# C_2016065EN.01012001.xml

| 19.2.2016 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 65/120 |
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19.2.2016

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 65/120

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P7_TA(2013)0280

A broader Transatlantic partnership

European Parliament resolution of 13 June 2013 on the role of the EU in promoting a broader Transatlantic Partnership (2012/2287(INI))

(2016/C 065/16)

The European Parliament,

The European Parliament

| — | having regard to its previous resolutions on transatlantic relations, in particular its resolution of 1 June 2006 on improving EU-US relations in the framework of a Transatlantic Partnership Agreement (1), its resolution of 26 March 2009 on the state of transatlantic relations in the aftermath of the US elections (2) and its resolution of 17 November 2011 on the EU-US Summit of 28 November 2011 (3), |
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having regard to its previous resolutions on transatlantic relations, in particular its resolution of 1 June 2006 on improving EU-US relations in the framework of a Transatlantic Partnership Agreement (1), its resolution of 26 March 2009 on the state of transatlantic relations in the aftermath of the US elections (2) and its resolution of 17 November 2011 on the EU-US Summit of 28 November 2011 (3),

1

2

3

| — | having regard to the outcomes of the EU-US Summit held on 28 November 2011 in Washington, D.C., |
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having regard to the outcomes of the EU-US Summit held on 28 November 2011 in Washington, D.C.,

| — | having regard to the joint declarations of the 71st Transatlantic Legislators’ Dialogue (TLD) held in December 2011 in Jacksonville, the 72nd TLD held in June 2012 in Copenhagen and Strasbourg, and the 73rd TLD held in November 2012 in Washington, D.C., |
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having regard to the joint declarations of the 71st Transatlantic Legislators’ Dialogue (TLD) held in December 2011 in Jacksonville, the 72nd TLD held in June 2012 in Copenhagen and Strasbourg, and the 73rd TLD held in November 2012 in Washington, D.C.,

| — | having regard to its resolution of 23 October 2012 on trade and economic relations with the United States (4), which supported the idea of launching negotiations for a comprehensive economic agreement, and its resolution of 23 May 2013 (5) on the negotiating mandate, |
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having regard to its resolution of 23 October 2012 on trade and economic relations with the United States (4), which supported the idea of launching negotiations for a comprehensive economic agreement, and its resolution of 23 May 2013 (5) on the negotiating mandate,

4

5

| — | having regard to the statement of 13 February 2013 by US President Barack Obama, European Council President Herman Van Rompuy and European Commission President José Manuel Barroso announcing that both the United States and the European Union will initiate the internal procedures necessary to launch the negotiations for a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, |
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having regard to the statement of 13 February 2013 by US President Barack Obama, European Council President Herman Van Rompuy and European Commission President José Manuel Barroso announcing that both the United States and the European Union will initiate the internal procedures necessary to launch the negotiations for a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership,

| — | having regard to the Summit Declaration of the North Atlantic Council meeting in Chicago on 20 May 2012, |
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having regard to the Summit Declaration of the North Atlantic Council meeting in Chicago on 20 May 2012,

| — | having regard to its resolution of 12 September 2012 on the Annual Report from the Council to the European Parliament on the Common Foreign and Security Policy (6), its resolution of 22 November 2012 on the implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy (7), and its resolution of 22 November 2012 on Cyber Security and Defence (8), |
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having regard to its resolution of 12 September 2012 on the Annual Report from the Council to the European Parliament on the Common Foreign and Security Policy (6), its resolution of 22 November 2012 on the implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy (7), and its resolution of 22 November 2012 on Cyber Security and Defence (8),

6

7

8

| — | having regard to the joint statement of 12 July 2012 by the European Union and the United States on the Asia-Pacific Region, |
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having regard to the joint statement of 12 July 2012 by the European Union and the United States on the Asia-Pacific Region,

| — | having regard to the US Department of Defense document of January 2012 entitled ‘Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st century Defense’, outlining the changes in US military strategy, |
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having regard to the US Department of Defense document of January 2012 entitled ‘Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st century Defense’, outlining the changes in US military strategy,

| — | having regard to US President Barack Obama’s second Inaugural Address of 21 January 2013 and his State of the Union Address of 12 February 2013, and the remarks made by US Vice-President Joseph Biden at the Munich Security Conference of 2 February 2013, |
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having regard to US President Barack Obama’s second Inaugural Address of 21 January 2013 and his State of the Union Address of 12 February 2013, and the remarks made by US Vice-President Joseph Biden at the Munich Security Conference of 2 February 2013,

| — | having regard to the EU’s strategic partnerships with Brazil (2007) and Mexico (2008), to the EU Association Agreements with Mexico, Chile and Central America, the Trade Agreements with Colombia and Peru, the ongoing negotiations with Canada on a Strategic Partnership Agreement and a Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, and the current negotiations with Mercosur, |
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having regard to the EU’s strategic partnerships with Brazil (2007) and Mexico (2008), to the EU Association Agreements with Mexico, Chile and Central America, the Trade Agreements with Colombia and Peru, the ongoing negotiations with Canada on a Strategic Partnership Agreement and a Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, and the current negotiations with Mercosur,

| — | having regard to its resolution of 12 June 2012 on defining a new development cooperation with Latin America (9), which underlines the EU’s support for the Latin American regional integration process, as represented by CELAC, UNASUR, Mercosur, the Andean Community, SICA, CARICOM and the Pacific Alliance, |
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having regard to its resolution of 12 June 2012 on defining a new development cooperation with Latin America (9), which underlines the EU’s support for the Latin American regional integration process, as represented by CELAC, UNASUR, Mercosur, the Andean Community, SICA, CARICOM and the Pacific Alliance,

