NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

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No. 19-3591

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

DAVID MORRISSEY, a/k/a David Smentkowski,

Appellant

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On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

(D.C. Criminal Action No. 1-18-cr-00454-001)

District Judge: Hon. Renee M. Bumb

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Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

Monday, June 15, 2020

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Before: CHAGARES, PORTER, and FISHER,

Circuit Judges

(Filed:June 16, 2020)

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OPINION

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 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.
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PORTER, Circuit Judge.

David Morrissey violated the terms of his supervised release that he was serving 

for another crime. Citing his history of recidivism and need for correctional treatment, the 

District Court sentenced Morrissey to six months’ imprisonment and a new five-year

term of supervised release. Morrissey timely appealed. Because the District Court did not 

abuse its discretion when it sentenced Morrissey, we will affirm.1

On appeal, Morrissey challenges the substantive reasonableness of his five-year 

term of supervised release. We review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence for 

abuse of discretion. See United States v. Woronowicz, 744 F.3d 848, 851 (3d Cir. 2014).

We will affirm a sentence “unless no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed 

the same sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons the [sentencing] court 

provided.” United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 568 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc). “As long 

as a sentence falls within the broad range of possible sentences that can be considered 

reasonable in light of the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors, we must affirm.” United States v. 

Wise, 515 F.3d 207, 218 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

“[The] District Court may revoke a defendant’s supervised release and impose a 

term of imprisonment” if it determines “that the defendant violated a condition of 

supervised release.” United States v. Bagdy, 764 F.3d 287, 290 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting 18 

U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3)). The District Court may also impose a “term of supervised release 

1 The District Court had subject-matter jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have 

appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 
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. . . following a term of post-revocation imprisonment[.]” United States v. Williams, 675 

F.3d 275, 278 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h)).

Morrissey has a substantial criminal record and history of recidivism. In 2000, 

Morrissey pleaded guilty to an offense that subjected him to lifetime community 

supervision in New Jersey. Later, Morrissey pleaded guilty to a federal offense and was 

sentenced to eleven months and twelve days’ imprisonment, followed by five years of 

supervised release. Shortly after his release from prison, Morrissey was arrested for 

assaulting his girlfriend and therefore violated the terms of his federal supervised release. 

Morrissey pleaded guilty and faced a range of eight to fourteen months’ imprisonment

under the United States Sentencing Guidelines. Because Morrissey violated his 

supervised release, the District Court had discretion to impose a term of supervised 

release up to life. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h), (k). The parties asked for a downward 

variance to six months’ imprisonment with no additional term of supervised release.

The District Court then considered the § 3553(a) factors. It granted the parties’ 

request for a variance because six months’ imprisonment was enough, but not greater 

than necessary, to serve the statutory purposes of sentencing. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

But the District Court rejected the parties’ recommendation that Morrissey not receive a 

term of supervised release. In doing so, it cited Morrissey’s extensive history of 

recidivism and that Morrissey violated the terms of his federal supervised release shortly 

after it began. After acknowledging the restrictive terms of Morrissey’s lifetime state 

supervision, the District Court concluded that Morrissey was “just not learning his 

lesson.” App. 37. Thus, the District Court imposed a five-year term of supervised release, 
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stressing the need to provide Morrissey with “educational treatment, vocational 

training[,] or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner.” App. 38; see 

also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D). After Morrissey objected to the term of supervised 

release as unnecessarily punitive, the District Court disagreed and again emphasized that 

supervised release was necessary under the § 3553(a) factors.

Given the District Court’s thoughtful reasoning, we cannot conclude that “no 

reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence on [Morrissey] for 

the reasons the [D]istrict [C]ourt provided.” Tomko, 562 F.3d at 568. Rather, the District 

Court carefully considered the circumstances of Morrissey’s case and imposed a belowrange term of imprisonment and a within-range term of supervised release. See U.S.S.G. 

§ 7B1.3(g)(2). “If the sentence is within the applicable Guidelines range, we may 

presume that the sentence is reasonable.” United States v. Handerhan, 739 F.3d 114, 

119–20 (3d Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). Nothing in the record overcomes that 

presumption here. Nevertheless, Morrissey argues that the District Court abused its 

discretion by unreasonably applying the § 3553(a) factors. We disagree. The District 

Court’s reasoning was not “arbitrary, fanciful, or clearly unreasonable.” United States v. 

Green, 617 F.3d 233, 239 (3d Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).

* * *

For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.