ARI Research Note 87-14

I-A , HLL _ - A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF NATIONAL TRAINING CENTER

NFORCE-ON-FORCE PERFORMANCE

14% Judith J. Nichols

0, The BDM Corporation

0

00 .for

IContracting Officer's Representative

Nancy K. Atwood

ARI Field Unit at Presidio of Monterey, California

James H. Banks, Chief

TRAINING RESEARCH LABORATORY

Jack H. Hiller, Director

"DTIC

,:.::l I{[ ELECTE

;"; : MAY 1 3 1987

U.S. Army E

Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

January 1987

*," ,o -ooved for oubIc -'ease i;stributncn unl,mitel.

,'.N
"% U. S. ARMY RESEARCH INSTITUTE

FOR THE BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

A Field Operating Agency under the Jurisdiction of the

Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel

WM. DARRYL HENDERSON

EDGAR M. JOHNSON COL. [N

Technical Director C anding

Research accomplished under contract

for the Department of the Army

-The BDM Corporation

Technical review by

John J. Kessler

.°3

~~This *ePori. asl slubmitted by the contraor.ot has been cleared 1,, *eleast o Detfense Teichn~c.'I Infotml-on Cen'lef

WTI (OTIC) to comply ith regulatory teiruernenits. It ties been given no primary ditribtution oihe, then to OTIC

and will be available only thrc-ugh DTIC or other reference services such as the National Tochncat Informalon

Sorsvic (NTIS). The vitiw. c ,ne.ni. enr/or flndings contained in this report are those of the aulhor(O and

should not be constuet.; as an ofiecia Cepatmert of the Army position. policy, or decision, unlest to detig n a l

e'

by other olficial documentet-on.

A.A . .,,

Vi
UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Date Entered)

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM

I. REPORT NUMBER 2. GOVT ACCESSION NO. 3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER lalq .:;.ARI Research Note 87-14

4. TITLE (and Subtitle) 5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED

A Preliminary Analysis of National Training Final Report

Center Force-On-Force Performance February 82 - January 85

. '" "*.'" :BDM/AR 6. PERFORMING I-TR- ORG. 01 I1-86 REPORT NUMBER

7. AUTHOR(a) S. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s)

Judith J. Nichols MDA 903-85-C-0472

9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS 10. PROGRAM ELEMENT. PROJECT TASK The BDM Corooration AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS

2600 Garden Road, North Building 2Q263743A794

Monterey, 93940 511C1

11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS 12. REPORT DATE

ARI Field Unit at Presidio of Monterey, California January 1987

P.O. Box 5737 13. NUMBER OF PAGES

Presidio of Monterey, CA 93944 32

4. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS(If different from Controllinj Office) 15. SECURITY CLASS. (of thi. report)

U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral Unclassified

and Social Sciences, 5001 Eisenhower Avenue,

Alexandria, VA 22333-5600 I5.. DECLASSIFICATION'DOWNGRADING

SCHEDULE

16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of thle Report)

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the ebstrect entered In Block 20, If different from Report)

18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

Nancy K. Atwood, contracting officer's representative

19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverie side If neceseary nd Identity by block number)

National Training Center (NTC) Performance

Army Research Institute (ARI) Training

Take Home Packages (THPs)

20. ABSTRACT (tm'e-tue SM reverse et49 if n"*c Mar4y nd idetwify" by block nuenber)

This Research Note presents the conclusions of an exploratory analysis

performed by the Arly Research Institute (ARI). Using the data compiled from 64 utake home packagesO completed by units which had been through battalion

task force training at the National Training Center (NTC), the following

findings were made:

1) There was considerable variability in performance, both between battallions,

(OVER)

DD FO" 147 EDITION OF I OVS IS OBSOLETE JAN SE T CIINCI ASTFIFF iSECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Date Entered)
UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE(W71o Dal Eni...d)

ARI Research Note 87-14

20. Abstract (continued)

and across missions.

2) Generally, the task forces suffered very high casualty rates themselves,

while inflicting relatively low casualty rates on the opposing forces (OPFOR).

This seemed to be the case for all task forces, and was seemingly unrelated

to the MTOE (modification table of organization and equipment) of the task

force. In order to understand task force performance, it will be necessary to

have a full complement of data, rather than the partial complement available

in the take home packages.

SAcesslon For-

<-z '2Dis t r i bu t i °n/ "

l*t 010(403

, ,: iA:allana,/or

U11

.:L L: '2 C .

UNCLASSIFIED

11 SECuRITY CL ASSIFIC ATION OF T WS P AG[(01"m. fat. F,.d)

- 9-' . .
A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF NTC FORCE-ON-FORCE PERFORMANCE

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION ~ . . ~ . . .~ . .. ~ . .~ . . ~ ... . ~ . .. ~ . . ~ . . ~ . . P 

BANTROUTION......................................................

BCKOUND..........................................................

SCOE......................................................... 2

Sataple.......................................................

Data Sources............................................... 3

DaSUTa Analysis.................................................

Analysis of Task Force Performance ......................... 5

%Lost Performance Measure............................ 5

Casualty Exchange Ratios............................. 8

Analysis of Task Force Type and Task Force Organization. 9

% Lost Measures.......................................g9

Offensive Operations ............................. 9

-Defensive Operations ............................ 11

Casualty Exchange Ratios............................. 12

Offensive Operations............................ 12

Defensive Operations............................ 14

D I C S I N . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

DISCUSNCSIO......................................................16

APPENDIX A..................................................... A-1
LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES

" ""Pane

Figure 1 Typical Mission Schedule for an NTC Rotation 2

Table I Percentage of Task Force Vehicles Lost in

Force-on-Force Exercises 6

2 Casualty Exchange Ration for TF in

Force-on-Force Exercises 7

3 Percentage of Task Force Vehicles Lost in

Offensive Engagement Simulation (DES)

Force-on-Force Exercises 10

4 Percentage of Task Force Vehicles Lost in

Defensive Engagement Simulation (DES)

Force-on-Force Exercises 11

5 Casualty Exchange Ratios for Offensive

Engagement Simulation (DES)

Force-on-Force Exercises 13

6 Casualty Exchange Ratios for Defensive

Engagement Simulation (DES)

Force-on-Force Exercises 15

A-i Kill Ratio by Mission for Mech and Armor TFs

(TF Losses per One OPFOR Loss) A-2

A-2 X Numbers of Vehicles Killed Across DES Missions A-3

A-3 Casualty Exchange Ratios For Three DES Missions

(TF Vehicles Killed per One OPFOR Kill) A-4

A-4 Casualty Exchange Ratios For Three DES Missions

(TF Vehicles Killed per One OPFOR Kill) A-5

A-5 DES Summary Data for All Rotations A-6

A-6 DES Summary Data for All Rotations A-8

" iv

:i.