9

| — | having regard to the regular summits that the EU and the US hold with Latin American countries, the biannual EU-CELAC Summit and the Summit of the Americas, both of which are expected to be held in 2015, |
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having regard to the regular summits that the EU and the US hold with Latin American countries, the biannual EU-CELAC Summit and the Summit of the Americas, both of which are expected to be held in 2015,

| — | having regard to the EU’s relationship with the African regional and subregional organisations of the Atlantic rim, in particular the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), |
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having regard to the EU’s relationship with the African regional and subregional organisations of the Atlantic rim, in particular the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC),

| — | having regard to the G20 Leaders Declarations, the outcome document of the UN System Task Team on the Post-2015 UN Development Agenda (‘Realising the Future We Want for All’), and the outcome document of the UN Conference on Sustainable Development (‘The future we want’), |
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having regard to the G20 Leaders Declarations, the outcome document of the UN System Task Team on the Post-2015 UN Development Agenda (‘Realising the Future We Want for All’), and the outcome document of the UN Conference on Sustainable Development (‘The future we want’),

| — | having regard to its resolutions on, inter alia, the Arab Spring, Mali, the Middle East, Syria, Iran, Afghanistan, the Eastern Partnership, Russia and China, |
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having regard to its resolutions on, inter alia, the Arab Spring, Mali, the Middle East, Syria, Iran, Afghanistan, the Eastern Partnership, Russia and China,

| — | having regard to Rule 48 of its Rules of Procedure, |
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having regard to Rule 48 of its Rules of Procedure,

| — | having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A7-0173/2013), |
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having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A7-0173/2013),

| A. | whereas in the whole Atlantic Basin the most important political and economic relationship is that linking the EU and the US; whereas the beginning of a new term of the Obama presidency should serve to strengthen that relationship through an ambitious new agenda; |
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A.

whereas in the whole Atlantic Basin the most important political and economic relationship is that linking the EU and the US; whereas the beginning of a new term of the Obama presidency should serve to strengthen that relationship through an ambitious new agenda;

| B. | whereas the transatlantic partnership is based on strong political, cultural, economic and historical links, on shared values such as freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law, and on common goals, such as prosperity, open and integrated economies, social progress and inclusiveness, sustainable development, and the peaceful resolution of conflicts; |
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B.

whereas the transatlantic partnership is based on strong political, cultural, economic and historical links, on shared values such as freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law, and on common goals, such as prosperity, open and integrated economies, social progress and inclusiveness, sustainable development, and the peaceful resolution of conflicts;

| C. | whereas the global economic downturn has led to significant cutbacks in defence spending in both the EU and the US; |
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C.

whereas the global economic downturn has led to significant cutbacks in defence spending in both the EU and the US;

| D. | whereas in a global, complex and increasingly multipolar world, the EU and the US should, in spite of the economic crisis, continue to play key constructive roles in the world’s politics and economy and in the shaping of the international environment, and jointly face regional conflicts and global challenges on a multilateral basis, notably in the framework of international organisations; whereas, to that end, they should also secure the involvement of new key powers — including the EU’s two Latin American Strategic Partners, Brazil and Mexico — and of Canada; |
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D.

whereas in a global, complex and increasingly multipolar world, the EU and the US should, in spite of the economic crisis, continue to play key constructive roles in the world’s politics and economy and in the shaping of the international environment, and jointly face regional conflicts and global challenges on a multilateral basis, notably in the framework of international organisations; whereas, to that end, they should also secure the involvement of new key powers — including the EU’s two Latin American Strategic Partners, Brazil and Mexico — and of Canada;

| E. | whereas, in parallel to the shift in the global landscape triggered by the rise of Asian emerging powers, think-tanks, international organisations and some governments have recently been highlighting the growing importance of the Atlantic Basin as a whole, including its southern dimension, and the need for cooperation between the countries of which it is composed, so as to enable all of them to deal with problems that are common to the wider region; |
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E.

whereas, in parallel to the shift in the global landscape triggered by the rise of Asian emerging powers, think-tanks, international organisations and some governments have recently been highlighting the growing importance of the Atlantic Basin as a whole, including its southern dimension, and the need for cooperation between the countries of which it is composed, so as to enable all of them to deal with problems that are common to the wider region;

| F. | whereas Latin America is a region which shares with the EU and the US many values, interests, history and increasing economic ties; whereas Latin American countries have established a large number of regional or subregional organisations; whereas it is useful to study possible fields in which various modalities of triangular cooperation could be developed; whereas that cooperation could be extended to include the African countries of the Atlantic Basin; whereas it is important to base cooperation in the transatlantic space on compromises between the various interests, and whereas all parties should preserve their right to follow their own national priorities and developmental approaches; |
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F.

whereas Latin America is a region which shares with the EU and the US many values, interests, history and increasing economic ties; whereas Latin American countries have established a large number of regional or subregional organisations; whereas it is useful to study possible fields in which various modalities of triangular cooperation could be developed; whereas that cooperation could be extended to include the African countries of the Atlantic Basin; whereas it is important to base cooperation in the transatlantic space on compromises between the various interests, and whereas all parties should preserve their right to follow their own national priorities and developmental approaches;

| G. | whereas some countries, notably China and also others such as India, are becoming increasingly active in the Atlantic basin area, particularly in the Southern Atlantic, where their actions are influenced by their need to acquire raw materials and food; |
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G.

whereas some countries, notably China and also others such as India, are becoming increasingly active in the Atlantic basin area, particularly in the Southern Atlantic, where their actions are influenced by their need to acquire raw materials and food;

| H. | whereas the broader transatlantic partnership needs to tackle issues such as development, security, energy and immigration, as well as favouring gradual economic and political convergence; |
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H.

whereas the broader transatlantic partnership needs to tackle issues such as development, security, energy and immigration, as well as favouring gradual economic and political convergence;

| I. | whereas, beyond the broader Atlantic perspective, there are other current issues and conflicts in respect of which coordinated action on the part of the EU and the US is essential; |
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I.

whereas, beyond the broader Atlantic perspective, there are other current issues and conflicts in respect of which coordinated action on the part of the EU and the US is essential;

| J. | whereas an increase in the number and sophistication of high profile cyber-attacks has led to the review of related legislation, with the US adopting voluntary reporting mechanisms while the EU plans to adopt tighter compulsory measures; |
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J.

whereas an increase in the number and sophistication of high profile cyber-attacks has led to the review of related legislation, with the US adopting voluntary reporting mechanisms while the EU plans to adopt tighter compulsory measures;

Bilateral relations

Bilateral relations

| 1. | Congratulates Barack Obama on his re-election as President of the United States of America; invites him to address the European Parliament at its plenary session in Strasbourg during his next visit to Europe; |
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1.

