ButL'DtnG ~t~ 13~SES 

tn Tl1E nEGEV 

BUILDING AIR BASES 

IN THE NEGEV 

THE U.S. ARMY 

CORPS OF ENGINEERS 

IN ISRAEL, 1979-1982 

by 

Frank N. Schubert 

OFFICE OF HISTORY, CORPS OF ENGINEERS 

and 

CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY 

UNITED STATES ARMY 

WASHINGTON, D.C., 1992 
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 

Schubert, Frank N. 

Building air bases in the Negev: the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

in Israel, 1979-1982/ by Frank N. Schubert. 

p. cm. - (CMH pub; 70-45) 

Includes bibliographical reference and index. 

1. Besis Hel avir ' Ovdah (Israel)-History. 2. Besis Hel avir 

Ramon (Israel)-History. 3. Air bases-Israel-Negev-Design and 

construction-History-20th century. 4. United States. Army. 

Corps of Engineers-History-20th century. 5. Negev (Israel)-

History. I. United States. Army. Corps of Engineers. Office of 

History. II. Center of Military History. III. Title. IV. Series. 

UG635.1752B477 1992 

358.4'17-dc20 

CMH Pub 70-45 

First Printing 

91-45499 

CIP 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 

Washington, D.G. 20402 
Foreword 

The U.S. Army's role as an instrument of foreign policy is usually viewed in a strictly military sense. This book tells the story of 

an Army agency supporting national objectives in a different way. 

It traces the development of a major construction project, managed by the Army Corps of Engineers, that helped bring peace between two long-time antagonists in the Middle East, Israel and 

Egypt. The Corps has managed construction in support of American policy overseas many times, but this role is not widely known 

outside of the Corps. 

While telling the story of one of the more substantial, recent 

Corps of Engineers accomplishments, this book also speaks to the 

present and future. Large programs such as the air base construction mission in Israel demand broad vision from those who plan 

and execute them. Their management must be set up with a view 

to the evolution of the program through its entire life cycle and 

not extemporized as the program moves through predictable 

phases of start-up, expansion, maturity, completion, and closure. 

There are lessons here for thoughtful managers, in the Corps of 

Engineers and elsewhere in the Army, and we commend this book 

to them and to others interested in the diverse ways in which the 

Army serves as an agent of national policy. 

HENRY J. HATCH 

Lieutenant General, USA 

Chief of Engineers 

1 November 1991 

Washington, D.C. 

III 

HAROLD W. NELSON 

Brigadier General, USA 

Chief of Military History 
The Author 

Frank N. Schubert is chief of the Military Studies Branch in the 

Research and Analysis Division of the U.S. Army Center of Military 

History. He holds a Ph.D. from the University of Toledo. During 

thirteen years as a historian for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 

he produced a variety of publications on engineer exploration of 

the West as well as the manuscript for this book. He also has written extensively on black soldiers in the trans-Mississippi West. 

iv 
Preface 

Between the spring of 1979 and the summer of 1982, the U.S. 

Army Corps of Engineers managed a remarkable construction project in Israel's Negev Desert. This effort, carried out in a highly inflationary period and with a supply line thousands of miles long, 

produced two ultramodern Israeli air bases in a remarkably short 

time and at a cost that only exceeded original estimates by less 

than 3 percent. It also contributed directly to peace between Israel 

and Egypt. 

The political stakes were high. At Camp David in 1978, Israel 

had agreed to relinquish the Sinai peninsula to Egypt, provided 

that the bases in the Negev were ready to accept the aircraft of the 

Israeli Air Force before the withdrawal took place. When the time 

came for the Israelis to leave the Sinai, the bases were in fact operational. The Israelis did withdraw, Egyptian sovereignty was restored to the peninsula, and for the first time in nearly half a century Israel was at peace with its largest and most formidable 

neighbor. In terms of its objectives, the air base program was a 

great success. 

Demanding conditions, among which the political ramifications were foremost, surrounded the project. The unprecedented 

withdrawal to which Israel had committed itself awaited completion of the bases. Moreover, at the time, the Camp David accords 

held some promise as the basis for an enduring settlement of the 

hostility between Israel and its neighbors-the even thornier problem of a Palestinian homeland and nationality. 

Aside from diplomatic considerations, there were other complicating factors. The demands of a tight schedule were magnified by 

the need to work at remote desert sites. Moreover, the organizational structure divided management between the Corps, the U.S. 

Air Force, and the Israeli Air Force; and the program had a complex budgetary arrangement in which the United States paid the 

bulk of the costs but Israel also contributed. The organizationwith the Corps working under two program managers, one Israeli 

and one American-created an interesting and challenging situav 
tion that was unique in the annals of Corps military construction 

and offered ample opportunity for tension, misunderstanding, and 

hostility. Of interest for its impact on this program, this arrangement does not provide many lessons that might be useful in subsequent programs, except perhaps that it should not be emulated. 

The construction itself did not make this project unique. To be 

sure, some unusual methods were employed, notably in the aircraft shelter complexes, and Israeli construction practices differed 

from those normally used by the Americans. However, with few exceptions, construction was largely routine. "It is not a complicated 

job," Otis Grafa, a civilian manager for the Corps, observed while 

the work progressed, "it's just a hell of a lot of it." I Or, as Lt. Gen. 

Max Noah rhetorically asked, "How the hell couldn't you make an 

airfield out there?" 2 

In any case, from a construction standpoint the project has already received considerable study within the Corps of Engineers. 

Early in the 1980s, when the work in Israel was still in progress and 

the Corps was active in Saudi Arabia, four documents purporting 

to convey the lessons of construction in the Middle East appeared. 

Using different techniques and a wide range of data, they looked 

at a number of projects with an eye toward what they could teach 

about military construction in the region. Unfortunately, these by 

now obscure compilations took a more or less cookbook approach 

to the projects and put little emphasis on the human dimension of 

construction management. 3 

In Israel it became clear that the program's most challenging 

problems involved that very aspect. In any project, whether public 

or private, foreign or domestic, management theory, constructor 

organization, computerized information systems, and building 

technology create the reality of structures only through application by human beings. Their actions, judgments, and choices represent the critical variables. This was certainly true on the air base 

program: personality conflicts, institutional loyalties, and the tense 

relations between managers representing different organizations 

and levels of management within organizations greatly affected the 

work. Their influence went far beyond what might have been expected for a construction project that seemed so suited to a logical, straightforward approach. Much time and energy were consumed in defending and expanding agency turf and in resolving 

clashes among competing interests. Overall, the program suffered 

due to the lack of clear-cut organizational arrangements and also 

because of the personalities of the individuals involved. 

These problems were widely regarded as substantial. Lt. Gen. 

Bennett L. Lewis, reflecting on an effort that based on the usual 

VI 
criteria-the job was well done, completed within the tight schedule, and very nearly finished within the budget-was a major success, concluded that "It was a great success, at terrible human 

cost. '''I Maj. Gen. William Wray made the same point, albeit less 

dramatically. Commenting on a draft of this history, he observed 

that "although management problems, failures and successes 

make up a large part of the story [as written], the area of interpersonal relationships played a critical part in the difficulties of getting the job done."5 In fact, he concluded in retrospect, "I think 

there is no question but what the relationships among individuals 

and management personnel was the major problem. That was, 

without question, the key factor that influenced the execution of 

the program." 6 

The problems in the program illustrate the need to consider 

carefully institutional and individual roles, relationships, and responsibilities. They also show the importance of selecting leaders 

based on the ability to interact effectively with others as well as for 

technical qualifications. Choosing the wrong people hinders execution of a mission; selecting the right people helps. As the program raced toward completion and grappled with diverse stresses 

and strains, it showed substantial doses of both. 

While the program faced both help and hindrance, I was luckier. My good fortune started at the top in the Corps of Engineers. 

Government agencies do not habitually display the foresight to assign a historian to a major project while the work is under way. 

That the Corps of Engineers took this unusual step in this case was 

due to the vision of one man. Lt. Gen. John W. Morris, who was the 

Chief of Engineers when the work in Israel started, insisted that a 

historian from his Office of History document this important and 

unusual construction project. With his support, I was able to watch 

the evolution of the project from the early planning stages until 

the end of construction in Israel and finally through closeout at 

Fort Belvoir, Virginia. This proximity to the project gave me the 

opportunity to meet and talk with many participants, watch the 

bases themselves actually develop, and make sure that the written 

record survived. 

This narrative and the extensive research collections on which 

it is based, including the nearly one hundred oral history interviews conducted as part of the research, all result directly from the 

decision of General Morris. So do the personal and professional 

gratifications that I derived from the opportunity to do this study. 

So to him I am particularly grateful. 

Once I got started, many people in the Corps of Engineers provided important assistance, whether with making contacts with othVB 
ers, locating documents, or just keeping up with what was happening on the project in Israel. At the headquarters, in what was then 

called the Directorate of Military Programs, these included Bill Augustine, Carl Damico, Tom Koonce, Fred McNeely, Barbara Myerchin, John Reimer, Paul Theuer, and Jim Wharry. Bob Blakeley, 

then chief of the Office of Administrative Services, to whom my 

own office reported, was supportive and encouraging. In the New 

York offices of North Atlantic Division and New York District, I also 

found help whenever I asked for it from Paul Bazilwich, Paul Cheverie, Lou Fioto, George Grimes, Ozzie Hewitt, Mike Jezior, David 

Lipsky, and Al Vinitsky. 

On my four research visits to Israel, I also received ample aid. 

In Tel Aviv, those who helped included Bob Amick, Moshe Bar-Tov, 

John Brown, Joe Chapla, Lee Graw, Gene Gamble, Jack Gilkey, 

Paul Hartung, Ailene Jacques, Shirley Jacobson, Tom I{ahlert, 

!{ami !{av, Ken Keener, Carol Koplik, !{arson Kosowski, Mike Maloney, Harry McGinness, Ed Moore, Jackie Partridge, Janet Sales, 

Ray Shaw, Alan Shepherd, George Snoddy, Charlie Thomas, Steve 

West, and Donald Wong. At Ramon, Ann Avenell, Fred Butler, Bud 

Griffis, Jon Jacobsen, Glenn Lloyd, Bill Parkes, and Paul Taylor 

were especially helpful; at Ovda, John Blake, Irving Davis, Otis 

Grafa, Bob Horton, Dick Huggins, Patrick Kelly, John Morris, Nick 

Moon, Pete Peterson, and Ed Wainwright assisted me. 

Most notably, John F. Wall, then a brigadier general and project manager and since retired from the Army as a lieutenant general, made sure that I got what I needed. He assured the cooperation of his staff, tolerated my intrusions into the busy life of the 

Near East Project Office, and gave me the time I needed for interviews. Without the cooperation of General Wall, along with Brig. 

Gen. Paul T. Hartung of the United States Air Force and Brig. Gen. 

Moshe Bar-Tov of the Israeli Air Force, my research in Israel would 

never have been successful. 

While I was with the Corps' history office, I got more than a little help from my friends. John Greenwood, who was the chief 

through almost the entire development of this history, chose me 

for the project and was supportive throughout. Marty Reuss, with 

whom I shared an office through most of the period, was an insightful and intelligent critic. Paul Walker oversaw the processing 

of my many oral history tapes quickly and efficiently; later, when 

he became chief of the office he continued to be helpful, as a critic 

and a friend. Margaret Wales provided any administrative support 

I needed; and Lisa Wagner organized the project records into a usable collection. Diane Arms managed the editorial work and !{athlee n Richardson edited the manuscript. Jim Dayton of the 

V1ll 
Humphreys Engineer Center Support Activity, a perfectionist as 

well as a photographer, reproduced the pictures. 

Outside the Corps of Engineers I also found people willing to 

provide assistance. Thanks go to Haywood Hansell and Wayne Upshur of the Middle East Task Group in the Office of the Secretary 

of Defense; Fred Pernell of the Washington Regional Archives in 

Suitland, Maryland; Bill Heimdahl in the Office of Air Force History; Daisy Walker of Defense Security Assistance Agency; and VerinaJordan and Joyce Rhode, first at the Federal Emergency Management Agency and later in the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense. Naomi Kogon Steinberg also helped me understand 

some of the nuances of the Israeli press. 

At the U.S. Army Center of Military History, I have been fortunate to work with Morris MacGregor, John Elsberg, Catherine 

Heerin, Arthur S. Hardyman, Diane Arms, and Sherry Dowdy. 

Without them there would be no book. I would also like to thank 

contractor Susan Carroll for the index. 

Many of the people mentioned above and some others also 

read and commented on various drafts of the manuscript. For this 

particularly important service-and especially onerous task-they 

deserve special recognition. Thanks go to Bill Baldwin, Roger Beaumont, Frank Billiams, Joseph Bratton, Bates Burnell, David Chambers, John Chambers, Paul Cheverie, Carl Damico, Charles Dunnam, Barry Fowle, Gene Gamble, John Gates, Ernest Graves, John 

Greenwood, Bud Griffis, James Johnson, Bennett Lewis, Glenn 

Lloyd, Morris MacGregor, Fred McNeely, John W. Morris, Max 

Noah, Richard Perry, Marty Reuss, Bory Steinberg, Paul Walker, 

John Wall, and William Wray. All of them helped improve the 

manuscript; none of them should be blamed for any errors of fact 

or interpretation in the final product. The views expressed in this 

book are mine and do not reflect the official policy or position of 

the Department of Defense or the U.S. government. 

Through it all my wife Irene and my son Max remained my 

best friends. I thank them for that friendship, which still helps me 

keep my work in proper perspective. 

1 November 1991 

Washington, D.C. 

IX 

FRANK N. SCHUBERT 
Notes 

1. Interv, author with Otis W. Grafa, May 81, Ovda, Israel. All interviews by author are filed at the Office of History, Headquarters, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. 

2. Lt Gen Max W. Noah, comments on draft MS, 4 May 88, Israeli Ail" Base Program Collection, Box 93, folder 8, Office of History, Headquarters, U.S. Army 

Corps of Engineers (hereafter cited as IABPC, 93/8). 

3. USACE, The Ismeli Airbase Program: Lessons Leamed, Engineer Pamphlet 

5-1-5 (Washington, D.C.: Office, Chief of Engineers, Sep 82); USACE CERL, J. 

G. Kirby, Project Manager's Handbook for Special Projects, Technical Rpt P-85/01 

(Champaign, Ill.: CERL, Oct 84); USACE SCMO, After-Action Report: Constmction of Facilities in Sinai Desert [1983], copy in Office of History, HQ USACE, 

files; USACE ESC, Jill M. Davis, G. Leslie Geiger, and Robert B. Grundberg, The 

USAGE in the Middle East-Benefits and Experiences for FutU1"e Constmction Challenges, 

Rpt 84-11 (Fort Belvoir, Va.: ESC, Dec 84). Note: for the meaning of short titles 

and other abbreviations see the Glossary. 

4. Lt Gen Bennett L. Lewis (Ret.) , comments on draft MS, 5 Feb 88, IABPC, 

93/5. 

5. Ltr, Maj Gen William R. Wray (Ret.) to the author, 24 Feb 88, IABPC, 

93/ 10. 

6. Interv, author with Wray, May 88, Fort Belvoir, Va. 

x 
Contents 

Chapter Page 

1. Prologue: Palestine, 1942-1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 

2. Prelude to a Mission: War and Diplomacy, 

1973-1979. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 

3. Planning for the Mission, Autumn 1978 ............ 20 

4. Necessary Steps: Diplomatic, Political, and Contractual Preparations, February-December 1979 . . . . . 40 

5. Setting Up Shop, April-October 1979 .......... 63 

6. In Pursuit of Stability: Organizational and Conn-actual Problems, September-December 1979 . . . . . . 81 

7. Tripartite Management: The Apportionment of 

Power and Influence, December 1979-March 

1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97 

8. Starting in the Desert, April 1979-June 1980. . . . .. 112 

9. Time of Trials, March-June 1980. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136 

10. Management in Transition, June-October 1980 . . . 157 

11. Construction Management,June-December 1980. 170 

12. The Three-Legged Stool, June 1980-January 

1981 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190 

13. From Construction Camps to Air Bases, 

January-October 1981. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 214 

14. Activating the Bases, Deactivating the Project, 

November 1981-August 1982 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 237 

15. Closeout...................... . .......... 265 

16. Conclusion: A Forgotten Success. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 273 

Bibliography. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 279 

Glossary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 291 

Index ... ... .. ......... .................... ... 297 

xi 
Tables 

No. Page 

1. Costs of Definitive Contracts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 

2. Engineering Change Proposals (ECPs) by Month and 

Originator. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208 

3. Total Engineering Change Proposals. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208 

4. Approved Manpower Plans for Area Offices, October 

1981 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 248 

5. MSA Manpower Phasedown Schedule, November 1981.. 248 

Map 

1. Israel, 1982 2 

Illustrations 

Camp David Accords . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 

Col. Clarence D. 'Jack" Gilkey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 

IBM Building in Tel Aviv. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76 

Joe McNabb of Air Base Constructors and Colonel Gilkey 

Sign the Ramon Contract. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92 

Palace Hotel. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107 

Ramon Plateau. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 113 

Ovda Valley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 114 

Nose of a 750-Pound Bomb Exposed During the 

Clearance of Unexploded Ordnance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 120 

Ramon Access Road. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127 

Bulk Cement Storage Facility. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130 

Secretary of the Army Clifford Alexander Confers With 

Colonel Curl and Colonel Gilkey at Ovda . . . . . . . . . . . . 137 

Maj. Gen. John F. Wall. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147 

Reporters Boarding an Israeli Air Force C-47 . . . . . . . . . . . 158 

Management Camp at Ovda. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173 

Utility Ducts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 177 

Backfilled and Compacted Utility Trench. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177 

Thai Kitchen Workers at Ovda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178 

Excavation of Glide Path Hill at Ramon. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180 

Lt. Gen. Joseph K. Bratton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194 

Briefing at Ramon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196 

Family Housing at Ovda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224 

Xll 
Page 

Airmen's Dormitories at Ovda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 225 

One of the First Israeli Air Force Fighters To Land at 

Ovda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229 

Prime Minister Begin, General Rafael Eitam, and Maj. Gen. 

David Ivry at the Formal Opening of Ovda Air Base . . . . 230 

Col. Fletcher H . Griffis and ABC General Manager Fred 

Butler. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 254 

All illustrations are from Office of History, Headquarters, U.S. 

Army Corps of Engineers, files. 

xiii 

BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

THE U.S. ARMY CORPS OF 

ENGINEERS IN ISRAEL 

1979-1982 
ISRAEL 

1982 

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--
CHAPTER 1 

Prologue: Palestine, 1942-1944 

I understand that it is now a suburb of Tel Aviv, but when I first went 

to Lydda it was out in the country where we built the first air base in 

Palestine, now called Israel. 

Maj. Gen. Alden K. Sibley I 

During the early days of World War II, Palestine was a backwater. Worldwide headlines came later, in the wake of Israel's independence, the tank battles and aerial shootouts of the Arab-Israeli 

wars, and the oil embargo that caused long lines at American service stations. Still, the lack of publicity did not alter the fact that 

the region was important to the United States and its Allies. The 

fighting in nearby North Mrica led to establishment of a network 

of Allied logistical facilities throughout the Middle East. Midway 

through 1941, the influx of airplanes and supplies overburdened 

Great Britain's bases in Egypt, the Sudan, and Palestine. Britain 

and the United States, which had not yet entered the war but 

which had provided material aid against the Axis powers, decided 

to expand the regional transportation system and build new depots for storage and repair. 2 

Expansion of the logistical base at the far eastern end of the 

Mediterranean called for rapid construction and brought the 

Corps of Engineers to the region. The North Atlantic Division of 

the Corps, with its headquarters in New York City, established the 

North Mrican District to manage the program. Because of the urgent construction needs, the district negotiated a c08t-plus-fixed-fee 

contract with the Minneapolis firm of Johnson, Drake & Piper, Inc. 3 

Such a contract differed from the normal one in which the cost of a 

project was settled in advance. Cost-plus arrangements assured the 

contractor reimbursement for legitimate expenses incurred during 

construction, guaranteed a fee above those costs, and allowed the 

work to start without time-consuming and complex negotiations. 

Early in 1942 management of the program moved to Middle 

East District's headquarters in Asmara, Eritrea. In February Maj. 

Louis Claterbos, the district engineer, set up three subordinate of-
4 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

fices. With the permission of the British government in Jerusalem, 

which governed Palestine under a mandate from the League of 

Nations, the three included the Palestine Area Office in Tel Aviv. 

Lt. Frank A. Ferguson, the area engineer, had his office in the Barclay's Bank Building on Rothschild Boulevard, located in the old 

commercial center in the southern part of the city.4 

The Tel Aviv office did a modest amount of work in the city 

and n earby. Those who worked there saw their operation, renamed the Levant Area Office in a summer 1942 reorganization 

that moved the district office to Cairo, as isolated and neglected. 

''There is a general disgust," a lieutenant observed, "among ... 

personnel in the Levant concerning what they report as lack of attention by headquarters personnel in Cairo to their needs. Several 

expressed the opinion that Cairo seemed to forget all about them 

except when missions were desired to be carried out." 5 

The Levant office's most significant project was construction of 

a depot at Tel Litvinsky, a few miles east of Jaffa and just south of 

Ramat Gan. Initial plans envisioned a major repair base for equipment that had been manufactured in the United States for the 

British Army. It would resemble the larger one at Heliopolis outside of Cairo except that it would lack a diesel locomotive maintenance shop. As the battle lines in North Mrica receded westward, 

plans for Tel Litvinsky were scaled down. In February 1943 it became a rest camp and jerrican plant. Then, later in the spring, the 

Army canceled plans for the manufacture of the fuel containers. 

The most consequential entries in the headquarters journal announced the arrival of Coca-Cola syrup for the bottling plant in 

Haifa and the visit of comedian Jack Benny.6 

The office had two other small projects. In Tel Aviv, at the intersection of Dizengoff and Arlosoroff streets in the northern and 

more modern part of the city, the Corps built an optical repair 

shop and laboratory. The shop repaired lenses for the British 

Army in North Mrica. The third project, also small, involved improving an airstrip near Lydda. A few miles southeast of Tel Litvinsky, the strip consisted of only one little-used runway amid the orange groves. The Levant office restored the runway and 

constructed a building for pilots and repair crews. Small liaison 

planes used the field, but it could handle larger DC-3s as well,? 

With only these three projects, the Tel Aviv office represented 

little more than a footnote to operations in the Middle East and 

North Mrica. The depot at Tel Litvinsky faded into near oblivion 

before closing in November 1943, and the airstrip never grew beyond its one runway. The office itself went through a number of 

name changes worthy of a much larger organization, from Pales-
PROLOGUE 5 

tine Area Office to Levant Service Command to Levant Area Office. The Army terminated the contract of Johnson , Drake & Piper 

on 31 March 1943. Later in the year North Atlantic Division was removed from the chain of command. The Tel Aviv office finally 

closed in January 1944.8 

Thirty-five years later the Corps of Engineers returned to Tel 

Aviv. The new office also reported to North Atlantic Division in New 

York. Once again the work involved managing cost-plus airfield 

construction, albeit on a vastly larger scale. The mission required 

rapid completion of two desert air bases for the State of Israel. Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai peninsula, as promised in the historic 1979 peace treaty with Egypt, depended on timely and skillful 

execution of the job. This is the story of that important mission. 
6 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

Notes 

1. Interv, Paul K. Walker with Alden K. Sibley,Jul 82, Brownfield, Me., copy in Office of 

History, HQ USACE. 

2. Edith C. Rogers, The Army Air Force in the Middle East: A Study of the Origins of the 

Ninth Air Force, AAF Reference History 8, Manuscript 101-108 [Washington, D.C.: Office 

of Air Force History, n.d.], p. 20. 

3. Historical Section, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff G-2, HQ, AMET, History of 

Africa-Middle East Theater, sec. II, Principal Special Staff Reports, vol. 3, n.d., p. 2, copy in 

Historical Records Branch, CMH, Washington, D.C.; MiddleEast Wal'Projects of Johnson, Drake 

& Piper, Inc., for the Corps of Engineers, u.s. Anny 1942-1943 (New York: William E. Rudge's 

Sons, 1943), p. 13. 

4. History of Africa-Middle East Theater, sec. II, vol. 3, p. 3; Ltr, Lt Col Alden K. Sibley, 

Operations Planning Section, through CG, SOS, USAFIME, to CG, USAFIME, 18 Aug 43, 

Alden K. Sibley Papers, Office of History, HQ USACE. 

5. Ltr, Lt Hal F. Winter to CG, USAFIME, 7 Sep 42, AMET G-2 files, Box 724, AMET 

Records, Record Group (RG) 332, National Archives (NA) , Suitland, Md. 

6. Lu', Sibley to CG, USAFIME, 18 Aug 43, Sibley Papers; History of Africa-Middle East 

Theater, sec. II, vol. 3, p. 52; HQ, Levant Service Command, HeadquartersJournal, entries 

for 19 Aug and 4 Sep 43, Records of Levant Service Command, Box 566916, RG 338, NA; Interv (telephone), author with Sibley, Mar 83. For the location of Tel Litvinsky on a map, see 

Chaim Herzog, The Amb-Israeli Wan: War and Peace in the Middle East (New York: Random 

House, 1982), p. 37. 

7. Lu', Frank A. Ferguson to Economics Division, USAFIME, 12 Feb 44, Records of the 

Engineer Officer, AMET, File 322, Box 746, RG 332, NA; USAFIME, Agenda for Fourth 

Meeting, Middle East Council, American Aid Subcommittee, 3 Nov 42, Sibley Papers; Interv, 

Walker with Sibley, Jul 82. The building at 200 Dizengoff SU'eet later became known as Engineers House and served as the headquarters for a national engineering association. 

8, GO 7, HQ, USAFIME, Cairo, 16 Jan 44, Records of the Engineer Officer, AMET, File 

322, Box 746, RG 332, NA; LLI~ Lt Col N. H. Wild to Commanders, Eriu'ea, Delta, Levant, 

and Libyan Service Commands, 14 Mar 43, Records of the Engineer Officer, AMET, File 

321.7, Box 745, RG 332, NA; Work Order 65, Operations Section, Construction Division, 

USAFIME, 12 Nov 43, Records of the Engineer Officer, AMET, File 322, Box 746, RG 332, 

NA; History of Africa-Middle East Theater, sec. II, vol. 3, p. 11. 
CHAPTER 2 

Prelude to a Mission: War and 

Diplomacy, 1973-1979 

In the context of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, the 

United States is prepared to provide extraordinary assistance in order to 

help Israel in relocation of Sinai military facilities to the Negev. 

Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, 19 March 1979 I 

On 6 October 1973, the armed forces of Egypt and Syria 

launched surprise attacks against Israel. Carefully timed and coordinated, the blows took place on Yom Kippur, the holiest day of the 

Jewish year. Initially, both offensives succeeded. In the north the 

Syrians sent the Israelis reeling from the Golan Heights. In the 

south the Egyptians crossed the Suez Canal and penetrated deep 

into the Sinai peninsula. Within two weeks the Israelis, aided by 

massive infusions of American supplies and equipment, turned the 

tide on both fronts. The cease-fire agreements of 22 October in the 

north and 24 October in the south found the Israel Defense Force 

shaken but in control and the borders of 5 October virtually intact.2 

The 1973 war broke the political and military deadlock in the 

Middle East. Arab forces fought far better than they had in any earlier conflict and showed a mastery of electronic warfare that portended heavy Israeli casualties in any future conflict. The war 

forced Israel to reassess Arab military capabilities and to calculate 

anew the costs of continuing the occupation of the Sinai peninsula. 3 By the same token, the Arab successes did a great deal to improve self-esteem among Israel's enemies, particularly Egypt, 

whose army had done extremely well in the first days of the war.4 

"There is no doubt," Israeli President and historian Chaim Herzog 

concluded, "that the initial Arab success in the Yom Kippur War 

satisfied their feelings of national honour." 5 In addition to altering 

the military balance, the war led to a vastly increased commitment 

by the United States to peace and stability in the Middle East. The 

new American involvement began with the wartime airlift of materiel to Israel. The American presence grew after the war, and the 
8 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

ensuing oil embargo imposed by Arab members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Nations (OPEC) showed the new military and economic power of the Arab nations. Mter 1973 "triangular diplomacy," with the United States as intermediary between 

Israel and the Arab nations-particularly Egypt-became a fact of 

regional negotiations. 6 

In the years that followed the war, the United States pursued 

several objectives in the Middle East. Foremost was avoidance of 

war, which had the potential to grow into a major regional conflict 

and lead to Soviet involvement or even a confrontation between 

the superpowers. Other U.S. goals included containment of Soviet 

influence, protection of access to oil, and assurance of Israel's survival. To these concerns, all of which existed in one form or another prior to 1973, was added an important new purpose: the improvement of relations and economic ties with Arab states, most 

notably Saudi Arabia and Egypt. 7 

Egypt's interests coincided with this American goal. President 

Anwar Sadat was dissatisfied with Soviet support during the October war. Moreover, Egypt viewed improved relations with the 

United States as a way to pressure Israel while achieving a more 

balanced relationship with the superpowers. In 1974 Sadat restored diplomatic relations with the United States, ending a sevenyear break. Egypt also accepted American involvement in disengagement talks with Israel. Although frustrated in its efforts to 

obtain American arms, Egypt maintained good relations with the 

United States throughout the presidencies of Richard Nixon and 

Gerald Ford.8 

American diplomacy in the Middle East during those administrations was marked by the "shuttle diplomacy" of Secretary of 

State Henry Kissinger. Flying from one Arab capital to another as 

well as to Israel and home for consultations, Kissinger sought a way 

to convene a general peace conference while curbing Soviet influence. His efforts to create a basis for agreement between the Arab 

states, Israel, and the Palestinians as well as the superpowers never 

reached fruition. 9 Still, his diplomacy had two major long-lasting 

results. His overtures marked the beginning of a persistent American quest for an Arab-Israeli settlement. In time, even many Israelis came to appreciate this commitment by the United States, especially the economic and military help that came with it. In 

addition, Kissinger convinced two Arab nations-Egypt and Jordan-to sit at the table with Israel. Their unprecedented December 1973 meeting in Geneva, Switzerland, began the long process 

leading to a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. 1o 
PRELUDE TO A MISSION 9 

So, when Democratic PresidentJimmy Carter took office inJanuary 1977, certain breakthroughs had already been made. Some direct talks had taken place, and disengagement agreements had 

been reached on both fronts. The Carter administration, with a 

substantial interest in the Middle East rooted partly in the president's personal commitment, had a springboard for further efforts 

toward peace. Carter's approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict, based 

largely on a Brookings Institution report of 1975, differed from that 

of Nixon and Ford. The new president abandoned step-by-step solutions through shuttle diplomacy. Instead, he sought a way to negotiate a comprehensive peace agreement. The Carter administration felt that a bilateral accord between Egypt and Israel that 

ignored Palestinian aspirations would not be in the best interest of 

the United States. Such a deal would anger Saudi Arabia and could 

even provoke another Arab oil embargo. Moreover, the Americans 

still considered a regional peace to be attainable through a general 

conference in Geneva. Carter said publicly that such an agreement 

should include a Palestinian "entity" on the West Bank of the Jordan River, in the area Israel called Judea and Samaria, seriously 

dampening any Israeli enthusiasm for such a conference. I I 

In any case, the United States was under considerable pressure 

to reduce tensions and stabilize conditions in the Middle East. 

When the Shah's regime in Iran fell apart early in 1979 and gave 

way to a fundamentalist Muslim government, the United States lost 

a major ally. Moreover, the Soviet Union and Cuba were making inroads in Mrica, notably in Ethiopia and the former Portuguese 

colonies of Mozambique and Angola. This situation demanded action that would end Egypt's confrontation with Israel and enable 

Egypt to deal with the threat of Soviet expansion from the south. 12 

From almost the outset, the Carter administration's interest in 

the Middle East was marked by a deep mutual affection and respect between Carter and Sadat. They first met in Washington in 

April 1977. According to Sadat, Carter was "a man who understands what I want, a man impelled by the power of religious faith 

and lofty values-a farmer like me. "1 3 Carter too wrote warmly of 

their understanding: "There was an easy and natural friendship between us from the first moment I knew Anwar Sadat. We trusted 

each other. "1 4 

This harmony did not keep Sadat from surprising Carter along 

with the rest of the world when he offered to go to Jerusalem. The 

Egyptian president's announcement astonished the People's Assembly in Cairo on 9 November 1977. Eleven days later he stood 

before Prime Minister Menachem Begin and the Israeli parliament, called the Knesset, telling Israel and the world he wanted 
10 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

peace. Sadat's astounding gesture, which shifted the focus of negotiations from an overall settlement to bilateral talks between Egypt 

and Israel, drew mixed responses. Egyptians and Israelis alike welcomed his daring act. The Western democracies expressed pleasure and optimism regarding a settlement. Sadat's Arab allies, on 

the other hand, were appalled. Syria severed relations with Egypt, 

and leaders in many countries of the Middle East called for Sadat's 

assassination. IS 

Sadat said the trip, which Carter called "among the most dramatic events of modern history," emanated from the need for a 

new approach. Impatient with protocol and diplomacy, he sought 

a way around the formalities and procedural preoccupations that 

fettered diplomacy. When he first considered Jerusalem, he saw it 

as a location for a meeting of potential participants in a Geneva 

conference. A meeting there, he initially believed, could prepare 

for the more formal conference. Such a gathering could also make 

clear to Israel the prerequisites for any serious negotiations: withdrawal from occupied territories and acceptance of a Palestinian 

state. Then Sadat rejected this approach in favor of the visit that 

startled the world and redirected the focus of discussions from a 

broad framework to bilateral talks. 16 Begin's biographer called 

Sadat's grand gesture "a typical broad dramatic stroke." 17 

Several other factors underlay Sadat's decision. Troubles at 

home during 1977, notably the January riots after reduction of 

food price subsidies and the restiveness of fundamentalist Muslim 

groups, may have convinced him that the survival of his regime was 

at stake. A peace agreement that returned the Sinai to Egypt and 

brought new Western investment might save the situation. A 

Geneva conference promised to drag on for months without substantive results. Sadat's primary concerns included maintaining his 

presidency and preserving Egypt's sovereignty and national honor. 

The country had already spilled much blood and spent heavily on 

the Palestinian cause and was at best ambivalent toward continuing 

such outlays. In this framework the return of the Sinai took primacy. Sadat was willing to risk ostracism within the Arab community to attain it.IS 

Kissinger claimed that it was Arab nature "to believe that some 

epic event or personality will miraculously transcend the humdrum mess that is the usual human condition." 19 If such a tendency existed, Sadat's boldness and impatience surely reflected it. 

However, he thought carefully about the risks before taking action. 20 

According to Kissinger, Sadat "understood that a heroic gesture 

can create a new reality."21 He had acted in a grand and unpredictable manner in the past, expelling thousands of Soviet advisers 
PRELUDE TO A MISSION 11 

and technicians from Egypt in 1972 and reopening the Suez Canal 

three years later. 22 As ABC reporter Doreen Kays observed, Sadat 

"was an Arab leader with a history for surprises." 23 He also knew 

from experience the possibilities of such acts. In 1956, although a 

member of the Egyptian Revolutionary Command Council, he was 

surprised by President Gamal Abdel Nasser's nationalization of the 

Suez Canal. Done in retaliation for the denial of financial aid for 

the great dam at Aswan by the United States and the International 

Bank, the seizure electrified Egypt and stunned the world. Sadat 

noted admiringly in his autobiography that this grand and stirring 

act made Nasser "an Egyptian mythical hero." 24 

But there was more behind the Jerusalem trip. Of all the Arab 

nations, Egypt had by far the most in common with Israel. The two 

countries shared a British colonial background-Sadat and Begin 

both had been involved in armed plots against British rule-and 

had made halting and unsuccessful efforts at accommodation.25 So 

strong was this commonality that Israeli Lt. Gen. David Elazar reflected in 1972 that it was unfortunate that Israel and Egypt did 

not exist in isolation. "Left to our own devices," Elazar said, "we 

would have solved the points of contention between us easily and 

long ago." 26 Just two months before Sadat went to Jerusalem, both 

nations had secretly probed the extent of this shared interest. Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan had met with an Egyptian representative, Dr. Hassan Tuhami, in Rabat, Morocco, and explored the possibilities for a peace based on the return of the Sinai to Egypt. 

Other issues raised at their meeting included Palestinian rights 

and the status of territories occupied by Israel after the Six-Day 

War in 1967.27 

Not only for its grandeur did Sadat's gesture please the Israelis. 

Israel lacked enthusiasm for multinational peace talks, preferring 

separate discussions with each of its neighbors. Egyptian Foreign 

Minister Ismail Fahmy, who resigned in protest when Sadat announced his willingness to visit Jerusalem, thought Begin saw 

Sadat's overture as a chance to move away from a general conference and into talks with Egypt alone. Later, Carter came to a similar conclusion. He thought Israel sought a separate peace with 

Egypt that assured retention of the West Bank and Gaza while 

avoiding talks with Jordan and the Palestinians. Sadat's gesture 

also satisfied Begin for reasons quite unrelated to Israeli foreign 

policy. Mter almost thirty years in opposition, Begin's Herut party 

controlled a governing coalition. He had been in office barely a 

year when Sadat arrived in Jerusalem. The visit greatly enhanced 

the Begin government's public acceptance and support. 28 
12 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

The only immediately apparent concrete result of Sadat's conciliatory journey was a series of military negotiations that began in 

Cairo in January 1978. The talks between the Israeli team led by 

Minister of Defense Ezer Weizmann and Egyptian General 

Muhammad Abd aI-Ghani al-Gamassi clarified Israeli concerns regarding the Sinai. Israel had never given up an established settlement and insisted on keeping the towns in the northeastern corner of the Sinai. Israel also had a network of military bases on the 

peninsula. These provided a strong defense and allowed dispersal 

of combat aircraft over an area far larger than what historian 

Howard Sachar called "the narrow, and vulnerable, wedge of integral Israel." 29 Egypt was just as adamant: the settlements and bases 

had to go. For Sadat the issue was sovereignty, and he would accept 

no Israeli presence in the Sinai. The positions of both governments made a deadlock seem inevitable. 

Negotiations foundered through the first half of 1978. Then 

Carter asked Begin and Sadat to meet him at Camp David. This invitation reflected the strong American commitment to a Middle 

East solution but was not born of any optimism on Carter's part. 

He thought success unlikely, but he knew no better way to restore 

momentum to the peace talks. Much to the surprise of nearly all 

observers, Begin and Sadat accepted the invitation for a meeting 

in early September. 30 

At the presidential retreat in Maryland's Catoctin Mountains, 

the issues split into those pertaining to a general regional peace 

and others relating to a treaty between Egypt and Israel. Strenuous 

and frustrating negotiations resolved only the latter questions. 

After a week of talks, the Israeli refusal to remove the Sinai settlements seemed to create a deadlock. Begin finally yielded. In the 

final analysis, he lacked the emotional tie to the Sinai that would 

make him resist even consideration of giving up the territories that 

he called Judea and Samaria. The Sinai was not part of Eretz Yisrael, 

the traditional land of Israel. So he agreed to leave the peninsula, 

convinced partly by Carter's warning that he would end the talks 

and publicly blame Begin for their failure. On the other hand, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown offered an incentive: help in 

building large Negev air bases as replacements for the Sinai fields. 

He also promised to have the new facilities completed before Israel 

finished its evacuation of the SinaiY 

The offer to help with base construction was a strong inducement to make an otherwise unpalatable concession. Israel considered the Sinai bases, which were built after the capture of the 

peninsula during the 1967 war, very important. The Israelis relied 

heavily on air power, and the Sinai gave Israel strategic depth. The 
PRELUDE TO A MISSION 13 

Egyptian Air Force, whose planes had once been at EI Arish only 

seven minutes from Tel Aviv, was now more than twenty minutes 

away on the west bank of the Suez Canal. The Israeli Air Force, on 

the other hand, dispersed its facilities throughout the region, 

which was nearly three times as large as Israel proper. The Sinai 

gave Israel great freedom of action and vast tracts for training and 

maneuver. Already considered by many the best air force in the 

world, the Israeli Air Force prized the wide open spaces of the 

Sinai.

32 

Weizmann, who was a former air force pilot, repeatedly 

stressed the importance of the bases to Israeli security. General 

Mordechai Gur, chief of staff of the Israel Defense Force at the 

time of Camp David, agreed with Weizmann, who saw great risks in 

concentrating the air force's planes in fewer bases. Weizmann was 

willing to give up Sharm el Sheikh, which controlled waterborne 

access to the Israeli port of Eilat. He also was willing to give up 

large chunks of territory, but not the airfields.33 "If we give them 

up," he commented half in jest, "we shall have to buy an aircraft 

carrier." 34 

The Israelis were especially concerned about the two largest 

bases. Eitam in the northern Sinai provided in-depth defense 

against an attack from Egypt. Etzion to the south protected navigation through the Straits of Tiran to Eilat and covered Israel's southern flank against attack from both Egypt and Saudi Arabia. The 

base may have had other uses as well: one newspaper claimed that 

the Israeli planes that destroyed the Iraqi nuclear plant at Osirak 

inJune 1981 came from Etzion. 35 Neither base was ever completed, 

but some experts considered Etzion to be "the finest tactical 

fighter base in the world." 36 Weizmann decided that Israel would 

have to give up the bases to get a peace agreement. At Camp David 

he asked Brown about American aid in building replacements, 

hoping to commit the United States to construction prior to withdrawal and thereby to shift the cost of relocation from the overburdened Israeli economy. Brown readily agreed to the possibility, 

prompting Weizmann to conclude that the American had anticipated the request. Thereafter, Begin saw the choice as either the 

airfields or peace. He opted for the latter. 37 

Before leaving the presidential retreat, Begin and Sadat signed 

two documents. The "Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace 

Treaty between Egypt and Israel" of 17 September 1978 followed 

the concept examined by Tuhami and Dayan in Rabat. It provided 

for return of the Sinai to Egypt and withdrawal of all Israeli forces 

and settlements. It limited Egyptian use of abandoned Israeli airfields to civilian purposes and guaranteed passage to Eilat and 
14 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

CarnjJ David accords. President Sadat, President Cartel; and Prirne Minister 

Begin signing the agreement. 

through the Suez Canal for Israeli ships. This document became 

the basis for the treaty signed in Washington on 26 March 1979. 

The other agreement concerned a general regional peace. The 

"Framework for Peace in the Middle East" expressed the interests 

of both nations in "a just, comprehensive, and durable settlement 

of the Middle East conflict." It also left the issues of Palestinian 

rights and the Israeli occupation of the West Bank, Gaza, and the 

Golan Heights open for negotiations.

38 With none of the key issues 

regarding the Palestinians and the territories decided, the overall 

agreement was extremely ambiguous. So the Camp David outcome 

amounted to a separate peace between Israel and Egypt, a result 

that did not get to the crux of the regional problem and that had 

not been sought by the United States or Egypt.39 

The frameworks made no reference to American pledges of 

aid to either party. In fact, as Carter pointed out, few promises of 

any kind were made. Carter agreed only "to visit Egypt and to consult with Israel on how we might help with moving the Sinai airfields." 40 Even this cautious step showed Carter's awareness of the 
PRELUDE TO A MISSION 15 

importance of the bases. Brown knew that the Israelis relied heavily on their air force for defense. In a letter to Weizmann later in 

September, he spelled out the American understanding of the crucial importance of Israeli air power and the promise to discuss 

help with relocation. Brown understood "the special urgency and 

priority" Israel attached to preparing new bases "in light of its conviction that it cannot safely leave the Sinai air bases until the new 

ones are operational." He suggested talks on their scope and cost 

and on American aid that might facilitate construction. The president, Brown noted, stood ready to seek congressional authority for 

whatever aid the United States might offer. 41 

Camp David evoked a variety of responses. In the United States 

and Western Europe, public opinion generally supported the accords. Begin and Sadat shared the Nobel Peace Prize. Howard 

Sachar called the agreement "a good arrangement for both sides." 

Egypt obtained the territory it had lost in 1967; Israel won a reassuring transition period during which it could test Egyptian intentions prior to withdrawal as well as peace with its most formidable 

military foe . The Arab response differed dramatically from the 

Western reaction. The anger triggered by Sadat's trip to Jerusalem 

continued unabated. Egypt under Nasser had been leader of the 

Arab world; now the country was being vilified. At a hastily called 

conference in Baghdad, Iraq, leaders of most Arab states voiced 

their outrage, while the oil exporters of the Persian Gulf decided 

to cut off their once substantial financial aid to Egypt. Arab rejection shocked and wounded Sadat.42 

The separation of Egypt from the Arab mainstream became an 

enduring feature of regional life. In 1983, four years after the 

treaty was concluded, Israel's neighbors remained adamant. Arab 

delegates at a conference of nonaligned nations in India won approval from representatives of 101 nations for a resolution condemning the Camp David agreement. Nowhere in the Arab world 

was the sense of betrayal and outrage greater than in Syria. The 

Syrians needed unremitting Egyptian pressure on Israel, which 

had occupied the Golan Heights after the 1967 war, ending 450 

years of Damascus-based con trol. They feared that the end of Egyptian hostility might tempt Israel to solidify its hold on the Golan 

Heights. Events ultimately justified this concern: Israel annexed 

the heights in December 1981. Thereafter, Syrian opposition to 

any accommodation with the Israelis and to the Camp David accords 

only grew more intransigent.43 

In Egypt the agreement won wide acclaim, albeit with significant 

exceptions. Some key officials resigned in protest, among them 

Fahmy's successor in the foreign ministry, Ibrahim Kamil. The ac-
16 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

cord with Israel also contributed to the alienation of fundamentalist 

Muslims, some of whom assassinated Sad at in October 1981.4

'1 

The agreement even received mixed reviews in Israel, which 

seemed to some the most obvious beneficiary. Mter all, the accords brought the promise of peace with its most powerful neighbor. However, Israel's argumentative and contentious political culture made unanimity unlikely in any case. Opponents included the 

religious right-just as it did in Egypt-and even members of 

Prime Minister Begin's governing coalition. Public relations adviser Shmuel Katz opposed even the implicit recognition of Palestinian political rights in the "Framework for Peace in the Middle 

East" and the unprecedented abandonment of the settlements on 

the Sinai coast. Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir, Defense Minister 

Ariel Sharon, and Chairman Moshe Arens of the Knesset Committee on Security and Foreign Relations all opposed the agreement, 

particularly if it meant giving up settlements.45 Only in the democratic West did the accords win nearly universal approval. 

The agreement set the stage for new developments in relations 

between the United States and Israel. Mter the signing, high-level 

American officials for the first time referred to Israel as an ally. 

This new closeness, which ultimately led to the 1981 memorandum 

on strategic cooperation, was underscored in 1979 by the Sixth 

Fleet's call at the port of Haifa. Also in the same year came a new 

kind of American aid, the construction of two new air bases for the 

Israeli Air Force. 46 
PRELUDE TO A MISSION 17 

Notes 

1. Ltr, Brown to Minister of Defense Ezer Weizmann, 19 Mar 79, METG files, 

OASD (ISA). 

2. For a concise narrative of the October war, see Herzog, The Amb-Israeli WaTS, 

pp. 227-323. Some excellent and more de tailed accounts of the war include the 

following: Avraham Adan, On the Banks of the Suez: An Israeli General's Personal Account of the Yom Kippur War (San Rafael, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1980); Hanoch Bartov, Dado: 48 YeaTS and 20 Da),s, trans. Ina Friedman (Tel Aviv: Ma 'miv Book Guild, 

1981); Chaim Herzog, The Wm' of Atonel1lent, October 1973 (Boston, Mass.: Little, 

Brown & Co., 1975); Edgar O 'Ballance, No VictOl; No Vanquished: 17w Yom Kippur 

War (San Rafael, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1978); Saad el Shazly, 17le Crossing of the 

Suez (San Francisco, Calif.: American Mideast Research, 1980). 

3. Howard M. Sachar, A HistOl) of Ismel: From the Rise of Zionism to Our Time 

(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1976) , p. 826; Herzog, The Amb-Israeli WaTS, p. 321; Ismail Fahmy, Negotiatingfor Peace in the Middle East (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins 

University Press, 1983) , p. 34; Henry Kissinger, YeaTS of Upheaval (Boston: Little, 

Brown & Co., 1982), pp. 460-61, 476. 

4. Anwar el Sadat, In SeaTCh of Identit)': An Autobiograj}hy (New York: Harper and 

Row, 1977), pp. 249, 270. It is difficult to overemphasize the importance of the 

initial triumphs to Egyptian national pride and self-esteem. For some idea of the 

influence of these victories, see The Book of the International Symposium on the 1973 

October Wm; Cairo 28-31 October 1975 [Cairo: Ministry of War, 1976], pp. 5, 10,31, 

41,43, and passim. 

5. Herzog, The Amb-Israeli WaTS, p. 323. 

6. Fahmy, Negotiatingfor Peace in the Middle East, p. 34; Sachar, A HistoT), of Ismel, 

p. 818; Kissinger, YeaTS of Upheaval, pp. 612-13. 

7. Patrick Seale, "The Egypt-Israel Treaty and Its Implications, " World Today 35 

(May 1979): 189; Paul Jabber, "U.S. Interests and Regional Security in the Middle 

East," Daedalus 109 (Fall 1980): 69; Kissinger, YeaTS of Upheaval, pp. 615-16, 644. 

8. Fahmy, NegotiatingfoT Peace in the Middle East, pp. 152, 155-57; Herzog, The 

Arab-Israeli WaTS, p. 321; Sadat, In Seau;h of Identity, pp. 291-94; Kissinger, YeaTS of 

Uj}heaval, pp. 649,747-48. 

9. Kissinge r, Yum of Upheaval, pp. 645-46; Sadat, In SeaTCh of Identity, pp. 

294-96; Fahmy, NegotiatingfoT Peace in the Middle East, pp. 3, 214. 

10. David Pollock, The Politics of PreSSUTe: American Anns and Ismeli Policy Since 

the Six-Day War, Contributions in Political Science, no. 79 (Westport, Conn.: 

Greenwood Press, 1982) , pp. 166-67; Kissinger, YeaTS of Upheaval, pp. 797-98. 

11. TowaTd Peace in the Middle East: Report of a Study Group (Washington, D.C.: 

The Brookings Institution, 1975), passim;Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: MemoiTS of a 

President (New York: Bantam Books, 1982), pp. 292-95; Fahmy, NegotiatingfoT Peace 

in the Middle East, pp. 189-90, 199; Howard M. Sachar, f<-gypt and Ismel (New York: 

Richard Marek Publishers, 1981) , p. 262; Melvin A. Friedlander, Sadat and Begin: 

17te Domestic Politics of Peacemaking (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1983), pp. 51, 

111 ; Robert O. Freedman, "Moscow, Jerusalem, and Washington in the Begin 

Era," in Robert O. Freedman, ed., Israel in the Begin ETa (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982) , p. 161. 

12. Seale, "The Egypt-Israel Treaty," pp. 190-91. 

13. Sad at, In SeaTCh of Identity, p. 302. 

14. Carter, Keeping Faith, p. 284. 
18 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

15. Fahmy, Negotiating for Peace in the Middle East, pp. 243, 297; Sachar, Egypt 

and Israel, pp. 266-67; Carter, Keeping Faith, p. 309. 

16. Carter, Keepingl'aith, p. 297; Sad at, In Search of Identity, pp. 303- 04, 306-07. 

17. Eric Silver, Begin: The Haunted Prophet (New York: Random House, 1984), 

p.174. 

18. Friedlander, Sadat and Begin, pp. 31, 43-44, 70, 306; Doreen Kays, Fmgs 

and Scmpions: Egypt, Sadat and the Media (London: Frederick Muller Limited, 

1984), p. 83. 

19. Kissinger, Years ofUpheava~ p. 617. 

20. Carter, Keeping Faith, p. 282; Fahmy, Negotiatingfor Peace in the Middle East, 

p. 280; Mohamed Heikal, Autumn of Fm-y: The Assassination of Sadat (New York: 

Random House, 1983), p . 64. 

2l. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 647. 

22. Sachar, Israel and Egypt, p. 263. 

23. Kays, Frogs and Scorpions, p. 10. 

24. Sadat, In Seanh of Identity, pp. 142-43. 

25. Sachar, Egypt and Israel, pp. 3, 35-36, 40-41, 78-79; Felipe FernandezArmesto, Sadat and His Statecraft (London: The Kensal Press, 1982), p. 150; Donald Neff, WanioTS fm'Jerusalem: The Six Days That Changed the Middle East (New 

York: Linden Press/Simon and Schuster, 1984), pp. 338-39. 

26. Bartov, Dado, p. 155. 

27. Moshe Dayan, Breakthmugh: A Personal Account of the Egypt-Israel Peace Negotiations (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1981), pp. 42-54. 

28. Fahmy, Negotiatingfor Peace in the Middle East, p. 251; Carter, Keeping Faith, 

p. 409; Efram Torgovnik, "Likud 1977-1981: The Consolidation of Power," in 

Freedman, Israel in the Begin Era, pp. 20-21. 

29. Sachar, 1<-{!;;>jJt and Israel, pp. 272-73. 

30. Ibid., pp. 276-77; Carter, Keeping Faith, p. 316; Seale, "The Egypt-Israel 

Treaty," pp. 189-90. 

3l. Carter, Keeping Faith, pp. 394-96; Sachar, Egypt and Israe~ p. 28l. For insightful comments on the Israeli negotiating style, see Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 

p. 539; Silver, Begin, p. 16l. 

32. Sachar, A History of Israel, p. 639; T. R. Milton, "Mideast Survey: Problems 

and Prospects," Air Force Magazine 63 (August 1980): 71; Randolph S. Churchill 

and Winston S. Churchill, The Six-Day Wm' (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967), pp. 

89, 194; Edward N. Luttwak and Daniel Horowitz, The Israeli Anny 1948- 1973 

(Cambridge, Mass.: Abt Books, 1983), p. 221; Interv (telephone), author with Col 

Haywood S. HanselllII,Jun 79, Washington, D.C. 

33. Ezer Weizmann, The Battle for Peace (New York: Bantam Books, 1981), pp. 

90,96,101,104,107,139,144,170,175,181,183,322. 

34. Ibid., p. 175. 

35. Washington Post, 10 Jun 8l. 

36. Time, 30 Mar 8l. 

37. Weizmann, BattleforPeace, pp. 371-72. 

38. Friedlander, Sadat and Begin, p. 311; Sachar, Egypt and Israel, p. 282. For 

copies of the frameworks, see Dayan, Breakthmugh, pp. 321-26. 

39. Pollock, Politics of Pressure, p. 226. 

40. Carter, Keeping Faith, p. 402. 

4l. Ltr, Brown to Weizmann, 28 Sep 78, METG files, OASD (ISA); Hansell 

interview. 

42. Sachar, Egypt and Israel, pp. 282, 291; Friedlander, Sadat and Begin, p. 231; 

Freedman, "Moscow, Jerusalem, and Washington," pp. 173-76; Fernandez-
PRELUDE TO A MISSION 19 

Armesto, Sadat and His Statecraft, pp. 134-35, 158-59; Heikal, Autumn of Fwy, p. 

174. 

43. The lVliddleEast, no. 102 (April 1983) : 14; Seale, 'The Egypt-Israel Treaty," 

p. 194; Fahmy, Negotiating for Peace in the Middle East, p. Ill; Washington Post, 14 

Dec 81 and 11 Dec 83; Stanley Reed, "Syria's Assad: His Power and His Plan," New 

YOT/I Times Magazine, 19 Feb 84, pp. 59, 64; Newsview 4 (8 November 1983): 16. 

44. Sachar, r.gypt and Ism el, p. 290; Heikal, Autumn of Fury, pp. 169, 210; 

Fahmy, Negotiating for Peace in the Middle East, p. 29 l. 

45. Freedman, "Moscow, J erusalem, and Washington, " p . 175; Shmuel Katz, 

The Hollow Peace Oerusalem: Dvir and the Jel'usalem Post, 1981), pp. 270, 280, 284; 

Bernard Avishai, "The Victory of the New Israel," New York Review of Boo/(s 28 (13 

August 1981): 49; In ternational H erald Tribune, 3 Sep 80; Newswee/(, 16 Nov 81; 

Roger Rosenblatt, "From the Battlefield of Beliefs," New York Times Booli Review 88 

(6 November 1983): l. 

46. Pollock, Politics of Pressw-e, pp. 284-85. 
CHAPTER 3 

Planning for the Mission 

Autumn 1978 

By the time April came around, when they finally signed the thing, 

... we had brainstormed that thing so much that I knew exactly what I 

wanted done. 

Maj. Cen.James A. Johnson I 

I think the Corps is probably the only organization in the whole 

damn world that could even do this. 

Oswald I. Hewitt 2 

To the Corps of Engineers Camp David meant the possibility of 

a new mission. Soon after the two frameworks were signed, the 

Corps began planning for a part in building replacements for Israel's major Sinai airfields. On 22 September 1978, six days before 

Brown formally told Weizmann of American willingness to discuss 

aid, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Mfairs David E. McGiffert called Deputy Chief of Engineers Maj. 

Gen. Bates C. Burnell to the Pentagon. McGiffert wanted the 

Corps and the Air Force to provide lists of people and skills for a 

jointly staffed survey team. This group would visit Israel, examine 

potential sites, and explore the characteristics of and problems 

related to a construction mission. 3 

Burnell set up an informal planning group. His meeting with 

McGiffert had been on a Friday evening. On Saturday morning he 

met with two men who would be instrumental in developing any 

military construction project. Lee S. Garrett, the chief of the engineering division in the Military Programs Directorate, had been 

with the Corps for twenty-eight years and was a veteran of earlier 

missile construction programs. Frederick B. McNeely, chief of the 

construction division, had a background that included work on 

military projects from Greenland to Okinawa. The three knew only 

that whatever they might do in Israel would have to be completed 
PLANNING FOR THE MISSION 21 

quickly. Burnell expected the work to involve two replacement 

bases. He thought they should consider contracting approaches 

and selection of a design firm. They discussed the possibilities but, 

with more meetings soon to take place in the Pentagon, could do 

little except note likely prospects and collect information. The office had almost no data on Israel, so McNeely sent an engineer to 

the Pentagon for maps. Garrett started thinking about a preliminary cost estimate. Within a week the Office of the Chief of Engineers also took the first steps toward contracting parts of the job by 

setting up selection boards to consider firms for site investigations 

and design work. 4 

A few days later the Corps took more formal action toward creation of a planning group. Lt. Gen. John W. Morris, the chief of engineers, looking for an experienced and capable colonel who might 

stay with the project and become its manager, brought in Col. 

James E. Hays to lead the planning effort. Thinking that he was 

going to the chief's office for a quick consultation, Hays left Champaign, Illinois, where he commanded the Corps' Construction Engineering Research Laboratory, with only "a change of socks . . . 

and a toilet kit." The other members of the task force-Cleon 

Moore, a construction expert from Mobile District, and 

T. R. Wathen, an engineer from San Francisco District-had arrived 

already. Capt. Robin R. Cababa, who served as executive officer and 

administrator, completed the group. Morris told Hays to assume 

that the Corps would build two airfields in the Negev Desert. The 

bases would have to be operational in three years. Morris wanted alternative concepts for government management and contractor execution of the mission, keeping in mind that only a minimum number of Corps of Engineers people could be involved. He placed the 

resources of his headquarters at Hays' disposaP 

The staff welcomed Hays, whose experience told him that on 

crash programs "people break down the bureaucratic walls, and 

the red tape gets rolled up and snipped off in a lot of areas." This 

project proved no exception: "Any time I called on people, they 

stopped what they were doing practically, and gave me what I 

needed. And as a result, it went a lot better than I think I had a 

right to expect." 6 Members of the military programs staff told Hays 

of the work already in progress. Donald W. Butler, deputy chief of 

Garrett's engineering division and the division's coordinator for 

this effort, reported that his office already had devised a preliminary schedule and estimated costs. McNeely, whose construction 

division had set up the selection boards, was represented on the 

project by Carl A. Damico. The Office of Counsel had also been ac-
22 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

tive; attorney M. Randall Head had been working with McGiffert's 

office in the Pentagon on enabling legislation. 7 

Mter a quick trip to Illinois for sartorial reinforcements, Hays 

spent his first week arranging for his group's operation. He reported directly to Maj. Gen. William R. Wray, who headed the Military Programs Directorate. All correspondence relating to the 

planning effort passed through Hays' office, which became known 

as the Corps of Engineers Near East Group or CENEG. The name 

screened from public view the specific mission being considered. 

Circumstances demanded such obscurity because the program was 

a long way from realization. Still to come were the actual peace 

treaty, the U.S. commitment to build the bases, and congressional 

approval of funds. 8 

During his short stay in Washington, Hays worked on two 

phases of the project plans. With the Air Force and McGiffert's office, he prepared for the survey team's trip to Israel. The team 

members had already been chosen, with Hays the senior man for 

the Corps of Engineers. Within the Office of the Chief of Engineers, he and the task force looked at a variety of contractual 

approaches to construction.

9 

One plan for the operation preceded the deliberations of the 

Hays task force. Garrett's office produced a framework known as 

TABU, or Two Air Bases in Israel. This proposal called for a main office staffed jointly by Corps personnel and a management contractor. Two subordinate offices, one at each site, would direct two construction consortia, each of which would include subcontractors for 

support, site investigation, design, procurement, and construction. 10 

Hays' group drew heavily on the knowledge of the headquarters staff in their investigation of contracting options. They looked 

at the experience of the Corps, notably the North Mrican air base 

construction program of the 1950s, the ballistic missile facilities in 

the 1950s and 1960s, and more recent work for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. They also considered possibilities based on the current organization. This structure consisted of 

fourteen divisions, each managing work in a large region. Twelve 

of these divisions were divided into two to four districts. Within the 

districts, area offices and project offices directly supervised specific 

projects. Heading this organization was the Office of the Chief of 

Engineers, which occasionally managed a program directly but 

usually contented itself with policy guidance. In 1978 this structure 

included three overseas divisions. Pacific Ocean Division, with responsibilities ranging from Hawaii to Japan and Korea, was remote 

from any projected mission in Israel. Middle East Division, which 

managed the construction program in Saudi Arabia from Riyadh 
PLANNING FOR THE MISSION 23 

with a support staff called Middle East Division-Rear at Berryville, 

Virginia, could not participate because of the potential political effect of such a connection on relations with the Saudi government. 

Europe Division represented another possibility, as did creation of 

a new division. The group also considered setting up an office 

under an existing division. II 

In addition to looking into organizational options, Hays and 

his group made assumptions that informed the development of 

specific proposals. First was the need to minimize the number of 

U.S. government people in Israel. They also postulated completion of work within three years and execution of design and construction by the United States. In addition, they shared McGiffert's 

understanding that design would involve replication of existing 

airfields based on current Israeli standards. 12 

With these guidelines, the task force drew up four concepts for 

the organization. All of the proposals called for a headquarters in 

Israel, with an executive office and a construction division. The office also would contain small cadres in other areas, including legal 

support, finance and accounting, administration, procurement, 

and personnel. Additional help in these fields would come from 

the permanent Corps organization. None of the four contained a 

separate engineering or design staff. Each followed the example of 

Middle East Division and relegated the design element to a stateside support activity, in this case a subordinate office that was 

usually called CENEG-Rear. 13 

The proposals that emerged in the middle of October reflected a fundamental uncertainty regarding the nature of the mission. The United States had made no formal commitment to any 

specific task, so planning remained hypothetical. Technical clarification regarding the job ahead awaited the removal of political 

ambiguities. Even that the mission would involve building two 

bases remained an assumption. The Israelis planned to remove a 

network of training facilities, fortifications, and depots, and the Israeli government wanted as much American help as it could get. 

With the precise extent of American aid undetermined, the preliminary schemes had to anticipate major U.S. involvement. 

Hence, one of the concepts included construction managers for 

two airfields and for "Army projects." Another provided for the 

even more amorphous category of "other projects." 

The main differences in the proposals involved the number 

and type of contracts to be managed. The plan known as "concept 

A" called for executing all work through a single consortium of 

construction management contractors. This conglomerate would 

perform site investigations and surveys and prepare preliminary 
24 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

design concepts. It also would direct three groups of contractors. 

One would provide support services, another would do the horizontal construction-roads, runways, utility lines, and the like-at 

both sites, and the third would erect all buildings. This scheme 

presupposed a strong similarity in the work at both sites. Moreover, 

of the four concepts, it alone did not specify a cost-type contract in 

which the contractor received reimbursement for all legitimate expenses and a preestablished fee, either fixed or based on specific 

standards and incentives. 

The task force cited a number of advantages in concept A. Perhaps the most obvious was the small span of control required of 

Corps management with the work handled through a single contractor group. Other positive features involved rapid start of preliminary design and actual construction. The Hays group also saw 

disadvantages. This approach placed many layers of contractor 

management between the Corps and actual designers and constructors. So it reduced chances to discover and fix problems that 

might cause delays. Finally, it would cost more to manage a program through a management consortium than to do so directly. 

The other three proposals called for cost-type arrangements 

with contractor joint ventures. They had in common the basic 

premise of any cost-plus contract: too little knowledge of what lay 

ahead to establish a clear scope of work on which a contractor 

could bid and make a commitment. The proposals also shared 

other assumptions, notably the need to provide operational bases 

before relocating Israeli Air Force units from their Sinai bases. All 

of them made possible a "fast-track" operation, with concurrent 

design, procurement, and construction. Consequently, all anticipated increased costs: fast-track work required intensive management and increased the chance of error. On the positive side, all 

three offered good opportunities for comparing plans, procedures, and costs for the two bases. 

The first of these three proposals, dubbed concept B by the task 

force, called for a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract with a consortium for 

construction management. This group would handle the complex activities involved in base construction-design, procurement, mobilization, and support, as well as construction itself. Site investigation would 

begin immediately under a separate contract and revert to the consortium after it was established. Control by a single construction manager 

streamlined management. This plan also presented the greatest problem: dependence on a single manager increased the chance of failure. 

If the contractor backed out for some reason, the Corps would be left 

without an on-site organization to carry out the work. 
PLANNING FOR THE MISSION 25 

Concept C, involving three prime contractors, resembled the 

plan that had been developed in Garrett's office. Two joint ventures with cost-plus contracts would design and build one base 

each. The third consortium would support the Corps in managing 

the construction organizations. Like concept B, this scheme provided initially for separate site investigation contracts. These could 

be reassigned later to a prime construction contractor. The task 

force thought this plan offered the best possibility for correcting 

design errors during construction. On the debit side, it consigned 

direct management of the work to the contractors and offered only 

minimum opportunities for the exchange of experience between 

the sites. 

The fourth proposal, labeled concept D, started with one costtype contract for managing design and construction at both sites. 

The plan included at least four additional prime contracts for design, construction, and support at each base. More cumbersome 

and costly than the others, this scheme also required more than 

twice as many government employees in Israel. 

Concept 

A ....... . ............ .... . 

s ............. .. ......... . C ..... .......... .. .... . .. . 

D ............ . ........ . 

Project Staffing 

Israel Office 

(construc/ion division) 

83 (46) 

65 (24) 

78 (33) 

176 (76) 

SUjJ/Jort 

Office 

13 

13 

13 

54 

However, it maximized control, assured higher quality work, and 

enhanced chances of meeting a very tight schedule. 

While Hays evaluated these options, Weizmann and Dayan 

came to Washington for talks on moving from the Camp David 

framework to an actual treaty. Weizmann also discussed American 

aid for withdrawal from the Sinai with a Department of Defense 

delegation led by Robert J. Murray, McGiffert's deputy for Near 

Eastern, Mrican, and South Asian affairs. Col. Haywood S. Hansell 

III, whose Middle East Task Group within Murray's office coordinated Department of Defense activities regarding the bases, accompanied Murray. Hays also went, as did U.S. Air Force Brig. 

Gen. Paul T. Hartung, who had been chosen to lead the survey 

team to Israel. l4 Hartung had entered the service in World War II 

by enlisting as a sailor. His Air Force engineering experience came 

after a direct commission during the Korean War and included familiarity with the Corps of Engineers and its construction methods. He had worked with the Corps on the Atlas intercontinental 

ballistic missile program and on construction of the North Ameri-
26 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

can Air Defense Command's underground complex at Cheyenne 

Mountain, near Colorado Springs, Colorado. When he joined the 

survey team, he was deputy chief of staff for engineering and services at the Military Airlift Command. Hays found him personable 

and skilled at solving problems and was particularly impressed with 

his organizational approaches to problems. 15 

At the meeting Weizmann discussed possible sites for air bases 

and mentioned that some of them overlapped firing ranges and 

maneuver areas. He explained the need for multiple runways to 

lessen the likelihood that a single attack could close a base. Brig. 

Gen. Amos Lapidot, the vice commander of the Israeli Air Force, 

added that his air force considered protection of aircraft as the 

first priority in base design. He also told the Americans that the Israelis intended to design the bases themselves, although possibly 

with American help. Before the session ended, Weizmann expressed interest in securing more aid for relocation of army facilities. Murray turned that inquiry aside. The question would have to 

be raised with the president. 16 

Within a few days the task force reduced the number of proposals to h-vo. Essentially, these resembled concept B, which called 

for management through a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract with one 

construction management consortium, and concept C, which 

specified three cost-type contracts-two with construction joint 

ventures and another with a construction manager. As Hays noted, 

neither allowed for a high degree of government control. Both involved high management costs, although the single-contractor "B" 

plan would be more expensive and harder to manageP 

The task force also suggested t\-vo possible organizations for the 

Corps' project office. One put the office directly under the Office 

of the Chief of Engineers and attached a stateside support group 

to the project headquarters. This arrangement offered a flexible 

organization dedicated entirely to the project, although it required assembly and lacked interim capability. The other proposal, 

for an office that also reported directly to Washington but was 

linked with an engineer division or one of its districts for support, 

provided a framework on which to build. Consequently, it could 

start operations more quickly. The main drawback came from the 

inability of any division to focus on this project to the exclusion of 

its other work. Either of these organizations could be tied to one of 

the suggested contracting concepts. IS 

Meanwhile, McNeely's construction division examined the 

need for support from the United States. A staff study concluded 

that help was needed in a variety of administrative and technical 

areas and identified North Atlantic Division and Missouri River Di-
PLANNING FOR THE MISSION 27 

vision as those best able to aid in the project. North Atlantic was 

one time zone closer, had better access by air, and had more overseas experience, so it seemed the better choice. Mter Wray approved this recommendation, a different issue related to a support 

organization arose. On 30 October Deputy Chief Burnell, acting as 

chief of engineers in the absence of Morris, approved involvement 

of North Atlantic Division in the work. He also ordered North Atlantic to devise a plan for managing the entire mission from its 

New York office. Burnell stopped short of assigning the job to New 

York but obviously inclined in that direction. McNeely said, 'They 

already had the mission anyway, as far as we were concerned." Only 

Hays still saw the project as tied directly to Washington. 19 

Meanwhile, the Hays group began to expand. Aided by McNeely and Garrett, with their widespread contacts within the Corps, 

Hays brought more engineers into the office to develop lists of tasks 

for possible contracts and to prepare mission statements for the 

components of an expanded task force office. At the same time, 

personnel specialists arrived to prepare job descriptions and recruit 

employees. The task force appeared to be evolving into a project 

management office. Moreover, by using the acronym CENEG for itself and for the project office that would run the program in Israel, 

the group's reports tended to reinforce that impression.

20 

Burnell's order did not surprise North Atlantic Division. Maj. 

Gen. James A. Johnson, the division commander, had been thinking about the project since September. "I started planning for it," 

Johnson later said, "actually before they signed the Camp David accord." He did so because the proceedings there convinced him 

there was "a strong possibility that the Corps of Engineers would 

get involved, particularly in some of those things that require construction support." He also considered options for managing such 

a construction mission. Middle East Division was in Saudi Arabia, 

whose government would probably resent sharing an engineering 

organization with Israel, and Europe Division had too much work 

already. Therefore, he concluded, any project resulting from the 

Camp David accords would be managed either by the Office of the 

Chief of Engineers or through it by a stateside division. 21 

Johnson shared Morris' view of the Washington office as a policy headquarters rather than an operational one. He also agreed 

with Morris' opposition to special offices for specific projects. Morris thought this approach created problems. "There was," he explained, "a standard organization with fixed responsibilities." It 

was better "to do things within the framework than to set up special cells which had to be defined." Special offices required new 

statements of responsibilities and were likely to overlap with exist-
28 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

ing components of the organization. Both Johnson and Morris 

thought the Corps program should be executed through the divisions by districts or similar organizations.22 

Johnson actively pursued the airfield mission, just as he had always eagerly sought new jobs. When the chief's office had sought a 

district to do a small dredging job in Gabon, he took the work for 

Philadelphia District. Success there, he later recalled, "helped 

[Philadelphia's] morale and gave them a little extra work to do." 

So weeks before Burnell told him to plan for the job, he went to 

Washington and told Morris and Burnell of his interest. He 

thought his division "the logical command to do it" because of 

North Atlantic's experience with cost-plus base construction in 

North Mrica, Greenland, and elsewhere. Besides, he later said, "it 

was a great project." So without an order to proceed or assurance 

that the Corps would have work in Israel, he informally assigned 

consideration of the job to a small group of senior staff members.23 

At this juncture the chief's office prepared to participate in the 

survey team. That group would bring back useful answers only if it 

posed the right questions. General Wray asked his engineering division for a study of the requirements for operational air bases and 

of the logistical support needed for construction. Garrett selected 

a task force led by Donald Butler. John F. Reimer, the chief estimator in the division and a member of the group, said they set out "to 

ask the proper questions and to ascertain the construction requirements as well as the functional requirements of such a base." In a 

week the group listed the data needed for analyzing the job, including runway lengths, pavement thickness, the number of and 

types of aircraft, types of soil, and the number of people who 

would reside at the bases. They also raised questions about labor, 

materials, and equipment, whether Israeli, American, or other 

sources would be used. 24 

The survey team set out for Israel with the engineering division's shopping list in hand. Mter briefings on 2 and 3 November 

by Hartung, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the State Department, the team flew to Tel Aviv. Composed of Air Force officers and Corps civilian employees, with Hays the only engineer officer from the Corps, the group represented a substantial pool of 

knowledge on base development, ranging from site investigations 

and cost estimating to base activation. The Israelis were gracious 

hosts, treating the team well and surprising its members with their 

openness. Weizmann even insisted that Israeli officers speak English among themselves at meetings with the Americans. Lt. Col. 

Richard G. Rhyne, an Air Force team member who had been in Is-
PLANNING FOR THE MISSION 29 

rael regarding the transfer of American equipment to the Israelis, 

said they had never before been as helpfu1. 25 

It was indeed unusual for the Israel Defense Force to show potential base sites or classified documents to foreigners. In the previous twenty-four years, the Israelis had absorbed massive amounts of 

American military aid. 26 In all that time they had never accepted the 

American advisers who customarily went with the hardware. Back in 

1954, the United States had agreed for the first time to an Israeli request for arms and wanted to send fifty to one hundred advisers 

with the weapons. Moshe Dayan rejected the offer: Israel was a 

sovereign nation, and its defense plans and preparations were state 

secrets. No foreign advisers, Dayan said, would ever set foot on an Israeli military installation. Yet in November 1978, a government that 

included Dayan as foreign minister was uncharacteristically openY 

The team learned a great deal about the Israeli Air Force. In 

Tel Aviv members were briefed on Israeli air strategy and base configuration and toured potential base sites with their hosts. The Israelis also took the Americans to an active base and showed them 

what happened when the alarm sounded. Hays remembered 

"standing there watching in amazement" as an air base came alive. 

Sirens blared and pilots dashed to their aircraft, which were fueled 

and armed in the shelters-like "an Indianapolis 500 pit stop," according to one American-while the fliers in their cockpits got instructions by radio. When all was completed, the planes taxied 

onto the runways and took off. The first plane was airborne in 

three minutes. As an Israeli with the team said, "That's not bad." 28 

Mter initial discussions, the team broke up into small specialized groups. Each operated separately with its own transportation 

and escorts from the Israeli Air Force. The American embassy in 

Tel Aviv provided office space and information as well as a central 

location where team members could discuss their findings privately. Hosts and visitors reached a basic understanding of their respective needs and abilities. The Israeli Air Force needed bases for 

five squadrons-150 aircraft-in the Negev when Israel vacated 

the Sinai. They saw these units spread over three bases with ultimate expansion to eight squadrons. Meanwhile, the Americans 

formed ideas about the cost of such a project. Estimators Ronald]. 

HaGvell of the Office of the Chief of Engineers and Air Force Lt. 

Col. David Bull decided that two bases accommodating five 

squadrons would cost just over $1 billion. As Hays noted, their 

work was critical: "They were a real keystone in the whole organization of the report because of the importance of the cost data." 29 

Hartung emphasized that the United States could build operational albeit incomplete airfields for Israel in three years. Facilities 
30 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

and buildings unrelated to the ability to fly and fight might take 

longer to finish. He considered this distinction important. A misunderstanding might create false expectations and damage relations between the two nations.30 

When the survey team returned home, its members briefed policy makers in the Department of Defense. These sessions stressed 

that timely completion of a construction job in Israel required quick 

decisions and early funding. Delays at the start would be costly at the 

end. Hartung explained the team's most important conclusions. 

The Israeli Air Force, he wrote, would have preferred to build the 

bases under their own control. However, they lacked experience 

with fast-track construction and decided that they could not do the 

work in less than five or six years. Moreover, with the Israeli construction industry ''virtually saturated," a job this big would adversely 

affect the small country's economy; the sudden increase in demand 

for building materials and labor would boost an already very high 

rate of inflation. So, to meet a tight schedule and avoid economic 

damage, the Israelis decided to import all materials and labor for 

the job and agreed to American involvement in a fast-track operation with simultaneous design, procurement, and construction.31 

With the answers brought back by the survey team, Reimer and 

his colleagues developed the initial figure. In addition to knowledge of the cost of previous efforts, the estimate required that they 

envision the details of work not yet started and anticipate conditions that might confront the builders.32 The estimators used data 

brought back by Hartung and aerial photographs of the Sinai 

bases as the basis for calculating the approximate number and type 

of buildings. McNeely's office provided information on the effect 

of tight construction schedules and procurement of materials that 

had to be ordered well in advance. The Army's experience in military construction, which was quantified in regulations, yielded unit 

cost data for standard facility designs and cost factors for construction in isolated and remote locations.

33 The estimators divided the 

project into its vertical and horizontal parts, the latter including 

runways and roads as well as utilities and other underground systems. Ordinarily vertical construction was more labor intensive, 

and the estimators calculated the ratios of labor and machinery for 

the expected amounts of these different types of work. To this they 

added the cost of logistical and administrative support. In December they came up with a tentative figure: $l.06 billion. 34 Their 

total, perhaps more art than science, turned out to be remarkably 

accurate. This figure was revised several times early in the following winter. Finally the estimators settled on $1.04 billion.35 
PLANNING FOR THE MISSION 31 

Still, the nature of American participation was unclear. Hartung thought the possibilities ranged from an advisory role to total 

project control. In any case, he believed that the Corps of Engineers should represent the United States in construction matters. 

The Corps, he noted, had "the people with fast track construction 

experience and the organization to accomplish the task." The survey team concluded that normal military construction procedures 

should be used if the Defense Department became involved in 

construction. The Corps would be design and construction agent. 

The Air Force would provide a small regional civil engineer team 

that would be the Corps customer and would represent the U.S. 

government with the Israeli Air Force, which was the user.36 Such a 

relationship resembled the normal arrangement for air force construction, except that the U.S. Air Force was usually the user as 

well as the customer. 

Even with American construction management, the Israeli 

government had major responsibilities. These included deciding 

early on design criteria, compiling rainfall and runoff data for the 

sites, and gathering information on the nature and availability of 

local foods and fuels. The Israelis also faced the expense and effort 

of dismantling bases and moving forces out of the Sinai. In addition, they had to provide utilities-water, electricity, and telephones-to the sites. The government of Israel could support the 

program in other ways, ranging from providing translators and repair of haul roads to housing and on-site transportation and security. Hartung advised against involving the host country. He argued 

that these activities involved "resources required to accomplish the 

project, and if assigned to [the government ofIsrael], they are not 

under the contractor's control." Reliance on any outside party 

would restrict the contractor's ability to meet the rigid schedule by 

intensively managing all resources. 37 

The survey team was still in Israel when GeneralJohnson formally set up his task group to plan execution. On 13 November 

1978, he told three senior staff members with experience in accelerated overseas construction to devise a management plan. This 

team consisted of Frank Pagano, chief of the engineering division; 

Alvin Vinitsky, chief of construction operations division; and Oswald Hewitt, comptroller. The only person missing, Vinitsky later 

said, was the man who would actually manage the project. "The 

guy that's got to live with it" was not there. Johnson assigned them 

an office that came to be called the Israeli war room. He directed 

his deputy for military construction, Col. Paul Bazilwich, to assist 

the group. They had one week to produce a plan.38 
32 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

For the next five days the task force set aside all other work and 

concentrated on this assignment. They started with little information. Colonel Hays, whose report was still incomplete, told them 

what he had seen. They also had u.s. Air Force manuals on air 

base facilities and layout drawings of Eitam and Etzion. "All we 

knew," Vinitsky recalled, "was that we were going to build airbases. 

We had very Ii ttle data." 39 

GeneralJohnson did give the group some planning guidelines. 

He wanted a four-part organization: a headquarters in Israel, a 

stateside support group, and two area offices, one at each base. He 

also wanted · the staff limited to 180 to 200 people, one-third of 

them military. This unusually heavy use of soldiers would assure 

that the project did not draw too heavily from the largely civilian 

management and in turn disrupt the stateside construction program. It also would give the engineer officers some important experience. Johnson also thought an organization with a large number of military people would be easy to dismantle later. "I want the 

organization developed quickly, and I want it buried quickly," he 

said. He estimated the life of the office as four years, with three to 

do the job and another to close out the operation. Because soldiers more readily accepted rapid reassignments, they were best 

suited for this project. 40 

Johnson wanted an engineer brigadier general in charge of the 

work in Israel. The political environment and the rigorous sch edule demanded high-level leadership. He also wanted someone with 

the experience and strength to stand up to pressures from the U.S. 

Air Force and the Israelis. "He's got to be tough," Johnson concluded.41 Morris turned down the request. He saw two organizational choices: an independent office in Tel Aviv under a general 

or a smaller office with a streamlined staff under a colonel and attached for support to a stateside division. The former would require staff to handle accounting, personnel support, logistics, and 

administrative matters. The latter could draw much of this help 

from the division to which it was assigned. In any case no brigadier 

generals were available . Besides, colone ls in the Corps of Engineers had managed more complicated construction jobs than this. 

At Cape Canaveral, for example, a colonel had overseen erection 

of a complex network of facilities for the space program. Morris 

was sure "we could run the job site with a colonel. Colonels usually 

build air fields." 42 

With so little to go on, numerous assumptions entered the task 

force's plans. Primary among them was the expectation that the 

work would be done through an engineer division-preferably 

their own-by an organization that resembled an engineer district. 
PLANNING FOR THE MISSION 33 

The task force also assumed that the tight schedule and the lack of 

firm construction criteria would require the use of letter contracts 

to start work and cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts to carry it out. Because the group thought complete design of the air bases would be 

required, they sought prime construction contractors with full design capabilities.43 Hewitt favored combining these contractual and 

organizational arrangements. "It enabled us to get a faster start by 

getting hard-to-acquire expertise aboard in a hurry and moving," 

he said. "If we'd had only Corps people, we'd have to make a lot of 

contacts with people we know and then get the approval of their 

chiefs to use them." 44 

In theory the Corps had a framework for rapid mobilization of 

engineer districts staffed by a variety of experts. Each of three "redi 

districts" was to have a nucleus of civilians designated in advance. 

In an emergency the Corps could assemble these organizationsone each from the South Atlantic, North Atlantic, and South Pacific Divisions-and send them overseas on short notice. The reality of the situation in 1978 did not match the concept. The task 

force considered the possibility of mobilizing a ready district. Vinitsky said it would take too long, and Hewitt doubted the availability 

of people with needed skills, especially with a number of districts 

occupied with floods in the United States.

45 Hays had seen the rosters and found that "most of them were several years out of date." 46 

Bazilwich summed up the ready district as "a paper thing meeting 

a paper requirement." 47 Because of the problems involved in 

quickly assembling enough Corps employees to manage the job, 

the group sought a contractor that could support and augment 

project management. 48 

Relying on these premises, the task force went to work. Daily 

the group briefed Johnson, analyzed their plan, picked it apart, 

and rebuilt it. With Pagano nominally in charge, they kept the project informal, avoided assigning portions to individuals, and 

worked together. When necessary, they spent long hours on the 

job and consulted other members of the staff. Johnson was almost 

a fourth member of the team. Vinitsky thought he "enjoyed it the 

same way we enjoyed it with regard to getting your feet wet, a 

hands-on operation." The others also enjoyed working with Johnson. When they thought he was wrong, they told him. Even more 

important, he listened, suggested, and made decisions only after 

considering the views of the others.49 

The group finished the report on Friday evening and produced it the next day. Pagano and draftsmen from New York District prepared slides for a presentation to Burnell in Washington. 