. -. ,.. - - ..
A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF NTC FORCE-ON-FORCE PERFORMANCE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

- . Requirement:

To assess the Task Force Performance in Force-on-Force

Simulation at the NTC.

Procedure:

Using the data available in 64 Take Home Packages for

battalions training at the NTC during the period of February 1982

to January 1985, an exploratory analysis (Tukey, 1977; Hartwig and

Dearing, 1979) of performance in force-on-force simulations was

conducted. This analysis focused on the relative contribution of

task force type (Armor vs. Mechanized Infantry) and task force

MTOE organization (H-series vs J-series) to mission performance.

Two measures of performance were used in the analyses: percentage

of task force vehicles lost and casualty exchange ratio.

- ,. Findings:

o Substantial performance variation was found across

battalions and missions.

o Performance differed for type of task forces (Armor vs.

Mechanized Infantry). This difference was greatest for

Offensive missions.

o Performance was not consistantly related to the new MTOE

organization, though J-series task forces lost a lower

percentage of their force while simultaneously having a

higher casualty exchange ratio.

o The results show that:

- The battalions suffered very high casualty rates while

correspondingly inflicting a lower casualty rate upon

the OPFOR.

- Battalion TFs are rendered combat ineffective by

mission's end as a result of their casualties.

- Battalion TFs suffered very heavy tank casualties with

an average loss of two-thirds of the available tanks.

- The above results hold true for all types of Task Forces

°W.

•4 V
'-" Military Implications:

o The force multiplier effects of reorganization under the

J-series MTOE cannot be determined from these results

and will need to be investigated with the full complement

of data.

o The OPFOR performs better than the battalion task forces

by achieving a much higher kill ratio on both offense and

defense. This suggests basic weaknesses in battalion

training. As a result, careful examination should be given

to home-station factors and NTC performance, particularly

to identify areas for improved Army-wide training.

i6e
&EL1tliinAri Anahli 21 KU E2E~t=:2n:E2EQft Elftl~An~t

INTRODUCTION

U.S. Army battalions have been training at the National

Training Center (NTC) at Ft. Irwin. California since 1981. The

objective of NTC training is to provide a facility where units can

undergo essential combined arms training that cannot be accomplished at home stations due to physical limitations and the

prohibitive cost of providing a realistic training envi,'onment. A

- secondary objective of NTC training is to gather information which

can be used to contribute to the improvement of doctrine, tactics,

training systems. equipment and procedures in the U.S. Army.

In support of the NTC information-gathering objective, the

Army Research Institute (ARI) has developed a research program

which includes as a technical objective the collection, organiza-

- tion. and analysis of NTC data in order to assess those training

Obenefits which may be accrued by the units training at the NTC.

. This report is an exploratory investigation (Tukey, 1977: Hartwig

and Dearing, 1979) of the force-on-force data that are contained

in the Take Home Packages (THPs) which are compiled anJ issued to

u-- -. the training units at the end of each NTC rotation. The

objectives of this study was two-fold. First, it was designed to

provide a description of the overall force-on-force performance at

the NTC. Second, it investigated whether this performance was

• ." related to the task force type (Armor vs. Mechanized Infantry)

*... and/or to task force organization (H- vs. J-MTOE series

organization).

BACKGROUND

The NTC concept is geared to the training of the battalion

task force (TF). Each battalion task force participates in

approximately six force-on-force exercises during a two-week

rotation period at the NTC. These exercises usually are more or

less evenly divided between offensive and defensive operations

- using laser-based engagement simulation instrumentation to provide real-time casualty assessment. The simulator, the Multiple

Integrated Laser Engagement System (MILES), is used on all principal weapons and casualties are assessed when a weapon fires and

the MILES laser hits a target. In addition to force-on-force

training, units also perform three missions on the live fire range

-, during their rotation (see Figure 1). A separate investigation of

- live-fire performance has been conducted and is reported in

Forsythe and Doherty (1985).

"o 1 1-

'Jo

..................................................................
Missions Conducted

TF - - conducted the following missions during their

NTC training period:

DATE MISSION

Deliberate Day Attack

Defend in Sector

Delay in Sector

Defend Battle Position (Day) (LFX)

Defend Battle Position (Night) LFX)

Movement to Contact (LFX)

Movement to Contact

Deliberate Night Attack

Defend Battle Position

Figure 1. Typical Mission Schedule for an NTC Rotation.

The scenario dictates the force ratios of the combatants.

While terrain and scenario options are limited, no two scenarios

are exactly the same. When the TF conducts defensive missions

they are always attacked by an OPFOR that replicates a Motorized

Rifle Regiment. When TFs conduct offensive operations, they originally encountered a defending Motorized Rifle Company. However,

in the summer 1984. the force ratio was changed to deploy a

defending Motorized Rifle Battalion (-).

SCOPE

Sample

The source of the data analyzed in this report is the Take

Home Package (THP) prepared at the end of each rotation. Data

from 64 THPs covering the period February 1982 through January

1985 are represented in this analysis. The 64 THPs represent the

rotations of 64 battalions from six divisons and two separate

brigades located in the Continental United States (CONUS) that

underwent training at the NTC during the above time period. The

64 battalions included 32 Armor and 32 Mechanized Infantry units

which were cross reinforced to form 64 combined arms task forces

(i.e., 32 Armor heavy and 32 Mech heavy TFs). Two rotations by

the opposing force (OPFOR) -- i.e.. two MTOE battalions permanently stationed at Ft. Irwin -- were also included in the sample

The OPFOR battalions did not undergo the s'andard rotation series

of exercises but rather performed a mini-ARTEP. However, the

34

. .~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~....--.....-......._........ ...... ........ .. ..-...-..... .-. .. .-.... ,-- -. ........
data extracted for the two missions performed by the OPFOR

battalions (i.e., movement to contact and defend in sector)

were not substantially different from the data of the rest of

the sample and so were included in the analysis.