Congratulates Barack Obama on his re-election as President of the United States of America; invites him to address the European Parliament at its plenary session in Strasbourg during his next visit to Europe;

| 2. | Calls for an EU-US summit to be held as soon as possible to decide on a common agenda of short-term and long-term goals with regard to both bilateral matters and global and regional issues; |
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2.

Calls for an EU-US summit to be held as soon as possible to decide on a common agenda of short-term and long-term goals with regard to both bilateral matters and global and regional issues;

| 3. | Recognises the long-term implications for the transatlantic partnership of the geopolitical rebalancing on the part of the US towards Asia; emphasises the need for a constructive, coherent and strategic response by the EU; believes that this also presents an opportunity for the EU to engage more actively in the Asia-Pacific region, as an autonomous global actor but in close cooperation with the US, thereby deepening the strategic dimension of the transatlantic partnership; |
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3.

Recognises the long-term implications for the transatlantic partnership of the geopolitical rebalancing on the part of the US towards Asia; emphasises the need for a constructive, coherent and strategic response by the EU; believes that this also presents an opportunity for the EU to engage more actively in the Asia-Pacific region, as an autonomous global actor but in close cooperation with the US, thereby deepening the strategic dimension of the transatlantic partnership;

| 4. | Welcomes the official announcement of negotiations for a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP); stresses that this agreement will represent a significant boost to the EU and US economies and will reinvigorate the EU-US relationship; notes that its global impact would go beyond its bilateral implications, by providing common approaches to rules and standards in global trade, investment and trade-related areas; stresses the need to exercise strong political will and a constructive attitude in order to pursue the negotiations in an efficient manner; expects the TTIP process to engender a renewed political momentum in transatlantic relations, which could and should be used to stimulate closer cooperation in other areas, including foreign policy; |
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4.

Welcomes the official announcement of negotiations for a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP); stresses that this agreement will represent a significant boost to the EU and US economies and will reinvigorate the EU-US relationship; notes that its global impact would go beyond its bilateral implications, by providing common approaches to rules and standards in global trade, investment and trade-related areas; stresses the need to exercise strong political will and a constructive attitude in order to pursue the negotiations in an efficient manner; expects the TTIP process to engender a renewed political momentum in transatlantic relations, which could and should be used to stimulate closer cooperation in other areas, including foreign policy;

| 5. | Calls on the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP), the Council, the Commission and the EU Member States to enhance their coordination of EU policy vis-à-vis the US administration, so as to send out a convincing message that the EU is a coherent and efficient international player; highlights the importance of also strengthening the common security and defence policy, given the different crises that may arise in the EU’s neighbouring regions and the US’s ‘leading from behind’ doctrine; |
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5.

Calls on the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP), the Council, the Commission and the EU Member States to enhance their coordination of EU policy vis-à-vis the US administration, so as to send out a convincing message that the EU is a coherent and efficient international player; highlights the importance of also strengthening the common security and defence policy, given the different crises that may arise in the EU’s neighbouring regions and the US’s ‘leading from behind’ doctrine;

| 6. | Recalls its suggestion that a Transatlantic Political Council (TPC) be created to serve as a body for systematic consultation and coordination on foreign and security policy, led by the HR/VP and the US Secretary of State; |
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6.

Recalls its suggestion that a Transatlantic Political Council (TPC) be created to serve as a body for systematic consultation and coordination on foreign and security policy, led by the HR/VP and the US Secretary of State;

| 7. | Highlights the contribution of the TLD, as a content -based, constructive body, to the strengthening of EU-US relations by providing a forum for parliamentary dialogue, identifying objectives and coordinating on issues of common concern; welcomes the opening of the European Parliament Liaison Office in Washington, and invites the US Congress to follow suit in Brussels; calls for the continuation of staff exchanges between the two institutions; |
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7.

Highlights the contribution of the TLD, as a content -based, constructive body, to the strengthening of EU-US relations by providing a forum for parliamentary dialogue, identifying objectives and coordinating on issues of common concern; welcomes the opening of the European Parliament Liaison Office in Washington, and invites the US Congress to follow suit in Brussels; calls for the continuation of staff exchanges between the two institutions;

| 8. | Strongly condemns the Boston terrorist attacks of 15 April 2013; encourages both partners to continue the fight against terrorism and organised crime and, at the same time, to respect and uphold human rights and fundamental liberties; is deeply concerned by recent revelations on the US surveillance and data gathering operations under the PRISM programme, and their implications for the protection of EU citizens' civil liberties; calls on the Commission and the Council to raise the issue at the forthcoming JHA EU-USA Ministerial meeting on 14 June 2013; notes the fact that the Passenger Name Records Agreement and the Terrorist Finance Tracking Programme Agreement (SWIFT Agreement), approved by the European Parliament, are already in force; calls on the partners to increase their cooperation on the Data Privacy and Protection Agreement, in order to finalise the negotiations in such a manner as to ensure the proper transparency of data processing and sufficient protection of personal data; |
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8.

