No. 81-428 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1982 

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF 

BEVERLY J. LARSON, 

Petitioner and Appellant, 

-vsFRED J. LARSON, 

Respondent and Respondent. 

Appeal from: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Cascade, The Honorable 

H. William Coder, Judge presiding. 

Counsel of Record: 

For Appellant: 

Smith, Baillie & Walsh, Geeat Falls, Montana 

For Respondent: 

Alexander & Baucus, Great Falls, Montana 

Submitted on Briefs: June 10, 1982 

Decided: September 2, 1982 

SL~ .. 2 1982 

Filed: 
Mr. Justice Frank B. Morrison, Jr., delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

On ~pril 17, 1981, the Eighth Judicial District Court 

entered a decree which dissolved the marriage of petitioner 

and respondent, established child custodv, support and 

visitation, divided the real and personal property comprising 

the marital estate, and ordered each party to pay his or her 

attorney's fees. This decree was amended June 10, 1981, and 

from that amended order, Beverly Larson appeals. 

Petitioner raises the following issues on appeal: 

1) Whether the District Court's valuation and division 

of the marital estate was adequate and equitable? 

2) Whether the District Court should have awarded 

maintainence to Beverly Larson? 

3) Whether the District Court should have required 

Fred Larson to pay Beverly Larson's costs and attorney's 

fees? 

On the basis of the first issue we reverse the District 

Court's decision and remand this matter for reconsideration 

of the factors enumerated in section 40-4-202, MCA, as 

elaborated in this opinion. Maintainence and attorney's 

fees need to be reviewed after the District Court has adequately 

determined the value of the net marital estate and apportioned 

the estate in an equitable fashion. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

Beverly and Fred Larson were married October 15, 1965. 

Both had been previously married and had children from those 

marriages. These children have attained majority. The 

issue of the Larson marriage are as yet minors, Valerie, age 

14, and Andy, age 9. 

At the time of the marriage Fred Larson was in the 

process of purchasing a piece of property known as the Thorn 

Place on a contract for deed. The purchase price was $61000.001 

with $1,500.00 down and the remaining $4,500.00 payable at 
the rate of $100.00 per month beginning August 30, 1963. A 

balance of approximately $2,000.00 remained when the parties 

were married. The parties used jointly-acquired funds and 

the proceeds from the sale of a house Fred owned in Fairfield 

to pay the balance. Title to the Thorn Place was in Fred 

Larson's name. 

The Larsons lived on and operated the Thorn Place until 

November, 1976, when the property was sold on a contract for 

deed at a price of $39,650.00. The parties received $11,500.00 

as a downpayment and as of the hearing date, the balance on 

the Thorn contract was $26,893.04. 

In 1970, the parties acquired as joint tenants a 160- 

acre piece of property referred to as the Bartlett Property. 

In 1976, the parties remodeled the house on the Bartlett 

Property using the downpayment they received on the Thorn 

Place. They moved into the Bartlett house in November of 

that year. The Bartlett Property was subsequently refinanced 

through the Federal Land Bank of Spokane, and as of the 

hearing date, the amount remaining on that loan was $28,900.00. 

The present fair market value of the Bartlett Property is 

$80,000.00. 

The third parcel of property involved in this matter is 

the Davis Place. This 160-acre tract was purchased under 

a contract for deed in 1973. The purchase price was $32,000.00; 

the terms were $9.000.00 down with ten annual payments of 

$3,162.09. The title to the Davis Place was acquired in the 

names of Fred Larson, and his son, Martin Larson, then 20 

years of age. A loan was obtained from the First National 

Bank of Fairfield to make the downpayment. Fred Larson was 

the named obligor on the loan and security included cattle 

and machinery on the Bartlett Property. art in owned an 

unspecified number of cattle located on the Bartlett Property. 
As of the hearing date, the balance due on the Davis Place 

contract was $18,987.00. The appraised value was $43,700.00. 

Throughout the marriage and during the pendency of 

these proceedings, Fred Larson, with assistance from his son 

Martin, operated the various parcels of property as one 

economic unit, accounting for income and expenses on a 

common basis. The proceeds from the unified ranching operation, supplemented by Fred's wages from his employment by 

Greenfield Irrigation District as a ditchrider, were used to 

meet living and operating expenses and annual loan obligations. 

Beverly Larson cared for the children, numbering as many as 

five during some years of the marriage, and the home. She 

also tended the yard and chickens and occasionally helped 

out with small ranch chores and errands. 

Beverly Larson filed a petition for dissolution of the 

marriage on December 21, 1977. Some forty months later the 

final dissolution decree was entered. 