Data Sources

As previously mentioned, Take Home Packages (THPs) are prepared and issued to the training units at the termination of each

NTC rotation. Separate packages are prepared for the respective

Armor and Mechanized Infantry task forces. The THP is an overall

description of unit performance during the rotation and includes

statements of performance trends during the 14-day rotation period. The THP is the final compilation of all after action review

scripts and encompasses an assessment of all seven operating

systems, live fire gunnery data, and TF and opposing force (OPFOR)

aggregate losses.

The force-on-force results are reported in the THPs in several formats and include the following data:

TF and OPFOR vehicle loss summaries for Offensive

Engagement Simulation (DES) operations

TF and OPFOR vehicle loss summaries for Defensive

Engagement Simulation (DES) operations

-- Numbers of TF vehicles started and killed for each

mission

Numbers of OPFOR vehicles killed for each

mission

Offensive and defensive operations summary data were extracted

from the 64 THPs. Mission-specific data for the six most commonly

performed missions (i.e., movement to contact/meeting engagement,

deliberate day attack, deliberate night attack, defend in sector,

delay in sector, and defend from a battle position) were also

extracted from the THPs and combined with the summary data to

construct the data base for this analysis. Each individual task

force was coded to preserve anonymity and the data were then

subjected to a number of statistical operations.

Data Analysis

The task force was designated as the unit of measurement and

the data were divided into groups in order to identify differences

in task force performance at the NTC during the period that force

modernization was taking place. Task forces that *ere organized

as H-MTOE series rotations occurring between Febrjary 1982 and

January 1985 were identified as one analytic group while another

"p.

'i3
group was identified to include all J-MTOE series rotations

occurring during the same time period. The two groups were

further identified as Mechanized Infantry and Armor TFs within the

H- and J-series categories. This provided a 2x2 analytic design

for inferential investigation of performance differences.

The limited scope of force-on-force data available in the

THPs severely constrained the analysis in several areas. For

example. information on the numbers of OPFOR tanks and APCs starting each mission was not available in the THP thus prohibiting the

derivation of percent of enemy vehicles killed during an exercise.

Although the force strengths for Motorized Rifle Regiment and

Motorized Rifle Company are available in FM 71-2. The Tank and

Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force, Appendix H, this does

not allow for instances of vehicle breakdown in the field, numbers

of vehicles actually available to the OPFOR during specific individual missions, and so forth. For the purposes of this report,

which is a preliminary exploration of the data available in the

Take Home Packages only, it was decided that assumption of consistent standards for OPFOR strengths would not be made.

Of those data available in the THP (see Appendix A). two

measures were selected as meaningful indicators of differences in

TF performance. The first indicator, "Lost", represents the

percentage of TF vehicles lost on the NTC battlefield -- i.e.,

numbers of TF vehicles killed at each mission / numbers of TF

vehicles started at each mission. The %Lost indicator was

available for each TF vehicle type killed (i.e., APCs to include

TOWs, and tanks) as well as an aggregate value ("Total Vehicles

Lost") that combined all vehicle types. ITV/TOW data were

extracted from the THPs for the six missions analyzed in the

study. Results of ITV/TOW analyses revealed that losses were not

obviously different from APC losses and so ITV/TOW data were

incorporated into the APC data to produce the APC/TOW category.

This indicator was investigated for overall offensive and

defensive performance summaries. Because of the small number of

cases for individual missions this indicator was not analyzed at

the mission level.

The second type of measure "Casualty Exchange Ratio".

consisted of the ratio of vehicle casualties for the two forces

-- i.e.. numbers of TF vehicles killed / number of OPFOR vehicles

killed -- and was calculated for both specific vehicle types

(i.e., APC/TOW and tanks) and across vehicle types. This

indicator was used for both overall summary and mission level

analyses.

.44

. . . . . . . .- - - - -
RESULTS

The results of the investigation for the two types of

performance measures are reported below. The discussion has been

organized into two parts. The first part reports the results of

simple descriptive analyses which portray the overall performance

of the TF. The second part presents the results of the analyses

of two factors (i~e. type of task force and task force

organization) which might relate to variation in TF performance.

In both sections, separate results are reported for offensive and

defensive summary performance. Casualty exchange ratio results

are also presented for six individual missions in the Appendix.

Analysis of Task Force Performance

%lost Performance Measure

Table I shows the percentage of TF vehicles by type that were

lost across offensive and defensive missions. As seen in the

table, TFs experience serious losses as evidenced by both the

offensive and defensive mission summaries. In the offense, the TF

lost over 45% of their combat vehicles on the average. A high

loss pattern of results is found when the specific type of vehicle

is examined. Almost two-thirds (64.8%) of the TF tanks are lost

on the average offensive mission. At the same time, the TF loses

an average of over a third (36.3%) of its APC's in the offense.

a.-
Table 1

Percentage of Task Force Vehicles Lost in All Force-on-Force Exercise

Offense Missions %TANK %APC COMBINED

LOST LOST VEHICLES

.. (SO) (SD) (SO)

Mechanized

Infantry TFs 67.3 35.8 42.5

(N=31) (17.4) (14.3) (12.0)

Armor TFs 62.3 36.7 48.1

(N=31) (14.2) (12.9) (12.1)

Oj All TFs 64.8 36.3 45.3

(14.7) (12.6) (12.7)

Defense Missions %TANK %APC COMBINED

LOST LOST VEHICLES

(SD) (SD) (SD)

Mechanized

Infantry TFs 74.6 45.9 52.0

(N=31) (16.8) (18.0) (16.0)

Armor TFs 72.0 45.7 56.9

(N=30) (16.7) (13.5) (13.3)

All TFs 73.3 45.8 54.4

(15 9) (14 .3) (13 .7)

.- The summary performance results for defensive missions show

greater TF losses than for offense at the NTC. On the average,

the TF's lose more than half their vehicles (54.4%). The loss is

greatest for tanks. The TF average almost three-quarters of their

tanks as casualties. The APC loss averages slightly less than 50%

(45.8%). Thus, the average TF at the NTC loses more than half of

all their vehicles: three quarters of their tanks. and about half

of their APCs.

