J-S14023-23

 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

MICHAEL D. COPLEY 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 395 WDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 28, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County Criminal Division at No(s): 

CP-07-CR-0000150-2019

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED: July 25, 2023

Appellant’s wife was reported missing in December of 2015 and her body 

was discovered in a garage in June of 2016. Following a two-year 

investigation, Appellant was arrested and ultimately convicted of, inter alia, 

homicide in the third degree for her murder. Appellant raises three claims on 

appeal from his judgment of sentence of 26.5 to 57 years of incarceration. 

We affirm.

The trial court opinion does not contain a factual recitation and 

Appellant’s statement of the case does not offer any factual history. But see 

Pa.R.A.P. 2117(a)(4) (stating that the statement of the case shall contain “[a] 

closely condensed chronological statement, in narrative form, of all the facts 

which are necessary to be known in order to determine the points in 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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controversy” with appropriate citations to the record). As Appellant’s 

challenges do not depend on the validity of any inferences drawn from the 

Commonwealth’s evidence, we offer a short summary of the essential facts. 

On June 8, 2016, the decomposing body of Catherine Copley was found 

in the detached garage of a home in Altoona. Mrs. Copley’s mother had 

reported her missing on December 13, 2015, while Appellant had already 

reported Mrs. Copley missing shortly after midnight on December 11, 2015. 

The evidence established that on the evening of December 9, 2015, the 

Copleys had friends over to drink. Mrs. Copley and some other guests decided 

to get some marijuana for the group to smoke from Dustin Salyard, who lived 

approximately a half mile from the Copley residence. They returned sometime 

after 1 a.m., and the party continued. Mrs. Copley went missing the next day. 

On December 17, 2015, Appellant called the police to report that he saw 

one of Mrs. Copley’s shoes in Salyard’s backyard. Salyard consented to a 

search of his home; no other evidence was found. Following the discovery of 

Mrs. Copley’s body, the matching shoe was discovered adjacent to her corpse. 

DNA testing established that Appellant’s DNA was present on the shoe found 

in Salyard’s yard, while Salyard’s and Mrs. Copley’s were not. Furthermore, 

Appellant’s DNA was under Mrs. Copley’s fingernails. 

The Commonwealth’s theory was that Appellant killed his wife and 

planted the shoe in Salyard’s yard in an attempt to pin the crime on him. The 

Commonwealth presented evidence of marital strife between the Copleys. The 

Commonwealth obtained cell phone records demonstrating that Appellant had 
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accused his wife of having sex with Dustin Salyard in exchange for marijuana, 

an accusation confirmed by cell phone extractions of Mrs. Copley’s phone. 

Other witnesses testified that Appellant had made angry comments about his 

wife’s infidelities. 

Additionally, Appellant gave several statements to police officers that 

were contradicted by the foregoing testimony. Particularly, Appellant claimed 

that their marriage was untroubled and that he was unaware of Mrs. Copley’s 

affair with Salyard until after her disappearance. He also appeared nonchalant 

about his wife’s whereabouts in the months preceding her body’s discovery, 

and did not participate in her funeral arrangements. Appellant was also 

observed tearing down a “missing person” poster asking for information. 

Locational data extracted from Appellant’s phone indicated that it had

connected to a tower near the garage on the night of her disappearance. That 

garage and its home were vacant, as the homeowner had died several years 

before. The home was listed for sale by the county to pay taxes. Stephen 

Little, a friend of the Copleys, testified that Appellant and Mrs. Copley had 

discussed purchasing the property. 

Following a five-day jury trial, Appellant was convicted of, inter alia,

homicide in the third degree and burglary, and sentenced as previously stated. 

He filed a timely notice of appeal and complied with the trial court’s order to 

file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. The trial court authored its responsive 

opinion and the matter is ready for review of the three questions Appellant 

presents for our review:
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I. Did the Commonwealth present sufficient evidence to support 

... Appellant’s conviction for burglary?

II. Did the trial court err in permitting the Commonwealth to 

present various photographs of the decedent which only served to 

inflame the passions of the jury?

III. Did the trial court err in permitting the Commonwealth to elicit 

testimony from the funeral director regarding the circumstances 

of decedent’s funeral arrangements?

