupt the upcoming presidential elections, despite mediation efforts by Burkina Faso; |
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Z.

whereas the situation in Kidal remains uncertain and is threatening to disrupt the upcoming presidential elections, despite mediation efforts by Burkina Faso;

| 1. | Stresses its commitment to the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Mali; welcomes the French intervention in support of these principles as a first step towards the reconstruction and democratisation of Mali; calls for strong EU involvement in this process; |
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1.

Stresses its commitment to the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Mali; welcomes the French intervention in support of these principles as a first step towards the reconstruction and democratisation of Mali; calls for strong EU involvement in this process;

| 2. | Supports a Malian-led political process enabling the country to achieve long-term political stability and economic prosperity; underlines the importance of inclusive national dialogue, and of the reconciliation process, in the effort to reach a genuine and democratic political solution to the country’s recurrent crisis; welcomes, in this context, the establishment of the National Dialogue and Reconciliation Commission on 6 March 2013, and expresses hope that it is rapidly made operational; welcomes the nomination of a woman and a Tuareg as vice-presidents of this Commission as a sign of a commitment to inclusiveness and plurality in the political process; |
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2.

Supports a Malian-led political process enabling the country to achieve long-term political stability and economic prosperity; underlines the importance of inclusive national dialogue, and of the reconciliation process, in the effort to reach a genuine and democratic political solution to the country’s recurrent crisis; welcomes, in this context, the establishment of the National Dialogue and Reconciliation Commission on 6 March 2013, and expresses hope that it is rapidly made operational; welcomes the nomination of a woman and a Tuareg as vice-presidents of this Commission as a sign of a commitment to inclusiveness and plurality in the political process;

| 3. | Is deeply concerned about the situation in Kidal, where Tuaregs from the MNLA are still refusing to hand over control to the Malian army and are therefore seriously hampering the reconstruction process; invites the government and the MNLA to hold a preliminary discussion about the participation of MNLA in the Commission for National Dialogue and Reconciliation; |
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3.

Is deeply concerned about the situation in Kidal, where Tuaregs from the MNLA are still refusing to hand over control to the Malian army and are therefore seriously hampering the reconstruction process; invites the government and the MNLA to hold a preliminary discussion about the participation of MNLA in the Commission for National Dialogue and Reconciliation;

| 4. | Urges swift implementation of the roadmap, in order to sustain the transition until the constitutional order and the rule of law has been re-established throughout the country through the organisation of democratic, free, fair and transparent elections in 2013; welcomes the commitment on the part of the Malian authorities to organise the elections on 28 July and 11 August 2013, as well as the declarations by leaders of the transitional government not to stand for election; acknowledges the challenges that the organisation of the elections pose, including tasks such as ensuring security in the northern areas, issuing biometric voter cards and registering refugees on the electoral rolls, and calls on the EU and its international partners to step up their support for the upcoming electoral process; welcomes, in this respect, the intention of sending an EU electoral observation mission, as requested by the Malian government; |
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4.

Urges swift implementation of the roadmap, in order to sustain the transition until the constitutional order and the rule of law has been re-established throughout the country through the organisation of democratic, free, fair and transparent elections in 2013; welcomes the commitment on the part of the Malian authorities to organise the elections on 28 July and 11 August 2013, as well as the declarations by leaders of the transitional government not to stand for election; acknowledges the challenges that the organisation of the elections pose, including tasks such as ensuring security in the northern areas, issuing biometric voter cards and registering refugees on the electoral rolls, and calls on the EU and its international partners to step up their support for the upcoming electoral process; welcomes, in this respect, the intention of sending an EU electoral observation mission, as requested by the Malian government;

| 5. | Reaffirms that the presidential and legislative elections are seen as a first step towards a return to democracy, and that holding the elections is an essential element in ensuring the credibility and legitimacy of future governments; |
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5.

Reaffirms that the presidential and legislative elections are seen as a first step towards a return to democracy, and that holding the elections is an essential element in ensuring the credibility and legitimacy of future governments;

| 6. | Welcomes the mediation efforts by the President of Burkina Faso in the ongoing negotiations in Ouagadougou between the Malian government and Tuareg rebels; calls for the rapid conclusion of the negotiations, and reiterates its determination to support the re-establishment of the State administration throughout the territory of Mali and the forthcoming holding of elections, including in Kidal Region and in refugee camps; |
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6.