Table I also shows the offensive and defensive results for

the Mechanized Infantry and Armor task forces. These results indicate that the Armor task force experiences somewhat higher

overall vehicle losses than the Mechanized Infantry in both the

6
offensive and defensive missions. Examination of the results by

vehicle type. shows very similar percentage losses in the

defensive area for the two TF types, and a cross-over pattern in

the offensive area. That is, the Armor loses a lower percentage

of its tanks but a slightly higher percentage of its APCs. The

* Mechanized Infantry experiences the reverse of this pattern.

Table 2

Casualty Exchange Ratio For TF in All Force-on-Force Exercises

Offense Missions

TF Tanks TF APC/TOWs TF Combined

Per OPFOR Per OPFOR Per OPFOR

Kill Kill Kill

(SD) (SO) (SO)

Mechanized

Infantry TFs 4 .45 2.94 3 .34 (N=31) (4.98) (2.12) (2.70)

Armor TFs 4.69 1.58 2.39

(N=32) (3.41) (0.98) (1.28)

All TFs 4 .57 2.26 2.87

(4.23) (1.40) (2.07)

Defense Missions

TF Tanks TF APC/TOWs TF Combined

Per OPFOR Per OPFOR Per OPFOR

Kill Kill Kill

(SD) (SD) (SO)

Mechanized

Infantry TFs .45 .62 .55

(N-31) (.25) (.28) (.21)

Armor TFs .70 .34 47

(N=30) (.37) (.14) (.14)

All TFs .58 .48 .51

(.22) (0.17) (.15)

@I'.

.4'<
Casualty Exchange Ratios

Table 2 presents the offensive and defensive summary results

for the casualty exchange ratio measure. This measure is

expressed in terms of the number of TF vehicles killed for each

OPFOR vehicle killed. Thus, values greater than one indicate

greater numbers of TF vehicles lost per OPFOR vehicle lost.

For offensive missions the TF lose slightly less than three

vehicles for each OPFOR vehicle killed. An examination of the

losses by vehicle type show that greater losses are experienced

for tanks than for APCs. The results indicate that over four

tanks are lost per OPFOR tank loss in offensive missions. This

rate of loss appears to be extremely high in light of the relative

size of the two opposing forces at the NTC.

The offensive results for Armor and Mechanized Infantry TFs

shown in Table 2 follow the same pattern as the combined results,

i.e. a greater loss for tanks than APC/TOWs. It is interesting to

note that the Armor TF had a combined vehicle casualty exchange

ratio about two-thirds as large as that for the Mechanized

Infantry TF. The Armor TFs show a casualty exchange ratio in the

number of APCs of almost half that for the Mechanized Infantry.

The Mechanized Infantry shows about the same losses in number of

tanks as the Armor TFs.

The results for the individual missions, contained in the

Appendix. show that the largest fluctuations in tank and APC/TOW

exchange ratios occur in the Movement to Contact mission for all

TF types (i.e., All TF. Mechanized Infantry TF, and Armor TF).

The results for the remaining offensive missions display less

variation in performance.

The summary results for the defensive missions are also

presented in Table 2. As one can see, the offensive missions show

a much higher casualty exchange ratio than found for defensive

missions. This finding is particularly interesting in light of

the Table I results, where the Task Forces lost a greater

percentage of the vehicles in the defense than in the offense.

Thus, it should be stressed that the average casualty exchange

ratios are not sufficient for the TFs to offset the numerical

superiority of the OPFOR when the TFs are on the defense.

Analysis of the individual defensive mission results,

presented in the Appendix, shows that the largest fluctuations in

tank exchange ratios across defensive missions occur in the Hseries groups with the largest occurrences in the Mechanized

Infantry TF category. H-series Armor TFs have the lowest exchange

ratios for both tanks and APC/TOW vehicles at the Delay in Sector

mission. Armor TFs killed on the average of 2 OPFOR tanks for

each tank they lost and slightly more than 3 OPFCR APC/TOW

vehicles for each TF APC/TOW vehicle lost. Both Defend in Sector

and Defend a Battle Position show H-series Armor TFs with the

highest tank exchange ratios of the three task force categories

8
although the ratio of exchange is less than I TF tank lost per

OPFOR tank kill. Generally. Armor TFs showed higher tank exchange

ratios for both H- and J-series groups at each mission.

The results of the analyses on the casualty exchange ratio

reinforce the finding for the percentage lost measure. The TFs

experience losses at a rate which would not allow them to stop an

enemy at the current OPFOR strength level. The loss is

particularly high for tanks, a result which both TF types

experience.

Analyais of Task Force Ty and Task Force Organization

The previous results presented a picture of the performance

at the NTC on force-on-force missions. The results were displayed

in terms of combined performance and by TF type. This section

specifically examines the question of whether the performance

-A variation reported above is related to two factors: TF type

(Armor vs. Mechanized Infantry) and TF organization (H-series to

J-series MTOE). To address this issue, a two factor multivariate

analysis of variance (MANOVA) was performed separately on each of

the two performance indicators. For each analysis, the dependent

.J. variable set included APC and tank average mission losses* for both

"-7 offensive and defensive missions (this produced a total of four

dependent measures in each analysis). The results of the MANOVA

for the two performance indicators are presented separately below.

%Lost Measures

Tables 3 and 4 show the mean values for the %Lost measures

across three offensive and three defensive missions. Data are

displayed for task force type categories (i.e., Mech Fs and

Armor TFs) and are separated into H- and J-MTOE series

organizational groups.

Offensive Operations. The results of the MANOVA for the %lost

measure indicated a significant overall effect for the TF

organization (H- vs. J-series MTOE: F=4.89, p<.01, df=4.53) but

not for the TF type (Armor vs. Mechanized Infantry) or the

interaction term. Examination of the univariate results showed

that the only significant difference occurred on the APC loss

measure for offensive missions (F= 20.10, p < .01. df=1,56).

.-4 These findings were further explored by examining the cell means.

* The average mission casualty exchange ratio should not be

confused with the OES and DES casualty exchange ratios reported in

the first section. The earlier results include all missions,

partial and completed, performed during a rotation. The average

mission casualty exchange ratio includes performance on specific

complete missions: Movement to Contact, Deliberate Day Attack.