Appellant’s Brief at 5 (unnecessary capitalization omitted). 

Appellant’s first issue challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to 

support his burglary conviction. Appellant maintains that the Commonwealth 

failed to establish that the garage was not “abandoned,” which is a statutory 

defense to burglary. We conclude that Appellant waived this issue by failing 

to raise that defense at trial. 

The Commonwealth charged Appellant with violating the following 

subsection of the burglary statute: 

(a) Offense defined.--A person commits the offense of burglary 

if, with the intent to commit a crime therein, the person:

. . . . 

(2) enters a building or occupied structure, or separately 

secured or occupied portion thereof that is adapted for 

overnight accommodations in which at the time of the 

offense no person is present;

18 Pa.C.S. § 3502(a)(2). 

Abandonment is one of three statutory defenses codified within

subsection (b):

(b) Defense.--It is a defense to prosecution for burglary if any 

of the following exists at the time of the commission of the 

offense:
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(1) The building or structure was abandoned.

(2) The premises are open to the public.

(3) The actor is licensed or privileged to enter.

18 Pa.C.S. § 3502(b).

Abandonment being a defense is significant in that it speaks to whether 

the Commonwealth is required to disprove that element beyond a reasonable 

doubt as part of its case-in-chief. Difficult interpretive questions can arise 

when the statutory text defining the crime contains an “exception.” An 

example of this is Section 6106(a) of the Pennsylvania Uniform Firearms Act 

of 1995. In Commonwealth v. Lopez, 565 A.2d 437 (Pa. 1989), our 

Supreme Court examined the following statutory language: “No person shall 

carry a firearm in any vehicle or concealed on or about his person, except in

his place of abode or fixed place of business, without a license therefor as 

provided in this subchapter....” Id. at 439 (quoting statute).1 The “except in 

his place of abode or fixed place of business” language was deemed an 

element of the offense. “This clause is clearly an integral part of the forbidden 

conduct found in the definition of the offense. The Commonwealth cannot 

successfully prove a violation of section 6106 without showing that the gun, 

found on the person, was carried outside the place of abode.” Id. In contrast, 

subsection (b) of that statute, which remains defined as “Exceptions,” are 

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1 The statutory language today states: “Except as provided in paragraph (2), 

any person who carries a firearm in any vehicle or any person who carries a 

firearm concealed on or about his person, except in his place of abode or fixed 

place of business, without a valid and lawfully issued license under this chapter 

commits a felony of the third degree.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 6106. 
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“affirmative defenses, which must be placed in issue by the defendant, and 

which need not be negated by the prosecutor in its case-in-chief.” Id. at 440. 

“Under the rules of statutory construction, subsection (b) clearly evidences a 

distinction between the definition of the crime and its exceptions.” Id.

Turning to the crime of burglary, subsection (b), entitled “Defense,” 

clearly evidences a statutory distinction between the definition of the crime 

and its defenses. There is thus no question that the Commonwealth is not 

required to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the building is not 

abandoned (or that the premises were not open to the public or that the actor 

was not privileged to enter). Those are defenses, which must be put into issue 

by Appellant. He failed to do so. 

Appellant recognizes that abandonment is a defense, arguing that “once 

an affirmative defense has been raised, in any proper manner, the 

Commonwealth must present evidence beyond a reasonable doubt to refute 

same.” Appellant’s Brief at 13-14 (citing Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 53 

A.3d 738 (Pa. 2012)). Appellant submits that whether the garage was 

“abandoned” was put into issue from several sources, beginning with

Commonwealth witness Jason Keith, who discovered Mrs. Copley’s body. Mr. 

Keith testified that the homeowner had died within the last “year or two[,] 

within that time frame” and, in response to the Commonwealth’s question,

“So the property was abandoned?[,]” he answered, “Yeah.” N.T., 8/3/21, at 

74. Appellant also points out that the Commonwealth in its opening and 
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closing arguments referred to the garage as abandoned.

2 Additionally, the 

coroner testified that her husband’s cousin happened to own the home, and

that he had passed away on February 9, 2014, with the home remaining 

vacant. Id. at 135. 