Vinitsky spent Saturday at a photocopying machine. The product 
34 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

of their week-long effort was a 22-page proposal. Not to be outdone by the Hays task force, they stenciled diagonally across the 

title page their own acronym, CENADNEG, for Corps of Engineers 

North Atlantic Division Near East Group.50 

On Monday, 20 November, Johnson and his task force took the 

CENADNEG proposal to Washington. They presented a straightforward plan, known as the blue book because of its binding. It 

tersely covered the major points, ranging from the supposition 

that the project would involve two sites to their understanding that 

the design of the new bases would replicate the old. The document 

contained several important lists. One included the names of 

North Atlantic personnel in construction, engineering, and support areas with experience in cost-type or overseas work. Another 

identified laws and regulations for which waivers should be sought. 

For example, the 1969 National Environmental Policy Act required a government construction agency to file an environmental 

impact statement before starting work. This requirement was irrelevant to work in a foreign country. Still other lists bore the names 

of firms that might be able to handle portions of the work.5 1 

The proposal, which resembled concept C of Hays' group, included an organizational concept and charts for elements of the 

project office. It called for either three or five cost-plus-fixed-fee 

contracts. A management contractor would assist with supervision, 

conduct analyses, and prepare reports. The work would be done 

either by two joint ventures, one at each site for design and construction; or by four, with separate firms for design and construction. This latter possibility, which allowed for the merger of the designers with the respective builders later in the project, was 

rejected. The scope of design work seemed too vague for separate 

contracts. Moreover, the fast-track concept, with procurement and 

construction starting while design continued, required close coordination. Consolidation of design and construction in a single 

joint venture seemed the best way to pull together the designer 

and the builder.52 

While the framework borrowed from work that had been done 

in Washington, the project office as seen by the North Atlantic Division had one original feature. In addition to the executive office, 

for which Johnson still wanted a brigadier general, the structure 

contained four divisions, three of which appeared routinely designed. Engineering consisted of 17 people, construction had 33, 

and program management consisted of 10. The fourth, the resource management office, was the largest at 38. It subsumed a 

number of usually separate functions, including the personnel office, procurement and supply, administrative services, and office of 
PLANNING FOR THE MISSION 35 

counsel. "Resource management," Hewitt envisioned, "would handle everything except engineering and construction." 53 

Johnson shared Hewitt's enthusiasm for this arrangement. Engineer regulations give the resource management office responsibility for a wide range of financial functions, notably the standard 

comptroller duties of "receiving, controlling, accounting for and 

issuing" appropriations made by Congress for the Corps of Engineers. Other areas of responsibility involved long-range planning, 

manpower management, contracting and procurement, and employee training. Johnson adopted a more literal and broader view, 

asserting that the resource manager's job was managing resources. 

Consolidation of staff offices that managed resources of one kind 

or another, he believed, increased overall efficiency.54 

Others shared their belief in a strong resource manager. McNeely's experience with overseas programs convinced him that the 

Corps frequently paid insufficient early attention to property accountability and documentation of financial transactions. He 

agreed that the resource manager should have ample staff for control of equipment and materials. The project always got built, 

Vinitsky added, noting that potential trouble lay in failure to document expenditures and directions to contractors. McNeely, Hewitt, 

and Vinitsky all remembered cost-plus overseas missions where indifference to these details had brought trouble, particularly the administrative and financial nightmare that developed in the wake of 

construction of the North Mrican airfields in the 1950s. Nevertheless, even McNeely saw the proposal as an effort to create a large 

enough organization to justify a very high grade for whomever 

might take charge.55 

The proposal received a hostile reception from most of the 

Washington staff. Johnson recalled that Col. Donald H. Morelli, 

chief of the resource management office in the headquarters, supported the idea. However, Morelli's own suggestions for staffing 

the office, made the preceding week, were relatively modest. He 

called for eleven people concentrating on financial management 

in three areas: budget and programs, audit, and finance and accounting. Others in the chief's office insisted on a more conventional arrangement, with resource management performing 

comptroller functions such as those in Morelli's proposal. Morris' 

aversion to experimental organizations may have applied here too. 

Separate staff offices would handle personnel matters, provide 

legal advice, and manage other support services. 56 

Despite rejection of this part of their plan, the briefing went well. 

North Atlantic got the job. Vinitsky thought that Burnell had made 

up his mind even before the briefing. McNeely, who worked closely 
36 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

with Burnell during this period, thought so too. Hays may have been 

disappointed, but he and the staff raised no major objections.57 

About the time that North Atlantic received the assignment, 

Johnson decided that he needed an expert in management and 

administration as well as a military commander for the project office. He chose an old friend and classmate at the Military Academy, 

Hugh]. Bartley, who had retired from the Army as a brigadier general in 1976 after serving on the Army staff as director of plans, 

programs, and budget in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff 

for Operations. Johnson invited Bartley to his Governor's Island 

home for Thanksgiving dinner and made his offer. He wanted 

Bartley to leave a consulting job with the University of Pittsburgh 

Medical School, taking a pay cut of over $100 per day. As one of 

the first project people in Israel, he would set up the organization. 

Mter a walk around the island, Bartley agreed, although he was 

not convinced that a peace treaty would materialize. He would 

leave Pittsburgh as soon as Johnson called.58 

Johnson also knew who he wanted to command the office in Israel. Knowing that he would be unable to get a brigadier general 

or Colonel Hays, who did not want to go to Israel, Johnson proposed Col. Clarence D. Gilkey for the job. Gilkey'S experience included duty with a military training mission in Saudi Arabia in 

1966-1967. He also had spent three years as Portland District engineer before going to West Point as the facilities engineer in 1976. 

He was still there when Johnson decided he wanted him. Gilkey's 

nearby location made it possible to include him in planning from a 

very early date. Still in November,Johnson asked the deputy superintendent at West Point to release Gilkey from duty at the academy. 

Here again Johnson u sed his personal friendships. Brig. Gen. 

Charles W. Bagnal had been a West Point cadet when Johnson was 

his tactical officer. Bagnal shared Bartley's skepticism about the 

likelihood of the mission but agreed to release Gilkey after Johnson promised to find a replacement. So Gilkey was available for 

briefings and planning sessions in New York.59 

Before Johnson could do much more, important developments had to take place. A treaty ratifying the Camp David commitments remained to be signed. Next, Congress would have to appropriate money for the job. Only then could the Corps select 

contractors and hire people for work in Israel. The Corps had prepared for these actions by choosing an organization to carry out 

the job, settling on a tentative structure for it, and preparing lists 

of likely participants. As 1978 ended, the Corps was well along in 

its preparations to make good the American promise to provide 

operational airfields to replace the Sinai bases. 
PLANNING FOR THE MISSION 

Notes 

1. Interv, author with Maj GenJames A.Johnson, Sep 83, Fort Belvoir, Va. 

2. Interv, author with Oswald 1. Hewitt,Jan 80, New York City. 

37 

3. Memo, M~ Gen Bates C. Burnell, Acting CaE, for ASD (ISA), 25 Sep 78, 

sub: Construction Support to Near East Activities, METG files; Frederick B. McNeely, Early Days of Israeli Airbase Program, Encl to Ltr, McNeely to Maj Gen 

Bennett L. Lewis, NAD, 10 Apr 80, sub: Early Days of Israeli Airbase Program, 

lABPC,11 / 6. 

4. McNeely, Early Days of Israeli Airbase Program, Encl to Ltr, McNeely to 

Lewis, 10 Apr 80; Interv, author with Frederick B. McNeely, Sep 83, Washington, 

D.C.; DF, William R. Darnell, Engineering Division, to Lee S. Garrett, Chief, Engineering Division, MC, aCE, 27 Sep 78, sub: AE Selection Boards for Two Site Investigation Firms and Two Design Firms for Middle East Projects, lABPC, 1/4. 

5. Inte rv, author with Col James E. Hays, Dec 79, Alexandria, Va.; Chronology 

of Decisions/ Guidance, n.d., lABPC, 89/3; Maj Gen William R. Wray, comments 

on draft MS, lABPC, 93/10. 

6. Hays interview. 

7. Ibid.; Col J ames E. Hays, Minutes of CENEG Meeting, 4 Oct 78, lABPC, 

1/5. 

8. Hays, Minutes of CENEG Meeting, 4 Oct 78. 

9. Hays interview. 

10. Ibid.; TABII Contracting Plan, lABPC, 1/5. 

11. Hays in terview. 

12. DF, Hays to aCE Staff, 23 Oct 78, sub: Request for Comments/Concurrence: Organizational Concepts for Accomplishment of CENEG Mission, lABPC, 

1/ 5. 

13. Concepts A (13 Oct 78), B (13 Oct 78, revised 16 Oct 78), C (13 Oct 78, 

revised 16 Oct 78), and D (18 Oct 78), all in IABPC, 1/5. This narrative is based 

on these documents. 

14. MFR, Hays, 18 Oct 78, IABPC, 1/ 5; Dayan, Breakthmugh, p. 199. 

15. Hays interview; USAF Office of Public Affairs Biography, Brigadier General Paul T. Hartung, in Office of Air Force History, Bolling Air Force Base, Washington, D.C. 

16. Hays interview; MFR, Hays, 18 Oct 78. 

17. DF, Hays to aCE Staff, 23 Oct 78. 

18. Ibid. 

19. David A. Spivey, Staff Study: CENEG Support, 25 Oct 78, IABPC, 1/5; DF, 

Maj Gen William R. ''''ray to CaE, 26 Oct 78, sub: Recommendation of Support 

Division for CENEG Operations, with comment by Burnell, 30 Oct 78, lABPC, 

1/ 1; McNeely interview, Sep 83. 

20. Capt Robin R. Cababa, CENEG Status Report, 31 Oct 78, IABPC, 1/5; 

Hays interview. 

21. Johnson interview. 

22. Ibid.; Interv, author with Lt GenJohn W. Morris (Ret.), Mar 83, Arlington, 

Va. 

23. Johnson interview; John W. Chambers, The North Atlantic Engineers: A Hist01)1 oj the North Atlantic Division and Its Predecessors in the U.S. Ann)' C01PS oj Engineers 

(New York: NAD, 1980), p. 91. 

24. In addition to Butler, the task force included estimators John Reimer and 

Ronald Hatwell from the engineering support branch, and a rchitect Thomas 
38 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

Payne, chief of the architectural and building systems branch. There were also 

four members from the advanced technology branch: chief Harold McCauley, an 

expert on hardened structures; D. S. Reynolds, also a specialist in hardened structures; August Muller, an environmental engineer specializing in water and sewer 

systems; and paving expert Samuel Gillespie. Interv, author with John F. Reimer, 

Feb 82, Washington, D.C. 

25. Cababa, CENEG Status Reports, 31 Oct and 1 Nov 78, IABPC, 1/5; Hays 

interview. 

26. For a summary of U.S. aid to Israel, see U.S. Congress, General Accounting Office, U.S. Assistance to the State of Israel, Report 83-51 (Washington, D.C.: 

GPO, 1983). 

27. Wilbur C. Eveland, Ropes of Sand: America's Failtm in the Middle East (New 

York: W. W. Norton, 1980) , p. 86; Yoram Peri, Between Battles and Ballots: Israeli Military in Politics (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 6. 

28. Hays interview; Milton, "Mideast Survey: Problems and Prospects," p. 71; 

Ze'ev Schiff, A Histo)), of the Israeli Anny, 1874 to the Present (hereafter cited as The 

Israeli Anny) (New York: Macmillan, 1985), p. 137. 

29. Hays interview; Memo, Brig Gen Paul T. Hartung for Maj Gen William D. 

Gilbert, 30 Nov 78, sub: Methods of Accomplishing/Managing Israeli Air Base 

Construction, IABPC, 89/3. 

30. Memo, Hartung for Gilbert, 30 Nov 78. 

3l. Hays interview; Memo, Hartung for Gilbert, 30 Nov 78. 

32. ENR 210 (28 April 1983) : 182. 

33. Reimer interview, Feb 82. 

34. AR 415-17, Construction: Cost Estimating for Milita'ry Programming, Change 1 

(Washington, D.C.: HQDA, 1 Aug 78). This version of the regulation did not include a location adjustment factor for construction in Israel. The next revision, issued in February 1980, did. 

35. Reimer interview, Feb 82. 

36. Memo, Hartung for Gilbert, 30 Nov 78. 

37. Memo, Brig Gen Hartung for DASD (ISA) Robert]. Murray, Dec 78, sub: 

GOI Participation in Relocation from the Sinai to the Negev, IABPC, 89/3. 

38. MFR, Oswald 1. Hewitt, 13 Nov 78, sub: NAD Task Force CENEG Established, IABPC, 10/8. 

39. Interv, author with Alvin Vinitsky,Jan 80, New York City. 

40. Johnson interview. 

4l. Ibid. 

42. Morris interview; Ltr, Morris to Ambassador Samuel Lewis, 14 Aug 80, 

IABPC, 7/5;Johnson interview. 

43. Hewitt and Vinitsky interviews. 

44. Hewitt interview. 

45. ER 1-1-190, Administration: &tablishment of Rl!.DI DIST (Washington, D.C.: 

OCE, 12 Apr 68); Hewitt and Vinitsky interviews. 

46. Hays interview. 

47. Interv, author with Col Paul Bazilwich,Jan 80, New York City. Toward the 

end of 1982, the Corps brought the concept and the reality of the ready district 

into line by abolishing the concept. EC 310-1-438, Military Publications: Rescission 

(Washington, D.C.: OCE, 10 Dec 82), rescinded the regulation that had set up the 

ready district concept as "no longer required." 

48. Hewitt and Vinitsky interviews. 

49. MFR, Hewitt, 13-20 Nov 78, sub: Task Force Progress, IABPC, 10/8; Hewitt and Vinitsky interviews. 
PLANNING FOR THE MISSION 39 

50. MFR, Hewitt, 13-20 Nov 78, sub: Task Force Progress; Vinitsky interview; 

CENADNEG proposal, IABPC, 10/6. 

5l. CENADNEG proposal. 

52. Ibid.; McNeely interview, Sep 83. 

53. CENADNEG proposal; Hewitt interview. 

54. ER 37-3-7, Financial Administration: Budgeting and Funding for Militar), 

Functions Appropriations (Washington, D.C.: OCE, 30 Nov 79); OM 10-1-1, Organization and Functions: Office of the Chief of Engineers (Washington, D.C.: OCE, 3 Nov 

80), p. H-1;Johnson interview. 

55. McNeely interview, Sep 83; Vinitsky interview. On the North African program, see MS, Karl C. Dod, Overseas Military Operations of the Corps of Engineers, 1945-1970, ch. 15, Airfield Construction in North Africa, Office of History, 

HQ USACE, files. Also see U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee 

on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Military Public Works, Hearings. Investigations of MililaT)' Public WOdlS, Part 4, Moroccan Air Base Construction, 82d Cong., 2d 

sess., 1952; U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Military Public Works, Re/)ort. kforoccan Air Base Construction, 82d Cong., 2d sess., 1952. 

56. Hewitt and Johnson interviews; DF, Col Donald H. Morelli to DAEN-MPT 

[Col Hays], 25 Oct 78, sub: Comments and CENEG Structme, IABPC, 1/5. 

57. Hewitt, Johnson, and Vinitsky interviews; McNeely interview, Sep 83. 

58. Johnson in terview. 

59. Ibid. 
CHAPTER 4 

Necessary Steps: 

Diplomatic, Political, and Contractual 

Preparations 

February-December 1979 

Ordinarily we would do the design and go and get somebody to build 

them-hopefully under a fixed-price contract. 

Lt. Cen.John W. Morris I 

If I were the contractor, I would hate like hell to be in Israel three 

years from now if it isn't done on time. 

Maj. Cen.James A. Johnson 2 

Most of December 1978 and January 1979 passed with no new 

developments for the program, but the pace picked up before the 

end of winter. Late in February, with talks between the United 

States and Israel expected to start soon, Deputy Assistant Secretary 

of Defense for Installations and Housing Perry J. Fliakis said the 

Defense Department would assign the construction mission to the 

Corps of Engineers. Normally, the Department of the Navy served 

as the Department of Defense construction agent in the Middle 

East, but the Corps had participated in the site surveys and had 

more people with the skills required for this kind ofprogram. 3 

Before official word of the mission came, the Corps assumed 

that it would get the job and planned accordingly. Carl Damico estimated that $5 million would start the job and sustain it until 

Congress appropriated funds. General Burnell in Washington told 

General Johnson in New York to continue planning and authorized him to make a list of potential prime contractors. On 16 

March Deputy Secretary of Defense Charles W. Duncan formally 

designated the Corps as the Department of Defense's construction 

agent for the Israeli air bases. He explained the choice on the basis 

of the involvement of the Corps in site surveys, its personnel resources, and its development of an approach to construction. In 
NECESSARY STEPS 41 

other words, aggressive planning efforts helped assure that the 

Corps got the work. He also directed the Department of the Air 

Force to act as program manager and liaison with the Israeli Air 

Force. 4 

Even with that settled, many issues required resolution before 

work could start. Foremost among them was peace between Israel 

and Egypt. At Camp David they had only agreed to agree. A formal 

treaty was yet to be signed. Israel and the United States would also 

have to make a formal agreement that spelled out mutual obligations and responsibilities within a construction program. Matters 

within the United States required settlement as well. Congress 

would have to provide money, the Corps and the Air Force would 

have to devise a working arrangement, and contractors would have 

to be chosen. Then there could be construction. 

In the early spring of 1979 final negotiations over the con ten ts 

of a peace treaty started in Washington. Officials from Egypt and 

Israel worked out details with the Americans. On 15 March Weizmann, Brown, and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance started a series 

of talks. Between these meetings, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Mfairs Robert]. Murray chaired a 

discussion on the findings of the survey team that had visited Israel 

the previous autumn. The conference also considered the possible 

terms of an agreement be~.yeen the United States and Israel concerning construction.5 

A week later detailed talks on the bases started in Tel Aviv. The 

American delegation consisted of a team from the embassy and a 

Department of Defense group led by Lt. Gen. Ernest Graves and 

General Hartung. Graves was a logical choice for the mission. As 

director of the Defense Security Assistance Agency, he worked directly for McGiffert, managing a military aid program that included sales, training, and financial support. His duties included liaison with American weapons manufacturers and the governments 

that bought their wares. He also had a long-standing familiarity 

with military construction and the Corps of Engineers and had 

spen t three years in the Office of the Chief of Engineers, first as director of civil works and then as deputy chief of engineers under 

Morris. Five of the Americans with Graves represented the Corps. 

Fred McNeely and Carl Damico from the construction division, attorney Randy Head, and General Wray's secretary, Nancy Saunders, came from Washington. North Atlantic Division sent Ozzie 

Hewitt, the resource manager. On their first day in Israel, Graves 

and his team described their funding concept and proposal for 

project management at the embassy. Ambassador Samuel Lewis' 

staff promised full support and assistance. 6 
42 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

Mter the initial discussions at the embassy, the Americans and 

a Ministry of Defense team met several times over the next week. 

The Israeli government apparently attached considerable importance to the talks. Deputy Minister of Defense Mordechai Zippori 

led a delegation that included Director-General Yosef Ma'ayan of 

the ministry and the commander of the Israeli Air Force, Maj. 

Gen. David Ivry. The construction department of the ministry and 

the air force's construction division also participated. Representatives of the Ministries of Finance, Interior, and Foreign Mfairs also 

attended, as did the Water Commission. 7 

Zippori welcomed the Americans warmly. He emphasized Israel's commitment to peace and the risks involved in the withdrawal from the Sinai and expressed confidence in the outcome of 

the air base project. He saw the bases as important to the defense 

of Israel but thought they would also "contribute in many ways towards the well-being and the defense of the Western world." He 

noted that Israel had always "succeeded with our airfields quite 

nicely," but he expected the new ones to be "much better than 

those we have done by ourselves." When he finished, Ma'ayan 

wanted to hear the American presentations. First, Richard Viets, 

charge d'affaires in the absence of Ambassador Lewis, emphasized 

the strength of the American commitment to the program. The 

participation of an officer of Graves' rank and the high caliber of 

his team confirmed this dedication. "I can assure you," Viets said, 

"that everyone in the U.S. government who has anything to do 

with this project fully understands its importance to all of you." He 

was certain that American efforts would meet Israeli expectations.8 

With the pleasantries over, Graves turned to his agenda. "We 

have come here," he began, "to give you the results of the study effort that we have made to date on these airfields, and second, to sit 

down with you and work out the agreement between us as to how 

we will carry out this work." All told, his team would make four presentations, starting with Hartung's discussion of the survey team 

report. Hartung reviewed the assumptions on which both countries agreed. Normal construction procedures would not produce 

an initial operating capability, defined as the ability to fly and fight 

from the new Negev bases, within three years. The fast-track approach provided the only hope. Hartung explained that this 

method required concurrent design and construction. It involved 

an unusually large amount of heavy construction equipment on 

the work site, especially with two bases under simultaneous construction. He estimated the premium cost of fast-track construction at 25 percent.9 
NECESSARY STEPS 43 

The Israelis wanted three bases from which a total of five 

squadrons, each with thirty aircraft, could operate. They had already chosen three Negev sites. One of these, Tel Malhata between 

Beersheva and Arad, presented serious problems. The Bedouin 

residents of the area claimed that the government intended to 

take their lands without fair compensation, and Hartung correctly 

sensed that the Israelis should focus their efforts on the other two 

sites. He also urged limiting the scope of the program to facilities 

for four squadrons. An attempt to provide more would involve a 

high risk offailure. 1O 

Hartung and the survey team had considered a number of combinations for American and Israeli participation in the program. 

They rejected an arrangement by which the Israelis would design 

and construct the bases with American advice on fast-track procedures. Experience had shown them that those who actually managed the work should have experience with fast-track construction. 

The team concluded that the normal American approach, with Air 

Force program management and Corps of Engineers construction, 

would serve best. As Hartung saw it, success depended on limiting 

design work as much as possible to replication of facilities at the 

Sinai bases and their adaptation to the new sites. ll 

The Israelis listened patiently to the presentations. Damico 

gave a preliminary version of the schedule and work sequence, trying to estimate the effort and resources needed. He urged rapid 

development of engineering criteria and a master plan that laid 

out the project. Like Hartung, Damico considered "the biggest 

thing in fast track" to be control. "You can spend a lot of money in 

fast tracking," he cautioned, "and get absolutely no work done if 

you don't monitor this carefully. " Mter Graves explained the U.S. 

intention to provide $800 million for the job, Hartung again took 

the floor. Although his topic was the management concept-"an 

agreed pattern of relations between the U.S. people and the Israeli 

authorities," as Graves put it-he reemphasized the need for close 

supervision. "Mistakes will be made on this program," he said, 

"and the most important thing is that we discover them early." 12 

Only one consequential issue emerged from this session. Even 

before the speakers finished, Ma'ayan saw the major source of potential disputes. "The way you have presented your thoughts," he 

told Graves, "is that you will have almost complete authority." 

Ma'ayan wanted the division of management between the two 

countries clarified but was willing to leave the matter unsettled 

pending talks on the details of an agreement. 13 

Mter a recess for the Israeli sabbath, the delegations met again. 

This time senior Ministry of Defense officials and embassy represen-
44 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

tatives did not attend but left the detailed discussions of budgetary 

management and program authority to the ministry's commanders, 

engineers, economists, and lawyers. The Israelis acknowledged the 

American "authority and responsibility to construct the air bases in 

the framework of an agreed budget, agreed timetable and adequate 

quality," but insisted on a clear role in management. "MOD being 

the user of the air bases," they asserted, "reserved the right to exert 

during the process of construction control of the budget, timetable, 

and quality at milestones that will be agreed upon." Another issue 

also began to emerge. General Lapidot's service was studying a new 

design for the aircraft shelters. He hoped for timely conclusion of 

the plans but acknowledged that delays were possible. Col. Menachem Friedman of the Israeli Air Force's construction division expected the new drawings in six months.14 

When the group reconvened on the twenty-sixth, the discussion 

returned to the question of project control. The Israelis reiterated 

their interest but softened their position. Instead of seeking participation, they wanted to influence management. "It is clear to us," N. 

Gurel of the Ministry of Defense construction department said, "that 

you are giving all the instructions to the contractors and you are 

doing all the supervision." Still, he said, "We have to find a way 

through your people to give some remarks and influence the work."15 

Gurel also turned to the question of procurement within Israel. He acknowledged the scarcity of construction labor and 

equipment, which underlay the decision to bring both into the 

country, but distinguished between the saturated construction sector of the economy and other areas. Some production items, such 

as air conditioners and plumbing fixtures, would be available as 

would engineering and architectural consultants. They could do 

the design locally, Colonel Friedman suggested, to the benefit of 

all concerned. Hartung reminded them that "the ideal situation 

would be if you could give us as-builts for everything there." 16 

So the talks clarified some significant points. In program management the Israelis appeared inclined to accept an arrangement 

that permitted influence on construction decisions rather than 

participation in them. In the area of design they were moving away 

from the idea of widespread replication of facilities, which Hartung preferred, to new design by Israeli architect-engineers. This 

was most evident regarding aircraft shelters. All outstanding disputes were minor enough that both sides were willing to start 

preparing a formal agreement. 17 

With the issues close to being resolved, Graves explained the financial situation. The program needed $5 million immediately so 

the Department of Defense could send a team to Israel to work on 
NECESSARY STEPS 45 

the plan and pay contractors to begin assembling their organizations. He suggested that Israel provide this sum through a foreign 

military sales case processed by his agency. In other words, Israel 

would borrow the money from the United States to pay for the 

start of the work. The money would carry the program about sixty 

days, from mid-April to mid:June. By then Congress would have approved the grant, giving the program its own financial base. 18 

On the same day, 26 March, Israel and Egypt signed their treaty. 

It was a day, Ezer Weizmann said, when "the chill of winter 

.. . receded before the pale sun." 19 At a brief ceremony in Washington the two governments reaffirmed their adherence to the Camp 

David framework and ended a long-standing state of war. In annex I 

to the treaty, the "Protocol Concerning Israeli Withdrawal and Security Agreements," Israel agreed to a complete withdrawal from 

the Sinai within three years of the exchange of ratifications. A memorandum of agreement appended to the treaty expressed American 

willingness to consider Israeli needs for military and economic 

help, "subject to congressional authorization and appropriation." 20 

Meanwhile, McNeely told Morris' office of the situation in Tel 

Aviv. He expected that the $5 million would be available in ten 

days and urged award of letter contracts at that time for site investigations. Hartung, he said, would lead a team to Israel in April to 

work with the host government on design needs, program development, and a cost estimate. Hartung already had chosen ten Air 

Force officers. The team needed two members from the management support contractor and several more from the Corps of Engineers. The most important would be the colonel who would be 

Hartung's deputy on the team and who would stay in Israel. McNeely wanted thirteen others, in a variety of specialti es, and 

stressed that only those who were likely to stay with the program 

should be chosen. Continuity was important. 21 

With the work finished, McNeely had time for shopping and 

sightseeing. Palestinian terrorists were active that spring-a 

grenade had exploded in a Jerusalem restaurant during the delegation'S first days in the country. But such incidents did not keep 

the Americans from touring when work allowed. McNeely, Damico, and Saunders window shopped on Tel Aviv's busy Dizengoff 

Street. When Saunders went into a shop, the others waited outside. 

While they chatted, a black van pulled up and four denim-clad 

men jumped out. Swiftly but with care, they swarmed over a parked 

truck loaded with cardboard boxes. The Americans watched as 

one man lifted the hood and peered inside, another unlocked the 

door, the third slipped under the vehicle, and the fourth examined the cargo. "All of a sudden," McNeely recalled, "Carl looked 
46 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

at me, and I looked at him. It dawned on us: this was the bomb 

squad." They ran into the shop, found Saunders, "and took her to 

the back of the store in case it blew up." Mter the crew left, the 

three returned to the street.22 

While Saunders had her brush with the effects of the Arab-Israeli conflict on the streets of Tel Aviv, General Wray had his in Syrian air space. On the day of the signing of the treaty between Israel 

and Egypt, he was flying to Riyadh to inform the Saudi Arabian 

government of possible U.S. involvement in Israel. The multibillion-dollar Corps construction program in that country came 

under Wray's directorate, so he personally intended to inform the 

Saudi minister of defense and aviation of the situation. Mter straying over the Syrian missile belt, the American commercial aircraft 

was forced to land in Damascus, where it sat for nearly eight hours 

before being released. Wray made the rest of his journey without 

incident and returned home with assurance that the Saudi government was not unduly concerned about the involvement of the 

Corps with construction in Israel.23 

Within a week of the Americans' return from Israel, the major 

issues were settled and a formal agreement was complete. On 6 

April McGiffert and Weizmann signed the "Agreement between 

the Government of Israel and the Government of the United 

States concerning Construction of Airbase Facilities." Primary responsibility rested with the U.S. Department of Defense. The 

agreement authorized the Americans "to perform in Israel all acts 

necessary to carry out and manage the work, including funds management and administration, engineering, construction, and program management." It spelled out only a few specific Israeli responsibilities, among them protecting the sites and providing 

utilities for the construction camps. Most tasks were left for inclusion in the "plan of work," which would also specify actual work requirements. However, the government of Israel did commit itself 

to "exert its best efforts to assist the government of the United 

States in the fulfillment of its responsibilities under this agreement." Both parties agreed to "share responsibility to assure the 

completion of all IOC [initial operating capability] construction" 

prior to the date set for the final withdrawal from the Sinai. 24 

The document addressed but did not resolve the questions 

raised in negotiations. It specified that criteria and designs from 

the Sinai bases would be used or other mutually agreeable ones 

would be chosen. A cautionary note said that "any deviation from 

the Eitam and Etzion criteria and designs must not delay the accomplishment of IOC." The signers also took a flexible approach 

to procurement from Israeli sources. The overall premise re-
NECESSARY STEPS 47 

mained the one reported by Hartung the previous autumn. The Israeli construction industry was "virtually saturated" and could not 

do the work without severe adverse economic effects. So labor, 

equipment, and materials would be imported. Within this context, 

each request for purchases within Israel, brought up by either 

party, would be examined on its merits. The criteria were availability, quality, cost, and timeliness. 25 

Funding was covered in a separate agreement. If Congress approved, the United States would grant $800 million in the form of 

"defense articles and defense services." Israel would provide the remainder from any source available to it, including credits and 

loans from the United States. The program would spend the American grant first. 26 

Graves and his team were still in Tel Aviv negotiating these issues when the contractor selection process started in North Atlantic's office. The procedure represented a modification of the 

normal process for cost reimbursable contracts specified by regulations. Morris allowed the change because of the time constraints 

related to the programY As McNeely put it, "It appeared like we 

had to run like hell with this Israeli thing." 28 

Even the normal method for handling such a contract reduced 

the steps for contractor selection. In an environment so uncertain 

as to warrant a cost-plus contract, competition regarding fees and 

estimated costs did not apply. The only relevant competition involved the qualifications, capability, and experience of potential 

contractors. Such a competition assured the government of a contractor that could do the job and held out some promise of completion at a fair price. Regulations required the Corps to invite all 

reasonably available and basically qualified contractors to submit 

detailed capability proposals. The Corps provided a general scope 

of work, timetable, and list of special requirements. Based on this 

information, interested firms were expected to explain their respective mobilization plans, tentative construction schedules, and 

anticipated extent of subcontracting. Each also had to describe its 

management staff, equipment, financial capacity, current commitments, and home office support. For the government, a selection 

board assessed the proposals and interviewed potential contractors. The board listed three or more of the best prospects in order, 

with detailed justifications for their choices. Mter the convening 

authority-the commander of either an engineer district or division-and the chief's office approved the choices, negotiations 

with the highest ranking firm could begin.29 

Reminiscent of the methods used to select contractors for airfields and radar installations during the early days of the cold war, 
48 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

the process authorized by Morris included more shortcuts. 3o A 

committee of North Atlantic Division specialists in engineering, architecture, construction, and management prepared criteria later 

used by a preselection board to decide which design and construction contractors were "reasonably available and [had] the basic capability to perform the work." 31 Within a day of receipt of the directive from Morris, the committee finished primary and 

secondary criteria. The most important requirement was experience in some aspect of similar work-cost-plus contracts, airfields, 

overseas construction, or combination design and construction 

projects. 32 "Mter that," Wray summarized, "we looked at the ventures' current capabilities, the size of the firms in the ventures, and 

their present workloads." 33 Secondary factors ranged from availability and interest to the size of home office support forces. 34 

A separate committee set up criteria for a management support contractor. The primary standard was financial capacity, as determined by information from Dun and Bradstreet and Engineering 

News-Record. The others dealt with experience in aspects of the 

huge job, which included design review, quality assurance, and life 

support, and previous work for the Department of Defense and on 

cost-reimbursable contracts. 35 

With criteria in hand, a preselection board under Lt. Col. 

Michael A. lezior, deputy New York District engineer, compiled 

lists of potential contractors. The board made minor changes in 

the criteria, deciding to consider heavy or highway construction as 

equivalent to air base work and reducing the standard for financial 

responsibility from $200 million in annual overseas sales to $100 

million. It also increased emphasis on heavy equipment, moving it 

from the secondary category to the primary. The initial list was 

based on a review of the top 400 construction firms listed in Engineering News-Record during 1975-1977. The board added companies that had expressed interest in the project, then cut the list to 

twenty, using data from Dun and Bradstreet as well as the selection 

standards. 36 

Then the evaluation passed to separate boards, one for designconstruction firms and another for the support contract. The 

boards ranked the firms on their respective lists before asking the 

top companies to submit proposals. A third selection board listed 

acceptable architect-engineer firms for use by whichever prime 

contractors might be selectedY This activity took place without the 

knowledge of potential bidders. The shortcut essentially reversed 

the standard approach, which required companies to take the first 

step, indicating their interest in the work by submitting a proposal. 

This method forced North Atlantic to take the initiative in deter-
NECESSARY STEPS 49 

mining which firms might be suitable and then asking them if they 

were interested. 38 

The change did not please everyone. The decision not to advertise the contracts troubled Colonel Bazilwich. Although prompt 

action was critical, he thought potential bidders should have the 

chance to submit proposals. Even without an announcement, firms 

that had heard of possible work in Israel called North Atlantic. He 

believed that his office would have to deal with many protests if it 

made the selection without advertising.39 Jezior also thought it a 

poor way to make the choice. Without prior expressions of interest, he could not be sure that his board was identifying firms that 

wanted the work. As it turned out, his board's first list did in fact 

name businesses that later failed to express interest. Moreover, 

compiling the list without public notice precluded forming new 

combinations of construction companies in response to this particular job.40 Despite the misgivings, the process continued until 

halted in Washington. As Col. John E. Schweizer, Johnson's other 

deputy, explained, "I think everybody had sort of a natural reluctance but we all stood up and saluted and marched ahead."41 

Despite the concerns, this procedure was well under way. 

Other actions proceeded more slowly. The most significant delays 

involved securing congressional approval of funds, which Graves 

had told the Israelis he hoped for by mid:June. Seed money was 

transferred to the Corps so that initial contracts could be written 

and site surveys could start. Congressional action was needed before the United States could provide the $800 million grant. After 

that ran out, the Americans and Israelis agreed, Israeli contributions would be made as needed, normally quarterly and in advance 

of the quarter in which payments of obligations were due. 42 

Three days after conclusion of this agreement, President 

Carter sent his proposal for aid in support of the peace treaty to 

Congress. The total package for Egypt and Israel, economic aid as 

well as military loans and grants, would cost $4.8 billion, including 

1979 appropriations of almost $l.5 billion. Weizmann once had 

told the Egyptians that the United States "will foot the bill for the 

peace agreement."43 Here was the tab. The 1979 appropriation included the $800 million for the bases, which Carter singled out as 

particularly important. Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai and the 

peace itself depended on the availability of the bases. Carter hoped 

for "swift congressional action to enact the bill," to "demonstrate 

U.S. capacity to move quickly and decisively to support our friends 

in the Middle East." 44 

At the same time that Carter sent his request to Capitol Hill, 

the chief's office reversed itself on the procedure for choosing 
50 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

contractors. North Atlantic Division convinced headquarters that 

there would be time for a more customary method, with the program advertised in the Commerce Business Daily, the normal government vehicle for informing industry of available contl'acts. When 

the Corps made this decision, the selection process reverted to dependence on prospective bidders for initial expressions of interest. 

The change also laid to rest the concerns that had been expressed 

by Bazilwich andJezior.45 

Two notices, one announcing the management support contract and the other listing the design-construction contracts, appeared on 13 April, only three days after the decision to alter the 

selection process. The management support notice specified that 

an advance party should be in Israel some time around 7 May. The 

other announcement expressed the intent to have construction 

under way in the summer, while acknowledging that "the actual 

date will depend upon congressional authorization and appropriation offunds for these facilities." 46 

The Corps still contemplated a compressed procedure. A week 

after the notices appeared, North Atlantic hosted a briefing for 

prospective bidders at a New York ballroom. Over 350 representatives of 125 firms as well as journalists heard Johnson describe the 

job and the government-to-government agreement. He also explained the selection criteria. These standards, set up after talks 

with veterans of the construction program managed by the Corps 

in Saudi Arabia, were simpler than those on the original lists. 

Three years remained the period allotted for construction, although Johnson estimated that normal completion would require 

twice as long. He wanted management support proposals by 24 

April, so the selection board could choose the top three for interviews and make a final choice by 4 May. He also asked for designconstruction submissions by 1 May, for selection of the five best 

prospects by 7 May.47 

The Israeli government watched the unfolding of the process 

carefully. On the day of the New York briefing, Colonel Gilkey in 

Tel Aviv told General Johnson that the Israelis wished to participate in the selections. They did not want an Israeli firm under a 

false name in one of the joint ventures but were even more concerned that a company from an unfriendly nation, also under a 

pseudonym, might become involved. Johnson refused to allow Israeli participation, which he said would violate U.S. law. But he did 

inform the potential bidders at the meeting that the United States 

and Israel had agreed that all contractors had to be nationals of 

countries that had diplomatic relations with Israel. "We will not," 

Johnson told them, "pick somebody who is anathema to Israel." 
NECESSARY STEPS 51 

Moreover, he reminded his audience, shortages and inflation in Israel were such that Israeli labor and materials would be used only 

when both governments agreed on the necessity. He also told 

Gilkey to assure the Ministry of Defense that the prime contractors 

would be American owned. Any possible Israeli subcontractors 

would be cleared through the ministry.48 

Mter the 20 April meeting, the selection process split into two 

separate evaluations, with the management support contractor 

chosen first. Jezior chaired the board that evaluated the twelve proposals submitted by the 24 April deadline. 49 His group chose the 

five best. A second board under Schweizer narrowed the choices to 

three. Schweizer's board picked a joint venture called Management Support Associates. The firm combined three companies: 

Lester B. Knight Associates, Inc., of Chicago; A. Epstein and Sons, 

International, Inc., also of Chicago; and New York-based Pope, 

Evans and Robbins, Inc. Johnson seconded the choice, explaining 

to the chief's office that Management Support Associates had "a 

well-balanced team of designers and construction managers." 

Johnson said the firm's practical knowledge of construction management, extensive use of its own personnel rather than people 

hired for this job, and its overseas experience in Israel and elsewhere all influenced the decision. Morris approved, and North Atlantic announced the selection on 7 May.50 

The competition for the management support contract provided a rare opportunity for firms partly or completely owned and 

managed by American Jews. At the time, the government of Saudi 

Arabia excluded such firms from the Corps' massive construction 

program in that country. A partner in one of the companies that 

bid unsuccessfully for the Israeli contract called this situation to 

the attention of New York Senator Jacob R. Javits. "Over the past 

several years," Jordan L. Gruzen of ajoint venture known as GSCA 

wrote, "the Corps has been awarding vast amounts of contracts in 

Arab countries and firms such as ours have been denied the opportunity to participate in these programs." He thought the air 

base program gave the Corps "the opportunity to balance the 

scales." Javits forwarded the letter to the Department of Defense, 

commenting favorably on the firm's experience and ability but 

making no mention of the issue raised by Gruzen.51 

The choice of Management Support Associates seemed to satisfy everyone. Johnson had noted the firm's ability to start quickly, 

and the joint venture did not disappoint him. In a matter of days, 

the contractor set up a liaison office in the Church Street building 

occupied by North Atlantic, advertised for engineers in the Wall 

Street Journal, and sent its first employees to Tel Aviv. Gilkey ap-
52 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

plauded the selection and had plenty of work ready. He passed the 

news to Ma'ayan, who also expressed his satisfaction.52 

Choosing the design-construction ventures followed the same 

lines. Twelve combinations of more than forty companies expressed interest. Some firms held back, fearing loss of possible 

work in Arab countries. Others seemed concerned about involvement in cost-reimbursement contracts, which limited profits as 

well as risks.53 By 17 May the process was complete. Mter reducing 

the list to five , interviewing those, and getting approval from Washington, Schweizer's board picked two consortia.54 Negev Airbase 

Constructors consisted of its sponsor, the Perini Corporation of 

Framingham, Massachusetts; the Harbert International, Inc., of 

Birmingham, Alabama; the Paul N. Howard Company of Greensboro, North Carolina; and designer Louis Berger International, 

Inc., of East Orange, New Jersey. The other venture, Air Base Constructors, was sponsored by the Guy F. Atkinson Company of San 

Francisco. Also participating were the Dillingham Corporation of 

Honolulu; Nello L. Teer Company of Durham, North Carolina; 

and designer Tippetts-Abbett-McCarthy-Stratton of New York. 

Both Perini and Atkinson had vast experience with large overseas 

projects and fast-track construction.

55 

Completion of the selections did not end Israeli interest in 

them. An article in the English-language Jerusalem Post later 

claimed that the Perini Corporation actively participated in the 

Arab boycott of Israel and had opposed antiboycott legislation in 

the United States. Louis Berger International, part of the same 

consortium, came under fire from a Tel Aviv paper, which listed 

Berger's activities in Arab nations and questioned the wisdom of allowing a company with such contacts to participate in the design of 

an Israeli air base.

56 Perini successfully denied the claims; Berger 

ignored them.57 The criticism did serve notice that the newspapers 

were paying attention. 

The contractors and the government reached their agreement 

in letter contracts. These "written preliminary contractual instruments" authorized an immediate start. 58 The government u sed this 

type of agreement only when time was extremely limited. Regulations required replacing letter contracts with "definitive contracts 

at the earliest possible date. " 59 Despite this initial agreement, 

much still had to be done: both parties had to prepare detailed estimates of job costs and negotiate the final contracts. But at least 

mobilization could start. 

Financial issues remained open. The Corps waited impatiently 

for Congress to act while the seed money began to dwindle. McGiffert's office started work on an amendment to the foreign military 
NECESSARY STEPS 53 

sales case for an additional $10 million, which appeared adequate 

for operations until 15 July. By then Congress was expected to complete work on the appropriation. The Carter administration's Special International Security Assistance Act, which included the $800 

million for the bases, began making its way through Congress in 

mid-April. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee spent two 

days on the bill. Hearings before a subcommittee of the House 

Foreign Mfairs Committee were also brief. Secretaries Vance and 

Brown and General Graves testified for the bill. Brown emphasized 

Israel's security needs during and after departure from the Sinai. 

The United States shared Israel's concern for its defenses. According to Brown, passage of the bill was necessary to assure a timely Israeli withdrawal while preserving its military capability.60 

Graves testified before the House Subcommittee on Europe 

and the Middle East with one eye on his watch. Appearing the day 

after the treaty went into effect, he told the members that "the 

clock is starting to tick and we have but three years to carry out a 

massive effort in assisting Israel in its relocation." The Corps, he 

said, "was very aware of this fact" and "most anxious to receive the 

authority from Congress to proceed." He also explained why normal contracting procedures could not be used: time was so short 

that concurrent design and construction were required. In addition, little was known about the actual facilities that would be built. 

He estimated that a competitive procurement would add a year to 

the program, because a detailed scope of work and design would 

have to precede bidding. ''You cannot," he told the subcommittee, 

"have -a competitive bid unless the man knows what he is bidding 

on, because he could not come up with a price." 61 

Both houses approved the bill without serious opposition. 

They sent the measure authorizing the expenditure and appropriating the entire amount to the president in July. President Carter 

signed it on the twentieth, ending the program's dependence on 

foreign military sales funds. 62 Another law, signed five days later, 

authorized the Corps to enter into the contracts needed to carry 

out the mission.63 

As the bill became law, the Corps and the Air Force were reaching a definitive understanding about their respective program 

roles. Such an agreement required a formal memorandum of understanding. The Department of the Army, as represented by the 

Corps of Engineers, and the Department of the Air Force held divergent views about management responsibilities, especially regarding control of program funds. These opposing ideas crystallized during negotiations that started in May 1979 and continued 

until the end of July. The Air Force started the discussion over the 
54 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

roles it and the Corps would play. Antonia Handler Chayes, the assistant secretary of the Air Force for manpower, reserve affairs, and 

logistics when the negotiations got under way, claimed that the 

Duncan memorandum of 16 March had not clarified sufficiently 

each agency's responsibilities. A Boston attorney who became the 

first woman to serve as under secretary of any of the armed forces 

when she moved up to be under secretary of the Air Force in July, 

Chayes wanted a clear statement of Air Force authority and responsibility for managing the air base program. She sought this 

through designation of the Air Force as the Department of 

Defense executive agent. 64 

Others agreed with Chayes on the need for clarification of responsibilities. McGiffert thought either the secretary of the Army 

or the secretary of the Air Force should have charge of the program. Graves also saw the need for a single command but thought 

it should rest with the secretary of the Army. Timely completion, 

he argued, depended mainly on effective management by the 

Corps of Engineers.65 Graves outlined all three perspectives for 

Morris by sending his former boss three versions of a draft memorandum clarifying program relationships. One, reflecting the 

Chayes position, gave overall direction to the Air Force and gave 

Hartung con trol of all construction funds for provision to the 

Corps as needed. The other two did not mention control of the 

money. One placed the program manager under Graves' office; 

the other assigned the program to the Department of the Army.66 

Graves shared the general view that Hartung made an ideal 

program manager, but he thought it unnecessary and undesirable 

to put the secretary of the Air Force in charge. The Air Force's 

major responsibility, Graves thought, was to act as liaison between 

the Corps and the user, working with the Israelis to adjust the plan 

of work as warranted by changing needs, schedule slippage, cost 

growth, or problems with quality.67 In any case, Hartung had direct 

access to the Air Force Directorate of Engineering and Services for 

help with technical and administrative matters. Major issues and 

disputes with the Israelis would go to McGiffert or Graves. So perhaps the Defense Security Assistance Agency was the right place 

for the program. On the other hand, while Hartung might need 

occasional help from Graves or McGiffert, the Corps required 

broad support from the Department of the Army. Graves thought 

success could depend on prompt and effective responses in a number of areas, including contracting, transportation, personnel, 

labor relations, and financial management. With the predominant 

support effort within the Army, perhaps that service should run 

the job. Graves thought the issue important enough to tell Morris 
NECESSARY STEPS 55 

that "the Secretary of the Army may have to weigh in at some 

point." 58 Morris responded quickly. He sent the draft memorandums and related papers to Secretary of the Army Clifford Alexander. Morris was satisfied with Duncan's assignment of responsibilities. But if clarification was needed, he would support Graves' 

position and recommend a program management office under 

the Defense Security Assistance Agency.59 

While Morris staked out his position with the help of Graves, 

Fliakis asked the Army to draft a memorandum of understanding. 

He chose the Army, he said, because he wanted the document to 

focus on execution of construction. Other Department of Defense 

agencies also had interests, so he asked that the draft include formats and schedules for progress reports. His own office would 

monitor development of the agreement to ensure consistency with 

the original assignment. With these instructions in hand, Morris 

reconsidered his stand on the relationship of the Corps and the 

Air Force. He changed his mind about placing program management under Graves and decided that the secretary of the Air Force 

was a more logical choice. Such an arrangement would permit use 

of procedures familiar to all with experience in Corps military construction for the Air Force.7o 

Morris sought two critical changes to the conventional relationship. First, he wanted the program manager excluded from 

control of contract administration or construction supervision. In 

other words, the chain of command for construction would flow 

from the sites through Corps channels to Morris, Alexander, and 

Brown. Essentially, Morris envisioned an arrangement that would 

put the Air Force in apparent control with largely liaison duties 

while vesting real power in the Corps of Engineers. He also wanted 

the secretary of defense to give program funds directly to the Army. 

Morris knew that money was the key to control of the program. 

Also, Burnell and Johnson had urged him to assure that the Corps 

controlled construction funds. Morris "thought it was critical" and 

intended to do just that. "If! was going to be responsible for building the airfields," he said, "then I would need the money." Time was 

short, and recurrent requests for more funds could slow work. If 

such delays sent the program past the deadline of 25 April 1982, the 

Corps would get the blame. "In the final analysis the only agency 

. .. that was going to get held up by the thumbs if the job didn't get 

done on time was the construction agency." Morris told Wray to use 

this framework as guidance for future talks with the Air Force. 7l 

Within the Corps, aversion to Air Force involvement in financial management was widespread. Theodore Henningsen of Morris' procurement office asked whether such participation would 
56 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

hamper the program. Money provided leverage for arbitrary control. Moreover, funding through another party could become an 

administrative burden and delay payments to contractors. Resultant cash-flow difficulties might harm contractor performance. If 

the Corps h ad to live with such an arrangement, the office had to 

devise detailed procedures. These would provide the only defense 

against the stifling effects of a bureaucratic review and approval 

process. North Atlantic Division heartily endorsed these views. Its 

own draft of the agreement strictly limited the Air Force role. 

Johnson's office wanted deletion of all references to Air Force involvement in organizing, directing, and controlling the program. 

The New York office wanted the Air Force limited to coordination 

and liaison with the Israelis. Graves' office should provide the 

Corps with instructions and all of the program funds at once. That 

was sufficient; the Corps would do the rest. 72 

The Corps version of the agreement reflected this insistence. 

Wray sent a draft memorandum through Army channels to McGiffert. This rendition gave the Corps control of construction, with 

Defense Security Assistance Agency providing all of the money directly to the Corps at the outset. Adopting the Air Force position, 

Wray argued, would provide "another layer of management that 

could adversely affect an already critically condensed program."73 

The Air Force's position still contrasted sharply with that of the 

Corps. Chayes remained convinced that the Air Force's designation as executive agent with con trol of the money enhanced 

prospects of timely completion. Her d epartment envisioned a 

management office staffed jointly by Air Force and Corps people 

under Air Force direction. This office would set and carry out policies and procedures and manage the work itself. The funding arrangement would resemble the normal military construction relationship, with the Air Force releasing money as the Corps needed 

it. By July Chayes was showing her frustration. She urged McGiffert 

to "get on with this." She expected that "the project itself will produce plenty of problems," and saw "no need to compound [them] 

by permitting bureaucratic arguments." 74 

Graves sent the latest expression of the Air Force position to 

Morris. Brig. Gen. John F. Wall, Wray's deputy in military programs, reviewed the package. Wall opposed designation of the Air 

Force as executive agent and indicated that a compromise paragraph on funding, already agreed upon by Graves and M~. Gen. 

William D. Gilbert, the Air Force's director of engineering and services, was acceptable. The compromise stipulated that the Corps 

would get its construction money from the Air Force, but that the 

Air Force would "promptly provide all ... program funds directly 
NECESSARY STEPS 57 

to the construction agency together with such instructions as may 

be appropriate." 75 

On 11 July Morris took this solution to his meeting with Fliakis. 

Mter discussions with Fliakis, the Corps, and Defense Security Assistance Agency, the Air Force accepted this face-saving compromise. The memorandum deleted the word "promptly" but otherwise adopted the same wording. Ostensibly neither service got its 

way. They agreed that the Air Force was "responsible for overall 

program management." Beyond that, the agreement listed numerous specific duties. Most of these were coordination and review 

functions. They did include two very important missions, liaison 

with the Israelis and site activation. The Corps, on the other hand, 

was "responsible for execution of the design and construction of 

the air bases and their facilities." Moreover, "direction and control 

of the contractors [would] be by the CE contracting officer." The 

Air Force would manage the air base program, but within that program the Corps would run a construction project. 76 

One aspect of the ground rules remained unclear. Normal 

construction programs operated in a restrictive context. Various 

laws set cost accounting standards, limited procurement authority 

for data processing equipment, and stipulated complex procedures for soliciting bids on contracts for architect-engineer services. 77 All parties felt that some relief was necessary.78 Waivers 

awaited issue of an executive order by the president. Congress already had expressed its support of such an order in the Special International Security Assistance Act. 79 Some months passed while 

the draft order moved through various agencies, among them the 

Department of the Army, the Office of Management and Budget, 

and the Department of Justice. All the while there seemed no 

doubt that the order would be issued. Certainly the program was 

off and running in Israel. Design firms had been hired without 

concern for some of the restrictions or notification requirements 

still to be waived. In December President Carter granted the exemptions and completed the authorization package. so 
58 

1. Anny Times, 20 Aug 79. 

2. ENR202 (26 April 1979): 10. 

BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

Notes 

3. Memo, DASD (I&H) Perry]. Fliakis for DASD (ISA) Robert]. Murray, 22 

Feb 79, sub: Israeli Airfield Construction, METG files. 

4. Ltr, Fliakis to Murray, 14 May 79, sub: Seed Money for the Israeli Airbase 

Program, METG files; Ltr, Maj Gen Bates C. Burnell, Acting Chief of Engineers, 

to NAD, 15 Mar 79, sub: Design and Construction Mission, Israel, IABPC, 10/ 9; 

Ltr, DSD Charles W. Duncan to the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, 

16 Mar 79, sub: Construction Agent Assignment, METG files. 

5 . Program for the Visit of the Honorable Ezer We izmann , Minister of 

Defense, Israel, 15- 17 Mar 79, METG files. 

6. Telex, USDAO Tel Aviv to OSD for ASD (ISA), 23 Mar 79, sub: Israeli Airbase Negotiation Team, METG files; Transcript, Meeting of U.S. Delegation on 

Air Fields, Headed by General Graves, with Israeli Delegation, Headed by Deputy 

Defense Minister Zippori (hereafter cited as Transcript, Meeting with Graves Delegation) , 23 Mar 79, Tel Aviv, IABPC, 40/5; DOD Directive 5105.38, Defense Secu1i ty Assistance Agency (DSAA) (Washington, D.C.: OSD, 10 Aug 78); Who's W'ho in 

Amelica, 1982-1983,2 vols. (Chicago, III.: Marquis "Vho's "Vho, 1982) , 1: 1285. 

7. Transcript, Meeting with Graves Delegation, 23 Mar 79. 

8. Ibid. 

9. Ibid. 

10. Ibid.; Lesley Hazelton, "Forgotten Israelis," New York Review of Books 27 (29 

May 1980): 44; (Tel Aviv) Ma 'ariv, 17 Feb 80; (Tel Aviv) Ha'm'etz, 23 Dec 80; Ian 

Lustick, "Israel's Arab Minority in the Begin Era," in Freedman, ed., Ismel in the 

Begin Em, p. 13l. 

11. Transcript, Meeting with Graves Delegation, 23 Mar 79. 

12. Ibid. 

13. Ibid. 

14. Transcript, Meeting with U.S. Team on New Airfield Construction, 25 Mar 

79, IABPC, 40/5. 

15. Transcript, Meeting with U.S. Team on Air Field Construction, 26 Mar 79, 

IABPC, 40/ 5 (hereafter cited as Transcript, Meeting with U.S. Team, 26 Mar 79). 

16. Ibid. 

17. Ibid. 

18. Ibid. 

19. Weizmann, BattleforPeace, p. 382. 

20. The treaty and clarifying documen ts are included after page 330 in 

Sachar, l:-gypt and Israel. 

21. Telex, USDAO Tel Aviv (Frederick B. McNeely) to DAEN-MPC, 26 Mar 79, 

sub: Israeli Airbase Program Development, IABPC, 5/8. McNeely asked for 14 

people, 4 by name: 1 construction manage r (Carl Damico) , 2 estimators (Ronald 

]. Hatwell and 1 other), 1 design specialist (T. R. Wathen) , 1 scheduling specialist 

(Donald P. Samanie) , 1 p roj ect manager for engineering, 2 mechanical engineers, 2 electrical engineers, 2 civil engineers, and 2 paving and soils engineers. 

22. McNeely interview, Sep 83. 

23. Maj Gen William R. Wray comments on draft MS. 

24. David E. McGiffert and Ezer Weizmann, Agreement between the Government ofIsrael and the Government of the United States concerning Construction 

of Airbase Facilities, 6 Apr 79, IABPC, 8/ 4 (hereafter cited as Government-to-Govern men t Agreement). 
NECESSARY STEPS 59 

25. Ibid.; Memo, Brig Gen Paul T. Hartung for Maj Gen William D. Gilbert, 30 

Nov 78, sub: Methods of Accomplishing/Managing Israeli Air Base Construction, 

IABPC, 89/3. 

26. McGiffert and Weizmann, Agreement between the Government of Israel 

and the Government of the United States concerning Funding of Airbase Construction, 6 Apr 79, IABPC, 8/4. 

27. Ltr, Lt GenJohn W. Morris to Maj GenJames AJohnson, 20 Mar 79, sub: 

Negotiation of Cost-Type Contracts for Construction in Israel, IABPC, 1/1. 

28. McNeely interview, Sep 83. 

29. ER 415-345-230, Construction: Negotiation Regulation for Cost-Plus-A-Fixed-Fee 

Construction Contracts (Washington, D.C.: OCE, 1 Oct 67), pp. 3-4. 

30. McNeely interview, Sep 83. 

31. ER 415-345-230. The committee consisted of Charles Schroer and Alfred 

Lellis of NAD's construction division, attorney F. H. Cawood, and three people 

from the engineering division: Joseph Sullivan, W. D. Stockman, and Robert E. 

Levy. 

32. After experience, the five primary criteria were financial capacity, based 

on Dun and Bradstreet and ENR data; capability to manage a $200-million-peryear project at a remote site; proven ability to meet completion dates; home office 

support; and being an American firm. Criteria for Contractor Selection: Primary 

Selection Considerations, 21 Mar 79, IABPC, 1/1. 

33. ENR 202 (24 May 1979): 40. 

34. The ten secondary criteria were availability and interest in the work area; 

experience in quality control, safety, procurement oflabor and materials for overseas work, and meeting budget targets; ability to obtain bond for 50 percent of 

the project amount or 50 percent of the prime contractor's direct involvement; 

current future contract commitments; life support, an operational management 

system, and participation by senior members of the finn with ten or more years at 

management level; ready availability of a relatively new crushing plant, concrete 

plant, and heavy equipment for moving earth and paving and ability to perform 

repairs on site; ability to start design within twenty days and start work on site 

within sixty days; prior association with reliable and financially stable subcontractors; availability of a computer system, a record of meeting completion dates, critical path management; and home office support. Criteria for Contractor Selection: Secondary Considerations if Available, 21 Mar 79, IABPC, 1/1. 

35. Selection Criteria for Management Assistance Contractor, n.d., IABPC, 

1/ 1. The committee consisted of Louis Pinata, chief of construction division, New 

York District; Angelo Tomasetti, Jr., chief of the military projects management 

branch, New York District; and C. J. Dow, chief of the procurement and supply 

division, Baltimore District. 

36. Memo, Lt Col Michael A Jezior, Chairman, Pre-Selection Board, for Division Engineer, 31 Mar 79, sub: Pre-Selection of Firms for the Construction of Airfields in Israel, IABPC, 6/ 1. 

37. Ibid. 

38. Ltr, Morris to Johnson, 20 Mar 79. 

39. Bazilwich interview. 

40. Interv, author with Lt Col Michael A Jezior, Jan 80, New York City; McNeely interview, Sep 83. 

41. Interv, author with Col John E. Schweizer,Jun 80, Falls Church, Va. 

42. U.S. DOD Offer and Acceptance FMS Case IS-B-HAA, 20 Mar 79, METG 

files; Transcript, Mee ting with U.S. Team, 26 Mar 79; McGiffert and Weizmann, 

Agreement .. . concerning Funding of Airbase Construction, 6 Apr 79. 
60 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

43. Ltr, President Carter to Honorable Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr., Speaker of the 

House of Representatives, 9 Apr 79, in U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, 

Special International Security Assistance Act oj 1979. Communication FOIn the President oj 

the United States Tmnsmitting a DraJt oj Proposed Legislation to Auth01'ize Supplemental 

International Security Assistance Jor the Fiscal Year 1979 in Sup/Jort oj the Peace Treaty Between Egypt and Israel and Related Agreements, and J01' Other Pwposes, 96th Cong., 1st 

sess., 1979, H. Doc. 96-91, pp. 1-2; Weizmann, BattleJorPeace, p . 323. 

44. Ltr, Carter to O'Neill, 9 Apr 79. 

45. Commerce Business Daily, 13 Apr 79; Bazilwich interview. 

46. Information Paper, DAEN-MPC, 11 Apr 79, sub: Air Base Construction for 

the Government of Israel, IABPC, 6/1; Lu', Burnell to Johnson, 13 Apr 79, sub: 

Selection Procedures for Management Support Contractor and Design and Construction Contractors for Air Base Construction in Israel, IABPC, 6/1; Commerce 

Business Daily, 13 Apr 79. 

47. ENR202 (26 April 1979) : 10; New Yod,Post, 20 Apr 79; The j ewish Week-Amelican Examinel; 29 Apr 79; International Constmction Week 8 (30 April 1979); Schweizer 

interview. The Commerce Business Daily notices listed the same four criteria for both 

types of contracts: specialized experience; capacity to accomplish the work; quality 

of past performance, particularly on relevant Deparunent of Defense contracts; and 

proposed organizational structure and management approach. 

48. Telecon transcript 2,20 Apr 79, IABPC, 10/3; "trashington Post, 21 Apr 79; 

Orientation for Israeli Airbase Construction, 20 Apr 79, IABPC, 11/2. 

49. In addition to JeziOl~ the board included Stanley Fafinski, assistant chief of 

the engineering division, New York District; Patrick R. Fiscina, chief of the military 

section in the engineering division, NAD;James V. Gruttadauria, chief of the quality 

assurance branch, engineering division, NAD; and]. G. Starr from Norfolk District. 

50. DF, Selection Board to Johnson, 3 May 79, sub: Selection of a Contractor 

for Management Support Activities in Connection with the Design and Construction of Two Airbases in the Negev Region of Israel, IABPC, 6/1; Ltr, Johnson to 

Morris, 4 May 79, sub: Request for Approval of Management Support Contractor 

Selection, IABPC, 6/1; NAD News Release 79-1, 7 May 79, NAD PAO files; Intel e 

national Constmction NewsleUer4 (May 1979): 1, 7. 

51. Ltr, Jordan L. Gruzen, GSCA, to Honorable Jacob R. Javits, 26 Apr 79, 

METG files; Ltr, Javits to Jack L. Stempler, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense 

(Legislative Affairs), 4 May 79, METG files. 

52. Ltr,Johnson to Morris, 4 May 79; Telecon transcript 7,7 May 79, IABPC, 

10/3; Te lecon transcript 8,8 May 79, IABPC, 10/3; Wall Street journal, 22 

May 79. 

53. Jezior interview; Schweizer interview; ENR 202 (24 May 79): 40-41; Washington Post, 21 Apr 79. 

54. Schweizer's board included Stockman, Lellis, Schroer, and G. A. 

Dohmeier. 

55. ENR 202 (24 May 79): 40-41; Wall Streetjoum.al, 18 May 79; NAD News Release 79-2, 17 May 79; Walter McQuade, "A Construction Job That Will Help Buy 

Peace," Fortune 100 (16June 1979): 65. 

56. jerusalem Post, 10 Jul 79; (Tel Aviv) lV[a'miv, 13 Jun 80. 

57. Ltr, David B. Perini to Maj Gen Johnson, 10 Jul 79; Ltr, Perini to Col 

Clarence D. Gilkey, 11 Jul 79; Ltr, Nathan Perlmutter, Director, Anti-Defamation 

League ofB'nai Brith, to Perini, 17 Jul 79; Ltr, Charles]. Patterson, Vice President 

for Corporate Relations, Perini Corporation, to George Grimes, NAD Public Affairs Officer, 24Jul 79; Ltr, Maj Gen Bennett L. Lewis to Perini, 25 Jul 79. All in 

IABPC, 10/3. 
NECESSARY STEPS 61 

58. AR 310-25, Milital)' Publications: DietionaT), of United States Arm)' 'Terllls, 

Change 1 (Washington, D.C.: HQDA, 12 Apr 77), p. 152. 

59. ER 1180-1-1, Contmels: Engineer Contmet Instme/ions (Washington, D.C.: 

OCE,1 Dec 69), pp. 3-7. 

60. Information Paper, DAEN-MPC-F, 24 Apr 79, sub: Israe li Air Fields, 

IABPC, 90/6; U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings 

Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, to Hear Administration Officials on th e Middle East Peace Package, 11 Aprll 1979, pp. 

26--27, DSAA files. 

61. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, 

Hearings Before the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs and the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the Committee on 

Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives. Special International Security Assistance Act of 1979, the Egyptian-Israeli Treaty and the Upcoming Peace Negotiations. 26 April 1979, pp. 10-11 ,47, DSAA files. 

62.93 Slat. 89 . 

63. 93 Slat. 97 . 

64. USAF Office of Information Biography, Antonia Handler Chayes, Under 

Secretary, U.S. Air Force [1 979], in Office of Air Force History, Bolling Air Force 

Base; Memo (unsigned), Lt Gen Ernest Graves, Jr., n.d., sub: Management of Israeli Air Base Construction, Encl to Memo, Graves for CaE (Lt Gen John W. 

Morris), 14 May 79, File 1501-07, IABP files, DAEN-MPC-G. 

65. Memo (unsigned), Graves, sub: Management ofIsraeli Air Base Consu·uction. 

66. Draft memo, DSD to SA and SAF, sub: Israeli Air Base Construction-Action Memorandum, Tab B to Memo (unsigned), Graves, sub: Management of Israeli Air Base Construction; Draft memo, DSD to SA and SAF, sub: Israeli Air Base 

Construction-Action Memorandum, Tab C to Memo (unsigned), Graves, sub: 

Management of Israeli Air Base Construction. 

67. Draft memo, DSD to SA and SAF, sub: Israeli Air Base Consu'uction-Action Memorandum, Tab D to Memo (unsigned), Graves, sub: Management of 

Israeli Air Base Construction. 

68. Memo (unsigned), Graves, sub: Management ofIsraeli Air Base ConsU·uction. 

69. Ibid.; Memo, Graves for CaE, 14 May 79; Memo, Morris for SA, 15 May 79, 

sub: Management of Israeli Air Base Construction-Information Memorandum, 

File 1501-07, IABP fi les, DAEN-MPC-G. 

70. Memo, Fliakis for ASA (IL&FM) and ASAF (MRA&L), 17 May 79, sub: Israeli Air Base Construction; MFR, Morris, 7 Jun 79, sub: Management of Israeli 

Air Base Construction Program, File 1501-07, IABP files, DAEN-MPC-G. 

71. MFR, Morris, 7 Jun 79, sub: Management ofIsraeli Air Base Construction 

Program; Interv (telephone), author with Bates C. Burnell, Nov 83; Johnson 

interview; Morris interview. 

72. MOU, DAEN-PRZ (Theodore Henningsen) to DAEN-MPC, 22 Jun 79, 

sub: Memorandum of Understanding Between the DOD Agencies in the Israeli 

Air Base Construction Program, Tab B, Executive, DAEN-MP, routing slip to 

EDES, 22Jun 79, File 1501-07, IABP files, DAEN-MPC-G; NAD, Draft Memorandum of Understanding, Tab E to Executive, DAEN-MP, routing slip to EDES, 22 

Jun 79. 

73. Memo, Maj Gen Willi am R. Wray, through CS, U.S. Army, and ASA 

(IL&FM), for ASD (MRA&L), 27 Jun 79, sub: Memorandum of Understanding 

Between DOD Agencies in Israeli Air Base Construction Program-Decision 

Memorandum, File 1501-07, IABP files, DAEN-MPC-G. 

74. Ltr, Chayes to McGiffert, 6 Jul 79, sub: Israeli Air Base Construction, Encl 

to Memo, Graves for Morris, 9 Jul 79, File 1501-07, IABP fil es, DAEN-MPC-G; 
62 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

Chayes note to McGiffert, n.d. [c. 6-9 Jul 79], cover for Memo, Chayes for ASD 

(ISA) , 6 Jul 79, sub: Israeli Air Base Construction. 

75. Brig Gen John F. Wall comments on Memo, Chayes for ASD (ISA), 6 Jul 

79, sub: Israeli Air Base Consu'uction; alternative paragraph on funding attached 

to Memo, Chayes for ASD (ISA) , 6 Jul 79, sub: Israeli Air Base Construction. 

76. Memo, Joe F. Meis, Acting ASAF (MRA&I), for DASD (I&H), OASD 

(MRA&L), 16 Jul 79, sub: Memorandum of Understanding Between DOD Agencies in the Israeli Air Base Construction Program-Decision Memorandum, File 

1501-07, IABP files, DAEN-MPC-G; Wray and Gilbert, Memorandum of Understanding Between the DOD Agencies in the Israeli Air Base Construction Program, 25 Jul 79, IABPC, 11 / 2. 

77. The specific laws included Title IX of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, as amended, 86 Stat. 1278; Section 612 of the Military 

Construction Authorization Act of 1949, as amended, 80 Stat. 756; Section 719 of 

the Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended, 84 Stat. 796; and Section III of 

the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, as amended, 79 

Stat. 1127. 

78. Ltr, Deanne C. Siemer, General Counsel, DOD, to William M. Nichols, 

General Counsel, OMB, 8 Aug 79, sub: Department of Defense Executive Order 

Document 240, DAEN-MPC-G files. 

79. 93 Stat. 90. 

80. EO 12178, 10 Dec 79, in Public Papers oj the Presidents oj the United States: 

Jimmy CaTtel; 1979 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1980), p . 2220. 
CHAPTER 5 

Setting Up Shop 

April-October 1979 

It's not exactly an invasion, but the Americans have landed, formed a 

beachhead in Tel Aviv and are fanning out in the Negev. 

Jerusalem Post I 

Only a child of the twentieth century could like Tel Aviv. Unlike 

so much of Israel, where the biblical past was ubiquitous, Tel Aviv 

was thoroughly modern. In 1909 a group of Jewish pioneers had 

started the settlement on the seaside dunes north of ancient Jaffa 

with its overwhelmingly Arab population. They chose the unintentionally ironic name of Tel Aviv or hill of spring for their community atop the mounds of sand. Seventy years later, nearly one-half 

million people lived there in a metropolis that sprawled in every direction except westward into the Mediterranean. Buses and trucks 

and the automobiles that darted between them turned a downtown 

stroll into a noisy and perilous adventure. Exhaust fumes spread a 

blue film overhead, sometimes to be swept away by the sea breeze, 

sometimes to cling through the steamy night. With none of the 

charm of older cities and most of the problems of bigger ones, 

Israel's largest city was a good advertisement for air conditioning. 

Colonel Gilkey arrived in April. He had little in hand except 

orders that had established the Near East Project Office as "a 

major subordinate organization of the North Atlantic Division," as 

of 26 March 1979.2 The American embassy could be expected to 

provide some assistance with communications and temporary work 

space. Otherwise there was little to go on. Gilkey needed money 

and people, as well as places where they could work and live. Like 

Tel Aviv's founders, he would build from scratch. 

Much uncertainty remained regarding the nature of the design 

program. During the previous autumn, agreement had been 

reached in General Johnson's office at North Atlantic Division on 

at least one basic concept. Ozzie Hewitt had sketched on a legal 
64 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

Colonel Gilkey, the first pTOject manager 

pad his proposal for design by 

the construction con tractor, 

which he thought offered the 

only way to meet the project 

deadline. Johnson, Frank 

Pagano, and Al Vinitsky had 

agreed, and Fred McNeely 

had endorsed the idea, which 

became the basis for the "Blue 

Book" design proposal. But 

agreement on this concept was 

only the beginning. Establishment of a viable Tel Aviv design organization, which had 

not been contemplated in the 

earliest plans, awaited answers 

to many other questions. 3 

The Americans did understand the Israeli force structure and design philosophy. 

From the early 1950s, Israel 

had built its air force around multiple-purpose fighter-bombers. Its 

missions, which changed little over the years, gave first priority to 

air superiority and then to tactical and reconnaissance support of 

ground forces. Israel's bases had to be ready for combat. The air 

force refueled and rearmed its aircraft with lightning speed and put 

them back in the air, compensating for the relatively small number 

of planes and pilots. Air base criteria were more exacting than were 

American standards, especially in the areas of pavement, power 

generation, and fue l supply. The Sinai bases, which were models for 

the new ones, contained dispersed, decentralized facilities. They 

also included redundant pavement and utility systems and made 

possible the rapid dispatch of aircraft into action. As General Hartung noted, "You can almost say that these are land-based aircraft 

carriers." 4 

As soon as the Americans arrived in Tel Aviv, they set out to answer numerous questions about the design program and the Israeli 

way of doing business. Of primary importance was a clear delineation of responsibility for design and for the construction that 

would follow. The American position remained the one stated by 

General Graves in March: "Once the design is agreed upon, then 

our view is that the U.S. must have the primary voice in executing 

that design." Also the amount of replication of Sinai facilities that 

the program would entail needed to be determined. Because repli-
SETTING UP SHOP 65 

cation involved adapting extant designs to the sites rather than design itself, clarification of the extent to which structures would be 

copied was a prerequisite for defining the scope of the entire project. Design standards were also important. In many cases, the Israelis used American design standards; others were either British or 

Israeli. Gilkey needed a full list. He also needed more data about 

the climate, geology, and topography of the sites; the proximity of 

potential quarries and wells; and the layouts of the national utility 

and transportation systems. For the bases themselves, he wanted 

master plans and facility lists, guide specifications for design, and 

drawings of structures that would be replicated. Even more important was a list offacilities needed for initial operating capability and 

a schedule for completion of design by the Israeli Air Force.s 

Much of the early concern centered on timely design of the aircraft shelters. These structures, important to the dispersal and protection of aircraft at the bases, represented a large part of construction. Each base included ten complexes of six shelters each. In 

addition to the protective shells themselves, the complexes contained ancillary facilities and structures, among them electrical systems and storage for explosives. Their mechanical systems included 

compressed air, fuel distribution, fire protection, potable water, and 

sewage. When the project started, the Israeli Air Force was evaluating choices for these structures. Manuel M. Schechet, a consultant 

to the project who had just retired from the North Atlantic Division 

as chief of the engineering division, saw the potential for delay in 

July 1979. He warned that the schedule called for prompt decisions 

from the Israelis on the types of structural frame, doors, and exhaust 

systems. To minimize delays, he urged the Corps to be ready to augment design staffs with consultants well versed in shelter design.6 

Gilkey and Hartung began work to determine what the Israelis 

had done, where they were going, and what they wanted of the 

Americans. The Israeli Air Force had done a great deal since the 

March negotiations. Gilkey reported that thirty to forty Israeli firms 

already were designing facilities, and drawings were well under way. 

The contracts and the construction organizations had been developed under the assumption that elements of the consortia would 

do much of the design, although there had been some early signs 

that the Israelis wanted a major part. General Lapidot had said in 

October that they intended to design the bases themselves. By the 

end of April it was clear that the Israelis preferred to use their own 

architect-engineer firms for the actual drawings. They wanted the 

American contractors to coordinate the effort. 7 

Although this was a far cry from the American expectation 

that the contractors would do most of the design, coordinating the 
66 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

work of the Israeli firms was no small task. Standard Israeli practice 

called for numerous small firms doing specialized portions of designs. One architect did a building's outer shell while a consultant 

designed the electrical system and another developed mechanical 

systems. Charles R. Thomas, chief of Gilkey's engineering division 

after his arrival in July, was surprised by this approach and likened 

the coordination effort to "trying to throw a lasso on a school of 

minnows." The Israelis also wanted to do most of the site investigations and laboratory analysis, but accepted organization of these 

activities under the prime contractors.8 

Overall, the project seemed to be off to a good start. Hartung 

and Gilkey met Moshe Bar-Tov, the newly promoted brigadier general who was Hartung's counterpart as the Ministry of Defense's 

program manager. The agreement between the United States and 

Israel made no provision for such a participant, but there he was, 

and no one seemed to mind. At forty, Bar-Tov was younger than 

Hartung and Gilkey. A career navigator who had been wounded in 

action in 1973 and held a master's degree in business administration from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Bar-Tov was 

only slightly taller than the Americans. However, with his erect 

bearing and booming voice, he seemed to tower over both of 

them. All three smoked innumerable cigarettes, and their meetings generated clouds of smoke. Hartung took an immediate 

liking to Bar-Tov and characterized him as "a winner." 9 

Bar-Tov's priorities did not correspond with those of the Americans. Throughout the life of the job, he appeared preoccupied, 

sometimes even obsessed, with economy. He railed at the profligacy 

of the Corps of Engineers and its indifference to the public trust. 

He believed much of what the Corps did represented waste and 

featherbedding and insisted on the importance of watching costs 

from the outset. Referring to the surfeit of clerical workers in the 

Near East Project Office during its first days, he complained about 

people who had been paid to read Sears catalogs. Early errors created unrecoverable waste. 10 They also made lasting impressions. 

There were other indications of potential conflict. The Israelis 

wanted to alter some design concepts. Mter members of the Iillesset questioned the importation of all project materials, the Ministry of Defense also broached the possibility of buying more Israeli goods and services. In addition, the Israelis had concerns 

about potential prime contractors that did business with countries 

that did not recognize Israel and wan ted to screen the selection 

lists. Nevertheless, management seemed harmonious and development of a plan of work was under way. Hartung summed it up: "All 

team members are first rate. Lots of work being accomplished." 11 
SETTING UP SHOP 67 

Formation of contractor organizations began while much 

remained unclear. The structures of the construction consortia reflected the basic decision to place the design function under prime 

contractors, but diverged from there. Negev Airbase Constructors 

handled design through a component of the joint venture, Louis 

Berger International. Air Base Constructors let a subcontract with 

Tippetts-Abbett-McCarthy-Stratton, which became known on the 

project as Air Base Consultants. The third contractor, Management 

Support Associates, anticipated a m~or role in design and built its 

organization with that in mind. The Corps of Engineers intended 

to maintain only a small work force in Israel and needed help in reviewing and controlling production of drawings. Management Support Associates expected to do much of this. One of its six major divisions in Tel Aviv, the Technical and Construction Management 

Support Directorate, reflected that expectation. 12 

The contractor selection process was still incomplete when 

Gilkey realized how much uncertainty remained about design. On 

30 April he told Johnson that the Israelis proposed numerous 

changes to the Sinai base designs. Relying on a decade of experience, they altered the configuration of the airfields, adding highspeed turnouts and taxiways to the plans. Five days later, Gilkey reported a changed situation. The Israelis renewed interest in 

replication, and a basis for agreement on the scope of work 

seemed assured. Gilkey knew that such concurrence was essential 

and hoped to have it in a week. "The big effort," he said, "is to try 

and get the scope nailed down." 13 

By mid-May identification of the specific scope of work was virtually complete. Of 105 construction items at each base, about 70 

involved replication. For these, constructors needed as-built designs and adaptations for the sites. Fifteen facilities required minor 

changes, for which criteria were available. The rest, which needed 

new designs, included a number that were peculiar to each site, 

among them drainage structures, utilities, and pavements. No final 

decision had been made on aircraft shelters, but Hartung expected that this question would not delay work. Overall, the design 

effort for the American joint ventures appeared smaller than 

originally expected. 14 

The Corps and its contractors divided the design tasks among 

themselves, essentially assigning operational aspects to the construction contractors and centralized review to Gilkey's office with 

the help of Management Support Associates. For example, the 

constructors established specifications for each building and prepared cost estimates and shop drawings. The Corps and the sup-
68 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

port contractor reviewed and approved these. The agreement did 

not provide for Ministry of Defense involvement in the process.

15 

As uncertainty about the nature of the work began to fade, 

Gilkey faced two essential tasks. The Near East Project Office 

needed an element that managed design. It also required procedures and guidelines for its work. Both began to emerge from the 

analysis Schechet provided during the summer. From the outset, 

he urged Gilkey to fix clear areas of responsibility for each contractor and to simplify procedures and functions. As to the project itself, he divided it into three phases-predesign, design, and construction. Each presented different problems and opportunities 

for design management. In the predesign phase, Schechet emphasized three areas. The first was early development of firm criteria 

and scope to prevent expensive changes and delays later. Next he 

expressed concern about the translations of Israeli drawings from 

Hebrew to English, the quality of which varied. He also feared that 

differences between Israeli and American methods of presentation 

might cause misinterpretations in the field. Finally, he urged 

preparation of project specifications based on Corps of Engineers 

guide specifications, modified as needed by Israeli standards.

16 

. Engineers on programs of this size routinely created guide 

specifications that blended program needs with Corps guidelines. 

The Safeguard antiballistic missile program and the work in Saudi 

Arabia both had begun with program-oriented guide specifications. The development of a set of Negev Outline Specifications, 

combining Israeli and American standards, began in mid-:June, anticipating Schechet's first report. An early start was essential because this important predesign task might take considerable time. 

Schechet, who envisioned a substantial design role for Management Support Associates, wanted the management support contractor to do the work. However, Pagano in New York thought the 

construction contractors, who already complained that Management Support Associates was taking over their responsibilities, 

would object. Air Base Constructors wound up with the bulk of the 

job, but General Manager Fred Butler was not pleased. "People 

have come to regard this item as our contract responsibility," he 

wrote, "when in reality, it is not." According to Butler, "The only 

reason the job ended up with us is that we demonstrated a certain 

ability to perform it when others did not." 17 

Schechet expected plans to evolve from these outline specifications and Israeli drawings. So he recognized that the actual design 

segment of the project would require close coordination with the 

Israeli firms that produced the drawings. Cooperation was essential for avoidance of expensive changes in plans, for compliance 
SETTING UP SHOP 69 

with the tight schedule, and for integration of plans with the contractors' equipment and methods. During construction, he foresaw a declining engineering effort with reviews and changes based 

on field needs. The important actions came early, and he chafed at 

the slow development of an organization and procedures. Some of 

the delays were beyond project control. Congress was slow voting 

the money, suitable work space in Tel Aviv proved hard to find, and 

people on temporary duty left for home after only a few weeks on 

the job, taking their knowledge and experience with them. IS 

Then things began looking up. Confusion about the nature of 

the design function faded as Israeli firms prepared the basic drawings and the Americans adapted them to the sites. Moreover, the 

project was about to get its full-time manager back. Gilkey, who 

had gone home for his wife, had been delayed for a month recuperating from injuries received in an automobile accident. Carl 

Damico had served in his stead but lacked the staff and authority 

to negotiate arrangements with Bar-Tov while directing the activities of the contractors. 19 

An engineering organization was taking shape in the Near East 

Proj ect Office. To a large degree the structure followed Schechet's 

plan calling for a division chief, a project engineer for each site, 

and a technical branch consisting of two engineers in each discipline. The technical engineering branch under Thomas' deputy, 

Edgar N. Moon, included two teams, one for each base. Both had 

engineers in seven specialties-civil, soils, estimating, structural, 

mechanical, electrical, and environmental-and an architect. 

Schechet advised against permanent teams at the sites because the 

contractors intended to carry out their design work in Tel Aviv. 

Thomas, whose experience included the National Aeronautical 

and Space Administration's vertical assembly building at Cape 

Canaveral, radar sites for the antiballistic missile program, and 

King Khalid Military City in Saudi Arabia, ignored this recommendation. He had used liaison offices at job sites in Saudi Arabia 

while assistant chief of engineering for Mediterranean Division in 

1975. The liaison teams lacked environmental engineers and architects, but otherwise matched the Tel Aviv organization. Thomas 

recruited Gene Mahoney and Richard Huggins, both of whom he 

knew from previous assignments, to lead the teams at Ramon and 

Ovda, respectively. He also added an estimating branch under Billy 

Kellum, an architect he knew from the Canaveral project. This 

branch made projections of costs under different circumstances 

and validated anticipated costs of final designs. 20 

In August, while Butler's people still worked on the draft outline specifications, the Corps set up review and approval proce-
70 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

dures. Mter examining each draft section, Corps and Management 

Support Associates engineers would discuss their comments with 

representatives of the construction contractors who worked in the 

same disciplines, among them civil, electrical, and mechanical. 

Formal transmission of comments back to the drafters would follow. Next would come revisions, another check, and final approval. 

While establishing these procedures, the Corps' engineering division split the specifications into eight categories. Each became a 

project specification package for a group of related facilities. One 

grouping included all horizontal civil features- runways, taxiways, 

aprons, roads, and drainage systems. 21 Another included the shelter complexes. Ultimately, this organization formed the basis for 

dividing the work at each base into eight construction packages, 

which in turn were subdivided into work packages. For example, 

one construction package included all horizontal constructionsite preparation, roads, runways, and taxiways- broken into 

twenty-four component work packages.22 

The decision regarding aircraft shelters was the Ministry of Defense's last major design choice. During August, the ministry cut 

the alternatives to two and sent them to the contractors for cost estimates. A month later, the Israelis settled on a concrete shell, 

backfilled with earth and buried underground. The shell consisted 

of precast wall panels that were reinforced with steel and topped 

by a massive reinforced arched roof that was poured in place over a 

large portable steel frame. Each hangar had blast doors in front 

and an exhaust flume in the rear. Mter selection of this basic design and translation of the documents, the contractors began to 

receive the drawings for site adaptation. 23 

The Americans were unfamiliar with this approach to shelter construction. American bases usually had free-standing shelters with concrete walls formed and poured in place and topped by concrete over 

corrugated steel. The Israeli method caused some unease and resistance, partly due to its very novelty and partly because of uncertainty 

about the strength of shelters constructed in such a way. Gradually, 

the Corps and its contractors came to accept the Israeli approach.