*. Deliberate Night Attack. Defend in Sector. and Defend from a

Battle Position. The use of the average mission results insured a

more constant performance sample for comparing the different

battalions and thus was selected for this analysis.

'..
The largest differences between H- and 3-series groups occur

within the Mechanized Infantry task forces. J-series APC/TOW

losses are significantly different from the corresponding losses

in the H-series group (H-series APC/TOW losses=43%. J-series

APC/TOW losses=25% at p<.01). J-series TFs also incur 7% fewer

tank losses than TFs in the H-series group (H-series tank

lossesx70%. J-series tank losses=63%). This 7% difference is

slightly more than 1/2 tank over all in absolute numbers.

Table 3

Average Percentage of Task Force Vehicles Lost in Selected

Offensive Engagement Simulation Force-On-Force Exercises

MTOE Organization

H-series J-series

% Tanks % APCs/TOWs % Tanks % APCs/TOWS

Lost Lost Lost Lost

(SD) (SD) (SD) (SD)

Mechanized 70% 43%** 63% 25%**

Infantry TFs (17%) (12%) (17%) (10 )

N=19 N=12

Armor TFs 64% 40* 62% 32%*

"- (1 t)(15%) (18%) (06%)

N=19 N=12

* Univariate F-Test significant p<.01

** Univariate F-Test significant p<.05

.1"

414

10

2.'- - .....
Although the Armor TF category shows smaller differences

between H- and J-series TFs than the Mechanized Infantry TF

category shows, the overall pattern of significantly lower APC/TOW

losses is also found in the Armor TFs. J-series TFs average 8%

fewer APC/TOW losses (significant at p<.05) than H-series TFs.

Qefensive Operations. The multivariate analysis indicated the

presence of no statistically significant differences in

performance on the defensive missions due to either TF type or TF

organization.

The results in Table 4 for Mechanized Infantry and Armor task

forces show very small differences between the percentage of

combat vehicles lost by H- and J-series TFs on the NTC

battlefield. Additionally, there is no substantial difference

between the Mechanized Infantry and Armor TFs when organizational

group is not considered.

Table 4

Average Percentage of Task Force Vehicles Lost in Selected

Defensive Engagement Simulation Force-On-Force Exercises

Defensive Engagement

Simulation

H-series J-series

%Tanks %APC/TOWs %Tanks %APC/TOWs

Lost Lost Lost Lost

(SD) (SO) (SO) (SO)

Mechanized 75% 46% 74% 46%

Infantry TF (21%) (19%) (09 ) (18%)

N=19 N=12

Armor TFs 75% 47% 67% 44t

(16%) (12%) (17%) (14%)

N=19 N-12

-- 11
A parallel analysis to that performed on the tlost" measure

was conducted on the casualty exchange ratio. For purposes of

analysis, the average casualty exchange ratio was calculated

across three offensive missions and three defensive missions for

. each vehicle type. The use of the average mission casualty

exchange ratio was required by the variation in missions which TFs

performed at the NTC.* This produced a dependent variable set

that consisted of four separate indicators (offensive APCs,

offensive tanks, defensive APCs, and defensive tanks).

The results of the MANOVA on the average mission casualty

exchange ratios indicates an overall significant difference due to

TF type (F=13.84, p < .01, df=4,56). Also. there were statistical

differences across the comparison groups formed on the basis of

combining TF type and TF organization (TF Type x TF Organization;

F=4.15, p < .01 df=4,56). Examination of the univariate results

shows statistically significant differences for offensive APCs,

defensive tanks, and defensive APCs. There was a significant

p <.01) difference due to TF type for all three variables (the

respective results were: F-6.45, F=12.25, F-16.50: df=1,59). The

remaining significant result on the defensive tank loss indicator,

is for the combined effect of TF type and TF organization which

reached the .05 significance level (F=5.55. df=1, 59).

Interpretation of these differences was accomplished through the

- results of specific comparisons on the means as described below.

"" Tables 5 and 6 show the mean casualty exchange ratios for

offensive and defensive missions. As indicated above, casualty

exchange ratios were calculated by dividing the numbers of TF

tanks and/or APCs (to include TOWs) killed by the numbers of

corresponding type OPFOR vehicles killed thus yielding the numbers

of TF vehicles lost per one (1) OPFOR loss.

Offensive Opgerations. As is shown in Table 5, the Mechanized

Infantry has a larger tank exchange ratios for TFs in the J-series

group than for H-series. A comparison of Mechanized Infantry and

Armor TFs shows significantly higher APC/TOW exchange ratios for

the Mechanized Infantry than for Armor TFs in the H-series group

for all offensive missions.

* The average mission casualty exchange ratio should not be

confused with the DES and DES casualty exchange ratios reported in

the first section. The earlier results include all missions,

partial and completed, performed during a rotation. The average

mission casualty exchange ratio includes performance on specific

compge missions: Movement to Contact, Deliberate Day Attack,

Deliberate Night Attack, Defend in Sector, and Defend from a

Battle Position The use of the average mission results insured a

more constant performance sample for comparing the different

12

L* .-.- **~*'***"*.
battalions and thus was selected for this analysis.

Armor TFs show higher tank exchange ratios than the

Mechanized Infantry TF categories in the H-series group although

generally, tank exchange ratios for Armor TFs show more

consistency between the H- and J-series groups than for the

Mechanized Infantry TFs. H-series APC/TOW exchange ratios are

substantially and significantly (p<.05) smaller for the Armor TF

than for the Mechanized Infantry TF.

Table 5

Average Mission Casualty Exchange Ratios for Selected Offensive

Engagement Simulation Force-On-Force Exercises

Offensive Engagement

Simulation

H-series i-series

TF Tanks TF APC/TOWs TF Tanks TF APC/TOWs

Per I Per 1 Per I Per I

OPFOR Kill OPFOR Kill OPFOR Kill OPFOR Kill

(SD) (SO) (SD) (SD)

Mechanized 2.77 2.77[*] 4.09 1.84

Infantry TFs (2.82) (2.22) (3.02) (1.33)

n=19 n=12

Armor TFs 4.47 1.21[*] 4.38 1.75

(2.73) (0.64) (4.21) (1.14)

n=18 n= 12

'[* Univariate F-Test between Mechanized Infantry and Armor iFs

- p<.05.

