* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-31048

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

CHAD JAMES

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

USDC No. 2:06-CR-55-1

Before REAVLEY, STEWART, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Chad James appeals following his conviction for possession with intent to

distribute five grams or more of crack cocaine, possession with intent to

distribute a quantity of cocaine hydrochloride, possession of a firearm in

furtherance of drug trafficking, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. He

challenges the district court’s denial of a suppression motion and several trial

rulings, as well as the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction.

Finding no reversible error, we AFFIRM.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

September 10, 2008

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 07-31048

2

James was arrested on a parole violation warrant. When police arrived at

his apartment to execute the warrant they accompanied him inside so that he

could get dressed. He was initially calm and compliant, but upon entering the

apartment James suddenly and quickly closed an interior door leading to

another room, which police found suspicious. Police also observed a shotgun in

plain view leaning against the bedroom wall next to the bed. As the officers

tried to handcuff James, he resisted and began a violent altercation that led to

two officers and James tumbling down the stairs and out into the street, where

James continued the fight. Although no one was present on the street, James

began calling for help. The officers did not know whether James was calling for

assistance from someone who may have been inside the apartment. After

securing James, an officer reentered the apartment to secure the shotgun and

to conduct a protective sweep. The officer observed suspected cocaine in plain

view in the room to which James had slammed the door. The officer secured the

residence and obtained a search warrant. Police then seized crack and powder

cocaine, drug distribution paraphernalia, a loaded shotgun, and over $5000 in

cash.

James contends that all the evidence except for the shotgun was obtained

in an illegal protective sweep of his apartment and that the district court should

have granted his suppression motion. We disagree.

Incidentto an arrest, a police officer may conduct a visual protective sweep

of premises to ensure that no other persons are hiding therein who may pose a

threat to the safety of officers or other persons when there are articulable facts

and inferences from which a prudent officer could believe the area to be swept

harbors another dangerous individual. Buie v. Maryland, 494 U.S. 325, 334, 110

S. Ct. 1093, 1098 (1990); United States v. Mata, 517 F.3d 279, 285–86 (5th Cir.

2008). Contrary to James’ assertion in his brief that no one found his sudden

closing of the inside door suspicious, Sgt. Kerr testified that this action was
No. 07-31048

3

inconsistent with James’s demeanor to that point and raised red flags with him.

Already on alert from James’s sudden slamming of the door, police were then

confronted with a firearm in plain view in a felon’s apartment and with a violent

struggle that resulted in injuries to two officers. As James continued to resist

and fight, he called for help from unknown persons even though no one else was

in the street. From the officers’ perspective, other individuals could have been

inside the apartment with the weapon. Police reentered the apartment less than

a minute after subduing James. Given the totality of the circumstances and

rapidly evolving events,the district court’s factual determination thatthere was

sufficient danger to justify a protective sweep was not clearly erroneous. See

United States v. Watson, 273 F.3d 599, 603 (5th Cir. 2001).

James next argues that during trial the district court improperly

permitted a DEA agentto offer experttestimony about narcotics trafficking that

went to James’s ultimate state of mind. He contends that the agent offered

improper profile evidence. We conclude, however, that the agent’s testimony

provided the jury with helpful information about the significance of evidence in

the case, e.g. that drug distributors usually bundle their money in a certain way

and possess certain amounts of drugs, firearms, and other items helpful to drug

trafficking. The agent also indicated the street value of the drugs seized. We

have held that experienced narcotics agents may provide this type of evidence

to assist the jury, United States v. Washington, 44 F.3d 1271, 1283 (5th Cir.

1995), and the district court did not abuse its discretion. See United States v.

Speer, 30 F.3d 605, 609–10 (5th Cir. 1994). To the extent that James argues he

was denied due process because he lacked an expertto counter the Government’s

witness, we find no merit to the claim.

James next argues that the evidence was insufficient to show that he had

an intent to distribute the drugs seized from his apartment. James was found

in possession of 14.7 grams of crack and 79 grams of powder cocaine. These
No. 07-31048

4

drugs had a value of approximately $3000. There was evidence in the form of

cocaine residue on pots and pans that James had been converting the powder

cocaine into crack. James was also in possession of drug distribution

paraphernalia, including cutting agents, a scale, and baggies. Furthermore,

police seized over $5000 in cash stacked in $1000 bundles, which the testimony

showed was consistent with drug trafficking. An intent to distribute may be

found from possession of drug distribution paraphernalia, large quantities of

cash, or the value and quantity of the drugs seized. United States v. Harrison,

55 F.3d 163, 165 (5th Cir. 1995). A rational jury could conclude from the

evidence here that James had the requisite intent.

James also argues that the evidence was insufficient to show that he

possessed the shotgun in furtherance of drug trafficking because the

Government proved only that a common hunting weapon was present at the

scene. A defendant convicted of a drug offense who also engages in hunting or

target shooting does not violate 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) if he merely possesses

a firearm useful for that purpose that is unloaded or is inaccessible. United

States v. Ceballos-Torres, 218 F.3d 409, 415 (5th Cir. 2000). James’s shotgun

was not mounted for display on a wall, was not unloaded, and was not otherwise

locked or inaccessible. In was possessed illegally and was found loaded, in plain

view, and easily accessible in James’s bedroom. Although the gun was not in the

same room as the other contraband, James’s apartment contained a significant

amount of drugs and drug distribution paraphernalia and a large quantity of

cash. The evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude the weapon was

possessed in furtherance of drug trafficking. See id. at 414–15.

Finally, James challenges several evidentiary rulings, contending that the

district court erred by admitting the parole violation warrant, the search

warrant, and testimony about his fight with the arresting officers. With respect

to the parole violation and search warrants, we note that James did not object
No. 07-31048

5

to admission of the evidence but only to the evidence being published to the jury.

Notwithstanding the Government’s view thatthe objection failed to preserve the

issue for review beyond plain error, we are not convinced that the disputed

evidence likely influenced the jury’s verdict. The evidence was more than

sufficient to support James’s conviction, and his contention that the jury may

have convicted him because of the parole violation or the search warrant is

unpersuasive. Any error would be harmless. See United States v. Hawley, 516

F.3d 264, 268 (5th Cir. 2008), pet. for cert. filed (Apr. 29, 2008) (No. 07-10773).

With respectto testimony about James’s fight with the officers, the district

court denied a motion in limine to exclude this evidence. Because James did not

object to the testimony at trial, the issue is subject to plain error review. See

C.P. Interests v. Cal. Pools, Inc., 238 F.3d 690, 697 & n.5 (5th Cir. 2001). James

argues that the testimony was not relevant to the crimes charged in the

indictment and presented unnecessary evidence of violent conduct. We agree

with the district court that the events surrounding the struggle led police to the

protective sweep and to request a search warrant and helped explain the context

for the discovery of the drugs. We also conclude from the record that the

evidence was not the kind likely to incite the jury to an irrational decision.

Furthermore, the district court properly instructed the jury that James was not

on trial for any act not alleged in the indictment. James therefore fails to show

sufficient prejudice. See United States v. Yi, 460 F.3d 623, 633 (5th Cir. 2006).

AFFIRMED.