Welcomes the mediation efforts by the President of Burkina Faso in the ongoing negotiations in Ouagadougou between the Malian government and Tuareg rebels; calls for the rapid conclusion of the negotiations, and reiterates its determination to support the re-establishment of the State administration throughout the territory of Mali and the forthcoming holding of elections, including in Kidal Region and in refugee camps;

| 7. | Insists that any political solution to rebuild Mali needs to be accompanied by a clear and sustainable economic development strategy that addresses the problem of unemployment in order to improve the livelihood of the population, and stresses that the provision of basic services such as health, education, water and sanitation must be resumed as they are essential to the stability of the country; believes that institutional reforms are necessary to ensure political stability and to allow the Malian community as a whole to be involved in building the country’s future; stresses as well the need to strengthen democratic processes and accountability throughout the country if better development results are to attained; |
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7.

Insists that any political solution to rebuild Mali needs to be accompanied by a clear and sustainable economic development strategy that addresses the problem of unemployment in order to improve the livelihood of the population, and stresses that the provision of basic services such as health, education, water and sanitation must be resumed as they are essential to the stability of the country; believes that institutional reforms are necessary to ensure political stability and to allow the Malian community as a whole to be involved in building the country’s future; stresses as well the need to strengthen democratic processes and accountability throughout the country if better development results are to attained;

| 8. | Welcomes the sustainable recovery plan for 2013-2014 that forms part of the Roadmap for Transition of 29 January 2013 and the Strategic Framework for Growth and Poverty Reduction 2012-2017 of December 2011 (CSCRP 2012-2017); |
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8.

Welcomes the sustainable recovery plan for 2013-2014 that forms part of the Roadmap for Transition of 29 January 2013 and the Strategic Framework for Growth and Poverty Reduction 2012-2017 of December 2011 (CSCRP 2012-2017);

| 9. | Is convinced that the success of the Plan for the Sustainable Recovery of Mali requires that account be taken of the regional and sub-regional dimension, in particular through consolidation of good governance and greater economic integration, development of economic infrastructure, development of human resources in healthcare and education, and establishment of a partnership to mobilise resources and monitor evaluation; |
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9.

Is convinced that the success of the Plan for the Sustainable Recovery of Mali requires that account be taken of the regional and sub-regional dimension, in particular through consolidation of good governance and greater economic integration, development of economic infrastructure, development of human resources in healthcare and education, and establishment of a partnership to mobilise resources and monitor evaluation;

| 10. | Invites the Malian government to work together with relevant international organisations and NGOs in order to provide the people of Mali with adequate and coordinated support; |
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10.

Invites the Malian government to work together with relevant international organisations and NGOs in order to provide the people of Mali with adequate and coordinated support;

| 11. | Takes the view that responding to Mali’s development challenges requires both adequate funding and improved coordination, both at EU level and with other international donors; strongly supports a tailor-made approach that focuses on the needs of the country and that reflects the progress made towards implementing the roadmap and restoring the rule of law; |
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11.

Takes the view that responding to Mali’s development challenges requires both adequate funding and improved coordination, both at EU level and with other international donors; strongly supports a tailor-made approach that focuses on the needs of the country and that reflects the progress made towards implementing the roadmap and restoring the rule of law;

| 12. | Calls on the EU and its international partners to help West African governments fight against drug trafficking and the proliferation of arms; calls on the countries in the region to put a balanced and sustainable development strategy at the heart of their development policy, provide basic public services to the population in general and create employment opportunities, in particular for the young; |
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12.

Calls on the EU and its international partners to help West African governments fight against drug trafficking and the proliferation of arms; calls on the countries in the region to put a balanced and sustainable development strategy at the heart of their development policy, provide basic public services to the population in general and create employment opportunities, in particular for the young;

| 13. | Calls on the EU, the UN and the individual states to provide logistic and technical support to help Malians fight against drug trafficking and the proliferation of arms; invites all countries in the Sahel region to coordinate their respective security policies with a view to formulating a strong response to trafficking; |
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13.

Calls on the EU, the UN and the individual states to provide logistic and technical support to help Malians fight against drug trafficking and the proliferation of arms; invites all countries in the Sahel region to coordinate their respective security policies with a view to formulating a strong response to trafficking;

| 14. | Stresses that security and development in the Sahel are mutually reinforcing; welcomes the initial intervention by France, reinforced by the Afisma (and, with effect from 1 July 2013, the MINUSMA), to halt further destabilisation and to counter extremist forces; underlines the important complementary role of the EU Training Mission (EUTM Mali) in providing decisive assistance in building the longer-term capacity of the Malian army; recalls that longer-term stability, security and territorial integrity of the country requires not only that violent and radical extremists — and traffickers in arms, drugs and people — are defeated but that alternatives to the illegal activities of impoverished people and unemployed youth are promoted; |
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14.