It is true that defendants may raise affirmative defenses when evidence 

supporting the defense is introduced by any source. Commonwealth v.

Alvarez-Herrera, 35 A.3d 1216, 1219 (Pa. Super. 2011) (“An affirmative 

defense may be introduced from any source, Commonwealth or defense.”). 

However, we disagree that the defense of abandonment can be raised 

implicitly. Defenses must either be disproven beyond a reasonable doubt by 

the Commonwealth, or the defendant bears the burden of establishing it by a 

preponderance of the evidence.3 In both cases, the fundamental point 

remains that the issue must be raised. This ensures that the parties are aware 

of the need to establish (or rebut) the defense. In turn, this enables the fact-

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2 Appellant also cites the fact that the Commonwealth withdrew the charge of 

criminal trespass during trial, informing the trial court that it could not 

overcome the abandonment issue. Because abandonment is a statutory 

defense to criminal trespass as well as burglary, Appellant submits that the 

Commonwealth conceded that the defense applied. It is not clear why the 

Commonwealth withdrew that charge. Nevertheless, the Commonwealth’s 

legal conclusion does not bind this Court, as even an actual concession of error 

“is not a substitute for independent judicial review.” Commonwealth v. 

Brown, 196 A.3d 130, 146 (Pa. 2018). See also Commonwealth v. Perrin,

291 A.3d 337 (Pa. 2023) (concluding that the trial court did not have to accept

a joint stipulation by the parties to a witness’s credibility). 

3 There does not appear to be any decision from our appellate courts 

addressing who bears the burden once a Section 3502(b) defense is raised. 
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finder to determine the issue. As the trial court noted, the jury was never 

instructed to decide whether the garage was abandoned. Trial Court Opinion 

(“TCO”), 6/1/22, at 5 (“It also appears that there was no request for any jury 

instruction on the factual question of abandonment.”). That is directly 

attributable to Appellant’s failure to adequately raise the defense. Id. (“This 

[c]ourt questions whether ... [Appellant] has waived this issue. ... [T]his 

[c]ourt’s review of the record ... leads this [c]ourt to the conclusion that 

[Appellant] did not raise the defense of abandonment at trial.”). We therefore 

conclude that Appellant did not adequately place the defense at issue during 

trial, rendering this claim waived. See Commonwealth v. Wanner, 158 

A.3d 714, 717 (Pa. Super. 2017) (“[The a]ppellant avers that there is a 

statutory affirmative defense to Defiant Trespass that is applicable in the 

instant case. [The a]ppellant waived this claim by failing to raise it before the 

trial court and preserve it in her Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Statement.”) (footnote and 

citation omitted).4 

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4 Had Appellant not waived his abandonment claim, we would be unpersuaded, 

based on the record before us, by the Commonwealth’s argument that it 

successfully established the inapplicability of the defense beyond a reasonable 

doubt. The Commonwealth argues that the evidence established that the 

building was not abandoned, citing Commonwealth v. Henderson, 419 A.2d 

1366 (Pa. Super. 1980), where this Court held that the General Assembly 

intended “abandon” to track the dictionary definition meaning of “wholly 

forsaken or deserted.” Id. Henderson involved the defendant’s entering a 

building that was up for sale. In that case, we concluded in short order that 

“under the evidence there was no abandonment of the building or structure.” 

Id. Here, the Commonwealth cites Henderson as proof that the garage here 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Turning to Appellant’s second issue, we conclude that this claim has also 

been waived. This issue challenges the admission of photographs of Mrs. 

Copley’s body. The standards governing the admission of post-mortem 

photographs is well-settled:

Photographs of a murder victim are not per se inadmissible.... The 

admission of such photographs is a matter within the discretion of 

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was not abandoned because the home, like the building in Henderson, was 

up for sale. However, the similarities end there. In Henderson,

[t]he subject building was a seminary owned by the 

Christian Educational Department of the AME Zion Church. 