Strongly condemns the Boston terrorist attacks of 15 April 2013; encourages both partners to continue the fight against terrorism and organised crime and, at the same time, to respect and uphold human rights and fundamental liberties; is deeply concerned by recent revelations on the US surveillance and data gathering operations under the PRISM programme, and their implications for the protection of EU citizens' civil liberties; calls on the Commission and the Council to raise the issue at the forthcoming JHA EU-USA Ministerial meeting on 14 June 2013; notes the fact that the Passenger Name Records Agreement and the Terrorist Finance Tracking Programme Agreement (SWIFT Agreement), approved by the European Parliament, are already in force; calls on the partners to increase their cooperation on the Data Privacy and Protection Agreement, in order to finalise the negotiations in such a manner as to ensure the proper transparency of data processing and sufficient protection of personal data;

| 9. | Notes the increasing importance of the use of drones; underlines the need for a vigorous debate on armed drones and their limits, transparency and control,; welcomes the current debate in the US, and expects that a comprehensive regulatory framework could be established soon; welcomes, in this context, the decisions announced by President Obama in his speech of 23 May 2013 to formalise new limitations on the use of drones as lethal arms and to engage Congress to explore options for increased oversight of this use; invites both partners to engage in close discussions on armed drones, and stresses the need to take steps towards a future international regulation, given the global implications; |
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9.

Notes the increasing importance of the use of drones; underlines the need for a vigorous debate on armed drones and their limits, transparency and control,; welcomes the current debate in the US, and expects that a comprehensive regulatory framework could be established soon; welcomes, in this context, the decisions announced by President Obama in his speech of 23 May 2013 to formalise new limitations on the use of drones as lethal arms and to engage Congress to explore options for increased oversight of this use; invites both partners to engage in close discussions on armed drones, and stresses the need to take steps towards a future international regulation, given the global implications;

| 10. | Reiterates its view that the EU must continue to raise with the US, at both political and technical level, the longstanding issue of the visa requirement imposed on the citizens of four EU Member States; |
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10.

Reiterates its view that the EU must continue to raise with the US, at both political and technical level, the longstanding issue of the visa requirement imposed on the citizens of four EU Member States;

| 11. | Reiterates the growing importance of cyber-defence and welcomes the creation, at the 2010 summit, of the Working Group on Cyber-Security and Cyber-Crime; believes that the EU and the US should give special priority to their cooperation on cyber-security, with special regard to countering cyber-attacks and to jointly advancing efforts at international level for the development of a comprehensive and transparent international framework that will set minimum standards for cyber-security policies, while also upholding fundamental liberties; |
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11.

Reiterates the growing importance of cyber-defence and welcomes the creation, at the 2010 summit, of the Working Group on Cyber-Security and Cyber-Crime; believes that the EU and the US should give special priority to their cooperation on cyber-security, with special regard to countering cyber-attacks and to jointly advancing efforts at international level for the development of a comprehensive and transparent international framework that will set minimum standards for cyber-security policies, while also upholding fundamental liberties;

| 12. | Regrets that the EU and US plan to implement differing levels of cyber-security vigilance at a time when NATO is pushing for intensified cooperation; stresses that such inconsistencies not only pose a threat for cyber-defence but may also create trade-related problems for companies whose operations span both jurisdictions; |
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12.

Regrets that the EU and US plan to implement differing levels of cyber-security vigilance at a time when NATO is pushing for intensified cooperation; stresses that such inconsistencies not only pose a threat for cyber-defence but may also create trade-related problems for companies whose operations span both jurisdictions;

| 13. | Welcomes the renewed pledge of President Obama to close Guantánamo, expressed in his speech of 23 May 2013; reiterates its call to allow detainees who have not been charged to return home or to another safe country as quickly as possible, to try Guantánamo detainees against whom sufficient admissible evidence exists without delay in a fair and public hearing by an independent, impartial tribunal, and to ensure that, if convicted, they are imprisoned in the United States in accordance with the applicable international standards and principles; |
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13.

Welcomes the renewed pledge of President Obama to close Guantánamo, expressed in his speech of 23 May 2013; reiterates its call to allow detainees who have not been charged to return home or to another safe country as quickly as possible, to try Guantánamo detainees against whom sufficient admissible evidence exists without delay in a fair and public hearing by an independent, impartial tribunal, and to ensure that, if convicted, they are imprisoned in the United States in accordance with the applicable international standards and principles;

| 14. | Underlines the continuous importance of NATO as the cornerstone of transatlantic security; calls again for the strengthening of the strategic partnership between the EU and NATO; |
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14.

Underlines the continuous importance of NATO as the cornerstone of transatlantic security; calls again for the strengthening of the strategic partnership between the EU and NATO;

Atlantic and global agenda

Atlantic and global agenda

| 15. | Calls on both partners to study areas and frameworks through which broader transatlantic cooperation could be carried out in a pragmatic way, and to explore with other Atlantic countries the usefulness of this extended cooperation; underlines that possible areas from the EU’s point of view include economic and social issues, global governance, the process of democratisation, human rights, development cooperation, climate change, security and energy; calls on the partners to analyse the possibility of making use, for the purpose of these triangular dialogues, of the regional and subregional structures created in Latin America which the EU has traditionally encouraged; |
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15.

Calls on both partners to study areas and frameworks through which broader transatlantic cooperation could be carried out in a pragmatic way, and to explore with other Atlantic countries the usefulness of this extended cooperation; underlines that possible areas from the EU’s point of view include economic and social issues, global governance, the process of democratisation, human rights, development cooperation, climate change, security and energy; calls on the partners to analyse the possibility of making use, for the purpose of these triangular dialogues, of the regional and subregional structures created in Latin America which the EU has traditionally encouraged;

| 16. | Suggests that the partners engage in regular exchanges of views regarding their respective summits with Latin American countries in a regional framework, namely the biannual EU-CELAC summit and the Summit of the Americas held by the Organisation of American States; |
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16.

Suggests that the partners engage in regular exchanges of views regarding their respective summits with Latin American countries in a regional framework, namely the biannual EU-CELAC summit and the Summit of the Americas held by the Organisation of American States;

| 17. | Highlights the fact that there already exist various multilateral frameworks devoted to specific matters which have a strong triangular component, such as the Central America Regional Security Initiative; |
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17.