24 

With the first drafts of the nearly 150 sections of design drawings completed in August, reviews and revisions continued well 

into the autumn. A mid-September completion date went by, while 

all five typists working for Butler's design subcontractor and as 

many engineers and specification writers revised drafts. Finally, in 

early November the packages were finished.

25 

Just as important to the future of the design effort was development of a standard operating procedure. Thomas and Moon spent 

three weeks during September and October on this framework. 
SETTING UP SHOP 71 

Their product, based on experience and their understanding of 

the program and its approval cycles, established procedures in 

four areas of the design program. They specified procedures for 

developing the Negev Outline Specifications, which were already 

well along in the review process. Beyond that, they delineated the 

routines for as-builts, which replicated facilities at Eitam or Etzion; 

for new designs that were not peculiar to a particular site; and for 

new plans that were. Their procedure for handling drawings of asbuilts seemed to amplify on suggestions Schechet had made in 

June. His notion of the process had been direct and straightforward. Israeli architect-engineer firms passed their drawings to 

Management Support Associates, which translated and sent them 

to the constructors for adaptation to the sites. Meanwhile, the 

Corps of Engineers and the Israeli Air Force conducted simultaneous reviews for technical sufficiency.26 

The standard operating procedure added an initial review for 

deviations from the program scope. Instead of sending drawings 

directly to the sites, Management Support Associates distributed 

copies to the Corps' engineering division, both program management offices, and its own reviewers for examination against the 

scope. Mter this analysis the diagrams went to the constructors. Except for its role in the initial review, Management Support Associates did administrative tasks and translations, kept track of the process through a documents log, and provided copies of drawings. 

New designs also were reviewed for conformity with the scope of 

the program and for technical adequacy. The design-construction 

contractors monitored progress at the offices of the Israeli firms 

that made the drawings and adapted the plans to their bases. In all 

cases, the standard operating procedure warned, "Priority actions 

by the Corps, MSA, and IAF will frequently be required in order 

not to delay construction." 27 

While the government built up its engineering staff in Tel Aviv, 

the design-construction contractors did likewise. Long-term personnel gradually replaced temporaries. For example, the Air Base Consultants staff grew from eleven at the beginning of September to over 

twice as many at the end of October. Both contractors had teams in 

the desert studying the sites, the Negev Outline Specifications 

neared completion, and the design effort was indeed under way.28 

Gilkey was acutely aware that time was limited. Through the 

spring, he waited anxiously for Congress to provide funds and 

urged Johnson to speed up hiring. He also had other things to 

worry about, with elements of all three contractors arriving and 

the Israeli architect-engineer firms working on parts of the design. 

Procurement, the bridge between design and construction, was 
72 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

also troublesome from the beginning. The purchase of materials 

and equipment required innovative and flexible approaches attuned to changes in the Israeli economy and the transitions of fasttrack construction. For many months procurement was a source of 

frustration and annoyance for the Near East Proj ect Office, the 

constructors, and the Israelis. Some claimed to have seen the problem coming. Thomas later observed, "Before I decided to take the 

job, I could have walked in and said, 'long-lead items and procurement are going to be a real problem. Now what are the other problems?'" 29 That this was no surprise provided little comfort. 

Initially both construction consortia seemed eager to buy their 

materials and equipment as soon as possible. In June 1979 Negev 

Airbase Constructors proposed an early start on a deferred-payment basis. The contractor hoped to have its equipment bought 

and on board ships for delivery in Israel in late July or early August. Air Base Constructors also started to order machinery and vehicles in midsummer. The Corps of Engineers shared their desire 

for a quick start but had trouble finding enough capable people to 

manage procurement. The lack of talent was immediately apparent. North Atlantic had no one experienced with buying heavy 

construction equipment, so Johnson went outside for help. Management Support Associates hired broker Michael A. Zinman as a 

consultant on a part-time hourly basis. 30 

Zinman oversaw the acquisition of heavy equipment by the 

construction consortia. General Johnson insisted that both contractors get three bids and accept the cheapest one. Both wanted 

Caterpillar, and neither was pleased when Fiat-Allis came in lowest. 

One corporate executive said that Fiat was an acronym for "fix it 

again, Tony." The same opinion prevailed in the Corps of Engineers. McNeely said, "We all thoughtlJ was crazier than hell when 

he went with Fiat-Allis." However, inquiries to users showed that 

Fiat equipment had good "RAM characteristics," that is, it was reliable, remained available, and was maintainable. Johnson held 

firm, and Fiat-Allis won the contract. 31 

Well into the fall this shortage of procurement experts persisted. Zinman stayed on into 1980, when he became involved in 

litigation with Air Base Constructors over a finder's fee he claimed 

for locating some 63-ton dump trucks for Ramon. 32 Even before he 

left, the support office in New York complained to North Atlantic 

Division that it lacked purchasing specialists. They had one qualified person, but under pressure from Gilkey sent him to Tel Aviv. 

For his part, Gilkey pleaded to North Atlantic that he was in "dire 

need" of temporary helpY 
SETTING UP SHOP 73 

In a September 1979 introduction to the intricacies of fasttrack procurement, Hartung explained to Bar-Tov how the system 

should work. The principal objective was to get supplies and services of acceptable quality within the delivery schedule at the lowest price. The process had to be carried out in a fair and competitive atmosphere. Before completion and approval of contractor 

procurement system plans, the consent of the respective contracting officers was required for several kinds of transactions, notably 

subcontracts over $25,000 and acquisition of industrial facilities. 

The government controlled the process and treated it as sequential tasks rather than as receiving completed facilities or usable 

construction items. Materials and equipment had to be ordered 

ahead of time, so procurement tasks tended to occur early and 

needed prompt commitments of funds. While buying early might 

seem expensive, Hartung explained, the early purchases would 

reduce the number of hasty purchases later. 34 

The first chief of Gilkey's procurement and supply division, 

Ronald G. Hallmark from the Corps' Walla Walla District had prepared Hartung's little essay on procurement for Bar-Tov. Although 

Hallmark understood the way the system should operate, he had 

his hands full. Extremely cautious, he seemed uncomfortable with 

the job's fast pace. This project was not amenable to a routine approach. The area office at Ovda worried about lack of timely purchase of materials that had to be ordered well in advance, and the 

contractor at Ramon complained that "our procurement and approval systems are too time consuming." 35 Instead of offering help, 

Hallmark's office lectured them on the "fundamental responsibility to plan actions well enough to assure that 'short fuse' are the 

exceptions rather than the rule." 36 

In October 1979 Management Support Associates proposed 

centralizing procurement for both sites and the headquarters. A 

coordination group that included all three contractors would manage the program from Tel Aviv. This system would replace the original one, in which each construction contractor bought its own 

materia ls under supervision of the procurement and supply 

branch of the appropriate area office. 37 This proposal died quickly 

in the hands of the Near East Project Office staff. Donald Baer, 

chief of the construction division, said the coordination group represented "excess control, [would be] cumbersome, and time consuming." 38 Hallmark asserted that this drastic change would cause 

delays and add problems rather than solve them. He "strongly 

urge [d) that we clearly reject such a major change in the existing 

system, thus avoiding undue criticism," and suggested "that we 

pursue our present course, utilizing the value of the learning curve 
74 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

experience obtained which is resulting in an evolution of improvements."39 The office, he seems to have meant, was learning slowly 

and would improve at the same rate. Eighteen months later, looking back on a lost opportunity, Alan Shepherd of Management 

Support Associates assessed the rejection differently. "Conceptually," he said, "everyone agrees centralized ... procurement was 

the way to go. But," he asked, "do you give it to a person who is not 

in the fraternity?"40 According to this view, the bureaucracy had 

closed ranks in defense of its prerogatives. 

There were also some unexpected twists in procurement arrangements. The intergovernment agreement had emphasized 

buying outside of Israel to minimize the project's effect on the Israeli economy. Construction resources were occupied fully, notably 

in Iran, where Israeli firms had many projects under way. Then the 

revolution in Iran caused a dramatic change in Israel's construction industry. Firms with idle workers and machines asked the government for help in finding markets. Very soon after Gilkey arrived in Tel Aviv, the Israelis began to press for increased 

procurement activities in Israel. Some Israelis had objected to the 

agreement from the start.4J Auditor Naomi Kogon of Bar-Tov's office, who later married Bory Steinberg, the head of the project office's planning and coordination office from October 1979 to August 1980, labeled it a "a disaster."42 But the agreement had taken 

into account the Israeli situation, which was changing all the while. 

Bar-Tov noted the magnitude of some of the changes: "In all my 

studies, when I learned about double-digit inflation, I don't think 

that all these experts in economy thought that this term would be 

used for monthly inflation."43 So, still concerned with accommodating Israel's economic situation, the program looked for ways to 

increase local purchases. 

Israeli pressure for an expanded role started a month after 

conclusion of the government-to-government agreement. Gilkey 

expected that he would have to buy some supplies and materials 

locally. While at first it had seemed that local purchases might not 

go far beyond office supplies and some administrative support, in 

June the Israelis clarified their interest in selling building materials 

and equipment to the program. Given this area of concern, it was 

appropriate that the only standard procedure completed during 

Hallmark's tenure specified the items that had to be bought in Israel, those that had to be imported, and those that could come 

from either local or foreign sources.44 

Along with the expressions of interest in more- procurement 

came the first published claims that Israeli constructors should 

have been allowed to do the work. In the summer of 1979 the 
SETTING UP SHOP 75 

newspapers began to raise the issue. The papers usually focused on 

the money wasted in allowing the Americans to do the work. The 

program tried to adapt to the new situation. The Ministry of Defense still wished to minimize the "negative impact on the Israeli 

market which is already overheated by excess demand-inflation." 

So now the goals were twofold, expanded involvement as well as 

minimal harm to the economy. Before the year ended, the program managers approved a standard procedure that tried to accommodate these apparently conflicting interests. The agreement 

made purchasing within Israel ajoint effort. The procurement office prepared monthly lists of expected solicitations, on which the 

Israelis based their determinations of acceptable prices. The 

Israelis decided whether bidders were on the ministry's list of 

approved vendors as well as whether prices were reasonable. 45 

Gilkey also had to find space for his staff to live and work. 

Joseph Robbins, a principal in Management Support Associates, arrived in early May with his firm's first contingent. In addition to beginning evaluation of the Israeli design effort and gauging the 

amount of work involved in translating drawings from Hebrew, Robbins' people started the search for offices and housing. They found 

temporary space at the LaRomme Hotel, an incomplete luxury 

hotel along the beach. Meanwhile, they continued to look for permanent quarters, based on Johnson's earlier decision to seek offices 

and residences in the same place. In Tel Aviv, terrorist acts were unlikely but possible, so such an arrangement would protect his staff, 

even though the Israelis vetoed his idea of an eight-foot chain-link 

fence around the facility. Moreover, employees would avoid commuting time. Such a building would cost less than rent for hundreds 

of apartments and prove easier to administer. Johnson sometimes 

referred to the home he sought as a "cruise ship," and he would 

have considered a vessel anchored off shore. However, he mainly 

had in mind a hotel large enough to provide offices and to house all 

employees who did not bring their families. Hartung and Bar-Tov 

were not enthusiastic about the idea, particularly if the hotel remained open to the public. So the solution was to find one that 

could be taken over completely. The Diplomat on the tourist strip 

was willing to close but asked about $4 million per year. 46 

Bar-Tov had an interest in the choice because of an agreement 

to place his office alongside those of Hartung and Gilkey. Bar-Tov 

considered the Diplomat too pretentious and the potential source 

of press criticism. He also wanted project management located 

near the Israeli Air Force headquarters in a newer section of the 

city away from the beach. So, while the Americans studied hotel 

costs and discussed the problem with New York, Bar-Tovarranged 
76 BUILDING AlR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

the lease of four floors of the 

IBM Building, a three-sided 

tower whose upper floors provided spectacular views of the 

city and the sea. More important, IBM was across the street 

from the offices of the Israeli 

Air Force. Desperate ly in 

need of permanent office 

space, the Americans acceded 

to Bar-Tov's action. Gilkey was 

not pleased and understood 

the precedent that was involved: "We cannot let him 

[Bar-Tov] get into the position where he's approving 

anything that we do either on 

a temporary or permanent 

beddown." Still, IBM did proIBM Building in Tel Aviv vide a place to work. "We're 

in business," Damico told 

New York. "We now own the 

IBM Building. For the price we're paying for it, I thought we 

bought it," he added ruefully, with an eye on the $609,000 first-year 

price tag. 47 

The IBM Building represented only a partial solution to the 

need for office space. Four floors of the tower were crammed full 

with program management offices, Gilkey's staff, and the designconstruction contractors. Damico expected that this contingent 

would soon overflow these offices. The gradual movement of the 

offices from the LaRomme during July validated his judgment. The 

project still needed a hotel, but the emphasis was changing. With 

management at the IBM Building, it became clear that engineering 

activities should be centered there also. The hotel was for living 

space and administrative staff functions, including personnel, security, communications, and transportation. Along with Gilkey's office, engineering, construction, and resource management would 

remain. The project's focal point would still be the IBM Building. 48 

Meanwhile, Management Support Associates continued negotiations for the Diplomat. As talks proceeded, other hotels offered 

better prices. The best came from David Taic, owner of the 327-

room Forum Palace . A little north of the tourist center but on the 

beach, the hotel had once been the Tel Aviv Sheraton. Older than 

the others, in need of cosmetic repair, and beset with poorly func-
SETIING UP SHOP 77 

tioning mechanical systems, the Palace belied its name. Still, it had 

advantages, among them twenty more rooms than the Diplomat 

and large first-floor public areas that could be converted to offices. 

It also was more desirable from a security standpoint. A road ran 

under the Diplomat, making it something of a risk, while the 

Palace sat farther from the street and had a large enclosed parking 

lot. Moreover, the same problems that gave the Palace a run-down 

air made it more attractive from a public relations standpoint: everyone wanted to avoid unnecessarily lavish quarters. With a threeyear $3 million lease and an annual operating cost of about $2 million, the choice seemed sound. Mter a cursory evaluation of the 

building's condition, Management Support Associates signed a 

lease on 1 August 1979. The project was in the hotel business. 49 

The transition to government offices and billeting was not easy. 

Occupants were forced to move, and travel agents were told to cancel bookings. Then former employees of the hotel, angered by 

their abrupt dismissal, occupied the building. They refused to 

allow Israeli Hospitality Services, the subsidiary of the Dan Hotel 

Corporation that won the subcontract for operations and management, to take possession. In need of a quick resolution, Management Support Associates encouraged Dan to negotiate with the 

strikers. The agreement saved ninety-five jobs and raised the cost 

of the subcontract by about 10 percent. The Near East Project Office moved into the hotel at the beginning of September. General 

Johnson had his cruise ship.5o 
78 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

Notes 

1. "The Americans Dig In," Jerusalem Post, 18 Dec 79. 

2. DA, aCE, Permanent Orders 6-1, 29 Mar 79, IABPC, 87/9. 

3. Hewitt interview; McNeely interview, Sep 83. 

4. Milton, "Mideast Survey," p. 71; Luttwak and Horowitz, The Israeli Army 

1948-1973, pp. 121-22,228; Transcript, Meeting with Graves Delegation, 23 Mar 

79; Interv, author with Brig Gen Paul T. Hartung, Aug 80, Tel Aviv, Israel. 

5. Transcript, Meeting with Graves Delegation, 23 Mar 79; "Corps Mobilizes 

Quickly on Israeli AirbaseJobs," ENR 202 (26 April 1979) : 10; Telex, USDAO Tel 

Aviv (Col Clarence D. Gilkey) to DAEN-MPC, 20 Apr 79, sub: Israeli Air Base Program Development, IABPC, 12/1; Memo, Hewitt, Required Information for 

Design, NAD PAO files. 

6. Construction Package, vol. III, Aircraft Shelter Complex, Encl to Ltr, Col 

Richard L. Curl to NAC, 15 Oct 79, sub: Project Specifications and Construction 

Packages, IABPC, 22/1; Ltr, Manuel M. Schechet to NEPO Project Manager, 30 

Jun 79, sub: Interim Report No.1, and 30 Jul 79, No.2, IABPC, 80/6. 

7. Telex, USDAO Tel Aviv (Hartung) to HQ USAF, 23 Apr 79, sub: Israeli Air 

Base Program Development, Sitrep No. 1, IABPC, 12/1; Telex, USDAO Tel Aviv 

(Gilkey) to DAEN-MPC, 20 Apr 79; MFR, Hays, 18 Oct 78, IABPC, 1/5; Vinitsky 

interview. 

8. Interv, author with Charles R. Thomas, Aug 80, Tel Aviv, Israel. 

9. Te lex, NEPO PAO (Eugene Gamble) to U.S. Army Engineer District, 

Chicago, 22 Apr 80, sub: BG Moshe Bal'-Tov Biography, IABPC, 33/1; Interv, author with Paul Cheverie, Aug 86, New York City; Telex, USDAO Tel Aviv (Hartung) to HQ USAF, 23 Apr 79, sub: Israeli Air Base Program Development, Sitrep 

No.2; Telex, USDAO Tel Aviv (Gilkey) to DAEN-MPC, 20 Apr 79. 

10. Interv, author with Moshe Bar-Tov, May 82, Tel Aviv, Israel; Interv, author 

with McNeely, Mar 84, Washington, D.C. 

11. Telecon transcript 3,24 Apr 79, IABPC, 10/3. 

12. "Israeli Air Bases: Peace Treaty Puts U.S. Constructors on a Desert Fast 

Track," E.7VR 205 (30 October 1979): 26-27; A.J. Vercruyssen, MSA Situation Rpt, 

27 Jul 79, IABPC, 12/4. 

13. Telecon transcript 5, 30 Apr 79; Telecon transcript 16, 4 May 79. Both in 

IABPC, 10/3. 

14. Telex, USDAO Tel Aviv (Hartung) to HQ USAF, 14 May 79, sub: Israeli Air 

Base Program Development, Sitrep No.4, IABPC, 12/l. 

15. Telex, NEPO to NAD, 4Jun 79, IABPC, 65/l. 

16. Ltr, Schechet to NEPO Project Manager, 30 Jun 79, sub: Interim Report 

No.1. 

17. Telecon transcript 18, 11 Jun 79, IABPC, 10/3; Ltr, Schechet to NEPO 

Project Manager, 30 Jun 79, sub: Interim Report No.1, and 30 Jul 79, No.2; 

Thomas interview; Fred Butler, ABC Weekly Progress Report, 26 Sep 79, IABPC, 

12/13. 

18. Ltr, Schechet to NEPO Project Manager, 30 Jun 79, sub: Interim Report 

No.1; and 30Jul 79, No.2. 

19. Ltr, Schechet to NEPO Project Manager, 30 Jul 79, sub: Interim Report 

No.2. 

20. Ibid., 30 Jun 79, sub: Interim Report No.1; Thomas interview; MFR, Bal'-

Tov and Hartung, 26 Dec 79, sub: 20 December 1979 DOD/MOD PMs Meeting, 

IABPC, 45/4; NEPO, Organization Manual, 15 Sep 79, IABPC, 88/5. 
SETTING UP SHOP 79 

21. MFR, Edgar N. Moon, Acting Chief, Engineering Division, 20 Aug 79, sub: 

Procedures for Review of Negev Outline Specifications, IABPC, 21 / 14; Thomas 

interview. 

22. The other seven groups were exterior utility systems; aircraft shelters; 

housing, dormitories, and community facilities; operations and administration facilities; industrial and maintenance facilities; preengineered structures; and Ovda 

flood control. Ltr, Curl to Project Manager, NAC, 15 Oct 79, sub: Project Specifications and Construction Packages; Ltr, Col Donald M. O'Shei, COR, to GM, 

ABC, 15 Oct 79, sub: Project Specifications and Construction Packages, IABPC, 

22/ 1; Ltr, Lt Col Joseph A. Beben, COR, to GM, MSA, 15 Oct 79, sub: Project 

Specification Packages. All in IABPC, 22/1. 

23. NEPO Sitrep 3,13 Aug 79, IABPC, 12/6; MSA input, NEPO Sitrep 6, 3 Sep 

79, IABPC, 12/9. 

24. Interv, author with Carl Damico, Nov 88, Baltimore, Md. 

25. ABC Weekly Progress Reports, 26 Sep, 12 and 31 Oct, and 12 Nov 79, 

IABPC, 12/ 12, 15, 18, and 13/ 2; Ltr, Curl, COR, to Project Manager, NAC, 24 Sep 

79, sub: Progress of Negev Outline Specifications, IABPC, 29/ 4; Ltr, O'Shei, COR, 

to GM, ABC, 24 Sep 79, sub: Progress of Negev Outline Specifications, IABPC, 

29/4. 

26. Thomas interview; SOP 9, Design Development, Review, and Approval, 

IABPC, 15/ 9; Ltr, Schechet to NEPO Project Manager, 30 Jun 79, sub: Interim 

Report No. 1. 

27. SOP 9. 

28. Ltr, Schechet to NEPO Project Manager, 30 Jul 79, sub: Interim Report 

No.2; NEPO Sitrep 6; ABC Weekly Progress Reports, 12, 19, and 26 Sep and 3 

and 24 Oct 79, IABPC, 12/11-14, and 17. 

29. Telex, USDAO Tel Aviv (Hartung) to HQ USAF, 23 Apr 79, sub: Israeli Air 

Base Development, Sitrep No.1; Telex, USDAO Tel Aviv (Gilkey) to DAEN-MPC, 

20 Apr 79; Telecon transcript 2,20 Apr 79;John F. Wall, "Israeli Air Base Project: 

Construction Miracles in the Desert," The lWilitary Engineer 73 (September-October 1981): 329; Thomas interview. 

30. Telecon transcript 22, 21 Jun 79, IABPC, 10/3; ABC Weekly Progress Reports, 8, 15, 22, and 29 Aug 79, IABPC, 12/ 6-9; Memo, Richard A. Wilson, MSA, 

21Jun 79, IABPC, 77/ 4. 

31. Johnson interview; McNeely interview, Sep 83. 

32. The matter was settled out of court. IABPC, 77/3-6. 

33. Te lex, NEPO-Rear to NEPO, 7 Nov 79, sub: Procurement Actions at 

NEPO-Rear, IABPC, 66/ 1; Telex, NEPO to NAD, 12 Oct 79, sub: Request for TDY 

Assistance, IABPC, 65/ 8. 

34. Ltr, Hartung to Bar-Tov, 7 Sep 79, sub : Procurement Policy and 

Procedures, IABPC, 29/ 4. 

35. Procurement & Supply Division, Sitreps, 26 Aug, 2 and 9 Sep 79, IABPC, 

12/ 8-10; OAO, Master Diary, entry for 18 Oct 79, IABPC, 84/1; Butler, ABC 

Weekly Progress Report, 26 Sep 79, IABPC, 12/ 13. 

36. Three different versions of this letter, drafted by Hallmark's office, went to 

th e three contractors from the respective contracting officers' representatives. 

Ltrs, Curl to GM, NAC; O 'Shei to GM, ABC; and Beben to GM, MSA. All 5 Oct 79, 

sub: Time Allowed for Submission of Bids, IABPC, 30/ 1. 

37. Interv, author with Alan]. Shepherd, May 82, Tel Aviv, Israel; DF, Donald 

C. Baer, Chief, Construction Division, to Project Manager, 15 Oct 79, sub: MSA 

Recommendations on DCC Design and Procurement Process, IABPC, 30/ 1; DF, 

Ronald G. Hallmark, Chief, Procurement and Supply Division, to Project Manager, 16 Oct 79, sub: MSA Recommendations on Major Change to Existing 

Procurement Process, IABPC, 30/ 1. 
80 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

38. DF, Baer to Project Manager, 15 Oct 79. 

39. DF, Hallmark to Project Manager, 16 Oct 79. 

40. Shepherd interview, May 82. 

41. Telecon transcript 2, 20 Apr 79; jerusalem Post, 17 Jul 79; Memo, Hartung 

for Gilbert, 30 Nov 78, sub: Methods of Accomplishing/Managing Israeli Air Base 

Construction, IABPC, 89/3. 

42. Interv, author with Naomi Kogon Steinberg, Dec 81, McLean, Va. 

43. Proceedings of Program Press Conference, Tel Aviv, 12 Jun 80 (audiotape), IABPC, 92/2. 

44. Telecon transcript 2, 20 Apr 79; Telex, USDAO, Tel Aviv (Hartung), to 

HQ USAF, 23 Apr 79, sub: Israeli Air Base Program Development, Sitrep No.1; 

Ltr, Yossi Kedem, Economic Adviser, to MOD PM, to Damico, 13 Jun 80, sub: Use 

of Israeli Sources for Materials, Services, and Equipment, IABPC, 8/7; SOP 10, 

Procurement Pmcedures for Purchase of Materials, Equipment, and Services, 

9 Nov 79, IABPC, 15/1 0. 

45 .jel'usalem Post, 17 Jul 79 and 27 May 80; (Tel Aviv) Ha'aTetz, 25 Sep 81; (Tel 

Aviv) Al Ha1l!ish1llm~ 11 Nov 81; Ltr, Kedem to Damico, 13 Jun 80; SOP 10. 

46. Telex, USDAO Tel Aviv (Hartung) to HQ USAF, 14 May 79, sub: Air Base 

Program Development, Sitrep No.4; Telecon transcripts 12, 17 May 79, and 15, 

31 May 79, IABPC, 10/3;Johnson interview; McNeely inte rview, Sep 83. 

47. Telecon transcripts 14, 29 May 79; 15,31 May 79; 23, 25 Jun 79; and 24, 28 

Jun 79, IABPC, 10/3; Cost Effectiveness of a 350-Room Cruise Ship (with Office 

Co!ocated), MSA, Israeli AF Base Management Support Contractor Pmject Planning Documents and Briefing Book, May 79, IABPC, 89/2; Telex, NEPO to NAD, 

25 Jun 79, IABPC, 65/l. 

48. Telecon transcripts 19, 14Jun 79, and 23, 25Jun 79; NEPO Siu'ep No.1, 

30 Jul 79, IABPC, 12/4; NEPO Project Manager, Information Paper: Palace Billeting and Office Facility [Aug 79], Tel Aviv, IABPC, 17/2. 

49. Telecon transCl'ipts 23, 25 Jun 79, and 25, 2 Jul 79, IABPC, 10/3; Telex, 

NEPO (Hugh J. Bartley) to NEPO-Rear (Oswald I. Hewitt), 1 Aug 79, sub: RMO 

Activities, NEPO, IABPC, 65/4; NAD PAO, Statement on Forum Palace Hotel 

Lease, 13 Aug 79, IABPC, 12/5; Cheverie interview. 

50. Ltr, GM, MSA (Robert I. Barry) to CO (Gilkey), 21 Aug 79, sub: Management and Operation of the Forum Palace Hotel, Request for Approval to Subcontract, IABPC, 21/14; Information Paper: Palace Billeting and Office Facility [Aug 

79], Tel Aviv; Lt Col Joseph A. Beben, Sitrep submission, 9 Aug 79, IABPC, 12/6; 

j erusalem Post, 9 Aug 79. 
CHAPTER 6 

In Pursuit of Stability: 

Organizational and Contractual 

Problems 

September-December 1979 

I have to tell you that the start-up of the Israel project is a good example of how not to do it. 

Maj. Gen. Bennett L. Lewis I 

From my vantage point, the one Corps individual with the strength 

and capacity to deal with all facets of the program was General Bennett L. 

Lewis. More than any other person, I credit him with putting in motion 

the necessary events and actions which have brought the construction 

management to its present good posture. 

Lt. Gen.John W. Morris 2 

When the Near East Project Office was established, everyone 

involved with project management understood the need to convert the letter contracts into definitive documents. However, the 

contracts were not alone in their need for clarification. Before the 

office functioned smoothly, it too required further definition. Despite the planning that preceded occupation of the Palace Hotel, 

the initial organization was a preliminary and tentative arrangement that was useful only for starting the job. Time and firm leadership were needed to work out internal relationships, define staff 

functions, and establish an efficient organization. Relationships 

with the program managers and the area offices also needed to be 

worked out. Months passed and major personnel changes took 

place before the project organization was defined conclusively. 

When the headquarters moved into the Palace, one major 

change already had taken place. Johnson was no longer in command of North Atlantic Division. He had moved to Washington, 

where he replaced Burnell as deputy chief of engineers. A new di-
82 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

vision engineer, Maj. Gen. Bennett L. Lewis, arrived in New York in 

August. In some ways, Lewis contrasted markedly with his predecessor. Quick with a smile or a wisecrack and with a twinkle in his 

eye, the well-liked Johnson had given his subordinates in Tel Aviv 

almost a free hand. Lewis was more intense in appearance and 

manner. "He learns the business by getting deeply involved in details," his deputy Paul Bazilwich commented, "and he learns it very 

quickly at great frustration to you as an individual because he asks 

some very embarrassing questions." 3 Morris considered him "very 

smart and very tenacious, tireless, and perceptive." 4 Lewis did not 

tolerate foolishness. He was sometimes impatient and could seem 

obsessed with his work. 

Their approaches to the transition reflected the differences between the two men. At Lewis' request Johnson identified the most 

important concern facing Lewis as division engineer. Although 

Johnson considered the project in Israel very important, he believed that "the commander has got to think of the future," which 

he thought lay in North Atlantic Division's continued involvement 

in the development of water resources. Therefore he advised 

Lewis, whose major assignments had been in armaments development and procurement rather than water resources development 

and military construction, that preparation for congressional hearings on the civil works budget should receive the highest priority.5 

Lewis did as Johnson suggested but soon decided that he had 

chosen the wrong course. Lewis was not sure that civil works represented the wave of the future for the Corps. In fact, he foresaw a 

continued decline in the budget and in congressional authorization for new water projects. Moreover, Lewis thought the work in 

Israel was extremely important, "not an Army project, and not a 

Defense proj ect," but "a national project with very serious international implications." 6 When he focused his attention on the air 

base project, he did not like what he saw. He went to Israel for ten 

days in early September, visited the sites, and talked with the managers. He came away with a poor impression of operations and arrangements. He saw difficulties with the contractual framework, 

the organizational structure, the lack of consensus on goals, and 

operations themselves. 

Even before his first visit to Tel Aviv, Lewis turned his critical eye 

to the contracts for the proj ect. He understood that the government 

had resorted to cost-type contracts because of the uncertainties in the 

work. However, he did not consider the fixed-fee contract the best 

choice because it contained no monetary inducements for meeting 

the all-important 25 April 1982 deadline. He wanted a contract that 
IN PURSUIT OF STABILITY 83 

guaranteed the contractor a basic fee and included financial incentives for timely completion and for staying within the budget.7 

For help in determining the suitability of an incentive clause, 

Lewis turned to the Corps' Construction Engineering Research 

Laboratory. In Champaign, Illinois, the facility had branched out 

beyond its initial mission of long-term research in construction 

and now included a team that specialized in management issues. 

Two members of this unit, team chief Michael J. O'Connor and 

Glenn E. Colwell, analyzed the situation for Lewis. They concluded 

that introducing incentives for early completion as well as for cost 

control was indeed possible because the contractors still operated 

under letter contracts pending agreement on the definitive instruments. They also told Lewis that a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract represented the worst possible arrangement, whether from the standpoint of the lack of incentives for saving money, the anticipated 

price, or the administrative effort involved. This type of contract 

contained no incentives for economical management, so the government would have to monitor the contractor's activities closely 

and help manage the project.8 

While O'Connor and Colwell examined the contracts, Lewis 

looked at the government organization. The Near East Project Office was still in its organizational infancy. It lacked management 

systems and had few established procedures. Many positions had 

not been filled. Others had, but in the wrong sequence, with clerks 

being sent over before professionals and supervisors were even 

hired. Relations among members of the staff were also unclear. 

Worst of all from Lewis' point of view, individuals from many organizations made up the office instead of a cadre from one source. 

This staffing method was inevitable: the Corps did not have a 

ready-made project office that it could have sent to Israel. Because 

of how the office had been pieced together, its staff did not function as a team. Lewis thought the headquarters did not have control of the project. He also thought the Corps could and should 

have done better.9 

Lewis also saw the need for clear goals acceptable to all managers, whether they worked for the government or the contractors. 

From the start, Lewis viewed delivery of operational airfields by the 

April 1982 program deadline as his primary goal. He recognized 

the importance of quality and understood the Israeli concern for 

economy. If "a decision require[d] a trade-off between cost and 

time," he said, "time had precedence." He considered it crucial to 

"insure that the United States ... did nothing that could be held up 

as a reason for the Israelis not leaving the Sinai on 25 April 1982." 

Nevertheless, he did not consider this date a useful target for the 
84 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

construction agent. Only completion of facilities needed for initial 

operating capability well before the spring of 1982 would enable 

the United States to meet the April goal. The Israeli Air Force 

would need time to install its equipment, move people onto the 

bases, check out systems, and evaluate construction. Operations associated with site activation would take months. So he wanted completion by October 1981 of all construction needed for the start of 

base operations. He complained that Corps people "reacted very 

slowly, too slowly" to this need, but he insisted that they focus on 

that goal and plan accordingly. Eventually, they did SO.1O 

Lewis was also dissatisfied with the Near East Project Office's 

actual operations. The mission demanded creative approaches. 

Nevertheless, he found key civilian managers approaching their 

work routinely, "not in an innovative and practical mode with the 

urgency needed to match the requirements and sensitivities of the 

project." One senior employee in Tel Aviv told Lewis that his major 

problem involved the curtains in his hotel room. Lewis thought 

this complaint typified an excessive concern with creature 

comforts throughout the project.ll 

By the time that Lewis decided that he should concentrate on 

the air base program, Gilkey knew some of these problems. In August he reported that his office's structure was unclear. He did have 

the help of Hugh Bartley, who he described as his "de facto deputy." 

Operating under the title of assistant for administration, Bartley supervised all non engineering functions, fulfilling the role Johnson 

had envisioned for the resource manager. He was responsible for 

contract administration, personnel, public affairs, security, procurement, administrative services, and communications. But Gilkey 

knew that Bartley would be available for only a short time, and many 

of the staff sections had managers who were on the job only until 

permanent employees could be found. For example, even with an 

impending authorization for an $800 million budget, the resource 

management office had only three permanent employees at the beginning of August: the deputy chief, one auditor, and a secretary. 

Those who remembered the North Mrican airfields would have 

agreed: a three-person resource management office would not do. 12 

Gilkey had other help as well. InJune 1979 Col. Irving Kett had 

been called to active duty for the project at his own request. Kett's 

credentials seemed perfect. A professor of engineering at California 

State University, Los Angeles, he had worked in Israel for five years 

as chief design engineer for the Division of Highways in the Ministry 

of Public Works. He spoke Hebrew and understood Israeli construction practices. Although Bartley left before the end of the summer, 

Kett remained in the office with three other senior assistants whose 
IN PURSUIT OF STABILITY 85 

jobs at the time were ill defined. Still on board was Carl Damico, 

who had been interim project manager during Gilkey's absence earlier in the summer. Damico's title was assistant to the project manager, although it soon became deputy project manager. Kett was assistant project manager, Lt. Col. Joseph A. Beben was assistant 

deputy project manager, and Lt. Col. George R. Snoddy's title was 

assistant to the project manager for logistics and special projects. 13 

These senior men were not equally successful in finding suitable work, and it took time to establish their roles. Beben, who was 

among the early arrivals in May 1979, started out as a liaison between Tel Aviv and the construction contractors but, after a stint in 

the New York support office, assisted Damico in administering the 

Management Support Associates contract. Damico also took over 

the construction division after Donald Baer returned to South 

Pacific Division's San Francisco office in May 1980. Snoddy replaced Damico as contracting officer in the fall of 1980 and represented the project with the Air Force commissary system, which 

supplied much of the food for the dining rooms. Of the four, Kett 

had the most difficulty finding useful work. 14 

The only substantive job Gilkey could find for Kett involved 

preparing the weekly situation report to North Atlantic Division, 

which Kett compiled from material provided by Tel Aviv staff sections, the area offices, and the contractors. This task represented 

a misuse of Kett's talents, and Gilkey was no more comfortable 

with it than Kett. Leaving the door open for consideration of 

more suitable work, Gilkey encouraged "suggestions ... with regards to better utilizing your unique qualifications within the 

NEPO organization." Meanwhile Kett diligently garnered, sorted, 

and sent information to New York. 15 

If there were too many assistants at the level just below Gilkey, 

the problem with the next tier down was different. As the glut of 

deputies showed, no coherent management team had been hired, 

allowed to select supervisors and technicians, and sent to Israel. So 

engineering and construction divisions rounded out their staffs unsystematically. Neither Baer nor Thomas had the chance to select 

their staffs before going to Israel. When Damico first arrived, he 

found one professional engineer and nearly a dozen secretaries 

and typists. Because of the numerous volunteers in New York for 

clerical jobs, they were filled as quickly as they opened. Only later 

did the supervisors and professionals come. The recruiting was carried out in New York and Washington, sometimes influenced positively from Tel Aviv as when Thomas managed to get Gene Mahoney and Richard Huggins for the liaison offices at the sites. The 

rush to establish the organization, well intentioned though it was, 
86 BUILDING AlR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

may have obscured the need for a systematic approach. As McNeely 

said, looking back on the process, "It was a lousy way to do it." 16 

The staff's problems underscored the need to develop an efficient project team. Conflict between bureaucrats over perquisites 

or the avoidance of onerous jobs hit the office early. Two highranking civilians with adjacent offices fought it out on paper over 

the responsibility for ordering bulletin boards. 17 One of the participants in this feud also became involved in a dispute over the assignment of hotel rooms. He felt his room was not commensurate 

with his rank, rejected all explanations, and carried his complaint 

to the president of the United States. I S These disputes were still unresolved when unsanitary conditions forced the closing of the 

hotel dining room. Although the shutdown lasted only twenty-four 

hours, from dinner on 17 September through lunch on the following day, it forced 200 employees and dependents to look elsewhere 

for their meals and seek reimbursement afterward. Problems with 

food service continued for at least a month and constituted a 

major distraction for everyone, management included. 19 

Back in the States Lewis was trying to get control of the situation. He had left Israel with a low opinion of the Near East Project 

Office. He thought the staff did not understand the project's complexity or the needs of the customer. He also thought management 

gave too little attention to conclusion of the definitive contracts. 

Mter returning to New York, he waited in vain for word that 

Gilkey'S staff was reacting to his guidance and direction. Bartley, 

who in Vietnam had commanded a cavalry squadron alongside 

Lewis' combat engineer battalion, served as Lewis' link with 

Gilkey's office. Lewis considered Bartley "a genuine hero" for his 

battlefield leadership and an astute observer of human behavior. 

Bartley's reports on Tel Aviv's responses to Lewis' direction reinforced the latter's feeling that he was being tolerated and patronized. Lewis also concluded that little was being done. With Bartley's help, Lewis spelled out his goals. He set deadlines for 

completion for Gilkey, who still had to deal with the dining room 

problem and the question of Colonel Kett's role. 20 

Lewis knew that protracted negotiations preoccupied government and contractor management. Within the Corps, the long process meant that the Near East Project Office's chief counsel, John 

R. Brown, had to get temporary help for his routine business while 

he concentrated on the contracts. The contractors also put their 

best people to work on these discussions. As Brown said, "Their top 

people who are vitally into this job, who ought to be down at that 

site doing the work and overseeing it, are spending half their time 

negotiating to definitize the letter contract." 21 Manuel Schechet 
IN PURSUIT OF STABILITY 87 

had warned Gilkey that the concern for concluding the contracts 

was beginning to affect the project. The emphasis on negotiations, 

he said, delayed contractor recruitment for design personnel. It also 

led them to resort to short-term employees as a stopgap measure.22 

One of the contractors concluded a definitive agreement fairly 

quickly. Management Support Associates and the government settled on a total cost of $48 million during the first week of September. This contract was organized on the basis of task directives, issued by the government when it needed support in a particular 

area and covering a wide range of activities at the construction 

sites, in Tel Aviv, and in the United States. At Ramon and Ovda 

these included construction support services ranging from quality 

assurance to cost review. In Tel Aviv the jobs ranged from life-support functions to operation of project communications and control of design documents. The New York office managed the operation in Israel and assisted with stateside procurement. Each task 

carried a separate budget.23 

By mid-September only the two design and construction consortia still worked on the basis of letter contracts. The Corps group 

under Thayne Coffin, known as the D-team, was charged with concluding the definitive instruments. The group contended that letter contracts put the government at a disadvantage. Especially in a 

cost-plus-fixed-fee situation, with the profit based on an estimated 

cost, contractors had little interest in quickly concluding the negotiations. The longer they took, the more accurate their cost data 

became.

24 All the while, as Thomas and Brown agreed, they would 

be secure in the knowledge that the government would take no action that endangered completion of the air bases. To some it may 

have seemed in September 1979 that the negotiations would drag 

on forever. Early in July, Wray had appointed negotiators and later 

in the month sent them to Israel. He estimated then that the job 

would take from thirty to forty-five days.25 

A team of three auditors supported the Corps negotiators. The 

Definitization Internal Review Team-known as DIRT-was Hewitt's brainchild. It operated in direct communication with Hewitt 

and reported its progress to him. With a room, a conference table, 

and a calculator at the LaRomme, Frank Billiams, NormanJensen, 

and Carmy Zweig analyzed the contractors' plans. They reviewed 

the constructors' definitization plans for compliance with the contracts, evaluated their cost estimates, and looked for glaring dissimilarities in costs for similar work items. Much of their work focused 

on personnel costs, the number of people, and their benefits and 

holidays. They also evaluated work plans and standard procedures. 

Sometimes they found arithmetic errors of as much as 400 per-
88 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

cent. Although independent of the D-team, DIRT supported Coffin with analyses and recommendations. 26 

The negotiators also set up shop in the LaRomme. Before long 

the tremendous differences in the positions of the contractors and 

the government became clear. Air Base Constructors first submitted 

an estimate of $650.7 million, $583.0 million of which was the direct cost of construction. The remainder represented their fee, 

general and administrative costs, and contingencies. The government thought the Ramon project should cost $370.8 million. The 

divergence came at least partly from differing concepts of what the 

jobs entailed. The contractor's initial amount was based in part on 

Israeli drawings that delineated excavation and construction that 

were not in the plan of work. Lewis thought other factors included 

"the many uncertainties associated with the job" and the knowledge 

that ultimately the fee would be calculated as a percentage of the 

estimated cost. The government's figure came from the scope of 

work written in the contract as modified by the plan. By late 

September negotiations narrowed the gap between estimates considerably. The contractor had reduced proposed direct costs to 

$483.8 million, almost $100 million below the original estimate. 

The Corps had increased its figure by nearly $40 million to $407 

million. The difference was about $75 millionY 

The general managers for both contractors never held out 

much hope for early agreement. Fred Butler spotted trouble at the 

beginning of August. He and the Corps differed over their understanding of the contractor's responsibility for a proposal. Butler 

thought that a schedule of services was required; the Corps seemed 

to want a detailed estimate with a management plan for the duration of the project. "It would appear to us," he wrote then, "that 

progress is not adequate to have a contract by 15 September." 28 Unlike Butler, Warren Pettingell did not make public the reasons for 

his pessimism. Still, he too clearly had his doubts about early completion. In four consecutive reports he called the negotiation process "painfully slow. "29 

At first the office in Tel Aviv had been sanguine about completing the contracts by September. Later Gilkey foresaw problems. He 

became concerned that the contractors might delay the proceedings and cause negotiations to drag on. Lewis stepped in at this 

point, with two objectives in mind. Angry because his directions 

were not being followed in Tel Aviv and unsure of the ability of the 

office to do the job, he decided that he needed a Corps of Engineers general as project manager. This matter he would take up 

later with Morris. His other goal was to complete the definitive 

contracts. 30 He told Gilkey that preparation of a detailed govern-
IN PURSUIT OF STABILITY 89 

ment cost estimate "so sound as to enable you, your top people, 

and me to stake our professional reputations upon it" was the key 

to concluding the contracts. A mutually satisfactory work plan 

would serve as the basis for this estimate. The estimate would provide a means for analyzing contractor figures and resolving differences between the constructors and the government while showing the contractor that the government was serious about 

completing the process. 3 1 

Lewis placed a high priority on concluding the definitive contracts and considered the negotiators "very capable individuals." 

However, in keeping with his own inclination to participate actively 

in important tasks, he wanted the three colonels-Gilkey, who was 

then contracting officer for both construction contracts; and Cols. 

Donald M. O'Shei and Richard L. Curl, who eventually would command the Ramon and Ovda Area Offices, respectively, and assume 

management of the contracts pertaining to their respective sites-to 

become personally involved in the effort. "The responsibility for 

completing the process was theirs," Lewis said, "not that of the specialists who were sent ... to assist Corps management." He wanted 

Gilkey to spend less time responding to queries from the program 

managers and to concentrate on the government cost estimate from 

which he would negotiate definitization with the contractors.

32 

Estimators Ron Hatwell andJohn Reimer spent part of the summer and fall of 1979 in Israel with the D-team. The emphasis in the 

estimate shifted to determining the number of buildings, their size, 

and specifications. The estimators already had refined their original 

estimate and come up with an amount of $1.04 billion. But with design far from complete and no firm construction schedule, the process still involved conjecture.33 

Lewis understood "the chaotic situation" regarding the drawings. The project was trying to replicate Etzion and Eitam from the 

drawings for those airfields. At least fifty different architect-engineers had been involved in the design of those bases, which the Israelis had built over several years as funds had become available. By 

American standards the drawings were incomplete and inconsistent. Moreover, the accompanying specifications were in Hebrew. 34 

With characteristic impatience, Lewis gave Gilkey a month to 

prepare a government estimate "in which you place a high level of 

confidence" and to compare it with contractor estimates. He 

wanted Curl and O'Shei to assemble estimates for their sites that 

were so good that they could "stake their professional reputations 

on these estimates." Gilkey would use these for his overall figure. 

Failure to begin actual negotiations by 15 October, h e said, would 

require escalation of the process to higher headquarters. "If you 
90 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

see our schedule slipping for any reason," he admonished Gilkey, 

"please let me know immediately. It is necessary that we do not lose 

sight of what we expect to get done in the next six weeks." 35 

Negotiations with both contractors resumed in mid-October. 

Lewis actively participated, as did Gilkey, O'Shei, and Curl. Also involved for the Corps was Coffin's D-team. Depending on the needs 

of the moment, this group varied from as few as eight to as many as 

thirty people. It included estimators, attorneys, auditors, and negotiators.Joe B. McNabb, chairman of the Guy F. Atkinson Company, 

and David Perini of Perini Corporation also went to Israel with 

other partners in the consortia to join their general managers on 

the sites in concluding the discussions. 36 

Although numerous specific issues were involved, both negotiations included some similar disputes, notably those involving the 

cost of architect-engineer design services. The problem resulted in 

part from circumstances beyond the control of the program planners. The Shiite fundamentalists in Iran who deposed the shah and 

guided the Islamic revolution canceled large Israeli construction 

contracts and expelled the Israelis from Iran. Many Israeli design 

firms found themselves out of work. 37 

Several times during the life of the project, the Ministry of Defense took or urged actions to mitigate the resultant shock to the Israeli construction industry. In this instance, the ministry hired numerous architect-engineers to work on plans for the air bases. The 

designers affiliated with the American contractors had expected to 

do this work themselves and had organized their operations accordingly. Other areas of dispute included the cost of materials and the 

dollar value of construction.38 In fact, even after agreeing on the cost 

of equipment, life support, design, and supervision, the government 

and contractors "were far apart," as Gilkey noted, "on the direct cost 

of the construction itself." 39 

During the negotiations, Lewis raised the possibility of financial incentives for timely completion. The contractors declined to 

incorporate such changes into their contracts. Doing so would 

make their profit dependent on the later findings of a government 

board. Moreover, they were wary of an arrangement with which 

they lacked experience, particularly in the context of a project that 

already promised surprises aplen ty. 40 

Arrival at a mutually acceptable figure for the direct cost of actual construction was a major effort. Without specifications and 

complete plans, no one could be sure of the quantities of materials 

to be ordered or the schedule that would determine the sequence 

of construction. So price tags were put on buildings and other fea-
IN PURSUIT OF STABILITY 

TABLE I-CoSTS OF DEFINITIVE CONTRACTS 

(in millions) 

Negev Airbase Constructors 

Category (Ovda) 

Direct Costs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $402.6 

Contingencies. . . . . . . . . . . . . 17.4 

Gene ral & Administrative .... 6.3 

Fees. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27.7 

Totals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $454.0 

Airbase Constructors 

(Ramon) 

$400.7 

27.8 

6.4 

27.6 

$462.5 

Source; MFR, Lewis, n.d. [c. 10 Nov 79), sub: Dcfinilizalion ofLe ner Contracts, lABPe, 5/9, 

91 

tures, as John Reimer remembered, based on "sketches and very 

broad preliminary drawings." 41 

The issues between the government and the contractors came 

down to money. The contractors' estimates, which still seemed "extremely conservative" to Gilkey, were much higher than those 

done by the Corps. At the outset, Air Base Constructors asked for 

over $650 million, compared to the government estimate of just 

over $370 million. Gradually, the contractor cut its estimate and 

put a $470 million price tag on the Ramon work. This sum included $40 million for general and administrative overhead and 

fee. Negev Airbase Constructors, which initially asked for more 

than twice the government estimate, came in about $30 million 

lower, with a $440 million figure. 42 

Acceptance of these figures would still have put costs over the 

program amount, forcing the Israelis to reduce the scope of the 

project or to add money. In the course of negotiations, Ramon 

came down to $400.7 million, even accepting a $6 million reduction in fee and overhead; Ovda lowered to $402.6 million, including a $34 million reduction in fee and overhead (Table 1). In both 

cases, Lewis personally negotiated the reductions with the contractors. The resultant totals, with the fees and other additional costs, 

closely matched the previous estimates for construction alone. 43 

In spite of reaching substantial agreement on the price tags in 

November, the process dragged out into the spring of 1980. The 

actual contracts were signed in early March but were backdated to 

the May 1979 dates of the letter contracts.44 At last a clear picture 

of expected overall costs was available. At the same time, Gilkey 

transferred contracting officer authority and responsibility for 

overall management of the contracts to O'Shei at Ramon and Curl 

at Ovda. 45 The construction contracts absorbed the bulk of the 

money allotted to the program. The budget for operating all Department of Defense management elements, which included mili-
92 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

Joe McNabb of Air Base Constructors and Colonel Gilke), sign the Rarnon 

contract. 

tary and civilian labor and travel costs for Hartung's office, the 

Near East Project Office, the area offices, and the Department of 

Defense auditors, equaled that for the management support contract. An additional $20 million went for operating General BarTov's office, and a small amount remained in reserve. The total 

came extremely close to the original figure Reimer's estimators 

had developed in Washington. 

Program Budget

46 

Management Support Associates .. . ..... . . . .. .... . .. . . 

Air Base Constructors ................... . ..... . . . ......... . 

Negev Airbase Constructors . . .. .. . . . . . .. . .... .. . . . .. . . . . . . . 

Israeli Ministry of Defense .................... . ... . . . ..... . 

U.S. Department of Defense . ...... .. . . . . . .... . .. . ...... . . . 

Reserve ................ . ................. . ... . . . . . . . ... . . .. . 

Total. . ... . . . .. .. . . . . . ... . . .. .. . . ... .. ........ . .. . . . 

$ 48,000,000 

462,500,000 

454,000,000 

20,000,000 

48,000,000 

7,400,000 

$ 1,039,900,000 

Although most of the issues surrounding the definitive contracts were resolved in November, the Near East Project Office 
IN PURSUIT OF STABILITY 93 

remained in its formative stage. Not only did the formalities take 

several months to complete, but matters regarding the capability 

and status of the office remained unresolved. Toward the end of 

1979 Gilkey himself expressed concern regarding the effectiveness 

of his staff: managers seemed unable to direct their people, the 

office missed deadlines for reports, and communication with the 

sites was in disarray.47 Lewis understood these problems and hoped 

to resolve them by putting a general in command. At that point, 

however, he was more concerned about the relationship between 

Gilkey's office and the program managers. He thought "the understanding of the relationship is not adequate and needs better definition and clearer understanding." 48 Clarification of this situation 

and the related questions of command were high on his agenda as 

he sought a stable basis for the project's operation. Much of the 

winter and spring of 1980 were devoted to attaining management 

equilibrium among Gilkey, Hartung, and Bar-Tov. 
94 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

Notes 

1. Interv, author with Maj Gen Bennett L. Lewis, Jan-Feb 82, part 1, Washington, D.C. 

2. Ltr, Lt GenJohn W. Morris to Honorable Samuel Lewis, American Ambassador, U.S. Embassy, Tel Aviv, Israel, 14 Aug 80, IABPC, 7/5. 

3. Bazilwich interview. 

4. Morris interview. 

5.Johnson interview; Lewis interview,Jan-Feb 82, part 1. 

6. Lewis interview, Jan-Feb 82, part 1. 

7. Ibid. 

8. Interv (telephone), author with Michael J. O'Connor, Nov 84; O'Connor 

and Glenn E. Colwell, Cost-Plus Incentive Fee for Construction Contracts, Technical 

Report P-1l8 (Champaign, Ill.: CERL, Dec 80), p. 9. 

9. Lewis interview, Jan-Feb 82, part 1; Morris interview. 

10. Lewis interview, Jan-Feb 82, part l. 

11. Ibid. 

12. Memo, Col Clarence D. Gilkey, 27 Jul 79, sub: Assignment of Responsibilities, IABPC, 21/13; NEPO Sitrep No.3, 13 Aug 79; NEPO RMO Weekly Sitreps, 3 

and 12 Aug 79, IABPC, 12/6-7. 

13. Telex, NEPO to NAD, 10 Aug 79, sub: American Jewish War Vets Inquiry, 

IABPC, 65/4; NEPO Organization Chart, 15 Sep 79, IABPC, 88/5; Maj Gen 

William R. Wray comments on draft MS. 

14. Lt Col Joseph A. Beben, Journal, May-Jun 79 and Jan-Jul 80, IABPC, 

47/2; Telex, NEPO to NAD, 3 May 80, sub: NEPO Sitrep No. 38, IABPC, 14/3; Interv, author with Lt Col George Snoddy, Apr 81, Tel Aviv, Israel; Memo, Kett for 

Gilkey, 24 Aug 79, sub: Utilization of the Assistant Project Manager, IABPC, 17/2. 

15. Beginning on 30 July 1979, NEPO reported weekly to NAD by telex. The 

office used a nine-section format, which covered general subjects, engineering, 

construction, administrative activities, logistics, personnel, special staff actions, interim project milestones, and commander's comments; Memo, Gilkey for Kett, 20 

Sep 79, sub: Utilization of the Assistant Project Manager, IABPC, 29/4; DF, Kett to 

Snoddy, 26 Sep 79, sub: Sitrep Submissions, IABPC, 12/3; Memo, Kett for Gilkey, 

24 Aug 79. 

16. McNeely interview, Sep 83; Lewis interview, Jan-Feb 82, part 1; Bar-Tov 

interview, May 82. 

17. DF, CPO (Dieter Loose) to Chief, OAS (Billy C. Hyter) , 28 Sep 79, sub: Official Bulletin Boards, with CMT 2, Hyter to Loose, 30 Sep 79, and CMT 3, Loose 

to Hyter, 8 Oct 79, IABPC, 29/4 and 30/1, respectively. 

18. DF, Deputy Project Manager (Damico) to Chief, OAS (Hyter), 19 Nov 79, 

sub: Palace Billeting Facility, with CMT 2, Hyter to Damico, 20 Nov 79; CMT 3, 

Damico to Hyter, 22 Nov 79; CMT 4, Hyter to Damico, 27 Nov 79; and CMT 5, 

Damico to Hyter, 4 Dec 79. All in IABPC, 30/2-3. Ltr, Percy A. Pierre, Assistant 

Secretary of the Army, RD&A, to Billy C. Hyter, 26 Oct 79, IABPC, 8/2. 

19. Ltr, Gilkey to GM, MSA (Robert 1. Barry), 17 Sep 79, sub: 

DACA52-79-C-0002, IABPC, 29/4; Ltr, Gilkey to Barry, 8 Oct 79, sub: Palace 

Kitchen Operation, IABPC, 30/1; MSA Weekly Sitrep, 24 Sep 79, IABPC, 12/13. 

20. Ltr, Lewis to Morris, 26 Dec 79, IABPC, 1/7; Lewis, Memorandum of 

Meeting with Lt Gen John W. Morris, Maj Gen Joseph K. Bratton, and Maj Gen 

William R. Wray, 12 Aug 80, IABPC, 5/9; Interv, author with Lewis, Jan-Feb 82, 

part 4, and Nov 83. 
IN PURSUIT OF STABILITY 95 

21 . Interv, author with John R. Brown, Aug 80, Tel Aviv, Israel. 

22. Ltr, Schechet to NEPO Project Manager, 30 Aug 79, sub: Interim Report 

No.3, lABPC, 80/6; Telex, Lewis to Gilkey, 25 Sep 79, sub: Planning Schedule, 

lABPC, 65/6; Lewis, Memorandum of Meeting, 12 Aug 80. 

23. William Augustine, Information Paper, 10 Sep 79, sub: Israeli Air Base Program, lABPC, 5/9; Ltr, Dorman R. Mabrey, Assistan t for Contract Administration, 

MSA, to NEPO Contracting Officer (Damico), 10 Jan 80, sub: MSA Task Directives 

1-000 through 14-000, lABPC, 31/3. For a copy of the contract, see lABPC, 53/3. 

24. DF, NEPO Office of Counsel Qohn R. Brown) to NEPO Resource Manager Qoseph R. Chapla), 2 Sep 80, sub: Correct Action/Input on Survey/Audit by 

OCE Auditors, lABPC, 33/3; DF, NEPO Resource Manager to Assistant Deputy 

Project Manager, 15 May 80, sub: Input for Proj ect Manager's Letter to the Chief 

of Engineers, lABPC, 33/1. 

25. Thomas interview, Aug 80; Brown interview, Aug 80; Telex, Wl"ay to Division Engineers, 5 Jul 79, sub: Formation of Two Contract Negotiating Teams for 

Israeli Airfields, DAEN-MPC-G files. 

26. Interv, author with Frank Billiams, Nov 86, Washington, D.C. 

27.Jack G. Starr and J ack Shields, Record of Negotiations to Definitize Letter 

Contract DACA52-79-C-0003 for Air Base Ramon, Israel (hereafter cited as Starr 

and Shields, Record of Negotiations for Ramon), 27 Sep 79, lABPC, 9/5; Lewis interview,Jan-Feb 82, part 4; Interv, author with Michael Maloney, Aug 80, Tel Aviv, 

Israel. 

28. ABC Weekly Progress Reports, 1 and 8 Aug 79, lABPC, 12/5-6. 

29. NAC Weekly Progress Reports, 17, 24, and 31 Aug and 9 Sep 79, lABPC, 

12/7-10. 

30. NEPO Sitreps No.1, 30 Jul 79; No.2, 6 Aug 79, lABPC, 12/5; No.4, 20 

Aug 79, lABPC, 12/7; No.5, 27 Aug 79, lABPC, 12/8; Lewis, Memorandum of 

Meeting, 12 Aug 80. 

31. Telex, Lewis to Gilkey, 25 Sep 79; Lewis interview, Jan-Feb 82, part 4. ER 

415-345-230, Construction: Negotiation Regulation Jar Cost-Plus-A-Fixed-Fee Construction 

Contracts, p. 16, contains the requirement for a governmen t estimate and specifies 

its use. 

32. Lewis, Memorandum of Meeting, 12 Aug 80; Hewitt interview. 

33. Reimer interview, Feb 82. 

34. Lewis interview,Jan-Feb 82, part 1. 

35. Telex, Lewis to Gilkey, 25 Sep 79; Lewis interview,J an-Feb 82, part 1. 

36. Telex, Lewis to Gilkey, 25 Sep 79; Brown interview, Aug 80; Ltr, Lewis to 

Morris, 26 Dec 79. 

37. Interv, author with Col Clarence D. Gilkey, Aug 80, Tel Aviv, Israel; Hewitt 

interview. 

38. NEPO Sitrep No.5, 27 Aug 79, lABPC, 12/8, and NEPO Sitrep No. 14,29 

Oct 79, IABPC, 12/ 17; Gilkey interview; Hewitt intel"view; Starr and Shields, 

Record of Negotiations for Ramon, 27 Sep 79. 

39. Gilkey interview. 

40. Lewis interview,J an-Feb 82, parts 1 and 4; O'Connor interview. 

41. Reimer interview, Feb 82. 

42. Starr and Shields, Record of Negotiations for Ramon, 27 Sep 79; Starr and 

Shields, Record of Negotiations to Definitize Letter Con tract DACA52-79-0004 

for Air Base Ovda, 27 Sep 79, lABPC, 9/7; MFR, Lewis, n .d. [co 10 Nov 79], sub: 

Definitization of Letter Contracts, lABPC, 5/9. 

43. MFR, Lewis, sub: Definitization of Letter Contracts. 

44. Contract for Design and Construction of Air Base, Ramon, Israel, No. 

DACA52-79-C-0003, Department of the Army, Corps of Engineers, Near East 
96 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

Project Office, North Atlantic Division, 18 May 1979, was signed on 6 March 1980. 

A copy is in IABPC, 7/1-2. Contract for Design and Construction of Air Base, 

Ovda, Israel, No. DACA52-79-C-0004, Department of the Army, Corps of Engineers, Near East Project Office, North Atlantic Division, 18 May 1979, was signed 

on 28 February 1980. A copy is in IABPC, 38/2. 

45. i'-"NR 204 (6 March 1980): 5; ENR 204 (13 March 1980): 5; NEPO Sitrep 

No. 33, 11 Mar 80, IABPC, 13/18. 

46. DF, NEPO Resource Manager to Assistant Deputy Project Manager, 15 May 

80. 

47. Memo, Gilkey, 8 Nov 79, sub: COE Weekly Staff Meeting of21 Oct. 1979, 

IABPC, 30/3; MFR, Gilkey, 10 Dec 79, sub: COE Staff Meeting of 9 Dec. 1979, 

IABPC, 31/1; DF, Gilkey to all NEPO Staff Sections, 28 Dec 79, sub: Communications, IABPC, 31/1. 

48. Ltr, Lewis to Morris, 26 Dec 79. 
CHAPTER 7 

Tripartite Management: 

The Apportionment of Power 

and Influence 

December 1979-March 1980 

... to try to build airfields here is like trying to wrestle a tiger while 

you are wearing a straitjacket. 

Brig. Gen. Max W. Noah I 

vVhen all the money is in the project manager's hands, it just cuts the 

program manager right out of any decision-making process at all. 

Brig. Gen. Paul T. Hartung 2 

Quality also means doing as we request. We know the area, we know 

the threat, we know best what we need to the smallest seemingly insignificant detail. 

Brig. Gen. Moshe Bar-Tov 3 

In the winter of 1979-1980 the program was close to settling 

into the form it would take for the duration. Construction at the 

sites was barely under way, and the three components of Tel Aviv 

management-the Israeli Air Force's program management office 

under Bar-Tov, Hartung's American program management office 

staffed by U.S. Air Force personnel, and Gilkey's Near East Project 

Office-were all ensconced in the IBM Building. The apportionment of power and influence among the three was still unclear. 

When the test of their relationship came, the generals joined 

forces against Gilkey. From the outset Hartung and Bar-Tov had 

developed a strong friendship. Aside from Hartung's initial impression of Bar-Tov as a "winner," the two shared backgrounds as 

air force brigadier generals. As program managers they also had a 

common interest in influencing or even controlling operations. 

Their daily meetings reinforced this bond. So close were they that 

some employees called them "Har-Tov and Bartung.'''! As a colonel 
98 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

in charge of a construction project that two generals sought to 

dominate, Gilkey was the odd man out. 

Disagreements over program issues sometimes strained the relationship between Bar-Tov and Hartung. Lewis thought their spats 

benefited the Corps of Engineers because their preoccupation 

with each other diverted their attention from the Near East Project 

Office. However, such diversions seldom occurred. 5 As Hartung 

put it, "We've become close friends and we understand each 

other."6 While it was Gilkey's misfortune to face two generals 

united by friendship, the reasons for disagreements among the 

three transcended personal relationships. The needs of their respective agencies and governments ultimately determined individual positions. As the two air forces and the Corps of Engineers pursued different interests, albeit in the context of their shared goal 

of successful completion of the bases, their representatives were 

frequently at odds. 

Hartung's long association with military construction for the 

U.S. Air Force did not prepare him for the program's unusual financial arrangement. As program manager he expected to control 

and dispense the money when he was satisfied that the construction agent needed it. He never recognized the legitimacy of Corps 

control of the budget, believing that the arrangement nullified 

program manager control, cut flexibility, and increased costs. "If 

you give the man that has to do the work," he said, "too large a 

budget for a piece of work, if he can accomplish something for 

three-quarters of a million dollars and he has a million and h e 

does it for $900,000, he's still a hero."7 Although about 20 percent 

of the money would be provided by the Israeli government, control of the entire amount by the construction agent also meant 

that the Israelis had no real voice in how that money would be 

spent. According to Hartung this lack of control caused difficulties. Some were substantive; some were matters of perception, "but 

the real portion created the perceptions." 8 He opposed use of this 

financial arrangement for subsequent projects. "I don't think the 

Air Force would ever participate like this again," he said. "I 

wouldn't." Unable to control work through the purse strings as he 

was accustomed, he was not content to manage site activation and 

act as go-between for the Corps and the Israelis.9 

Bar-Tov too sought a dominant role. His position as program 

manager was not specified in any of the intercountry agreements, 

and, according to Graves, no Israeli program management organization was envisioned by the negotiators. In fact, the Ministry of 

Defense's establishment of his office-with its $20 million budget 

paid from program funds-constituted an explicit rejection of the 

portions of the 1979 agreements that stipulated that the United 
TRIPARTITE MANAGEMENT 99 

States would build and turn over to Israel two air bases.1O N evertheless, Israel's stake was legitimate. Mter all, its air force would use 

the bases. Moreover, after the American grant was spent, Israel 

would either realize any savings on the job or pay for overruns. As 

its representative, Bar-Tov used his forceful personality to exert 

maximum influence. That he would playa major part was evident 

soon after the Corps office in Tel Aviv was established. The program, Colonel O'Shei complained, was "saddled with a Troika-configured leadership, marred by the inevitable deficiencies that such 

command structures always involve." 11 

Control of the program budget certainly put the Near East Project Office in a powerful position vis-a-vis the program managers. 

In light of the frustration that Hartung and Bar-Tov experienced 

in trying to assert their influence over construction, it might even 

appear that the Corps of Engineers dominated the situation. This 

was not the case. Personality, rank, and numbers also entered into 

the equation. Gilkey could not deal with the barrage of questions 

and criticisms from the program managers and devote the proper 

attention to managing the project.12 

To a significant extent, this situation originated in Morris' decision to assign a colonel as manager of the project. His choice still 

troubled some participants, who wanted a more senior officer. 

While never questioning the decision to place the project under 

North Atlantic, these people continued to urge the chiefs office to 

send a brigadier general to Tel Aviv. They envisioned a management framework somewhere between the alternatives considered 

by Morris, one that had a general at the top but remained attached 

to North Atlan tic. 

In July 1979 Hewitt had evaluated the situation in Israel and 

concluded that a general was necessary. Supporting the argument 

Johnson had made earlier, Hewitt said that Bar-Tov's office pressured Damico for larger roles in management and execution. Only 

another general officer, Hewitt contended, could "go nose to nose 

with Bar-Tov." 13 Damico and the Near East Project Office staff 

seemed to agree. The organizational structure they recommended 

for their own office would be led by a brigadier general. 14 Johnson 

thought the best he might be able to do was obtain a second 

colonel to serve as deputy, but knew that a general would not be assigned "in the foreseeable future." Gilkey would remain in 

charge. 15 This prospect seemed to satisfy Gilkey, who had tried earlier to convince Johnson and the staff in New York that a general 

was unnecessary.16 

Mter Johnson left for Washington, the issue remained unresolved. Lewis renewed efforts to get a general for the project. He 
100 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

thought that "the Corps should have assigned a general officer as 

program manager [sic] and put him on the scene from the start of 

the project." He repeatedly urged Morris to rectifY the situation. 

Lewis' analysis of the relationship between Colonel Gilkey and the 

program managers only confirmed his view. "Too often," Lewis 

wrote, "the NEPO PM finds himself in a defensive position opposing 

two BGs." Lewis and Hewitt believed Hartung and Bar-Tov took up 

much of Gilkey's time with their complaints. As Lewis put it, "Hartung, instead of spending his time helping the Corps and the contractors in the interactions with agencies of the Israeli government, 

kept trying to manage the Corps." Consequently, Gilkey lacked the 

time and energy that should have been devoted to the project. 17 

From Lewis' viewpoint, Gilkey was being pressured from below 

as well as from above. Lewis described Curl and O'Shei, the area engineers who reported to Gilkey but were of equal rank, as "two very 

capable, strong-willed officers." At the time Lewis believed "there 

was a high probability both would be promoted." He also thought 

further advancement for Gilkey was unlikely. Curl and O'Shei "believed they were operating the air base projects as independent districts," and that Gilkey "had only general oversight and support 

responsibilities." Lewis thought that having a general in Tel Aviv 

would end the ambiguity in the relationship of Gilkey'S headquarters with the area offices and the program managers. 18 Lewis saw 

the mission as too important to manage in any other way. The complex and sensitive situation required the skill, experience, and prestige of a general. With his usual bluntness, Lewis told Morris he was 

convinced "that if the Corps of Engineers is to meet its responsibility as DOD's 'construction agent,' you should assign a general officer (GO) to devote 100 percent of his time to the project." 19 

Lewis knew who he wanted for the job. He nominated Brig. 

Gen. Max W. Noah, a self-assured and very tall officer known as 

"the gentle giant." Lewis thought Noah, who later became 

comptroller of the Army as a lieutenant general, had "both the 

personal and professional qualifications," among them "considerable experience with resource management, his personality and 

his physical presence." 20 Morris wanted to keep Noah as commander of the Huntsville Division, an anomalous element of the Corps 

whose organization-wide responsibilities included training and various special projects, but he finally agreed that "there was no question [that] we had to get Gilkey some help." 21 At the same time, he 

emphasized the need for increased cooperation with Hartung: he 

wanted to know Hartung's needs as well as a plan to meet them. 

'We are," he wrote, "far from where we must be vis-a-vis the GOI 

and the two PMs if we are ever to have a smooth operation." So 
TRIPARTITE MANAGEMENT 101 

Morris agreed to send Noah to Tel Aviv for three months. 22 Lewis 

"accepted him on a temporary basis if that was the only way to 

secure his services." 23 

Once Morris decided to send Noah to Tel Aviv, he began to 

shift his overall view of the role of project management. By compromising with Lewis and temporarily assigning a general, h e created a managerial situation that was midway between his original 

alternatives. His basic view remained unchanged: the two organizational possibilities were either an independent headquarters 

under a general officer or an office managed by a colonel and attached to a division. He now had an engineer general on the 

scene, and he began to see Noah as the prime manager. He 

thought the project's center of gravity should shift toward Tel Aviv, 

with more control of the work exercised there instead of from New 

York. By the same token, he wanted Lewis to cut his involvement 

with daily operations.24 "If I had intended to put a brigadier out 

there in the first place," he told Lewis, "I probably wouldn't have 

had the North Atlantic Division Engineer involved."25 

Noah went to Israel on temporary duty early in January 1980. 

He had followed developmen t of the program and at one time 

thought he might be assigned as project manager. He knew Lewis 

had wanted to send him there and that Morris had overruled the 

choice.26 Morris considered Noah "an outstanding organizer and 

manager," and wanted him to "review and strengthen the field 

management procedures." Specifically, Morris sought a system to 

control and report on progress, after which Noah was to devise 

ways to control the budget and the quality of construction. All 

three areas were important-delivering a quality product on time 

and under budget were standard project goals-but Morris 

stressed management of the schedule. His primary concern was 

completion of operational bases as promised by 25 April 1982.27 

Through the winter the fact that an engineer general would be 

assigned permanently became evident. Lewis kept up the pressure. 

At the same time, Morris told Gilkey that he was considering replacing him by the summer.28 Noah reported to Lewis on this conversation, concluding that the "Chief is convinced Jack [Gilkey] 

cannot handle it from here on in although [Morris] recognizes as 

should you that he has done [a] commendable job." 29 Morris went 

to Tel Aviv in January 1980 and asked Noah for his views on the future of project management. Noah considered three possibilities. 

The first involved replacing Gilkey with a "strong competitive 0-6 

[colonel]." The other two centered on putting a general in Tel 

Aviv, either Noah or someone else. The longer Noah remained in 

Israel, the more he inclined to recommending a general. "As I 
102 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

shoulder more of the burden," he told Lewis, 'Jack [Gilkey] is getting happier again-he needed it. I'm about to the stage that I 

would recommend a BG here no matter what." 30 

The situation Noah found in Tel Aviv seemed to call for the 

best available leadership. There was a set of common assumptions 

with which to work. While others wondered how firm was the Israeli commitment to withdraw from the Sinai and to finish the job 

on time, Noah found no reason to doubt their intentions.31 "There 

was," he said, "never a feeling ... that they ... wanted anything 

more than to have two very complete combat airfields built in the 

time allowed, and they wanted them to be the best."32 Nevertheless, he remained troubled by the possibility that the Corps might 

miss the deadline, which could result in Israeli refusal to finish the 

withdrawal: 'That's the first thing I think about when I wake up." 33 

Despite the common goals of all three managers, he believed the 

two generals tended "to be rather impatient," and that "the interface was sometimes very abrasive." Noah thought that Hartung 

sometimes seemed "so interested in pleasing the Israelis that he 

joins them in jumping on the Corps." He saw that the Corps operation was far from perfect, but thought Hartung and Bar-Tov complained too much. Lewis agreed.34 

Neither of the program managers appreciated the logistical and 

managerial complexities of the job. Moreover, they complained "ad 

nauseum, night and day continually." Too incessant and too significant to ignore, the dissatisfaction had to be faced. 35 Because, as 

O'Shei said, Hartung and Bar-Tov were "able men with the time to 

tinker," they "tended to get, quite frankly, in the way of operations." 36 Noah had to negotiate with them and found that he spent 

most of the time doing just that. Noah's objective in serving as a 

buffer between Gilkey and the program managers was to protect 

those who actually did the work. He wanted to "separate the contractors in their effort to get things moving ... from the political 

[and] financial inter-office concerns that went on in Tel Aviv." He 

understood that failure to do so would unnecessarily burden the 

people at the sites. As it was, the program managers "were down 

there enough, right in the middle of the contractor's business." 37 

Hartung and Bar-Tov saw the situation very differently. In the 

first place, they considered their own involvement in construction 

at the sites to be necessary and legitimate. In addition, Hartung 

thought the area engineers, both of whom had commanded civil 

works districts in the United States, lacked experience with military construction and fast-track operations. So he was particularly 

watchful of their operations.38 
TRIPARTITE MANAGEMENT 103 

Given the divergent views and purposes of the three management offices, it is hardly surprising that even the routine aspects of 

Noah's relations with Hartung and Bar-Tov took much of his time. 

Each weekly meeting actually consumed three days. On Tuesdays, 

Noah accompanied Hartung and Bar-Tov to the bases and answered their questions, an experience he likened to escorting congressional survey and investigation committees. Wednesdays were 

spent organizing for the meetings on the next day. Then came 

Thursday and the discussions themselves. The sessions reminded 

him "a little bit" of "the Panmunjom table," without the flags but 

nevertheless not without conflict, with the Corps facing the program managers across the table. The meetings considered every 

problem, "from the most miniscule to the biggest." Noah recognized that both program managers had legitimate concerns. Hartung was bent on ensuring the quality of the product through control of construction, and the Israelis were protecting their interest 

in the bases. 39 However, the confrontational style of the program 

managers set the tone for Noah's weekly meetings with his chainsmoking colleagues. 

Not all of Noah's efforts created distance between Gilkey and the 

generals. By approving the creation of a configuration control board 

to be administered by the project office's construction division, he 

also took a major step toward creating permanent roles in decisionmaking for program management. The program managers chaired 

the board, which included the project manager as a member. The 

group evaluated the operational need for changes in design, master 

plans, and schedules. The board also considered the technical requirements for implementation of proposals and their effect on 

completion dates and construction costs. Changes required unanimous acceptance by the board. In the event of dissenting votes, the 

program managers resolved the impasse. Cochairmanship of the 

board firmly placed Bar-Tov in the management process.40 

Noah also became involved in attempts to improve the troublesome procurement process. By the winter it had become clear 

that the system so ardently defended by Gilkey's staff a few months 

earlier was not working. Lewis, who had seen the problem during 

his visit in December, decried the lack of teamwork. He complained that the contractors' design and construction elements 

did not cooperate in putting together procurement packages and 

that the Near East Project Office offered little help because its procurement staff lacked the experience to do so. Noah, who had 

been instructed by Lewis to concentrate on the procurement system, was proud of the Huntsville Division procurement organization and considered purchasing to be one of his division's special 
104 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

strengths. He took reinforcement with him in the person of Raymond Aldridge, his chief of procurement and supply at Huntsville 

Division. Within a week Aldridge was at Ovda, offering help with 

the contractor's procurement plan. 41 

Joseph Perini of Negev Airbase Constructors' parent company 

also visited Ovda in January. He told Noah he was shocked at the 

amount of time involved in the procurement process. Noah 

promised to focus on what he acknowledged as a problem area. 42 

Procurement help came from the Defense Contract Audit 

Agency, which sent a team to Ovda to evaluate the procurement 

system used by Negev Airbase Constructors. Members of the audit 

team underscored the need for training contractor procurement 

personnel. Their formal report listed a host of problems with documentation of purchases. The team also cited the failure to consider properly the time required to fill orders and the need to 

place more orders to ensure adequate competition. The team that 

examined the situation at Ramon also urged establishment of a 

program to indoctrinate purchasing employees in the requirements imposed by government regulations. 43 

To Aldridge the message was obvious: "The one thing that 

came out loud and clear is the need for training in the [design and 

construction contractors'] purchasing departments." With the 

audit report as a guide, he wanted procurement analyst Roy E. Edwards from Huntsville Division to teach procedures to the contractors, both of whom welcomed the help. Noah approved the proposal, and a third Huntsvillian came to Tel Aviv.44 As had Noah 

when he first arrived, Aldridge and Edwards stepped into a situation that lacked structure and form. Only one standard procedure, 

designating which classes of materials could be purchased in Israel, had been written. 45 While Edwards worked with the contractors developing check sheets, forms, and procedures, Aldridge 

began the effort to systematize the process at the other end, in 

Gilkey's headquarters. The results began to appear in April in a 

procurement guidance series issued by the procurement and 

supply division. Each issue spelled out procedures and consolidated information on one subj ect. The documents went to the Tel 

Aviv staff, the program managers, the area offices, and the New 

York office. The first explained the series itself.46 The next twelve 

covered subjects ranging from procurement staff visits at the area 

offices to assistance by the Ministry of Defense in local purchases.47 

Theoretically, Noah did not replace Gilkey as manager. Instead, 

they discussed issues, and Noah recommended courses of action. According to Noah, Gilkey still had final authority and was free to decide whether to follow his advice. However, in addition to outrank-
TRIPARTITE MANAGEMENT 105 

ing Gilkey, Noah had agreed to follow courses of action determined 

by Lewis, with whom he talked frequently by telephone. So the lack 

of any notable independent action by Gilkey is far from surprising.48 

Lewis did not content himself with interposing Noah between 

Gilkey and the generals. His assessment of the relationship between the three offices convinced him of the need for other measures. Lewis thought that the program managers unnecessarily 

complicated the project by attempts to control construction. He 

understood Gilkey's mission as construction of the two air bases, 

while program management's primary responsibility was making 

the bases operational. He also believed that the American program 

manager did not provide Gilkey with proper support. For example, 

after the program manager's office failed to respond to the request for help in establishing a communications network, the project's signal officer had to establish his own direct contacts with the 

Ministry of Communications. 49 

To rectify this situation, Lewis told Gilkey to take the offensive. 

Lewis wanted "to start the flow of requests moving in the other direction, that is, from him to Hartung." He had come to Gilkey with 

a problem regarding a subpoena issued by the Israelis to an American contractor, and Lewis thought Hartung should have handled 

the matter with the Israelis. But these specific complaints were secondary and merely symptoms of his primary concern: alleviation 

of the pressure on Gilkey.50 

Lewis also saw the proximity of Gilkey's office to those of Hartung and Bar-Tov as part of the problem. O'Shei had told him that 

the close location of the three offices exacerbated the tendency of 

the program managers to intervene in construction decisions: 

"Program personnel attend our staff and technical meetings, are 

on distribution for our reading files, and even receive copies of the 

correspondence and reports between the Area Engineer and his 

staff." Given this arrangement, O'Shei continued, "intervention in 

our process is as casual and easy as this proximity would indicate. "51 

Lewis finally concluded that, with the two generals demanding so 

much of Gilkey's time, the IBM Building was not big enough for all 

three of them. If Gilkey moved across town into the Palace Hotel, 

the situation might improve. So, after clearing his decision with 

Johnson in Washington, Lewis told Gilkey to move his office.52 

Bar-Tov saw the relocation coming months before it took place. 

He alerted Hartung to a rumor of a move in October 1979. He acknowledged the dubious utility of such stories but cautioned his 

American counterpart that "our mutual short experience in this 

project has indicated that many rumors in the past turned into reality and accomplished facts." He thought such a move would signifi-
106 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

candy shift the program's center of gravity. "I would appreciate your 

advising the COE," he wrote Hartung, "to bring any such plans to 

us for our mutual approval before reaching a point of no return." 53 

Hartung assured Bar-Tov that the story lacked validity. He too 

had heard the rumors, which he thought originated with uninformed employees. Hartung believed that expansion of the program would eventually necessitate placing more support offices in 

the Palace but did not "envision Project Management or design interface activities being a part of this thinking." These were the 

"'Center of Gravity' functions," and they would remain where they 

were. He expected that "any planning to shift activities closely 

aligned to Program management will be discussed with us before 

any action." Neither he nor Bar-Tov asked why the Near East Project Office might be considering such a move. 54 

In December Gilkey told Hartung that he had been directed to 

take his office to the Palace. When office space became available 

there after the first of the year, he transferred the executive office 

and the construction division from the IBM Building to the hotel. 

The moves continued over the winter as more staff sections and 

some contractor offices also left the IBM Building. 55 

Bar-Tov complained that the moves complicated liaison activities and delayed work. The hiring freeze in his ministry made it impossible to compensate for the separation with additional Israeli 

employees. He asked Hartung to "direct NEPO not to make any independent decisions that according to good management practices should be discussed and approved on the PM's level." 56 

Hartung appeared to have been particularly stung by the move, 

carried out so soon after he had denied the rumors. He complained to Noah that the transfer was not in the best interest of the 

program. He also contended that the refurbishment of the offices 

in the Palace prior to the move constituted an extravagance that 

"was perceived as an example of total disregard for Program cost 

control, right at the project manager level." An inclination to 

profligacy, he concluded, "permeates throughout the organization." Hartung also took the opportunity to lecture Noah on cost 

control. "[I] would appreciate it," he wrote, "if all NEPO folks better understood that in addition to this program having CPFF contracts, the Construction Agency is not on the normal fixed fee basis 

for its operation, but is financed directly from program funds on 

an actual cost basis." He told Noah that "a dollar saved by NEPO is 

a dollar saved for the program," rather than for the Corps through 

a nonexistent account he dubbed "the COE industrial fund." 57 

Noah listened but changed nothing. He explained only that 

the shortage of space in the IBM Building had made the action 
TRIPARTITE MANAGEMENT 107 

Palace Hotel 

necessary. Thereafter, the Near East Proj ect Office kept its distance 

from the program managers. Mter Brig. Gen. John Wall took over 

as project manager in the spring, he returned the construction division to its former location, but he kept his headquarters and his 

own office in the Palace.58 

The move provided some breathing room but did not alleviate 

tension between the Corps and the program managers. Morris visited Israel in late January 1980 and recognized that this was the key 

problem. He called the establishment of proper working relationships among the three managers "by far my biggest concern." 59 

The feelings of mutual frustration that had brought about the 

transfer of the office persisted, perhaps even grew, and spilled over 

into other areas of their relationship. 

Extensive negotiations over the proper method for construction of family housing at the bases reflected this hostility. All of the 

participants worked in Tel Aviv, yet they conducted their discussions through formal memorandums. The question involved responsibility for that part of the job. Either it would be removed 

from the contractors' scope of work and assigned to Israeli pro-
108 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

gram management or built for the Americans by Israeli subcontractors. Both of these options reflected a willingness to accommodate the changing economic situation in Israel. All told, the housing matter involved a relatively small $20 million slice of a 

billion-dollar pie. 