Stresses that security and development in the Sahel are mutually reinforcing; welcomes the initial intervention by France, reinforced by the Afisma (and, with effect from 1 July 2013, the MINUSMA), to halt further destabilisation and to counter extremist forces; underlines the important complementary role of the EU Training Mission (EUTM Mali) in providing decisive assistance in building the longer-term capacity of the Malian army; recalls that longer-term stability, security and territorial integrity of the country requires not only that violent and radical extremists — and traffickers in arms, drugs and people — are defeated but that alternatives to the illegal activities of impoverished people and unemployed youth are promoted;

| 15. | Underlines the need to find a regional solution, rooted in a regional agreement supported by a conference of the countries of the sub-region, in particular Algeria and Mauritania; |
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15.

Underlines the need to find a regional solution, rooted in a regional agreement supported by a conference of the countries of the sub-region, in particular Algeria and Mauritania;

| 16. | Calls for the reform of the Malian armed forces, and the broader security services, to be stepped up under democratic and civilian control in order to ensure stability and build confidence in the role of the security sector in contributing to lasting peace and democracy in the country; |
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16.

Calls for the reform of the Malian armed forces, and the broader security services, to be stepped up under democratic and civilian control in order to ensure stability and build confidence in the role of the security sector in contributing to lasting peace and democracy in the country;

| 17. | Calls on the Malian government to pay particular attention to promoting human rights throughout the territory of Mali, and to prosecute all those who have committed serious violations of human rights, regardless of whether they belong to radical Islamist groups or to the Malian army; |
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17.

Calls on the Malian government to pay particular attention to promoting human rights throughout the territory of Mali, and to prosecute all those who have committed serious violations of human rights, regardless of whether they belong to radical Islamist groups or to the Malian army;

| 18. | Commends the efforts of the African countries that contributed to Afisma and welcomes its deployment to Mali; welcomes, equally, the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 2100 (2013) establishing the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), an operation with a robust mandate to stabilise the country, support the implementation of the roadmap for transition, protect civilians, promote and protect human rights, as well as support humanitarian assistance, cultural preservation and national and international justice; expresses its hope that MINUSMA will soon be fully operational and that the security situation will be such that it can be deployed on 1 July 2013; |
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18.

Commends the efforts of the African countries that contributed to Afisma and welcomes its deployment to Mali; welcomes, equally, the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 2100 (2013) establishing the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), an operation with a robust mandate to stabilise the country, support the implementation of the roadmap for transition, protect civilians, promote and protect human rights, as well as support humanitarian assistance, cultural preservation and national and international justice; expresses its hope that MINUSMA will soon be fully operational and that the security situation will be such that it can be deployed on 1 July 2013;

| 19. | Welcomes the launch of EUTM Mali on 18 February 2013 and its mandate to support the reform of the Malian armed forces under democratic civilian control; recalls the urgent need to support the Malian government in ensuring that it can maintain its territorial integrity over the longer term, which includes having the means to address key asymmetric threats represented by the radical Islamist groups and by those trafficking in people, goods and arms; takes the view that the EU should consider including in the training programmes of the Malian armed forces modules on good practices, human rights and fighting corruption; |
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19.

Welcomes the launch of EUTM Mali on 18 February 2013 and its mandate to support the reform of the Malian armed forces under democratic civilian control; recalls the urgent need to support the Malian government in ensuring that it can maintain its territorial integrity over the longer term, which includes having the means to address key asymmetric threats represented by the radical Islamist groups and by those trafficking in people, goods and arms; takes the view that the EU should consider including in the training programmes of the Malian armed forces modules on good practices, human rights and fighting corruption;

| 20. | Notes the complementary work of EUCAP Sahel Niger in providing training to strengthen the security sector in neighbouring countries and in coordinating with EUTM Mali through a liaison officer in Bamako; calls on the VP/HR to set out options for providing similar support for the reform of the broader security sector in Mali (including police, national guard, gendarmerie and the justice sector), inter alia by assessing whether this could be done through an extension of the mandate of EUTM Mali or EUCAP Sahel Niger, or through the creation of a new CSDP Mission dedicated to the broader reform of the civilian security sector; |
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20.

Notes the complementary work of EUCAP Sahel Niger in providing training to strengthen the security sector in neighbouring countries and in coordinating with EUTM Mali through a liaison officer in Bamako; calls on the VP/HR to set out options for providing similar support for the reform of the broader security sector in Mali (including police, national guard, gendarmerie and the justice sector), inter alia by assessing whether this could be done through an extension of the mandate of EUTM Mali or EUCAP Sahel Niger, or through the creation of a new CSDP Mission dedicated to the broader reform of the civilian security sector;

| 21. | Condemns the human rights violations and calls for the perpetrators to be held responsible; welcomes the decision by the International Criminal Court (ICC) to open an inquiry, and calls on the Malian authorities to cooperate with the ICC; welcomes the deployment of the first human rights observers in Mali, in accordance with the decisions of the African Union Peace and Security Council and Ecowas; underlines that political reconstruction and its credibility also depend on the establishment of transitional justice mechanisms; |
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21.