Highlights the fact that there already exist various multilateral frameworks devoted to specific matters which have a strong triangular component, such as the Central America Regional Security Initiative;

| 18. | Recalls the positive role that Canada — with which both partners have a solid relationship — can play in a broader transatlantic cooperation; |
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18.

Recalls the positive role that Canada — with which both partners have a solid relationship — can play in a broader transatlantic cooperation;

| 19. | Calls on both partners also to study the possibility of a broader cooperation including the African rim of the Atlantic Basin, and, in addition, to identify pertinent fields and frameworks, taking the relevant African organisations into account; |
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19.

Calls on both partners also to study the possibility of a broader cooperation including the African rim of the Atlantic Basin, and, in addition, to identify pertinent fields and frameworks, taking the relevant African organisations into account;

| 20. | Calls on the EU and the US to work in a coordinated manner with a view to contributing to a stable international order of peace and cooperation, based on effective multilateralism with emerging players, including those of the South Atlantic rim; urges the partners to continue working on the UN reform programme while engaging the other Atlantic countries and taking their interests into account; stresses the need for an enhanced cooperation between the EU and the countries of the Americas within the UN; |
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20.

Calls on the EU and the US to work in a coordinated manner with a view to contributing to a stable international order of peace and cooperation, based on effective multilateralism with emerging players, including those of the South Atlantic rim; urges the partners to continue working on the UN reform programme while engaging the other Atlantic countries and taking their interests into account; stresses the need for an enhanced cooperation between the EU and the countries of the Americas within the UN;

| 21. | Recalls that the International Criminal Court is an increasingly indispensable instrument of international law and a fundamental element of EU foreign policy in relation to the goal of ending impunity; pays tribute to the work of the ICC on its tenth anniversary; welcomes the move of the Obama administration to re-establish a working relationship with the Court, and expects that the US will take further steps towards re-signing and ratifying the Rome Statute; |
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21.

Recalls that the International Criminal Court is an increasingly indispensable instrument of international law and a fundamental element of EU foreign policy in relation to the goal of ending impunity; pays tribute to the work of the ICC on its tenth anniversary; welcomes the move of the Obama administration to re-establish a working relationship with the Court, and expects that the US will take further steps towards re-signing and ratifying the Rome Statute;

| 22. | Calls on the EU and the US to work jointly towards the strengthening of regional and subregional organisations in the Atlantic Basin, given the important role played by them in promoting economic and political integration; |
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22.

Calls on the EU and the US to work jointly towards the strengthening of regional and subregional organisations in the Atlantic Basin, given the important role played by them in promoting economic and political integration;

| 23. | Calls on the partners to give a new impetus to the G20, inter alia by simultaneously, engaging, on an equal footing, the other Atlantic powers participating in that forum; highlights the fact that, given Obama’s re-election and the large number of new leaders in key G20 countries, the moment is timely to make the next meeting of the G20 more ambitious and operational, and expects that this issue will be addressed at the next bilateral summit; |
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23.

Calls on the partners to give a new impetus to the G20, inter alia by simultaneously, engaging, on an equal footing, the other Atlantic powers participating in that forum; highlights the fact that, given Obama’s re-election and the large number of new leaders in key G20 countries, the moment is timely to make the next meeting of the G20 more ambitious and operational, and expects that this issue will be addressed at the next bilateral summit;

| 24. | Stresses that the eventual conclusion of the TTIP will create the prospect of a wide economic space that would include North America, the EU, and the many Latin American countries with which the partners have negotiated economic agreements; |
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24.

Stresses that the eventual conclusion of the TTIP will create the prospect of a wide economic space that would include North America, the EU, and the many Latin American countries with which the partners have negotiated economic agreements;

| 25. | Stresses that the integration of two of the biggest market economies can create a geopolitical template for promoting democratic values; |
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25.

Stresses that the integration of two of the biggest market economies can create a geopolitical template for promoting democratic values;

| 26. | Stresses that democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights must be central for the Atlantic Basin countries; encourages further cooperation between EU and US programmes promoting democracy, free and fair elections and the upholding of human rights; |
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26.

Stresses that democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights must be central for the Atlantic Basin countries; encourages further cooperation between EU and US programmes promoting democracy, free and fair elections and the upholding of human rights;

| 27. | Stresses the importance of coordination to combat the risks to global security, such as terrorism, failed states, trafficking in human beings, arms and drugs, organised crime, piracy and cyber-security, all of which constitute current threats in the Atlantic Basin; underlines the need to deepen comprehensive cooperation between all the countries of the Atlantic Basin in the fight against drug trafficking, a phenomenon which is on the rise throughout West Africa and the Sahel; welcomes the partners’ support for the ECOWAS Regional Action Plan on Drugs; |
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27.

Stresses the importance of coordination to combat the risks to global security, such as terrorism, failed states, trafficking in human beings, arms and drugs, organised crime, piracy and cyber-security, all of which constitute current threats in the Atlantic Basin; underlines the need to deepen comprehensive cooperation between all the countries of the Atlantic Basin in the fight against drug trafficking, a phenomenon which is on the rise throughout West Africa and the Sahel; welcomes the partners’ support for the ECOWAS Regional Action Plan on Drugs;

| 28. | Draws attention to the particularly important role that maritime security must play in the Atlantic space; welcomes the efforts of the partners, in close coordination with ECOWAS and ECCAS, to fight piracy and promote maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea; |
| --- | --- |

28.