The notes went back and forth through the late winter and early 

spring. Hartung wanted the Corps to stop its procurement and design activities and consider alternatives for management of housing 

construction that would take into account the Israeli interest in carrying it out. The Corps was responsible for completing usable bases 

on time, so Gilkey, backed by Noah and Lewis, refused to yield control over construction of any of the facilities required for initial operating capability. Finally, Bar-Tov withdrew his ministry's request 

for consideration of Israeli management of the housing project. 60 

Participants understood the issue to involve much more than a 

small piece of a big job. Lewis and Bar-Tov rarely agreed on questions of substance, but they did concur on the significance of the 

dispute over housing. Lewis recalled that "the most basic issue was 

who was in charge of managing the construction project itself: the 

Israelis, BG Hartung, or the Corps." 61 Bar-Tov, on the other hand, 

concluded that "without the ability to direct NEPO directly from 

the PM's office, the PMs will be left with the responsibility without 

any authority-a situation that is unacceptable to me." He too saw 

the fundamental question as one of control. He also saw that he 

was losing it. 62 
TRIPARTITE MANAGEMENT 109 

Notes 

l. Memo, Brig Gen Max W. Noah for Lewis, 1 Feb 80, IABPC, 1/2. 

2. Hartung inte rview, Aug 80. 

3. Bar-Tov, Open Letter "To My American Friends in the Negev Air Base 

Program,"Jul 81, IABPC, 75/4. 

4. Cheverie interview. 

5. Lewis interview, Jan-Feb 82. 

6. Hartung interview, Aug 80. 

7. Ibid., Aug 80 and Apr 8l. 

8. Hartung inte rview, Aug 80. 

9. Ibid. 

10. Interv, author with Lt Gen Ernest Graves, Jr., Ret., Apr 85, part 8, A.!-lington, Va.; MFR, Gilkey, 21 May 81, sub: Secretary West and LTG Graves Visit, 18-19 

May 1981 , IABPC, 63/5. 

11. Memo, O'Shei for Lewis, n.d. [Nov 79], sub: Proj ect Manager Grade 

Level, Lewis Papers, Office of History, HQ USACE. 

12. Lewis inte rview, Jan-Feb 82, part 3; Interv, author with Max W. Noah, Apr 

83, Washington, D.C. 

13. DF, Hewitt to Johnson, 5 Jul 79, sub: Briefing for GeneralJohnson on 5 Jul 

79, IABPC, 8/2. 

14. Memo, Damico for Johnson, 4 Jun 79, File 228-01 , IABPC, 8/4. 

15. Telex,Johnson to NEPO [c. 3] Jul 79, IABPC, 65/2. 

16. Telecon transcript 9,11 May 79, IABPC, 10/3. 

17. Ltr, Lewis to Morris, 21 Nov 79, IABPC, 8/2; Lewis interview, Jan-Feb 82, 

part 3; Hewitt, Marginal Comments on Ltr, Morris to Lewis, 31 Jan 80, IABPC, 9/7. 

18. Lewis interview, Jan-Feb 82, part 3. 

19. Ltr, Lewis to Morris, 21 Nov 79. 

20. Ibid.; Noah interview. 

2l. MFR, Lewis, Te lecon with Chief of Engineers, 13 Dec 79, IABPC, 9/7; 

Morris in terview. For information on the evolution of the Huntsville Engineer Division, see J ames H. Kitchens III, A History of the Huntsville Division, u.s. Ann)' CO/ps 

of Engineers, 1967-1976 (Huntsville, Ala.: U.S. Army Engineer Division, Huntsville, 

1978) . 

22. Ltr, Morris to Lewis, 31 J an 80, IABPC, 9/7. 

23. Lewis interview,Jan-Feb 82, part l. 

24. MFR, Lewis, Telecon with Chief of Engineers, 13 Dec 79; Morris interview. 

25. Morris interview. 

26. Noah inte rview. 

27. Morris interview; NEPO Sitrep No. 25, 13Jan 80, IABPC, 13/10. 

28. Ltr, Lewis to Morris, 22 Feb 80, Le\vis Papers; Memo, Noah for Lewis, 28 

Jan 80, IABPC, 1/2. 

29. Memo, Noah for Lewis, 28 Jan 80. 

30. Memo, Noah for Lewis, 1 Feb 80, IABPC, 1/2. 

3l. Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari, Israel's Lebanon War, trans. Ina Friedman 

(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), p. 68; Interv, author with Fred Butler, Aug 

80, Ramon, Israel. 

32. Noah interview. 

33. u.s. News and World Rellort, 26 May 80, p. 49. 

34. Noah interview; Memo, Noah for Morris, 26Jan 80, sub: Relationship with 

PM/ DOD and NEPO-Corps, IABPC, 9/7. 
llO BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

35. Noah interview. 

36. Memo, O'Shei for Lewis, sub: Project Manager Grade Level. 

37. Noah interview. 

3S. Hartung interview, Apr Sl. 

39. Noah interview. 

40. SOP 14, Configuration Management, 15 Feb SO, IABPC, 15/14. 

4l. Ltr, Lewis to Morris, 26 Dec 79, IABPC, 1/7; OAO, Master Diary, 13 Jan 

SO, IABPC, S4/4; Noah interview. 

42. MFR, Noah, 14Jan SO, sub: Meeting with NAC Executive, IABPC, 31/2. 

43. DCASR New York, CPSR: Initial Review, NAC, 26 Mar SO, pp. 1-4-1-5, 

II-I, IABPC, S/3; Ltr, Gilkey to GM, ABC, 12 Feb SO, sub: CPSR, IABPC, 32/2. 

44. Memo, Raymond Aldridge for Noah and Gilkey, 15 Feb SO, sub: Use of 

Roy Edwards, IABPC, 32/2; Memo, Noah for Area Engineers, 19 Feb SO, sub: Purpose and Scope of TDY Effort of Roy Edwards, IABPC, 32/2. 

45. SOP 10, Procurement Procedures for Purchase of Materials, Equipment, 

and Services, 9 Nov 79, IABPC, 15/10. 

46. Procurement Guidance 1, IS Apr SO, sub: Procurement Guidance, IABPC, 

S/7. 

47. The rest of the series are in IABPC, S/7. They are the following: (2) MOD 

Assistance to Prime Contractors; (3) Policy on Contracting for Transportation 

Services; (4) Subcontract Consent Reviews for Actions of $100,000 or More; (5) 

Monitoring of Contractor Procurement Activities; (6) Procurement Staff Visits to 

Area Offices; (7) Evaluation Factors; (S) Emergency Procurements; (9) Not Used; 

(10) Flow Down of Prime Contract General and Special Provisions into Subcontracts; (11) Small Purchases (Purchases Not in Excess of $10,000); (12) Technical 

Compliance with Purchase Order Requirements; (13) Not Used; (14) Procurement from Bonded Warehouse; and (15) Shipment of Food from Foreign 

Sources. 

4S. NEPO Sitrep 29, 11 Feb SO, IABPC, 13/14; Noah interview; Lewis interview,Jan-Feb S2, part l. 

49. Lewis interview,Jan-Feb S2, part 3. 

50. Ibid. 

5l. Memo, O'Shei for Lewis, sub: Project Manager Grade Level. 

52. Lewis interview, Jan-Feb S2, part l. 

53. Ltr, Bar-Tov to Hartung, 11 Oct 79, sub: Shifting Center of Gravity from 

IBM Building to Forum Palace, End to Ltr, Hartung to Noah, 2 Mar SO, sub: Shifting Center of Gravity-IBM Building to the Palace, IABPC, 9/7. 

54. Ltr, Hartung to Bar-Tov, 23 Oct 79, sub: Shifting Center of Gravity from 

IBM Building to Forum Palace, End to Ltr, Hartung to Noah, 2 Mar SO; NEPO 

Sitreps No. 24, 6Jan SO, and No. 25, 13Jan SO, both in IABPC, 13/9. 

55. Ltr, Hartung to Noah, 2 Mar SO; DF, Chief, Construction Division to Chief, 

Engineering Division, S Jan SO, sub: SOP #9-Design, Development, Review, and 

Approval, IABPC, 23/4. 

56. Ltr, Bar-Tov to Hartung, 24 Feb SO, sub: Shifting Center of Gravity from 

IBM Building to the Palace, End to Ltr, Hartung to Noah, 2 Mar SO. 

57. Ltr, Hartung to Noah, 2 Mar SO. 

5S. MFR, Bar-Tov and Hartung, 2S Feb SO, sub: DOD/MOD Program Managers Meeting of21 Feb. 19S0, IABPC, 45/4; Ltr, Wall, through Lewis, to Morris, 

25 Jun SO, sub: Management Issues, Israeli Air Base Program, IABPC, 9/7; Noah 

interview. 

59. Ltr, Morris to Lewis, 31 Jan SO. 

60. Ltr, Hartung to Damico, 11 Feb SO, sub: Family Housing and Dormitories; 

Ltr, Noah to Hartung, 12 Feb SO, sub: Family Housing and Dormitories; Ltr, Har-
TRIPARTITE MANAGEMENT 111 

tung to Noah, 14 Feb 80, sub: Family Housing and Dormitories; Ltr, Gilkey to 

Hartung, 13 Mar 80, sub: Family Housing and Dormitories; MFR, Noah, 14 Mar 

80, sub: Family Housing & Dormitories, OYda and Ramon Air Bases; Ltr, Bar-Toy 

to Hartung, 10 Apr 80, sub: Family Housing and Dormitories; Ltr, Hartung to 

Noah, 11 Apr 80, sub: Family Housing and Dormitories. All in lABPC, 1/2. 

6l. Lewis interyiew,Jan-Feb 82, part 3. 

62. Ltr, Bar-Toy to Hartung, 10 Apr 80. 
CHAPTER 8 

Starting in the Desert 

April 1979-June 1980 

We have a big army and a little country. 

Adir Schapiro, Nature Reserves Authority director I 

We have viewed with interest the unearthing of certain artifacts, 

including two human skeletons alleged to be 4,000 years old. 

e. Van Landingham, Acting General Manager, Air Base Constructors 2 

Israel encompasses only about 11,000 square miles, counting 

the occupied territories. 3 The country is barely larger than the 

state of Maryland. The Negev represents a little less than half of 

the nation, "5,000 square miles," David Ben-Gurion once wrote, "of 

sand, eroded soil and mountain." 4 This desert resembles a wedge 

pointing south to the port of Eilat and the Gulf of Aqaba. To the 

west lies the Egyptian Sinai. Across the low parched wadi of the 

Arava, also known as the Jordan rift valley and extending from the 

Dead Sea to the Red Sea, is Jordan. Moshe Dayan first saw the 

Negev in 1948, during the war of independence. He called this 

region of mountains and craters "a wide-open expanse, bare, 

parched, cragged, primeval." The only plants he saw in this "hot, 

wild world, void of rain and apparently of dew" were acacia, 

tamarisk, and "a bush with long hard thorns, sharp as spears." 5 Although it is hottest and driest nearest to the tip, blazing daytime 

temperatures, clear skies, and dry winds make the region a land to 

be approached with caution. Rain, when it comes, turns the wadis 

into churning rivers and makes the clay desert floor a sea of mud. 

Not always hostile to human habitation, for centuries the region had supported substantial communities. As long as 5,000 

years ago, the northern Negev was the site of "a highly organized 

and diverse civilization." This "Beersheva culture" included farming, animal husbandry, and copper smelting. The patriarch Abraham came to the Beersheva plain about 1,500 years later. In the 

days of the Judean kingdom, between 850 and 600 B.C., agricultural 
STARTING IN THE DESERT 113 

Ramon plateau 

settlements based on the careful collection of winter runoff extended as far south as Mitzpe Ramon. Human society in the Negev 

continued to thrive for several hundred years, with settlements 

throughout most of the region, even in the extremely hot and dry 

south. The Nabateans, traders with their capital across the Arava at 

Petra, built cities astride the route between the Red Sea at Eilat and 

the Mediterranean at Gaza. They prospered until the Byzantine period, during which Rome's Middle Eastern commerce declined 

along with the empire's military strength. Only later did the Negev 

become an arid wasteland. The seminomadic Bedouins and their 

flocks of sheep remained, indifferent to the potential of irrigation 

and even dismantling systems for their stone. To a large extent the 

Negev encountered by the Israelis in the early days of their independence was a man-made desert, developed over centuries ofneglect.6 

The establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 opened a new 

era in the history of the Negev. The Zionist ideology of the early 

days of the nation included a commitment to the conquest of the 

desert. David Ben-Gurion, prime minister during 1949-1953 and 

again in 1955-1963, personified this dedication. Ben-Gurion be-
114 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

Ovda valley 

lieved the Negev was the economic heart of the infant nation as 

well as a source of spiritual refreshment. He made his home at the 

kibbutz Sde Boker, a struggling agricultural collective in the desert 

south of Beersheva. For him, transforming the Negev into a center 

of economic and intellectual activity was an obligation for a generation of Israelis and for Jews around the world. 7 

Settlement burgeoned during the first thirty years of Israeli nationhood. Beersheva became a booming city of 100,000. With its 

fast food, traffic, and prostitutes, it reminded one American observer of "a fron tier town gone mad." 8 By the late 1970s Beersheva 

marked the edge of the desert with cotton fields and citrus groves 

as well as sheep ranges to the north. Settlement also spread to the 

south. Farming communities sprung up, and the government tried 

to encourage urban settlement by building a handful of small 

cities: Mitzpe Ramon, Dimona, Yeruham, and one or two others. 

These so-called development towns, with their apartment blocks 

stark and forbidding against the desert sky, seemed outposts 

against the desert itself.9 
STARTING IN THE DESERT 115 

The growth of the Israel Defense Force and the loss of the vast 

maneuver space of the Sinai had important consequences for the 

Negev and other parts of Israel. The desert held the largest 

amount of usable space for the relocation of military training areas 

and bases. The choice of the Negev for the Israeli Air Force's three 

new bases-two built by the United States and the other by the Israelis-was inevitable. The redeployment also affected the Israeli 

occupation of the West Bank. The same process that made the 

Negev the logical choice for the air bases put pressure on the land 

resources of the Jordan River valley. The use of large tracts for the 

airfields greatly reduced the training area available for land forces 

in the desert. In turn, the lack of usable space led the army to 

transfer some of its units from the Sinai to the West Bank. Along 

with this movement came establishment of a network of bases and 

depots in the occupied territory. So the chain of events that started 

with the departure from the Sinai solidified the Israeli presence on 

the West Bank and produced an argument against withdrawing the 

Israel Defense Force from the territory.lO 

For the two airfields that would be built by the Americans, the 

Israelis chose locations near the northern and southern limits of 

the Negev. Ramon, the northern site, was about thirty miles south 

of Beersheva. Ovda, farther down in the desert, was about the same 

distance from Eilat.ll Only about fifty miles separated them, but 

they differed substantially. 

The Ramon tract stood on a plateau called Ramat Matred in 

the Ramon Mountains, the highest range in the Negev. The mountains marked a transitional zone between the northern highlands, 

which received about four inches of rain a year, and the more arid 

southern highlands. Judean residents between 1,000 and 600 B.C. 

had used the runoff from the annual flood to farm the area. 12 The 

Nabateans had built the city of Avdat nearby. The ruins, from 

which an observer with binoculars could clearly see the air base 

site, overlooked what had been a major trade route and was now 

the main highway to Eilat. Now the wind swept undeflected over 

the Ramon tableland, which lay close to the main road but had no 

connection with it. 

The Ovda site was in a valley almost eight miles from the nearest paved road. It had been the staging area for a military operation named Ovda-fact, or fait accompli, in Hebrew-that had 

outflanked the Jordanian army and assured the fledgling nation of 

access to the Red Sea during the war of independence. 13 Two 

ranges of purple hills rose to the east of Ovda. The first separated 

the valley from the Arava. The higher second range was on the 

other side, inJordan. 
116 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

Site investigations began in the spring of 1979, soon after the 

first Americans arrived in Tel Aviv. However, the Near East Project 

Office did not carry out the analysis. The Ministry of Defense 

hired Israeli firms for the soil studies and laboratory work. These 

companies had the capability and the equipment and could start 

sooner. Their contracts were assigned to the American prime contractors. Investigators dug test pits at 400-meter intervals along the 

lines of future runways and taxiways. They took samples from the 

two-meter-deep holes and examined them for compaction, density, 

and moisture. Seismic surveys and laboratory testing of the soil 

came later. The preliminary visual assessment of the test pits revealed a great deal about the sites. The soils at both places contained similar materials, including limestone, dolomite, chert, 

flint, and wadi gravel. Within reasonable distances were adequate 

quantities of rocks suitable for aggregates to be used in concrete or 

as subbase and base underpaving for runways and roads.

14 

The similarities between Ovda and Ramon were only superficial. The composition and depth of the soils differed significantly. 

These dissimilarities, recognized from the outset, considerably influenced the construction process. At Ovda the dominant material 

was a mixture of silts, sands, and gravels. Every year the floodwaters 

from the surrounding hills washed more of this fine loose substance into the valley. Bedrock was as far as 120 feet beneath the 

surface, so compaction for construction represented a major problem. Hartung expected that aircraft shelters, other hardened structures, and multiple-story buildings might need pile foundations. 

Moreover, protection of the air base required the diversion and 

containment of floodwaters. Ramon was a different story. The 

dominant surface material was a medium dense loess. When vehicles broke up this surface, it turned into a fine flour-like dust that 

clung to everything. More important for construction was the 

proximity of bedrock to the surface. In some places the rock was 

only six feet below ground, and outcroppings protruded here and 

there. Early site surveys disclosed huge quantities of rock along the 

runway axes initially plotted by the Israelis. Rather than dig this 

material, the Israeli Air Force decided to realign the runways.1 5 

Investigations at both sites progressed satisfactorily through 

the summer. The Israelis completed their test pits and borings for 

runways and taxiways and turned to the shelter sites. The Americans searched for quarry sites and experimented with compaction 

techniques to determine the equipment and procedures needed. 16 

At the end of the summer the Corps established the administrative units, known as area offices, that would manage the operations 

at the sites. For projects costing nearly $500 million each, the offices 
STARTING IN THE DESERT 117 

were small. Each had an authorized personnel strength of fifty-six in 

addition to the design liaison branch from Tel Aviv. The executive 

office consisted of seven people-the area engineer and deputy, two 

project engineers, an attorney, a secretary, and a clerk-typist. The 

rest of the area office was divided into five parts, each of which reported to the executive office. Contract management, under a supervisory civil engineer, had ten employees in two sections-a supervision section and a reports section. The construction office, also 

under a supervisory civil engineer, had seventeen divided among 

the horizontal and vertical teams. Administrative services, with 

eleven people under a supervisory management specialist, handled 

communications, traffic, security, and public affairs, as well as administration and mail. Procurement and supply was carried out by 

three people-a contract specialist, a procurement agent, and a procurement assistant. Resource management had eight employees, 

with a supervisory operating accountant in charge. 17 

Like Gilkey, the commanders at the sites were colonels and former district engineers. O'Shei, who headed the Ramon Area 

Office, was well acquainted with his contractor. The Guy F. Atkinson Company had built New Melones Dam on California's Stanislaus River during his tenure in Sacramento District. Curl, his counterpart at Ovda, had been Kansas City District engineer but went to 

Israel from the office of President Carter's science adviser. Morris 

chose both of them and, as Johnson said, "They were picked because they were good. [Either] one of them could have been promoted to general, and one of them [O'Shei] was." 18 

Theirs may have been the most critical jobs of all. Much more 

than engineers, they were management and government as well. 

As contracting officers for their respective construction contracts 

after 6 March 1980, the area engineers made critical decisions regarding the legitimacy of contractor expenditures and actions. As 

the senior officials at the sites, they also provided the equivalent of 

community government for the thousands who lived there. Their 

highly visible jobs involved substantial risks of failure and promised 

significant rewards for success. Such an assignment could make or 

break a colonel's career. 19 Both relished the work. Curl had told 

Johnson that he wanted the most difficult of the two sites. Johnson 

thought Ovda might prove to be the most troublesome so he sent 

Curl there. O'Shei was also an aggressive manager and responded 

to concern about problems that might delay completion with 

Henry V's "he which hath no stomach to this fight, let him depart." 20 The selection of these energetic, assertive former district 

engineers reflected the criticality of their jobs and the mission. 
118 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

Two substantial requirements stood in the way of an immediate 

construction start. Israeli scholars had anticipated the need to expose the sites of earlier civilizations and preserve the important objects that might be found. Yigael Yadin, who was the nation's leading archaeologist as well as deputy prime minister, sounded the 

alarm months before the actual site surveys began. The withdrawal 

of the Israel Defense Force from the Sinai endangered more than 

the sites that might lay beneath the surface at Ramon and Ovda. 

Other construction would occur, for the armored forces and artillery as well as for air bases, and most of it would be in the Negev.

21 

The archaeological digs would come, but the more compelling 

initial obstacle to construction involved unexploded ordnanceduds-on the sites. A large portion of Israel had been battleground in one war or another, but earlier conflicts did not directly 

create the problem. The Israeli armed forces had for some years 

used both places for firing practice. The air force had bombed 

mock runways at Ovda, while a nearby artillery school and the 

fliers had used target areas at Ramon. No one knew the number or 

kinds of duds scattered over the sites, but estimates included 

bombs as large as 299 kilograms. The Ministry of Defense assumed 

responsibility for removing the duds, and by July 1979 an Israeli 

Air Force team was in the desert. Soon it became apparent that visual sweeps with hand-held magnetic mine detectors were inadequate. Particularly at Ovda, the drifting soil filled bomb craters 

and covered duds. The presence of shrapnel and other metal 

debris also complicated detection. 22 

The magnitude of the job caught everyone by surprise. Certainly, the government-to-government agreement had not designated a responsible party. Bar-Tov and the Ministry of Defense had 

responded to the problem without such a mandate. However, the 

seriousness of the matter was soon clear. Schechet warned Gilkey 

that clearance of explosives represented "potentially the most serious issue that has arisen to date." Thorough and prompt action 

was needed to avoid construction delays and increased costs and to 

protect workers.23 

While the Israelis probed the sites, the Americans wrote home 

for help. They needed detecting equipment that could find ordnance under twelve feet of gravelly silt. With the help of the support office in New York, the project settled on the Ferex 4.021 

sweeper, a West German product that was available in the United 

States. The project needed sixteen of the detectors, but the factory 

in Germany turned down the request for the equipment, explaining that "due to delivery liabilities assumed by us for various Arabic 

states, in the past months, we have bound ourselves in writing not 
STARTING IN THE DESERT 119 

to supply these instruments to Israel." Only one could be found at 

a dealer in the United States. That one was shipped to Israel. 24 

Removal continued through the summer and fall. Sometimes 

the rate of progress caused anxiety for Gilkey and the managers at 

the sites. At Ramon Butler noted with an eye to the possible response of his Portuguese work force that "discovery of duds during 

excavation could cause a severe unplanned stoppage of work." 25 

The Ovda team had problems reaching an agreement with the Israelis on the sequence of areas to be cleared, but completed most 

of its sweeps in October and went to augment operations at 

Ramon. The Israeli Army reserve units that did most of the work at 

Ramon did not always share the same sense of urgency as the 

Americans who looked on and waited. Nevertheless, work proceeded. The numerous duds found included as many as 100 objects unearthed in a 200-square-yard area. Each evening, after the 

workers returned to camp, these bombs were detonated where 

found. Most of the site was cleared by late November. A small ordnance disposal team stayed to detonate munitions uncovered 

during construction. 26 

The inevitable accident came in mid-December. Six workers involved in cutting an access road to a gravel site were taking their 

lunch break when a small bomb exploded less than ten meters 

away. The dud scattered metal fragments and injured three of the 

men. Because there were no hand injuries, investigators concluded 

that none of the workers had disturbed the ordnance; it may have 

been activated by construction equipment. Thereafter, workers 

were permitted to take their meals or park equipment only in 

areas that had been cleared by heavy equipment, such as bulldozers with sheepsfoot rollersY 

Underground explosives were not the only peril. Several times, 

Israeli pilots brought their jets in low over the sites, sometimes 

below crane boom level, for practice strafing passes over vehicles. 

"You do not hear the aircraft coming," wrote Lt. Col. Jack Clifton 

at Ramon. "When they pull out and hit their afterburners," he 

complained, "there is a tremendous roar and noise, which is very 

painful to the ears of the workers that are directly underneath." 28 

On 24 October Clifton counted n-venty-seven such runs within t\-vo 

hours. He was angry and willing to fight back. He did "not see why 

they have to continue to insist upon diving after the vehicles driving down the road, flying directly over the work site, and proving a 

general nuisance to all workers on the site." Clifton, whose grin 

hid a feisty spirit, did not find the runs amusing: "We will begin 

detonating very shortly, and it might be fun to see if they can time 
120 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

." ~ ~ 

J ' J 

~ -

Nose oj a 750-jJound bomb eX/Josed at one oj the sites dwing the cleamnce oj 

unexploded ordnance. 

an explosion at the same time that an aircraft comes over. We may 

get their attention." 29 

The aviators might have considered the overflights harmless 

pranks, but at other times and places, they had more than fun in 

mind. For example, in April 1977 five Israeli Kfirs had swooped 

down on the Saudi air base at Tabuk, about 120 miles southeast of 

Eilat, made a practice bombing run over the strip, and roared off. 

Repeat performances underscored Tabuk's vulnerability and Israeli dominance of the skies. 3o The message left at Ramon and 

Ovda was not as clear. Still, the overflights may have represented 

opposition to the unprecedented American involvement in Israeli 

defense matters or to the withdrawal from the Sinai. Such resistance surely existed within the Ministry of Defense and remained a 

concern for the U.S. Department of State until the departure from 

the peninsula actually took place. 3 1 In any case, the Americans on 

the sites were not amused by such playfulness. 

The contractors complained to Tel Aviv. The Ministry of 

Defense first responded by limiting overflights to 300 feet, hardly 
STARTING IN THE DESERT 121 

restrictive enough according to some of the Americans. Hartung 

pointed out that the planes represented the purpose for the bases 

and that a higher limit would inhibit the Israeli training program. 

The complaints persisted, and the Israelis finally agreed to the same 

400-meter restriction imposed over Israeli civilian communities.32 

The planes were still overhead and the duds were still under 

foot when the archaeologists came. They started at Ramon in October, where they provoked considerable interest but did not appear to get in the way of construction. At Ovda they began later, in 

January 1980. There the area office provided the diggers with 

water, portable toilets, and medical support.33 Although Air Base 

Constructors' weekly reports from Ramon never indicated that the 

archaeologists disrupted operations, the New York Times painted a 

different picture. In two November articles, one of which was 

picked up by the International Herald Tribune, David Shipler wrote 

of scholars racing bulldozers in an attempt to complete excavations. 34 Although assured by Rudolph Cohen of the Israeli government's Department of Antiquities that the constructors did "their 

best not to destroy sites .. . ," Shipler left an impression of frantic 

graduate students chased by crazed engineers atop earthmovers 

and power shovels. 35 

These newspaper accounts had no bearing on the actual conduct of the archaeological digs. By March 1980 the work was finished at both sites. The vigilant and pugnacious Israeli press followed the operations but did not complain about Corps of 

Engineers' handling of the excavators. 36 When construction workers at Ramon exposed a small cave while digging for a taxiway, 

O'Shei halted construction and notified Cohen so that he could 

evaluate the find. 37 At Ovda Corps cooperation brought a note of 

thanks from the Department of Antiquities to Curl and his deputy, 

Lt. Col. Bruce F. Miller. 38 

While the unfavorable attention of the Times did not affect the 

conduct of operations, it did have an impact on the Corps of Engineers, from Tel Aviv all the way to Washington. Secretary of the 

Army Clifford Alexander's office asked the Corps to explain the 

situation characterized in Shipler's articles. Gilkey answered with 

his assessment of area office relations with the archaeologists, 

passed it to New York, and thence to the chief's office in Washington and finally the Pentagon. 39 The response from the Corps satisfied Alexander, but did not end the matter. Before the issue faded, 

the Washington office had to answer a letter from an irate scholar 

who had read the Times articles. Philip King, president of the 

American Schools for Oriental Research, complained about the 

callous indifference of the Corps to the cultural heritage of the Is-
122 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

raelis and about the Corps' failure to finance archaeological work 

at the air base sites. For good measure, he sent copies of his letter 

to President Carter, two senators, one representative, and the 

heads of some executive agencies. 40 

General Wray in Military Programs Directorate and Maj. Gen. 

E. R. Heiberg III, director of Civil Works, replied separately to the 

letter. Director of Antiquities Eitam also assured King of the good 

relations his archaeologists had with the Corps.41 But, as Heiberg 

noted in his reply, "Your letter to me went to many who watch and 

judge our work: the President, two Senators, and others .... I ask 

you if you can suggest to me a way to put this matter into perspective in the minds of those who judge the Corps?" 42 As in the case of 

the original article, the damage was already done. 

Preserving the evidence of the remote past and clearing unexploded ordnance were not the only prerequisites to construction. 

Establishing a reliable communications network was vital. The project needed a system connecting the sites to the Near East Project 

Office and Tel Aviv to the United States, for transmission of computer data as well as for message and telephone traffic. The program made some provision for such a system from the start. Col. 

Newton B. Morgan, the Signal Corps officer who was chief of the 

communications division at the Corps' Washington office, arrived 

in Israel shortly after Gilkey did. During his two-month stay, he 

began work on connections with the sites. More important, he 

urged the addition of a communications expert to the permanent 

project office staff to manage development in this important field. 43 

Col. Donald Wong, who followed Morgan at the end of June 

and remained as communications manager, faced three major 

challenges. The desert environment represented the least of them. 

Radio connections with Ramon, which sat atop a plateau, were established easily. The mountains that surrounded Ovda made contact more difficult, but it was still possible.44 The two major problems were the Israeli communications system and the project's own 

procurement rules. 

As a military communicator, Wong was accustomed to assessing 

his needs and bringing to bear the necessary Army resources. So 

he probably would have found making arrangements with any 

public utility system something of a challenge. The Israeli Postal, 

Telephone, and Telegraph system in the Ministry of Communications, known as the PTT, was something special. It was notorious 

for its backlog of telephone installations, estimated by some to 

number in the hundreds of thousands and to extend back several 

years. PTT horror stories, featuring repairmen who refused to 

work until they caught enough fish for lunch or installers who 
STARTING IN THE DESERT 123 

demanded meals before doing their jobs, abounded. Wong had to 

break into this intimidating bureaucracy and make it work. In 

Israel there were no alternatives. The public system monopolized 

installation and maintenance of all telephones. 45 

He found dealing with PTT less daunting than it first appeared. As communications specialist Kenneth Keener noted, "We 

never found any unwillingness to support us." Wong still had concerns. Israel was a small and densely populated state with fewavailable radio frequencies. As a result Wong found himself competing 

with residential users and businesses for circuits. In addition, 

equipment had to be compatible with the government of Israel's 

standards for two reasons: PTT would do all repairs during the life 

of the program, and equipment purchased for the program would 

remain in the country as the property of the Israeli government 

once the job was done. 46 

Wong's third area of concern involved changes in the rules 

governing procurement. Early in the spring the program had 

agreed to the Israeli request for increased purchases from local 

sources. For Wong the growing emphasis on buying and hiring 

within Israel signaled a need to expand the communications network. He and his staff of three civilian communications management specialists-Keener in Tel Aviv and one at each construction 

site-had their work cut out for them. 47 

Unlike Wong in Tel Aviv, with his multiple problems, the people at the sites had a straightforward concern for more and better 

communications. Through the summer and into the fall of 1979, 

managers for the contractors and the government complained of 

inadequate radios and telephones. Curl considered unsatisfactory 

links his greatest problem. Butler, with his managers living and 

working in Beersheva and his workers on site at Ramon, feared 

major delays were in store. Solutions were a long time coming. The 

contractors bought mobile radios for on-site communications and 

borrowed single side-band sets from the Israelis for contact with 

Tel Aviv. Meanwhile, the Israeli Air Force installed tactical 

microwave systems while working on the communications buildings at both sites. All the while PTT, which refused to carry out any 

installation before completion of the buildings, waited. Apparently, the postal and telegraph system was not interested in carrying out some fast-track construction. 48 

The difficulties persisted until permanent base communications were established in the autumn of 1981. Interim measures 

never provided reliable and clear connections, and efforts to 

rectify the situation sometimes created friction between the Americans and Israelis. Some Americans, Wong included, became skepti-
124 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

cal of Israeli commitments and complained that the Israelis were 

slow to respond to problems. As Wong said when informing Ovda 

that PTT planned to complete circuits to Tel Aviv, "Don't hold 

[your] breath." 49 

Problems involving communications, unexploded bombs, and 

archaeological sites were superimposed on the main job of setting 

up camps from which to carry out construction. The work itself 

was a major undertaking. With nothing but empty desert where 

the bases would go, both operations started from interim facilities 

elsewhere. The Corps and Negev Airbase Constructors set up shop 

on 2 September 1979 near the port of Eilat. Work at Ramon 

started earlier in the summer from rented quarters at the Desert 

Inn in Beersheva, first in a small ballroom and then spreading into 

office trailers in the hotel parking lot. The contractor's management personnel lived in the hotel and commuted to the site in 

pickup trucks and vans rented in town from Avis. The drive from 

each town to its site took at least an hour.50 

These offices in town directed the first construction efforts 

while the Israeli Air Force assembled premobilization camps for 

the first 80 to 100 people at the sites. The contractors objected to 

the austere Israeli trailer camp, but Carl Damico told them "they 

are going to use it unless they show me how they can get it cheaper, 

quicker and I don't think they can do that." 51 The contractors 

used the Israeli facilities but were never happy about it. Complaints ranged from lack of furniture and electric outlets to dirty 

rooms. Moreover, the Israelis did not finish assembling the buildings on schedule and did not try to compensate with overtime 

work. All told, Butler concluded "for the record that relying on the 

IAF for the premobe camp was a mistake." 52 

The disagreement over the camp lasted into the winter. New 

preengineered buildings for use as residences and offices began to 

arrive in large numbers during the fall. As they went up at Ramon, 

management and administrative staff moved onto the site. "You 

can imagine the boost in morale," Butler reported, "when you 

have your own bed without a two-hour bus ride every day." By midDecember Ramon also had rooms for 240 Portuguese workers. 

However, at the end of the year 85 Portuguese still lived in the premobilization camp, and Butler faced "the albatross of the IDF 

premobe camp" until almost the end of January 1980.

53 

Completion of the permanent camp buildings removed one 

source of contention but spawned another. At Ovda the Israelis 

wanted to locate the construction camp and industrial facilities so 

that they could be incorporated into the permanent base. The Israelis, who would own the mobilization structures after construc-
STARTING IN THE DESERT 125 

tion of the bases anyway, hoped in this way to delete some facilities 

from the plan of work and reduce the cost of the project. The 

Americans made some effort to accommodate the Israelis by reviewing construction plans with this interest in mind. Nevertheless 

some facilities were installed so that their continued use was impossible. Overall, General Bar-Tov wanted the mobilization camp 

on the east side of the runways where the hills protected buildings 

from direct Jordanian observation, but the contractor installed it 

on the west. Other problems also occurred, such as the truck scales 

that were put so close to the runway that they would have to be 

relocated after the base became operational. So the attempt to 

plan for long-term use never succeeded. 54 

The deeper issues that divided the Israelis and Americans in these 

matters recurred from time to time. The Americans, many of whom 

considered timely completion their primary goal, lacked patience 

with the more measured pace at which the Israelis did business. The 

Israelis, on the other hand, placed a greater emphasis on economy. 

The premobilization camps were still in use when the workers 

started to come into Israel. The arrival of large numbers of foreign 

construction workers in Middle Eastern countries was not unusual. 

Oil-rich Arab nations with elaborate development plans compensated for their lack of skilled labor forces by importation. In 1980 

the government of Saudi Arabia acknowledged the presence of one 

million such workers in that country, although one estimate put the 

number at more than twice as many. At the same time, some countries with chronic unemployment regularly exported labor to the 

Middle East. This practice reduced the likelihood of unrest at 

home and brought in badly needed foreign exchange. Foremost 

among this group of nations was the Republic of the Philippines. 

Thailand and Portugal, which were eighth and ninth on this list in 

1979, furnished the workers for the air base program. 55 

The first Thai laborers came to Ovda in mid-September. Curl 

explained that they had been chosen because "they are industrious, 

hard-working and have experience in this sort of thing," having 

worked on American air bases in Thailand before and during the 

war in neighboring Vietnam. The Thais did not bring much with 

them. Many lacked adequate work clothes, some had no shoes, and 

most had practically no money. A supervisor lent some of the early 

arrivals money for tennis shoes. At the same time, very little awaited 

the first workers. No recreation facilities had been established. Only 

the mail that started trickling in during October offered any reading material, and spices and condiments for their dining hall were a 

long time coming. In spite of the lack of diversion, the Thais rarely 
126 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

ventured out to Eilat after their ten-hour workdays. Early in 1980 

their pay averaged around $400 per month.56 

Portuguese workers began to arrive at Ramon around the same 

time. Here too delivery of the special foods needed for the labor 

force-tripe, pigs' heads and feet, pork kidneys, cod, and sardines-was slow. The Portuguese were more experiep.ced in the 

construction trades than were the Thais and were recruited in 

smaller numbers. Their wages ran about 2.5 times higher than 

Thai pay, averaging over $10,000 a year. Supervisors were "generally pleased with the performance of the Portuguese workers." 57 

Although importing labor was a fairly standard practice in the 

Middle East, it was unusual for Israel. The nation lacked the capital 

resources of its more prosperous neighbors. On the other hand, it 

did have a skilled and versatile labor force, much of which was organized in Histadrut, the articulate and powerful labor federation. 

Histadrut was unlike any labor organization in North America. A 

major industrial employer, it owned a number of large firms, including SoleI Boneh, which was by far Israel's largest construction 

company and one of the largest in the world. In 1981 SoleI 

Boneh's worldwide design and construction contracts exceeded 

$450 million. Histadrut had strong ties to the Labor Party, which 

dominated Israeli politics until the 1977 election of Prime Minister 

Begin, and it is unlikely that a Labor government would have 

risked the federation's ire by insisting on a foreign work force . In 

its political and entrepreneurial as well as its unionist activities, 

Histadrut combined the Zionist ideal of rebuilding the land of Israel and the socialist goal of a Jewish workers' state. It was a 

formidable organization, and its voice would be heard frequently.58 

Workers and their living quarters represented only part of the 

mobilization requirement. Along with billets and offices came 

kitchens, utilities, and support services such as infirmaries, banks, 

post offices, and laundries. Recreation facilities included theaters, 

soccer and softball fields, handball courts, and swimming pools. In 

October 1979 Ovda also put in a desalinization plant to purify 

water piped onto the site from wells in the Arava. Construction demanded huge quantities of water for grading, compaction, and excavation, all of which could use saline water, as well as for mixing 

concrete, which required sweet water. Early estimates put peak 

daily needs for compaction alone at about 5,000 cubic meters or 

roughly l.3 million gallons. Experience later validated these predictions. 59 

The Israelis initially trucked water to both sites. Meanwhile, the 

national water company, Mekeroth, built pipelines from Ramon to 

the Sea of Galilee far to the north and from Ovda to the Arava 
STARTING IN THE DESERT 127 

Ramon access mad 

wells. The constructors also installed 25,OOO-cubic-meter storage 

ponds that were lined and covered with plastic. At Ovda, providing 

a consistent supply for the work force proved early to be a significant problem. Before the purification plant began operation at the 

end of October, shortages were "severe and inexcusable," according to Curl. In later months occasional breakdowns at the plant required management to issue bottled water for drinking and to pipe 

brackish water to the billets for sanitary use. 5O 

Sometimes the construction emphasis during these early 

months seemed to go too far toward providing amenities. Curl rejected the contractor's plan for two olympic-size swimming pools 

for the work camp as "clearly in excess of the requirement and 

with no apparent consideration for cost control." He insisted on 

reviewing all subsequent plans for recreation facilities. G1 The impression of an undue emphasis on creature comforts persisted 

among some Americans as well as Israelis. General Lewis said after 

a December visit that the Ovda contractor's "concern for the welfare of his people is obvious in the facilities built and planned." He 

thought "the energy flowing from this concern should be engaged 
128 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

in productive work rather than on recreational facilities." "The 

camp," Lewis concluded, "is not austere." 62 

Food was a necessity but also an important pleasure to workers 

on a remote construction site. A subsidiary of RCA provided satisfactory service at Ramon. Ovda started with a temporary contract 

with ajoint venture called MEML-Tamam. MEML, or Middle East 

Manpower and Logistics, was based in Hong Kong. The other part 

of the firm, Tamam Aircraft Food Industries of Tel Aviv, provided 

catering service to Israel's El Al Airline, whose food had a poor 

reputation among international travelers. Ovda too had many unhappy customers. "U.S. personnel," Pettingell reported in November, "are upset, dissatisfied and on the verge of riot activity." Award 

of the permanent contract to American-owned Dynateria stabilized matters, but only after MEML-Tamam failed to overturn the 

award in the Israeli courts.63 

Comforts were not shared equally. Each site had two separate 

camps, one for Corps and contractor management and another 

for the workers. Initial plans at Ramon called for single eight-byten rooms for the Americans. Unhappiness over this policy led to 

an increased allocation.6

" Americans moved into tvvo-room suites 

similar to those at Ovda. Portuguese and Thai workers lived four 

and eight to a room, depending on their job levels. One Israeli 

newspaper referred to the arrangement as "upstairs-downstairs."65 

In addition to accommodations for workers and managers, mobilization required a wide range of structures and plants for base 

construction. While some of the workers assembled the billets, 

others graded shop areas and poured concrete pads for preengineered maintenance shops and warehouses and for open storage 

yards. They also installed fuel storage tanks and a filling station. Industrial facilities included processing plants for construction materials, including a shop for storing, sorting, and bending reinforcing steel. Roads were opened to quarry sites, where rock crushers 

were assembled. Then came asphalt and concrete batch plants. 

Although not as significant as construction for mobilization, 

work on air base facilities also started in 1979. Earliest among these 

at both sites were the access roads that would connect the bases to 

the main north-south highway through the Negev and the perimeter security system of fences and roads. Work on both sites started in 

October. At Ovda the contractor experimented with several methods of excavating and placing fence posts in the loose granular soil 

before deciding to cut a continuous trench. Within a short time 

seven-man crews daily set 250 tapered forms, emplaced as many 

posts, and poured concrete. At Ramon the ground proved too rocky 

for earth augurs, and the workers used air track drills with six-inch 
STARTING IN THE DESERT 129 

rock bits to dig post holes along the nineteen-mile network of 

fences. Work at both places continued through the winter. 56 Completion of the access roads took considerably longer. The fifteenkilometer road to Ovda and the ten-kilometer connection to 

Ramon began as crude trails. In the course of construction they 

were widened to accommodate large pieces of equipment, compacted, and graveled. Only toward the end of the project were they 

paved. 57 

Early construction at both bases was defined in large measure 

by the special characteristics of the sites. Not only did the terrain 

determine the respective approaches to perimeter security and 

much later construction, but each site had unique construction requirements. At Ramon, 300,000-cubic-meter Glide Path Hill, an 

obstruction to planes approaching the main runway, had to be leveled. Workers gradually reduced the hill with explosives. They 

trucked the rubble to haul roads and the mobilization camp as fill 

while gaining experience with the heavy equipment that they used 

on other work at the site. 58 

Ovda's location in a flood-prone wadi required developing a 

protective network to carry off the waters that rushed through the 

valley. The 31-mile system of diversionary channels and dams was 

designed to protect the base from a deluge so severe that it was 

likely to occur only once every 100 years. Even Israeli engineers 

thought the danger remote. Nevertheless, those who worked there 

came to appreciate the protection offered by the system. In December 1980 a storm and flood of almost biblical proportions inundated the site. Two days of rain washed out all the roads and 

filled excavations, stopping most work for six days and setting back 

digging of the communications ducts by nearly one month. A day 

after the rain stopped, the excavations still held water but the site 

showed only minimal ponding because the diversion ditches carried away most of the water. "Flood control devices," Deputy Area 

Engineer John J. Blake said, "worked as they were intended to. If 

anybody had any doubts that they were necessary, they should have 

been here last night." 69 

The development of the shelters in the last few months of 1979 

showed fast-track procedures in operation. The work proceeded 

on several parallel lines, as foundation design, excavation, and 

purchasing of materials started. While the Israelis selected their 

design, the Americans evaluated footings for the shelters. The 

depth of bedrock at the locations varied by as much as eight meters. The use of driven piles for foundations, previously considered 

a possibility by Hartung, was once again mentioned. However, neither contractor possessed equipment for this costly alternative. 
130 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

Bulk cement storage facility under construction at Ovda in the spring of 

1980. 

The engineering division decided to use spread footings, set into 

bedrock where possible, and elsewhere on structural filpo 

In October the contractors received the general plans for 

adaptation to the sites and for procurement action. Meanwhile Israeli architects continued to work on foundation plans. The foundations at Ovda still troubled Curl. He remained unconvinced of 

the adequacy of footings for some of the shelters. To stay on the 

excavation schedule while tests continued, he convinced the contractor to concentrate on the complexes with sound footings. Pilings finally proved unnecessary, and by late November all excavation drawings were done. 71 

While these questions of foundations and the sequence of excavation were resolved, the major issue remained progress on design. 

Numerous Israeli firms, their work coordinated by the Israeli Air 

Force, worked on parts of the plans. Warren Pettingell complained 

that these architects took too long and kept him from meeting his 

schedule.72 Fred Butler found the situation confusing and frustrat-
STARTING IN THE DESERT 131 

ing. The shelters, Butler wrote, "are on the critical path and have 

been, thus far, locked into forces and agencies beyond our effective 

control." 73 Drawings trickled in throughout late autumn until finally all were available before the end of December.74 Butler's relationship with Israeli architect-engineers reflected his frequent complaints about the multiplicity of firms doing the work, the problems 

associated with piecing together numerous small pieces of design, 

the complex approval process, and translations. For example, one 

group of six hangars and ancillary facilities at Ramon involved 175 

separate sheets, all of which needed translation, piecing together, 

adapting to the site, and procurement action.75 

Even with the contractors completing the drawings and releasing them for construction through the winter of 1980, work on 

foundations was already well under way. The Ovda contractor completed excavation for nine of the ten complexes in February. 

Within a few days the precast plant at the site began production of 

panels for the walls. At Ramon earthwork for the shelters started in 

December, even before anyone was sure that the scrapers would 

not encounter rock that required blasting. Digging for the first 

group of six hangars required removing 163,000 cubic meters of 

earth. By March the work of digging and pouring footings 

proceeded routinely.76 

The earth movers still uncovered unexploded ordnance at 

Ramon. At one complex deep detection equipment turned up 

twenty-three duds, but work crews found still more. Their excavators 

cut into two white phosphorous projectiles, which ignited and flared 

but caused no damage. At other times demolition experts exploded 

500-pound bombs, sending shock waves through the housing areas. 77 

In spite of the many construction activities that were under 

way, mobilization dominated on-site operations until well into the 

spring of 1980. The little construction of permanent facilities that 

took place was based on available plans and materials rather than 

on logical construction sequences. Both sites built what they could 

as fast as they could and hoped that plans and materials would 

catch up. This situation soon changed. In March the project was 

entering one of the many transitions that came in rapid succession 

throughout the life of the job. The contractor at Ovda reported 

that construction was beginning to take priority over support activities. A month later Butler at Ramon wrote that "the mobilization 

phase of the project is drawing to an end." In June the headquarters in Tel Aviv confirmed these views and directed that both area 

offices shift their emphasis to permanent facilities. Permanent 

construction was in full swing.78 
132 

1. New YOI'll Times, 2 Feb 81. 

BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

Notes 

2. ABC Weekly Progress Report, 31 Oct 79, IABPC, 12/ 18. 

3. The territories include the Gaza strip, EastJerusalem, the West Bank of the 

Jordan-called Judea and Samaria by the Israelis-and the Golan Heights. 

4. David Ben-Gurion, "Introduction," in Yaacov Morris, Masters of the Desert 

(New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1961), p. 11. 

5. Moshe Dayan , Moshe Dayan: Story of My Life (New York: Warner Books, 

1977), p. 187. 

6. Morris, Masters of the Desert, pp. 22, 29-46, 48,100-101,104-05; ZevViinay, 

The Guide to Israel Uerusalem: Daf-Chen Press, Ltd., 1980), p. 339. 

7. Ben-Gurion, "Introduction," in Morris, Masters of the Desert, p . 11 ; Dan Kurzman, Ben-Gurion: Pro/Jhet of Fin! (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), pp. 274, 

354-55, 367-69. 

8. Burton Bemstein, Sinai: The Great and Terrible Wilderness (New York: The 

Viking Press, 1979) , p. 35. 

9. Lesley Hazelton, Where Mountains Rom; A Personal Report fimn the Sinai and 

Negev Desert (New YOl-k: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1980), pp. 150-51. 

10. Meron Benvenisti, The West Bank Data Project: A SUTVI!)I of Israel's Policies 

(Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 

1984), p. 25. 

11. DF, Bazilwich , Deputy NAD Engineer for Military Construction, to Chiefs 

of Divisions, NAD, 15 May 79, sub: Site Designation ofIsraeli Ail-bases, NAD PAO 

files. 

12. Daniel Hillel, Negev: Land, Wate!; and Life in a Desert EnviTOmnent (New 

York: Praeger Publishers, 1982) , pp. 79, 118. 

13. Herzog, The Amb-Israeli Wan, p. 104; Kurzman, Ben-Gurion, pp. 309-10. 

14. Telex, USDAO Tel Aviv (Gilkey) to DAEN-MPC, 20 Apr 79, sub: Israeli Airbase Program Development; Telex, USDAO Tel Aviv (Hartung) to HQ USAF, 23 

Apr 79, sub: Israeli Air Base Program Development, Sitrep No. 1; Telex, USDAO 

Tel Aviv (Hartung) to HQ USAF, 14 May 79, sub: Israeli Air Base Program Development, Sitrep No.4; Telex, NEPO to NAD, n.d. [co 1 Oct 79], sub: Information 

for MG Lewis Address to Professional Engineers, NAD PAO files. 

15. Telex, USDAO Tel Aviv (Hartung) to HQ USAF, 14 May 79, sub: Israeli Air 

Base Program Development, Sitrep No.4; Telex, NEPO to NAD [co 1 Oct 79]; Lt 

Col Robert Hughes, Bl-iefing for Secretary of the Army Clifford Alexander and 

Gen eral Edward Meyer, 30 Jul 79, DAEN-MPC-G fil es. 

16. Ltr, Schechet to NEPO Project Manager, 30 Jul 79, sub: Interim Report 

No. 2; Butler, ABC Weekly Progress Report, 25 Jul 79, IABPC, 12/4. 

17. Organization Chart, Area Offices, 20 Sep 79, IABPC, 88/5. 

18.Johnson interview. 

19. Bar-Tov interview, May 82; Interv, author with John F. Wall, Aug 80, Tel 

Aviv; Ltr, Col Donald M. O 'Shei to NEPO Project Manager, 15 Ma r 80, sub: 

Ramon Air Base Progress Report for the Week Ending 13 Mar. 1980, IABPC, 

13/ 19; Lu-, Gilkey to O 'Shei, 7 Mar 80, sub: Designation of Successor Contracting 

Officer, IABPC, 32/ 3. 

20. Telecon transcript 10, 14 May 79, IABPC, 10/ 3; Wall, Project Notebooks, 

vol. I, 22 JUll 80, IABPC, 90. 

21. New Yo rk Daily News, 6 Dec 78; New York Times, 2 Feb 81. 
STARTING IN THE DESERT 133 

22. Telex, NEPO (Col Richard L. Curl) to NAD (Bazilwich), 13Jul 79, IABPC, 

65/1. 

23. Ltr, Schechet to NEPO Proj ect Manager, 30 Aug 79, sub: Interim Report 

No.3. 

24. Telex, NEPO (Curl) to NAD (Bazilwich) , 13 Jul 79; Telex, NEPO (Maj 

Stephen T. Sharr) to Herr Lange, Institute Dr. Foerster GMBH & Co., Reutlingen, FRG, 16 Aug 79, IABPC, 65/4; Telex, Foerster Institute to NEPO, 22 Aug 79, 

IABPC, 65/3; Telex, NEPO (Curl) to NEPO-Rear (Pagano), 9 Sep 79, sub: Purchase of Additional Ferex Detector, IABPC, 65/ 6; Telex, NEPO (Curl) to NEPORear (Pagano) , 17 Aug 79, sub: Dud Removal, IABPC, 65/4. 

25. Butle r, ABC Weekly Progress Report, 25 Jul 79. 

26. NEPO Sitrep No. 13, 21 Oct 79, IABPC, 12/ 16; Memo, Lt Col Jack H. 

Clifton , Deputy Area Engineer, for Col O 'Shei, 28 Sep, 7 Oct, and 22 Nov 79, sub: 

Weekly Progress Report Ramon, IABPC, 30/3. 

27. Memo, Mishap Board of Investigation (Lt Col Joseph A. Beben, USA; Lt 

Col Thomas]. Stepetic, USAF; Capt Benny Har-Gev, IAF) for Project Manager, 28 

Dec 79, sub: Mishap at Ramon Air Base 12 Dec. 1979, IABPC, 31/1. 

28. Memo, Clifton for Area Engineer, Ramon, 26 Oct 79, sub: Weekly Progress 

Report, Ramon, IABPC, 30/3. Also see MFR, Curl, 31 Oct 79, sub: Narrative Report, Week of 21-26 Oct. 1979, Ovda site; Weekly Sitrep, Construction Division 

(Baer) , 28 Oct 79. All in IABPC, 22/3. 

29. Memo, Clifton fm Area Engineer, Ramon, 26 Oct 79. 

30. David Holden and Richard Johns, 77le House of Saud: The Rise and Rule of 

the Most Powelful Dynasty in the Amb World (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 

1981), pp. 479, 486. 

31. Schiff and Ya'ari,lsmel's Lebanon Wm; p. 68. 

32. Memo, Ba r-Tov and Hartung, 14 and 25 Nov 79, sub: Joint MeetingDOD/ MOD Program Managers, COE, and NAC, IABPC, 30/3; Ltr, Gilkey to GM, 

NAC, and GM, ABC, 11 Dec 79, sub: Low Flying Aircraft at the Air Bases, IABPC, 

31/ 1. 

33. ABC Weekly Sitreps, 31 Oct, 7, 12, 19, and 26 Nov 79, IABPC, 12/18, and 

13/1-3; OAO, Master Diary, 9 Jan 80, IABPC, 84/4. 

34. New Yorlt Times, 4 and 18 Nov 79; International Herald Tribune, 20 Nov 79. 

35. New Yorlt Times, 4 Nov 79. 

36. See, for example, (Tel Aviv) Al Hmnishmar, 3 Feb 80; (Tel Aviv) Ha'm'elz, 11 

Feb 80;jerllsalelll Post, 28 Feb 80 and 17 Mar 80, 

37. Memo, O 'She i for Project Manager, 22 Mar 80, sub: Ramon Air Base 

Progress Report for the Week Ending 20 Mar, 1980, IABPC, 14/ 1. 

38. Ltr, Avi Eitan, Director of Antiquities, Department of Antiquities and Museums, to Curl and Miller, 11 Mar 80, IABPC, 87/1 I. 

39. Telex, Gilkey to NAD, 13 Nov 79, sub: Response to SecArmy Inquiry Ref 

Preserve of Archeological Resources, NAD PAO files; Col Robert Hughes, Information Pape r, 14 Nov 79, sub: Secretary of the Army's Inquiry Concerning the 

Prese rvation of Archeological Resources at the Israeli Airbase Construction Sites, 

IABPC, 87/ 11 . 

40. Ltr, Philip]. King to Maj Gen E. R. Heiberg III, 21Jan 80, IABPC, 87/11. 

41. Ltrs, Wray to King, 5 Feb 80; Heiberg to King, 27 May 80; Eitam to King, 

31 Mar 80; all in IABPC, 87/ 11. 

42. Llr, Heiberg to King, 27 May 80. 

43. Inte rv, author with Col Donald Wong, Aug 80, Tel Aviv, Israel; Interv, author with Kenneth Keener, Aug 80, Tel Aviv, Israel. 

44. Wong interview. 

45. Wong and Keener inte rviews. 
134 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

46. Ibid. 

47. Wong interview. 

48. OAO, Master Diary, vol. I, 18 Oct 79, IABPC, 84/1; Butler, ABC Weekly 

Sitrep, 24 Oct 79, IABPC, 84/1; Ltr, Hartung to Bar-Tov, 4 Sep 79, sub: Long-Distance Radio Requirements, IABPC, 29/4; Communications Sitreps, 24 and 30 

Sep, 7,14,21, and 26 Oct, and 11 Nov 79, and 20Jan 80, IABPC, 12/ 12- 17, and 

13/1 and 11; Memo, Wong for Damico, 25 Oct 79, sub: Communications Items 

for DOD and MOD PM, IABPC, 19/18. 

49. Communications Sitrep, 24 Sep 79; Telex, Wong to OAO, 21 Jan 80, sub: 

Telephone Lines, and Telex, Wong to OAO, 23 Apr 80, sub: Ovda Communications Support, both in IABPC, 33/1; (Tel Aviv) Ha'm'etz, 27 Oct 81. 

50. NEPO Sitrep No.7, 10 Sep 79, IABPC, 12/ 10; Ltr, Butler to Curl, 24Jul 79, 

sub: InterimJobsite Office, IABPC, 21/8; ABC Weekly Progress Report, 12 Sep 79, 

IABPC, 12/ 11. 

51. MSA, Israeli Air Force Base Management Support Contractor Project 

Planning Documents & Briefing Book (hereafter cited as MSA, Project Planning 

Documents & Briefing Book), May 79, IABPC, 89/2; Telecon transcript 15, 31 

May 79, IABPC, 10/3. 

52. MFR, Capt Walter J. Cunningham, Project Engineer, Ramon, 19 Sep 79, 

sub: Weekly Progress Report, Ramon Air Base, 31 Aug.-6 Sept. 1979, IABPC, 

29/4; ABC Weekly Progress Reports, 29 Aug and 12 Sep 79, IABPC, 12/9, 11, and 

12. 

53. NEPO Sitrep No. 16, 11 Nov 79, IABPC, 13/1; ABC Weekly Progress Reports, 12 Oct, 11 and 28 Dec 79, and 22Jan 80, IABPC, 12/ 15, and 13/6,8, and 12. 

54. MFR, Bar-Tov and Col John R. Harty, 2 Aug 79, sub: DOD/MOD PMs 

Meeting, 26Jul. 1979, IABPC, 45/4; MFR, Lt Col James R. Cranston, USAF, DOD 

PMO, 18 Sep 79, sub: Mobilization Work Camp Facilities at Ramon and Ovda, 

IABPC, 29/4; Memo, Wall for Area Engineers, 27 Aug 80, sub: Temporary Construction, IABPC, 33/2; Bar-Tov interview, Aug 80. 

55. Holden and Johns, The House of Saud, p. 534; ENR 203 (20 December 

1979): 107. 

56. OAO, Master Diary, 16, 20, 24, and 26 Sep and 1 Nov 79, IABPC, 84/1; 

Washington Post, 9 Feb 80; j erusalem Post, 5 Feb 80. 

57. ABC Weekly Progress Repol-t, 12 Sep and 17 Oct 79, IABPC, 12/ 11 and 16; 

Ltr, Clifton, CO, to Butler, 12 Jun 80, sub: Special Ethnic Food for TCN, IABPC, 

33/1; jerusalem Post, 5 Feb 80. 

58. SachaI', A History of Israel, pp. 157-59; ENR 209 (15 July 1982): 57. 

59. MSA, Project Planning Documents & Briefing Book, May 79; NEPO Sitrep 

No. 41, 23Jun 80, IABPC, 14/6; NEPO Sitrep No. 42, 7 Ju180, IABPC, 14/7. 

60. MFR, Curl, 31 Oct 79, sub: Narrative Report, Week of 21-26 Oct. 1979, 

Ovda site, IABPC, 12/18; OAO, Master Diary, 6 Nov 79 and 31 Jul 80, IABPC, 

84/1 and 84/2; NEPO Sitrep No. 42, 7 Jul 80. 

61. Ltr, Curl, COR, to GM, NAC, 8 Oct 79, sub: NAC Procurement ActionSwimming Pool, IABPC, 30/ 1. 

62. Ltr, Lewis to Morris, 26 Dec 79, IABPC, 1/7. 

63. Weekly Report 18, Pettingell to Curl, 23 Nov 79, IABPC, 13/4; Weekly Report 19, Pettingell to Curl, 30 Nov 79, IABPC, 13/4; NEPO Sitrep No. 20, 10 Dec 

79, IABPC, 13/5; (Tel Aviv) Mabat, 28 Nov 79. 

64. Memo, Clifton for Area Engineer, Ramon, 29 Oct and 9 Nov 79, sub: 

Weekly Progress Report, Ramon, IABPC, 22/3-4. 

65. (Tel Aviv) Ha'aTelz, 21 Dec 79. 

66. NEPO Sitrep No. 11, IABPC, 12/12; NEPO Sitrep No. 19, IABPC, 13/ 15; 

MFR, Curl, 31 Oct 79, sub: Narrative Report, Week of21-26 Oct. 1979, Ovda site, 
STARTING IN THE DESERT 135 

IABPC, 30/ 1; Memo, Clifton for Area Engineer, 16 Nov 79, sub: Weekly Progress 

Report, Ramon, IABPC, 22/4. 

67. Clarence D. Gilkey, "Fast-Tracking the Israeli Air Bases," The LVIilitmy Engineer 72 (September-October 1980) : 317. 

68. "Israeli Air Bases, " ENR205 (30 October 1980): 29. 

69. Wall, Briefing for Incoming Officers, Tel Aviv, 14 Jun 81, IABPC, 92; 

Jerusalem Post, 5 Feb 80; U.S. News and World Report, 26 May 80; OAO, Master Diary, 

26, 27, and 29 Dec 80, IABPC, 84/2. 

70. MFR, Leo H. Price, Engineering Division, 6 Sep 79, sub: Geotechnical 

Meeting [30 Aug 79], IABPC, 22/2; MFR, Price, 18 Sep 79, sub: Geotechnical 

Meeting [1 3 Sep 79], IABPC, 22/2; MFR, Price, n.d., sub: Geotechnical Meeting-Ramon, 4 Oct 79, File 103-03, Oct. 1979, IABPC, 22/3. 

71. NEPO Engineering Division Sitrep, 7 Oct 79, IABPC, 12/ 15; NAC Weekly 

Reports, 12, 19, and 26 Oct 79, IABPC, 12/ 15-17; LtI·, Curl to Project Manager, 

NAC, 3 Oct 79, sub: Shelter Foundations for Ovda, IABPC, 22/2; LtI·, Curl to Proj ect Manager, NAC, 8 Oct 79, sub: Corps of Engineers Memorandum dated 24 

Sep. 1979, Shelter Meeting-Foundation Designs, IABPC, 22/2. 

72. MFR, Thomas, 30 Oct 79, sub: Design and Engineering Meeting 24 Oct. 

1979, IABPC, 22/3; NAC Weekly Reports, 19 and 26 Oct 79. 

73. ABC Weekly Sitreps, 12 and 26 Nov 79, IABPC, 13/1 and 3. 

74. NEPO Engineering Division Sitrep, 21 Dec 79, IABPC, 13/7. 

75. ABC Weekly Sitreps, 5 and 26 Sep, 7 Nov, and 11 Dec 79, and 26 Feb 80, 

IABPC 12/ 10 and 13 and 13/ 1, 6, and 17; Ltr, Gilkey to Hartung, 15 Oct 79, sub: 

Drawings of New Facilities, IABPC, 22/1. 

76. NAC Weekly SitI'eps, 29 Feb and 8 Mar 80; ABC Weekly Sitrep, 25 Dec 79; 

Memo, Clifton for NEPO Project Manager, 29 Jan 80, sub: Weekly Progress Report, Ramon; ABC Weekly Sitrep, 18 Mar 80. All in IABPC, 13/7, 13, 15, 17, and 

18, respectively. 

77. ABC Weekly Sitrep, 1 May 80, IABPC, 14/ 4; Interv, author with Maj Glenn 

D. Lloyd, Feb 87, Fort Belvoir, Va. 

78. OAO, Master Diary, 27 Mar 80, IABPC, 84/4; ABC Weekly Progress 

Report, 8 Apr 80, IABPC, 14/3; Memo, Wall for Area Engineers, 11 Jun 80, sub: 

Base Camp Construction, IABPC, 33/1; Lloyd interview. 
CHAPTER 9 

Time of Trials 

March-June 1980 

Our quality assurance was not that good. Not that good? It was almost 

non-existent. 

Maj. Gen. Max Noah 1 

We just do not have control of this job to the extent that we should 

have. 

John]. Blake, Deputy Area Engineer, Ovda 2 

General Noah was still in Israel when the first of the problems 

that hit the program in the spring of 1980 began to unfold. The 

season proved difficult at the sites and in Tel Aviv. Labor relations, 

contractor and government management, and procurement of 

materials all proved troublesome. Overall, these problems shook 

Israeli confidence in the ability of the Near East Project Office to 

do the job, sidetracked construction at both sites, and kept management from concentrating on development of an efficient construction routine. 

By the time that the winter rains ended and the desert flowers 

bloomed, some Americans as well as Israelis expected that securing the supply of reinforcing steel bars would be difficult. The Israeli Air Force's specifications called for ten different sizes of bars, 

with diameters from 6 to 25 millimeters. These rods. strengthened 

the concrete in the many hardened buildings on both bases. In addition to the aircraft shelters, these structures included the control 

towers and terminals, assorted communications and utilities buildings, operations headquarters, some maintenance facilities, and 

personnel shelters. 3 

Steel supply grew more important in the early spring with shelter construction about to move into a major new phase. Some footings were still being poured and wall panels were still being placed 

on the vertical steel dowels but preparation for arch construction 

also began. These arches consisted of concrete poured over com-
TIME OF TRIALS 137 

Secretary of the Anny Clifford Alexander confers with Colonel Curl and 

Colonel Gilkey at Ovda. 

plex networks of reinforcing steel. In the shelters and other hardened buildings, Israeli design tended to call for smaller bars than 

those the Americans normally used. The Israelis bent a great number of the small bars by hand into a tight mesh over which they 

placed concrete. The completed wall resembled glass-encased 

chicken wire. Like other aspects of Israeli design that tended to be 

labor intensive, this method reflected the relatively low wages of 

workers compared to the cost of machines in Israel. Americans, on 

the other hand, usually faced higher wage and benefit costs. So 

they used fewer and larger rods, which they bent by machine. 4 

The specifications for this steel called for 15 percent elongation-elasticity under impact-to assure that the structures could 

withstand an air attack. This standard applied to bars used in the 

shelters as dowels for vertical columns and in wall panels and 

arches. Steel for footings and foundations did not have to meet 

this standard, which apparently originated in South Mrica. Although unfamiliar to the Americans, this requirement represented 

standard Israeli practice for hardened structures. In October 1979 
138 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

the Israeli architect who worked on the shelters notified the project of this specification. It also appeared on the site-adaptation 

drawings that had begun to trickle in, and the requirement was 

well known within the Tel Aviv office by then.s 

Although the Near East Project Office understood from the 

outset that problems in procuring this special steel could seriously 

affect the schedule and cost, the awareness came slowly at Ovda. 

The first indication that something was awry came from General 

Bar-Tov's office. In January 1980 his economic adviser, Eli Noy, 

claimed that the bidding process for awarding contracts for the 

steel contained substantial irregularities. He believed that 

Hamegader-Barzelit, the Israeli firm that won the contract, became the lowest bidder only after submitting a revised bid that did 

not include taxes within its price. Some of the other bids, all of 

which contained the duties, otherwise would have been lower. The 

Ministry of Defense also wanted assurance that the steel, which 

had been manufactured in South Africa by an affiliate of 

Hamegader, met specifications. 6 

The steel was already in Israel when Negev Airbase Constructors awarded the contract to Hamegader. It had been delivered between June and October 1979. Negev Airbase Constructors bought 

the steel later, with purchase orders dated in December 1979 and 

January 1980. In the interim the bars had sat in the bonded warehouse at the port of Eilat awaiting a buyer and payment of import 

duties. Colonel Curl, the area engineer at Ovda, later recalled that 

"a lot of the bundles were loose [and] a lot of the identifying tags 

were missing." His office had neither the staff nor the procedures 

to control quality; his contractor had "sort of a start of a quality 

control program." But he needed the steel, the vendor assured 

him that it met specifications, and the tests he was able to run indicated that the bars met the requirements. 7 

The expressions of concern within the Ministry of Defense 

brought reassurance but no significant action. In early February 

Colonel Gilkey in Tel Aviv replied by reviewing the procedure for 

quality control, concluding that "it is consid~red that all concerned are aware of potential problems and have taken measures 

to insure compliance." 8 Colonel Curl confirmed Noy's claims that 

procedures had been irregular and bids had been evaluated improperly but remained confident of the quality of the materials.9 

Curl had reasons for considering the matter unimportant. His 

experience indicated that many construction materials-notably 

concrete, aggregates, and cement-could cause problems but reinforcing steel never did. Moreover, in spite of the disarray of the 

bundles at the port, logic led him to infer that the steel was as 
TIME OF TRIALS 139 

promised: "It used to be bundled together, it came on the same 

ship, it came from the same steel mill, and there's no way on God's 

green earth that another piece of steel could have got into that 

shipment, so you assume that although the bundle was broken it 

was the same as that bundle was originally packed." 10 His response 

to queries from Gilkey's office reflected his view. Although Gilkey 

asked him to wire his assessment of the situation within five days, 

Curl took an extra week and replied by mail. Moreover, he 

brushed aside the problem, attributing it to contradictory guidance from Tel Aviv. He said the contractor would employ sound 

procurement principles in the future. I I 

Both Gilkey and Curl had reacted defensively to outside criticism. Neither took the concerns of the Ministry of Defense at face 

value. Gilkey had fended off Noy's comments with a restatement of 

his operating procedures. Curl in his turn had tried to blame 

Gilkey's office for whatever problem existed. The Israelis brought 

the matter up again on 21 February in a meeting of the program 

managers attended by both Noah and Gilkey. This time the questions concerned the quality of the steel and the possibility that substandard bars had been used in vertical columns of the aircraft 

shelters. Bar-Tov said some of the steel had been delivered without 

proper identification tags. Hartung had Curl's assurance that the 

steel was properly segregated by type, but Willy Rostocker, a retired 

Canadian steel expert who worked as a dollar-a-year consultant to 

Bar-Tov, insisted that Curl's claim was inaccurate. 12 

On the same day Colonel Kett from Gilkey's office visited Ovda 

and raised similar questions. He verified Bar-Tov's contention that 

the steel was not identified clearly. In fact, Kett reported, the bars 

were so poorly labeled and sorted that he could not tell whether they 

met standards. "If this were not a fast-track project, CPFF project," 

Kett wrote, "there is no doubt in my mind that a critical material of 

construction such as reinforcing steel would not be acceptable in its 

present condition." He urged "that the steel in question not be utilized while reasonable ambiguity as to its properties exists." 13 

Three days later Gilkey took action. He now feared that the 

bars already used in precast shelter panels might not meet specifications and that the seller might have misrepresented the steel to 

the contractor. He told Curl to formally notify Negev Airbase Constructors that they used improperly identified steel at their own 

risk. If random sampling detected the use of improper bars, Curl 

was to reject the panels at the expense of the contractor. Moreover, 

the cost of the testing itself was to be borne by the contractor. 14 

Despite these measures, the complaints continued. The loudest and most persistent protests came from Willy Rostocker. The 
140 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

second volunteer adviser brought to the Israeli program manager 

by Deputy Defense Minister Zippori, Rostocker had come after the 

death of Morris Hornstein, the 72-year-old former president of the 

New York-based Horn Construction Company. Hornstein, whose 

firm had worked on the Verrazano Narrows Bridge connecting 

Staten Island and Long Island, had served Bar-Tov as a troubleshooter and as sort of a cultural bridge, explaining American 

construction methods and practices to the Israelis. 15 Mter he died 

in the fall of 1979, Bar-Tov said the American had "invested his 

soul into the building of the air bases in the Negev." 16 While the 

respect for Hornstein appeared to be universal, Rostocker inspired 

a different reaction. Impatient, disorganized, and indifferent to 

his severely high blood pressure, Rostocker was known to barge 

into offices, Israeli or American, open drawers, copy documents, 

and leave. Then, with sheaves of papers in hand and blood streaming from his nose, he would demand a hearing from Bar-Tov or his 

civilian deputy Avi Sharon. Some of the Americans, Curl among 

them, disliked Rostocker and considered him a nuisance. Some of 

the Israelis seemed to agree. I? 

Even at the Ministry of Defense, Rostocker had trouble getting 

an audience. To all who would listen, he insisted that the problems 

remained unsolved. He had said so at meetings with the Americans 

and within his own office. Finally, Sharon had asked auditor 

Naomi Kogon to hear him out: "Do me a favor. Find yourself a few 

hours. Sit down with Willy and see what he wants." 18 

In early March Rostocker also aroused some interest among 

the Americans. He collared General Lewis, who was in Israel to review progress. "In an excited state," as Lewis recalled, Rostocker 

asked for a meeting. Lewis agreed to an evening discussion at his 

room in the Palace Hotel. There, Rostocker spread his documentation, including photostats of canceled checks and purchase orders, 

on the rug in front of Lewis and Noah. 19 The story unfolded over a 

bottle of scotch. While Lewis took notes and marveled at the accumulation of papers, Rostocker argued that the project had received at least one shipment of steel that did not meet specifications. He insisted that the purchase of steel had been mismanaged 

and perhaps even marked by fraud. 20 Noah was surprised. "It had 

not come to my attention or Lewis' attention or any of the management's attention," he recalled, "that there was a problem as severe as was purported to be." 21 When the session was over and the 

scotch was gone, Lewis decided "to move and move quickly." 22 

The next morning Lewis brought the Defense Contract Audit 

Agency into the picture. The agency had a branch in Tel Aviv that 

had opened in the summer of 1979 in conjunction with the air 
TIME OF TRIALS 141 

base project. The audit team led by Michael Maloney had representatives at both sites as well as in its main office at the Palace. 

Maloney reported to his agency's regional headquarters in Boston 

and worked independently of Gilkey's office. His primary task involved evaluating contractor claims for reimbursement of costS. 23 

Lewis "told the auditor to get on this right away ... and ... to get a 

hold of Willy and start exploring." 24 

Simultaneous pressure for remedial action also came from the 

American program management office. Lt. Col. James R. Cranston 

from General Hartung's program management staff went to Ovda 

and spoke with Curl. He learned that the area engineer had not 

notified the contractor that he used questionable steel at his own 

risk. According to Cranston, Curl thought to do so would be tantamount to stopping the job, and he felt he lacked sufficient 

grounds for such action. Cranston reported that Curl had discussed his position with Gilkey and that Noah also knew that the 

contractor had not been warned.

25 Hartung was appalled. He also 

felt betrayed. Only one day before Cranston's visit to Ovda, Hartung had assured Bar-Tov that Curl had taken adequate steps to 

prevent use of questionable materials and that Negev Airbase Constructors was absorbing the financial risk. "We cannot," he wrote 

Noah, "continue to operate with agreements being made with 

MOD that are subsequently reversed, with no discussion prior to 

such action being taken." Perhaps recalling Gilkey's move from the 

IBM Building, he complained that this was not the first time that 

the Corps of Engineers had put him in an untenable position. In 

any case, "whether ... caused by arrogance or just not paying attention to business, it is not the professional performance expected of the United States Department of Defense." 26 

Noah immediately apologized for the embarrassment the situation had caused Hartung. He regretted the breakdown in communications and agreed that "DOD elements must do better." Noah 

denied knowing that the "letter had not been sent to the contractor for whatever reason," but agreed that "this type of thing should 

not happen again." 27 

On the next day Curl learned that some of the steel had failed 

tests. Elongation was apparently not the problem; all samples met 

that particular standard. Instead, the failures involved yield tests. 

The strength of the steel in some of the samples did not meet project specifications. 28 Curl was not by nature an equivocator. When 

he recognized the problem, he acted immediately. He suspended 

construction of all structures that included reinforcing steel and ordered the contractor to take corrective measures. These included 

inventory and removal of any substandard steel on hand, identifica-
142 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

tion of structures in which any of the steel might have been used, 

and an engineering evaluation of the soundness of such structures. 

Curl attributed the situation to a failure of the contractor's quality 

control program and stressed "adequate controls must be initiated 

immediately to prevent similar unsatisfactory performance in the 

future." He gave Warren Pettingell three days to submit a quality 

control plan and a report on the situation.29 

While Pettingell prepared his response, rumors flew. Maloney's 

office had just started its investigation, and the auditor would say 

only that he thought the entire purchase had been badly managed. 

This report did not satisfY the program managers, who claimed that 

the steel transactions reflected fraud on the part of the supplier 

and the construction contractor. Even before the issue emerged, 

Bar-Tov's office had been certain that operations at the sites were 

shot through with criminality. Auditor Kogon said, 'We knew there 

was . . . some corruption there. We couldn't put our finger on it." 30 

In this climate gossip and hearsay, including claims of collusion 

between the contractor and the Corps and other wrongdoing, was 

hardly surprising. Nevertheless, it was disruptive. At Ovda Curl's 

deputy cautioned the area office staff not to become preoccupied 

with the allegations: "Unless there is substantive evidence, our people should not presuppose the outcome and the findings." 31 

Pettingell delivered a draft of his plan to Curl in a day. He outlined a procedure that would free the steel on hand for use. Essentially his proposal required withdrawing from the site all steel that 

was known to have failed tests as well as steel that was unidentified 

and untested. Pending their removal, these rods were segregated, 

banded in red, and marked clearly in Thai and English to preclude 

inadvertent use. Then he wanted to refill his racks with satisfactory 

steel, which would be tested against accompanying mill certificates. In the future he intended to accept only clearly marked and 

certified bundles. The area office's instructions on the control of 

steel quality incorporated all of these proposals. Noah added the 

requirement that all steel should be tested for quality at the port 

rather than after delivery to Ovda. 32 The assumptions under which 

Ovda worked clearly had changed. No longer would steel be presumed adequate based on circumstantial information. 

Pettingell and Curl still faced another important matter. They 

had to determine how much substandard steel had been used and 

where. Initially, they knew only that they had fabricated but not emplaced forty-seven wall panels that might contain some of the inferior materials. They soon learned how fortunate they were: the 

problem did not extend much further. In shelter complex five, the 

footings and nine wall panels contained suspect steel; the Israelis 
TIME OF TRIALS 143 

decided to accept the footings even with the mild steel. Tests of the 

steel inside the wall panels, on the other hand, disclosed that 

proper materials had been used. Otherwise, everything that had 

been built was up to standard.33 

An arrangement with the area office and contractor at Ramon 

assured that, if needed, Ovda could borrow enough steel to continue construction. Overall, Ramon was about one month behind 

Ovda in its procurement program and was receiving a valuable lesson from the trouble at the southern site. In any event a loan proved 

unnecessary, and Ovda was back on schedule fairly quickly. In less 

than a week, enough suitable steel had been identified for the fabrication of wall panels to begin anew. 34 

By this stage the issue transcended engineering and procurement remedies. The problem had become political and was beyond the control of the area office and the contractor. Maloney's 

inquiry did not stop claims that the steel transactions might have 

involved fraud. He found that some of the purchasing documents 

had been deficient, that the supplier had not been the low bidder, 

and that Negev Airbase Constructors had paid for some steel before receiving it. Something had to be done to lay the allegations 

to rest and restore confidence in the integrity of the program.35 

At Noah's suggestion, Gilkey appointed a board of officers to 

conduct an informal investigation. During the last week of March, 

the board examined procurement of the steel and the procedures 

used to control the materials after purchase. Colonel Wong, the 

communications officer, served as chairman, and the membership 

included Cranston and a nonvoting consultant from Bar-Tov's office as well as Lt. Col. George Snoddy and Maj. Stephen Sharr 

from the Corps.36 Bar-Tov still wanted a criminal investigation. Instead, it seemed to him that the Americans planned to cover up 

their wrongdoing. Because he suspected they were engaged in dubious and possibly criminal practices, Bar-Tov was frustrated by his 

inability to control the situation. "He was very vitriolic," John Blake 

noted at Ovda, "and accused the Corps of stalling, allowing documents to be lost, appointing people to the board with no investigative experience, et cetera, ad nauseum. "37 Still, Noah convinced 

him to let Kogon work with the board after she assured him that 

she would not participate in a whitewash.38 

The board studied the issue for nearly a month. Meanwhile, 

Negev Airbase Constructors dismissed its procurement manager 

without waiting for the board's report to Gilkey. In Bar-Tov's office, 

the sudden change seemed to confirm the suspicions of criminality. Although the findings mentioned no names, no one escaped 

unscathed. The board concluded that almost every level of pro-
144 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

curement operations lacked controls. In addition, the program's 

procedures and quality assurance system and the contractor's purchasing, receiving, and payment methods all needed sharper definition. Because the published guidelines were vague, the contractor's purchasing documents had not been reviewed in Tel Aviv by 

the engineering division or the procurement office. 39 

As to the steel itself, it had been manufactured to a British Commonwealth standard with which Americans were unfamiliar. It also 

had been poorly marked and improperly segregated in storage. 

Over 58 metric tons of a total of 8,218 had been found to be inadequate and had been returned to the vendor by the contractor. In 

the few weeks after completion of the board's report, an additional 

1,600 tons of badly labeled steel were set aside and removed from 

Ovda. The effect on operations turned out to be minor; estimated 

loss of production was between two and four weeks.40 The precast 

concrete plant was idle for eight days. The contractor also fell behind 1:\"'0 weeks in placement of wall panels "while tests were run, 

stocks were segregated and the problem scoped." 41 

Problems lingered into the late spring. Slowly, morale and momentum at Ovda recovered from the distractions. In Tel Aviv BarTov still had his misgivings about the integrity of the procurement 

system. Rostocker continued his crusade in the steel yard, interviewing contractor personnel and examining documents. Several 

times, Curl, Blake, and contractor management complained of Rostocker's activities. Blake considered him "a general nuisance," and 

Curl once ordered him to have no contact with Negev Airbase 

Constructors employees, but to no avail. The year ended as it 

started, with Ovda complaining about Rostocker's meddling. By 

the same token, the adversarial relationship bel:\",een Bar-Tov and 

Hartung on one hand and the Corps of Engineers on the other 

continued unabated. Moreover, the Israelis were slow to release additional steel from the port at Eilat, so Gilkey's office again alerted 

Ramon that loans of steel might be needed. As it turned out, borrowing once more proved unnecessary.42 

Meanwhile, Ovda made some gains in efficiency by streamlining steel purchases. The contractor reduced the ten originally 

specified sizes to five by eliminating the smallest sizes and substituting larger ones. By doing so, Negev Airbase Constructors cut costs 

and simplified their buying system without reducing the soundness 

of any buildings. In addition , the contractor decided to limit future reinforcing steel purchases to the special steel, thereby further simplifYing its inventory and enhancing the integrity of reinforced structures on the base. 43 
TIME OF TRIALS 145 

Despite the problems, the episode may have had some positive 

effects. As a result of the focus on the need for a more careful accounting of bulk materials, the contractor finally installed truck 

scales. In January Colonel Miller, Curl's deputy, had asked Negev 

Airbase Constructors to buy scales. That same month, O'Shei had 

approved a request from his contractor for the purchase of scales 

at Ramon as well. However, neither consortium was in a hurry to 

spend the money, and the headquarters in Tel Aviv only began to 

apply pressure in the wake of the steel issue. Negev Airbase Constructors put in their scale in May; the Atkinson organization 

followed suit in August. 44 

Steel started to arrive at Ovda again in late April. Under 

Blake's direction, production gradually returned to normal, within 

a more deliberate and cautious managerial framework. For Lewis 

and Noah, the problem called into question Pettingell's ability to 

carry out the job. At least the episode came early enough to teach 

useful lessons without irrevocably harming the job. 45 As Noah said, 

looking back at the problem three years later, "I t just wasn't that 

big a deal. We made a mistake, and there she was." 46 

Soon both contractors completed their first arch roofs over aircraft shelters. On 31 May 1980, Ovda installed the first one. Fiftynine more waited, but the area office reported that "morale of the 

entire work force soared due to placement of the first shelter 

arch." In the next two months Ovda finished seven, averaging 16 

days on eachY Ramon poured its first arches in June. In the first 

shelter, steel placement took 20 days, and the pour lasted just 

under eight hours. On the second, the iron workers needed only 

10 days to bend and tie the reinforcing steel and just over five 

hours to place the concrete. Colonel O'Shei hoped to reduce the 

time even further. His successor as area engineer at Ramon, Col. 

Paul W. Taylor, echoed O'Shei's optimism and reported in July 

that major vertical construction remained on schedule. By the end 

of the month eleven arches had been completed.48 

Mere statistics do not reveal the difficulties involved in completing a shelter arch. Mter the walls of a shelter were erected, a jumbo 

arch form was set up between them. The prime contractors fabricated six of these forms at each. site. Workers rolled sections of the 

forms into the shelter, bolted them together, jacked the form into 

place, and secured it. They then covered the huge steel frame with 

steel sheets, which were tack-welded into place to form a dome. 