.3
Defensive Operations. As indicated at the start of this section

the MANOVA analysis indicated significant differences due to TF

type for the defensive mission summaries. This result occurs for

both tank casualty exchange ratios and APC casualty exchange

ratios. In addition, for the tank casualty exchange ratio there

was a significant interaction term indicating that performance

depended both on TF type and TF organization.

Table 6 presents the summary values for tank and APC casualty

exchange ratios for TF type and TF organization. As can be seen

from that table, the Armor TFs had higher casualty exchange

ratios than the Mechanized Infantry for the tank variable. On the

other hand, the Mechanized Infantry had higher ratios for the APC

variable. The cause of these performance differences are not

totally clear, though the direction of the differences may

indicate that they may be a result of the relative vehicle

constitution of the TF. That is, since the Armor TF has more

tanks available to it there is a greater opportunity for loss in

this area. The reverse is true for APCs. Thus, these results may

not reflect a true difference in performance as much as be an

artifact of the numbers.

The presence of the interaction effect is reflected by the

improvement of the casualty exchange ratio for tanks for J-series

vs. H-series in the Armor TFs while the opposite occurs in the

Mechanized Infantry TFs. Alternatively the Armor TF performance

for the APC/TOWs is worse for J-series than H-series, while the

Mechanized Infantry experiences the exact opposite result. This

can be seen from an inspection of the cell means in Table 6.

14
Table 6

Average Mission Casualty Exchange Ratios for Selected Defensive

Engagement Simulation Force-On-Force Exercises

Defensive Engagement

Simulation

H-series J-series

TF Tanks TF APC/TOWs TF Tanks TF APC/TOWs -~Per 1 Per I Per 1 Per 1

OPFOR Kill OPFOR Kill OPFOR Kill OPFOR Kill

*X

(SD) (SD) (SD) (SD)

*Mechanized .38(*] .65(*] .54 .55

*Infantry TUs (.12) (.31) (.34) (.21)

N=19 N=12

-. Armor TUs .75(*] .31[*] .61 .41

(.28) (.15) (.22) (.15)

:N=19 N=12

- *) Univariate F-Test between Mechanized Infantry and Armor TUs

-p<.05.

15

T&............................................. .
DISCUSSION

The results of the analyses indicate that the determinants of

force-on-force performance are more complex than the current

information from the Take Home Packages allow us to investigate.

Considerable variation in battalion task force performance was

found in the results reported above. Yet, only a small portion of

that variation seemed to be related to differences in the

organization of the task force (H-series vs J-series) or to the

type of task force (Armor vs Mechanized Infantry). Further, the

differences in performance along these dimensions were not

, consistent either in terms of the type of mission (offensive or

defensive) or the type of performance measure (percentage lost or

casualty exchange ratio). This lack of systematic results provides

considerable evidence that force-on-force performance can only be

understood in the full context in wh ich that performance took

place. To accomplish that end it will be neceassry to employ the

full range of NTC digital data as well as supporting data such as

the commo tapes.

Despite the limitations of the results, several findings are

of note. There was considerable variation in performance of the

task forces measured either in terms of percentage of vehicles

lost or by the casualty exchange ratio. Variation in performance

was greater for offensive missions than defensive missions. This

suggests either that the casual Mechanisms for offensive

performance are more complex than for their defensive counterparts

or that training in the elements of defense are more standardized.

Alternatively, there might possibly be differential impact on the

two types of missions by home station resources. That is.

resource contraints at home station may preclude training on

offensive missions to the same degree as on defensive missions.

Thus. greater training would occur on the elements of the defense

than on the offensive elements.

The results also show that the loss rates experienced at the

NTC have considerable implications for survivability against a

numerically greater foe. In both the offensive and defensive

scenarios, the BLUEFOR task forces are being reduced to combat

ineffectiveness by their OPFOR counterparts. This trend is

consistent even for the J-series task forces which have greater

numbers of vehicles available to them.

The results also show that performance is different for the

type of task force and the way in which it is organized (i.e., Hor J-series). The manifestation of these differences is greatest

between type of task force and is most noticable for the offensive

missions. The cause of this difference can only be speculated on

here as there was no empirical information available for an

analysis of this issue. This is clearly a topic to be pursued in

the more detailed and comprehensive analyses to be conducted in

the future.

16
Another finding of note is that performance variation was

least visible in the loss of tanks. Differences between type of

task force and task force organization, when tested on the

percentage of tanks lost or in the casualty exchange ratio for

tanks, failed to produce any significant differences. As tanks

constitute the primary weapon system on the NTC battlefield.

performance characteristics in this area are particularly

- important. The high level of loss in this area and the lack of

relationship to the analysis variables studied here indicate a

more generic cause for the performance. The nature of this cause

needs to be identified and studied.

The last significant finding from these results concerns the

performance of the reorganized task forces (J-series). Since

performance for these task forces was not found to be consistently

better than their earlier counterpart (H-series), it is important

to determine why this should be the case. One possibility is that

the addition of the new assets independent of sufficient training

..-. in the deployment of those assets may result in their inefficient

and ineffective use. That is. the new assets may in fact be

consumed at a higher rate than the previous assets (under the

prior organization) because the task force commander is unable to

incorporate them into the scheme of maneuver. Whether this

hypothesis is true or whether some other causes are at work can

.- .only be determined by the more comprehensive analyses to be

performed in the future.

-'" As indicated at the start of this section the analysis of the

*force-on-force performance data was necessarily limited by the

type and level of information available for analysis. While

recognizing those limitations, it was felt that considerable could

be gained in exploring performance variations to determine the

extent of their existence and whether they were related to the

macro-level variables available in the THPs. The results of the

analysis have accomplished these objectives. They have

demonstrated that variation does exist and that the macro-level

variables, while related, do not account for all of the observed

differences in performance. Further, the analyses have pointed to

be pursued in more comprehensive analyses conducted with be

* conducted with the NTC digital data. Thus, the results reported

here represent the anticipated initial step of a multi-step

research effort.

V 17

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
APPENDIX A

This appendix contains both raw data that has

been extracted from the force-on-force exercise wrapups in the Take Home Packages and statistics derived

from the raw data.

.V.