The District Court originally found the net worth of 

the marital estate to be $36,098.00 and awarded Beverly 

Larson the following property: a 1972 Chevrolet valued at 

$675.00, an oil and gas lease valued at $320.00, household 

furniture and appliances worth $1,875.00, and twenty-five 

thousand dollars ($25,000.00) in cash, ten thousand ($10,000.00) 

of which was payable within 60 days, the remainder of which 

was payable in sixty monthly installments of $304.15. No 

mention was made of the remaining marital property in the 

ordering paragraph. By implication, the court awarded Fred 

Larson the Bartlett Property and the Davis Place valued at 

$80,000.00 and $43,700.00, respectively, automobiles and a 

trailer worth $6,275.00, cattle at a value of $5,000.00, 

$14,725.00 worth of farm machinery, the balance of the Thorn 

contract attributable to the marital estate valued at $2,527.95, 
and $9,892.00 in an unvested PERS retirement fund. The 

order expressly reposed in Fred Larson sole responsiblity 

for the parties' accumulated debt, then totalling $99,333.54. 

Included were First National Bank of Fairfield loans amounting to $44,040.00, a Federal Land Bank loan equalling $28,900.00, 

and the remainder due on the Davis Place contract, which was 

$18,987.00. Additionally, the court made no findings regarding 

petitioner's request for maintainence. It did find that 

both parties were capable of being responsible for their own 

attorney's fees. Fred Larson was ordered to pay Beverly 

Larson $200.00 per month per child for child support. The 

parties' stipulation regarding child custody and visitation 

was incorporated by reference. 

Petitioner then filed a timely motion for new trial or 

amendment of the findings of fact and order. Many of the 

issues raised on appeal were addressed in this motion. The 

court's amendments were limited to the following particulars: 

1) the fair market value of the cattle was changed from 

$5,000.00 to $45,000.00; 2) the net value of the marital 

estate was increased to $92,399.91; 3) Fred Larson was held 

responsible for the minor childrens' reasonable medical, 

dental and optical expenses; and 4) Beverly Larson's cash 

award was increased to $31.000.00, of which $21,000.00 would 

be payble in eighty-four monthly installments of $327.32. 

NET WORTH AND DIVISION OF MARITAL ESTATE 

Petitioner contends that the District Court abused its 

discretion first by omitting certain marital assets proven 

at trial, and second, in its determination of the value of 

the assets included by the court. The total of the omitted 

and undervalued assets is $55,622.06, according to petitioner. 

When that amount is added to the net estate found by the 
court, petitioner argues, an award of only $33,870.00 in 

cash and personalty to petitioner is inequitable. 

Petitioner maintains that respondent's checking account 

balance, certain shares of stock in the Federal Land Bank of 

Spokane, and a 1977 leased winter wheat crop in seed at the 

time of hearing, should have been valued and included in the 

marital estate. Respondent counters that it was reasonable 

for the District Court to omit those items because the 

checking account balance fluctuated greatly, depending on 

current working expenses or payment obligations, the shares 

had no marketable value because they were an integral part 

of the Federal Land Bank loan, and the crop lease may have 

existed at the time of hearing, but there was no evidence of 

its existence at time of distribution. 

As a general rule, if contested evidence is presented 

to the trial court regarding the existence or valuation of a 

marital asset and no findings are made regarding that asset 

or no explanation is provided as to why the District Court 

accepted one party's valuations over that of the other, the 

District Court has abused its discretion. Peterson v. 

Peterson (1981) , Mont. , 636 P.2d 821, 38 St.Rep. 

1723. Item-by-item findings are not required in property 

division cases, but findings nevertheless must be sufficently 

adequate to ensure that this Court need not succumb to 

speculation while assessing the conscientiousness or reasonableness of the District Court's judgment. In re the ~arriage 

of Caprice (1978), 178 Mont. 455, 585 P.2d 641. 

Here the District Court makes no finding regarding 

either the bank stock or the leased crop. The finding which 

pertains to the checking account fails to disclose why the 

~istrict Court chose to disregard the balance in its calculation 

of the net marital estate. This Court cannot uphold the 
District Court's judgment as within the realm of its broad 

discretion if we have no inkling of its thought processes. 

Petitioner's second contention is that the District 

Court erred in including less than ten percent of the balance 

remaining on the Thorn contract in the marital estate. 

Citing section 40-4-202, MCA, petitioner argues that there 

is no legal basis for limiting appreciation in land values 

over the course of the marriage by a fraction reflecting the 

ratio of prenuptial to post-nuptial payments made toward the 

original purchase price. Petitioner believes that such a 

valuation unduly minimizes her contribution as homemaker and 

ranch wife and disregards the statutory mandates of section 

40-4-202, MCA. We agree. 

The District Court reasoned that petitioner was only 

entitled to 4.7 percent of the value of the Thorn Place as a 

result of the parties' marriage because only $562.68 of the 

$2,000.00 balance remaining at the time of marriage was 

paid with jointly-acquired funds, the rest being paid with 

the proceeds from the sale of property Fred acquired before 

the marriage. Five hundred sixty-two dollars and sixtyeight cents represents approximately 9.4 percent of the 

original purchase price; therefore, only 9.4 percent of the 

balance remaining on the sale of the Thorn Place, one-half 

of which could be attributed to Beverly Larson's contributions 

during the marriage, should be included in the marital 

estate. The consequence of the court's reasoning was 

exclusion of $25,629.06 from the net value of the marital 

estate. 