Workers climbed onto the plates, where they bent and tied the reinforcing steel into a very dense network of mesh over three feet thick 

from top to bottom, with individual steel bars only a few inches 

apart. Temperatures soared to more than 140 degrees Fahrenheit, 
146 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

and the glistening steel dome of the jumbo arch form only intensified and reflected upward the vicious heat. Then came the concrete 

placement, a monolithic pour of approximately 450 cubic yards of 

concrete, that lasted almost all day. This phase always started early 

in the morning, while the weather was relatively cool. To assure that 

the concrete did not set too rapidly, ice was added to the water for 

the mix, which was controlled very carefully to assure the proper 

strength. About a week after the placement, when the concrete had 

set, the arch form was removed and moved to the next shelter, leaving the steel plates that had formed the roof of the form as a lining 

for the newly completed reinforced concrete arch.49 

The trouble at Ovda over the reinforcing steel was still unfolding when Brig. Gen. John F. Wall became involved in the project. 

When he first arrived in mid-March for an orientation visit, he had 

not yet been named project manager. A month later General Morris' office announced that Wall would take charge in Tel Aviv. Morris, who said he needed Noah back at Huntsville, thought Wall had 

an excellent background for the job. He had been district engineer at Fort Worth, "one of our busiest Districts," and Wray's 

deputy director of military construction in Washington. As soon as 

Wall completed work toward his law degree in May, Morris intended to send him over. Hartung and Bar-Tov would find Wall "a 

very conscientious, hard-working, and smart associate." Morris predicted that "the three will make a good team," and he expected "to 

keep [Wall] there until the air bases become operational." Although Morris did not consult Lewis before making the assignment, Lewis could take some satisfaction from the decision. His 

persistent campaign for a general officer in the Near East Project 

Office had at last borne fruit. Wall took over on 13 May.50 

Wall, who held a doctorate in civil engineering in addition to 

his new law degree, knew he was walking into a difficult situation. 

He expected that he would face problems as long as he stayed in Israel, but he was well suited for this kind of environment: "I'm not 

the type of individual who is going to have a blank sheet there that 

says there ain't no problems today." As far as his own career was 

concerned, he considered the assignment "a high-risk job for me." 

As far as the project was concerned, he shared Lewis' view: timely 

completion was critical to execution of the peace treaty and was his 

first priority. Overall, he saw "one alternative to finishing on time 

and that's finishing early." Plainly a man in a hurry, Wall came to 

the project at a difficult time. The steel issue was headed toward 

resolution but was uncovering problems with the overall procurement system and quality control procedures as it evolved. The issue 

also raised questions about management. Wall watched his staff at 
TIME OF TRIALS 

General Wall, pTOject manager fTOm 

June 1980 to August 1982 

147 

work and attended briefings, 

which became the basis for 

hurried decisions regarding 

personnel changes. 51 

He found his new headquarters significantly different 

from Fort Worth District. 

''When you've got a going District," he explained, "a District 

Engineer has to work hard to 

make a mistake. Because when 

he makes a dumb decision, the 

staff makes it come out correctly because they were experienced, had done it before, 

and were damn good." In Tel 

Aviv the Corps had started 

from scratch, and, despite the 

acknowledged importance of 

the mission, had not always 

found well-qualified people for 

the job. Although he considered some civilian and military members of his staff to be well suited 

for the project, he was disappointed overall. "It's easy to make a dumb 

mistake," he said, when ''you don't have the back-up." 52 

There was no time for gradually learning about the project. At 

Ramon relations between labor and management were uneasy. 

Since shortly after the first Portuguese workers had arrived in 

September 1979, their relationship with Air Base Constructors had 

become stormy. Strongly unionist and quick to complain, several 

had lost their jobs for insubordination during their first months in 

Israel. Others resigned for a variety of reasons. Some found the unexpectedly cold and wet winter weather intolerable. Others complained about living conditions or the difficulty in getting along 

with American management. One worker complained that the 

Americans "don't understand us. Most of them prefer to bridge 

the noncommunication gap by shouting and not explanation and 

conversation." Others left because of the problems with explosives, 

both the duds buried on the site and the firing from the nearby artillery school. 53 The demands of the job also provided a major 

source of stress. The sixty-hour workweek was extremely taxing. 

'Very seldom in my experience," Fred Butler commented, "have 

any jobs been worked ten hours a day, six days a week, that were 
148 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

honest hours . .. for long periods of time." At Ramon "they really 

work that time." 54 

While the unionist Israeli press sympathized with the Portuguese about conditions at the site, the Israelis still found the 

Portuguese a troublesome presence. Mfluent by Israeli standards, 

courtly, and well mannered, they charmed the women of Beersheva and the development towns. They also were aggressive. "The 

Portuguese offer marriage to every girl," said a woman from Beersheva. "One of the Portuguese offered to take me on a trip around 

the world and then marry me." A Dimona woman, who had been 

divorced by her Israeli husband and was preparing to leave the 

country with her new Portuguese spouse, said she was glad to be 

free of Israeli men, who she saw as "chauvinists, unmannered and 

spoiled." On the other hand, most Israeli women considered the 

Portuguese "polite, generous, and interesting." In addition to posing a threat to Israeli men, their presence challenged a social 

structure that opposed emigration and marriage outside of the 

Jewish faith. Fights broke out between workers and local youths in 

some towns. Under pressure from right-wing religious groups, Dimona declared itself off limits to foreign workers, and Yeruham 

banned nightclubs. The press featured stories of wealthy foreigners stealing local women, a theme familiar elsewhere but new to 

Israel. Newspapers that represented orthodox Jewry decried the 

"aspiritual havoc" and "grave ... breaks in the tumbling wall of the 

Jewish family" caused by the Portuguese. Only their departure 

from Israel ended complaints about their negative influence. 55 

By the end of 1979 the areas of tension between the Portuguese 

workers and contractor management were well known. Supervisors 

considered the Portuguese good workers, but it was plain that 

morale was low. In December, when improved living conditions convinced some workers to change their minds about leaving Ramon, 

O'Shei hoped that the worst was over. Problems persisted into 1980. 

Ultimately they caused enough concern in Tel Aviv for Gilkey to 

order Management Support Associates to analyze the situation. The 

conclusions verified what most observers already knew, citing Israeli 

artillery school shelling incidents as the largest single cause of departures. Gilkey asked O'Shei for solutions to the large turnover. 56 

Events overtook the study of working conditions. On 24 May 

Ramon had a work stoppage that almost amounted to a general 

strike. Angered by the public search three days earlier of several 

workers who had been accused of theft, most of the Portuguese 

failed to report for work. They gathered around Butler's office and 

demanded higher pay, more vacations, and better food. The 

protest lasted one day. Claiming that the "cause of the disturbance 
TIME OF TRIALS 149 

was a professional group of organizers," Air Base Constructors 

fired 319 Portuguese. The dismissals included many key workers 

and reduced the available work force by about 25 percent. The 

next day, two El Al planes returned the dissidents to Portugal. According to Butler, the site was back to "business as usual." Nevertheless, to make sure that a labor force would be available if the situation disintegrated, his parent firm made quiet contingency 

arrangements for workers from the Philippines.57 

Butler thought that the strike was politically motivated, and 

some observers agreed. Several Israeli papers and one Lisbon daily 

claimed that the organizers had previously worked on an air base 

construction project in Algeria, that they had connections with the 

Portuguese Communist party, and that they had been sent to Israel 

to disrupt the project. Wall's office also thought the leaders had 

been politically motivated and that they might have coerced their 

fellow workers into participation. 58 

In less than a month the situation was almost back to normal. 

Israeli media interest, which lasted only a few days, reflected a revival of Histadrut's efforts to represent the foreign workers. 59 

Davar, the Tel Aviv daily that had been the organ of the labor federation for forty-five years, commented somewhat wistfully that "if 

the Portuguese only had a labor union much of the friction would 

be resolved to the satisfaction of both parties. "60 In Portugal several 

papers covered the affair but only for a short time. The American 

embassy in Lisbon noted these articles and passed translations to 

program management through the embassy in Tel Aviv. 61 The contractor was also busy in Lisbon recruiting new workers, who began 

to arrive in early June. By the middle of the month only 100 strikers 

were unreplaced. Wall's office estimated that adding one hour of 

overtime each day per worker had kept productivity within 10 percent of the prestrike level. Nevertheless, the loss of so many experienced workers set the project back substantially. New men filled the 

vacancies, but the stoppage delayed by about two months the expansion of the work force that had been planned for the summer.62 

At the other site, discontent among the Thai workers also 

caused concern. The area office noted that the most important 

complaint involved impoundment by Israeli customs authorities of 

shipments of Thai spices and fish sauce. The workers had been 

without these condiments for sixty days, and their frustration over 

the food was "catalyzing other gripes and complaints."63 Unlike 

the situation at Ramon, contractor and Corps managers met with 

the Thais and discussed their grievances. The workers expressed 

their dissatisfaction with the eight-man rooms rather than with the 

food, and Negev Airbase Constructors took steps to reduce the 
150 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

number in a room to six. The contractor also paid an American to 

act as ombudsman for the Thais and created a Thai council. Later 

in the summer the general manager agreed to hold monthly meetings with this group at his home. 64 

The general manager who arranged regular meetings with the 

Thais was not the man who presided over the project during the 

steel troubles. On 5 June the Perini Corporation replaced Pettingell and two other senior people at the site. Wall, who had been disappointed at the lack of a sense of urgency within Negev Airbase 

Constructors management, was pleased. 65 The changes attracted 

newspaper attention, primarily in Israel but in the United States as 

well. Two of the three largest Tel Aviv dailies and the English-language Jerusalem Post prominently displayed stories on the removals. 

Along with the news came headline claims of mismanagement and 

even corruption in the program. The newspapers also complained 

that the program was not buying enough materials in Israel. 66 

By this time a large portion of the Israeli press had made clear 

its opposition to the American presence. This hostility had several 

roots. Unionist dailies opposed the use of foreign labor of any sort 

in Israel. Papers representing orthodox religious groups reacted 

against the destabilizing effect of the suave Portuguese. Other papers took offense on nationalistic grounds, contending that foreigners should not have been brought into the country to do ajob 

that Israelis could do as well. In the spring of 1980 the big issue in 

the newspapers was program management, particularly American 

management. Overall the Israeli press lacked confidence in the 

ability of the Corps of Engineers to do the job. Ma 'ariv questioned 

the depth of the American commitment to the program. The paper 

said the management change served to prove that the Americans 

had not chosen the best people and cared little about saving 

money,67 Ha 'aretz cited cases of American inefficiency, among them 

extravagant use of air freight, importation of materials that were 

cheaper in Israel, and the quality control problems related to the 

reinforcing steel. According to the Ha'aTetz story, senior officials in 

the Ministry of Defense, who were disappointed with the Corps of 

Engineers, claimed "that the Israelis are just as capable of planning 

and building the airports as are the Americans." 68 

The charges of mismanagement and fraud convinced the three 

generals to call a press conference for 12June. Nearly thirty representatives of various media attended, including correspondents for 

the American wire services and television netw'orks. For the only 

time in the life of the program, Bar-Tov, Hartung, and Wall faced 

the press together. Displaying a united front, they defended the 

program and denied reports of waste and incompetence. Hartung 
TIME OF TRIALS 151 

served as primary spokesman. He said the bases were on schedule 

and would be completed under budget. He also asserted that "in 

gross terms ... we are right where we planned to be when we made 

the plan a year ago." The others also defended their work. Bar-Tov 

assured the reporters that the program "will cost less than the original" estimate, although the economic situation was uncertain. "In 

all my studies," he observed, "when I learned about double-digit 

inflation, I don't think that all these experts in economy thought 

that this term would be used for monthly inflation." Some of the 

claims in the newspapers echoed those that had come from his 

own office a few weeks earlier. However, before the reporters he 

defended the program's procurement practices, reminding the 

press that the original agreement between the two nations had 

required that purchases within Israel be held to a minimum. 6g 

Wall, who had been in Israel only a month, emphasized the 

commitment of the Corps of Engineers to the effort and extolled 

the integrity and responsibility of the contractors. He also acknowledged the ability ofIsraelis to build perfectly good air bases, but reminded his audience that the tight schedule had brought the 

Corps of Engineers into the country. He assured reporters that his 

relationship with Hartung and Bar-Tov was harmonious. "The cooperation among General Bar-Tov, General Hartung, and myself," 

he said, "has been outstanding and will improve even more. It's 

synergistic and its mutually supportive. I believe we can handle any 

problem that lies ahead together." 70 

The journalists saw Wall's arrival as an attempt to deal with the 

management problems they associated with the program. One reporter, referring to "the interesting coincidence that shortly after 

your arrival three senior officials of the civilian contractor apparently lost their jobs," asked Wall about his involvement in the 

turnover at Ovda. He denied that the changes amounted to firings 

and said Morris had long tried to place a general officer in charge 

of the Near East Project Office. As to the contractor's personnel 

manager, Wall claimed that a change was made because the incumbent lacked adequate qualifications, "not that he wasn't doing a 

goodjob."71 

Such statements did not reassure the journalists or their papers. 

A reporter who listened to the generals defend the program got "the 

feeling ... that what we're missing here is the lead to my story." 72 He 

did not understand why the meeting had been called. Three days 

later the Jerusalem Post editorialized that "the cover-up appears to be 

continuing." 73 A left-wing daily called the session "an orgy of mutual 

congratulations, pats on the back and embarrassing compliments." 74 To these newspapers and to Ma 'ariv, which in the week 
152 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

that followed ran a sharply critical three-day series on program management, the meeting must have seemed a waste of time.75 

Nevertheless, the press conference was noteworthy for at least 

one reason. It marked an instance of cooperation between the 

three agencies involved in the program. Despite the tensions of 

the previous months, the generals were united in defending their 

work and in assuring the public and the press of their commitment 

to the program goals. For the time being, what Wall termed "the 

three-legged stool" seemed on firm ground. 
TIME OF TRIALS 153 

Notes 

l. Noah interview. 

2. OAO, Master Diary, 29 Mar 80, IABPC, 84/4. 

3. Memo, Wong, 4 Apr 80, sub: Recapitulation of Approved Site Adaptation 

Drawings, IABPC, 86/4; MFR, Stanley N. Block, Project Manager, Engineering Division , Ovda Site, 13 Jun 80, sub: Reinforcing Steel Standal'dization, Ovda 

Airbase, IABPC, 86/4. 

4. Interv, author with Bill Parkes, May 81, Ramon, Israel; Interv, author with 

Delbert D. Peterson, May 81, Ovda, Israel. 

5. MSA Memo, David Soleimani for]. H. Leonard, 2 Nov 79, sub: 15 Percent 

Minimum Elongation for Rebars in Aircraft Shelters, IABPC, 86/4; Ltr, A. Milstein to Edgar Moon, NEPO Engineering Division, 25 Oct 79, sub: High Bond 

Steel Bars for Concrete Reinforcement in ACS, IABPC, 43/5; MFR, Bar-Tov and 

Hartung, n.d., sub: DOD/ MOD PMs Meeting, 25 Oct. 1979, IABPC, 45/ 4; MFR, 

Thomas, 5 Nov 79, sub: Design and Engineering Meeting, 31 Oct. 1979, IABPC, 

22/ 1; MFR, Thomas, 9 Nov 79, sub: Design and Engineering Meeting, 7 Nov. 

1979, IABPC, 22/4; Interv, author with Col Richard L. Curl (Ret.), Oct 84, 

Washington, D.C. 

6. Ltr, Eli Noy to Carl Damico, 21Jan 80, IABPC, 43/5; MFR, Bar-Tov and Hartung, sub: DOD/MOD PMs Meeting, 25 Oct. 1979; MFRs, Thomas, 5 and 9 Nov 

79; Ltr, Hartung to Deputy Project Manager, 23 J an 80, sub: MOD Request for Information Concerning Purchase of 15 Percent Elongation Reinforcing Bars, 

IABPC,31 /3. 

7. Curl interview; Fact Sheet, Attachment to Ltr, Hartung to Noah, 9 Mar 80, 

sub: Reinfol'Cing Steel-Ovda, IABPC, 86/4. 

8. Memo, Gilkey for Program Manager, 3 Feb 80, sub: MOD Request for Information Concerning Purchasing 15 Percent Elongation Reinforcing Bars, 

IABPC,32/l. 

9. DF, Richard Curl to Ronald Hallmark, 4 Feb 80, sub: Contract fOl' NAC, 

IABPC,86/4. 

10. Curl intel'view. 

11. DF, Hallmark to OAO, 23 Jan 80, sub: NAC Steel Procurement, IABPC, 

86/4; DF, Curl to Hallmark, 4 Feb 80, sub: Contract for NAC. 

12. MFR, Bar-Tov and Hartung, 28 Feb 80, sub: DOD/ MOD PMs Meeting of 

21 Feb. 1980, IABPC, 45/4; Noah interview. 

13. DF, Kett to Gilkey, 27 Feb 80, sub: Visit to the Ovda Site 21 and 22 Feb. 

1980, IABPC, 32/2. 

14. Telex, Gilkey to Curl, 24 Feb 80, sub: Construction Quality Control, Quality Assurance on Rebars-Possible Use ofInfel'ior Materials, IABPC, 32/2. 

15. Bar-Tov interview, Apr 81; (Tel Aviv) Ma'al'iv, 23 Nov 79. 

16. Noah interview; Proceedings of Program Press Conference, Tel Aviv, 12 

Jun 80 (audio tape) (hereafter cited as Proceedings of Press Conference, 12 Jun 

80), IABPC, 92/2; (Tel Aviv) Ma'wiv, 23 Nov 79. 

17. N. Steinberg interview; Noah interview; Lewis interview, Nov 83. 

18. N. Steinberg interview. 

19. Lewis inte rview, Nov 83. 

20. Ibid.; Noah interview. 

2l. Noah interview. 

22. Lewis interview, Nov 83. 

23. Ibid.; Maloney interview, Aug 80. 
154 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

24. Lewis interview, Nov S3. 

25. MFR, Lt Col James R. Cranston, 7 Mar SO, sub: Reinforcing Steel, IABPC, 

S6/4. 

26. Ltr, Hartung to Noah, 9 Mal- SO, sub: Reinforcing Steel-Ovda, IABPC, 

S6/4. 

27. Memo, Noah for Hartung, 10 Mar SO, sub: Reinforcing Steel-Ovda, 

IABPC, S6/4. 

2S. Memo, Block for Thomas, 12 Mar SO, sub: Reinforcing Steel, Ovda, 

IABPC, S6/4. 

29. OAO, Master Diary, 11 Mar SO, IABPC, S4/4; Ltr, Curl to Pettingell, 11 

Mar SO, sub: Quality Control-Rebar Steel, IABPC, 42/S. 

30. N. Steinberg interview; OAO, Master Diary, 7 and S Mar SO, IABPC, S4/4; 

Noah interview. 

31. OAO, Master Diary, 7 and S Mar SO; Noah in terview. 

32. Ltr, Pettingell to Curl, 12 Mar SO, sub: Quality Control-Rebar Steel, 

IABPC, S6/4; Trip Report, Roy Edwards, 12-13 Mar SO, Ovda (hereafter cited as 

Edwards Trip Report), IABPC, S6/4; MFR, Earl E. Wheatley, Construction 

Branch, OAO, 24 Mar SO, sub: Quality Control Testing Requirements for Aggregate, Cement, Concre te, Curing Compounds, and Admixtures, IABPC, 32/3; 

Telex, Noah to Curl, 2 Apr SO, sub: Reinforcing Steel, IABPC, 3S/4. 

33. Ltr, Pettingell to Curl, 12 Mar SO; Notes of Telephone Conversation, Ted 

Flecker, OAO, and Jim PeITY, NEPO Engineering Division, 12 Mar SO, File 

1515-13, Ovda Reinforcing Steel; Edwards Trip Report; Ltr, Col I. Gross, MOD 

PMO, to Cranston, 16 Mar SO, sub: Use of Elements in Which Reinforcement 

Does Not Meet Requirements, Ovda Aircraft Shelter Complexes, File 1515-13, 

Ovda Reinforcing Steel. All in IABPC, S6/4. 

34. Telex, NEPO Construction Division to OAO and RAO, 12 Mar SO, sub: 

Transfer of Rebar from Ramon to Ovda, IABPC, 32/3; OAO, Master Diary, 15 

Mar SO, IABPC, S4/ 4; Curl interview; Maloney interview, Aug SO. 

35. OAO, Master Diary, 19 Mar SO, IABPC, S4/4; Noah interview. 

36. Noah interview; Ltr, Gilkey to Hartung, 20 Mar SO, sub: Proposed Investigation Under Army Regulation 15-6, IABPC, 32/3; Ltr, Gilkey to Wong, 24 Mar 

SO, sub: Appointment of Board of Office rs, IABPC, 42/S. 

37. OAO, Master Diary, 26 Mar SO, IABPC, S4/4. 

3S. Ibid.; Ltr, Gilkey to Wong, 24 Mar SO; MFR, Wong, 2S Mar SO, sub: Board 

of Officers, IABPC, 42/S; N. Steinberg in terview. 

39. Board of Officers, Report of Findings and Recommendations, IABPC, 

42/S; N. Steinberg interview. 

40. Report of Findings and Recommendations; Memo, Brig GenJohn F. Wall 

for Hartung, 22 May SO, sub: Removal of Unidentifiable Reinforcing Steel, Ovda, 

IABPC, 33/1; Curl interview; Interv, author with Otis W. Grafa,Jr., May SI, Ovda, 

Israe l; Gilkey interview. 

41. Telex, OAO to NEPO, 1 Apr SO, sub: NEPO Sitrep, IABPC, 14/2. 

42. Telex, OAO to NEPO, 17 Apr SO, sub: NEPO Sitrep, IABPC, 14/3; NEPO 

Sitrep No. 3S, 20 Apr SO, IABPC, 14/3; Telex, NEPO to RAO, IS Apr SO, sub: 

Availability of 16 mm Rebar, IABPC, 33/1; OAO, Master Diary, 29 Apr, 5 May, 20 

and 25 Aug, and 29 and 30 Oct SO, IABPC, S4/4 and S4/2. 

43. MFRs, Block, 13 and 16 Jun SO, sub: Reinforcing Steel Standardization, 

Ovda Airbase, IABPC, S6/4. 

44. Maloney interview, May S2; OAO, Master Diary, 17 Jan SO, IABPC, S4/4; 

Ltr, O'Shei to GM, ABC, 31 Jan SO, sub: Truck Scales, IABPC, 31 /3; Telex, NEPO 

(P&S) to Area Engineers, 16 Apr SO, sub: Truck Scales, IABPC, 33/1; NEPO 

Sitrep No. 45, 25 Aug SO, IABPC, 14/ 10. 
TIME OF TRIALS 155 

45. MFR, Wray, 7 Jun SO, sub: Report on Visit to Israeli Air Base Project, 

IABPC, 11 /5; Interv, author with Joseph R. Chapla, Aug SO, Tel Aviv, Israel; Maloney interview, Aug SO; MFR, Noah, n .d. , sub: 30 April Discussion with David 

Perini on NAC Operation, IABPC, 1/6. 

46. Noah interview. 

47. NEPO Sitrep No. 40, 5 Jun SO, IABPC, 14/5; OAO, Biweekly Sitrep, 1-15 

Jun SO, IABP fil es, "VNRC, Accession 77-S3-1016, Box 10; DF, Damico, Acting 

Chief, Construction Division, 1 Aug SO, sub: Input for Letter to the Chief, IABPC, 

33/2. 

4S. Ltr, O'Shei to Project Manager, 16 Jun SO, sub: Ramon Air Base Progress 

Report for the Period 1-15 June 19S0; and Ltr, Col Paul W. Taylor to Project Manager, 15 JuI SO, sub: Ramon Air Base Progress Report 1-15July 19S0. Both in IABP 

files, WNRC, Accession 77-S3-1025, Box 4. DF, Damico, 1 Aug SO, sub: Input for 

Letter to the Chief. 

49. Wray comments on draft MS; Damico in terview, Nov SS. 

50. NEPO Sitrep No. 35, 26 Mar SO; NEPO Sitrep No. 3S, 20 Apr SO; NEPO 

Sitrep No. 39, 22 May SO. All in IABPC, 14/ 1, 3-4. Lewis interview, Jan-Feb S2, 

parts 1-3; Ltr, Morris to Gilbert, 14 Apr SO. 

51. Interv, author with Brig GenJohn F. Wall, Aug SO, Tel Aviv, Israel, and Sep 

S2, Washington, D.C.; ENR 205 (30 October 19S0): 29. 

52. Wall interview, Aug SO. 

53. ABC Weekly Progress Report, 12 Sep 79, IABPC, 12/ 11 ; j erusalem Post, 5 

Nov 79; (Tel Aviv) Ha'aTelz, 2S Nov and 21 Dec 79; (Tel Aviv) Ma'ariv, 17 and 20 

Dec 79; (Beersheva) Sheva News, S Feb SO. 

54. Interv, author with Fred Butler, Aug SO, Ramon, Israel. 

55. (Tel Aviv) Hamodia, 12 Feb, 10 and 27 Nov SI; (Tel Aviv) Yediot Aharonol, 

ISJun and 27 Aug SO; (Beersheva) Sheva News, 13 and 27 Jun and 19 Dec SO; (Tel 

Aviv) HazoJe, 9 J an SI; (Tel Aviv) Shemi1/!, S Nov SI and 2 Mar S2; Brown interview, 

AprS1. 

56. ABC Weekly Sitrep, 17 Oct 79, IABPC, 12/ 16; O'Shei, Weekly Progress Report, 2S Dec 79, IABPC, 13/23; Memo, Gilkey for O'Shei, 4 May SO, sub: 

Portuguese Termination Listing, IABPC, 33/1. 

57. ABC Weekly Sitrep, 27 May SO, IABPC, 14/5; ENR 205 (30 October 19S0): 

2S; (Lisbon) Dimio de Lisboa, 2Jun SO; (Tel Aviv) Yediol Aharonot, 25 May SO; MFR, 

Wray, 7 Jun SO, sub: Report on Visit to Israeli Air Base Project. 

5S. (Tel Aviv) Al Halllishmar, 26 May SO; (Beersheva) Sheva News, 13 Jun SO; 

(Tel Aviv) Ma'miv, 30 May SO; (Lisbon) A TaTde, 26 May SO; NEPO Sitrep No. 40, 5 

Jun SO; Gilkey interview. 

59. NEPO Public Affairs Office, Sitrep for the Period Ending 30 May 19S0, 

IABPC, 14/5; (Tel Aviv) Ma'ariv, 6Jun SO; (Tel Aviv) lHa11!ishm(U~ 6Jun SO. 

60. (Tel Aviv) Daval~ 30 May SO. 

61. (Lisbon) Dialio de Lisboa, 2 and 26 May SO; (Lisbon) Pri1l1ero de janeiro, 26 

May SO; (Lisbon) Dimio de Noticias, 27 May SO; (Lisbon) Correio cia Manha, 29 May 

SO, IABPC, 71 / 11. 

62. NEPO Sitrep No. 40, 5 Jun SO; j erusalem Post, Sand 13 Jun SO; Gilkey interview. 

63. Te lex, OAO to NEPO, 16 May SO, sub: NEPO Sitrep, IABPC, 14/4. 

64. OAO, Master Diary, IS and 27 May, 4 Jul, and 21, 23, and 25 Sep SO, 

IABPC, S4/ 4 and S4/2. 

65. Wall, Project Notebooks, vol. I, 24 May, 3 and 4 Jun SO, IABPC, 90. Warren 

Pettingell's article on the program makes no reference to the circumstances 

under which he departed. See Pettingell, "Managing Construction of a Macro-Airbase-Project in the Negev: A Contractor's Perspective," Technology in Society: An 

Inlernalionaljoltmall0 (19SS): 11 3-30. 
156 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

66. Newsview, SJun S2; (Tel Aviv) NJa'ariv, 10-12Jun SO; (Tel Aviv) Ha'aTelz, 11 

Jun SO; Jerusalem Post, 13 Jun SO; New Yod! Times, 12Jun SO. 

67. (Tel Aviv) Ma'ariv, 10-11Jun SO. 

6S. (Tel Aviv) Ha 'aTelz, 11 Jun SO. 

69. Proceedings of Press Conference, 12Jun SO; Jerusalem Post, 13 Jun SO. 

70. Proceedings of Press Conference, 12Jun SO. 

71. Ibid. 

72. Ibid. 

73. Jerusalem Post, 15 Jun SO. 

74. (Tel Aviv) Al Hamishmar; 13 Jun SO. 

75. (Tel Aviv) Ma'miv, 17-19 Jun SO. 
CHAPTER 10 

Management in Transition 

June-October 1980 

It's very hard to relinquish a pet project, particularly without a clear 

understanding of what went wrong. 

David Lipsky, Deputy Public Affairs Officer, North Atlantic Division I 

In many ways change represented the normal condition for a 

fast-track program. While many understood this, some of the program adjustments transcended the normal and expected. By the 

summer of 1980 two changes in the original management of the 

Near East Project Office had taken place. Gilkey's command of the 

office had ended with the four-month period during which Noah 

was detailed as the senior engineer officer. In this ambiguous situation Gilkey retained nominal control, and the office's reports referred to the pair as "General Noah and the Project Manager." 2 In 

May General Wall was placed in charge, with Gilkey staying on as 

his deputy. That change clarified one aspect of the management 

situation for the duration of the project. 

The changes that brought Wall into the project manager's job 

gave rise to another one, this time in the chain of command. 

Lewis, who had been a forceful and eloquent spokesman for installation of a general officer in Tel Aviv, had himself alluded to the 

implications of this change for the organizational structure. The 

reasons he had given Morris for making the assignment included 

his perception of the Near East Project Office as the equivalent of 

an operating division. He saw the two area offices under Tel Aviv's 

jurisdiction as "mini districts." They differed from conventional 

districts because they each had only one project, but they were 

commanded by colonels with contracting officer authority.3 The 

fact that both Curl and O'Shei had already been district engineers 

underscored the parallel. 

Sooner or later the logic inherent in Lewis' analysis should 

have led to an awareness that in at least some respects there now 
158 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

Reporters boarding an Israeli Air'Force C-47 JOT the daily shuttle between the 

sites and Tel Aviv. 

existed a division in Tel Aviv commanded by a division in New 

York. When Morris had agreed to send Noah to Israel, he told 

Lewis that he saw his general in Israel as the primary manager and 

that he wanted management to come primarily from Tel Aviv. 

Noah would set up procedures that eventually would relieve Lewis 

of involvement in daily operations:1 Noah himself came to view the 

office in Tel Aviv as the functional equivalent of a division headquarters, lecturing the staff after one maladroit administrative 

action "that it was time that we started acting like a division staff in 

these matters." 5 

As the months passed, Morris sharpened this perspective. He 

had originally relied on North Atlantic Division's commander for 

senior control, but Lewis had convin ced him that additional 

seniority and experience were needed in Tel Aviv. Had he placed 

a general there at the outset, Morris reflected in April 1980, he 

probably would not have involved North Atlantic. Still, for the 

sake of stability, he intended to maintain the link between Tel Aviv 

and New York for the time being. With major personnel changes 
MANAGEMENT IN TRANSITION 159 

in Israel expected during the months to come, including replacement of both area engineers, he wanted to avoid adding "to the 

personnel turbulence and loss of continuity." For the long run, 

Morris kept his options open. He would wait until Wall settled into 

his "very difficult job." Mterward, Morris told Lewis, "organizational adjustments may be appropriate." 6 

The issues surrounding the chain of command involved more 

than whether Wall would report to Lewis in New York or to Morris 

in Washington. Other questions related to the level and nature of 

North Atlantic Division's support to the project. During the planning stage, before and shortly after Corps people started to arrive 

in Tel Aviv, the division's senior staff had been active in project development. Vinitsky, Hewitt, and Pagano, with the regular participation of Johnson and Bazilwich, had shaped the project office 

and nursed it through its infancy. Others on the staff, including 

James Canfield, chief counsel, and Herbert Howard, engineering 

division chief, had become involved as needed. Consultant 

Schechet, who helped get the project's engineering organization 

under way, had recently retired from North Atlantic. Johnson himself left his mark in the form of the Palace Hotel arrangements 

and had personally chosen Hugh Bartley as Gilkey's primary assistant and as his own eyes and ears. For his part, Gilkey maintained 

regular telephone contact with New York and drew heavily on the 

staff for advice and aid. 

North Atlantic's office at 90 Church Street was not the only 

New York location important to the newly formed Near East Project Office. Less than a block away was the project's stateside support group. Usually called NEPO-Rear, this element remained vital 

to the project. With as many as 150 people there working for the 

government and all three prime contractors, in some respects the 

office contrasted markedly from the division. From comfortable 

and well-appointed quarters that differed sharply from the division's offices, the support group helped Tel Aviv in logistical and financial areas, working alongside contractor representatives in procurement, running the accounting system, and reimbursing the 

contractors for costs incurred. Alfred Lellis, the manager of the 

group, balanced the needs of Tel Aviv with external pressures from 

the Maritime Administration for use of American vessels and from 

congressional delegations on behalf of constituents. He and several others on the staff came from North Atlantic. So the division's 

involvement extended beyond the main office.? 

Support from the division office itself changed during the 

early months. The character of the relationship between New York 

and Tel Aviv began to shift when Lewis took over. While he delved 
160 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

deeply into the operation of the Israeli project, his staff became 

less involved. Lewis wasted no time in putting his mark on the job. 

He forced the office in Tel Aviv to define its objectives clearly. He 

also identified major structural and managerial problems that 

eventually convinced Morris to send in a general. Lewis' perception of Gilkey's situation also led to physical separation of the project office from program management. Surprised by his own staff's 

lack of knowledge of contracting options, he also started a Construction Engineering Research Laboratory study of the con tractual relationships and propelled contract negotiations forward. 8 

His influence was clear and pervasive. 

Lewis was concerned although not surprised that his staff did 

little to advance the effort. He believed few top managers in the 

Corps understood the nature and needs of such a project. His own 

people could have contributed more but gave only occasional temporary assistance. Sometimes this help proved very useful. However, the division did not provide a cadre for the management 

team that Lewis thought was so badly needed in Tel Aviv. 9 Why his 

subordinates lost interest is unclear. Perhaps the intensity of Lewis' 

own personal involvement discouraged them.'o Certainly the 

senior members felt able to deal with the project. Hewitt had at 

one time considered the resource management job in Tel Aviv, and 

as Vinitsky said, 'We had the expertise." But, he added, "I kind of 

backed out of the total program, I guess, just about when General 

Lewis came on board, and people started going over there. "11 In 

response to Lewis' request in April for reports on their involvement in the project, none of his staff sections could cite any contributions that were critical to the project's well-being. 12 

Lewis may have found that the division staff was not as conversant with operating an overseas project as he had presumed originally. He could not get the information he wanted from New York 

on the various types of cost-plus contracts. In addition, he had to 

turn elsewhere for insights into the problems common to projects 

in foreign countries. Col. Maurice H. Leiser, who had commanded 

AI Batin District in Saudi Arabia before he became executive director in Wray's directorate in 1979, stepped in to provide Lewis with 

information on his experience. 13 The execution of overseas construction projects may have been part of North Atlantic's tradition, 

but it did not appear to be part of its usable memory. 

Headquarters noticed the shift in the nature of New York's role. 

McNeely said that Lewis appeared to be running the project by himself. The construction division head rarely could convince anyone 

else from North Atlantic to visit Israel for a look at the job. Overall, 

McNeely said, the staff 'Just wasn't on top of it." 14 General Wray in 
MANAGEMENT IN TRANSITION 161 

the Military Programs Directorate agreed. "Only MG Lewis," he 

wrote Morris in March 1980, "seems to be actively involved at the Division level." He urged Morris to make a change. With the contracts 

definitized, most positions filled, and some permanent work under 

way, Wray believed it was time for Tel Aviv to report directly to Washington. Even then, 'The present daily operating practices [did] in 

fact have aCE dealing directly with NEPO . .. instead of through 

NAD." So such a change would only reflect reality. IS 

Wray understood that the chain of command should evolve 

with the program. North Atlantic had contributed significantly to 

mobilization of the project, but, he noted, "The initial build-up 

phase is over and we must now closely monitor construction placement." The project was very important, and he wanted to be able 

to provide policy guidance "more effectively and expeditiously." 

Mindful of the precedent set in the early 1960s when the Corps of 

Engineers Ballistic Missile Construction Office had been started 

within Los Angeles District and then placed directly under the 

chief's office after it was organized, Wray recommended "that 

NEPO be placed under the direct command and control of 

aCE." 16 However, with Morris still maintaining the standard organization, Wray's idea stood little chance on its operational merits. 

By the summer of 1980 North Atlantic clearly was not much of a 

factor in management. Some in Israel may have forgotten the important part the division played early in the program; others had not 

been on the job long enough to know. But by mid-1980 it was plain 

that the Near East Project Office disregarded its ties to New York. 

Wall considered support from the division to be minimal. He recognized the importance of "the dynamic leadership" provided by 

Lewis, but both Wall and McNeely were aware that Lewis alone handled the program in New York. Wall thought few people in the New 

York office had had any military construction experience. 17 His staff 

agreed. In a rare example of consensus beh",een the headquarters 

and the area offices, people at the sites concurred with this assessment. There too managers noted the contrast bel:\"leen the personal 

involvement and contributions of Lewis and the diffidence of the 

staff. 18 John Brown, the project office attorney, reflected the general 

view regarding North Atlantic's role: "Somebody had to kick it off." 19 

While the inactivity of the North Atlantic staff made it less relevant to the project, the intensity of Lewis' involvement became the 

source of stress and conflict. Lewis inclined toward constant contact with the engineer manager in Tel Aviv. v"hen Noah was there, 

he and Lewis talked by telephone several times a week. Noah was 

comfortable with this arrangement. "Vall, on the other hand, was 

not. Wall "was upset," Lewis recalled, "and told me he didn't want 
162 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

me to call him at night; he said he needed the sleep." 20 The calls, 

Wall said, tended to be "long and inquisitional at times." 21 With so 

many compelling problems before him during his first few weeks 

in Israel-relating to procurement, staff relations, and pressure 

from the Israeli press-Wall grew exasperated. He had been in Israel barely a month when he pondered three choices, at least one 

of which did not appear promising: "Wall out-NAD out-work 

w/NAD but don't believe will work." 22 

Lewis' regular contact with Israel reflected his deep interest in 

the project that he considered his most critical mission, the one 

job at which the Corps of Engineers could not fail. It also mirrored 

a management style that seemed to Wall to zero in on virtually 

every issue and that was diametrically opposed to his own approach. Wall did not consider all problems equally important. He 

always had a list of the most compelling issues, and the list 

changed as the job did. He also thought some problems were "best 

left unsolved and left to fester and some of them will just cure by, 

heal by, themselves." 23 Lewis' way left no room for the natural evolution of solutions. "General Lewis," Wall observed, "can be intense and very probing, almost to distrust." Wall thought Lewis 

took the same approach with people outside the Corps who were 

involved in the program. He "played very hard," Wall thought, 

with the ambassador, Hartung, and the Israelis and helped create a 

situation in which "relations with these players are very intense and 

appear acrimonious." 24 

Lewis went to Israel often. Preparing for his visits became a 

preoccupation; his departure left the staff trying to catch its 

breath. In September 1980 Wall went so far as to ask for estimates 

of the hours of preparation involved. 25 Once on the scene, Lewis 

demanded quick answers to complex questions. On the September 

trip, an architect who worked for one of the contractors told him 

that the Israelis had rejected some design modifications. As a result, he contended, some structures "would 'fall apart' within one 

year." Lewis then asked for a report of all changes suggested by the 

contractors, those that were rejected, and the consequences, all in 

four days. For the record, the engineering division's Edgar Moon 

noted that, "idle statements such as the one made by this architect 

always lead to extra efforts that could be better spent toward productive work." 26 In Israel as well as back at headquarters, a consensus was building. North Atlantic had to go, not because of any operational logic or the evolving needs of the program, although 

such justification existed, but because so many people involved 

with the job found working with Lewis extremely difficult. 27 
MANAGEMENT IN TRANSITION 163 

Only one of the three generals in Tel Aviv saw positive aspects 

in Lewis' style of management. Bar-Tov, who was himself persistent 

and intense in his approach to the project, saw the similarities between himself and Lewis. He defended Lewis' need, by virtue of his 

position, to be familiar with every aspect of the effort. In fact, BarTov himself tried to do exactly that. However, he asserted by way of 

contrast, "I don't do it by remote control. " 28 

Wall considered such close supervision by Lewis from New 

York intolerable. Responding to the telephone calls with their 

'''what if' questions took too much time," and he wanted to break 

free of them. From Wall's point of view, the project was not big 

enough for both of them.

29 He raised the issue of removing North 

Atlantic and Lewis from the chain of command with the headquarters in Washington. Wall wanted to report directly to the Military 

Programs Directorate, where Maj. Gen. Drake Wilson was about to 

take charge. Wray, who favored a direct link betw"een Washington 

and Tel Aviv, was soon to replace the retiring James Johnson as 

deputy chief of engineers. 3o 

Wall was not alone in seeking a change in the chain of command. The embassy also lobbied Morris, directly and through 

Wray, for a new arrangement. Ambassador Lewis had argued with 

General Lewis, and the latter thought that their disagreement in 

part accounted for the embassy's support for Wall. General Lewis 

also thought the Air Force, particularly Under Secretary Chayes 

and General Hartung, had encouraged the embassy to discuss 

changes with Morris. 3! 

Chayes visited the project in late May. Wall jotted down that 

she had come "to get rocks to throw." 32 She certainly contributed 

to the complex and somewhat Byzantine set of indirect discussions. To Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, she questioned the 

adequacy of Corps of Engineers management in general and General Lewis in particular. Her complaint, "full of gloom with dire 

predictions," found its way back to Lewis. So at least in this one instance he had the opportunity for a face-to-face meeting at which 

he tried unsuccessfully to convince her that she was wrong. According to Lewis, Chayes still held firmly to the original Air Force 

position: "She had as a principal objective getting the Corps out of 

the management chain or, failing this, placing the Corps firmly 

under the DOD Program Manager." Lewis believed that "she 

wanted the DOD PM to control project funds directly." 33 

General Lewis also believed that the opposition to his continued participation represented two converging conspiracies. On 

the one hand, he thought that Wall had agreed to go to Israel only 

on condition that he ultimately would be able to report directly to 
164 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

Washington. "I was told," he said about eighteen months afterward, "that the Chief agreed to this with John Wall before the assignment was made." He also thought Chayes influenced the ambassador, who along with Chayes, Hartung, and Bar-Tov formed "a 

very tight community." Ambassador Lewis in turn convinced Morris to break the connection with New York. 34 Wall's notebooks and 

recollections indicate that his efforts to change the command arrangement started weeks after he arrived in Tel Aviv, but certainly 

energies that should have gone into facilitating base construction 

were diverted to secondary and even counterproductive purposes. 

In any case, soon after Wall's arrival in Israel, the embassy's 

deputy chief of mission, William Brown, spoke to Morris and "extolled General Wall's virtues and capabilities and suggested that 

Wall be allowed to report directly to aCE." At that time, Morris 

was already considering a change. He was "reevaluating the 

organizational structure at this time with the hope that a date for extracting NAD could be identified and passed to Ambassador 

Lewis." 35 Despite the outside pressures, the decision on North Atlantic's role belonged to him. Although he apparently inclined toward ending New York's involvement inJune, Morris did not make 

his final decision until August. In doing so, he defended his original 

decision to send a colonel. He reiterated to Ambassador Lewis, who 

contended that a general officer should have been sent to Tel Aviv at 

the outset, that there was "absolutely no reason why the airfields 

could not have been constructed satisfactorily under the management of a Corps of Engineers colonel with over 25 years' experience." What set the Israeli job apart, Morris told the ambassador, was 

"the role and interest of your office, the Israeli Government, and the 

USAF, in this work and their close proximity to it." Morris added 

that "numerous officials who quite properly have a deep interest in 

what we are doing also became involved in how we get it done." 36 

With the job so thoroughly politicized, Morris saw little hope 

for a return to a more normal construction environment. "The externalities over which I have no control and which created the 

need to put a general officer in Tel Aviv some months ago," he 

noted, "probably have not changed." As far as Morris was concerned, Wall or any other general would "have little more likelihood of success than did Colonel Gilkey if outside pressures keep 

Wall and his staff from giving adequate attention to their primary 

role of building the airfields." vVhile Morris wanted to be responsive, the demands for information and the constant unsolicited advice threatened to affect construction adversely.37 At the same time 

that he sought to enlighten the ambassador about his plight, he 

defended General Lewis' contributions to the program. Mter all, 
MANAGEMENT IN TRANSITION 165 

Lewis had been first to see the need for a general officer in Tel 

Aviv. Moreover, he had done a great deal to bring construction 

management to what Morris considered "its present good posture." He was "the one Corps individual," Morris contended, "with 

the strength and capacity to deal with all facets of the program." 38 

Morris decided to go ahead with the change during his visit to 

Te l Aviv in August. He arrived expecting that the ambassador 

would again raise the issue. During their meeting on 6 August, 

Morris apparently approved the change in the chain of command. 

Then he told Wall, "You call Ben Lewis. "39 On 7 August, just after 

Morris left, Wall informed Lewis that Morris had told a Near East 

Project Office staff meeting that he would make the change, although it was contrary to his desire to keep the Washington office 

out of operations. 40 Four days later, Wall wrote Lewis that he 

"found relaying this decision to you a very difficult thing to do. ' ''II 

Morris, on the other hand, took his time informing Lewis of his intentions. He spoke with Lewis on 11 August but did not broach the 

subject. Only on the next day, when Lewis met him in Washington, 

did he break the news. 42 

With a general in Tel Aviv, Morris told Lewis, the project had 

evolved to a point where there was no need for North Atlantic in the 

chain of command. Morris praised Lewis' contributions and noted 

the progress since he became involved. He suggested several dates in 

the late summer and early fall for the changeover. They all seemed 

too early to Lewis, who wanted a chance to observe Wall's performance first. He also tried to convince Morris that changing the structure of the project would handicap the next chief of engineers.43 

Changing the command relationships involved two separate 

decisions. First was the timing, and Morris decided to complete the 

transition by 15 October. The second involved alternative solutions 

to the organizational structure. Morris had insisted that his office 

should not become an operational headquarters, so he did consider placing the Near East Project Office under another division 

or even a district. 44 Finally, however, he chose the arrangement favored by Wall and created a project management office in the Military Programs Directorate to oversee the work in Israel. 45 

For the eighteen months prior to establishment of this small office, the directorate had monitored the air base project through the 

international programs branch of the construction division. Col. 

Gene A. Schneebeck, an assistant director of military programs with 

staff responsibility for Air Force construction programs in general 

and head of the new Israel project office, reported directly to Wilson. Schneebeck oversaw the staff of three, which included an engineer as his deputy, a personnel specialist, and an administrative as-
166 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

sistant. Wilson designated the office as point of contact for all staff 

actions regarding the job in Israel. Schnee beck replied to congressional inquiries, located technical experts needed for temporary 

duty in Israel, provided procurement and audit assistance, and coordinated the participation in the project of other staff elements at the 

headquarters. For his part, Wall required that his staffs communication with Washington go through Schnee beck. Later, when the program neared completion, the office was moved back to McNeely's 

construction division and managed by a civilian engineer.46 

Implementation of the decision involved more than issuing new 

organizational charts and changing office symbols. Communications facilities had to be set up so that documents and information 

could be passed directly to Washington. The office in Tel Aviv also 

sent a complete reference collection of directives and procedures 

issued by the program and project managers to Schneebeck's office. Continued support from New York in the areas of finance and 

accounting were arranged, albeit with some inconvenience because 

the transition did not coincide with the end of a fiscal year or even a 

reporting month. Morris' office also considered relocating the support group but decided to leave the operation in New YorkY 

Not everyone thought the move was a great idea. Those in New 

York who had been associated with the project's management were 

particularly upset. Johnson, who had a prominent role in bringing 

the job to New York in the first place, called the change "categorically wrong." He attributed the change to the conflicts between Wall 

and Lewis, precipitated by their different approaches to management. The project itself, Johnson contended, was moving well toward completion. David Lipsky, the deputy public affairs officer at 

the division, agreed that the conflicts had not jeopardized the project. The work was still on schedule and appeared within budget. He 

thought the incessant disagreements between the Corps and the Air 

Force rather than any personal animosities had forced the change. 

In any event, he wondered whether it was possible to come out of 

such a high-pressure task without some bumps and bruises.48 

Johnson and Lipsky both believed removing the division from 

the chain of command severely damaged morale in New York.Jewish members of the staff seemed to take the situation especially 

hard. Probably none were as upset as Lewis, who acknowledged 

that he "was very disappointed to leave the project at the time I 

did." He began a vacation in Australia just before the actual 

change in the chain of command took place. Lipsky also noted 

that the change created an air of uncertainty at the support group. 

Most of the people in that office had come from the division and 
MANAGEMENT IN TRANSITION 167 

now feared for their jobs. New Yorkers to the core, they worried for 

a time that their operation might be moved to Washington. 49 

Removing North Atlantic Division from the chain of command 

solved two intertwined issues relating to Lewis and the division itself. 

In the case of the division office, there had been too little participation in the project. By nearly all accounts, the division offered hardly 

any help to Wall and his staff. On the other hand, Lewis was too heavily involved. He never could follow McNeely's advice and "turn the 

damn job loose" so that he could spend more time on other North 

Atlantic responsibilities, such as Philadelphia District's dredging mission.50 McNeely put his finger on both aspects of the situation. On 

one hand, McNeely and several others "in aCE felt the NAD staff 

was completely out of the picture." On the other, Lewis "micromanaged the job from New York by a lot of phone calls and frequent trips 

which always took NEPO two weeks to recover from." 51 

When the senior officers were angry at each other, they all 

called each other micromanagers. Lewis applied the label to BarTov, Wall pinned it on Lewis, and area engineers hurled it at Tel 

Aviv. 52 In Lewis' case, the appellation may have had some validity, 

given his deep personal involvement in the project. 

Questions about management style should not obscure Lewis' 

lasting contribution. He saw the management tangle in which Gilkey 

was the odd man out, broke the impasse by separating him from the 

program managers, and convinced Morris to put a general officer 

on the job. He thereby set in motion events that provided an operational justification for his removal from the chain of command. 

Even Wall freely acknowledged that Lewis played a critical part. Wall 

credited him above all with energizing the project, bringing to it "a 

sense of urgency .. . that we didn't have before he came." 53 Now the 

project moved vigorously, Lewis and North Atlantic were out of the 

picture, and the three-legged stool was on its own. 
168 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

Notes 

1. Interv (telephone), author with David Lipsky, Nov 80. 

2. NEPO Sitrep No. 25, 13Jan 80. 

3. Ltr, Lewis to Morris, 21 Nov 79, IABPC, 8/2. 

4. MFR, Lewis, telecon with Chief of Engineers, 13 Dec 79. 

5. MFR, Damico, sub: COE Staff Meeting 13 and 19 J an . 1980, IABPC, 31/ 3. 

6. Ltr, Morris to Lewis, 4 Apr 80, IABPC, 8/2. 

7. "''harry, Information Paper, 29 Dec 80, sub: Israel Air Bases Construction 

Project, IABPC, 8/2; Organization Chart, CONUS Support Group, 20 Sep 79, 

IABPC, 88/5; Lipsky inte rview; Billiams interview; Cheve rie inte rview. The support group consisted of a small management group (Lellis, his deputy, and a secretary), a personnel specialist, and a large resource management group under 

Joseph R. Shaw. In addition to Shaw, this section was authorized a staff of eleven: 

an accountant, a procurement officer, a procurement agent, a budge t analyst, an 

accounting technician, a procurement assistant, a voucher examine r, a travel 

clerk, two accounting technicians, and a clerk-typist. 

8. Lewis interview, Jan-Feb 82, part 1. 

9. Ibid. 

10. Ltr, McNeely to author, 17 Dec 87, IABPC, 93/6; Johnson comments on 

draft MS, IABPC, 92/ 2. 

11. Vinitsky interview. 

12. Eight DFs, 3-9 Apr 80, sub: Support to NEPO, IABPC, 9/ 7. 

13. Ltrs, Col Maurice H. Leiser to Lewis, 20 Nov and 10 Dec 79, IABPC, 11 /5. 

14. McNeely interview, Mar 84. 

15. Memo, WI'ay for the Chief of Engineers, 25 Ma r 80, sub: Israeli Air Base 

Program, IABPC, 87/4; Wray interview. 

16. Memo, Wray for the Chief oEEngineers, 25 Mar 80, sub: Israeli Air Base 

Program. For a discussion of the possibility and utility of incorporating such a 

management transition in initial project planning, see Interv, author with Brig 

Gen George R. Robertson, May 85, Washington, D.C. 

17. Wall interview, Aug 80. 

18. Thomas interview, Aug 80; Interv, author with J anet Sales, Apr 81, Tel Aviv, Israel; Interv, author with J ohn Blake, Aug 80, Ovda, Israel; Parkes interview, May 81. 

19. Brown intervi ew, Apr 81. 

20. Lewis interview, J an-Feb 82, part 1. 

21. Wall inte rview, Aug 80. 

22. Wall, Project Notebooks, vol. I , 20 Jun 80, IABPC, 90. 

23. Wall interview, May 82. 

24. Wall inte rview, Aug 80. 

25. OAO, Master Diary, 27 Sep 80, IABPC, 84/2; McNeely interview, Mar 84. 

26. MFR, Moon, 26 Sep 80, sub: MG Lewis's Visit to NEPO, 22-30 Sept. 1980, 

IABPC, 23/ 3. 

27. Ltr, Wray to the author, 24 Feb 88; Wray comments on draft MS;Johnson 

comments on draft MS, IABPC, 92/2. 

28. Bar-Tov inte rviews, Apr 81 and May 82. 

29. Wall, Project Notebooks, vol. III, 21 and 24 Sep 80, IABPC, 90; Wall interview, Aug 80 and May 81. 

30. Lewis interview, J an-Feb 82, part 1. 

31. MFR, Morris, 10 Jun 80, IABPC, 90/ 6; Ltr, Wray to the author, 24 Feb 88; 

Lewis interview, Jan-Feb 82, parts 1 and 3. 
MANAGEMENT IN TRANSITION 169 

32. Wall, Project Notebooks, vol. I, 27 May 80, IABPC, 90. 

33. Lewis interview, Jan-Feb 82, parts 2 and 3. 

34. Ibid., parts 1-4. 

35. MFR, Morris, 10 Jun 80. 

36. Ltr, Morris to Ambassador Lewis, 14 Aug 80, IABPC, 7/5. 

37. Ibid. 

38. Ibid. 

39. Ltr, Wall to Morris, 6 Aug 80, IABPC, 38/1; Wall, Notes from Chief's Visit, 

n.d., IABPC, 38/1; Wall, Project Notebooks, vol. II, 7 Aug 80, IABPC, 90. 

40. Maj Gen Lewis, Notes on Telephone Conversation of 11 Aug. 1980 with 

Morris, IABPC, 7/5. 

41. Ltr, Wall to Maj Gen Lewis, 11 Aug 80, IABPC, 38/1. 

42. Maj Gen Lewis, Notes on Telephone Conversation of 11 Aug. 1980 with 

Morris; Maj Gen Lewis, Memorandum of Meeting, 12 Aug 80. 

43. Morris interview; Ltr, Morris to Ambassador Lewis, 14 Aug 80; Maj Gen 

Lewis, Memorandum of Meeting, 12 Aug 80; Lewis interview, Jan-Feb 82, part 4. 

44. The decision to transfer responsibility to Washington went against this 

conventional wisdom. A new perspective more tolerant of having headquarters 

supervise special proj ects may have emerged from the project, perhaps to become 

the cliche of the future. The new view is embodied in the analyses that advocate 

assigning special projects directly to the chief's office . See USACE, The Israeli Aile 

base Program: Lessons Learned, Engineer Pamphlet 5-1-5, p. 3; USACE CERL, Project Manager's Handbook for Special Projects, Technical Report P-85/ 01 , p. 30. 

45. DA, OCE, Permanent Orders 24-1,23 Sep 80, IABPC, 87/9. 

46. DF, DAEN-ZB (Wray), 1 Oct 80, sub: Designation-Israel Project Office 

(DAEN-MPI), IABPC, 87/4; DF, McNeely, DAEN-MPC, to DAEN-MPC-G, 24 Apr 

79, sub: Israeli Program, IABPC, 87/4; Charles N. Dunnam, DAEN-MPC, Information Paper, 8 Aug 80, sub: Israel Air Bases Construction Program, IABPC, 

87/4; DF, Wall, 28 Oct 80, sub: Communicating with COL Schneebeck, DAENMPI, IABPC, 18/7; McNeely inte rview, Mar 84. 

47. Telex, Shaw, NEPO-Rear, to Chapla, NEPO Resource Manager, n.d. [but 

after 2 Sep 80J, sub: Transfer of NEPO to OCE; Telex, Wong, NEPO, to Col Newton B. Morgan, OCE, 12 Oct 80, sub: Requirement for NEPO-OCE Fax Line; DF, 

NEPO Office of Administrative Services, 12 Oct 80, sub: Israel Air Bases Construction Projec t-Identification Symbol; Ltr, Wall to Maj Gen Drake Wilson , 26 

Oct 80, sub: NEPO Organizational Change. All in IABPC, 33/4. 

48. J ohnson interview. 

49. Ibid.; Lipsky interview; Lewis interview,Jan-Feb 82, part 4. 

50. McNeely intel"view, Mar 84. 

51. Ibid. 

52. Lewis interview,Jan-Feb 82, part 1; Wall interview, May 82; Interv, author 

with Col Paul W. Taylor,Jun 81, Washington, D.C. 

53. Wall interview, May 82. 
CHAPTER 11 

Construction Management 

June-December 1980 

We have situations where construction is constructing, design is still 

designing, and procurement is caught in the middle, lots of them. 

Brig. Gen. Paul T. Hartung I 

It is not a complicated job. It's just a hell of a lot of it. 

Otis Grafa, Chief, Construction Branch, Ovda Area Office 2 

During the last half of 1980 the project showed signs of its evolutionary character at Ramon and Ovda as well as in Tel Aviv. Wall 

arrived at a time of transition at both sites. Morris had set the tour 

of duty for the area engineers at twelve months, much to the chagrin of General Lewis. He thought Morris played down the role of 

the area engineers and wanted the commanders at the sites to remain for the duration. 3 With Curl and O'Shei finishing their stints 

and returning home in the spring, both sites experienced some instability during the summer. At Ramon the change of command 

was straightforward, with Col. Paul W. Taylor arriving in June to 

take over from O'Shei. Taylor stayed one year before a new area 

engineer replaced him. At Ovda the transfer turned out to be 

more complicated. 

Mter Curl's departure, Col. Robert K. Tener took over the area 

office. Tener had been thinking about coming to Israel since the 

beginning of the year. With his tour as district engineer in 

Nashville ending, he considered the prospects for his next assignment. "What the hell," he wondered, "can a District Engineer do 

that's onward and upward?" When he saw the choices, he knew 

that none better fit his qualifications and ambitions than did the 

air base project. So he felt drawn to the work in Israel, both because of a strong sense of duty and for the chance to see the Negev 

and the Middle East. As he put it, "I was eager to do a good job 

where I knew I fit." Still, the decision was not an easy one. Like 

other officers his age, Tener had children in school. More impor-
CONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT 171 

tant, his wife was disabled with multiple sclerosis. He faced a difficult struggle betweep duty and his family.4 

Tener's situation contrasted markedly with that of fellow officers who avoided assignment to Israel. At least one threatened to 

retire rather than join the project.5 The lack of interest surprised 

Wall. He thought that "for a hot-shot colonel," the project represented "the best chance to make general officer."6 Wall believed 

many excellent colonels in the Corps were capable of taking major 

roles in the project. According to him, the situation required the 

chief of engineers to say, "'You are going, Colonel X, you are going. 

If you don't like that, retire.'" But, Wall concluded, "He hasn't said 

that." 7 Morris would have agreed with Wall that the project represented an opportunity for energetic officers interested in advancement. His own criteria for measuring the suitability of officers for 

promotion emphasized their responses to the opportunity for failure. However, while he admired those who successfully handled 

high-risk missions, he felt that because officer assignments were 

made at the Pentagon and not in the Corps of Engineers he lacked 

sufficient control to insist that specific colonels gO.8 

The unwillingness of some officers to take on the challenges in 

Israel and the inability of Morris to insist that they do so shocked 

other participants, including Lewis and McNeely. "It was," McNeely 

said, "the first time I ever heard that you couldn't direct an 0-6 

[colonel] into an assignment."g In fact, if anyone had solid reasons 

to avoid the project, it was Tener. Nevertheless, he and his family 

decided that they could do it, particularly if they went to Ramon. 

His family could live in Beersheva, which had excellent medical facilities. In the middle of May Tener received a letter from Jack 

Clifton welcoming him to Ramon. lo 

A few days later Tener learned he was going to Ovda. This news 

revived the just-resolved dilemma. He even drafted a letter to Lewis, 

asking for relief from the assignment, but did not send it. 11 Wall 

pleaded with Tener "for the good of the project" to "handle that 

damned alligator at Ovda." He needed "a tough son of a bitch with 

tough contracting officer experience" and urged him to "please get 

your ass over here soon."12 It was the kind of appeal Tener could 

not resist. He would house his wife and tenth-grader in Tel Aviv and 

commute betw·een the city and the job site on weekends. 13 

Tener came to Israel during the first week of July. Impatient to 

start, he stayed in Tel Aviv only a few days before going to the 

desert. Curl was already gone when Tener arrived, and Deputy 

Area Engineer Blake was in charge. Tener found that a lack of cooperation prevailed in both Tel Aviv and Ovda. "The signs of poor 

teamwork were clear and unmistakable," particularly the "distrust 
172 BUILDING AlR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

and backbiting" between the Tel Aviv staff and the area office. 

Much fence-mending needed to be done. A sense of teamwork was 

also missing from relations between the area office and the contractor. Tener considered this less serious, because some distance 

had to be preserved in this relationship. Still, the distrust and lack 

of credibility were evident. Part of this problem may have stemmed 

from lack of a well-defined Corps position on dealing with the 

Perini organization. Tener saw that Wall and Lewis disagreed in 

their assessment of the contractor. Lewis considered the consortium motivated and manageable; Wall pushed for close and constant scrutiny of the contractor. So the first order of business was 

creating an environment in which Negev Airbase Constructors, the 

area office, and Tel Aviv worked as a team.14 

Tener never got the opportunity to take on the challenge. He 

had been in Israel less than two weeks when his teenage son back 

home became seriously ill. The crisis forced him to leave, and 

Blake again took over. Tener at least felt confident that he was 

leaving the job in good hands. 15 

Blake's presence gave stability to the situation. With the departures of Curl and then Tener and the recent turnover in management of the contractor organization, some continuity was important. Civilian deputies had arrived at both sites earlier in the spring, 

much to Hartung's delight. Pete Peterson went to Ramon as deputy 

for administration; Clifton stayed on as deputy for operations. 

Blake was the only deputy at Ovda, although Peterson joined him 

briefly to provide help pending the arrival of a new area engineer. 

Like Col. Patrick J. Kelly, who replaced Tener in September and 

agreed to stay for the duration of the program, both Blake and Peterson came to Israel from Huntsville Division. They had experience on many major construction jobs and had worked together on 

the Department of Energy's strategic petroleum reserve program. 16 

Blake, who came to Ovda shortly after the departure of 

Colonel Miller, differed from the easy-going Peterson. Stern and 

acerbic, Blake had no patience with the Near East Project Office 

staff or the niceties of the chain of command. He had little tolerance for foolishness and complained that the better pay and benefits in Saudi Arabia kept many of the best Corps employees from 

coming to Israel. Wall credited Blake with "a purely fantastic job, a 

fabulous job." He had Wall's ear as well as his respect and sometimes went straight to the top, avoiding his own boss and the Tel 

Aviv staff to do SO.17 

O'Shei and Curl had resisted establishment of civilian deputy 

positions. Curl criticized his civilian staff as "a bunch of really less 

than competent people." He attributed the situation in part to a 
CONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT 173 

/ 

A1anagement camp at Ovda 

lack of incentives for overseas work; often the best people did not 

want to leave the United States. In addition, he found that excellent 

credentials did not always reflect reality. "Some of the documents 

that I reviewed," he said, "indicated the person was quite stable and 

sane and competent, and how those supervisors ever could have 

rated that person that way was a mystery." On the other hand, he insisted that his "green suiters," Colonel Miller and Capts. Louis 

Wenick and Robert T. Roberts, played critical roles in getting the 

project under way. Miller in particular was "a doer," although his 

lack of tact alienated the Israelis and eventually prompted Lewis to 

send him back to the States. "If my whole staff had been the quality 

of those guys," Curl claimed, "I'd have had no problems at all." 18 

Colonel Taylor, who came to Ramon in June 1980, was concerned more with continuity and stability than starting the job. He 

thought each area engineer should have had a civilian deputy 

from the outset. However, he understood the importance of the officers who had worked for Curl. Mobilizing a flexible and responsive civilian work force on short notice was harder than starting a 

project with soldiers. 19 Up to certain levels at least, soldiers went 

where they were needed and did as they were told. 
174 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

By the end of the summer of 1980 the major changes at the area 

offices seemed over. Taylor and Peterson were on board at Ramon, 

where Butler remained in charge for the contractor. Kelly and Blake 

headed the Ovda Area Office, and the contractor had made numerous changes at the top. New general manager Irving Davis, a veteran of cost-plus projects in Saudi Arabia, quickly won the respect of 

Hartung and Wall. 20 All in all, the prospects for stability in both government and contractor management seemed very good. 

Given the size and political implications of the job at each site, 

continuity was important. The area engineer and his deputy directed the construction project, approved expenditures, and stood 

between the contractor and higher headquarters, from whence 

came constant demands for reports and information. All of them 

used frequent meetings and regular site tours to keep up with their 

swiftly evolving projects. Blake started his day in a four-wheel-drive 

vehicle, touring the work site alone before he talked with his immediate staff. Both area offices also used project engineers who 

managed specific aspects of the job. Some of these were civilian engineers; others were Corps of Engineers captains. In the spring of 

1980 only eight project engineers worked at the two sites. They 

monitored selected facilities, keeping track of progress and 

potential problem areas. 21 

The methods used by the area offices to manage the contractors sparked considerable discussion. Task directives, which formed 

the basis for operation of the Management Support Associates contract, were used only to a limited extent for the other contracts. 

Hartung thought the key was control of resources, which evolved in 

the spring and summer of 1980 with the establishment of construction and activation schedules and the application of resources to 

the schedule, particularly by coordinating procurement with the 

timetables. Later, Hartung claimed that the Corps lost much of its 

control because it too readily approved contractor expenditures.22 

The main focus of disagreement involved neither task directives nor allocation of resources. Instead, the use of disallowance of 

contractor expenditures-refusal by the government to reimburse 

the contractors for outlays that were deemed irresponsible or unnecessary-sparked the most controversy. Discussion of disallowances began early and increased in frequency as audits appeared. Wall's chief counsel noted several obstacles to extensive 

use of nonreimbursement. Documentation of such action, for 

which the burden of proof was on the government, was costly in 

terms of time and money. Moreover, contractors knew from experience of their favorable odds in a courtroom. Although they acted 

concerned, attorney Brown believed they were not intimidated by 

the threat. Occasional use of disallowance showed that the govern-
CONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT 175 

ment paid attention but provided little benefit beyond that. Although Hartung was less than satisfied with the way the Corps 

managed the contractors, he agreed that extensive use of this tool 

was unproductive. Hartung understood that the contractor could 

respond by becoming extremely cautious and slowing down the 

project, endangering the schedule and bringing even higher costs. 

So he advocated conservative and selective use of this measure. 

Wall agreed with his attorney and preferred to resort to disallm.yance in cases of repetitive incompetence and then only as a preliminary measure prior to dismissing the responsible employees. 

The Israelis, in line with their concern about the cost of the project, disagreed. They considered the American attitude too permissive and wanted more disallowances.

23 

With the need to protect the government's interest on one 

hand and the requirement to keep the work moving on the other, 

the contracting officers walked a tightrope. Rigid management 

could reduce contractor initiative and create incentives for excessive caution. At the same time, inadequate control might result in 

unnecessary expense. For Hartung, resolving this dilemma required transfer of contracting officer authority from the sites to 

Tel Aviv. "The delegation," he said, "of contracting officer responsibility to the area engineers living with the contractor was a gross 

error in my mind." Proximity made it hard to maintain a clear perspective on the constructors' actions and expenditures.24 

The views of some of the area engineers seemed to add credence to Hartung's concern. Kelly became a strong partisan of 

Negev Airbase Constructors. He lauded their cost accounting and 

procurement systems and was generally satisfied with how they did 

business. Taylor also expressed his approval of Air Base Constructors and applauded their commitment to the schedule.25 Perhaps 

they understood better than anyone else that "fast track construction, by its very nature, is a cooperative process." He felt that contractors who were forced to go to extraordinary lengths to defend 

andjustiry their costs might not get the job done. 26 

Wall did not consider the rapport between the area engineers 

and the contractors a problem. He was more concerned with protecting Kelly and Taylor from frequent inquiries and close oversight by the program managers. "If the contracting officers were 

up here," he asserted, " ... they would be constantly barraged with 

'what if' questions." Wall considered that one of his major responsibilities was "to insulate the contracting officers away from all this 

cheap stuff so they can manage their jobs."27 As far as keeping 

them honest was concerned, procurement regulations, auditors, 

and attorneys provided sufficient safeguards.28 
176 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

The disagreement about where to place contracting officer authority reflected larger questions concerning relations between 

the area offices and Tel Aviv. The issue involved the nature and 

level of headquarters involvement in construction as carried out in 

the field. When Wall arrived he thought the area offices appeared 

unduly defensive but saw the need to act as a buffer between them 

and the program managers so that the area engineers could solve 

their own problems. He also saw antagonisms betw'een staff sections in Tel Aviv and in the field, notably in the procurement area 

but elsewhere too. Wall thought he succeeded in providing the 

space in which the area offices could operate. Blake at Ovda 

agreed; others did not. Taylor complained that he spent more than 

half his time dealing with questions from Tel Aviv. The net effect of 

these inquiries, according to Taylor, was to keep him and his staff 

from concentrating on their work. Kelly felt less put upon but objected to the Tel Aviv staff's direct approaches to the contractor. 

He insisted that Wall's people deal with Negev Airbase Constructors through his office. 29 

The managers for the construction contractors had different 

views of the headquarters in Tel Aviv. Butler at Ramon said that 

while the job was easy, the network of relationships was difficult 

to sort out. Wall's office consumed a great deal of his time. So did 

Hartung's, Bar-Tov's, and the large number of Israeli Air Force 

consultants and designers. Davis agreed, noting that "everybody 

up there has something to say." At least, he said, the removal of 

North Atlantic Division from the Corps' chain of command cut the 

number of parties to which he had to report. 30 Much of this sentiment among the contractor managers at the sites may have been 

based on experience with fixed-price contracts. They were unaccustomed to such intensive Corps involvement in their work, 

resented it, and wanted to make their own decisions. However, 

some of the Corps construction personnel also saw too much involvement by headquarters. 31 As Bill Parkes, chief of vertical construction for the area office at Ramon, said, "We have more layers 

of management on this job than I have ever seen anywhere in my 

life, anywhere at any time. It's ridiculous." 32 

One of the major criticisms leveled against Wall's office from 

the field involved the time it took to convince Tel Aviv to authorize 

more workers. During the spring and summer of 1980 the area offices, particularly Ovda, hounded the Near East Project Office for 

permission to hire more people. The Ovda master diary was full of 

pleas for authority tobring in 500 additional Thais and to raise the 

number of "direct workers," those directly involved in construction, up to nearly 1,500. Blake and almost the entire staff agreed 
CONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT 177 

Utility ducts (left); a backfilled and compacted utility t1·ench. 

that "this job is in jeopardy if we cannot decide by 1 September 

1980 to go to an increased level of manpower." 33 While trying to 

prove its case with Tel Aviv, the area office at Ovda also did what 

it could to correct things. Where possible, support workers-

"indirects" in the jargon of the project-were reassigned to construction. Toward the end of June, Blake halved janitorial services 

in the management billets and the offices so he could put more 

men on thejob.34 

Wall sent Lt. Col. Fletcher H. "Bud" Griffis to Ovda early in 

July. He wanted Griffis, who was new to the project, to see to the 

firing of 300 workers. Griffis assessed the situation and concluded 

that the area office needed 600 more workers. He convinced Wall 

to change his mind. At the end of the month Wall approved large 

increases for both sites: 300 Portuguese for Ramon and 500 Thais 

for Ovda, where Captain Roberts wrote, "The manpower struggle 

was finally concluded." Within a month the contractor's agents in 

Bangkok sent the first new workers into Israel, causing hasty expansion of the work camp.35 

Although he had made the basic decision on an increase in 

manpower, Wall wanted a team from the United States to review 

direct labor needs. McNeely chaired the group. Wall asked Lewis 

to send a senior member of his staff, preferably Vinitsky or Herbert 

Howard, but instead got Charles Schroer, assistant chief of con-
178 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

Thai kitchen workers at Ovda 

struction in Baltimore District. The other three members were senior executives in the firms that made up Management Support 

Associates. The group visited the sites, evaluated progress, and 

studied use of the work forces. Based on interviews and brief visits, 

the team verified the need for more workers and even recommended increases beyond those approved by Wall. Members noted 

that excavations for utilities at Ramon consumed many more manhours than had been expected. At Ovda the 400 men working 

within the shelter complexes could have been doubled easily if the 

manpower were available. In general, many activities on the sites 

were starved for labor. The compelling fact was that the current 

production rate of 2 percent each month would be insufficient to 

finish on schedule. 36 

Inquiries into the size of the work force never related to the 

quality of the labor. The Portuguese and Thais both contributed to 

the cultural and linguistic diversity that sometimes caused problems at their work sites, but they were respected for their industry 

and skill. Blake, who was not easily pleased, called the Thais "exceptional little guys." He and most observers considered them 
CONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT 179 

adept craftsmen and fast learners, although their lack of upper 

body strength was sometimes a problem. They also were well-mannered and disciplined workers, who caused few problems. Management also highly regarded the Portuguese, who were a somewhat 

troublesome presence in the towns near Ramon but excellent 

workers nonetheless. 37 

While the labor force was good, there were still problems with 

the placement of work. Nowhere was this more evident than in the 

shelter complexes. Mter moving so well in the early summer of 

1980, work on these facilities ran into a major difficulty in August. 

A consultant to the Ministry of Defense concluded that some of 

the walls of the ammunition storage facilities within the complexes 

would be unable to support the earthen cover. If this proved true, 

a fatal design error existed. Work on affected buildings at Ramon 

stopped immediately, and a search for a remedy began. In September work at Ovda stopped on almost all shelter features except 

arches and exhaust flumes. 38 

From that summer to the following winter, other potentially serious design flaws were discovered. During that period construction of unaffected portions continued, rumors of numerous defects spread, and inquiries regarding solutions proceeded. Most of 

the questions involved the structural integrity of walls after they 

were covered with earth. Other problems concerned subsurface 

drainage of the shelter complexes during heavy rain, the ability of 

the buildings to withstand seismic disturbances, and fireproofing. 

The need to deal with these questions and problems delayed construction of these critical base features and added a feeling of uncertainty to the job. From June through September, 97 of the 202 

engineering change proposals pertaining to the shelter complexes 

were issued. At the end of July Butler reported the need to revise 

over one hundred drawings to reflect the changes. He thought the 

expenditure of so much time and money would eventually affect 

production of other vital facilities. At Ovda Davis also feared that 

the changes would derail his construction schedule. 39 

The protracted examination of design flaws and discussions of 

solutions probably frustrated and annoyed the Israelis as well. Although Hartung had advised against departing from their initial 

plan of replicating the Sinai bases, they chose an experimental 

design. The Americans, who were accustomed to far more detailed 

plans than the Israelis produced, complained that they had to augment the drawings before turning them over to construction 

crews. Now errors were turning up in the shelter plans, and some 

of the Americans claimed that these were the major cause of unexpected expenses and delays. The Israelis took strong exception. 
180 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

Excavation of Glide Path Hill at Ramon 

Bar-Tov said the whole business was blown out of proportion. He 

believed that the Americans were wrong in attributing increased 

costs to the changes. In fact, he thought the changes saved money 

by improving design. Moreover, the Israelis disagreed with the contractors' claims that late design drawings delayed construction. 

When the contractors did receive the plans, the Israelis said with 

some justification, they did not always start work quickly: 1O 

Hartung thought the Israelis were unnecessarily defensive 

about the mistakes. "I don't think," he said, "any designer would 

have designed something from scratch, brand new, and not make 

mistakes in that short time-frame. It doesn't matter who he is. He 

might have made different ones, but he would have made them."41 

While the problems were debated for several months, work on the 

shelter walls and arches continued. These portions of the structures 

were the largest and most costly parts of construction, so it was fortunate that the work could go on. At Ramon the last arch was poured in 

January 1981, even before agreement on design alterations. 42 

In early 1981 solutions that satisfied all participants finally 

emerged . In part the delay until winter was intentional. Hartung 
CONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT 181 

convinced Bar-Tov to wait until January so deliberations regarding 

changes would not distract the contractors during peak design activity. Then "a joint structural engineer task group" could review 

the entire shelter system, evaluate all deficiencies, and determine 

the best solution. "Treating the shelter complex as a system," Hartung contended, "rather than a series of parts, should result in 

least cost and time construction effort retrofits." 43 The task group 

of about thirty-five engineers, representing the three prime contractors, all three managers, and the Israeli designers, met in late 

January. They looked at five solutions for dealing with the structural deficiencies of buildings in the shelter complexes. The remedies included building two types of retaining walls, one of reinforced concrete and another of gabions (rock-filled galvanized 

wire cages). Others included gravity walls of mass lean concrete 

and two approaches to reinforcing the earthen backfill. One of 

these required the use of terre arme panels, interlocking blocks of 

precast reinforced concrete anchored in the ground with steel 

straps. The fifth option, concrete modified backfill, was adopted as 

the quickest and least costly way to reinforce the walls. The committee added a drainage system that carried water away from the 

structures to prevent the buildup of hydrostatic pressure.

44 

In spite of the problems with the shelter complexes during the 

summer and fall of 1980, progress on permanent facilities was beginning to be noticeable. Carl Damico of the construction division 

felt he was in a transitional period during August with buildings rising as design started to wind down. Gilkey thought both sites were 

'Just about to explode" and expected that the recently authorized 

increases in manpower would bring the rapid increases in production that Morris and Wall agreed were so necessary. Hartung said 

that construction "really started to bloom" in September. 45 

And it did. Much of the preliminary horizontal and underground work, some of which was difficult to see, was out of the way. 

Both sites had perimeter fences and patrol roads. At Ovda a 

fifteen-kilometer canal, big enough to carry off the waters of the 

biggest flood expected in a 100-year period, was in place. At 

Ramon Glide Path Hill, the small mountain at the end of the runway, was no more. The 300,000-cubic-meter hazard had been leveled to clear the flight path, with the rock hauled off and used as 

fill for roads and camp facilities. 46 

Work on the runways gathered momentum toward the end of 

the year. Stripping and excavating for the 10,000-foot runways actually began at Ramon in late 1979 and at Ovda in January 1980. In 

September Ramon was placing subbase and planning to add a second shift of workers to accelerate progress. The Ovda landing strip 
182 BUILDING AIR :SASES IN THE NEGEV 

was further along, with the first application of base course material 

under way. The work there moved along so quickly that the commanding general of the Israeli Air Force, Maj. Gen. David Ivry, made 

a ceremonial landing of ajet fighter at the end of November.47 

Both sites had problems with horizontal construction. The difficulty with the runway at Ramon came about because the embankment was allowed to dry out and crack. The contractor nevertheless started to spread the subbase over the inadequate surface. The 

initial solution, removing a seven-centimeter layer and recompacting the material below, was rejected. Tel Aviv and the area office 

agreed to scarify, disk, moisten, and recompact the subbase rather 

than remove it. Wall did not "consider this significant, especially 

when compared to the original fix intended." The next layer, or 

base course, required rock that was considerably harder than that 

produced by the quarry. A separate crushing operation was set up 

at the nearest source of adequate wadi gravel, about five miles 

away. Because of these complications, Taylor required the contractor to double the quality control staff and increased his own emphasis on that area. At Ovda quality control on horizontal work 

also became a major concern as the year wore on. Kelly complained that the contractor had too few people watching construction on the roads as well as the runways to ensure proper grades 

and thicknesses oflayers of base course.48 

Ultimately, the problems with horizontal work called into question the adequacy of the process by which the quality of construction was ascertained. Responsibility for quality control and inspection on Corps projects usually rested with the contractor, while 

quality assurance, consisting essentially of sampling, surveillance, 

and verification, was the government's job. In Israel, because of 

the need to minimize the number of permanent government employees, the Corps assigned quality assurance to Management Support Associates. This arrangement, in which construction management services were contracted, was not unknown in private 

construction but was unusual for the Corps of Engineers. During 

the mobilization phase of the project, the spectrum of activities involved in ascertaining the quality of construction appeared to 

cause more problems at Ramon than at Ovda. In any case, only the 

Ramon Area Office raised questions for the record. Nevertheless, 

by the beginning of 1980 General Morris became concerned about 

implementation at both sites and ordered Gilkey to hold O'Shei 

and Curl personally responsible for implementation of procedures. Morris' expression of concern brought immediate albeit 

partial results. Both sites hastened to establish laboratories where 

they could test materials and production. With command atten-
CONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT 183 

tion focused on the situation, Colonel Kett, who was still looking 

for meaningful work, finally found an opportunity to put to good 

use his experience with pavements. 49 

Command interest was helpful, but progress remained slow. In 

February Curl assured Morris that his laboratory was functioning, 

but two months later he still complained that the contractor did 

not provide enough people or equipment. At Ramon not until 

September did the area engineer insist that the constructor establish a procedure for notifying and briefing quality assurance people and site activators before starting work on a new building. He 

wanted the discussion to cover general methods, specific requirements, and specifications.50 

A variety of problems beset efforts to make sure the job was 

done right. Defective precast shelter panels sometimes left the 

plant for delivery to the work site, only to be rejected there. In 

other instances, crews were turned loose to work on a building 

without access to adequate drawings. At Ramon O'Shei complained that Butler had too few qualified field construction people 

as well as inadequate procedures. Butler agreed that his operation 

was "poorly manned," but blamed "absurd local testing requirements imposed by local standards" for his troubles. 51 It was plain by 

mid-1980 that quality control would be a major issue between the 

Corps and its contractors, on one hand, as well as between the 

Americans and the Israelis on the other. 

Concrete production, which proved to be an almost intractable 

problem at Ramon, was the major issue there from a quality control 

standpoint. In April an inspector's slump test showed that concrete 

containing too much water was being placed in the footing for an 

aircraft shelter. In July the foundation for the control tower had to 

be ripped out because the material was structurally inadequate.52 

At first, O'Shei suggested solutions to the contractor. These included plant controls, such as improved procedures for batch tickets and closer surveillance of scales and water meters during batching, and more stringent field controls, particularly regarding 

addition of water to the mixture. Later, he took a tougher position 

and required submission of written procedures before placement 

of concrete on shelter roofs. O'Shei's requirements seemed to 

have little effect. Taylor faced the same problem and had to order 

the removal of the control tower's foundation, "a major setback" 

that retarded completion of the structure for three weeks. Then in 

August he complained about carelessness in curing procedures for 

the floor of the facility for storing liquid oxygen. 53 

Finally, Taylor issued detailed instructions for quality control, 

warning that he would halt concrete operations if the situation did 
184 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

not improve. He wanted more stringent inspections before placement and also verification by quality control personnel of the accuracy of the quantity, type of mix, and location for each delivery. He 

also insisted that weigh tickets indicate the amount of water permitted in the mix and that field personnel be kept from adding excessive water. He determined that workers at the plant and those 

overseeing quality needed more training. Finally and perhaps most 

important, Taylor wanted the person responsible for the design 

and testing of the mix identified by name. His efforts to document 

activities involved in production proved very effective. One quality 

control supervisor had been extemporaneously adjusting the mixture of cement and water "like a cook stirring a big pot somewhere, and testing it every now and then," rather than adhering to 

specifications. With problems identified and controls established, 

Taylor allowed production to continue, but only conditionally, on 

the basis of biweekly evaluations. Until well into the autumn, he 

carefully monitored production of concrete.54 

The cement from which the concrete was made turned out to 

be part of the problem, and stringent quality control became necessary here as well. Much of the cement supplied by the Israeli 

firm Nesher proved to be of a much coarser grind than the Americans normally used. Also, it sometimes came in quite hot, not having been allowed sufficient time to cool in a silo. Changes in the 

contract with the supplier corrected some of these deficiencies. Filtering the material for foreign particles as it was taken from the 

trucks also helped, although this practice made no friends among 

the truck drivers who delivered it and sat waiting for the process to 

be finished. 55 

By the end of 1980 the area offices sorted out arrangements 

for verifying quality. The program involved more than 100 people 

at each site. Ovda had a total of 115 authorized, with 96 contractor 

employees working in the area of quality control and 19 from Management Support Associates dealing with quality assurance; 

Ramon had 82 and 23, respectively. Although the support contractor's people did the work, Corps managers understood that the 

program remained their responsibility.56 With nearly one-fourth of 

construction finished at the end of the year, stabilization of the 

surveillance program could not have waited much longer. 