It was no longer in use but was not abandoned and was in 

fact up for sale and was visited by the caretaker virtually 

every day and by the Church’s lawyer once a week. It had 

been out of use for only two to three months. The attorney 

in charge of arranging a sale and the caretaker both testified 

that the defendants had never been given permission to 

enter the building or to remove any property from the 

premises. Both these men also testified that when they had 

last visited the building shortly before the incident, there 

were no broken or boarded up windows, and the premises 

were secure.

Id. at 1367 (citations omitted).

We would not read Henderson to hold that any building which is up for 

sale is per se not abandoned. The facts in Henderson established that a 

caretaker visited the site “virtually every day” and that the property had been 

unused for two to three months. Henderson does not speak to the facts in 

the case sub judice, where the structure was apparently unused for a far 

lengthier time period and may or may not have been regularly maintained. 

This point, however, illustrates the importance of squarely raising a defense. 

Had Appellant directly cited the statutory defense at trial, the parties may well 

have anticipated presenting more facts and testimony on the issue of 

abandonment.
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the trial judge. The test for determining the admissibility of such 

evidence requires that the court employ a two-step analysis. 

First[,] a court must determine whether the photograph is 

inflammatory. If not, it may be admitted if it has relevance and 

can assist the jury’s understanding of the facts. If the photograph 

is inflammatory, the trial court must decide whether or not the 

photographs are of such essential evidentiary value that their 

need clearly outweighs the likelihood of inflaming the minds and 

passions of the jurors.

Commonwealth v. Mollett, 5 A.3d 291, 301 (Pa. Super. 2010) (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Tharp, 830 A.2d 519, 531 (Pa. 2003)).

On June 23, 2021, Appellant filed a motion in limine to exclude fortythree photographs taken during the autopsy and thirty-two photographs taken 

at the garage, all of which showed Mrs. Copley’s body. The trial court ordered 

a hearing, which took place on July 8, 2021. There, the trial court stated that,

during an off-the-record discussion with counsel, the Commonwealth had 

selected 85 photographs out of approximately 300 total that it intended to 

present at trial, including “approximately twenty ... that don’t depict the 

decedent at all.” N.T. Motion to Suppress, 7/8/21, at 21. The trial court 

proposed that the Commonwealth offer “argument as to why they believe the 

photographs are relevant and admissible. We would then provide [Appellant] 

until close of business Monday to file of record specific objections to the 85 

photographs.” Id. at 2. The parties agreed with this plan, and they proceeded 

to discuss, in detail, what each photograph showed and its assertions of their 

evidentiary value. See id. at 4-22.

Appellant filed his objections on July 12, 2021, discussing each 

photograph. Appellant conceded that several of the photographs were 
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admissible, and further agreed to withdraw objections to others if the 

Commonwealth edited the photographs to crop certain features and/or modify 

color photographs to black and white. 

The trial court issued a ruling on July 26, 2021, granting the motion to 

exclude eight photographs and conditionally allowing all others, assuming the 

Commonwealth could establish their relevance at trial. Appellant now argues 

that the trial court erred in allowing the introduction of “[six] photographs of 

the decedent’s arms and hands taken during the autopsy.” Appellant’s Brief 

at 17 (citing slides sixteen through twenty-one). These six photographs were 

introduced during testimony about swabbing Mrs. Copley’s fingernails for DNA. 

Appellant also challenges the admission of “multiple photographs of the 

decedent taken shortly after her body was found.” Id. at 17-18 (citing slides 

32, 35, 36, 37, and 39). These were introduced through the testimony of 

Pennsylvania State Police Trooper Charles Stitt. Appellant argues:

[T]he photographs at issue in the present case were such that 

they should be considered inflammatory in that their effect would 

be to cause anger or violent feelings. Therefore, it would be

submitted that the trial court should have conducted an analysis 

to determine if such inflammatory content was outweighed by 

their essential evidentiary value.

As it relates to the photographs presented to the jury during the 

testimony of Trooper Stitt, ... Appellant concedes that there 

existed evidentiary value to the photographs to provide the jury 

with insight into the condition of the body at the time it was 

discovered. However, said evidentiary value was outwieghed [sic]

by the inflammatory nature of the photographs and the 

cumulative nature of presenting multiple photographs. Moreover, 

it would be submitted that if the photographs were black and 

white[,] it would have diminished the inflammatory nature of [the] 

same.
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As it relates to the photographs that were presented through the 

testimony of Dr. Land, ... Appellant would submit that [the] same 

had little to no probative value. Therefore, the inflammatory 

nature of the photographs far exceeded any probative value.