Draws attention to the particularly important role that maritime security must play in the Atlantic space; welcomes the efforts of the partners, in close coordination with ECOWAS and ECCAS, to fight piracy and promote maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea;

| 29. | Highlights the importance of diversifying energy suppliers, sources and transportation routes; stresses the growing relevance of the countries of the Atlantic Basin with regard to energy production and reserves as well as raw materials, all of which offer considerable diversification opportunities; suggests that the EU-US Energy Council, together with the other countries of the Atlantic Basin, should study the possibility of working together on energy security and sustainability matters, including renewable energy technologies; likewise suggests studying the possibility of closer cooperation on raw materials efficiency and recycling; |
| --- | --- |

29.

Highlights the importance of diversifying energy suppliers, sources and transportation routes; stresses the growing relevance of the countries of the Atlantic Basin with regard to energy production and reserves as well as raw materials, all of which offer considerable diversification opportunities; suggests that the EU-US Energy Council, together with the other countries of the Atlantic Basin, should study the possibility of working together on energy security and sustainability matters, including renewable energy technologies; likewise suggests studying the possibility of closer cooperation on raw materials efficiency and recycling;

| 30. | Welcomes the emphasis placed by President Obama in his inauguration speech on the renewal of the United States’ capacity to manage crises abroad, and hopes that the cooperation already engaged in by the EU and the US in crisis management, and increasingly in crisis prevention, in East Africa will be extended to the Atlantic rim; in this context, invites both partners to make full and constructive use of the 2011 Framework Agreement on US participation in the CSDP; calls on the EU Member States to engage seriously in joint pooling and sharing projects in order to be able to autonomously fulfil the tasks described in Article 43 of the Lisbon Treaty; |
| --- | --- |

30.

Welcomes the emphasis placed by President Obama in his inauguration speech on the renewal of the United States’ capacity to manage crises abroad, and hopes that the cooperation already engaged in by the EU and the US in crisis management, and increasingly in crisis prevention, in East Africa will be extended to the Atlantic rim; in this context, invites both partners to make full and constructive use of the 2011 Framework Agreement on US participation in the CSDP; calls on the EU Member States to engage seriously in joint pooling and sharing projects in order to be able to autonomously fulfil the tasks described in Article 43 of the Lisbon Treaty;

| 31. | Calls on the EU and the US to continue strengthening their dialogue and cooperation in the field of development, in order to improve the quality and effectiveness of their development assistance; urges both partners to continue promoting the objective of achieving the Millennium Development Goals by 2015; welcomes the fact that the partners have set up a reflection group to work on a post-2015 agenda concerning the Millennium Development Goals; urges the partners to engage in close coordination with the countries of the Atlantic rim in relation to those goals, given their special importance for that group; calls on the EU and the US, in this reflection process, to address the issue of how the post-2015 MDGs and the Sustainable Development Goals can be linked; |
| --- | --- |

31.

Calls on the EU and the US to continue strengthening their dialogue and cooperation in the field of development, in order to improve the quality and effectiveness of their development assistance; urges both partners to continue promoting the objective of achieving the Millennium Development Goals by 2015; welcomes the fact that the partners have set up a reflection group to work on a post-2015 agenda concerning the Millennium Development Goals; urges the partners to engage in close coordination with the countries of the Atlantic rim in relation to those goals, given their special importance for that group; calls on the EU and the US, in this reflection process, to address the issue of how the post-2015 MDGs and the Sustainable Development Goals can be linked;

| 32. | Welcomes President Obama’s renewed commitment to the fight against climate change; urges the partners to agree, as early as possible and by 2015 at the latest, on binding commitments on the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions in line with maintaining climate change below 2 oC; expects this issue to be addressed at the next bilateral summit; highlights the need to involve the Atlantic countries in this effort, especially given the harmful impact of climate change, in those countries and across the globe, on food production, biodiversity, desertification and extreme weather events; regards it as essential that the EU and the US lead the way towards a global agreement on the regulation of airline emissions in the context of the ICAO General Assembly; reaffirms the need for close transatlantic cooperation in the field of shale gas exploitation; |
| --- | --- |

32.

Welcomes President Obama’s renewed commitment to the fight against climate change; urges the partners to agree, as early as possible and by 2015 at the latest, on binding commitments on the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions in line with maintaining climate change below 2 oC; expects this issue to be addressed at the next bilateral summit; highlights the need to involve the Atlantic countries in this effort, especially given the harmful impact of climate change, in those countries and across the globe, on food production, biodiversity, desertification and extreme weather events; regards it as essential that the EU and the US lead the way towards a global agreement on the regulation of airline emissions in the context of the ICAO General Assembly; reaffirms the need for close transatlantic cooperation in the field of shale gas exploitation;

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| 33. | Calls on the EU and the US to adopt a common strategy in international forums, especially the UN, for reducing stocks of weapons of mass destruction and conventional arms, and to involve the Atlantic countries in those endeavours; expects the US and Russia to make further progress on nuclear disarmament; warmly welcomes the recent approval of the Arms Trade Treaty by the UN General Assembly, and urges the EU Member States and the US to swiftly sign it; |
| --- | --- |

33.

Calls on the EU and the US to adopt a common strategy in international forums, especially the UN, for reducing stocks of weapons of mass destruction and conventional arms, and to involve the Atlantic countries in those endeavours; expects the US and Russia to make further progress on nuclear disarmament; warmly welcomes the recent approval of the Arms Trade Treaty by the UN General Assembly, and urges the EU Member States and the US to swiftly sign it;

| 34. | Encourages think-tanks and researchers to continue their study of broader transatlantic cooperation, which also helps to foster the idea of a wider Atlantic community; |
| --- | --- |

34.

Encourages think-tanks and researchers to continue their study of broader transatlantic cooperation, which also helps to foster the idea of a wider Atlantic community;

| 35. | Stresses that cultural exchanges through educational programmes are fundamental to developing common values and, therefore, to building bridges between the Atlantic basin partners; |
| --- | --- |

35.