As work progressed and activities associated with verifying the 

adequacy of the work became more important, the small teams representing the program managers became more involved at the sites. 

These teams, known collectively as the Air Force regional civil engineer, reflected a standard United States Air Force approach to construction management. Initially Hartung had wanted a group of 
CONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT 185 

three or four at each site acting as the customer to the Corps and as 

liaison with the Israeli Air Force. As in all major construction for 

the U.S. Air Force, he noted, the teams would provide the focal 

point for coordination between the user's needs and those of design and construction management. This concept of the regional 

civil engineer as an American organization that handled 

coordination between the Corps and the Israelis at the sites was embodied in the memorandum of understanding between the Corps 

and the Air Force. The agreement specified that the Air Force 

would set up such a group, which would report to the program 

manager. Although the document listed fifteen separate functions, 

most of them were different ways of saying that the unit would review progress and coordinate American work with Israeli needs, 

particularly when it came time for final acceptance of facilities. 57 

The organization that was established in April 1980 emerged 

in a very different form than originally anticipated. Hartung's office drafted a standard operating procedure that from the outset 

assumed that the team would include representatives of the Israeli 

program management office as well as his own. "We created something different here," Hartung said, "the only AFRCE in the whole 

U.S. Air Force that is international." Working from the premise 

that the Israelis were in fact participants in decision-making, Hartung said he "brought the staff of General Bar-Tov and my own 

staff . .. under the umbrella of the AFRCE." Th e organization consisted of an ad hoc headquarters, drawn from the two program 

manage men t offices, that functioned as the regional civil engineer 

only when needed. At the sites the teams had formal structures 

with permanently assigned members from the program management offices and the Israeli Air Force. As Hartung saw it, the combined unit, headed by his deputy, Col. John R. Harty, became "in 

effect the user." Control of construction still rested "on the U.S. 

side," Hartung insisted, " .. . but you don't try to make a big issue 

of it." Gilkey's office accepted the proposaP8 

For Hartung this "kind of unique organization" represented a 

compromise. He tried "to stick to standard practice between the 

Corps of Engineers and the Air Force ... so everybody doesn't 

have to learn new ways of doing things." He also knew that in this 

situation he could not entirely do so. The joint regional civil engineer constituted a creative response to an unusual situation: the 

Americans rarely built for a foreign client that was technically competent to build its own bases. 59 The arrangement also testified to 

the force of Bar-Tov's personality. Like the procedure that had 

been set up for the configuration control board, the joint team 
186 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

showed the degree to which Bar-Tov had solidified his position as 

Hartung's partner in management. 

Although the organization differed significantly from the typical structure, the mission remained the same as originally intended. The site teams did become involved in unconventional 

areas, such as assistance with local procurement. Each team included an economist from the Ministry of Defense for this purpose, although the purchasing help did not always come as quickly 

as the area engineers might have liked. This liaison group inevitably became the focus of some of the tension that developed in 

the haste to get the job done. At Ramon junior officers did a little 

editing and "AFRCE" became "FARCE." At Ovda both the American and Israeli members of the team questioned the accuracy of 

the area office's situation reports. Blake, preoccupied with problems in shelter design, lack of transportation for equipment, and 

the shortage of quality control and quality assurance people, responded with customary bluntness. "I advised them," he wrote, 

"that if they start picking at it, they may not continue to get it." In 

spite of such troubles, overall relations seemed "cooperative and 

supportive" at the end of the year, according to James Wharry of 

the chiefs office, who singled out the Israeli component for particular credit as "a perceptive advocate for the Israeli MOD." 60 

While Israeli positions were well articulated within the framework of the liaison organization, Hartung's claim that the Americans retained control of construction was still valid. When the time 

came to turn over facilities, the area engineers dealt only with the 

U.S. Air Force. That, according to Kelly, was "the way it should be." 

He said that despite the appearance of participatory management, 

Hartung was "a very strong personality and he exercises very 

central management." 61 
CONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT 

Notes 

1. Hartung interview, Apr 81. 

2. Grafa interview. 

3. Lewis interview, J an-Feb 82, part 2. 

4. Interv (telephone), author with Col Robert K. Tener (Ret.) ,Jan 85. 

5. McNeely interview, Mar 84; Lewis interview, Jan-Feb 82, part 2. 

6. Wall interview, Aug 80. 

7. Ibid., May 81. 

8. Morris interview. 

9. McNeely interview, Mar 84; Lewis interview, Jan-Feb 82, part 2. 

10. Tener interview. 

11. Ibid. 

12. Ltr, Wall to Tener, 26 May 80, Tener Papers, lABPC, 89/5. 

13. Tener interview; Ltr, Tener to Wall, 10 Jun 80, lABPC, 89/5. 

14. Tener interview. 

15. Ibid. 

187 

16. Peterson interview, May 81; Hartung interview, Apr 81; NEPO Sitrep No. 

47,23 Sep 80, lABPC, 14/ 12. 

17. Telex, Blake to NEPO, "Attention: COL Gilkey," 12 May 80, sub: NEPO 

Procurement Guidance No.2, lABPC, 33/1; Wall interview, Aug 80; Wall, Project 

Notebooks, vol. V, 12Jun 81, lABPC, 90; Blake interview. 

18. Peterson interview, Oct 81; Curl interview; MFR, Noah, 14 Feb 80, sub: 

Poor Behavior of LTC B. F. Miller, lABPC, 1/2; Bar-Tov interview, Apr 81. 

19. Taylor interview. 

20. Interv, author with Irving Davis, Aug 80, Ovda, Israel; Wall interview, Aug 

80; Hartung interview, Apr 81. 

21. DF, Moon, Engineering Division, to Project Engineers, 4 Apr 80, sub: 

Mon thly Progress Report, lABPC, 33/1. 

22. Wall interview, Oct 81; Hartung interview, Apr 81 and May 82. 

23. Brown interview, Apr 81 and Apr 82; Hartung interview, Apr 81 and Oct 81; 

Wall interview, May 81; Interv, author with Leroy H. Graw, Apr 81, Tel Aviv, Israel. 

24. Hartung interview, Oct 81 and May 82. 

25. Interv, author with Col Patrick]. Kelly, May 81, Ovda, Israel; Taylor interview,Jun 81. 

26. William R. Squires III and Michael]. Murphy, "The Impact of Fast Track 

Construction and Construction Management on Subcontractors," Law and ContemjJormy Problems 46 (January 1983): 64. 

27. Wall interview, May 81. 

28. Peterson interview, May 81; Maloney interview, May 81. 

29. Wall interview, Aug 80 and May 81; Blake interview; Taylor interview; Kelly 

interview, Oct 81 . 

30. Butler interview; Davis interview. 

31. Parkes interview, May 81; Grafa interview. 

32. Parkes interview, May 81. 

33. Blake interview; OAO, Master Diary, 1 Jul 80, lABPC, 84/2. 

34. OAO, Biweekly Sitrep, 16-30 Jun 80, IABP files, WNRC, Accession 

77-83-101 6, Box 10. 

35. Interv, author with Col Fletcher H. Griffis, Aug 86, New York, N.Y.; NEPO 

Sitrep No. 44, 5 Aug 80, lABPC, 14/ 9; Ltr, Special CE/ MSA Team to Wall, 13 Aug 

80, sub: Summary Report of Analysis of DCCs Dil-ect Manpower Utilization and 
188 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

Requirements, IABPC, 4/4; OAO, Master Diary, 28Jul and 22, 25, and 29 Sep 80, 

IABPC, 84/2; Blake inte rview. 

36. Telex, Wall to Lewis, 3 Aug 80, sub: Review and Analysis of Manpower Requirements at Ramon and Ovda, IABPC, 4/4; Ltr, Special CE/MSA Team to Wall, 

13 Aug 80. MSA members were Joseph E. Robbins, president of Pope, Evans and 

Robbins; George E. Heunsch, vice president of A. Epstein and Sons International; 

and John P. Sylva, vice president of Lester B. Knight and Associates. 

37. Blake interview; Davis interview; Wall interview, May 82; Gilkey interview; 

Grafa interview; Butler interview; Parkes interview, May 8l. 

38. DF, Damico to NAIPM-AD, 29 Aug 80, sub: Input for Chief's Report; and 

Ltr, Taylor to Butler, 27 Aug 80, sub: Shelter Complex 13.2, Facilities 8,10,11,13, 

and 16. Both in IABPC, 33/2. OAO, Master Diary, 23 Sep 80, IABPC, 84/2. 

39. MFR, David Levi, NEPO Engineering Division, n.d. [meetings, 19-20,22 

Jan 81], sub: Aircraft Shelters' Fatal Errors, IABPC, 86/10; MFR, Levi, n.d. [meeting, 27 Jan 81], sub: Aircraft Shelters' Fatal Errors' Fixes and Subsurface 

Drainage In-house Design Review, IABPC, 86/10; MFR, Blake, 6 Nov 80, sub: Fatal 

Errors in Shelter Complexes, in OAO, Master Diary, IABPC, 84/2; Griffis, Daily 

Journal, P&C Office, 27 Oct 80, IABPC, 41/1; NEPO Engineering Division, ECP 

Log, IABP files, WNRC, Accession 77-83-1025, Box 46; ABC Design/Engineering 

Narrative Report--Problem Areas, 31 Jul 80, IABP files, WNRC, Accession 

77-83-1025, Box 4. 

40. Hartung interview, Apr 81; Hays interview; t."NR 205 (30 October 1980): 

27; Thomas interview, Oct 81; Bar-Tov interview, Oct 8l. 

4l. Hartung interview, Apr 8l. 

42. (Tel Aviv) Ha'arelz, 14Jan 8l. 

43. Ltr, Hartung to Bar-Tov, 25 Nov 80, sub: Aircraft Shelter Complex-Fatal 

Errors, IABPC, 86/10; MFR, Harty and Bar-Tov, 29 Dec 80, sub: DOD/MOD 

Program Managers Meeting of24 Dec. 1980, IABPC, 45/4. 

44. MFR, Levi, NEPO Engineering Division, n.d., sub: Aircraft Shelters' Fatal 

Errors, IABPC, 86/10; MFR, Levi, n.d., sub: Aircraft Shelters' Fatal Errors' Fixes 

and Subsurface Drainage In-house Design Review, IABPC, 86/10; Amendment to 

Specifications, vol. III, 17 Feb 81, IABPC, 86/10. 

45. Damico interview, Aug 80; Gilkey interview; Wall interview, Aug 80; 

Hartung interview, Apr 8l. 

46. ENR205 (30 October 1981): 29. 

47. Memo, Clifton for Area Engineer, Ramon, 2 Nov 79, sub: Weekly Progress 

Report, Ramon, IABPC, 22/4; Deputy Area Engineer, Ovda, Weekly Sitrep, 13-18 

Jan 80, IABPC, 13/ 11 ; Butler, ABC Weekly Sitrep, 10 Sep 80, IABP files, WNRC, 

Accession 77-83-1025, Box 4; OAO, Biweekly Sitrep, 16-30 Sep 80, IABP files, 

vVNRC, Accession 77-83-1016, Box 10; (Tel Aviv) Ha'm'elz, 30 Nov 80. 

48. Hartung inte rview, Apr 81; Telex, Hartung to HQ USAF, 2 Sep 80, sub: 

Israeli Air Base Program, DOD/PMO Sitrep Aug. 1980, IABPC, 3/6; Ltr, Taylor to 

Wall, 31 Aug 80, IABPC, 38/1; Telex, Wall to Lewis, 10 Sep 80, sub: Your Msg, 9 

Sept. 1980, IABPC, 2/5; Parkes interview, May 81; OAO, Master Diary, 4 Nov and 

11 Dec 80, IABPC, 84/2. 

49. Ltr, Dorman R. Mabrey, Assistant for Contract Administration, MSA, to 

NEPO Contracting Officer (Damico), 10 Jan 80, sub: MSA Task Directives 1-000 

through 14-000, IABPC, 31/3; Richard D. Connor, "Contracting for Construction 

Management Services," Law and ContempormJ Problems 46 (January 1983): 20-21; 

Ltr, Clifton to GM, ABC, 28 Oct 79, sub: Contractor Quality Control, IABPC, 

22/3; Ltr, Clifton to NEPO Project Manager, 7 Dec 79, sub: Weekly Progress Report, Ramon, IABPC, 31/1; Ltr, Gilkey to O'Shei and Curl, 31 Jan 80, IABPC, 
CONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT 189 

31/3; NEPO Sitrep No. 29, 11 Feb 80, IABPC, 13/14; DF, Kett to Gilkey, 27 Feb 

80, sub: Visit to the Ovda Site 21 and 22 Feb. 1980, IABPC, 32/2. 

50. Ltr, Curl to Pettingell, 14 Apr 80, sub: Quality Contml Laboratory at 

Quarry, IABPC, 33/1; Ltr, Taylor to Butler, 2 Sep 80, sub: Preparatory Inspections, IABPC, 33/3. 

51. Telex, NEPO to Area Engineer, Ramon, 18 Apr 80, sub: QC and QA on 

Precast Shelter Panels, IABPC, 33/1; Lu', O'Shei to Butler, 16 May 80, sub: Work 

Item 52-Automated Warehouse, IABPC, 33/1; Ltr, O'Shei to Butler, 17 May 80, 

sub: Vertical and Horizontal Quality Control, IABPC, 33/1; ABC Weekly Sitrep, 25 

May 80, IABPC, 14/5. 

52. Ltr, O'Shei to Butler, 16 Apr 80, sub: Concrete Testing at Placement, 

IABPC, 33/1; Ltr, Taylor to Butler, 8 Jul 80, sub: Work Item 010, Control Tower, 

Foundations, IABPC, 33/2; Parkes interview, May 81. 

53. Ltr, O 'Shei to Butler, 29 May 80, sub: Quality Control of Concrete Operations, IABPC, 33/1; Ltr, O'Shei to Butler, 27 May 80, sub: Quality Control Procedures for Domes in Shelters, IABPC, 33/1; Ltr, Taylor to Project Manager, 15 Jul 

80, sub: Ramon Air Base Progress Report 1-15 July 1980, IABP files, WNRC, Accession 77-83-1025, Box 4; Ltr, Taylor to Butler, 26 Aug 80, sub: Concrete Curing 

and Protection, IABPC, 33/2. 

54. Ltrs, Taylor to Butler, 23 and 29 Aug, 15 Sep, and 15 Oct 80, sub: Control 

of Concrete Quality, IABPC, 33/2-4; Parkes interview, May 81. 

55. Parkes intel-view, May 81. 

56. DF, Acting Chief, Construction Division, to Project Manager, NEPO, 23 

Oct 80, sub: Project Management and QC/QA for Construction Sites, IABPC, 

23/4. 

57. Ltr, Hartung to Gilbert, 30 Nov 78, sub: Methods of Accomplishing/Managing Israeli Air Base Construction, IABPC, 89/3. For a summary of the U.S. Air 

Force's system of construction management, see Maj. Gen. Clifton D. Wright, Jr., 

"Air Force Engineering and Services-Investing Today for a Better Tomorrow," 

Constl'uctor67 (May 1985): 47-52. 

58. Wray and Gilbert, Memorandum of Understanding Between the DOD 

Agencies in the Israeli Air Base Construction Program, 25 Jul 79, IABPC, 11 /2; 

MFR, Bar-Tov and Hartung, 3 Mar 80, sub: DOD/ MOD PMs Meeting 28 Feb. 

1980, IABPC, 45/4; Hartung interview, Aug 80; SOP 18, Air Force Regional Civil 

Engineer (AFRCE) Organization, 11 Apr 80, IABPC, 15/18; MFR, Bar-Tov and 

Hartung, 2 Apr 80, sub: DOD/ MOD PMs Meeting 27 Mar. 1980, IABPC, 45/4. 

59. Hartung interview, Aug 80. 

60. DF, Graw to Gilkey, 3 Jul 80, sub: Input for Letter to the Chief of Engineers, IABPC, 33/2; Ltr, Taylor to Lt Col Reeves Smith, DOD PMO, AFRCERamon, 5 Nov 80, sub: Lack of Response to Request for Information, IABPC, 

33/4; OAO, Master Dial'y, 30 Jul and 5 Nov 80, IABPC, 84/2; Lloyd interview; 

MFR, Wharry, 17 Dec 80, sub: Trip Report-Israel Air Bases Construction Project, 

IABPC, 8/2. 

61. Grafa interview; Kelly interview, May and Oct 81. 
CHAPTER 12 

The Three-Legged Stool 

June 1980-January 1981 

That's a term that I coined .... I likened it to a stool, three legs of a 

stool, because ... no leg can do it alone, nor can two legs do it by themselves. 

Brig. Gen. John F. Wall 1 

All things considered, after just over a year in Israel, the project 

was on firm ground. The major organizational elements were in 

place, and the Near East Project Office had a commander who 

could deal as an equal with the program managers. The setbacks of 

the spring had been overcome, and optimism seemed to be justified. Hartung reflected this view at the June press conference. He 

told the reporters that much progress had been made. Little of it 

was visible because permanent construction had just begun, but 

major parts of the job were complete, among them large portions 

offacility planning and initial design as well as some procurement. 

Final designs were still in progress, and the lion's share of construction to date involved camps, offices, and facilities-such as 

quarries, rock crushers, and concrete batch plants-with which to 

do the job. But the mobilization phase was over. For the next 

twelve to eighteen months the emphasis would be on building permanent structures. Then the project would close down. With the 

phases of construction overlapping, Hartung stressed the evolutionary nature of the process. "A program like this," he said, "trying to accomplish everything on a tight time constraint, goes 

through several transition periods." Overall, progress was good: 

"In gross terms of a program like this, where you have all of these 

overlaps and interfaces and concurrencies, we are right where we 

planned to be when we made the plan a year ago." 2 

One problem was strained relations between the three principal managers. Some disagreement was inevitable because none of 

these assertive and articulate men willingly conceded primacy to 

the others. Of course, tension and conflict between the managers 
THE THREE-LEGGED STOOL 191 

was not new to the program, but the arrival of Wall, whose role in 

the Corps of Engineers chain of command was much clearer than 

Noah's had been, altered the equation. And while Wall, Hartung, 

and Bar-Tov talked about the three-legged stool and a common 

purpose, there was ample contention among them. The issues involved their different views of program goals-whether the priority 

should be timely completion, quality work, or economy. 

The number one priority for the Corps of Engineers remained 

attainment of initial operating capability by 25 April 1982. On this 

point, if not on everything else, the engineer generals-Wall, 

Lewis, and Morris-agreed. In the spring of 1980 Morris had made 

clear to the Israelis that he saw his primary responsibility as meeting that deadline. Quality and cost were important, but the schedule was the foremost consideration. Lewis likewise asserted that 

"time was at the top of the priority list." 3 

As Wall saw the situation, his primary goal coincided somewhat 

with that of the construction contractors. Their interests were best 

served by rapid completion so that they could collect their fees and 

move on to work elsewhere. He thought that the cost-plus-fixed-fee 

contract provided insufficient control over their expenditures beyond the personal assurances of the principal partners. Their reputations, like that of the Corps', would be enhanced by attaining all 

of the project goals, to be sure, but a quick finish represented the 

main payoff. Although Wall knew that the contractors' self-interest 

aligned them with his most important goal, he alerted his new staff 

officers to the need to monitor their actions closely.4 

Wall understood that the other major participants did not 

agree with his emphasis on the schedule . Hartung's major mission 

involved activating two bases, rather than building them on time, 

so he concentrated more on turning over two high-quality airfields. Wall thought his own concern with the deadline gave Hartung this opportunity: "I worry so damn much about time . .. he 

can worry about quality a little bit more." Bar-Tov's mission involved activating three bases, the two built by the Americans and a 

third slated for construction by the Israelis, so he stressed economy; he needed to have money available to finish his third installation. Wall understood the divergence of goals, as did Bar-Tov and 

his staff. Naomi Kogon described what she saw as American profligacy and its relationship to the Corps' goals: "If someone gave me 

the money and told me to build something as quickly as possible 

and gave me a limit of time, I'd say the hell with the money." 5 

Although the Americans knew that their priorities differed 

from Bar-Tov's, they never understood or accepted the depth of 

the Israeli concern for frugality. They did know that every dollar 
192 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

saved would correspondingly reduce Israel's contribution. But 

there remained a gap in comprehension of this issue, perhaps for 

two reasons. In the first place, the Corps lacked perspective on the 

Ministry of Defense's overall budget. From the time of the Six-Day 

War in 1967, Israeli defense outlays consumed ever-larger portions 

of government expenditures. In the mid-1980s the ministry's operating budget came to about $6 billion a year. The 1984 sum of 

$6.24 billion represented more than 31 percent of the government's budget. The amount was dwarfed by the American Department of Defense's $300 billion annual outlay but represented a far 

greater portion of public resources. Given this difference in resources, the Israelis placed much more importance on marginal 

project dollars. The American difficulty in coming to terms with Israeli design standards may also have added to the lack of understanding. Noah thought this problem stemmed partly from resentment of the need to work to foreign standards. Whether true or 

not, everyone in the Corps contingent-from Wall at the top to 

construction managers in the field-had problems with Israeli 

specifications. Some, Wall among them, saw many Israeli requirements as excessive, citing the extravagance of finishing details such 

as plaster walls and terrazzo floors. Others agreed but thought that 

the Israelis deliberately over-designed structures, hoping that their 

own construction contractors might come close to meeting them. 6 

Wall thought Ovda and Ramon amounted to communications 

zone air bases in a combat zone environment. He compared them 

to more austere American bases and to the Sinai bases that were 

being replaced. As an example, he contrasted the control tower 

meant for one of the new bases to an Israeli-built tower in the 

Sinai: "There's a damn tower .... They ain't built one of these sonsabitches there [Eitam and Etzion] yet." Mter eight years in the 

Sinai, the Israelis still had "one of these old temporary things .... I 

submit that any air force base in the world would be happy to have 

one of these." 7 

The Israeli concern for frugality often translated into efforts to 

release contingency funds committed to the program. With the 

widespread optimism about completing the job for less than the 

program estimate, they thought they could convince the Americans 

to reduce the allocation for contingencies, thereby freeing the 

funds for use elsewhere. Soon after Wall arrived, Bar-Tov raised the 

issue. During Morris' visit in August, the matter also came up. He 

turned it aside pending better data on final cost but expressed willingness to consider the possibility in 1981. At the end of the summer Ma'ayan brought it up again. Hartung sometimes seemed will-
THE THREE-LEGGED STOOL 193 

ing to discuss these overtures. However, with so many issues still unclear and with actual construction just under way, Wall declined. 8 

Otherwise, the differing opinions over the relative importance of 

project goals meant that all three had their spokesmen, although the 

representation was far from equal. For most of the Near East Project 

Office's short life, the Corps' emphasis on timely completion dominated the project. As Wall put it, restating the golden rule to reflect 

the reality of the project, "He who has the gold rules." This dominant position sometimes manifested itself in "an independent air," as 

McNeely put it. Wall conceded only a limited responsibility to the 

program managers in the area of "criteria and program requirements." His "command lines" went through New York City to Washington, and some thought he and his staff saw Hartung and Bar-Tov 

as adversaries. Whether or not this was so, the Tel Aviv staff did see itself as independent of the IBM Building. When forty-five former 

Near East Project Office employees later completed surveys, none of 

them identified the program manager as the man to whom the project reported.9 

In assessing his own staff, Wall saw areas that needed attention. 

He was concerned about morale, especially in Tel Aviv where the 

connection between the daily routine and progress at the sites was 

not always clear. He also sought a more efficient working relationship 

between the area offices and the headquarters. Basically, he picked 

up the theme of teamwork, that Lewis so often stressed. He and the 

area engineers, Wall knew, were still "feeling our way with each 

other," but he expected that to work out. He wanted his staff actively 

assisting the area offices rather than imposing requirements and creating work. In this regard procurement was his main concern, but 

procurement in general was becoming his greatest interest. [0 

Initially, Wall expressed some disappointment in the overall 

quality of personnel. Here, as with his emphasis on teamwork, he 

shared some of Lewis' concerns. Wall sought "a sense of urgency," 

particularly at Ovda where contractor management seemed sluggish in the wake of the rebar episode, but he did not find it there 

or in most other places. Some headquarters changes, including 

the arrival of a new procurement officer in June, promised improvement. In the construction division the situation remained 

unstable for much of the summer. Carl Damico replaced Donald 

Baer as head in May, but Wall and the assistant chief of construction, Rudolph E. Etheridge, got involved in a dispute that lasted 

through the season. Etheridge thought the project's long workweek unjustified by meaningful work. Because he considered the 

overtime superfluous, he refused to work beyond forty hours. Wall 

offere d him a new job as chief of construction at Ramon . 
194 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

General Bratton, Chief of Engineers 

Etheridge refused because 

that was not the position for 

which he came. There the situation stood until the summer, when his tour ended and 

he went home. 11 

Wall also alerted the staff 

to the need for phasedown 

planning, giving notice to all 

of the transitional and indeed 

transitory nature of the project. He assigned a senior officer to coordinate the work. 

Colon e l Wong did this initially. After h e left, Wall 

brought Colonel Clifton from 

Ramon to concentrate on this 

area. The impetus for early attention came from Lt. Gen. 

Joseph K. Bratton, who replaced Morris as chief of engineers in October 1980. Bratton wanted Wall out of Israel before 

the end of 1982. The Corps had no models for guidance in this difficult area, so Wall set up a temporary committee to assess the 

problem. Only with difficulty did the project staff make the mental 

shift needed to plan for phasedown while at the peak of construction. Colonel Griffis captured the irony of the situation: "I guess it 

is about time that a person start looking at that undertaking as 

both sites are about 10% completed." Given the problems involved 

in this change of emphasis, starting early was a good idea. 12 

Wall set the committee's agenda. He wanted the group to think 

about moving some functions to the sites but emphasized issues relating to the office in Tel Aviv. These included the number of people required, housing, office space, the post office, and the commissary. The group also examined the optional fourth year of the 

Management Support Associates contract, which would begin in 

May 1982. The committee brought together a large number of 

Wall's civilian and military staff officers, first chaired by Griffis and 

later by Wong. Members came from the personnel office, counsel, 

resource management, and administrative services. Thomas of the 

engineering division, who later became special adviser to Wall on 

phasedown, also participated, as did Hartung's office. Wong and 

George Snoddy also served on the committee. 13 
THE THREE-LEGGED STOOL 195 

The main operational effort in the headquarters still focused 

on tying together design, procurement, and construction. In accordance with Wall's insistence that construction should dominate the operational aspects of the project, the construction division became the center of activity just as permanent construction 

became the major effort in the field. Although the project represen ted a "design, procure [men t], and construction arena," as 

Thomas put it, Leroy H . Graw, who replaced Hallmark in procurement, put the relationships in perspective: "Construction has to 

come first." Wall wanted to secure the ties between the three components while ensuring the growing primacy of construction, so 

he transferred the scheduling function from the planning and coordination office to the construction division. Hartung consid. 

ered this change long overdue. A sensible approach to the sequence of work required close coordination of the schedule with 

the need for resources. Management of this coordination went to 

Damico's office, "where it belongs," according to Hartung, "and 

where it should have been ... when construction started." John 

Blake agreed; this small and ostensibly minor adjustment ended 

an illogical connection. Constructors, Blake thought, should determine construction schedules. In any event, he cared little for 

the analysis that came from planning and coordination. As far as 

he was concerned, "There never was any connection between reality and what was coming out of P &C." 14 

The real turning point came soon afterward. In August all participants agreed on what Hartung called "the construction site-activation interface schedule" for all work items at both bases. This 

meant reaching agreement on the timing and sequence for delivery of facilities so the Israelis could test them and install their 

equipment before moving in and making the bases operational. 

No less important than consensus on the schedule was an agreement on commitments. This did not come easily. Soon after Wall 

arrived, he recognized the gap between his understanding of his 

job and the perceptions of the program managers. In particular, 

he thought that Bar-Tov saw completion objective dates for individual facilities differently than he did. Wall considered them goals toward which he and the Corps would expend "their best efforts." 

Bar-Tov seemed to see them as deadlines to which the Americans 

were committed. To clarify the situation, Wall explained these 

views to both program managers. 15 

When Wall made his point to the program managers, he first 

showed a draft of his letter to Hartung. Wall sometimes used this 

technique to make a point or get action without having to sign and 

send a formal letter. This time, because of the importance of the 
196 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

Briefing at Ramon: Col. Paul Taylor describes construction to (left to 

right) Brig. Gen. John Wall, Brig. Gen. Paul Hartung, Mordechai Zippori, 

and Brig. Gen. Moshe Bar-Tov. 

matter, the draft was not a ploy. He meant to put the issu e on the 

table but gave Hartung the chance to consider the matter first. 

"Look," Wall said to Hartung early in July, "I'm going to send you 

this letter. Have you got any suggested changes?" Two weeks later, 

after Hartung indicated that h e could reply, Wall sent it to the IBM 

Building, and the issue was on the record to be resolved. 16 

All three generals saw the main question as involving the nature of the responsibilities of the Near East Project Office, but 

their views diverged from there. "Vall wanted to be h eld accountable only for doing the best h e could. Hartung thought Wall's 

point moot. As he saw it, except for the crucial April 1982 deadline, the Corps could not be expected to meet rigid sch edules. He 

also thought Wall's emphasis on his own commitments missed the 

key point: Bar-Tov, Hartung, and Wall shared responsibility for 

timely completion. Hartung agreed that the three-legged stool 

worked but reminded Wall that "the three legs are only needed to 

keep the stool on an even keel." Atop the stool sat the objective: 
THE THREE-LEGGED STOOL 197 

"The joint commitment of both DOD and MOD to share the responsibility to assure successful IOC." Bar-Tov appeared skeptical 

about Wall's insistence that his role was limited to "best efforts." 

Like Hartung, he stressed joint responsibility for the mission. 17 

Wall claimed that the exchange of correspondence cleared the 

air as well as highlighted differences. He proved to be right. By 

early October Wall and Hartung settled on a joint declaration of 

responsibilities. This was no mean feat. Ber,.yeen 28 September 

and 2 October, the statement went through eight drafts, with Wall, 

Hartung, and Lewis all making changes before a satisfactory version appeared. The negotiations bet'.-veen the Corps and the Air 

Force resembled discussions bet'.-veen sovereign governments in 

complexity and concern with nuance. 18 

As finally prepared, the statement entitled "Construction-Site 

Activation Interface Date" had t'.-vo noteworthy features. In line with 

Hartung's emphasis on the collective nature of program responsibility, it acknowledged the commitment of "all members of the Program" to completing the mission. The agreement also deleted all 

use of the phrase "best efforts," although Wall continued to use it in 

other references to his role. Instead, the statement spoke of the dedication of all "to meet or better the construction-site activation interface dates to provide the IAF initial operational capability." The 

Corps and its contractors would "manage construction to target 

dates which are essentially interface dates less r,.yo months or more 

of contingency time." Where a target date appeared unattainable, 

"the Program Managers and the Project Manager jointly" would decide on changing the date, arrange a workable joint occupancy, or 

seek other solutions. All in all, the statement reaffirmed the mutual 

commitment to the recently established schedule. 19 

Agreement on the schedule made it possible to deal with the 

long-standing need for a management information system. Both 

construction contracts required information systems that tracked 

progress and expenditures. Bory Steinberg of the planning and 

coordination office had wanted a system that would provide data 

"upon which to make a decision and to find out whether there are 

any problems and where to focus their attention." Very early, the 

Corps had decided to use extant contractor systems rather than 

require a single new one. This decision saved some time and 

money, but problems appeared when it became clear that the contractor systems were inappropriate. Also, there were just too many 

things to do at the beginning-ordering equipment, producing 

drawings, providing life support, and setting up a working relationship with the Israelis. "You can't do everything at once," 

Gilkey said, although fast-track construction demanded virtually 
198 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

that. "We were so busy trying to get things organized, get things 

moving, get other major problems solved," he noted, "that I think 

we went for a period of two or three months at the very beginning 

of the project without paying enough attention to the early developmen t of these programs." 20 

The magnitude of the problem became clear to Gilkey in 

September 1979. Soon afterward, Hartung began complaining 

about the lack of realistic and usable management data. There were 

grounds for concern, especially in the mobilization phase of the 

program. "A hell of a lot of bucks were being spent up front without 

any work going into the ground," Steinberg recalled, "and people 

were nervous." This was Hartung's point. In November 1979 he 

noted that outlays exceeded $57 million and obligations totaled 

over $190 million. ''Your three contractors," he told Gilkey, "could 

provide a more reasonable and accurate assessment of where 

they've been, where they are, and where they are planning to be in 

the near future ." But the basis for measuring the resources and 

time needed to complete structures was lacking for many months. 

The project had no way to predict productivity for its Thai and Portuguese workers. Moreover, until almost the end of 1979, when the 

construction contractors agreed to accept the government estimate 

for the cost of the work, final estimates of costs, labor, and schedule 

were not really possible. Despite the impediments to full and useful 

program reporting, Hartung and Bar-Tov pressured Gilkey for better reports. Meanwhile, the area offices pushed him the other way. 

"The time has come," O'Shei told Gilkey in May 1980, "to take a 

hard look at the whole MIS with a view toward reducing, not expanding, the flow of detailed information that, in my opinion, 

serves more to occupy the staff than provide operators with appropriate project and program level management data." 21 

At the same time, Wall arrived and started an all-out effort to rectify the situation. He called the management information system "my 

number one problem." Avoiding arguments about whether O'Shei 

or Hartung might be right, he had more basic concerns. "That's a 

problem," he said of the system, "because Mrs. Chayes, Under Secretary of the Air Force, thought it was a problem." As Steinberg put it, 

a main job of the system was to assure those interested in the program that progress was satisfactory: "to give them a warm-fuzzy that 

we were on schedule and within budget." And there was no question 

about Chayes' concern about the quality of the reporting system and 

the questions raised by the project office's ability to develop effective 

and timely schedules and cost estimates.22 

This drive itself may not have been possible without other critical and closely related actions during the summer of 1980, no-
THE THREE-LEGGED STOOL 199 

tably the establishment of meaningful schedules for turnover of 

facilities and the decision to increase the number of workers. 

Without timetables and the data on worker productivity that had 

been accumulated, as Steinberg said, "You couldn't pin down the 

exact size and skills of the work force needed." 23 Even with this information in hand, his office had to track between the bases to 

make sure they reported the same categories. With a number of 

major issues to be covered in the reports-bed down schedule, 

best efforts versus commitments, cost tracking and control, ties 

between design and procurement, and credible upward reporting-the project either had to develop its own system or accept 

the contractors' figures. 

The program adopted the latter choice and worked from 

there. Both Hartung and Wall expected in August 1980 that a usable system would be available the following month. Usable did 

not mean perfect. Data from the two systems had to be correlated 

manually, "with green eye shades and stubby pencils." In effect, the 

manual compilation of data from the two automated but different 

contractor systems became a third system. The report that 

emerged in September appeared coincidentally with the transition 

from mobilization to permanent construction. All of the necessary 

experience factors and schedules were in hand. Moreover, with 

permanent construction becoming the dominant part of the job, 

there was something more substantial than spending to report. 

Hartung appeared satisfied that the reports generated by this process met his needs. One report per base gave information on 

scheduling and progress that was no more than ten days old. Information on expenditures was reported one month behind the data 

on progress and schedule.

24 

Hartung still thought the system was poorly conceived. He felt 

that the reporting should have been a program responsibility or at 

least a construction agent responsibility, perhaps carried out by 

Management Support Associates. The effort to combine two different accounting systems, which were both geared to managing construction rather than a program, yielded a product that was not useful for making comparisons between the bases, for analyzing 

program costs involving the Department of Defense and Management Support Associates in Tel Aviv, or for tracking site activation.

25 

Meanwhile, efforts to tie construction more closely to design 

and procurement went on. Their relationship was clear to all as 

the emphasis continued to shift toward construction. During the 

summer of 1980 Thomas recognized that design was still incomplete and that partial design allowed for only partial procurement. 

He hoped to finish design by February 1981, while Wall goaded 
200 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

the procurement office into action. The problems inherent in concurrent design and procurement, combined with the knowledge 

that delays in procurement would slow construction, meant that all 

three would have ample chance to work together. 26 

Some aspects of this coordination went more easily than others. 

Damico in construction and Thomas of engineering had worked 

together at Cape Canaveral, on the antiballistic missile program, 

and in Saudi Arabia. Craw in procurement was a stranger to the 

Corps of Engineers but had impressive credentials. A 1964 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy and a veteran of six years on active duty, he had remained in the Army Reserves after his resignation in 1970. So he was well acquainted with the Army. He also had 

a doctorate in education from the University of Southern California and ample experience in government procurement, most recently with the Defense Logistics Agency. He should have fit well 

but did not. Like Management Support Associates, which had tried 

to reorganize procurement in the previous year, Craw was an outsider. Damico and Thomas, veterans of the Corps old-boy network, 

ran the divisions between which he was supposed to provide the 

bridge. Craw himself sometimes appeared to alienate his coworkers-Wall considered him "a little overbearing at times"-and was 

never fully accepted. Nevertheless, no one questioned his ability. 

Bar-Tov, who generally thought poorly of American management, 

called Craw "one of the pros in this program." 27 

When Craw arrived in June, the last issues of the procurement 

guidance series started by Raymond Aldridge were coming out, 

and there was a procurement logjam. "There were," Craw said, 

"still things that were being done [just] before I arrived that 

should have been done ... nine or twelve months before." The systems created by Aldridge and Roy Edwards represented a positive 

but relatively untested step. Basically, the project was propelled 

along on the basis of procedures with which Craw took issue. He 

found the situation "very difficult professionally, coming in at that 

point in time after the program had operated under those procedures and attempting to change them." As Craw saw the situation, 

the emphasis on the schedule took its toll in terms of quality and 

cost. He saw unnecessary haste and indifference to cost analyses 

prior to purchases. Virtually everyone involved with the program 

would have agreed to a degree with Craw's impression. In the summer of 1980 problems with the procurement operation generally 

were considered those most in need of resolution. 28 However, consensus on the exact nature of the difficulty or its cause was lacking. 

From the construction division's point of view, the problem was 

twofold. On one hand, compiling information on needed materials 
THE THREE-LEGGED STOOL 201 

was a time-consuming process that depended on timely completion 

of facility design. Enough materials for construction never seemed 

to be on hand. The sites also complained of equipment shortages. 

Butler at Ramon said that nothing came on site quickly enough. 

The chief auditor, Michael Maloney, had a somewhat different view. 

He thought too much of the purchasing was carried out on an 

emergency basis because of inadequate planning. He attributed the 

problem to the lack of familiarity among government and contractor personnel with the acquisition processes for a project on such a 

tight schedule. Craw felt that he absorbed the blame for someone 

else's problem; bills of materials were the engineering division's 

business. If design was not completed promptly, neither was purchasing, so the engineering division made its presence felt in the establishment of priorities. Moreover, all other things being equal, 

the contractor, particularly at Ramon, tended to choose the fastest 

delivery over the lowest price. 29 

At the area offices some agreed at least partly with this assessment. Assistant Area Engineer Peterson at Ramon thought that the 

emphasis on procurement during the spring of 1980 had been misplaced. He felt that procurement was the next step after design, 

where more attention should have been invested. Colonel Kelly at 

Ovda also cited delays in completing design packages. Criffis, who 

ran the planning and coordination office on Wall's staff until replacing Colonel Taylor as head of the Ramon Area Office in the summer 

of 1981, agreed that "the procurement problems are engineering 

problems and not procurement expert problems." So, Craw was not 

alone in arguing that the slow procurement stemmed from difficulties in the design process. He also believed that the excessive cost of 

some purchases derived from the lack of cost analysis.

3o 

There was no disagreement about the inextricable relationship 

among design, procurement, and construction. The three were indeed interrelated, and the evolution of design determined the pace 

at which materials could be bought. In fact, the approval system in 

the Near East Project Office included simultaneous authorizations 

for site adaptation and procurement. Bulk materials were purchased 

when the layout and general design were approved, and increased 

releases for purchase were based on more detailed drawings. Craw 

saw the issue as the amount of influence that the other two activities 

exerted over purchasing. So while views of the specific nature of the 

relationship varied, everyone understood the close tie. 3! 

Craw's solution had a familiar ring. He thought procurement 

should not have been split and located in the desert. The design 

organization, on which so much of the procurement work depended, was centralized in Tel Aviv. Moreover, such procurement 
202 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

talent as existed within the project was spread thinly through the 

government and contractor organizations and could have been 

better used in a single office. With the program so far along that 

consolidation was not realistically possible, Craw called for better 

communication between the sites so the separate procurement operations could share their experiences. Another incentive to centralization was the fact that the construction contractors followed 

divergent approaches to purchasing. Negev Airbase Constructors 

developed a consolidated procurement plan. With a larger professional staff on board earlier than that at Ramon and a fresh infusion of management after the reinforcing steel issue was resolved, 

the Ovda contractor got off to a faster start with its office engineering and procurement. Kelly thought developing a consolidated 

procurement plan was "the most fantastic thing they could have 

done." Air Base Constructors on the other hand bought materials 

by individual facility, so they took longer and did not catch up with 

Ovda until the middle of 1981. In addition to producing results at 

different paces, the two approaches produced different reports 

and tended to confuse vendors.

32 

With the project so far along, Wall did not try to reorganize the 

system. Instead he gave procurement command attention, designating as his most urgent priority the completion of 90 percent of purchases by January 1981. Later, when he was able to reflect on the 

matter, he did recommend centralized procurement on subsequent 

projects. He and Craw both knew that the completion of exactly 

nine-tenths of all purchases by the first of the year-WaIl's "management challenge number one"-was unimportant. In the summer of 1980 Wall did not expect that the goal would be met and was 

even unsure that it was important to do so. Considering the construction schedule, he would have settled for 90 percent by February or March. Basically, he wanted to goad the procurement organization into action. As Hartung said, Wall's "ninety percent was an 

arbitrary thing, but it created a catalyst to put people to work." 33 

And it did work. Neither area office hit exactly 90 percent, but 

both came close. They completed the lion's share of their purchasing, albeit with some panic buying in December, as Wall knew. He 

expected to "have problems with procurement until we get all procured items on board and we get them imbedded in the buildings." Still the major surge in activity was over at the start of 1981. 

Kelly thought Wall's emphasis on this area helped immensely: "It 

did more for this program than anything else." 34 

There was more to the procurement problem in the summer 

of 1980 than the need to accelerate the pace. Relations between 

the office in Tel Aviv and the procurement branches in the area of-
THE THREE-LEGGED STOOL 203 

fices were abysmal. August and September 1980 were especially 

bad. Ovda accused Graw of "extra-legal suggestions." Ramon 

hinted that it would send Graw the data he wanted only if its use 

was apparent to the area office and claimed that his instructions 

confused the vendors. Graw contributed a lecture on "the Federal 

norm" in procurement. Clearly relations between Graw's office 

and the sites transcended the usual vertical tension between superior and subordinate headquarters. As Wall said in August, "If I 

had to pick the worst area of cooperation it would probably be procurement right now." Graw thought part of the problem was organizational: procurement people on the sites worked for their 

respective area engineers and did not take well to directions from 

Tel Aviv. Among the consequences of this arrangement that he 

found frustrating was lack of control over hiring for purchasing 

j obs at the sites. Coupled with the different contractor approaches 

to procurement, the independence of the area offices made implementing uniform policy and procedures difficult. Even coordinating the two sites to obtain discounts through larger purchases 

sometimes proved impossible. 35 

The area offices did not hesitate to tell the Near East Project 

Office that it was a large part of the procurement problem. In 

April Curl had "repeatedly asked" Noah to cancel the weekly procurement meetings that Curl considered a waste of his time. 

Graw's arrival did nothing to lessen the hostility. Six weeks after 

he arrived, he asked Ramon and Ovda for lists of their top five 

problems. Each put Graw's office on its list. Ovda's complaints included complicated program procedures that confused and 

lengthened the procurement cycle. Ramon cited Tel Aviv in two 

of its five trouble areas: for confusing guidance and excessive requests for information.

36 

Even in the summer of 1980, when Wall could not be sure that 

the procurement system would respond as well as it did to his 

challenge, he looked at another major area of concern. Changes 

in the Israeli economy, particularly in the constru ction sector 

where unemployment was high and equipment stood idle, had 

brought requests for more opportunities for Israeli workers and 

vendors. At the June press conference Hartung described efforts 

to expand Israeli involvement. The program was doing its best to 

buy materials in the country and had made commitments to 

spend more than $50 million. Expenditures would go even 

higher, Hartung told reporters. The program also absorbed some 

unemployed construction workers. During the previous winter 

Ramon had been authorized to hire 200 Israelis from nearby 

towns, but so far only 90 had taken jobs. The considerations that 
204 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

determined the level of involvement of Israeli vendors or workers 

had little to do with the needs of the program. Decisions, as general manager Davis at Ovda noted, were based on politics rather 

than engineering, and some Americans were more sensitive to the 

situation than others. Hartung usually seemed more willing to accommodate the Israelis than did the Near East Project Office, although the Corps also took steps to integrate Israeli goods and 

services. In December 1979 Gilkey had made a presentation to 

the Israeli Association of Manufacturers on project procurement. 

More than two hundred business representatives attended. In July 

1980, as cooperation grew, Graw assigned Leonard Beder of his 

staff to work more closely with Bar-Tov's office in improving 

relations with Israeli firmsY 

The expanded effort in 1980 involved numerous meetings at 

which Graw or others from the project explained the U.S. government's way of doing business and the needs of the program. As attorney John Brown noted, "The moment we realized they didn't 

understand us, we set out to teach them." Although Wall recognized the necessity of the discussions, he was not pleased. "Meetings are bad," he contended, "because they take people away from 

the job of building air bases." Nevertheless, a dramatic increase in 

the amount of money spent in Israel ensued. The total value rose 

from about $8.5 million through December 1979 to over $36 

million by the end of June 1980.38 

As the Americans adjusted to more Israeli participation, the 

problem became that of keeping the Israelis from disrupting the 

procurement system. Part of the difficulty came from their different approach to business. Israeli standards for materials were no 

lower than American specifications, but their procedures tended 

to be less formal than the more explicit and rigid procedures in 

federal regulations. Wall saw an inclination among the Israelis to 

bargain after a contract was signed. This tendency, he said, caused 

"a lot of consternation." He responded by trying to withhold price 

information from Bar-Tov's office. He was willing to discuss technical and contractual aspects of bids but insisted that the award go to 

the lowest bidder who met those requirements. ''This caused the Israelis a hell of a lot of problems," he said; they wanted to "see what 

the technical package looked like in relation to its price" so they 

could negotiate prices on that basis. Their approach, unconventional and at times even incomprehensible by American standards, 

led to some peculiar situations. In September 1980 Ramon let a 

contract for electrical supplies with an Israeli vendor, who later 

withdrew his bid. This change came at the request of the Ministry 

of Defense, which wanted the next lowest bidder to get the award. 
THE THREE-LEGGED STOOL 205 

"This is a case," the area office complained, "of MOD and the vendors working it all out and presenting ABC with either a fait 

accompli or collusion or both." Innovators with little patience for 

routine, the Israelis showed no more respect for a chain of command than for procedures. Bar-Tov's office went directly to the 

constructors with procurement directions, bypassing Wall's staff 

and the area office. The area office at Ramon objected strenuously. Taylor told Butler that only the area office was authorized to 

issue guidance to the contractor organization. 39 

The Israelis never left any doubt that they were paying close attention to procurement transactions. Bar-Tov wanted both program managers to give full attention to the procurement activities 

of the contractors. He and his advisers protested the number of 

emergency procurement actions, which they claimed gave Israeli 

firms insufficient time to respond. Bar-Tov also complained that 

the same companies repeatedly won contracts by small margins. Although he had no proof of foul play, he stayed concerned about 

fraud. As Kogon recalled, he wanted "to see the first guy in jail." 40 

The Israeli concern may have been legitimate, but it was distracting. Hartung tried to minimize Bar-Tov's involvement, reminding him that it was unwise to tie up the contractors and area 

offices with questions. Bar-Tov persisted, insisting that management in Tel Aviv should help the contractors spot possible errors. 

Keeping Bar-Tov's office out of the process was difficult if not impossible. Moreover, doing so would have been counterproductive. 

The staff helped with the maze that was Israeli customs. In addition, the contractors used the help of the Ministry of Defense in 

conducting preaward surveys and price analyses and later in expediting deliveries from Israeli suppliers. In fact, the help from BarTov's office in these areas was sufficiently important that it was the 

subject of the first substantive procurement guidance document. 

Bar-Tov himself almost became the point of contact between the 

project office and Israeli businesses, adding significantly to his already heavy work load and to the crowded agendas of the program 

management meetings. 41 

Although creation of expanded opportunities for Israeli businesses and workers did not derive from the needs of the program itself, it still worked to the program's advantage. Israeli workers never 

made a significant impact because of the small number employed. 

On the other hand, purchases of Israeli goods proved beneficial. 

Whether made in the United States, as they frequently were, or in 

Israel, their quality was high, and transportation costs were low. 42 

By the end of the summer of 1980 the procurement structure 

and the needs that it filled had evolved considerably. Still, Wall had 
206 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

no illusions about the future. He expected that problems would not 

disappear but only change. He was concerned about excessive purchases and control of the inventory that he would have to turn over 

to the Israelis at project's end. Maloney was even less sanguine, 

claiming that from a systems point of view, little had changed. In 

fact, as time grew shorter, individual purchases became even more 

rushed and disorganized. 43 Yet, dramatic improvements had taken 

place. The procurement specialists from Huntsville had given structure to the program; Wall and Craw had given it effective management. At the same time, the project had reached an equilibrium 

with the Israelis that balanced their desire for greater participation 

against the American need to work within their system. 

Despite the attention paid to procurement during the second 

half of 1980, design also received command interest. Mter all, design set the pace for work. Completion of purchases and development of definitive construction schedules awaited the end of this 

phase. Thomas considered the job big, rather than difficult, except for the hardened facilities, which required substantial attention. All in all, during the summer of 1980, he saw the task in terms 

of "this school of minnows swimming around." There were indeed 

a great number of minnows. Each base required about 5,500 drawings, which were issued an average of three times. The pace of design quickened during the spring and summer, and Air Base Constructors' design organization went on an eighty-hour workweek in 

May. Israeli firms still produced incomplete or partial plans, which 

the contractors coordinated and consolidated for procurement 

and construction.44 

As production increased, the need to limit and control 

changes of completed drawings became clear. Virtually all major 

construction jobs, whether fast track or fixed price, faced this 

problem. Evolving project needs, new technology, and design flaws 

caused by errors or omissions necessitated reevaluation and alteration of drawings. Corps projects were no exception. However, in 

less developed but richer nations than Israel, the issue was not as 

troublesome. In Saudi Arabia, where for many years competence 

was limited while funds were not, changes were easily accepted and 

incorporated in plans. 45 

Hartung, who raised the issue with Bar-Tov in March, was concerned about changes finding their way into designs and master 

plans without going through the approval process for engineering 

change proposals. Each adjustment might be warranted, but impromptu changes in the field left management out of the decisionmaking process. Besides, a large number of changes, however 

small each one might be, threatened to affect the schedule and 
THE THREE-LEGGED STOOL 207 

cost of the project. Discussions of control of these changes revealed differing viewpoints between the program managers. In 

principle, the configuration control board set up during Noah's 

tenure managed the processing and implementation of design 

changes. The existence of a procedure, however, brought no assurance that it would be followed, and Hartung complained that 

changes slipped into designs and master plans unbeknownst to 

management. He feared that an accumulation of changes, however justified and minor they might be individually, would collectively harm the project. Bar-Tov's view differed somewhat. He encouraged adherence to the rules, but only to a degree. Procedures, 

he insisted, were meant to help do the job and should be followed 

only to the extent that they did so. The Israeli armed forces had 

earned a reputation for improvisation, and he sought to keep his 

freedom of action. "As professional managers," he said, "we are responsible for using judgment in applying rules; don't be dead 

right in applying the ECP process." 46 

The Israeli penchant for improvisation became clearer as the 

number of change proposals mounted. All told, the alterations 

came from a variety of sources, the program management offices, 

the Corps of Engineers, the three contractors, and the Air Force 

regional civil engineer. Bar-Tov's office consistently produced 

more than any of the other six sources. Four hundred of the 907 

that were processed and approved came from the Ministry of Defense. During June through October 1980 the number of changes, 

particularly those from Bar-Tov's office, peaked. They became the 

focus of attention by Wall's office and the sites and caused tension 

among the three principal managers. Wall, who disliked the procedure for managing the changes because it "gave ultimate ECP approval authority to DOD PM," found the long meetings over the 

issue frustrating. During one discussion, he wrote "Build it!!!" in 

his notebook while listening to the arguments. Damico, perhaps 

echoing the feelings of construction people everywhere, also considered the changes very disruptive (Tables 2 and 3) Y 

In August the program managers acted to limit the number of 

proposals. Thomas, who complained about trivial changes by the 

Ministry of Defense, urged that changes be limited to those that 

fixed so-called fatal errors-design flaws that had to be corrected 

before construction began. Changes in shelter design already had 

caused alteration of more than one hundred drawings. Bar-Tov 

and Hartung agreed to this standard for plans already in the approval process. Thomas was to provide all agencies with a design 

schedule so they could consider the status of specific plans before 

suggesting changes.

48 
208 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

TABLE 2-ENGINEERING CHANGE PROPOSALS (ECPs) 

BY MONTH AND ORIGINATOR 

(Aircraft Shelter ECPs in Parentheses) 

Month ECPs DOD MOD COE AFRCE ABC NAC MSA UNK 

Dec 79 ... 2 2 

Jan SO .... 5 3 2 

Feb SO ... 34(4) 6 22(4) 4 I 

Mar SO ... 40( 16) 4 12(1) 19(10) 2(1) 3(4) 

Apr SO ... 44(1S) 1 21 (7) 5(2) 5(4) 11(5) 

MaySO . . . 4S(11) 1(1) 22(4) 12(3) 4 7(3) 

Jun SO ... . 61 (25) 30(11) 10(6) 7(3) 14(5) 

JuISO .... 80(22) 3(1) 37(10) 16(4) 6(2) 12(5) 6 

Aug SO ... S6(29) 2(2) 41 (12) 14(4) lS(7) 9(4) 2 

Sep SO ... SO(21) 2(2) 20(S) 14(4) 1 (1) 23(3) 19(3) 

Oct SO ... 66(12) 1 17(5) 22(1) 4(1) 9(4) 13(1) 

Nov SO ... 3S(6) 2 21 (6) S 5 

Dec SO ... 33(6) 1 22(5) S( l) 1 

Jan Sl .... 30(1) 1 (1) 13 7 4 2 2 

Feb Sl ... 33(6) 17(3) 10(2) 3 2( 1) 

Mar Sl ... 4S(5) 25(3) 13 1 (1) 4(1) 5 

Apr Sl ... 37(5) 4(1) 17(3) 9(1) 6 

MayS1 ... 32(S) 6 16(6) S(2) 2 

Jun SI ... IS 1 9 S 

Jul 81 .... 22(2) 3 10(1) S(l) 

Aug Sl ... 9 5 4 

Sep Sl . . . 10(3) 3(1) 4(1) 2(1) 

OctS1 ... 11 S 2 

Nov Sl .. 10 4 5 

Dec S1 ... 7(1) 4(1) 2 1 

J an S2 .... 16(1) 5 3(1) 3 2 3 

Feb S2 ... 2 2 

Mar S2 . . . 5 2 2 

Source: NEPO Engineering Division, ECP Log, IABP files, WNRC, Accession 77-83-1025, Box 4. 

TABLE 3-TOTAL ENGINEERING CHANGE PROPOSALS 

(Aircraft Shelter ECPs in Parentheses) 

Agency December 1979-March 19S2 June-October 1980 

DOD ........... 49 (9) S (5) 

MOD ... . .... .. . 400 (92) 145 (46) 

COE .. .. . .. . ... 222 (42) 76 (19) 

AFRCE .......... S (3) 5 (2) 

ABC .. . . . ... . ... 104 (25) 63 (19) 

NAC . ... ... . . . . 106 (30) 67 (1S) 

MSA ............ 17 (1) 9 

Total .. . . . . . 906 (202) 373 (109) 

Source: NEro Engineering Division, Eep Log, IABP files, WNRC, Accession 77-83-1025. Box 4. 
THE THREE-LEGGED STOOL 209 

Wall took over from there. He told the area offices to "take a 

very hard line on ECPs." Then he spelled out this position. The 

problem had reached a point where "even minor changes may 

have a serious impact on the program." Like Hartung, he was concerned that "a proliferation of seemingly insignificant and unimportant changes will build up to have a significant impact." He 

wanted the area offices to assess each proposal they received, inform Wall's representative on the configuration control board of 

the cost of each, and state their positions regarding acceptance. 49 

While Wall tried to control the growing number of change proposals, the issues they generated remained only partly resolved. 

Bar-Tov complained that the contractors made unauthorized 

changes while adapting building designs to the sites, introducing 

alterations that might themselves contain fatal errors or create delays. Thomas thought that the Israelis rather than the contractors 

were inclined to make impromptu changes in plans. Wall agreed, 

although he cared little about where the tinkering came from: 'We 

do not intend to accept changes from any source except approved 

ECPs while designs are in progress." 50 

Well into the fall, the matter of change proposals created tension between the program managers. Over the summer positions 

had remained unchanged. For the Israelis, Ma'ayan contended that 

management of changes was the program's main problem. He understood the reluctance of the Americans to consider desirable but 

unnecessary changes. However, he thought that Bar-Tov should decide which ones were in fact needed. Hartung disagreed. He 

claimed that discriminating between changes that were required 

and those that were not was a subj ective exercise. Bar-Tov later 

agreed with this point but otherwise held to his former position. 

Hartung also remained adamant: he wanted the changes stopped 

because they cost money and slowed progress. If the job could be 

done first and the change made later, Hartung wanted it that way.51 

At stake was more than competing viewpoints on change proposals. The issues were program control and the philosophy governing construction. If the Israelis prevailed, they would improvise 

and experiment all the way to April 1982. If the Americans kept 

control, they would adhere to the design plans and their system of 

project management. While the program managers argued, the 

Corps of Engineers grew more concerned. In Washington Deputy 

Chief of Engineers Wray knew that Hartung was doing his best to 

control changes but was troubled by the lack of progress. Wall's 

boss in the Directorate of Military Programs, Drake Wilson, added 

that the large volume of changes was causing a decline of confi-
210 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

dence in the Corps' ability to meet the schedule. Like Hartung, he 

believed it would cost less to correct mistakes later. 52 

Meanwhile, Wall became even more frustrated. Because of a 

dispute over a detail in a shop drawing, the Israelis at Ramon 

halted a concrete pour at the radio transmitter building. The delay 

kept the contractor from meeting his scheduled completion date. 

Wall thought this was no way to build an air base. The facility 

should have been built as designed or taken off the list of facilities 

needed for initial operating capability. If the design error was indeed fatal, all concerned should have walked away from it, analyzed the problem, and rescheduled construction. 53 

Although the discussions persisted until late autumn and flared 

anew in later months, by December the program reached an equilibrium if not a consensus. The number of change proposals declined 

from an average of 70 per month from June to October to 33 in December and 30 in January. In part, the issue was taking care of itself: 

as design became more complete, fewer changes were proposed. At 

the same time, the area offices helped reduce the number of 

changes and the amount of effort expended in Tel Aviv by approving 

and issuing minor changes (those not affecting design or the scope 

of work) as "Information Reports" in the field. Changes with broad 

effects still went to the program managers, but Hartung remained 

determined to limit changes and the ensuing disruptions.

54 

As the issue declined in importance, the pendulum continued 

to swing toward the construction division. In February 1981 Damico took over approval of change proposals. At the same time, 

much but not all project design was completed. Problems inherent 

in the Israeli approach to this phase persisted, and incomplete 

drawings complicated procurement for some time. Craw noted 

that a great deal remained to be done, that even in the fall of 1981, 

many months after design was nominally finished, drawings for 

electrical panel boards for Ramon were yet to be done. "This 

stuff," he said, "about 100 percent of the design being completed 

in January of 1981 is all bull shit." Still, 1981 started with procurement nearly 90 percent complete and design also close to being 

done. The prime activity for the new year would be construction. 55 
THE THREE-LEGGED STOOL 211 

Notes 

1. Wall in tenriew, Aug 80. 

2. Proceedings of Press Conference, 12 Jun 80. 

3. MFR, Wray, 30 Apr 80, sub: Meeting with Israeli Officials on Air Base 

Construction, IABPC, 1/2; Lewis interview, J an-Feb 82, part 1; Morris interview. 

4. Wall, Briefing for Incoming Officers, 14Jun 8l. 

5. Ibid.; N. Steinberg interview. 

6. Lucinda Franks, "Israel After Lebanon," New York Times Magazine (25 March 

1984) : 66; Drew Middleton, "Israel's Defense: As Good As Ever?" New York Times 

Magazine (19 May 1985) : 63; Schiff, The Israeli Anny, p. 189; Wall interview, Aug 80. 

7. Noah interview; Wall interview, Aug 80, May 81, Oct 81, and May 82; Grafa 

interview; Parkes interview, May 81; Interv, author with Edgar N. Moon, Oct 81, 

Ovda, Israel. 

8. Lewis, Notes on Telephone Conversation of 11 Aug. 1980 with Morris; Wall, 

Project Notebooks, vol. I, 22Jun 80, and vol. III, 24 Sep 80, IABPC, 90. 

9. Wall, Briefing for Incoming Officers, 14Jun 81; McNeely interview, Mar 84; 

Proceedings of Press Confe rence, 12 Jun SO; USACE CERL, Project Manager's 

Handbook for SPecial Projecls, Technical RptP-S5/01 , p. 5S. 

10. Wall interview, Aug 80; Wall, Project Notebooks, vol. 1,21 Jun SO, and vol. 

II, lSJul SO, IABPC, 90. 

11. Wall interview, Aug 80; Wall, Project Notebooks, vol. I, 24 May SO, IABPC, 

90; DF, R. E. Etheridge, Assistant Chief, Construction Division, to Project Manager, 17 Aug SO, sub: Work Schedule of the Undersigned, with comments 2, 3, 

and 4, IABPC, 3/6. 

12. Wall inte rview, May 81; Chapla interview, Apr Sl; Griffis, Daily Journal, 

P&C Office,Jul SO-Apr Sl, 14 Aug SO, IABPC, 41/1. 

13. DF, Gilkey to DOD PM and Committee Members, 14 Aug SO, sub: Project 

Phasedown, IABPC, 33/2; Sales interview, Apr Sl. 

14. Graw inte rview, Oct Sl; Thomas inte rview, Aug SO; Blake inte rview; 

Hartung interview, Apr Sl. 

15. Hartung interview, Apr Sl; Ltr, Wall to Hartung, 1 Sep SO, sub: Construction Site Activation Interface-Ramon, IABPC, S6/1; Wall, Project Notebooks, 

vol. V, 31 Mar and 8 May Sl, IABPC, 90; Wall interview, Aug 80. 

16. Wall interview, Aug SO; Wall, Briefing for Incoming Office rs, 14Jun Sl. 

17. Ltr, Wall to Hartung, 20 Jul 80, sub: Commitment Versus "Best Effort" in 

Meeting IAF Bed Down Dates, IABPC, 33/2; Ltr, Hartung to Wall, 29 Jul SO, sub: 

Construction-Site Activation Inte rface Scheduling, IABPC, S6/2; Bar-Tov inte rview, Oct 81. The Balfour Declaration of 1916, Great Britain's pledge to wOl-k toward creation of aJewish homeland in Palestine, centered on a phrase similar to 

Wall 's "best efforts." The declaration said in part: "His Majesty's Gove rnment view 

with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish 

people, and will use their best endeavors [emphasis added] to facilitate the achievement of this objective." Quote from Kurzman, Ben-Gl.l1i on, p. 121. 

I S. Ltr, Wall to Hartung, 1 Sep SO, sub: Construction Site Activation Interface; 

MFR, Alan Shepherd, 2 Oct 80, sub: Construction Site Activation Interface Date 

Position Statement Audit Trail. Both in IABPC, S6/2. 

19. Construction-Site Activation Inte rface Date, Encl to Lu-, Wall to Wray, 2 

Oct SO, sub: Construction Site Interface Schedule, IABPC, S6/2; Wall, Briefing 

for Incoming Officers, 14Jun 81. 
212 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

20. Inte rv, author with Bory Steinbe rg, Feb S5, Washington , D.C.; Lewis 

interview, jan-Feb S2, part 3; Gilkey interview; ENR (22 April 19S2): 75. 

21. B. Steinberg interview; Ltr, Hartung to Gilkey, IS Nov 79, sub: Program 

Report-October 1979, IABPC, 9/7; Gilkey interview; Hartung interview, Apr SI; 

Lewis inte rview, jan-Feb S2, pa rt 3. Ltrs, Bar-Tov to Hartung, 2S Feb SO, sub: The 

Program Reports; Hartung to Noah, 7 Mal' SO, sub: Program Reports; Gilkey to 

Hartung, 13 Mar SO, sub: Program Reports; Hartung to Gilkey, 17 Mar SO, sub: 

Program Reports; in IABPC, 9/7. Ltr, O'Shei to Gilkey, 21 May SO, sub: Request 

for Scheduling Data, IABPC, 33/1. 

22. Wall interview, Aug SO; B. Steinberg interview; NEPO Sitrep No. 40, 5 jun 

SO, IABPC, 14/5. 

23. B. Steinberg in terview. 

24. Wall interview, Aug SO; Hartung interview, Aug SO and Apr SI; Interv, 

author with Robert 1. Barry, Aug SO, Tel Aviv, Israe l; B. Steinberg interview. 

25. Hartung inte rview, May S2. 

26. Taylor inte rview; Thomas interview, Aug SO. 

27. Damico interview, Aug SO; Graw interview, Oct SI ; Association of Graduates, United States Military Academy, Register oj Graduates and Fonner Cadets, 

1802- 1984 (Association of Graduates, 19S4) , p . 6S4; Wall in terview, May SI ; 

OAO, Master Diary, vol. IV, 20 Feb SI, IABPC, S5/1; Bar-Tov in terview, May S2. 

2S. DF, Leonard Beder, Acting Chief, P&S, to Deputy Project Manager, 3 jun 

SO, sub: Input for Project Manager's Letter to the Chief of Engineers, IABPC, 

33/1; Chapla interview, Aug SO; Graw interview, Apr and Oct S1. 

29. Wall interview, Aug SO; Blake interview; Butle r inte rview; Maloney 

interview, Aug SO; Graw interview, Apr and Oct SI . 

30. Graw inte rvi ew, Apr and Oct SI ; Peterson interview, May SI; Kelly 

inte rview, May SI ; Griffis, P&Cjournal, 3 Sep SO, IABPC, 41/1. 

31. Hartung interview, May SI; Thomas interview, Aug SO; Maloney inte rview, 

May S1. 

32. Hartung in terview, Apr SI; Graw interview, Apr and Oct SI ; Petel'son 

interview, Oct SI; Kelly inte rview, May S1. 

33. USACE, The Israeli Airbase Program: Lessons Lea'rned, Engineer Pamphlet 

5-1-5 (Washington, D.C.: OCE, Sep S2), p. 20; Wall interview, Aug SO; Graw 

interview, Oct SI; Hartung inte rview, Apr S1. 

34. ''''all interview, May SI; Wall, Proj ect Notebooks, vol. IV, 10 Dec SO, IABPC, 

90; Kelly inte rview, May S1. 

35. Telexes, Ovda P&S to NEPO P&S, 5 Aug SO, sub: Procurement Data Requ irements and Procedures; Ramon P&S to NEPO P&S, IS Aug SO, sub: Procurement Data Requirement; Ramon P&S to NEPO P&S, 29 Aug SO, sub: Data Requests; Ramon P&S to NEPO P&S, 21 and 29 Aug SO, sub: Aircraft Towing 

Winches; NEPO P&S to Ramon P&S, 21 Aug SO, sub: Aircraft Towing Winches. All 

in IABPC, 33/ 2. Ltr, Wall to Area Engineers, 7 Sep SO, sub: Adherence to the Defense Acquisition Regulation (DAR), IABPC, 33/3; Wall interview, Aug SO; Graw 

interview, Apr and Oct SI; MFR, Wharry, 17 Dec SO, sub: Trip Report-Israel Air 

Bases Construction Project. 

36. OAO, Master Diary, vol. II, 29 Apr SO, IABPC, S4/4. Telex, OAO P&S to 

NEPO P&S, 1 Aug SO, sub: Procurement Data Requirements; Telex, RAO P&S to 

NEPO P&S, 2 Aug SO, sub: Procurement Data Requirements. Both in IABPC, 

33/ 2. 

37. Proceedings of Press Conference, 12 jun SO; Davis in terview; Lewis interview, j an-Feb S2, part 1; NEPO Sitrep No. 24, 6jan SO, IABPC, 13/ 9; DF, Gl'aw to 

Gilkey, 3 jul SO, sub: Input for Letter to the Chief of Engineers, IABPC, 33/2. 
THE THREE-LEGGED STOOL 213 

3S. Brown interview, Aug SO; Wall interview, Aug SO; Memo, Wall through 

DOD PM for MOD PM, 27 Jul SO, sub: Quarterly Report fo r Central Bureau of 

Statistics, IABPC, lS/6. 

39. Chapla intervi ew, Aug SO; Wall interview, Aug SO; Te lex, Ramon P&S to 

NEPO P&S, 25 Sep SO, sub: MOD Interference in ABC Procurement, IABPC, 

33/3; Ltr, Taylor to Butler, 29 Sep SO, sub: Au thorized Direction from the Contracting Officer, IABPC, 33/3. 

40. Telex, Kedem, MOD PMO Economic Unit, to NEPO P&S and AFRCERamon [co 15 May SO], sub: RFQ No. 54030E09; Telex, Moshe Goldsmidt, MOD 

PMO Economic Unit, to NEPO P&S and AFRCE-Ramon, 9 Jun SO, sub: Water 

Storage Tank, IABPC, 33/1; MFR, Hartung and Bar-Tov, 2 Apr SO, sub: 

DOD/MOD PMs Meeting, 27 Mar. 19S0, IABPC, 45/4; N. Steinberg interview. 

41. MFR, Bar-Tov and Hartung, 30 Jun SO, sub: DOD/MOD PMs Meeting of 

26 June 19S0, IABPC, 45/4; Wall, Briefing for Incoming Officers, 14 Jun Sl; Procurement Guidance 2, 10 Jun SO, sub: MOD Assistance to Prime Contractors, 

IABPC, S/7; Noah in terview. 

42. Hartung interview, Apr Sl; Chapla inte rview, Aug SO; Damico interview, 

Aug SO. 

43. "Va ll in terview, May Sl ; Maloney interview, May S1. 

44. Thomas interview, Aug SO; Wall, "Israeli Air Base Proj ect," p. 329; ABC 

Weekly Sitreps, 26 Feb, IS Mar, and 27 May SO, IABPC, 13/ 17, 14/ 1, and 14/5. 

45. J ohn B. Tieder, Jr., and Robert K. Cox, "Construction Management and 

the Specialty Trade (Prime) Contractors," Law and Con /em/JOm1)' Problems 46 

(Win ter 19S3): 45; Interv, author with Richard Huggins, May Sl , Ovda, Israel. 

46. MFR, Ha rtung and Bar-Tov, 2 Apr SO, sub: DOD/ MOD PMs Meeting of27 

Mal'. 19S0; SOP 14, Configuration Management. 

47. [Wall] , General Lewis Fallout Requirements, 2S Sep SO, IABPC, 40/9; 

Wall, Project Notebooks, vol. III, 24 Sep SO, IABPC, 90; Damico interview, May S1. 

4S. MFR, Bal'-Tov and Hartung, 24 Aug SO, sub: PMs Meeting of 21 Aug. 19S0, 

IABPC, 45/4; Thomas interview, Aug SO. 

49. Memo, Blake, 22 Aug SO, sub: Meeting with BG Wall an d Carl Damico-20 

and 21 Aug, in OAO, Master Diary, vol. III, IABPC, S4/2; Ltr, ''''all to Area Engineers, 2 Sep SO, sub: Impact of ECPs, IABPC, 23/3. 

50. Ltr, Bar-Tov to Hartung, 25 Aug SO, sub: Design Changes; Memo, T homas 

for DOD PM, S Sep SO, sub: Design Changes; Memo, Wall for DOD PM, 24 Sep 

SO, sub: ECPs. All in IABPC, 23/3. 

51. Wall , Project Notebooks, vol. III, 12 Oct SO, and vol. IV, 22 Nov SO, IABPC, 90. 

52. Wall, Project Notebooks, vol. III, 27 Oct SO, and vol. IV, 22 Nov SO, IABPC, 90. 

53. Wall, Project No tebooks, vol. III, 31 Oct SO, IABPC, 90. 

54. MFR, Wharry, 17 Dec SO, sub: Trip Report-Israel Air Bases Construction 

Project. 

55. Hartung in terview, Apr Sl ; Damico interview, Oct Sl; Graw interview, Oct 

Sl; Parkes intel'view, May Sl; Thomas interview, Aug SO. 
CHAPTER 13 

From Construction Camps to Air Bases 

January-October 1981 

Our Israeli friends have criticized us for paying too much attention to 

time and not enough to quality and not enough to cost control. There is 

no question in our minds that all three of them are important, but if we 

had to give emphasis to one at the expense of the others, it would be to 

time. That is the most important. 

Brig. Gen. John F. Wall 1 

In the spring of 1981 the project showed many signs of the 

changing rhythm of a fast-track job well on the way to completion. 

Design and procurement were nearly done. Both construction 

contractors had the bulk of their purchasing under control, and 

the emphasis there shifted from completion on schedule to containment of costs. The few problems involving the confusion regarding American, European, and Israeli specifications for materials served as reminders that the completion of purchases still held 

the key to the efficient and timely end of the project. Construction 

itself was in high gear, and, although it was massive, it was generally 

not complex. On the management side, emphasis was shifting 

from the schedule to the budget. Along with the new focus came 

more audits and the possibility of legal disputes with the contractors, as well as an even greater stress on planning for phasing out 

the project, now at the peak of construction. 2 

Procurement underwent a transition parallel to that of overall 

project management. During 1981 the focus moved from meeting 

the schedule to containing costs. Lee Graw thought the shift came 

too late to be very helpful. Still finding surpluses and redistributing 

them between the sites remained possible. The adjustment of priorities brought more intensive reviews from the headquarters and 

heightened area office resistance. At the sites, changes in procurement activities came quickly after meeting the 90 percent goal. In the 

spring of 1981 the construction contractors began expediting the remaining procurement actions. They sent representatives to vendors 
FROM CONSTRUCTION CAMPS TO AIR BASES 215 

in North America and Europe as well as to Israeli suppliers to assure 

timely deliveries. In the United States the New York support office assisted with this effort; in Israel the Ministry of Defense helped. 3 

Despite the emphasis on expediting the remaining purchases, 

lack of such common objects as doors and windows delayed completion of buildings. In part the situation resulted from the increased procurement in Israel in 1980. Israeli vendors did not understand the American purchasing process, so the project staff lost 

time explaining specifications and negotiating prices. With Ministry of Defense help, problems were resolved and production 

picked up. Before deliveries caught up with construction, however, 

some structures were finished without doors. In another instance 

involving a mundane necessity, the supply of cement had been endangered by an autumn 1980 strike at Nesher, an Israeli firm. The 

bases needed about 275,000 metric tons of cement, and any interruption of supply would have threatened the schedule. Management Support Associates' general manager Alan Shepherd found a 

source of offshore cement in Turkey, and its availability helped 

stabilize supply for the project." 

Another difficulty related to procurement involved overbuys. 

With purchasing sometimes moving ahead of design, excess stockpiles of supplies were inevitable. "I suspect," Hartung said in April, 

''we're going to have a few million dollars worth of residual materials. That's part of the premium of fast-track." The overbuy came to 

between $10 million and $15 million, which was not excessive considering the size and haste of the job. Insufficient purchases would 

have been worse. The project dealt with excess materials in a variety 

of ways. In some cases, one construction contractor bought too 

much of something that the other needed and sold the article to 

the other site. Such transactions, which provided convenient solutions at no extra cost to the program, were handled through discussions and the exchange of lists of excess inventory. Cooperation between the contractors, which were accustomed to competing rather 

than sharing information, did not come naturally. However, with 

some encouragement from the Near East Project Office and the 

area offices, they overcame habit and shared data on drawings and 

materials on hand as well as equipment and supplies. Bar-Tov believed such cooperation came too late and was never enough, but 

business practices developed over many years did not change easily.5 

There were other ways to cut inventories. The U.S. Army Sinai 

Construction Management Office proved helpful. This office was 

established in Tel Aviv in August 1981 to manage "the accelerated 

design and construction of two military life support facilities in the 

Sinai Desert." These camps, constructed by a consortium of con-
216 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

tractors known as the Facilities and Support Team (FAST), built 

and maintained bases for Norwegian Lt. Gen. Fredrik Bull-Hansen 

and his Multinational Force and Observers. 6 This international 

force, which included American soldiers from the 82d Infantry Division (Airborne), patrolled the Sinai during the period of the Israeli withdrawal and the Egyptian reoccupation . The American 

construction organization, commanded by Col. William E. Lee,Jr., 

remained in Israel until it completed its mission in the fall of 1982 

and was disbanded the following year. 7 

At first it appeared that the new office would create an unwanted distraction. Wall and his superiors disagreed on control of 

Lee's operation. Because he was the senior engineer officer in Tel 

Aviv, Wall thought that Lee should report to him. The chief's office 

disagreed and assigned the new project directly to Washington. 

Wall already had a large enough job to manage and was charged 

with providing administrative, logistical, and technical support for 

the new operation. Lee, who needed office space and quarters for 

his people precisely at the time that Wall's requirements declined, 

paid the project for the use of the Palace Hotel. He also bought 

some surplus rations and construction materials. All told, the new 

office saved the project about $1 million. 8 

In dealing with excessive spare parts for construction machinery, the project employed a third and less satisfactory approach to 

reducing the stock. According to Hartung, the unanticipated excellent performance of the Fiat-Allis equipment combined with a 

lack of control over contractor purchases early in the project produced a surfeit of parts. In any case, large quantities had to be sent 

back to the manufacturer. Mter lengthy negotiations, the project 

paid $211 ,000 for restocking, shipping, and interest on the returned components.9 

In the ten months between Wall's 90 percent target date and 

the 25 October 1981 joint occupancy date, virtually all problems 

with shortages and overbuys came under control. Overall, Ovda 

was in better shape than Ramon. The southern site still had problems with purchases of unique items and with windows and doors, 

but productivity was improving and substantial amounts of materials were being transferred to Ramon. Graw considered Ovda "out 

of the woods," and worried more about Ramon. The tension and 

distrust between the area office there and Tel Aviv persisted, making it difficult to solve the material deficiencies that remained. lO 

More and more, as the year passed, relations between the Near 

East Project Office and the program managers became bound up 

in the financial questions. The three generals seldom agreed com-
FROM CONSTRUCTION CAMPS TO AIR BASES 217 

pletely on the issues of how much the job would cost, how the 

money would be provided, and who would pay. 

Although Bar-Tov and his staff may have been under pressure 

from their government to finish the job as far under the program 

estimate as possible, they also were driven by their own concerns 

for economy. Bar-Tov's public affairs officer, Lt. Col. Karni Kav, 

who had gained a measure of fame in the 1967 war when as a lieutenant she had been among the first combat troops to enter 

Jerusalem, echoed this concern for frugality. Nevertheless, the Israelis understood the urgent need to comply with the deadline. 

Like Deputy Minister of Defense Zippori, who had warned that 

his forces would not move from the Sinai if the bases were not 

ready on time, Bar-Tov knew that the deadline was central. He 

was no more interested than the Americans in asking the Egyptian 

government for a delay. 11 

Wall's priorities, as he explained them to a small group of new 

staff officers who arrived in Tel Aviv inJune, reflected the progress 

of the job and the evolution of the program's concerns. In December 1980 his primary consideration had been placement of construction, followed by procurement and adherence to a schedule 

that provided fifty days of flexibility. Six months later he called cost 

control "definitely number one" among his priorities. Site activation came next, followed by elimination of changes in construction. Such changes had not been on the previous list but had become a matter of great concern for much of 1980. In the spring of 

1981 the changes once again caused friction among the managers. 

All of the old arguments and issues related to construction philosophy and project control were restated, and only firm management held down changes. Further down the list stood procurement and placement of work. Ranked first and second in 

December, they were now fourth and fifth, respectively. Inventory 

control, phasedown, and safety-in the rush to build the bases 

three workers had died in accidents during a two-week periodcompleted the eight-item list. 12 

Although it was becoming plain that the critical objective of 

initial operating capability would be reached, budget problems 

began in the spring of 1981. In mid-March Wall learned that Ovda 

might cost more than expected. The area office informed him that 

permanent materials were costing more than had been projected. 

Blake cited the seriousness of the problem, fearing that the Near 

East Project Office staff would hide the situation from Wall. He was 

concerned particularly with the engineering division's estimators, 

who he thought had an interest in defending the more optimistic 

figures they had developed earlier. Blake thought Wall was "sur-
218 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

rounded by staff who do not want to tell him any bad news," and 

that if any arose, they would "try to mitigate and confuse it." So he 

made sure that his assessment got to Wall, telephoning him first 

and later meeting with him personally. "If we have a disaster in the 

wings," Blake said, "we need to face up to it." 13 

Wall referred to the news as the "bombshell on NAC costs." 

Alan Shepherd, who was with Wall when he heard the Ovda briefing, said the report 'Just about devastated the Project Manager, BG 

Wall." Shepherd understood that the news had far-reaching implications for project management. He estimated that the increase in 

costs at Ovda could result in an overrun of as much as $20 million-about 2 percent of the total cost-for the program. Such a 

development would shift management's focus from completion of 

facilities to budgetary matters. "It is important that we understand," he told his staff, "that even though cost is not the number 

one priority to the U.S. government's interests, it is the number 

one priority to the Israeli government and, as such, the political 

pressures between the two governments will cause cost problems 

... to become a major issue." 14 Essentially, he feared that construction issues were becoming political ones. 

From that point on, although Wall pushed both area offices to 

complete facilities, he always kept an eye on the budget. He saw 

several reasons for the higher estimate for Ovda. Foremost was the 

increased cost of permanent materials, due in part to panic buying 

at the end of 1980 in a desperate effort to reach his 90 percent 

goal. The site also had bought too much reinforcing steel, and the 

kindergarten in the residential area was headed for higher 

construction costS.15 

The spring of 1981 signaled a transition in Wall's evaluation of 

the financial situation. Hartung remained sanguine about delivering the bases within the budget. However, he turned aside Israeli requests for a reduction in their commitment, and told Director General Ma'ayan that the large number of engineering change 

proposals and the constant direct contact between Israelis and construction forces clouded the financial picture. Perhaps influenced 

by Blake, Wall became concerned that the estimators painted too 

optimistic a picture, giving Hartung and himself data that might 

prove wrong. Still, Wall remained unconvinced that an overage at 

Ovda would cause an overrun for the whole project. At the end of 

June he thought he was still-barely-within the budget. 16 

Late in the same month Bar-Tov and Ma'ayan started to insist 

that an overrun was certain and seemed to step up their scrutiny of 

outlays. Some Americans complained about the Ministry of Defense's close surveillance, but none should have been surprised 
FROM CONSTRUCTION CAMPS TO AIR BASES 219 

when it increased. That the Israelis were the first to see that the 

cost of the job would go over the budget was appropriate. They 

had watched the outlays more closely than had the Americans and 

would pay the bill in the event of an overrun. On the other hand, 

reaching that conclusion must have been difficult for them. Mter 

all, they had only recently urged Hartung to reduce the program 

amount so they could cut their commitment. As for Wall, his notes 

of the meeting show his reaction. He recorded it with one dramatically punctuated word: "!Tilt!" 17 

Before the summer ended the chief's office sent Fred McNeely 

and a team under chief estimator John Reimer to assess the situation. The headquarters anticipated a high-level Israeli effort to 

convince the United States to pay any additional bills. Some people in Wall's office resented the lack of confidence that such an independent analysis implied, but Washington needed precise financial information. Reimer's team spent six weeks of August and 

September in Israel. They arrived at an overall current working estimate of $1.077 billion, including $13 million for contingencies. 

Their total came fairly close to that of Wall's staff. The most significant disagreement with Tel Aviv involved the anticipated cost of 

the base at Ramon, particularly the final price tag for permanent 

materials there. IS 

From that point the only question in Wall's mind involved the 

magnitude of the overrun. Yet, even after the scuttling of the budget 

became a certainty, Wall kept his perspective on the overall effort. 