Id. at 18-19.

This claim was not adequately preserved in Appellant’s concise 

statement of matters complained of on appeal, wherein Appellant merely 

stated that “[t]he [t]rial [c]ourt erred in denying [Appellant]’s Motion ... in 

which he sought to preclude certain photographs from being presented by the 

Commonwealth in that their probative value was far outweighed by the 

likelihood of unfairly prejudicing the jury against [Appellant].” Concise 

Statement, 4/28/22, at unnumbered 1, ¶ 3. The trial court’s opinion 

responded to this claim as follows:

This [c]ourt conducted a hearing on ... [Appellant]’s Motion in 

Limine on July 8, 2021. It was at the July 8, 2021 hearing where 

the [c]ourt considered the parties’ position on the photographs in 

question. During this hearing, the [c]ourt went through each and 

every potential photograph that was to be admitted at the time of 

trial. This [c]ourt heard the Commonwealth’s position on the 

photographs and also heard ... [Appellant]’s response. There was 

a certain level of agreement that was reached between the parties 

on certain photographs. At the conclusion of the hearing, there 

were a number of photographs that remained in dispute. This 

[c]ourt subsequently issued an Order on July 26, 2021[,] on ... 

[Appellant]’s Motion in Limine pertaining to the photographs. In 

our Order of July 26, 2021, this [c]ourt granted ... [Appellant]’s

Motion in Limine as it pertained to eight photographs. We

deferred ruling on the remaining photographs until the time of trial 

to determine if the Commonwealth could establish relevance. We 

also directed the Commonwealth to take reasonable measures to 

crop any photographs.... 

This [c]ourt stands by our decision made by Order dated July 26, 

2021. This [c]ourt does not believe that the photographs ...

actually admitted into evidence at the trial constituted 
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inflammatory photographs. In addition, this [c]ourt believes that 

each of the photographs admitted into evidence had evidentiary 

value to prove various things that the Commonwealth was

attempting to prove with each photograph. The [c]ourt believes 

that the probative value of each photograph outweighed any

prejudicial effect that the photograph may have had on ... 

[Appellant]. This [c]ourt also notes that during our final charge 

to the jury, we provided a cautionary instruction to the jury 

concerning the photographs. This [c]ourt will not address any 

specific photographs and their evidentiary value because we are 

uncertain as to which photographs ... [Appellant] is specifically 

taking issue with[,] as his Statement of Matters Complained of on 

Appeal references only “certain photographs.”

TCO at 8-10.

We agree that Appellant’s failure to specify which photographs the trial 

court erred in admitting waived his present claim. “We specifically conclude 

that when an appellant fails to identify in a vague Pa.R.A.P.1925(b) statement 

the specific issue he/she wants to raise on appeal, the issue is waived, even 

if the trial court guesses correctly and addresses the issue in its 

Pa.R.A.P.1925(a) opinion.” Commonwealth v. Lemon, 804 A.2d 34, 38 (Pa. 

Super. 2002). While the concise statement adequately apprised the trial court 

that he took issue with the introduction of photographs as a generic matter, 

Appellant failed to specify which photographs were, in his view, improperly 

admitted. Appellant’s language may have been sufficient if his motion in 

limine addressed only a few photographs. But his motion and the hearing 

concerned dozens of photographs and, as reflected in the trial court’s opinion,

the parties agreed to the admission of some of these photographs, and the 

court further directed the Commonwealth to crop some others. Nothing in 
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Appellant’s concise statement indicates that his complaint was limited to the 

specific photographs he now addresses on appeal. 

While the failure to specifically describe which photographs were at issue 

justifies a finding of waiver, we separately conclude that Appellant has waived 

his present claim for failing to adequately develop his argument. Appellant’s

concise statement alleged that the photographs’ “probative value was far 

outweighed by the likelihood of unfairly prejudicing the jury against 

[Appellant].” Concise Statement, 4/28/22, at unnumbered 1, ¶ 3. 