Stresses that cultural exchanges through educational programmes are fundamental to developing common values and, therefore, to building bridges between the Atlantic basin partners;

Current issues and conflicts

Current issues and conflicts

| 36. | Calls on the partners to prioritise close coordination in supporting the democratic transition in North Africa and the Middle East on the basis of a comprehensive and conditional strategy of assistance and incentives linked to democratic reforms; urges the partners to coordinate as closely as possible regarding support for the opposition in Syria, and to maintain pressure on Russia and China with a view to an urgent political solution for the tragic crisis in that country; supports the call for a peace conference on Syria in Geneva; underscores the need for a common response to the political instability and looming economic crisis in Egypt; encourages cooperation in order to support democratisation programmes in the region; |
| --- | --- |

36.

Calls on the partners to prioritise close coordination in supporting the democratic transition in North Africa and the Middle East on the basis of a comprehensive and conditional strategy of assistance and incentives linked to democratic reforms; urges the partners to coordinate as closely as possible regarding support for the opposition in Syria, and to maintain pressure on Russia and China with a view to an urgent political solution for the tragic crisis in that country; supports the call for a peace conference on Syria in Geneva; underscores the need for a common response to the political instability and looming economic crisis in Egypt; encourages cooperation in order to support democratisation programmes in the region;

| 37. | Underlines the need for coordination between the EU, its Member States, the US, the AU, ECOWAS, the UN and other actors in support of implementation of the roadmap to transition in Mali, as well as the need for financial and logistical support for the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA), which is poised to transfer its authority to the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), pursuant to UN Security Council resolution 2100 as adopted on 25 April 2013; |
| --- | --- |

37.

Underlines the need for coordination between the EU, its Member States, the US, the AU, ECOWAS, the UN and other actors in support of implementation of the roadmap to transition in Mali, as well as the need for financial and logistical support for the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA), which is poised to transfer its authority to the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), pursuant to UN Security Council resolution 2100 as adopted on 25 April 2013;

| 38. | Regrets the stalling of the Middle East peace process; welcomes the fact that President Obama visited Israel, the Palestinian Authority and Jordan during his first visit abroad after his re-election, and welcomes the fact that the Middle East peace process has again become a main priority, as shown by the current efforts made by the Secretary of State, John Kerry; welcomes President Obama’s commitment to a two-state solution; calls on the US side to push for a freeze on settlement construction and to work together with the EU on the resumption of direct Israeli-Palestinian negotiations; shares President Obama’s view on Israel’s ongoing settlement building and on the importance of ensuring Israel’s security; |
| --- | --- |

38.

Regrets the stalling of the Middle East peace process; welcomes the fact that President Obama visited Israel, the Palestinian Authority and Jordan during his first visit abroad after his re-election, and welcomes the fact that the Middle East peace process has again become a main priority, as shown by the current efforts made by the Secretary of State, John Kerry; welcomes President Obama’s commitment to a two-state solution; calls on the US side to push for a freeze on settlement construction and to work together with the EU on the resumption of direct Israeli-Palestinian negotiations; shares President Obama’s view on Israel’s ongoing settlement building and on the importance of ensuring Israel’s security;

| 39. | Urges the two partners to continue to work towards a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue with a view to expeditiously achieving a comprehensive negotiated long-term settlement which would foster international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear programme, while respecting Iran’s legitimate rights to the peaceful use of nuclear energy in conformity with the NPT; calls on the EU and the US to consider, in the context of the EU 3+3 (P5 +1) negotiations with Iran, the coordinated and conditional lifting of sanctions in exchange for mutually agreed and verifiable action by the Iranian government to resolve all outstanding issues concerning its nuclear programme, in full compliance with the provisions of the NPT, the IAEA Board of Governors and the relevant UN Security Council resolutions, as well as the demands made by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); calls on both partners to adopt a more comprehensive approach towards relations with Iran that addresses the human rights situation as well as the broader regional security picture, and to involve Iranian civil society and NGOs wherever applicable; |
| --- | --- |

39.

Urges the two partners to continue to work towards a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue with a view to expeditiously achieving a comprehensive negotiated long-term settlement which would foster international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear programme, while respecting Iran’s legitimate rights to the peaceful use of nuclear energy in conformity with the NPT; calls on the EU and the US to consider, in the context of the EU 3+3 (P5 +1) negotiations with Iran, the coordinated and conditional lifting of sanctions in exchange for mutually agreed and verifiable action by the Iranian government to resolve all outstanding issues concerning its nuclear programme, in full compliance with the provisions of the NPT, the IAEA Board of Governors and the relevant UN Security Council resolutions, as well as the demands made by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); calls on both partners to adopt a more comprehensive approach towards relations with Iran that addresses the human rights situation as well as the broader regional security picture, and to involve Iranian civil society and NGOs wherever applicable;

| 40. | Urges the partners to jointly develop a comprehensive approach to Afghanistan for the post-2014 period, in coordination with the Afghan government; stresses that properly trained and equipped Afghan military and police forces, together with human and socio-economic development, good governance and pro-rule of law policies, will be vital for peace, stability and security in the country, while a much stronger commitment from Afghanistan’s neighbours to these goals will also be required; also stresses the need for a democratic and inclusive political process in the country; recognises the fundamental role that has been played by NATO in coordinating the security response to the terrorist threat in Afghanistan, including reconstruction and rehabilitation, and recognises the potential role of NATO in the post-2014 period; |
| --- | --- |

40.

Urges the partners to jointly develop a comprehensive approach to Afghanistan for the post-2014 period, in coordination with the Afghan government; stresses that properly trained and equipped Afghan military and police forces, together with human and socio-economic development, good governance and pro-rule of law policies, will be vital for peace, stability and security in the country, while a much stronger commitment from Afghanistan’s neighbours to these goals will also be required; also stresses the need for a democratic and inclusive political process in the country; recognises the fundamental role that has been played by NATO in coordinating the security response to the terrorist threat in Afghanistan, including reconstruction and rehabilitation, and recognises the potential role of NATO in the post-2014 period;

| 41. | Highlights the importance of the Eastern Partnership to the EU; stresses the need to bring the countries of this neighbouring region closer, politically and economically, to the EU and to the common values of the transatlantic partners; calls on the EU and the US to coordinate actively in this regard, and stresses the need for concerted efforts in order to promote democratic reforms, consolidate democratic institutions and enhance peaceful conflict resolution; appreciates the continued support of the US support for the Western Balkans enlargement process, and encourages both partners to maintain a coordinated approach toward the countries of this region; |
| --- | --- |

41.