.......................... .k2.. ...........
Table A-1

Kill Ratios by Mission for Mech and Armor TFs

(TF losses per one OPFOR loss)

Mission I Mission 2 Mission 3 -Mech Armor Mech Armor Mech Armor

(SD) (SO) (SD) (SO) (SD) (SD)

DES n=25 n=30 ns27 n=29 n-27 n=29

Tanks 5.1 6.1 6.6 8.4 6.2 7.2

(6.4) (8.8) (6.3) (8.8) (5.4) (5.3)

APCs 3.9 2.5 4-3* 2-5* 2.6 1.9

(3.8) (3.1) (3.6) (2.3) (2.6) (3.4)

Combined 3.8 2.9 4.4 3.7 3.5 2.7

(3.6) (3.0) (3.0) (3.7) (3.2) (1.7)

Mission 4 Mission 5 Mission 6

Mech Armor Mech Armor Mech Armor

(SD) (SD) (SD) (SD) (SD) (SD)

-- - - - - - n = 28 - -n =2 9 - -n= 16 ----- n=24 n-I

Tanks -45** .80** .51 1.30 .61 .80 4. .22) (.41) (.55) (2.0) (.69) (.80)

APCs .79* .40* 1.-10* .32* .63 .45

(.86) (.24) (1 .10) (.24) (.38) (.56)

Combined .61 .55 .75 .52 .58 .59

(.45) (.27) (.73) (.25) (.33) (.63)

* P<.05

** P<. 0 1

a. Mission 1=Movement t o Contact, Mission 2=Deliberate Day

Attack. Mission 3=Deliberate Night Attack, Mission 4=Defend *.in Sector, Mission 5=Delay in Sector, and Mission 6=Defend

From a Battle Position.

A-2
Table A-2

X Numbers of Vehicles Killed Across OES Missions

MissionI Mission2 Mission3

Armor Mech Armor Mech Armor Mech

(TFs)

Tanks 12.5** 24.4** 16.1 20.3 9-5** 16.4**

APCs 28.3** 18.7** 28.5** 16.6** 11.6 9.3

Comb 40.8 43.1 44.6 36.9 21.1 25.8

(OPFOR)

Tanks 12.4 9.0 4.0 4.1 3.2 2.5

APCs 16.1 13.7 11.0 10.5 8.3 6.7

Comb 28.4 22.7 15.0 14.6 11.4 9.2

-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - a

X Numbers of Vehicles Killed Across DES Missions

Mission4 Mission5 Mission6

Armor Mech Armor Mech Armor Mech

(TFs)

Tanks 13.5** 21.5** 10.8** 20.4** 12.8** 19.9**

APCs 32-9** 18.7** 23.1** 12.7** 25.9* 16.6*

Comb 46.3 40.2 33.9 33.1 38.7 36.5

(OPFOR)

Tanks 31.8 33.2 26.3 28.8 37 .3 29.0

APCs 53.7 52.3 44,5 41.4 52.3 45.4

Comb 85.5 85.5 70.8 70.3 89.6 74.4

* p(.05

** P<-01

a. Mission 1=Movement to Contact, Mission 2=Deliberate Day Attack.

Mission 3 =Deliberate Night Attack, Mission 4=Defend in Sector,

Mission 5 =Delay in Sector, and Mission 6 =Defend a Battle

P os i t i on.

A-3
Table A-3

Casualty Exchange Ratios for Three DES Missions

(TF vehicles killed per 1 OPFOR kill)

OES Missions

Movement to Deliberate Deliberate

Contact Day Attack Night Attack

Tank APC/TOW Tank APC/TOW Tank APC/TOW

H-series 4.90 2.73 5.96 2.62 5.48 1.35*

(n=38) (n=38) (n-29) (n-33) (n=30) (n=32)

J-series 7.12 4.25 7.48 3.63 7.36 2.170*

(n-12) (n-16) (n-22) (n-23) (n-23) (n-23)

Mech TUs

H-series 3.02 3.95[*] 4.73 5.06(*] 4.11 1.691*]

(n=19) (n=19) (n-14) (n-16) (n=15) (n=16)

J -series 11.71 3.85 7.67 3.09 7.46 3.88 -(n-4) (n-6) (n-10) (n-11) (n=10) (n-11)

Armor U~s

H-series 6.77 1.51[*] 7.11 2.28[*] 6.86 1.00[*]

(nzl9) (nx19) (n=15) (n-17) (n=15) (n-16)

i-series 5.29 4.49 7.32 2.20 7.28 1.62

(n=10) (n=10) (nzl2) (n-12) (n=13) (n=12)

* Ttest comparison between H- and i-series U~s (p<.05).

(] Ttest comparison between Mechanized Infantry and Armor U~s

(p(.05).

A-4

'Ap-
Table A-4

Casualty Exchange Ratios for Three DES Missions

(TF vehicles killed per I OPFOR kill)

DES Missions

Defend in Delay in Defend a

Sector Sector Battle Position

Tank APC/TOW Tank APC/TOW Tank APC/TOW

All TFs

H-series .64 .67 1.00 .81 .79 .58

(n=35) (n=35) (n=23) (n=23) (n=29) (n=29)

J-series .60 .54 .58 .42 .62 .48

(n=22) (n=22) (n=08) (n=08) (n=23) (n=23)

Mech TFs

H-series .41[*] .70 1.51 1.30(*] .64 .73

3-series .50 .92 .42 .42 .57 .50

(n=11) (null) (n=O4) (n=04) (n=11) (n= l)

Armor TFs

H-series .86[*] .39(*] .54 .27[*] .91 .45

(n=18) (n=18) (n=1) (n=l ) (n=16) (n=16)

J-series .71 .42 .74 .43 .66 .45

(null) (null) (n=04) (n=04) (n=12) (n=12)

(*] Ttest comparison between Mechanized Infantry and Armor TFs

(p<.05).

A-5

U
=.