The admission of post-mortem photos, as previously discussed, entails 

a two-part inquiry. The first is whether the photographs are inflammatory. If

so, the “essential evidentiary value” standard applies. Commonwealth v. 

Schroth, 388 A.2d 1034, 1036–37 (Pa. 1978) (“Normally the general rule is

that testimony is admissible if it is relevant and competent. However, where 

the photograph possesses gruesome or inflammatory qualities likely to inflame 

the passions of the viewer, our cases require the application of the ‘essential 

evidentiary value’ balancing test.”) (citations omitted). Appellant’s brief takes 

it for granted that the photographs were inflammatory, but the trial court 

opinion explicitly disagreed with this assertion. TCO at 9 (“This [c]ourt does 

not believe that the photographs ... constituted inflammatory photographs.”). 

Appellant offers little argument concerning the threshold question of whether

these photographs were inflammatory.

Relatedly, Appellant appeared to concede that some other photographs

were properly admitted despite being inflammatory. As such, it is not clear 
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whether he is arguing that the photographs were improperly admitted under

the two-part test or because of their cumulative nature. For instance, 

Appellant’s objections filed after the hearing raised “[n]o objection ... for 

[s]lides 25 and 26[,]” but he objected to “[s]lides 27, 28, 29 and 30 ... as 

being unduly inflammatory and ... cumulative of [s]lide 26.” Objections, 

7/12/21, at unnumbered 2 ¶¶ 11-12. At the hearing, the Commonwealth 

stated, “Slide 26 depicts the body as well as fluid around the body which the 

Commonwealth previously indicated would be necessary for Dr. Land to opine 

as to the extent of the decay that had occurred....” N.T. Motion to Suppress, 

7/8/2021, at 8. If slides 27 through 30 are cumulative of 26, then 26 must 

logically be unduly inflammatory in terms of what it depicts, too. Appellant’s 

brief alludes to this concession. See Appellant’s Brief at 19 (arguing that the 

“evidentiary value was outwieghed [sic] by the inflammatory nature of the 

photographs and the cumulative nature of presenting multiple photographs”). 

Accordingly, Appellant’s specific complaint is unclear. We will not go through 

each photograph and explain why each was or was not inflammatory and, if 

so, whether the essential evidentiary value was met in comparison to other 

photographs that were admitted without objection and/or whether those 

photographs were cumulative. “When a court has to guess what issues an 

appellant is appealing, that is not enough for meaningful review.” 

Commonwealth v. Butler, 756 A.2d 55, 57 (Pa. Super. 2000) (brackets and 

quotation marks omitted).
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Appellant’s final issue argues that the trial court erred in allowing the 

testimony of Anthony Scaglione, who arranged Mrs. Copley’s funeral. 

Appellant contends that this evidence was irrelevant and that its admission 

prejudiced Appellant by inflaming the jury with irrelevant details. The trial 

court explained why it deemed the evidence relevant:

This [c]ourt allowed the testimony of Anthony Scaglione on day 

two of the five[-]day trial. While the [c]ourt allowed testimony 

from Mr. Scaglione, we substantially limited the Commonwealth’s 

originally intended testimony. The substance of Mr. Scaglione’s 

testimony was simple, straightforward, and brief. Essentially, the 

purpose of the Commonwealth’s presentation of Mr. Scaglione was 

to establish that [Appellant] did not attend, nor participate in, nor 

pay, towards the cost of his wife’s funeral. This [c]ourt notes that 

this testimony was coupled with other testimony at trial to 

establish that [Appellant] appeared to have a lack of remorse for 

his [w]ife’s death. Several items of evidence and other 

corroborating testimony [were] presented to further this 

assertion. This [c]ourt finds that the testimony of Mr. Scaglione 

was relevant in light of the Commonwealth’s theory of the 

evidence. We note that this was a circumstantial case and the 

specific details of the cause of death of the victim’s death were in 

dispute. The [c]ourt allowed [Appellant]’s behavior after his 

[w]ife’s death to be admissible in light of the specific 

circumstances of this case.

TCO at 11-12. We fully agree with this analysis and find no abuse of 

discretion. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/25/2023