Condemns the human rights violations and calls for the perpetrators to be held responsible; welcomes the decision by the International Criminal Court (ICC) to open an inquiry, and calls on the Malian authorities to cooperate with the ICC; welcomes the deployment of the first human rights observers in Mali, in accordance with the decisions of the African Union Peace and Security Council and Ecowas; underlines that political reconstruction and its credibility also depend on the establishment of transitional justice mechanisms;

| 22. | Calls for the provision to continue of humanitarian aid to populations in need, and for measures to be taken to ensure the free and voluntary return of the refugees; stresses the need to maintain a clear distinction between humanitarian and political/security agendas in order to ensure the impartiality of humanitarian action, the safety of humanitarian workers and the access to relief of those in need; |
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22.

Calls for the provision to continue of humanitarian aid to populations in need, and for measures to be taken to ensure the free and voluntary return of the refugees; stresses the need to maintain a clear distinction between humanitarian and political/security agendas in order to ensure the impartiality of humanitarian action, the safety of humanitarian workers and the access to relief of those in need;

| 23. | Invites all security forces in Mali to secure the country in order to allow humanitarian aid to reach the whole population; |
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23.

Invites all security forces in Mali to secure the country in order to allow humanitarian aid to reach the whole population;

| 24. | Reiterates its condemnation of the looting and destruction of cultural heritage sites; welcomes the recent measures taken by Unesco to rehabilitate Mali’s cultural heritage; |
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24.

Reiterates its condemnation of the looting and destruction of cultural heritage sites; welcomes the recent measures taken by Unesco to rehabilitate Mali’s cultural heritage;

| 25. | Takes the view that the EU should, in light of the Malian crisis, make necessary adjustments to the European Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel; underlines the need for better integration between the development and security pillars of the strategy, and for better coordination of its policy instruments; stresses the need to improve the EU’s early warning systems in order that it may realise the strategy’s preventive dimension; |
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25.

Takes the view that the EU should, in light of the Malian crisis, make necessary adjustments to the European Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel; underlines the need for better integration between the development and security pillars of the strategy, and for better coordination of its policy instruments; stresses the need to improve the EU’s early warning systems in order that it may realise the strategy’s preventive dimension;

| 26. | Welcomes the positive outcome and the conclusions of ‘Together for a New Mali’, the high-level donor conference organised by the EU and France together with Mali and held in Brussels on 15 May 2013 in support of the Plan for the Sustainable Recovery of Mali; calls on the EU and its international partners to implement their mutual commitments as part of an effective and coordinated follow-up to the conference; stresses, in this context, the importance of initiating a global reform of governance in Mali, of establishing a new decentralisation policy and of creating the conditions for sustainable economic and social development in Mali; |
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26.

Welcomes the positive outcome and the conclusions of ‘Together for a New Mali’, the high-level donor conference organised by the EU and France together with Mali and held in Brussels on 15 May 2013 in support of the Plan for the Sustainable Recovery of Mali; calls on the EU and its international partners to implement their mutual commitments as part of an effective and coordinated follow-up to the conference; stresses, in this context, the importance of initiating a global reform of governance in Mali, of establishing a new decentralisation policy and of creating the conditions for sustainable economic and social development in Mali;

| 27. | Stresses the need for closer regional cooperation, and takes the view that the EU should use its political influence and financial leverage to encourage its partners in the region to harmonise their often fragmented political, diplomatic and military initiatives in order to address more effectively the multi-faceted challenges that the Sahel faces; |
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27.

Stresses the need for closer regional cooperation, and takes the view that the EU should use its political influence and financial leverage to encourage its partners in the region to harmonise their often fragmented political, diplomatic and military initiatives in order to address more effectively the multi-faceted challenges that the Sahel faces;

| 28. | Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council, the Commission, the EU Special Representative for Human Rights, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Government and National Assembly of Mali, the African Union, Ecowas, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the United Nations Human Rights Council and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation. |
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28.

Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council, the Commission, the EU Special Representative for Human Rights, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Government and National Assembly of Mali, the African Union, Ecowas, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the United Nations Human Rights Council and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation.

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(1)  Texts adopted, P7_TA(2012)0141.

1

(2)  Texts adopted, P7_TA(2012)0263.

2

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