Highlights the importance of the Eastern Partnership to the EU; stresses the need to bring the countries of this neighbouring region closer, politically and economically, to the EU and to the common values of the transatlantic partners; calls on the EU and the US to coordinate actively in this regard, and stresses the need for concerted efforts in order to promote democratic reforms, consolidate democratic institutions and enhance peaceful conflict resolution; appreciates the continued support of the US support for the Western Balkans enlargement process, and encourages both partners to maintain a coordinated approach toward the countries of this region;

| 42. | Urges both partners to better coordinate their policies regarding critical engagement with Russia; emphasises the importance of cooperation with Russia on global challenges, including disarmament and non-proliferation; calls on the EU and the US to contribute to Russia’s modernisation process, with particular emphasis on consolidating democracy, human rights and the rule of law and on promoting diversified and socially equitable economic growth; highlights the importance of promoting people-to-people contacts; in this regard, regrets the new restrictive laws on NGOs and the increasing pressure being applied by the Russian authorities on the offices of NGOs based in Russia; stresses that implementation of the commitments made by Russia when it joined the WTO is an important part of the modernisation agenda of the country; calls on both partners to engage in a constructive discussions with Russia on frozen conflicts; welcomes the approval of the Magnitsky list by the US Congress, and recalls its own resolution of October 2012; |
| --- | --- |

42.

Urges both partners to better coordinate their policies regarding critical engagement with Russia; emphasises the importance of cooperation with Russia on global challenges, including disarmament and non-proliferation; calls on the EU and the US to contribute to Russia’s modernisation process, with particular emphasis on consolidating democracy, human rights and the rule of law and on promoting diversified and socially equitable economic growth; highlights the importance of promoting people-to-people contacts; in this regard, regrets the new restrictive laws on NGOs and the increasing pressure being applied by the Russian authorities on the offices of NGOs based in Russia; stresses that implementation of the commitments made by Russia when it joined the WTO is an important part of the modernisation agenda of the country; calls on both partners to engage in a constructive discussions with Russia on frozen conflicts; welcomes the approval of the Magnitsky list by the US Congress, and recalls its own resolution of October 2012;

| 43. | Notes the shift of international attention towards East Asia owing to the political and economic rise of the Asia-Pacific region; welcomes the recent establishment of closer consultation between the EU and the US regarding that region, and believes this might lead to closer EU-US cooperation concerning Asia; notes, in particular, the need for a coordinated response to issues that could potentially disturb peace in the region, especially in the case of the South-East China Sea conflict, which is fuelling aggressive nationalism in some Asian countries and poses a threat to maritime security; |
| --- | --- |

43.

Notes the shift of international attention towards East Asia owing to the political and economic rise of the Asia-Pacific region; welcomes the recent establishment of closer consultation between the EU and the US regarding that region, and believes this might lead to closer EU-US cooperation concerning Asia; notes, in particular, the need for a coordinated response to issues that could potentially disturb peace in the region, especially in the case of the South-East China Sea conflict, which is fuelling aggressive nationalism in some Asian countries and poses a threat to maritime security;

| 44. | Strongly condemns the escalating war rhetoric on the part of North Korea and its direct threats made against the US in response to the recent UN Security Council resolution 2087 adopting tougher sanctions; calls on Pyongyang to abide by the relevant UN Security Council resolutions calling for a cessation of its nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles programmes; urges both sides to maintain calm and to pursue peace through diplomatic channels; urges the EU, the US and South Korea to maintain close dialogue with China in order to restrain the Pyongyang regime; |
| --- | --- |

44.

Strongly condemns the escalating war rhetoric on the part of North Korea and its direct threats made against the US in response to the recent UN Security Council resolution 2087 adopting tougher sanctions; calls on Pyongyang to abide by the relevant UN Security Council resolutions calling for a cessation of its nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles programmes; urges both sides to maintain calm and to pursue peace through diplomatic channels; urges the EU, the US and South Korea to maintain close dialogue with China in order to restrain the Pyongyang regime;

| 45. | Calls on the EU and the US to make a coordinated effort to commit the new Chinese leadership to dealing more actively with global agenda issues and conflicts; welcomes the fact that the EU and China have agreed to hold a regular dialogue on defence and security policy, as well as to maintain regular contacts between special representatives and special envoys; recalls the importance of sustaining an open dialogue with China on good governance and respect for human rights; |
| --- | --- |

45.

Calls on the EU and the US to make a coordinated effort to commit the new Chinese leadership to dealing more actively with global agenda issues and conflicts; welcomes the fact that the EU and China have agreed to hold a regular dialogue on defence and security policy, as well as to maintain regular contacts between special representatives and special envoys; recalls the importance of sustaining an open dialogue with China on good governance and respect for human rights;

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| 46. | Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the US Government and the US Congress. |
| --- | --- |

46.

Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the US Government and the US Congress.

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(1)  OJ C 298 E, 8.12.2006, p. 226.

1

(2)  OJ C 117 E, 6.5.2010, p. 198.

2

(3)  Texts adopted, P7_TA(2011)0510.

3

(4)  Texts adopted, P7_TA(2012)0388.

4

(5)  Texts adopted, P7_TA(2013)0227.

5

(6)  Texts adopted, P7_TA(2012)0334.

6

(7)  Texts adopted, P7_TA(2012)0455.

7

(8)  Texts adopted, P7_TA(2012)0457.

8

(9)  Texts adopted, P7_TA(2012)0235.

9

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