He continued to insist that the area engineers had done excellent 

jobs and that the base construction was superb. Reviewing the estimators' report, General Wilson agreed: 'We of course recognize that 

the replacement product (Ramon and Ovda) is far superior in quality and quantity to the original model (Etzion and Eitam) ." 19 

By the autumn of 1981 only Hartung still insisted that the job 

would be completed within the original $1.04 billion budget. He 

rejected the Reimer team's analysis and Wall's current working estimate of $1.042 billion as too high and considered the additional 

sum set aside for contingencies as excessive. He viewed estimating 

as an inherently pessimistic art, in this case reinforced by the negativism of other participants in the program. ''The biggest thing I 

have heartburn with in this whole program," he said, "is that there 

are so darn few people that have any vision." Passive management 

that was indifferent to waste could still cause additional and unnecessary costs, but he did not consider an overrun inevitable.20 

The disagreement between Wall and Hartung on the final cost 

stemmed from profoundly divergent understandings and differing 

analyses of the situation. By the fall of 1981 Wall and his staff in-
220 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

sisted on charting obligations-commitments for future payments-rather than actual expenditures. In fact, Wall attributed 

his earlier surprise at predictions of higher costs to his concentration on current spending rather than longer term obligations. His 

office now understood that it had to plan for funding well ahead of 

actual outlays. These commitments provided the best yardstick of 

total requirements. Moreover, because Wall could not obligate 

money he did not have, they also determined his financial needs at 

any given time. This concentration on obligations reflected standard Corps practice on cost-plus contracts for at least thirty years. 

The 1951 manual emphasized that it was "extremely important 

that the contractor's accounting system adequately provide for the 

current recording of all obligations and commitments in connection with the contract in order that overruns of available funds 

may be avoided." 2 1 

Hartung disagreed with the Corps view. He contended that the 

emphasis on planning for obligations was misplaced and represented "fixed-price thinking." He resisted management of obligations and stressed the need to validate requirements as raised by 

the contractor. As far as he was concerned, management of obligations merely assured the availability of money that the contractors 

wanted instead of verifying the actual need. 22 The issue of the actual cost of the program remained unresolved until all of the bills 

were counted many months. later; the dispute regarding the 

proper approach to financial management was never settled. 

Even those who agreed that the total cost was likely to be more 

than originally expected differed regarding the causes. The numerous contributing factors were materials, unexpectedly low productivity, engineering change proposals, and the use of local workers.23 However, at that point in the fall of 1981 the major question 

still dividing Hartung and Wall was the amount of the final bill. 

By the time the estimating team left Israel, the initial optimism 

about completing the job within the program amount-Morris' 

goal had been 10 percent less than that sum-was forgotten. Wall's 

current working estimate of $l.042 billion hovered just above the 

project figure. At that point control of contractor expenditures 

with an eye toward future obligations tightened considerably. Wall 

explained his intent with characteristic bluntness: "Effective immediately, I am directing a series of management actions to prevent 

more effectively contractors from incurring any additional unnecessary obligations and to manage better our meager resources."24 

The project's financial options were very limited by that time. 

Manpower was becoming the key variable. Beyond that, with procurement largely completed, only life support provided major possibili-
FROM CONSTRUCTION CAMPS TO AIR BASES 221 

ties for cost reductions. Overall, adherence to the schedule remained 

a top priority for a cost-conscious management. The American presence became more expensive in relation to the work done as the job 

approached the end. As Hartung observed, 'The quicker we can convince our Israeli friends that we ought to get out of their hair and 

then they finish it up, the better, from a cost standpoint." 25 

Nevertheless, Wall did not content himself with demands for reducing the costs of labor and life support. He insisted that the area 

offices slash expenditures everywhere and imposed unusual requirements to make sure that they did so. Withdrawing the blanket 

authorization for purchases under $25,000, he required Kelly and 

Griffis or their deputies to scrutinize every purchase order for over 

$1,000. He also called for redistributing excess supplies between 

the sites where possible and turned to Maloney's office for audits of 

all unfilled purchase orders. Wall stopped short of consolidating 

contracting officer operations in Tel Aviv because he feared that 

such a change might cause unnecessary problems, especially with 

the critical joint occupancy date approaching in October. He never 

forgot that adhering to the schedule still held the key to cost containment as well as to accomplishing the mission: 'We will build airbases to meet activation schedules and, in so doing, will insure that 

final costs are reduced to absolute minimum." 26 

Whatever these final costs, "Vall still had to ensure sufficient 

funds to pay them. Because of the 1980 procurement rush and an 

accelerated construction schedule, the project was rapidly running 

out of money. Based on the survey team's analysis, Wall calculated 

that he had enough to fund work into January. To ensure that operations continued smoothly thereafter, he needed authority before 

the end of November to incur additional obligations. If the money 

was not forthcoming, he feared that the contractors could start to 

close down operations. With Wilson's approval, "Vall formally notified Hartung that he expected the total cost to reach $1.077 billion 

and asked that he get the additional money from the IsraelisY 

Ironically, Wall's increasing control of construction in the 

autumn of 1981 was matched by declining control over project 

funds. Up to the point at which he needed to ask for additional 

money from the Ministry of Defense, his office had managed the 

balance of program money. The first financial transition, from 

American to Israeli funds after the initial $800 million ran out early 

in 1981, had already passed smoothly. It had been well planned and 

controlled. The chain of communications from Wall's office to Hartung; then to Headquarters, United States Air Force; and then to 

the Israeli Procurement Mission in New York, which provided the 

money to the Defense Security Assistance Agency in Washington; 
222 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

had worked well. The money was there when needed, and the program conducted its business as usual. Harmonious relations between the Americans and the Israelis in general and Hartung and 

Bar-Tov in particular remained unchanged. 28 

By August 1981 nerves were fraying. Work at the sites was building up to the joint-occupancy climax. In Tel Aviv the managers argued about the potential for overruns and the control of change 

proposals. Wall saw a split develop between the program managers, 

with Bar-Tov "driving Hartung nuts." Hartung, who still lacked the 

level of control that he desired and who disagreed completely with 

Wall on financial management, called his assignment the "most 

frustrating job I ever had." Wall himself, who usually smiled long 

after the others gnashed their teeth, was troubled by high blood 

pressure and also feeling the strain. "I'd rather fail graciously," he 

wrote, "than be captive to cantankerous non-professionals." 29 

As management wrestled with the issue of providing funds to 

complete the job, the question of who would pay the bill for the 

overrun also arose. There was no question about where the formal 

liability rested; the agreement between the two governments 

clearly set forth the Israeli responsibility for any additional funding. However, no one was surprised when the Israelis asked the 

United States to pick up the tab. At an October meeting Ma'ayan 

reiterated complaints about the American preoccupation with the 

schedule at the expense of quality and cost. He told Bratton that 

he expected an overrun of between $50 million and $100 million 

and complained that Bar-Tov lacked sufficient control. The United 

States, he contended, should pay the Israeli share of the original 

amount and any overruns. Bratton, who thought Ma'ayan's estimate excessive, refused to commit the Corps to the additional payments. The question was politicaPO 

While the financial questions were debated, workers at both 

sites rushed toward the joint-occupancy deadline. In terms of the 

completion of facilities, joint occupancy almost equaled initial operating capability, which was the goal for the following April. Attaining the latter and more critical objective, on which the completion of the Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai and the peace with 

Egypt depended, primarily awaited the activation of the structures 

already completed. As Bill Parkes noted at Ramon in October, 'We 

have almost fulfilled our obligation." Except for utilities, which 

proved extremely difficult to finish because of the blasting 

involved, "the base is operational." 31 

The agreement between Israel and the United States specified 

only attainment of initial operating capability by 25 April 1982. However, General Lewis had insisted on working toward earlier comple-
FROM CONSTRUCTION CAMPS TO AIR BASES 223 

tion of the facilities so there would be enough time for site activation. Lewis chose 25 October 1981, six months in advance of the key 

date. At first he complained that Corps people responded slowly to 

this need, but by early fall of 1981, the late October 'Joint-occupancy 

date" was widely accepted as the crucial construction goal. 

Awareness that the project would have to pass through ajointoccupancy stage came long before Lewis established this important formal goal. Joint occupancy represented the crucial transition during which construction sites actually became air bases. 

When the contractors arrived, they knew that the months before 

achieving initial operating capability would require them to work 

alongside the Israeli Air Force, installers from the telephone company, and others. Corps employees also recognized the need for 

what Thomas called "a three-dimensional interface." He had 

learned at Cape Canaveral that fast-track site activation required 

designers, builders, and activators to work alongside, over, and 

around each other. Planning for this phase started early in 1980. 

The area offices did construction-site activation interface studies, 

which they submitted to Tel Aviv before discussing them with their 

respective constructors. Months of negotiations and refinements 

took place before all agreed in August on a schedule, but the matter did not end there. The contractors, who until then had arranged their work for maximum construction efficiency, had to 

reorder tasks to coincide with the schedule. 32 

During the first half of 1981 the concentration on activation increased. Hartung reminded Corps managers that the emphasis 

would soon swing from construction to installation and checkout, 

including the actual emplacement and testing of equipment, relocation of people from the Sinai, training of pilots and ground 

crews, and certification of the operational capability of both bases. 

He warned that coordinating the activities of contractors, subcontractors, installers, and Air Force personnel would create heavy demands on the Corps. He wanted to be sure that the Americans remained evenhanded and cooperative and did not favor other 

Americans unfairly. In April Wall named the construction division 

as his representative in the process. Along with the area offices and 

program managers, Carl Damico, the construction division chief, 

was to prevent unnecessary disruption of construction and to anticipate any potential problems. Wall wanted Damico and the area 

offices to conduct regular evaluations of the status of all facilities 

within ninety days of activation. 33 

Before spring became summer the first turnovers for activation 

were under way. Not all were as fraught with problems as the first 

one at Ramon, which Area Engineer Griffis said was "sort of like a 
224 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

Family housing; complete with camouflage netting, at Ovda. 

Mongolian goat grab." The transfer of the ammunition storage 

area simply "bombed out," according to Griffis. The Americans in 

the regional civil engineer organization wanted to turn over the 

entire area at once; the Israelis objected because of pavement flaws 

in one portion. Problems also appeared at Ovda during turnover 

of parts of the radio transmitter and receiver work package because of a seven-page list of deficiencies, many of them trivial or 

irrelevant. Worse yet, Wall found out about the embarrassing situation from Hartung rather than from the area office. 34 

Soon both area engineers saw the need for meticulous planning for the process. Ovda developed a list of prerequisites for orderly and complete turnovers. These needs included early identification of purchasing problems; coordination of procurement and 

building schedules; identification and correction of deficiencies 

with available materials; and development of a simple management structure to oversee the process. Ideally, beginning four 

months before the scheduled transfer, a project engineer with a 

bill of materials in hand for each facility would keep track of procurement for the structure and of any potential problems. Ovda's 
FROM CONSTRUCTION CAMPS TO AIR BASES 225 

Airmen's dormitories, with sola?' panels on mojtojJs, at Ovda. 

system put the lion's share of the management burden on Negev 

Airbase Constructors; the contractor's field facility coordinator became responsible for meeting turnover dates. In doing so, he integrated the procurement and construction schedules and each 

week updated the exception report on the facility. Th e contractor 

a lso appointed an activation interface coordinator who kept a 

ninety-day activation schedule and prepared weekly reports on activation and deficiencies for a Corps employee with a similar title. 

The system was completed with a wrap-up crew. This group of 

workers from several disciplines eliminated all known deficiencies 

that they could correct with equipment and materials on hand. 35 

For his part, Wall wanted a list of projected deficiencies thirty 

days prior to the completion objective date. The area offices provided this list to Damico at the weekly site activation meeting. Thereafter, the area offices updated their deficiency list at the two weekly 

meetings and presented a final list one week before the expected 

turnover. At the same time, the area office formally notified the 

construction contractor of the impending transfer of a facility.36 A 

letter from the contract management branch included a reminder 
226 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

of the upcoming date and specified requirements still unmet. The 

letter also named the responsible individual in the area officeY 

In the week that followed, the regional civil engineer and the 

area office divided the remaining problems into minor "punch 

list" deficiencies and major shortcomings, such as the lack of doors 

and air conditioners. The resultant compilation showed the postbeneficial occupancy work requirement. Griffis added other prerequisites for turnover. Before the area office offered a structure to 

the Ministry of Defense, reasonable access had to be assured. In 

addition, all utilities, including water, sewer, and electricity, had to 

be provided unless materials were not available. He also required 

plans for assuring continued access during the period of paving.38 

The increase in facility transfers in the autumn signaled the 

peak of activity for transition from construction camps to air bases. 

These turnovers showed great improvement over the first ones. 

The number of work-arounds declined but still made the Israelis 

unhappy. Typical of the overlaps and complexities of fast-track 

construction, the deficiencies that caused work-arounds and 

turnover of incomplete facilities represented many process components-delayed delivery of materials and equipment, late changes 

to structures, and even incomplete drawings. At Ramon utility 

problems due mainly to the difficulties involved in digging the 

trenches for the conduits worsened the situation. Griffis did what 

he could to fulfill his commitment to provide utilities. "We have," 

Bill Parkes noted, 'Just an unbelievable number of portable generators." The main challenge at Ramon became actual completion of 

facilities so that the construction crews could walk away confident 

that they would not have to return. 39 

The American site activators prodded the Israelis to accept and 

move into facilities when they became ready, but the Israelis did 

not share their urgency. In part their caution reflected uncertainty 

about what they were getting, and both area offices understood the 

need for credibility with their customer. The job of overcoming 

that concern fell to the American members of the Air Force regional civil engineers. The area offices worked only with Hartung's 

staff, avoiding the distractions of dealing directly with the Israelis. 

They also cooperated with the activators of both countries in solving problems at the sites to prevent them from becoming political 

issues in Tel Aviv. All in all, the turnovers caused less difficulty and 

stress than some expected. Hartung turned out to be a strong central manager of the process, which nevertheless expanded the role 

of Bar-Tov's program management organization while focusing the 

attention of all on the facilities that the Israelis needed. Generally, 

constructors and activators moved cautiously and developed 
FROM CONSTRUCTION CAMPS TO AIR BASES 227 

procedures for dealing with each other that would minimize the 

number of inefficiencies. 40 

Just as the requisites for joint occupancy came together, the Israeli concern for timely completion became public. Most of the 

complaints from the Ministry of Defense concerned quality or 

wasted money. Ma'ayan once told Wall, ''You are too concerned with 

schedules." Nevertheless, in August 1981 the commanding officer at 

Eitam in the Sinai said that the Negev bases would not be completed in the agreed-on time. American papers picked up the claim, 

which first appeared in the Los Angeles Times, even though Minister 

of Defense Sharon promptly denied the existence of a lag. 4! 

By the joint-occupancy date in October a tremendous volume 

of construction had been accomplished along with the months of 

planning for the turnovers. Half of the 120 aircraft shelters stood 

ready for planes. With only minor corrections still needed, the 

control towers, maintenance facilities, and many of the community 

structures for soldiers and their families were finished. Israeli Air 

Force families started to move onto Ramon at the end of July, 

adding their safety and comfort to the imperatives facing the area 

office. Runways were finished also. At Ramon aJune ceremony had 

marked completion of runway "A" four months before joint occupancy. The observance featured the landing of a Mirage fighter by 

General Ivry and a short address by Griffis, complete with a trilingual greeting-"good morning, bon dia, shalom." 42 

Throughout the months leading to joint occupancy the character of the job at both sites changed visibly. As major facilities were 

completed, the outdoor work was compressed into more compact 

areas. Then, as the deadline grew near, much of the effort moved 

indoors as crews concentrated on finishing touches. Most observers thought the quality of work improved as the year progressed. Some of the private Israeli consultants hired by Bar-Tov's 

office claimed that this was not so. Bar-Tov sometimes echoed this 

view, although he finally conceded that in general the bases were 

well built. Ivry, who more closely reflected the Israeli Air Force attitude, seemed satisfied. He called the Ovda base "operationally ... 

the best we knew how to make." Hartung defended Wall against 

charges of inferior work. He and others thought the consultants' 

criticisms might have been self-serving, motivated more by their interest in perpetuating their positions than by a concern for quality. 

Griffis even characterized one group of consultants as "an unethical, sensationalist firm." 43 

Problems with quality control and with creation of an oversight 

organization had been at their worst in the spring of 1 981. 

Ramon's quality control group had started with too many labora-
228 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

tory people and too few field inspectors. This imbalance may have 

contributed to the difficulties with the cement mix in the previous 

year. Mter adjusting the ratio between laboratory and field personnel and firing negligent inspectors, the situation improved. At the 

same time, Ovda also faced a rash of quality control problems, none 

more frustrating than the survey busts. Sixteen crews working long 

hours under pressure inevitably would make mistakes, but Thomas 

had never seen a job with so many failures. An April reorganization 

broke up the sixteen crews, which had until then come under one 

supervisor, into four. However, this action was not enough. Blake 

and Robert Horton of the area office construction branch urged 

replacement of incompetent and inefficient workers. The new 

organization would be fine if it had the right people. 44 

Ramon also had survey problems. In April the contractor annoyed both program managers by situating a transformer building 

on the site intended for another small structure. All was not lost, as 

Hartung noted, because "the other building can be moved; there's 

a place ninety feet down the road that's empty." Nevertheless, BarTov wanted the contractor to pay for the mistake. Hartung put the 

issue in perspective, asking who was at fault: "Let me put on my 

contractor hat and ask you, government, where the hell were you 

while I was making this great mistake? You watched me build it." 

Wall agreed. Unless he could prove "gross mismanagement," the 

program would pay, in terms of lost time as well as money. The dispute brought to the fore the conflicting needs for speed and accuracy. If the contractor had to pay for every error, he would work 

more deliberately, putting the schedule at risk. With this in mind, 

Wall refused to penalize Air Base Constructors. 45 

Neither quality control by the constructors nor assurance by 

Management Support Associates inspired complete confidence. 

The Israelis questioned the construction contractor role. The 

Americans were generally satisfied with the quality of the bases, but 

efforts to convince the Israelis of the propriety of constructor involvement did not erase all of their doubts. Others also had reservations. The area offices shared the general Corps reluctance to 

entrust meaningful technical jobs to a support contractor. Tel Aviv 

earlier had rejected the Management Support Associates proposal 

for centralized procurement; the sites never adjusted to the idea of 

quality assurance by a contractor. In the final analysis L. M. Harris, 

Wall's assistant for manpower, argued that "the Corps will never accept a contractor management team as equals. There is simply too 

much tradition and plain old bureaucratic obstinacy at work." 46 

Although Wall's main objective from the start was meeting the 

deadline for initial operating capability, he believed that the users 
FROM CONSTRUCTION CAMPS TO AIR BASES 229 

One of the first Israeli Air Force fighters to land at Ovda. 

would remember the quality of the work long after adherence to 

the schedule was forgotten. With this in mind, he insisted that the 

system for quality verification had to work well. To make sure that 

it did, he relied heavily on the project engineers. The area office 

construction branches were the focal points for this effort. The 

managers of the support contractor's quality assurance teams at 

the sites reported to the respective chiefs of the construction 

branches, rather than to their own parent organization. Also 

within the construction branch, project engineers oversaw specific 

work items or facilities, ascertaining the adequacy of procurement 

and making sure that schedules were met as well as ensuring quality. Completely responsible for coordination of design, purchasing, 

and construction for their facilities, they monitored and reviewed 

progress daily until final acceptance by the userY 

Neither area office had an excess of project engineers. Ramon 

managed the job with two officers and seven civilians divided into 

seven assignment areas. Three of the nine doubled as a technical 

support group.48 Nevertheless, in the summer of 1981 Griffis expressed his pleasure at how well the system worked: "I feel for the 
230 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

Prime Minister Begin at the formal opening of Ovda Air Base in October 

1981, flanked by the Ismeli Defense Force's Chief of Staff, General Rafael 

Eitam (on Begin's right), and the commander of the Ismeli Air Force, 

Maj. Gen. David Ivr)'. 

first time in the project that we have a good tool by which to manage the cost-plus con tract." 49 

In October the elements of the process came together. However, joint occupancy was not achieved without tension and anger. 

Hartung once complained that Ramon did not seem intent on 

completing the shelters, and Wall recommended that a site visit 

would allay Hartung's fears. The proof was indeed evident at the 

bases. At Ovda the first Kfir fighter-bomber arrived on 18 October. 

Six more followed on 8 November. At Ramon four American-built 

A-4s landed on 25 October, joining another that had come earlier 

to test the systems in the shelters. The landings did not severely impair construction, but everyone found it hard not to watch. "Most 

everyone," Griffis wrote, "including me and my staff, generally 

drop what we are doing and watch the planes take off and land." 

Perhaps, Griffis hoped, everyone soon would become accustomed 

to the sights and sounds of the jets.50 
FROM CONSTRUCTION CAMPS TO AIR BASES 231 

The construction crews quickly had ample opportunity to become familiar with the noise of streaking jets. Within two weeks full 

squadrons began operations at both bases. Wall maintained that 

the project had done more than meet the joint-occupancy goal set 

by Lewis. "I consider Ramon and Ovda air bases operational on 25 

October 1981," he crowed. Since then, he added, "daily aircraft operations ... have been part of the normal routine." As far as he was 

concerned, "All in the Corps can take justifiable pride in the 

Corps/ contractor team here in Israel who at the lOD date [sic] are 

providing bases which are operational for at least a squadron at 

each six months earlier than the IOC date of25 April 1982."5! 

A small ceremony at Ramon and a large public celebration at 

Ovda marked the achievement. Prime Minister Begin was among 

those at Ovda on 8 November. He unfurled the flag of the squadron 

that would be based there and thanked the United States government for help with the base, which he called "a great asset to Israel 

[and] an asset to the free world." Recalling that Israel had paid for 

peace with Egypt by giving up the Sinai with its two fine air bases, he 

called Ovda "a symbol of our striving for peace." Ambassador 

Samuel Lewis, the senior American official, echoed the prime minister, calling the American effort part of its partnership with Israel in 

the struggle for peace. Not everyone agreed that the opening of the 

new base was a positive step. Some veterans who had come as part of 

the squadron from Etzion could not hold back their tears. A female 

soldier shouted at the prime minister, accusing him of abandoning 

the Sinai and giving the airfields there to the Egyptians.52 

For journalists too the event brought into focus the still incomplete withdrawal. Few editors resisted puns, mostly ironic, on the 

name Ovda, which is "fact" or "fait accompli" in Hebrew. Beyond 

that, some pointed to the project as showing Israel's diminishing 

autonomy and power. The United States, one writer contended, 

slapped Israel twice: while turning over the bases to the Israeli Air 

Force, they provided airborne warning and command aircraft to 

Saudi Arabia and F-15 fighters to Egypt. He concluded: "The Arabs 

will defend and secure, the Portuguese will work and build, the 

Americans will supply and pay, the Europeans will supervise and 

control. For Israel only one role is left: to retreat. A fact-Ovda." 53 

The expedited completion of the bases carried a high cost. 

The construction surge in 1981 started as an attempt to assure that 

the site activation schedule would be met. Management resorted 

to overtime as well as expansion of the labor force early in the year, 

which Wall called a "plus-up." Hartung put an $8 million price tag 

on this growth, which also involved increased housing, equipment, 

and other support for the extra crews. The additional resources of-
232 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

fered the chance to get ahead of the schedule. As Hartung said, 

"You continue to use that resource as long as you can keep it productive ." The results were the dramatic achievement of October 

and, in Wall's words, "a frightful, frightful cost growth." There 

were other costs too. The drive toward joint occupancy caused 

physical exhaustion along the way and an emotional letdown later. 

As Shepherd said, "Mter you achieve a milestone such as the lOD, 

there's going to be a downer." 54 

The 60-hour workweek was common on overseas construction. 

On some jobs, employees even worked thirteen 10-hour days before getting one day off. Such a schedule carried its own built-in inefficiencies. Long days of honest work, intensified by technology 

that made for greater productivity, had limited value. Two such 

weeks produced more results than two but less than three 40-hour 

weeks. Overtime exacerbated the situation. Ovda pushed its work 

force into 12-hour days for six weeks, even with the knowledge that 

beyond 10 hours the returns diminished rapidly. The effects of 

such long hours could be mitigated by extending the noon hour, 

but this step never seemed necessary. Shortly before the joint-occupancy date, General Wilson reminded Wall that "overtime beyond 

the 60-hour workweek should be avoided." He pointed out that 

"studies show that increased overtime results only in worker 

fatigue and production is actually reduced." 55 

Despite the effort and the success that it brought, much work 

remained. A reporter who visited Ramon for the Israeli Air Force's 

monthly magazine noticed "a new [dormitory] building, shining, 

beautifully built" that had no paved approach. In the family housing area, the homes were "lovely, air conditioned," but again without pavement. Overall it was "still a long way to the completion of 

the whole project." 56 Management too had plenty to do before the 

project could be considered finished. The huge labor force would 

have to be reduced while the bases were being completed. The 

financial issues, which seemed always to straddle the line between 

internal questions and broader political issues, still needed solving. 

And, finally, the whole organization needed to finish the job and 

leave Israel. The job ahead amounted to activation of the bases 

and deactivation of the project. 
FROM CONSTRUCTION CAMPS TO AIR BASES 

Notes 

1. Wall interview, May 81. 

233 

2. Kelly interview, May 81; Graw interview, Apr 81; Brown inte rview, Apr 81. 

3. Davis interview; Graw interview, Apr and Oct 81; Kelly interview, May 81. 

4. Pe terson interview, Oct 81; Kelly inte rview, Oct 81; Wall interview, Oct 81; 

ENR 208 (22 April 1982): 75; Telex, NEPO to OAO, 30 Sep 80, sub: Nesher Cement Production Slowdown, lABPC, 33/3; OAO, Master Diary, 23 Oct 80, lABPC, 

84/ 2; Griffis, P&CJournal, 22 Oct 80, lABPC, 41/1; Memo, Wall fOl- PM, 30 Mar 

81, sub: Deferment ofMSA Cement Procurement, lABPC, 25/1 . 

5. In terv, author with Joseph R. Shaw, Oct 81 and Apr 82, Tel Aviv, Israel; Hartung inte rview, Apr 81; Shepherd, Daily Journal, 26 Feb 81, lABPC, 89/ 1; OAO, 

Master Diary, 27 Mar 80 and 14 and 15 May 81, lABPC, 84/4, 85/1; Memo, Gilkey 

for Area Engineers, 19 May 81, sub: Cross Leveling Conference, lABPC, 18/9; Ltr, 

Baer, Chief of Construction Division, NEPO, to Area Engineer, Ramon, 15 Apr 

80, sub: Capital Equipment, lABPC, 33/1; ENR 208 (22 April 1982): 75. 

6. The FAST contractor was made up of three constituent companies: Harbert 

Inte rnational, Inc.; Paul N. Howard; and Louis Berger Inte rnational; all of which 

were associated with the Perini Company as part of the Negev Airbase Constructors consortium at Ovda. 

7. USACE, Pe rmanent Orders 17-1 , 10 Aug 81, lABPC, 87/9; ENR 207 (20 

August 1981) : 21; ENR 207 (10 September 1981): 13; Graw inte rview, Oct 81; 

Shaw in te rvi ew, Apr 82; Wall Street j ouTlwl, 11 Ma r 82; Washington Post, 18 Mar 82; 

USACE, Permanent Orders No. 33-2, 13 Oct 82, lABPC, 87/9; USACE, Pennanent Orders 2-1, 16 J an 84, lABPC, 87/9. The history of SCMO can be u-aced 

through th e compilation of documents in U.S. Army Engineer Sinai Construction 

Management Office, Afte r-Action Report: Construction of Facilities in Sin ai 

Desert [1983], Office of History, HQ USACE fi les. 

8. McNeely interview, Mar 84; Inte rvs, author with J ohn E. Moore, Oct 81 and 

Apr 82, Tel Aviv, Israel; with Lt Col Steven G. West, Apr 82, Tel Aviv, Israe l; with Alfred Lellis, Apr 82, Tel Aviv, Israel; with Leonard H . Gregor, Oct 81, Tel Aviv, 

Israel; USACE, Pe rmanent Orders 17-1, 10 Aug 81. 

9. Ha rtung intel-view, Apr 81; Memo, Wall for DOD PM, 2 Feb 81 , sub: Restocking Charges for Fiat-Allis Spare Parts, lABPC, 25/3. 

10. Wall inte rview, Oct 81; Graw interview, Oct 81; Kelly interview, Oct 81. 

11. McNeely interview, Mar 84; N. Steinberg interview; J. Robert Moskin, 

Among Lions: The Battle j orjerusalem, june 5-7, 1967 (New York: Arbor House, 

1982), pp. 206, 218, 240-41; Bar-Tov inte rview, Aug 80, Apr 81, Oct 81, and May 

82; Wall interview, May 81; MFR, Wall, 25 J an 81, sub: LTG J oseph K. Bratton 's 

Visit, 9 Through 14 Jan. 1981 , lABPC, 75/1; Wa ll, Project Notebooks, vol. I, 22 

Jun 80, lABPC, 90. 

12. Wall, Proj ect Notebooks, vol. IV, 18 Dec 80, IABPC, 90; Wall, Briefing for 

Incoming Officers, 14 Jun 81; USACE CERL, Project Manager's Handbook Jor Special 

Projects, Technical Rpt P-85/01, p. 48; Memo, Wall for DOD PM, 10 May 81, sub: 

ECPs, lABPC, 34/1; Memo, Gilkey for Area Engineers, 19 May 81, sub: Policy on 

Initiation of ECPs, lABPC, 34/1; Ltr, Hartung to Bar-Tov, 25 May 81, sub: ECP 

Summary, Hartung file,June-J uly 1981, lABPC, 49/13. 

13. Shepherd, Daily J ournal, 12-23 Mar 81, lABPC, 89/1; OAO, Master Diary, 

16 and 18 Mar 81, lABPC, 85/1; MFR, Blake, 26 Mar 81, sub: Minutes ofa Meeting with BG Wall and His Principal Staff, the Area Engineer and His Staff and the 
234 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

Principals of the NAC Organization to Discuss Cost Growth and Materials Estimates, in OAO, Master Diary. 

14. Wall interview, Oct 81; Wall, Project Notebooks, vol. V, 13 Mar 81, lABPC, 

90; Shepherd, Daily Journal, 12 Mar-3 Apr 81, lABPC, 89/l. 

15. Wall, Project Notebooks, vol. V, 31 Mal' 81, lABPC, 90. 

16. Wall, Project Notebooks, vol. V, 24 Apr, 8 May, and 14Jun 81, and vol. VI, 

24Jun 81, lABPC, 90. 

17. Wall, Project Notebooks, vol. V, 8 May 81, and vol. VI, 25 Jun 81; Peterson 

interview, Oct 81; Shaw interview, Oct 8l. 

18. Reimer interview, Feb 82; Moore interview, Oct 81; Shaw interview, Oct 

81; Wall interview, Oct 81; West interview, Oct 8l. 

19. Wall interview, Oct 81; Ltr, Maj Gen Wilson to Wall, 30 Sep 81, sub: OCE 

Special Task Force Findings, lABPC, 58/l. 

20. Hartung interview, Oct 81; Bar-Tov interview, May 82; Wall interview, Oct 8l. 

2l. Wall interview, Oct 81; Shaw interview, Apr 82; Brown interview, Apr 82; 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Manual Jar Administmtion oj Cost-Plus-A-Fixed-Fee 

Constmclion Contmcts (Washington, D.C.: OCE, 1Jan 51), p. 9. 

22. Hartung interview, Oct 81. 

23. Graw interview, Apr 81; Wall interview, Oct 81; Peterson interview, Oct 81; 

Shaw interview, Oct 8l. 

24. Wall interview, Oct 81; Chapla interview, Aug 80; Memo, Wall for Contracting Officers, 17 Sep 81, sub: Control of Contractor Obligations, IABPC, 

18/9; West interview, Oct 8l. 

25. West interview, Oct 81 and Apr 82; Hartung inte rview, May 82. 

26. West interview, Oct 81; Memo, Wall for Contracting Officers, 17 Sep 81, 

sub: ContI-ol of Contractor Obligations; Memo, Moore for Managel', Israe l 

Branch, DCAA, 20 Sep 81, sub: Request for Materials Cost Audit, file 301-07, Financial Management Reference Papers (1981), lABPC, 18/8; Ltr, Wall to Wilson, 

17 Sep 81, sub: OCE Audit Team Results, IABPC, 58/l. 

27. Ltr, Wall to Wilson, 17 Sep 81, sub: OCE Audit Team Results; Chapla interview, Apr 81; Ltr, Wilson to Wall, 30 Sep 81, sub: OCE Special Task Force Findings; Ltr, Wall to Hartung, 9 Oct 81, sub: Funding Increase to the Plan of Work 

(POW) for the Israeli Airbase Program, lABPC, 49/15; Ltr, Wall to Wilson, 13 Oct 

81, sub: Program Cost Underestimate Management, lABPC, 58/l. For General 

Provision 3(d), Limitation of Funds, see, for example, Contract for Design and 

Construction of Airbase, Ovda, Israel, 18 May 79, lABPC, 38/2. 

28. Shaw interview, Oct 81; Chapla interview, Apr 81; Hartung interview, Apr 8l. 

29. Wall, Project Notebooks, vol. VI, 2 and 11 Aug 81, lABPC, 90. 

30. Wall, Project Notebooks, vol. VI, 14 Oct 81, lABPC, 90. 

3l. Wall interview, Oct 81; Parkes interview, Oct 8l. 

32. Telex, USDAO Tel Aviv (Gilkey) to DAEN-MPC, 20 Apr 79; Thomas interview, Apr 80; Ltr, Gilkey to Hartung, 18 Mar 80, sub: Construction/Site Activation 

Schedule Interface-Ovda Air Base, lABPC, 32/3; Ltr, Wall to Wray, 2 Oct 80, sub: 

Construction Site Interface Schedule, lABPC, 33/4; Butler, ABC Weekly Sitrep, 28 

Oct 80, ABC Weekly Sitreps, July-Dec. 1980, RAO file 201-02, NEPO files, Box R-l. 

33. Proceedings of Press Conference, 12Jun 80; OAO, Master Diary, 6Jan and 

3 Feb 81, lABPC, 85/l. This evaluation focused on four areas: the degree of completion required for the Israelis to begin installation and check out; special Israeli 

requirements, including priority work space, room for support equipment, open 

storage at the facility, temporary utility supply, and specific security arrangements; 

the nature of the work to be done by Ministry of Defense crews, the projected 

number of activators in a facility, and the duration of their work; and problems 

that might affect the schedule. Memo, Wall for Area Engineers, 22 Apr 81, sub: 
FROM CONSTRUCTION CAMPS TO AIR BASES 235 

NEPO/lABAO/lABAR Procedures as Concerns Construction Site Activation Interface Planning, lABPC, 25/3. 

34. RAO, Daily Journal, 1 and 10 Jul Sl, file 1515-13, NEPO files, Box R-1, 

lABPC, 4S/S; OAO, Master Diary, 4 and 5 May Sl, lABPC, S5/l. 

35. OAO, Master Diary, 6 May Sl, lABPC, S5/l. 

36. There are numerous late-19S1 examples of this type of letter in the Ramon 

central reference files. For example, see Lu', Griffis to Butler, 20 Aug Sl, sub: Construction Interface-Site Activation: Final TUl'nover of Permanent Facility No. 37, 

Facility Item No. 275, Site Work for Temporary Synagogue, lABPC, 23/5. 

37. Procedures for Turn-over of Facilities, Attachment to Memo, Wall for Area 

Engineers, 7 Jul Sl, sub: Upward Reporting-Facility Transfer, lABPC, 49/13. 

3S. Ltr, Griffis to Wall, 21 Aug Sl, sub: Site Activation Interface Meeting of 9 

Aug. 19S1 , lABPC, 24/1; Kelly interview, Oct Sl; Moore interview, Oct Sl; Peterson interview, Oct Sl ; Parkes interview, May and Oct Sl. 

39. Parkes inte rview, May and Oct Sl; Kelly interview, May and Oct Sl; MFR, 

Grafa, 6 May Sl, sub: Minutes of General Staff Meeting for 6 May 19S1, in OAO, 

Master Diary, lABPC, S5/1; RAO, Daily Joumal, 14-16JuIS1, lABPC, 4S/S. 

40. Moore interview, Oct Sl and Apr S2; Kelly interview, Oct Sl. 

4l. MFR, Wall, 25Jan Sl, sub: LTG Joseph Bratton's Visit, 9 Through 14Jan. 

19S1; Los Angeles Times, 15 Apr Sl; (Long Island) Newsday, 17 Aug Sl;jerusalem 

Post, 17 Aug Sl. 

42. RAO, Daily Journal, 1,9,12-16,25, and 27 JuIS1, lABPC, 4S/S; Brochure, 

Ramon Airbase Sunday 2S June 19S1, First Aircraft Landing, lABP files, ""NRC, 

Accession 77-S3-1005, Box 2; j erusalem Post, 3 JuISl. 

43. Wall interview, Oct Sl; Peterson interview, Oct Sl; Hartung interview, Oct 

Sl; Parkes interview, Oct Sl; Bar-Tov interview, Oct Sl;jerusalemPost, 9 Nov Sl; 

RAO, Daily Journal, 29 and 30 Sep Sl, lABPC, 4S/S. 

44. Parkes interview, May Sl; Thomas interview, Apr Sl; Kelly interview, May 

Sl; OAO, Master Diary, 23 Apr Sl, lABPC, S5/l. 

45. Griffis, P&CJoumal, 23 Apr Sl, lABPC, 41/1; Hartung interview, Apr Sl; 

Wall interview, May Sl. 

46. Wall interview, Oct Sl; Grafa interview; Bar-Tov interview, May S2; Shepherd interview, Oct Sl and May S2; DF, Harris to the Project Manager, 5 Sep SO, 

sub: MSA Lessons Learned, lABPC, S6/l. 

47. Wall interview, Apr SO and Oct Sl; RAO, Office Memorandum 10-1-2, Realignment of Function of Construction Branch-Ramon Area Office, 17 Feb Sl, 

lABPC, 23/5; Memo, Carl R. Smith, Chief, Construction Branch, RAO, for Construction Branch Personnel, 9 May Sl, sub: Letter of Instruction-Proj ect Engineer, lABP files, WNRC, Accession 77-S3-1001, Box l. 

4S. The seven assignment areas were shelters, including mechanical systems; 

concrete facilities; preengineered buildings; mechanical and miscellaneous systems; roads and runways; utilities distribution; and utilities structures. DF, Taylor 

to Project Engineers, 1 Jun Sl, sub: Assignment of Project Engineers, lABP files, 

WNRC, Accession 77-S3-1001, Box l. 

49. RAO, Daily Journal, 15 Aug Sl, lABPC, 4S/ S. 

50. Lu', Hartung to Moore, IS Sep Sl, sub: Construction Completion Scheduling, lABPC, 49/14; Ltr, Wall to Hartung, 1 Oct Sl, sub: Construction Completion 

Scheduling, lABPC, 49/15; OAO, Master Diary, IS Oct Sl, lABPC, S4/3; Philadelphia InquiTel; 9 Nov Sl; RAO, Daily Joumal, 23-27 Oct Sl, lABPC, 4S/S. 

5l. Ltr, Wall to Bratton, 5 Nov Sl, sub: Monthly Progress Report, Israeli Airbase Program, lABPC, SS/6. 

52. Remarks of Prime Minister Menachem Begin, S Nov Sl, lABPC, 74/3; Ltr, 

Wall to Wilson, S Nov Sl, lABPC, 74/3; (Tel Aviv) Ma'miv, 13 and 20 Nov Sl. 
236 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

53. (Tel Aviv) Ma'ariv, 10 Nov 8l. 

54. Kelly interview, Oct 81; Hartung interview, May 82; Wall interview, May 82; 

Shepherd inte rview, May 82. 

55. Wall interview, May 82; Blake intervie\v; Peterson interview, May 81; Butler 

interview; Davis interview; Grafa interview; Ltr, \-\Tilson to vVall, 30 Sep 81, sub: 

OCE Special Task Force Findings, lABPC, 58/l. 

56. Merav Halperin, "The Inauguration of Ramon and Ovda," Biton Heil 

Ha'avil; Oct 8l. 
CHAPTER 14 

Activating the Bases 

Deactivating the Project 

November 1981-August 1982 

I guess I have spent more time, got more white hairs, lost my temper 

more times on this damn money issue than any other issue. 

Brig. Gen.John F. Wall, May 1982 1 

There is no question that we have had quite a disagreement on the 

cost management .. . between the Corps of Engineers and this office. 

Brig. Gen. Paul T. Hartung, May 1982 2 

Whenever you get into a close down operation and people are changing jobs, the anxiety level goes up. 

Col. John E. Moore, Deputy Project Manager 3 

The autumn of 1981 was marked by an uneasy combination of 

achievement and disappointment. The schedule would be met. Of 

that, there was little question. However, money issues loomed ever 

larger, became more time consuming and sensitive, and left little 

time to savor accomplishments. The likelihood of an overrun was 

becoming more apparent to Wall. In addition, tensions among the 

managers increased as the project neared the financial brink several times, and Hartung and Wall confronted one another over the 

final cost and how it would be paid. Even before 25 October and 

joint occupancy, Hartung and Wall skirmished over a budget increase. Early in the month Wall told Hartung that planning would 

be based on an estimated completion cost of $1.077 billion, which 

was in line with the August estimating team's figure. He also 

alerted the program manager that the project would run out of 

money and exhaust its authority to obligate funds in January. Without an infusion of funds by 30 November, the COntractors would 

have to begin demobilization. 4 
238 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

Otherwise, Wall considered several possibilities. These included de obligating money from the Management Support Associates contract and diverting it or portions of the program management budgets to the construction contracts. He also considered 

using unpaid contractor fees to keep the work going. "These are 

all," Lt. Col. Steven West of Wall's staff conceded, "extremely 

drastic actions." They were also unacceptable, so 30 November 

loomed as "a critical milestone." The real choices, which rested 

with the Ministry of Defense, came down to providing the money 

or reducing project scope. 5 

Hartung disagreed with the assessment on which these choices 

hinged. He still believed that "the funding deficit of $40 million .. . 

may be exaggerated, at least at this time," but recognized that 

some extra money might be needed. Until he was satisfied with 

Wall's figures and could use them as a basis for convincing the Israelis to put more money in the job, he held fast to a final cost estimate of $l.008 billion. 'John," he told Wall, "I'm convinced you 

can manage this thing within the money as long as you stay hard 

nosed." For Hartung, the question centered on the validity of the 

obligations anticipated by Wall. For example, all of Wall's estimates 

for the three prime contracts contained some costs that were likely 

to be disallowed or suspended. Hartung estimated the amount 

likely to be withheld at $4.1 million. He also cited what he viewed 

as an overestimate of $2.8 million in the support contract: fiftynine jobs for which return air fare and shipment of household 

goods to the United States had been budgeted had been filled with 

people hired in Israel. Overall, he thought Wall's figures had too 

many estimates of what might happen-contingencies-rather 

than obligations for which funding had to be provided. 6 

If more money did prove necessary, Hartung did not want to 

give it to Wall in one sum. He and Bar-Tov thought that any additional need would be for less than $40 million. Ma'ayan was also reluctant to accept Wall's figures without concurrence by the program 

managers and agreed to provide more money only on an incremental basis. Hartung, who had long been frustrated by his lack of control over funds, was comfortable with this position. With an air of finality, he reported that "additional 'dependable undertaking' as 

determined to be required will be provided on an incremental basis 

as MOD does not want excessive obligation authority to pass directly 

to the construction agent as has been done in the past." 7 

There was another reason for the Israeli desire to fund the rest 

of the project incrementally. Although the initial government-togovernment agreement obligated Israel to pay all of the bills beyond the American grant of $800 million, the Israeli portion ulti-
ACTIVATING THE BASES, DEACTIVATING THE PROJECT 239 

mately came from money borrowed from the United States. Incremental allocations to the air base project stretched out the loans 

and minimized their interest payments. 8 

As of early November Wall remained adamant about the need 

for more money. If he did not get it by the end of the month, he 

would be unable to prevent the diversion of contractor resources 

to demobilization planning. The disagreements with Hartung over 

what constituted an obligation could be worked out, but right now 

he needed money. He opposed incremental funding as an impediment to planning. However, he was willing to take $30 million 

rather than the $40 million he thought he needed to finish. With 

careful management and detailed monthly reviews, he would try to 

reduce costs wherever possible.9 

A few days later Wall again reduced the amount. In response to 

Hartung, he cut his immediate request to $23.5 million. Later, he 

would in all likelihood need more. According to Wall, Hartung 

had to decide "whether or not it is politic to go only once to the 

well-to GOI and DSAA-or to do so a number of times." The program managers had held back from officially notifying the Defense 

Security Assistance Agency of an impending overrun. The agency 

would likely take a month to provide the money Wall needed in 

three weeks. "It appears to me," Wall wrote, "that time is of the 

essence." As far as incremental funding was concerned, he remained firmly opposed. Bratton supported Wall, reminding General Gilbert of the Air Force that the agreement between the governments did not mention such an arrangement and specified 

only that funds would be made available as needed. The original 

$800 million had been given to the Corps in one sum; the remaining need should be filled the same way-and soon, Bratton added, 

stressing "the critical requirement for additional authority well 

before 30 November 1981."10 

Hartung misunderstood Wall's position. He interpreted Wall's 

willingness to reduce the sum he wanted as acceptance of increments. Working from this assumption, Hartung proposed a few 

small adjustments in the program budget and a total additional 

sum of $26 million, issued to the project in four installments, at 

the end of November, then again in December, January, and 

March. Such an arrangement, he claimed, would provide the 

chance to determine adjustments monthlyY It also would give him 

the control that he had sought from the beginning. 

Wall's clarification of his position crossed Hartung's proposal 

in the office mail. Wall insisted that "the money should be given 

the project in accordance with what I understand the MOU between the USAF and USACE states." He had cut his request as Har-
240 BUILDING AlR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

tung and Air Force Lt. Gen. James H. Ahmann, the new head of 

Defense Security Assistance Agency, had asked. Still, he reminded 

Hartung, "I am not in favor of any plan to incrementally distribute 

the additional funds required." Wall saw that a confrontation over 

this issue was likely and sought a way to resolve the dispute. Hartung told him that the money was going to be provided in increments "or I won't be here." Wall insisted that he had to be told in 

writing that the money was on hand. He suggested a series of letters of credit from the Ministry of Defense-six at $5 million each 

and five more of $2 million each-which could be used as scheduled or necessary. This solution would guarantee availability of the 

money he needed and provide a dependable reservoir for obligation authority through closeout while honoring the Israeli desire 

to hold down interest payments. 12 

Hartung finally notified Bar-Tov's office of Wall's stated need 

for $40 million. He still thought Wall's estimate contained "unquantifiable hidden contingencies" and that the plan for phasedown was "not as aggressive as it should be." Because of overstated 

needs due to these factors, Hartung thought Wall's estimate remained too high and that monthly adjustments of the funding 

plan would reduce the total. Meanwhile, incremental funding remained the answer. Wall's marginal notes on his copy of this letter 

to Bar-Tov-the sad face on the top, "B.S." several times and "not 

true" alongside the text-reflected his unhappiness and frustration. He knew he was far from a resolution to the impasse. 13 

On 19 November the three generals had a day-long session on 

the issue. Wall accepted $19 million, which was more than the first 

increment of $8 million that Hartung had offered and less than 

Wall's $23.5 million compromise figure. The amount also matched 

West's expectations: in October he had anticipated that Wall would 

get his $40 million less $16 million contingencies and $7 million 

for contract closeout. Hartung's claims that the phasedown plan 

was inadequate and that the estimate had "unquantifiable hidden 

contingencies" still bothered Wall, but he wanted to get past the 

squabbling. "I hope," he wrote after the meeting, "that the initial 

increment of our required funding is provided quickly and that 

our detailed re-evaluation of total requirements in December leads 

to reestablishment of synergistic relations between the DOD 

elements of the program." 14 

At the end of December the next round of financial talks 

started. Wall gave Hartung a schedule of his needs for the remainder of the project. By this time Wall tacitly had come to terms with 

incremental allocation and couched his needs accordingly. He 

wanted $10 million by 1 February, $6 million by 1 April, and an-
ACTNATING THE BASES, DEACTNATING THE PROJECT 241 

other $6 million a month later. By then it was becoming clear that 

Wilson and Gilbert planned to send representatives to Israel for an 

independent analysis of the cost of the remaining work. For the 

moment Wall stood by his own staff's assessment. 15 

With the focus on finances, it was only a matter of time before 

another estimating team assessed the situation. "Vilson planned to 

visit the program during the winter and wanted Wall'sjudgment of 

the final cost. Wall recommended that Wilson's own estimator, 

John Reimer, make the determination. ''You should not," Wall recalled arguing, "believe me since Hartung feels so vehement about 

this. You send your guy over and put me to the test. Make me prove 

that I am right. " Wilson wanted to know where the project stood, 

including the total cost of construction to date. He also asked the 

team to estimate the time, manpower, and money needed to finish 

the job, based on the Near East Project Office's phasedown plan. 16 

The team grew more complex, with representatives from the 

U.S. Air Force and Bar-Tov's office. Wilson told his engineering 

division to include both program management organizations. BarTov, apparently ignorant of Wilson's desire for Israeli membership 

and unwilling to wait for an invitation, asked to participate. 

Neither Wall nor Hartung objected, and the composition of the 

team was set. At the outset, a truly joint effort appeared to be taking shape, with Reimer as chairman and team leader. If all went 

well, the team would resolve what Wall knew to be "deep-seated 

fee lings and real disagreements on the cost issue." The Air Force 

contributed two members. The senior person was Charles K. Hudson, who was special assistant to Brig. Gen. Clifton D. Wright, the 

deputy director of engineering and services at Air Force headquarters. Hudson oversaw critical Air Force programs in Saudi Arabia, 

facilities for the MX missile, and the Israeli job. The other Air 

Force member, Maj. Edward L. Parkinson, ran the construction 

cost-management group in the Air Force Engineering and Services 

Center at Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida. Set up in the spring of 

1981 along lines recommended by a committee under Hudson, 

Parkinson's office gave the Air Force an "in-house cost management/analysis capability to evaluate construction programs for 

new weapons and research facilities." This mission entailed provision of independent estimates and cost analyses of major longterm construction. 17 As long as the Corps of Engineers acted as 

construction agent for the Air Force, this job essentially came 

down to second-guessing the Corps. 

With the team assembling in Tel Aviv, Wall delayed asking for 

more authority to spend money. He gave Hartung a draft of a letter 

he intended to send him, pending Wilson's approval. Wall was will-
242 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

ing to accede to Hartung's "urgent request" and "take a risk and attempt to continue funding current construction up to 1 March 

within the present obligation authority." He had "a dangerously 

bare-boned plan," to get the project through until the estimators reported at the end of the month. Thereafter, if more money was not 

at hand, he faced having to start demobilization activities, a possibility which came up several times during that winter and spring. IS 

Unlike earlier estimates, this one left little room for imagination. Too much had already been done at the sites for that. 

Reimer's method of operation reflected the current situation. He 

worked independently of Wall's office, except when he had questions for the staff. His team looked at every building in every facility, noted remaining work, determined previous productivity on 

that kind of work, and made projections. As he put it, "We spent 

many hours walking through the buildings and making engineering analysis on work remaining to come up with the remaining 

man hours and equipment and the estimate that was prepared. " 19 

Soon, the team began to unravel. Reimer and Hudson strongly 

disagreed about methodology. Reimer wanted to do the analysis as 

of 31 December 1981, while Hudson insisted that all disbursements be taken into account as made and the estimate be adjusted 

for each. Hudson also wanted to go beyond an estimate of resources needed to complete the job. He wished to assess the validity of earlier outlays and even determine which contractor costs 

might be disallowed. Perhaps seeking to show the lowest possible 

final cost, he wanted the estimate to reflect credits that would accrue at the end of the program. These awaited final adjustment of 

the costs of subcontracts and various refunds to the program, 

among them value-added taxes that had been paid on purchases in 

Israel, commissary profits, and workmen's compensation insurance rebates. The exact amount, Reimer insisted, could not be determined yet. Moreover, the money from these sources would not 

be available until after the job was done. So these sums could not 

be counted against the amount needed to finish. 20 

The inability to reach a basic agreement frustrated Hudson as 

well as Reimer. Hudson and Parkinson finally abandoned the effort and went sightseeing in Jerusalem, while Reimer told Wall that 

"an impasse existed" and that the briefing scheduled for 1 February should be "either delayed or canceled." Wall asked Hartung to 

cancel the meeting. He shared Reimer's pessimism and his feeling 

that the Air Force had sent people who acted more like "management head hunters" than estimators. Without a consensus on 

method, mutually acceptable conclusions appeared unlikely. Wall 
ACTIVATING THE BASES, DEACTIVATING THE PROJECT 243 

still hoped for an accommodation but was becoming convinced 

that "the joint team bit is impossible." 21 

The events of the next day confirmed Wall's view. Early on 2 

February, while Reimer ate breakfast, Parkinson took some working papers out of Reimer's desk and file cabinet, and photocopied 

them. He packed much of what he took with other papers in a carton, addressed it to himself at Tyndall, and left it next-door at the 

Air Force post office for mailing to the United States. Meanwhile 

Reimer searched frantically for his notes, some of which Parkinson 

returned later in the morning without explanation. Lt. Col. Robert 

Amick, Wall's security officer, found the box at the post office. He 

called Hartung, who drove to the Palace from his office at the IBM 

Building, picked up the carton, and drove off. Later he returned 

some documents to Reimer. Wall and his staff never learned the 

exact contents of the box and did not know what-if any thingParkinson sent to Tyndall. In any case, it was obvious that an estimate on which all parties could agree was no longer possible. 22 

The episode raised two questions. One involved a possible 

breach of security. Wall believed that some of the papers that were 

taken, notably the Ovda contractor's monthly cost and man-hour 

printout, contained "somewhat sensitive information that required 

special handling." Bar-Tov expressed his "deep disappointment" 

with "the method and the quality of the work." However, the 

Israelis, who had an officer on the team, never voiced a concern 

regarding the pilfered documents. In fact, Wall's deputy, Col. John 

E. Moore, thought they viewed the matter mainly as "squabbling 

among the gringoes." 23 

The affair also highlighted the deterioration of relations between Hartung and Wall and their offices. Some of Wall's staff reacted angrily to the episode, which became known around the 

Palace as "Parkinson's disease." Moore considered Parkinson's approach "outside the team" but thought he acted more from excessive zeal than lack of principle. Others showed less understanding. 

Amick called the removal of the papers "a breach of ethics." Wall, 

who understood that Parkinson "had a lot of pressure from his mission and [Hartung] and others," still saw his actions as "gross and 

base." He asked Hartung, "If the situation had been reversed and 

an Army officer had acted as apparently did Parkinson, I wonder 

how seriously you would have viewed the situation?" 24 

The Air Force did not view the matter as seriously as did Wall. 

Mter the incident, neither Parkinson nor Hudson took part in the 

analysis, although they stayed in Israel. On 6 February, when 

Reimer presented his estimate of $1.086 billion, including $10 million for contingencies, they were present, seated with Hartung's 
244 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

staff. Wall decided against a formal protest and confined his expressions of outrage to his notes to Hartung. With a new sum corresponding closely to Reimer's August 1981 estimate and no 

progress toward a consensus on the numbers, the effort yielded 

only more mutual annoyance and suspicion. Only the Air Force Directorate of Engineering and Services' official history hinted, however obliquely, of the embarrassment that the episode represented 

for the Air Force. The semiannual volume produced while the 

team was in Israel mentioned the mission and their objective, "an 

agreed-upon program amount." 25 Later issues did not mention the 

group's existence, let alone its failure. 

Soon after the team left, Wall's office again neared the financial brink. His financial staff main tained only fifteen days of 

reserve, which meant about $10 million. On 10 February the 

money dwindled to only $2 million-"on the thin edge," according 

to Wall-before urgent phone calls to Washington made an additional $13 million available.

26 

By this time, the problem was exacerbated by demands from 

the American embassy in the name of amicable American-Israeli 

relations. Tensions between the long-time friends were on the rise, 

as the prospect of a large Israeli military operation in Lebanon 

jeopardized the Camp David accords and the treaty with Egypt. 

Ambassador Lewis sought to keep the program from creating another-albeit minor-source of friction. With the financially 

strapped Ministry of Defense's fiscal year ending in March, he 

tried to defer the program's financial demands on Israel. He 

claimed it was not in the interest of the United States to ask for 

more money before the new accounting year. At aJanuary meeting 

with Wall, Lewis was "extremely adamant," according to Griffis, 

about restraint. John Brown also recalled that Lewis exerted 

"tremendous pressure ... to get past April 1." 27 

Wall did his best to reach April without further payments, 

some.times with substantial consequences for construction. At 

Ramon Griffis noted the threat to some completion schedules. "I 

hate that that's happening," he told his staff, "but the override decision-making criteria is the fact that we do not go to the Government oflsrael before the 1st of March [sic] for any additional obligation authority. This requirement," he added, "overrides any 

other construction requirement." 28 

During the austere time before the project obtained more 

money in April, help came from an unexpected source. Managemen t Support Associates made available $2 million that had been 

committed to its operation. Wall used some of the money to pay 

the construction contractors and later returned the entire amount 
ACTIVATING THE BASES, DEACTIVATING THE PROJECT 245 

to the original account. Wall was unstinting in his praise: "The 

only reason I got to the first of April was because I de obligated 

funds from MSA, because they knew it was important to the program and to the government of Israel and to our nation and the 

ambassador." General Manager Shepherd was fiercely loyal to the 

project. "Under no circumstances," he declared, "would I ever put 

the project at jeopardy for selfish gain." 29 

This extraordinary transaction owed a lot to Wall's support of 

Shepherd's beleaguered organization. Bar-Tov considered the firm 

"a big waste of money, period." Hartung agreed and in the fall of 

1981 had recommended terminating the support contract. Wall 

took "strong exception" to Hartung's claim that a combination of 

temporary government employees from the United States and increased Ministry of Defense help would provide technical assistance and life support for less money. "I could not," he wrote Bratton, "disagree more with this scheme." Wall appreciated the 

contractor's flexibility and dedication and viewed any change at 

that time as distracting and time consuming. Moreover, the decision on the organization's future belonged to him, not to Hartung. 

Wall intended to win this battle and did. To make sure, he sent 

copies of his response to Hartung to Wilson, Bratton, Ahmann, 

and Deputy Chief of Mission William Brown at the embassy, all 

covered with personal notes. In March 1982, with the project on 

the financial brink, his loyalty to Management Support Associates 

paid great dividends. 30 

Before the end of March Wall got an infusion of money for use 

during the following month. Hartung had recommended that no 

more than $10 million be authorized. However, this increase in the 

dependable undertaking came to $14 million, the sum Bar-Tov 

considered sufficient to carry the project into June. By that time, 

it was becoming clear that only one more payment would be 

necessary to finish. 31 

Hartung still maintained that the program could be finished for 

the original program amount. No argument by Wall or Bar-Tov 

could ever convince him that more money was really needed. Defense Contract Audit Agency's Maloney, whose formal audits persuaded him that even Wall and the contractors underestimated the 

cost of the job, never understood how the program manager's staff 

got its figures: ''They just seemed to me . .. to have really no understanding of an accounting system." Nevertheless, Hartung persisted 

in the belief that tighter management was all that was necessary.32 

The financial situation greatly affected the whole operation. In 

the field, as Colonel Griffis had complained in February, cuts in 

manpower pushed back scheduled completion of some facilities. 
246 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

But the most serious effect was felt in Tel Aviv, where management 

focused on "cons tan tly fending off this financial disaster." This preoccupation came at the expense of cost reviews, such as analysis of 

the effectiveness of overtime. It also created the need for stringent 

control of current spending. For example, in early March Wall 

curbed the authority of the contracting officers still further. During the previous autumn, he had reduced their authority to approve purchases from a $25,000 limit to $1,000. Now he required 

his resource manager to certify the availability of funds before the 

contracting officers incurred even the smallest obligations. This 

bureaucratic control cost the program money, but just as important was the anxiety it produced. "When ... you end up," Moore 

observed, "at the end of the month with $158,000 in the till, when 

... every voucher that comes in is ... in excess of several million, it 

tends to make a few of the folks a little uneasy." 33 

At the end of April the project needed one more infusion of 

money. The job had started with the Near East Project Office in 

control of a vast sum and was ending with short-term drawdowns. 

While there was a general understanding that fast-track construction represented a state of flux, this change was unexpected. 

Nevertheless, by the spring the painful transition to incremental 

funding had been made. 

Any time not spent walking the financial tightrope was devoted 

to phasedown, with reorganizations, changes, and reductions in 

personnel. In 1980 Bratton had instructed Wall to turn his attention to this matter. In addition, Wilson kept pressing for early completion of planning. "Austerity, control, and allocation," he told 

Wall at the end of September 1981 , "must be the guiding principles." He wanted Wall's overall plan by the first of December but 

underscored the need to get the project out of the Palace as 

quickly as possible. 34 

Earlier in 1981 Wall had brought Jack Clifton up from Ramon 

to develop a phasedown plan. Clifton tried to set up a flexible and 

orderly framework that tied phasedown to construction progress. 

His concept divided the effort into four periods. Phase I, involving 

peak construction, concurrent site activation, and gradual reduction in the work force, went from August 1981 through March 

1982. In the next period, construction was finished; the project 

turned over property and facilities to the Israelis, consolidated 

functions, and significantly reduced personnel. At the end of 

phase II, in September 1982, the project personnel would leave Israel. The third period-audits, claims, reconciliations, and closeout in the United States-would last until June 1983. The final administrative closeout of the contracts in phase IV would be 
ACTIVATING THE BASES, DEACTIVATING THE PROJECT 247 

decentralized to the offices of the contractors for conclusion by 

the end of 1983.35 

Clifton's replacement, Lt. Col. Leonard C. Gregor, made no 

major changes to the plan. With construction still not done, he 

found "too much uncertainty out there in the future as far as the 

... construction job progress to really nail down where you're 

going in phasedown." Direct labor at the sites was still the key variable to which logistical and administrative support was tied. "So 

much of the support here in Tel Aviv," Gregor observed, "is contingent on exactly when we're going to turn over these facilities and 

phase the direct labor out of here." Moreover, the lack of a firm decision on a location for closeout made it hard to determine who in 

the Corps would stay with the project until the end.

36 

In October 1981, while the project raced toward joint occupancy, Wall set up a task force to plan for manpower reductions. 

The group included Moore, deputy commander; Louis R. Unzelman of Management Support Associates; and Thomas, former 

chief of engineering and now Wall's assistant for technical affairs. 

With Gregor about to go home, Thomas managed reductions of 

government personnel and relations with the _ Sinai Construction 

Management Office. Wall wanted the task force to review the 

phasedown plans of the area engineers and suggest changes. Overall, they were to ensure the best use of available people. "I expect 

you to meet with resistance" from the area offices, staff sections, 

and the general managers of the contractors, Wall told them. "Do 

not let this resistance deter you from completing your mission in 

an objective and clinical manner." 37 

In the fall, while Wall's office faced the technical difficulties in 

reconciling phasedown with an unclear construction future, there 

was significant disagreement on the proper pace for the effort. 

The questions centered on priorities and perspectives. Hartung, 

who was concerned mainly with keeping costs down, insisted that 

the Corps paid too little attention to reducing the direct labor at 

the sites and had no real plan for cutting back, 'Just a series of 

ideas." Wall, meanwhile, cut overtime to 5 percent. He also issued 

three schedules for reducing contractor forces. These plans 

showed the number of workers at joint occupancy and the relationship between direct and indirect labor, both at that time and 

projected into the future . Wall required the area offices and Management Support Associates to make the monthly cuts in these 

manpower plans by the fifteenth of each month (Tables 4 and 5) .38 

Griffis at Ramon protested the severity of the cuts. He claimed 

Wall's office cared only about placating Hartung. Any reductions 

before the end of January would threaten his schedule, which re-
248 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

TABLE 4-APPROVED MANpOWER PLANS FOR AREA OFFICES, 

OCTOBER 1981 

Ovda Ramon 

Direct Indirect Direct Indirect 

Date Labor'" Labor Total Labor Labor 

Oct 8l. .. . 2,592 1,040 3,632 2,515 1,443 

Nov 81 .......... 2,346 963 3,309 2,400 1,135 

Dec 81 .. ........ 2,000 932 2,932 1,850 l,llO 

J an 82 ..... .. .. .. 1,800 826 2,626 1,800 933 

Feb 82 ........... 1,480 737 2,217 1,600 717 

Mar 82 ... . . .... . 1,160 661 1,821 1,000 517 

Apr 82 .......... 650 599 1,249 450 376 

May 82 ... . . . .... 350 414 764 250 2ll 

Jun 82 ........... 80 282 362 100 100 

JuI 82 ... 0 95 95 0 21 

"'This column of figures includes workers in plants and shops. 

Total 

3,958 

3,535 

2,960 

2,733 

2,317 

1,5 17 

826 

461 

200 

21 

Source: Ramon Approved i\lanpowcr Plan , 28 OCl 81 ; Approved i\lanpowcr Plan, 28 OCl81. Both in IABPe , 48/ 6. 

TABLE 5-MSA MANpmVER PHASEDOWN SCHEDULE, NOVEMBER 1981 

Americans/ 

Third-Coun try 

Date Nationals Israelis 

Oct 81 . ... . .... . . 116 31 

Nov 81 .......... 109 28 

Dec 81 .. ........ 76 32 

Jan 82 ....... .. . . 65 30 

Feb 82 ........... 53 29 

Mar 82 .... . . ... . 53 28 

Apr 82 .... . . ... 53 28 

May 82 .......... 36 21 

Jun 82 .. ....... .. 35 20 

JuI82 ..... ..... .. 26 11 

Aug 82 ...... . . 22 9 

Sourcf". i\ISA Accelerated i\lanpower Phascdown Schedule, 17 Nov 8 1, IABPC, 48/ 6. 

Total 

147 

137 

108 

95 

82 

81 

81 

57 

55 

37 

31 

mained his primary concern. Hartung was not impressed. He 

wrote Gilbert that the plan that Griffis found so drastic "is not considered as aggressive as it should be." With the contractors more 

distressed than Griffis and with Bar-Tov agreeing with Hartung, the 

range of opinions was wide. At joint occupancy a consensus 

seemed unlikely. Wall was caught in the middle. He told Bratton 

that "the PMs (especially Hartung) believe I did not slash enough," 

but he thought his cuts were "realistic and as deep as we should go 

now into the contractors' forces without adversely impacting con-
ACTIVATING THE BASES, DEACTIVATING THE PROJECT 249 

struction progress." Because of the gathering momentum, he did 

not want "to take chances in slowing or stopping the charging 

rhinoceros in the field righ t now." 39 

At least there was harmony regarding where management 

should focus its efforts. All agreed that controlling the size and 

composition of the work force held the key to the remaining cost 

of the program. At the headquarters, such control involved management of the ratio of direct to indirect labor in addition to the 

spread of labor over the remaining months. These h-vo factors directly affected outlays for labor, which West estimated in the autumn of 1981 constituted 40 percent of the remaining cost. Six 

months later, it was 60 percent. 40 

Careful management to reduce the work force faced several obstacles. At Ovda Kelly had to break up what he considered to be a 

good team of government and contractor management. Naturally, 

he was reluctant to do so. To some others in the government, the 

contractors seemed slow to cut management, so the ratio of indirect to direct labor tended to stay high. At the same time, the support contractor thought it bore an unfair portion of staff reductions. Shepherd pointed to the 70 people he had lost between 

February and October 1981 and the 50 more who would go by 

year's end, while the Corps cut its staff by 25. The apparent disparity impeded cooperation and hurt morale. While Tel Aviv concentrated on the size of the force and the balance beh-veen direct and 

indirect labor, at the sites concerns focused on keeping the right 

people in the right specialties. Orderly completion depended on 

the availability of the proper mix of skills. A balance had to be 

struck beh-veen curbing costs and the imperatives of the schedule. 41 

Wall relied on Moore's task force to balance cuts against job 

needs. His phasedown plan divided the program's "manpower universe" into four parts: the Department of Defense, including civilians and the Army and Air Force at Tel Aviv, the sites, New York, 

and Washington; Management Support Associates, also at Tel Aviv, 

the sites, and New York; and the design and construction consortia, 

in Israel and New York as well as Bangkok for Negev Airbase Constructors and Lisbon in the case of Air Base Constructors. For each, 

he directed the task force "to assure that by the 15th of each month 

manpower objectives are reached and positively accomplished." 

The task force assessed progress every two weeks and recommended adjustments monthly. Their determinations were based on 

progress on the job matched against available manpower and skills. 

West's management analysis and control division, formed of the old 

resource management and planning and coordination offices in 

June 1981, monitored progress and collated data from three phase-
250 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

down managers. Gregor watched the Department of Defense and 

Management Support Associates segments; the deputy area engineers oversaw their respective construction contractors. Wall intended that "this manpower plan will be the basis for manpower reductions throughout the remainder of the project." 42 

Before the year ended Wall eliminated the quality assurance organization and returned the function to the area offices. From remnants of the disbanded teams, he assembled a small supervision 

and inspection group for the construction division in Tel Aviv, in effect giving Damico oversight of quality assurance. This reorganization paved the way for consolidating the duties of the contracting 

officers in Tel Aviv. The change also showed anew how readily the 

support contractor responded to the project's changing needs. 43 

Government employees represented a special concern. Wall 

thought well of the people who remained and wanted to minimize 

instability due to the distractions of job seeking during the last 

months of the project. His personnel officer, Janet Sales, was responsible for reducing the anxieties caused by phasedown. For 

the various job classifications in the office, she had to decide 

when to end recruiting and to stop renewing travel agreements 

while providing counseling and publicizing placement programs. 

Bratton's office helped with assurances of job placement, but the 

decline in staff size inevitably created morale problems. People 

worried about their future prospects, and rumors began to fly, especially in the confined working and living space of the Palace. 

Anxiety could be reduced by careful sequencing of phasedown 

events and by assuring that everyone knew this sequence as early 

as possible. Yet, even with precise planning, eliminating the stress 

was impossible. As Sales noted, employees had to take care of 

themselves as well as the project:

14 

While Wall set in motion these activities relating to the number 

and kind of specialties needed for the remainder of the project, he 

also started what became an ongoing reorganization of the headquarters. The changes in office structure aimed mainly at consolidating similar functions while reducing the staff. The organization 

that evolved during the early months of 1982 made greater use of 

majors and lieutenant colonels, who were less expensive and more 

flexible for short term use than were civilians.

45 

These changes started in the summer of 1981, when Wall 

merged resource management with planning and coordination to 

form the management analysis and control division. The new element also included the remnants of the engineering division's estimating branch. West thought the combination was a logical fit of 

functions. It eliminated internal discrepancies in estimates and fa-
ACTIVATING THE BASES, DEACTIVATING THE PROJECT 251 

cilitated staff reductions. Although resource management complained that the project needed the independent financial analysis 

that the office had once provided, the loss itself could also have advantages. General Bar-Tov frequently commented on the "Egyptian 

culture" of reporting represented in the inconsistent and confusing figures he received from the Americans. This complaint once 

caused Griffis, when he was in the planning and coordination office, to ponder whether Bar-Tov got too much information. "We 

will have to do a better job digesting it for him," Griffis told his 

staff, particularly to maintain consistency with the figures from resource management. "There is," Griffis claimed, "an awful waste of 

management talent to have to explain answers every time someone 

in the Israeli PM shop finds an inconsistent number; one he 

doesn't understand." 46 

In another consolidation in the fall of 1981, Wall created the 

administration and logistics division. This element consisted of the 

transportation office, procurement and supply, and administrative 

services, all under Maj. Harry J. McGinness, formerly the transportation officer. Although the branches continued to report directly to the executive office, Graw objected and soon left. This division changed again in March as procurement activities ended. 

Administration and logistics was left with its two remaining 

branches, and procurement went into a division that combined 

the function with property accountability. The new office came 

under Alfred Lellis, once head of the support group in New York 

and the only civilian to head a division created during Wall's reorganizations. Property accountability had started as a one-person 

operation in resource management. Then it became a branch in 

West's division before emerging to prominence under Lellis. Now, 

with very few purchases to be made, Lellis concentrated on transferring program property to the Israelis. He analyzed consumption 

of supplies and equipment, set about accounting for losses, and 

prepared for an inventoryY 

Along with the new organizational arrangements came a larger 

role for the security officer, Robert Amick. He became deputy project manager for support in February. The new divisions came 

under him, along with public affairs, security, and communications. 

Like McGinness, he preferred that those responsible for these functions "be action officers, deal direct [sic] with the commander and 

deputy commander on actions." He wanted them to keep him informed; he in turn tried to help them where he could.48 

Wall was pleased with the changes. Officers "march to a different drum," he said, forgetting or ignoring the difficulty he once 

had trying to find colonels to accept the challenges of the pro-
252 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

gram. Wall held that officers did additional work and accepted 

schedule changes without complaint, understanding "by Gestalt 

reasoning" what was expected. Civil servants, on the other hand, 

needed explanations for new and different demands on them. "I 

don't have the time on a job like this," Wall said, "to explain all 

these things." The new arrangement was not trouble free. Some officers would not stay beyond their one-year tours of duty, so shortterm replacements were needed to fill gaps. Also, the reorganization created civilian-military relationships with stresses of their 

own. For example,Joseph R. Chapla, the GS-15 resource manager, 

found himself in the unusual situation of working for a lieutenant 

colonel; similarly, Graw, a GS-14, reported to a major. Graw was so 

disturbed about the situation that he left. Chapla stayed but resented any levels of authority between him and the commander. 49 

While these changes took place, Wall still tried to figure out 

where he would close out the contracts. By the end of 1981 he was 

reconsidering locations for the later phases of closeout. His revised 

plan of November 1981 made a case for conducting the operation 

through phase III in Tel Aviv rather than in the United States. His 

staff was experienced and worked a longer week than stateside offices. He expected that closeout would take five months in Tel Aviv 

and nine back home. If he had to go to the United States, he preferred New York. The veterans of the support group were there, as 

well as offices, furniture, and computers. Besides, Management 

Support Associates was based in the city, and Perini was in nearby 

Boston. An alternative choice involved leaving Tel Aviv by September as originally proposed and moving to Fort Belvoir, Virginia, 

about fifteen miles south of Washington. This plan, which would 

allow release of contractor employees to their respective home offices, envisioned closing the New York office in July and maintaining a small staff at Belvoir until all issues were decided. The plan 

put the closeout near the Corps headquarters and had the lowest 

real estate cost. Wall still thought completion in the United States 

would take longer, but McNeely and Wilson favored Fort Belvoir. 

So Wall and his staff had to take this option seriously.50 

The decision on a location came during Wilson's January visit. 

He and McNeely considered the original proposal the cheapest. So 

Wall decided to set up a small resource management unit at Fort 

Belvoir as early as July to maintain continuity in financial matters 

and to serve as an advance party. He still hoped to have many issues 

settled by then. He thought his office and the contractors could resolve or at least identify outstanding issues before returning to the 

States. The decision disappointed Wall. He thought proximity to 

the chiefs office at best irrelevant and at worst undesirable. How-
ACTIVATING THE BASES, DEACTIVATING THE PROJECT 253 

ever, the choice logically followed Bratton's emphasis on an early 

departure from Israel. Hartung, who cited the cost to the Israelis of 

a continued American presence, also wanted to leave quickly. And 

Wall knew that he needed "to find a way to get gracefully out of 

here so that the Israelis can be as happy as we can make them and 

that the Air Force can be as proud as we can make them too." 51 

Meanwhile, in early February he consolidated contract management in Tel Aviv and named Moore contracting officer for both 

sites. The area engineers became Moore's authorized representatives at that time. Wall also brought all contract administrators and 

attorneys together in Tel Aviv. Graw thought the persistent procurement problems at Ramon and area office resistance to cost reduction hastened the decision, but consolidation of the project 

was also becoming inevitable as it neared completion. 52 

Manifestations of constriction were also seen in Tel Aviv. Reducing the small stock of houses leased for senior officials, which 

had begun in the spring of 1981, continued. The project staff also 

started to consider the problem represented by the Palace. Rehabilitating the hotel after three years of project use promised to be a 

complicated job. Wall preferred to seek a cash settlement with the 

proprietor. However it was not clear at that time that anything the 

project did would satisfy the owner. 53 

In the field less uncertainty existed regarding the pitfalls of the 

late stages of the job. Project personnel had been warned early of 

problems during the transition from construction sites to bases. 

The team that assessed direct manpower needs in August 1980 had 

cautioned that productivity would suffer during joint occupancy. 

All steps, the members urged, should be taken to turn over facilities that were as complete as possible in order to minimize the 

period of shared occupation. And indeed inefficiencies did occur 

during turnover and activation. Sometimes the problems stemmed 

from a lack of coordination. At Ramon a guard at the ammunition 

storage area refused entry to t\ovo crews seeking to install doors. 

Verification of their security clearances took two hours. In other 

cases, workers inadvertently picked Israeli holidays to seek entry 

into areas for which they needed escorts. 54 

Operations on the new bases also restricted the movement of 

workers. Although the job did compress as it neared completion, 

the need to cross the runways presented a safety and security 

problem until the end. The movement of construction crews and 

equipment had to be coordinated with the arrival and departure 

of planes, reducing the flexibility needed for an efficient construction sequence and often requiring that truck traffic be regulated. Moreover, the flights of high-performance aircraft dis-
254 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

OPERATING SQU~ORO 

~IR 8 S 

Col. Fletcher H. "Bud" Griffis and ABC General ManagerFTed Butler at the 

opening of Ramon Air Base in November 1981. 

tracted workers, as did arrival of some Israeli Air Force women assigned to the garrisons. 55 

Through the activation process, participants cooperated well. 

The Israeli base and wing commanders were accommodating, and 

Colonel Moore attributed much of the success of the transition to 

the Israeli officers involved. The project also benefited from cooperation between the constructors. Bar-Tov and Hartung thought 

there was never enough joint planning and purchasing, but the 

sharing of materials and experience did increase toward the end. 

In February 1981 Butler suggested that the consortia trade lists of 

excess inventory to hold down overages. Such exchanges occurred 

frequently in the final year;56 

By early April 1982 meeting the all-important deadline for initial operating capability, less than four weeks hence, was no longer 

an issue. Even the usually cautious Corps headquarters was convinced that success was at hand. V\Tilson told a reporter that work 

was so far along that everything would be done six months ahead 

of schedule, and Engineering News-Record proclaimed that the con-
ACTIVATING THE BASES, DEACTIVATING THE PROJECT 255 

tractors had "won their battle against a fast-approaching completion date." Deputy Area Engineer Moon at Ovda listed requirements in the area office journal, not for the April milestone, which 

was now taken for granted, but for completion of the entire base. 

Some construction remained, deficiencies in what had already 

been done needed correction, and documentation in the form of 

operations and maintenance data and as-built drawings still 

required completion. 57 

One other area of substance required attention. The equipment and property bought for the job belonged to the Israeli government. These materials had been a source of contention all 

along. The Israeli construction industry had strenuously opposed 

importing new machinery when local resources sat unused. Construction interests revived the issue from time to time, although 

even the Israelis could not sustain a dispute indefinitely. The Ministry of Defense countered some of the objections by promising to 

store the equipment for emergencies while continuing to use machinery owned by civilians for routine construction. Perhaps the 

desert compounds that held rows of captured Soviet-made vehicles 

and equipment would become home for the earth movers and 

dump trucks left behind by the project. In any event, the government never put to rest the anxieties of the construction industry. 

Even at the very end of the project, General Ivry incurred the contractors' wrath. On television, he noted that Israeli firms could not 

have met the schedule. His statement merely reaffirmed the proj ect's original premise, but building trades groups responded angrily, demanding apologies and investigations of the program and 

the policies that spawned it. 58 

Compared to what Ivry confronted, the Americans faced only 

the relatively benign matter of accounting for the equipment and 

turning it over to the Ministry of Defense. Little early planning 

had been done for this task. McNeely, who remembered the difficulties resulting from poor accounting procedures in Morocco 

during the 1950s, worried about this oversight. "On any future 

cost-type job," he said, "the property man should be on the first airplane to the work site." Nevertheless, for some months the Israelis 

were themselves unready to accept the property. So until 1982 very 

few actual turnovers took place. 59 

The delay was fortunate. Israeli law required that the Ministry 

of Defense pay import duties on the equipment. This stipulation 

meant that a complete inventory would be necessary. Moreover, 

matters of taxation involved the Ministry of Finance, which Wall 

called "the bureaucracy to answer the bureaucrat's prayer." So Wall 

expected to face a large administrative burden. He tried to force 
256 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

the issue, hoping perhaps to at least come to a definitive understanding. By the spring of 1982 there was very little progress. A 

standard procedure had been published the preceding year, and a 

few vehicles had been transferred. Still, most of the big items 

sat locked in yards at both sites, pending an agreement, and the 

issue was degenerating into disputes about who should guard and 

maintain the equipment.6o 

Hartung expected the transfer of property to be an even worse 

problem for the Israelis. Mter all, their program management 

would have to conduct inventories and decide on redistribution of 

the assets while activating the bases. Hartung saw the turnover as 

two separate matters. First were the large items, about $150 million 

worth of equipment and buildings. Then came the small thingsspare parts, materials, and tools-valued at about $30 million, 

which according to Hartung were "the real problem" because of 

the quantities. With more important things to do, the Ministry of 

Defense fell behind in its efforts to deal with the property. Finally, 

Bar-Tov took an easy way out. He decided to save time and money 

by foregoing a detailed American inventory, which he would have 

to verify. Instead, he accepted Hartung's view that a thorough 

American accounting would be wasteful because he would have to 

do one as well. Bar-Tov settled for an estimate of quantities. This 

decision was a stroke of good fortune for the Americans and left 

McNeely wondering "how in hell we came out as clean as we did. "61 

Some of the elements of completion were under better control. 

In the summer of 1980 the Near East Project Office and Management Support Associates had started planning for the manuals and 

other documentation on the operations and maintenance of the facilities at the new bases. 62 David Levy from the engineering division, 

who coordinated the effort, visited the Sinai bases and talked with 

Israeli Air Force base engineers about their approach to installation 

maintenance. This important but tedious compilation-Thomas 

called it "dog work"- was done as construction progressed, so it 

presented no problem during the late stages. According to McNeely, Hartung reported in April 1982 that "O&M documentation 

is progressing well, will be completed shortly and is by far better 

than any he has ever seen and received on U.S. projects." 63 

Even with the quality of the documentation, some Americans 

were concerned about the ability of the Israelis to maintain the 

bases. To Griffis it was "evident that the IAF does not have the resources assigned to Ramon sufficient to maintain this sophisticated 

air base." Two days before the 23 June closing of his area office, he 

noted poor maintenance practices, including the dismantling of 

some systems to provide parts for others. He expected that the fifty-
ACTIVATING THE BASES, DEACTIVATING THE PROJECT 257 

person base civil engineer organization that the Israeli Air Force 

had assigned to Ramon would prove woefully inadequate. Wall 

agreed: "My judgment is that the IAF cannot keep up with ordinary 

maintenance and cannot even fully man the sophisticated facilities 

that have been designed, constructed, and turned over to it." 64 

As the deadline for initial operating capability neared, the 

political imperatives that drove the program came into focus. 

Some Israelis hoped that departure from the Sinai would bring 

lasting peace, but others were pessimistic. Reluctance, anguish, 

and even a little resistance marked completion of the withdrawal. 

At the coastal town of Yamit, soldiers of the Israel Defense Force 

found themselves in a dramatic confrontation with Israeli civilians. 

The troops forcibly removed some settlers and bulldozed buildings. The Israelis had invested about $12 billion and a little of 

themselves in the region. For the first time, they were about to 

withdraw from territory they had won in war, and they had put 

down some roots there. The armed forces' magazine articulated a 

sense of loss: "Sinai is dying. This is seen everywhere. It may possibly bloom again soon-but for others. We, its residents during recent years, will then be strangers. Our home will no longer be 

here, and we shall come as guests to the houses we built. The 

feeling, even now, is strange." 65 

The absence of unanimity within the fractious polity of Israelor among its supporters in the United States-on such a vital issue 

was not surprising. Many American Jews urged Israel to stay in the 

Sinai. Only a month before the scheduled departure, fifty-one of 

these, who called themselves "American Jews deeply concerned 

about the security and survival of Israel and the United States," 

signed a Jerusalem Post advertisement urging the government to reconsider. "Stand firm," the public letter exhorted, "and the Jews of 

the world will stand firm with you!" The names included Irving Kett, 

who identified himself as "Colonel, ... U.S. Army Corps of Engineers." Wall and his staff were furious, but they confined their anger 

to intraoffice memorandums and passed the matter to Washington. 