Respondent maintains that the District Court's reasoning 

is in keeping with the language of section 40-2-202, MCA, 

and the broad discretion afforded a District Court under 

section 40-4-202, MCA. 
The Court is not impressed with respondent's defense of 

the District Court's order. Section 40-2-202, MCA, refers 

to a married person's property rights during a marriage. 

The days when section 40-2-202, !<CAI and its predecessors 

limited the jurisdiction of the District Court in disposing 

of the individual property of a married person upon dissolution 

of the marriage have long since passed. Compare, Emery v. 

Emery (1948) , 122 Mont. 201, 200 P.2d 251 with Schultz v. 

Schultz (1982), Mont. -I - P. 2d , 39 St.Rep. 

1435 (discussion of relationship of a companion statute, 

section 40-2-201, MCA, to the Uniform Marriage and Divorce 

Act, Title 40, Chapter 4, MCA) . 

Section 40-4-202, MCA, establishes the power of the 

District Court in a dissolution proceeding to "finally 

equitably apportion between the parties the property and 

assets belonging to either or both, however and whenever 

acquired and whether the title thereto is in the name of the 

husband or wife or both." (Emphasis added.) Section 40-4- 

202, MCA, also provides that the District Court consider 

"the contribution of a spouse as a homemaker to the family 

unit" and that if the nonmonetary contributions of the 

homemaker facilitated the maintainence of prior acquired 

property, that property may be considered as part of the 

marital assets for division. 

Unlike In re Marriage of Jorgenson (1979), 180 Mont. 

294, 590 P.2d 606, the District Court here expressly found 

that petitioner contributed "services of a domestic nature" 

during the marriage and implicity found that those services 

contributed to the maintenance of the ranch properties for 

at least thirteen years. The implication here drawn arises 

from the finding that since the parties1 separation in 

January, 1978, Beverly Larson had not contributed in any 
fashion to the maintenance of the ranch properties or operation. 

We caution the trial court not to place emphasis on petitioner's 

lack of connection with the ranch during the pendency of 

these proceedings. Cf. Torma v. Torma (1982), Mont. 

, 645 P.2d 395, 39 St.Rep. 839 (discussion of parties' 

relative contributions toward property maintenance and 

equity after final decree has been entered). Though petitioner's 

homemaking services and nonmonetary contributions may not 

have been rendered in the ranch context, they nevertheless 

continued as petitioner had custody and primary responsibility 

for the physical and emotional needs of the parties' minor 

children. This no doubt facilitated respondent's ability to 

maintain his employment and ranch responsibilities as he was 

not required to take time from these activities to ensure 

that the childrens' basic needs were being met. 

Along this same vein, we are disturbed by the District 

Court's finding that petitioner had a "desire to seek employment" 

but did not intend to do so "while she has a husband to 

support her." Not only does that finding fail to adequately 

address considerations which should be preeminent in the 

District Court's judgment in apportioning marital assets, 

such as petitioner's occupation, vocational skills, employability, 

and opportunity to acquire capital assets and income in the 

future, it punishes her for her rather traditional belief 

that the man should be the family breadwinner. The testimony 

is undisputed that petitioner has not been employed outside 

the home, in other than positions as a motel maid and domestic 

servant, since 1959. It is not surprising that a displaced 

homemaker with two minor children in her care, dependent on 

her husband's financial resources, limited public assistance 

and her meager earnings ($63.00, to be exact) as a freelance 

writer for the local weekly newspaper, would utter such a 
statement in the context of a hotly contested, drawn-out 

dissolution proceeding. Given the statutory mandate of 

section 40-4-202, MCA, and the facts of this case, it was 

inappropriate for the trial court to attach any legal significance to this statement. 

In reevaluating petitioner's nonmonetary contributions 

toward the marital estate and apportioning the marital assets, 

the District Court is directed to review this Court's opinions 

in Lewis v. Lewis (1982), Mont. , 643 P.2d 604, 39 

St.Rep. 759; Tefft v. Tefft (1981) , Mont . , 628 

P.2d 1094, 38 St.Rep. 837; and Smith v. Smith (1981), 

Mont. , 622 P.2d 153, 38 St.Rep. 146. 

Petitioner's last contention involves the District Court's 

treatment of the Davis Place. She argues that respondent's 

purchase of the Davis Place in joint ownership with his son 

Martin shows an intent to defraud petitioner of any interest 

in the property. Under Humbird v. Arnet (1935), 99 Mont. 

499, 444 P.2d 576, petitioner asserts she is entitled to 

protection as a creditor from fraudulent conveyances. 

We find no merit in petitioner's argument. Not only do 

we have some difficulty in finding a purchase by a father 

and son to be a conveyance of the petitioner's interest in 

any property, we cannot ignore substantial credible evidence 

that father and son had long intended to arrange such a 

partnership and that son had worked for his father with the 

intention of achieving that objective. In limiting that 

portion of the Davis Place to be included in the marital 

estate to one-half, the District Court properly recognized 

the nonmonetary contributions of both the son and the spouse 

in maintaining the family ranch and the statutory limitations 

of its power to affect the property rights of only the 
husband and wife. 

Reversed and remanded. 

We Concur: 

~XLS. A/, M%g 

Chief Justice