Table A-5

DES Summary Data for All Rotations

TF TF OPFOR OPFOR % TF

Tanks APCs Tanks APCs Vehicles

BN TM Killed Killed Killed Killed Killed

231 T 58 31 80 187

232 M 18 32 54 66 09.30

241 T 56 51 57 75 89.11

242 M 34 101 51 83 65.54

251 T 52 23 32 75 63.16

252 M 21 70 52 99 58.02

261 T 60 28 69 128 45.13

262 M 10 16 24 31 24.30

271 T 68 36 100 140 63.80

272 M 21 55 33 67 53.15

281 T 26 22 33 43 53.33

282 M 26 100 83 102 82.89

311 T 54 28 86 118 50.62

312 M 24 72 94 103 64.00

321 T 45 25 53 93 59.83

322 M 23 36 77 98 46.09

331 T 75 24 71 97 68.28

332 M 20 46 39 82 61.11

341 T 78 49 91 104 72.57

342 M 27 80 91 112 53.50

351 T 75 53 94 90 71.58

352 M 25 109 71 78 61.09

361 T 59 46 99 165 58.33

362 M 19 50 74 141 53.49

371 T 64 39 197 222 60.48

372 M 27 102 95 143 70.11

381 T 7 5 11 30 38.71

382 M 7 7 13 27 34. 15

391 T 30 20 69 98 47.17

392 M 35 91 111 162 56.00

401 T 55 52 109 147 58.47

402 M 23 45 63 122 40.48

411 T 74 43 109 168 55.98

412 M 21 77 93 177

421 T 79 47 104 214 68.07

422 N 24 47 61 88 46.98

431 T 48 92 103 134 66.16

432 M 36 81 115 131 48.55

441 T 39 35 88 144 55.64

442 N 22 32 51 118 40.30

451 T 37 60 73 145 61.78

452 M 46 103 92 143 57.09

A-6

1W4
Table A-5 (Cont'd)

DES Summary Data for All Rotations Continued

TF TF OPFOR OPFOR % TF

Tanks APCs Tanks APCs Vehicles

8N TM Killed Killed Killed Killed Killed

461 T 34 30 72 112 36.78

462 M 52 67 105 166 45.77

411 T 50 71 58 127 14.48

42 M 64 105 106 154 80.95

481 T 18 30 77 125 28.92

482 M 25 55 77 122 43.24

491 T 50 70 51 114 70.59

492 M 19 71 50 141 59.14

501 T 45 49 81 157 54.34

502 M 33 41 73 149 45.40

503 T 43 27 57 88

504 M 18 66 54 74 58.74

505 T 321 39 35 72 46.41

506 M 31 60 66 92 48.66

511 T 00 00 00 00

512 H 69 89 65 130 52. 14

521 T 28 49 72 139 42.54

522 H 34 63 25 63 80.56

531 T 50 43 86 122 41 .70

532 H 29 35 105 133 34.41

541 T 55 42 78 116 44.91

*542 M 18 47 76 125 34.39

A-7

04
Table A-6

OES Summary Data For All Rotations

TF TF OPFOR OPFOR % TF

Tanks APCs Tanks APCs Vehicles

ON TM Killed Killed Killed Killed Killed

231 T 71 53 18 53 70.54

232 M 62 42 19 45 57.07

241 T 72 52 32 58 56.83

242 M 13 50 24 29 30.29

251 T 31 14 13 16 78.05

252 M 16 62 15 38 63.93

261 T 75 37 28 52 53.85

262 M 48 71 23 40 38.51

271 T 39 29 26 28 59.65

272 N 27 59 12 34 50.33

281 T 68 44 32 35 54.37

282 N 15 50 34 28 52.00

* 311 T 52 36 25 20 57.05

312 M 28 68 26 22 55.49

321 T 86 51 25 27 54.37

322 M 51 118 22 29 55.59

331 T 75 34 21 39 51.87

332 N 44 74 14 13 54.63

341 T 51 22 15 33 41.48

342 M 30 83 14 38 43.63

351 T 76 55 32 54 54.13

352 N 27 68 2 7 54.29

361 T 59 29 5 14 51 .46

362 N 37 19 29 52 62.64

371 T 33 12 4 25 32.87

372 N 23 56 5 9 39.70

381 T 15 8 4 10 58.67

382 M 10 23 4 11 64.71

391 T 58 31 7 28 30.80

392 M 36 52 7 14 42.23

401 T 44 42 7 13 56.57

402 N 33 96 9 32 36.99

411 T 65 49 13 34 30.29

412 M 34 59 19 46

421 T 57 32 8 24 45 64

422 M 23 80 23 40 34 45

431 T 52 55 25 55 38.63

432 M 26 31 7 16 23 .50 - .. 441 T 104 46 20 42 48.08

442 N 40 66 25 51 40.93

451 T 82 72 22 48 54.49

452 N 45 32 5 13 27.38

A-8

. .. ... . . ., . .,.. . ' .,., ,*.., ,- PY , ',' ,. ..... :. . -,
Table A- (Cont'd)

OES Summary Data For All Rotations Continued

TF TF OPFOR OPFOR % TF

Tanks APCs Tanks APC s Vehicles

ON TM Killed Killed Killed Killed Killed

461 T - 64 - - - -34 - 8-- - - - -15 -- -- - 4.83 -- -- - 462 M 41 28 10 30 28.24

471 T 74 12 77 28 46.56

472 M 66 11 66 34 34.81

481 T 64 85 38 33 47.15

482 M 60 59 6 13 31.96

491 T 64 68 12 39 39.13

*492 M 35 80 21 40 48.31

501 T 79 70 57 129 41.56

502 M 77 106 28 75 45.76

503 T 58 25 13 27 25.63

504 N 32 53 16 41 31.16

505 T 40 34 8 25 27.66

506 M 47 27 7 23 25.25

511 T 54 63 39 13

512 N 28 6 38 17 27. 21

521 T 41 56 11 33 34 .07

522 M 14 31 3 20 38. 10

531 T 61 58 29 62 56.40

532 M 46 71 23 54 36.24

541 T 83 40 5 17 49.40

*542 M 28 117 10 28 44.32

A-9

Mc.. do- AIL it. .L
REFERENCES

Forsythe, T. K. and Doherty, W. 3., An Anays_ of NTC Live-Fire

- .- Pern ance. ARI Research Note (August 1985).

Hartwig, F. with Dearing. B. E.. Exloatory ta Analysis.

Beverly Hills. CA: Sage. Inc. 1979.

Shackelford, W. L., Lesnsn E.Ero NTC. ARI Research Report

(November 1985).

Tukey. 3.. Exot12trV 211-4 An!lyAiss Reading, MA: AddisonWesley. Inc. 1977.

4-. • .

J2.'

--

-I

. 4 

..........................................................................-.