The issue of whether Kett's use of his rank and affiliation in the Post 

letter violated Army regulations went unresolved there. Wall had 

enough problems: 'The task of building the air bases at Ovda and 

Ramon involves political as well as construction problems. Letters 

such as [this] one ... do not make this task any easier." 66 

Others were unhappy for different reasons. By the spring of 

1982 Hartung hated his association with the project. Bitterly frustrated by the constraints under which he worked, he wanted to 

leave his job and Tel Aviv as soon as possible. On a trip to the 

United States in mid-April, he and Gilbert raised the issue with Ah-
258 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

mann. Hartung said that he no longer served a useful purpose, 

and neither did the Air Force's engineering and services directorate. McNeely reported that Hartung "adamantly averred that he 

required authority if he was to function as the DOD Program Manager or his presence in Israel was a complete waste of time." Ahmann disagreed. He saw the program as a well-done team effort of 

which everyone should be proud. The memorandum between the 

Air Force and the Corps of Engineers provided basis enough for 

Hartung's continued presence. Ahmann wanted to keep the team 

together until the end. Thwarted again, Hartung went to San Antonio, Texas, where he accepted an award from the Society of 

American Military Engineers for his accomplishments in the program before returning to Israel at the end of the month.67 

Hartung probably did not appreciate the ironic juxtaposition 

of his failed effort to break free and the award in San Antonio. Just 

after returning to Tel Aviv, he said, "This has been the most miserable, unfulfilling assignment I have ever had in my career, and if I 

had had any idea it was like this, I would never have come over 

here." Part of his misery stemmed from his constrained role and 

the agreement that defined it. Wall's office, on the other hand,just 

did not take him or his position seriously. "Hartung," McNeely 

said, "even though he was Air Force, was the DOD PM and the 

American top dog on the scene .... We didn't want to work for the 

Air Force and forgot or never put in perspective that Hartung was 

DOD." In the end, McNeely concluded, ''The infighting, end-runs, 

and day-to-day hassles took their toll on him." 68 

While Bar-Tov found much to dislike in the American way of 

construction, he did not leave the program with anything approaching Hartung's bitterness. Certainly his inclination to improvise and deal directly with the contractors was frustrated many 

times. Hartung fended off Bar-Tov, souring what had been a warm 

relationship. At the end, Bar-Tov complained long and loud about 

the withholding of information and his inability to influence decisions. But he gave as good as he got. He did not shy away from confrontation, public or otherwise, and used all means, ranging from 

a 4 July message "to my American friends in the Negev air base 

program" to an impromptu harangue at a program social gathering, to make sure the Americans got the message about Israeli standards and needs. 69 Mter all, it had been the sheer force of his personality that had propelled him so close to the center of the 

decision-making process, despite the lack of formal provision for 

his participation. The same strength sustained him through the 

program and kept it from defeating him. 
ACTIVATING THE BASES, DEACTIVATING THE PROJECT 259 

Wall had the upper hand and knew it. Bar-Tov thought Wall 

never paid attention to Hartung and that the notion of an American team was little more than a convenient fiction. Wall did frequently refer to the program team-the three-legged stool was his 

phrase for joint program and project management-but he also 

expressed his attitude toward his relationship with Hartung's office 

in a restatement of the golden rule: "He who has the gold rules." 70 

So, it was hardly surprising that in the end only Wall was smiling. 

On the job, 25 April passed almost unnoticed. Three weeks 

later a ceremony at Ramon formally inaugurated the two new 

bases. The Israeli government seemed to play down the occasion, 

waiting until 17 May to mark the transfer with Defense Minister 

Sharon in attendance rather than Prime Minister Begin.71 Perhaps 

the delay served to obscure the association of the opening with the 

withdrawal that had so recently sparked considerable passion. 

In early June plans were made for closing the area offices and 

camps. Kelly listed five prerequisites, which he intended to carry 

out by 15 July. All horizontal work was to be done by 30 June, with 

construction deficiencies corrected by the same date. A week later 

the cinema was to be finished, and the last concrete was to be 

poured in the helicopter complex on 10 July. That left four days 

for cleaning up. Ramon planned to close a little earlier.

72 

At the same time, Hartung and Bar-Tov drafted procedures for 

concluding the program. The document dealt with several pending matters, including completion of construction, the need for an 

American program management agency, operations and maintenance documentation, the disposal of remaining property, reports, 

fiscal matters, and other activities associated with closing out the 

contracts. A few provisions in the document caused argument. Defense Security Assistance Agency's acting director, Walter B. Ligon, 

expressed concern that Hartung's departure might be premature. 

His desire to leave was no secret, and Ligon accepted an arrangement that permitted Hartung to go at the beginning of July. Ligon 

also objected to a suggestion that his agency had accepted Ministry 

of Defense participation in the closeout. Resolution of this matter 

awaited discussions between the Corps and the Israelis. Despite 

these objections, Hartung and Bar-Tov signed the essentially unchanged memorandum on 22June.73 

Wall also objected to some parts of the document, particularly 

Hartung's attempt to extricate himself. Again, he wrote "Tilt" in 

the margin of the draft next to the most offensive paragraph. Even 

now, in the waning days, Wall did not want to deal directly with 

Bar-Tov's office and did not want the area offices in direct contact 

with the Israelis in the field. To Hartung he stated clearly, "I am 
260 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

not a party to your procedure and am reviewing the impact." Moreover, he said, the memorandum did "not appear to conform to Mr. 

Ligon's DSAA guidance." At the end of June Wall's office still held 

back from acknowledging the validity of the procedures. Moore 

said he awaited formal approval from U.S. Air Force headquarters. 

Hartung told Damico that he had approval by telephone and 

wanted the Corps to follow the procedures. "The procedures are in 

effect," Damico reported back, "and we should follow them unless 

we intend to ignore it [SiC]. "74 Hartung departed within a week, 

leaving Lt. Col. Francis A. DeMartino as his representative. 

It was not long until this last dispute between the Corps and the 

Air Force in Tel Aviv became moot. The area office at Ramon already 

closed a week earlier; Ovda shut down on 9 July, leaving the movie 

house to be finished by the Israelis. The telex connection with the 

Pentagon was discontinued after work on 15 July, and Wall left two 

weeks later to command the Corps' South Atlantic Division in Atlanta, Georgia. His 1 April goal of turning everything over to the Israelis by the end of July and leaving before September was in hand.75 

Moore took over as commander of the project. In his first act 

as the new boss, he moved the small remaining staff out of the 

Palace and down the beach to the Plaza Hotel. Restoration of the 

Palace, which had been home for the project for nearly three 

years, and final turnover of property to the Ministry of Defense 

began in earnest. In another month he too would depart, leaving 

David Levy as a one-man liaison office working with the defense 

attache at the embassy.76 
ACTIVATING THE BASES, DEACTIVATING THE PROJECT 261 

Notes 

1. Wall interview, May 82. 

2. Hartung interview, May 82. 

3. Moore interview, Apr 82. 

4. Ltr, Wall to Hartung, 9 Oct 81, sub: Funding Increase to the Plan of Work 

(POW) for the Israeli Airbase Program, IABPC, 49/ 15; Shaw interview, Apr 82. 

5. West interview, Oct 81. 

6. Ltr, Hartung to Bar-Tov, 19 Oct 81, sub: Request for Additional GOI Dependable Undertaking, IABPC, 50/ 2; Ltr, Hartung to Wall, comments on Wall 's 

draft letter, 22 Oct 81, sub: Requirement for Obligation Authority and Program 

Funding, IABPC, 49/ 15; Telex, Hartung to Gilbert, 29 Oct 81 , IABPC, 50/ 2. 

7. Telex, Hartung to Gilbert, 29 Oct 81. 

8. Brown interview, Apr 81 ; Chapla interview, Apr 81. 

9. MFR, Wall to Hartung, 4 Nov 81, sub: Phasedown and Costs, IABPC, 48/ 6; 

Ltr, Wall to Hal·tung, 5 Nov 81, sub: Requirements for Obligation Authority, 

IABPC, 88/6. 

10. Ltr, Wall to Hartung, 10 Nov 81, sub: Additional Cost Figures, IABPC, 

48/ 6; Lu-, Bratton to Chief of Staff, USAF, Attn: AF / LEE, 10 Nov 81, sub: Requiremellt for Obligation Authority-Israeli Air Bases, IABPC, 50/2. 

11. Ltr, Hartung to Wall, 11 Nov 81, sub: Requirements for Obligation Authority, IABPC, 50/ 2. 

12. Ltr, Wall to Hartung, 11 Nov 81, sub: Requirements for Obligation Authority, IABPC, 50/ 2; MFR, Wall, n.d., IABPC, 48/ 6; Ltr, Wall to Hartung, 13 Nov 

81 , sub: Continuation of Letters of Requirements for Obligation Authority, 

IABPC, 50/ 2. 

13. Ltr, Hartung to Bar-Tov, 15 Nov 81, sub: Request for Additional GOI 

Dependable Undertaking, IABPC, 50/ 2. 

14. Ltr, Wall to Wilson [draft], 19 Nov 81, IABPC, 50/ 1; Ltr, Hartung to Wall, 

11 Nov 81 , sub: Requirements for Obligation Authority; West interview, Oct 81. 

15. Ltr, Wall to Hartung, 31 Dec 81, sub: Estimate to Complete Israeli Ail-base 

Program, IABPC, 50/ 1. 

16. Wall interview, May 82; Memo, Wilson for DAEN-MPE, 4 Jan 82, sub: 

Tasking Memorandum-Israeli Air Base Program, IABPC, 50/ 4. 

17. Memo, Wilson for DAEN-MPE, 4 Jan 82; Ltr, Wall to Hartung, 8 Jan 82, 

IABPC, 50/ 4; Ltr, Bar-Tov to Hartung, 8 Jan 82, sub: Program Cost Review, IABPC, 

50/ 4; MFR, Wall, 21 Jan 82, sub: General Wilson's Visit, IABPC, 41 / 13; MS, Directorate of Engineering and Services, HQ, USAF, Millie Glasebrook, compiler, History of the Directorate of Engineering and Services, DCS/L&E, 1 July-31 December 1980, vol. I [Office of Air Force History], p. 84; MS, Directorate of Engineering 

and Services (Glasebrook), History of the Directorate of Engineering and Services, 1 J anuary-30 June 1981, vol. I, pp. 91-95; MS, Directorate of Engineering 

and Services (Glasebrook), History of the Directorate of Engineering and Services, 1 July-31 December 1981, vol. I, p. 104; Edward L. Parkinson, "Getting a 

Handle on Co$t," Engineering and Services Qum·terly 23 (Summer 1982): 20-24. 

18. Ltr, Wall to Hartung, 12Jan 82, sub: Requirements for Obligation Authority [draft], IABPC, 50/ 4; Shaw interview, Apr 82. 

19. Reimer interview, Feb and Apr 82. 

20. MFR, Reimer, 1 Feb 82, sub: Special Task Team Methodology Disagreement, IABPC, 41 / 13; Reimer interview, Dec 85. 
262 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

21. MFR, Reimer, 1 Feb 82, sub: Special Task Team Methodology Disagreement; Reimer interview, Feb 82; Wall interview, Apr 82; Ltr, Wall to Hartung, 1 

Feb 82, lABPC, 50/3. 

22. Ltr, Wall to Hartung, 4 and 5 Feb 82, lABPC, 50/3; Interv, author with 

Lt Col Robert L. Amick, Apr 82, Tel Aviv, Israel. 

23. Ltr, Bar-Tov to Hartung, 9 Feb 82, sub: CaE & USAF Program Cost Evaluation Team, lABPC, 50/3; Moore interview, Apr 82 and Dec 85; Wall interview, 

May 82; Amick interview. 

24. Ltr, Wall to Hartung, 4 Feb 82, lABPC, 50/3; Moore interview, Apr 82 and 

Dec 85; Amick interview. 

25. Reimer interview, Feb 82 and Dec 85; Moore interview, Dec 85; MS, Directorate of Engineering and Services (Glasebrook), History of the Directorate of 

Engineering and Services, 1 July-31 December 1981, vol. I, p. 95. 

26. Ltr, Wall to Hartung [two separate notes], 10 Feb 82, lABPC, 50/ 3. 

27. Wall, Project Notebooks, vol. VII, 19 Jan 82, IABPC, 90; RAO, Daily 

Journal, 15-16 and 18-21 Jan 82, lABPC, 48/8; Brown interview, Apr 82. 

28. Ltr, Wall to Hartung, 14 Feb 82, lABPC, 50/3; RAO, Daily Journal, 19 Feb 

82, IABPC, 48/8. 

29. Brown interview, Apr 82; Shepherd interview, May 82; Wall interview, May 82. 

30. Bar-Tov interview, May 82. Ltrs, Wall to Hartung, 9 Nov 81; Wall to Wilson, 

10 Nov 81; Wall to Bratton, 10 Nov 81; Wall to Ahmann, 10 Nov 81; Wall to Brown, 

10 Nov 81; in lABPC, 50/ 2. Ltr, Wall to Bratton, 5 Nov 81 , sub: Monthly Progress 

Report, Israeli Airbase Program, lABPC, 88/ 6. 

31. Shaw interview, Apr 82. 

32. Maloney interview, May 82; Hartung interview, May 82. 

33. Shaw interview, Apr 82; Memo, Chapla for Contracting Officers; CaRs; 

Chief, CONUS Support Group; Commander, NEPO; DOD PM; and Chief, RMO, 

aCE; 8 Mar 82, sub: Program Obligation Authority-Interim Operating Policy, 

IABPC, 41 / 12; Moore interview, Apr 82. 

34. Ltr, Wilson to Wall, 30 Sep 81, sub: aCE Special Task Force Findings, 

IABPC, 58/1. 

35. Definition of Phases, n.d., file 201-07, NEPO files, Box T- 228; Interv, author with Lt Col Jack H. Clifton, May 81, Tel Aviv, Israel. This interview is essentiallya transcript of Clifton's briefing on the phasedown plan. 

36. Gregor interview. 

37. Memo, Wall for Task Force Members, 5 Oct 81, sub: Manpower Phase 

Down, IABPC, 48/ 6; Thomas interview, Oct 8l. 

38. Hartung interview, Oct 81; Ltr, Wall to Area Engineers, 29 Oct 81, sub: 

Action Plan fO!° Manpower Phase Down, IABPC, 48/ 6; Memo, Wall for Contracting 

Officer, MSA, 9 Nov 81 , sub: Action Plan for Manpower Phase Down, IABPC, 48/6. 

39. RAO, Daily Journal, 23-27 Oct 81, IABPC, 48/8; Telex, Hartung to Gilbert, 

29 Oct 81, IABPC, 50/2; Ltr, Hartung to Wall (on legal pad), 2 Nov 81, IABPC, 

50/2; MFR, Wall to Hartung, 4 Nov 81, sub: Phasedown and Costs, IABPC, 48/6; 

Ltr, Wall to Bratton, 5 Nov 81, sub: Monthly Report, Israeli Airbase Program. 

40. Hartung interview, May 82; Moore interview, Oct 81; West interview, Apr 82. 

41. Maloney interview, May 81; Kelly interview, Oct 81; Shepherd interview, 

Oct 81; Hartung interview, May 82; Moon interview. 

42. NEPO Organization Chart, Jun 81, IABPC, 88/ 5; Memo, Wall for Contracting Officers, 9 Nov 81, sub: Management Plan for Manpower Phasedown, 

IABPC, 48/ 6. 

43. Ltr, Wall to Hartung, 9 Nov 8l. 

44. Wall interview, May 82; Sales interview; Gregor interview; Kelly interview, 

Oct 81; Moore interview, Oct 81. 
ACTIVATING THE BASES, DEACTIVATING THE PROJECT 263 

45. Moore interview, Oct 81 and Apr 82; Wall interview, May 82. 

46. West interview, Oct 81; Shaw interview, Oct 81 and Apr 82; Bar-Tov interview, Apr 81; Griffis, P&CJournal, 14 Aug 80, IABPC, 41/1. 

47. Interv, author with Maj Harry J. McGinness, Apr 82, Tel Aviv, Israel; Graw 

interview, Oct 81; West interview, Oct 81; Lellis interview. 

48. Amick interview. 

49. Wall interview, May 82; Wall, Project Notebooks, vol. VII, 7 Dec 81, IABPC, 

90; Kelly interview, May 81; Graw interview, Oct 81; McGinness interview; Moore 

interview, Oct 81 and Apr 82. 

50. Phase Down Plan (revised 22 Nov 81), IABPC, 58/4; Annex B, Phase III 

Location, Encl to Memo, Wall for Contracting Officers, 17 Dec 81, sub: Phase III 

Closeout Location, IABPC, 58/5. 

51. Ltr, Wall to Maj Gen Wilson, 4 Feb 82, sub: NEPO Close Out Plan, IABPC, 

58/5; Wall interview, May 82; Hartung interview, May 82. 

52. Ltr, Wall to Maj Gen Wilson, 4 Feb 82, sub: NEPO Close Out Plan; Moore 

interview, Apr 82; Graw interview; Oct 81. 

53. Wall interview, May 81; Clifton interview; Moore interview, Apr 82. 

54. Special CE/MSA Team, CE/MSA DCC Direct Manpower Plus-Up Study, 

10-12 Aug 80, IABPC, 4/4; Moon interview; Parkes interview, Oct 81; Peterson 

interview, Oct 81. 

55. Moon interview; Parkes interview, Oct 81; Peterson interview, Oct 81; 

Moore interview, Oct 81. 

56. Wall interview, Oct 81 and May 82; Hartung interview, Oct 81 and May 82; 

Moore interview, Apr 82; ENR 209 (22 April 1982): 75; OAO, Master Diary, 27 

May 80, IABPC, 84/4; DF, Baer, Chief, Construction Division, to Area Engineer, 

Ramon, 15 Apr 80, sub: Capital Equipment, IABPC, 33/1; Ltr, Griffis to Butler, 28 

Oct 81, sub: Inventory of Reinforcing Steel, IABPC, 24/4; Shepherd, Daily 

Journal, 26 Feb 81, IABPC, 89/1. 

57. ENR208 (11 March 1982): 23; OAO, Master Diary, 1 ApI' 82. 

58. Jerusalem Post, 19 and 27 Sep, and 5 and 8 Oct 79; (Tel Aviv) Joumal oj Commerce, 14 May 80; (Tel Aviv) Davar, 1 and 3 Jun 80; (Tel Aviv) Sha'm; 18 Nov 80; 

(Tel Aviv) Ma 'ariv, 5 May 82; (Tel Aviv) Ra 'arelz, 19 and 24 May 82. 

59. Chapla interview, Aug 80; McNeely interview, Sep 83; MFR, V'I'harry, 17 

Dec 80, sub: Trip Report-Israel Air Bases Construction Project. 

60. Wall, Briefing for Incoming Officers, 14Jun 81; Memo, Wall for Hartung, 

28 Dec 81, IABPC, 50/1; Memo, Wall for Hartung, 10 Feb 82, IABPC, 50/3; SOP 

31, Transfel' of Defense Articles and Services (Equipment and Material), 20 Apr 

81, revised 12Jun 81, IABPC, 15/31; McGinness interview; OAO, Master Diary, 4 

Mar 81, IABPC, 85/1. 

61. Hartung interview, May 82; MFR, McNeely, 22 Apr 82, sub: Meeting with 

DSAA on Israeli Air Base Program, IABPC, 41 / 13; Lellis interview; Moore interview, Apr 82; McNeely interview, Sep 83. 

62. Six types of documents ultimately were transferred for each base: as-built 

drawings; contractor's shop drawings; vendor's data; operations and maintenance 

manuals, including an index; a master equipment list; and contractor's design calculations and analysis. Ltr, Kelly to David Holmes, 10 Nov 81, sub: Operation and 

Maintenance Documentation Instruction, IABPC, 35/2. 

63. Ltr, Thomas to GM, MSA, 2 Jul 80, sub: Completion of O&M Documentation Instruction, IABPC, 33/2; MFR, David Levy, 8 Aug 80, sub: Transmission by the 

DCCs ofPl'Oj ect Documents Related to Operations and Maintenance, IABPC, 23/ 1; 

MFR, McNeely, 22 Apr 82, sub: Meeting with DSAA on Israeli Air Base Pl'Ogram. 

64. Ltr, Gl'iffis to Wall, 21 Jun 82, sub: Ramon Airbase Completion; Memo, 

Wall for Maj Gen Ames Albro, 7 Jul 82, IABPC, 83/1. 
264 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

65. "Mideast Beat," World Press Review 29 (June 1982) : 15; Newsview, 9 Mar 82, 

p. 6; Sachar, £'gyjJt and Israel, p. 305; Ba'mahane, 10 Mar 82. 

66. j el'usalem Post, 19 Mar 82; Memo, Amick (Routing and Transmittal slip) for 

Wall, 21 Mar 82, sub: jerusalem Post ad-19 Mar. 1982, IABPC, 41/5; Ltr, Wall to 

Maj Gen ,,,Tilson , 24 Mar 82, sub: Advertisement Published in the jerusalem Post 

Newspaper, IABPC, 41/5. 

67. MFR, McNeely, 22 Apr 82, sub: Meeting with DSAA on Israeli Air Base Program; ''Worth Noting" [United States Air Force] Engineering and Services Quarterly 

23 (Summer 1982) : 18. 

68. Hartung interview, May 82; McNeely interview, Mar 84. 

69. Bar-Tov interview, May 82; Bar-Tov, Open Letter "To My American Friends 

in the Negev Air Base Program," Jul 81, IABPC, 75/4. The author was at the party 

in the Palace Hotel on 30 April 1981. 

70. Bal~Tov interview, May 81; Wall interview, Aug 80. 

7l. MFR, Moore, 22 Apr 82, sub: FONECON with Chief of Engineers, LTG 

Bratton, IABPC, 41/13; Memo, Wall for the Ambassador, 14 May 82, sub: Israeli 

Air Base Program Site Visits and IOC Ceremony-17 May 1982, IABPC, 41/13. 

72. OAO, Master Diary, 1 Apr 82; Ltr, Griffis to Wall, 21 Jun 82, sub: Ramon 

Airbase Completion, IABPC, 83/l. 

73. Procedures for Program Conclusion, draft, n.d., attached to Memo, WaIter B. Ligon, Acting Director, DSAA, for the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air 

Force (Installations), sub: Israeli Air Base Program, 15 Jun 82, IABPC, 82/5; Hartung and Bar-Tov, Procedures for Program Conclusion, 22 Jun 82, IABPC, 82/5. 

74. Procedures for Program Conclusion, draft, n.d., attached to Memo, Ligon 

for DASAF(I), 15 Jun 82; Ltr, Wall to Hartung, 23 Jun 82, IABPC, 82/5; Ltr, 

Moore to Hartung, 30 Jun 82, sub: Open Issues Discussed 28-30 June 1982, 

IABPC, 82/5; MFR, Damico, sub: Information Provided by General Hartung and 

General Bar-Tov to the Undersigned on 30 June 1982, IABPC, 82/5. 

75. Ltr, Griffis to Wall, 21Jun 82, sub: Ramon Airbase Completion; OAO, Master Diary, 8 Jul 82, IABPC, 85/2; Memo, Wall, through DOD Program Manager 

Representative, for MOD Program Manager, 9 Jul 82, sub: Discontinuance of 

Pentagon Circuit, IABPC, 83/l. 

76. Information Paper, Moore, 4 Aug 82, attached to MFR, Moore, sub: Support for NEPO Liaison Office-Tel Aviv, IABPC, 41/13; Ltr, Moore to Bratton, 3 

Aug 82, sub: Monthly Report, Near East Project Office, IABPC, 91/2. 
CHAPTER 15 

Closeout 

All effort as outlined in the plan of work is complete .... Successful 

construction completion of the two air bases some nine months ahead of 

the 25 April 1983 mandate stands as a notable cooperative achievement. 

Col. John E. Moore, November 1982 1 

Preparations for closeout dated back to the earliest phasedown 

planning in Tel Aviv. In the winter and spring of 1982 these plans 

grew more specific. Based on experience and the reports that had 

been done by Maloney's auditors, the resource manager identified 

the issues that might result in suspensions, disallowances, or 

claims. When the construction crews attained initial operating capability, just over sixty potential contractual disputes were already 

identified and under review. As of 31 May, a total of $7.9 million 

had been withheld from the three contractors, and the issues were 

fairly well understood. 2 

There was more to closeout than identifying the likely controversies. The operation had to have a home. The chiefs office in 

Washington overrode Wall and told him to finish the project at Fort 

Belvoir. McNeely in particular argued for the southern site, claiming that it was less costly than New York, and Wall thought McNeely 

was largely responsible for the choice of Belvoir. As far as McNeely 

was concerned, the resistance to bringing the office to the Washington area originated with the support group in New York. 3 

Colonel Moore, who expected to take charge of the closeout, 

saw the opposition of the New York employees as the significant 

drawback to the decision. He anticipated difficulties in convincing 

them to make the move, and he needed the continued participation of the accountants and clerks who had tracked the financial 

transactions for the duration of the job. Moore credited Frank BilIiams of the New York office with convincing the staff to move to 

Fort Belvoir. Billiams, Moore said, "had sort of gathered those folks 

as a family-type thing and worked with them over a three-year 

period. He brought with him virtually intact his money account-
266 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

ability folks down to the GS- 6 and GS- 7 level, and having them 

come removed what I saw as one of the last disadvantages of 

coming to the Fort Belvoir area." 4 

Deciding whether Belvoir was a logical and effective location 

did not end the matter. Twenty-year-old policy encouraged decentralization of government operations away from the National Capital Region. So the move from Tel Aviv to northern Virginia required the permission of the assistant secretary of defense for 

manpower, reserve affairs, and logistics. 5 

Such approval came easily but did not clear the way for the 

closeout team to get down to business. First, the Israeli desire for a 

role in the process required resolution. Bar-Tov expressed this interest during an April meeting in Washington. He claimed that 

closeout would be "a battle and war" with the contractors and that 

his ministry would help resolve issues involving Israeli subcontractors and suppliers, reducing the final cost of the program as a result. Wilson was amenable to such participation provided "it was 

clearly understood that decision authority rested with the contracting officer and his decision was final." His position reflected Wall's 

view that "the Israelis would not be allowed to participate in decisions nor the negotiations, but that they would be allowed to provide input for our effort." In any event, Wall believed, "The Israelis 

were already involved in providing input and therefore, there 

would be no change to our present procedures." 6 

Such assurances did not satisfy Bar-Tov, who pushed for a more 

formal arrangement. At a June meeting in his office at the IBM 

Building, he offered Hartung and Moore help in preparing for all 

negotiations involving the three prime contractors as well as Israeli 

subcontractors and vendors. He also wanted an observer from his 

office present at negotiations. Bar-Tov envisioned an arrangement 

in which his representative would not speak but would pass notes 

to the chief negotiator. He conceded that there might be cases in 

which he would have nothing to contribute, and Hartung, apparently tired of diplomacy, "indicated that this might be true in 

perhaps nine cases out of ten." 7 

Wall still tried to accommodate the Israeli interest in a limited 

involvement. He and Bar-Tov signed an agreement specifying the 

conditions under which the Israelis could participate in negotiations 

between the Corps and the contractors. The memorandum limited 

Ministry of Defense participants to observation, prohibited them 

from joining discussions ("normal pleasantries excepted"), and 

made it clear that the contracting officer could "terminate negotiation conferences or ask any participant, including observers, to 

leave, and continue to conduct the negotiation conference alone." 8 
CLOSEOUT 267 

Wall did his best to get contractor acceptance of this provision. 

He emphasized that any Israeli participant would be "a silent observer and in no case . .. an active participant." He asked the 

prime contractors to cooperate, claiming that the Israeli presence 

would be in the best interests of the United States, the companies, 

and Israel. The contractors objected. "We are," Wall wrote Hartung, "running into a buzz saw of resistance to any involvement 

outside Corps with ABC and NAC."9 

McNeely already had alerted Wall to the adamant opposition 

of Air Base Constructors' attorney Manning Seltzer, a former chief 

counsel in the Office of the Chief of Engineers. So the contractors' 

official reply came as no surprise. By telex and by letter, Fred Butler sent the same message: the presence of any outsiders at negotiations was totally unacceptable. Third parties would inhibit the 

free exchange of views and obstruct progress. Butler took Wall's 

assertion of a substantial Israeli interest in the proceedings and 

reduced it to its absurd conclusion: "If 'vital interest' is a criterion, 

we may as well include the stockholders of our various companies, 

not to mention U.S. taxpayers. We are irrevocably convinced that 

contract costs will increase and issues will be prolonged if any outside parties are allowed to participate." 10 The contract specified 

that the contractor and the Corps would conduct negotiations, 

and Butler insisted on adherence. Unlike the government at the 

start of the program, the contractors at the end would not be 

swayed by Bar-Tov's forceful personality. 

In the face of this opposition, Bar-Tov withdrew his request to 

participate at the negotiating table. Discussions with the contractors, which had stopped pending resolution of this matter, resumed. Bar-Tov retired from the air force in November, and the 

issue of Israeli participation did not come up again. II 

Meanwhile, the removal of the Near East Project Office from 

Tel Aviv to Fort Belvoir was carried out over the summer of 1982. 

In late June five finance and accounting employees arrived at the 

new headquarters as the nucleus of the resource management office. In the office of counsel, two of the three lawyers who were still 

in Israel inJuly left on 1 August, one for a new assignment and the 

other for Fort Belvoir. One left in the middle of the month and 

went to Belvoir in early September. By the middle of September, 

the transition was completed, and the new office was in place in a 

one-story preengineered building, similar to the structures that 

had been used as offices at the Negev sitesY Alongside stood an 

unheated warehouse in which were deposited the 1,000 or so 

boxes of Near East Project Office records, ranging from commander's logs to daily concrete batch plant reports. 
268 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

The organizational structure that Colonel Moore established 

at Fort Belvoir differed somewhat from the one he had envisioned 

while still in Tel Aviv. He originally planned an organization with 

five branches-counsel, procurement and supply, contract administration, property, and resource management-and the liaison office in Tel Aviv manned by David Levy. The Fort Belvoir office combined the property and procurement branches and left the h.yo 

procurement positions vacant. Moore's staff did not expect to face 

any issues involving supply matters. 13 

Two basic types of disputes needed to be resolved. One involved the validity of contractor expenditures and pitted the government against the contractors. Issues of this type were well anticipated and documented and were settled fairly quickly. For 

example, by 1 February 1983, the Corps and Air Base Constructors 

resolved all outstanding issues except a $900,000 dispute regarding 

the office overhead charged by the firm's design subcontractor. 

Three weeks later that matter too was settled, with the designer accepting a $500,000 settlement. Virtually all such disputes were laid 

to rest by the spring of 1983.14 

The other type of disagreement involved third-party suits: 

actions brought against the prime contractors by former employees, vendors, or subcontractors. These were more difficult to predict. They continued to trickle in, sometimes surprising Moore 

and his small staff, even as late as 1985. They also amounted to a 

much higher dollar value. The suits that were active at the beginning of1983 totaled more than $110 million. They involved a host 

of issues from sexual harassment and wrongful termination of 

employment to claims for customs duties and taxes. 15 

The largest of these legal actions came as no surprise. Moore 

and his closeout team expected during the fall of 1982 that the 

Palace Hotel lease would cause them significant problems in the 

coming months. Management Support Associates, which was the 

prime contractor responsible for the hotel, offered owner David 

Taic a lump-sum settlement instead of restoration. After Taic 

rejected the offer, the contractor refurbished the building. According to Moore, the consortium's efforts "proved very successful, 

were completed on time, and initial reports by objective consultants indicate [d] the hotel is in as good, or better, condition than 

when accepted by MSA three years ago." Nevertheless, Moore still 

expected extensive litigation. 16 

Formal return of the Palace to Taic took place in August. Taic 

had ninety days to take whatever legal action he chose, and he 

waited until almost the last minute to bring a suit of $3.89 million 

against Management Support Associates for damage to his build-
CLOSEOUT 269 

ing. It soon became clear that settling this case was going to take 

several years. As Moore noted, "In litigation you talk in years, and 

the major litigation of the hotel, we knew right away was going to 

be a four- or five-year [effort], because even after three years if you 

got to some kind of decision you would be in an appeal process." 

Moore hoped to have the matter settled by mid-1986, but in 1988 

the case was still undecidedP 

Ironically, while Taic's case against the relatively small Management Support Associates organization loomed larger, all of the 

outstanding issues relating to the two huge construction contracts 

were settled quickly. By January 1983 most disputes between the 

government and the contractors were resolved. Based on various 

audits, the government had withheld nearly $6 million from the 

two joint ventures. Settlement resulted in payment of about $3.8 

million of the disputed amount and concession of the remainder 

by the companies. Within the next two months the government 

and both consortia reached out-of-court agreements concerning 

disputed overhead costs for the design elements and on the few 

other remaining issues. By spring these contractors shut down 

their suburban Virginia offices entirely. 18 

In the spring of 1983 the structure and size of the closeout 

organization changed significantly. Colonel Moore became commander of the Facilities Engineering Support Agency of the Corps 

on 29 April, while remaining in charge of the closeout on a parttime basis. The size of the group had been reduced to eleven over 

the past months, and by June the team was down to four. In addition to Colonel Moore, only Frank Billiams, attorney Paul Cheverie, and secretary Sallie Thornburg remained. Most of the office 

furniture had been sold or turned over to the Israeli mission, and 

the number of unresolved claims declined. Little remained to be 

resolved except the Palace Hotel suit. 19 

From that time forward, the trend in staffing and outstanding 

issues continued to be downward. Only Thornburg still worked 

full-time on the project. The others participated when needed 

from new jobs that they held elsewhere. Moore retired in 1986, 

and Damico, now head of the construction division in the Baltimore District of the Corps and associated with the program 

longer than anyone, became contracting officer responsible for 

resolution of the outstanding issues. 2o 

New disputes still emerged from time to time. In the fall of 1983 

Fiat-Allis filed a claim for reimbursement for spare parts that the 

company asserted were damaged before being returned to their 

warehouses. Such surprises occurred until the very end. Even as 

late as 1985 the Portuguese government sued the program for taxes 
270 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

allegedly owed by a subsidiary of Air Base Constructors. As Moore 

later recalled, "what is the surprising thing, you end up with spikes 

[of activity] and there is surprise litigation that comes out of the 

woodwork." 21 

So the closeout dragged on into the late 1980s, in sharp contrast to the program itself, which was carried out with remarkable 

speed. For that matter, the major issues between the government 

and the contractors were also resolved quickly and without resort 

to the courts. The government had good records and able negotiators, and the contractors shared the Corps' interest in completing 

negotiations quickly.22 

The program did cost more than originally allotted, but very 

little more. The original budget estimate of $1.038 billion was exceeded by about $20 million, although the ongoing litigation 

made it impossible to determine a precise figure in 1988. Any 

number of factors could have caused the small overrun. Perhaps it 

was the need in 1979 and 1980, as Joseph R. "Ray" Shaw said, to 

"buy like hell to get the project moving." Maybe what Wall described as early "lapses in financial discipline" among American 

managers interested in their own comfort or the drastic increase in 

indirect costs that accompanied the surge in manpower during the 

late months of 1980 pushed the project over budget. 23 But whatever the reasons, the amount was small, and Alan Shepherd was 

probably right when he concluded that, given the variables, the 

uncertainties, and the haste, "Any board of directors would kiss 

your feet. "24 
CLOSEOUT 271 

Notes 

1. Ltr, Moore to HQ, USAF, Office of Director of Engineering and Services, 

19 Nov 82, sub: Final Monthly Summary Progress Report, lABPC, 91/2. 

2. Shaw interview, Apr 82; Ltr, Wall to Bratton, 4Jun 82, sub: Monthly Report, 

Israeli Airbase Program, lABPC, 91/2. 

3. Wall interview, May 82; McNeely interview, Mar 84. 

4. Moore interview, Dec 85. 

5. Memo, Brig GenJerome B. Hilmes, Deputy Director for Facilities Engineering and Housing, Directorate of Military Programs, through CS and ASA 

(IL&FM), for ASD (MRA&L), 5 Apr 82, sub: Proposed Relocation of Near East 

Project Office to Fort Belvoir-Decision Memorandum, lABPC, 62/4; DOD Directive 5305.2, Decentralization of DepaTtment of Defense Activities from the National 

Capital Region (Washington, D.C.: OSD, 24 Sep 63). 

6. MFR, McNeely, 22 Apr 82, Meeting with DSAA on Israeli Air Base Program, 

lABPC, 41/13; MFR, Wall, 25 Apr 82, sub: Telephone Conversation with General 

Wilson, lABPC, 41/13. 

7. MFR, Maj Harold E. Fievet, Jr., 8 Jun 82, sub: MOD Concept of Closeout, 

File 201-07, lABPC, 41/13. 

8. MOU, Wall and Bar-Tov, 23 Jun 82, lABPC, 83/1. 

9. Memo, Wall for Contracting Officers and General Managers, MSA, ABC, 

NAC, 4 Jul 82, sub: MOD Representative Role as Observers in Project Contract 

Closeout Operations, lABPC, 83/1; Ltr, Wall to Hartung, 4Jul 82, lABPC, 83/1. 

10. Memo, McNeely for Moore, 25 Jun 82, sub: Questions on MOD Budget 

and Other Matters, lABPC, 83/1; Telex, Butler to Wall, n.d., lABPC, 83/1; Ltr, 

Butler to Moore, 7 Jul 82, sub: Closeout Negotiations, lABPC, 83/1. 

11. Ltr, Moore to Bratton, 3 Aug 82, sub: Monthly Report, Near East Project 

Office, lABPC, 91/2; Ltr, Moore to Albro, 12 Nov 82, sub: Status Report, Near 

East Project Office, lABPC, 91/2. 

12. Ltr, Moore to Robert Flahive, Deputy Chief, OAS, OCE, 1 Jun 82, sub: 

Space Planning for the Kingman (Humphreys) Complex, lABPC, 62/4; NEPO 

Organization Charts, 3 Aug and 20 Sep 82, lABPC, 88/5; Memo, Paul Cheverie, 

Chief Counsel, for Col Moore, 27 Jun 82, sub: OC Schedule for Move to Ft. 

Belvoir, lABPC, 41/13. 

13. Total strength stood at eighteen in September. The executive office consisted of the commander, deputy, staff support assistant, and secretary. The contract administration branch had a civil engineer (contract management), a civil 

engineer (cost schedule), two civil engineers (contract administration), and a secretary. Resource management included six people: a financial manager, an auditor, an accountant, an accounting technician, a voucher examiner, and a secretary. Office of counsel consisted of two lawyers, and property and procurement 

was a one-man operation. NEPO Organization Charts, 3 Aug and 20 Sep 82; 

Moore interview, Dec 85. 

14. Ltr, Moore and H. R. Nelson, Deputy General Manager, Air Base Constructors, 25 Feb 83, sub: ABC Overhead on Design Subcontract Settlement 

Agreement, in NEPO Program Manager Update, 11 Mar 83, lABPC, 91/4. 

15. NEPO Briefing for Brig Gen Moshe Bar-Tov (Ret.), 27 Jan 83, lABPC, 91 /3. 

16. Ltr, Moore to Albro, 12 Nov 82, sub: Status Report, Near East Project 

Office, lABPC, 91/2; Ltr, Moore to Bratton, 20 Sep 82, sub: Monthly Report, Near 

East Proj ect Office, lABPC, 91 /2. 
272 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

17. Ltr, Moore to Albro, 12 Nov 82, sub: Status Report, Near East Proj ect 

Office; NEPO, OCE Program Update, 3 Mar 83, IABPC, 91/2; Moore interview, 

Dec 85; NEPO Briefing for Bar-Tov, 27 Jan 83. 

18. NEPO Briefing for Bar-Tov, 27 Jan 83; NEPO, OCE Program Update, 3 

Mar 83. 

19. Ltr, Moore to Albro, 29 Mar 83, sub: Near East Proj ect Office Transition 

Update, IABPC, 91 /4; Ltr, Moore to Bar-Tov, 7 Jun 83, sub: Program Update, 

IABPC,91/4. 

20. Ltr, Moore to Damico, 13 May 86, sub: Designation of Successor ContI"acting Officer, IABPC, 91/5. 

2l. Ltr, Moore to Bar-Tov, 18 Oct 83, sub: Program Update, IABPC, 91 /5; Ltr, 

MOOl"e to Reuven Kokolevich, 1 Oct 85, sub: Israeli Air Base Progl"am Update, 

IABPC, 91/5; Moore interview, Dec 85. 

22. McNeely interview, Mar 84. 

23. Shaw interview, Apr 82; B. Steinberg interview; Wall, "Managing Construction of Israeli Air Bases in Negev-A Personal Perspective," Joumal oj Management 

in Engineering 1 (October 1985): 236. 

24. Shepherd interview, May 82. 
CHAPTER 16 

Conclusion: 

A Forgotten Success 

Ten years after Camp David a broader peace remains elusive. 

William B. Quandt, National Security Council staff member, Carter 

administration I 

Looking back from the perspective of nearly a decade, it is 

clear that for the Corps of Engineers the Israeli air base program 

was a significant success. Under the direction of Lt. Gen. John W. 

Morris, the Corps leadership eagerly pursued this mission in which 

they knew the organization must not fail. Maj. Gen. JamesJohnson 

and his North Atlantic Division staff in New York and the planners 

in Washington-Fred McNeeley, Lee Garrett, Bates Burnell, and 

the people who worked for them-jumped at the chance to get the 

highly visible risk-laden job for the Corps. Those who followedJack Gilkey, Dick Curl, Don O'Shei, Ben Lewis, John Wall, and the 

others-spent no time complaining about the difficult situation 

that had been thrust on them. They too appreciated the importance of the effort, and many thrived in the challenging, fast-paced 

environment. Morris' agency responded with the spirit that he 

sought in subordinates. Collectively, the Corps did not shy away 

from the opportunity to fail. 

They did not fail. In fact, in conjunction with the other government and contractor participants in the program, they produced a 

remarkable success. The management plan that came out of the 

combined efforts of New York and Washington offices of the Corps 

got the program moving, and the cost estimates produced in the 

office of John Reimer turned out to be remarkably accurate. However, these estimates were not self-fulfilling. It was the management 

of John Wall and his staff along with the cooperation of the contractors that balanced the requirements of schedule, quality construction, and the budget to complete the program with only the 

smallest of overruns. 
274 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

Success did not come easily. The complexity of the management scheme in Tel Aviv in combination with conflicts between organizations and the clashes of strong personalities did produce difficulties. But all of the participants acted in what they saw as the 

best interests of the mission, and the commitment of all to the 

goals of the program was never in doubt. 

All knew that failure would have had far-reaching implications. 

The Carter administration's quest for peace between Israel and 

Egypt and in the Middle East at large would have been jeopardized 

had the Corps not succeeded. But the bases were completed, and 

the Israelis honored their historic commitment to withdraw from 

the Sinai peninsula. The Corps of Engineers added another major 

accomplishment to its list of huge construction projects and reaffirmed its ability to work in conjunction with private contractors in 

an environment that approximated mobilization for war. Military 

construction by the Corps of Engineers proved a valuable tool in 

the implementation of the nation's foreign policy. 

The air base program was only the most prominent and most 

recent episode in the long history of post-World War II c.onstruction by the Corps of Engineers in the Middle East. From the early 

days of the cold war, the Corps supported American policy in the 

region with construction for American forces and for friendly governments. Most of the work was explicitly military, and early 

projects ranged from bases for American air forces along the 

southern shore of the Mediterranean in Libya and Morocco to a 

network of logistical, administrative, and tactical facilities for the 

shah's government in Iran. Engineer projects in the 1960s also included over five hundred miles of highways in Afghanistan-about 

one-third of that landlocked country's paved roads. Beginning 

around the same time and extending well in to the 1980s, the 

Corps also managed a huge program in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, a multibillion-dollar complex of military and civil construction 

for several government ministries. 2 

So, by the time of Camp David, military construction was a 

tried and true albeit little known instrument of American policy in 

the region. But the connection of the air base work in the Negev to 

diplomacy was more explicit and immediate than in most cases. 

The project was tied directly to a specific diplomatic initiative 

rather than to long-range policy goals. 

The air base program differed from American construction 

elsewhere in the region in other ways. These differences emanated 

from the specific policy goals that were involved and the contrast 

between Israel's level of maturation and that of other Middle East-
CONCLUSION 275 

ern nations rather than from the special relationship between the 

United States and Israel. In other Middle Eastern locales, Corps 

projects contributed to development programs for societies on the 

road to modernization and diversification. But Israel was already a 

modern industrial nation, with a politically sophisticated and combative press and construction practices that Americans found idiosyncratic but conceded to be effective. This was not nation building, as the provision of infrastructure in developing countries is 

frequently called. In fact, in some respects something antithetical 

to nation building seemed to take place. The American presence, 

particularly because it was related to the withdrawal from the Sinai, 

represented a blow to Israeli national pride. Distress was especially 

acute in the building industry and crafts, which interlocked in the 

Histadrut labor federation. This unhappiness combined with the 

stress caused by the Portuguese workers in Negev towns to generate 

considerable negative publicity. It also underscored the difference 

between Israel and other Middle Eastern hosts of Corps projects as 

well as the distinctions between the political imperatives that drove 

the air base program and other Corps work in the region. 

The most important questions about the air base program pertain to the ultimate result of the diplomacy that created the Corps 

mission in the Negev. What happened to the Camp David accords 

and the possibility of peace in the Middle East? On one hand, 

there is peace between Israel and Egypt, a peace that has seen 

some rocky times but still endures. However, Camp David was also 

and perhaps more importantly intended to serve as the basis for an 

overall regional peace and for resolution of the issues surrounding 

Palestinian nationality and territory. As a framework for regional 

peace, Camp David is a dead letter-repudiated by some, ignored 

by others, and supported by only a few. 

Many Arab countries have firmly rejected further negotiations 

based on the Camp David accords. Most notable among these are 

Egypt itself, which was so instrumental in beginning the process, 

and Jordan, which has renounced its claims to its former territories on the West Bank of the Jordan River. They now seek solutions 

through a comprehensive international conference supported by 

the United States and the Soviet Union, the very approach that 

both Israel and the United States sought to avoid through the 

Camp David meetings. Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, who 

had pledged full support for Camp David when he succeeded 

Sadat, grew disenchanted when discussions of Palestinian autonomy collapsed early in the 1980s. He later rejected the Camp David 

formula for Palestinian autonomy as "a thing of the past whose 

time has ended." The Palestinian protests against Israeli occupa-
276 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

tion of the West Bank and Gaza, the intifada that started late in 

1987 and raged through the following year and into 1989, reinforced the conviction of many that Camp David did not show the 

way to a solution that would guarantee an end to the occupation. 

Other Arab countries-among them Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the 

United Arab Emirates, Morocco, and Syria-shared this view. 3 • 

In Israel the Camp David accords still had strong official backing. Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir remained committed to Camp 

David at the end of 1988, perhaps because the accords had provided an excuse for his government to forestall meaningful negotiations regarding the future of Palestinians in the occupied territories. 'We have made it clear to all potential partners," Shamir was 

reported as saying, "that we are committed to the Camp David accords and we will not change our position in this regard." 4 

Shamir's adamancy notwithstanding, the fate of the three key 

participants underscores the failure of the Camp David initiative as a 

framework for regional peace. Sadat, who risked so much to open 

communications with Israel, was assassinated in his own country and 

did not live to see the completion of the Israeli withdrawal from the 

Sinai. Begin, who welcomed the initiative, became a recluse after Israel's disastrous invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and the death of his 

wife. Carter, who brought the two together, was defeated in Ronald 

Reagan's landslide election in 1980. As Ambassador Samuel Lewis 

reflected, looking back in the mid-1980s, regional peace seemed "a 

lonely relic of shattered dreams." True, Israel and Egypt remained 

formally at peace, and that in itself was a substantial achievement "in 

a tormented region where peace is rare and warfare and terror 

seem endemic." 5 But on the tenth anniversary of Sadat's visit to 

Jerusalem, both countries felt "ambivalence and a sense of disappointment," according to Glenn Frankel of the Washington Post. 6 

Gone was the sense of "the turning point," as former Israeli Foreign 

Minister Abba Eban called Sadat's dramatic 1977 gesture, when "the 

windows were opened and the air came rushing in." 7 

While Camp David has not quite been forgotten, and indeed 

should be remembered for bringing peace between Israel and 

Egypt, the air base program quickly disappeared from the public 

memory of even the American president who helped create it. The 

chronology in President Carter's memoir ignored the program entirely, moving from the March 1979 treaty to the November seizure 

of American citizens in Iran, without mention of the intervening 

establishment of the Near East Project Office. Similarly, his entry 

for April 1982 mentioned only the return of the Sinai and the dismantling of the settlements. There was nothing about the successful completion of base construction and attainment of initial oper-
CONCLUSION 277 

ating capability by the treaty date, an accomplishment that made 

possible the Israeli relocation of defense facilities from the Sinai.8 

The Palestinian uprising that began late in 1987 dispelled any 

doubt regarding the irrelevance of Camp David for resolution of the 

overarching regional conflict. For two years large-scale Palestinian 

protests swept through the Gaza strip and West Bank. While the uprising raged across the occupied territories, scholars in the United 

States noted the rejection of Camp David that the intifada reflected. 

William Quandt had been at Camp David as a member of President 

Carter's National Security Council staff in September 1978. Ten 

years later, in September 1988, he wrote that the "clear message [of 

the uprising] is that the Camp David formula of 'autonomy' and the 

idea of having Egypt or Jordan represent Palestinian interests are 

unacceptable."g New proposals and initiatives were required. 1O 

So to a large extent, the Camp David accords were a failure. 

The Palestinian demand for a state remains at the heart of tensions 

in the Middle East. Yet the peace between Egypt and Israel has endured, and travel, communication, and commerce between the 

signatories continue. In fact, in the spring of 1989, with the final 

return to Egypt of Taba, a tiny slice of disputed Red Sea beach on 

the edge of the Sinai, prospects for an enduring peace seemed 

good. 11 That much still remains the legacy of Camp David and 

the air base program. 

Many people deserve the credit, notably the leaders of the 

countries concerned, for their vision and commitment. But the 

men and women of the air base program-Israeli, American, Thai, 

Portuguese, and others-helped create the conditions that made 

peace possible. Working for the U.S. government, the Israeli government, contractors, and suppliers, they made the Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai and the ensuing peace between Israel and 

Egypt possible. Their efforts should not be forgotten. 
278 

1. New York Times, 17 Sep 88. 

BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

Notes 

2. Very little has been written on the vast program of Middle Eastern construction carried out by the Corps of Engineers, except the lessons-learned publications cited in the introduction, a handful of articles in The Military Engineer by 

officers who participated in one project or another, and the inadequate histories 

of some of the engineer districts that carried out the work. Yet there is much to be 

learned from this program, on a wide range of subjects from desert construction 

methods to the nature of modernization efforts in the region and the extent of 

American support for the military establishments of Middle Eastern countries. 

The records of these endeavors are voluminous and are housed in several locations: successors of the districts and divisions that did the work, the research collections of the Office of History of the Corps of Engineers, and various parts of 

the National Archives system. 

3. New York Times, 16 and 22 Feb 88. 

4. Washington Post, 4 Nov 88 and 25 Mar 89. 

5. New Yor'k 'Times, 23 Mar 86. 

6. Washington Post, 19 Nov 87. 

7. Ibid. 

8. Jimmy Carter, The Blood of Abmham (Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin, 

1985), pp. xviii-xix. David Shavit's The United States in the Middle East: A Historical 

DictionaTY (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1988) also fails to mention the 

Near East Project Office or its work. 

9. New York Times, 17 Sep 88. 

10. For some ideas by a distinguished journalist, see Thomas L. Friedman, 

"Proposals for Peace," New Yo1'lt Times Magazine, 30 October 1988. 

11. New York Times, 27 Feb 89. 
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HazoJe (Tel Aviv). 1981. 

International Herald Tribune (Paris). 1979-1980. 

Jerusalem Post. 1979-1982. 

The Jewish Week-American Examiner (New York). 1979. 

Journal of Commerce (Tel Aviv). 1980-1982. 

Los Angeles Times. 1981. 

Ma'ariv (Tel Aviv). 1979-1982. 

Mabat (Tel Aviv) . 1979. 

New YOTk Daily News. 1978. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 

New York Post. 1979. 

New York Times. 1979-1989. 

Newsday (Long Island). 1981. 

Philadelphia Inquirer. 1981. 

Primero de janeiro (Lisbon) . 1980. 

Sha 'ar (Tel Aviv). 1980. 

Shearim (Tel Aviv). 1981-1982. 

Sheva News (Beersheva). 1980. 

Wall Street journal (New York). 1979-1982. 

Washington Post. 1980-1989. 

Yediot Aharonot (Tel Aviv). 1980. 

289 

AAF 

ABC 

A-E 

AFRCE (or AFR) 

AF/ LEE 

AMET 

AR 

ASA 

ASA (IL&FM) 

ASAF (MRA&I) 

ASD 

ASD (ISA) 

ASD (MRA&L) 

AWAC 

CE 

CENADNEG 

CENEG 

CERL 

CG 

CMH 

CMT 

CO 

COE 

CONUS 

COR 

CPFF 

Glossary 

Army Air Force 

Air Base Constructors 

Architect-engineer 

Air Force regional civil engineer 

Engineering and Services Directorate, 

Headquarters, United States Air,Force 

Mrica-Middle East Theater 

Army regulation 

Assistant secretary of the Army 

Assistant secretary of the Army for installations, logistics, and financial management 

Assistant secretary of the Air Force for manpower, reserve affairs, and installations 

Assistant secretary of defense 

Assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs 

Assistant secretary of defense for manpower, reserve affairs, and logistics 

Airborne Warning and Command 

Corps of Engineers 

Corps of Engineers, North Atlantic Division, Near East Group 

Corps of Engineers, Near East Group 

Construction Engineering Research Laboratory 

Commanding general 

U.S. Army Center of Military History 

Sequential reply to internal memorandum 

written on disposition form (DF) 

Contracting officer 

Chief of engineers 

Continental United States 

Contracting officer's representative 

Cost-plus-fixed fee 
292 

CPO 

CPSR 

CS 

DA 

DAEN-MP 

DAEN-MPC 

DAEN-MPC-F 

DAEN-MPC-G 

DAEN-MPE 

DAEN-MPI 

DAEN-MPT 

DAEN-PRZ 

DAEN-ZB 

DASD 

DASD (I&H) 

DASD (ISA) 

DCAA 

DCASR 

DCC 

DF 

DIRT 

DOD 

BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

Civilian Personnel Office(r) 

Contractor Purchasing System Review 

Chief of staff 

Department of the Army 

Office symbol for Military Programs Directorate, Headquarters, U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers 

Office symbol for Construction Division, 

Military Programs Directorate, Headquarters, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

Office symbol for Air Force Branch, Construction Division, Military Programs Directorate, Headquarters, U.S. Army 

Corps of Engineers 

Office symbol for International Programs 

Branch, Construction Division, Military 

Programs Directorate, Headquarters, 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (later 

General Programs Branch) 

Office symbol for Engineering Division, 

Military Programs Directorate, Headquarters, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

Office symbol for Israel Proj ect Office, Directorate of Military Programs, Headquarters, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

Office symbol for Hays task force 

Office symbol for Procurement Office, 

Headquarters, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

Office symbol for deputy chief of engineers 

Deputy assistant secretary of defense 

Deputy assistant secretary of defense for installations and housing 

Deputy assistant secretary of defense for international affairs for the Near East, 

Mrica, and South Asia 

Defense Contract Audit Agency 

Defense contract audit service region 

Design and construction contractor 

Disposition form (format for internal memorandums) 

Definitization Internal Review Team 

United States Department of Defense 
GLOSSARY 

DSAA 

DSD 

EC 

ECP 

EDES 

ENR 

ER 

ESC 

FAST 

FONECON 

FRG 

GM 

GO 

GOI 

GPO 

HQ 

HQDA 

IABP 

IABPC 

IAF 

IDF 

IOC 

ISA 

JOD 

MC 

MEML 

METG 

MFR 

Milcon 

MOD 

MOU 

MSA 

Defense Security Assistance Agency 

Deputy secretary of defense 

Engineer circular 

Engineering change proposal 

293 

Executive director, Engineer Staff, Office of 

the Chief of Engineers 

Engineering News-RecoTd 

Engineer regulation 

Engineer Studies Center 

Facilities and Support Team 

Telephone conversation 

Federal Republic of Germany 

General manager 

General orders 

Governmen t of Israel 

Government Printing Office 

Headquarters 

Headquarters, Department of the Army 

Israeli Air Base Program 

Israeli Air Base Program Collection 

Israeli Air Force 

Israel Defense Force 

Initial operating capability 

International Security Mfairs 

Joint occupancy date 

Military Construction Directorate 

Middle East Manpower and Logistics 

Middle East Task Group, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Mfairs, for the Near East, 

Mrica, and South Asia 

Memorandum for the record 

Military construction 

Israeli Ministry of Defense 

Memorandum of understanding 

Management Support Associates 
294 

NA 

NAC 

NAD 

NAD-PA 

NAIPM-AD 

NEPO 

NEPO-Rear 

OAO 

OASD (ISA) 

OCE 

OM 

OMB 

OSD 

PAO 

P&C 

PM 

PMO 

P&S 

PTT 

QA 

QC 

RAO 

RD&A 

RFQ 

RG 

RMO 

SA 

SAF 

SCMO 

Sitrep 

SOP 

SOS 

Stat. 

BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

National Archives 

Negev Airbase Constructors 

North Atlantic Division 

Office symbol for North Atlantic Division 

Public Mfairs Office 

Office symbol for administrative assistant to 

the project manager, NEPO 

Near East Project Office 

New York-based support group assigned to 

Near East Project Office 

Ovda Area Office 

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense 

for International Security Mfairs 

Office of the Chief of Engineers, U.S. Army 

Office memorandum 

Office of Management and Budget 

Office of the Secretary of Defense 

Public Mfairs Office 

Planning and control office ofNEPO 

Program manager/project manager 

Program managemen t office 

Procurement and supply division ofNEPO 

Post, Telephone, and Telegraph 

Quality assurance 

Quality control 

Ramon Area Office 

Research, development, and acquisition 

Request for quotation 

Record group 

Resource management office 

Secretary of the Army 

Secretary of the Air Force 

Sinai Construction Management Office 

Situation report 

Standard operating procedure 

Services of Supply 

U. S. Statutes at Large 
GLOSSARY 

TABU 

TCN 

USA 

USACE 

USAF 

USAFIME 

USDAO 

WNRC 

Two air bases in Israel 

Third country national(s) 

United States Army 

United States Army Corps of Engineers 

United States Air Force 

295 

United States Army Forces in the Middle 

East 

United States Defense Attache Office 

Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Maryland 

Index 

A. Epstein and Sons, International, Inc.: 51 

Ahmann, Lt. Gen.james H.: 240, 245, 

257-58 

Air Base Constructors: 52, 67, 68, 72, 88, 

91,121,143,145,147-49, 175,202, 

206,228, 249,267,268,269,270 

Air Base Consultants: 67, 71 

Aircraft shelters: 26, 116, 129-31,227,230, 

235n 

construction of: 145-46, 179-81, 183 

design: 44, 65, 67, 70, 130-31 ,207 

hardening: 136--37, 139 

Al-Gamassi, Egyptian General Muhammad 

Abd ai-Ghani: 12 

Aldridge, Raymond: 104,200 

Alexander, Clifford: 55, 121 

Amick, Lt. Col. Robert: 243, 251 

Archaeology: 118, 121-22 

Arens, Moshe: 16 

Bae r, Donald: 73, 85,193 

Bagnal, Brig. Gen. Charles W.: 36 

Balfour Declaration (1916) : 211n 

Bar-Tov, Brig. Gen. Moshe: 66, 69, 73-76, 

92, 93,97-100, 102, 103,105-06, 108, 

118,1 24, 138-44, 146, 150-51, 

163-64, 167, 176,180-81 , 185-86, 

190-93, 195-98,200,204-07,209, 

215,217-19,222,226--28,238, 

240-41,243,245,248-49,251,254, 

256, 258-60, 266--67 

Bartley, Hugh].: 36, 84, 86,159 

Bazilwich, Col. Paul: 31, 33, 49,50,82, 159 

Beben, Lt. Col. joseph A.: 85 

Beder, Leonard: 204 

Begin, Menachem: 9-16, 231, 259, 276 

Ben-Gurion, David: 112, 113-14 

Billiams, Frank: 87, 265-66, 269 

Blake,john].: 129, 136, 143, 144, 145, 171, 

172, 174, 176--79, 186,195,217-18 

Bratton, Lt. Gen.joseph K: 194,222,239, 

245,246,248-49,250,253 

Brown, Harold: 7, 12, 13, 15,20,41,53,55, 

163 

Brown,john R.: 86--87, 161, 174-75, 204, 

244 

Brown, William: 164, 245 

Bull, Lt. Col. David: 29 

Bull-Hansen, Lt. Gen. Fredrik: 216 

Burnell, Maj. Gen. Bates c.: 20-21, 27, 28, 

33-36,40,55,81-82,273 

Butler, Donald W.: 21, 28, 37n 

Butler, Fred: 68, 69-70, 88,119,123,124, 

130-31 , 147-49,174, 176,179,183, 

201,205,254,267 

Cababa, Capt. Robin R.: 21 

Camp David accords: 12-16,20,25,27,36, 

41,45,275-76,277 

Canfield,james: 159 

Carter, jimmy: 9-16, 49-50, 53, 57, 276, 

277 

Caterpillar: 72 

Cawood, F. H.: 59n 

CENADNEG. See Corps of Engineers, 

Nortll Atlantic Division, Near East 

Group. 

CENEG. See Corps of Engineers, North Atlantic Division, Near East Group. 

Chapla,joseph R.: 252 

Chayes, Antonia Handler: 54, 56,163,164, 

198 

Cheverie, Paul: 269 

Claterbos, Maj. Louis: 3-4 

Clifton, Lt. Col. jack: 119-20, 171 , 172, 

194,246-47 

Coffin, Thayne: 87-88, 90 

Cohen, Rudolph: 121 

Colwell, Glenn E.: 83 

Communications network: 122-24 

Consu·uction 

change orders: 179-80,206--07,209-10, 

217,218,222 

problems: 145-46, 179-81, 183 

schedules: 89, 174, 179, 195-98, 202, 

206--07,221-23,225,229,244-46 

supervision: 44, 55-57, 174, 176 

Construction workers: 220-21 

hiring of: 176--77 

housing for: 124-26, 128 

productivity: 198-99, 228 

quality of: 178-79,228 

recreation facilities for: 127-28 

special foods for: 125-26, 128, 149-50 

working conditions: 147-49,231-32 
298 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

Contractors. See also fur Base Constructors; 

Management Support Associates; 

Negev furbase Constructors. 

cooperation between: 215, 221 

expenditures: 174-75,220-22 

and joint occupancy: 223 

organizations: 67, 70, 71,193 

procurement by: 73-74, 104, 138-44, 

175,202-03,205 

quality control: 138-44 

responsibilities: 68, 71, 87, 88 

selection of: 40, 47-52, 53, 59n, 60n 

Contracts 

administration of: 44, 55-57, 85, 117, 

174-76, 182, 191, 193,225-26, 

229-30,253 

change orders: 179-80,206--07,209-10, 

217,218,222 

closeouts: 265-70 

cost-plus-fixed-fee: 3, 24-26, 33-35, 47, 

52,82-83,87,191,220 

design-construction: 48, 50-52 

disputes: 265, 268-70 

letter: 33, 45, 52, 81, 83, 86--87, 91 

management support: 48, 50, 51 

negotiations: 86--93,95n-96n, 160 

preplanning for: 22-26, 33-34, 47, 

82-83,87,90,160 

Corps of Engineers. See also Near East 

Project Office; North Atlantic Division; Ovda Area Office; Ramon Area 

Office. 

chain of command: 55, 157-67, 169n, 

172, 176, 191 

Construction Engineering Research 

Laboratory: 83, 160 

Levant Area Office: 4-5 

Middle East District: 3-4 

Middle East Division: 22-23, 27 

Military Programs Directorate: 22, 163, 

165 

Missouri River Division: 26--27 

NEPO-Rear: 159, 166, 168n, 215 

New York District: 33-34,48 

North African District: 3 

North Atlantic Division, Near East 

Group: 22,23, 27, 34 

Palestine Area Office: 4-5 

planning task force: 21-27, 31-36 

Sinai Construction Management Office: 

215-16, 233n, 247 

Costs. See Financial management. 

Cranston, Lt. Col. James R.: 141, 143 

Curl, Col. Richard L.: 89-90, 91,100, 117, 

121, 123, 125, 127, 130, 138-39, 140, 

141-44, 157,170-73,182-83,203,273 

Damico, CarlA: 21 , 40, 41 , 43, 45-46, 58n, 

Damico, Carl A-Continued 

69,76,85,99,124,181,193,195,200, 

207,210,223,225,250,260,269 

Dan Hotel Corporation: 77 

Davar: 149 

Davis, Irving: 174, 176, 179, 204 

Dayan, Moshe: 11, 13,25,29, 112 

Defense Contract Audit Agency: 104, 

140-42, 245 

Defense Intelligence Agency: 28 

Defense Security Assistance Agency: 54, 55, 

56,57,221-22,239-40,259-60 

DeMartino, Lt. Col. Francis A: 260 

Design 

and change orders: 206--07, 209-10, 

217,218,222 

contracts: 21, 34, 64, 89 

costs: 90 

engineering drawings: 65, 67, 70, 71, 88, 

89,130-31,179-81,206 

errors: 179-81 

management: 68, 199-200 

and procurement: 200-201 

scope: 43,64-65,67-68, 70 

specifications/ standards: 23, 43, 46, 

64-65,67-68,71,192 

Dillingham Corporation: 52 

Division engineers. SeeJohnson, Maj. Gen. 

James A.; Lewis, Maj. Gen. Bennett L. 

Dohmeier, G. A.: 60n 

Dow, C.].: 59n 

Duncan, Charles W.: 40-41, 54, 55 

Dynateria: 128 

Eban, Abba: 276 

Edwards, Roy E.: 104, 200 

Egypt: 7-16, 17n, 41, 45, 49, 275, 276--77 

Egyptian fur Force: 13 

Eilat, Israel: 13-14 

Eitam air base: 13,32,46,71,89,219 

Elazar, Lt. Gen. David: 11 

Engineering News-Record: 254-55 

Engineers, U.S. Army Chief of. See Morris, 

Lt. Gen.John W.; Bratton, Lt. Gen. 

Joseph K. 

Etheridge, Rudolph E. : 193-94 

Etzion air base: 13,32,46,71,89,219 

Facilities and Support Team (FAST): 

215-16, 233n 

Fafinski, Stanley: 60n 

Fahmy, Ismail: 11, 15 

Ferguson, Lt. Frank A: 4 

Fiat-Allis: 72, 216, 269-70 

Financial management: 44, 54, 55-57, 66, 

198,216--22,252 

accounting: 198, 199 

audits: 221 , 245,265,269 
INDEX 

Financial management-Continued 

control offunds: 44, 54--57, 98-99, 

237-45 

cost analysis: 241-44, 246, 250-51 

cost control: 66, 83, 90, 106, 191-93, 

200,201,206-07,209-10,214, 

217-21,247-49 

cost estimates: 21, 30, 45, 52, 67, 69, 70, 

87-93, 95n, 198, 217-20,237-44, 

245, 270, 273 

funding sources: 47, 49, 52-53, 222, 

237-45 

Israeli funding: 221-22,237-45 

Fiscina, Patrick R.: 60n 

Fliakis, Perry].: 40, 55, 57 

Flood control: 129, 181 

Floods: 116, 129 

Food service : 128 

Ford, Gerald: 8, 9 

Fort Belvoir, Virginia: 252, 265-68 

Frankel, Glenn: 276 

Friedman, Col. Menachem: 44 

Garrett, Lee S.: 20-21, 22, 25, 27, 28, 273 

Gilbert, Maj. Gen. William D.: 56-57, 239, 

241,248,257-58 

Gilkey, Col. Clarence D.: 36, 50-52, 63, 

65-69,71-76,84--91,93,97-106, 108, 

11 7-19,121-22,138-39,141,143-44, 

148, 157, 159, 160, 164, 167, 181-83, 

185,197-98,204,273 

Gillespie, Samuel: 38n 

Glide Path Hill: 129, 181 

Grafa, Otis: 170 

Graves, Lt. Gen. Ernest: 41-45, 47, 49, 

53-56,64,98 

Graw, Leroy H.: 195,200-204,206,210, 

214,216,251-52,253 

Great Britain: 3, 4, 21 1 n 

Gregor, Lt. Col. Leonard C.: 247, 250 

Griffis, Col. Fletcher H. "Bud": 177, 194, 

201,221,223-24,226,227,229-31, 

244,245-46,247-49,251,256-57 

Gruttadauria,James V: 60n 

Gruzen,Jordan L.: 51 

GSCA: 51 

Gur, General Mordechai: 13 

Gurel, N.: 44 

Guy F. Atkinson Company: 52, 90, 117, 145 

Ha'al'elz: 150 

Hallmark, Ronald G.: 73-74, 79n, 195 

Hamegader-Barzelit: 138 

Hansell, Col. Haywood S., III: 25 

Harbert International, Inc.: 52, 233n 

Harris, L. M.: 228 

Hartung, Brig. Gen. Paul T.: 25-26, 28-31, 

41-46,54,64--67,73,75,92,93, 

299 

Hartung, Brig. Gen. Paul T.-Continued 

97-103, 105-06, 108, 116, 121 , 

129-30, 139, 141, 144, 146, 150-51, 

162-64,170,172,174--76,179-81 , 

184--86,190-99,202-07,209-10,215, 

216, 218-24, 226-28, 230-32, 237-45, 

247-49,253,254,256-60,266-67 

Harty, Col. John R.: 185 

Hatwell, Ronald].: 29, 37n, 58n, 89 

Hays, Col. James E.: 21, 22-29, 32, 33, 34, 

36 

Head, M. Randall: 22, 41 

Heiberg, Maj. Gen. E. R., III: 122 

Henningsen, Theodore: 55 

Herut party (Israel): 11 

Herzog, Chaim: 7 

Heunsch, George E.: 188n 

Hewitt, Oswald I.: 20, 31, 33, 35, 41, 63-64, 

87-88,99, 100,1 59, 160 

Histadrut: 126, 149 

Hornstein, Morris: 140 

Horton, Robert: 228 

Housing: 75-77, 107-08, 124--26, 128 

Howard, Herbert: 159, 177 

Hudson, Charles K.: 241, 242-43 

Huggins, Richard: 69, 85 

Infantry Division (Airborne), 82d: 215-16 

Iran: 9, 74, 90 

Israel 

construction industry: 44,46-47,66, 74, 

90,203-05,255,275 

occupied territories (West Bank and 

Gaza): 9, 11 , 115, 132n, 275-77 

peace negotiations with Egypt: 10- 16, 

41,45 

war with Egypt and Syria: 7 

withdrawal from Sinai peninsula: 11-16, 

25,31,42,45,49,53,115,216,257, 

273, 274 

Israel Defense Force: 7, 29, 115, 118, 124, 

257 

Israeli Air Force: 13, 16,24,26,29,30,31, 

41-44,65,71,75-76,84,97-98, 

115-16,118-21,123,124,130,136, 

176, 182, 185,223,227,231,232, 

253-54, 256-57 

strafing, practice: 119-21 

Israeli-American relations: 97-108, 184--86, 

190-93,195-98,204--07,209-10,258 

American offer of construction assistance: 12-16, 20, 25,49 

construction agreement: 41-46, 49 

construction responsibility: 64, 74--75, 

107-08 

contract closeout: 259, 266-67 

cost control: 175, 191-93,218 

design: 65-66, 179-81,207 
300 BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

Israeli-American relations-Continued 

procurement: 66, 74, 138-44,203-04 

project priorities: 66,83,191-93,201 , 

214,217,218 

quality control: 183,227-29 

site activation: 217, 222-24, 253-54 

transfer of property: 255-60, 263n 

Israeli Hospitality Services: 77 

Israeli Ministry of Communi cations: 122 

Israeli Ministry of Defense: 44, 51, 68, 70, 

75,90,98-99,104, 116,118,120-21, 

138, 139,140, 141,1 50,179, 186,192, 

204-05,207,215, 218-19,221,226, 

227,233n, 238, 240, 241,244, 245, 

255,256,259-60,266-67 

Israeli Postal, Telephone, and Telegraph 

(PIT) system: 122-24 

Israeli Procurement Mission: 221-22 

Ivry, Maj. Gen. David: 42, 182,227,255 

javits,jacob R.: 5] 

jensen, Norman: 87 

Jerusalem Post: 52,63, 150, 151, 257 

j ezior, Lt. Col. Michael A.: 48, 49, 50, 51, 

601/. 

johnson, Maj. Gen. james A.: 20, 27-28, 

31-36,40,49,50-51,55-56, 63- 64, 

67,71,72,75,77,81-82,84,99,105, 

117, 159,163, 166,273 

johnson, Dra ke & Piper, Inc.: 3, 4 

joint occupancy: 222-27,230-32,247-49, 

253-55 

jordan: 8, 11 ,275,277 

Kami l, Ibrahim: 15 

Katz, Shmuel: 16 

Kav, Lt. Col. Karni: 217 

Kays, Doreen: II 

Keener, Kenneth: 123 

Kellum, Billy: 69 

Kelly, Col. Patrick].: 172, 174, 175, 176, 

182, 186,201 ,202,221 ,224,249,259 

Kelt, Col. Irving: 84-85,86,139,182-84, 

257 

King, Philip: 121-22 

Kissinger, Henry: 8, 10 

Kogon , Naomi: 74, 140, 142, 143, 191 ,205 

Labor-management relations: 147-50 

Labor Party (Israel): 126 

Lapidot, Brig. Gen. Amos: 26, 44, 65 

Lee, Col. William E.,jr.: 216 

Le iser, Col. Maurice H.: 160 

Lellis, Alfred: 59n, 60n, 159, 16811,251 

Leste r B. Knight Associates, Inc.: 51 

Levy, David: 256, 260, 268 

Levy, Robe rt E.: 5911 

Lewis, Maj. Gen. Bennett L.: 81-84, 86, 

Lewis, Maj. Gen . Benne tt L.-Continued 

88-91 , 93, 98,99-102, 103,105, 108, 

127-28, 140-41, 145, 146, 157-67, 

170,171-73,177-78, 191,193, 196, 

222-23,231,273 

Lewis, Samuel: 41, 163, 164, 231, 244, 276 

Ligon, Walter B.: 259-60 

Lipsky, David: 157, 166 

Louis Berger International, Inc.: 52, 67, 

23311 

Ma'miv: 150,151-52 

Ma'ayan, Yosef: 42, 43, 52,192,209,218, 

222, 227, 238 

McCauley, Harold: 38n 

McGiffert, David E.: 20, 22, 23, 25, 41, 46, 

52,54,56 

McGinness, Maj. Harry].: 251 

l'vlcNabb, joe B.: 90 

McNeely, Frederick B.: 20-2 1, 26-27, 30, 

35- 36,41 ,45-46,47, 58n, 64, 72, 86, 

160-61,166,167,171, 177,193,219, 

252, 255, 256, 258, 265, 267, 273 

Mahoney, Gene: 69, 85 

Maloney, Michael: 141, 142, 143,201, 206, 

221, 245, 265 

Management infornlation system: 197-99, 

249-50 

Management Support Associates: 51-52, 

67, 68,70-77,85,87,148, 174,178, 

182,184, 188n, 194, 199-200, 215, 

228-30, 238, 244-45, 247, 249-50, 

252,256,268-69 

Maritime Administration: 159 

Mekeroth: 126-27 

l'vhddle East Task Group: 25-26 

Nlililmy Engineer: 278n 

Miller, Lt. Col. Bruce F.: 121, 145, 172, 173 

Mine detectors: 118-19 

Moon, Edgar, N.: 69, 70-71, 162,255 

Moore, Cleon: 21 

Moore, Col. john E.: 237, 243, 246, 247, 

249, 253, 254, 260, 265-66, 268-69, 

270 

Morelli, Col. Donald H.: 35 

Morgan, Col. Newton B.: 122 

Morris, Lt. Gen.john W: 21, 27-28, 32, 

35, 40,41 ,45,47-48,51 ,54-57,81 , 

82,88-89,99,100- 102,107,117, 146, 

15 1,1 57-59,160,161 , 163-67,170, 

171 , 181,182-83, 191,192,194,220, 

273 

Mubarak, Hosni: 275-76 

Muller, August: 38n 

Murray, Robert].: 25, 26, 41 

Nasser, Gamal Abde l: II, 15 

Near East Project Office: 63, 66, 68- 69, 
INDEX 

Near East Proj ect Office-Continued 

72-74,81,83-90,92-93, 94n, 97-101 , 

103, 107-08, 11 6, 122, 131, 136, 138, 

145-46, 151, 157-67, 190, 193, 196, 

204,215, 246, 267-68,276 

morale: 193,249,250 

office space: 75-77, 105-06 

organization: 81, 83-85, 99, 250-51, 268, 

271n 

proj ect phasedown: 241, 246--50, 259-60, 

265 

relationship to area offices: 171-78, 193, 

194,202-03,216--18 

staffing problems: 84-86 

Negev Airbase Constructors: 52, 67, 72, 88, 

91,1 04, 124,131, 138-39, 141-45, 

149-50, 172, 175, 176, 202, 225, 233n, 

243, 249, 267,269 

Negev Desert: 11 2- 19 

Negev O utline Specifications: 68, 69-70, 

71 

Nello L. Teer Company: 52 

Nesher: 215 

New York Times: 121 

Nixon, Richard M.: 8, 9 

Noah , Brig. Gen. Max W.: 97, 100- 106, 

108, 136, 139, 140-43, 145, 146, 

157-58, 161-62, 191, 192, 203, 207 

North Atlantic Division: 3,5,26--27,34-36, 

41,47-50, 56, 59n, 60n, 63, 72, 81-82, 

85, 94n, 99, 101, 158-67, 176, 273 

Noy, Eli: 138, 139 

O 'Connor, Michael].: 83 

O 'She i, Col. Donald M.: 89-90, 91, 99, 100, 

102, 105, 11 7, 121, 145, 148, 5~ 170, 

172-73, 182-84, 198,273 

Ordnance d isposal: 118-19, 131 

O rganization of Petroleum Exporting 

Countries (OPEC) : 8 

Ovda air base: 87, 104, 115, 11 6, 11 8-21, 

124, 151,224-25, 233n, 257, 259 ' 

construction progress: 128-31, 181,216 

cost esLimates: 91, 217-19 

j oint occu pancy: 222-27, 230-32 

quality con trol: 228-30 

runway construcLion: 181-82 

shelters: 130-31, 179 

steel supply: 138, 141-44, 146 

water supply: 126--27 

workers: 124, 125, 149-50 

Ovda Area Offi ce: 69,73, 89,92, 11 6--17, 

121-22,124, 142, 170-72, 174, 

176--77, 184, 192, 193,202-03, 209, 

217-18,247, 249, 255,259-60 

Pagano,Frank: 31,33-34, 64, 68, 159 

301 

Palace Hotel, Tel-Aviv, Israel: 76--77,81, 

105-07, 159,216, 246,253,260, 

268-69 

Palestine: 3, 4 

Palestinians: 8, 9, 10, 11 , 14, 16, 275-76, 

277 

Parkes, Bill: 176, 222, 226 

Parkinson , Maj . Edward L.: 241, 242-43 

Paul N. Howard Company: 52, 233n 

Payne, T homas: 37n- 38n 

Perini, David: 90 

Perini,J oseph: 104 

Perini Corporation : 52, 90, 150, 172, 233n, 

252 

Pe terson , Pe te: 172, 174, 201 

Pettingell, Warren : 88, 128, 130,1 42, 145, 

150, 155n 

Pina ta, Louis: 59 n 

Pope, Eva ns and Robbins, Inc.: 51 

Portugal: 270 

Portuguese workers: 124, 126, 128, 147-49, 

177, 178-79, 275 

Procurement: 71-72, 103-04, 146--47, 151, 

199-200 

by contractors: 73-74, 104, 138-44, 175, 

202-03, 205 

excess materials: 215-16 

guidelines: 104, lIOn, 122, 200, 205 

management of: 72-74, 159, 174-77, 

200-206, 209-10,214, 224-25 

steel: 138-43 

training for: 104 

within Israel: 44, 46--47, 66, 74-75, 104, 

123, 203-05,215 

Proj ect phasedown: 240, 246--50, 256--60, 

265 

Proj ect priori Lies: 66, 83,191-93, 201 ,214, 

217, 218 

Quality assurance: 48, 103, 138-44, 

146--47, 150,179, 182-84,228-30,250 

Quality con trol: 138-44, 179-84,227-28 

Quandt, William B.: 273, 277 

Radio communicaLions: 122-23 

Ramon air base: 87, 88, 91 , 104, 11 5-16, 

118-21, 123, 124,225,228,244-45, 

257, 259 

construction progress: 128-31, 181, 216 

cost estimates: 91, 219 

Israeli maintenance of: 256--57 

j oint occupancy: 222-24, 226--27, 

230-32, 253 

quality con trol: 227-30 

r unway construcLion : 181-82, 227 

shelters: 131, 179-80 

wa ter su pply: 126--27 

workers: 126, 147-49 
302 

Ramon Area Office: 69, 72, 73, 89, 92, 

116-17,121-22,143,145,170-74, 

176-77,182,184,192-94, 201-03, 

205,209,247-48,253,259-60 

Recreation facilities: 127-28 

Reimer,John F.: 28, 30, 37n-38n, 89,90, 

92,219,241-44,273 

Reynolds, D. S.: 38n 

Rhyne, Lt. Col. Richard G.: 28-29 

Road construction: 128-29 

Robbins,Joseph E.: 75, 188n 

Roberts, Capt. Robert T.: 173, 177 

Rostocker, Willy: 139-40, 141, 144 

Runway construction: 181-82 

Sachar, Howard: 12, 15 

Sadat, Anwar: 8, 9-16, 276 

Sales, Janet: 250 

Samanie, Donald P.: 58n 

Saudi Arabia: 8,9, 13,27,46,50,51, 172, 

206 

Saunders, Nancy: 41, 45-46 

Schapiro, Adir: 112 

Schechet, Manuel M.: 65, 68, 69, 71, 

86-87,118, 159 

Schneebeck, Col. Gene A.: 165-66 

Schroer, Charles: 59n, 60n, 177-78 

Schweizer, Col. John E.: 49,51 , 52, 60n 

Seltzer, Manning: 267 

Shamir, Yitzhak: 16,276 

Sharon, Ariel: 16 

Sharon, Avi: 140, 227, 259 

Sharr, Maj. Stephen: 143 

Shaw,Joseph R "Ray": 168n, 270 

Shepherd,Alan: 74,215,218, 232, 245, 

249, 270 

Shipler, David: 121 

Sibley, Maj. Gen. Alden K.: 3 

Site activation: 84, 183, 195-99, 217, 

222-26, 231-32, 253-55 

Site investigations: 21, 22, 24, 25, 26, 42, 

45,49,66, 116,118 

Site protection: 46 

Snoddy, Lt. Col. George R: 85, 143, 194 

Society of American Military Engineers: 

258 

Solei Boneh: 126 

Special International Security Assistance 

Act: 53, 57 

Starr,]. G.: 60n 

Steel: 136-44 

Steinberg, Bory: 74, 197, 198,199 

Stockman, W. D.: 59n, 60n 

Sullivan,Joseph: 59n 

Survey team, potential base sites: 22, 

25-26,28-30,31,41,42,43 

Sylva,John P.: 188n 

BUILDING AIR BASES IN THE NEGEV 

Syria: 7, 10,15 

TABU (Two Air Bases in Israel): 22 

Taic, David: 76-77, 268-69 

Taylor, Col. Paul w.: 145, 170, 173-74, 175, 

176,182,183-84,201,205,224 

Tener, Col. Robert K.: 170-72 

Thai workers: 125-26, 128, 149-50, 176-79 

Thomas, Charles R.: 66, 69, 70-71, 72, 85, 

87,194,195,199-200,206,207,209, 

223,228,247,256 

Thornburg, Sallie: 269 

Tippetts-Abbett-McCarthy-Stratton: 52, 67 

Tomasetti, Angelo,Jr.: 59n 

Truck scales: 145 

Tuhami, Hassan: 11, 13 

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: 8, 9, 

10-11 

U.S. Air Force: 20, 22, 31, 32, 41, 43, 

53-57,97-98,163,221-22 

commissary system: 85 

Directorate of Engineering and Services: 54,241,244, 258 

regional civil engineer: 184--86, 207, 

224--25 

U.S. Air Force-Corps of Engineers relations: 53-57,97-108, 184--86, 252-53, 

257-60 

control offunds: 53-57,98-99, 237-45 

responsibilities: 195-97 

U.S. Department of State: 28, 120 

Unzelman, Louis R.: 247 

Utilities: 46, 222, 226, 235n 

Van Landingham, C.: 112 

Vance, Cyrus: 41,53 

Viets, Richard: 42 

Vinitsky, Alvin: 31, 32, 33-34, 35, 64, 159, 

160, 177 

Wall, Brig. Gen.John F.: 56-57,107,146, 

149,150-51,157,159,161-67,171, 

172,174--78,181-82,190-207, 

209-10,211 n, 214, 216-32, 237-60, 

265,266,270,273 

Water supply: 126-27 

Wathen, T. R: 21, 58n 

Weizmann, Ezer: 12, 13, 15, 20, 25, 26, 28, 

41,45,46,49 

Wenick, Capt. Louis: 173 

West, Lt. Col. Steven: 238, 240, 249, 

250-51 

Wharry, James: 186 

Wilson, Maj. Gen. Drake: 163, 165-66, 

209-10,219,221,232,241,245,246, 

252, 254--55, 266 
INDEX 

Wong, Col. Donald: 122-24, 143, 194 

World War II: 3-5 

Wray, Maj. Gen. William R.: 22, 27, 28, 41, 

46,48,55,56,87,122, 146, 160-61, 

163, 209- 10 

Wright, Brig. Gen. Clifton D.: 241 

Yadin, Yigael: 118 

Yom Kippur War (1973) : 7 

Zinman, Michael A.: 72 

Zippori, Mordechai: 42, 140, 217 

Zweig, Carmy: 87 

303 

fl u.s. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1992 305-917 

PIN: 069113- 000